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+supreme court of canada the supreme court of canada rules that police must have an approved screening device with them when they order someone to provide a breath sample. early in the afternoon of april 2, 2017, in val‑b lair near quebec city, police were looking for someone reported by trail patrollers to be driving an all‑terrain vehicle (atv) while drunk. they stopped pascal breault, who was walking away from a parked atv at a campsite. the officers wanted to take a breath sample from mr. breault, but they did not have an approved screening device (asd) to do so. they radioed nearby officers to obtain a device. while still waiting for the device, the officers demanded that mr. breault provide a breath sample. mr. breault refused three times to provide the required sample, even after he was told that refusing without a reasonable excuse to comply with the demand was a criminal offence. given the repeated refusals of mr. breault, who said he had not driven the atv, and given that the device had not yet arrived, the officers eventually cancelled their request. mr. breault was then charged with refusing to comply with a demand by police to provide a breath sample. under section 254(2)(b) of the criminal code (now section 320.27(1)(b)), police can demand that a person 'provide forthwith' a breath sample if the person is suspected of drinking and driving within the last three hours. the test must be done using an asd. when a person blows into the device, it provides officers with a reading that determines if there is sufficient alcohol in the person's body to warrant a full breathalyzer test. anyone who refuses to take the test without a reasonable excuse commits a criminal offence. a municipal court in quebec found mr. breault guilty of refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample, and quebec's superior court dismissed his appeal. he then turned to the quebec court of appeal, which allowed his appeal and acquitted him. the crown appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the demand by police to provide a breath sample was invalid because they did not have immediate access to an asd when making the demand. writing for a unanimous court, justice suzanne côté ruled that the validity of a demand to provide a breath sample requires that police have immediate access to an asd at the time the demand is made. according to justice côté , the word 'forthwith' in section 254(2)(b) must, as a general rule, be given a strict interpretation that reflects its ordinary meaning, namely 'immediately' or 'without delay'. at this step of the detection procedure, a detained driver does not have a right to counsel as guaranteed by section 10(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, since the driver must provide a breath sample immediately. the limit on this right is justified because the detention is very brief. it is therefore essential to the constitutional validity of this provision that the interpretation given to the word 'forthwith' be consistent with its ordinary meaning. as she noted, 'the more flexibly the word ‘forthwith' is interpreted, the less the recognized justification for limiting the right to counsel holds up'. justice côté stated that, exceptionally, unusual circumstances may justify a flexible interpretation of the word 'forthwith' if they are related to the use of the device or the reliability of the result. however, unusual circumstances cannot arise from budgetary considerations or considerations of practical efficiency, such as the supplying of asds to police forces or the time needed to train officers to use them. the absence of a device at the scene at the time the demand is made is not in itself an unusual circumstance. the crown did not show that there were unusual circumstances that would account for the absence of an asd at the scene and thus justify a flexible interpretation of the immediacy requirement. justice côté therefore found that the demand made by police was invalid. for these reasons, mr. breault's refusal to provide a breath sample was not a criminal offence.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that banning conditional sentences for certain offences is constitutional. in 2015, cheyenne sharma, arrived in toronto on an international flight with almost two kilograms of cocaine in her suitcase. the 20-year-old woman with no criminal record confessed to the rcmp that her partner had promised her $20,000 to bring the suitcase to canada. she plead guilty to importing cocaine. since ms. sharma is a woman of ojibwa ancestry and member of the saugeen first nation, the court requested a gladue report, which is a pre-sentencing report for indigenous offenders. this report noted that ms. sharma's grandmother was a residential school survivor and that her mother had spent time in foster care. the report also noted that ms. sharma had been sexually assaulted and had dropped out of school. the gladue report gets its name from the supreme court of canada's 1999 ruling in r v gladue, which established the factors that courts must take into account when sentencing indigenous offenders. conditional sentencing was introduced in 1996. this type of punishment allows offenders to serve their sentences under strict surveillance in their communities, rather than in jail. in 2012, parliament changed the law to eliminate conditional sentences for certain offences listed in paragraphs 742.1(b) to (f) of the criminal code. three requirements must be met before a conditional sentence can be imposed: (1) the offender must not have been convicted of any of those offences; (2) a court would have otherwise imposed a prison sentence of less than two years; and (3) the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community. if an offender meets these requirements, a judge must then determine whether a conditional sentence is appropriate and in line with the fundamental principles of sentencing. this includes section 718.2(e) of the criminal code, which directs judges to consider alternatives to imprisonment 'with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders'. this provision was enacted to reduce the overrepresentation of indigenous offenders in jail, among other reasons. when ms. sharma sought a conditional sentence, she was found ineligible because she had plead guilty to an offence covered by section 742.1(c) of the criminal code and which carried a maximum prison sentence of 14 years or life. ms. sharma challenged the constitutionality of that section, along with section 742.1(e)(ii), which makes conditional sentences unavailable for any offence that carries a maximum prison sentence of 10 years and involves drugs. the sentencing judge confirmed that ms. sharma was not eligible for a conditional sentence. he also dismissed her challenges under sections 7 and 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. section 7 guarantees everyone the right to life, liberty and security of the person, while section 15 guarantees everyone the right to equal treatment before the law. the sentencing judge imposed an 18-month prison sentence. ms. sharma appealed her sentence and the dismissal of her charter challenges to the ontario court of appeal. it allowed her appeal and ruled that sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) had violated section 7 because they were too broad, and had violated section 15 because they discriminated against indigenous offenders like ms. sharma. the court of appeal sentenced ms. sharma to time already served in jail. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has allowed the crown's appeal. sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) of the criminal code are constitutional. writing for a majority of the judges, justices russell brown and malcolm rowe found sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) constitutional. they said there is no section 15 charter violation. the majority noted that although the crisis of indigenous incarceration is undeniable, ms. sharma did not demonstrate that the challenged provisions created or contributed to a disproportionate impact on indigenous offenders, compared to non‑indigenous offenders. ms. sharma was required to show this disproportionate effect as a first step in the section 15 analysis, which she did not. the majority also said there is no section 7 charter violation because the provisions achieve their intended purpose, which is 'to enhance consistency in the conditional sentencing regime by making imprisonment the typical punishment for certain serious offences and categories of offences'. they added that maximum sentences provide a reasonable indication of the seriousness of an offence, and as such, the provisions do not deprive individuals of their liberty in circumstances that are unconnected to their objective. ms. sharma's 18-month prison sentence was restored. however, since she has already served her time in prison, no further orders were made.
+supreme court of canada if a quebecker is found dead within seven years of going missing, it can retroactively affect payments that were based on them being alive, the supreme court has ruled. mr. roseme was a professor. when he retired, he chose a pension plan that would pay more each month. the compromise was that the payments would stop when he died. in september 2007, mr. roseme was 77 years old. he was in the early stages of alzheimer's disease. he went for a walk near his home and never came back. about a year later, his former employer, carleton university, heard mr. roseme was missing. carleton said he must be dead. this meant it didn't have to keep paying the pension. it said his former partner, ms. threlfall, had to pay back most of the benefits received since he disappeared. but ms. threlfall pointed out that, under quebec law, mr. roseme was an 'absentee.' an absentee is a person who lives in quebec and disappears. no one knows if they are still alive. the law presumes them to be alive for seven years, unless there is proof of death before then. the law treats the absentee as if they are alive. they have the same rights (for example, to pension payments) and duties (for example, to pay their mortgage) as anyone else. another person takes over the practical issues for them. if no proof of death is ever found, the date of death is officially set as the seventh anniversary of the disappearance. at this point, mr. roseme was an absentee. there was no proof he was dead. that meant carleton had to keep paying and ms. threlfall had to manage the payments on his behalf. about six years after he disappeared, mr. roseme's body was found. the coroner's report said his death was likely natural or accidental. his date of death was recorded as september 11, 2007 one day after he disappeared. since mr. roseme went missing, carleton had paid almost half a million dollars in pension benefits. once his death was official, it asked ms. threlfall for the money back. it said mr. roseme had agreed the payments would stop when he died, and he died in 2007. for different reasons, the lower courts both said ms. threlfall had to pay carleton back. the supreme court majority agreed that ms. threlfall had to pay the money back. it said mr. roseme had agreed the pension payments would stop when he died. this meant when he actually died, not the later date his death was discovered. quebec law presumed mr. roseme was alive for the six years he was missing. but when his body was found, this proved that he wasn't. mr. roseme had a right to his pension payment while he was alive. this continued when he went missing but was legally presumed alive. but the majority said the source of mr. roseme's right to the pension went away when he died, even if no one knew about it until later. it said that, during the time the person was presumed to be alive, if proof was found that they were actually dead, the law had to rely on the true state of affairs. the majority said this applied retroactively. this was because of the law about absentees, and what it is meant to do. presuming the person is alive protects their personal and financial interests in the hope that they return. it keeps things stable, but uncertain. after seven years, the law and the people close to the absentee need certainty. the death then becomes legally final. if death is proved within the seven-year period, though, the situation is different. that's because the purposes of treating the person as alive no longer apply. there is no more uncertainty, and no interests to protect for the person's return. mr. roseme didn't have a right to the pension after he died. the legal basis for carleton to pay it was the presumption that he was alive. but this basis fell away once his true date of death was discovered (even though no one knew that at the time). that meant ms. threlfall had to pay back the money she received on mr. roseme's behalf. absentees used to be treated differently in quebec law. they weren't considered either alive or dead. they were declared legally dead once they had been missing for 30 years or on their 100th birthday. the law was changed with quebec's new civil code in 1994.
+supreme court of canada judges can give bail conditions to people not charged with crimes while they wait for a peace-bond hearing, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. mr. penunsi was in prison. a police officer thought he might hurt someone once he was freed and asked a judge for a 'peace bond.' a peace bond is a promise to the court to keep the peace, behave, and follow certain conditions. it is meant to prevent crime. having a peace bond against you is different than being charged with a crime, but breaking the promise to the court is a crime. the judge put out an arrest warrant to make mr. penunsi come to court to respond to the request. but he was already in prison, so he wasn't arrested. a court date was scheduled for after he would be freed. the crown (the prosecution) was afraid he might hurt someone in the meantime. it said mr. penunsi should either have to stay in jail or follow certain conditions until then. it asked for a bail hearing so a judge could decide what to do. mr. penunsi argued that bail rules didn't apply to peace bonds. he said bail was only for people charged with crimes, and he wasn't being charged with anything. the provincial court judge agreed that bail rules didn't apply to peace bonds. because of this, he said he didn\'t have the power to hold a bail hearing. the crown asked a superior court judge to review the provincial court judge's decision. (the superior court that handles trials in newfoundland and labrador is called the 'supreme court.') that judge said bail rules applied to peace bonds. the court of appeal, however, said they didn't. this was because someone waiting for a peace-bond hearing isn't charged with a crime. the issue was moot before the superior court judge heard it. 'moot' means the judge's decision didn't matter for practical purposes because the problem was already solved. mr. penunsi had willingly agreed to follow certain conditions after he left prison. but the issue was important, so the judge decided to hear the case anyway. courts in other parts of canada also couldn't agree on what to do in situations like mr. penunsi's. it depended on how parts of the criminal code were interpreted. the law wasn't clear. the supreme court of canada unanimously said that arrest and bail rules applied to peace bonds. but it said the rules applied in a unique way, so they had to be modified. this was to make sure they were appropriate for preventing crime, rather than dealing with someone already accused of one. the court looked at the text, context, and purpose of parts of the criminal code dealing with peace bonds, arrest, and bail. the court said that judges can get people to appear in court to answer to peace bonds in two ways. the usual way is by an order to come to court, called a 'summons.' sometimes, though, an arrest warrant is appropriate. if the person is arrested, a judge can order a bail hearing. at the bail hearing, the judge can put conditions on them while they wait for their peace-bond hearing. the conditions should only deal with making sure the person shows up for court and protecting the public before the hearing. if the person is not arrested (for example, if they get a summons), the judge can't put conditions on them before the peace-bond hearing. mr. penunsi wasn't arrested according to the law. when someone is arrested, they have to be told why and have a chance to get a lawyer. this didn't happen for mr. penunsi. since he wasn't arrested, the bail rules didn't apply. that meant the judge couldn't put conditions on him before his peace-bond hearing. the court also said judges had to be careful not to set peace-bond defendants up to fail. often, judges order people to stay away from drugs and alcohol as a bail condition. this can be very hard for people with addictions. like a peace bond, being on bail is not a crime. but breaking a bail condition is. judges should be very careful not to turn people into criminals for something they can't control. keeping someone in jail should be a last resort. when a person isn't charged with a crime, it should only happen if they refuse to promise to follow conditions while waiting for their peace-bond hearing. the supreme court of canada recently dealt with bail in r v myers.
+supreme court of canada a journalist can only be forced to reveal a source if it's absolutely necessary and in the public interest, the supreme court has said. mr. côté was a former quebec politician. in 2016, he was arrested on charges related to possible political corruption from 2000 to 2012. ms. denis was a journalist with radio-canada. between 2012 and 2016, she gave four television reports about the possible corruption. the reports contained sensitive information that ms. denis got from confidential sources. mr. côté said the criminal charges were an 'abuse of process' (a misuse of the courts). he asked for a 'stay of proceedings' (a suspension of the charges that is usually permanent). he said that if he knew who ms. denis' sources were, he could identify who was responsible for the leaks. he could then prove that the government was trying to hurt his case, which would justify staying the charges. mr. côté got a legal order to make ms. denis reveal her sources. ms. denis refused. she said she didn't even know the identities of the people who gave her information for two of the reports. the court of quebec judge said ms. denis didn't have to reveal her sources, because she didn't know who they were. the superior court said the court of quebec judge made a mistake. this was because ms. denis did know the sources for two of the four reports. it said she had to provide that information. when ms. denis appealed, the court of appeal said it didn't have the power to decide the issue. this was because the law said only the first decision (the court of quebec's) could be appealed, which already happened at the superior court. the court of appeal said she could ask for permission to appeal to the supreme court, though. the supreme court had to look at two appeals from ms. denis. the first was about whether the court of appeal was right to decide it didn't have the power to look at her appeal. the second was what should actually happen with it. the supreme court hearing was postponed once because the crown (the prosecution) had new evidence and wanted to change its arguments. the court didn't postpone a second time when the crown asked. the majority at the supreme court agreed that the court of appeal didn't have the power to decide ms. denis' appeal. however, it said the original court (the court of quebec) should look at the whole issue again. the majority said people only have a right to appeal if a written law says so. in this case, no law said an appeal to a second court was allowed for an issue like ms. denis'. (that is, one that didn't decide whether someone was guilty of something, or involve putting them in jail.) this made sense, because having one level of appeal helps cases move more quickly. the majority didn't decide whether ms. denis had to reveal her sources. it said the court of quebec should look at everything again. this was because the crown had new evidence and wanted to change its arguments. an appeal court is supposed to decide if a lower court decision should stand. that means looking at whether the lower court made the right decision, based on the facts and arguments before it. it can't do that if suddenly there are new facts and arguments. that's one reason why parties normally can't introduce new facts and arguments on appeal. (another reason is that it's unfair to the other side.) this was the first time the court looked at new rules to protect journalists' confidential sources. the majority gave some guidance on how the rules should be used. it said the person who didn't want to reveal a source has to show they are a 'journalist' and their source is a 'journalistic source' under the canada evidence act. the person who wants the information has to show they can't really get it any other way. they also have to show that the public has a greater interest in making sure the crime is prosecuted than it does in protecting the confidential source. the majority said that revealing journalists' confidential sources should only be a last resort. the court previously looked at journalists' confidential sources in r v vice media canada inc. that case fell under the old rules.
+supreme court of canada how a taxpayer uses a 'derivative contract' determines how it is treated for tax purposes, the supreme court has ruled. mr. macdonald had worked in finance and owned a large number of shares. he started a business. he got a loan from his bank. he used some shares to 'secure' part of the loan. if he couldn't pay back what he borrowed, the bank could take the shares as 'security.' he could borrow up to 95% of the value of the shares. this was over $10 million. mr. macdonald and his bank also signed a 'forward contract' covering the shares. a forward contract is an agreement to buy (or sell) something at a specific price on a future date. it is a kind of 'derivative contract,' which is a contract based on an 'underlying asset' (in this case, the shares). these kinds of contracts are common in the financial world. forward contracts can be for 'speculation' or for 'hedging.' 'speculation' is when someone invests in something that increases their risk, hoping for a high return. it is more like gambling. 'hedging' is when someone invests in something to reduce risks of price changes in something else. it is more like insurance. in this case, if the value of the shares went up, mr. macdonald agreed to pay the difference between the new price and the price in the forward contract. if the value of the shares went down, the bank would pay him. the money mr. macdonald got would be used as extra security for the loan. the price of the shares increased. mr. macdonald paid his bank about $10 million. these payments were 'cash settlement payments' under the forward contract. the issue in this case was how mr. macdonald claimed the cash settlement payments on his income tax. under the income tax act, there are two basic categories of earnings. the first category is ordinary income from things like employment and business. the second is capital gains or losses, which are the profits (or losses) you get from selling something for more (or less) than you paid for it. how gains and losses are treated can make a big financial difference for a taxpayer. whether the payments from the forward contract were income losses or capital losses depended on whether the forward contract was a hedge or speculation. mr. macdonald said he was using the forward contract to speculate. this meant the payments he made should be deducted from his business income. canada revenue agency said he was using the forward contract to hedge. this meant the payments were capital losses. the tax court said the forward contract was speculation. the federal court of appeal said it was a hedge. the majority of judges at the supreme court said the purpose of a derivative contract determines whether it is a hedge or speculation. they said the purpose of mr. macdonald's contract was hedging. this meant the payments were capital losses. to find the purpose of the forward contract, the majority looked at how closely it was tied to the shares (the 'underlying asset'). the more closely a derivative contract is tied to the underlying asset, and the better it is at lowering risk, the more likely it is to be a hedge. otherwise, it's more likely to be speculation. shares can go up or down in value over time. but in this case, the majority noted the forward contract protected mr. macdonald from this risk and uncertainty. this protection was almost perfect. the loan agreement and the agreement to use the shares as security weren't part of the forward contract. but the majority said they were important context for determining the purpose of the forward contract. mr. macdonald had to provide the bank with shares and with any payments from the forward contract as security for the loan. the amount of money he could borrow was tied to the value of his shares. the amount of shares he provided as security for the loan were the same number of shares covered by the forward contract. this allowed the bank to give mr. macdonald a good deal because it faced very little risk if he didn't pay back his loan. this arrangement showed enough of a connection between the contract and the shares to indicate a hedging purpose. this case started as a disagreement with canada revenue agency. tax disagreements can be appealed to the tax court of canada, which focuses on tax cases.
+supreme court of canada military members charged with civilian crimes don't have the right to be tried by a jury if they are tried in the military justice system, the supreme court has ruled. in canada, the military justice system has always been separate from the civilian justice system. this is because the military has unique needs, like discipline, efficiency, and morale. the national defence act sets out the rules for the military justice system. it says that when a military member commits a crime under a federal law (such as the criminal code), that is a 'service offence.' service offences can be tried in the military justice system. several military members were accused of serious crimes, like sexual assault and forgery. they wanted to be tried by jury. but the military justice system, unlike the civilian system, has never had juries. trials can take place before a judge and a military panel, but a panel isn't the same as a jury. while a jury is made up of twelve people from all parts of canadian society, a military panel is made up of only five people, all from the military. the accused military members argued that the national defence actbreached their constitutional right to be tried by a jury. they said this was guaranteed under section 11(f) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, part of canada's constitution. section 11(f) says people charged with crimes have the right to be tried by a jury if they could go to jail for five years or more. but there is an exception: the right does not apply to crimes under military law tried before military courts. this is called the 'military exception.' the accused military members argued that this exception applied only to 'pure' military crimes, like spying or mutiny. they said it didn't apply to civilian crimes that any canadian (military member or not) could be charged with. the military prosecutors, on the other hand, said the exception applied to all service offences, including civilian crimes by military members. all but one of the challenges failed, and appeals followed. in the first appeal (stillman), the court martial appeal court of canada (a military court) ruled that they didn't have a right to be tried by a jury. but in the second appeal (beaudry), the same court reached the opposite result. this meant there were conflicting rulings. the majority at the supreme court said military members could be tried for civilian crimes without juries. the constitution gives parliament power over the military. this includes the power to pass a law saying that civilian crimes committed by military members are service offences. this makes them offences under military law. the majority noted that when a military member commits a civilian crime (even in a non-military setting), that has an impact on discipline, efficiency, and morale. because of all this, the majority concluded that when a military member is charged with a civilian crime, the military exception under section 11(f) of the charter applies. that means there is no right to be tried by a jury. juries have been part of the common law system for over 900 years. they are meant to protect the individual from the heavy powers of the state (or, in older times, the king or queen). they are also meant to inform the public about the law and how the legal system works, and apply community standards to trial verdicts. juries play an important role in the justice system, but the charter makes clear that the right to a jury has an exception.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an employment discrimination dispute involving a unionized worker should be settled by a labour arbitrator appointed under the collective agreement, not by a human rights adjudicator. this case involves a dispute between an employee and her employer. the supreme court was asked if the dispute should be heard by a labour arbitrator or a human rights adjudicator. ms. linda horrocks was employed by the northern regional health authority (nrha) in manitoba. as a unionized worker, the terms and conditions of her employment were set out in a 'collective agreement'. a collective agreement is a written contract between an employer and a union. in 2011, ms. horrocks was suspended for being at work while under the influence of alcohol. she disclosed to her employer her alcohol addiction, which is a disability. the health authority asked ms. horrocks to formally agree to abstain from alcohol and get treatment for her addiction. when she refused to sign the agreement, she was fired. her union filed a grievance on her behalf and, as a result, she returned to work on essentially the same terms as the agreement she had refused to sign. soon after, the nhra alleged that she had broken the terms of that agreement. ms. horrocks filed a discrimination complaint with the manitoba human rights commission. she alleged the nhra failed to sufficiently accommodate her disability. a human rights adjudicator was appointed to decide the complaint. the health authority opposed the adjudicator's jurisdiction. it argued that under the collective agreement, a labour arbitrator should settle the dispute. the adjudicator disagreed because she said the dispute was an alleged human rights violation. she went on to rule that the nrha had in fact discriminated against ms. horrocks. the nhra appealed to a reviewing judge who agreed with it. ms. horrocks then appealed to the court of appeal. it said disputes concerning the termination of unionized workers do fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator, even when there are allegations of human rights violations. but in this case, the court found the adjudicator had jurisdiction and sent the case back to the reviewing judge to decide if the adjudicator's decision on the complaint itself was reasonable. the health authority appealed to the supreme court. it has ruled that the human rights adjudicator did not have jurisdiction over ms. horrocks' complaint. a labour arbitrator should decide all disputes under a collective agreement, including human rights disputes, unless another law states otherwise. writing for the majority of the judges, justice brown said the human rights adjudicator did not have jurisdiction over ms. horrocks' complaint. justice brown explained that a labour arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction when labour legislation provides for settling disputes under a collective agreement, unless another law states otherwise. in this case, ms. horrocks' complaint arose under the collective agreement and within the mandate of a labour arbitrator. other legislation did not give concurrent jurisdiction to the human rights adjudicator. as a result, the adjudicator did not have jurisdiction over ms. horrocks' complaint.
+supreme court of canada quebec tax officials were allowed to send a letter demanding information to a bank branch in alberta, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. under the constitution, provinces have the power to tax on their territories. whether someone pays tax depends on where they 'reside.' a person's place of residence is usually where they live. for a trust (which is a 'legal' person), it is usually where the trust is managed. figuring out residence can be complicated. quebec collects its own income taxes, unlike other provinces. the province's tax officials can demand information to enforce tax laws. anyone who doesn't agree to provide the information can be fined or sent to prison. bitton trust was set up in alberta by a quebec family in 2003. the trust had a bank account with national bank in calgary. but quebec tax officials thought the trust might actually reside in quebec. if so, the trust would have to pay taxes there. in 2014, quebec tax officials asked for some information and documents about the trust that would help them figure this out. they sent a formal demand letter to the branch where the account was (in calgary). quebec tax officials said that this is what a federal law, the bank act, said they had to do. the bank act said that any demand had to go to the branch where the account was located. the trust said that quebec officials didn't have the power to do this. that's because under quebec's tax administration act, they had power only in quebec. it said that any action the tax officials took outside the province would be 'extraterritorial' (outside the place where they had power). that meant sending the demand letter to the calgary branch would be outside their power, even if the bank act required it. the trust asked the quebec courts to quash (cancel) the demand. everyone agreed that without the federal law, the bank act, the officials could send the demand to national bank in quebec. the issue was whether the quebec tax officials could send the demand outside quebec to the calgary branch, as the bank act required. the motions judge said that the tax officials could send the demand to the calgary branch, and the court of appeal agreed. all the judges at the supreme court agreed with the lower courts. they said that the quebec tax officials had the power to send the demand to national bank's calgary branch. this was because national bank operated in quebec. quebec tax officials had power over anyone operating in the province's territory. all the bank act did was say how the officials had to communicate their demand to national bank. specifically, it said they had to send their demand directly to the branch where the account was located. in this case, the branch happened to be in a different province. but that didn't change the fact that the quebec tax officials had power over national bank. the tax officials weren't trying to exercise power in alberta just because they sent the demand there. whatever action they were going to take against national bank if it didn't comply would happen in quebec. so the demand wasn't 'extraterritorial.' the tax officials were allowed to demand the information in the way that they did, and national bank had to give it to them, or face the consequences. however, the judges noted it might be different if national bank didn't operate in quebec. the supreme court didn't decide where bitton trust should pay taxes. it only decided that the quebec tax officials could get the information it demanded to decide whether the trust had to pay in quebec.
+supreme court of canada an employee forced by their employer to quit should get a bonus they would have received during the notice period, unless their contract says otherwise, the supreme court has ruled. mr. matthews was a chemist. he worked for ocean nutrition. he helped make the company successful in making omega-3 products. his job was important to him. in 2007, ocean nutrition hired a new chief operating officer. the chief operating officer and mr. matthews did not get along. he took responsibilities and team members away from mr. matthews. this left mr. matthews with much less to do. the chief operating officer also lied to him. this upset mr. matthews. in 2010, ocean nutrition put mr. matthews under review. this meant he might lose his job. the chief operating officer told the board of directors that there was no place for mr. matthews at the company. this upset mr. matthews even more. mr. matthews suspected that ocean nutrition was going to be sold. as part of his contract, mr. matthews would get a large bonus payment if this happened. this was part of the reason he stayed with the company for so long, even after the problems started. but eventually he found himself in an impossible situation, so he quit. just over a year later, ocean nutrition was sold for over half a billion dollars. because mr. matthews didn't work there anymore, the company said it didn't owe him the bonus payment. mr. matthews said he would have still been working there if ocean nutrition didn't 'constructively dismiss' him. 'constructive dismissal' is when an employer forces an employee out by making things so bad that they quit, instead of firing them. mr. matthews said the company owed him the bonus payment. the trial judge said that mr. matthews was constructively dismissed. he said mr. matthews should get 15 months of 'reasonable notice.' the law says someone who is dismissed ('constructively' or not) should get 'reasonable notice' of the dismissal. 'notice' is a specific amount of time the employee gets between the date when the employer tells them the contract will end and when it ends. sometimes the employee will keep working during the notice period. but sometimes the employer just pays them what they would have been paid if they had worked the time. either way, they still count as an 'employee' during the notice period. the trial judge said mr. matthews would have received the bonus payment if he was still working at ocean nutrition. he said mr. matthews should still get it since ocean nutrition was sold during the reasonable notice period. the bonus was about $1 million. the majority at the court of appeal agreed that mr. matthews was constructively dismissed. it agreed that the notice period should be 15 months. but it said he didn't have a right to the bonus after he left the company. by the time the case got to the supreme court of canada, everyone agreed that mr. matthews was forced to quit. everyone agreed that he should have received 15 months' notice. they disagreed on whether he should get the bonus payment as part of his reasonable notice. they also disagreed on whether ocean nutrition lied to him, and whether this meant he should get the bonus. all the judges at the supreme court of canada agreed that mr. matthews should get the bonus payment. they said that the reasonable notice period should be 15 months, like the trial judge said. they said mr. matthews should get compensation because he didn't get notice. the court said the compensation should include the bonus payment. this was because the company was sold, and the bonus payment triggered, during the notice period. there was nothing in mr. matthews' contract that said he shouldn't get it in this situation. the court also noted that ocean nutrition wasn't honest with mr. matthews about his future with the company. this was separate from constructively dismissing him without notice. mr. matthews didn't get extra compensation for this, though. this was because he only asked for the bonus, which he already got as part of reasonable notice. the court dealt with whether people might be employees in uber v heller and modern cleaning concept inc. v comit paritaire. it dealt with equal pay in employment in quebec (attorney general) v alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la sant et des services sociaux and centrale des syndicats du qu bec v quebec (attorney general).
+supreme court of canada a quebec law delaying pay equity for women in female-dominated workplaces violated charter equality rights, the supreme court has ruled, but it declined to strike the law down. in 1996, quebec passed a law that required all employers with ten or more employees to ensure pay equity for women by 2001. pay equity means equal pay for work of equal value. for most employers, the 1996 law meant identifying jobs that are done mostly by women, and comparing their salaries to the salaries for jobs done mostly by men in the same workplace. the problem was that there was no way to determine pay equity for women in workplaces where there were no mostly male jobs for comparison. measuring pay equity in those workplaces was difficult. quebec gave its pay equity commission more time to come up with a solution. this meant that women in mostly-female workplaces waited six years longer for pay equity than women in mixed-gender workplaces. some unions went to court to complain that this delay discriminated against the women who were forced to wait. the trial judge found that the delay did not violate the women's equality rights. this was because the distinction the government made was not based on the women's sex (a ground of discrimination listed in the canadian charter of rights and freedoms). instead, it was because there was no male group to compare them to. the quebec court of appeal agreed. justice rosalie silberman abella, for the majority of the court on this issue, held that the women's equality rights were breached. the delay targeted a group that had suffered systemic discrimination based on the idea that 'women's work' was worth less than 'men's work.' delaying access to pay equity for this group of women was discriminatory because it continued their historic disadvantage in the workforce. the government's reasons for the delay did not matter to the question of whether discrimination happened, but it did matter to deciding whether the delay was justified. justice abella, along with three other judges, concluded that it was. the delay was intended to achieve the important objective of finding an effective solution to the problem of pay inequity. this long-term benefit outweighed the short-term harm. justice suzanne côté , writing for herself and three other judges, said that there was no breach of the women's equality rights. this distinction was not based on sex, but on the unique situation the women found themselves in working in places with no male job classes for comparison. the law did not discriminate against this group of women. it actually benefitted them by correcting the lower pay they got due to systemic discrimination. quebec was the first province to tackle this difficult aspect of pay equity and should be encouraged, not punished. chief justice beverley mclachlin (as she was when the case was heard) agreed with justice abella that the women's equality rights had been breached. but she disagreed that this breach was constitutionally justified. she would have struck down parts of the law. this case was decided on the same day as quebec (attorney general) v alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la sant et des services sociaux which struck down other parts of quebec's pay equity laws.
+supreme court of canada the law societies of british columbia and ontario had the power to deny approval to a proposed law school that would have required students to follow a religiously-based code of conduct restricting sexual behaviour, the supreme court has ruled. trinity western university (twu) is a private christian university in langley, british columbia. it wants to open a law school. at twu, all students and faculty have to follow a code of conduct (known as a 'covenant') that prohibits sexual intimacy except within marriage between a man and a woman. students and faculty must follow the covenant the whole time they attend or work at twu, whether they are on or off campus. the law society of british columbia regulates lawyers in bc, while the law society of ontario (formerly known as the law society of upper canada) does the same in ontario. both law societies get their powers from the government. one of their roles is to protect the public interest in deciding who can practice law in those provinces. usually, a person who wants to become a lawyer must have a degree from an approved law school. twu applied for approval of its proposed law school in both bc and ontario. in bc, the law society put the decision to a vote by its members (all lawyers already licensed to practice law there). a majority voted against twu\'s proposal, and the law society passed a resolution to formalize the decision. in ontario, the law society's 'benchers' (board of directors) decided not to approve the proposal. twu and one of its graduates (who hoped to attend the law school) asked the courts to review the law societies' decisions in both provinces. they said that the decisions violated freedom of religion and other rights protected under the charter. in bc, the bc supreme court and court of appeal ruled for twu and said that the law society's decision was invalid. in ontario, the divisional court and court of appeal both ruled for the law society. at the supreme court of canada, the majority ruled for the law societies. justices rosalie silberman abella, michael moldaver, andromache karakatsanis, richard wagner (who was not yet chief justice when the cases were heard), and cl ment gascon wrote their reasons together. for them, the question the court had to answer was whether the law societies' decisions not to approve twu's proposed law school were reasonable. they said that they were. to be considered reasonable, the decisions had to strike a proportionate balance between the religious rights of the twu community and the law societies' objectives to protect the public interest. for the majority, the 'public interest' included promoting equality by ensuring equal access to the legal profession, supporting diversity within the bar, and preventing harm to lgbtq law students. neither law society was stopping someone from following his or her own religious beliefs (including following the covenant if s/he wanted to). they only prevented twu from enforcing beliefs on other members of the law school community. because of this, the majority said the decisions did not seriously limit anyone's religious freedoms. as the benefits of protecting the public interest were important, and the limitation on religious rights was minor, the majority said that both decisions reflected a proportionate balance, and were therefore reasonable. then-chief justice beverley mclachlin agreed with the majority that the law societies' decisions were proportionate and reasonable. however, she disagreed with their approach. in her view, courts reviewing administrative decisions challenged under the charter should first look at whether a charter right (rather than a value) has been breached. if so, the state actor that made the decision has to show that the infringement is reasonable and justifiable in a free and democratic society. unlike the majority, she considered the limitation on the religious, expressive, and associational rights of the twu community to be serious. but, in addition to negative effects on diversity and equality within the legal profession, she emphasized that approving twu's proposal would condone discrimination against lgbtq people based on sexual orientation. the law societies' refusal to condone this discrimination was in keeping with their legal obligations to act in the public interest. in chief justice mclachlin's view, these obligations outweighed twu's claims to freedom of religion. justice malcolm rowe agreed with the majority that the law societies' decisions were reasonable, but disagreed with both how and why they reached this conclusion. like chief justice mclachlin and the dissent, justice rowe said that the analysis must focus on charter rights (rather than charter values). like them, he also said that the state actor bears the burden of justifying any limit on those rights. in this case, however, justice rowe said the law societies' decisions did not infringe the charter rights raised by twu. the twu community was not just seeking to protect its own beliefs and practices. it wanted the law societies to approve a law school where students would be forced to follow evangelical christian beliefs whether they shared these beliefs or not. justice rowe said that freedom of religion protects the right to believe in whatever one chooses and to follow those beliefs. but it does not protect the right to impose those beliefs and practices on others. for this reason, he said that twu's claim fell outside the scope of freedom of religion protected by the charter. justices suzanne côté and russell brown disagreed with the other judges, and would have ruled for twu. writing in dissent, they said that the laws that gave the law societies their powers limited what they could consider in deciding whether to approve a law school. for them, the decision was only about whether graduates would be fit to practice law (ie, competent and ethical). since there was no evidence that the graduates would not be fit, they said the law societies should have approved twu's proposal. in the dissenting justices' view, freedom of religion also protects the freedom to express religious views (for example, through the covenant) and to associate to study law in an educational community reflecting their religious beliefs. they disagreed with chief justice mclachlin that approving the proposal meant condoning discrimination. for them, a state actor (like a law society) accommodating a private actor (like a faith-based university) does not mean it supports the private actor's beliefs. if this were so, it would indirectly force private actors to follow the charter (even though the charter only applies to state actors). they noted that it is also in the public interest to accommodate different religious beliefs. they also noted that law societies in other provinces had approved twu's proposed law school. for justices côté and brown, the law societies' decisions seriously limited the religious freedom of members of the twu community, and they were not justified. while both the bc and ontario cases had separate histories, they dealt with the same issue and were heard at the supreme court on the same days. in the end, eight judges agreed that the law societies' decisions limited religious freedoms (the five majority judges, chief justice mclachlin, and the two dissenting judges). however, five (the majority) said the limitation was not serious, while three (chief justice mclachlin and the two dissenting judges) said it was serious. six of the eight judges who said there was a limitation said it was reasonable (the five majority judges and chief justice mclachlin). one judge (justice rowe) said no religious freedoms were infringed.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court upholds an alberta man's conviction for drug and firearm offences despite a police error. on october 8, 2016, sokha tim hit a road sign on a busy street in calgary, alberta and kept driving. when police found him about one kilometre away, the officer asked to see his driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. while mr. tim searched for the documents, the officer saw him try to hide a zip-lock bag containing a single yellow pill. the officer correctly identified the pill as gabapentin, a prescription drug, but mistakenly believed it was a controlled substance. after the officer arrested mr. tim, he and another officer searched him and his car, and found illegal drugs, ammunition and a loaded handgun. mr. tim was charged with drug and firearm offences. at trial, he said the police had no basis to arrest or search him because the officer was mistaken about the legal status of gabapentin. as a result, he argued the police had violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (charter). section 8 of the charter protects people from 'unreasonable search or seizure' and section 9 protects people from 'arbitrary detention'. the trial judge dismissed his arguments and admitted the evidence. convicted on all charges, mr. tim appealed to alberta's court of appeal, which found no violation of his charter rights. he then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. mr. tim's charter rights were violated, but the evidence could be admitted nonetheless. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice mahmud jamal said police violated mr. tim's section 9 charter right by arresting him based on a mistake about the legal status of gabapentin. 'allowing the police to arrest based on what they believe the law is rather than based on what the law actually is would dramatically expand police powers at the expense of civil liberties', he wrote. justice jamal also said because mr. tim's arrest was unlawful, the searches of him and his car that followed also violated his section 8 charter right. when evidence is obtained in a manner that violates an accused's charter rights, courts must conduct an analysis to determine if the evidence could still be admitted, or whether its admission would harm or 'bring the administration of justice into disrepute'. in this case, justice jamal said the violations were less serious and only moderately impacted mr. tim's charter-protected interests. on the other hand, the evidence was reliable and essential to the prosecution of serious offences. weighing these considerations, justice jamal said the evidence could be admitted. as a result, the court has upheld mr. tim's convictions. the canadian charter of rights and freedoms the charter is part of canada's constitution and protects various rights and freedoms. it came into force 40 years ago, on april 17, 1982. since that time, canadian courts have decided a wide range of legal questions where they interpret and apply the charter. in criminal cases such as this one, the charter helps clarify police powers in relation to the rights of the accused.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that a cockpit voice recording can be disclosed at an aviation accident class action trial. in march 2015, an air canada flight from toronto had an accident upon landing in wind and snow at halifax's stanfield international airport. the flight was carrying 133 passengers and 5 crew members. several people were injured, including 25 who were taken to local hospitals. following the accident, some of the passengers filed a class action lawsuit in the supreme court of nova scotia. they claimed that negligence on the part of the airline, its pilots, the aircraft manufacturer, the airport and others, caused them harm. in an exercise unrelated to the class action, the transportation and safety board of canada (the board) investigated the accident. the board is a federal government agency mandated to improve aviation safety. following its investigation, the board issued a report but did not assign blame as that is not its role. the board is not part of the class action. as part of its defence, the aircraft manufacturer filed a motion asking the court to order the release of the cockpit voice recording. it records the communications of the flight crew and is part of the so-called 'black box' from the aircraft. the aircraft manufacturer argued that access to the recording was necessary for a fair trial and to determine what caused the accident. the only copy of the recording was with the board and it opposed its release. so did the airline and its pilots, who wanted to protect pilot privacy. the board claimed the recording was protected by 'statutory privilege', meaning a specific rule in a law protected it from being disclosed. in this case, section 28 of the canadian transportation accident investigation and safety board act (the act) states no one can be required to produce an on-board recording or give evidence related to it in legal proceedings unless authorized to do so by a court or coroner. section 28(6) also states that a judge or coroner must examine the on-board recording 'in camera', meaning not before members of the public, and give the board a reasonable opportunity to make observations about the recording. the privilege attached to an on‑board recording serves two purposes: to protect pilot privacy and to promote aviation safety. the motion judge listened to the recording in camera, and decided it was reliable, relevant and necessary evidence for resolving the class action. he said the importance of the recording to the administration of justice outweighed the importance of the statutory privilege. the judge refused the board's request to present observations or arguments about the recording, concluding that such arguments were unnecessary for him to understand what was at stake. the board appealed the judge's ruling to nova scotia's court of appeal. the court of appeal dismissed the appeal and the board appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the judge made no errors in ordering the recording's disclosure, so it can be released. writing for a majority of the judges, justice nicholas kasirer said the motion judge made no reviewable errors in deciding to order the disclosure of the recording. as such, the decision to release the recording stands. the majority said the judge or coroner who is presented with a request for disclosure has the option of ordering the disclosure or not based on the test set out in the act. that test is whether the public interest in the proper administration of justice outweighs in importance the privilege attached to the on-board recording. 'in this balancing exercise, the decision‑maker must place two competing public interests on the scales: on one side, the relevance, probative value and necessity of the on-board recording to the fair resolution of the dispute and, on the other, the effects of disclosure on pilot privacy and aviation safety', justice kasirer wrote. having weighed the relevant factors, the majority found the judge made a fact-driven and discretionary decision. since there was no error of law or palatable and overriding error of fact or proof he abused his discretion, the judge's decision should stand. the majority also rejected the board's claims regarding its right to make arguments in camera without the other parties present. they noted that the judge had the discretion to hear such arguments or not. while in camera necessarily means without the public, the judge also had the discretion to allow other parties to be present or not.
+supreme court of canada note:  this document contains details about sexual violence against a child that may be upsetting to some readers. courts should impose tougher punishments for sexual crimes against children, the supreme court has ruled. mr. friesen met a woman online. one night, he was at the woman's home. the woman's friend was also there, babysitting the woman's two kids. mr. friesen and the woman had sex. he then told her to bring her four-year-old daughter to the bedroom so he could do something sexually violent to her. the woman carried her sleeping daughter into the room and put her on the bed. the child woke up. she started to cry. she tried to get away. mr. friesen was hurting her. the woman's friend woke up. she came and took the child away. mr. friesen told the woman to bring the child back. he said if she didn't do it, he would tell the friend that the woman had sexually assaulted her one-year-old son. but the friend confronted mr. friesen, and he left. the woman recorded everything on her phone. mr. friesen pleaded guilty to sexual interference (touching someone under 16 in a sexual way). he also pleaded guilty to trying to extort the woman (threatening her to make her do something). the judge who decided the sentence said mr. friesen should go to prison for six years. he got six years by comparing mr. friesen's case to another case. that case said a sentence should start at four to five years. the court of appeal said the judge made a mistake. it said he shouldn't have relied on the other case as a starting point, because the facts were different. in that other case, there was a 'relationship of trust' between the child and the abuser. a 'relationship of trust' is a relationship where the adult should protect the child and keep them safe. for example, a parent-child or teacher-student relationship. violating a relationship of trust is very serious. the court of appeal said mr. friesen didn't have a relationship of trust with the child. it said he should go to prison for four and a half years. the judges at the supreme court were unanimous. all the judges said the original six-year sentence should stand. given the facts, they said six years was actually a light sentence. protecting children is one of the basic values of canadian society. in 2012, over half of victims of sexual crimes reported to police were under 18. these crimes are often hidden because they are often done in homes, by someone the child knows and trusts. our understanding of sexual violence against children has changed over the years. parliament made punishments for sexual crimes tougher. it also said judges should focus on preventing and condemning sexual crimes against children when deciding sentences. the supreme court judges said that sentences have to reflect the harm to the child, which can last a lifetime, and might not be fully known right away. they said sentences also have to reflect society's deeper understanding of the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children. the supreme court judges said courts should start giving higher sentences for sexual crimes against children. they said longer sentences (for example, ten years or more) shouldn't be unusual. they said sexual crimes against children should be punished more severely than sexual crimes against adults. they noted parliament made the maximum sentences the same for sexual interference and sexual assault of a child, so one isn't less serious than the other. the judges set out a list of factors to help lower courts decide an appropriate sentence. they didn't create strict ranges or starting points, though. they said courts of appeal should do this because they know their local situations best. some people said using starting points (instead of ranges) for sentences caused problems. but the supreme court didn't decide on this. the judges said they would wait for a more appropriate case. the supreme court judges said appeal courts should only change a sentence if the sentencing judge made a legal mistake. but in this case, the sentencing judge considered the facts properly and there was no mistake. sexual crimes against children are serious and widespread. these crimes are the original basis of many cases that come to the supreme court. the actual legal issues appealed may be different, though. recent cases that started out as charges for sexual crimes against children and teenagers include r v kgk, r v poulin, r v rv, r v mills, r v morrison, r v jarvis, and r v reeves.
+supreme court of canada ontario has copyright in plans of survey filed in the province's land registry, the supreme court has ruled. copyright protects original works of writing, theatre, music, or art. a person who has copyright in something has the exclusive right to produce, copy, publish, or perform it. canadian copyright law tries to balance two goals. the first is to reward the people who create new works. the second is to make sure that the public has access to new ideas and works. there are special rules in the copyright act for when the crown can own copyright. ('the crown' is a legal term that basically means 'the government.') section 12 of the copyright act, which is over a century old,says the crown has copyright in what it prepares (creates) or publishes. it also says the government has copyright where it directs or controls what someone else prepares or publishes. ontario has an electronic land registry system. the land registry is a database about all properties in the province. it says who owns (or has other rights to) each one. the database contains many kinds of documents, including plans of survey. plans of survey show information about a specific property (like its size and shape), like an official map of the property. even though the land registry is electronic, plans of survey still have to be physically brought to a land registry office to be scanned. the electronic land registry system is run by a company called teranet, which helped create it. teranet paid independent surveyors to help build the database and provide plans of survey. a regulation says that all plans added to the land registry become property of the crown (that is, of the ontario government). surveyors bring plans of survey to the land registry office to be included. when they do, teranet makes copies of the plans available electronically. teranet does all of this on ontario's behalf. keatley surveying, a land survey company, launched a class action in 2007. a class action is a special kind of lawsuit when a group of people with the same kind of problem get together to sue. the class action was on behalf of land surveyors who provided plans of survey to the land registry. it said the surveyors (not the crown) had copyright in the plans of survey they had created. it said teranet was therefore infringing the land surveyors' copyright by storing and copying plans of survey. it said the crown should only get copyright in works that it created itself (or where it ordered or controlled creation by someone else). teranet argued that the crown should get copyright in everything it published. in 2016, a judge said ontario owned the copyright and said keatley surveying's class action couldn't go forward. the court of appeal agreed. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that ontario owned the copyright in the plans of survey. the majority said the plans of survey were in a narrow category of documents that fell under crown copyright. crown copyright protects the public interest by giving the crown copyright in things whose creation or publication it very much directed or controlled. this case was about publication, not creation, since the crown didn't create the plans of survey itself. a number of laws set out how the land registry system worked, the requirements for plans of survey, and how ontario could use the plans. the government directed and controlled every aspect of the publication of the plans of survey. the laws also gave ontario the exclusive right to make changes to them, and make them available to the public. this amount of control meant the crown owned the copyright, and could allow teranet to make copies of the plans of survey on the government's behalf. there have been many changes in canada's approach to copyright law in the last hundred years, and the majority took them into account when interpreting section 12. section 12 of the copyright act, which deals with crown copyright, is over a century old. this is the first time the supreme court has looked at this section.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court of canada rules the federal carbon pricing law is constitutional. parliament passed the greenhouse gas pollution pricing act in 2018, based on the consensus that greenhouse gas emissions contribute to global climate change. countries around the world committed to drastically reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under the 2015 paris agreement. in canada, the federal government passed the act to implement its commitments. specifically, the law required provinces and territories to implement carbon gas pricing systems by january 1, 2019 or adopt one imposed by the federal government. why is the federal act constitutional? chief justice richard wagner wrote for the majority of the judges, which found the act to be constitutional. they noted that global warming causes harm beyond provincial boundaries and that it is a matter of national concern under the 'peace, order and good government' clause of the constitution. the majority noted the act would only apply where provincial or territorial pricing systems are not strict enough to reduce global warming. a rarely applied doctrine of canadian constitutional law the majority noted that national concern is a well-established but rarely applied doctrine of canadian constitutional law. the application of this doctrine is strictly limited in order to maintain the autonomy of the provinces and respect the diversity of confederation. however, the federal government has the authority to act in appropriate cases, where there is a matter of genuine national concern and where the recognition of that matter is consistent with the division of powers. federalism the constitution divides federal and provincial powers. the majority of judges observed that canada, which has a federal system of governance, requires a balance between federal and provincial powers. they recalled that this concept, known as federalism, is a foundational principle of canada's constitution. not a tax the majority noted that the term 'carbon tax' is often used to describe the pricing of carbon emissions. however, they said this has nothing to do with the concept of taxation, as understood in the constitutional context. as such, they also concluded that the fuel and excess emission charges imposed by the act were constitutionally valid regulatory charges and not taxes. how did the case get to the supreme court? three provinces saskatchewan, ontario and alberta challenged the constitutionality of the act by referring the legislation to their respective courts of appeal. the courts of appeal for saskatchewan and ontario found the act constitutional, while the alberta court of appeal found it unconstitutional. the question for the supreme court was whether the federal government had the authority to pass such a law that puts a price on carbon. what were the main arguments? the provinces said they had their own climate policies, tailored to their own circumstances. they also argued that they have jurisdiction over natural resources. for its part, the federal government argued that it has the authority to address issues that are national in scope. it also maintained that the law was a backstop (or safety net) to ensure minimum carbon pricing standards across the country. climate change is real the supreme court also pointed out that all of the parties agree that global climate change is real. it's caused by greenhouse gas emissions resulting from human activities and it poses a grave threat to the future of humanity.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court of canada rules that non-citizens and non-residents can claim an aboriginal right under the constitution. mr. richard lee desautel, an american citizen, shot and killed an elk without a hunting license in the arrow lakes region in british columbia in october 2010. he is a member of the lakes tribe of the colville confederated tribes and lives on reserve in washington state. he was charged with hunting without a license and hunting big game while not being a resident of british columbia. mr. desautel admitted that he shot the elk, but argued that he was exercising his aboriginal right to hunt in the traditional territory of his sinixt ancestors under section 35 of the constitution act, 1982 (canadian constitution). he claimed that the lakes tribe is a successor group to the sinixt people whose traditional territory included an area in what is now british columbia. the place where he shot the elk was within this territory. the central question for the supreme court was whether people who are not canadian citizens, and who do not reside in canada, can exercise an aboriginal right that is protected under the canadian constitution. 'aboriginal peoples of canada' the case revolved around the definition of 'aboriginal peoples of canada' found in section 35 of the canadian constitution, which recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights. this was the first time the court had interpreted the words 'aboriginal peoples of canada'. the majority of the judges of the supreme court said a fundamental purpose of section 35 was to recognize the prior occupation of canada by organized, autonomous aboriginal societies. the majority said that 'aboriginal peoples of canada' means the modern-day successors of aboriginal societies that occupied canadian territory at the time of european contact, even if such societies are now located outside canada. excluding aboriginal peoples who moved or were forced to move, or whose territory was divided by a border, would add to the injustice of colonialism. they concluded that groups whose members are neither citizens nor residents of canada can be considered part of the 'aboriginal peoples of canada' and claim an aboriginal right under section 35. can the group in question be considered part of the 'aboriginal peoples of canada'? the majority of the judges then considered whether the specific group that mr. desautel belonged to could be considered part of the 'aboriginal peoples of canada'. they noted that when it comes to aboriginal claims, the trial judge is typically best suited to assess the evidence as it is presented. the majority accepted the trial judge's finding that that mr. desautel's group, the lakes tribe, is a successor group of the sinixt people. at the time of contact between the sinixt and europeans, their territory extended into what is now british columbia (to the north), and into what is now washington state (to the south). an international border was created in 1846, and by 1872, a number of members of the sinixt were living for the most part in washington state, but continued to travel to british columbia for hunting purposes. the majority agreed that moving to live in the american part of their ancestral territory did not prevent the lakes tribe from being a successor group to the sinixt. as such, they found that the lakes tribe could be considered part of the 'aboriginal peoples of canada' under section 35 of the canadian constitution. does the group have aboriginal rights under section 35 of the constitution? having established that the group is part of the 'aboriginal peoples of canada', the majority then had to determine if the group had aboriginal rights under section 35. they explained that the test to determine the existence of rights is the same for groups outside canada as for groups in canada. a critical element of the test was whether the claimed modern right, the right to hunt in this case, was a continuation of a historical practice that existed prior to european contact. the majority agreed with the trial judge that the claimed right was a continuation of a historical practice. they also agreed that apart from periods in which no hunting took place, there was no significant difference between the pre-contact practice and the modern one. as a result, the majority agreed that mr. desautel was exercising an aboriginal right and had been properly acquitted of all charges by the trial judge.
+supreme court of canada rulings made in the middle of a criminal case can't be challenged until after the judgment, even if they are wrong, the supreme court has confirmed. the court emphasized that the purpose of this general rule is to avoid trial interruptions and prevent delays. ms. awashish was charged with impaired driving and driving 'over 80.' when a person is charged with a crime, s/he has a right to see copies of the documents related to the charges. this is called disclosure. the crown (the prosecution) gave ms. awashish disclosure. her lawyer asked for more documents. these related to the breathalyzer used to test her, including maintenance records and training records for the person using it. a provincial court judge ordered the crown to give ms. awashish the documents. in a criminal case, there will normally be a final decision, called a judgment, which results in a verdict of guilty or not guilty. but a judge will also make other smaller decisions along the way, such as how much court time a trial will take or what evidence should be admitted. these smaller decisions normally can't be challenged, except as part of an appeal of the trial judgment to a higher court (that is, after a guilty or not-guilty verdict). there are only very limited exceptions to this rule. in this case, though, the crown asked a superior court judge to review the provincial court judge's decision to order the disclosure before the trial judgment. it did so using a legal procedure called certiorari. certiorari (pronounced different ways, including ser-tee-oh-rarr-ee) is a court's power to cancel another court's decision because of an obvious mistake. it is not the same as an appeal, and is rarely granted in criminal cases in canada. certiorari was only even a possibility because ms. awashish's case was being heard before the court of quebec, which is a provincial court, not the superior court. provincial and territorial courts are sometimes called 'inferior courts' because they get their powers from legislatures. they can't hear all the same kinds of cases that superior courts can, and can have their decisions changed by superior courts. superior courts, on the other hand, get their powers from the constitution. their decisions can't be changed by other courts, except when there is an appeal. superior courts include most trial courts, and all provincial and territorial appeal courts. trial-level superior courts can be called different names in different provinces; for example, bc has a 'supreme court' and alberta, manitoba, saskatchewan, and new brunswick have 'courts of queen's bench.' the superior court judge ruled for the crown and granted certiorari (that is, canceled the provincial court judge's order). she agreed with the crown that ms. awashish didn't show why the request for additional documents should be allowed. in response, ms. awashish asked the crown to tell her if it had the documents she wanted. but the crown wouldn't confirm or deny if the records existed, because it said that they weren't relevant to her case. the provincial court judge (the same one who made the original order) once again ordered the crown to provide the information. the crown again asked the superior court for review. a different judge granted a second certiorari application, saying the information didn't have to be shared unless ms. awashish could show it was relevant. the court of appeal ruled for ms. awashish. it said that certiorari is only available in limited situations, such as if a party's basic rights would be permanently harmed. it said certiorari shouldn't have been granted because the provincial court judge had the power to make the decision (even if she made the wrong one). the supreme court unanimously ruled for ms. awashish. it said parties could only use certiorari in criminal cases when a provincial or territorial court judge went beyond his or her powers (a 'jurisdictional error'). it agreed with the court of appeal that the provincial court judge applied the wrong rules to ms. awashish's request. but this was a legal error, which could be corrected on appeal, not a jurisdictional error that needed to be fixed with certiorari. so, even though the decision was wrong, certiorari couldn't be used to fix it. the court also noted that letting parties appeal decisions before trials are finished would create delays. that's why these types of appeals, known as 'interlocutory appeals,' are not allowed in the criminal code. while certiorari is different from an appeal, courts limit it for the same reason, because lawyers could use it to get around the rule against interlocutory appeals. the court noted that it had previously been clear that courts need to do a better job of finishing criminal trials in a reasonable time. allowing certiorari in situations like ms. awashish's would go against that. the decision confirmed the general rule that trials should not be interrupted to deal with side issues. the court noted that certiorari would still be available in some circumstances, such as when a legal error affected other people who wouldn't have the right to appeal a judgment. the court said that if ms. awashish asked for disclosure again, the documents' relevance should be looked at in light of the court's decision in r v gubbins, which was released on the same day.
+supreme court of canada a business that leaves a car unlocked with the keys inside will not necessarily be responsible when someone is injured after the car is stolen, the supreme court has ruled. the business will only be responsible where it should have known both that the car could be stolen, and that someone could be injured due to it being driven unsafely. in a 7-2 decision, justice andromache karakatsanis, writing for the majority, allowed an appeal by the owner of rankin's garage, which had been held liable for such an injury by lower courts. one evening in july 2006, fifteen year-old j and 16 year-old c were at c's mother's house, drinking and smoking marijuana. c's mother provided some of the alcohol. sometime after midnight, the boys left the house to walk around the town and steal valuables from unlocked cars. they entered rankin's garage and found an unlocked car with its keys in the ashtray. though he did not have a driver's licence and had not driven on the road before, c decided to steal the car and told j to get in. while they were on the highway, the car crashed, and j suffered a catastrophic brain injury. rankin's garage, c, and c's mother were sued for negligence. the jury found rankin's garage 37% responsible, c 23% responsible, c's mother 30% responsible, and j himself 10% responsible for his injuries. the trial judge had found that the owner of rankin's garage should have known that leaving an unlocked vehicle with the keys in it could result in intoxicated teenagers like j getting hurt. it therefore owed j a duty of care. (in law, a duty of care is a requirement to act reasonably to avoid harm to others. the harm must be reasonably foreseeable, or the duty will not exist.) the court of appeal upheld the trial judge's holding. rankin's garage appealed. the majority of the supreme court noted that there was no consensus in previous case law on whether a duty of care existed in similar situations. to determine whether rankin's garage owed j a duty of care, the majority looked at whether the garage owner should have known that his failure to take care could cause harm to someone like j while the garage owner should have known that leaving a car unlocked with the keys inside could result in it being stolen, the evidence did not show that he should have known someone could be injured by a stolen car. this is because there was no evidence suggesting that a stolen vehicle would be driven unsafely for example, suggesting that it would be stolen by a young person. the majority noted that just because something is possible does not mean that it is reasonably foreseeable under the law. rankin's garage therefore did not owe a duty of care to j justice russell brown, writing for the dissent, disagreed with the majority's approach and would have dismissed the appeal. he considered that the garage owner could have reasonably foreseen that someone could get hurt as a result of his negligence in leaving keys inside an unattended, unlocked car. this case turned on the question of what kinds of harm are reasonably foreseeable. the majority's decision clarified that a business will only be liable in this kind of situation where both the theft and the unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle should have been foreseen. it further indicated that a defendant may still owe a duty of care even if a plaintiff participates in criminal activity.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules an ontario law that cut the number of toronto city councillors during the 2018 municipal election was constitutional. on may 1, 2018, a municipal election campaign started in the city of toronto. candidate nominations were due by july 27, 2018. over 500 people registered as candidates. on the day nominations closed, the government of ontario announced its intention to introduce a law to reduce the number of electoral wards from 47 to 25. the law, known as the better local government act, 2018, came into force on august 14, 2018. soon after, the city challenged the law in court. it argued the law violated the freedom of expression of candidates and voters, contrary to section 2(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. it also argued the law violated certain unwritten constitutional principles, such as democracy. the ontario superior court agreed with the city. the province of ontario appealed that decision. in the meantime, the election was held on october 22, 2018, with 25 wards only. later, the court of appeal ruled in favour of the province. the city then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has agreed with the province. the law did not violate the freedom of expression of candidates and voters. writing for the majority, chief justice wagner and justice brown said the lawdid not stop candidates from expressing themselves: 'the candidates and their supporters had 69 days longer than most federal and provincial election campaigns to re-orient their messages and freely express themselves according to the new ward structure'. the judges said the law did not restrict what candidates could say or do. they noted many candidates had successful campaigns, raised substantial amounts of money and won lots of votes. they said this would not have been possible if candidates had been prevented from meaningful expression. the majority recognized that some of the candidates' messages, made before the number of wards was reduced, may have lost their relevance. however, they said section 2(b) of the charter does not guarantee the effectiveness or relevance of messages or campaign materials. unwritten constitutional principles cannot invalidate a law. the majority said unwritten constitutional principles, such as democracy, can be used to understand and interpret the constitution, but these principles cannot be used to invalidate laws. the authority of provinces over municipalities was not in dispute. section 92(8) of the constitution allows provinces to pass laws affecting municipalities. that means the province could change the number of wards at any time without consulting the city beforehand. this authority was not in dispute in this case.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court finds no abuse of process during lengthy disciplinary proceedings against a saskatchewan lawyer. mr. peter v abrametz is a member of the law society of saskatchewan and has practiced law in prince albert for 49 years. in 2012, the law society audited mr. abrametz's financial records, found irregularities and began disciplinary proceedings against him. those irregularities included making high-interest loans to vulnerable clients and issuing cheques to a fictitious person before endorsing and cashing them. in 2013, the law society notified mr. abrametz that he would be suspended temporarily. however, mr. abrametz was allowed to continue practicing, subject to certain conditions. they included that mr. abrametz had to retain a lawyer to supervise his practice and its financial accounts, including withdrawals. he was also barred from accepting, endorsing and cashing cheques. the law society served mr. abrametz a second notice in 2014, but again he was allowed to continue to practice under similar conditions. a year later, the law society issued a formal complaint against mr. abrametz and appointed a hearing committee. it wasn't until 2018 that the law society found him guilty of four charges of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. it disbarred him with no chance at applying to rejoin the law society for almost two years. during the disciplinary proceedings, mr. abrametz argued that the law society took too long to investigate and decide his case. he said it amounted to an abuse of process. the law society's hearing committee dismissed that argument but the court of appeal for saskatchewan agreed with mr. abrametz. the law society then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has agreed with the law society. there was no abuse of process. writing for the majority of supreme court judges, justice malcolm rowe said there is no basis to set aside the hearing committee's finding that there was no abuse of process. 'the court of appeal departed from its proper role when it substituted its own findings of fact.' the test to determine whether delays amount to an abuse of process was set out in an earlier supreme court case. it has three steps. first, the delay must be unreasonable. this is determined by the context, including the nature and purpose of the proceedings, the length and causes of the delay and the complexity of the facts and issues in the case. second, the delay must have caused the person harm. examples include psychological or reputational harm, disruption to family life and loss of work. when these two requirements are met, courts must conduct a final test to determine if there was an abuse of process. this test is met when the delay is manifestly unfair to a party or in some other way brings the administration of justice into disrepute. in this case, mr. abrametz has not shown that the hearing committee was wrong in concluding that the delay was long but that it was not inordinate and that there was no significant prejudice to mr. abrametz. therefore, the test was not met and the court of appeal should not have set aside the hearing committee's conclusions.
+supreme court of canada a class action lawsuit about video lottery games can't go forward, the supreme court has ruled. video lottery terminals (vlts) are electronic gambling machines. they let people pay to play gambling games, like slots, for fun or in hopes of winning money. they are usually found in bars and places that sell alcohol. any place that has a vlt has to get a licence for it. in newfoundland and labrador, atlantic lottery corporation approves the licence. mr. babstock played vlts. he wanted to sue atlantic lottery corporation. he said vlts were dangerous and that they tricked people. he said atlantic lottery corporation should have to pay six years' worth of profits from vlts in newfoundland and labrador to the people who played them. mr. babstock wanted to sue on behalf of all of these people. when a large group of people have the same legal problem, they might decide to get together and sue as a group. this is called a 'class action' lawsuit. (the 'class' is the group, so it's a group action.) a class action lets the whole group get their complaint dealt with in court at once. otherwise, each person would have to go to court on their own. a judge has to 'certify' the class action, to give it permission to go ahead. a 'representative plaintiff' is a person that represents the entire group. in this case, mr. babstock was the representative plaintiff. he asked the court to certify the class action. mr. babstock said that atlantic lottery corporation was negligent (that is, it didn't take proper care). he said it should have warned people about the risks of gambling on vlts. these risks included addiction and suicidal thoughts. mr. babstock said this was wrong. he said atlantic lottery corporation should have to pay the group all the profits it made. he said it had to do this even if no one showed any harm or loss. mr. babstock said that this was a 'waiver of tort.' he said it wasn't just a way of compensating harm, but that it was the basis for that harm. also, mr. babstock said that atlantic lottery corporation broke a contract with each person who paid to play. he said it should have provided games that were safe. instead, the games tricked people. this was a 'breach of contract.' finally, he said atlantic lottery corporation got a benefit at the group's expense that it didn't have a legal right to. this was 'unjust enrichment.' both the certification judge and court of appeal said the class action could go ahead. they said 'waiver of tort' may be a basis someone could sue on, not just a way of compensating for harm. the majority of judges at the supreme court said that none of mr. babstock's arguments had a chance of success. because of this, they said the class action shouldn't go ahead. all the judges agreed that 'waiver of tort' doesn't exist in canadian law. they said people could be compensated for harm through 'disgorgement' but that it couldn't be the basis for harm. disgorgement means giving up your profits even if you didn't cause anyone harm or loss. the majority said that disgorgement could only be used as compensation in very specific situations, like a broken contract. it could only be used if other ways of compensating wouldn't work. for example, if it isn't possible to calculate the amount of the loss, or if the loss can't be expressed in money, disgorgement might be an option. the majority said that wasn't the case here. the majority said this wasn't a case of 'unjust enrichment' because there was a contract, as mr. babstock admitted. getting a benefit from a valid contract is a legal reason to keep that benefit. trials, especially class action trials, take a lot of time and money. this is why judges have to make sure a class action has a chance of success before saying it can go ahead. they don't look at all of the evidence to decide this. they just apply the law to decide whether it would have a chance of success if all the claims were true.
+supreme court of canada a person born in canada to parents who were undercover russian spies is a canadian citizen, the supreme court has ruled. mr. vavilov was born in toronto in 1994. in 2010, his parents were arrested for spying in the united states, where they were living. mr. vavilov learned then that his parents had been undercover russian spies his whole life. the united states sent the parents back to russia as part of a spy exchange. mr. vavilov tried to renew his canadian passport. he was rejected twice. officials said he needed proof he was canadian, and his birth certificate wasn't enough. he needed a certificate of canadian citizenship. he got this and applied again. but he still didn't get a passport. instead, he got a letter from the registrar of citizenship. the registrar makes the final decision on who is a canadian citizen. the letter said giving mr. vavilov the certificate of citizenship was a mistake and that he was not a canadian citizen. the registrar's decision was based on her view of the citizenship act. the general rule is that anyone born in canada is a canadian citizen. but there is an exception. this exception applies to a child of 'a diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in canada of a foreign government.' if neither parent is a canadian citizen or permanent resident, the child won't be a citizen. the registrar said the exception applied in mr. vavilov's case. the registrar relied on a report for her decision. the report was written by a junior analyst. the analyst noted there was no definition of 'other representative or employee in canada of a foreign government' in the act. but she said it could include undercover spies. the analyst recommended the registrar cancel mr. vavilov's certificate of citizenship. mr. vavilov asked the federal court to review the registrar's decision. the federal court ruled for the registrar. it said the decision was 'correct.' the federal court of appeal ruled for mr. vavilov. it said the decision was 'unreasonable' and quashed (canceled) it. (to better understand what 'correct' and 'unreasonable' mean here, read the 'case law in brief' on the standard of review.) all the judges at the supreme court said the registrar's decision was 'unreasonable' and that the federal court of appeal was right to quash it. they said mr. vavilov was a canadian citizen. the judges said the registrar didn't justify her view of the law. they said she didn't properly consider lawmakers' debates, court cases, the text of the citizenship act, and international law. these sources showed that the exception was only meant to apply to people who had diplomatic 'privileges and immunities.' citizens have to follow all their country's rules. for example, canadian citizens have to pay canadian taxes and obey canadian laws. but people working for foreign governments, like at embassies or consulates, don't always have to. they may have 'privileges and immunities.' these are like exceptions to the rules that citizens have to follow. they are meant to make sure one country can't meddle in another country's foreign policy through its officials. the officials need the privileges and immunities to do their jobs properly. that's why diplomats and other foreign representatives to canada can't become canadian citizens. the majority said it didn't matter that mr. vavilov's parents were working for a foreign state. what mattered was whether they had privileges and immunities. they didn't. that meant the exception didn't apply to mr. vavilov. normally, if a court finds an administrative decision unreasonable, it will send it back to the decision-maker to try again. in this case, the majority said it wouldn't be useful to do that. mr. vavilov had already brought up all these issues and nothing changed the registrar's mind. the judges said that mr. vavilov was a canadian citizen. this case was one of three cases known as the 'administrative law trilogy.' (the other two cases, decided in bell canada v canada (attorney general), were about super bowl ads.) vavilov and the super bowl ad cases were about very different issues. but they all dealt with an area of administrative law called 'standard of review.' to learn more about this (and to better understand the court's reasons in this case), read the 'case law in brief' on the standard of review.
+supreme court of canada time limits for adult criminal trials also apply to youth criminal trials, the supreme court has ruled. in april 2015, kjm was 15 years old. he got into a fight and stabbed someone in the face and head with a box cutter. he was charged with several crimes. he said it was self-defence and pleaded not guilty. kjm's trial was set for september 2015. but an issue about some evidence came up that had to be dealt with. the earliest date available to deal with it was six months later. but kjm came to court late that day, and there wasn't time to finish. the next available date was about four months later. there was also a delay when a transcript wasn't ready. in the meantime, the supreme court released an important decision, r v jordan. jordan set out new rules to decide how long is too long for a criminal trial. in canada, everyone charged with a crime has the right to be tried in a reasonable time. this right comes from section 11(b) of the charter of rights and freedoms, part of canada's constitution. if the time between the charge and the end of trial is too long, the court can stop the prosecution. this is called a 'stay of proceedings.' jordan said most trials should finish either 18 or 30 months after a person is charged, depending on the type of trial. if a trial takes longer, it should be 'stayed' unless the crown (the prosecution) can show a good reason why it should continue. a trial taking less time can still be stayed if the defence tried to move things along and the trial took 'markedly' (a lot) longer than it should have. jordan also created special rules for cases already in progress when the rules changed, like kjm's. these were called 'transitional' cases. in october, just over 18 months after he was charged, kjm asked for a stay. according to jordan, he argued, his trial should have finished earlier. the trial judge disagreed. kjm was found guilty of assault and weapons crimes soon after. the majority of the court of appeal agreed kjm's trial hadn't taken too long. the supreme court had to decide if the jordan time limits for adult criminal trials also applied to youth criminal trials. the majority said they do. it said the jordan rules are flexible enough to apply to everyone, no matter what their situation. but the majority noted that timely trials are especially important for young people. young people tend to be more short-sighted about consequences than adults. they need the opportunity to grow during their teenage years. long trials create stress and anxiety and get in the way of positive change. the majority said that the entire youth criminal justice system needs to respect this. the majority also said judges need to consider a person's age when a trial takes less than 18 or 30 months. each case is different, but a trial that isn't too long for an adult can be too long for a young person. in this case, the total time between when kjm was charged and when he was found guilty was almost 19 months. the majority said this wasn't actually over the jordan time limit. this was because, under the jordan rules, three to four months were deducted for delays caused by the defence and the transcript problem. the majority said that while the defence did try to move things along quickly, it wasn't convinced the trial took a lot longer than it should have. the majority also considered the fact that jordan came out 15 months after kjm was charged. that made his case 'transitional'. in the end, the majority said the trial judge's decision should stand. even though it didn't apply to kjm, the majority said time taken to deal with young offenders outside court shouldn't count toward the jordan time limits. this includes time taken for things like counselling or community service programs. this is to encourage other ways of dealing with youth crime, which may have better results. this case was about the right to be tried in a reasonable time. the right doesn't just benefit people charged with crimes. it also protects the rights of victims, witnesses, and society as a whole. victims and witnesses benefit from less worry and frustration when trials happen faster, and they can move on. society benefits when justice happens quickly and people charged with crimes are treated fairly.
+supreme court of canada an agreement saying an ubereats driver had to go to arbitration instead of suing in ontario was so unfair it was invalid, the supreme court has ruled. uber was a company that created software (phone apps) to arrange ride-sharing and food delivery. mr. heller was a driver for ubereats, the food delivery service. to become a driver, mr. heller had to click to agree to a long, standard contract. he didn't have any power to negotiate any of it. his only option was to accept or reject it. the contract said any legal problem mr. heller had with the company had to be resolved by the international chamber of commerce in the netherlands, not a court. this part of a contract is called an 'arbitration clause.' the agreement meant mr. heller wasn't allowed to sue the company in court. when mr. heller clicked on the contract, he didn't know how much arbitration would cost. the contract didn't say anything about this. he later found out that it would cost him almost $15,000 (us dollars) just to start the process. this didn't count legal fees, travel costs, or lost wages. mr. heller earned between $400 and $600 (canadian dollars) each week. this was before he paid taxes and expenses. starting the arbitration would cost most of his yearly income. in 2017, mr. heller said uber was breaking the terms of the contract and ontario employment law. he decided to sue uber. his lawsuit was about whether he and other drivers were employees of the company. uber said mr. heller couldn't sue in ontario courts. this was because he had agreed to go to arbitration. mr. heller said the arbitration clause was 'unconscionable' (so unfair it was invalid). the motion judge stayed (stopped) the lawsuit. he agreed with uber that the arbitrator should decide if the arbitration clause was unfair. the court of appeal, on the other hand, agreed with mr. heller that ontario courts should decide whether the arbitration agreement was valid. the court of appeal decided the agreement was invalid. the majority of judges at the supreme court agreed that courts should decide if the arbitration clause was unfair. they also agreed that it was invalid. the majority said ontario's arbitration act applied in this situation. the act said a lawsuit in court shouldn't go forward in court if both sides had agreed to arbitration, but there were exceptions. one exception was if the agreement was invalid. in this case, the majority said upholding the arbitration agreement would deny mr. heller access to a remedy (that is, a way to get compensated for harm or wrongdoing). there would be no way he could even have his arguments heard without paying most of his yearly income and likely having to go to the netherlands. he didn't know any of this when he agreed to the contract. the majority said this made the arbitration agreement unconscionable, so it was invalid. courts use unconscionability to protect weaker parties in contracts with stronger parties. when one party has no choice, or doesn't understand what they are signing, their bargaining power is weaker. courts can set aside the agreement if a stronger party gets too much of an advantage (even if it doesn't mean to). because it found the arbitration clause to be invalid for unconscionability, the majority didn't need to decide if it was also invalid for avoiding mandatory employment laws. the result meant mr. heller could continue his lawsuit in ontario courts. arbitration agreements are becoming more common in many contracts. the supreme court previously dealt with ontario arbitration laws in telus communications inc. v wellman.
+supreme court of canada the right to be tried in a reasonable time protects accused persons when trial judges take too long to render their decisions, the supreme court has ruled. the canadian charter of rights and freedoms is part of canada's constitution. under section 11(b), anyone charged with a crime has the right to be tried in a reasonable time. it protects both people accused of crimes and society. long criminal trials cause suffering and frustration for everyone involved. people accused of crimes often sit in jail while waiting for their trial. victims and their families are left waiting for a final decision. the public waits longer to see justice done. the right to be tried in a reasonable time is important. if an accused person's trial takes too long, it can be stopped. this is called a 'stay of proceedings.' it means there won't be a verdict of guilty or not guilty. in july 2016, the supreme court of canada decided an important appeal, r v jordan. jordan set out rules to decide how long is too long for a criminal trial. it said that most trials should finish either 18 or 30 months after a person is charged, depending on the type of trial. jordan tells judges to 'presume' (accept as true) that anything longer is 'unreasonable,' unless there is something unusual to justify it. (in this context, 'unreasonable' basically means 'too long.') if the time taken was unreasonable, the proceedings have to be 'stayed.' jordan also set out special rules for cases like kgk's, which had already started when the rules changed. these were called 'transitional' cases. in 2013, kgk was charged with sexual crimes against a child. his trial finished in january 2016. the trial judge took nine months to decide the case. in october 2016, he found kgk guilty. the day before, kgk asked for a stay of proceedings. he said that his case had taken longer than the usual 30-month maximum. he said the trial judge had taken too long to give his decision. the crown (the prosecution) argued that the time taken was reasonable because kgk's case was 'transitional'. it said the trial judge's decision-making time didn't count toward the jordan time limit. the judge who dealt with kgk's request for a stay said the trial judge's time shouldn't be counted under jordan. a majority of the court of appeal agreed. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that the time a trial judge takes to decide a case doesn't count toward the jordan time limit. the majority said at the time jordan was decided, there was a real problem with delays in getting people to trial. the criminal justice system had become too accepting of those delays. but there wasn't any evidence of a problem with the time trial judges were taking to give their decisions. so jordan didn't deal with that. the majority created a new approach to decide if a trial judge has taken too long to give their decision. it said that trial judges should be presumed to take only the time necessary to deliver a fair decision. trial judges know that criminal charges should be dealt with as quickly as possible. as the people dealing with all the evidence and arguments, they are in the best position to figure out how long they need to decide the case. still, sometimes trial judges take too long. if the accused can show that the trial judge took 'markedly longer' (a lot longer) than was reasonably necessary to make their decision, the proceedings will be stayed. in this case, the majority said the trial judge took a long time, but not 'markedly longer' than he should have. it also noted that the whole trial, and a lot of the time the trial judge took to decide, happened before jordan came out. the majority said if this case had happened after jordan, its decision would likely have been different. besides the time the judge took, the majority said that any other delay in kgk's case was reasonable. this was because his case was 'transitional.' this was one of two cases heard during the supreme court's visit to winnipeg, manitoba in september 2019. it was the first time in history the court sat outside of ottawa.
+supreme court of canada courts can't force parties to renegotiate contracts, the supreme court has confirmed. unexpected changes in electricity prices didn't mean that hydro-qu bec had to share its profits from the churchill falls power station. in 1969, after many years of negotiations, hydro-qu bec and the churchill falls (labrador) corporation (part of newfoundland and labrador hydro) agreed to build a power station on the churchill river. it was a huge and expensive project. hydro-qu bec took on most of the financial risk in the contract. it agreed to buy most of the electricity at fixed prices price for 65 years, whether it needed it or not, and to cover any construction cost overruns. but it got a long-term supply of cheap energy in return for taking this risk on. the corporation got a long-term, stable source of income. that meant it was able to borrow money to build the station, which in 2018 was worth over $20 billion. by 2009, the price of electricity was much higher than it had been forty years before. hydro-qu bec was taking advantage of the low rates and selling electricity to customers outside quebec at higher prices. the corporation didn't think this was fair. it said it should be able to share in the profits. in 2010, when hydro-qu bec refused to renegotiate the contract, the corporation asked the courts to force it to. in quebec law, people who sign a contract together have certain duties toward each other. the province's civil code says that all sides have to treat each other with 'good faith.' that means they have to be honest and not do anything to hurt each other. as part of this duty, they are sometimes expected to cooperate. how far the duty goes depends on the kind of contract it is. it is stronger for a 'relational' contract than for a 'transactional' one. a relational contract is based on a long-term, cooperative relationship where risks and benefits are expected to be shared (like a partnership). a transactional contract specifically sets out risks and benefits agreed to by all sides. the corporation said the contract was relational, so hydro-qu bec had to share its benefits. hydro-qu bec said it wasn't a relational contract, so it didn't have to share anything. both the trial court and the court of appeal ruled for hydro-qu bec. the majority at the supreme court also ruled for hydro-qu bec. it said the trial judge was not wrong to decide that the contract wasn't relational, and that hydro-qu bec didn't have to renegotiate. the contract set out many things very precisely, which showed both sides meant to follow the specific wording of the agreement, not to rely on any ongoing relationship. good faith didn't mean hydro-qu bec had to give up the benefits it had negotiated. good faith also didn't mean hydro-qu bec had to renegotiate just because there was an unexpected change in electricity prices. while quebec courts sometimes make a party compromise a bit to find a solution, no court ever forced parties to renegotiate the key parts of a contract. also, no court ever found that a duty to cooperate meant a party had to give up some of its profits just because the other party wasn't profiting as much. finally, the majority agreed with the trial judge that the corporation's claim was too late anyway. this case dealt with a long-term contract and civil law concepts of good faith, equity, and unforeseeability. the majority confirmed that courts should not change contracts or force parties to renegotiate them if this would upset the balance the parties originally agreed to.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court of canada rules that quebec's ban on possessing and cultivating cannabis plants for personal purposes is constitutional. in 2018, the federal government enacted a law about cannabis, which says people cannot possess or cultivate more than four cannabis plants at home. provinces and territories then enacted their own laws to regulate practical matters, such as how cannabis can be sold and stored. in quebec, the cannabis regulation act prohibits the possession and cultivation of cannabis plants for personal purposes. if caught breaking this law, people can be fined between $250 and $750. soon thereafter, mr. murray‑hall brought a case to quebec's superior court on his own behalf and on behalf of everyone in that province who might be fined for possessing or cultivating cannabis plants. he argued that the quebec government does not have the power to ban cannabis plants. he said that only the federal government has that power as a matter of criminal law, which is within federal jurisdiction under section 91(27) of canada's constitution. alternatively, mr. murray‑hall argued that the quebec ban should be declared of no force or effect because the federal law should prevail over the provincial law. the judge agreed and declared the quebec ban unconstitutional. the attorney general of quebec appealed that decision on behalf of the province. the quebec court of appeal disagreed and ruled that the ban is constitutional because it pertains to matters of provincial jurisdiction under two other sections of the constitution: section 92(13), which allows provinces to make laws related to property and civil rights; and section 92(16), which permits them to make laws of a local or private nature within a province. that outcome meant quebeckers could not possess or cultivate cannabis plants. mr. murray‑hall appealed the decision to the supreme court. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. in pursuing public health and security objectives, the quebec legislature has jurisdiction to prohibit the possession and cultivation of cannabis for personal purposes. writing for a unanimous court, chief justice wagner found that the pith and substance of the challenged provisions of the provincial law is to ensure the effectiveness of the state monopoly over cannabis in order to protect the health and security of the public, and of young persons in particular, from cannabis harm. banning the possession of cannabis plants and their cultivation at home is a means of achieving the provincial law's public health and security objectives. according to the chief justice, the prohibitions act as incentives for the integration of consumers into the legal cannabis market that ensures 'control of the quality of the products offered, education on the risks of cannabis consumption and compliance with rules on the minimum age for purchasing cannabis', among other things. such provincial legislative action in the field of public health comes within the provinces' jurisdiction over property and civil rights and residual jurisdiction over matters of a merely local or private nature. the chief justice also determined that the challenged provisions of the provincial law do not frustrate the purpose of the federal law. contrary to mr. murray‑hall's argument that the purpose of the federal law is to confer a positive right to possess or cultivate a maximum of four cannabis plants in order to eliminate or reduce the illicit cannabis market, the chief justice stated that the purpose of the federal law is rather to reduce the presence of criminal organizations in the cannabis market while at the same time excluding the possession and cultivation of a maximum of four cannabis plants from the scope of the criminal offences in that law. although the provincial law prohibits any possession or cultivation of cannabis plants, the same objective guided both levels of government. for these reasons, the chief justice concluded that the provisions of the provincial law banning the possession and cultivation of cannabis plants in quebec are valid and operative under canada's constitution.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that a court in the uae can decide the custody of two resident children who travelled to ontario with their canadian mother. the parents were married in 2012 in pakistan and then moved to dubai in the united arab emirates (uae) where the father works. both are citizens of pakistan but the mother is also a canadian citizen. their daughter was born in 2016 and their son in 2019. the mother has always been the primary caregiver and her residency in dubai has depended on the father. in june 2020, the mother travelled to ontario with the children to visit her family. the father agreed to the trip but he remained in dubai. a few weeks later, the mother informed the father that she would not be returning to dubai with the children. the father started legal proceedings in ontario for the children to return to dubai. he invoked ontario's children's law reform act (clra), which can apply in cases of international child abduction by a parent. the mother responded by saying she would not return to dubai. she asked the ontario court to decide the custody of the children, instead of a court in the uae. the mother claimed the children would suffer serious harm if they returned to dubai and that staying with her in ontario was in their best interests. before the hearing, the father offered to settle their dispute. he promised to ensure the mother's independent residency status in dubai by buying her a property in her name. he also agreed to allow the children to reside there primarily with her. under the clra, ontario courts typically do not exercise jurisdiction on custody issues when children have been wrongfully taken from their home in another country and end up in the province. however, there are exceptional circumstances when an ontario court may act. under section 23 of the law, a court can act when children are physically present in ontario and the court is convinced they would suffer serious harm if removed from there. in this case, the ontario court declined jurisdiction. the judge was not convinced the children would suffer serious harm if they returned to dubai. he declared that the mother had wrongfully kept the children in ontario and that they should be returned to uae with or without her. the judge gave the parties an opportunity to make further submissions on whether to include the father's settlement proposal in his order. the mother made no submissions in this regard and the settlement offer was not included. the mother appealed the order to ontario's court of appeal, where it was dismissed. she then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the 'serious harm' threshold required under the clra was not met. writing for a majority of the judges, justice nicholas kasirer explained that as a general rule in canadian family law, the best interests of children are measured from the children's perspective and are the paramount consideration for all decisions that concern them. while separating young children from their primary caregiver could certainly cause them psychological harm, it will not always rise to the level of 'serious harm' required under the clra. justice kasirer said the trial judge in this case made no reviewable error in deciding that this level was not met. as a result, the custody of the children should be resolved by a court in the uae. while the majority judges found no reason to interfere with the trial judge's assessment, they said the father should be bound by his initial settlement offer if the mother decides to return to dubai. in this case, the legal question focused only on jurisdiction. as justice kasirer said, the case was not 'a comprehensive comparison of the child's life in the two jurisdictions', nor a 'broad-based best interests test' as is conducted on the merits of a custody application.
+supreme court of canada religious groups don't need to have the same fair procedures as public bodies, the supreme court has ruled. also, courts can't interfere with their decisions on purely religious questions. the highwood congregation of jehovah's witnesses is a religious group with about a hundred members in calgary. to become a member, a person must be baptized and show that s/he understands the religious teachings and lives according to the community's rules. anyone who doesn't follow the rules will be urged to repent (apologize). if the behaviour continues, a committee of at least three elders can decide to expel or 'disfellowship' the member. the congregation calls this committee a 'judicial committee.' randy wall became a member in 1980. in 2014, the judicial committee disfellowshipped him for sinning and not fully repenting. the decision was confirmed by an appeal committee and by the watch tower bible and tract society of canada, the head office of jehovah's witnesses in this country. mr. wall asked the alberta court of queen's bench to review the decision. 'judicial review' is when courts look at tribunals' decisions to make sure they are proper. courts can only judicially review the decisions of public bodies (set up by the government and acting on its behalf), not private ones. when making decisions, public tribunals must treat everyone fairly and make decisions without bias. this is what is meant by 'procedural fairness.' mr. wall argued that the judicial committee acted unfairly. he said that the decision caused him to lose money because jehovah's witness clients avoided his real estate business. the lower courts first had to decide whether they had any power (or legal authority) to review the judicial committee's disfellowship decision. they decided they did, even though the judicial committee was not a public decision-maker. they decided this due to the financial impact on mr. wall and because the procedure may not have been fair. writing for a unanimous supreme court, justice malcolm rowe said this was wrong. the courts did not have the power to review the disfellowship decision of a private, religious organization. mr. wall didn't have a right to the congregation members' business. he also didn't have a right to membership in the congregation that courts could enforce, like a contract. justice rowe confirmed that courts can only review the decisions of public decision-makers and that private decision-makers don't have to follow fair procedures unless an enforceable legal right is at stake. he also confirmed that disagreements about religious principles are 'non-justiciable' that is, not appropriate for courts of law to get involved in. this decision confirmed that religious groups can decide their own membership and rules. courts cannot interfere with their decisions, except when needed to resolve an underlying, 'justiciable' legal dispute.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court issued written reasons in a case decided from the bench in november 2019. in 2009, ms. macht got a loan for $306,000 from td bank. the loan was secured by a hypothec on her house. (a hypothec in quebec's civil-law system is like a mortgage in common-law provinces and territories.) she also got a loan of about $94,000 from the youngs. it was also secured by a second hypothec. the youngs knew about the first hypothec with the bank. ms. macht stopped paying her loans. if a hypothec doesn't get paid, the person owed money can force the property to be sold or can take it themselves. the youngs asked the quebec court to force ms. macht to give up the house in order to pay the debt she owed them. in 2011, the court declared them the owners. but the bank still had its hypothec on the house. shortly after, the bank asked the court to be allowed to take the house from ms. macht because its hypothec wasn't paid. but the youngs owned it now. they paid the bank what ms. macht owed in missed payments, even though they didn't agree they had to. the bank asked the court to force the youngs to give up the house in order to pay ms. macht's debt. the trial judge agreed with the bank, and said it was the owner. the court of appeal disagreed. it noted that the bank only took action against the youngs, who owned the house at the time. the bank didn't take action against ms. macht, who personally owed it the money. the court of appeal said the hypothec didn't exist anymore. it had expired even before the trial judge made his decision. the bank should have taken action against ms. macht to stop it from expiring. but the time had expired, so it was too late for it to do this and try to get its money back from the youngs. the supreme court decided this case 'from the bench' at the end of the hearing on november 7, 2019. when a case is decided 'from the bench,' it means an oral decision is given right away. the parties don't have to wait for a written decision, which takes some time (an average of about five months in 2019). about a third of decisions were given from the bench in 2019. when a case is decided from the bench, the court will sometimes give a written explanation (reasons) later. this can be done to make things more clear. in most cases, though, there won't be written reasons. this doesn't mean there is no explanation. when giving the oral decision, the court might give a short explanation, or say something like, 'we allow (or dismiss) this appeal substantially for the reasons given by the court of appeal.' that means it's relying on the reasons of the lower court, which basically got it right. in this case, the majority of judges agreed completely with the court of appeal. the court of appeal's decision stayed in effect. that meant the youngs got to keep the house and the bank couldn't claim anything on it. canada has two major legal traditions, common law (based on english law) and civil law (based on the french civil code). quebec is the only province that applies civil law. it can be found in the province's civil code, which applies to most non-criminal legal issues. some concepts like mortgages and hypothecs are similar under common law and civil law. but they are often based on different principles and can have different rules. having two main legal traditions helps make canada unique. in fact, the supreme court of canada is the only bilingual (two languages) and bijural (two legal systems) supreme court in the world.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules the four-year mandatory minimum sentence for discharging an air-powered pistol or rifle at a house is unconstitutional. on may 6, 2014, mr. jesse dallas hills consumed a large amount of prescription medication and alcohol. the intoxicated man later left his lethbridge, alberta home with a baseball bat and a loaded rifle designed for hunting big game. mr. hills proceeded to swing his bat at a passing car and then fire a shot at it. the driver called 9-1-1. before police arrived, mr. hills turned his attention to an unoccupied parked car. he smashed its windows and then approached a house. he fired a round that went through the home's living room window and through a wall into a computer room before it stopped in a drywall stud and bookcase. at the time mr. hills fired his shots, the home was occupied by a couple and their two children. the father called 9-1-1, then went to the basement with the rest of the family where they waited for police to arrive. the officers discovered that several rounds had penetrated the walls and windows, into parts of the home where someone could have been hit. after a preliminary inquiry, mr. hills pled guilty to four offences, including discharging a firearm into or at a house contrary to section 244.2(1)(a) of the criminal code. at the time, this offence carried a four-year mandatory minimum sentence set out in section 2442(3)(b) mr. hills challenged the sentence under section 12 of the charter, which guarantees the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. he argued the mandatory minimum sentence was grossly disproportionate and therefore constituted cruel and unusual punishment. his challenge relied on a hypothetical scenario, where a young person intentionally discharges an air-powered pistol or rifle at a residence that is incapable of perforating the walls of a home. the sentencing judge found that the sentence in the hypothetical scenario was grossly disproportionate. he sentenced mr. hills to three and a half years in prison. the crown appealed the judge's finding and the sentence. the court of appeal allowed the appeal on both grounds. it restored the mandatory minimum sentence and sentenced mr. hills to four years in prison. mr. hills then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court allowed the appeal. the four-year mandatory minimum sentence set out in section 244.2(3)(b) of the criminal code is cruel and unusual punishment. writing for a majority of the judges, justice sheilah l martin ruled that the four-year mandatory minimum sentence set out in section 244.2(3)(b) is grossly disproportionate in the hypothetical scenario raised by mr. hills. it infringes section 12 of the charter and cannot be saved by section 1. it is immediately declared of no force or effect and this declaration applies retroactively. the three-and-a-half-year sentence imposed on mr. hill by the sentencing judge is reinstated. the evidence showed that many air-powered rifles, such as paintball guns, are considered 'firearms', even though they could not perforate the wall of a typical residence. the majority found that the provision applies to a wide spectrum of conduct, ranging from acts that present little danger to the public, to those that pose a grave risk. it is also reasonably foreseeable that a young person could intentionally discharge such a 'firearm' into a home. as justice martin said, 'it would shock the conscience of canadians to learn that an offender can receive four years of imprisonment for firing a paintball gun at a home'. in arriving at this conclusion, justice martin further developed the framework applicable to challenges to the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the charter. to determine if a mandatory minimum sentence is grossly disproportionate, the court must take two steps. first, a court must determine a fit and proportionate sentence for the offence, in line with the objectives and principles of sentencing in the criminal code. the court must then decide if the mandatory sentence is grossly disproportionate to the fit and proportionate sentence. the outcome will depend on the scope and reach of the offence, the effects of the punishment on the offender, as well as the penalty and its objectives.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that police violated a quebec man's right to a lawyer when he was arrested for murder. patrick dussault was arrested by police in gatineau, quebec, in august 2013 and charged with murder and arson. the police informed him of his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (charter). section 10(b) provides that 'everyone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right'. at the police station, mr. dussault spoke to a lawyer on the phone who explained the charges against him and his right to remain silent. when the lawyer had the impression that mr. dussault did not understand, he offered to come to the station and to continue the conversation in person. mr. dussault agreed and the police approved the lawyer's visit. in the meantime, the lawyer told mr. dussault not to speak to anyone until he arrived at the station. he also asked the police to suspend their investigation until he was present. yet when the lawyer arrived, the police did not allow him to see mr. dussault. instead, they told mr. dussault the lawyer was not at the station. the police proceeded to interrogate mr. dussault. the accused then made an incriminating statement that was later used against him in court. mr. dussault pleaded guilty to the arson charge and a jury trial was held to decide the murder charge. at trial, mr. dussault asked the judge to exclude the incriminating statement from the evidence. he argued that it violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the charter. the trial judge disagreed and admitted the statement. the jury eventually convicted mr. dussault of murder. he then appealed to quebec's court of appeal. the court of appeal found that police had violated mr. dussault's section 10(b) charter right and ordered a new murder trial. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. mr. dussault's section 10(b) charter right was violated. writing for a unanimous court, justice michael moldaver said police failed to provide mr. dussault with a further opportunity to speak with his lawyer before they interrogated him. as a result, his section 10(b) charter right was violated. an initial conversation between the accused and a lawyer normally satisfies the right to counsel. but if the police cause the accused to doubt the legal advice received or the trustworthiness of the lawyer who provided it, the police must provide the accused another opportunity to speak with a lawyer. in this case, the supreme court found that the police caused mr. dussault to doubt his lawyer's advice. it said they led mr. dussault to believe that: (1) an in-person meeting would happen when his lawyer arrived at the station; and (2) his lawyer had not come to the station. this 'was one of those rare cases in which the police were obligated to provide the accused with a second opportunity to consult counsel', wrote justice moldaver.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court upholds the eight-year prison sentence for a bc man who sexually assaulted two girls. in 2019, kerry nahanee plead guilty to two counts of sexual assault against his nieces. mr. nahanee admitted to sexually assaulting one niece once and sexually assaulting the other niece many times. at the sentencing hearing, the crown asked the judge to sentence mr. nahanee to between four to six years in prison. the lawyer for mr. nahanee asked the judge for a sentence of three to three-and-a-half years. the judge sentenced mr. nahanee to five years for the assaults on the first niece and three years for the assault on the second niece for a combined total of eight years in prison. the judge considered various aggravating and mitigating factors in calculating mr. nahanee's sentence. aggravating factors increase the severity of a sentence, while mitigating factors contribute to a more lenient sentence. in the judge's view, the aggravating factors in this case included: abuse of a family member; abuse of a person under the age of 18; abuse of a position of trust; and that the offences significantly impacted the two victims. as for mitigating factors, mr. nahanee had plead guilty, he was relatively young, and he had no criminal record. the judge also considered mr. nahanee's indigenous background during sentencing. section 718.2(e) of the criminal code directs courts to pay special attention to the circumstances of indigenous offenders. as such, the judge reviewed the gladue report, which is a pre-sentencing report done for indigenous offenders.the gladue report gets its name from the supreme court of canada's 1999 ruling in r v gladue, which established the factors that courts must take into account when sentencing indigenous offenders. mr. nahanee appealed his sentence to british columbia's court of appeal. he argued that the 'public interest test' established by the supreme court of canada in its 2016 ruling in r v anthony-cook should apply to his case. that test guides judges when the crown prosecutor and defence lawyer agree to a specific sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. according to the test, judges should impose the agreed-upon sentence unless it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, which is never in the public interest. mr. nahanee also argued the sentencing judge should have advised the parties that she intended to impose a harsher sentence than the crown was seeking. the court of appeal dismissed mr. nahanee's appeal. he then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed mr. nahanee's appeal. the anthony-cook case does not apply. writing for the majority, justice michael moldaver said that the public interest test in the anthony-cook case, 'does not, and should not, apply to contested sentencing hearings following a guilty plea'. the anthony-cook case applies only when both parties propose a joint submission on sentencing, meaning they agree on the sentence. mr. nahanee's case involved a contested sentencing hearing because the crown and defence lawyer had proposed different sentences. the majority said judges must notify the parties if they intend to impose a harsher sentence than the one sought by the crown. the judge must then give the parties the opportunity to make further submissions. in this case, the judge did not notify the parties that she intended to impose a harsher sentence and did not provide them an opportunity to make further submissions. however, the majority said mr. nahanee did not show he had information to provide the judge that would have impacted his sentence. also, the judge provided adequate reasons for why she exceeded the sentence the crown was seeking and her reasons, when read as a whole, were not wrong. finally, the eight-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules the copyright act only requires users to pay one royalty fee to stream works online. copyright law protects original works of writing, music or art. under canada's copyright act,the person who creates a work holds its 'copyright' and is the only person with the right to reproduce or perform the work. if someone else wants to reproduce or perform the work, they must ask the copyright holder for permission, and they are usually asked to pay a fee called a royalty. the copyright holder is also the only person with the right to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication, such as playing a song on the radio. in 2012, a new section was added to the copyright act to clarify that this right includes 'making the work available' online by uploading it to the internet. for example, downloading a song creates a new copy of the music, so a reproduction royalty must be paid. likewise, streaming a video of the song is a new performance of the music, so a performance royalty must be paid. the copyright board of canada is a federal administrative body whose mandate includes approving the amount of royalties to be paid for some online services. it received submissions from different groups on how to interpret the new section of the copyright act, including the society of composers, authors and music publishers of canada ('socan'). socan is an organization that collects and distributes royalties for music creators, publishers and visual artists. socan argued that 'making works available' online attracts a royalty separate from the royalties for downloading or streaming the same works later on. this would mean that, for example, online music services would have to pay a royalty when they post a song on the internet in a way that allows for online access by individual users. another royalty would be paid when a song is downloaded or streamed. the copyright board agreed with socan. the federal court of appeal overturned the decision of the copyright board. it said the new section of the copyright act does not create a new and separate royalty for uploading a work, in addition to the royalty that must be paid when users download or stream the content. socan appealed the court of appeal's decision. the supreme court has dismissed socan's appeal. the copyright board's decision was wrong. writing for the majority of supreme court judges, justice malcolm rowe found that the copyright board's interpretation of the new section of the copyright act was inconsistent with the text and purpose of the law and how it operates, and ran contrary to previous decisions of the supreme court in other copyright cases. in rejecting the board's and socan's interpretation, justice rowe said 'the copyright act does not exist solely for the benefit of authors'. the copyright board's interpretation would also force users to pay more fees if they access works on the internet instead of using other means, such as listening to the radio. justice rowe said this violates the principle of technological neutrality: the law should treat online works the same way it treats offline works. 'what matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it,' he wrote. for streaming, the supreme court found that the new section of the copyright act simply clarifies that a work is 'communicated' when it is made available or uploaded online. this already attracts a royalty. if and when individual users stream that same work, no additional royalties must be paid. streaming is part of 'one continuous act' that began when the work was made available online. because of this, streaming something that was already uploaded online requires paying only one royalty, not two. downloading is different. it involves a separate right: the right to reproduce the work, not the right to communicate the work to the public by telecommunication. this interpretation of the new section of the copyright act ensures that canada complies with its obligations under an international copyright treaty. the test to determine how courts should review administrative decisions on legal issues, like the decision of the copyright board here, was set out in an earlier supreme court case: canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v vavilov. vavilov established categories of legal issues that should be reviewed under the standard of 'correctness'. 'correctness' means that the administrative decision on that issue has to be the only right answer in light of the law and the facts. but the legal issue raised by the copyright board's decision in this case did not fall into one of the existing 'correctness' categories. however, vavilov said that new categories could be created in rare circumstances. the supreme court created a new category of 'correctness' review and found that the copyright board's decision was wrong in this case.
+supreme court of canada for the first time, the supreme court has found a pay equity law unconstitutional because it was discriminatory. in a 6-3 decision, justice rosalie silberman abella, writing for the majority, dismissed an appeal by the government of quebec. to tackle the problem of wage discrimination against women workers, quebec passed a law in 1996 forcing employers with 10 or more employees to give equal pay for work of equal value. ten years later, less than half of employers had complied. less than two-thirds had even started on a plan. in 2009, quebec changed the law to require employers to review their progress on pay equity every five years through audits. if the audits showed women were not being paid fairly, they could still only get pay equity every five years, with no back pay for unfair wages in between. some unions challenged the new law in court. they said that making pay equity available only every five years was discriminatory. the quebec courts agreed that the law breached women's equality rights under section 15 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. justice abella agreed that the law violated women's equality rights. pay equity is based on the idea that stereotypes about the role of women in society lead to 'women's work' being valued and paid less than 'men's work.' pay equity laws require employers to identify jobs done mostly by women, and compare their salaries to the salaries for jobs done mostly by men. where equal pay is not being given for work of equal value, employers have pay their women employees to close the gap. by restricting pay equity to every five years, the law let employers off the hook. the law continued the disadvantage women already suffered in the workforce. this breach of women's equality rights was not constitutionally justified. it continued to punish women financially for their employers' failures. five judges agreed with justice abella. justices suzanne côté , russell brown, and malcolm rowe disagreed. they said quebec's law did not breach women's equality rights. they noted that charter rights are 'negative rights,' meaning that governments do not have to adopt particular laws but if they do, those laws must comply with the charter. quebec decided to adopt a pay equity law, and when it saw that the original scheme was not working, it chose to replace it with one that would better achieve equal pay for women. in practice, the changes benefitted women employees and brought them closer to real pay equity. these judges said that the choice of how to improve quebec's pay equity laws should be left to quebeckers' elected representatives, not the court. they also noted that back pay was available for unfair wages in between audits. this case was decided on the same day as centrale des syndicats du qu bec v quebec (attorney general) which upheld other parts of quebec's pay equity laws.
+supreme court of canada refusing a breathalyzer after causing a fatal accident is as serious as the crime of drunk driving causing death, the supreme court has confirmed. in may 2013, two year-old geo mounsef was killed when richard alan suter drove his car onto a restaurant patio where the mounsef family was eating dinner. mr. suter and his wife were arguing as he pulled up to park in front of the restaurant. at one point, he accidentally hit the gas pedal instead of the brake and drove into the patio. the sentencing judge later found that mr. suter wasn't impaired by alcohol at the time. mr. suter was arrested. he spoke to a legal aid lawyer, who confused him and gave him bad legal advice by telling him not to provide a breath sample. mr. suter then refused to provide the sample, despite being told by a police officer that this was a crime. sometime after his arrest, mr. suter was abducted by a group of vigilantes who used a set of pruning shears to cut off his thumb. the attack was linked to the death of geo mounsef. mr. suter pleaded guilty to refusing to provide a breath sample after causing an accident where someone died. there is a wide range of possible penalties for this, depending on the circumstances and the offender's moral blame. the maximum penalty is life in prison, the same as for drunk driving causing death. this is to reflect the seriousness of the crime and discourage people from refusing. when a person refuses to provide a breath sample, it means the police, court, public, and family of the person who died will never really know whether the driver was impaired or 'over 80' at the time. the sentencing judge would have sent mr. suter to prison for over three years, but lowered the sentence to four months plus a thirty-month driving ban because of the circumstances. he said four months was appropriate because mr. suter's refusal to provide a breath sample was based on the lawyer's bad advice, and that 'fundamentally' reduced his moral blame. both mr. suter and the crown appealed. the court of appeal increased his prison sentence to twenty-six months. justice michael moldaver, writing for the majority at the supreme court, said that both the court of appeal and sentencing judge made errors. the court of appeal, in raising mr. suter's sentence to twenty-six months, effectively punished mr. suter for crimes he wasn't charged with (careless driving or dangerous driving causing death). it also didn't consider the vigilante attack as part of his total circumstances. on the other hand, the sentencing judge, in sentencing mr. suter to four months, gave too much weight to the fact that mr. suter was not drunk at the time and received bad legal advice. justice moldaver agreed with the sentencing judge that mr. suter should have received a lower sentence than would normally be the case. but given the sentencing judge's errors and the seriousness of the crime, he thought four months was too low. he decided that a 15 to 18-month sentence would have been appropriate at the time of the plea. however, mr. suter had already served just over 10 months in custody, and spent almost nine months awaiting the supreme court's decision. justice moldaver said that sending him back to jail now would serve no useful purpose, so he reduced the sentence to 'time served' (leaving the thirty-month driving ban in place). five judges agreed. justice cl ment gascon disagreed and would have kept the four-month sentence. while he would have weighed the facts differently than the sentencing judge did, he didn't find the sentence 'clearly unreasonable' (the legal standard required to change it). justice gascon said the circumstances of this case were unique and particularly sympathetic; mr. suter was sober and only refused the breath sample because he was explicitly told to by his state-provided lawyer. this left him with very little moral blame. in any case, he said, the sentencing judge was in the best position to weigh these facts and decide an appropriate sentence. this was the first time the court ruled on 2008 changes to the criminal code that raised penalties for refusing a breath sample after an accident where someone is hurt or dies. the changes meant that refusing a breath sample would lead to the same penalties as impaired and 'over 80' offences causing injury or death. the decision highlighted that a sentence must match both the seriousness of the crime and the person's level of responsibility.
+supreme court of canada a person who shares an electronic device with someone else can't waive the other user's charter rights, the supreme court has ruled. police violated a man's charter rights when they took his computer to search it with only his spouse's consent. mr. reeves wasn't allowed to live in the family home after he was charged with domestic violence. his spouse told mr. reeves' probation officer that the year before, she thought she'd seen child pornography on the home computer they shared. in response to this report, a police officer came to the home. he didn't have a search warrant, and didn't think he had enough evidence of a possible crime to get one. but mr. reeves' spouse let the officer in and signed a form saying he could take the computer. the police kept the computer for four months before doing anything. they didn't report to a judge or justice of the peace that they had taken it, which the law said they had to do. when they finally searched it, they used a faulty warrant. however, they found 140 images and 22 videos of child pornography. mr. reeves was charged. section 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms says that 'everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.' this means the state can't search or take something private without permission, unless the law specifically allows it, like when police have a warrant. everyone agreed that the police violated mr. reeves' charter rights when they didn't report the seizure and when they searched the computer with a faulty warrant. but mr. reeves argued the initial seizure of the computer was also a charter breach. he said that the violations were together so serious that the files shouldn't be allowed into evidence. the crown (the prosecution) argued the police were allowed to take the shared computer because mr. reeves' spouse gave them permission. the judge who heard the pre-trial argument agreed with mr. reeves that the computer evidence couldn't be used. without it, mr. reeves was found not guilty. the court of appeal said that, given the series of charter breaches, this was a borderline case, but said the evidence should be allowed. it ordered a new trial. all the judges at the supreme court agreed with the pre-trial judge that the files shouldn't be allowed into evidence. they said the not-guilty verdict should stand. the majority said that the police breached mr. reeves' charter rights by taking the computer without his consent and without a warrant. an individual who shares a computer with someone else takes the risk that the other person can access their personal data, and maybe even tell the police about it. but the law shouldn't allow the police to take the device or its data directly, without the individual's consent or a warrant. when two people share a personal computer, one can't consent to its search or seizure on behalf of the other. only mr. reeves could waive his own charter privacy rights; his spouse could not. when deciding if section 8 has been violated, courts balance society's interest in protecting personal privacy with its interest in allowing police to enforce the law. the real question isn't whether someone broke the law (when charges are laid, there's usually evidence that they did). it's whether the police went too far in trying to find evidence of a crime. where a police investigation invades someone's privacy in a way that could cause the public to lose confidence in the justice system, courts won't allow the evidence to be used. while this may result in a not-guilty verdict, it is necessary to signal the importance of protecting the privacy of every canadian, including those never charged with a crime. the majority said the police went too far when, along with the two other charter breaches, the officer took mr. reeves' home computer without his permission or a warrant. the majority didn't decide if the police officer's entry into the home was legal, because it didn't rule on whether one person can allow the police to enter and search shared spaces. it wasn't the central issue in this case. the devices canadians use every day, like laptops and cell phones, contain a great deal of private information. they can also be used to access even more information stored elsewhere, like in email and social media accounts. this case was important because it affected the privacy rights of all canadians in shared devices.
+supreme court of canada a binding agreement will exist where both sides show by their actions they meant to enter an agreement, the supreme court has ruled. crystal square was a large complex in burnaby, bc. it had a mall, office tower, residential tower, hotel, parking garage, police office, and cultural centre. each was in a different 'air space parcel.' air space parcels are parts within a whole. they can be separate buildings, or parts of a building (like specific floors in a large tower). legally, air space parcels are separate. but they can share certain parts of the building or services. for example, access to the street or connections for water or electricity. when crystal square was built, its developer signed an air space parcel agreement with the city of burnaby. one thing the agreement set out was access to parking for each air space parcel and how much they would pay for it. the office tower was a strata (condo) tower. a strata is made up of several units or 'strata lots.' strata lots are owned by different people, but have shared areas. each strata lot owner is a member of a strata corporation. the corporation manages and maintains shared areas and services. a strata corporation is considered a legal person. that means it can sign contracts and own property, just like a physical person can. the strata corporation didn't exist yet when the air space parcel agreement was signed. but the members of the strata corporation still used the parking garage and paid for it like the agreement said. eventually, the owners felt that the parking cost was too high. they realized they never formally signed the air space parcel agreement. they said they didn't agree to the terms and it didn't apply to them. crystal square parking owned and ran the parking garage. it said the strata corporation accepted the agreement by following the terms for a while. the trial judge said the strata corporation didn't sign any agreement. she said the agreement between the developer and the city couldn't be enforced against the corporation. the court of appeal said the strata corporation made a new agreement about parking. the new agreement had the same terms as the one between the developer and the city. the majority of judges at the supreme court of canada agreed with the court of appeal. they said the strata corporation made a new agreement with crystal square parking, and that it could be enforced. they said the new agreement had the same terms that were in the air space parcel agreement. the court used the usual rules of contract law to decide this case. there was no law in bc that would change the way the rules applied to a strata corporation. it was clear the owners couldn't be forced to follow the original air space parcel agreement. contracts are only between the parties who agree to them. two people can't sign a contract to force another person, who didn't agree, to do something. this is called 'privity of contract.' ('privity' comes from the same latin word that 'private' does, and contracts are private agreements.) some companies can 'adopt' contracts that were agreed to before they existed, but that didn't apply here. the majority said the strata corporation made and accepted a new agreement, though. the owners had to follow that. generally, contracts don't have to be in writing. that just makes the terms easier to prove. if it's not clear that there is an agreement, or exactly what was agreed to, courts look at actions. if both sides showed they meant to enter an agreement, and acted in a way that led the other side to expect they would follow through, then there is a contract. in this case, crystal square parking made parking passes available to the strata owners. the owners used the parking spots and paid the fees that the original air space parcel agreement set out. in this situation, there was no reason for crystal square parking to think the strata owners didn't agree to the terms. this case was decided based on common law contract rules (that is, rules about contracts developed by judges). legislatures can change these rules by passing laws, but no written laws (statutes) applied to strata corporations in this particular case. the supreme court of canada has dealt with many different kinds of contract issues before. for example, in moore v sweet, it said a verbal agreement about who got insurance money was valid.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an online police investigation targeting people searching for sex with children was not entrapment. 'project raphael' was an online investigation conducted by the york regional police in ontario between 2014 and 2017. it targeted people searching online who wanted to pay to have sex with girls and boys. it involved police placing fake advertisements on the escort sub-section of a website called backpagecom people who engaged with these ads were led to text message conversations between a supposed 18-year-old sex worker, who was actually an undercover police officer. once the prospective client and the undercover officer agreed to a sexual transaction, the officer would then reveal that they were too young for sex work. every client who agreed to continue with the transaction and showed up to the designated hotel room, was arrested. project raphael led to the arrest of 104 men, including temitope dare. mr. dare was charged with three offences: (1) telecommunicating with a person he believed was under the age of 18, for the purpose of obtaining sexual services; (2) telecommunicating with a person he believed was under the age of 16, for the purpose of inviting sexual touching; and (3) communicating to obtain sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18. a jury convicted mr. dare of all three offences but he applied to have the proceedings against him stopped, alleging that he was the victim of police entrapment. mr. dare argued that officers had offered him the opportunity to commit a crime. to avoid an operation being considered entrapment, a police investigation must be a 'bona fide inquiry'. in this case, it meant that police must have had reasonable suspicions that a crime was being committed in the escorts section of the backpage.com website. having considered the entrapment test, the judge found that mr. dare was not entrapped and dismissed his application. mr. dare appealed to ontario's court of appeal, which dismissed his appeal. he then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the supreme court heard this case together with r v ramelson, r v jaffer and r v haniffa, and the judgments are being rendered at the same time. those cases also involved individuals claiming they were entrapped as a result of project raphael. their appeals have also been dismissed. mr. dare was not entrapped. writing for a unanimous court, justice andromache karakatsanis ruled that mr. dare was not entrapped, for the reasons set out in r v ramelson. in that case, she had concluded that project raphael was a bona fide inquiry because 'police had reasonable suspicion in a space defined with sufficient precision'.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that companies cannot undo transactions that later cause them unintended taxes. this is a case involving two companies, rite-way metals ltd. and harvard industries ltd., which were wanting to avoid paying taxes on some of their assets. the companies followed guidelines published by the canada revenue agency (cra). according to these guidelines, section 75(2) of the income tax act allowed companies to avoid taxes on dividends if paid to a family trust. a dividend is a part of the profit a company pays to its shareholders. a family trust is a legal entity created to hold assets. once assets are transferred into the trust, they are no longer the property of the person who transferred them. instead, they belong to the trust, which is then administered for the benefit of the trustees (or beneficiaries), who are usually members of the relevant family. in this case, the trusts were for the collins and cochran families. the trusts were created in 2008. a few years later, in an unrelated case, the tax court of canada issued a decision with a different interpretation of section 75(2). the effect of the ruling was that family trusts owe taxes on any such dividends. the collins and cochran family trusts applied to the supreme court of british columbia to cancel the transactions that led to the dividends. british columbia's supreme court agreed to do so. the court of appeal dismissed the appeal by the attorney general of canada on behalf of the cra. the attorney general then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has agreed with cra's interpretation of the law. the transactions cannot be cancelled. writing for the majority of supreme court judges, justice russell brown said principles of equity and tax law prevent the companies from reversing their transactions. 'taxpayers should be taxed based on what they actually agreed to do and did, and not on what they could have done or later wished they had done,' justice brown wrote. a court may grant relief to parties only when it would be unfair to enforce transactions. the judges wrote there is nothing unfair about the ordinary application of tax laws to transactions freely undertaken. if any changes are required, it would be up to parliament to make them, not the courts, the majority noted. retroactive tax planning is not allowed. the supreme court has previously stated that retroactive tax planning is not allowed. this means people cannot later change their tax arrangements to prevent any unintended negative consequences. although taxpayers can arrange their finances as they see fit to reduce their taxes, their planning may have the opposite effect. if so, they must bear that responsibility.
+supreme court of canada in ontario, businesses can't get out of arbitration agreements by joining class action lawsuits with consumers, the supreme court has ruled. when a large group of people have the same legal problem, they might decide to get together and sue as a group. this is called a 'class action' lawsuit. (the 'class' is the group, so it's a group action.) a class action lets the whole group get their complaint dealt with in court at once. otherwise, each person would have to go to court on their own. before a class action can go ahead, a court needs to 'certify' (approve) it. mr. wellman had a cellphone contract with telus. he said that, for a certain time, telus rounded up calls to the next minute without telling customers. he said customers were overcharged and not given their full number of minutes. he asked the court to certify a class action against telus on behalf of himself and about two million other customers in ontario. about 1.4 million of these customers were consumers (who bought cell services for personal use). the rest were business customers (who bought services for business use). mr. wellman was asking for over $500 million in damages on behalf of the group. all of telus's customers agreed to standard terms and conditions when they signed up. one of these terms was that billing disagreements had to be decided in 'arbitration.' arbitration is when a neutral third party (other than a judge or a court) decides a legal dispute. businesses often use it because it can be more efficient and less costly than going to court. in ontario, arbitration rules are set out in the arbitration act. one of the act's main principles is that people who agree to go to arbitration should have to live up to their agreement. there are some exceptions, like when the agreement isn't valid. one exception is for consumers. the ontario consumer protection act says consumers can join a class action like mr. wellman's even if they agreed to arbitration. because of this, everyone agreed that the consumers could ask for compensation in court. but business customers weren't covered by the consumer protection act. telus said this meant they should be held to their agreement to go to arbitration. it asked the court to 'stay' the claims of the business customers, or stop them from going forward in court. the main issue in this case was how to interpret section 7(5) of the arbitration act. mr. wellman said the section meant courts could decide to let a claim go to court, even if it was covered by an arbitration agreement. he said this could happen if it wouldn't be reasonable to separate claims covered by the agreement (like the business customer claims) from claims that weren't (like the consumer claims). for him, that meant that both groups should be allowed to ask for compensation in court. telus, on the other hand, said courts had to stay claims covered by valid arbitration agreements. it said courts could let claims not covered by an agreement go to court. but claims that were covered (in this case, the business customer claims) had to be stayed. both the motions judge and the court of appeal agreed with mr. wellman. they said the business customers could join the class action. the majority at the supreme court disagreed. it said section 7(5) didn't allow the court to refuse to stay claims dealt with in a valid arbitration agreement. otherwise, the principle that people should respect their agreements would be weakened. people would be able to avoid their agreements just by piggybacking on, or joining their claims to, those of people who weren't bound to go to arbitration. the majority noted that the only dispute in this class action was about billing. all customers agreed this would be dealt with through arbitration. normally, this would mean everyone's claims in the class action would be stayed. it would not be heard in court at all. but because of the exception in the consumer protection act, consumers were protected from a stay. their claims could still be heard. business customers weren't covered by the exception, so they had to respect their agreement. their claims were stayed, and they would have to go to arbitration instead. this decision didn't deal with mr. wellman's claim that telus overbilled its customers. it only decided that the business customers weren't allowed to go to court to argue that.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court has upheld first-degree murder convictions for parents who abused and unlawfully confined a child. a unanimous supreme court dismissed spencer jordan's and marie-eve magoon's appeals against their first-degree murder convictions in an oral judgment on november 27, 2017. the court's written reasons, penned by justices rosalie silberman abella and michael moldaver, were released on april 13, 2018. the charges in this case related to the death of six year-old meika jordan, who died after spending a weekend with her father, spencer jordan, and her stepmother, marie-eve magoon. meika had endured serious abuse in the days before she died, which ms. magoon and mr. jordan justified as discipline. among other things, she had been deliberately burned, hit in the stomach (with enough force to damage her internal organs), and suffered several serious blows to her head. she was ordered to run up and down the stairs as a form of punishment, and beaten when mr. jordan and ms. magoon thought she was not complying with their orders. as a result of her injuries, meika lost consciousness and died. ms. magoon and mr. jordan were charged with first-degree murder. the trial judge found that they intended to harm meika in a way that was likely to cause her death, and that they were reckless about whether she actually died. they were convicted of second-degree murder at trial. the trial judge did not find them guilty of first-degree murder because she was not satisfied that they had unlawfully confined meika while inflicting the injuries. first and second-degree murder are related charges. second-degree murder is the less serious offence, and is said to be 'included' in the charge of first-degree murder. first-degree murder contains all the elements of second-degree murder, but in addition requires planning or an aggravating circumstance in this case, the aggravating circumstance was meika's unlawful confinement in the home. despite this 'inclusion,' both charges are considered separately when a criminal judgment is appealed. in this case, it meant that after trial the crown could appeal the acquittal for first-degree murder, while mr. jordan and ms. magoon could appeal their convictions for second-degree murder. the alberta court of appeal dismissed ms. magoon's and mr. jordan's appeals, confirming the conviction for second-degree murder. however, it also allowed the crown's appeal and upgraded the convictions to first-degree murder. mr. jordan and ms. magoon appealed to the supreme court. the court looked at the issue of unlawful confinement in the context of a parent-child relationship. they held that 'confinement' does not require a child to be physically bound or locked up, and that it can just as easily result from controlling conduct. when parents abuse or harm a child beyond any acceptable form of parenting, they lose legal authority to restrict the child's liberty, and may be found guilty of unlawful confinement. the supreme court agreed with the court of appeal that the pair's acts of 'discipline' went far beyond any acceptable form of parenting, and amounted to abuse. the court further agreed that meika was unlawfully confined by ms. magoon and mr. jordan. therefore, the two could be found guilty of first-degree murder. this case dealt with what constitutes unlawful confinement of a child by a parent, in the context of a criminal charge of first-degree murder. the court confirmed the alberta court of appeal's conviction of both mr. jordan and ms. magoon for first-degree murder. the penalty for first-degree murder is life in prison with no possibility of parole for 25 years.
+supreme court of canada evidence found on a young racialized man who was detained by police without reasonable suspicion can't be used against him in court, the supreme court has ruled. one evening in 2012, mr. le and four friends were hanging out in a backyard talking. three police officers saw them. the officers hadn't been called there for any specific reason. they didn't have a warrant. they had just been told that this was a 'problem address' for drug dealing and that a wanted suspect sometimes hung out there. they didn't see the men doing anything wrong. even so, the officers came into the yard without asking permission. they questioned the men, told one of them to keep his hands visible, and asked for id. mr. le said he didn't have id with him. the officer asked what was in the bag he was carrying. at that point, mr. le ran away. he was arrested and found to have a gun, drugs, and cash. he was charged with ten crimes related to these items. at his trial, mr. le said the items found on him couldn't be used as evidence against him. he said the police breached his rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the charter is part of canada's constitution. section 9 says that 'everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.' this means that police can't detain people, or put them in jail, without a legal reason. section 24(2) says that evidence taken by breaching someone's rights can't be used if it 'would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.' that means it can't be used if admitting it could make people lose faith in the justice system and the laws meant to protect them. everyone agreed that the police had no legal authority to make mr. le and his friends answer questions, follow directions, or show id. everyone agreed that mr. le was detained at some point. the question was exactly when, and whether there was a legal reason for it. the trial judge said mr. le wasn't detained until he was asked about his bag. he said the detention was legal because the officers had reasonable suspicion of a crime by that point (they thought mr. le might have a gun). he found mr. le guilty. a majority of the court of appeal agreed. the majority at the supreme court said the detention was illegal. it said the police actions were so shocking that the items they found by detaining mr. le couldn't be used against him in court. the majority said someone is 'detained' when an ordinary person in the same situation would think that they weren't free to leave and had to comply with police demands. mr. le was a member of a racialized community in a low-income area. members of racial minorities and people living in low-income areas often have more negative police contacts than other people do. an ordinary person stopped by the police many times before would think they had to do what the police said. the majority said mr. le was detained as soon as the officers entered the backyard. the majority noted that the officers came in without warning and without any reasonable suspicion of a crime. (someone just saying that drug dealing was happening wasn't enough.) since they didn't have reasonable suspicion, what they did was illegal. the majority said this was exactly the kind of thing the charter was meant to protect people from. the police got the evidence against mr. le by walking into a backyard and detaining him without a legal reason. if this were allowed, the majority said, people would lose faith in the justice system. police have to follow the charter in all neighbourhoods and for all people, no matter what their racial background or income. this helps people trust the law and the police, and makes our communities safer. the majority said the evidence the police found on mr. le couldn't be used against him. it entered not-guilty verdicts for the charges. this result wasn't because the charter doesn't care about violence, drugs, or community safety. it was because the illegal police actions were so serious. this case came to the supreme court as an appeal 'as of right.' that means there is an automatic right to appeal. the person doesn't need the court's permission. the right is automatic in criminal cases when a court of appeal judge dissents (disagrees) on a point of law, as happened here.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court clarifies how an 'accounting of profits' should be calculated for patent infringement. nova chemicals corporation (nova) and dow chemical company (dow) are competitors in the plastics industry. dow patented thin but strong plastics used in products such as garbage bags and food wrappings. when nova manufactured and sold products covered by dow's patent, dow sued for patent infringement. the federal court found that nova had violated dow's patent. as a remedy, dow asked the court to calculate its award based on the profits nova made by violating the patent. this is called an 'accounting of profits'. to determine the money owed to dow, the court calculated the revenues nova had earned by selling the infringing plastics. it then deducted what nova had paid to produce the patented plastics. the main chemical ingredient in theses patented plastics is called ethylene. nova produces ethylene for less than what it would cost to buy this product on the market. yet, nova asked the court to use the market cost of ethylene when calculating how much to deduct from its revenues, instead of its actual cost. the federal court refused. it deducted the actual cost of nova's ethylene production when calculating the amount it had to pay dow. in addition to the profits nova earned before the patent expired, dow argued it should also receive some of the profits nova made after the patent's expiry that resulted from the infringement. an advantage of having a patent is that an inventor has the opportunity to sell their product on the market before anyone else. a company who violates a competitor's patent will take over market shares more quickly after the expiry of a patent. profits earned from that advantage are called 'springboard' profits. the federal court agreed. nova then appealed to the federal court of appeal to reduce the award. it argued that, if it had not used its ethylene to make the patented plastics, it would have sold that ethylene to a third party, so it should be able to keep what it would have made from selling it. the federal court of appeal disagreed and upheld the original award. nova then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the lower courts did not make errors in calculating the award. writing for a majority of the judges, justice malcolm rowe said the lower courts calculated nova's accounting of profits correctly. he also said dow is entitled to the springboard profits. the majority judges rejected new arguments nova had raised before the supreme court. nova had said that it could have used its own ethylene to produce a completely different kind of plastic used to make pails and crates. it argued that it should be able to keep what it would have made selling those products. the majority ruled that the court should only deduct profits made from products that are comparable, but do not infringe the patent. since pail and crate plastics are nothing like the patented plastics, they could not be used as a hypothetical non-infringing option. 'the pail and crate plastics markets and patented plastics markets do not overlap. a potential buyer interested in the patented plastics would not purchase pail and crate plastics as an alternative', justice rowe wrote.
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