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+supreme court of canada the supreme court orders a new trial for a saskatchewan man accused of armed robbery. two people robbed a subway restaurant in regina, saskatchewan on july 7, 2016. one wore a mask and brandished a knife, while the other stood watch at the front door. the only employee on duty at the time could not identify the two robbers, but the restaurant security camera had captured images of the masked person. an anonymous tip implicated jason william cowan and he was arrested soon after. mr. cowan denied having any involvement in the incident and he claimed to have an alibi. however, he did admit to telling a group of people 'how to do a robbery' on the same day it occurred. police also noted that mr. cowan had been wearing shoes that closely resembled those worn by the masked person in the images from the security camera. when police showed mr. cowan the images from the security camera, he named two of his acquaintances. he called the lookout person 'littleman' and the armed robber mr. robinson. mr. cowan later named two more people. he told police that mr. fiddler and mr. tone had driven littleman and mr. robinson to the restaurant and that they had waited in mr. fiddler's vehicle during the robbery. mr. cowan was charged with armed robbery. he was tried by judge alone with no jury. at trial, the crown advanced two theories about what happened. the first was that mr. cowan was the masked armed robber and, as a result, was guilty as a principal offender. the second theory was that if he was not the masked man, mr. cowan was a guilty party because he had either helped commit the crime or had advised others on how to do it. the trial judge rejected both theories and acquitted mr. cowan. the crown appealed to the court of appeal, which agreed with the trial judge that mr. cowan was not a principal offender. the judges did not all agree, however, with the trial judge's finding that the crown had to first prove who had committed the actual robbery before finding mr. cowan guilty of helping or advising others on how to commit the crime. the majority of the court of appeal found that this error may have affected the verdict. they allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial on the second theory of liability. both mr. cowan and the crown appealed the court of appeal's ruling to the supreme court of canada. mr. cowan argued that the trial judge made no error and that his acquittal should stand. the crown argued that the court of appeal was not allowed to limit a new trial to a single theory of liability. instead, the crown said there should be a new trial on the charge of armed robbery as a whole. the supreme court has dismissed mr. cowan's appeal and allowed the crown's appeal. the new trial will be on the charge of armed robbery as a whole. new trial required writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice moldaver said the trial judge committed an error of law in assessing mr. cowan's liability as a party to the offence. to have an acquittal set aside due to a legal error, the crown must satisfy an appeal court to a reasonable degree of certainty that the error could have changed the outcome of the trial. in this case, the judges said, the crown had satisfied the court. they said that the verdict may well have been different if the trial judge had considered the evidence in light of the correct legal principles. appeal courts may not limit the scope of a new trial to a particular theory of liability on a single criminal charge. the majority said the new trial should be a 'full new trial' that is not limited to a particular theory of liability. the majority explained that appeal courts may not limit the scope of a new trial to a particular theory of liability on a single criminal charge. they said, 'as one of the purposes of the criminal process is to foster a search for truth, justice cannot require that a trier of fact be restricted in their ability to determine how, if at all, an accused participated in a given offence. rather, a trier of fact must be able to consider any and all theories of liability that have an air of reality based on the evidence adduced at the new trial.'
+supreme court of canada the speaker of the quebec legislature couldn't use parliamentary privilege to avoid the grievance process when he fired three security guards, the supreme court has ruled. parliamentary privilege only covers decisions that are necessary for a legislature to fulfill its constitutional role. in 2012, the speaker of quebec's national assembly (its legislature) fired three security guards for using assembly cameras to watch people in nearby hotel rooms. the security guards didn't think they should be fired. their union filed grievances (a formal complaint under a collective agreement) on their behalf. this was the normal procedure for civil servants who felt they had been wrongly fired by their employer. in this case, however, the speaker said his decision to fire the security guards was covered by 'parliamentary privilege.' parliamentary privilege is a kind of immunity (legal protection) that comes from the constitution. it is meant to allow legislatures to operate without outside interference. it applies both to individual elected members and to the legislature as a whole. the speaker said no one else was allowed to review his decision not even a labour arbitrator because it was covered by privilege. (a labour arbitrator is a person who decides complaints under a collective agreement.) the speaker based his argument on two specific types of privilege. the first was the privilege over the management of employees. the second was the privilege to exclude 'strangers' from the national assembly building, a task the security guards did on the speaker's behalf. ('strangers' are people who aren't members or officials of the legislature.) while both sides agreed that the privilege existed, they disagreed on whether it covered the firing of the guards. the arbitrator ruled for the security guards, saying that the decision to fire them was not protected by parliamentary privilege, and that the grievances could be heard. the speaker asked the courts to review the arbitrator's decision. the reviewing judge ruled for the speaker, saying the decision was, in fact, covered by privilege, and the arbitrator wasn't allowed to hear the dispute. the court of appeal disagreed and ruled against the speaker, saying parliamentary privilege did not apply. justice andromache karakatsanis also ruled against the speaker, saying that parliamentary privilege did not apply to his decision to fire the security guards. she said the purpose of parliamentary privilege was to allow the assembly and its members to do the work they needed to do under the constitution independently and with dignity and efficiency. the scope of protected decisions had to be limited to what was closely and directly connected to the legislature's constitutional role. this was important because courts can't review decisions protected by privilege even ones that go against the charter. justice karakatsanis said that, while security was crucial to the legislature's work, not all decisions about security guard management had to be protected. she also said that, while excluding strangers from the legislative buildings was protected by privilege, protecting a decision to fire employees who helped do that was going too far. while the speaker could fire the security guards if he had a good reason, justice karakatsanis said he still had to follow the same process for them as he would for any other civil servant. she said the dispute should go back to the arbitrator to decide. five judges agreed with justice karakatsanis. justice malcolm rowe agreed that the case should be sent back to the arbitrator to decide, but for different reasons. he said the assembly had set out how it would deal with employee management in the act respecting the national assembly. in his view, the assembly defined how it would use its privilege by passing this law. under the act, all employees of the national assembly were civil servants, with the same rights and obligations as other members of the civil service. the act provided a procedure to remove employees from the public service employment scheme, but the procedure was not exercised in this case. justice rowe said that the legislature couldn't set out the rules that would apply to it in law, and then later rely on privilege to depart from that law. justices suzanne côté and russell brown, writing in dissent, would have ruled for the speaker. they said security was critical to the assembly's ability to do its work, and the speaker delegated certain security tasks, including the exclusion of strangers, to the guards. this meant there was a close and direct link between their work and the work of the assembly, and so they were covered by parliamentary privilege. so was the speaker's management of these employees, and his decision to fire them. justices côté and brown noted that giving an arbitrator the power to revise the speaker's decision to fire guards he no longer had confidence in would take away the assembly's control over part of its security. this decision made clear the scope of the parliamentary privilege over two activities: the management of employees and the exclusion of strangers. the majority and dissenting judges agreed that privilege should be limited to what was necessary for a legislature to fulfil its role. but the majority judges did not think the speaker's decision in this particular case qualified.
+supreme court of canada judges have to make sure that people put in jail while they wait for trial really need to be there, the supreme court has ruled. when someone is charged with a crime, they are presumed innocent until proven guilty in court. this is why after an arrest, an accused person is normally released on bail to wait for their trial. however, in special situations, a judge may decide to keep the person in jail after their arrest. this is called 'remand' or 'pre-trial detention.' a person can be put in pre-trial detention because it's the only way to make sure they show up for court, to keep the public safe, or to protect public confidence in the justice system. even if a person is eventually found guilty, the presumption of innocence means that pre-trial detention is supposed to be a last resort. in canada, many people are kept in jail while waiting for their trials. on any given day, about half of people in jail in canada are waiting for their trial and have not been found guilty. being in jail makes it harder for them to defend themselves. people kept in jail before trial may be more likely to plead guilty. being in jail also affects their mental and physical well-being, family life, and jobs. a judge is supposed to look at the situation 90 days after the person was ordered to go to pre-trial detention. mr. myers was arrested in january 2016 and charged with several crimes, including some firearms crimes. he had been found guilty of other crimes before, and was on probation when he was arrested. he stayed in jail to finish that previous sentence. but by october, the only reason he was in custody was because of his new charges from january. he asked for bail for the first time in november 2016. the bail judge didn't think the conditions suggested by mr. myers' lawyer were enough to protect the public, and said no. mr. myers was supposed to get a detention review after 90 days, but waited many months longer. the new judge said he could only release mr. myers if there was unreasonable delay or some change in his situation. mr. myers didn't make any arguments in response, so he wasn't released. but he appealed, saying the judge's approach to the law was wrong. (most cases get appealed to a court of appeal, but courts of appeal don't have the power to look at bail review decisions. so mr. myers had to appeal directly to the supreme court of canada.) the problem was that courts across canada didn't agree how 90-day detention reviews worked. some said a person could only be released if their case was taking too long (if there was an 'unreasonable delay'). others said someone could be released even if there wasn't an unreasonable delay. some people thought that anyone who didn't have a bail hearing when they were first arrested didn't have a right to a review. others said everyone should get a review, no matter how they came to be in custody. the supreme court unanimously said these detention reviews are automatic. the jail or the prosecutor must apply for a hearing 90 days after the last order putting (or keeping) the person in custody. the judge then has to schedule a review hearing as soon as possible. the only question the judge has to decide is whether keeping the person in jail is legally necessary to make sure they attend trial, to keep the public safe, or to protect public confidence in the justice system. delay is just one thing a judge can look at. but delays don't necessarily have to be 'unreasonable.' what matters is the effect keeping the person in jail would have on them, now or in the future. for example, a judge should consider whether the person will spend longer in pre-trial detention than their sentence would be if they were found guilty. after hearing from both sides, the judge has to give the person a decision about why they have to stay in jail (or why they can leave, with or without conditions). the court said that judges have special obligations to make sure detention is justified and that trials are on track. many accused people don't have lawyers, and so judges have to take extra care to make sure things are fair. judges can make orders to speed up trials, especially when people are held in pre-trial detention.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court finds an accused person guilty of first degree murder for chasing and then killing a man who escaped from a moving truck. in 2015, darren sundman and two accomplices killed a rival drug dealer. it happened as all four men were riding in a truck outside prince george, british columbia. mr. sundman started hitting the victim with a handgun while the truck was traveling so fast that the victim could not escape the truck. but when the truck slowed down to make a turn, the victim jumped out and tried to run away. mr. sundman and the two accomplices chased after the victim on foot. mr. sundman shot the victim several times, stopping him from being able to run any farther. one of the accomplices then said 'i got him, boss', before shooting the victim at close range, killing him almost instantly. even though mr. sundman did not fire the fatal shot, he and the two accomplices had an intent to kill the victim, and so they were each charged with first degree murder. first degree murder usually means the murder was both planned and deliberate. that is, the accused person intended to kill someone and prepared it or thought it out ahead of time. but an unplanned murder can also be in the first degree when the accused person killed the victim while committing another serious offence, such as sexual assault or kidnapping. in this case, the crown argued that the murder was planned and deliberate, or that mr. sundman and his accomplices had forcibly confined the victim when they killed him. forcible confinement is when someone unlawfully keeps another person trapped or detained against their will. at trial, the judge acquitted mr. sundman of first degree murder, but convicted him of second degree murder. the judge found that because the killing was not planned, and because the victim managed to escape his confinement when he jumped out of the truck, this could not be first degree murder. the crown appealed the verdict to british columbia's court of appeal. it overturned the trial judge's decision and convicted mr. sundman of first degree murder. it said the victim could still be considered 'confined' after jumping out of the truck because he was being chased. mr. sundman appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has upheld mr. sundman's conviction for first degree murder. confinement does not always mean being physically restrained. writing for a unanimous supreme court, justice mahmud jamal said that, 'as a matter of law and common sense', the victim's 'brief escape' from the truck does not change the seriousness of mr. sundman's crime. 'on any sensible view,' he wrote, mr. sundman's 'moral blameworthiness cannot be considered to be lower' simply because the victim 'managed to jump from a moving truck and was running for his life when he was executed just moments later'. forcible or unlawful confinement involves depriving a person of their liberty so that they cannot move about the way they want to. the supreme court has clarified that confinement does not mean a person has to be restricted to a particular place. the person also does not need to be physically restrained. restraint can be enforced through violence, fear, intimidation, or through psychological means or other methods. in this case, the victim was forcibly or unlawfully confined inside the truck, because it was moving so fast. when the victim escaped from the truck and ran, he was still forcibly or unlawfully confined even though he was no longer physically restrained. he could not move about the way he wanted to, because mr. sundman and his accomplices chased him on foot while shooting at him with their guns. the supreme court concluded that the murder happened while the victim was still unlawfully confined, even when outside the truck. the confinement and the murder did not have to happen at the exact same time. the supreme court also said if a murder occurs during another serious offence, like confinement, treating it as first degree murder does not mean that the confinement and the killing needed to happen exactly at the same time. the test is whether the confinement and the murder were part of the same transaction or interaction, or if they represented a single continuous sequence of events. in this case, the supreme court found that mr. sundman and his accomplices murdered the victim 'while committing' the offence of unlawful confinement, because the two crimes happened in a single transaction between the victim and his killers. the confinement and the murder were close in time, and they involved a situation of continuous or ongoing domination over the victim that began in the truck, continued when the victim briefly escaped, and ended when he was killed. as for the accomplices, one was convicted of second degree murder and the other was convicted of manslaughter. those verdicts were not appealed to the supreme court.
+supreme court of canada a trust set up for a person with disabilities shouldn't disqualify them from their landlord's rental assistance program, the supreme court has ruled. ms. a was living with disabilities and receiving social assistance (government) benefits. after her father died, some money was put 'in trust' for her in 2012. when something is 'in trust,' it means someone (a 'trustee') takes care of it for the benefit of someone else. there are many kinds of trusts to meet many different needs. this kind, called a 'henson trust,' was designed to let someone put aside money or property for a person with disabilities. henson trusts try to do this in a way that still lets the person get government benefits. henson trusts aren't normally counted as 'assets' for programs that require proof of income or assets. this is because the trustee has full power to decide whether, and how much, to pay the person with disabilities. the person can't force the trustee to make any payments. in this case, ms. a and her sister were co-trustees and had to agree on all decisions together. ms. a lived in an affordable housing complex run by metro vancouver housing corporation. to qualify for affordable housing, a person had to show they had a low income each year. metro vancouver housing also had a rental assistance program to lower monthly rent payments even more for tenants with less than $25,000 in assets. but due to the program's limited funds, not everyone who was eligible could actually get assistance. tenants applied by filling out a form. ms. a applied and got assistance when she moved in in 1992, and got it every year after. ms. a applied again in 2015, as she did every year. this time, metro vancouver housing said the trust counted as an asset, and would be used to decide if she could still be considered for the program. ms. a said the trust wasn't an asset that could affect her eligibility, and refused to tell metro vancouver housing how much it was worth. metro vancouver housing said it couldn't process ms. a.'s application because she didn't provide the information. she stopped getting rental assistance as a result. the bc supreme court and court of appeal both said the trust was an asset that could disqualify ms. a from consideration for rental assistance. the majority at the supreme court of canada disagreed. it said metro vancouver housing had a duty under contract to consider ms. a.'s application for rental assistance. the application and its related agreements (including the lease) together made up the contract between ms. a and metro vancouver housing. the main issue was the meaning of the word 'asset' in the application. the majority looked at what both ms. a and metro vancouver housing understood the word to mean. 'asset' wasn't defined in any of the documents that were part of the contract. it was defined in a metro vancouver housing policy, but the application didn't refer to the policy. the majority noted that in everyday use, 'asset' means some kind of valuable property that a person can actually use to pay for things. it said it should have this meaning in the rental assistance application. the majority explained that ms. a's henson trust didn't meet this definition of 'asset.' that's because she had no control over whether she'd get any money from the trust, and couldn't count on it to pay rent. (the majority said it wasn't relevant that ms. a was a co-trustee, because she had no right to make any payments to herself on her own. all decisions had to be unanimous with the other trustee.) because the trust wasn't an 'asset' under the application, the majority said it couldn't disqualify ms. a from the rental assistance program. metro vancouver housing didn't have to give ms. a rental assistance but it did have a duty to consider her request. it breached this duty by not doing so when she applied in 2015. the majority sent the case back to the trial judge to decide how much ms. a should receive in compensation. it said the amount should put her as close as possible to the position she would have been in if metro vancouver housing hadn't breached its duty. this was the first time the supreme court looked at henson trusts. the majority didn't say a henson trust could never be treated as an asset, but only that it would depend on the criteria of the specific program.
+supreme court of canada the charter only protects human beings not corporations from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, the supreme court has ruled. 9147-0732 qu bec inc. was a corporation. it was found guilty of doing construction work without a licence. quebec's building act set out a minimum fine as punishment. it was fined over $30,000. the corporation said that the minimum fine was cruel and unusual punishment. it said this made the fine unconstitutional. the canadian charter of rights and freedoms sets out the rights and freedoms that canadians have. it is part of canada's constitution. section 12 says that everyone has the right 'not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.' this means certain treatments or punishments are unacceptable and not allowed. a corporation is a 'legal person.' a legal person is treated like a physical person (a human being) for some purposes under the law. it has its own 'legal personality,' meaning it has its own rights and duties. for example, it can sign contracts and own property, just like a human being can. corporations can benefit from some charter rights. for example, corporations are protected against 'unreasonable search and seizure' under section 8. the state can't search or take something private from a corporation without permission, unless the law specifically allows it, like when police have a warrant. corporations also have the right to a criminal trial in a reasonable time under section 11(b) however, they don't get the benefit of all charter rights. corporations don't have a right to 'life, liberty and security of the person' under section 7. they also don't have a right not to be forced to testify under section 11(c) the question in this case was whether a corporation could be protected from cruel and unusual punishment under section 12. the trial judge at the court of quebec said the fine wasn't cruel and unusual. anyway, he said, section 12only protects human beings, not corporations. the first appeal judge, at the superior court, agreed. the majority of judges at the court of appeal disagreed, though. they said section 12 could apply to corporations. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that section 12 only protects people (that is, real, live human beings). they said it doesn't protect corporations. cases dealing with section 12 have focused on 'human dignity.' human dignity is the idea that everyone has value and deserves respect, simply because they are a human being. it doesn't matter who they are or what they've done. the judges pointed out that section 12 is meant to protect human dignity. only human beings can have human dignity. corporations can't. the majority noted that it didn't matter that there were human beings behind the corporation. there are always real human beings behind a legal person. even though they may be making decisions on its behalf, they still keep their own separate, individual legal personality. most of the judges looked at the word 'cruel' in the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishment.' they pointed out that this word would normally only describe something that caused pain or suffering. that could only happen to a living thing like a human being, not a legal person like a corporation. this supported the idea that section 12 didn't apply to corporations. the majority of judges focused on the wording of the charter, its goals, and its history in making their decision. they said the wording of the charter and past canadian court decisions made it clear that section 12 only applied to human beings. the majority said they didn't need to rely on international treaties or laws or cases from other countries to help them decide. but they said international treaties that canada agreed to should matter more than ones that it didn't agree to. section 12 falls under the part of the charter that deals with legal rights. sections 7 to 14 protect people's rights when they are dealing with the justice system. they make sure people can trust it and that they are treated fairly, especially when they are charged with a crime. they are based on a belief in the dignity and worth of every human being.
+supreme court of canada british columbia law says courts can order back child support even after the child is grown up, the supreme court has ruled. ms. michel and mr. graydon were 'common-law' spouses. this meant the law considered them married, even if they didn't have a marriage certificate. they lived in british columbia. they had a child, ag. a few years later, the relationship ended. ag went to live with ms. michel. mr. graydon said his income was about $40,000 a year. he agreed to pay about $340 a month in child support based on that. while ag was growing up, ms. michel lived on social assistance. because of this, she had to sign over her rights to child support to the government. the government would collect the child support and pay her social assistance. the government never tried to ask for more support for ag. when ag became an adult, the child support ended. but ms. michel found out that mr. graydon's income had been higher than he said. she asked for back (retroactive) child support based on his real income. mr. graydon said it was too late to ask for this. he said the court didn't have the power to make him pay now, because ag wasn't a child anymore. when parents are formally married and decide to get divorced, the divorce act applies. the divorce act is a federal law. but before someone files for divorce, or when parents are de facto spouses (in quebec) or common-law spouses (in other provinces), provincial laws apply. under the federal divorce act, if the child is now grown up, parents don't have to pay back child support even if they should have paid it earlier. mr. graydon said british columbia's family law act should be read the same way. the trial judge said mr. graydon hid his real income, and this hurt ag. he was to blame for the situation. the trial judge ordered mr. graydon to pay $23,000 in back child support, split between ms. michel and ag. but the appeal judges agreed with mr. graydon that it was too late to order back child support. all the judges at the supreme court of canada said mr. graydon had to pay. they said that courts could change past child support orders under the family law act. they could do this even if the child was now grown up. child support is a right that belongs to the child. the parents can't negotiate it away. it should give the child the same standard of living they had when their parents were together. all the judges agreed that back payments are fair. parents are always responsible for paying according to their income. back payment orders just hold them to that. all the judges said courts need to consider the entire situation in deciding whether to make a parent pay retroactive child support. this includes why a parent waited to ask for the support, the behaviour of the parent who was supposed to pay, the child's situation, and whether it would cause hardship. the majority said the reason ms. michel waited to ask for back payments was that she had been badly hurt and the government took over her right to support. mr. graydon knew his income was higher than he was saying, so it wouldn't have been a surprise to him that he had to pay more. he also knew how bad ag's living situation was because of lack of money, and instead of helping her, made hurtful comments about it. he could afford to pay it now. all of this meant that he had to pay. all the judges agreed that preventing retroactive child support hurt women most. they said that support should be limited only where the law clearly says so. they said that although an older version of the law might have prevented child support for the past, the current one didn't. in any case, it would be wrong to encourage people to avoid paying in case the other parent might wait too long to ask for it. people shouldn't be able to profit from acting badly. this case was decided 'from the bench' at the end of the hearing on november 14, 2019. when a case is decided from the bench, it means the judges tell the parties the outcome right away. in this case, the judges gave written reasons later to explain.
+supreme court of canada a land developer's lawsuit against a residents' group was meant to silence critics and can't go forward, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. 1704604 ontario ltd. was a land development company in sault ste. marie, ontario. it wanted to build a neighbourhood on an area that was part of a wetland. some local residents were against the plan. they said it would destroy the wetland and cause other damage to the environment. they formed a group called pointes protection. the company had to get permission to build the neighbourhood. it needed approvals from the local conservation authority and city council. the conservation authority approved the plan. pointes protection said the decision was wrong. it asked a court to review it. while this was happening, council said no to the plan. the company appealed council's decision to the ontario municipal board, which decides on planning disagreements. pointes protection agreed not to go to court about the conservation authority decision. it agreed not to say that the conservation authority's decisions were against the law or not allowed. the company lost at the municipal board hearing. during the hearing, a pointes protection representative testified about the company's plan. he said the plan would hurt the environment and destroy part of the wetland. the company said this went against the agreement. it sued for breach of contract and asked for $6 million in damages. pointes protection said the company was wrongly trying to stop residents from speaking out. it said the company was trying to silence criticism on an important public issue. it said this was a 'strategic lawsuit against public participation,' or 'slapp.' slapps aren't about genuine legal claims. they are about intimidating and silencing critics. they are about getting people to settle and stop speaking to avoid the time and money it would cost to go to court. like some other provinces, ontario has a law to stop slapps before they ever go to trial. the motion judge said the lawsuit wasn't a slapp and it could go forward. the court of appeal said it was a slapp, so it had to be dismissed. all the judges at the supreme court of canada agreed this was a slapp. they said that slapps hurt people's right to freedom of expression, and that freedom of expression is important to our democracy. ontario's rules about slapps were new, so the court had to decide how to apply them. for a lawsuit to be a slapp, it had to be about something the defendant (the person being sued) communicated. whatever it was the defendant communicated had to be important to the public. but the person suing (the plaintiff) could show the lawsuit wasn't a slapp by showing three things. the first was that they were likely to win. the second was that the person being sued had no valid defence. the third was that it was more important to the public to let the lawsuit go forward than to protect what the defendant said. the court said judges have to look at the whole situation, between the parties and in society, to decide whether a lawsuit is really a slapp and should be stopped. in this case, the testimony at the ontario municipal board was an expression related to the public interest, as it was about the environmental impacts of the company's plan. the lawsuit was based on what the pointes protection representative said in the testimony. the court said that the company didn't have much of a chance of winning because its argument was based on an incorrect interpretation of the agreement. pointes protection had agreed it wouldn't raise their environmental concerns to the conservation authority. however, nothing in the contract said it couldn't use the same evidence in a different situation. the court also said it was more important to the public to protect pointes protection's testimony before an administrative decision-maker than to prevent the harm the company said it experienced. this was the first time the supreme court dealt with ontario's new rules about slapps. another case, bent v platnick, was also about slapps. the court used its decision in this case and applied it to that one. the court heard the cases on the same day.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court decides how 'releases' should be interpreted. on march 3, 2009, mrs. bailey struck mr. temple while driving her husband's car. mr. temple, an employee of the city of corner brook in newfoundland and labrador, was performing road work at the time. he sued mrs. bailey for the injuries he sustained. meanwhile, the baileys sued the city for the damage to the car and the injuries mrs. bailey sustained. on august 26, 2011, the baileys settled with the city and signed a 'release'. the release stated that the baileys agreed to exempt the city from any past, present or future claims of any kind related to the accident. in the years that followed, mr. temple's lawsuit against mrs. bailey continued. in that lawsuit, mrs. bailey filed a claim against the city, in which she asked the judge to order the city to pay mr. temple for her, should she be found responsible for his injuries. this is known as a third party claim, because the city in this case was not a party to the lawsuit but was being drawn into it. the city objected to the third party claim and argued the release prevented mrs. bailey from trying to get the city to pay. the judge agreed with the city. but on appeal, the court of appeal agreed with mrs. bailey. the city then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court agreed with the city and allowed the appeal. the court concluded the release that mrs. bailey had signed prevented her from making the third party claim against the city. a 'release' is a contract the supreme court explained that a release is a contract and should be interpreted according to general principles of contract law as set out in the court's previous decision of sattva capital corp. v creston moly corp. these principles require courts to give'the words used [in a contract] their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract'. the surrounding circumstances consist only of objective evidence of the facts at that time. it does not include the subjective intentions of the parties, meaning what may have been going on in their minds at the time. in this case, the judges noted that the release clearly stated that mrs. bailey was giving up her rights against the city in 'all actions, suits, causes of action foreseen or unforeseen and claims of any kind or nature whatsoever arising out of or relating to the accident'. the judges concluded that mrs. bailey's third party claim against the city came within the plain meaning of those words. they also concluded that the surrounding circumstances of the case confirmed that the parties, when signing the release, had objective knowledge of the third party claim. wording to consider when interpreting a release, the question will be whether the release includes the type of claim filed. therefore, when drafting a release, a person might consider wording that makes clear what claims the release will cover, including whether the release will cover yet unknown claims. a release that is specific to a timeframe or subject matter is less likely to cause disputes.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court has restored the conviction of an ontario man after determining that evidence obtained from an unlawful sobriety stop was nonetheless admissible. in the early morning of march 26, 2016, ontario provincial police officers spotted walker mccolman driving an all-terrain vehicle (atv) out of a convenience store parking lot onto a highway. the officers were on general patrol in a small town on lake huron in ontario and decided to follow the atv. they caught up to mr. mccolman about a minute later, when he had pulled onto the private driveway of his parents' home. the officers approached mr. mccolman in the driveway and observed obvious signs of impairment. they said mr. mccolman was unable to stand up straight and he smelled strongly of alcohol. mr. mccolman told the officers that he might have had 10 beers that evening. the officers arrested him for impaired driving and brought him to the police station, where he did two breathalyzer tests. mr. mccolman was then charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. at trial, one of the officers testified they did not see any signs of impairment before stopping mr. mccolman. he explained they were exercising their authority to conduct random sobriety checks under section 48(1) of ontario's highway traffic act (hta). this section gives the police the authority to randomly stop a motor vehicle and check if the driver is sober. the ontario court of justice convicted mr. mccolman of driving with excess blood alcohol, imposed a $1,000 fine, and prohibited him from driving for one year. mr. mccolman appealed. he argued the sobriety stop was illegal under section 48(1) of the hta because it was conducted on private property. he also said the officers had breached his rights under section 9 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms to not be arbitrarily detained. as a result, mr. mccolman argued the evidence obtained during the stop should have been excluded from the trial pursuant to section 24(2) of the charter. section 24(2) requires that evidence obtained in a way that breached the charter rights of an accused be excluded from trial if admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. the ontario superior court of justice agreed with mr. mccolman, set aside his conviction and acquitted him. when the court of appeal came to the same conclusion, the crown appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and restored the conviction. while the evidence was obtained by the police during an unlawful stop, it should not have been excluded from trial. writing for a unanimous court, chief justice wagner and justice o'bonsawin determined that the officers did not have the authority under section 48(1) of the hta to conduct the random sobriety stop in the private driveway. in their opinion, the hta defined a 'driver' as someone who drives or has care or control of a vehicle on a highway. a highway is defined as a 'common and public highway, street, avenue [] intended for or used by the general public'. they said mr. mccolman was not a driver for the purpose of section 48(1) because he was not on a highway when the police effected the stop. as such, the stop was unlawful, resulting in the arbitrary detention of mr. mccolman and the violation of his section 9 charter rights. yet, due to the nature and importance of the evidence, as well as the seriousness of the offence, the court considered that admitting the evidence was warranted: 'admission of the evidence in this case would better serve the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process and would not damage the long-term repute of the justice system'. for these reasons, the court concluded that the evidence obtained by the officers should not have been excluded from the trial.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court upholds convictions for two men who were operating a sexual escort service. the question in this case is how courts should treat crimes that are committed after the supreme court of canada declares a law unconstitutional but before that declaration takes effect. that is what happened when mr. tamim albashir and mr. kasra mohsenipour were convicted in 2019 for offences that occurred between 2013 and 2016. at that time, the men were operating a sexual escort service in vancouver. among the offences was a violation of section 212(1)(j) of the criminal code, which barred pimps from living off the money made by sex workers. in 2013, in the case of canada (attorney general) v bedford, the supreme court found canada's prostitution laws were unconstitutional, including section 212(1)(j) the judges found that it had criminalized all sex work, instead of focusing on controlling and abusive pimps. the supreme court gave parliament a one year 'suspension period' to change the law, which it did in 2014. mr. albashir and mr. mohsenipour committed the section 212(1)(j) offences during that suspension period, but were charged after it ended. at their trial, the question was whether the old law had become unconstitutional, preventing the men from being convicted. the trial judge decided that the law had indeed been unconstitutional at the time the crimes were committed and quashed the charges against both men. the crown appealed to the british columbia court of appeal, which convicted the men. the court of appeal held that the supreme court's declaration of unconstitutionality had never taken effect because parliament had replaced section 212(1)(j) before the end of the suspension period. mr. albashir and mr. mohsenipour appealed their convictions to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeals. the men could be charged and convicted under section 212(1)(j) of the criminal code after the suspension period had ended for conduct committed during it. writing for the majority, justice karakatsanis explained that a retroactive declaration means the law is considered to have always been invalid. a prospective declaration, on the other hand, means the law is considered to be invalid only after the suspension period has ended and the declaration of constitutional invalidity has taken effect. in the bedford case, the court had not said whether that declaration would apply retroactively or prospectively. but the purpose for the suspension was to continue to protect vulnerable sex workers while parliament replaced section 212(1)(j) with a new law. in light of this purpose, the majority in this case said section 212(1)(j) was unconstitutional only after the suspension period had ended. as a result, mr. albashir and mr. mohsenipour were liable under this provision for their conduct during the suspension period, and could be charged and convicted under it.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules a quebec media company may not access court documents that had been filed, and then removed, from a civil lawsuit once proceedings ended. this case involves the company mediaqmi inc., which publishes the journal de montr al newspaper. the news outlet wanted to publish details about a case involving mr. magdi kamel and his former employer, the centre int gr universitaire de sant et de services sociaux de l'ouest‑de‑l'ele‑de‑montr al (ciusss). the ciusss had sued its former manager, mr. kamel, claiming he had misappropriated approximately $400,000 of its money by channeling it into four different bank accounts over several years. it also asked the court to issue an order to learn who owned the four bank accounts. among the documents the ciusss filed with the court to support its case was a forensic accounting report. the quebec superior court agreed to order the identification of the bank account holder or holders. it also ordered the entire court record be sealed. mediaqmi subsequently asked the quebec superior court to unseal the documents so it could access the court record and its exhibits. however, before a judge could decide that issue, the ciusss dropped the lawsuit. as such, there was no trial, and both the ciusss and mr. kamel sought to retrieve documents from the court record. yet mediaqmi objected to the ciusss's efforts to remove its exhibits. the quebec superior court judge who ruled on the matter ordered the unsealing of the court records, but said that because the lawsuit had ended, the parties could retrieve their exhibits and shield them from the public. mediaqmi appealed to the quebec court of appeal and lost. it then appealed to the supreme court of canada. does the public still have access to exhibits once parties have retrieved them from the court record? the main question for the supreme court was whether the public can still have access to exhibits in court records once a lawsuit has ended and the parties have removed their exhibits from the court record. in quebec, the code of civil procedure gives any member of the public the right to access court records. the code of civil procedure also contains a provision dealing with the removal of exhibits filed in a court record. during proceedings, parties may withdraw their exhibits if all of them consent. once the proceedings have ended, parties have one year to retrieve their exhibits. if they do not, the exhibits may be destroyed. the majority of the judges of the supreme court of canada has upheld the finding of the court of appeal. they said that once parties retrieve their exhibits at the end of a proceeding, members of the public may continue to consult court records, but will no longer have access to exhibits that have been removed. the supreme court also emphasized that the general rule is that court proceedings and records are open and public.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court finds constitutional a new procedure in the criminal code for deciding if a complainant's private documents can be used by an accused in a sexual offence trial. jj was accused of sexual assault in british columbia. his identity is protected by a publication ban. shane reddick was also accused of the same in ontario. in both cases, the men argued that sections 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code are unconstitutional. those provisions set out how a judge decides if a complainant's private documents (called 'records' in the criminal code) can be used by the accused during their trial for a sexual offence. this is known as the record screening process. these provisions are also used to decide how evidence of the complainant's past sexual activity can be used. evidence like private documents and past sexual activity can be allowed in certain circumstances. jj had records of communications between himself and the complainant. he wanted to use those records to cross-examine the complainant. likewise, mr. reddick wanted to cross-examine the complainant in his case, but on evidence of her past sexual activity. before their trial, both jj and mr. reddick asked a judge to decide that the record screening process violated three of their rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms:the right to remain silent and to not self-incriminate, the right to a fair trial, and the right of an accused to present evidence in their defence and challenge the evidence against them. in jj's case, the judge found one aspect of the record screening process unconstitutional. both the crown and jj appealed the judge's decision to the supreme court of canada. a jury later found jj not guilty, and the crown has not appealed the acquittal. in mr. reddick's case, the judge found the entire record screening process unconstitutional. the complainant asked the supreme court for permission to appeal that decision. she said it affected the right of sexual assault complainants to participate in decision-making about how details of their private sexual lives would be used in a public courtroom. the supreme court gave her permission. the supreme court has found the record screening process in sections 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code constitutional. the record screening process does not violate the charter rights of the accused. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, chief justice richard wagner and justice michael moldaver said the accused's rights are not violated. the accused's right to silence is not in issue because they are not forced to testify during the record screening process. also, the accused's right to a fair trial does not mean they can receive the most advantageous or beneficial trial possible. finally, the accused's right to present and challenge evidence is not unlimited. ambushing complainants with their own highly private records at trial can be unfair to complainants and may be contrary to the search for truth. the majority explained that sections 278.92 to 278.94 of the criminal code were created to remove barriers preventing sexual assault victims from coming forward. the goal of those sections was to have a process to protect the interests of complainants in their own private documents when an accused has those documents and wants to use them at trial. this process balances the rights and interests of the accused, the complainant and the public, the majority said.
+supreme court of canada when companies fix prices, even people who bought from other companies can sue them, the supreme court has ruled. 'optical disc drives' include cd, dvd, and blu-ray drives. pioneer, toshiba, and other companies made and sold these drives. they also made other products that contained them. mr. godfrey said these companies agreed to sell these drives and products at higher prices. this is called 'price fixing.' it is illegal under the federal competition act. he said that between 2004 and 2010, consumers paid higher prices because of this. he said the real market price would have been lower. mr. godfrey launched a 'class action' in british columbia. a class action is a special kind of lawsuit when a group of people with the same kind of problem get together to sue. in the phrase 'class action,' the 'class' is the group and the 'action' is the lawsuit. class actions can affect many people and their legal rights. people can be affected even if they don't actively take part in the lawsuit. a judge has to give permission for a class action to go ahead. a 'representative plaintiff' stands in for the group. mr. godfrey was the representative plaintiff in this case. mr. godfrey said the 'class' should include everyone in bc who bought pioneer and toshiba drives. he also said it should include people who bought drives made and sold by other companies. he said those companies charged higher prices because pioneer and toshiba did. the federal competition act said a lawsuit like mr. godfrey's had to be launched within two years. pioneer said the claim against it was too late. this was because the period mr. godfrey was suing for ended in 2010 and the class action against pioneer was launched in 2013. pioneer and toshiba also said they weren't responsible for what other companies did. they said the class couldn't include people who bought products made and sold by others. the certification judge gave mr. godfrey permission to go ahead with the class action. the court of appeal agreed. the majority at the supreme court of canada also said the class action could go ahead. it said consumers who bought from other companies besides pioneer and toshiba could be part of the class. that's because mr. godfrey planned to show that pioneer's and toshiba's actions affected the entire market. since pioneer's and toshiba's prices were higher, other companies also charged higher prices. people were harmed because they paid more than they should have. pioneer and toshiba made more money as a result. to get any kind of compensation, though, people who bought from other companies would have to specifically show that they were harmed. the majority also said the two-year deadline to file a lawsuit could be extended if the person couldn't really have known about the problem before. it didn't actually decide whether mr. godfrey was too late to sue pioneer. it said the trial judge would have to decide this later. the majority said these kinds of deadlines have three purposes. the first is to give people certainty, so they won't be surprised by lawsuits for things they did long ago. the second is to make sure the evidence is still available and usable. the third is to encourage people to take action quickly when they are harmed. in this case, mr. godfrey said pioneer and toshiba hid what they were doing so he and the other consumers couldn't find out. the majority said it wouldn't make sense that people could lose the right to sue before they had any way of even finding out they were harmed. the majority also said mr. godfrey and the class could sue pioneer and toshiba for two legal reasons. first, they could sue based on the competition act, because it said price-fixing was illegal. second, they could sue based on rules in the common law (law based on court cases, made by judges). different rules applied to each one, and they didn't exclude each other. this case didn't decide whether pioneer and toshiba did anything wrong. it only decided that the class action could go forward and both sides could present their case. the supreme court of canada recently dealt with class actions in telus communications inc. v wellman and l'oratoire saint joseph du mont royal v jj.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court has ruled that jury selection errors can be remedied if certain requirements are met. in 2015, mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser were found guilty of terrorism offenses in connection with a series of plots designed to kill people. a judge sentenced them both to life in prison with potential availability of parole after serving 10 years from the date of their arrest. they appealed their conviction. the court of appeal for ontario overturned their convictions and ordered a new trial. it found that the jury had not been chosen correctly, in accordance with the rules governing jury selection. the crown (prosecution) appealed the case to the supreme court of canada. mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser chose to be tried by a jury. in canada, a jury is a group of 12 people (jurors) who decide if a person charged with a criminal offence is guilty or not guilty. the members of the jury are chosen randomly from a group of regular people who have been asked to report for jury duty. that group is called the jury panel. the prosecutor or the defence lawyer may challenge members of the jury panel if they feel someone might not be fair-minded. this is called a 'challenge for cause' and can be used to exclude people from the jury based on their responses to questions. before the trial, mr. jaser's lawyer requested a 'challenge for cause' to find out if any potential juror might not be fair-minded as a result of having read pre-trial news reports, or because the two accused men are members of visible minorities and muslim. at the time, the criminal code outlined two separate systems for determining if a potential juror was biased, both of which relied on people known as 'triers', whose job was to decide whether each potential juror was fair-minded or not. one way to decide if someone on the panel was biased was by using 'rotating triers'. that's when the judge would choose two people to serve as deciders until the first juror was chosen (being chosen would mean that the deciders believed the person to be fair-minded). the first juror would then replace one of two deciders (who would be sent home). this process would continue, with the newly selected jurors replacing the existing triers, until the entire jury had been selected. with this 'rotating triers' approach, all potential members of the jury would be in courtroom during the 'challenge for cause' questioning (meaning that they could hear everyone's answers). another method of choosing jurors was through 'static triers'. that's when the judge would select two people from the jury panel to determine the fair-mindedness of every juror. after the full jury was selected, these two deciders would be sent home. with this process, all potential members of the jury would be asked to wait outside during the questioning (meaning that they could not hear everyone's answers). mr. jaser wanted 'rotating triers'. he also wanted the trial judge to use his discretion (power) to remove potential jurors from the courtroom during the process because hearing other people's answers might make them biased. if his request could not be granted, mr. jaser wanted 'static triers'. the trial judge refused mr. jaser's request for 'rotating triers'. he concluded that trial judges did not have the power to exclude unsworn jurors from the courtroom where 'rotating triers' were being used. in any event, he said that he would not have used the discretion even if he had it. he believed that to accept mr. jaser's request would be to expose the sworn jurors (actual members of jury) to the possible biased comments of potential jurors, and this could pose a risk to the trial's fairness. in the end, the trial judge imposed 'static triers' in accordance with mr. jaser's alternative request. all nine judges of the supreme court agreed with the court of appeal that the jury was improperly formed. the trial judge made an error in refusing mr. jaser's requests for two reasons. first, the trial judge had the discretion to exclude potential jurors from the courtroom while using 'rotating triers'. second, his refusal to use his discretion was unreasonable. as a result of the error, the supreme court said the jury was not properly formed for mr. jaser, as it was incorrectly selected by 'static triers' instead of 'rotating triers' with potential jurors removed from the courtroom. the jury was also improperly formed for mr. esseghaier, as he was denied his right to 'rotating triers'. the judges all agreed that a specific section of the criminal code could be used to remedy jury selection errors. they said the requirements of that section had been met in this case. although the procedure for selecting jurors was technically incorrect, it was one of two alternatives to ensure that an accused person's right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury was protected. while mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser did not receive the specific jury selection process they wanted, the law does not demand procedurally perfect justice, but fundamentally fair justice. the supreme court reinstated mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser's convictions. mr. esseghaier and mr. jaser will now be able to appeal their convictions on other grounds before the court of appeal for ontario.
+supreme court of canada a law preventing residents of new brunswick from stocking up on alcohol from another province is constitutional, the supreme court has ruled. provinces have flexibility to make laws to address particular conditions and priorities within their borders. they can do this even if those laws may incidentally restrict the movement of goods across their borders. the court unanimously allowed the crown's appeal in a case of a new brunswick man who bought alcohol from neighbouring quebec. section 134(b) of the new brunswick's liquor control act forbids residents from possessing large amounts of alcohol not purchased from the new brunswick liquor corporation for example, purchased from other provinces. the rcmp was watching new brunswick residents who crossed the border into quebec to buy cheaper alcohol. on october 6, 2012, gerard comeau drove to quebec from his home in new brunswick to stock up. when he returned to new brunswick, mr. comeau was stopped by the rcmp with large amounts of beer and some spirits he bought in quebec. he was fined $240, plus fees. mr. comeau fought the fine. he said that section 121 of the constitution act, 1867 guarantees free trade across provincial borders. the crown disagreed. it argued that section 121 was only meant to prevent provinces from charging tariffs or similar costs at the border. the crown said the provision did not apply in mr. comeau's situation. the trial judge, breaking with longstanding supreme court precedent, agreed with mr. comeau and dismissed the charge. the new brunswick court of appeal dismissed the crown's request for permission to appeal. the crown appealed to the supreme court. the supreme court held that while section 121 prohibits laws whose main purpose is to prevent the movement of goods across provincial borders, it does not prohibit legislation that has incidental effects on trade. while the new brunswick law mr. comeau challenged restricted the movement of alcohol across the provincial border, this was not its main purpose. its main purpose was to manage the supply and demand of liquor in new brunswick. therefore, the law is constitutional. this case turned on the meaning of section 121 of the constitution act, 1867. to understand its meaning, the court looked at the wording, history, and position of the provision within the constitution. it also looked at the legal principles that guide how courts understand the constitution. the court concluded that section 121 prohibits laws restricting inter-provincial trade, but only where restricting trade is the laws' main purpose. if section 121 were understood to guarantee free inter-provincial trade, it would have far-reaching effects on agricultural supply management, public health prohibitions, environmental controls, and similar schemes. section 121 lets provinces enact these types of measures, as long as their main purpose is not simply to prevent the importation of goods from other provinces.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that courts of appeal have the authority to lift their own publication bans after cases are closed. the supreme court of canada was asked if the manitoba court of appeal could lift a publication ban it had previously issued in the case of mr. stanley frank ostrowski. the question arose after the canadian broadcasting corporation (cbc) had asked to see a document covered by the ban. mr. ostrowski was convicted of first-degree murder in 1987 and sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole for 25 years. in 2009, mr. ostrowski asked manitoba's minister of justice to review his conviction. later that year, he was released from prison pending the outcome of that review. by then, he had served 23 years of his sentence. in 2014, the minister of justice asked the court of appeal to decide if there had been a miscarriage of justice at trial. during its proceedings, the court of appeal ordered a publication ban on a sworn statement called an affidavit, which mr. ostrowski wanted to submit as evidence. while the appeal court did not accept the affidavit into evidence, it ordered the publication ban to remain in effect indefinitely. in 2018, the appeal court found that a miscarriage of justice had indeed occurred at mr. ostrowski's 1987 trial. it said he did not have access to important information that could have helped his defence at the time. as a result, the appeal court set aside mr. ostrowski's conviction. in may 2019, the cbc asked the appeal court to lift the publication ban, so that it could read the affidavit. the appeal court refused, on the basis that it had already given its judgment in the case, so it no longer had authority to reconsider the publication ban. after deciding a case, a court of appeal may reconsider a publication ban in limited circumstances the supreme court has ruled courts of appeal may consider lifting their own publication bans after the end of proceedings. writing for the majority, justice kasirer explained that a court cannot rehear a case after rendering its judgment. this is called the doctrine of functus officio. but afterwards, the court still has the authority to control access to the court record. as a result, a court may reconsider a publication ban made during the case. as justice kasirer said, even after the case comes to an end, 'important decisions about the openness of the court record may need to be taken'. this does not mean that a court of appeal may reconsider a publication ban at any time or for any reason. it can do so in two situations only: first, if there was a change in circumstances; or second, if someone affected by the publication ban, such as the media, was not given notice at the time of the ban. in this case, justice kasirer said there were no change of circumstances. but the court of appeal must still decide if the cbc's request meets the second condition. he referred the case back to the appeal court to do so. publication ban a publication ban is an order that a court makes to prevent anyone from publishing, broadcasting or transmitting information in a court file, to protect either the evidence in the case or the identity of a victim, witness or other person involved. court proceedings are open and public as a general rule, court proceedings are open and public. this is known as the open court principle, which is protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression. it is an essential feature of our democracy. given the importance of the open court principle, publication bans apply in limited circumstances only.
+supreme court of canada quebec family property rules apply to a family home held by a trust that one of the spouses controls, the supreme court has ruled. when people get married in quebec, a 'family patrimony' is created. it usually includes property such as family homes, cars, and furniture. these can be owned by both spouses, or by just one spouse. it can also include a family home that a spouse doesn't own, but has rights to use. under quebec's civil code, 'rights which confer use' are included in the family patrimony. if the marriage ends, family patrimony almost always gets divided equally between the spouses. mr. karam and ms. yared got married in 1998. they had four children together. in 2011, ms. yared was diagnosed with incurable cancer. mr. karam decided to set up a trust for the benefit of the children. in quebec law, a trust is a patrimony without an owner. it doesn't belong to anyone. a trust can have settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries who create, control, and benefit from it. but the property in the trust never becomes part of anyone's personal patrimony. when mr. karam set up the trust, he didn't do it to avoid any rules of family patrimony. he just wanted to protect the family assets. in 2012, the spouses put money in the trust to buy a home in montreal. the home was worth over $2 million. mr. karam said he wanted to buy a house that could be both the family home and an investment that would benefit the children. in 2014, ms. yared left the family home and filed for divorce. she made a will and divided her estate into four trusts, one for each of the children. she died in 2015, before the divorce was finalized. ms. yared's brothers were the liquidators (executors) of her estate. in 2016, they asked a court to include the value of the home held by the trust in the family patrimony. if either spouse had owned the home, it would have been part of the family patrimony. but mr. karam said it shouldn't be included because the trust owned it. the trial judge said the value of the home should be included, even though neither spouse directly owned it. the court of appeal disagreed and said it shouldn't be included. the majority of judges at the supreme court said the value of the home should be included in the family patrimony. they said that even though neither spouse owned the family home, mr. karam had 'rights which confer use' to it. even though trustees don't own the property in a trust, the control they have over it may give them 'rights which confer use.' in this case, the majority found that mr. karam had control over the family home. he had the power to decide who could use the home and who had a right to its value. the majority said it didn't matter whether a spouse transferred the home to a trust or, as in this case, the trust purchased the home directly. rules around family patrimony are rules of 'public order.' that means people can't get around them, for example by signing a contract that says something different. they apply no matter what. this is because the rules are meant to protect vulnerable spouses and put them on equal footing when a marriage ends. trusts are an example of the effect canada's two major legal traditions, common law and civil law, have on each other. trusts are a common law concept. but they were introduced into quebec civil law with the new civil code in the 1990s a common law trust is a kind of shared ownership. but a civil law trust is the transfer of property to an independent patrimony that nobody owns.
+supreme court of canada judges don't have to make someone pay a fine equal to the earnings from crime they used (with permission) to pay for their defence, the supreme court has ruled. people shouldn't profit from crimes. property someone gets through crime is called 'proceeds of crime.' the criminal code says the crown (the prosecution) can take the property if it is probably proceeds of crime. the property is held during the owner's trial. if the person is found not guilty, and the property is not proven to be proceeds of crime, they can have it back. if they are found guilty, the crown can keep it if a judge says so. without the seized property, a person accused of crimes may not be able to afford a lawyer to defend them. the criminal code says they can ask a judge to let some of the property be used to pay legal fees. if the judge agrees, they can set conditions to make sure the money is only used to pay for legal fees. if the person is found guilty, a judge will decide their sentence. the sentencing judge also has to decide exactly what property came from crime. the crown usually gets to keep this. if the amount the crown holds at sentencing is less than the amount the judge decides came from crime, the judge can make the person pay a fine. this is to prevent people from spending or hiding the proceeds of crime before they can be taken permanently. if the person doesn't pay, they can go to prison (or go to prison longer). mr. rafilovich was arrested for dealing drugs. the police found almost $50,000 worth of cocaine and $42,000 in cash. the crown seized the cash as it was probably proceeds of crime. in 2009, before his trial, mr. rafilovich asked to use the money to pay for his lawyer. the judge said yes, and set a number of conditions, including an hourly rate and the maximum number of hours the lawyer could bill. mr. rafilovich pleaded guilty and was sentenced to jail. the judge decided the money the police found was proceeds of crime. but the money was gone because it had all been used to pay mr. rafilovich's lawyer. the crown said mr. rafilovich should still have to pay the total amount as a fine. but the sentencing judge said no. he only used the money to hire a lawyer, which he wouldn't have been able to do if the money wasn't returned. the court of appeal said the sentencing judge had to charge the fine. it said paying for a lawyer with proceeds of crime let mr. rafilovich benefit from his crime. the point of seizing proceeds of crime was to prevent people from benefiting from crime. it fined mr. rafilovich almost $42,000. in the past, lower courts disagreed about what to do in this kind of situation. the supreme court had to decide what to do when an accused person got a judge's permission to use possible proceeds of crime for legal fees. the majority said judges can decide whether or not to charge a fine, depending on the situation. the sentencing judge was allowed to decide not to fine mr. rafilovich. the majority said that sentencing judges shouldn't normally fine someone to get back the amount that was used (with a judge's approval) to pay for their legal defence. this would be unfair. an accused person is presumed to be innocent during their trial. (the presumption of innocence is part of the reason the criminal code says the money can be returned if a judge gives permission.) if the accused person had to pay the amount they spent on legal fees to the crown if they lost, they might decide not to hire a lawyer. the majority said the purpose of the fine was to prevent people from spending or hiding the proceeds of crime. it wasn't to punish someone from relying on the presumption of innocence and hiring a lawyer to defend themselves. criminal justice is meant to provide a fair process to get a just result. it isn't about getting maximum punishment at any cost. this case was about how a judge should use their 'discretion.' discretion is a judge's freedom to decide certain issues. that freedom has limits set by the law. this was the first time the court looked at a judge's discretion to order a fine to get back proceeds of crime used to pay legal fees.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that new brunswick missed its deadline to file a $50 million claim. in 2009, the province of new brunswick agreed to guarantee $50 million in bank loans for a company called atcon, which provides construction, energy, industrial and waste management services. the province had agreed to act as a guarantor on the basis of a report prepared by an auditing company called grant thornton. atcon hired the company to review its financial statements. the report from grant thornton concluded that atcon's financial statements were accurate and were prepared according to proper accounting principles. however, atcon subsequently defaulted on its bank loans and asked the province to pay. it paid the entire $50 million in march 2010. in june 2010, the province hired another auditing company to review and report on atcon's finances. on february 4, 2011, the new auditors submitted a draft report stating that atcon's finances had not been prepared according to proper accounting principles. the report contained evidence that atcon had overstated its assets, revenues and profits. it also found atcon had understated its liabilities, expenses and losses. the final report, which was almost identical to the draft, was completed on november 30, 2012. on june 23, 2014, the province filed a $50 million claim against grant thornton, arguing that it had been negligent in preparing its report of atcon's finances. grant thornton responded that it had not been negligent and asked the judge to dismiss the claim, arguing that the province had run out of time to file it. grant thornton invoked the limitation of actions act, a law in new brunswick that says a plaintiff has two years to file a claim after 'discovering' it. the judge sided with grant thornton, but the court of appeal sided with the province. the supreme court of canada has agreed with grant thornton. the province filed its claim too late. when is a claim 'discovered'? in a unanimous judgment, the supreme court said a claim is 'discovered' when the plaintiff has enough information to know the defendant was probably at fault. in this case, the court was satisfied the province had discovered the claim against grant thornton on february 4, 2011, the date it received the draft report. by then, the province knew or ought to have known a loss occurred that grant thornton had been hired to detect. this was sufficient information to know grant thornton had been negligent. although the province knew this on february 4, 2011, it did not bring its claim until june 23, 2014, more than two years later. as a result, the court concluded that under new brunswick's limitation of actions act, the province had filed its claim too late. deadline for filing a claim anyone filing a claim should consider the deadlines that apply in their province or territory. otherwise, they risk losing the opportunity to have courts uphold their rights.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court confirms an alberta man's murder confession should not be used at trial because he did not have enough opportunity to get legal advice. in 2015, police suspected nigel lafrance of having been involved in a murder, and got a search warrant for his home in fort mcmurray, alberta. on the morning of march 19, a team of armed police officers entered his home to search it. they asked mr. lafrance if he was willing to answer some questions and, when he agreed, they drove him to a police station and interviewed him for over three hours. police took a blood sample, fingerprints, and mr. lafrance's cell phones and some clothing. he was not told he could contact a lawyer. on april 7, the police arrested mr. lafrance for the murder. this time the police told him he could contact a lawyer, and mr. lafrance had a short phone call with legal aid, who told him he should 'get a lawyer' to talk about his situation. the police then interviewed mr. lafrance for several hours. mr. lafrance asked if he could call his father, to help him get a lawyer. the police refused his request, since he had already called legal aid, and the police pushed for more answers. mr. lafrance eventually confessed to the murder. before the trial, mr. lafrance argued that his confession and some other evidence taken during the date of his first encounter with police should not be used at his trial. he said he should have been allowed to talk to a lawyer on march 19 and he should have been given a second chance at contacting a lawyer during the april 7 interview. section 10(b) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms guarantees that 'everyone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and be informed of that right'. the trial judge refused mr. lafrance's request, and the evidence was used at his trial. the judge found that because the police had not actually 'detained' mr. lafrance during the march 19 interview, they did not need to let him contact a lawyer on that day. also, the police was not required to give him a second chance at talking to a lawyer during the april 7 interview. a jury convicted mr. lafrance of murder. mr. lafrance appealed the conviction to alberta's court of appeal. a majority of judges in that court sided with mr. lafrance. they ordered a new trial to be held without the confession and without some of the other evidence the police had obtained. the crown appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has agreed with the court of appeal: mr. lafrance is entitled to a new trial. mr. lafrance's section 10(b) charter right to counsel was violated. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice russell brown found that the police violated mr. lafrance's right to counsel on both dates. given the 'power imbalance' between police and a person detained by police, and because legal advice helps 'cure' that imbalance, 'these were serious breaches', he wrote. whether police actually 'detained' someone depends on three questions. first, how did the person perceive or understand the encounter with the police did the person feel forced to comply with police instructions? second, what did the police actually do, and how and where did they do it? third, how would another person of a similar age, size, racial background and level of experience or sophistication have felt during the encounter? in this case, the supreme court found that the police did in fact detain mr. lafrance after searching his home on march 19. any reasonable person in mr. lafrance's shoes would have understood that they were being singled out for investigation. several factors support this conclusion: the police's show of force in entering the home, waking mr. lafrance up and ordering him to leave; a long ride with police officers to the station; and a lengthy police interview in a secure area. as well, mr. lafrance was 19 years old, is indigenous, had a lack of experience with police, and was unfamiliar with his legal rights. he would not have felt free to remain silent or free to leave. the right to counsel guaranteed by the charter includes not only informing a detained person of their right to talk to a lawyer, but also giving them time and an opportunity to actually get legal advice. a single consultation with a lawyer is usually enough. however, sometimes the police must provide the detained person with another chance to talk to a lawyer, especially if the person did not understand their rights or the advice they received. in this case, the police violated mr. lafrance's right to counsel on march 19 because they actually detained him but did not tell him he could talk to a lawyer. the police again violated his right to counsel on april 7. after his first call to legal aid, it was clear mr. lafrance did not understand his rights. the police should have given him another chance at talking to a lawyer to get legal advice. relying on the evidence would damage the reputation of the justice system. the police only obtained the confession and some other evidence after mr. lafrance's charter rights were violated. the supreme court concluded that the confession and the other evidence should not be used at his trial. the seriousness of the charter violations committed by the police, and the impact on mr. lafrance's rights, outweigh the public's interest in allowing the jury to hear that evidence. in these circumstances, justice brown concluded that allowing this evidence to be used at trial 'would bring the administration of justice into disrepute'.
+supreme court of canada part of the criminal code section dealing with child luring is unconstitutional because it violates the presumption of innocence, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. it's a crime to talk to an underage person online (or using a cellphone) to try to take advantage of them sexually. it's also a crime if you believe they're underage, even if they're actually not. this is called 'child luring.' mr. morrison posted an ad online. part of the ad's title was 'daddy looking for his little girl.' a police officer pretending to be a 14-year-old girl named 'mia' responded. mr. morrison and 'mia' had sexual conversations online for over two months. he asked 'mia' to touch herself sexually. he also said she should skip school so they could meet and engage in sexual acts. he was charged with child luring. during his trial, mr. morrison said he thought he was talking to an adult woman who was just pretending to be 14. he also argued that three important points in the child luring section of the criminal code violated his rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. (the charter is part of canada's constitution.) first, the criminal code said that if someone told someone else they were underage, the law presumed the person believed it. the only exception was if there was evidence that the person didn't believe it. mr. morrison said this violated his right to be presumed innocent. before anyone can be found guilty of a crime, a judge or jury has to believe that the person is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. the right to be presumed innocent is violated whenever a law lets someone be found guilty even though there is a reasonable doubt. the law presumed mr. morrison believed 'mia' when she said she was 14, even though there could be other explanations. second, the criminal code said a person wouldn't be found guilty if they honestly believed that the other person was of legal age, even if that belief was wrong. but they could only use this as a defence if they took 'reasonable steps' to find out how old the other person really was. mr. morrison said this violated basic principles of justice. this was because he could be found guilty simply for not taking 'reasonable steps' to find out 'mia's' real age. third, for the most serious cases, the criminal code set out a 'mandatory minimum sentence' of one year. the judge couldn't lower it, even if it would be too harsh in the circumstances. mr. morrison said this violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. the trial judge agreed that the first point violated mr. morrison's right to be presumed innocent. but he found mr. morrison guilty anyway, because he didn't take reasonable steps to find out how old 'mia' really was. he agreed, though, that the mandatory minimum sentence violated the charter, and ordered a shorter sentence. the court of appeal agreed. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that the first point violated the right to be presumed innocent. just because someone is told something online doesn't mean they believe it. people don't always tell the truth. yet the law's presumption meant that someone could be found guilty even if the judge or jury had a reasonable doubt about whether they believed the other person was underage. this violated the presumption of innocence. most of the judges agreed that the 'reasonable steps' requirement didn't violate the charter. but they said the lower courts misinterpreted it. mr. morrison could try to defend himself by saying he honestly believed 'mia' was of legal age. to succeed, though, he had to show evidence that he took reasonable steps to find out how old she really was. but simply proving mr. morrison didn't take reasonable steps wasn't, on its own, enough to find him guilty. the crown (the prosecution) still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mr. morrison believed 'mia' was underage. the majority didn't decide either way whether the mandatory minimum sentence violated the charter. the lower courts misunderstood how the law worked, and this misunderstanding wasn't a good basis to decide this. most of the judges agreed there should be a new trial because of the trial judge's mistakes. two previous supreme court cases dealt with the child luring section of the criminal code. but this was the first time the court looked at whether it violated the charter.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court finds the quebec human rights tribunal did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the case of a comedian who mocked a well-known teen singer with a disability, because it was not discrimination under the quebec charter of human rights and freedoms. the court also explains the legal framework that applies to a discrimination claim involving a public figure's right to dignity and a professional comedian's freedom of expression. the court said a reasonable person would not view the comedian's comments as inciting others to detest or vilify the young person's humanity. this case involves professional comedian mike ward, who mocked a well-known young person with a disability, j r my gabriel. between september 2010 and march 2013, mr. ward performed a popular show called 'mike ward s'expose', where he mocked several prominent people from quebec's artistic community. mr. gabriel, a high school student with a singing career, was among them. mr. ward also posted video clips of himself mocking the quebec artists. in 2012, mr. gabriel's parents filed a complaint with the commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (commission), on their own behalf and on behalf of their son. the commission concluded that there was a basis for discrimination. it took mr. ward to the quebec human rights tribunal (tribunal) on behalf of mr. gabriel. before the tribunal, the commission argued that mr. ward's show and online content infringed the quebec charter of human rights and freedoms, on the basis of mr. gabriel's disability. in his defence, mr. ward argued that he had the right to say what he did about mr. gabriel, under the quebec charter's protected right to freedom of expression. the tribunal sided with the commission. it found mr. ward had infringed mr. gabriel's right to dignity, without discrimination, because of his disability under sections 4 and 10 of the quebec charter. the tribunal also found that mr. ward's comments exceeded the limits of what a 'reasonable person' can tolerate as freedom of expression under section 3 of the quebec charter. in law, a reasonable person is a hypothetical individual that is used as a legal standard to determine how a typical person would think or behave. this concept is applied in many areas of the law. mr. ward's appeal of the tribunal's decision was dismissed by a majority of the judges of the quebec court of appeal. he then appealed that decision to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has found that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction to proceed with this case, because it was not a discrimination complaint. this was a not discrimination complaint. chief justice wagner and justice côté wrote for the majority of judges. as they explained, the tribunal had found that mr. gabriel was the target of mr. ward's jokes due to his fame, not due to his disability, and fame is not a prohibited ground of discrimination under the quebec charter. as a result, the tribunal did not have jurisdiction (that is, authority) to proceed with the case. the majority noted that the comments made by mr. ward about mr. gabriel did not lead to an action in defamation, but rather to a discrimination claim. this distinction is important because the tribunal has no power to decide actions in defamation or other civil liability actions, since its jurisdiction is limited to complaints of discrimination under the quebec charter. the tribunal can hear disputes involving comments like those made in this case only if they are allegedly discriminatory. legal framework the majority went on to explain the legal framework that applies to a discrimination claim involving a public figure's right to dignity, on the one hand, and a professional comedian's freedom of expression, on the other. under the first requirement of this framework, the majority said a reasonable person would not view mr. ward's comments about mr. gabriel as inciting others to detest or vilify his humanity. they wrote, 'making fun of a person's physical characteristics may be repugnant; it most certainly is when the person in question is a young person with a disability who contributes with determination to society. but expression of this kind does not, simply by being repugnant, incite others to detest or vilify the humanity of the person targeted.' under the second requirement of this framework, the majority said a reasonable person could not view the comments as likely to lead to discriminatory treatment of mr. gabriel. as a result, the majority concluded that the comments, 'exploited, rightly or wrongly, a feeling of discomfort in order to entertain, but they did little more than that'.
+supreme court of canada prison authorities must show that psychological and statistical tools used to make decisions about indigenous inmates are effective for them, the supreme court has said. correctional service of canada (csc) runs federal prisons. its goal is to help rehabilitate inmates, while protecting other inmates, staff, and society as a whole. to do this, it uses certain psychological and statistical tools to make decisions about inmates, like whether s/he is likely to reoffend or what kind of supports s/he should get. under the corrections and conditional release act, csc has to 'take all reasonable steps to ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate, up to date and complete as possible.' the act also says csc must make sure that its policies and programs are suitable for indigenous offenders and take their specific needs and circumstances into account. mr. ewert is a federal inmate and identifies as m tis. he was serving two simultaneous life sentences for murder and attempted murder. because certain tools used to make decisions about him were created based mostly on non-indigenous people, mr. ewert argued they were less accurate for indigenous persons like himself. he said that csc was not following the law by using these tools on indigenous offenders without proof that they worked. the federal court agreed with mr. ewert, but this was overturned by the federal court of appeal. mr. ewert appealed to the supreme court. writing for the majority, justice richard wagner (who was not yet chief justice when the case was heard) granted mr. ewert a declaration that csc was not obeying the law. he said csc hadn't taken reasonable steps to make sure its tools gave accurate and complete results for indigenous offenders. justice wagner was concerned about the growing gap between how indigenous and non-indigenous offenders are treated in the criminal justice system. for example, indigenous offenders are more likely to be classified at a higher security level and less likely to get early release. he said the gap is due in part to policies that may look neutral on the surface but actually discriminate against indigenous offenders. that's why it was important to ensure the tools worked. csc knew there were concerns about the tools, but it continued using them anyway. based on all of this, justice wagner formally declared that csc violated the law. six judges agreed with justice wagner. justice malcolm rowe, writing in dissent, disagreed. in his view, 'information' clearly meant only biographical or factual data about an inmate (for example, whether s/he had been in a fight in prison). it did not mean the results of psychological and statistical tools. he said that csc only needed to keep complete and accurate records of the results of the assessment tools. he agreed with the majority that it was important to address the high number of indigenous inmates in prisons compared to their share of the population. but this had to be done in a way that respected the logic of the law. justice rowe said mr. ewert instead should have asked the courts to review the specific decisions csc made about him using the results of the tools. this case dealt with the interpretation of section 24(1) of the corrections and conditional release act, in the context of section 4(g) of the same act. it was the first time the court interpreted section 4(g) while the majority formally declared that csc had violated the act, mr. ewert would still have to apply for judicial review to challenge any decision. mr. ewert also argued his charter rights were violated, but those arguments were rejected.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court has unanimously upheld an order for a journalist to give police copies of conversations with a person who said he belonged to a terrorist group. in 2014, vice media canada published three stories about a canadian man who said he was a member of the so-called 'islamic state' terrorist group in syria. the stories were based on conversations one of vice's journalists had with the man through an instant messaging application. police read the stories and thought the man was committing serious crimes (participating in terrorist activities and making death threats). police wanted to investigate, but the news stories weren't enough. even though the man was identified by name and wanted people to know what he was doing, they needed hard evidence like copies of the actual conversations. but the messaging application the journalist used to talk to the man didn't store them. the only way police could get them was from one of the participants. they asked a judge to order vice and the journalist to give them copies of the messages so they could build their case. this kind of order is called a 'production order,' because it forces someone to produce (in the sense of 'provide') something for someone else. for most legal issues, judges will hear both sides in court before making a decision. there are some exceptions where a judge will hear only one side, such as if the issue is urgent or there is a danger the evidence could be lost. this happens in an 'ex parte' hearing. ex parte means without the other party being there (and without them knowing about it). in this case, the police didn't want vice to know they were trying to get the information. they were afraid that vice might move it somewhere canadian courts couldn't touch it. the judge granted the order in an ex parte hearing. later, when vice received the order, it said it only had screenshots of the messages. it didn't think it should have to give those to police and went to court to fight it. at the time vice went to court, the law said the order could be canceled only if no other reasonable judge would have allowed it. judges can't look at all details of all issues from the start and re-analyze them every time. this would take too long and cost too much. these are some of the reasons higher-court judges 'defer to,' or rely on, lower-court judges' decisions. they look at what a reasonable judge might have done, not what decision they might personally have made. the reviewing judge heard vice's arguments but said it still had to share the screenshots. this was because the original judge's decision had a reasonable basis. the court of appeal agreed. all of the judges at the supreme court agreed that vice had to give police the screenshots. they looked at all the factors and said the original judge's decision was reasonable. they noted it was important for media to be able to gather and share news with the public without government interference, and that it had a special role in society. but, in this case, society's interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes outweighed it. the majority said that while this wasn't an appropriate case to make major changes to the rules on media search warrants and production orders, they had to be tweaked. according to the rules, a judge first has to think about whether it is best to let the media know about a police request for a warrant or production order, or to hold a hearing ex parte. the majority added a slightly modified rule. it said that if a warrant or order is granted ex parte, the media should be able to go to court to argue points the original judge didn't know about. if these points could reasonably have affected the original judge's decision, another judge has to review the whole decision from the beginning (not just looking at whether it had a reasonable basis). second, the judge has to make sure all the conditions listed in the criminal code are met. specifically, that there is a good chance a crime has been or will be committed, that the person has the information the police are looking for, and that the information will provide evidence of the crime. third, the judge has to look at all the facts and circumstances. s/he has to balance society's interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes against the media's right to privacy in gathering and sharing news. finally, the judge has to think about ways to make sure the media wouldn't be overly restricted in carrying out its work. applying these updated rules to this case, the majority said the lower courts were right. the new journalistic sources protection act became law in 2017. it didn't apply to this case because the events happened before it came into force.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rejects parent's bid to reduce or cancel $170,000 child support debt. the parties were married in 1983 and divorced in 1996. the mother was awarded sole custody of the couple's two daughters, and the father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $115 per child on a weekly basis. for 16 years, the father failed to make any voluntary child support payments, did not disclose his income, and moved to two different countries without notifying the mother. his obligation to pay child support ended in 2012, but by that time, he owed the mother almost $170,000 in unpaid child support. in 2016, the father sought to have his child support debt cancelled or substantially reduced. he applied under section 17 of the divorce act, which allows a payor parent to apply to retroactively decrease an order for child support. he asked the court to retroactively change the child support amount, and to establish it based on the federal child support guidelines (guidelines), which came into effect in 1997. the ontario superior court of justice agreed, and it reduced the amount of unpaid child support the father owed to approximately $42,000. the mother appealed that decision to the ontario court of appeal, which overturned the lower court decision and ordered the father to pay his original debt of $170,000. the father appealed to the supreme court of canada. framework for courts to follow this case gave the supreme court the opportunity to establish a framework for courts to follow when a parent tries to retroactively decrease child support to reflect a past reduction in income under section 17 of the divorce act. the supreme court noted that family law matters are diverse and complex and that courts need wide discretion to come to a fair result. it said courts must balance a child's need for regular and appropriate support with the need for flexibility when a parent's ability to pay is affected by changes in income over time. the framework recognizes two long-established principles of canadian child support law. first, children have a right to a fair standard of support. that is a core objective of the guidelines. secondly, parents are obliged to financially support their children starting at birth and continuing after separation. the supreme court also explained that since the guidelines came into effect,the payor parent is under a free-standing legal obligation independent of any court order to pay child support in line with their income. the supreme court stressed the child support system depends on adequate, accurate and timely financial disclosure. it said 'frank disclosure of income information by the payor lies at the foundation of the child support regime'. principle of retroactive decrease applied to this case in this case, the father tried to seek a retroactive decrease of child support payments back to 1997, claiming that he was automatically entitled to it, even though he never notified the mother about his decreased income at the time. the supreme court noted that a parent who has established a past decrease in income is not automatically entitled to a retroactive decrease of support to the date of the decrease. it emphasized that it is up to the court to make a discretionary decision based on its analysis of the specific circumstances of the given case. the court said the father failed to communicate or seek a change of the support order for 18 years. it said 'he made few, if any, voluntary payments during that time and showed no willingness to support his children, who suffered hardship as a result of his failure to fulfill his obligations. his conduct shows bad faith efforts to evade the enforcement of a court order'. in this unanimous decision, all judges of the supreme court agreed that the father was not entitled to a reduction in child support based on decreased income. further, they said his failure to produce adequate evidence of his financial circumstances was fatal to any attempt to cancel his child support debt. the court concluded that the father had not proved that he could not pay now or in the future, even with a flexible payment plan. in any event, the court said the cancellation of child support debt would only happen in exceptional cases and as a last resort. the payment and enforcement of a child support debt is the rule. as a result of the court's decision, the father will be required to pay the mother the child support owed, approximately $170,000.
+supreme court of canada a lawsuit against a canadian company for violations of customary international law in eritrea can go forward, the supreme court has ruled. eritrea is a country in east africa. it has a 'national service program,' where all eritreans have to do military training and military or other public service when they turn eighteen. but people in this program are forced to work for years and years on projects supported by military or political party officials. the bisha mine was built starting in 2008. it is owned by the bisha mining share company. workers from the national service program were used to help build it. they were forced to work under harsh and dangerous conditions for years. they weren't allowed to leave. they were beaten and punished in many ways. three workers said they arrived at the bisha mine between 2008 and 2010. they said they were forced to work at least twelve hours a day, six days a week, in temperatures close to 50c they escaped eritrea between 2011 and 2013 and became refugees. nevsun is a canadian company based in british columbia. it owns the bisha mining share company. the workers sued nevsun, saying it was responsible for slavery; forced labour; cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment; and crimes against humanity. they said these were violations of 'customary international law.' they said customary international law was part of canadian law. they said that meant canadian courts should be able to hold nevsun responsible for the harm they suffered. 'customary international law' is part of international law. it is like the common law of the international legal system. within customary international law, some rules are so important that no one is allowed to ever break them. these are called 'peremptory norms.' ('peremptory,' is pronounced per-remp-torr-ee. peremptory norms are rules that can never be avoided). the violations the workers were claiming were violations of peremptory norms. nevsun said british columbia courts didn't have the power to rule on the workers' lawsuit. it said it was immune because of something called the 'act of state doctrine.' this doctrine says courts in one country aren't allowed to rule on what another country does. it had never been applied in canada before. nevsun also said it couldn\'t be sued for violating customary international law. the lower courts said the workers' lawsuit could go forward. the majority of judges at the supreme court of canada said the act of state doctrine wasn't part of canadian law. the majority said that customary international law is part of canadian law, though. it said customary international law becomes part of canadian law automatically. this is different than treaty law, which needs parliament to pass a law to bring it into force. because customary international law is part of canadian law, courts could, in the right cases, find canadian companies responsible for violating it. the majority noted that violations of peremptory norms are serious violations of rights that are important to everyone, everywhere. they need to be strongly discouraged. the court didn't decide whether nevsun was responsible for violating the workers' rights. it said that the workers' lawsuit could go forward. it said that the trial judge would have to decide whether nevsun breached customary international law and if it did how it should be held responsible.
+supreme court of canada a person's right to trial within a reasonable time was breached because it took over four and a half years for his trial to begin, the supreme court has ruled. the canadian charter of rights and freedoms is part of canada's constitution. under section 11(b), anyone charged with a crime has the right to be tried in a reasonable time. this right protects both people accused of crimes and society. long criminal trials cause suffering and frustration for everyone involved. people accused of crimes often sit in jail while waiting for their trial. victims and their families are left waiting for a final decision. the public waits longer to see justice done. the right to be tried in a reasonable time is important. if an accused person's trial takes too long, it can be stopped. this is called a 'stay of proceedings.' it means there won't be a verdict of guilty or not guilty. in 2016, the supreme court of canada decided an important appeal, r v jordan. jordan set out rules to decide how long is too long for a criminal trial. it said that most trials should finish either 18 or 30 months after a person is charged, depending on the type of trial. jordan tells judges to 'presume' (accept as true) that anything longer is 'unreasonable,' unless there is something unusual to justify it. (in this context, 'unreasonable' basically means 'too long.') if the time taken was unreasonable, the proceedings have to be 'stayed.' jordan also set out special rules for cases that had already started when the rules changed. these were called 'transitional' cases. mr. thanabalasingham was charged with second-degree murder of his spouse in 2012. before the trial was scheduled, the crown (the prosecution) wanted to change the charge to first-degree murder. the preliminary hearing (a hearing that sometimes happens before a trial for serious crimes) took over a year. there were also other delays. the trial was set for 2017, after jordan was released. but just before it was going to start, mr. thanabalasingham said his right to be tried in a reasonable time had been breached. he asked for a stay of proceedings. the trial judge agreed and ordered the stay. a majority at the court of appeal agreed. the supreme court unanimously agreed that mr. thanabalasingham's right to be tried in a reasonable time was breached. it said the proceedings should be stayed. the delay in mr. thanabalasingham's case was at least 45 months, and he spent it waiting in jail. this was much longer than the 30-month maximum set out in jordan. the court said it was open to the crown to change the charge to first-degree murder. but the crown should have been aware that this could cause delay, and the delay would affect mr. thanabalasingham's right to be tried in a reasonable time. most of the delay in this case happened before jordan was decided. this was a 'transitional' case, but that didn't matter because it also would have been stayed under the old rules. the court said that, because of jordan, delays this bad probably wouldn't happen again. before jordan, many people in the justice system just accepted long delays as normal. jordan said it shouldn't be this way. it sent the message that everyone in the justice system has a role to play in making sure people get tried in a reasonable time. the crown has to be organized, share information with the defence without delay, and not waste court time. the defence has to be ready to go ahead with the trial if the court and the crown are. trial judges have to avoid delay where they can, even if it means denying a defence request to postpone. this is because the right to a trial in a reasonable time also benefits victims and society, too. this case came to the supreme court as an appeal 'as of right.' this means that the person doesn't need the court's permission to appeal. there is an appeal as of right in criminal cases when a court of appeal judge dissents (disagrees) on a point of law, as happened here.
+supreme court of canada anyone charged with a provincial offence in bc has the right to a trial in either english or french (just like for a criminal trial), the supreme court has ruled. the federal government has the power to make laws on crimes. these are mostly found in the criminal code, and include things like murder. the criminal code also explains the rules for how criminal trials should take place. provinces and territories have powers to make laws about 'quasi-crimes' (which are kind of like crimes, but usually aren't as serious). these are called provincial (or territorial) offences, and include things like not wearing a seatbelt. bc has an offence act that explains the rules for how provincial offences trials should take place. mr. bessette was charged with a provincial offence in bc. he asked for his trial to be in french. if he had been charged with a crime under the criminal code, mr. bessette would have had the right to have his trial in either english or french. the right isn't just about fair trials. it's about the person's linguistic and cultural identity. all courts in canada that deal with criminal matters already hold criminal trials in both official languages. this includes the bc provincial court, where mr. bessette's trial was taking place. mr. bessette's provincial offence wasn't a crime, so the criminal code didn't apply at least not directly. but the bc offence act didn't say anything about trial language. it did say the criminal codecould be used to fill in any gaps in the offence act. mr. bessette said that meant the parts of the criminal code that talked about language applied. he said he should get to choose to have his trial in either french or english. the crown (the prosecution) disagreed. it said trials for provincial offences had to be in english. this was because an 18th-century english law said so. this law was part of bc law because bc adopted all the english criminal laws that existed while it was an english colony. the provincial court judge agreed with the crown. mr. bessette challenged the decision but the higher courts in bc didn't look at his arguments. they said he should wait to raise them on appeal if he were found guilty. there is a general rule that criminal and quasi-criminal trials shouldn't be stopped in the middle to deal with side issues. that's because it's important to get trials done quickly. mr. bessette said language rights were too important to be just a side issue. he said the higher courts in bc should have cancelled the provincial court's decision to run his trial in english. the supreme court of canada unanimously agreed that mr. bessette had the right to a trial in french. it said the bc supreme court judge was wrong to make him wait to appeal if he were found guilty. it looked at how the offence act, criminal code, and 18th-century english law worked together. it said that when someone is charged with a provincial offence, the offence act applies first. the only exception is if another, more specialized law has priority. in this case, the specialized law (the motor vehicle act)didn't say anything about trial language. that meant the offence act still applied except it didn't say anything about trial language, either. but it did say the criminal code could fill in any gaps. the criminal code said mr. bessette could have his trial in either language. the court said this overrode the 18th-century english law. because the law said mr. bessette had a choice, the provincial court didn't have the power to make him have his trial in english. any decision on his case would have no legal effect because it wouldn't respect his trial language rights. if he lost this (english) trial, he could have appealed about the trial language issue. but he would likely have to go through a second (french) trial once the appeal court saw the mistake. if he won his (english) trial, he would never have a chance to have his language rights respected, because you can't appeal when you win. this case wasn't about mr. bessette's language rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. it was about what all the laws that applied to his trial, taken together, said about what language he could be tried in. the supreme court of canada previously dealt with language rights during hearings in mazraani v industrial alliance insurance and financial services inc.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an insurance company with no knowledge of a policy violation may deny full coverage once made aware of the violation. on may 29, 2006, mr. steven devecseri died in a motorcycle accident where other people were injured. among them, mr. jeffrey bradfield and mr. jeremy caton decided to sue his estate. mr. devecseri's insurance company, royal & sun alliance (rsa), proceeded to defend the estate in the two lawsuits. three years after the accident, and more than a year into litigation, rsa learned mr. devecseri had consumed alcohol immediately before the accident, putting him in breach of his insurance policy. rsa promptly stopped defending mr. devecseri's estate and denied coverage. in doing so, mr. bradfield and mr. caton were no longer eligible for $1 million under the insurance policy. nearly three years later, mr. caton's action went to trial. the result was a judgment against mr. devecseri's estate as well as against mr. bradfield. there was also a judgment in favour of mr. bradfield on his counter-claim against the estate. mr. bradfield sought a declaration allowing him to recover judgment against rsa on the basis that the insurance company had waived its right to deny full coverage because it had provided a defence to mr. devecseri's estate as the litigation progressed. the trial judge granted the declaration, finding that rsa had indeed waived its right to deny full coverage. the ontario court of appeal allowed rsa's appeal. it held that rsa could deny coverage, despite having provided a defence to mr. devecseri's estate, because it did not know of his policy breach. mr. bradfield sought to appeal the decision to the supreme court of canada, but after being granted leave, he settled with rsa and dropped his appeal. the trial lawyers association of british columbia was permitted to be substituted as the appellant. although the appeal was moot, the trial lawyers association wanted to know how the court would have decided the issue. an appeal is moot if the dispute is already resolved. however, a court may decide to hear a case nonetheless, to clarify the law on the issue. the supreme court agreed to hear the appeal, but ultimately sided with rsa. waiver by conduct was not possible under the statute as it read at the time. writing for a majority of the judges, justices moldaver and brown observed that the trial lawyers association had conceded, rightfully in their view, that waiver by conduct was precluded by the insurance act as it read at the time. the statute required that waiver be given in writing and, in this case, the parties agreed that rsa had not given a waiver in writing. also, the majority agreed with the court of appeal that rsa could deny coverage, despite having defended claims against mr. devecseri's estate, because it did not know of his policy breach.
+supreme court of canada if a party to a contract exercises its discretion unreasonably, it breaches a duty of good faith, the supreme court has ruled. wastech services ltd. (wastech) was a company that moved and disposed of waste. the greater vancouver sewerage and drainage district (metro) was responsible for the administration of waste disposal in the district. wastech and metro had a long-term contract. the contract was for the removal and transportation of waste by wastech. the contract said that metro could choose to send the waste to any of three different disposal sites. wastech would be paid a different rate depending on which site was chosen. wastech was paid more if the site was farther away. however, the contract aimed to pay wastech a 'target operating ratio' of .89, meaning costs were 89% of revenue, and it did not guarantee a specific operating ratio in any given year. the contract also gave metro discretion to send the waste to the site of its choice. in 2011, metro decided to send more waste to a closer location. this meant that wastech did not reach the target operating ratio. as a result, wastech said metro violated the contract. the contract said that any legal disagreement should go to arbitration. this is the process where a neutral third party decides who is correct in a disagreement, not a judge or a court. wastech told the arbitrator that metro violated the contract by distributing waste in a way that made wastech unable to reach the target operating ratio under the contract. the arbitrator said the parties purposely decided not to include a clause in the contract to deal with a situation where the distribution of waste made it impossible for wastech to reach the target operating ratio. in the arbitrator's opinion, metro was allowed to use its discretion in a way that had a negative financial impact on wastech. but metro had a duty to act in good faith when using this discretion. metro breached its duty by using its discretion in a way that prevented wastech from having any chance of meeting the target operating ratio. therefore, wastech was entitled to compensation. the courts allowed metro to appeal the arbitrator's decision. the judge set aside the arbitrator's award, because the duty applied by the arbitrator contradicted the contract made by the parties. the court of appeal upheld the judge's decision. the court of appeal said that the arbitrator applied the wrong legal test, and extended the duty of good faith further than the law allows. the supreme court upheld the lower courts' decisions, setting aside the arbitrator's award. it said good faith does not allow a contracting party to use its discretion unreasonably. the supreme court considered discretion to be used unreasonably when it is used in a way that is unconnected to the purposes for which the parties agreed to have discretion in the first place. in this case, the contract showed the parties agreed to give metro discretion, so metro could operate efficiently and keep costs low. the contract did not require metro to use its discretion to ensure wastech reached its target operating ratio in any given year. for this reason, the majority found that metro exercised its discretion for the right purposes. therefore, metro did not violate the duty to act in good faith. the supreme court also dealt with good faith in a contract in cm callow inc. v zollinger, which was heard on the same day.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules it was unconstitutional to raise the monetary value of cases that can be heard by the court of qu bec. the supreme court of canada was asked to decide if a change to the code of civil procedure in quebec infringed on the constitutionally protected jurisdiction of superior courts. in 2016, the provincial government changed article 35 of the code of civil procedure to raise the monetary value of cases that could be heard by the court of qu bec from any amount under $70,000 to any amount under $85,000. the court was also asked if certain powers of the court of qu bec, pertaining to appeals of administrative decisions, infringed on the powers of the superior court. superior court judges in quebec disagreed with the increase. they said that giving the court of qu bec the exclusive power to hear cases involving amounts of less than $85,000 violated section 96 of the constitution. they argued that the superior court should have retained the power to hear cases of $70,000 and above. they also contested the appeal powers granted to the court of qu bec with respect to certain administrative decisions. quebec eventually asked the court of appeal for an opinion on the matter, saying that access to justice considerations had motivated it to increase the value of cases that could be heard by the court of qu bec. it said there are often no superior courts in small towns, and wanted to help people living outside of major cities to access the courts without having to travel long distances. it also argued that the appeal powers of the court of qu bec related to administrative decisions did not infringe on the powers of the superior court. the court of appeal concluded that article 35 was unconstitutional, but that the appeal powers of the court of qu bec in administrative matters had no effect on those of the superior court. the supreme court was then asked for its opinion on both questions. the court system in canada the court system across canada is essentially the same. this is thanks to the constitution, which divides provincial and federal government powers. each province has a three-level court system: provincial (or lower) courts, superior courts, and appeal courts. the constitution recognizes that provinces are responsible for administering justice in their respective jurisdictions. this includes organizing and maintaining the civil and criminal provincial courts, as well as civil procedure in those courts. section 96 of the constitution mentions special types of courts in canada, known as the 'superior courts'. these courts are the highest courts in a province and benefit from a special protected status. in quebec, the superior court and the court of appeal are the 'superior courts'. the federal government has a certain amount of power over those courts. for instance, the federal government is responsible for appointing superior court judges. the supreme court's answers to the questions on the first question, the majority of the judges concluded that article 35 was unconstitutional. they noted that when the constitutionwas enacted in 1867, the monetary ceiling for lower courts was $100. based on expert evidence, they agreed that this amount would be equivalent to between $63,698 and $66,008, canada-wide, today. however, they said that establishing this amount is only a first step in the analysis, and that a determination on whether the new ceiling amount was actually too high depended on several other factors. the majority concluded that the monetary increase gave the court of qu bec the exclusive jurisdiction to handle too wide a range of legal matters. this, they said, prevented the superior court from exercising its constitutionally protected right to decide on many legal matters at the heart of quebec private law. as such, the majority concluded the monetary ceiling of less than $85,000 was too high for the court of qu bec. they also said the provincial government failed to prove that access to justice was facilitated by the increase in the monetary ceiling for cases heard by the court of qu bec. the supreme court did not answer the second question. it said it was irrelevant given its recent decision in canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v vavilov and given the effects of a recent quebec law which limits how the court of qu bec exercises its appeal powers over administrative decisions.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court restores a hockey coach's convictions of voyeurism. randy william downes of british columbia was found guilty in 2019 of voyeurism. he had secretly taken 38 photos of two boys aged between 12 and 14 in their underwear in hockey dressing rooms in coquitlam and surrey. mr. downes was the boys' hockey coach. he also ran a sports photography business from his home. upon his return from a brief trip to the united states, officials with the canada border services agency searched mr. downes' electronic devices and found thousands of photos of children engaged in sporting activities. some of the children were in locker rooms. although none of the photos involved nudity or child pornography, the cbsa alerted the rcmp because of a concern that mr. downes might have child pornography on his home computer. a month later, while searching mr. downes' home and devices, the rcmp found the photos of the two boys taken on mr. downes' iphone without their knowledge. he was charged with two counts of voyeurism. under section 162(1)(a) of the criminal code, a person is guilty of voyeurism when they secretly observe or visually record a person who is in circumstances in which they could reasonably expect privacy. this may arise in a place where it can reasonably be expected that people may be nude. the trial judge determined that mr. downes had secretly taken photos of the two boys in the hockey dressing rooms and convicted him of voyeurism. mr. downes appealed to british columbia's court of appeal. a majority of the court of appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial. the majority said the trial judge should have considered whether nudity was reasonably expected 'at the time' mr. downes took the photos. in their view, the offence of voyeurism applied to perpetrators who expect to observe or record nudity or sexual activity. the supreme court has allowed the appeal and restored mr. downes' convictions. the prosecution did not need to prove that nudity could reasonably be expected in the dressing rooms at the time the photos were taken. writing for a unanimous court, justice mahmud jamal said that section 162(1)(a) of the criminal code has no implicit temporal component. this means that the crown did not have to prove that a person could reasonably be expected to be nude in the dressing rooms at the specific time when the photos were taken. as justice jamal explained, it suffices if the person is in a place where a person may 'reasonably be expected to be in such a state [of undress], such as a changing room, toilet, shower stall, or bedroom'. as a result, he determined the trial judge had appropriately convicted mr. downes of voyeurism. justice jamal arrived at this conclusion by interpreting section 162(1)(a) according to the text of the provision and the purpose for which it was enacted. with respect to the provision itself, he stated that if parliament had intended to include a temporal component to the offence, it could have done so expressly. moreover, he determined the purpose of the offence was to protect the privacy and sexual integrity of individuals. this purpose was best achieved by interpreting section 162(1)(a) as a location-based offence. the fact that mr. downes secretly took photos of the two boys in hockey dressing rooms, a place where individuals are often in a state of undress, was sufficient to find him guilty of voyeurism.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court restores a foster parent's convictions for the death of a child and for causing bodily harm to another. kevin goforth and his wife were charged with the second degree murder of a four-year old and unlawfully causing bodily harm to a two-year old. both children were being foster parented by the goforths. the parents were accused of failing to provide the children with the necessaries of life, such as food and water, contrary to section 215 of the criminal code. in 2016, a jury convicted both foster parents of unlawfully causing bodily harm to the younger child. as to the older child, the jury found the wife guilty of second degree murder, whereas it found mr. goforth guilty of manslaughter. second degree murder is a more serious offence than manslaughter because someone who murders intends to kill (or at least cause the victim serious harm), while someone who commits manslaughter does not. mr. goforth appealed to saskatchewan's court of appeal, which set aside his convictions and ordered a new trial. the court of appeal said the trial judge made errors in her instructions to the jury in two ways. first, she was wrong in how she described the guilty mind requirement, known as the 'mens rea'. second, she failed to properly instruct the jury regarding mr. goforth's evidence that he was only a secondary caregiver to the children. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court agreed with the crown. the jury was properly instructed. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice suzanne côté said the jury was properly instructed. 'this court has long held that an accused is entitled to a jury that is properly   and not necessarily perfectly   instructed', she wrote. trial judges must be allowed some flexibility in the language they use to instruct a jury since their role is to simplify the law and evidence. an appeal court must review any alleged errors in the instructions in the context of the evidence, the entire jury instructions and the trial as a whole. in this case, the trial judge's instructions were not perfect but were adequate. the majority of judges said there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have been confused about the mens rea requirement or been misled about what the crown had to prove for mr. goforth to be found guilty of either manslaughter or unlawfully causing bodily harm. also, the trial judge's instructions were sufficient as to mr. goforth's evidence relating to his busy schedule and that he was only a secondary caregiver, which he argued prevented him from foreseeing the risk of harm to the children. finally, the judge's instructions necessarily allowed the jury to make a common sense assessment about whether failing to provide food and water to young children was a marked departure (significantly different) from what a reasonably prudent person would do.
+supreme court of canada a decision to allow us super bowl ads to be shown in canada went beyond the crtc's power, the supreme court has ruled. the canadian radio-television and telecommunications commission is a federal body. it makes rules about tv, phone service, and internet on behalf of the government. some of the rules deal with 'simultaneous substitution' of tv broadcasts. 'simultaneous substitution' means replacing one station's broadcast with another's at the same time. if a canadian tv station has the exclusive right to a program in canada, under 'simultaneous substitution' rules, it can make other stations use its version. this includes the commercials. cable and satellite companies have to use this version on all their channels showing the program. the rules are meant to give canadian tv stations a bigger audience. this way, they can make more money selling advertising. 'simultaneous substitution' isn't allowed where it's not in the public interest. the super bowl has been shown on canadian tv for over 40 years. part of the experience has been the commercials. but, because of 'simultaneous substitution,' viewers in canada have always seen different commercials than viewers in the united states. the public told the crtc that it wanted to see the us super bowl commercials. so the crtc decided that 'simultaneous substitution' wouldn't be allowed for the super bowl anymore. in 2015, it made a 'policy statement' saying this. it made the official decision in a 'final order' in 2016. the final order said the change would happen in 2017. bell media bought the exclusive rights to show the super bowl on its ctv stations until 2019. bell and the national football league (which owned the copyright for the super bowl) disagreed with the crtc's decision. they said it didn't have the power to make it. the federal court of appeal agreed with the crtc, saying its decision was 'reasonable.' but the majority of judges at the supreme court said the federal court of appeal took the wrong approach. there are specific ways courts have to look at decisions made on behalf of the government by bodies like the crtc. for some decisions, courts 'review' the decision. but in this case, the law said the parties had the right to 'appeal.' that meant the court had to treat the crtc's decision the same way it would treat a court decision. it had to look at whether the decision was 'correct' in light of the law. (to better understand what 'reasonable' and 'correct' mean here, read the 'case law in brief' on the standard of review.) the majority agreed with bell and the nfl. they said the crtc didn't have the power to make the decision. the decision was made under a specific section of the broadcasting act. the majority read the words of that section in their entire context. it looked at its wording and grammar, the purpose of the act, and what parliament intended when it passed it. it said that section only gave the crtc power to order cable and satellite companies to carry specific channels. as part of that power, it could create terms and conditions the companies had to follow. part of the reason for the section was to support canadian content that cable and satellite companies might not consider profitable. in this case, the crtc was saying cable and satellite companies carrying us stations had to broadcast the us version of the super bowl, including the commercials. this was beyond the powers the crtc had under that section of the act. going beyond its powers made the decision not 'correct.' the majority didn't decide whether the crtc could make the decision under a different section of the act, though. the bell canada and nfl cases were two of three cases known as the 'administrative law trilogy.' (the other case, canada (minister of citizenship and immigration) v vavilov, was about whether someone was a canadian citizen.) the super bowl ad cases and vavilov were about very different issues. but they all dealt with an area of administrative law called 'standard of review.' to learn more about this (and to better understand the court's reasons in these cases), read the 'case law in brief' on the standard of review.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules the city of montreal could not apply payments from quebec's voluntary reimbursement program to cover the amount it owed to a contractor. this case involves the city of montreal and one of its contractors, an engineering firm called sm group. in 2018, sm group sought to avoid bankruptcy by applying to quebec's superior court for protection under the companies' creditors arrangement act (ccaa). this process is called restructuring. sm group had also participated in a two-year voluntary reimbursement program under a quebec law meant to help recover money paid 'in the course of the tendering, awarding or management of a public contract in relation to which there may have been fraud or fraudulent tactics'. the 2015 law was in response to the charbonneau commission of inquiry into collusion and corruption in public contracts with the construction industry. the superior court granted sm group's application. it appointed deloitte restructuring (deloitte) to monitor the company's restructuring and ordered a 'stay of proceedings'. the stay meant that all legal actions against the company were put on hold to give the engineering firm the opportunity to get its business back on track. following that initial court order, sm group continued with the construction of the samuel de champlain bridge and the rebuilding of the turcot interchange in montreal. however, the city refused to pay for that work. it said it could use 'pre-post compensation' to reduce or cancel the amount owed for the work performed by sm group. this meant the city would apply payments from the voluntary reimbursement program (vrp) to cover the amount owed for the work done on the bridge and interchange. pre-post compensation is usually not allowed by the courts, but the city said it should be allowed in this case because the money sm group owed through the vrp resulted from fraud. in response to the city's refusal to pay, deloitte applied to the superior court to stop the city from using pre-post compensation. the court granted deloitte's application, which the city then appealed. when the court of appeal agreed the city could not use pre-post compensation, the city turned to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has also agreed the city could not use pre-post compensation. the city failed to prove the vrp claim was fraudulent. writing for the majority, chief justice wagner and justice côté explained that a vrp claim is not necessarily fraudulent. they wrote, 'the mere fact that a debtor company participated in the vrp is not sufficient to infer that the company defrauded a public body'. in this case, the city of montreal still had the burden of proving that sm group had committed fraud, which the city failed to do. the majority said a court should generally not allow pre-post compensation, unless there are exceptional circumstances. they said there were no such exceptional circumstances in this case.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court decides canada north group can pay expenses necessary to its restructuring process before money owed to the canada revenue agency. the companies' creditors arrangement act is a law to help businesses avoid bankruptcy when a company has more than $5 million in debt that it cannot afford to repay. the process is called restructuring. this could include giving a company more time to pay its debt, reducing its interest costs or permitting it to borrow money to repay the debt. companies that restructure must hire experts such as interim lenders, monitors and lawyers. if there is not enough money to pay everyone, a court will decide who gets paid first. on july 5, 2017, an alberta court ordered canada north group, an alberta company that provides remote workforce accommodations, to pay its restructuring experts first. as a result, those expenses became 'super priority' charges. this meant the experts would be paid before all other debts, including payroll deductions and gst owed to the federal government (crown). however, the crown objected, asking that it be paid before everyone else. when the court refused to change the order, the crown turned to the alberta court of appeal, which dismissed its appeal. the federal government asked the supreme court of canada to consider the issue. even though there was enough money to pay everyone in this case, the court decided to hear it to determine the law. 'super priority' for restructuring-related expenses a majority of the judges dismissed the crown's appeal. they said a court supervising a restructuring process has the authority to order that 'super priority' charges be paid first, even before paying the crown the money it is owed. this is because the companies' creditors arrangement act gives the court a broad discretionary power to make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances. for experts to put themselves at financial risk in order to restructure a company, only to discover later that other creditors must be paid first, would not be fair. four judges disagreed, saying that the money owed to the crown takes priority over all other debt or expenses, including the money owed to the restructuring experts.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court provides guidance on how to interpret non-liability clauses under quebec civil law. this case centers on a contract dispute between two companies. prelco is a large manufacturing company based in rivière-du-loup, quebec, that makes and transforms flat glass for architectural and industrial uses. in 2008, it hired a company called createch to design and install a management software system. the contract included what is known as a 'non-liability clause'. in this case, the clause limited createch's liability should the software cause damages to prelco such as the loss of data or profits. after the software installation, prelco experienced problems with the system that affected its business. in 2010, prelco ended its contract with createch and hired another company to fix the faulty system. prelco sued createch for loss of profits and to recover the costs it paid to have the other company repair the system. createch responded with a counterclaim against prelco for an unpaid invoice. the trial judge ruled that createch could not invoke the 'non-liability clause' due to problems with the system. he said that even though prelco signed the contract with this non-liability clause, createch must still meet its fundamental obligation under the contract, which was the design and installation of a software system that met prelco's needs. the judge awarded damages to prelco, but not as much as the company had requested. both createch and prelco appealed to the quebec court of appeal, which dismissed their appeals. createch then appealed its case to the supreme court of canada. it argued that the non-liability clause was valid. the supreme court has agreed with createch. createch could limit its liability toward prelco under the contract. writing for a unanimous court, chief justice wagner and justice kasirer recognized that createch had not met its fundamental obligation under the contract to design and install a software system that met prelco's needs. despite that breach, they wrote that the non-liability clause was still valid. after all, the parties had agreed to it when negotiating the contract. the judges said, the will of the parties had to be respected. in arriving at their conclusion, the judges explained the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation. according to this rule, a person or business cannot limit their liability for their primary service under a contract. this would make the contract meaningless. the judges said there are reasons for this rule under quebec civil law, but these reasons do not apply in this case. in other words, createch could rely on the non-liability clause in its contract with prelco to limit its liability for the faulty system. as a result, createch will only have to pay prelco what it cost to hire another company to fix the faulty system. as for prelco, it must pay the unpaid invoice to createch. the contract in this case is different than a consumer contract. chief justice wagner and justice kasirer said the non-liability clause in this case was valid because it was negotiated by two sophisticated companies. this is different than for consumer contracts, where non-liability clauses are restricted by law to protect consumers who can be disadvantaged as compared to a company.
+supreme court of canada a property owner who thinks s/he is the victim of 'disguised expropriation' needs to act in a reasonable time to challenge a municipal by-law, the supreme court has ruled. an owner can still ask to be compensated for the loss in property value even if the court rejects the challenge. in 1989, the numbered company 2646-8926 qu bec inc. bought a wooded property in the town of lorraine. mr. pichette, the majority shareholder, planned to build a housing subdivision there eventually. but in 1991 the town passed a zoning regulation and included over half of the property in a conservation area. mr. pichette did not find out about this until about ten years later when he visited the land for the first time. he tried to get the town to change its mind about what it had done to the property, but it didn't. mr. pichette accused the town of 'disguised expropriation.' disguised expropriation is when a government illegally takes away some of the rights of owning a property (but not the property itself) without fair compensation. in this case, mr. pichette said passing a zoning by-law that unfairly limited use of the property without fair compensation was disguised expropriation. a property owner who thinks the government has taken away his or her property illegally can ask the courts for help. for example, a court can cancel a by-law or declare that it can't be applied to the property. the court's power in these cases is discretionary, meaning it can refuse to intervene, for example, if the property owner waited too long to do anything. mr. pichette's company turned to the courts for help in 2007. the company asked for the by-law to be overturned and for the town to pay damages. the trial judge said the two issues (overturning the by-law and the damages) should be decided separately. he focused on the by-law, keeping the issue of damages aside to decide later. he rejected the request to overturn the by-law because it was made too late. the court of appeal disagreed with this. it said the trial judge should have thought about whether the by-law was an abuse of power, which courts could intervene to correct even though there was a delay. (an abuse of power is when a state actor does something that it was not supposed to, with or without bad intent.) the court of appeal ruled for the property owner, but sent the matter back to the lower court to decide on compensation. the town appealed. chief justice richard wagner, writing for a unanimous supreme court, ruled for the town. the question before the court was whether the trial judge could refuse to declare the by-law unenforceable against the owner of the land. specifically, it was whether the trial judge could refuse to do so when the owner claimed the by-law was illegal, but waited too long to take legal action. chief justice wagner said the trial judge's decision to deny the claim because of the delay was reasonable. the trial judge was allowed to use his discretion this way in this situation. sixteen years had passed from the time the by-law came into effect to the time the company challenged it in court. at least four years had passed from the time mr. pichette learned about it. both delays were unreasonable. also, the civil code of quebec said the owner no longer had a right to make the claim because it had waited more than ten years to act. however, chief justice wagner noted that an owner who didn't challenge a by-law in a reasonable time could still ask for compensation to cover the loss in property value caused by the by-law. he didn't decide on compensation in this case, because that issue was separate from the issue of whether the by-law could be enforced, as the trial judge had said. this case dealt with zoning regulations that a property owner said amounted to disguised expropriation. the decision confirmed that an owner trying to have a zoning by-law declared void or unenforceable has to act in a reasonable time to defend the rights claimed, or the request will be denied.
+supreme court of canada a lawyer's uncivil behaviour in court may not amount to professional misconduct if it was based on a mistaken understanding of the law, the supreme court has ruled. all the circumstances must be taken into account. joseph groia was the lawyer for john felderhof, a bre-x mining executive charged with insider trading and other crimes. the trial was tense, marked by personal attacks and sarcastic remarks. during the first half of the trial, mr. groia believed prosecutors were acting wrongly. he accused them repeatedly and in harsh language of abuse of process. mr. groia was actually wrong about the law, but the judge did not correct him. lawyers have to follow many ethical rules. in ontario, these are enforced by the law society of ontario (formerly known as the law society of upper canada). the duty to practice law with 'civility' is only one of them. civility is not just about being polite; when lawyers attack each other personally, it weakens the justice system. personal attacks distract from the parties' dispute and makes it harder for lawyers to work together to find solutions. the law society can charge lawyers who act uncivilly with professional misconduct. the law society began an investigation into mr. groia in 2004 for his behaviour toward the prosecution, even though no one complained. he was charged with professional misconduct in 2009 and found guilty by a law society hearing panel in 2012. the law society appeal panel confirmed this in 2013. mr. groia's licence to practice law was suspended for a month and he was ordered to pay $200,000 in costs. he disagreed with the decision and asked the courts to review it. both the divisional court and the court of appeal upheld the law society appeal panel's decision. justice michael moldaver, writing for the majority at the supreme court, ruled for mr. groia. in his view, the law society's decision was unreasonable. he said that mr. groia had a reasonable basis to accuse the prosecution of misconduct, even though the allegations stemmed from his mistaken understanding of the law. the prosecutors' conduct, the fact that the judge did not correct him, and the legal uncertainty about how to raise the issue of abuse of process all led him to act as he did. justice moldaver worried that the law society's decision would make lawyers think twice about forcefully defending their clients, for fear they could be charged with misconduct. he also said the law society should pay careful attention to the legal rulings made by a trial judge who, unlike the law society, saw mr. groia's behaviour in person. four judges agreed with justice moldaver. justice suzanne côté agreed with justice moldaver that the law society was wrong to punish mr. groia. but unlike the majority, she thought that courts should not simply accept a law society's disciplinary decision about a lawyer's conduct in the courtroom. this was because letting a law society review in-court behaviour raises concerns about the role and independence of judges. justices karakatsanis, gascon, and rowe disagreed with justice moldaver on how to review the law society's decision and on the outcome. they said it was open to the law society to find mr. groia guilty of misconduct. in their view, he had disrupted the trial and unfairly accused the other side's lawyers of dishonesty. they said the law society reasonably decided that mr. groia's own mistaken view of the law was no excuse for his bad behaviour. lawyers have both a professional obligation to advocate strongly for their clients and a duty to act civilly during a trial. this case was about deciding when strong courtroom advocacy becomes incivility, and when incivility becomes professional misconduct. the supreme court said that decision-makers should look at the full situation when deciding if a line was crossed.
+supreme court of canada the federal government couldn't force a bc crown corporation to pay gst on its own property, but it still had to pay because bc agreed, the supreme court has ruled. british columbia investment management corporation (bci) was a crown corporation owned by the british columbia government. bci managed and invested pension and other money for several public-sector organizations. the federal government collected gst under the excise tax act. bci didn't charge direct fees for some of its investment services. instead, it took some of the profits from those investments to cover the costs of its services. it didn't charge gst. under the constitution, the federal and provincial governments each have different powers. they can't interfere with each other's powers. the constitution says that they can't force each other to pay tax. they have 'immunity' against each other's taxes. but the federal government said bci had to charge gst for the investment services. according to the federal government, bci was holding the investments 'in trust' for (for the benefit of) pension boards. the pension boards were private and not part of any government. because the pension boards were getting a service, the federal government said they had to pay gst, which bci had to collect. the federal government also said bci still had to pay gst even if the investments weren't being held 'in trust' for anyone else. this was because the bc government had agreed to pay gst in some situations. according to the federal government, bci was bound by bc's agreement to pay gst. the federal government said bci owed over $40 million, plus interest and penalties, for three years. bci asked a british columbia court to legally declare that it didn't have to pay federal taxes. the bc court decided the federal government couldn't force bci to pay under the excise tax act. but the court also said that bci still had to pay because of bc's agreements with the federal government. the court of appeal agreed. the majority of judges at the supreme court of canada agreed with the lower courts. bc law didn't actually say who the 'beneficiary' of the trust was (that is, who got the real benefits from it). bci legally owned the investments. bci was a crown corporation managing the investments. so if the federal government charged bci gst for investment services under the excise tax act, it would be charging tax on property owned by the province. that's not allowed under the constitution. but the majority of judges agreed that bci still had to pay because it was a provincial crown corporation. just as it benefitted from the province's tax immunity, it was also bound by the province's agreements to pay gst to the federal government. the majority said that even though one level of government can't force the other to pay tax, that doesn't mean they can't agree to pay tax if they choose to. another issue in this case was which court should decide the dispute. the tax court is the only court that has the power to decide if a federal tax assessment is correct. because it is a provincial superior court, the bc court has the power to hear any legal issue, unless the power to hear it has been given to another court. the issue about whether bc's agreements to pay gst applied to bci wasn't about a specific tax assessment, so the tax court wouldn't have had the power to decide it. since it made sense to hear all the issues together, it was right for the bc court to hear it.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules police did not violate an ontario man's privacy when they searched his home. on june 1, 2017, police in oakville, ontario responded to a report about a man hitting a woman in a car. the man was later identified as matthew stairs. police found the car parked in the driveway with no one inside, so they knocked on the front door of the house. when no one answered, the officers entered through a side door. inside, they found a woman with a bruised face. they found and arrested mr. stairs in the basement. police then looked around the basement living room and found drugs (methamphetamine). mr. stairs was charged with possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, and with assault and breach of probation. at trial, mr. stairs argued that police were not allowed to search his home and therefore that the drug evidence could not be used against him. he invoked section 8 of the charter, which protects people from 'unreasonable search or seizure'. police testified they searched the basement living room to address their safety concerns. mr. stairs was convicted of all charges. he appealed his drug conviction to ontario's court of appeal, which found the police search had not violated his section 8 charter right. he then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the search did not violate mr. stairs' section 8 charter right. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justices moldaver and jamal said the search of the basement living room did not violate mr. stairs' section 8 charter right. police had reason to suspect a safety risk, and that that their concerns would be addressed by a quick scan of the room. the judges said the search of the basement living room complied with section 8 of the charter because: (1) mr. stairs' arrest was lawful; (2) the search was related to his arrest, was of the surrounding area only and was conducted for safety reasons; and (3) the search accounted for the increased privacy interests in a home. as a result, the drug evidence could be admitted at trial. 'a fundamental and longstanding principle of a free society is that a person's home is their castle', the judges wrote. they added that this privacy interest must be balanced with valid law enforcement objectives. in other words, police can search a home for safety reasons if the search is conducted in a reasonable manner and accounts for the greater expectation of privacy in a person's home.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules canadian military investigators did not violate the charter of rights and freedoms while investigating a canadian soldier's criminal activity abroad. retired corporal (cpl.) colin mcgregor was posted to the canadian defence liaison staff at canada's embassy in washington, dc given his position in the united states, cpl. mcgregor had diplomatic immunity in respect of his person, property and residence under the vienna convention on diplomatic relations. in 2017, one of his canadian armed forces colleagues posted to the united states discovered two audio recording devices in her home. she believed cpl. mcgregor had placed them there and reported the discovery to her senior officer. upon investigating the matter, the canadian forces national investigation service found there were reasonable grounds to believe cpl. mcgregor had committed the offences of voyeurism and possession of a device to surreptitiously record private communications. yet, the investigation service could not search his residence in alexandria, virginia because it was not located on canadian armed forces property. as a result, the lead investigator asked the canadian embassy to waive cpl. mcgregor's immunity under the vienna convention. with immunity waived, the alexandria police department obtained a warrant that authorized the search of cpl. mcgregor's residence, as well as any electronic devices found there. the american police entered cpl. mcgregor's residence and invited the investigation service to conduct the search. officers seized electronic devices and searched some of them while in the residence. they discovered evidence of the suspected offences as well as others. the electronic devices were removed to canada and searched further, in line with canadian warrants. a military judge dismissed cpl. mcgregor's motion to exclude the evidence for breach of section 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, which protects people from 'unreasonable search or seizure'. the military judge convicted him of voyeurism, possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications, sexual assault and disgraceful conduct. that decision was affirmed by the court martial appeal court. cpl. mcgregor then appealed to the supreme court of canada. both parties relied on this court's decision in r v hape about whether the charter applies to searches and seizures conducted by canadian police officers in other countries. cpl. mcgregor took the position that the charter applies in this case to the investigation service, whereas the crown argued the opposite. a unanimous supreme court dismissed the appeal and affirmed his convictions. the investigation did not violate cpl. mcgregor's rights under section 8 of the charter. writing for a majority of the judges, justice suzanne côté found it unnecessary to deal with the issue of extraterritoriality, because she said the investigation service did not violate the charter. working within the constraints of its authority in virginia, the investigation service asked local authorities to obtain and execute a warrant under virginia law. that warrant authorized the search, seizure and analysis of cpl. mcgregor's electronic devices expressly. the evidence of sexual assault was discovered inadvertently by investigators while triaging the devices at the scene of the search. its incriminating nature was immediately apparent. although the warrant did not foresee such evidence, the digital files fell into plain view. as justice côté explained, there are two requirements of the plain view doctrine and in this case they were both met: (1) the investigators had a legitimate prior justification for the intrusion in the form of a warrant; and (2) the incriminating evidence was in plain view in that it was immediately obvious and discovered inadvertently. in addition, the investigation service obtained canadian warrants before searching the devices any further. for all these reasons, justice côté said it is difficult to see how the investigators could have acted differently to attain their legitimate investigative objectives.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court has provided guidance to appellate courts on inconsistent jury verdicts. this case deals with the concept of inconsistent verdicts given by a jury. this happens when a jury finds an accused person both guilty and not guilty of the same conduct. the supreme court of canada clarified the approach to be taken by appellate courts when verdicts are alleged to be inconsistent. the accused, rv, was charged with sexual offences against an underage person between 1995 and 2003. specifically, he was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. the jury convicted rv of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. the same jury found him not guilty of sexual assault based on the same evidence. rv appealed his convictions. he claimed the guilty verdicts were unreasonable because they were inconsistent with the not guilty verdict. the crown (prosecution) cross-appealed the not guilty verdict, claiming the instructions to the jury were so unnecessarily confusing that it amounted to an error of law. a majority of the court of appeal for ontario found that the convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching were unreasonable because they were inconsistent with the not guilty verdict on the sexual assault charge. it also concluded there was no legal error in the instructions to the jury. therefore, the majority set aside the convictions and substituted not guilty verdicts. the prosecution appealed the case to the supreme court of canada. a majority of the judges of the supreme court of canada set out a framework to analyze cases where an accused person alleges that verdicts are inconsistent. the majority wrote that in some cases, the prosecution can try to reconcile verdicts that appear to be inconsistent if they were the result of a legal error in the instructions to the jury. in explaining the framework, the majority said that the burden is on the prosecution to satisfy an appellate court to a high degree of certainty that there was a legal error in the instructions to the jury and that the error: (1) had an impact on the not guilty verdict; (2) did not have an impact on the guilty verdict; and (3) demonstrates that the jury did not find the accused guilty and not guilty of the same conduct. applying the framework to the facts before them, the majority found that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on the charge of sexual assault, which was a legal error. specifically, the trial judge left the members of the jury with the mistaken impression that the element of 'force' required for sexual assault was different than the element of 'touching' required for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching. the majority then found, to a high degree of certainty, that the legal error: (1) had a significant impact on the not guilty verdict of sexual assault; (2) did not have an impact on the guilty verdicts; and (3) demonstrated that the jury did not actually find rv guilty and not guilty of the same conduct, because the jury had not been given the right explanation of what 'force' meant. as a result of its analysis, the majority concluded that the verdicts were not actually inconsistent and therefore not unreasonable. the majority reinstated the guilty verdicts. it also set aside the not guilty verdict on the charge of sexual assault and entered a 'stay of proceedings' on that charge. this means the criminal process was stopped instead of ordering a new trial.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that a copyright tariff was not enforceable against york university. from 1994 to 2010, york university ('york') and access copyright ('access') had a licencing agreement that allowed york professors to copy published works in access' collection in exchange for payments called royalties. access is not the copyright owner of the works, it is a collective society that administers copyright protection on behalf of authors and publishers. by 2010, the royalties consisted of an annual fee of $3.38 per full-time student in addition to $0.10 per page copied into a course pack for sale or distribution to students. in 2010, york and access were negotiating to renew the agreement. as the licence expiry date approached, access asked the copyright board of canada to set an interim tariff. the copyright board of canada is the organisation that sets the royalties to be paid for the use of copyrighted works, when the copyright on such works are being administered collectively by a society. the interim tariff took effect in january 2011 and york paid the royalties until july 2011. it then stopped. york said that the interim tariff was not enforceable and that it had the right to copy from access' collection without paying, because of the 'fair dealing' provisions in the copyright act. 'fair dealing' allows for copying of works without requiring permission if done in the public interest. york said this includes copying for research and education. in 2013, access asked the federal court to enforce the interim tariff. it argued york's copying was neither licenced, nor protected by the fair dealing provisions. york responded by arguing that its copying was indeed protected. the federal court ruled in favour of access. york then turned to the federal court of appeal, which allowed york's appeal on the enforcement of tariffs but dismissed its appeal on fair dealing. both parties then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeals. tariffs approved by copyright board are voluntary for users in a unanimous decision, the supreme court concluded that the tariff was not mandatory and york did not have to pay it. the judges said the copyright act does not allow access to enforce royalties against york for any tariffs, interim or final, because it chose not to be bound by the agreement. protection of users the collective administration provisions of the copyright act are intended to protect users such as york. for example, these provisions provide a cap on the amount that can be charged for a licence. but they do not allow a collective society to force a licence on an unwilling user. that would be contrary to their protective purpose. users can always choose whether or not to accept a licence. not an infringement case if people accept a licence, but don't pay the royalties, they will be liable for defaulted payments. if they do not accept the licence, they can be liable for copyright infringement but not for defaulted payments. that is the case with york, because it did not accept the licence. that means it cannot be liable for defaulted payments. the court noted that this is not a case of copyright infringement because access could not make that claim. the only parties who could make that claim are the authors and publishers who own the copyright. without the proper parties, the court refused to address the fair dealing issue.
+supreme court of canada the choice to speak either english or french in certain courts is a protected right, the supreme court has confirmed. when this right is not respected, there might have to be a new hearing. mr. mazraani worked as a personal insurance representative for industrial alliance for six months in 2012. his contract said he was self-employed. when he lost his job, he wanted to apply for employment insurance benefits, but self-employed people aren't eligible. his case ended up before the tax court of canada. canada has two official languages, english and french. the constitution says that people have the right to use either language in certain courts (such as a court created by parliament, like the tax court). it doesn't matter how well a person can speak either language. it's their choice, and they can change their mind in the middle of a hearing (that is, a trial, an appeal, or another legal proceeding) if they want. language rights are different from the charter right to understand (and be understood) during a trial. they are meant to protect official language communities. every court has rules of procedure that apply to it. the tax court's rules said that the parties could say which language they wanted to use in court and ask for an interpreter if they needed one. but some cases are dealt with in a less formal way, to save time (and money) for everyone. in these cases, the usual rules don't apply. the simplified rules that applied in mr. mazraani's case didn't say how someone could tell the court which language s/he wanted to use. they also didn't set out how someone could ask for an interpreter. when the hearing started, mr. mazraani wanted to use english. industrial alliance's first witness wanted to speak in french. but the judge said they would have to come back another day when an interpreter was available for mr. mazraani. industrial alliance decided not to wait, so the witness spoke in english. the hearing lasted a few more days and other witnesses who wanted to speak in french were asked to speak in english. the judge also asked industrial alliance's lawyer to make his arguments in english, even though he was more comfortable in french. even so, many parts of the hearing happened only in french, and mr. mazraani couldn't understand them. the tax court judge ruled mr. mazraani was an employee. he criticized industrial alliance's witnesses as 'misleading' and said they played with words to avoid telling the truth. he said the company acted so badly that it had to pay mr. mazraani's legal costs. this was to discourage 'abuse of process' (misuse of the courts). industrial alliance appealed, saying the judge had violated the language rights of its witnesses and lawyer. the federal court of appeal agreed. it also said mr. mazraani's rights were violated because large parts of the hearing were never translated for him. it ordered a new hearing before a different judge. the supreme court unanimously agreed the witnesses' and lawyer's language rights were violated, and that mr. mazraani's were, too. it didn't matter that there were no rules about language rights in the simplified tax court procedures. the judge still had to make sure people's language rights were protected (especially people coming to court without lawyers, like mr. mazraani). it was wrong for the judge to ask anyone to use a different language. every party, witness, and lawyer had to know s/he had a real choice about what language to use. the court said that language rights were so important that there would usually have to be a new hearing when they were violated, even if the violation didn't affect the result. in this case, the violations had a clear effect on the proceedings and the decision, so the court ordered a new hearing. this decision noted that breaching someone's language rights can be seen as a sign of bias against a language group. this lowers public trust in our courts, which is one reason it is so important for judges to protect these rights.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court issued written dissenting reasons in a case decided orally by the majority of judges in december 2019. instrubel was a dutch company. it had a dispute about contracts with the republic of iraq. it took the dispute to arbitration (a non-court process often used to settle international contract cases). in 2003, iraq was ordered to pay instrubel $32 million plus interest. iraq didn't pay. in 2013, instrubel asked a quebec court for help to get payment. it said iraq had money in quebec. soon after, it asked the court to seize money from the international air traffic association (iata). iata collected fees from airlines on behalf of different countries, for the right to fly over and into those countries. one of the countries iata collected fees for was iraq. iata wasn't involved in the fight between iraq and instrubel. but its headquarters were in montreal. this meant quebec courts had jurisdiction (power) over it. quebec has rules to help make sure people ordered to pay others actually do so. for example, the court can order a third party to pay a debt it owes to another person to someone else. (it can also make the third party hand over certain kinds of property belonging to the person.) the court can also order the money to be seized to make sure it's still there by the time the final decision is given. in this case, iata could be ordered not to pay its debt until the court made a final decision. then it would either pay it to instrubel or iraq, depending on who won the case. iata told the court it didn't have any money or property that belonged to iraq. but less than a week before, it held $166 million (us dollars) for the iraqi civil aviation authority. the court said iata had to transfer $90 million (canadian dollars) to a bank account in quebec. it would stay there until the final decision. iata asked for the seizure to be quashed (canceled). the judge who heard the issue said the money couldn't be seized. he said quebec courts didn't have jurisdiction (power) to seize money that was outside of quebec when the court order was issued. he also said the money iata collected for iraq wasn't a debt, so it couldn't be seized under quebec law. the court of appeal overturned the judge's decision. among other things, it said the money could be seized and said it was a debt. it said the debt legally existed at iata's headquarters in montreal. this was true even if the money was collected in another place and was held in a bank account somewhere else. the supreme court decided this case 'from the bench' right after the hearing on december 11, 2019. when a case is decided 'from the bench,' it means an oral decision is given right away. the parties don't have to wait for a written decision, which takes some time (an average of about five months in 2019). about a third of decisions were given from the bench in 2019. when a case is decided from the bench, the court will sometimes give a written explanation (reasons) later. this can be done to make things more clear. in most cases, though, there won't be written reasons. this doesn't mean there is no explanation. when giving the oral decision, the court might give a short explanation, or say something like, 'we allow (or dismiss) this appeal substantially for the reasons given by the court of appeal.' that means it's relying on the reasons of the lower court, which basically got it right. in this case, the majority of judges dismissed iraq's and iata's appeals 'substantially for the reasons of the court of appeal.' they didn't give their own written reasons. the court of appeal's decision stayed in effect. that meant the money could be seized from iata. one judge disagreed and said she would give written reasons later. it doesn't happen often that there are only written reasons for a dissent, when a judgment is from the bench. but dissent is an important part of canada's judicial process. this case was about enforcing an international arbitration decision. quebec courts weren't involved in the original decision. but they heard the case because it was important to support international arbitration. this included support to make sure awards got paid.
+supreme court of canada part of ontario's sex-offender registry law discriminates against people with mental disabilities, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. in 2001, g had his first and only mental health episode. he was charged with two counts of sexual assault against his then-wife. in 2002, he was found 'not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.' this meant that he did not know what he was doing or did not know that it was wrong, or both. it also meant he didn't have any kind of criminal record. the ontario review board decides if someone found not criminally responsible is a risk to public safety. it said g wasn't a major risk. it gave him an 'absolute discharge' in 2003. this meant he didn't need to be monitored by the review board. he was never charged with any other crime again. even though he got the absolute discharge from the review board, g was placed on ontario's sex offender registry. because of this, he had to report to the police every year. police could also randomly check up on him. his name couldn't be deleted from the list, even if he died. sexual crimes are very serious. but not everyone who commits a sexual crime has to register in ontario. anyone who gets a 'discharge' at sentencing doesn't have to register. this kind of discharge means the person isn't convicted even if they are found guilty. anyone who is pardoned is deleted from the registry. anyone who gets a 'record suspension' (where their record is taken out of the criminal record database) doesn't have to keep reporting. in each of these situations, officials can look at a person's case on an individual basis to decide what kind of risk they are to the public. but none of these options were available to people like g who were found not criminally responsible. those people had no way of getting off the registry. they had to report to police at least once a year no matter what. this was true even if they got an absolute discharge, like g did. g said this was discriminatory. he said it breached sections 7 and 15(1) of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, part of canada's constitution. section 7 protects everyone's right to life, liberty, and security of person. section 15(1) says everyone has the right to be treated equally. the judge who heard the charter application said g's rights weren't breached. the court of appeal agreed that his section 7 rights weren't breached. but it said his section 15 rights were. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that g's section 15 right to be treated equally and without discrimination was breached. they all pointed out many people wrongly think those with mental disabilities are always, and by nature, dangerous. the majority said ontario's sex offender registry law was discriminatory under section 15. this was because it didn't provide a way for people found not criminally responsible to get off the list or to not have to report anymore. people who were found guilty had ways to do this. this discriminated against people like g based on mental disability. (the majority didn't need to look at section 7 because it already found a charter breach under section 15.) when a court finds that a law violates the constitution, the next question is the proper 'remedy,' or how to make it right. the majority set out principles for courts to use when deciding remedies in these kinds of cases. in this case, the majority said that the court of appeal was right that the part of ontario's law that discriminated against g was invalid. it also said that the court of appeal was right to give ontario a year to fix the problem. when deciding whether to give governments time to fix an unconstitutional law, the majority said courts should look at the whole situation. the majority also said that the court of appeal was right to delete g from the registry. it said the court of appeal was right to exempt him from having to keep reporting even though it gave the government time to fix the law. this was because g, like others who bring successful charter cases, help the public by uncovering unconstitutional laws. giving governments time to fix unconstitutional laws should be rare. the supreme court has not done this since carter v canada (attorney general), over five years ago.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an online police investigation targeting people searching for sex with children was not entrapment. 'project raphael' was an online investigation conducted by the york regional police in ontario between 2014 and 2017. it targeted people searching online who wanted to pay to have sex with girls and boys. it involved police placing fake advertisements on the escort sub-section of a website called backpagecom people who engaged with these ads were led to text message conversations between a supposed 18-year-old sex worker, who was actually an undercover police officer. once the prospective client and the undercover officer agreed to a sexual transaction, the officer would then reveal that they were too young for sex work. every client who agreed to continue with the transaction and showed up to the designated hotel room, was arrested. project raphael led to the arrest of 104 men,including erhard haniffa. mr. haniffa was charged with three offences: (1) telecommunicating with a person he believed was under the age of 18, for the purpose of obtaining sexual services; (2) telecommunicating with a person he believed was under the age of 16, for the purpose of inviting sexual touching; and (3) communicating to obtain sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18. a trial was held and mr. haniffa was convicted of all three offences but he applied to have the proceedings against him stopped, alleging that he was the victim of police entrapment. mr. haniffa argued that officers had offered him the opportunity to commit a crime. to avoid an operation being considered entrapment, a police investigation must be a 'bona fide inquiry'. in this case, it meant that police must have had reasonable suspicions that a crime was being committed in the escorts section of the backpage.com website. having considered the entrapment test, the judge found that mr. haniffa was not entrapped and dismissed his application. mr. haniffa appealed to ontario's court of appeal, which dismissed his appeal. he then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the supreme court heard this case together with r v ramelson, r v jaffer and r v dare, and the judgments are being rendered at the same time. those cases also involved individuals claiming they were entrapped as a result of project raphael. their appeals have also been dismissed. mr. haniffa was not entrapped. writing for a unanimous court, justice andromache karakatsanis ruled that mr. haniffa was not entrapped, for the reasons set out in r v ramelson. in that case, she had concluded that project raphael was a bona fide inquiry because 'police had reasonable suspicion in a space defined with sufficient precision' and the offences police provided the opportunity to commit 'were rationally connected and proportionate' to the offences they suspected were occurring in that space.
+supreme court of canada the crown has to act honourably toward canada's indigenous peoples, but this does not mean parliament has to consult them when making laws, the supreme court has ruled. the mikisew cree first nation is a band whose traditional territory is mostly in northeastern alberta, and contains oil sands. the mikisew joined treaty 8 along with other groups in 1899. treaty 8 was the eighth agreement signed by queen victoria and first nations in western canada. under the treaty, in exchange for giving up their ownership of a large amount of land, the mikisew kept the right to hunt, trap, and fish on it. today, aboriginal treaty rights, like those under treaty 8, are protected by the constitution. treaties are understood to be between indigenous groups and 'the crown.' 'the crown' means canada as a state. the crown negotiated and signed treaties like the one with the mikisew in 1899, and still has a duty to fulfill them today. the crown also has other duties, based on the aboriginal and constitutional law concept of the 'honour of the crown.' this requires the crown to act honourably toward indigenous peoples. in 2012, the federal government introduced two bills that changed how canada's environment would be protected. the mikisew said their rights to hunt, trap, and fish on the land would be harmed by the new laws. oil companies and others would be allowed to build structures on or near many waterways without government approval. the mikisew said no one would be making sure fish and wildlife wouldn't be harmed. they were not consulted on the changes. the mikisew said that the government had a legal duty to consult them, rooted in the honour of the crown. in 2013, the mikisew asked the federal court to review the bills, formally declare that the government should have consulted them, and block the new laws. at the federal court, the application judge said the crown should have consulted the mikisew when developing the bills. but the federal court of appeal disagreed, saying the federal court didn't have jurisdiction (power) to hear the mikisew's application in the first place. it also said courts should only be able to hear challenges to laws that have been passed, not laws that are being developed and debated. this was because parliament, not the crown, develops and passes law, according to the 'separation of powers' in the canadian constitution. separation of powers means that different branches of the state have different roles in canada's democracy. the executive (which includes the prime minister and cabinet) decides policy and implements laws (for example, by passing regulations). the legislature (parliament) makes and passes laws. the judiciary (the courts) interprets and applies laws once they are passed. in this case, the mikisew said the ministers were acting in their executive roles when they introduced the laws. the government said they were acting in their legislative roles. at the supreme court of canada, all the judges agreed that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to review the actions of the federal ministers who developed the bills. this was because the federal courts act said it could only review decisions of a federal board, commission, or other tribunal. ministers working on policies that might eventually become law did not fall into any of these categories. the judges disagreed about the honour of the crown and the duty to consult. justice andromache karakatsanis said that there was no duty to consult during the law-making process. however, she said that while parliament didn't have to consult the mikisew, that didn't mean the crown was off the hook. the honour of the crown applied to both the executive and parliament, even if the duty to consult only applied to executive action. the crown still had to act honourably toward the mikisew when a law might negatively affect their treaty rights. justice karakatsanis noted that it didn't matter to the mikisew and other groups whether action that harmed their rights was taken by the executive or by parliament. however, she said the duty to consult wasn't the only possible way for them to protect their constitutional rights, and other approaches could be developed. two judges agreed with justice karakatsanis. justice rosalie silberman abella agreed with justice karakatsanis that parliament had a duty to uphold the honour of the crown. but she went further and said that this included a duty to consult indigenous groups when making laws that might adversely affect them. what mattered was the effect of government action on aboriginal rights, not which branch of government the action came from. she said that parliamentary sovereignty and privilege could not override the honour of the crown, which was also protected by the constitution. one judge agreed with justice abella. justice russell brown said the honour of the crown only bound the executive, not parliament. that meant parliament didn't have a duty to consult the mikisew. even though ministers are part of the executive (as members of cabinet), they act in their legislative roles when they introduce and debate bills. for justice brown, getting courts involved during the lawmaking process (through the duty to consult or another approach) would violate the separation of powers and parliamentary privilege. he said this would create a lot of uncertainty. for him, bills could only be challenged in court once they became law, but not before. justice malcolm rowe agreed with everything justice brown said, but added three additional reasons he thought there should be no duty to consult when preparing laws. he said there were other ways for the mikisew to assert their rights without interfering with parliament's independence. he also said it could make it very complicated for governments to prepare legislation and budgets. finally, he said that it would put courts in the position of supervising dealings between indigenous groups and legislators, something they are not well suited to do. two other judges agreed with justice rowe (and with justice brown). this case was about whether the crown had a duty to consult aboriginal peoples when deciding on changes to laws that may harm their treaty rights, and whether courts had a role in enforcing it. a total of five judges said the honour of the crown was involved at the lawmaking stage. but a total of seven said there was no binding duty to consult before a law was passed.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an online police investigation targeting people searching for sex with children was not entrapment. 'project raphael' was an online investigation conducted by the york regional police in ontario between 2014 and 2017. it targeted people searching online who wanted to pay to have sex with girls and boys. it involved police placing fake advertisements on the escort sub-section of a website called backpagecom people who engaged with these ads were led to text message conversations between a supposed 18-year-old sex worker, who was actually an undercover police officer. once the prospective client and the undercover officer agreed to a sexual transaction, the officer would then reveal that they were too young for sex work. every client who agreed to continue with the transaction and showed up to the designated hotel room, was arrested. project raphael led to the arrest of 104 men, including corey ramelson. mr. ramelson was charged with three offences: (1) telecommunicating with a person he believed was under the age of 16, for the purpose of inviting sexual touching; (2) communicating to obtain sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18; and (3) telecommunicating to make arrangements to commit sexual offences against a person he believed was under the age of 16. a trial was held and mr. ramelson was convicted of all three offences but he applied to have the proceedings against him stopped, alleging that he was the victim of police entrapment. mr. ramelson argued officers had offered him the opportunity to commit a crime. to avoid an operation being considered entrapment, a police investigation must be a 'bona fide inquiry'. in this case, it meant that police must have had reasonable suspicions that a crime was being committed in the escorts section of the backpage.com website. the ontario superior court of justice initially dismissed mr. ramelson's entrapment application in november 2019. however, after the supreme court of canada's may 2020 ruling in r v ahmad, the ontario court invited the parties to make additional submissions and ultimately revised its decision, finding that police had entrapped mr. ramelson. the ahmad decision had reviewed what could be considered a bona fide inquiry in virtual spaces. in light of that judgment, the ontario superior court concluded that project raphael was not a bona fide inquiry because the classified ads website was too broad a space to support a reasonable suspicion. the crown appealed that decision to ontario's court of appeal, which allowed the appeal. mr. ramelson then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. members of the court heard this case together with r v jaffer, r v haniffa and r v dare, and the judgments are being rendered at the same time. those cases also involved individuals claiming they were entrapped as a result of project raphael, and their appeals have also been dismissed. mr. ramelson was not entrapped. writing for a unanimous court, justice andromache karakatsanis said project raphael was a bona fide inquiry because 'police had reasonable suspicion in a space defined with sufficient precision'. the space was the particular type of ads within the york region escort subdirectory of backpage.com that emphasized the sex worker's youth. she also said that the offences police provided the opportunity to commit 'were rationally connected and proportionate' to the offences they suspected were occurring in that space. to determine whether an investigation, conducted on broad virtual spaces, such as the internet, is precisely defined, courts must look at the space's function, its interactivity and the sub-spaces embedded into the broader virtual space. justice karakatsanis said the entrapment doctrine strives to balance competing interests: the rule of law and the need to protect an individual's privacy interests and personal freedom from state overreach, with the state's interest in investigating and prosecuting crime. requiring police investigations to pass the bona fide inquiry test, helps to ensure that balance.
+supreme court of canada everyone has a right to the strongest protections to make sure they aren't held in custody against the law, the supreme court has ruled. mr. chhina came to canada in 2006 and got refugee status two years later. in 2012, he was ordered to leave canada for lying on his refugee application and committing crimes. he was held in custody for a while, but released with conditions while he waited for his travel documents. mr. chhina disappeared and was only found by the police a year later. he was then held in maximum security and kept on lockdown for all but 90 minutes a day. mr. chhina said that his treatment was illegal under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, part of canada's constitution. he argued that he had been there over a year and no one could tell him how much longer he would be held. he also said the lockdown conditions were not appropriate. he applied for habeas corpus (pronounced 'hay-bee-us kor-pus') in 2016. habeas corpus is an old and important legal concept, dating back many centuries. it means 'produce the body' in latin. taking someone's freedom away should be a last resort, and habeas corpus guarantees it won't happen illegally. section 10(c) of the charter says that '[e]veryone has the right on arrest or detention to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.' this means a person can ask a court to decide if they are being held illegally. if the authorities can't show enough of a reason, the court will order them to let the person go. habeas corpus is so important that courts have rules to hear these applications quickly and give them priority over other court business. there are only two exceptions where a person can't use habeas corpus. the first is when they try to challenge being found guilty or challenge their punishment. (they can challenge these by appealing the decision to a higher court instead.) the second is when there is another process in place that is as good as, or better than, habeas corpus. the judge decided not to hear mr. chhina's application. he said the process under the immigration and refugee protection act was just as good as habeas corpus, so it fell under that exception. the court of appeal said this wasn't the case. it said the judge should have heard mr. chhina's application. everyone agreed that the review process under the act worked in general. the question was whether it worked as well as habeas corpus for mr. chhina's specific situation. the majority at the supreme court said that it didn't. this was for several reasons. one reason had to do with the kind of review that happened. decision-makers would review someone's detention every 30 days under the act, but they usually based their decision on what was decided before. under habeas corpus, a judge would give the situation a fresh and independent look. another reason had to do with the power to change things. under the act, a judge could only look at a specific decision from a decision-maker. because of the first reason, the judge was limited to a decision that was usually based on a previous decision. under habeas corpus, a judge could look at the whole situation, not just what the decision-maker looked at. a third reason had to do with what each side had to show or prove. under the act, a detained person had to show why they should be released. under habeas corpus, it was up to the authorities to show why the person should be held. this put less of a burden on the person to prove their case, so habeas corpus was better for them. a fourth reason was time. the process under the act took weeks, and so by the time it got to a judge it was often too late. habeas corpus could happen quickly, and a judge could order the person released right away if they were being held illegally, which was obviously better for them. the majority said the judge should have heard mr. chhina's application. this case was 'moot' by the time it reached the supreme court, meaning it didn't matter for practical purposes. this was because mr. chhina had already been deported and wasn't detained anymore. the court decided to hear the case anyway because the issues were so important.
+supreme court of canada hydro-qu bec could make a company pay government charges based on a contract with a power company which was transferred to it, the supreme court has ruled. in 1926, the canadian international paper company concluded a contract with the gatineau power company. the paper company agreed to pay the power company for electricity to run its mills. the contract said the paper company could have to cover any 'taxes or charges' the power company paid to the quebec government. the contract also said it would apply to the 'successors or assigns' of both companies. that meant anyone who took over the company's rights would have to follow it. the quebec government created hydro-qu bec in the 1940s the government wanted to nationalize electricity (that is, make it publicly-owned). in the 1960s, hydro-qu bec bought most of gatineau power's shares. hydro-qu bec supplied power to the paper company, and the paper company paid for it, like the 1926 contract said. the paper company concluded a contract with hydro-qu bec for more power in 1982. that contract referred to the contract with gatineau power in 1926. the paper company's electricity bills came from hydro-qu bec from at least 1999 on. in 2007, the government of quebec started making hydro-qu bec pay two yearly amounts. in 2011, hydro-qu bec sent the paper company a bill for $3 million to cover these amounts. hydro-qu bec said it could do this because of the 1926 contract. it said gatineau power 'assigned' (transferred) the contract to hydro-qu bec in 1965. the paper company said the 1965 contract made hydro-qu bec a 'mandatary' of gatineau power. that meant hydro-qu bec was acting on behalf of gatineau power, not on behalf of itself. the paper company said its contract was with gatineau power. it said it didn't owe hydro-qu bec anything. even if this wasn't the case, it said assigning the contract wasn't allowed. it also said the amounts weren't 'taxes or charges.' (everyone agreed the paper company that signed the contract in 1926 eventually became resolute fp.) the trial judge said gatineau power didn't assign the 1926 contract to hydro-qu bec. she said the 1965 contract made hydro-qu bec a 'mandatary' of gatineau power. she also said the amounts owed weren't 'taxes or charges.' that meant resolute fp didn't have to pay. the court of appeal said the 1926 contract was assigned by the 1965 contract. it also said the amounts were 'taxes or charges.' the majority of judges at the supreme court agreed with the court of appeal, but for different reasons. they said the trial judge made important mistakes in saying the 1965 contract was a 'mandate.' (that is, it made hydro-qu bec a 'mandatary' acting on gatineau power's behalf.) this meant the court of appeal could intervene. the majority said gatineau power assigned the contract with the paper company to hydro-qu bec in 1965. if hydro-qu bec was acting on behalf of gatineau power, like resolute fp argued, hydro-qu bec wouldn't get to keep the profits for itself. and it wouldn't be responsible for the debts owed to resolute fp itself. the majority said that a party to a contract needs the other party's permission to assign it to someone else. in this case, gatineau power had the permission in advance. the 1926 contract said it was allowed. the paper company (which later became resolute fp) also knew it was doing business with hydro-qu bec since at least 1982. the majority said it didn't matter if the amounts charged by the government were considered 'taxes' or not. that's because the 1926 contract said the paper company would have to pay increases in 'taxes or charges.' it also didn't matter if hydro-qu bec was owned by the government. provinces are allowed to tax or charge crown corporations (corporations they own). hydro-qu bec could ask resolute fp to cover these taxes or charges because it was assigned the 1926 contract, and that contract said so. the civil code of qu bec applies to most non-criminal legal issues in quebec. part of the issue in this case was that there weren't explicit rules about assigning contracts in the civil code. the court last looked at a contract that was assigned in modern cleaning concept inc. v comit paritaire.
+supreme court of canada the constitution allows the federal, provincial and territorial governments to work together to regulate securities trading under a single, unified system, the supreme court has ruled. securities are stocks, bonds, and other financial products. they are often traded on stock markets by investors. canada is one of the only developed countries that doesn't have a national (that is, a canada-wide) regulator to oversee securities trading. this is mostly because of how the constitution is written, with powers divided between the provincial and federal governments. courts have read the constitution as saying that only provinces and territories can make laws about securities trading within their borders. the federal government can't make these kinds of laws, but it has other general powers over trade and commerce. so, in canada, each province and territory has its own securities regulator. the federal government thought financial markets were so important to the canadian economy that they should be overseen by a single regulator. in 2011, it asked the supreme court whether parliament would be allowed to pass a federal law to do that. the court said no, because under the constitution, the provinces and territories have power over most aspects of securities regulation. the federal government can't make laws on issues that belong to the provinces and territories. the court said, though, that a cooperative approach could be constitutional. in a cooperative approach, provinces and territories would deal with aspects of securities regulation within their power, and the federal government would deal with aspects within its power. based on this advice, the governments of canada, ontario, bc, saskatchewan, new brunswick, pei, and yukon proposed a 'cooperative system' to oversee securities markets across the country. it was made up of a 'draft law' that the federal parliament could pass, a 'model law' that provincial and territorial legislatures could pass, and a national securities regulator. the system was set out in an agreement between executive levels of government (that is, the prime minister and premiers, and their cabinets). quebec, alberta, and manitoba had concerns about the proposal. in 2015, quebec asked its court of appeal to answer two questions about it. the first was whether the proposed cooperative system would be permitted by the constitution. the second was whether the draft federal law overstepped the federal government's general trade and commerce powers. the court of appeal answered no to both questions. the supreme court unanimously answered yes to the first question, and no to the second question. while the proposal is constitutional, the court said that each province and territory has to decide for itself whether it is a good idea to join. this is a policy choice, not a legal one. on the first question, the court said the cooperative system is constitutional because it doesn't interfere with 'parliamentary sovereignty.' parliamentary sovereignty is an important constitutional principle. it means that the legislature (and only the legislature) can pass, change, and get rid of any laws that it chooses to. some provinces argued that the cooperative system would force provincial and territorial legislatures to pass the model law, and any changes made to it at a later date (which would go against parliamentary sovereignty). but the court disagreed, and said that any legislature remains free to reject the model law, or any of its changes, if it wants to. even though a 'council of ministers' would be in charge of approving changes to the cooperative system, they wouldn't have the power to change any actual laws. if a legislature disagrees with the cooperative system or any changes, it could always reject them. for the second question, the court said the draft federal law falls within parliament's general powers to regulate trade and commerce, which it has under the constitution. but parliament can only use this power to make laws dealing with truly national issues, which are issues that provinces and territories can't deal with on their own. in this case, the draft federal law was written very carefully. it focuses on 'systemic risk' that could hurt canada's economy, and doesn't go beyond that. it is meant to work together with provinces' and territories' laws, and doesn't interfere with their role in securities regulation. finally, and related to the second question, the court said it is fine for the federal government to give the council of ministers the power to make federal regulations on its behalf. regulations are 'secondary rules' made by people or groups that are given rule-making powers by the legislature. some of the provinces saw a problem with parliament letting a group like the council of ministers, made up mostly of provincial representatives, be involved in making federal regulations. but the court doesn't see a problem with this. parliament can choose to delegate power to make federal regulations to other people or groups, including provincial groups, if it wants to. it can also take that power away, if it wants to. this case came to the supreme court as an appeal from a provincial 'reference.' references are questions that governments ask courts for their opinion on. (in law, an 'opinion' isn't just a belief or point of view. it is a formal explanation of the law.) the federal government can ask the supreme court for a legal opinion on an issue, like it did with the securities act reference in 2011. provincial and territorial governments can ask their courts of appeal for opinions, too. these opinions can be appealed to the supreme court. this case began as a reference to the quebec court of appeal by the quebec government.
+supreme court of canada after going bankrupt, an oil and gas company has to fulfill provincial environmental obligations before paying anyone it owes money to, the supreme court has ruled. redwater was an alberta oil and gas company. it owned over a hundred wells, pipelines, and facilities when it went bankrupt in 2015. bankruptcy is what happens when a person or company can't pay debts. under the bankruptcy and insolvency act (bia), a trustee manages the process. anyone who can prove they are owed money can make a claim, called a 'claim provable in bankruptcy.' anyone with a provable claim will get paid in a certain order set out in the bia. they won't get paid, though, if there is no money left. other claims fall outside of the payment order. the bankrupt company's 'estate' (its leftover money and property) is still responsible for them, despite the bankruptcy. under the constitution, only the federal government has power to make laws on bankruptcy, so the bia is a federal law. the constitution also gives provinces power to make laws in specific areas. these include natural resources and property rights. using these powers, alberta passed laws saying oil and gas companies need a licence to operate. as part of the licence, companies have to ''abandon' wells, pipelines, and facilities when they are done. this means permanently taking these structures down. they also have to 'reclaim'' the land (by cleaning it up). companies can't transfer licences without permission from the alberta energy regulator. they won't get it if they haven't met their responsibilities. most of redwater's wells were dry when it went bankrupt. dismantling the sites and restoring the land would have cost millions of dollars more than they were worth. to avoid paying these costs, the trustee decided not to take responsibility for (basically, to disown) the useless wells and sites. it said it was allowed to do this under the bia. it wanted to sell the productive sites to pay people redwater owed money to. the regulator said that this wasn't allowed under the bia or provincial law. it ordered the trustee to dismantle the disowned sites. the trustee said that even if the regulator was right, the provincial abandonment orders were provable claims under the bia. this meant the money would first go to pay people redwater owed. the problem was that the federal and provincial laws seemed to contradict each other. when laws are applied, they sometimes overlap. this happens even when governments stick to their own areas under the constitution. it often comes up in bankruptcy cases. where a valid provincial law conflicts with a valid federal law, the federal law will normally apply as far as the conflict goes. (federal and provincial laws should be understood as being in harmony, where possible.) in constitutional law, this is known as the 'doctrine of paramountcy.' there were two main legal issues. the first was whether the bia said the trustee could simply walk away from sites it didn't take responsibility for. the second was whether the provincial orders to remove structures from the land were provable claims under the bia. if they were, that would mean the payment order set up in the bia applied. only money left at the end if there was any could be used to pay for taking the sites down. the trial judge said the trustee was allowed to walk away from the disowned sites and the abandonment costs were provable claims. the majority at the court of appeal agreed. the majority at the supreme court said the trustee couldn't walk away from the disowned sites. it said the bia was meant to protect trustees from having to pay for a bankrupt estate's environmental claims with their own money. it didn't mean redwater's estate could avoid its environmental obligations. the majority also said the abandonment costs were not provable claims. these costs weren't debts requiring payments they were duties (to the public and nearby landowners). this put the abandonment costs outside the bia's payment order scheme. that meant there was actually no conflict between the federal and provincial laws. in this case, the trustee had already sold or given up all of redwater's assets. the money from the sales was held 'in trust' (that is, by a court) during the lawsuit. this money must now be used to abandon and reclaim the land before anything is paid to anyone redwater owed money to.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court finds the mandatory and lifetime registration on the sex offender registry unconstitutional. this ruling has important implications for the registration of sex offenders. the sex offender information registration act (soira) came into force in 2004. it created a national sex offender registry. to place an offender on the registry, a crown prosecutor had to apply for a 'soira order'. the judge would then decide to grant the order or exclude the offender from the registry. judges had discretion to determine if the effect of the order on the offender's privacy or liberty would exceed the public interest in protecting society. in 2011, parliament changed the law. it removed the discretion of the crown and the sentencing judge to exclude an offender from the registry. since then, section 490.012 of the criminal code has required the mandatory registration of anyone found guilty of a sexual offence. this means the personal information of every sex offender must be added to canada's national registry. section 490013(21) also imposed a mandatory registration for life, for those who committed more than one such offence. in 2015, eugene ndhlovu pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault against two people at a party four years earlier when he was 19-years-old. the trial judge sentenced him to six months in jail, to be followed by three years of probation. after reviewing mr. ndhlovu's history and the evidence, the judge found he was unlikely to re-offend. however, due to the legislative changes in 2011, mr. ndhlovu was automatically subject to a lifetime registration on the national sex offender registry. after his sentencing, mr. ndhlovu challenged the constitutionality of sections 490.012 and 490013(21) of the criminal code. the judge concluded that those provisions violated section 7 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (the charter), which guarantees everyone the right to life, liberty and security of the person. the crown then asked the court to decide if the provisions could be acceptable under section 1 of the charter. that section permits courts to find otherwise unconstitutional laws justifiable in a free and democratic society. the judge concluded that sections 490.012 and 490013(21) could not be saved by section 1. she then declared the provisions to be without force or effect and did not order mr. ndhlovu to register himself. the crown appealed that decision to the court of appeal of alberta. it found the provisions were constitutional. mr. ndhlovu then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court allows the appeal. sections 490.012 and 490013(21) of the criminal code are unconstitutional. writing for a majority of the judges, justices andromache karakatsanis and sheilah l martin said the two provisions of the criminal code violate section 7 of the charter in a way that cannot be justified in a free and democratic society. these provisions infringe on the right to liberty protected under section 7 of the charter, 'because registration has a serious impact on the freedom of movement and of fundamental choices of people who are not at an increased risk of re‑offending'. registering offenders who are not at risk of committing a future sex offence is disconnected from the purpose of registration, which is to capture information about offenders to help police prevent and investigate sex offences. as such, the majority has declared the provisions unconstitutional. they said the declaration of invalidity for section 490.012 will take effect in one year. the finding for section 490013(21) takes effect immediately and is considered invalid from the time it was enacted in 2011. as for mr. ndhlovu, the judges granted him an exemption to section 490.012 pending its declaration of invalidity. this means he does not have to register in the sex offender registry.
+supreme court of canada it's contradictory for quebec residents to argue that a foreign court doesn't have the power to decide a lawsuit against them, while bringing up points the court could use to resolve the dispute in their favour, the supreme court has ruled. laws are local. a law passed in one place doesn't automatically apply somewhere else. this means you can't take a court judgment from one place (eg, where you live) and get it automatically enforced in another (eg, where someone who owes you money lives). because laws are local, courts only have 'jurisdiction' (power) in their own territories. but life and business today cross borders, so there are rules about how to deal with foreign court decisions fairly and efficiently. these rules are part of a branch of law known as 'private international law' or 'conflict of laws.' for a foreign decision to be enforced in quebec, a quebec court must decide to accept (or 'recognize') it in the province. this doesn't mean looking at all the facts and arguments again. it just means the quebec court will apply quebec rules to decide if the foreign court had jurisdiction over the quebec resident. foreign court decisions will usually be recognized, with some exceptions. one way a foreign court's decision can be accepted and enforced in quebec is if the quebec resident has recognized the foreign court's authority. in legal terms, this is called 'submitting to the jurisdiction.' if the quebec resident didn't submit, the quebec court may decide not to enforce the foreign judgment. in such a case, the person suing the quebec resident won't be able to be paid in quebec, even though the foreign court has ordered it. that means it's important to know whether a quebec resident who is sued abroad has submitted to the foreign court's jurisdiction. but this isn't always clear. you can submit explicitly by saying so, but you can also submit implicitly by your actions. judges and legal thinkers have disagreed about which actions will be considered signs of submission. in particular, they've disagreed about whether someone really submits when they argue about the 'merits' to avoid a bad outcome while also saying the foreign court doesn't have jurisdiction. (the 'merits' are the facts and legal substance of the case.) this was the issue in mr. barer's case. mr. barer was a quebec resident. he was president of two companies, one based in montreal and one based in the us state of vermont. knight brothers was based in the us state of utah, where the vermont-based company was involved in a project. after a contract dispute over the project, knight brothers sued mr. barer and both of his companies in a utah court. mr. barer asked the utah court to summarily dismiss the lawsuit against him (that is, to dismiss it without a full hearing). he said the court didn't have jurisdiction, but also argued that there were legal reasons why knight brothers' claim couldn't succeed. the judge rejected his motion to dismiss and mr. barer didn't defend himself any more. the utah court eventually ruled for knight brothers. because mr. barer lived (and had assets) in quebec, knight brothers asked a quebec court to recognize the decision. the trial judge said the decision could be recognized in quebec. it said mr. barer had submitted to the utah court's jurisdiction by arguing the merits of the case in his motion to dismiss. the judge said mr. barer had to pay knight brothers over $1.2 million. the court of appeal dismissed his appeal. the majority at the supreme court agreed that the utah judgment should be recognized in quebec. it said defendants submit to a court's jurisdiction when they make arguments that (if accepted) would resolve the dispute or part of the dispute on its merits. it would be unfair and inefficient if someone could try to convince a foreign court on the merits while still being able to challenge jurisdiction at home if they didn't like the result. when mr. barer argued the merits of the case in his motion to dismiss, he submitted to the utah court's jurisdiction under quebec law. if the utah court had accepted this argument, it would have decided in his favour on that issue and knight brothers would have had to accept it. mr. barer made a strategic choice, and he had to accept the consequences. this case was specific to quebec law, found in quebec's civil code. the civil code applies to non-criminal legal issues in quebec.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court clarifies that applications in criminal proceedings must be 'manifestly frivolous' to be summarily dismissed. mr. cody rae haevischer and mr. matthew james johnston were members of a criminal organization called the red scorpions. in 2014, they were tried together and found guilty of six counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in what became known as the 'surrey six' murders, precipitated by a dispute over the drug trade in surrey, british columbia. before convictions were entered into the court record, the two accused asked the judge to stop the trial. this is known as an application for a 'stay of proceedings'. in the criminal context, a stay is a remedy available to the accused when the state has compromised their rights to a fair trial and undermined the integrity of the justice system. mr. haevischer and mr. johnston each applied for a stay, alleging systemic police misconduct by officers involved in the investigation. they also claimed they were deliberately and punitively kept in solitary confinement in harsh and inhumane conditions following their arrests. the crown asked the trial court to dismiss the stay applications, without considering them at a full hearing on their merits. it argued that neither application disclosed sufficient grounds to establish that a full hearing was necessary to determine whether the alleged abuses entitled the accused to a stay of proceedings. the trial judge agreed to hear the crown's request. she permitted mr. haevischer and mr. johnston to present their arguments and some evidence, but the record did not represent the full range of evidence they wanted the judge to consider. such evidence would have been submitted at a full hearing and would have included cross-examinations of certain police officers involved in the misconduct. the trial judge summarily dismissed the stay applications and ordered convictions. she concluded that even if she believed everything the two men claimed, and even though the alleged police misconduct was very serious, the crimes were so shocking that a stay of proceedings would not be an appropriate remedy. in her view, there was no reason to further consider the applications in a full hearing to hear all of the accused's evidence. the court of appeal allowed the appeal. it held the trial judge had not taken the correct approach in coming to her decision. she had not assumed that all of the allegations were true. in fact, if all of mr. haevischer and mr. johnston's allegations were believed to be true, there was some chance the trial could be stayed. as a result, it was necessary to hear all of the accused's evidence to determine the applications. the crown appealed to the supreme court. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. the trial judge should not have summarily dismissed the applications as they were not manifestly frivolous. writing for a unanimous court, justice martin ruled that an application in a criminal proceeding should only be summarily dismissed if the application is 'manifestly frivolous'. she explained that when applied, the 'frivolous' part of this standard weeds out the applications that will necessarily fail, while the word 'manifestly' captures the notion that the frivolous nature of the application should be obvious. according to justice martin, '[i]f the frivolous nature of the application is not manifest or obvious on the face of the record, then the application should not be summarily dismissed and should instead be addressed on its merits'. by adopting this rigorous standard, a judge may dismiss applications that would never succeed and which would, by definition, waste court time. however, it also protects fair trial rights by ensuring that those applications which might succeed are decided on their merits. in light of the seriousness of the alleged state misconduct in this case, justice martin concluded the applications were not manifestly frivolous and should not have been dismissed summarily. she dismissed the appeal but ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on mr. haevischer's application for a stay of proceedings only, as mr. johnston had died after the appeal was argued before the supreme court of canada.
+supreme court of canada an experienced naturopath wasn't guilty when one of her patients died after treatment, the supreme court has ruled. ms. javanmardi worked as a naturopath in quebec for over 20 years. she had a degree in science. she also had a doctorate and diploma in naturopathic medicine. her education included classes and clinical training about intravenous injections. she gave these injections to thousands of patients while working as a naturopath. while naturopaths are allowed to give injections in other provinces, they aren't allowed to in quebec. in 2008, mr. matern visited ms. javanmardi's clinic. he was 84 and had heart disease. he was frustrated with the treatment he got at regular medical clinics and hoped naturopathy would help. ms. javanmardi recommended an intravenous injection. mr. matern asked for one right away. it turned out that one of the vials ms. javanmardi used for the injection was contaminated. mr. matern died later that night. two other patients got injections from the same vial that day without any problems. ms. javanmardi was charged with two crimes. the first was 'unlawful act manslaughter.' this means doing something illegal that causes someone to die. the second was 'criminal negligence causing death.' this means doing something that a 'reasonable person' wouldn't have done that causes someone to die. both charges were based on the fact that ms. javanmardi gave mr. matern an injection. to be guilty of a crime, a person must do something that is against the (criminal) law. but something has to make them responsible for what they've done. for many crimes, responsibility is based on meaning to do something wrong. but for some crimes, a person can be responsible even if they don't mean to do anything wrong. in these cases, a judge will compare what the person did to what a 'reasonable person' would have done in the same situation. if the actions of the accused person and the 'reasonable person' are very different, the judge can decide the accused person didn't take proper care. the trial judge found ms. javanmardi not guilty on both charges. she said ms. javanmardi had the necessary skills and experience to give mr. matern the injection. she said ms. javanmardi followed proper safety procedures. she bought her nutrients from a respected pharmacy. she chose proper nutrients for the injection. she also said that a reasonable person in ms. javanmardi's position wouldn't have thought that the injection would hurt mr. matern. she said ms. javanmardi's actions weren't a 'marked departure' (very different) from what a reasonable person with her skills and training would have done. the court of appeal disagreed. it found ms. javanmardi guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, but said there should be a new trial on criminal negligence. the majority at the supreme court said the trial judge's ruling should stand. this meant ms. javanmardi was not guilty of both crimes. it is the trial judge's job to weigh the evidence and make conclusions about the facts. the majority said the court of appeal was wrong to re-weigh the evidence and replace the trial judge's factual conclusions with its own. the majority noted the trial judge was right to consider ms. javanmardi's extensive training and experience as a naturopath when deciding what was reasonable in the circumstances. this case came to the supreme court as an appeal 'as of right.' that means there is an automatic right to appeal. the person doesn't need the court's permission. the right is automatic in criminal cases when a court of appeal replaces a not-guilty verdict with a guilty verdict, as happened here.
+supreme court of canada even when someone is allowed to put an end to a contract, this has to be done in an honest way, the supreme court has decided. mr. callow ran a property maintenance business. in 2010, his company concluded a contract with some condo corporations. the contract was for things like clearing away snow and it lasted for two winters. the company made a new contract with the condo corporations in 2012. it was supposed to last two more winters. but if the condo corporations weren't happy, the contract said they could end it for any reason. they just had to give ten days' notice. in the winter of 2012 to 2013, some people complained that snow wasn't always removed from their parking spots. mr. callow came to a meeting to talk about the problem. the meeting went well. everyone seemed happy enough. a few months later, the condo buildings got a new property manager, ms. zollinger. ms. zollinger told the committee in charge of the contract that they should put an end to it before the next winter. the committee decided to end the contract but no one told mr. callow. mr. callow thought everyone was happy with his services. people from the condo corporations talked to him and led him to believe that he would probably get another contract for more winters. he thought this was true. he also had a summer contract with the condo corporations. during the summer, he did extra work for free because he wanted to encourage them to renew the winter contract. in september 2013, the condo corporations told mr. callow they were putting an end to the winter contract. they gave him ten days' notice. mr. callow didn't think this was fair. it was too late to find a new contract for the winter. he said the condo corporations didn't live up to their 'duty of honest performance.' this duty means that people who make contracts together can't lie to or mislead each other on purpose in doing what they have agreed to in the contract. it's part of every contract, even if the parties do not want to include it. mr. callow sued. he asked the court for over $80,000. this was to cover breaking the contract, not being honest with him, and the extra services he gave the condo corporations for free. the condo corporations said they had lived up to their duty. they said not telling mr. callow certain things didn't mean they had been dishonest with him. the trial judge said the condo corporations knew they were going to put an end to the contract. but they actively misled mr. callow into thinking it was safe, and that it would likely get renewed again, by communicating with him in a way that suggested this. the trial judge said he should be paid for everything except the free services. the court of appeal disagreed, though. it said that the condo corporations had not been dishonest. it also said anything the condo corporations did to mislead mr. callow was about the next contract (for the next two winters he hoped to be hired for), not the current one. there was no duty of honest performance for a contract that didn't exist yet. the majority of judges at the supreme court said the condo corporations breached the contract. the condo corporations had a duty to act honestly toward mr. callow. they were dishonest in how they dealt with putting an end to the contract. they actively misled mr. callow to believe they were happy with his work and that the contract would not be ended early. the majority said the dishonesty was about the current contract because the condo corporations acted dishonestly in putting an end to it. the majority said the duty of honest performance doesn't mean one side has to sacrifice their interests for the other. it didn't mean the condo corporations had to tell mr. callow that they were going to end the contract early. but it did mean they couldn't mislead him about it. they couldn't pretend it would be renewed once they knew it would be ended. contracts are agreements that give people rights against each other. the majority said that no one is allowed to exercise a right under a contract in a dishonest way. the civil law and the common law are two canadian legal traditions. civil law, historically related to french law, is used for law about contracts in quebec. common law, historically related to english law, is used in the rest of canada. even though this case was decided under the law of ontario, the majority looked at civil law sources from quebec to help illustrate how the case should be decided in the common law. the majority said that ideas from the civil law were useful to understand whether the dishonesty was about the current contract.
+supreme court of canada a class action by investors against mutual fund sellers and managers can go ahead, the supreme court has ruled. desjardins financial services sold mutual funds and helped people with financial planning. desjardins global asset management created and managed investments that people could buy. mr. asselin talked to a desjardins financial planner. the financial planner recommended he buy some investments. he bought them. the investments were 'capital-guaranteed,' meaning he wouldn't lose any money. the representative gave mr. asselin documents saying the investments would make money and weren't risky. in the end, he earned nothing. he did get his original investment back, though. mr. asselin said he only found out later that the investments were risky. he also said they were managed in a risky way. mr. asselin said he wouldn't have bought them if he knew the risks. he argued that desjardins financial services should have told its financial planners about the risk, so they could tell their clients. other people were in the same position as him. mr. asselin decided to launch a 'class action' lawsuit on their behalf. he said desjardins financial services was directly responsible for the fact he didn't make the money he expected. this was because it didn't give proper instructions to its financial planners and other representatives. he said it was indirectly responsible for the representatives passing on the bad information. he also said desjardins financial management was responsible because it created and managed the investments. when a large group of people have the same legal problem, they might decide to get together and sue as a group. this is called a 'class action' lawsuit. (the 'class' is the group, so it's a group action.) a class action lets the whole group get their complaint dealt with at once. otherwise, each person would have to go to court on their own. a judge has to give permission for (authorize) the class action to go ahead. in quebec, the judge's main goal is to make sure the class action isn't 'frivolous' (has no chance of success). the motion judge said the class action couldn't go forward. the court of appeal said it could. the majority of judges at the supreme court mostly agreed with the court of appeal. they said the motion judge went beyond making sure the class action wasn't frivolous. this was legally wrong at this point in the process. the majority didn't make a decision about mr. asselin's claim. it only said he could have his day in court. the majority agreed with mr. asselin that desjardins financial services had a 'duty to inform' people about the risks. the majority said a trial judge might eventually hold it responsible directly (for not giving its representatives the information) and indirectly (through the representatives acting on its behalf). however, a trial judge would decide that later. the majority said a trial judge might eventually hold desjardins global asset management responsible for how it designed and managed the investments. it might not be responsible for everything, though. part of the class action asking for 'punitive damages' (which aren't meant to compensate victims, but to punish wrongdoers) wouldn't go forward. the trial judge would have to decide what this covered. class actions are based on people having the same legal issues. this means the court has to deal with 'common questions' (questions that are the same for many or all members of the group). but people may also have individual issues and questions. in quebec, as long as there is one common question that pushes the class action forward, that's enough. in this case, a common question was whether desjardins financial services didn't properly inform its representatives, who then failed to tell clients about the risks. it wasn't about a particular financial adviser who made a mistake. all the financial advisers may have made the same mistake if they weren't trained properly or given the right information. class actions are meant to help people get access to justice. this can be easier to do as a group instead of individually. when a class action is authorized, judges aren't supposed to look at whether the case will be successful. they are just supposed to look at whether it has a chance of success. different provinces and territories have different rules, but the goals are the same. the court previously dealt with class actions in atlantic lottery corporation inc. v babstock, pioneer corp. v godfrey, l'oratoire saint joseph du mont royal v jj, and telus communications inc. v wellman.
+supreme court of canada excessive speeding can be dangerous driving, even if it's just for a few seconds, the supreme court has ruled. in 2015, mr. chung was driving down a street in vancouver. the speed limit was 50 km/h. over the span of one block, just before a major intersection, mr. chung moved into the curb lane. he passed at least one car on the right and dodged another while accelerating to 140 km/h. he hit a car that was turning left. the driver of the other car died. mr. chung was charged with dangerous driving causing death. to be guilty of a crime, a person must do something that is against the (criminal) law. this is called the 'actus reus,' which means 'guilty act' in latin. but something has to make the person responsible for what they've done. this is called the 'mens rea,' which means 'guilty mind' in latin. for many crimes, mens rea is based on intent. but for some crimes, a person can be responsible even if they don't mean to do anything wrong. in these cases, a judge doesn't have to look at what the person themselves was thinking. instead, they will look at what an ordinary, sensible person (a 'reasonable person') would have done. if the actions of the accused person and the 'reasonable person' are very different, this is called a 'marked departure from the standard of care.' this 'marked departure' is the mens rea for crimes like dangerous driving causing death. the actus reus for this crime is driving in a way that is dangerous to the public and that results in death. the trial judge said mr. chung's extreme speeding over a short distance met the requirement for the actus reus. but he didn't think mr. chung had the mens rea or guilty mind. he said the brief period of speeding, on its own, wasn't enough to establish the mens rea for dangerous driving causing death. the crown appealed. when someone is found not guilty, the crown can only appeal if the judge made a legal error. it can't appeal just because the decision is unreasonable. the crown said the trial judge made legal errors in this case. the court of appeal agreed that the trial judge made a legal error by concluding that speeding over a short period of time wasn't enough to show a 'marked departure.' since the trial judge made all the necessary findings of fact, the court of appeal could find that mr. chung had the mens rea for dangerous driving. without the error, the trial judge would have found mr. chung guilty. so the court of appeal replaced the 'not guilty' finding with 'guilty.' the majority of judges at the supreme court of canada agreed that the trial judge made legal errors. they said the trial judge focused on comparing what mr. chung did to specific things people had been found guilty for in other cases. he also focused on the fact that his speeding was for a short period of time. but these weren't the right things to focus on. the trial judge should have looked at whether a reasonable person would have foreseen a danger to the public and what they would have done in the situation. the trial judge should have compared this to what mr. chung did, and then decided if his conduct was a 'marked departure.' the majority said that mr. chung's conduct was a 'marked departure.' they said a reasonable person would have foreseen that quickly accelerating toward a major intersection at a high speed would create a risk, almost immediately, of hurting someone. the majority of judges said that a reasonable person understands that driving, by nature, is risky. they said the faster someone drives, the harder they accelerate, and the more aggressively they deal with traffic, the more risky it becomes. they said that even careful driving can have tragic results. but some conduct is so dangerous it deserves criminal punishment, like in this case. the majority confirmed that mr. chung was guilty of dangerous driving causing death. the supreme court needs to give permission to hear appeals in most cases. one exception is when a court of appeal overturns a 'not guilty' decision. that's what happened in this case, so mr. chung had a right to appeal without permission. this is called an appeal 'as of right.'
+supreme court of canada denying young offenders an automatic right to appeal to the supreme court is constitutional. the supreme court upholds a teenager's sexual assault conviction because the teenaged victim was too intoxicated to consent to sexual activity. today's judgment stems from a toronto-area beach party, where a 15-year-old boy sexually assaulted a 14-year-old girl. after being found guilty of sexual assault, the boy known as cp because he is a young offender, appealed to the ontario court of appeal. he claimed the verdict was unreasonable based on the evidence. cp lost his appeal, but one of the three judges disagreed with their colleagues on a point of law. adults convicted of such serious crimes under the criminal code and who lose their appeals have the automatic right to appeal to canada's highest court when the judges at the court of appeal disagree on a point of law. that is not the case for offenders convicted of such crimes under the youth criminal justice act (ycja). in his appeal, cp challenged section 37(10) of the ycja. he claimed it violates the rights of young offenders under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (the charter). the constitutional argument in his appeal, cp asked the supreme court of canada to overturn the guilty verdict and to decide if section 37(10) of the ycja violated his section 7 and 15 charter rights. section 7 protects an individual's right to life, liberty and security. section 15 of the charter protects groups from discrimination, including on the basis of age. the court agreed to answer both questions. the verdict was reasonable a majority of supreme court judges agreed with the majority of the ontario court of appeal that the verdict was reasonable. they found that the trial judge provided solid reasons for what she believed happened on the night of the sexual assault. the majority said the trial judge's reasons for finding cp guilty were rigorous and thoughtfully explained. section 37(10) of the youth criminal justice act is constitutional the majority of the judges of the supreme court also found that section 37(10) of the ycja is constitutional. five judges explained that the ycja did not violate cp's section 7 charter rights because the modern youth justice system recognizes the vulnerability of young offenders with greater and more tailored protections in line with their unique circumstances. four judges found that section 37(10) did not breach cp's section 15 charter rights. they said that parliament did not discriminate against young people when it passed the ycja. the judges found the law balances the benefits of review on appeal against the harms inherent in that process, such as the principle that there should be no unnecessary delays in the final outcome of criminal trials. one judge found that section 37(10) had breached cp's section 15 charter rights. however, he concluded that the violation was reasonable under section 1 of the charter, which says rights can be limited, if reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. this judge reasoned that in cp's case, the limit was justified because it served the goal of timely justice and young people may still appeal to the supreme court with permission.
+supreme court of canada shareholders usually can't sue when a corporation is harmed, causing their shares to lose value, the supreme court has confirmed. this case dealt with a complex business structure. mr. brunette and mr. maynard managed a trust. the trust owned only one thing: 100% of the shares in a holding company (a company set up to own shares in other companies). that holding company owned shares in companies together known as the groupe melior, which owned and operated seniors' homes. in 2009, most of these companies went bankrupt after they received unexpected tax bills. these bankruptcies also caused the holding company to go bankrupt. since the only thing the trust owned was shares in the holding company, it was now worthless. the groupe melior's business structure was based on advice from lawyers and accountants. mr. brunette and mr. maynard said the lawyers and accountants didn't do their jobs properly. they said this caused the surprise tax bills, which caused the bankruptcies, which led to the complete loss of value of the trust. they also argued the lawyers and accountants were supposed to tell the trust about possible problems with the tax structure right away, but didn't. mr. brunette and mr. maynard sued the lawyers and accountants for $55 million on the trust's behalf. the main issue was whether the trust, represented by mr. brunette and mr. maynard, was allowed to sue the accountants and lawyers. before the trial, accountants and lawyers asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing mr. brunette and mr. maynard clearly had no 'interest' to sue. in law, having an interest means that the issue affects you in a personal and direct way. it is a necessary condition to have a judge hear your claim in court. if a person being sued thinks that the person suing them clearly has no interest, they can ask that a judge reject the lawsuit before a trial takes place. this makes sure that courts don't waste time and resources on cases that have no chance of success. in the present case, the issue was whether the trust had a sufficient interest for the case to go to trial. the problem with the claim was that the trust was only a shareholder of the companies that went bankrupt. in quebec's civil law, as well as the common law used in the rest of canada, shareholders usually can't sue for damages to a company they hold shares in. this is particularly true if the damage results in a loss in value of their shares. only the company has the right to sue. this is in part because the law considers that when damage is done to a company, shareholders are harmed only indirectly. according to the civil code of quebec, only direct harm can be claimed in court. the only time shareholders can sue is if the wrongdoer owes them a separate legal duty than the one owed to the corporation, and that this causes a separate harm to the shareholders. in order to decide if the trust had an interest that would give it the right to sue, the court had to decide if the lawyers and accountants owed it a separate duty and caused it a separate and direct harm. the trial judge and court of appeal agreed that the trust couldn't sue. the majority at the supreme court agreed with the lower courts. it said the groupe melior corporations were directly harmed, but not the trust. the lawyers and accountants did not have an obligation to inform and advise the trust about the groupe melior's tax structure. also, the trust's loss was the same as that lost by the groupe melior corporations (the value of the seniors' homes). it was the exact same harm, which meant that it couldn't be claimed by the shareholders, only by the companies. the majority noted that the business structure was designed to protect the trust from having to pay the groupe melior's debts. but this also meant it couldn't exercise the corporations' right to sue. this case came from quebec, which uses the civil law. both systems apply different rules to solve legal problems. because they are different, they don't always end up with the same result. but often, like in this case, they do.
+supreme court of canada if someone has sexual conversations with a child they don't know online, they can't expect their messages to stay private from the police, the supreme court has ruled. in 2012, a police officer created fake facebook and hotmail accounts pretending to be 'leann,' a 14-year-old girl. mr. mills contacted 'leann.' he was 32, but pretended to be 23. over the next two months, he sent 'leann' several messages and emails, including a photo of his penis. police used software to take screenshots of all the communications. eventually, mr. mills asked to meet 'leann' in a public park. he was arrested and charged with child luring. this is the crime of talking to an underage person online (or using a cellphone) to try to take advantage of them sexually. during his trial, mr. mills argued that police weren't allowed to run the undercover operation that led to his arrest. he said they needed a judge's permission. he said they breached his charter right to privacy because they didn't have permission. because of the breach, he said the evidence shouldn't be allowed in court. this would mean his conversations with 'leann' couldn't be looked at. privacy rights are found in section 8 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the charter is part of canada's constitution. section 8 says that 'everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.' this means the state can't search or take something private without permission. to show a breach of privacy rights, a person has to show that they should have been able to expect something would be kept private. this is called a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.' part of this is subjective (that is, the person actually thinks the thing should be private). part of it is objective (that is, most other people would agree it should be private). the state can still search or take something someone reasonably expects to be private. but it has to have permission. permission can be from a judge (like a warrant). it can also be given if the law directly says so. in this case, the police said it wasn't reasonable for mr. mills to expect his conversations with 'leann' would be kept private. they said they didn't need permission to run the undercover operation or to screen-capture the conversations. the trial judge agreed with mr. mills that police should have had a judge's permission to do some things. the judge said it was okay for the police officer who posed as 'leann' to capture their conversations on facebook and hotmail. but using software to save screen-caps of the conversation was an additional step. they should have gotten permission to do this. but the judge said the evidence should be allowed anyway, and mr. mills was found guilty. the court of appeal said the police didn't need a judge's permission. it said mr. mills couldn't expect privacy when he was messaging a child he didn't know. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that mr. mills should be found guilty. the majority said that mr. mills didn't have a reasonable expectation of privacy. he couldn't have expected that his messages would be kept private when he was talking to a child he didn't know. (if he did know the child, then the conversations might be private.) in this case, the police knew for sure mr. mills didn't know 'leann,' because they invented her. that meant there was no chance of a privacy breach. there was no reason a judge shouldn't look at the messages mr. mills sent to 'leann' to decide if he was guilty. this case involved online messages, but the majority said text messages would also be treated the same when it comes to privacy rights. all the judges at the supreme court agreed courts shouldn't just look at whether something is actually private. (just because something is exposed doesn't mean it isn't private anymore.) instead, they should look at what a person ought to be able to expect to be private in our society. most judges agreed it isn't reasonable to expect this kind of conversation would be kept private. the court decided two other cases involving privacy rights in the months before this one: r v reeves in december 2018 and r v jarvis in february 2019. it decided another case about child luring, r v morrison, in march 2019.
+supreme court of canada hydro-qu bec could rely on permissions given in the decades before to build a new transmission line on people's land, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. in recent years, hydro-qu bec worked to modernize its electricity system. in particular, it wanted to make montreal's access to power more reliable. it also wanted to make sure there was enough electricity to meet people's needs in terrebonne. to do this, it needed to build a new transmission line. transmission lines move high-voltage electricity over long distances. (the voltage gets lowered before it moves to regular power lines closer to where it will be used.) these kinds of lines have thicker cables and are held up by tall metal towers. building the transmission line would mean crossing parts of people's property. hydro-qu bec realized it would be easiest to put the transmission line somewhere it already had permission to. under quebec's civil law rules, a 'servitude' is a kind of permission to use someone else's property for a specific purpose. it's like an 'easement' in the common law rules found in other provinces. both servitudes and easements are recorded in the land registration system. hydro-qu bec had close to 40,000 different servitudes on people's property. many of these servitudes were very old. the servitudes that hydro-qu bec wanted to use to build the transmission line were from the 1970s it originally got them through 'expropriation' to build another transmission line. expropriation is when government takes property, or some kind of right in that property, from owners. owners usually get compensation when this happens. after the expropriation, hydro-qu bec came to agreements with the people who owned the land at the time. the agreements set out exactly what the permission was for, and how much hydro-qu bec would pay the owners. a first transmission line was built afterward. in 2016, hydro-qu bec started working on its new project. workers went to the properties that the transmission line would cross. they wanted to take measurements and get the land ready to build. ms. matta and the other property owners didn't let them do this. the property owners said the servitudes hydro-qu bec was relying on were only for the transmission line that was built in the 1970s they said hydro-qu bec wasn't allowed to use those servitudes to build a new line. the trial judge said hydro-qu bec could go ahead. the court of appeal said it couldn't, unless it got new servitudes. to get those, it could make new agreements with the owners or follow the usual process for expropriation. all the judges at the supreme court said hydro-qu bec could go ahead. it said the court of appeal made a few mistakes. the court of appeal relied on evidence the parties didn't talk about, which it shouldn't have done. it also made an incorrect statement that affected the outcome of the case. the court said the agreements between hydro-quebec and the property owners likely best captured everyone's understanding of what the servitudes covered. servitudes that are gotten through expropriation can be changed by contract if everyone agrees. the agreements between hydro-qu bec and the owners were the documents that should be relied on. the supreme court added that higher courts have a limited role. they aren't allowed to change a lower court's decision on the nature of an agreement simply because they disagree with it. they can only step in if there is a major and obvious mistake. in this case, there was none. the trial judge was right to say that the agreements reflected the permissions given by the servitudes. he was also right to say that these permissions let hydro-qu bec build its new transmission line on the owners' land. therefore, the court of appeal should not have interfered with his decision. there are different legal rules for when higher courts can or can't step in. these are called 'standards of appellate review.' higher courts can step in more easily if the judge makes a mistake that's only about the law. they can't easily do this if it's a mistake about the facts or a combination of the law and the facts.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules the confessions made by two men who killed their landlord were admissible as evidence at their trial. james andrew beaver and brian john lambert rented rooms in a calgary townhouse from their landlord sutton bowers. mr. bowers also lived in the home. on october 9, 2016, mr. lambert called 9-1-1 to say that he and mr. beaver had arrived home to find mr. bowers dead in a puddle of blood. mr. lambert told the operator they did not know how mr. bowers died. yet, he admitted the three of them had argued all week, including the night before, when mr. bowers had told him and mr. beaver to get out of the house. shortly after arriving at the scene, police officers detained mr. lambert and mr. beaver under legislation that does not exist. this breached their rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. the police then transported the two accused to the police station for questioning. at the station, homicide detectives realized the first officers had unlawfully detained the two men. the detectives tried to make a 'fresh start' by advising them of their charter rights. they then arrested the men for murder. when questioned separately, mr. lambert and mr. beaver initially denied knowing how mr. bowers died. eventually, they both confessed to killing him during a fight, mopping up his blood and dragging his body to the bottom of the stairs to make his death look like an accident. the trial judge held a voir dire, which is a trial within a trial without the jury present, to determine if the confessions were admissible into evidence. the accused argued their confessions were involuntary and thus inadmissible. they also claimed the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest them for murder. finally, they said their confessions must be excluded because the detectives had failed to make a 'fresh start' after their unlawful detentions. the trial judge admitted their confessions into evidence. as a result, the accused submitted an agreed statement of facts where they admitted their roles in the killing and asked the trial judge to convict them of manslaughter. the trial judge agreed and sentenced each to four years in prison. mr. lambert and mr. beaver appealed unsuccessfully to alberta's court of appeal before turning to the supreme court of canada. only mr. beaver appealed the voluntariness of his confession. both mr. lambert and mr. beaver claimed their confessions should be excluded. the supreme court has dismissed the appeals. the confessions are admissible. writing for the majority, justice mahmud jamal agreed with the lower courts that mr. beaver's confession was voluntary and thus admissible. he also agreed the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the two men for murder. however, justice jamal found the homicide detectives had made a 'fresh start' from the charter breaches for mr. lambert, but not for mr. beaver. mr. lambert confessed only after he consulted counsel, after he understood his rights, and after he appreciated that he had been arrested for murder. mr. beaver had not. thus, only mr. beaver's confession was obtained in a manner that breached the charter. section 24(2) of the charter says that when a court concludes evidence was obtained in a manner that breached anyone's rights or freedoms guaranteed by the charter, the evidence must be excluded if, having regard to all the circumstances, admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. justice jamal concluded that in this case admitting mr. beaver's confession into evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. he therefore confirmed the men's convictions for manslaughter.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that an alberta first nation could qualify to have its legal fees paid in advance by the government despite having funds of its own. the question in this case is whether an alberta first nation qualifies for 'advance costs'. advance costs means a party's legal fees are paid in advance by the government in order to allow the case to continue when it is a matter of public interest. this case involves the beaver lake cree nation (beaver lake) of northeastern alberta whose members are beneficiaries of treaty no. 6, which means they have the right to hunt and fish on their traditional lands. more than a decade ago, beaver lake sued the governments of canada and alberta for damages due to industrial development on those lands, including oil and gas wells. since then, there have been many preliminary court proceedings, and the case has yet to go to trial. but beaver lake has already paid $3 million in legal fees and says it cannot afford to pay more. as a result, it asked the court of queen's bench of alberta to award it advance costs. the court of queen's bench accepted the request and ordered canada and alberta to each contribute $300,000 annually to beaver lake's legal costs until the trial is over. this was the same amount as beaver lake would also contribute annually. the court of appeal of alberta reversed that order because beaver lake had not proven it could not afford the ongoing litigation. beaver lake then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has ruled that beaver lake could qualify for advance costs should it not be able to pay its legal fees. a first nation could qualify for advance costs despite having funds of its own, if it cannot afford to pay its legal fees nonetheless. writing for a unanimous court, justices karakatsanis and brown explained that advance costs are rarely awarded. however, a party that has funds of its own could still qualify for advance costs if it satisfies the test for 'impecuniosity'. impecuniosity means not having enough money to pay. it is one of the three requirements for advance costs set out by the supreme court in 2003 in british columbia (minister of forests) v okanagan indian band. the other two requirements are not disputed by the parties in this case. the supreme court said the test for impecuniosity is not easily met. an applicant must demonstrate that it cannot afford to pay its legal fees given its other pressing needs and that the case would therefore not continue. a court's analysis must be based on the evidence. the court must be able to: (1) identify the applicant's pressing needs; (2) determine what resources are required to meet those needs; (3) assess the applicant's financial resources; and (4) identify the estimated costs of the litigation. the supreme court said that in cases such as this one, pressing needs must be understood in the spirit of reconciliation and from the perspective of a first nation, because it would have its own spending priorities. the case has been sent back to the court of queen's bench of alberta for a new hearing. the judges of the supreme court concluded there was not enough evidence on the record before the court of queen's bench of alberta to decide beaver lake's application for advance costs. as such, the judges decided to send the case back to that court for a new hearing. this will enable the court of queen's bench to consider all relevant evidence, including beaver lake's current financial situation.
+supreme court of canada in a criminal case, 'reasonable' doubt should be based on evidence, not speculation, the supreme court has confirmed. in 2012, mr. cyr-langlois was pulled over on suspicion of drunk driving. he was taken to a police station, where his blood alcohol level was tested with a breathalyzer device. following standard procedure, two breath samples were taken about 20 minutes apart. the officer who took the samples didn't stay in the same room with mr. cyr-langlois to watch him before each test. another officer did. mr. cyr-langlois blew over the legal limit for both samples. he was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with blood alcohol 'over 80' (more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood). this appeal was about the 'over 80' charge. when the crown (the prosecution) charges someone with a crime, it has to prove the person committed the crime beyond a 'reasonable doubt.' this is a very high standard, but it is not absolute certainty (in law, as in life, very few things can be proven with 100% confidence). if a judge or jury thinks an accused person is 'probably' guilty, they have to find the person not guilty. 'probably' is not enough. on the other hand, if a doubt is purely theoretical or imaginary, and not based on evidence, it is not 'reasonable' doubt. this high standard is important because everyone even police, lawyers, and judges can make mistakes. but mistakes are less likely to happen when this high standard is met. in a drunk driving case, the main evidence against a person is usually a blood alcohol test. a breathalyzer test is assumed to be trustworthy (that is, proving drunkenness beyond reasonable doubt) unless the accused person can show it isn't. they would have to show evidence that the device may not have been working properly, or was used incorrectly, and that this could affect the reliability of the results. this would be reasonable doubt. unless the crown had other evidence, the person would have to be found not guilty. mr. cyr-langlois didn't argue that the breathalyzer wasn't working. he said the police officer didn't use it properly, because the procedure wasn't followed exactly. he said a police officer had to wait and watch the suspected drunk person for 20 minutes, take a sample, wait 20 minutes, and take a sample again. the reason the officer was supposed to watch the person was to make sure nothing happened during that time that could affect the result. for example, burping or throwing up could bring traces of alcohol directly from the stomach into the mouth, which could change the result. mr. cyr-langlois said the police officer who took the samples left the room. the officer wasn't sure if his colleague had watched mr. cyr-langlois the whole time. mr. cyr-langlois said this meant the procedure wasn't followed, so the test results couldn't be trusted. he said he should be found not guilty. the summary conviction judge agreed with mr. cyr-langlois, and found him not guilty. the crown appealed to the superior court, which cancelled the not-guilty verdict and ordered a new trial. the court of appeal ruled for mr. cyr-langlois, saying the not-guilty verdict should stand. the majority at the supreme court canceled the not-guilty verdict and said there should be a new trial. mr. cyr-langlois' arguments were speculation, not reasonable doubt. he didn't suggest that anything happened before the two samples that might have made the test less reliable, like a digestive issue. he argued it was enough that an officer might not have watched him the whole time, and theoretically something could have been missed. to raise reasonable doubt, he had to show concrete proof the incorrect use of the breathalyzer could have affected the results and made them untrustworthy. for example, he could have testified that he had burped before the samples were taken. he didn't testify, so it didn't matter if an officer was watching him for the whole time or not. this decision was given from the bench on october 17, 2018. the court released written reasons explaining it on december 6, 2018. the court also released two other decisions involving breathalyzers about six weeks before this one: r v gubbins and r v awashish.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that a private halifax land developer can take the regional municipality to court for its plan to expropriate its land. the annapolis group started buying lands in the halifax area in the 1950s over time, it acquired 965 acres of land, which the company planned to develop and sell. in 2006, halifax adopted a 25-year regional municipality planning strategy for land development. it included the annapolis lands. the planning strategy indicates some of those lands would be zoned for a public park with the rest designated for 'serviced development', such as residential neighbourhoods. for serviced development to occur, halifax must adopt a resolution authorizing a 'secondary planning process' and make an amendment to the land use by-law. annapolis made several attempts to develop the lands, starting in 2007, with no success. in 2016, halifax ultimately adopted a resolution refusing to initiate the secondary planning process. annapolis responded by filing a lawsuit against halifax in the supreme court of nova scotia. it claimed, among other things, that halifax had essentially expropriated private property for a public park, which amounted to a 'constructive taking'. in 2019, halifax asked the court for summary judgment to dismiss the constructive taking claim from the lawsuit. summary judgment is a procedure that allows a party in a lawsuit to ask the court to decide an issue without a full trial. in response, annapolis argued that its claim of constructive taking raised issues that required a trial. the judge agreed but halifax appealed that decision to the nova scotia court of appeal. based on the supreme court of canada's 2006 ruling in canadian pacific railway co. v vancouver (city), the court of appeal concluded that annapolis had no reasonable chance of success. annapolis then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has allowed annapolis's claim of constructive taking to proceed to trial. the claim raises disputed issues of fact that need to be decided at trial. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justices suzanne côté and russell brown found that annapolis' claim of constructive taking raises disputed issues of fact that must be decided at trial, based on the constructive taking test set out in the canadian pacific railway co. case. there are two parts to the test for establishing a constructive taking. first, the test must show the government has acquired a beneficial interest in the property or flowing from the property. a beneficial interest is an advantage, such as when private property is enjoyed as a public resource. second, the test requires showing the proposed regulatory measures would remove all reasonable uses of the private property. the nova scotia court of appeal had interpreted the first part of the test as requiring annapolis to show that halifax had actually taken possession of the lands. however, justices côté and brown wrote, 'what must be shown by the property owner can fall short of an actual acquisition by the state.' the majority said the court of appeal was also wrong in holding that halifax's intention is irrelevant to applying the second part of the test. the majority of the supreme court noted, 'annapolis is entitled to adduce evidence at trial to show that, by holding annapolis' land out as a public park, halifax has acquired a beneficial interest therein; and that, because halifax is unlikely to ever lift zoning restrictions constraining the development of annapolis' land, annapolis has lost all reasonable uses of its property'. annapolis may also adduce evidence of halifax's intention in not doing so, the majority said.
+supreme court of canada a judge had the power to step in when a man's claim was wrongly denied under the indian residential schools settlement agreement, the supreme court has ruled. canada is still coming to terms with a terrible part of its history. from the 1860s to the 1990s, over 150,000 first nations, inuit, and m tis children were taken from their homes. they were put in boarding schools called 'indian residential schools.' the schools were set up and run by the federal government and churches together. many students were physically, sexually, and psychologically abused there. years later, many of these former students sued for the harms they suffered. they sued the federal government, churches, and others. the indian residential schools settlement agreement, signed in 2006, settled the lawsuits. this agreement did many things. it set out a way toward national healing, education, and reconciliation through the truth and reconciliation commission. it also set out ways for people who were harmed to ask for compensation. one of these ways was through the independent assessment process (iap). the iap decides what kind of compensation someone should get for specific harm that they suffered. iap decisions are made by adjudicators (decision-makers who aren't judges). each province and territory has a 'supervising judge' to oversee how the settlement agreement is applied. this is to make sure people get the compensation and benefits they bargained for. the issue in this case was whether a judge was allowed to intervene in an adjudicator's decision. jw went to a residential school as a young boy. while he was waiting to have a shower, a nun grabbed his private parts over his clothes. he asked for compensation for this harm through the iap. but the decision-maker denied his claim. she said jw had to prove the nun meant her touch to be sexual. jw asked two iap reviewers to look at the decision. they both agreed with the first decision-maker's conclusion. jw asked the supervising judge in manitoba to look at his case. the judge agreed with jw that the reviewers had failed to apply the agreement, and said the case should be heard again by a new decision-maker. this new decision-maker agreed with jw that he had been sexually abused and said he should be compensated. but before jw was paid, the federal government appealed the judge's decision. it said the judge didn't have the power to give his own interpretation of the settlement agreement. the court of appeal agreed, saying the judge only had the power to look at whether the iap decision-maker considered the correct parts of the agreement. it restored the original decision, which denied jw's claim. the seven judges who heard this case at the supreme court split three ways. five judges came to the same conclusion, but for different reasons. they agreed that jw should get the benefits the settlement agreement promised him. they said that the new decision-maker's decision should stand, and jw should receive compensation. the settlement agreement is meant to help canada come to terms with the damage caused by the indian residential schools policy. resolving cases like jw's is an important part of this process.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that the city of nelson can be held responsible for injuries caused by its snow clearing decisions. after a heavy snowfall in january 2015, snow clearing crews for the city of nelson in british columbia started plowing the streets. not long after, ms. taryn joy marchi parked her car on baker street in the downtown area. city crews had already plowed the street, but they had created a snowbank along the curb of the sidewalk. ms. marchi decided to walk over the snowbank to get from her car to the sidewalk and seriously injured her leg. she sued the city for negligence. the city of nelson argued that it should not have to pay any damages to ms. marchi, because snow clearing decisions are 'core policy decisions' that are immune from negligence claims. core policy decisions are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors. they must be rational and not taken in bad faith. at trial, the judge agreed with the city that its snow clearing decision was a core policy decision and the city did not have to pay any damages to ms. marchi. she appealed to the province's court of appeal, which disagreed with the trial judge and ordered a new trial. the city of nelson appealed that decision to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has agreed with the court of appeal. the city can be held responsible for injuries caused by its snow clearing decisions. operational decisions are not policy decisions. writing for a unanimous court, justices karakatsanis and martin agreed that core policy decisions are immune from negligence claims. however, they pointed out that operational decisions to carry out a policy are not policy decisions. they said, 'the fact that the word ‘policy' is found in a written document' does not settle the question. in analyzing the city's snow clearing decision in this case, the court concluded that the decision was not a core policy decision. rather, the decision was operational and not immune from a negligence claim. the judges said the city owed ms. marchi a 'duty of care' and that a new trial is required. the new trial would assess if the city breached that duty of care and, as a result, whether it should pay damages to ms. marchi. what is a 'duty of care'? a person making a negligence claim must prove four things in court: a duty of care, a breach of that duty, the cause and any damages. a duty of care means the other person or organization was required to do, or avoid doing, something that could likely cause harm.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that $30 million award to lac seul first nation was not enough compensation for flooded reserve land. part of lac seul first nation (lsfn)'s reserve land in northern ontario was flooded for a hydroelectricity project that began in the 1920s the project involved the governments of canada, manitoba and ontario. the project went ahead without the consent of the lsfn and without compensation. the flooding caused major damage. years later, the lsfn brought a claim for that damage. the federal court ordered the government of canada to pay the lsfn $30 million in compensation. the judge considered the value of the land in the 1920s but without the added value for the hydroelectricity project. the lsfn appealed to the federal court of appeal. the lsfn said that amount did not sufficiently compensate them for the loss of the flooded land. the federal court of appeal disagreed. but the supreme court of canada agreed. it said $30 million did not sufficiently compensate the lsfn. it therefore allowed the appeal. damage to reserve land due to the hydroelectricity project the supreme court noted that the hydroelectricity project caused major damage to the lsfn reserve land. a majority of the judges wrote that approximately '17% of the lsfn reserve 11,304 acres or approximately 4,575 hectares is now permanently flooded. homes were destroyed, as were wild rice fields, gardens, haylands, and gravesites. fishing, hunting, and trapping were all impacted. the community was separated because one part of the reserve became an island. and, despite the sacrifices suffered by the community to make the hydroelectricity project possible, the reserve was not provided with electricity until the 1980s.' assessment of equitable compensation the majority of judges said the compensation amount should have included the added value for the hydroelectricity project. they explained that the compensation owed by canada to the lsfn should be the amount that a properly negotiated deal by canada would have earned them. this meant a deal based on the value of the land to those who were wanting to use it, which in this case was the hydroelectricity project. the majority agreed with the lsfn that $30 million was not enough to include that project and ordered that the federal court reassess the amount. canada's 'fiduciary duty' towards indigenous peoples the majority explained that canada's specific duty towards indigenous peoples is called a 'fiduciary duty'. fiduciary duty means that canada is obliged to act in the best interest of indigenous peoples, especially as concerns reserve land. if that land is to be taken away or damaged, as it was in this case, canada must get the best price for the land on their behalf.
+supreme court of canada repeated and extreme attempts to destroy evidence can, in some circumstances, be used to infer intention to commit murder, the supreme court has ruled. ms. jordan went missing in 2013. police suspected that her partner, mr. calnen, murdered her. they arrested him. during questioning, mr. calnen said ms. jordan died accidentally. he said that she was going to leave him and they argued. he said ms. jordan became physically aggressive. he said she tried to punch him, but he ducked and she fell down the stairs and died. mr. calnen said he panicked. he said he'd used crack cocaine on the way home, and again after ms. jordan died. he didn't want to call police. he said he hid her body in the woods, but came back to move it a couple of times, and burned it in two different places. he said he placed ms. jordan's ashes near her family cottage, because that's what ms. jordan had said she wanted done with her ashes if she died. he said he put the parts that were not fully burned by the fire in the lake. police found some burned belongings in the woods and unidentifiable bone fragments in the lake. they also found text messages. some seemed to suggest mr. calnen may have been abusive toward ms. jordan. others showed her plans to leave him and steal his property. mr. calnen was charged with second-degree murder (intentionally causing ms. jordan's death). he was also charged with indecent interference with human remains (damaging or disrespecting a dead person's body). he pleaded guilty to the interference charge at the start of the trial, but said he didn't kill her. a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. the majority of the court of appeal said the trial judge made a mistake in his instructions to the jury. it overturned the murder conviction. it said that if there were a retrial, it should be for manslaughter, not murder. second-degree murder is more serious than manslaughter. that's because someone who murders intends to kill (or at least cause serious harm), while someone who commits manslaughter doesn't. everyone agreed that the jury could use mr. calnen's attempts to destroy ms. jordan's body to infer he killed her and was guilty of manslaughter. the question was whether it could use these attempts to infer he intended to murder her. inferences have to be based on logic, common sense, and experience. some can be stronger than others. for example, if there is no other reasonable explanation, an inference will be strong. judges can tell juries what kinds of inferences they are allowed to make. in this case, there was no direct physical evidence (like blood or video) that mr. calnen killed ms. jordan, so proper inferences were important. all judges at the supreme court agreed, in principle, that someone's actions after a suspected murder can (in some circumstances) be used to infer their intent to commit second-degree murder. most of the judges agreed, in this case, that evidence about mr. calnen's actions after ms. jordan died could be used to infer his intent for second-degree murder. if mr. calnen hadn't destroyed the body, it could have showed how she died and revealed something about his intent. for example, if ms. jordan had been stabbed, it would have been obvious her death wasn't an accident. it would have been open to the jury to find that mr. calnen intentionally killed her. inferring that he moved and burned her body to hide what he had done was common sense. another issue in this case was the trial judge's instructions to the jury. after juries hear all the evidence, they get instructions from the judge about how to decide if a person is guilty. these are meant to make sure juries make decisions based on the law and the evidence (not feelings or hunches). the question was whether the judge made an error by not specifically telling the jury what inferences it was allowed to make about mr. calnen's actions after ms. jordan died. the majority said judges have to give proper instructions, not perfect ones, so the trial judge didn't make any error. it restored mr. calnen's second-degree murder conviction. this case came to the supreme court as an appeal 'as of right.' that means the right to appeal is automatic, and the court's permission isn't needed. the right was automatic in this case because a court of appeal judge dissented (disagreed) on a point of criminal law.
+supreme court of canada a business that holds keys to a customer's car parked on its lot doesn't necessarily have care and control of that vehicle, the supreme court has ruled. the econolodge aeroport hotel, located near montreal's pierre elliott trudeau airport, offered a 'park and fly' service where guests could park their cars for free while they traveled. in winter, guests had to leave their keys with the hotel to make it easier to remove snow from the parking lot. econolodge didn't have any guards, fences, or cameras in the parking lot, and anyone could enter at any time. in the winters of 2005 and 2006, two cars were stolen from its property. econolodge still had the car keys its guests had left behind, and didn't know about the thefts until the guests returned. the owners filed claims with their insurance companies and were compensated under their policies. the insurance companies, in turn, sued the hotel for not taking reasonable steps to prevent the thefts. econolodge said it did nothing wrong, but that even if it had, its own insurance company should pay. that company, lombard, covered econolodge for civil liability (responsibility for actions that harm others or their property, but aren't criminal). lombard said it didn't have to pay because there was an exception in the policy. the exception said it wasn't responsible when the hotel had care and control of the vehicles. the trial judge said econolodge had a contract with its guests for the 'park and fly' service. under the quebec civil code, that meant it had to act diligently in all matters related to the contract. (the civil code is the body of law that applies to non-criminal legal issues in quebec.) the hotel did not take reasonable steps to secure the parking area, but let guests believe that it had. the trial judge said it was therefore responsible. she also said that econolodge did not have care and control of the vehicles just because it had the keys. that meant the exception in the insurance policy did not apply, so lombard had to pay. the court of appeal agreed that econolodge was responsible, but disagreed about the exception. it said lombard didn't have to pay because having the car keys meant econolodge had control of the vehicles. the supreme court agreed with both lower courts that econolodge was responsible for the thefts. but it said that the trial judge wasn't wrong to decide the policy exception didn't apply (which meant lombard had to pay). she also wasn't wrong to say that econolodge didn't have care and control of the vehicles in the legal sense. looking at the full situation, the court said it was open to the trial judge to conclude that people only left their keys with the hotel for a limited reason. this was to make it easier to clear snow from the lot; summer guests didn't have to leave their keys at all. econolodge wasn't really taking 'control' of the vehicles, then. lombard's insurance policy was meant to cover exactly this kind of situation when the insured is at fault providing its usual services, and harms others (or their property) in the process. one of the reasons for the exception was to avoid the policy being used as a backdoor way to insure third-party property that had nothing to do with the contractual services. this case dealt with the application of part of a standard commercial insurance contract. econolodge's fault fell within what the insurance policy was supposed to cover, so the insurance company had to pay for it.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules that communications during family mediation sessions may be used to prove the existence of a settlement agreement between the spouses. this is a family law case from quebec involving spouses who participated in family mediation to resolve the terms of their separation. in quebec, family mediation by certified mediators is made available to married, civil union and common law spouses with or without children. this process is subsidized by the provincial government. ms. isabelle bisaillon and mr. michel bouvier were common law spouses for more than three years. they had two children during that time. after their relationship ended, they participated in several family mediation sessions in 2012 with a certified mediator to resolve their disputes about the children's care, the family home and other matters. at the end of that process, the mediator prepared a document known as a 'summary of mediated agreements' that explained how the parties had agreed to settle their disputes. in 2014, ms. bisaillon filed a lawsuit in quebec's superior court for more money than set out in the summary. mr. bouvier took the position they should stick to the terms of the contract agreed to in mediation, and set out in the summary. ms. bisaillon denied the existence of the contract and objected to the summary being admitted in evidence. she said the summary was protected by a rule of absolute confidentiality. the superior court rejected ms. bisaillon's argument. in its reasons, the court relied on a commercial mediation case from 2014 called union carbide canada inc. v bombardier inc. in that case, the supreme court acknowledged the confidentiality of the mediation process, but recognized the 'settlement exception'. this exception allows parties to a settlement to prove it exists. as such, the superior court found ms. bisaillon and mr. bouvier had a contract. ms. bisaillon appealed to quebec's court of appeal, which also sided with mr. bouvier. while ms. bisaillon decided not to appeal that decision, quebec's association de m diation familiale was permitted to take ms. bisaillon's case to the supreme court. the supreme court has sided with mr. bouvier. the settlement exception also applies to family mediation cases. writing for the majority, justice nicholas kasirer said the settlement exception outlined in union carbide may also apply to family mediation cases. he wrote, 'it is certainly true that confidentiality is necessary in any mediation to allow for frank discussion between the parties in order to encourage settlements. it is also true that, unlike in the case of civil or commercial mediation, negotiations following the breakdown of a relationship often take place during a period of personal upheaval that may heighten the vulnerability of either spouse.' however, justice kasirer explained how the family mediation process includes other safeguards beyond confidentiality to assure the protection of vulnerable parties. these additional safeguards include a certified and impartial mediator chosen by the parties and a judge who confirms any agreement arising from the mediation. due to these important safeguards, a rule of absolute confidentiality is not required. this means people may use the settlement exception to prove the existence and terms of what they agreed to during mediation.
+supreme court of canada police need good reason to suspect someone answering a phone (or the number itself) is involved in drug dealing before asking them to sell drugs, the supreme court has ruled. police can investigate crime in different ways. to find out about crimes that are hard to investigate (like drug trafficking, child luring, or terrorism), they may have to tempt people to commit them. but there are limits to this. they have to be able to show the court that they had a 'reasonable suspicion' (a good reason to suspect) that a certain crime was happening. needing reasonable suspicion makes sure courts can review police actions to check they are acting properly. if police don't have a reasonable suspicion and they tempt a person to commit a crime anyway, it is called 'entrapment.' entrapment is very serious. it undermines society's sense of justice and the rule of law. when it happens, there has to be a 'stay of proceedings.' that means the prosecution must be stopped and the person can't be convicted of the crime. this decision dealt with two entrapment cases. in mr. ahmad's case, the police got a tip that someone named 'romeo' was selling drugs over the phone. the officer called 'romeo's' phone number. he didn't know if the tip was trustworthy. he had a short conversation with 'romeo,' who agreed to sell him cocaine. they met in person and 'romeo' sold the officer cocaine. police arrested and searched 'romeo,' who turned out to be mr. ahmad. the trial judge said mr. ahmad wasn't entrapped. this was because police confirmed enough about the tip during their conversation to have a good reason to suspect he was already selling drugs. they did this before they asked to buy drugs from him. mr. ahmad was convicted. in mr. williams' case, a police officer got information from another officer that someone named 'jay' was selling cocaine. the information also came from a tip. the officer didn't know if the information was trustworthy or recent. another officer called jay's number and asked to buy crack cocaine. 'jay' agreed to meet and sold the officer crack. 'jay' turned out to be mr. williams. the police arranged another drug deal eleven days later. a month later, police arrested mr. williams. the trial judge said police didn't have a reasonable suspicion of mr. williams before they asked to buy drugs from him. the trial judge said mr. williams was entrapped, and ordered a stay of proceedings. the court of appeal heard both appeals together, because they dealt with the same issue. it said neither mr. ahmad nor mr. williams were entrapped. all the judges at the supreme court agreed that mr. ahmad wasn't entrapped, but for different reasons. the majority said mr. williams was entrapped. the majority said police can ask a person answering a phone to commit a crime. but they can only do this if they already have reasonable suspicion. reasonable suspicion must be about a specific person committing a crime or crime happening in a specific place. but in this digital age, a place doesn't have to be physical. it can be a phone number. so, police need a good reason to suspect that the person answering is committing a certain crime or the phone number is being used for that crime before asking them to commit a crime. police don't have reasonable suspicion if they just have a tip and don't know if it's reliable. they can develop reasonable suspicion by investigating if a tip is reliable before calling. the majority said it's better to have reasonable suspicion before making the call. but it's also possible to establish reasonable suspicion by having a conversation with the person who answers. in both appeals, the police didn't have reasonable suspicion before calling the phone numbers. but the majority said mr. ahmad wasn't entrapped because police developed a good reason to suspect he was selling drugs while talking to him on the phone. they did this before they asked to buy drugs from him. the police didn't confirm the tip during the phone call in mr. williams' case, though. the majority said mr. williams was entrapped because the police asked to buy drugs from him before they had a good reason to suspect he was selling drugs. mr. ahmad got permission (or 'leave') to appeal to the supreme court. people who get convicted on appeal when they weren't convicted at trial, like mr. williams, can appeal 'as of right' (meaning they don't need permission).
+supreme court of canada police can't arrest someone who isn't breaking the law to prevent others from breaching the peace, the supreme court has ruled. mr. fleming was on his way to join a protest in caledonia, ontario in 2009. the protest was against the occupation of a piece of land by a first nations group. he was carrying a canadian flag on a wooden pole and walking down a street beside the occupied land. police officers saw him as they drove by. there had been violence in the past, and they were planning to keep the groups apart. the officers turned their vehicles around and sped toward him. mr. fleming got off the road and crossed a low fence. he said he did this to get away from the speeding vehicles and onto level ground. the officers were yelling. mr. fleming said he didn't think they were yelling at him because he hadn't done anything wrong. the people occupying the land came toward him. when they were about ten or twenty feet away, the police told mr. fleming he was under arrest. they ordered him to drop his flag. he refused. officers forced him to the ground, took his flag, and handcuffed him. mr. fleming said they injured his arm. the police took him to jail but let him go a few hours later. he was charged with obstructing a police officer (preventing a police officer from doing their job). he went to court a dozen times to fight the charge, which was later dropped. in 2011, mr. fleming sued the province of ontario and the officers involved in his arrest. he said the officers acted wrongfully. he said they assaulted and battered him, wrongfully arrested him, and falsely imprisoned him. he also said they violated several of his rights under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, part of canada's constitution. police officers get their powers from statutes (like the criminal code) and common law (the law made by judges deciding cases). they can only act within those laws. under the common law, the police can limit someone's freedom (for example, arrest them) if it's reasonably necessary to carry out their duties. the police argued they had the power to arrest mr. fleming under the common law. they said it was to prevent a 'breach of the peace.' a breach of the peace is more than a disturbance. it means there is a risk of violence and that someone will get hurt. the trial judge said the police didn't have the power to arrest mr. fleming. she said he should be compensated because officers violated his rights. the majority at the court of appeal disagreed. it said the police did have the power to arrest him. it said arresting him was necessary because officers thought there was going to be a breach of the peace. it did say there should be a new trial about whether the officers used too much force, though. the supreme court unanimously said the officers didn't have the power to arrest mr. fleming. the police can't arrest someone acting lawfully just because they think it will stop others from breaching the peace. they already have other powers to deal with these situations under the criminal code. since they had these less drastic options, arresting mr. fleming wasn't really necessary. the court noted that preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protecting life and property are the main duties of police officers under the common law. they have the power to take actions to support these duties, even if these actions aren't specifically set out in the criminal code.preventing breaches of the peace is obviously related to preserving the peace, preventing crime, and protecting life and property. but the court said it wasn't reasonably necessary to arrest someone to prevent a breach of the peace, if that person hadn't done (and wasn't about to do) anything wrong. police are allowed to use as much force as reasonably necessary to carry out their duties. but in this case, they weren't allowed to arrest mr. fleming, so no amount of force was justified. taking away someone's freedom, even temporarily, is serious. often, in situations like mr. fleming's, the person wouldn't have any way to challenge their arrest in court, because there wouldn't be any charges. the only option would be an expensive civil lawsuit. this was another reason the court said the standards for judging police actions should be strict.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules a luxembourg company can benefit from a canadian tax exemption due to an existing tax treaty. an american oil and gas company created a luxembourg subsidiary called alta luxembourg, which had its own subsidiary in canada called alta canada. a subsidiary is a company that is owned by another company. in 2013, alta luxembourg sold its shares in alta canada and made more than $380 million in profit. alta luxembourg paid taxes on the profit to luxembourg tax authorities. in its canadian tax return, alta luxembourg claimed a tax exemption on the basis that the profit was not 'taxable income earned in canada'. it supported its claim by relying on the tax treatybetween canada and luxembourg. the agreementexempts luxembourg companies who profit from selling shares in canada from paying taxes as long as the shares relate to buildings and lands in canada where the company conducts business. the minister of national revenue of canada denied the exemption and alta luxembourg appealed to the tax court of canada. before the tax court, the minister argued that alta luxembourg could not quality for the exemption because alta canada did not do business on the property. the minister also said that the only reason alta luxembourg existed was to sell the shares without having to pay taxes to canadian tax authorities. lawyers for the minister said that was abusive tax avoidance. the tax court sided with alta luxembourg. the minister appealed that decision to the federal court of appeal. it also sided with alta luxembourg, finding no abusive tax avoidance. the minister then turned to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeal. there was no abusive tax avoidance. writing for the majority, justice côté said the minister had not proven abusive tax avoidance. she said canada had agreed to include exemptions for buildings and lands in the tax treaty to encourage investments by luxembourg residents and companies. alta luxembourg made such an investment. as a result, it can claim a tax exemption and the anti-avoidance provisions of the canadian income tax act cannot be used to deny the exemption.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court restores a british columbia man's murder conviction after confirming the admissibility of an overheard conversation as evidence at his trial. in september 2016, the body of japanese student natsumi kogawa was found in a suitcase in vancouver's west end. police later arrested and charged william schneider with second degree murder following a tip from his brother. a jury trial was held and mr. schneider's brother testified for the crown. the brother said he confronted mr. schneider after seeing a photo of him with the missing woman in a news release. he said mr. schneider allegedly admitted that he had been in a relationship with ms. kogawa. the next day, the brother said, mr. schneider had attempted suicide in his presence and told him where to find the woman's body. the brother testified that he then overheard mr. schneider call his wife on the phone and ask if she had heard about the missing woman. according to the brother, mr. schneider then told his wife something along the lines of 'i did it' or 'i killed her'. in his testimony, the brother said he did not remember 'word-for-word' what mr. schneider said, but that he was taking responsibility for the woman's death. the judge held a voir dire, which is a trial within a trial without the jury present, to determine if the brother's testimony about what he overheard was admissible as evidence in court. witness testimony about a conversation they were not part of is called hearsay evidence. typically, it is not admissible as evidence. however, there are certain exceptions. the judge decided to admit the evidence about the overheard conversation. she said the words the brother heard were relevant to an issue at trial. secondly, the judge determined that the value of the evidence in proving a point at trial (probative value) outweighed its potential to be unfair to the accused (prejudicial effect). the jury convicted mr. schneider of second degree murder. mr. schneider appealed his conviction to british columbia's court of appeal. he argued the trial judge made a mistake by admitting his brother's testimony about the overheard conversation. two of the three judges of the court of appeal agreed with mr. schneider and ordered a new trial. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has allowed the crown's appeal and restored mr. schneider's conviction for second degree murder. the trial judge did not make an error in deciding to admit the brother's testimony. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice malcolm rowe said 'the trial judge did not err in admitting the brother's testimony as to what he overheard the accused say'. three questions needed to be answered to come to this conclusion. was what the brother overheard relevant? was an exception to the hearsay rule applicable? did the trial judge exercise her discretion correctly in deciding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect? the majority said the answer to all three questions is, 'yes'. what the brother overheard was indeed relevant. also, the 'party admission' exception is applicable in this case because it allows witness testimony about a confession even if the witness was not a party to that conversation. finally, the trial judge used her discretion correctly and further minimized the potential harmful effects of the evidence with a strong caution to the jury about what they could make of it.
+supreme court of canada courts should look at all relevant circumstances to determine a child's 'habitual residence,' the supreme court has ruled in a case about the meaning of those words in an international treaty. in a 6-3 decision written by chief justice beverley mclachlin (as she was when the case was heard), the supreme court provided guidance for courts to determine a child's habitual residence under the convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. the parents in this case married in ontario in 2000 and moved to germany in 2001. they became permanent residents there and had two children, but later separated. the children were struggling in school, so the parents decided the mother would take them to canada for 16 months to see if things improved. in august 2014, at the end of the 16 months, the mother did not return the children to germany. the father asked the court to order the return of the children. based on a court order, the children were eventually returned to germany in october 2016. soon after, the german courts gave the mother sole custody of the children. in april 2017, the children and the mother returned to canada. by the time this case was heard at the supreme court, the disagreement between the mother and father was resolved. however, the questions asked in the appeal were important, so the court decided to provide guidance on how to determine a child's habitual residence in future cases. this case involved the convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. nearly 100 countries are members of the convention, including germany and canada. the treaty seeks to protect children by enforcing custody rights and securing children's quick return to their country of habitual residence. under article 3 of the treaty, the children in this case would have to be returned to germany if that was their place of habitual residence. the words 'habitual residence' are not defined, and the parents' main disagreement was about what those words actually meant. the judge who first heard the case found that the intentions of the parents were most important. the divisional court later found that the children's integration into the community was most important. the court of appeal agreed with the first judge. that decision was appealed to the supreme court. the majority of the supreme court held that courts should look at all relevant considerations a child's habitual residence. this includes the child's links to, and circumstances in, each country. the circumstances of the parents, including their intentions, may be considered. however, courts have no definitive list of factors that they must take into account; they must look at the child's complete situation. a court can, however, decline to return a child if an exception listed in the treaty applies. determining habitual residence quickly allows children to be returned as soon as possible. this protects children, deters abduction by parents, and helps ensure that the proper courts (in the child's country of habitual residence) can decide custody and access issues more quickly. justices suzanne côté and malcolm rowe, writing in dissent, disagreed with the majority about how to determine the habitual residence of the children. they said that in situations where the parents' intentions were clear, courts should respect those intentions. they said this would lead to faster and more predictable decisions, which is one of the goals of the convention. in this case, the parents had signed an agreement that said that the move to canada would be temporary. for this reason, justices côté and rowe would have upheld the rulings of the application judge and the court of appeal, which had found that germany was the children's habitual residence. this case led to changes in the way the supreme court deals with international custody cases. the majority noted that the legal procedures took too long, and said this was unacceptable because the first goal of the convention is to bring children home quickly. to prevent future delays, the court is making sure that cases like this one will be identified and sped up. the court encouraged lower courts to take similar measures.
+supreme court of canada the canadian human rights tribunal did not have the power to decide if parts of the indian act were discriminatory, because legislation is not a 'service' provided to the public, the supreme court has confirmed. individuals could still make a charter claim in court, however. indigenous persons can be registered as status 'indians' under the indian act, the law that determines who qualifies as 'indian.' ('indian' is an outdated term to refer to an indigenous person that still exists in some canadian laws.) this gives them access to different programs and services from the government. status is not based on ethnicity, heritage, or racial background; whether it is granted depends on if a person's parents have (or could get) status. there are two types of status under the act. the first, known as 'section 6(1) status' allows a person to pass status on to his or her children, even if the other parent doesn't have status. the second, 'section 6(2) status,' does not allow status to be passed on unless the other parent has status. some people who consider themselves indigenous may not qualify for status. one reason for this situation was the existence of past discriminatory government policies that caused people to lose it. people lost their status by becoming 'enfranchised,' which meant losing their rights under the indian act. one policy encouraged people to give up status to get basic rights other canadians enjoyed (like full citizenship and the right to own land). another policy automatically 'enfranchised' any status woman who married a non-status man. the goal of these policies was to destroy indigenous culture and assimilate indigenous peoples, so they had serious negative effects on canada's indigenous community. both policies were ended by 1985, and the government has passed laws to give status back to people who lost it, as well as to their children and grandchildren. this case involved two groups of people who had status they could not pass on to their children or who were not eligible for status at all. the situation was due to the discriminatory policies. the groups said that the government had not done enough to undo the damage done by the previous policies. the first group was the matson siblings, whose grandmother lost her status when she married a non-status man. while legislation later gave them section 6(2) status, they are not able to pass status on to children they have with a non-status person. had their grandmother never lost her status, they would have had section 6(1) status and could pass status on to their children no matter what. the second group was the andrews family. mr. andrews' father was voluntarily enfranchised before mr. andrews was born. later legislation was meant to fix the problem, but didn't quite. it left mr. andrews with section 6(2) status, and his daughter without any status at all. had mr. andrews' father never lost status, mr. andrews would have been eligible for section 6(1) status and his daughter for section 6(2) status. the canadian human rights commission brought challenges to the canadian human rights tribunal on the matsons' and the andrewses' behalf. the commission argued the law on who qualifies for status was discriminatory. the tribunal said it did not have the power to decide that. the commission asked the courts to review the tribunal's decisions. both the federal court and federal court of appeal upheld the decisions. justice cl ment gascon, writing for the supreme court majority, said the tribunal's decisions to dismiss the challenges were reasonable. courts normally give wide latitude to a decision-maker's understanding of its own powers under the law that governs it (its 'home statute'), unless a decision falls outside the range of reasonable outcomes. the canadian human rights act was the tribunal's home statute. the statute said the tribunal only had the power to decide if a 'service' was being delivered in an unequal way, not whether the law itself was discriminatory. the matsons and the andrewses were arguing the indian act itself was discriminatory. justice gascon said it was reasonable for the tribunal to consider whether a law could be considered a service, and dismiss the claims when it decided that it was not. but he made it clear that the matsons and the andrewses could still challenge the indian act under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, as the tribunal had said. justice russell brown agreed that the tribunal's decisions should stand. however, he took issue with part of the majority's approach to reviewing administrative decisions in general. justices suzanne côté and malcolm rowe also agreed that the tribunal's decisions should stand, but for different reasons. they said that courts should look at many factors before deciding whether to give the tribunal so much latitude. after considering these factors, they said the tribunal's answer to the question about whether legislation was a 'service' didn't just have to fall within a reasonable range of answers it had to be the correct one. that meant courts could overturn a decision if, for example, the tribunal had incorrectly said that a complaint challenged a 'service' when it did not. in this case, they found that the tribunal was correct when it decided that the act of making laws was not a service, and they would have upheld the decisions. the supreme court did not rule on whether parts of the indian act were actually discriminatory, but only confirmed that the canadian human rights tribunal did not have the power to decide that. while all the judges agreed on this point, there was some disagreement about how courts should look at decisions by administrative bodies.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules children can relocate within british columbia to live with their mother. this is a child custody case. the mother and father met in 2011. soon after, the mother moved to kelowna, where the father was living. they got married, bought a house and had two boys. when their relationship ended in 2018, the mother took the children to her parents' home in telkwa, a 10-hour drive from kelowna. the children split their time between telkwa and kelowna before the parents agreed the children should remain in kelowna with the father until the mother returned there, although she never did return. instead, she asked the court to relocate the children to telkwa. if not, she said she was willing to move to kelowna, but the father was unwilling to move to telkwa. at trial, the judge said the children could move to telkwa with the mother for two reasons: the bitter relationship between the parents affected the children; and the father might not be able to afford to stay in the kelowna home. the father then appealed to british columbia's court of appeal, asking to present additional evidence about his financial situation. the court of appeal sided with the father. it allowed the new evidence, saying it affected the trial judge's finding about the father's finances. as a result, the relocation could no longer be justified. the mother then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has sided with the mother. the new evidence should not have been allowed on appeal. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, justice andromache karakatsanis said the children can move to telkwa with their mother. the majority said the court of appeal was wrong to apply a different test than that set out by the supreme court in palmer v the queen when deciding whether the father could present new evidence. as the majority explained, this test applies to evidence even at the appeal stage. according to the test, four criteria must be met for the evidence to be allowed: (1) despite the party's due diligence, the evidence could not have been presented at trial; (2) the evidence is relevant; (3) it is credible; and (4) it could have affected the result at trial. in this case, the test was not met because the evidence about the father's finances could have been presented at trial if he had taken all reasonable steps to obtain it in time. the move is in the children's best interests. the majority said there was no reason for the court of appeal to change the trial judge's decision. the move was in the children's best interests. there was a significant risk that the bitter relationship between the parents would affect the children if they stayed in kelowna. also, the mother needed her parents' help to care for the children, and they are in telkwa. in such cases, the question is 'whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, having regard to child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being', the majority said. the analysis is highly fact-specific and discretionary, and the possibility for change on appeal is very narrow.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court upholds sentences for two men convicted of wholesale drug trafficking in alberta. two convicted drug dealers appealed to the supreme court of canada after the alberta court of appeal increased their prison sentences. patrick douglas felix and cameron o'lynn parranto pleaded guilty to several offences, including the trafficking of wholesale fentanyl. wholesale trafficking means selling drugs in large quantities for others to then resell them. mr. felix worked in fort mcmurray and his offences dated from 2015, whereas mr. parranto worked in edmonton and his offences dated from 2016. at trial mr. felix was sentenced to seven years in prison and mr. parranto was sentenced to 11 years. unsatisfied with those sentences, the crown appealed to alberta's court of appeal, which heard the two cases together. in its ruling, the court of appeal set a 'starting point' sentence of nine years for wholesale fentanyl trafficking and increased mr. felix's sentence to 10 years and mr. parranto's to 14 years. a starting point gives the courts a place to start when deciding an appropriate sentence. both men then appealed their longer sentences to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has dismissed the appeals. a majority of the judges found the sentences at trial were 'demonstrably unfit', meaning the sentences were clearly unreasonable, and that the court of appeal's ruling was appropriate. appeal courts may set 'starting points' to help lower courts decide on appropriate sentences. the supreme court has confirmed that appeal courts may set starting points to help lower courts decide appropriate sentences. the majority explained that sentencing is, 'one of the most delicate stages of the criminal justice process'. it remains a discretionary exercise that requires judges to consider and balance many factors. the goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sentence. proportionality is the most important principle in reaching this goal. parity and individualization are secondary principles. the majority wrote, 'the question is always whether the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, the offender's degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case.' trial courts are best positioned to craft a fit sentence for the offenders before them. the majority noted that appellate courts play two roles. they consider the fitness of a sentence and promote stability in the development of the law, while providing guidance to lower courts to ensure trial judges apply the law consistently. courts of appeal are well positioned to provide such guidance, the judges wrote, because of their appreciation of overall sentencing practices, patterns and problems in their jurisdiction. even so, the majority said appeal courts must give a high level of deference to trial court sentencing decisions. deviating from a sentencing range or starting point alone does not justify the intervention of appeal courts. it is only when a sentence is demonstrably unfit or the sentencing judge made a mistake that an appeal court may vary the sentence.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court restores the 2017 convictions of an individual who was found guilty of multiple sex offences against children. in 2012, jd was charged with 18 counts of sexual offences involving young people committed between 1974 and 1993 in quebec. two of the complainants were his children (cd and sd) the trial by judge alone (without a jury) started in 2016. jd's daughter (cd) testified over two days. soon after, the judge fell ill and the trial was postponed. section 669.2(3) of the criminal code sets out what should happen if a judge cannot continue a trial but has not yet rendered a verdict. in this case, a new trial was started before another judge. at the new trial in 2017, the parties agreed to file the original transcript of c.d's testimony so that she would not have to testify again. the new judge also heard testimony from the other complainants and found jd guilty on nine counts of sexual offences. jd appealed to quebec's court of appeal, which ordered a new trial on the counts concerning his two children. the court said the trial judge should have conducted a two-part test before permitting cd's initial testimony to be filed as evidence at the new trial. the judges said the test would have ensured that the accused truly agreed with the decision to file the testimony and that the filing would not affect the fairness of the trial. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has sided with the crown. a transcript of witness testimony given at a first trial can be filed as evidence in a second trial if the parties agree. writing for a unanimous court, justice suzanne côté said the law does not require the new judge to conduct a test before allowing a transcript of witness testimony given at a first trial to be filed as evidence at a second trial, if the parties agree. justice côté said section 669.2(3) of the criminal code is clear. where a trial is by judge alone, the new judge must begin the trial again as if no evidence had been taken, and cannot require the parties to file evidence from the first trial. instead, both the prosecution and the defence can present their evidence as they see fit. for example, they may choose, as they did in this case, to file a transcript of previous testimony. this is a strategic decision like choosing to cross-examine a witness, and the judge should not intervene. 'all that is needed is that the transcript be duly filed and that the parties consent to it being filed', justice côté wrote. in this case, the new judge did not require the parties to file the transcript from the first trial. rather, the parties agreed between themselves to file it. there was no reason for the judge to question the accused's consent in this regard. as a result, the second trial was fair.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court rules the delay for the retrial of a quebec father charged with multiple sex offences was reasonable. in 2011, jf was charged with seven counts of sexual offences involving his daughter committed between 1986 and 2001 in quebec. following a preliminary inquiry, jf's trial began before the court of qu bec in late 2013. meanwhile, in 2016, the supreme court of canada issued its ruling in r v jordan. in that case, the supreme court established limits on the amount of time between a person being charged and the conclusion of their trial. the limit is 30 months for a trial in a provincial court, such as the court of qu bec, following a preliminary inquiry. eventually, jf's trial ended with his acquittal in 2017, six years after he was charged. the crown appealed to quebec's court of appeal, which ordered a new trial. before the retrial began, jf asked the court to stop or 'stay' the proceedings. he argued that the delays during his first trial and before his retrial were unreasonable. due to these delays, jf argued his right under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms (charter) 'to be tried within a reasonable time', was violated. the retrial judge agreed with jf that his section 11(b) charter right had been violated. the crown appealed to quebec's court of appeal. the judges on that court ruled that the delay for each trial must be considered separately. they said that it would only be necessary to consider the delay for the retrial, if the delay for the first trial were reasonable. in jf's case, however, the first trial delay was unreasonable. so the court of appeal dismissed the crown's appeal and did not consider the retrial delay. the crown then appealed to the supreme court of canada. the supreme court has sided with the crown. only the delay for the retrial is counted. writing for a majority of the judges of the supreme court, chief justice richard wagner said the jordan decision requires both the crown and the defence lawyers to act in a timely manner. this includes the accused raising an issue of delay promptly. as a result, in the case of a single trial, an accused who believes their right to be tried within a reasonable time has been violated must raise the issue before their trial. sometimes an accused may raise the issue on appeal, but that would be exceptional. an accused should not raise the delay for their first trial after an appeal court has ordered a retrial. once an appeal court has ordered a retrial, the chief justice said only the delay for that retrial counts, and the same time limit as set out in the jordan case applies. a delay from the first trial will be considered in exceptional circumstances only. in this case, jf did not raise the delay issue before or during his first trial, and he did not raise it at the court of appeal. he only raised it at his retrial. so only the delay for the retrial can be considered. that delay was 10 months and 5 days, which is well below the 30-month limit. as such, it was reasonable, and there is no reason to stay the proceedings.
+supreme court of canada supreme court clarifies link between consent and capacity to consent in a sexual assault case. gf and rb were charged with sexually assaulting a 16‑year‑old during a camping trip. the issue at trial was whether the teenager who had consumed alcohol, had consented to sexual activity with the two adults. the victim and gf both testified and presented opposite versions of events. rb did not testify. the crown prosecutor argued that the teenager's evidence clearly established incapacity due to intoxication and also that she had not agreed to the sexual activity. gf and rb claimed that the 16-year-old had not been as intoxicated as she claimed, and that she had agreed to engage in the sexual activity. the trial judge convicted gf and r.b of sexual assault. gf and rb appealed the convictions to the court of appeal for ontario. the court of appeal agreed that based on the evidence, the verdict was reasonable. however, the court of appeal said the trial judge should have explained the factors he considered when assessing if the teenager was too intoxicated to consent. the court of appeal also found that the trial judge failed to consider consent first and independently from the question of capacity to consent. as a result, the court of appeal concluded that a new trial was necessary for both g.f and rb the crown appealed to the supreme court of canada. consent and capacity are inseparable the majority of the supreme court judges noted that this appeal gave the court an opportunity to clarify the relationship between consent, and the capacity to give consent. consent is the foundation of canada's sexual assault laws. the majority of the judges said that consent and the capacity to give consent are inseparable. they explained that consent to sexual activity requires someone to be capable of consenting before giving their consent. the majority stated that trial judges are not obliged to evaluate consent and capacity separately or in any particular order. in this case, the majority said the trial judge made no mistakes in finding the teenager was incapable of consenting and that she never agreed to the sexual activity. the majority also found that the trial judge made no mistake when he addressed the two questions together in his reasons. capacity is a precondition to being able to consent. capacity to consent requires that people have a mind capable of understanding the physical act, its sexual nature, the specific identity of their partner, as well as the choice of whether or not to engage in the sexual activity in question. trial judge's reasons were sufficient the majority found the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and that the court of appeal had assessed the trial judge's reasons in a way that was removed from the context of the issues at trial. the majority concluded that the trial judge's blending of consent and capacity revealed neither an error in law nor insufficient reasons. capacity was not the only issue at trial, and the trial judge's reasons can be read as finding both that the complainant was incapable of consenting and that she did not agree to the sexual activity. the majority said that these findings were not legally contradictory and both were available conclusions on the basis of the evidence.
+supreme court of canada the royal canadian mounted police pension plan discriminates against women, the supreme court has ruled. ms. fraser, ms. pilgrim, and ms. fox were royal canadian mounted police (rcmp) officers. they all had children in the 1990s when they went back to work, they found it hard to juggle work with their childcare responsibilities. the rcmp wouldn't let them work part-time. ms. fox retired and ms. fraser and ms. pilgrim took more unpaid leave. in december 1997, the rcmp began to allow job-sharing as an option instead of unpaid leave. this way, two or three people could split the duties of one full-time position. it was for the benefit of both the employees and the rcmp. the three women joined the program and came back to work. most people who joined the program were women with children. most did so to balance work with their childcare responsibilities. members of the rcmp pay into a pension plan, and get a pension when they retire. their pension gets bigger the longer they work and the more money they earn. full-time members could 'buy back' pension credit if they were suspended from duty or took unpaid leave. this would make their pension bigger. but if they job-shared, they weren't allowed to buy back any pension credit. job-sharers said the situation was unfair. an expert said the rcmp could change the pension plan to let the job-sharers buy back pension credit. an rcmp committee agreed that job-sharers should be allowed to buy it back. the rcmp still didn't let them. ms. fraser, ms. fox, and ms. pilgrim said they should be allowed to buy back the pension credit. they said the pension plan treated job-sharers (who were mostly women with children) worse than other members. they said this breached section 15(1) the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, part of canada's constitution. section 15(1) says the law should treat everyone equally, without discrimination on certain characteristics. the judge who heard the charter application said there was no breach of section 15(1). she said if they were disadvantaged, it wasn't because they were women or the fact that they had kids. it was because of their own choices. the court of appeal agreed. the majority of judges at the supreme court disagreed with the lower courts. they said the pension plan discriminated against the job-sharers because they were women. the charter protects certain groups that share specific characteristics (for example, their race or religion). the law isn't allowed to discriminate against people based on these 'protected' characteristics. to decide if equality rights have been breached under section 15(1), courts first look at whether a protected group is singled out by the law somehow. laws that seem neutral may still discriminate against members of protected groups by affecting them differently. members of the group don't have to show that the protected characteristic somehow caused the group to be more affected. it also doesn't matter if all members of the group are affected in the same way. next, courts look at whether the law maintains any kind of disadvantage to the group, or makes it worse. the majority noted that many attitudes and policies had disadvantaged women in the past. while many things have changed, rules like those in the pension plan can build on those past harms. in this case, the majority said the pension plan breached the job-sharers' right to equality. this was because it disadvantaged women more than men. it didn't matter that the plan didn't set out to hurt women in particular. what mattered was its effect. the job-sharers were mostly women who were job-sharing because they needed to care for their children. this maintained the disadvantage caused by the long-standing expectation that women should be responsible for childcare. the pension plan didn't allow them to buy back credit like other people could. the women were in this situation because they had to job-share to take care of their kids. the majority said the job-sharers should be able to buy back all their pension credit. the court previously looked at ways women were disadvantaged at work in centrale des syndicats du qu bec v quebec (attorney general) and quebec (attorney general) v alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la sant et des services sociaux.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court sets aside an alberta man's convictions for a 2017 home invasion robbery. shawn metzger was convicted of offences arising from the home invasion robbery in june 2017, in the small town of morningside, alberta, near red deer. he was allegedly part of a group of three or four perpetrators who stole a truck. the truck belonged to mr. valentin iten, one of the two victims of the robbery. the vehicle was found approximately 11 hours later, outside a bar in red deer. neither of the victims clearly saw the perpetrators during the robbery. at trial, the prosecution relied on two pieces of evidence to identify mr. metzger as one of the thieves. first, mr. metzger's dna was on a cigarette butt found in the stolen truck. second, mr. iten testified that he may have heard someone say 'metzger' during the robbery. mr. metzger did not testify at his trial. based on this evidence, the trial judge concluded mr. metzger participated in the robbery. alberta's court of appeal dismissed mr. metzger's appeal. it found the trial judge was correct in determining mr. metzger's guilt in the robbery. one judge disagreed, which permitted mr. metzger to appeal his case to the supreme court of canada as of right. an appeal 'as of right' is available in some criminal cases where one judge on the court of appeal has dissented on a point of law, as was the case here. this means the appellant does not need to apply to the supreme court of canada for permission to have their case heard. the case can be heard if the appellant simply files a notice to this effect. the supreme court has allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions and substituted acquittals. mr. metzger's convictions were unreasonable based on the evidence presented at trial. writing for a majority of the judges, justice malcolm rowe found mr. metzger's guilty verdicts were unreasonable based on the totality of the evidence. first, the dna evidence on its own was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. it only established mr. metzger's presence in the stolen truck at some point, rather than his participation in the actual robbery. second, mr. iten's testimony with respect to hearing the name 'metzger' was fraught with frailties. he had been struck on the head at the beginning of the robbery, and was fading in and out of consciousness throughout. during his testimony, mr. iten had questioned his own recollection of what he heard that night. justice rowe also determined that mr. metzger's decision not to testify at trial could not be raised against him. the evidence in this case was not such that it 'cried out for an explanation that only [his] testimony could provide'. for these reasons, justice rowe stated that 'no trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused's guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available'.
+supreme court of canada the supreme court has confirmed a fine against a lumber company whose inaction led to a forest worker's accidental death. in 2010, west fraser mills hired an independent contractor to cut down 'trap trees' to reduce the beetle population on its property. ('trap trees' are dead trees used to lure insect pests; the trees are then cut down and destroyed.) the contractor, in turn, hired a 'faller' (tree-cutter) to do the work. the faller reported to and was supervised by the contractor. the faller was struck by a falling tree, and later died. an investigation found that tree was dangerous and should have been removed before the work began. british columbia, like other provinces, has a workers' compensation scheme to prevent and deal with workplace injuries and deaths. under the workers compensation act, the government gave the workers' compensation board of british columbia broad powers to make rules about workplace safety. different actors, including 'owners' and 'employers,' have different responsibilities. in this case, the board found that west fraser mills failed as an 'owner' to ensure safe work practices. this violated a workplace safety regulation the board had adopted. the board also found the company was an employer, although not the employer of the faller. under the act, only an 'employer' could be fined. the board fined west fraser mills $75,000. west fraser mills appealed to the workers' compensation appeal tribunal. it argued that the legislation did not allow the board to adopt this particular regulation about workplace owners. therefore, there could be no finding of owner misconduct as a basis for a fine. west fraser mills also argued that because it was not the faller's employer, and only employers could be fined, there were no grounds to fine it. the tribunal rejected the arguments, but reduced the fine based on the company's safety record and because it did not purposely disregard safety standards. the decision was upheld by the bc supreme court and court of appeal. then-chief justice beverley mclachlin, writing for the majority at the supreme court of canada, confirmed the tribunal's decision and the fine. she said that the board acted reasonably in adopting a regulation to respond to increased deaths in the forestry sector. in her view, the board was free to interpret the legislation in a way that better supported the goal of promoting safety, including adopting a regulation targeting owners. a more narrow approach would undermine this goal. finally, she said that the board had the authority to impose the fine. this was in part because west fraser mills employed individuals on the site in question. five judges agreed with chief justice mclachlin. justice suzanne côté , writing in dissent, would have allowed west fraser mills' appeal. she said that the board did not have the authority to adopt this particular regulation or to impose a fine that applied to employers on a company that only breached its obligations as an owner. justices russell brown and malcolm rowe also dissented, in separate reasons. they agreed with the majority that the board had the authority to adopt the regulation, but would have allowed the appeal against the fine for the same reasons as justice côté . this case involved courts' review of an administrative tribunal's decision. it confirmed that courts should generally defer to administrative bodies (like the board) when those bodies are given wide authority to make regulations.
+supreme court of canada maple leaf foods wasn't responsible for the lost profits of mr. sub owners due to a food recall, the supreme court has ruled. mr. sub was a chain of canadian sandwich shops. it was a 'franchise.' this meant each shop was owned by different 'franchisees.' as franchisees, shop owners had the benefit of mr. sub's brand. they also got better prices for supplies. franchisees usually have to use specific products and do things a specific way. this is so the customer's experience is always the same. as part of mr. sub's franchise agreement, its franchisees agreed to buy most of their sandwich meats from maple leaf foods. in 2008, maple leaf foods learned that some of its meat contained a bacteria called listeria. there was a lot of news coverage about people getting sick and dying from eating maple leaf meats. no one got sick or died from eating meat at a mr. sub. anyone who bought the meat from maple leaf had to return it to be destroyed, or throw it away, and would get a refund. two of the meats affected by the recall were used by mr. sub shops. right after the listeria outbreak, shop owners weren't allowed to buy meats from somewhere else. this was because the franchise agreement with mr. sub said they couldn't. after about two months, mr. sub said the shop owners could buy from other companies. but before this, the individual shops lost money. their reputations were hurt. this was because people knew they used maple leaf products, and they knew about the listeria contamination. the shop owners could have asked mr. sub for permission to buy meat from another company during this time, but they didn't. the shop owners sued maple leaf foods. they couldn't sue mr. sub because the franchise agreement said they couldn't. they said maple leaf was responsible for their lost sales, profits, business value, and customer goodwill because of the recall. the motion judge said maple leaf was responsible for the shop owners' losses. the court of appeal said it wasn't. the majority of judges at the supreme court said maple leaf foods didn't owe the shop owners for the money they lost or the damage to their reputation. for maple leaf foods to be legally responsible, the shop owners would have to show that it owed them a 'duty of care.' in law, a duty of care means someone has to act reasonably to avoid hurting others close to them. it is an important concept in tort law. tort law deals with non-criminal wrongdoing outside of a contract. tort law isn't about contracts. but one way courts can decide if someone is close enough to owe someone else a duty is if there is a contract between them. the shop owners didn't have a contract with maple leaf foods. they had a contract with mr. sub. the contract with mr. sub said they had to buy meat from maple leaf. but maple leaf wasn't part of that contract. contracts are only between the parties who agree to them. maple leaf didn't have a contract with any of the shop owners saying it had to supply the meat to them. the shop owners said maple leaf foods had to provide meat that was fit to eat. they said it was responsible for their losses because it didn't. when a claim is only for lost profits, sales, value, or goodwill, it is a claim for 'pure economic loss.' this is a loss that doesn't involve mental or physical damage to someone or something. claims for pure economic loss are allowed in very specific situations. for example, it can be allowed so someone can avoid injury when someone else builds or supplies something dangerous. the majority said maple leaf's duty was to protect customers from getting sick from eating their meats, not to protect shop owners' business interests. while it was responsible for removing the danger (by recalling the meat), it wasn't responsible for the shop owners' lost profits, sales, value, or goodwill. this case was a 'class action.' when a large group of people have the same legal problem, they might decide to get together and sue as a group. the 'class' is the group, and the 'action' is the lawsuit. that means a class action is a group lawsuit. it lets the whole group get their complaint dealt with at once. in this case, 1688782 ontario inc. was the plaintiff who represented the group.
+supreme court of canada a defendant should have been allowed to ask limited questions about a complainant's sexual history, but in this case it wouldn't have changed the verdict, the supreme court has ruled. a fifteen year-old girl was camping with her family one canada day weekend. she said her 20 year-old cousin, rv, sexually assaulted her. she didn't tell anyone at the time, but later found out she was pregnant. her doctor said she became pregnant around the end of june or early july. the girl ended the pregnancy so there was no dna evidence available to prove who got her pregnant. rv was later charged with sexual assault and sexual interference (touching someone under 16 in a sexual way). at rv's trial, the crown (the prosecution) said the girl was a virgin before that weekend. it said she became pregnant around the time she said she was assaulted. it used this evidence to support the charge that rv sexually assaulted her. but rv denied this. he said someone else must have made her pregnant. he wanted to ask the girl whether she had sex with anyone else. a person who accuses someone else of a crime (like the girl in this case) is a 'complainant.' in sexual assault cases, there are rules in the criminal code about what anyone can say about a complainant's sexual history. trials are supposed to get to the truth. but some people believe myths and stereotypes about women and their sexual history. these get in the way of the truth. the rules are there to protect the trial process, and help judges and juries get to the truth. evidence about a complainant's sexual history will only be allowed if it meets very strict conditions. in this case, the crown introduced the evidence about the girl's virginity and pregnancy. rv wanted to challenge it. he wanted to ask questions about whether someone else could have made her pregnant. he said if he wasn't allowed to challenge what she said, he wouldn't be able to defend himself properly. rv had to ask a judge whether he was allowed to ask these questions, because they were about sexual history. the judge said rv was allowed to ask whether the girl was telling the truth about being a virgin at the time, and what she thought 'virginity' meant. but he wasn't allowed to ask whether anyone else could have made her pregnant. the trial judge found rv guilty and sentenced him to four years in prison. the court of appeal said it was unfair that the crown could rely on the pregnancy but rv wasn't allowed to challenge the suggestion that he caused it. it ordered a new trial. the majority at the supreme court agreed that rv should have been allowed to ask the girl whether someone else could have made her pregnant. but it said it wouldn't have made a difference. he still would have been found guilty. it said the guilty verdict should stand. the majority said that the presumption of innocence is vital to our criminal law. part of the presumption of innocence is being able to defend yourself. that meant rv had to be able to challenge the evidence against him by asking questions. while the pregnancy was evidence that some kind of sexual activity had happened, it wasn't evidence of who caused the pregnancy or when. these questions were important to getting to the truth. but the court noted that the questions would have been limited, under the criminal code rules, to protect the girl's dignity and privacy. the majority said that in rare cases like this one, even if rv had been allowed to ask his questions differently, it wouldn't have changed the result. during rv's trial, the girl said she was a virgin at the time and there was nothing to suggest she was lying. the majority said a judge should have decided what could be said about sexual history, and how rv could challenge it, even before the crown introduced the evidence. the majority noted that judges have to make sure any questions that are allowed don't go too far in invading the complainant's privacy. judges can also change rulings about these kinds of questions if things change during the trial. the court recently dealt with a complainant's sexual history in r v goldfinch and r v barton.
+supreme court of canada a company couldn't make a bankrupt company it had a contract with pay a penalty just because of the bankruptcy, the supreme court has ruled. when a company can't pay all of its bills, it can file for bankruptcy. when this happens, everything it owns is given to a 'trustee.' the trustee decides how to divide everything among the people the company owes money to. the rules for doing this are set out in the bankruptcy and insolvency act, a federal law. chandos construction signed a contract with capital steel. it was worth almost $1.4 million. part of the contract said chandos would get money if capital steel went bankrupt. the contract would be frozen and capital steel would have to pay chandos for anything it lost, plus extra for overhead and profit. the contract also said capital steel would have to pay chandos 10% of the contract price (that is, about $140,000) for the inconvenience. capital steel went bankrupt. at the time, chandos owed capital steel about $150,000 on the contract. but it said capital steel actually owed it over $10,000. this was because of the costs and the 10% inconvenience fee that the contract said capital steel had to pay if it went bankrupt. this added up to more than was left on the contract. the trustee asked the court if this was allowed. the application judge said yes. the majority of the court of appeal said no. this was because it broke the 'anti-deprivation rule.' the anti-deprivation rule says any part of a contract that takes away (that is, deprives the trustee of) some of what the bankrupt company owns isn't allowed. the majority of judges at the supreme court agreed with the court of appeal. they said there are two reasons why part of a contract might be found invalid during a bankruptcy. the first is where the contract gives some people who are owed money more than their fair share, so they get bigger slices of the pie than they deserve. this is called the 'pari passu rule.' the second is when part of the pie is taken away so the whole pie is shrunk before it can even be sliced. this is the situation covered by the anti-deprivation rule. the majority said that the anti-deprivation rule had been part of canadian law since the 1870s it was part of 'common law,' not legislation. common law is law made by courts when there is no legislation (laws passed by parliament or legislatures). it can also help interpret and apply legislation. common law can't go against legislation. it is just there to fill in the gaps, keeping with the spirit of what parliament or the legislature wanted. legislation can change common law, though. but in this case, the majority said the common law was never changed, even by the bankruptcy and insolvency act. the majority said the act's purpose was to make sure the trustee had as much as possible to give to people who were owed money. the anti-deprivation rule helps make sure this happens. it stops people from writing contracts to get around the rules in the act. when deciding if something broke the anti-deprivation rule, the majority said that courts should look at its effect. they shouldn't look at what the parties wanted, or said they wanted, at the time they came to an agreement. first, it would be hard to know or prove what people wanted if a contract was signed a long time ago. second, a contract could still have the effect of hurting others who were owed money, even if no one meant for that to happen. this would still be wrong. however, the majority said the anti-deprivation rule might not be broken where someone agreed to give up physical property (not money). agreeing to get insurance, or a putting up money (security) as a guarantee for the contract, might also be allowed. the majority said that chandos wasn't allowed to reduce what it owed to capital steel by deducting the inconvenience fee amounts. capital steel didn't actually owe chandos any money, so there was nothing to deduct. bankruptcy is a complicated process, and often involves many companies, people, and issues. the court previously dealt with bankruptcy's effect on companies' environmental obligations in orphan well association v grant thornton ltd. and resolute fp canada inc. v ontario (attorney general). it dealt with bankruptcy's effect on shareholders in brunette v legault joly thiffault.
+supreme court of canada the mandatory victim surcharge that everyone convicted of a crime has to pay is unconstitutional, the supreme court has ruled. the majority said it was cruel and unusual punishment, and struck it down. the criminal code says that anyone found guilty of a crime has to pay a 'victim surcharge.' the amount depends on the type of crime. it is 30% of any fine charged. if there is no fine, it is $100 for every summary conviction count and $200 for every indictable (pronounced 'in-dye-ta-bull') count. (these are different types of charges, with indictable counts being more serious.) the surcharge has to be paid even if the judge gives the person a 'discharge,' meaning there is no other punishment. the money is meant to help victims. a lot of people who commit crimes are poor. many live with addictions or mental health issues. sometimes they simply can't pay. before 2013, a judge could choose not to make someone pay the surcharge if it would cause too much hardship. parliament changed the law in 2013 to say that judges had to impose it no matter what. they could increase it, but couldn't lower it. in hardship cases, the most judges could do was give the person more time to pay. this case involved seven people appealing four different decisions in two provinces. in each case, the offenders said they couldn't afford the surcharge. one person was ordered to pay $1,400. he was homeless, addicted, and unemployed, with a yearly income of only $4,800. another was ordered to pay $700. he had addiction and mental health issues and had only $136 each month after food and housing were paid for. other people had different physical and mental health issues, and some struggled with addictions. all lived in poverty. but they were still ordered to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars. even judges making the orders said the offenders couldn't afford to pay, but their hands were tied. the offenders argued this violated section 12 of the canadian charter of rights and freedoms, which is part of canada's constitution. section 12 says that 'everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.' the lower courts and all judges at the supreme court accepted that the surcharge was 'punishment'; the question was whether it was 'cruel and unusual.' 'cruel and unusual' means more than just harsh. it means punishment so unacceptable and extreme that society shouldn't allow it. the quebec and ontario courts of appeal said the surcharge wasn't cruel and unusual punishment and was constitutional. they said all the offenders had to pay it, while conceding they probably wouldn't be able to. the majority at the supreme court disagreed. it said the mandatory victim surcharge was, in fact, cruel and unusual punishment. the surcharge created a crushing financial burden on very poor people (for them, a few hundred dollars is more like $23,000 for an average canadian). people who couldn't pay were constantly under threat of being arrested and jailed, even if only briefly, for not paying. they might also be harassed by collections agencies. they could end up in court over and over again to explain why they hadn't paid, which amounts to public shaming. and the surcharge was basically an unending punishment, because all of this would continue until it was paid. offenders couldn't apply for a pardon that might allow them to get work and move forward. the majority said this also burdened the justice system, which spent more trying to get poor people to pay the surcharge than it would ever get back. the majority noted that a sentence works best if it is made for the individual. the mandatory victim surcharge didn't allow judges to look at a person's circumstances, or the best way to rehabilitate them. it also didn't make sense sometimes for example, five counts of vandalism would have a higher surcharge than a count of murder. this decision means that judges can't order victim surcharges anymore. it doesn't mean all victim surcharges ordered in the past are canceled. when a law is struck down in court, it is struck down retroactively only for the people who fought the case. but the majority noted that cruel and unusual punishment happens both when it is imposed and when it is enforced. a convicted person who was ordered to pay a surcharge before the law was struck down, but hasn't, could challenge it when brought to court to explain the non-payment.
+supreme court of canada an offender should have challenged a long-term supervision order directly, instead of challenging it indirectly after he was charged with violating it, the supreme court has ruled. mr. bird was a 'long-term offender' with over 60 criminal convictions. long-term offenders are at higher risk of committing more crimes in the future. because of this, they are 'supervised' after they finish their prison sentences to make sure they stay out of trouble. they have to report to corrections officials on a regular basis. they may have to live in a certain place or be home by a certain time, or follow other conditions. long-term supervision is meant to protect the public. it is also meant to help long-term offenders re-enter society. a judge decides the length of a long-term supervision order. the parole board sets the conditions. the parole board is an 'administrative' body (meaning it is set up by parliament to do things on behalf of the state in this case, deal with parole and related matters). this means a long-term supervision order is an 'administrative' order rather than a court order. still, violating one is a crime.the punishment is up to ten years in prison. in 2013, after being convicted on a weapons charge, mr. bird was sentenced to a year in prison. he hoped to return to his first nation in north central saskatchewan and live with his brother after finishing his prison sentence. but the parole board decided he would be too much of a risk to the community. it ordered him to live in a 'community correctional centre' (a halfway house) in regina for about six months after his prison sentence. this was a 'residency condition' of his long-term supervision order. before his prison sentence ended, mr. bird got a letter from the parole board. it said he could ask the parole board to consider changing or removing any of the conditions of his long-term supervision order. he never did. less than a month after his long-term supervision began, mr. bird left the halfway house and didn't come back. he was arrested over two months later and charged with violating the order. mr. bird fought the charge. he argued that the residency condition was unconstitutional. he said the parole board didn't have the power to impose the condition. he said the condition violated his right to liberty under the canadian charter of rights and freedoms. he argued that being forced to live at the halfway house was like being forced to live in prison. he said long-term supervision orders weren\'t meant to put people back in prison after they served their time. the trial judge accepted mr. bird's argument. he ruled that the residency condition was unconstitutional, so mr. bird couldn't be found guilty of violating it. the court of appeal disagreed. it said mr. bird wasn't allowed to launch a 'collateral attack' on the residency condition. a collateral attack is an indirect attack on an order or decision, through a new or separate case. in this case, a direct attack would have been doing what the letter said and asking the parole board to think about changing or removing the residency condition. the court of appeal found mr. bird guilty of violating the order. the majority at the supreme court agreed that the collateral attack was not allowed. because long-term supervision orders are 'administrative' orders, it had to look at what parliament intended. the key question was whether parliament meant to allow long-term offenders to launch collateral attacks on these orders. to determine parliament's intent, the majority looked at a number of factors. it looked at the wording and purposes of different laws. it looked at whether mr. bird could have challenged the order in other ways. it looked at the parole board's expertise in long-term supervision orders. and it looked at the punishment for violating the order. in the end, the majority said that parliament didn't intend to allow long-term offenders like mr. bird to launch collateral attacks on their long-term supervision orders in criminal proceedings. it noted that he had several options to challenge the condition. it said parliament meant for him to use these rather than indirectly attacking the condition after he violated it. it sent the case back to the provincial court to decide a sentence. courts don't have to decide every question parties ask them. in this case, the majority didn't need to decide whether the residency condition was actually unconstitutional, because parliament didn't intend to allow collateral attacks.
+supreme court of canada a class-action lawsuit against a religious group (and an institution it ran) for sexual abuse can go forward, the supreme court has ruled. jj said he was sexually abused by both his teacher and a priest in the 1950s both were members of the congr gation de sainte-croix. he said the teacher abused him at school. he said the priest abused him at the oratoire saint-joseph du mont-royal, where jj was an altar boy.the priest died in 2001 and the teacher died in 2004. jj didn't tell anyone about the abuse for decades. he said he had nightmares and flashbacks for years. he believed there were other victims like him, so he decided to launch a 'class action' in quebec in 2013. a class action is a special kind of lawsuit when a group of people with the same kind of problem get together to sue. in the phrase 'class action,' the 'class' is the group and the 'action' is the lawsuit. class actions can affect many people and their legal rights, even if they aren't actively involved. a judge has to give permission for (authorize) a class action to go ahead. the judge is just supposed to look at whether the class action meets the conditions to go to court, not whether it will succeed. they have to assume the facts are true unless they are clearly wrong or unlikely. a 'representative plaintiff' represents the group and asks for permission to launch the class action by applying to the court. jj wanted to be the representative plaintiff in this case. jj said the congr gation and the oratoire were directly responsible for what happened to him by their own acts. he said they knew (or should have known) about the abuse but didn't stop it, and even covered it up. he said they were also responsible for the acts of the teacher and the priest, because they assigned them to work with children. the congr gation and the oratoire said the class action shouldn't be allowed. they said the class members didn't have similar issues because the abuse happened in different places. they said jj waited too long after the men he said abused him died. they said jj didn't show enough facts that anything happened. the oratoire said it couldn't be responsible just because abuse might have happened on its property. the judge agreed with the congr gation and the oratoire that the class action couldn't go forward. but the court of appeal disagreed. it unanimously said the class action against the congr gation could go forward. the majority said the class action against the oratoire could go forward as well. all the judges of the supreme court agreed it wasn't too late for jj to sue. they noted that quebec had a new three-year time limit to sue if the abuser or victim died. but most judges said the rule didn't apply to a lawsuit against third parties like the congr gation and the oratoire. it only applied to lawsuits brought against the abuser's succession (estate), or brought by the victim's succession, after they died. just because the men jj said abused him died didn't mean he couldn't sue the congr gation and the oratoire for their own failures to prevent or stop the abuse. in any case, most judges said the time limit started when a victim realized that the abuse was responsible for their injury. this could be long after the abuser died. most judges noted that the changes to the law were meant to make it easier for victims of sexual abuse to get justice, not harder. most judges said the class action could go forward against the congr gation. the majority said all the class members had a similar issue. they wanted to know whether the congr gation was responsible for sexual assaults on children by members assigned to work with those children. the majority said that just because the children didn't report the abuse at the time didn't mean that the congr gation didn't know what was happening. the majority said the class action could go forward against the oratoire as well. it wasn't being sued because it was the location of some of the assaults. it was being sued because of its close connection to the congr gation, and because its directors who were all congr gation members failed to stop (or covered up) the abuse. this case doesn't mean that jj won the class-action lawsuit. it only means that a court can now hear all the arguments and make a decision.
+supreme court of canada a cabinet document used to decide on judges' pay in british columbia should stay confidential, the supreme court has unanimously ruled. but parts of one used in nova scotia should be disclosed. under the constitution, canada has three branches of state. the executive branch (the prime minister or premier and cabinet) decides policy. the legislative branch (parliament or legislatures) makes laws. the judiciary (the courts) interprets and applies laws. each branch has a different role. it is important for our democracy that each branch has some independence. for courts, 'judicial independence' means they can do their work without interference from the other branches. for example, judges can only be removed from office for very good reasons. this is so judges aren't afraid to make the right decisions, even unpopular ones. also, only judges can decide how to manage court processes. and judges must be paid properly, so financial pressure can't be used against them. judges can't negotiate their salaries with the government. negotiations would make the issue political. this would upset the relationship between the branches. instead, independent commissions make salary recommendations to governments. governments have to formally respond and give reasons if they decide not to follow them. only the executive and the legislative branches can make decisions about judges' salaries. but courts can still review these decisions. this is to make sure governments are doing what they are supposed to under the constitution. for judges' salaries, courts will look at whether there was a valid reason not to follow a recommendation. they will look at whether the decision was based on facts. and they will look at whether the government respected the commission's role and judicial independence. commissions in british columbia and nova scotia made recommendations about salaries of judges appointed by those provinces. the governments decided not to follow all the recommendations. the associations representing the judges asked the courts to review the governments' decisions. as part of this, they asked the courts to order the governments to give them copies of the confidential cabinet documents used to make the decisions. the lower courts in both provinces said the governments had to disclose (share) the cabinet documents. all the judges at the supreme court of canada said the british columbia cabinet document should stay confidential. but they said part of the nova scotia document should be disclosed (shared). the court said confidential cabinet documents could only be shared under certain conditions. there had to be reason to believe the documents might help show that the government didn't follow its obligations. in such a case, a judge would look at the documents, without anyone else seeing them. if the judge decided the document would help show the government didn't follow its obligations, the judge could still decide not to release the documents. but only if there was a good reason not to. for example, the document could be protected by solicitor-client privilege, if it dealt with legal advice to the government. the document could also be protected by 'public interest immunity.' this is when courts look at whether the public interest in keeping cabinet documents confidential outweighs the public interest in knowing what was said. it would depend on the situation. but it is important that ministers can have frank discussions with their colleagues. they have to defend government decisions publicly, even if they don't agree with them personally. it's part of their job. if cabinet discussions weren't confidential, ministers could be criticized for holding different private views than those they defended in public. this could be a distraction and lower people's confidence in government. in the british columbia case, the court said there was no reason to believe the document might help show the government didn't follow its obligations. but, in the nova scotia case, the court said there was reason to believe the document might help show the government didn't follow its obligations when it decided on judges' salaries. the court looked at the cabinet document. it confirmed parts of it would help show the government didn't follow some obligations. and the court said public interest immunity didn't prevent those parts from being shared. courts have a special role in society because they hold up the rule of law. the rule of law is the principle that everyone should follow the same legal rules in society. under the constitution, courts can't be politicized. otherwise, people could lose faith in our justice system. this is why judicial independence is important to all canadians, not just judges.
+supreme court of canada a person named as an irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy doesn't always have a right to keep the insurance money, the supreme court has confirmed. a third party may have a right to the insurance money if there has been 'unjust enrichment.' mr. moore bought a $250,000 life insurance policy in 1985, while he was married to ms. moore. ms. moore was named the sole beneficiary, which means that she would get the money if mr. moore died. the moores separated in 1999 and divorced in 2003. until 2000, the moores paid the $507.50 premium each year out of their joint bank account. in 2000, ms. moore and mr. moore verbally agreed that ms. moore would pay all of the yearly premiums. in exchange, mr. moore would keep ms. moore on the policy as the sole beneficiary. from 2000 on, ms. moore paid the premiums herself. in 2000, mr. moore moved in with ms. sweet. soon after, he made her the 'irrevocable' beneficiary of the policy, even though he had agreed to keep ms. moore named as sole beneficiary. he didn't tell ms. moore that he made this change. ontario's insurance act sets out the rules for insurance policies. it says an insured person can name another person (or group of people) as the beneficiary of their life insurance policy. that other person can be named either a 'revocable' beneficiary or an 'irrevocable' beneficiary. 'revocable' beneficiaries can be removed from a policy at any time. they don't have to agree, or even be informed that they are being removed. ms. moore was a 'revocable' beneficiary. 'irrevocable' beneficiaries, like ms. sweet, can only be removed if they agree to it. ms. moore only found out that she had been removed as the beneficiary when mr. moore died in 2013. at this point, she sued ms. sweet for $250,000, the value of the policy. she argued that ms. sweet got a benefit at her expense, and there was no legal basis for it. this kind of situation is called 'unjust enrichment.' ms. moore asked the court to put the money in a 'constructive trust,' a common request when unjust enrichment happens. a constructive trust means someone has to hold certain property for someone else's benefit. both ms. moore and ms. sweet agreed that the verbal agreement between the moores was a contract. the question was whether the insurance act gave ms. sweet legal basis to keep the money in spite of that. the trial judge ruled in favour of ms. moore, saying mr. moore had given her rights to the policy through their verbal agreement. the court of appeal disagreed. it said that while ms. moore should get back all the money she paid for the premiums (about $7,000), ms. sweet should get to keep the rest of the money. the majority at the supreme court ruled in favour of ms. moore. the fact that ms. sweet was an irrevocable beneficiary of the policy wasn't enough for her to be allowed to keep the money. the insurance act set out how beneficiaries could be named, but it didn't say that naming a new beneficiary would automatically override other people's rights from previous agreements. courts already said that other people could have rights to an insurance policy no matter who was actually listed on it. this could be through a contract or by the concept of 'equity' (rules of fairness). those people could claim the insurance money on some legal or 'equitable' (fair) basis, like unjust enrichment. the majority also noted that ms. sweet would have received nothing if ms. moore ever stopped paying. for those reasons, the majority said that ms. moore should get the insurance money under a constructive trust. this case was about what happens when someone has a pre-existing right to an insurance policy, but someone else is named as the irrevocable beneficiary. the majority said that in this case, the beneficiary was unjustly enriched and could not keep the insurance money.
+supreme court of canada a jury shouldn't have heard that an accused person and a complainant in a sexual assault case were 'friends with benefits,' the supreme court has ruled. mr. goldfinch dated and lived with a woman for a while. she ended the relationship, but they later got back in touch. they considered their relationship to be 'friends with benefits.' one evening in 2014, the woman was at mr. goldfinch's place. they had drinks with mr. goldfinch's roommate. the woman said she told mr. goldfinch that sex wasn't going to happen that night, but mr. goldfinch said he didn't hear this. they kissed on the couch, and mr. goldfinch said they should go to bed. after that, their stories became very different. mr. goldfinch said he followed her to his bedroom. he said they each took off their own clothes, and then had sex. he said he fell asleep and she woke him up later, saying he hit her on the head in his sleep. he said he was annoyed and told her to leave. the woman said she told mr. goldfinch she didn't want to have sex. she said he dragged her to the bedroom, and it was like something 'just snapped' in him. she said he pushed her onto the bed, hit her, and forced her to have sex. mr. goldfinch was charged with sexual assault. he wanted to tell the jury that he and the woman were 'friends with benefits'. he said this was important context for jury members to know. he said if the jury thought the relationship was not a sexual relationship, he wouldn't be able to properly defend himself. he wanted the jury to know specifically that, as 'friends with benefits,' they had sex from time to time. the crown (the prosecution) agreed to tell the jury they had dated and lived together and that, sometimes, the woman would stay the night at his house. a person who accuses someone else of a crime (like the woman in this case) is a 'complainant.' in sexual assault cases, there are rules in the criminal code about what the defence and crown can say about a complainant's sexual history. trials are supposed to get to the truth. but some people believe myths and stereotypes about women and their sexual history. these get in the way of the truth. one myth is that a person who agreed to sex in the past is more likely to agree again. evidence that might support this myth is not allowed at trial, except where it's relevant and useful for other important reasons. the trial judge said mr. goldfinch was allowed to tell the jury that he and the complainant were 'friends with benefits' because this was important 'context' to understand their relationship. the jury found him not guilty. the crown appealed. the court of appeal said the evidence shouldn't have been allowed. just saying the evidence was 'context' wasn't enough to outweigh the risk that the jury would make its decision based on a myth. (that is, the myth that because a woman has said yes in the past, she was more likely to say yes this time.) the majority at the supreme court agreed that the evidence shouldn't have been allowed. while mr. goldfinch said the evidence was for 'context,' it didn't add anything useful to help the jury decide his guilt. in this case, telling the jury he and the woman had a sexual relationship was only useful for one reason. that was to suggest she had agreed to have sex in the past, and so was more likely to agree that night, too. this is wrong because agreeing to sexual acts (consent) doesn't carry over from one time to the next. consent has to be given, and communicated, at the time of each act. by letting the jury hear the evidence, the judge made a legal mistake. the judge should have made mr. goldfinch show that the evidence was useful for some other important reason. the majority said there should be a new trial where the rules about using the complainant's sexual history would be followed. this case came to the supreme court as an appeal 'as of right.' that means there is an automatic right to appeal. the person doesn't need the court's permission. the right is automatic in criminal cases when a court of appeal judge dissents (disagrees) on a point of law, as happened here. the court previously dealt with sexual history evidence in r v barton.
+supreme court of canada rioters who damaged police cars after a montreal hockey game only have to pay for the specific damage they caused personally, the supreme court has ruled. they cannot be held responsible for damage others caused independently to the same vehicle. on april 21, 2008, the montreal canadiens beat the boston bruins in a playoff hockey game. street celebrations turned into riots in downtown montreal. nine police cars were destroyed and six more were damaged. police were able to identify and arrest about twenty people who did different wrongful acts, from kicking doors for some to setting cars on fire for others. the city of montreal sued the rioters, asking the court to make each one pay for up to the full cost of the damage to the car he participated in destroying. if one or more of the other rioters who damaged the same car could not pay, or could not be identified, others who damaged the same car would have to make up the difference. the civil code of quebec applies to non-criminal legal issues in the province. this case dealt with the interpretation of two articles of the code, articles 1480 and 1526. normally, a person who does something wrong will only have to pay for the exact harm that s/he causes to someone else. but the code gives two exceptions, and allows two or more people to each be held responsible for all the damage in certain situations that don't involve contracts. article 1526 says this can happen where two or more people take part in the same wrongful act or, by separate wrongful acts, contribute to the same damage. article 1480 says this can happen if two or more people took part, together, in the same wrongful act, or separate wrongful acts, and it's impossible to tell who actually caused what damage. in either case, a single injury must have been caused by the people involved for them to each be held liable for up to the full cost of the damage. the trial judge ordered some rioters who acted together to each pay for all the damage they caused to a car. for the other rioters, he said that the two exceptions did not apply. the judge ordered each of these rioters to pay only for the precise damage they each caused, plus punitive damages. the city appealed the judgments where the rioters had not all been found responsible for all the damage. the court of appeal agreed with the trial judge. justice cl ment gascon, writing for the supreme court majority, agreed with the courts below. he said the rioters in this appeal could not each be held responsible for the total damage caused to a car during the riot. their situation did not meet the requirements for either one of the exceptions. the general principle that a person who does something wrong will only have to pay for the exact harm that s/he causes to someone else should apply. by their different wrongful acts, these rioters caused distinct damage. it was possible to identify the damage each of them caused, since it was caught on camera. also, most of these rioters didn't even know or talk to each other. they acted on their own, often at different times. they could therefore not have chosen to act together by either open or unspoken agreement. five judges agreed with justice gascon. justice suzanne côté had a different opinion. she said the code did not require pre-planning or clear agreement for one of the exceptions to apply. here, the actions of each person who participated in the destruction of a particular car were connected because they damaged the same car, in a short period of time, and egged each other on until that car was seriously damaged or completely destroyed. these persons acted together to destroy the same car and should be responsible to pay up to the full amount of the damage caused to that car. in justice côté's view, both exceptions in the code apply, even if it were possible to identify the specific damage one person caused. the seriousness of each rioter's wrongful act would help divide responsibility between the members of the group associated with each car. but each of them remained responsible to pay up to the full amount to the city. this decision confirmed that damaging property during a riot doesn't make someone automatically responsible for damage caused to the same property by other rioters.
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