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2011_11-182

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-182

. To address pressing issues related to the large number of aliens within its borders who do not have a lawful right to be in this country, the State of Arizona in 2010 enacted a statute called the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. The law is often referred to as S. B. 1070, the version introduced in the state senate. See also H. 2162 (2010) (amending S. 1070). Its stated purpose is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Note following Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1051 (West 2012). The law’s provisions establish an official state policy of “attrition through enforcement.” Ibid. The question before the Court is whether federal law preempts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the state law. I The United States filed this suit against Arizona, seeking to enjoin S. B. 1070 as preempted. Four provisions of the law are at issue here. Two create new state offenses. Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1509 (West Supp. 2011). Section 5, in relevant part, makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; this provision is referred to as §5(C). See §13–2928(C). Two other provisions give specific arrest authority and inves- tigative duties with respect to certain aliens to state and local law enforcement officers. Section 6 authorizes officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States.” §13–3883(A)(5). Section 2(B) provides that officers who conduct a stop, detention, or arrest must in some circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s immi- gration status with the Federal Government. See §11–1051(B) (West 2012). The United States District Court for the District of Arizona issued a preliminary injunction preventing the four provisions at issue from taking effect. 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (2010). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 641 F.3d 339, 366 (2011). It agreed that the United States had established a likelihood of success on its preemption claims. The Court of Appeals was unanimous in its conclusion that §§3 and 5(C) were likely preempted. Judge Bea dissented from the decision to uphold the preliminary injunction against §§2(B) and 6. This Court granted certiorari to resolve important questions concerning the interaction of state and federal power with respect to the law of immigration and alien status. 565 U. S. ___ (2011). II A The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); see generally S. Legomsky & C. Rodríguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 115–132 (5th ed. 2009). This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to “establish an uniform Rule of Nat- uralization,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and its inher- ent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations, see Toll, supra, at 10 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled. Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws. See, e.g., Brief for Argentina et al. as Amici Curiae; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–589 (1952). Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad. See Brief for Madeleine K. Albright et al. as Amici Curiae 24–30. It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–280 (1876); see also The Federalist No. 3, p. 39 (C. Rossiter ed. 2003) (J. Jay) (observing that federal power would be necessary in part because “bordering States . . . under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury” might take action that would undermine foreign relations). This Court has reaffirmed that “[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941). Federal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex. Congress has specified catego- ries of aliens who may not be admitted to the United States. See 8 U. S. C. §1182. Unlawful entry and unlawful reentry into the country are federal offenses. §§1325, 1326. Once here, aliens are required to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status on their person. See §§1301–1306. Failure to do so is a federal misdemeanor. §§1304(e), 1306(a). Federal law also authorizes States to deny noncitizens a range of public benefits, §1622; and it imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a. Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so. Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other criteria set by federal law. See §1227. Re- moval is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. See Brief for Former Commissioners of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service as Amici Curiae 8–13 (hereinafter Brief for Former INS Commissioners). Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave without formal removal. See §1229a(c)(4); see also, e.g., §§1158 (asylum), 1229b (cancellation of removal), 1229c (voluntary departure). Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are con- sistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities. Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security play a major role in enforcing the country’s immigration laws. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is re- sponsible for determining the admissibility of aliens and securing the country’s borders. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, p. 1 (2011). In 2010, CBP’s Border Patrol apprehended almost half a million people. Id., at 3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a second agency, “conducts criminal investigations involving the enforcement of immigration-related statutes.” Id., at 2. ICE also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center. LESC, as the Center is known, provides immigra- tion status information to federal, state, and local officials around the clock. See App. 91. ICE officers are respon- sible “for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens from the United States.” Immigration Enforcement Actions, supra, at 2. Hundreds of thousands of aliens are removed by the Federal Government every year. See id., at 4 (reporting there were 387,242 removals, and 476,405 returns without a removal order, in 2010). B The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not di- minish the importance of immigration policy to the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens are apprehended in Arizona each year. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 93 (2011) (Table 35). Unauthorized aliens who remain in the State comprise, by one es- timate, almost six percent of the population. See Passel & Cohn, Pew Hispanic Center, U. S. Unauthorized Im- migration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade 3 (2010). And in the State’s most populous county, these aliens are reported to be responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime. See, e.g., Camarota & Vaughan, Center for Immigration Studies, Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Situation 16 (2009) (Table 3) (estimating that unauthorized aliens comprise 8.9% of the population and are responsible for 21.8% of the felonies in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix). Statistics alone do not capture the full extent of Arizona’s concerns. Accounts in the record suggest there is an “epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems” associated with the influx of illegal migration across private land near the Mexican border. Brief for Petitioners 6. Phoenix is a major city of the United States, yet signs along an interstate highway 30 miles to the south warn the public to stay away. One reads, “DANGER—PUBLIC WARNING—TRAVEL NOT RECOMMENDED / Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area / Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles Traveling at High Rates of Speed.” App. 170; see also Brief for Petitioners 5–6. The problems posed to the State by illegal immigration must not be underestimated. These concerns are the background for the formal legal analysis that follows. The issue is whether, under pre- emption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement the state-law provisions in dispute. III Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210–211 (1824). There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 4). State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992). The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where there is a “federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law. Crosby, supra, at 372. This includes cases where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963), and those instances where the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373 (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects”). In preemption analysis, courts should assume that “the historic police powers of the States” are not superseded “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice, supra, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). The four challenged provisions of the state law each must be examined under these preemption principles. IV A Section 3 Section 3 of S. B. 1070 creates a new state misde- meanor. It forbids the “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document . . . in violation of 8 United States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a).” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1509(A) (West Supp. 2011). In effect, §3 adds a state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law. The United States contends that this state enforcement mechanism intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. See Brief for United States 27, 31. The Court discussed federal alien-registration requirements in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52. In 1940, as international conflict spread, Congress added to federal immigration law a “complete system for alien registration.” Id., at 70. The new federal law struck a careful balance. It punished an alien’s willful failure to register but did not require aliens to carry identification cards. There were also limits on the sharing of registration records and fingerprints. The Court found that Congress intended the federal plan for registration to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” Id., at 74. Because this “complete scheme . . . for the registration of aliens” touched on foreign relations, it did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal law or to “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. As a con- sequence, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania could not enforce its own alien-registration program. See id., at 59, 74. The present regime of federal regulation is not identi- cal to the statutory framework considered in Hines, but it remains comprehensive. Federal law now includes a requirement that aliens carry proof of registration. 8 U. S. C. §1304(e). Other aspects, however, have stayed the same. Aliens who remain in the country for more than 30 days must apply for registration and be fingerprinted. Compare §1302(a) with id., §452(a) (1940 ed.). Detailed information is required, and any change of address has to be reported to the Federal Government. Compare §§1304(a), 1305(a) (2006 ed.), with id., §§455(a), 456 (1940 ed.). The statute continues to provide penalties for the willful failure to register. Compare §1306(a) (2006 ed.), with id., §457 (1940 ed.). The framework enacted by Congress leads to the conclusion here, as it did in Hines, that the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration. See American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419, n. 11 (2003) (characterizing Hines as a field preemption case); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (same); see also Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J. 2085, 2098–2099, 2107 (2000) (same). The federal statu- tory directives provide a full set of standards governing alien registration, including the punishment for noncompliance. It was designed as a “ ‘harmonious whole.’ ” Hines, supra, at 72. Where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field pre- emption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to fed- eral standards. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984). Federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep track of aliens within the Nation’s borders. If §3 of the Arizona statute were valid, every State could give itself independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations, “diminish[ing] the [Federal Government]’s control over enforcement” and “detract[ing] from the ‘integrated scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.” Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288–289 (1986). Even if a State may make violation of federal law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field (like the field of alien registration) that has been occupied by federal law. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730–731, 733 (1949); see also In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372, 375–376 (1890) (States may not impose their own punishment for perjury in federal courts). Arizona contends that §3 can survive preemption because the provision has the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive standards. This argument not only ignores the basic premise of field preemption—that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself—but also is unpersuasive on its own terms. Permitting the State to impose its own penalties for the federal offenses here would conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted. Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347–348 (2001) (States may not impose their own punishment for fraud on the Food and Drug Administration); Wisconsin Dept., supra, at 288 (States may not impose their own punishment for repeat violations of the National Labor Relations Act). Were §3 to come into force, the State would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies. There is a further intrusion upon the federal scheme. Even where federal authorities believe prosecution is ap- propriate, there is an inconsistency between §3 and fed- eral law with respect to penalties. Under federal law, the failure to carry registration papers is a misdemeanor that may be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or a term of probation. See 8 U. S. C. §1304(e) (2006 ed.); 18 U. S. C. §3561. State law, by contrast, rules out probation as a possible sentence (and also eliminates the possibility of a pardon). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1509(D) (West Supp. 2011). This state framework of sanctions creates a conflict with the plan Congress put in place. See Wisconsin Dept., supra, at 286 (“[C]onflict is imminent whenever two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). These specific conflicts between state and federal law simply underscore the reason for field preemption. As it did in Hines, the Court now concludes that, with respect to the subject of alien registration, Congress intended to preclude States from “complement[ing] the federal law, or enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations.” 312 U. S., at 66–67. Section 3 is preempted by federal law. B Section 5(C) Unlike §3, which replicates federal statutory requirements, §5(C) enacts a state criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart exists. The provision makes it a state misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly ap- ply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor” in Ari- zona. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–2928(C) (West Supp. 2011). Violations can be punished by a $2,500 fine and incarceration for up to six months. See §13–2928(F); see also §§13–707(A)(1) (West 2010); 13–802(A); 13–902(A)(5). The United States contends that the provision upsets the bal- ance struck by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and must be preempted as an obstacle to the federal plan of regulation and control. When there was no comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of unauthorized aliens, this Court found that a State had authority to pass its own laws on the subject. In 1971, for example, California passed a law imposing civil penalties on the employment of aliens who were “not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.” 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1442, §1(a). The law was upheld against a preemption challenge in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). De Canas recognized that “States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” Id., at 356. At that point, however, the Federal Government had expressed no more than “a peripheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.” Id., at 360; see Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Current federal law is substantially different from the regime that prevailed when De Canas was decided. Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). The law makes it illegal for employers to know- ingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers. See 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). It also requires every employer to verify the employment authorization status of prospective employees. See §§1324a(a) (1)(B), (b); 8 CFR §274a.2(b) (2012). These requirements are enforced through criminal penalties and an escalat- ing series of civil penalties tied to the number of times an employer has violated the provisions. See 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(e)(4), (f); 8 CFR §274 A. 10. This comprehensive framework does not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee side (i.e., penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized work). Under federal law some civil penalties are imposed instead. With certain exceptions, aliens who accept unlawful employment are not eligible to have their status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. See 8 U. S. C. §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8). Aliens also may be removed from the country for having engaged in unauthorized work. See §1227(a)(1)(C)(i); 8 CFR §214.1(e). In addition to specifying these civil consequences, federal law makes it a crime for unauthorized workers to obtain employment through fraudulent means. See 18 U. S. C. §1546(b). Congress has made clear, however, that any information employees submit to indicate their work status “may not be used” for purposes other than prosecution under specified federal criminal statutes for fraud, perjury, and related conduct. See 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F)–(G). The legislative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose crim- inal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. A commission established by Congress to study immigration policy and to make recommen- dations concluded these penalties would be “unnecessary and unworkable.” U. S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners 65–66 (1981); see Pub. L. 95–412, §4, 92Stat. 907. Proposals to make unauthorized work a criminal offense were debated and discussed during the long process of drafting IRCA. See Brief for Service Employees International Union et al. as Amici Curiae 9–12. But Congress rejected them. See, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. 14184 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis). In the end, IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status—would be inconsistent with federal policy and ob- jectives. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 919–920 (1971) (statement of Rep. Rodino, the eventual sponsor of IRCA in the House of Representatives). IRCA’s express preemption provision, which in most instances bars States from imposing penalties on employers of unauthorized aliens, is silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against the employees themselves. See 8 U. S. C. §1324a(h)(2); Whiting, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–2). But the existence of an “express pre-emption provisio[n] does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “special burden” that would make it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–872 (2000); see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002). The ordinary principles of preemption include the well-settled proposition that a state law is preempted where it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe- cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Under §5(C) of S. B. 1070, Arizona law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although §5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized that a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971). The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. See Puerto Rico Dept. of Con- sumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988) (“Where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, then the pre-emptive inference can be drawn—not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with action”). Section 5(C) is preempted by federal law. C Section 6 Section 6 of S. B. 1070 provides that a state officer, “without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him] removable from the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–3883(A)(5) (West Supp. 2011). The United States argues that arrests authorized by this statute would be an obstacle to the removal system Congress created. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent. When an alien is suspected of being removable, a federal official issues an administrative document called a Notice to Ap- pear. See 8 U. S. C. §1229(a); 8 CFR §239.1(a) (2012). The form does not authorize an arrest. Instead, it gives the alien information about the proceedings, including the time and date of the removal hearing. See 8 U. S. C. §1229(a)(1). If an alien fails to appear, an in absentia order may direct removal. §1229a(5)(A). The federal statutory structure instructs when it is ap- propriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. For example, the Attorney General can exercise discretion to issue a warrant for an alien’s arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1226(a); see Memorandum from John Morton, Director, ICE, to All Field Office Directors et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) (hereinafter 2011 ICE Memorandum) (describing factors informing this and re- lated decisions). And if an alien is ordered removed after a hearing, the Attorney General will issue a warrant. See 8 CFR §241.2(a)(1). In both instances, the warrants are executed by federal officers who have received training in the enforcement of immigration law. See §§241.2(b), 287.5(e)(3). If no federal warrant has been issued, those officers have more limited authority. See 8 U. S. C. §1357(a). They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regula- tion,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to trained federal immi- gration officers. Under state law, officers who believe an alien is removable by reason of some “public offense” would have the power to conduct an arrest on that basis regardless of whether a federal warrant has issued or the alien is likely to escape. This state authority could be exercised without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case. This would allow the State to achieve its own immigra- tion policy. The result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be removed. This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer. A principal example is when the Attorney General has granted that authority to specific officers in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See §1357(g)(1); see also §1103(a)(10) (authority may be extended in the event of an “imminent mass influx of aliens off the coast of the United States”); §1252c (authority to arrest in specific circumstance after consultation with the Federal Government); §1324(c) (authority to arrest for bringing in and harboring certain aliens). Officers covered by these agreements are subject to the Attorney General’s direction and super- vision. §1357(g)(3). There are significant complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law, including the determination whether a person is removable. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 4–7). As a result, the agreements reached with the Attorney General must contain written certification that officers have received adequate training to carry out the duties of an immigration officer. See §1357(g)(2); cf. 8 CFR §§287.5(c) (ar- rest power contingent on training), 287.1(g) (defining the training). By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable, §6 violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483–484 (1999); see also Brief for Former INS Commissioners 8–13. A decision on removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States. Decisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005) (“Removal decisions, including the selection of a removed alien’s destination, may implicate [the Nation’s] relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing political and economic circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress . . .”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government”). In defense of §6, Arizona notes a federal statute permitting state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1357(g)(10)(B). There may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government. The Department of Homeland Security gives examples of what would constitute cooperation under federal law. These include situations where States participate in a joint task force with federal officers, provide operational support in executing a warrant, or allow federal immigration officials to gain access to detainees held in state facilities. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters 13–14 (2011), online at http:// www.dhs.gov/files/resources/immigration.shtm (all Internet materials as visited June 21, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). State officials can also assist the Federal Government by responding to requests for information about when an alien will be released from their custody. See §1357(d). But the unilateral state action to detain authorized by §6 goes far beyond these measures, defeating any need for real cooperation. Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited circumstances. By nonetheless authorizing state and local offi- cers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter, §6 creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress. See Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Section 6 is preempted by federal law. D Section 2(B) Section 2(B) of S. B. 1070 requires state officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1051(B) (West 2012). The law also provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released.” Ibid. The accepted way to perform these status checks is to contact ICE, which maintains a database of immigration records. Three limits are built into the state provision. First, a detainee is presumed not to be an alien unlawfully present in the United States if he or she provides a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar identification. Second, officers “may not consider race, color or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Ari- zona Constitution[s].” Ibid. Third, the provisions must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” §11–1051(L) (West 2012). The United States and its amici contend that, even with these limits, the State’s verification requirements pose an obstacle to the framework Congress put in place. The first concern is the mandatory nature of the status checks. The second is the possibility of prolonged detention while the checks are being performed. 1 Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. Congress has made clear that no formal agreement or special training needs to be in place for state officers to “communicate with the [Federal Government] regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1357(g)(10)(A). And Congress has obligated ICE to respond to any request made by state officials for verification of a person’s citizenship or im- migration status. See §1373(c); see also §1226(d)(1)(A) (requiring a system for determining whether individuals arrested for aggravated felonies are aliens). ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center operates “24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year” and provides, among other things, “immigration status, identity information and real-time assistance to local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.” ICE, Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Support Center (May 29, 2012), online at http:// www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/lesc.htm. LESC responded to more than one million requests for information in 2009 alone. App. 93. The United States argues that making status verification mandatory interferes with the federal immigration scheme. It is true that §2(B) does not allow state officers to consider federal enforcement priorities in deciding whether to contact ICE about someone they have detained. See Brief for United States 47–50. In other words, the officers must make an inquiry even in cases where it seems unlikely that the Attorney General would have the alien removed. This might be the case, for example, when an alien is an elderly veteran with significant and longstanding ties to the community. See 2011 ICE Memorandum 4–5 (mentioning these factors as relevant). Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with ICE in these situations, however. Indeed, it has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations. See 8 U. S. C. §1357(g) (10)(A). A federal statute regulating the public benefits provided to qualified aliens in fact instructs that “no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from [ICE] information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” §1644. The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 23–24) (rejecting argument that federal law preempted Arizona’s requirement that employers determine whether employees were eligible to work through the federal E-Verify system where the Federal Government had encouraged its use). 2 Some who support the challenge to §2(B) argue that, in practice, state officers will be required to delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. See, e.g., Brief for Former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard et al. as Amici Curiae 37, n. 49. Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission”). And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. Cf. Part IV–C, supra (concluding that Ari- zona may not authorize warrantless arrests on the basis of removability). The program put in place by Congress does not allow state or local officers to adopt this enforcement mechanism. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. To take one example, a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be unable to produce identification. The first sentence of §2(B) instructs officers to make a “reasonable” attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE if there is reasonable suspicion that his presence in the United States is unlawful. The state courts may conclude that, unless the person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong the stop for the immigration inquiry. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 12, n. 4 (“[Section 2(B)] does not require the verification be completed during the stop or detention if that is not reasonable or practicable”); cf. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where questioning about immigration status did not prolong a stop). To take another example, a person might be held pending release on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. As this goes beyond a mere stop, the arrestee (unlike the jaywalker) would appear to be subject to the categorical requirement in the second sentence of §2(B) that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before [he] is released.” State courts may read this as an instruction to initiate a status check every time someone is arrested, or in some subset of those cases, rather than as a command to hold the person until the check is complete no matter the circumstances. Even if the law is read as an instruction to complete a check while the person is in custody, moreover, it is not clear at this stage and on this record that the verification process would result in prolonged detention. However the law is interpreted, if §2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive pre- emption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948) (authority of state officers to make arrests for federal crimes is, absent federal statutory instruction, a matter of state law); Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475–476 (CA9 1983) (concluding that Arizona officers have authority to enforce the criminal provisions of federal immigration law), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (CA9 1999). The nature and timing of this case counsel caution in evaluating the validity of §2(B). The Federal Government has brought suit against a sovereign State to challenge the provision even before the law has gone into effect. There is a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (“So far as statutes fairly may be construed in such a way as to avoid doubtful constitutional questions they should be so construed; and it is to be presumed that state laws will be construed in that way by the state courts” (citation omitted)). As a result, the United States cannot prevail in its current challenge. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) (“To hold otherwise would be to ignore the teaching of this Court’s decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists”). This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. V Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation. On May 24, 2012, at one of this Nation’s most distinguished museums of history, a dozen immigrants stood before the tattered flag that inspired Francis Scott Key to write the National Anthem. There they took the oath to become American citizens. The Smithsonian, News Release, Smithsonian Citizenship Ceremony Welcomes a Dozen New Americans (May 24, 2012), online at http://newsdesk.si.edu/releases. These naturalization cere- monies bring together men and women of different ori- gins who now share a common destiny. They swear a common oath to renounce fidelity to foreign princes, to defend the Constitution, and to bear arms on behalf of the country when required by law. 8 CFR §337.1(a) (2012). The history of the United States is in part made of the stories, talents, and lasting contributions of those who crossed oceans and deserts to come here. The National Government has significant power to regulate immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse. Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that process continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law. * * * The United States has established that §§3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted. It was improper, however, to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that enforcement of the provision in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ARIZONA et al. v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 11–182. Argued April 25, 2012—Decided June 25, 2012 An Arizona statute known as S. B. 1070 was enacted in 2010 to address pressing issues related to the large number of unlawful aliens in the State. The United States sought to enjoin the law as preempted. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing four of its provisions from taking effect. Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; §5(C) makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; §6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States”; and §2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to make efforts, in some circumstances, to verify the person’s immigration status with the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the United States had established a likelihood of success on its preemption claims. Held: 1. The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immigration and alien status rests, in part, on its constitutional power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and on its inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign relations, see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10. Federal governance is extensive and complex. Among other things, federal law specifies categories of aliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8 U. S. C. §1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status, §§1304(e), 1306(a); imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a; and specifies which aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so, see §1227. Removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials, who must decide whether to pursue removal at all. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing illegal aliens. It also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center, which provides immigration status information to federal, state, and local officials around the clock. . 2. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. A statute may contain an express preemption provision, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___, but state law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 115. Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67. . 3. Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted by federal law. . (a) Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. In Hines, a state alien-registration program was struck down on the ground that Congress intended its “complete” federal registration plan to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” 312 U. S., at 74. That scheme did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal law or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. The federal registration framework remains comprehensive. Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. . (b) Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty stands as an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens,” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147, makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and requires employers to verify prospective employees’ employment authorization status, §§1324a(a)(1)(B), (b). It imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, §§1324a(e)(4), (f), but only civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment, e.g., §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8). IRCA’s express preemption provision, though silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against employees, “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “special burden” making it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869–872. The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. . (c) By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of certain aliens suspected of being removable, §6 too creates an obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue a warrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute. If no federal warrant has been issued, these officers have more limited authority. They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with even greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government. This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform an immigration officer’s functions. This includes instances where the Attorney General has granted that authority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See, e.g., §1357(g)(1). Although federal law permits state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States,” §1357(g)(10)(B), this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain authorized by §6. . 4. It was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that §2(B)’s enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives. . (a) The state provision has three limitations: A detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he or she provides a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar identification; officers may not consider race, color, or national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]”; and §2(B) must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” P. 20. (b) This Court finds unpersuasive the argument that, even with those limits, §2(B) must be held preempted at this stage. . (1) The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal immigration scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. In fact, Congress has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations. See §§1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c). The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___. . (2) It is not clear at this stage and on this record that §2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay the release of detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. This would raise constitutional concerns. And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. If the law only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. Without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that conflicts with federal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277. This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. . 641 F.3d 339, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Kagan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

. To address pressing issues related to the large number of aliens within its borders who do not have a lawful right to be in this country. See §1324(a) and §1325(b) of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Act. The law is often referred to as S. B. 1070, the version introduced in the state of Arizona. See 8 U. S. C. §1226(d)(1)(A) (2010) (requiring a determination whether a person is removable. See also §1327(a), §11–1509(A)(2) (2011). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Government has made clear that a state law is preempted by federal law. See Section 1357(a)(1). The United States has established a federal law that makes it a crime for aliens to enter the United States. See §§1357(b), §1371(c), and §1546(b). It is important to note that the federal government has no authority to enforce the federal immigration law. The Court has established that federal law does not allow for the imposition of penalties on aliens who violate federal immigration. See 9 U. N.C. §1351(a). The federal statutory structure instructs state officers to determine whether to detain aliens. See S. R. v. United States, supra, at 2.2.3.4. The federal government does not have jurisdiction to enforce federal immigration laws. See. Ibid. The Federal Government does not. See... §3.5. The Department of Homeland Security. The government is not a federal agency. It is a state agency. The Government is a federal government. The State is a State.

2011_11-161

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-161

. For many years, an Indiana statute, the “Barrett Law,” authorized Indiana’s cities to impose upon benefited lot owners the cost of sewer improvement projects. The Law also permitted those lot owners to pay either immediately in the form of a lump sum or over time in installments. In 2005, the city of Indianapolis (City) adopted a new as- sessment and payment method, the “STEP” plan, and it forgave any Barrett Law installments that lot owners had not yet paid. A group of lot owners who had already paid their entire Barrett Law assessment in a lump sum believe that the City should have provided them with equivalent refunds. And we must decide whether the City’s refusal to do so un- constitutionally discriminates against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Amdt. 14, §1. We hold that the City had a rational basis for distinguishing between those lot owners who had already paid their share of project costs and those who had not. And we conclude that there is no equal protection violation. I A Beginning in 1889 Indiana’s Barrett Law permitted cities to pay for public improvements, such as sewage proj- ects, by “apportion[ing]” the costs of a project “equally among all abutting lands or lots.” Ind. Code §36–9–39–15(b)(3) (2011); see Town Council of New Harmony v. Parker, 726 N.E.2d 1217, 1227, n. 13 (Ind. 2000) (project’s beneficiaries pay its costs). When a city built a Barrett Law project, the city’s public works board would create an initial lot-owner assessment by “dividing the estimated total cost of the sewage works by the total number of lots.” §36–9–39–16(a). It might then adjust an individual assessment downward if the lot would benefit less than would others. §36–9–39–17(b). Upon completion of the project, the board would issue a final lot-by-lot assessment. The Law permitted lot owners to pay the assessment either in a single lump sum or over time in installment payments (with interest). The City would collect installment payments “in the same manner as other taxes.” §36–9–37–6. The Law authorized 10-, 20-, or 30-year installment plans. §36–9–37–8.5(a). Until fully paid, an assessment would constitute a lien against the property, permitting the city to initiate foreclosure proceedings in case of a default. §§36–9–37–9(b), –22. For several decades, Indianapolis used the Barrett Law system to fund sewer projects. See, e.g., Conley v. Brummit, 92 Ind. App. 620, 621, 176 N.E. 880, 881 (1931) (in banc). But in 2005, the City adopted a new system, called the Septic Tank Elimination Program (STEP), which fi- nanced projects in part through bonds, thereby lowering in- dividual lot owners’ sewer-connection costs. By that time, the City had constructed more than 40 Barrett Law projects. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. We are told that installment-paying lot owners still owed money in respect to 24 of those projects. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 16–17, n. 3 (citing City’s Response to Plaintiff’s Brief on Damages, Record in Cox v. Indianapolis, No. 1:09–cv–0435 (SD Ind., Doc. 98–1 (Exh. A)). In respect to 21 of the 24, some installment payments had not yet fallen due; in respect to the other 3, those who owed money were in default. Reply Brief for Petitioners 17, n. 3. B This case concerns one of the 24 still-open Barrett Law projects, namely the Brisbane/Manning Sanitary Sewers Project. The Brisbane/Manning Project began in 2001. It connected about 180 homes to the City’s sewage system. Construction was completed in 2003. The Indianapolis Board of Public Works held an assessment hearing in June 2004. And in July 2004 the Board sent the 180 affected homeowners a formal notice of their payment obligations. The notice made clear that each homeowner could pay the entire assessment—$9,278 per property—in a lump sum or in installments, which would include interest at a 3.5% annual rate. Under an installment plan, payments would amount to $77.27 per month for 10 years; $38.66 per month for 20 years; or $25.77 per month for 30 years. In the event, 38 homeowners chose to pay up front; 47 chose the 10-year plan; 27 chose the 20-year plan; and 68 chose the 30-year plan. And in the first year each homeowner paid the amount due ($9,278 upfront; $927.80 under the 10-year plan; $463.90 under the 20-year plan, or $309.27 under the 30-year plan). App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. The next year, however, the City decided to abandon the Barrett Law method of financing. It thought that the Barrett Law’s lot-by-lot payments had become too burdensome for many homeowners to pay, discouraging changes from less healthy septic tanks to healthier sewer systems. See id., at 4a–5a. (For example, homes helped by the Brisbane/Manning Project, at a cost of more than $9,000 each, were then valued at $120,000 to $270,000. App. 67.) The City’s new STEP method of financing would charge each connecting lot owner a flat $2,500 fee and make up the difference by floating bonds eventually paid for by all lot owners citywide. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, n. 5. On October 31, 2005, the City enacted an ordinance implementing its decision. In December, the City’s Board of Public Works enacted a further resolution, Resolution 101, which, as part of the transition, would “forgive all assessment amounts . . . established pursuant to the Barrett Law Funding for Municipal Sewer programs due and owing from the date of November 1, 2005 forward.” App. 72 (emphasis added). In its preamble, the Resolution said that the Barrett Law “may present financial hardships on many middle to lower income participants who most need sanitary sewer service in lieu of failing septic systems”; it pointed out that the City was transitioning to the new STEP method of financing; and it said that the STEP method was based upon a financial model that had “considered the current assessments being made by participants in active Barrett Law projects” as well as future projects. Id., at 71–72. The upshot was that those who still owed Barrett Law assessments would not have to make further payments but those who had already paid their assessments would not receive refunds. This meant that homeowners who had paid the full $9,278 Brisbane/ Manning Project assessment in a lump sum the preced- ing year would receive no refund, while homeowners who had elected to pay the assessment in installments, and had paid a total of $309.27, $463.90, or $927.80, would be under no obligation to make further payments. In February 2006, the 38 homeowners who had paid the full Brisbane/Manning Project assessment asked the City for a partial refund (in an amount equal to the smallest forgiven Brisbane/Manning installment debt, apparently $8,062). The City denied the request in part because “[r]efunding payments made in your project area, or any portion of the payments, would establish a precedent of unfair and inequitable treatment to all other property owners who have also paid Barrett Law assessments . . . and while [the November 1, 2005, cutoff date] might seem arbitrary to you, it is essential for the City to establish this date and move forward with the new funding approach.” Id., at 50–51. C Thirty-one of the thirty-eight Brisbane/Manning Project lump-sum homeowners brought this lawsuit in Indiana state court seeking a refund of about $8,000 each. They claimed in relevant part that the City’s refusal to provide them with refunds at the same time that the City forgave the outstanding Project debts of other Brisbane/Manning homeowners violated the Federal Constitution’s Equal Pro- tection Clause, Amdt. 14, §1; see also Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The trial court granted summary judgment in their favor. The State Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 918 N.E.2d 401 (2009). But the Indiana Supreme Court reversed. 946 N.E.2d 553 (2011). In its view, the City’s distinction between those who had already paid their Barrett Law assessments and those who had not was “rationally related to its legitimate interests in reducing its administrative costs, providing relief for property owners experiencing financial hardship, establishing a clear transition from [the] Barrett Law to STEP, and preserving its limited resources.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. We granted certiorari to consider the equal protection question. And we now affirm the Indiana Supreme Court. II A As long as the City’s distinction has a rational basis, that distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. This Court has long held that “a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the dis- parity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320 (1993); cf. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155, 165–166 (1897). We have made clear in analogous contexts that, where “ordinary commercial transactions” are at issue, ra- tional basis review requires deference to reasonable under- lying legislative judgments. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (due process); see also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (equal protection). And we have repeatedly pointed out that “[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983); see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107–108 (2003); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1940); Citizens’ Telephone Co. of Grand Rapids v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 329 (1913). Indianapolis’ classification involves neither a “fundamental right” nor a “suspect” classification. Its subject matter is local, economic, social, and commercial. It is a tax classification. And no one here claims that Indianapolis has discriminated against out-of-state commerce or new residents. Cf. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). Hence, this case falls directly within the scope of our precedents holding such a law constitutionally valid if “there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Nordlinger, supra, at 11 (citations omitted). And it falls within the scope of our precedents holding that there is such a plausible reason if “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Moreover, analogous precedent warns us that we are not to “pronounc[e]” this classification “unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.” Carolene Products Co., supra, at 152 (due process claim). Further, because the classification is presumed constitutional, the “ ‘ burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” Heller, supra, at 320 (quoting Lehnhausen, supra, at 364). B In our view, Indianapolis’ classification has a rational basis. Ordinarily, administrative considerations can jus- tify a tax-related distinction. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511–512 (1937) (tax exemption for businesses with fewer than eight employees rational in light of the “[a]dministrative convenience and expense” involved); see also Lehnhausen, supra, at 365 (comparing administrative cost of taxing corporations versus individuals); Madden, supra, at 90 (comparing administrative cost of taxing deposits in local banks versus those elsewhere). And the City’s decision to stop collecting outstanding Barrett Law debts finds rational support in related administrative concerns. The City had decided to switch to the STEP system. After that change, to continue Barrett Law unpaid-debt collection could have proved complex and expensive. It would have meant maintaining an administrative system that for years to come would have had to collect debts arising out of 20-plus different construction projects built over the course of a decade, involving monthly payments as low as $25 per household, with the possible need to maintain credibility by tracking down defaulting debtors and bringing legal action. The City, for example, would have had to maintain its Barrett Law operation within the City Controller’s Office, keep files on old, small, installment-plan debts, and (a City official says) possibly spend hundreds of thousands of dollars keeping computerized debt-tracking systems current. See Brief for International City/County Management Association et al. as Amici Curiae 13, n. 12 (citing Affidavit of Charles White ¶13, Record in Cox, Doc. No. 57–3). Unlike the collection system prior to abandonment, the City would not have added any new Barrett Law installment-plan debtors. And that fact means that it would have had to spread the fixed administrative costs of collection over an ever-declining number of debtors, thereby continuously increasing the per-debtor cost of collection. Consistent with these facts, the Director of the City’s Department of Public Works later explained that the City decided to forgive outstanding debt in part because “[t]he administrative costs to service and process remaining balances on Barrett Law accounts long past the transition to the STEP program would not benefit the taxpayers” and would defeat the purpose of the transition. App. 76. The four other members of the City’s Board of Public Works have said the same. See Affidavit of Gregory Taylor ¶6, Record in Cox, Doc. No. 57–5; Affidavit of Kipper Tew ¶6, ibid. Doc. No. 57–6; Affidavit of Susan Schalk ¶6, ibid. Doc. No. 57–7; Affidavit of Roger Brown ¶6, ibid. Doc. No. 57–8. The rationality of the City’s distinction draws further support from the nature of the line-drawing choices that confronted it. To have added refunds to forgiveness would have meant adding yet further administrative costs, namely the cost of processing refunds. At the same time, to have tried to limit the City’s costs and lost revenues by limiting forgiveness (or refund) rules to Brisbane/Manning homeowners alone would have led those involved in other Barrett Law projects to have justifiably complained about unfairness. Yet to have granted refunds (as well as pro- viding forgiveness) to all those involved in all Barrett Law projects (there were more than 40 projects) or in all open projects (there were more than 20) would have involved even greater administrative burden. The City could not just “cut . . . checks,” post, at 4 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting), without taking funding from other programs or finding additional revenue. If, instead, the City had tried to keep the amount of revenue it lost constant (a rational goal) but spread it evenly among the apparently thousands of homeowners involved in any of the Barrett Laws projects, the result would have been yet smaller individual payments, even more likely to have been too small to justify the administrative expense. Finally, the rationality of the distinction draws support from the fact that the line that the City drew—distinguishing past payments from future obligations—is a line well known to the law. Sometimes such a line takes the form of an amnesty program, involving, say, mortgage payments, taxes, or parking tickets. E.g., 26 U. S. C. §108(a)(1)(E) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (federal income tax provision allowing homeowners to omit from gross income newly forgiven home mortgage debt); United States v. Martin, metricconverter523 F.3d 281, 284 (CA4 2008) (tax amnesty program whereby State newly forgave penalties and liabilities if taxpayer satisfied debt); Horn v. Chicago, metricconverter860 F.2d 700, 704, n. 9 (CA7 1988) (city parking ticket amnesty program whereby outstanding tickets could be newly set- tled for a fraction of amount specified). This kind of line is consistent with the distinction that the law often makes between actions previously taken and those yet to come. C Petitioners’ contrary arguments are not sufficient to change our conclusion. Petitioners point out that the Indiana Supreme Court also listed a different consideration, namely “financial hardship,” as one of the factors supporting rationality. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. They refer to the City’s resolution that said that the Barrett Law “may present financial hardships on many middle to lower income participants who most need sanitary sewer service in lieu of failing septic systems.” App. 71. And they argue that the tax distinction before us would not necessarily favor low-income homeowners. We need not consider this argument, however, for the administrative considerations we have mentioned are sufficient to show a rational basis for the City’s distinction. The Indiana Supreme Court wrote that the City’s classification was “rationally related” in part “to its legitimate interests in reducing its administrative costs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a (emphasis added). The record of the City’s proceedings is consistent with that determination. See App. 72 (when developing transition, the City “considered the current assessments being made by participants in active Barrett Law projects”). In any event, a legislature need not “actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.” Nordlinger, 505 U. S., at 15; see also Fitzgerald, 539 U. S., at 108 (similar). Rather, the “burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Madden, 309 U. S., at 88; see Heller, 509 U. S., at 320 (same); Lehnhausen, 410 U. S., at 364 (same); see also Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (upholding state tax classification resting “upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived” as creating a rational distinction). Petitioners have not “negative[d]” the Indiana Supreme Court’s first listed justification, namely the administrative concerns we have discussed. Petitioners go on to propose various other forgiveness systems that would have included refunds for at least some of those who had already paid in full. They argue that those systems are superior to the system that the City chose. We have discussed those, and other possible, systems earlier. Supra, at 8–9. Each has advantages and disadvantages. But even if petitioners have found a superior system, the Constitution does not require the City to draw the perfect line nor even to draw a line superior to some other line it might have drawn. It requires only that the line actually drawn be a rational line. And for the reasons we have set forth in Part II–B, supra, we believe that the line the City drew here is rational. Petitioners further argue that administrative considerations alone should not justify a tax distinction, lest a city arbitrarily allocate taxes among a few citizens while forgiving many similarly situated citizens on the ground that it is cheaper and easier to collect taxes from a few people than from many. Brief for Petitioners 45. Petitioners are right that administrative considerations could not justify such an unfair system. But that is not because administrative considerations can never justify tax differences (any more than they can always do so). The question is whether reducing those expenses, in the particular circumstances, provides a rational basis justifying the tax difference in question. In this case, “in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed,” Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S., at 152, it is reasonable to believe that to graft a refund system onto the City’s forgiveness decision could have (for example) imposed an administrative burden of both collecting and paying out small sums (say, $25 per month) for years. As we have said, supra, at 7–9, it is rational for the City to draw a line that avoids that burden. Petitioners, who are the ones “attacking the legislative arrangement,” have the burden of showing that the circumstances are otherwise, i.e., that the administrative burden is too insubstantial to justify the classification. That they have not done. Finally, petitioners point to precedent that in their view makes it more difficult than we have said for the City to show a “rational basis.” With but one exception, however, the cases to which they refer involve discrimination based on residence or length of residence. E.g., Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (state tax preference distinguishing between long-term and short-term resident veterans); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (state use tax that burdened out-of-state car buyers who moved in-state); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (state law that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate than in-state companies); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (state dividend distribution system that favored long-term residents). But those circumstances are not present here. The exception consists of Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336 (1989). The Court there took into account a state constitution and related laws that required equal valuation of equally valuable property. Id., at 345. It considered the constitutionality of a county tax assessor’s practice (over a period of many years) of determining property values as of the time of the property’s last sale; that practice meant highly unequal valuations for two identical properties that were sold years or decades apart. Id., at 341. The Court first found that the assessor’s practice was not rationally re- lated to the county’s avowed purpose of assessing properties equally at true current value because of the intentional systemic discrepancies the practice created. Id., at 343–344. The Court then noted that, in light of the state constitution and related laws requiring equal valuation, there could be no other rational basis for the practice. Id., at 344–345. Therefore, the Court held, the assessor’s discriminatory policy violated the Federal Constitution’s insistence upon “equal protection of the law.” Id., at 346. Petitioners argue that the City’s refusal to add refunds to its forgiveness decision is similar, for it constitutes a refusal to apply “equally” an Indiana state law that says that the costs of a Barrett Law project shall be equally “apportioned.” Ind. Code §36–9–39–15(b)(3). In other words, petitioners say that even if the City’s decision might otherwise be related to a rational purpose, state law (as in Allegheny) makes this the rare case where the facts preclude any rational basis for the City’s decision other than to comply with the state mandate of equality. Allegheny, however, involved a clear state law requirement clearly and dramatically violated. Indeed, we have described Allegheny as “the rare case where the facts precluded” any alternative reading of state law and thus any alternative rational basis. Nordlinger, 505 U. S., at 16. Here, the City followed state law by apportioning the cost of its Barrett Law projects equally. State law says nothing about forgiveness, how to design a forgiveness program, or whether or when rational distinctions in doing so are permitted. To adopt petitioners’ view would risk transforming ordinary violations of ordinary state tax law into violations of the Federal Constitution. * * * For these reasons, we conclude that the City has not violated the Federal Equal Protection Clause. And the Indiana Supreme Court’s similar determination is Affirmed.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ARMOUR et al. v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, et al. certiorari to the supreme court of indiana No. 11–161. Argued February 29, 2012—Decided June 4, 2012 For decades, Indianapolis (City) funded sewer projects using Indiana’s Barrett Law, which permitted cities to apportion a public improvement project’s costs equally among all abutting lots. Under that system, a city would create an initial assessment, dividing the total estimated cost by the number of lots and making any necessary adjustments. Upon a project’s completion, the city would issue a final lot-by-lot assessment. Lot owners could elect to pay the assessment in a lump sum or over time in installments. After the City completed the Brisbane/Manning Sanitary Sewers Project, it sent affected homeowners formal notice of their payment obligations. Of the 180 affected homeowners, 38 elected to pay the lump sum. The following year, the City abandoned Barrett Law financing and adopted the Septic Tank Elimination Program (STEP), which financed projects in part through bonds, thereby lowering individual owner’s sewer-connection costs. In implementing STEP, the City’s Board of Public Works enacted a resolution forgiving all assessment amounts still owed pursuant to Barrett Law financing. Homeowners who had paid the Brisbane/Manning Project lump sum received no refund, while homeowners who had elected to pay in installments were under no obligation to make further payments. The 38 homeowners who paid the lump sum asked the City for a refund, but the City denied the request. Thirty-one of these homeowners brought suit in Indiana state court claiming, in relevant part, that the City’s refusal violated the Federal Equal Protection Clause. The trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners, and the State Court of Appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City’s distinction between those who had already paid and those who had not was rationally related to its legitimate interests in reducing administrative costs, providing financial hardship relief to homeowners, transitioning from the Barrett Law system to STEP, and preserving its limited resources. Held: The City had a rational basis for its distinction and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. . (a) The City’s classification does not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320. Its subject matter is local, economic, social, and commercial. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152. It is a tax classification. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547. And no one claims that the City has discriminated against out-of-state commerce or new residents. Cf. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612. Hence, the City’s distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause as long as “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,” FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, and the “ ‘burden is on the one attacking the [classification] to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,’ ” Heller, supra, at 320. . (b) Administrative concerns can ordinarily justify a tax-related distinction, see, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 511–512, and the City’s decision to stop collecting outstanding Barrett Law debts finds rational support in the City’s administrative concerns. After the City switched to the STEP system, any decision to continue Barrett Law debt collection could have proved complex and expensive. It would have meant maintaining an administrative system for years to come to collect debts arising out of 20-plus different construction projects built over the course of a decade, involving monthly payments as low as $25 per household, with the possible need to maintain credibility by tracking down defaulting debtors and bringing legal action. The rationality of the City’s distinction draws further support from the nature of the line-drawing choices that confronted it. To have added refunds to forgiveness would have meant adding further administrative costs, namely the cost of processing refunds. And limiting refunds only to Brisbane/Manning homeowners would have led to complaints of unfairness, while expanding refunds to the apparently thousands of other Barrett Law project homeowners would have involved an even greater administrative burden. Finally, the rationality of the distinction draws support from the fact that the line that the City drew—distinguishing past payments from future obligations—is well known to the law. See, e.g., 26 U. S. C. §108(a)(1)(E). . (c) Petitioners’ contrary arguments are unpersuasive. Whether financial hardship is a factor supporting rationality need not be considered here, since the City’s administrative concerns are sufficient to show a rational basis for its distinction. Petitioners propose other forgiveness systems that they argue are superior to the City’s system, but the Constitution only requires that the line actually drawn by the City be rational. Petitioners further argue that administrative considerations alone should not justify a tax distinction lest a city justify an unfair system through insubstantial administrative considerations. Here it was rational for the City to draw a line that avoided the administrative burden of both collecting and paying out small sums for years to come. Petitioners have not shown that the administrative concerns are too insubstantial to justify the classification. Finally, petitioners argue that precedent makes it more difficult for the City to show a rational basis, but the cases to which they refer involve discrimination based on residence or length of residence. The one exception, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336, is distinguishable. . 946 N.E.2d 553, affirmed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Alito, JJ., joined.

. For many years, an Indiana statute, the “Barrett Law,” authorized Indiana’s cities to impose upon benefited lot owners the cost of sewer improvement projects. The Law also permitted those lot owners to pay either immediately in the form of a lump sum or over time in installments. In 2005, the City decided to forgive outstanding debt. See, e.g., Conley v. Brummit, 92 U.S. 540, 522, 530 (1959) (upholding state tax classification). The City had to pay the full amount of the Barrett Law. The City was required to pay a portion of the outstanding Barrett Law assessments. It could not do so. The Court found that the City was “rationally related” in part “to its legitimate interests in reducing its administrative costs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a (emphasis added). And the City would have had to adjust the entire assessment—$9,278 per property, which would have been subject to a tax-related distinction. See App. 72. At the same time, in light of the state constitution and related laws requiring equal valuation, there could not be a rational basis for the City. See also Barrett Law §36–9–39–15(b)(3). But. The constitutionality of a county tax assessor. The tax assessment. The Tax Act. The Indiana Supreme Court. We have not. The Constitution. The Code. The Civil Rights Act. And the Civil Rights. The Ohio State Constitution. And we have. The State. The United States. We. See.... The City. We’re not.

2011_11-159

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-159

. Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999. Robert died of cancer less than three years later. With the help of in vitro fertilization, Karen gave birth to twins 18 months after her husband’s death. Karen’s application for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins, which the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied, prompted this lit-igation. The technology that made the twins’ conception and birth possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act (Act) originated (1939) or were amended to read as they now do (1965). Karen Capato, respondent here, relies on the Act’s initial definition of “child” in 42 U. S. C. §416(e): “ ‘[C]hild’ means . . . the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual.” Robert was an insured individual, and the twins, it is uncontested, are the biological children of Karen and Robert. That satisfies the Act’s terms, and no further inquiry is in order, Karen maintains. The SSA, however, identifies subsequent provisions, §§416(h)(2) and (h)(3)(C), as critical, and reads them to entitle biological children to benefits only if they qualify for inheritance from the decedent under state intestacy law, or satisfy one of the statutory alternatives to that requirement. We conclude that the SSA’s reading is better attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction that garners the Court’s respect under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). I Karen Capato married Robert Capato in May 1999. Shortly thereafter, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and was told that the chemotherapy he required might render him sterile. Because the couple wanted children, Robert, before undergoing chemotherapy, deposited his semen in a sperm bank, where it was frozen and stored. Despite Robert’s aggressive treatment regime, Karen conceived naturally and gave birth to a son in August 2001. The Capatos, however, wanted their son to have a sibling. Robert’s health deteriorated in late 2001, and he died in Florida, where he and Karen then resided, in March 2002. His will, executed in Florida, named as beneficiaries the son born of his marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage. The will made no provision for children conceived after Robert’s death, although the Capatos had told their lawyer they wanted future offspring to be placed on a par with existing children. Shortly after Robert’s death, Karen began in vitro fertilization using her husband’s frozen sperm. She conceived in January 2003 and gave birth to twins in September 2003, 18 months after Robert’s death. Karen Capato claimed survivors insurance benefits on behalf of the twins. The SSA denied her application, and the U. S. District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the agency’s decision. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a (decision of the Administrative Law Judge); id., at 15a (District Court opinion). In accord with the SSA’s construction of the statute, the District Court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if, as §416(h)(2)(A) specifies, they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law. Robert Capato died domiciled in Florida, the court found. Under that State’s law, the court noted, a child born posthu-mously may inherit through intestate succession only if conceived during the decedent’s lifetime. Id., at 27a–28a.[1] The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. Under §416(e), the appellate court concluded, “the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow” qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law. 631 F.3d 626, 631 (2011).[2] Courts of Appeals have divided on the statutory interpretation question this case presents. Compare ibid. and Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596–597 (CA9 2004) (biological but posthumously conceived child of insured wage earner and his widow qualifies for benefits), with Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960–964 (CA8 2011), and Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54–63 (CA4 2011) (posthumously conceived child’s qualification for benefits depends on intestacy law of State in which wage earner was domiciled). To resolve the conflict, we granted the Commissioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 565 U. S. ___ (2011). II Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1939 to provide a monthly benefit for designated surviving fam- ily members of a deceased insured wage earner. “Child’s insurance benefits” are among the Act’s family-protective measures. 53Stat. 1364, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §402(d). An applicant qualifies for such benefits if she meets the Act’s definition of “child,” is unmarried, is below specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of the insured’s death. §402(d)(1).[3] To resolve this case, we must decide whether the Capato twins rank as “child[ren]” under the Act’s definitional provisions. Section 402(d) provides that “[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title)” of a deceased insured individual “shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit.” Section 416(e), in turn, states: “The term ‘child’ means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an individ-ual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) . . . the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who meets certain conditions].” The word “child,” we note, appears twice in §416(e)’s opening sentence: initially in the prefatory phrase, “[t]he term ‘child’ means . . . ,” and, immediately thereafter, in subsection (e)(1) (“child or legally adopted child”), deline-ating the first of three beneficiary categories. Unlike §§416(e)(2) and (3), which specify the circumstances under which stepchildren and grandchildren qualify for benefits, §416(e)(1) lacks any elaboration. Compare §416(e)(1) (referring simply to “the child . . . of an individual”) with, e.g., §416(e)(2) (applicant must have been a stepchild for at least nine months before the insured individual’s death). A subsequent definitional provision further addresses the term “child.” Under the heading “Determination of family status,” §416(h)(2)(A) provides: “In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State].”[4] An applicant for child benefits who does not meet §416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy-law criterion may nonetheless qualify for benefits under one of several other criteria the Act prescribes. First, an applicant who “is a son or daughter” of an insured individual, but is not determined to be a “child” under the intestacy-law provision, nevertheless ranks as a “child” if the insured and the other parent went through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for certain legal impediments. §416(h)(2)(B). Further, an applicant is deemed a “child” if, before death, the insured acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or her son or daughter, or if the insured had been decreed by a court to be the father or mother of the applicant, or had been ordered to pay child support. §416(h)(3)(C)(i). In addition, an applicant may gain “child” status upon proof that the insured individual was the applicant’s pa- rent and “was living with or contributing to the support of the applicant” when the insured individual died. §416(h)(3)(C)(ii).[5] The SSA has interpreted these provisions in regulations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The regulations state that an applicant may be entitled to benefits “as a natural child, legally adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted child.” 20 CFR §404.354. Defining “[w]ho is the insured’s natural child,” §404.355, the regulations closely track 42 U. S. C. §§416(h)(2) and (h)(3). They state that an applicant may qualify for insurance benefits as a “natural child” by meeting any of four conditions: (1) the applicant “could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her natural child under State inheritance laws”; (2) the applicant is “the insured’s natural child and [his or her parents] went through a ceremony which would have resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a legal impediment”; (3) before death, the insured acknowledged in writing his or her parentage of the applicant, was decreed by a court to be the applicant’s parent, or was ordered by a court to contribute to the applicant’s support; or (4) other evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s “natural father or mother” and was either living with, or contributing to the support of, the applicant. 20 CFR §404.355(a) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the SSA reads the statute, 42 U. S. C. §416(h) governs the meaning of “child” in §416(e)(1). In other words, §416(h) is a gateway through which all applicants for in-surance benefits as a “child” must pass. See Beeler, 651 F. 3d, at 960 (“The regulations make clear that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of §416(h) are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish ‘child’ status under §416(e) as a natural child.”).[6] III Karen Capato argues, and the Third Circuit held, that §416(h), far from supplying the governing law, is irrelevant in this case. Instead, the Court of Appeals determined, §416(e) alone is dispositive of the controversy. 631 F. 3d, at 630–631. Under §416(e), “child” means “child of an [insured] individual,” and the Capato twins, the Third Circuit observed, clearly fit that definition: They are undeniably the children of Robert Capato, the insured wage earner, and his widow, Karen Capato. Section 416(h) comes into play, the court reasoned, only when “a claimant’s status as a deceased wage-earner’s child is in doubt.” Id., at 631. That limitation, the court suggested, is evident from §416(h)’s caption: “Determination of family status.” Here, “there is no family status to determine,” the court said, id., at 630, so §416(h) has no role to play. In short, while the SSA regards §416(h) as completing §416(e)’s sparse definition of “child,” the Third Circuit considered each subsection to control different situations: §416(h) governs when a child’s family status needs to be determined; §416(e), when it does not. When is there no need to determine a child’s family status? The answer that the Third Circuit found plain: whenever the claimant is “the biological child of a married couple.” Id., at 630.[7] We point out, first, some conspicuous flaws in the Third Circuit’s and respondent Karen Capato’s reading of the Act’s provisions, and then explain why we find the SSA’s interpretation persuasive. A Nothing in §416(e)’s tautological definition (“ ‘child’ means . . . the child . . . of an individual”) suggests that Congress understood the word “child” to refer only to the children of married parents. The dictionary definitions offered by respondent are not so confined. See Webster’s New International Dictionary 465 (2d ed. 1934) (defining “child” as, inter alia, “[i]n Law, legitimate offspring; also, sometimes, esp. in wills, an adopted child, or an illegitimate offspring, or any direct descendant, as a grandchild, as the intention may appear”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2003) (“child” means “son or daughter,” or “descendant”). See also Restatement (Third) of Property §2.5(1) (1998) (“[a]n individual is the child of his or her genetic parents,” and that may be so “whether or not [the parents] are married to each other”). More-over, elsewhere in the Act, Congress expressly limited the category of children covered to offspring of a marital union. See §402(d)(3)(A) (referring to the “legitimate . . . child” of an individual). Other contemporaneous statutes similarly differentiate child of a marriage (“legitimate child”) from the unmodified term “child.” See, e.g., Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, ch. 443, §120, 56Stat. 385 (defining “child” to include “legitimate child,” “child legally adopted,” and, under certain conditions, “stepchild” and “illegitimate child” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor does §416(e) indicate that Congress intended “biological” parentage to be prerequisite to “child” status under that provision. As the SSA points out, “[i]n 1939, there was no such thing as a scientifically proven biological relationship between a child and a father, which is . . . part of the reason that the word ‘biological’ appears nowhere in the Act.” Reply Brief 6. Notably, a biological parent is not necessarily a child’s parent under law. Ordinarily, “a parent-child relationship does not exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s genetic parents.” Uniform Probate Code §2–119(a), 8 U. L. A. 55 (Supp. 2011) (amended 2008). Moreover, laws directly addressing use of today’s assisted reproduction technology do not make biological parentage a universally determinative criterion. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §7613(b) (West Supp. 2012) (“The donor of semen . . . for use in artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization of a woman other than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child.”); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 46, §4B (West 2010) (“Any child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered the legitimate child of the mother and such husband.”). We note, in addition, that marriage does not ever and always make the parentage of a child certain, nor does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child’s parentage is uncertain. An unmarried couple can agree that a child is theirs, while the parentage of a child born during a marriage may be uncertain. See Reply Brief 11 (“Respondent errs in treating ‘marital’ and ‘undisputed’ as having the same meaning.”). Finally, it is far from obvious that Karen Capato’s proposed definition—“biological child of married parents,” see Brief for Respondent 9—would cover the posthumously conceived Capato twins. Under Florida law, a marriage ends upon the death of a spouse. See Price v. Price, 114 Fla. 233, 235, 153 So. 904, 905 (1934). If that law applies, rather than a court-declared preemptive federal law, the Capato twins, conceived after the death of their father, would not qualify as “marital” children.[8] B Resisting the importation of words not found in §416(e)—“child” means “the biological child of married parents,” Brief for Respondent 9—the SSA finds a key textual cue in §416(h)(2)(A)’s opening instruction: “In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,” the Commissioner shall apply state intestacy law. (Emphasis added.) Respondent notes the absence of any cross-reference in §416(e) to §416(h). Brief for Respondent 18. She overlooks, however, that §416(h) provides the crucial link. The “subchapter” to which §416(h) refers is Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§401 through 434. Section 416(h)’s reference to “this subchapter” thus includes both §§402(d) and 416(e). Having explicitly complemented §416(e) by the definitional provisions contained in §416(h), Congress had no need to place a redundant cross-reference in §416(e). See Schafer, 641 F. 3d, at 54 (Congress, in §416(h)(2)(A), provided “plain and explicit instruction on how the determination of child status should be made”; on this point, the statute’s text “could hardly be more clear.”). The original version of today’s §416(h) was similarly drafted. It provided that, “[i]n determining whether an applicant is the . . . child . . . of [an] insured individual for purposes of sections 401–409 of this title, the Board shall apply [state intestacy law].” 42 U. S. C. §409(m) (1940 ed.) (emphasis added). Sections 401–409 embraced §§402(c) and 409(k), the statutory predecessors of 42 U. S. C. §§402(d) and 416(e) (2006 ed.), respectively. Reference to state law to determine an applicant’s status as a “child” is anything but anomalous. Quite the opposite. The Act commonly refers to state law on matters of family status. For example, the Act initially defines “wife” as “the wife of an [insured] individual,” if certain conditions are satisfied. §416(b). Like §416(e), §416(b) is, at least in part, tautological (“ ‘wife’ means the [insured’s] wife”). One must read on, although there is no ex-press cross-reference, to §416(h) (rules on “[d]etermination of family status”) to complete the definition. Section §416(h)(1)(A) directs that, “for purposes of this subchapter,” the law of the insured’s domicile determines whether “[the] applicant and [the] insured individual were validly married,” and if they were not, whether the applicant would nevertheless have “the same status” as a wife under the State’s intestacy law. (Emphasis added.) The Act similarly defines the terms “widow,” “husband,” and “widower.” See §§416(c), (f), (g), (h)(1)(A). Indeed, as originally enacted, a single provision mandated the use of state intestacy law for “determining whether an applicant is the wife, widow, child, or parent of [an] insured individual.” 42 U. S. C. §409(m) (1940 ed.). All wife, widow, child, and parent applicants thus had to satisfy the same criterion. To be sure, children born during their parents’ marriage would have readily qualified under the 1939 formulation because of their eligibility to inherit under state law. But requiring all “child” ap-plicants to qualify under state intestacy law installed a simple test, one that ensured benefits for persons plainly within the legislators’ contemplation, while avoiding con-gressional entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of family relations. Just as the Act generally refers to state law to determine whether an applicant qualifies as a wife, widow, husband, widower, 42 U. S. C. §416(h)(1) (2006 ed.), child or parent, §416(h)(2)(A), so in several sections (§§416(b), (c), (e)(2), (f), (g)), the Act sets duration-of-relationship limitations. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777–782 (1975) (discussing §416(e)(2)’s requirement that, as a check against deathbed marriages, a parent-stepchild relationship must exist “not less than nine months immediately preceding [insured’s death]”). Time limits also qualify the statutes of several States that accord inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children. See Cal. Prob. Code Ann. §249.5(c) (West Supp. 2012) (allowing inheritance if child is in utero within two years of parent’s death); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15–11–120(11) (2011) (child in utero within three years or born within 45 months); Iowa Code Ann. §633.220A(1) (West Supp. 2012) (child born within two years); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:391.1(A) (West 2008) (child born within three years); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §30.1–04–19(11) (Lexis 2001) (child in utero within three years or born within 45 months). See also Uniform Probate Code §2–120(k), 8 U. L. A. 58 (Supp. 2011) (treating a posthumously conceived child as “in gestation at the individual’s death,” but only if specified time limits are met). No time constraints attend the Third Circuit’s ruling in this case, under which the biological child of married parents is eligible for survivors benefits, no matter the length of time between the father’s death and the child’s conception and birth. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37 (counsel for Karen Capato acknowledged that, under the preemptive federal rule he advocated, and the Third Circuit adopted, a child born four years after her father’s death would be eligible for benefits). The paths to receipt of benefits laid out in the Act and regulations, we must not forget, proceed from Congress’ perception of the core purpose of the legislation. The aim was not to create a program “generally benefiting needy persons”; it was, more particularly, to “provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.” Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977). We have recognized that “where state intestacy law provides that a child may take personal property from a father’s estate, it may reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514 (1976). Reliance on state intestacy law to determine who is a “child” thus serves the Act’s driving objective. True, the intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children outside the Act’s central concern. Intestacy laws in a number of States, as just noted, do provide for inheritance by posthumously conceived children, see supra, at 12,[9] and under federal law, a child conceived shortly before her father’s death may be eligible for benefits even though she never actually received her father’s support. It was nonetheless Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality of cases. It did so here by employing eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law as a workable substitute for bur-densome case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her father’s earnings. Respondent argues that on the SSA’s reading, natural children alone must pass through a §416(h) gateway. Adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and step-grandchildren, it is true, are defined in §416(e), and are not further defined in §416(h). Respondent overlooks, however, that although not touched by §416(h), beneficiaries described in §§416(e)(2) and (e)(3) must meet other statutorily prescribed criteria. In short, the Act and regulations set different eligibility requirements for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren, see 20 CFR §§404.356–404.358, but it hardly follows that applicants in those categories are treated more advantageously than are children who must meet a §416(h) criterion. The SSA’s construction of the Act, respondent charges, raises serious constitutional concerns under the equal pro-tection component of the Due Process Clause. Brief for Respondent 42; see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). She alleges: “Under the government’s interpretation . . . , posthumously conceived children are treated as an inferior subset of natural children who are ineligible for government benefits simply because of their date of birth and method of conception.” Brief for Respondent 42–43. Even the Courts of Appeals that have accepted the reading of the Act respondent advances have rejected this argument. See 631 F. 3d, at 628, n. 1 (citing Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (CA9 2009)). We have applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to laws “burden[ing] illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents, because ‘visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.’ ” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). No showing has been made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents. We therefore need not decide whether heightened scrutiny would be appropriate were that the case.[10] Under rational-basis review, the regime Congress adopted easily passes inspection. As the Ninth Circuit held, that regime is “reasonably related to the government’s twin interests in [reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent’s support, and in using reasonable presumptions to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case basis.” Vernoff, 568 F. 3d, at 1112 (citing Mathews, 427 U. S., at 509). IV As we have explained, §416(e)(1)’s statement, “[t]he term ‘child’ means . . . the child . . . of an individual,” is a definition of scant utility without aid from neighboring provisions. See Schafer, 641 F. 3d, at 54. That aid is supplied by §416(h)(2)(A), which completes the definition of “child” “for purposes of th[e] subchapter” that includes §416(e)(1). Under the completed definition, which the SSA employs, §416(h)(2)(A) refers to state law to determine the status of a posthumously conceived child. The SSA’s interpretation of the relevant provisions, adhered to without deviation for many decades, is at least reasonable; the agency’s reading is therefore entitled to this Court’s deference under Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. Chevron deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–227 (2001). Here, as already noted, the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is set forth in regu-lations published after notice-and-comment rulemaking. See supra, at 6–7. Congress gave the Commissioner authority to promulgate rules “necessary or appropriate to carry out” the Commissioner’s functions and the relevant statutory provisions. See 42 U. S. C. §§405(a), 902(a)(5). The Commissioner’s regulations are neither “arbitrary or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). They thus warrant the Court’s approbation. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–222, 225 (2002) (deferring to the Commissioner’s “considerable authority” to interpret the Social Security Act). V Tragic circumstances—Robert Capato’s death before he and his wife could raise a family—gave rise to this case. But the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of Karen Capato’s application for child’s insurance benefits by reference to state intestacy law. We cannot replace that reference by creating a uniform federal rule the statute’s text scarcely supports. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Notes 1 The District Court observed that Fla. Stat. Ann. §732.106 (West 2010) defines “ ‘afterborn heirs’ ” as “ ‘heirs of the decedent conceived before his or her death, but born thereafter.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert.27a (emphasis added by District Court). The court also referred to §742.17(4), which provides that a posthumously conceived child “ ‘shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will.’ ” Id., at 28a. 2 Because the Third Circuit held that posthumously conceived children qualify for survivors benefits as a matter of federal law, it did not definitively determine “where [Robert] Capato was domiciled at his death or . . . delve into the law of intestacy of that state.” 631 F. 3d, at 632, n. 6. These issues, if preserved, may be considered on remand. 3 Applicants not in fact dependent on the insured individual may be “deemed dependent” when the Act so provides. For example, a “legitimate” child, even if she is not living with or receiving support fromher parent, is ordinarily “deemed dependent” on that parent. 42 U. S. C. §402(d)(3). Further, applicants “deemed” the child of an insured individual under §416(h)(2)(B) or (h)(3) are also “deemed legitimate,” hence dependent, even if not living with or receiving support fromthe parent. §402(d)(3). See also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 499, n. 2 (1976) (deeming dependent any child who qualifies under §416(h)(2)(A)); Tr. of Oral Arg. 13–14 (counsel for the SSA stated, in response to the Court’s question, that statutory presumptions of dependency are irrebuttable). 4 Section 416(h)(2)(A) also states that persons who, under the law of the insured’s domicile, “would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.” Asked about this prescription, counsel for the SSA responded that it would apply to equitably adopted children. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9, 54; see 20 CFR §404.359 (2011) (an equitably adopted child may be eligible for benefits if the agreement to adopt the child would be recognized under state law as enabling the child to inherit upon the intestate death of the adopting parent). 5 Respondent does not invoke any of the alternative criteria as a basis for the twins’ “child” status. 6 The Commissioner of Social Security has acquiesced in the Ninth Circuit’s conflicting interpretation for cases arising in that Circuit. See Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05–1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55656 (2005). 7 Because the Court of Appeals found the statutory language unambiguous, it had no occasion to “determine whether the [SSA’s] interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute.” 631 F. 3d, at 631, n. 5 (citing Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984)). 8 Respondent urges that it would be bizarre to deny benefits to the Capato twins when, under §416(h)(2)(B), they would have gained benefits had their parents gone through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid save for a legal impediment. Brief for Respondent 26, n. 10; see supra, at 5–6. Whether the Capatos’ marriage ceremony was flawed or flawless, the SSA counters, no marital union was extant when the twins were conceived. Reply Brief 11. 9 But see N. Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law Ann. §4–1.1(c) (West 1998) (“Distributees of the decedent, conceived before his or her death but born alive thereafter, take as if they were born in his or her lifetime.”). Similar provisions are contained in Ga. Code Ann. §53–2–1(b)(1) (2011), Idaho Code §15–2–108 (Lexis 2009), Minn. Stat. Ann. §524.2–120(10) (West Supp. 2012), S. C. Code Ann. §62–2–108 (2009), and S. D. Codified Laws §29A–2–108 (Supp. 2011). 10 Ironically, while drawing an analogy to the “illogical and unjust” discrimination children born out of wedlock encounter, see Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–176 (1972), respondent asks us to differentiate between children whose parents were married and children whose parents’ liaisons were not blessed by clergy or the State. She would eliminate the intestacy test only for biological children of married parents.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. CAPATO, on behalf of B. N. C. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit No. 11–159. Argued March 19, 2012—Decided May 21, 2012 Eighteen months after her husband, Robert Capato, died of cancer, respondent Karen Capato gave birth to twins conceived through in vitro fertilization using her husband’s frozen sperm. Karen applied for Social Security survivors benefits for the twins. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied her application, and the District Court affirmed. In accord with the SSA’s construction of the Social Security Act (Act), the court determined that the twins would qualify for benefits only if, as 42 U. S. C. §416(h)(2)(A) specifies, they could inherit from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law. The court then found that Robert was domiciled in Florida at his death, and that under Florida law, posthumously conceived children do not qualify for inheritance through intestate succession. The Third Circuit reversed. It concluded that, under §416(e), which defines child to mean, inter alia, “the child or legally adopted child of an [insured] individual,” the undisputed biological children of an insured and his widow qualify for survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law. Held: The SSA’s reading is better attuned to the statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. Moreover, even if the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a permissible construction entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. . (a) Congress amended the Act in 1939 to provide that, as relevant here, “[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title)” of a deceased insured individual “shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit.” §402(d). Section 416(e), in turn, defines “child” to mean: “(1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) . . . the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [under certain conditions].” Unlike §§416(e)(2) and (3), §416(e)(1) lacks any elaboration of the conditions under which a child qualifies for benefits. Section 416(h)(2)(A), however, further addresses the term “child,” providing: “In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State].” An applicant who does not meet §416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy-law criterion may nonetheless qualify for benefits under other criteria set forth in §§416(h)(2)(B) and (h)(3), but respondent does not claim eligibility under those other criteria. Regulations promulgated by the SSA closely track §§416(h)(2) and (3) in defining “[w]ho is the insured’s natural child,” 20 CFR §404.355. As the SSA reads the statute, 42 U. S. C. §416(h) governs the meaning of “child” in §416(e)(1) and serves as a gateway through which all applicants for insurance benefits as a “child” must pass. . (b) While the SSA regards §416(h) as completing §416(e)’s sparse definition of “child,” the Third Circuit held, and respondent contends, that §416(e) alone governs whenever the claimant is a married couple’s biological child. There are conspicuous flaws in the Third Circuit’s and respondent’s reading; the SSA offers the more persuasive interpretation. . (1) Nothing in §416(e)’s tautological definition suggests that Congress understood the word “child” to refer only to the children of married parents. The dictionary definitions offered by respondent are not so confined. Moreover, elsewhere in the Act, Congress expressly limited the category of children covered to offspring of a marital union, see §402(d)(3)(A), and contemporaneous statutes similarly distinguish child of a marriage from the unmodified term “child.” Nor does §416(e) indicate that Congress intended “biological” parentage to be prerequisite to “child” status. A biological parent is not always a child’s parent under law. Furthermore, marriage does not necessarily make a child’s parentage certain, nor does the absence of marriage necessarily make a child’s parentage uncertain. Finally, it is far from obvious that respondent’s proposed definition would cover her posthumously conceived twins, for under Florida law a marriage ends upon the death of a spouse. . (2) The SSA finds a key textual cue in §416(h)(2)(A)’s opening instruction: “In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,” the Commissioner shall apply state intestacy law. Respondent notes the absence of any cross-reference in §416(e) to §416(h), but she overlooks that §416(h) provides the crucial link: It requires reference to state intestacy law to determine child status not just for §416(h) purposes, but “for purposes of this subchapter,” which includes both §§402(d) and 416(e). Having explicitly complemented §416(e) by the definitional provisions contained in §416(h), Congress had no need to place a redundant cross-reference in §416(e). The Act commonly refers to state law on matters of family status, including an applicant’s status as a wife, widow, husband, or widower. See, e.g., §§416(b), (h)(1)(A). The Act also sets duration-of-relationship limitations, see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777–782, and time limits qualify the statutes of several States that accord inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children. In contrast, no time constraint attends the Third Circuit’s ruling in this case, under which the biological child of married parents is eligible for survivors benefits, no matter the length of time between the father’s death and the child’s conception and birth. Because a child who may take from a father’s estate is more likely to “be dependent during the parent’s life and at his death,” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514, reliance on state intestacy law to determine who is a “child” serves the Act’s driving objective, which is to “provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings,” Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52. Although the Act and regulations set different eligibility requirements for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren, it hardly follows, as respondent argues, that applicants in those categories are treated more advantageously than are children who must meet a §416(h) criterion. Respondent charges that the SSA’s construction of the Act raises serious constitutional concerns under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. But under rational-basis review, the appropriate standard here, the regime passed by Congress easily passes inspection. . (c) Because the SSA’s interpretation of the relevant provisions, is at least reasonable, the agency’s reading is entitled to this Court’s deference under Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. Chevron deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–227. Here, the SSA’s longstanding interpretation, set forth in regulations published after notice-and-comment rulemaking, is neither “arbitrary or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Mayo Foundation for Medical Ed. and Research v. United States, 562 U. S. ___, ___. It therefore warrants the Court’s approbation. . 631 F.3d 626, reversed and remanded. Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

. Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999. Robert died of cancer less than three years later. With the help of in vitro fertilization, Karen gave birth to twins 18 months after her husband’s death. See §416(h)(2)(A) for a definition of “child” and “parentage.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Act provides that “[w]e shall determine whether a child is the child of an insured parent,” (§416(e)(2) and (e)(3) must meet other statutorily prescribed criteria. See Schafer, 641 U. S. C. §409(b) (1940 ed.) (emphasis added). In other words, Section416(c) provides that, “where [Robert] Capato was domiciled at his death, the child would be eligible for benefits under the law of the State”. The Court also states that Congress intended “biological” parentage to be defined as “lawful” or “unnatural” under the Act. See 9 U.S. Code Ann. §416, at 628 (2009) (“[i]n 1939, there was no provision for such a provision”) and §416.1.2.3.4.5.6.4,5.5,6.7.6,7. The SSA. See supra.

2011_10-1320

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1320

. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense. The Clause does not, however, bar a second trial if the first ended in a mistrial. Before the jury concluded deliberations in this case, it re- ported that it was unanimous against guilt on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did so but still could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. All agree that the defendant may be retried on charges of manslaughter and negligent homicide. The question is whether he may also be retried on charges of capital and first-degree murder. I One-year-old Matthew McFadden, Jr., suffered a severe head injury on November 28, 2007, while home with his mother’s boyfriend, Alex Blueford. Despite treatment at a hospital, McFadden died a few days later. The State of Arkansas charged Blueford with capital murder, but waived the death penalty. The State’s theory at trial was that Blueford had injured McFadden intentionally, causing the boy’s death “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Ark. Code Ann. §5–10–101(a)(9)(A) (Supp. 2011). The defense, in contrast, portrayed the death as the re- sult of Blueford accidentally knocking McFadden onto the ground. The trial court instructed the jury that the charge of capital murder included three lesser offenses: first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. In addition to describing these offenses, the court addressed the order in which the jury was to consider them: “If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of capital murder, you will consider the charge of murder in the first degree. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of murder in the first degree, you will then consider the charge of manslaughter. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of manslaughter, you will then con- sider the charge of negligent homicide.” App. 51–52. The prosecution commented on these instructions in its closing argument. It told the jury, for example, that “before you can consider a lesser included of capital murder, you must first, all 12, vote that this man is not guilty of capital murder.” Id., at 55. The prosecution explained that this was “not a situation where you just lay everything out here and say, well, we have four choices. Which one does it fit the most?” Id., at 59. Rather, the prose- cution emphasized, “unless all 12 of you agree that this man’s actions were not consistent with capital murder, then and only then would you go down to murder in the first degree.” Ibid. After the parties concluded their arguments, the court presented the jury with a set of five verdict forms, each representing a possible verdict. There were four separate forms allowing the jury to convict on each of the charged offenses: capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. A fifth form allowed the jury to return a verdict of acquittal, if the jury found Blueford not guilty of any offense. There was no form allowing the jury to acquit on some offenses but not others. As stated in the court’s instructions, the jury could either “find the defendant guilty of one of these offenses” or “acquit him outright.” Id., at 51. Any verdict—whether to convict on one or to acquit on all—had to be unanimous. A few hours after beginning its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking “what happens if we cannot agree on a charge at all.” Id., at 62. The court called the jury back into the courtroom and issued a so-called “Allen instruction,” emphasizing the importance of reaching a ver- dict. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–502 (1896). The jury then deliberated for a half hour more before sending out a second note, stating that it “cannot agree on any one charge in this case.” App. 64. When the court summoned the jury again, the jury foreperson reported that the jury was “hopelessly” deadlocked. Ibid. The court asked the foreperson to disclose the jury’s votes on each offense: “THE COURT: All right. If you have your numbers together, and I don’t want names, but if you have your numbers I would like to know what your count was on capital murder. “JUROR NUMBER ONE: That was unanimous against that. No. “THE COURT: Okay, on murder in the first degree? “JUROR NUMBER ONE: That was unanimous against that. “THE COURT: Okay. Manslaughter? “JUROR NUMBER ONE: Nine for, three against. “THE COURT: Okay. And negligent homicide? “JUROR NUMBER ONE: We did not vote on that, sir. “THE COURT: Did not vote on that. “JUROR NUMBER ONE: No, sir. We couldn’t get past the manslaughter. Were we supposed to go past that? I thought we were supposed to go one at a time.” Id., at 64–65. Following this exchange, the court gave another Allen instruction and sent the jurors back to the jury room. After deliberations resumed, Blueford’s counsel asked the court to submit new verdict forms to the jurors, to be completed “for those counts that they have reached a verdict on.” Id., at 67. The prosecution objected on the grounds that the jury was “still deliberating” and that a verdict of acquittal had to be “all or nothing.” Id., at 68. The court denied Blueford’s request. To allow for a partial verdict, the court explained, would be “like changing horses in the middle of the stream,” given that the jury had already received instructions and verdict forms. Ibid. The court informed counsel that it would declare a mis- trial “if the jury doesn’t make a decision.” Id., at 69. When the jury returned a half hour later, the foreperson stated that they had not reached a verdict. The court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. The State subsequently sought to retry Blueford. He moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, citing the foreperson’s report that the jurors had voted unanimously against guilt on those offenses. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on interlocutory appeal. According to the State Supreme Court, the foreperson’s report had no effect on the State’s ability to retry Blueford, because the foreperson “was not making a formal announcement of acquittal” when she disclosed the jury’s votes. 2011 Ark. 8, p. 9, ___ S. W. 3d ___, ___. This was not a case, the court observed, “where a formal verdict was announced or entered of record.” Ibid. The court added that the trial court did not err in denying Blueford’s request for new verdict forms that would have allowed the jury to render a partial verdict on the charges of capital and first-degree murder. Blueford sought review in this Court, and we granted certiorari. 565 U. S. ___ (2011). II The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. The Clause “guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict the accused, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Blueford contends that the foreperson’s report means that he cannot be tried again on charges of capital and first-degree murder. According to Blueford, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a second trial on those charges, for two reasons. A Blueford’s primary submission is that he cannot be retried for capital and first-degree murder because the jury actually acquitted him of those offenses. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). The Arkansas Supreme Court noted—and Blueford acknowledges—that no formal judgment of acquittal was entered in his case. But none was necessary, Blueford maintains, because an acquittal is a matter of substance, not form. Quoting from our decision in Martin Linen, supra, at 571, Blueford contends that despite the absence of a formal verdict, a jury’s announcement constitutes an acquittal if it “ ‘actu- ally represents a resolution . . . of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 21. Here, according to Blueford, the foreperson’s announcement of the jury’s unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder represented just that: a resolution of some or all of the elements of those offenses in Blueford’s favor. We disagree. The foreperson’s report was not a final resolution of anything. When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury’s deliberations had not yet concluded. The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, even after the foreperson had delivered her report. When they emerged a half hour later, the foreperson stated only that they were unable to reach a verdict. She gave no indication whether it was still the case that all 12 jurors believed Blueford was not guilty of capital or first-degree murder, that 9 of them believed he was guilty of manslaughter, or that a vote had not been taken on negligent homicide. The fact that deliberations continued after the report deprives that report of the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal on the murder offenses. Blueford maintains, however, that any possibility that the jurors revisited the murder offenses was foreclosed by the instructions given to the jury. Those instructions, he contends, not only required the jury to consider the of- fenses in order, from greater to lesser, but also prevented it from transitioning from one offense to the next with- out unanimously—and definitively—resolving the greater offense in his favor. “A jury is presumed to follow its instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). So, Blueford says, the foreperson’s report that the jury was deadlocked on manslaughter necessarily establishes that the jury had acquitted Blueford of the greater offenses of capital and first-degree murder. But even if we assume that the instructions required a unanimous vote before the jury could consider a lesser offense—as the State assumes for purposes of this case, see Brief for Respondent 25, n. 3—nothing in the instructions prohibited the jury from reconsidering such a vote. The instructions said simply, “If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of [the greater offense], you will [then] consider the charge of [the lesser offense].” App. 51–52. The jurors were never told that once they had a reasonable doubt, they could not rethink the issue. The jury was free to reconsider a greater offense, even after considering a lesser one.[1] A simple example illustrates the point. A jury enters the jury room, having just been given these instructions. The foreperson decides that it would make sense to determine the extent of the jurors’ agreement before discussions begin. Accordingly, she conducts a vote on capital murder, and everyone votes against guilt. She does the same for first-degree murder, and again, everyone votes against guilt. She then calls for a vote on manslaughter, and there is disagreement. Only then do the jurors en- gage in a discussion about the circumstances of the crime. While considering the arguments of the other jurors on how the death was caused, one of the jurors starts rethinking his own stance on a greater offense. After reflecting on the evidence, he comes to believe that the defendant did knowingly cause the death—satisfying the definition of first-degree murder. At that point, nothing in the instructions prohibits the jury from doing what juries often do: revisit a prior vote. “The very object of the jury system,” after all, “is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves.” Allen, 164 U. S., at 501. A single juror’s change of mind is all it takes to require the jury to reconsider a greater offense. It was therefore possible for Blueford’s jury to revisit the offenses of capital and first-degree murder, notwithstanding its earlier votes. And because of that possibility, the foreperson’s report prior to the end of deliberations lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses, quite apart from any requirement that a formal verdict be returned or judgment entered. That same lack of finality undermines Blueford’s reliance on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). In those cases, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when a defendant, tried for a greater offense and convicted of a lesser included offense, is later retried for the greater offense. See Green, supra, at 190; Price, supra, at 329. Blueford argues that the only fact distinguishing his case from Green and Price is that his case involves a deadlock on the lesser included offense, as opposed to a conviction. In his view, that distinction only favors him, because the Double Jeopardy Clause should, if anything, afford greater protection to a defendant who is not found guilty of the lesser included offense. Blueford’s argument assumes, however, that the votes reported by the foreperson did not change, even though the jury deliberated further after that report. That assumption is unjustified, because the reported votes were, for the reasons noted, not final. Blueford thus overlooks the real distinction between the cases: In Green and Price, the verdict of the jury was a final decision; here, the report of the foreperson was not. B Blueford maintains that even if the jury did not acquit him of capital and first-degree murder, a second trial on those offenses would nonetheless violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial was improper. Blueford acknowledges that a trial can be discontinued without barring a subsequent one for the same offense when “particular circumstances manifest a necessity” to declare a mistrial. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949); see also United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 (1824). He also acknowledges that the trial court’s reason for declaring a mistrial here—that the jury was unable to reach a verdict—has long been con- sidered the “classic basis” establishing such a necessity. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978). Blueford therefore accepts that a second trial on manslaughter and negligent homicide would pose no double jeopardy problem. He contends, however, that there was no necessity for a mistrial on capital and first-degree murder, given the foreperson’s report that the jury had voted unanimously against guilt on those charges. According to Blueford, the court at that time should have taken “some action,” whether through partial verdict forms or other means, to allow the jury to give effect to those votes, and then considered a mistrial only as to the remaining charges. Reply Brief for Petitioner 11, n. 8. We reject that suggestion. We have never required a trial court, before declaring a mistrial because of a hung jury, to consider any particular means of breaking the impasse—let alone to consider giving the jury new options for a verdict. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 8).[2] As permitted under Arkansas law, the jury’s options in this case were limited to two: either convict on one of the offenses, or acquit on all. The instructions explained those options in plain terms, and the verdict forms likewise contemplated no other outcome. There were separate forms to convict on each of the possible offenses, but there was only one form to acquit, and it was to acquit on all of them. When the foreperson disclosed the jury’s votes on capital and first-degree murder, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to add another option—that of acquitting on some offenses but not others. That, however, is precisely the relief Blueford seeks—relief the Double Jeopardy Clause does not afford him. * * * The jury in this case did not convict Blueford of any offense, but it did not acquit him of any either. When the jury was unable to return a verdict, the trial court prop- erly declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. As a consequence, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not stand in the way of a second trial on the same offenses. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is Affirmed. Notes 1 In reaching a contrary conclusion, post, at 6 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.), the dissent construes the jury instructions to “require a jury to complete its deliberations on a greater offense before it may consider a lesser,” post, at 3 (emphasis added). But no such requirement can be found in the text of the instructions themselves. And the dissent’s attempt to glean such a requirement from the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Hughes v. State, 347 Ark. 696, 66 S.W.3d 645 (2002), is unavailing, for that decision nowhere addresses the issue here—whether a jury can reconsider a greater offense after considering a lesser one. 2 Finding our reliance on Renico “perplexing,” the dissent reads that decision to have “little to say about a trial judge’s responsibilities, or this Court’s, on direct review.” Post, at 10–11, n. 4. But Renico’s discussion of the applicable legal principles concerns just that, and the dissent in any event does not dispute that we have never required a trial court to consider any particular means of breaking a jury impasse.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus BLUEFORD v. ARKANSAS certiorari to the supreme court of arkansas No. 10–1320. Argued February 22, 2012—Decided May 24, 2012 The State of Arkansas charged petitioner Alex Blueford with capital murder for the death of a one-year-old child. That charge included the lesser offenses of first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Before the start of deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the offenses as follows: “If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of capital murder, you will consider the charge of murder in the first degree. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of murder in the first degree, you will then consider the charge of manslaughter. . . . If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt on the charge of manslaughter, you will then consider the charge of negligent homicide.” The court also presented the jury with a set of verdict forms, which allowed the jury either to convict Blueford of one of the charged offenses, or to acquit him of all of them. Acquitting on some but not others was not an option. After deliberating for a few hours, the jury reported that it could not reach a verdict. The court inquired about the jury’s progress on each offense. The foreperson disclosed that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the charges of capital murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did so but still could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When the State subsequently sought to retry Blueford, he moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on interlocutory appeal. Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrying Blueford on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder. Pp. 5−10. (a) The jury did not acquit Blueford of capital or first-degree murder. Blueford contends that the foreperson’s report that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the murder offenses represented a resolution of some or all of the elements of those offenses in his favor. But the report was not a final resolution of anything. When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury’s deliberations had not yet concluded. The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, and nothing in the court’s instructions prohibited them from reconsidering their votes on capital and first-degree murder as deliberations continued. The foreperson’s report prior to the end of deliberations therefore lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses. That same lack of finality undermines Blueford’s reliance on Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, and Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323. In both of those cases, the verdict of the jury was a final decision; here, the report of the foreperson was not. Pp. 5−8. (b) The trial court’s declaration of a mistrial was not improper. A trial can be discontinued without barring a subsequent one for the same offense when “particular circumstances manifest a necessity” to declare a mistrial. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690. Blueford contends that there was no necessity for a mistrial on capital and first-degree murder, given the foreperson’s report that the jury had voted unanimously against guilt on those charges. According to Blueford, the court at that time should have taken some action, whether through new partial verdict forms or other means, to allow the jury to give effect to those votes, and then considered a mistrial only as to the remaining charges. Blueford acknowledges, however, that the trial court’s reason for declaring a mistrial here—that the jury was unable to reach a verdict—has long been considered the “classic basis” establishing necessity for doing so. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509. And this Court has never required a trial court, before declaring a mistrial because of a hung jury, to consider any particular means of breaking the impasse―let alone to consider giving the jury new options for a verdict. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ___, ___. As permitted under Arkansas law, the jury’s options in this case were limited to two: either convict on one of the offenses, or acquit on all. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to add another option—that of acquitting on some offenses but not others. Pp. 9−10. 2011 Ark. 8, ___ S. W. 3d ___, affirmed. Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., joined.

. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense. The Clause does not, however, bar a second trial if the first ended in a mistrial. Before the jury concluded deliberations in this case, it re-examined the jury’s verdicts. It concluded that it was unanimous against guilt on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The court noted that the jury was not unanimous on those offenses, but had not reached a verdict. In addition to describing these offenses, the court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did not convict Blueford of any offense, but it did not acquit him of any either. That assumption is unjustified, because the jury deliberated for a half hour before sending out a second note. At that point, the trial court ruled that the verdict was not a final resolution of anything. The trial court denied the motion, and again, everyone votes against guilt. That same lack of finality does not prevent the jury from returning a verdict on the lesser offense, and there is disagreement. According to Blueford, the jury at that time should have taken “a unanimous vote.” See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 1, 569, 571.

2011_10-844

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-844

". When the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) evaluates an application to market a generic drug, it(...TRUNCATED)

"NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection (...TRUNCATED)

". When the FDA’s counterclaim is filed, it requires a copy of the patent to be submitted to the F(...TRUNCATED)

2011_11-204

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-204

". The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) imposes minimum wage and maximum hours requirements on employ(...TRUNCATED)

"NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection (...TRUNCATED)

". The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) imposes minimum wage and maximum hours requirements on employ(...TRUNCATED)

2011_10-1016

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1016

", in which The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined. The question in this case i(...TRUNCATED)

"NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection (...TRUNCATED)

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2011_10-948

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-948

". We consider whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U. S. C. §1679 et seq., precl(...TRUNCATED)

"NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection (...TRUNCATED)

". We consider whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U. S. C. §1679 et seq., precl(...TRUNCATED)

2011_10-1261

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1261

". We consider whether the 2-year period to file suit against a corporate insider under §16(b) of t(...TRUNCATED)

"NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection (...TRUNCATED)

". We consider whether the 2-year period to file suit against a corporate insider under §16(b) of t(...TRUNCATED)

2011_11-5683

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-5683

". Federal statutes impose mandatory minimum prison sentences upon those convicted of federal drug c(...TRUNCATED)

"NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection (...TRUNCATED)

". Federal statutes impose mandatory minimum prison sentences upon those convicted of federal drug c(...TRUNCATED)