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Because the limitation on remedies found in the Circuit City arbitration agreement significantly undermines Title VII's remedial purpose of making victims of discrimination whole and its deterrent purposes of forcing employers to eliminate and prevent discriminatory practices in the workplace, we hold that the provision at issue in this case was not enforceable. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "253 F.3d 1286, 1286",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"federal statutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions\"",
"sentence": "See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the arbitrability of discrimination “claims rests on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies”) (emphasis added); Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 683, 688 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages, which was available to the plaintiff under Title VII); cf. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1286 (holding that “federal statutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 F.3d 1062, 1062",
"parenthetical": "noting that the arbitrability of discrimination \"claims rests on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies\"",
"sentence": "See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the arbitrability of discrimination “claims rests on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies”) (emphasis added); Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 683, 688 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages, which was available to the plaintiff under Title VII); cf. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1286 (holding that “federal statutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions”)."
} | 9,340,399 | b |
Because the limitation on remedies found in the Circuit City arbitration agreement significantly undermines Title VII's remedial purpose of making victims of discrimination whole and its deterrent purposes of forcing employers to eliminate and prevent discriminatory practices in the workplace, we hold that the provision at issue in this case was not enforceable. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "12 F.Supp.2d 683, 688",
"parenthetical": "holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages, which was available to the plaintiff under Title VII",
"sentence": "See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the arbitrability of discrimination “claims rests on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies”) (emphasis added); Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 683, 688 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages, which was available to the plaintiff under Title VII); cf. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1286 (holding that “federal statutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "253 F.3d 1286, 1286",
"parenthetical": "holding that \"federal statutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions\"",
"sentence": "See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062 (noting that the arbitrability of discrimination “claims rests on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to court remedies”) (emphasis added); Trumbull v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F.Supp.2d 683, 688 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (holding that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because it prohibited an award of punitive damages, which was available to the plaintiff under Title VII); cf. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1286 (holding that “federal statutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions”)."
} | 9,340,399 | a |
Dismissal of Chaudry's claims against defendant Whispering Ridge Homeowners Association was proper because federal courts are required to abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "481 U.S. 1, 12-14",
"parenthetical": "states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts",
"sentence": "See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 965, 975",
"parenthetical": "listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief",
"sentence": "See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts)."
} | 4,255,745 | b |
Dismissal of Chaudry's claims against defendant Whispering Ridge Homeowners Association was proper because federal courts are required to abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 965, 975",
"parenthetical": "listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief",
"sentence": "See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts",
"sentence": "See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts)."
} | 4,255,745 | a |
Dismissal of Chaudry's claims against defendant Whispering Ridge Homeowners Association was proper because federal courts are required to abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts",
"sentence": "See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "381 F.3d 965, 975",
"parenthetical": "listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief",
"sentence": "See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention and explaining- that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (states have an important interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts)."
} | 4,255,745 | b |
P 16. The third factor is the actor's good faith. We have stated that the good-faith factor "is relevant only to the question of whether the converter intended to exercise dominion over the property." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 P.3d 1197, 1197",
"parenthetical": "reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion",
"sentence": "See Beall Transp. Equip. Co., 64 P.3d at 1197 (reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion); see also Trickey, 933 P.2d at 536 (citing intent and good faith as relevant factors in determining whether conversion occurred); Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (applying good-faith factor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "160 Vt. 300, 300",
"parenthetical": "\"Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.\"",
"sentence": "O’Brien, 160 Vt. at 300, 629 A.2d at 329. That comment, however, was part of a discussion rejecting good faith as a complete defense to liability. Id. at 299, 629 A.2d at 329 (“Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.”). Other jurisdictions applying the Restatement factors have rejected good faith as a defense to a conversion claim but considered it as a factor in determining whether a defendant so seriously interfered with another’s property that the defendant may justly be required to pay the full value of the property."
} | 3,587,811 | b |
P 16. The third factor is the actor's good faith. We have stated that the good-faith factor "is relevant only to the question of whether the converter intended to exercise dominion over the property." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 P.3d 1197, 1197",
"parenthetical": "reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion",
"sentence": "See Beall Transp. Equip. Co., 64 P.3d at 1197 (reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion); see also Trickey, 933 P.2d at 536 (citing intent and good faith as relevant factors in determining whether conversion occurred); Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (applying good-faith factor)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "629 A.2d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.\"",
"sentence": "O’Brien, 160 Vt. at 300, 629 A.2d at 329. That comment, however, was part of a discussion rejecting good faith as a complete defense to liability. Id. at 299, 629 A.2d at 329 (“Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.”). Other jurisdictions applying the Restatement factors have rejected good faith as a defense to a conversion claim but considered it as a factor in determining whether a defendant so seriously interfered with another’s property that the defendant may justly be required to pay the full value of the property."
} | 3,587,811 | b |
P 16. The third factor is the actor's good faith. We have stated that the good-faith factor "is relevant only to the question of whether the converter intended to exercise dominion over the property." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "629 A.2d 329, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.\"",
"sentence": "O’Brien, 160 Vt. at 300, 629 A.2d at 329. That comment, however, was part of a discussion rejecting good faith as a complete defense to liability. Id. at 299, 629 A.2d at 329 (“Specific intent to convert, that is, knowledge that the property is owned by another, is not required for liability in tort.”). Other jurisdictions applying the Restatement factors have rejected good faith as a defense to a conversion claim but considered it as a factor in determining whether a defendant so seriously interfered with another’s property that the defendant may justly be required to pay the full value of the property."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "64 P.3d 1197, 1197",
"parenthetical": "reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion",
"sentence": "See Beall Transp. Equip. Co., 64 P.3d at 1197 (reaffirming that good faith may be considered as factor in determining whether alleged tortfeasor is liable for conversion); see also Trickey, 933 P.2d at 536 (citing intent and good faith as relevant factors in determining whether conversion occurred); Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988) (applying good-faith factor)."
} | 3,587,811 | a |
This rule requires that a party alleging bias or prejudice must first file an affidavit in the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "744 P.2d 1019, 1023",
"parenthetical": "affidavits regarding bias or prejudice not admitted before the trial court will not be considered on appeal",
"sentence": "See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App.1987) (affidavits regarding bias or prejudice not admitted before the trial court will not be considered on appeal); see also Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948) (the issue of bias or prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial court “in the first instance,” subject to appellate review); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(C)(1) (providing examples of potential grounds for disqualification)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "the issue of bias or prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial court \"in the first instance,\" subject to appellate review",
"sentence": "See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App.1987) (affidavits regarding bias or prejudice not admitted before the trial court will not be considered on appeal); see also Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948) (the issue of bias or prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial court “in the first instance,” subject to appellate review); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(C)(1) (providing examples of potential grounds for disqualification)."
} | 10,365,453 | a |
This rule requires that a party alleging bias or prejudice must first file an affidavit in the trial court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 P.2d 520, 523",
"parenthetical": "the issue of bias or prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial court \"in the first instance,\" subject to appellate review",
"sentence": "See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App.1987) (affidavits regarding bias or prejudice not admitted before the trial court will not be considered on appeal); see also Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948) (the issue of bias or prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial court “in the first instance,” subject to appellate review); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(C)(1) (providing examples of potential grounds for disqualification)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "744 P.2d 1019, 1023",
"parenthetical": "affidavits regarding bias or prejudice not admitted before the trial court will not be considered on appeal",
"sentence": "See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App.1987) (affidavits regarding bias or prejudice not admitted before the trial court will not be considered on appeal); see also Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948) (the issue of bias or prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial court “in the first instance,” subject to appellate review); Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3(C)(1) (providing examples of potential grounds for disqualification)."
} | 10,365,453 | b |
However, it is clear that the district court here had constitutional jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to adjudicate this criminal case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "920 F.2d 619, 629",
"parenthetical": "noting that purported defense counsel's \"memorandum blithely ignored 18 U.S.C. SS 3231 which explicitly vests federal district courts with jurisdiction over 'all offenses against the laws of the United States' \"",
"sentence": "See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011) (reversing the Third Circuit’s holding that a criminal defendant lacked standing to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal statute because any rights under the Tenth Amendment accrued not to the defendant but to the states, and holding that the defendant-appellant’s “challenge to her conviction and sentence ‘satisfies the case- or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration .., constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redress-able by invalidation of the conviction.’” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998))). And it is equally patent that the court possessed statutory jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that purported defense counsel’s “memorandum blithely ignored 18 U.S.C. § 3231 which explicitly vests federal district courts with jurisdiction over ‘all offenses against the laws of the United States’ ”); United States v. Tony, 637 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The district court had jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3231.”); cf. United States v. DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the view that “a charging document’s failure to state an offense affects a federal court’s jurisdiction,” and noting that “[a] claim that a criminal statute is unconstitutional [as applied to the defendant] does not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "694 F.3d 1141, 1146, 1153",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the view that \"a charging document's failure to state an offense affects a federal court's jurisdiction,\" and noting that \"[a] claim that a criminal statute is unconstitutional [as applied to the defendant] does not implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction\"",
"sentence": "See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011) (reversing the Third Circuit’s holding that a criminal defendant lacked standing to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge to a federal statute because any rights under the Tenth Amendment accrued not to the defendant but to the states, and holding that the defendant-appellant’s “challenge to her conviction and sentence ‘satisfies the case- or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration .., constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redress-able by invalidation of the conviction.’” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998))). And it is equally patent that the court possessed statutory jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that purported defense counsel’s “memorandum blithely ignored 18 U.S.C. § 3231 which explicitly vests federal district courts with jurisdiction over ‘all offenses against the laws of the United States’ ”); United States v. Tony, 637 F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The district court had jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3231.”); cf. United States v. DeVaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the view that “a charging document’s failure to state an offense affects a federal court’s jurisdiction,” and noting that “[a] claim that a criminal statute is unconstitutional [as applied to the defendant] does not implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”)."
} | 12,267,098 | a |
In this case it is thus not necessary to decide whether case studies, clinical experience, inductive reasoning and anecdotal evidence can be combined to form a proper foundation for an' opinion on causation, because, regardless, the information these sources provided did not adequately support Dr. Maltsberger's opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "526 U.S. 158, 158-54",
"parenthetical": "issue was not general reasonableness of expert's methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion",
"sentence": "See also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-54, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (issue was not general reasonableness of expert’s methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion); Heller, 167 F.3d at. 159 (expert conclusion must “fit” or reliably flow from the data and methodology)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 144, 144",
"parenthetical": "issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts",
"sentence": "See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144, 118 S.Ct. 512 (issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts)."
} | 9,408,950 | b |
In this case it is thus not necessary to decide whether case studies, clinical experience, inductive reasoning and anecdotal evidence can be combined to form a proper foundation for an' opinion on causation, because, regardless, the information these sources provided did not adequately support Dr. Maltsberger's opinion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue was not general reasonableness of expert's methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion",
"sentence": "See also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-54, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (issue was not general reasonableness of expert’s methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion); Heller, 167 F.3d at. 159 (expert conclusion must “fit” or reliably flow from the data and methodology)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "522 U.S. 144, 144",
"parenthetical": "issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts",
"sentence": "See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144, 118 S.Ct. 512 (issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts)."
} | 9,408,950 | b |
In this case it is thus not necessary to decide whether case studies, clinical experience, inductive reasoning and anecdotal evidence can be combined to form a proper foundation for an' opinion on causation, because, regardless, the information these sources provided did not adequately support Dr. Maltsberger's opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts",
"sentence": "See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144, 118 S.Ct. 512 (issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "526 U.S. 158, 158-54",
"parenthetical": "issue was not general reasonableness of expert's methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion",
"sentence": "See also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-54, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (issue was not general reasonableness of expert’s methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion); Heller, 167 F.3d at. 159 (expert conclusion must “fit” or reliably flow from the data and methodology)."
} | 9,408,950 | a |
In this case it is thus not necessary to decide whether case studies, clinical experience, inductive reasoning and anecdotal evidence can be combined to form a proper foundation for an' opinion on causation, because, regardless, the information these sources provided did not adequately support Dr. Maltsberger's opinion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts",
"sentence": "See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144, 118 S.Ct. 512 (issue was not whether expert opinion could be supported by animal studies, but whether expert opinion could be sufficiently supported by animal studies that were substantially dissimilar to the facts)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "issue was not general reasonableness of expert's methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion",
"sentence": "See also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 158-54, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (issue was not general reasonableness of expert’s methodology, but reasonableness of using this approach to draw particular conclusion); Heller, 167 F.3d at. 159 (expert conclusion must “fit” or reliably flow from the data and methodology)."
} | 9,408,950 | a |
Hammons cites the State's failure to produce expert or lay testimony concerning the bat's deadliness as fatal to its case in chief. As we have previously noted, expert testimony is no longer a prerequisite to a deadliness finding. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "574 S.W.2d 132, 132",
"parenthetical": "whether opinion evidence is required to prove a knife is a deadly weapon depends on the evidence in each case",
"sentence": "See also Denham, 574 S.W.2d at 132 (whether opinion evidence is required to prove a knife is a deadly weapon depends on the evidence in each case) (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "668 S.W.2d 724, 724-25",
"parenthetical": "analysis of club as deadly weapon made by comparison to cases involving knives",
"sentence": "See id. (one who observes and receives wound from butcher knife is capable of testifying that the knife is a deadly weapon causing death or serious bodily injury); Jackson, 668 S.W.2d at 724-25 (analysis of club as deadly weapon made by comparison to cases involving knives)."
} | 10,017,680 | b |
Even assuming that appellant's request was ambiguous, it was the magistrate's duty to clarify that request and ascertain appellant's true desires. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "742 S.W.2d 1, 4-5",
"parenthetical": "after pulling out business card and showing it to detective, appellant was taken back to judge who questioned accused about desire to make a statement",
"sentence": "Castillo v. State, 742 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (after pulling out business card and showing it to detective, appellant was taken back to judge who questioned accused about desire to make a statement); Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (when accused’s desires are related in equivocal manner, interrogating officers not required to cease interview but must ask specific questions aimed at discovering accused’s true desire)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 1410, 1410",
"parenthetical": "Sixth Amendment principles impute the State's knowledge from one state actor to another.",
"sentence": "See and compare, Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1410 (Sixth Amendment principles impute the State’s knowledge from one state actor to another.). Otherwise, the right to appointed counsel prior to or during custodial interrogation is rendered meaningless."
} | 9,997,170 | a |
Even assuming that appellant's request was ambiguous, it was the magistrate's duty to clarify that request and ascertain appellant's true desires. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "when accused's desires are related in equivocal manner, interrogating officers not required to cease interview but must ask specific questions aimed at discovering accused's true desire",
"sentence": "Castillo v. State, 742 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (after pulling out business card and showing it to detective, appellant was taken back to judge who questioned accused about desire to make a statement); Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (when accused’s desires are related in equivocal manner, interrogating officers not required to cease interview but must ask specific questions aimed at discovering accused’s true desire)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "106 S.Ct. 1410, 1410",
"parenthetical": "Sixth Amendment principles impute the State's knowledge from one state actor to another.",
"sentence": "See and compare, Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S.Ct. at 1410 (Sixth Amendment principles impute the State’s knowledge from one state actor to another.). Otherwise, the right to appointed counsel prior to or during custodial interrogation is rendered meaningless."
} | 9,997,170 | a |
Soto argues that a hard 50 sentencing error is not subject to harmless error review because tire court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when considering tire existence of aggravated circumstances, and the findings of fact were never found beyond a reasonable doubt, as Alleyne requires. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "263 Kan. 708, 714",
"parenthetical": "concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "291 Kan. 475, 487-88",
"parenthetical": "clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | 12,417,227 | a |
Soto argues that a hard 50 sentencing error is not subject to harmless error review because tire court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when considering tire existence of aggravated circumstances, and the findings of fact were never found beyond a reasonable doubt, as Alleyne requires. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "263 Kan. 708, 714",
"parenthetical": "concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | 12,417,227 | b |
Soto argues that a hard 50 sentencing error is not subject to harmless error review because tire court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when considering tire existence of aggravated circumstances, and the findings of fact were never found beyond a reasonable doubt, as Alleyne requires. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "291 Kan. 475, 487-88",
"parenthetical": "clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | 12,417,227 | a |
Soto argues that a hard 50 sentencing error is not subject to harmless error review because tire court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when considering tire existence of aggravated circumstances, and the findings of fact were never found beyond a reasonable doubt, as Alleyne requires. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt",
"sentence": "See State v. Spain, 263 Kan. 708, 714, 953 P.2d 1004 (1998) (concluding that although K.S.A. 21-4635(c) specifies no particular standard of proof, statute implicitly requires judge to apply preponderance of evidence standard when finding aggravating circumstances); see also State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 487-88, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) (clarifying standard of proof for finding aggravating circumstances is preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt)."
} | 12,417,227 | a |
In cases where a defendant has complained about a definition that was given, although we have spoken of "this circuit's rule against elaborating on the meaning of 'reasonable doubt' ..." And although we have sometimes found error in such situations, we have not reversed on this ground alone. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "971 F.2d 1098, 1108",
"parenthetical": "declaring as \"frivolous\" claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction \"approved\" in Moss after request by jury",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own” [sic]); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th Cir.1985) (finding harmless error in unsolicited definition), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); Love, 767 F.2d at 1060 (finding no plain error in unsolicited instruction); but see United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir.1992) (declaring as “frivolous” claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction “approved” in Moss after request by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 329, 333",
"parenthetical": "holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: \"proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own\" [sic]",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own” [sic]); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th Cir.1985) (finding harmless error in unsolicited definition), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); Love, 767 F.2d at 1060 (finding no plain error in unsolicited instruction); but see United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir.1992) (declaring as “frivolous” claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction “approved” in Moss after request by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)."
} | 1,527,348 | b |
In cases where a defendant has complained about a definition that was given, although we have spoken of "this circuit's rule against elaborating on the meaning of 'reasonable doubt' ..." And although we have sometimes found error in such situations, we have not reversed on this ground alone. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring as \"frivolous\" claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction \"approved\" in Moss after request by jury",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own” [sic]); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th Cir.1985) (finding harmless error in unsolicited definition), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); Love, 767 F.2d at 1060 (finding no plain error in unsolicited instruction); but see United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir.1992) (declaring as “frivolous” claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction “approved” in Moss after request by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 329, 333",
"parenthetical": "holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: \"proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own\" [sic]",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own” [sic]); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th Cir.1985) (finding harmless error in unsolicited definition), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); Love, 767 F.2d at 1060 (finding no plain error in unsolicited instruction); but see United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir.1992) (declaring as “frivolous” claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction “approved” in Moss after request by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)."
} | 1,527,348 | b |
In cases where a defendant has complained about a definition that was given, although we have spoken of "this circuit's rule against elaborating on the meaning of 'reasonable doubt' ..." And although we have sometimes found error in such situations, we have not reversed on this ground alone. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 329, 333",
"parenthetical": "holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: \"proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own\" [sic]",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own” [sic]); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th Cir.1985) (finding harmless error in unsolicited definition), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); Love, 767 F.2d at 1060 (finding no plain error in unsolicited instruction); but see United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir.1992) (declaring as “frivolous” claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction “approved” in Moss after request by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring as \"frivolous\" claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction \"approved\" in Moss after request by jury",
"sentence": "See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.1985) (holding the unsolicited giving of the following definition to be harmless error: “proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely upon it without hesitation in your most important affairs of your own” [sic]); Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475-78 (4th Cir.1985) (finding harmless error in unsolicited definition), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 334 (1986); Love, 767 F.2d at 1060 (finding no plain error in unsolicited instruction); but see United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1108 (4th Cir.1992) (declaring as “frivolous” claim that it was error to give pattern jury instruction “approved” in Moss after request by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1013, 122 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993)."
} | 1,527,348 | a |
The Financial Institutions call Lead Plaintiff's interpretation of O'Hagan a "gross misreading," leading to a result that is contrary to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in this action. O'Hagan involved an appeal of a criminal conviction for insider trading, not imposition of civil liability in a private action under SS 10(b). The Supreme Court did not address the reliance element at all because, unlike in a private cause of action, it does not apply to criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.3d 106, 129-30",
"parenthetical": "unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "134 F.3d 542, 549",
"parenthetical": "holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | 4,212,951 | b |
The Financial Institutions call Lead Plaintiff's interpretation of O'Hagan a "gross misreading," leading to a result that is contrary to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in this action. O'Hagan involved an appeal of a criminal conviction for insider trading, not imposition of civil liability in a private action under SS 10(b). The Supreme Court did not address the reliance element at all because, unlike in a private cause of action, it does not apply to criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.3d 106, 129-30",
"parenthetical": "unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | 4,212,951 | b |
The Financial Institutions call Lead Plaintiff's interpretation of O'Hagan a "gross misreading," leading to a result that is contrary to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in this action. O'Hagan involved an appeal of a criminal conviction for insider trading, not imposition of civil liability in a private action under SS 10(b). The Supreme Court did not address the reliance element at all because, unlike in a private cause of action, it does not apply to criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.3d 106, 129-30",
"parenthetical": "unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | 4,212,951 | a |
The Financial Institutions call Lead Plaintiff's interpretation of O'Hagan a "gross misreading," leading to a result that is contrary to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in this action. O'Hagan involved an appeal of a criminal conviction for insider trading, not imposition of civil liability in a private action under SS 10(b). The Supreme Court did not address the reliance element at all because, unlike in a private cause of action, it does not apply to criminal cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "550 F.3d 106, 129-30",
"parenthetical": "unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation",
"sentence": "See, e.g., U.S. v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir.1998) (holding that reliance is not an element of the crime of stock manipulation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 827, 119 S.Ct. 75, 142 L.Ed.2d 59 (1998); see also S.E.C. v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 129-30 (1st Cir.2008) (and cases cited therein) (unlike in a private action, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation are not elements that must be proven in an SEC enforcement action)."
} | 4,212,951 | b |
Since waiver can be found by implication, it is wholly reasonable to take into consideration such factors as status, that is, the sophistication and other defining and relevant characteristics. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "304 U.S. 458, 464",
"parenthetical": "\"the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.\"",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(“the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”); see AT & T V, 307 F.3d at 1380 (sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 1380, 1380",
"parenthetical": "sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(“the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”); see AT & T V, 307 F.3d at 1380 (sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase)."
} | 1,200,866 | a |
Since waiver can be found by implication, it is wholly reasonable to take into consideration such factors as status, that is, the sophistication and other defining and relevant characteristics. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023",
"parenthetical": "\"the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.\"",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(“the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”); see AT & T V, 307 F.3d at 1380 (sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 1380, 1380",
"parenthetical": "sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(“the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”); see AT & T V, 307 F.3d at 1380 (sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase)."
} | 1,200,866 | a |
Since waiver can be found by implication, it is wholly reasonable to take into consideration such factors as status, that is, the sophistication and other defining and relevant characteristics. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.\"",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(“the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”); see AT & T V, 307 F.3d at 1380 (sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "307 F.3d 1380, 1380",
"parenthetical": "sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase",
"sentence": "Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(“the determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”); see AT & T V, 307 F.3d at 1380 (sophisticated contractor AT & T waived right to complain about fixed-price term of contract because it never sought price adjustment clause during negotiation phase)."
} | 1,200,866 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "321 S.C. 273, 277",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 S.E.2d 76, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "321 S.C. 273, 277",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 S.E.2d 76, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding defense counsel's statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the \"standard motions\" did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "321 S.C. 273, 277",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 S.E.2d 76, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant's directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | a |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "321 S.C. 273, 277",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable the directed verdict issue is not preserved as defense counsel did not specifically renew his directed verdict motion at the conclusion of the evidence. Rather, he made only a general reference to renewing his "previous objections," a statement he made earlier which did not include his directed verdict motion. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "468 S.E.2d 76, 79",
"parenthetical": "\"A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state's] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review",
"sentence": "See State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989) (finding defense counsel’s statement at the end of all the evidence that he was making the “standard motions” did not preserve the issue of directed verdict for appeal); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 508 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (noting a general or nonspecific objection presents no issue for appellate review); see also State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) (holding, under former Circuit Court Rule 76, the denial of the defendant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence); Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP (stating the rule “is substantially the substance of Circuit Court Rule 76”); State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ct.App.1998) (finding appellant’s directed verdict motion was not preserved where the argument raised on appeal was not presented to the trial court, and “[m]oreover, the record does not reflect that Adams renewed the motion at the close of his case”) (citing, inter alia, State v. Parler, 217 S.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 489 (1950) and the Note to Rule 19, SCRCrimP); State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 277, 468 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct.App.1996) (“A motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the [state’s] case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all the evidence, because once the defense has come forward with its proof, the propriety of a directed verdict can only be tested in terms of all the evidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)."
} | 421,184 | b |
Under the law, however, Colony Square had an affirmative duty to monitor Prudential's compliance with the lease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Georgia's \"discovery rule\" for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "147 Ga.App. 755, 757",
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action\"",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | 6,124,940 | b |
Under the law, however, Colony Square had an affirmative duty to monitor Prudential's compliance with the lease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Georgia's \"discovery rule\" for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "147 Ga.App. 755, 757",
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action\"",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | 6,124,940 | b |
Under the law, however, Colony Square had an affirmative duty to monitor Prudential's compliance with the lease. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "250 S.E.2d 155, 157",
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action\"",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Georgia's \"discovery rule\" for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | 6,124,940 | a |
Under the law, however, Colony Square had an affirmative duty to monitor Prudential's compliance with the lease. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Georgia's \"discovery rule\" for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "250 S.E.2d 155, 157",
"parenthetical": "\"a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action\"",
"sentence": "See Limoli v. First Ga. Bank, 147 Ga.App. 755, 757, 250 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1978) (“a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action”); see also Owen v. Mobley Construction Co., 171 Ga.App. 462, 320 S.E.2d 225 (1984) (Georgia’s “discovery rule” for the accrual of a tort cause of action inapplicable to a claim for breach of contract). Colony Square has presented no evidence of either its due diligence or of Prudential’s concealment."
} | 6,124,940 | b |
In O'Hagan, an attorney who traded on client secrets had a fiduciary duty to inform his firm that he was trading on the basis of the confidential information. Even in Zandford, which dealt principally with the statutory requirement that a deceptive device be used "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security, the defendant's fraud consisted of not telling his brokerage client -- to whom he owed a fiduciary duty -- that he was stealing assets from the account. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "535 U.S. 822, 822",
"parenthetical": "\"[Defendant's brokerage clients] were injured as investors through [defendant's] deceptions, which deprived them of any compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.\"",
"sentence": "See 535 U.S. at 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[Defendant’s brokerage clients] were injured as investors through [defendant’s] deceptions, which deprived them of any compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.”); see also id. at 823, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[A]ny distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ny distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.\"",
"sentence": "See 535 U.S. at 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[Defendant’s brokerage clients] were injured as investors through [defendant’s] deceptions, which deprived them of any compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.”); see also id. at 823, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[A]ny distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.”)."
} | 3,675,077 | a |
In O'Hagan, an attorney who traded on client secrets had a fiduciary duty to inform his firm that he was trading on the basis of the confidential information. Even in Zandford, which dealt principally with the statutory requirement that a deceptive device be used "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security, the defendant's fraud consisted of not telling his brokerage client -- to whom he owed a fiduciary duty -- that he was stealing assets from the account. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ny distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.\"",
"sentence": "See 535 U.S. at 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[Defendant’s brokerage clients] were injured as investors through [defendant’s] deceptions, which deprived them of any compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.”); see also id. at 823, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[A]ny distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Defendant's brokerage clients] were injured as investors through [defendant's] deceptions, which deprived them of any compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.\"",
"sentence": "See 535 U.S. at 822, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[Defendant’s brokerage clients] were injured as investors through [defendant’s] deceptions, which deprived them of any compensation for the sale of their valuable securities.”); see also id. at 823, 122 S.Ct. 1899 (“[A]ny distinction between omissions and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.”)."
} | 3,675,077 | b |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "136 N.J. 158, 169",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 N.J. 648, 648",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | a |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "136 N.J. 158, 169",
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | b |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 N.J. 648, 648",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | b |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing \"[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | b |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 N.J. 648, 648",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "213 N.J.Super. 275, 282",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | b |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "213 N.J.Super. 275, 282",
"parenthetical": "\"[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | b |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "170 N.J. 648, 648",
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | a |
In the motion judge's view, there were "many reasons" that could explain the "nervousness" of some of the defendants and the "conflicting statements" at 3 a.m. on the shoulder of the Turnpike. Indeed, it is a sad fact that not all persons feel comfortable in the presence of the police. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.\"",
"sentence": "State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401 (1994) (recognizing “[t]hat some city residents may not feel entirely comfortable in the presence of some, if not all, police is regrettable but true”); State v. Kuhn, 213 N.J.Super. 275, 282, 517 A.2d 162 (App.Div.1986) (“[N]ot wish[ing] to be in the proximity of police, [is] not a commendable, but also not an unlawful attitude.”); see also Carty, 170 N.J. at 648, 790 A.2d 903 (“[A]ppearance of nervousness is not sufficient grounds for the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of a detention beyond the reason for the original stop.”)."
} | 3,154,660 | b |
P41 A municipal corporation may act with the express and implied powers the legislature grants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "155 Wn.2d 612, 624, 627",
"parenthetical": "where the legislature granted a municipal corporation the right to condemn private property, the court inferred from the authorizing statute that the municipal corporation had the implicit power to reasonably carry out its condemnation procedures",
"sentence": "Sundquist, 140 Wn.2d at 410 (while acting in a proprietary capacity, the municipal corporation is implicitly allowed to make contracts and “ ‘to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public’ ”) (quoting Hite, 112 Wn.2d at 460); see also HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wn.2d 612, 624, 627, 121 P.3d 1166 (2005) (where the legislature granted a municipal corporation the right to condemn private property, the court inferred from the authorizing statute that the municipal corporation had the implicit power to reasonably carry out its condemnation procedures)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "140 Wn.2d 410, 410",
"parenthetical": "while acting in a proprietary capacity, the municipal corporation is implicitly allowed to make contracts and \" 'to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public' \"",
"sentence": "Sundquist, 140 Wn.2d at 410 (while acting in a proprietary capacity, the municipal corporation is implicitly allowed to make contracts and “ ‘to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public’ ”) (quoting Hite, 112 Wn.2d at 460); see also HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wn.2d 612, 624, 627, 121 P.3d 1166 (2005) (where the legislature granted a municipal corporation the right to condemn private property, the court inferred from the authorizing statute that the municipal corporation had the implicit power to reasonably carry out its condemnation procedures)."
} | 4,108,520 | b |
P41 A municipal corporation may act with the express and implied powers the legislature grants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the legislature granted a municipal corporation the right to condemn private property, the court inferred from the authorizing statute that the municipal corporation had the implicit power to reasonably carry out its condemnation procedures",
"sentence": "Sundquist, 140 Wn.2d at 410 (while acting in a proprietary capacity, the municipal corporation is implicitly allowed to make contracts and “ ‘to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public’ ”) (quoting Hite, 112 Wn.2d at 460); see also HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wn.2d 612, 624, 627, 121 P.3d 1166 (2005) (where the legislature granted a municipal corporation the right to condemn private property, the court inferred from the authorizing statute that the municipal corporation had the implicit power to reasonably carry out its condemnation procedures)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "140 Wn.2d 410, 410",
"parenthetical": "while acting in a proprietary capacity, the municipal corporation is implicitly allowed to make contracts and \" 'to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public' \"",
"sentence": "Sundquist, 140 Wn.2d at 410 (while acting in a proprietary capacity, the municipal corporation is implicitly allowed to make contracts and “ ‘to engage in any undertaking which is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public’ ”) (quoting Hite, 112 Wn.2d at 460); see also HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 155 Wn.2d 612, 624, 627, 121 P.3d 1166 (2005) (where the legislature granted a municipal corporation the right to condemn private property, the court inferred from the authorizing statute that the municipal corporation had the implicit power to reasonably carry out its condemnation procedures)."
} | 4,108,520 | b |
We review a case where the defendant preserved his Fanfan challenge in district court under the Rule 52(a) harmless error standard. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "411 F.3d 600, 600-01",
"parenthetical": "applying plain error review where Fanfan issue not preserved in district court",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520 n. 9 (“[I]f ... the issue presented in Fanfan is preserved in the district court by an objection, we will ordinarily vacate the sentence and remand, unless we can say the error is harmless under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); cf. Martinez-Lugo, 411 F.3d at 600-01 (applying plain error review where Fanfan issue not preserved in district court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f ... the issue presented in Fanfan is preserved in the district court by an objection, we will ordinarily vacate the sentence and remand, unless we can say the error is harmless under Rule 52(a",
"sentence": "See Mares, 402 F.3d at 520 n. 9 (“[I]f ... the issue presented in Fanfan is preserved in the district court by an objection, we will ordinarily vacate the sentence and remand, unless we can say the error is harmless under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); cf. Martinez-Lugo, 411 F.3d at 600-01 (applying plain error review where Fanfan issue not preserved in district court)."
} | 8,934,487 | b |
Moreover, "[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." (Punctuation omitted.) | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "282 Ga. 163, 163",
"parenthetical": "\"OCGA SS 9-11-15 is liberally construed in favor of allowing amendments.\"",
"sentence": "Morris v. Chewning, 201 Ga. App. 658, 659 (411 SE2d 891) (1991); see also Deering, supra, 282 Ga. at 163 (“OCGA § 9-11-15 is liberally construed in favor of allowing amendments.”) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "282 Ga. 161, 163",
"parenthetical": "\"Under OCGA SS 9-11-15, an amendment to a complaint may raise a new cause of action[.]\"",
"sentence": "OCGA § 9-11-15 (c); see Deering v. Keever, 282 Ga. 161, 163 (646 SE2d 262) (2007) (“Under OCGA § 9-11-15, an amendment to a complaint may raise a new cause of action[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted)."
} | 3,662,465 | b |
Although Rule 215.2(b) states that a trial court may impose discovery sanctions only "after notice and hearing," the Texas Supreme Court has expressly held that a "hearing" does not necessarily contemplate a personal appearance before the court or an oral presentation' to the court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "189 S.W.3d 413, 413",
"parenthetical": "oral hearing not required prior to imposition of discovery sanctions",
"sentence": "Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 843-44 (observing that nothing in the rule indicates that a trial court must hold an oral or evidentiary hearing before imposing discovery sanctions); see also Tidrow, 189 S.W.3d at 413 (oral hearing not required prior to imposition of discovery sanctions)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "134 S.W.3d 843, 843-44",
"parenthetical": "observing that nothing in the rule indicates that a trial court must hold an oral or evidentiary hearing before imposing discovery sanctions",
"sentence": "Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 843-44 (observing that nothing in the rule indicates that a trial court must hold an oral or evidentiary hearing before imposing discovery sanctions); see also Tidrow, 189 S.W.3d at 413 (oral hearing not required prior to imposition of discovery sanctions)."
} | 6,818,931 | b |
Instead, "[a] partially prevailing plaintiff should be compensated for the legal expenses he would have borne if his suit had been confined to the ground on which he prevailed plus related grounds within the meaning of Hensley." Ibid. This determination depends on how much time should have been expended on litigating the successful claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "957 F.2d 333, 339",
"parenthetical": "upholding attorneys' fee award even though plaintiffs did not prevail on all claims asserted in the suit because \"[t]he claims on which the plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail were all related to the claims on which they did prevail,\" and hence \"the plaintiffs won their case\"",
"sentence": "See also Wallace v. Mulholland, 957 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir.1992) (upholding attorneys’ fee award even though plaintiffs did not prevail on all claims asserted in the suit because “[t]he claims on which the plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail were all related to the claims on which they did prevail,” and hence “the plaintiffs won their case”); accord Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1278-81 (7th Cir.1983); but see Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 755 F.Supp. 223 (N.D.Ill.1991) (because plaintiffs suit was two-thirds successful, the court reduced plaintiffs fee by a corresponding percentage)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "because plaintiffs suit was two-thirds successful, the court reduced plaintiffs fee by a corresponding percentage",
"sentence": "See also Wallace v. Mulholland, 957 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir.1992) (upholding attorneys’ fee award even though plaintiffs did not prevail on all claims asserted in the suit because “[t]he claims on which the plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail were all related to the claims on which they did prevail,” and hence “the plaintiffs won their case”); accord Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1278-81 (7th Cir.1983); but see Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 755 F.Supp. 223 (N.D.Ill.1991) (because plaintiffs suit was two-thirds successful, the court reduced plaintiffs fee by a corresponding percentage)."
} | 726,045 | a |
The intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in good faith. See Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity under SS 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "25 P.3d 1207, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | 9,379,265 | a |
The intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in good faith. See Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"willful and intentional\" actions are distinct from those taken in good faith",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity under SS 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | 9,379,265 | b |
The intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in good faith. See Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity under SS 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"willful and intentional\" actions are distinct from those taken in good faith",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | 9,379,265 | a |
The intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in good faith. See Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity under SS 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "25 P.3d 1207, 1214",
"parenthetical": "\"False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.\"",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | 9,379,265 | a |
The intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in good faith. See Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity under SS 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"willful and intentional\" actions are distinct from those taken in good faith",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | 9,379,265 | a |
The intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in good faith. See Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"willful and intentional\" actions are distinct from those taken in good faith",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "indemnity under SS 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing",
"sentence": "Corp., supra, 94 N.Y.2d at 667, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 731 N.E.2d at 581 (“Because the underlying ... judgment establishes that [defendant’s] acts were committed in bad faith, [defendant] is not entitled to indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here see also In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir.1996)(“An agent who has intentionally participated in illegal activity or wrongful conduct against third persons cannot be said to have acted in good faith, even if the conduct benefits the corporation.”); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251 (D.Del.1978)(indemnity under § 145 is subject to the general public policy against indemnifying a party for his intentional wrongdoing), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.1979); cf. People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.2001)(“False statements, either intentionally or recklessly made, are the antithesis of-good faith.”); Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951)(“willful and intentional” actions are distinct from those taken in good faith)."
} | 9,379,265 | b |
But the jury could have found that Eastwood's fans would think him (1) a hypocrite for giving the Enquirer an "exclusive interview" about his private life (plus access to an "exclusive" baby picture), and/or (2) essentially washed up as a movie star if he was courting publicity in a sensationalist tabloid. This would have been sufficiently damaging to Eastwood's reputation to support an award of this magnitude. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 1093, 1104",
"parenthetical": "jury was entitled to award singer Tom Waits $75,000 in compensatory damages because it \"could have inferred from the evidence that the [defendant's] commercial [featuring an imitation of Waits' voice] created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.\"",
"sentence": "See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir.1992) (jury was entitled to award singer Tom Waits $75,000 in compensatory damages because it “could have inferred from the evidence that the [defendant’s] commercial [featuring an imitation of Waits’ voice] created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.”); cf. Carol Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal.App.3d 991, 1016, 193 Cal.Rptr. 206 (Cal.Ct.App.1983) (evidence of plaintiffs public image and Enquirer ’s wide readership supported award of $60,000 in damages for injury to reputation)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "144 Cal.App.3d 991, 1016",
"parenthetical": "evidence of plaintiffs public image and Enquirer 's wide readership supported award of $60,000 in damages for injury to reputation",
"sentence": "See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir.1992) (jury was entitled to award singer Tom Waits $75,000 in compensatory damages because it “could have inferred from the evidence that the [defendant’s] commercial [featuring an imitation of Waits’ voice] created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.”); cf. Carol Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal.App.3d 991, 1016, 193 Cal.Rptr. 206 (Cal.Ct.App.1983) (evidence of plaintiffs public image and Enquirer ’s wide readership supported award of $60,000 in damages for injury to reputation)."
} | 12,012,715 | a |
But the jury could have found that Eastwood's fans would think him (1) a hypocrite for giving the Enquirer an "exclusive interview" about his private life (plus access to an "exclusive" baby picture), and/or (2) essentially washed up as a movie star if he was courting publicity in a sensationalist tabloid. This would have been sufficiently damaging to Eastwood's reputation to support an award of this magnitude. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 1093, 1104",
"parenthetical": "jury was entitled to award singer Tom Waits $75,000 in compensatory damages because it \"could have inferred from the evidence that the [defendant's] commercial [featuring an imitation of Waits' voice] created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.\"",
"sentence": "See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir.1992) (jury was entitled to award singer Tom Waits $75,000 in compensatory damages because it “could have inferred from the evidence that the [defendant’s] commercial [featuring an imitation of Waits’ voice] created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.”); cf. Carol Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal.App.3d 991, 1016, 193 Cal.Rptr. 206 (Cal.Ct.App.1983) (evidence of plaintiffs public image and Enquirer ’s wide readership supported award of $60,000 in damages for injury to reputation)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence of plaintiffs public image and Enquirer 's wide readership supported award of $60,000 in damages for injury to reputation",
"sentence": "See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir.1992) (jury was entitled to award singer Tom Waits $75,000 in compensatory damages because it “could have inferred from the evidence that the [defendant’s] commercial [featuring an imitation of Waits’ voice] created a public impression that Waits was a hypocrite for endorsing Doritos.”); cf. Carol Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal.App.3d 991, 1016, 193 Cal.Rptr. 206 (Cal.Ct.App.1983) (evidence of plaintiffs public image and Enquirer ’s wide readership supported award of $60,000 in damages for injury to reputation)."
} | 12,012,715 | a |
A defendant is an armed career criminal when he violates 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) and has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e)(1). Because a Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, we reject this argument. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "659 F.3d 117, 118-20",
"parenthetical": "holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 118-20 (1st Cir.2011) (holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA); United States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993) (larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence); see also United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 230-33 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "596 F.3d 228, 230-33",
"parenthetical": "holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 118-20 (1st Cir.2011) (holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA); United States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993) (larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence); see also United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 230-33 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline)."
} | 4,202,968 | a |
A defendant is an armed career criminal when he violates 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) and has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e)(1). Because a Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, we reject this argument. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "596 F.3d 228, 230-33",
"parenthetical": "holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 118-20 (1st Cir.2011) (holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA); United States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993) (larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence); see also United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 230-33 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "984 F.2d 21, 25",
"parenthetical": "larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence",
"sentence": "See United States v. Rodriguez, 659 F.3d 117, 118-20 (1st Cir.2011) (holding Massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA); United States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993) (larceny from the person as defined under Massachusetts law constitutes a crime of violence); see also United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 230-33 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that North Carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline)."
} | 4,202,968 | b |
Nor could plaintiffs' conduct in the terminal be reasonably viewed as an escalation of events that would then have given rise to probable cause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "393 F.3d 63, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"The propriety of an officer's actions after an initial stop depends on ... how events unfold.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.2004) (“The propriety of an officer’s actions after an initial stop depends on ... how events unfold.”); cf. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 494-95 (noting that investigation conducted pursuant to a valid Terry stop had yielded probable cause to arrest). The Court fails to grasp the significance of Farag telling Smith that because he spoke Arabic he had been asked by the Bureau of Prisons to translate tapes, and that guns had been pointed at him as a police officer — both logical consequences of his past and present employments."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "935 F.2d 494, 494-95",
"parenthetical": "noting that investigation conducted pursuant to a valid Terry stop had yielded probable cause to arrest",
"sentence": "See United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.2004) (“The propriety of an officer’s actions after an initial stop depends on ... how events unfold.”); cf. Hooper, 935 F.2d at 494-95 (noting that investigation conducted pursuant to a valid Terry stop had yielded probable cause to arrest). The Court fails to grasp the significance of Farag telling Smith that because he spoke Arabic he had been asked by the Bureau of Prisons to translate tapes, and that guns had been pointed at him as a police officer — both logical consequences of his past and present employments."
} | 3,221,147 | a |
Second, the Ninth Circuit's dismissal for failure to plead a viable cause of action is a decision on the merits under that circuit's (and every other circuit's) law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "297 F.3d 953, 957",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b",
"sentence": "Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. d (1982). Furthermore, the issues decided within that decision, even though it was not submitted for publication, are clearly collaterally binding. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "415 U.S. 528, 542",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.\"",
"sentence": "Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. d (1982). Furthermore, the issues decided within that decision, even though it was not submitted for publication, are clearly collaterally binding. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”)."
} | 4,340,761 | a |
Second, the Ninth Circuit's dismissal for failure to plead a viable cause of action is a decision on the merits under that circuit's (and every other circuit's) law. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "297 F.3d 953, 957",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b",
"sentence": "Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. d (1982). Furthermore, the issues decided within that decision, even though it was not submitted for publication, are clearly collaterally binding. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.\"",
"sentence": "Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. d (1982). Furthermore, the issues decided within that decision, even though it was not submitted for publication, are clearly collaterally binding. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”)."
} | 4,340,761 | a |
Second, the Ninth Circuit's dismissal for failure to plead a viable cause of action is a decision on the merits under that circuit's (and every other circuit's) law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.\"",
"sentence": "Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. d (1982). Furthermore, the issues decided within that decision, even though it was not submitted for publication, are clearly collaterally binding. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "297 F.3d 953, 957",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b",
"sentence": "Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[A] dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a ‘judgment on the merits’ to which res judicata applies.”); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits.”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. d (1982). Furthermore, the issues decided within that decision, even though it was not submitted for publication, are clearly collaterally binding. 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (“Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”)."
} | 4,340,761 | b |
The academic literature has also largely criticized the revenue rule as having little application when the foreign sovereign is the plaintiff in a case. See William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 Hous. J. Int'l L. 265 (2000) (stating that Justice Hand's rationale that the review of foreign tax laws might cause the foreign nation "embarrassment" is outdated rationale when foreign government is plaintiff). To reiterate, this Court is less concerned about "embarrassing" Ecuador and is more concerned with encroaching on Legislative and Executive functions. Even Judge Ga-raufis conceded in his initial European Community opinion that separation of powers remains a legitimate basis for invoking the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "150 F.Supp.2d 477, 477",
"parenthetical": "\"abstention under the revenue rule is never warranted in the absence of genuine separation of powers concerns.\"",
"sentence": "See European Cmty. I, 150 F.Supp.2d at 477 (“abstention under the revenue rule is never warranted in the absence of genuine separation of powers concerns.”); see also European Cmty. II, 186 F.Supp.2d at 235 (“the concerns underlying the current version of the revenue rule are satisfied where the proper coordinate branch adequately confers its blessings on jurisdiction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "186 F.Supp.2d 235, 235",
"parenthetical": "\"the concerns underlying the current version of the revenue rule are satisfied where the proper coordinate branch adequately confers its blessings on jurisdiction.\"",
"sentence": "See European Cmty. I, 150 F.Supp.2d at 477 (“abstention under the revenue rule is never warranted in the absence of genuine separation of powers concerns.”); see also European Cmty. II, 186 F.Supp.2d at 235 (“the concerns underlying the current version of the revenue rule are satisfied where the proper coordinate branch adequately confers its blessings on jurisdiction.”)."
} | 9,511,031 | a |
Ill-gotten sums of cash, especially in this relatively small amount, are easily transportable. Given the evidence concerning the existence of various bank accounts, it is more reasonable to infer that an extortionist would seek to disperse or spend his booty in an attempt to hide it. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "756 F.2d 703, 705",
"parenthetical": "probable cause to believe that defendant would have all or some of the $228,241 proceeds of a bank robbery in his residence two months after robbery",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Van Ert, 350 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Wisc.1972) (it was not reasonable to infer that moveable, personal property would be present 55 days after last seen at place to be searched); but cf. United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1985) (probable cause to believe that defendant would have all or some of the $228,241 proceeds of a bank robbery in his residence two months after robbery)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "350 F.Supp. 1339, 1340",
"parenthetical": "it was not reasonable to infer that moveable, personal property would be present 55 days after last seen at place to be searched",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Van Ert, 350 F.Supp. 1339, 1340 (E.D.Wisc.1972) (it was not reasonable to infer that moveable, personal property would be present 55 days after last seen at place to be searched); but cf. United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1985) (probable cause to believe that defendant would have all or some of the $228,241 proceeds of a bank robbery in his residence two months after robbery)."
} | 6,052,084 | b |
The HCADRO is the successor to an agency known as the Health Claims Arbitration Office ("HCAO"). A handful of reported decisions of this Court considered whether the HCAO was a state court for removal purposes, although they ultimately did not resolve the issue. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "909 F.Supp. 304, 308",
"parenthetical": "declining to resolve contention that \"the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Office is not a 'state court' for purposes of removal,\" because removal was improper on other grounds",
"sentence": "See Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F.Supp. 304, 308 (D.Md.1995) (declining to resolve contention that “the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Office is not a ‘state court’ for purposes of removal,” because removal was improper on other grounds); Whitcomb v. Potomac Physicians, P.A., 832 F.Supp. 1011, 1012-13 (D.Md.1993) (same); see also Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F.Supp. 820 (D.Md.1995) (remanding to HCAO based on improper removal on other grounds, without considering whether HCAO was a state court for removal purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "remanding to HCAO based on improper removal on other grounds, without considering whether HCAO was a state court for removal purposes",
"sentence": "See Chaghervand v. CareFirst, 909 F.Supp. 304, 308 (D.Md.1995) (declining to resolve contention that “the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Office is not a ‘state court’ for purposes of removal,” because removal was improper on other grounds); Whitcomb v. Potomac Physicians, P.A., 832 F.Supp. 1011, 1012-13 (D.Md.1993) (same); see also Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F.Supp. 820 (D.Md.1995) (remanding to HCAO based on improper removal on other grounds, without considering whether HCAO was a state court for removal purposes)."
} | 3,955,448 | a |
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Holmes's retaliation claim because Holmes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Smith took an adverse action against Holmes because of his protected conduct. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 F.3d 899, 905",
"parenthetical": "\"[M]ere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.\"",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "791 F.3d 1023, 1035",
"parenthetical": "setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context",
"sentence": "See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); see also Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.”)."
} | 12,388,156 | b |
Plistorically, the Court also viewed the exclusionary rule as preserving the integrity of the judicial process by banishing evidence secured only because government agents violated the Constitution. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "232 U.S. 394, 394",
"parenthetical": "\"To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.\"",
"sentence": "Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394 (“To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.”)- The twin objectives of deterring unconstitutional searches and preserving judicial integrity made the exclusionary rule an essential remedy for Fourth Amendment violations."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "468 U.S. 905, 905-06",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that Court precedent has \"implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment\"",
"sentence": "See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393; cf. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (recognizing that Court precedent has “implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment”)."
} | 12,416,098 | a |
Like the statute at issue in Ransom, section 76-5-401 offends no deeply-rooted and fundamental tradition of due process. Children have historically received special protection from sexual contact with adults. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age",
"sentence": "See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997) (stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\"",
"sentence": "See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997) (stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\")."
} | 11,167,214 | a |
Like the statute at issue in Ransom, section 76-5-401 offends no deeply-rooted and fundamental tradition of due process. Children have historically received special protection from sexual contact with adults. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\"",
"sentence": "See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997) (stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\")."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 240, 244",
"parenthetical": "recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age",
"sentence": "See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997) (stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\")."
} | 11,167,214 | b |
Like the statute at issue in Ransom, section 76-5-401 offends no deeply-rooted and fundamental tradition of due process. Children have historically received special protection from sexual contact with adults. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age",
"sentence": "See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997) (stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\"",
"sentence": "See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n. 8, 72 S.Ct. 240, 244, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (recognizing that statutory rape has historically not required mens rea regarding element of vie-tim's age); see also Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997) (stating that \"[p]rior to 1964, it was the universally accepted rule in the United States that a defendant's mistaken belief as to the age of a victim was not a defense to a charge of statutory rape\")."
} | 11,167,214 | a |
The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs'] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking." Pls.' Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court's interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "322 F.3d 1328, 1332",
"parenthetical": "\"The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_\"",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "561 F.3d 1361, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.\" (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | 4,090,346 | a |
The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs'] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking." Pls.' Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court's interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 U.S. 579, 579",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.\" (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "322 F.3d 1328, 1332",
"parenthetical": "\"The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_\"",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | 4,090,346 | b |
The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs'] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking." Pls.' Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court's interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.\" (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "322 F.3d 1328, 1332",
"parenthetical": "\"The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_\"",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | 4,090,346 | b |
The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs'] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking." Pls.' Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court's interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "561 F.3d 1361, 1361",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.\" (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.3d 1340, 1340",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a takings case, that \"[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | 4,090,346 | b |
The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs'] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking." Pls.' Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court's interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.3d 1340, 1340",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a takings case, that \"[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "292 U.S. 579, 579",
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.\" (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | 4,090,346 | a |
The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs'] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking." Pls.' Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court's interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.\" (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.3d 1340, 1340",
"parenthetical": "recognizing, in a takings case, that \"[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment\"",
"sentence": "See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (recognizing, in a takings case, that “[i]ssues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment”); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 F.3d at 1361 (“[Cjontract rights can be the subject of a takings action.” (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840))."
} | 4,090,346 | b |
As the Tax Court observed in this case, although tax laws designed to raise revenue and simultaneously discourage lawful conduct, such as early withdrawal of retirement savings, must be understood as serving to deter, such taxes generally are not viewed as implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 767, 782",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336",
"parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | 4,305,718 | b |
As the Tax Court observed in this case, although tax laws designed to raise revenue and simultaneously discourage lawful conduct, such as early withdrawal of retirement savings, must be understood as serving to deter, such taxes generally are not viewed as implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336",
"parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | 4,305,718 | b |
As the Tax Court observed in this case, although tax laws designed to raise revenue and simultaneously discourage lawful conduct, such as early withdrawal of retirement savings, must be understood as serving to deter, such taxes generally are not viewed as implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336",
"parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | 4,305,718 | b |
As the Tax Court observed in this case, although tax laws designed to raise revenue and simultaneously discourage lawful conduct, such as early withdrawal of retirement savings, must be understood as serving to deter, such taxes generally are not viewed as implicating the Excessive Fines Clause. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "277 F.3d 1330, 1336",
"parenthetical": "concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana’s tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "511 U.S. 767, 782",
"parenthetical": "concluding that Montana's tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue",
"sentence": "See Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002) (concluding that additional tax for early withdrawal of funds in an IRA does not implicate the Excessive Fines Clause because early withdrawal is not proscribed); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 782, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, 780 (1994) (concluding that Montana’s tax on illegal possession of marijuana imposed punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause and distinguishing taxes that have the dual purpose of raising revenue and discouraging undesirable but lawful conduct and taxes designed solely to raise revenue)."
} | 3,896,389 | a |