purplecat24/Russel · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 74
Project Gutenberg's The Problems of Philosophy, by Bertrand Russell

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org


Title: The Problems of Philosophy

Author: Bertrand Russell

Release Date: June, 2004 [EBook #5827]
Posting Date: May 2, 2009

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII

* START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY *




Produced by Gordon Keener








THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY


By Bertrand Russell




PREFACE

In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those
problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say
something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism
seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a
larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics
much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.

I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E.
Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations
of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards
probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the
criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.

1912




CHAPTER I. APPEARANCE AND REALITY

Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no
reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might
not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can
be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a
straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the
study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer
such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in
ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring
all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the
vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer
scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a
great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may
believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our
present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be
derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate
experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that
I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I
see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out
of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun
is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot
globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's
rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an
indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal
person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and
books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as
the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be
so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who
doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted,
and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure
that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.

To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the
table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is
smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound.
Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this

Project Gutenberg's The Problems of Philosophy, by Bertrand Russell

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with

almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or

re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included

with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org

Title: The Problems of Philosophy

Author: Bertrand Russell

Release Date: June, 2004 [EBook #5827]

Posting Date: May 2, 2009

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY ***

Produced by Gordon Keener

THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

By Bertrand Russell

PREFACE

In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those

problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say

something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism

seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a

larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics

much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.

I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E.

Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations

of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards

probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the

criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.

1912

CHAPTER I. APPEARANCE AND REALITY

Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no

reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might

not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can

be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a

straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the

study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer

such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in

ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring

all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the

vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer

scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a

great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may

believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our

present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be

derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate

experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that

I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I

see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out

of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun

is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot

globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's

rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an

indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal

person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and

books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as

the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be

so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who

doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted,

and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure

that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.

To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the

table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is

smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound.

Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this