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CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 81-708. Argued October 6, 1982 Decided December 13, 1982 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 169. Robert Q. Keith argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was James Douglas Welch. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for the United States were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Marie E. Klimesz. Elizabeth K. Julian, Michael M. Daniel, William L. Robinson, Norman J. Chachkin, Elizabeth C. Petit, and Don Floyd filed a brief for appellees Douglas et al. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, requires that when a State or political subdivision covered by the Act adopts or seeks to administer any change in its standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting, it must obtain a preclearance either from the Attorney General of the United States or by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), held that changes in the boundary lines of a city by annexations that enlarge the number of eligible voters are events covered by §5. The question in this case is whether the District Court for the District of Columbia correctly held that the electoral plan for the Port Arthur, Tex., City Council could not be approved under § 5 because it insufficiently neutralized the adverse impact upon minority voting strength that resulted from the expansion of the city’s borders by two consolidations and an annexation. H — ( In December 1977, the city of Port Arthur, Tex., consolidated with the neighboring cities of Pear Ridge and Lake View. Six months later, the city annexed Sabine Pass, an incorporated area. As a result of these expansions of the city's borders, the percentage of the black population in Port Arthur decreased from 45.21% to 40.56%. Blacks of voting age constituted 35% of the population of the enlarged city. Prior to the expansions, the city was governed by a seven-member Council, including a mayor, each member being elected at large by majority vote. Each member except the mayor was required to reside in a specific district of the city. Members were elected for staggered terms. Following the two consolidations, the City Council passed an ordinance adding an eighth member to the Council, while retaining the at-large system with residency requirements. After the annexation of Sabine Pass, the city further proposed that the Council be expanded to nine members, with at-large elections as before. The two consolidations and the annexation, together with the proposed changes in the governing system, were submitted to the Attorney General for preclearance pursuant to §5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Attorney General refused preclearance, suggesting, however, that he would reconsider if the Council members were elected from fairly drawn single-member districts. As §5 permitted it to do, the city then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that the expansions and the nine-member plan did not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of color or race within the meaning of § 5. While that suit was pending, the city approved by referendum the “4-4-1” plan, calling for four members to be elected from single-member districts, four to be elected at large from residency districts identical to the single-member districts, and the ninth member, the mayor, to be elected at large without any residency requirement. That plan, like the previous plans, required a majority vote to elect each Council member. The city then moved to amend its complaint so as to seek a declaratory judgment as to the legality of the 4-4r-l plan. The District Court concluded that because there were legitimate purposes behind the annexation and the consolidations, those actions, under City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 (1975), could not be denied preclearance as discriminatory in purpose. 517 F. Supp. 987 (1981). Because the expansions had substantially reduced the relative political strength of the black population, however, it was necessary for preclearance that the postexpansion electoral system be found to satisfy the requirements of § 5. The District Court held that neither the first nine-member plan nor the 4-4-1 plan measured up, not only because each was adopted, with a discriminatory purpose, but also because in the context of the severe racial bloc voting characteristic of the recent past in the city neither plan adequately reflected the minority’s potential political strength in the enlarged community as required under City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980); City of Richmond v. United States, supra; and City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972), summarily aff’d, 410 U. S. 962 (1973). Soon after this decision, the city and the United States jointly submitted to the court for approval the “4-2-3” electoral plan. Under this scheme, the city would be divided into four single-member districts, Districts 1 through 4. District 5, comprising Districts 1 and 4 would elect another member, as would District 6, which combined Districts 2 and 3. Three additional members would be elected at large, one each from Districts 5 and 6, the third at-large seat to be occupied by the mayor and to have no residency requirement. All Council seats would be governed by the majority-vote rule, that is, runoffs would be required if none of the candidates voted on received a majority of the votes cast. Blacks constituted a majority in Districts 1 and 4, 79% and 62.78% respectively, as well as a 70.83% majority of the fifth district combining the two majority black districts. The sixth district was 10.98% black. Although the United States expressed reservations about the at-large and majority-vote features, its position was that neither of these aspects of the plan warranted a denial of preclearance. After response to and oral argument upon the submission, the District Court concluded “that the proposed plan insufficiently neutralizes the adverse impact upon minority voting strength which resulted from the expansion of Port Arthur’s borders.” App. 87a. The court added, however, that if the plan were modified to eliminate the majority-vote requirement with respect to the two nonmayoral, at-large candidates, and to permit election to these two seats to be made by a plurality vote, the court “would consider the defect remedied and offer our approval.” Id., at 87a-88a. This appeal followed, the basic submission being that under § 5 and the controlling cases the District Court exceeded its authority in conditioning clearance of the 4-2-3 plan on the elimination of the majority-vote requirement. We noted probable jurisdiction. 455 U. S. 917 (1982). M HH Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), held that annexations by a city are subject to § 5 preclearance because increasing the number of eligible voters dilutes the weight of the votes of those to whom the franchise was limited before the annexation and because the right to vote may be denied by dilution or debasement just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the franchise. It soon became clear, however, that § 5 was not intended to forbid all expansions of municipal borders that could be said to have diluted the voting power of particular groups in the community. In City of Petersburg v. United States, supra, the annexation of an area with a heavy white majority resulted in reducing the black community from majority to minority status. The District Court held that the annexation could nevertheless be approved but “only on the condition that modifications [in the electoral plan] calculated to neutralize to the extent possible any adverse effect upon the political participation of black voters are adopted, i. e., that the [city] shift from an at-large to a ward system of electing its city councilmen.” 354 F. Supp., at 1031. We affirmed summarily. 410 U. S. 962 (1973). Later, in City of Richmond v. United States, supra, we expressly reaffirmed Petersburg, recognizing that the Peters-burg annexation enhanced the power of the white majority to exclude Negroes from the city council but stating that such a consequence “would be satisfactorily obviated if at-large elections were replaced by a ward system of choosing councilmen.” 422 U. S., at 370. It was our view that a fairly designed ward plan “would not only prevent the total exclusion of Negroes from membership on the council but would afford them representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength in the enlarged community.” Ibid. We applied these principles in City of Richmond. There, the annexation of a heavily white area reduced the black population of the city from 52% to 42%, and the electoral proposal submitted for preclearance replaced the prior system of at-large elections with a single-member plan under which blacks would be in a substantial majority in four of the nine councilmanic districts. We held that as long as the ward system fairly reflected the strength of the Negro community as it existed after the annexation, preclearance under §5 should be granted. Under such a plan, “Negro power in the new city [would not be] undervalued, and Negroes [would] not be underrepresented on the council.” Id., at 371. The annexation could not, therefore, be said to have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of § 5. In the case before us, Port Arthur was a party to two consolidations and an annexation. Because the areas taken into the city were predominantly white, the relative percentage of blacks in the enlarged city was substantially less than it was before the expansions. The District Court refused preclearance because in its view the postexpansion electoral system did not sufficiently dispel the adverse impact of the expansions on the relative political strength of the black community in Port Arthur. The city submits that this judgment was in error under Petersburg and Richmond. Richmond, however, involved a fairly drawn, single-member district system that adequately reflected the political strength of the black community in the enlarged city. The plan was consequently an acceptable response to the annexation’s adverse impact on minority voting potential. It does not necessarily follow that the mixed single-member and at-large system at issue in this case sufficiently dispelled the impact of Port Arthur’s expansions on the relative political strength of the black community. The District Court concluded that although the 4-2-3 system provided a black majority in three councilmanic districts, it was necessary also to eliminate the majority-vote requirement with respect to the two nonmayoral at-large council positions. For several reasons, we cannot say that the District Court erred in this respect. First, whether the 4-2-3 plan adequately reflected the political strength of the black minority in the enlarged city is not an issue that is determinable with mathematical precision. Because reasonable minds could differ on the question and because the District Court was sitting as a court of equity seeking to devise a remedy for what otherwise might be a statutory violation, we should not rush to overturn its judgment. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971). Second, the 4-2-3 plan undervalued to some extent the political strength of the black community: one-third of the Council seats was to be elected from black majority districts, but blacks constituted 40.56% of the population of the enlarged city and 35% of the voting age population. In light of this fact, eliminating the majority-vote requirement was an understandable adjustment. As the District Court well understood, the majority-vote rule, which forbade election by a plurality, would always require the black candidate in an at-large election, if he survived the initial round, to run against one white candidate. In the context of racial bloc voting prevalent in Port Arthur, the rule would permanently foreclose a black candidate from being elected to an at-large seat. Removal of the requirement, on the other hand, might enhance the chances of blacks to be elected to the two at-large seats affected by the District Court’s conditional order but surely would not guarantee that result. Only if there were two or more white candidates running in a district would a black have any chance of winning election under a plurality system. We cannot say that insisting on eliminating the majority-vote rule in the two at-large districts would either overvalue black voting strength in Port Arthur or be inconsistent with Richmond. Third, even if the 4-2-3 electoral scheme might otherwise be said to reflect the political strength of the minority community, the plan would nevertheless be invalid if adopted for racially discriminatory purposes, i.e., if the majority-vote requirement in the two at-large districts had been imposed for the purpose of excluding blacks from any realistic opportunity to represent those districts or to exercise any influence on Council members elected to those positions. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S., at 378-379. The District Court made no finding that the 4-2-3 plan was tainted by an impermissible purpose; but it had found that the two preceding plans, the first nine-member plan and the 4r-4r-1 plan, had been adopted for the illicit purpose of preventing black candidates from winning election. The court had also found that the majority-vote requirement was a major means of effectuating this discriminatory end. When it was then presented with the 4-2-3 plan retaining the requirement for the two nonmayoral at-large seats, the Court conditioned approval on eliminating the majority-vote element. It seems to us that in light of the prior findings of discriminatory purpose such action was a reasonable hedge against the possibility that the 4-2-3 scheme contained a purposefully discriminatory element. On balance, we cannot fault the judgment of the District Court. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly Affirmed. It is undisputed that the city of Port Arthur is a political subdivision to which § 5 is applicable. See 28 CFR, p. 461, Appendix (1982). Section 5, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, in relevant part provides as follows: “Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect. . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate tate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made.” The preannexation and postannexation percentages are based on the 1980 census. The figure for the percentage of blacks in the voting age population is an estimate, which the District Court derived by extrapolating from the 1970 census data. The 1970 census showed that at that time 34.6% of the voting age population was black while 40.01% of the general population was black. The District Court itself noted the dangers of extrapolation, but explained that both parties had suggested the procedure for determining the percentage of the current voting age population that is black. Port Arthur also has a Hispanic community, which comprises 6.30% of the enlarged city’s population. The United States unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the referendum election before a three-judge court in the Eastern District of Texas. United States v. City of Port Arthur, No. B-80-216-CA (Sept. 5, 1980). The city argues that the District Court was required to approve a plan jointly submitted by the city and the Attorney General. The Voting Rights Act, however, assigns primary responsibility to the District Court to determine whether a change in voting procedures violates § 5. Pre-clearance by the Attorney General may obviate a court suit, but here the Attorney General was acting in the capacity of a litigant when he joined the city in submitting a plan for the court’s consideration. In that posture, neither the Attorney General, the city, nor both of them together could dictate the court’s conclusion as to the acceptability of the plan under § 5.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. SHIMER. No. 392. Argued April 27, 1961. Decided June 12, 1961. Wayne G. Barnett argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Alan S. Rosenthal, Anthony L. Mondello, Pinckney G. McElwee and Morton Hollander. The cause was submitted on brief by Edward Davis for respondent. William F. McKenna and Samuel E. Neel filed a brief for the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States brought this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to recover from Shimer, on theories of subrogration and indemnity, an amount of $4,000 which the Veterans’ Administration, as guarantor of a loan made to him by Excelsior Saving Fund and Loan Association, had paid to that institution. The relevant facts, as stipulated by the parties, are these: In 1948 Shimer, a World War II veteran, borrowed $13,000 from Excelsior secured by a mortgage upon residential realty which Shimer purchased with the proceeds. At Shimer’s request the Veterans’ Administration, pursuant to Title III of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended in 1945, granted a maximum guarantee of the loan — that is, the lesser of $4,000 or 4/13 of the indebtedness outstanding at any particular time. Both the “Home Loan Report” signed by Shimer, and the Administration certificate of guaranty, specified that the rights of the parties would be governed by Regulations of the Administration in effect at the date of the loan and guaranty. Shimer defaulted in 1948, and in 1949 Excelsior, as mortgagee, notified the Veterans’ Administration of his default and obtained a Pennsylvania judgment foreclosing the mortgage which then secured a debt in excess of $13,000. After the property was purchased by Excelsior at a sheriff’s sale for $250, the Veterans’ Administration paid it the entire guaranty of $4,000 and brought the present action against Shimer. In the Court of Appeals, the United States chose to rely exclusively on the Administration’s alleged right of indemnity against Shimer, and accordingly does not press its claim here upon a theory of subrogation. The Court of Appeals held that the United States was not entitled to recover, reaching this result by applying a well-established principle of surety law which both parties agree was recognized by Congress when it passed Title III: The Veterans’ Administration, as guarantor, could not recover from its principal, Shimer, any amount it was not obligated to pay the mortgagee, Excelsior, on his behalf. Turning to state law to determine the extent of the Administration’s obligation to Excelsior, the court below considered that under Pennsylvania law both Shimer and the Veterans’ Administration had been released from any further liability to Excelsior at the time the Administration paid its $4,000 guarantee, that is, after the foreclosure sale. 276 F. 2d 792. Under the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act a mortgagee who purchases the mortgaged property in execution proceedings cannot recover a deficiency judgment unless and until the mortgagee obtains a court determination of the fair market value of the mortgaged property and credits that amount to the unsatisfied liability. When, as eventuated in this case, the mortgagee fails to bring a proceeding for this purpose within six months after the foreclosure sale, the debtor and guarantor are permanently discharged. We granted certiorari, 364 U. S. 889, to pass upon the contentions of the United States that: (1) the application of state law to determine the Administration’s obligation to Excelsior is inconsistent with the Regulations prescribed by the agency charged with administering the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act; (2) these Regulations are authorized by the federal enactment; and (3) a right of indemnity under federal law arises in favor of the Veterans’ Administration upon proper payment of its obligations as guarantor. I. The Regulations promulgated by the Veterans’ Administration make clear that they were intended to create a uniform system for determining the Administration’s obligation as guarantor, which in its operation would displace state law. Section 36.4321, 12 Fed. Reg. 8344, in subsection (a) implements the “pro rata” requirements of § 500 (b) of the statute, Note 2, supra, and establishes the procedure for computing the amount of the guaranty which the mortgagee can, under § 506 of the statute, demand to have applied against his unpaid claim on the date of default. In this instance it is agreed that such amount is $4,000. However, we are informed by the Solicitor General that the mortgagee is both allowed and encouraged to delay collecting on the guaranty until after all events which may lead to a government offset have taken place. The Administration’s potential right as subrogee to some portion of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale is such a possible offset. Accordingly, Excelsior waited until after the foreclosure sale to collect on the guaranty. This brought Excelsior within subsection (b) of § 36.4321 which provides that “Credits accruing from the proceeds of a sale ... of the security subsequent to the date of computation [pursuant to subsection (a), supra], and prior to the submission of the [guaranty] claim” shall be applied in reduction of the outstanding debt and “the amount payable on the claim shall in no event exceed the remaining balance of the indebtedness.” It was at this point that the Court of Appeals applied the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act to determine the “Credits accruing from the proceeds of . . . [the foreclosure] sale.” However, the method of determining these credits is also specified in the Regulations, indeed spelled out in § 36.4320, 13 Fed. Reg. 7739-7741, in such great detail that there can be little doubt of an administrative intent that such method should provide the exclusive procedure. In substance, that section provides that in every case at least the amount realized at the foreclosure sale is to be credited. It also specifies the way in which the Veterans’ Administration can require the mortgagee to credit more than the amount received at the foreclosure sale and thereby protect itself against the very risk the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act was designed to alleviate — the risk of having to make good its guaranty simply because the mortgaged property is sold for an inadequate price at a judicial sale. The Administrator is authorized to “specify in advance of such sale the minimum amount which shall be credited to the indebtedness of the borrower on account of the value of the security to be sold.” The mortgagee must then reduce the balance of the unpaid debt by at least this minimum amount before collecting on the guaranty. The mortgagee has the option, however, of selling any property it purchased at or below this minimum amount to the Veterans’ Administration for the specified minimum amount. If, as in the present case, the Administrator does not specify a minimum amount “the holder [mortgagee] shall credit against the indebtedness the net proceeds of the sale . . . .” In effect, then, the scheme set up by the Regulations provides the Veterans’ Administration with a measure of assurance that there shall be credited against the unpaid debt at least what the Administrator regards as the fair value of the mortgaged property. In terms of the present case: With an unpaid balance of indebtedness of $13,000, the Veterans’ Administration should not have to pay its full guaranty of $4,000 unless the property which Excelsior may retain is worth less than $9,000. If Excelsior purchased property worth $10,000 for $250 at the foreclosure sale, the Administration should not have to pay more than $3,000 on its $4,000 guaranty, or, to state the matter more precisely, the Administration should realize a $1,000 credit as set off against its $4,000 guaranty which Excelsior could have claimed at the time of default. Accordingly, if the Administrator regarded the mortgaged property as worth $10,000 he could have specified (which he did not) a minimum credit (or “upset price”) of that amount which Excelsior would then have had to credit against the $13,000 unpaid debt. If Excelsior had purchased the property for $10,000 or less, it would have had an option to reconvey the property at a valuation of $10,000 to the Veterans’ Administration. This scheme of protection, while intended to remedy the same abuses at which the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act is directed, is, of course, inconsistent with the Pennsylvania procedures which provide for a judicial determination of the amount to be credited against an outstanding debt and do not obligate the guarantor to purchase the mortgaged property at its judicially determined value. We have no doubt that this regulatory scheme, complete as it is in every detail, was intended to provide the whole and exclusive source of protection of the interests of the Veterans’ Administration as guarantor and was, to this extent, meant to displace inconsistent state law. II. We think that the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act authorized the Veterans’ Administrator to displace state law by establishing these exclusive procedures. In this regard it is important to recall the scope of our review in a case such as this. More than a half-century ago this Court declared that “where Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or this court should be of opinion that his action was clearly wrong.” Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 108-109. This admonition has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. See, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190; Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111; Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793; Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194; Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344. In the present case we need only consider the statutory authorization for § 36.4320 (a) (4) which provides that “If a minimum amount [the upset price] has not been specified by the Administrator . . . the holder shall credit against the indebtedness the net proceeds of the sale . . . .” It would, of course, have been possible for the Administrator to have promulgated regulations consistent with much of the present scheme which would have, in addition, accepted the benefits of local law which tended further to reduce a guarantor’s risk of loss from sale of the mortgaged property at an inadequate price. Thus, with specific reference to the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act, there would have been nothing inherently illogical about administrative regulations providing for an “upset price” device and then adding that, in situations where the “upset price” technique was not used by the Administrator, the Veterans’ Administration was to be entitled to the benefits of the state judicial assessment of the value of property purchased by the mortgagee. However, the Veterans’ Administrator has chosen not to take advantage of laws like that of Pennsylvania. If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned. It is doubtless true that the policy of the Act is, broadly stated, to enable veterans to obtain loans and to obtain them with the least risk of loss upon foreclosure, to both veteran and the Veterans’ Administration as guarantor of the veteran’s indebtedness, and it is equally clear that had the Regulations adopted or included the provisions of the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act this would have furthered at least the second of these purposes. However, there are also ample indications both in the Act and in its legislative history that Congress intended the' guaranty provisions to operate as the substantial equivalent of a down payment in the same amount by the veteran on the purchase price, in order to induce prospective mortgagee-creditors to provide 100% financing for a veteran’s home. The Regulations which the Administrator has adopted provide what the agency could allowably view as a more effective reconciliation of these twofold ends than might be accomplished by a complete or partial adoption of the law of a State such as Pennsylvania. The Regulations assure a Pennsylanvia mortgagee-creditor that he will be able either to recover the full amount of the guaranty or to sell the mortgaged property to the United States and recover the amount of its loss after such sale. For example, in the present situation Excelsior knew that it could either recover $4,000 from the Veterans’ Administration and keep the mortgaged property, or that it could sell the mortgaged property to the United States, recovering on its guaranty the amount by which the unpaid debt exceeded the price which the United States had paid. The only risk of loss with which Excelsior would have been faced was the risk of having on its hands a property worth less than $9,000 to secure a residual debt of $9,000 (after the United States had paid $4,000 of the total debt of $13,000). This is precisely the risk which Excelsior would have had to assume had it insisted upon a $4,000 down payment by the veteran and lent $9,000 on the property. Presumably therefore it was willing to accept a $4,000 guarantee under the Administrator’s Regulations in exchange for a $4,000 down payment. In contrast, a mortgagee whose federal guaranty was subject to the law of a State such as Pennsylvania would be subjected both to an additional cost and to an additional risk, neither of which is present when there is an equivalent down payment. The additional cost is that required in every case to litigate the value of the mortgaged property. The additional risk is that, if it was judicially determined that the property was worth more than the amount for which the mortgagee could in fact sell it, the mortgagee would have to absorb the cost of the judicial error and could recover on its guaranty only the difference between the unpaid debt and the amount of the judicial estimate of the value of the property. Thus if the value of the mortgaged property in the present case had been judicially assessed at $10,000, Excelsior, after payment of the resulting $3,000 on the guaranty, would have been left with the mortgaged property in place of an unrequited $10,000 loan, whereas had it insisted on a $4,000 down payment from the veteran it would have had the mortgaged property to stand for a $9,000 loan. We cannot say that a Pennsylvania lender would not prefer a down payment to a guaranteed loan in the same amount if the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act were applicable. Nor can we say that the Administrator has unreasonably sacrificed either the Government’s or the veteran’s protection in relying exclusively on the “upset price” device in order to preserve the interchangeability of a guaranty with a down payment. The Veterans’ Administration can and does protect itself from a sale at an inadequate price by specifying the minimum credit which the mortgagee must subtract from the unpaid debt. In protecting itself it also places its own financial resources behind the debtor-veteran who may be forced to reimburse the Administrator only if the Administrator considers that the property has been sold at a fair price, and who retains all the benefits of state law as against the mortgagee. We consider the Regulations to be a reasonable accommodation of the statutory ends, first, of making a federal guaranty the substantial equivalent of a down payment, and, second, of protecting both the Veterans’ Administration and the veteran from unnecessary loss on a foreclosure sale. And since we find nothing in the statute or the legislative history antagonistic to this accommodation, we hold the Regulations to be a valid exercise of the authority granted the Administrator in § 504 of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (note 9, supra). III. Respondent’s final contention is that even though the Veterans’ Administration was obligated on its guaranty to Excelsior, the Administration nevertheless had no right to indemnity from him. It is argued, first, that under the Act the Administration, in circumstances like these, can recover over against the veteran only on a theory of subro-gation to the mortgagee’s rights. The Administrator having proceeded in this instance simply on a theory of indemnity, it is claimed that there is no statutory authorization for the present suit. Prior to the amendment of the Act in 1945, it was assumed that the ordinary concomitants of a guaranty relationship would follow upon the mere authorization of Government guaranteed loans and that these included the guarantor’s right of indemnity. Restatement of the Law of Security, § 104; Decisions of the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, No. 625, Vol. 1, p. 1154. The 1945 amendments made explicit that payment of the guaranty would be due on the veteran’s default and that thereupon the Administrator “shall be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the obligation to the extent of the amount paid on the guaranty.” It is argued that this amendment, by negative implication, overruled or rejected what the Administrator had previously regarded as his independent right to indemnity, but surely this is carrying a negative implication too far. We cannot agree that Congress, without any statutory reference to the problem and without any discussion of it, intended to relieve the veteran of direct liability for amounts properly paid on his behalf by the Veterans’ Administration. Not only might such a waiver of a guarantor’s normal rights require a more burdensome route to recovery over from the principal, but it would deprive the guarantor of any recovery on occasions when the mortgagee’s rights were limited as against the debtor by state law, yet were protected against the Administrator by state or federal law. Relief from liability in these circumstances would convert a guaranty into a grant of aid. But the. entire history of the “home loan” provisions of the statute is inconsistent with an intent to make outright grants, rather than loans of cash (S. 1767, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.) or credit, to returning servicemen. Moreover, the recognition of a loss to the guarantor merely because of a failure of the lender’s rights against the principal is incompatible with the background of general surety law against which the statute was drawn. See, e. g., Leslie v. Compton, 103 Kan. 92, 172 P. 1015. Indeed, at the time of the 1945 amendments to the Act the Administrator had already ruled that there was a right to-recover over against the veteran on a theory of indemnity in situations where recovery by way of subrogation was barred by state law. Decisions of the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, No. 625, Vol. 1, p. 1154. For these reasons, we are constrained to agree with the uniform construction of the lower courts, including that of the two courts below, that the statute affords an independent right of indemnity to the Veterans’ Administration. See United States v. Shimer, 276 F. 2d 792; McKnight v. United States, 259 F. 2d 540; United States v. Jones, 155 F. Supp. 52; United States v. Gallardo, 154 F. Supp. 373; United States v. Henderson, 121 F. Supp. 343. Finally, we find untenable respondent’s argument that the applicable Regulation does not support recovery because there was no debt due from the veteran at the time of payment on the guaranty. Section 36.4323 (e), 11 Fed. Reg. 2123, provides: “Any amounts paid by the Administrator on account of the liabilities of any veteran guaranteed or insured under the provisions of the act shall constitute a debt owing to the United States by such veteran.” The Regulation is merely declaratory of a surety’s customary right of indemnity for amounts paid pursuant to an obligation of the guarantor assumed with the consent of the principal. Restatement of the Law of Security, § 104. This right is in general unaffected by defenses of the principal which are not available to the guarantor. Simpson, Suretyship, at p. 227; Stearns, Law of Suretyship, § 284. The Regulation certainly indicates no purpose to depart from the general rule in the case of guaranties by the Veterans’ Administration. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas would affirm the judgment for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals, 276 F. 2d 792. 58 Stat. 291, as amended by 59 Stat. 626. “Sec. 500. (a) Any person who shall have served in the active military or naval service of the United States at any time on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of the present war . . . shall be eligible for the benefits of this title. Any loan made by such veteran within ten years after the termination of the war for any of the purposes, and in compliance with the provisions, specified in this title, is automatically guaranteed by the Government by this title in an amount not exceeding fifty per centum of the loan: Provided, That the aggregate amount guaranteed shall not exceed . . . $4,000 in the case of real-estate loans .... “(b) Loans guaranteed under this title shall be payable under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties thereto, subject to the conditions and limitations of this title and the regulations issued pursuant to section 504: Provided, That the liability under the guaranty within the limitations of this title shall decrease or increase pro rata with any decrease or increase of the amount of the unpaid portion of the obligation . . . .” The computation of the amount of the unpaid debt and the amount consequently owing on the guaranty will be open for further consideration by the District Court on the remand which will result from this opinion. Purdon’s Pa. Stat., Tit. 12, §§2621.1-2621.11. Section 36.4321 (a) provides in relevant part: “Computation of guaranty claims; subsequent accountings, (a) Subject to the limitation that the total amounts payable shall in no event exceed the amount originally guaranteed, the amount payable on a claim for the guaranty shall be the percentage of the loan originally guaranteed applied to the indebtedness computed as of the date of claim but not later than (1) the date of judgment or of decree of foreclosure . . . .” Section 506 of the Act provides: “In the event of default in the payment of any loan guaranteed under this title, the holder of the obligation shall notify the Administrator who shall thereupon pay to such holder the guaranty not in excess of the pro rata portion of the amount originally guaranteed, and shall be subrogated to the rights of the holder of the obligation to the extent of the amount paid on' the guaranty . . . .” Section 36.4320 (whose length and intricacy is such as to make impracticable its spreading in this opinion) was amended in particulars not here relevant and was generally clarified between the dates of the loan and guarantee and the dates of foreclosure and sale. We consider applicable the later wording in light of § 36.4300 of the Regulations which was in effect at the date of the loan and which provided: “Applicability. The regulations in this part and amendments thereto shall be applicable to each loan entitled to an automatic guaranty, or otherwise guaranteed or insured, on or after the date of publication thereof in the FEDERAL REGISTER, and shall be applicable to such loans previously guaranteed or insured to the extent that no legal rights vested thereunder are impaired.” (Emphasis added.) 12 Fed. Reg. 8342. This conclusion is fortified by § 36.4320 (d) which specifically excludes and waives one type of state protection of guarantors and lenders which otherwise would have seemed to fit the other provisions of the section. Subdivision (d) provides: “If a minimum bid is required under applicable State law, or decree of foreclosure or order of sale, or other lawful order or decree, the holder may bid an amount not exceeding such amount legally required. If an amount has been specified by the Administrator and the holder is the successful bidder for an amount not exceeding the amount legally required, such specified amount shall govern for the purposes of this section and for the purpose of computing the ultimate loss under the guaranty or insurance. In the event no amount is specified and the holder is the successful bidder for an amount not exceeding the amount legally required, the amount paid or payable by the Administrator under the guaranty shall not be subject to any adjustment by reason of such bid.” Section 504 of the Act provides: “The Administrator is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this title, as amended, as are necessary and appropriate for carrying out the provisions of this title, and may delegate to subordinate employees authority to issue certificates, or other evidence, of guaranty of loans guaranteed under the provisions of this title, and to exercise other administrative functions hereunder.” See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1418, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3, 9; Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 3749, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 31-33 (General Omar Bradley). Pennsylvania law does not require a mortgagee who purchases the mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale for an amount less than the unpaid debt to return any portion of the down payment pursuant to a judicial assessment of the value of the property. Moreover, at the time the Veterans’ Administration became liable on its guaranty (i. e., on the veteran’s default and prior to the-foreclosure sale, see notes 5 and 6, supra) the Administration and the respondent veteran had no defenses to payment either under state law or under the Regulations of the Administrator. This is made particularly clear by the form of the Regulation which was the predecessor of 11 Fed. Reg. 2123. The earlier Regulation, 9 Fed. Reg. 12655, provided: “(a) Any amounts paid to the creditor by the Administrator pursuant to the guaranty shall constitute a debt due to the United States by the veteran on whose application the guaranty was made . . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GREEN et al. v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF NEW KENT COUNTY et al. No. 695. Argued April 3, 1968. Decided May 27, 1968. Samuel W. Tucker and Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were James M. Nabrit III, Henry L. Marsh 111, and Michael Meltsner. Frederick T. Gray argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Button, Attorney-General of Virginia, Robert D. Mcllwaine III, First Assistant Attorney General, and Walter E. Rogers. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Poliak, Lawrence G. Wallace, and Brian K. Landsberg. Joseph B. Robison filed a brief for the American Jewish Congress, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision is whether, under all the circumstances here, respondent School Board’s adoption of a “freedom-of-choice” plan which allows a pupil to choose his own public school constitutes adequate compliance with the Board’s responsibility “to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis . . . .” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300-301 (Brown II). Petitioners brought this action in March 1965 seeking injunctive relief against respondent’s continued maintenance of an alleged racially segregated school system. New Kent County is a rural county in Eastern Virginia. About one-half of its population of some 4,500 are Negroes. There is no residential segregation in the county; persons of both races reside throughout. The school system has only two schools, the New Kent school on the east side of the county and the George W. Watkins school on the west side. In a memorandum filed May 17, 1966, the District Court found that the “school system serves approximately 1,300 pupils, of which 740 are Negro and 550 are White. The School Board operates one white combined elementary and high school [New Kent], and one Negro combined elementary and high school [George W. Watkins]. There are no attendance zones. Each school serves the entire county.” The record indicates that 21 school buses — 11 serving the Watkins school and 10 serving the New Kent school — travel overlapping routes throughout the county to transport pupils to and from the two schools. The segregated system was initially established and maintained under the compulsion of Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions mandating racial segregation in public education, Va. Const., Art. IX, § 140 (1902); Va. Code § 22-221 (1950). These provisions were held to violate the Federal Constitution in Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, decided with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 487 (Brown I). The respondent School Board continued the segregated operation of the system after the Brown decisions, presumably on the authority of several statutes enacted by Virginia in resistance to those decisions. Some of these statutes were held to be unconstitutional on their face or as applied. One statute, the Pupil Placement Act, Va. Code §22-232.1 et seq. (1964), not repealed until 1966, divested local boards of authority to assign children to particular schools and placed that authority in a State Pupil Placement Board. Under that Act children were each year automatically reassigned to the school previously attended unless upon their application the State Board assigned them to another school; students seeking enrollment for the first time were also assigned at the discretion of the State Board. To September 1964, no Negro pupil had applied for admission to the New Kent school under this statute and no white pupil had applied for admission to the Watkins school. The School Board initially sought dismissal of this suit on the ground that petitioners had failed to apply to the State Board for assignment to New Kent school. However on August 2, 1965, five months after the suit was brought, respondent School Board, in order to remain eligible for federal financial aid, adopted a “freedom-of-choice” plan for desegregating the schools. Under that plan, each pupil, except those entering the first and eighth grades, may annually choose between the New Kent and Watkins schools and pupils not making a choice are assigned to the school previously attended; first and eighth grade pupils must affirmatively choose a school. After the plan was filed the District Court denied petitioners’ prayer for an injunction and granted respondent leave to submit an amendment to the plan with respect to employment and assignment of teachers and staff on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. The amendment was duly filed and on June 28, 1966, the District Court approved the “freedom-of-choice” plan as so amended. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, en banc, 382 F. 2d 338, affirmed the District Court’s approval of the “freedom-of-choice” provisions of the plan but remanded the case to the District Court for entry of an order regarding faculty “which is much more specific and more comprehensive” and which would incorporate in addition to a “minimal, objective time table” some of the faculty provisions of the decree entered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F. 2d 836, aff’d en banc, 380 F. 2d 385 (1967). Judges Sobeloff and Winter concurred with the remand on the teacher issue but otherwise disagreed, expressing the view “that the District Court should be directed . . . also to set up procedures for periodically evaluating the effectiveness of the [Board’s] ‘freedom of choice’ [plan] in the elimination of other features of a segregated school system.” Bowman v. County School Board of Charles City County, 382 F. 2d 326, at 330. We granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 1003. The pattern of separate “white” and “Negro” schools in the New Kent County school system established under compulsion of state laws is precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown I and Brown II were particularly addressed, and which Brown I declared unconstitutionally denied Negro school children equal protection of the laws. Racial identification of the system’s schools was complete, extending not just to the composition of student bodies at the two schools but to every facet of school operations — faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities. In short, the State, acting through the local school board and school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part “white” and part “Negro.” It was such dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I held unconstitutional and a year later Brown II held must be abolished; school boards operating such school systems were required by Brown II “to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.” 349 U. S., at 301. It is of course true that for the time immediately after Brown II the concern was with making an initial break in a long-established pattern of excluding Negro children from schools attended by white children. The principal focus was on obtaining for those Negro children courageous enough to break with tradition a place in the “white” schools. See, e. g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1. Under Brown II that immediate goal was only the first step, however. The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about; it was because of the “complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination” that we provided for “all deliberate speed” in the implementation of the principles of Brown I. 349 U. S., at 299-301. Thus we recognized the task would necessarily involve solution of “varied local school problems.” Id., at 299. In referring to the “personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,” we also noted that “[t]o effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition . . . .” Id., at 300. Yet we emphasized that the constitutional rights of Negro children required school officials to bear the burden of establishing that additional time to carry out the ruling in an effective manner “is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.” Ibid. We charged the district courts in their review of particular situations to “consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.” Id., at 300-301. It is against this background that 13 years after Brown II commanded the abolition of dual systems we must measure the effectiveness of respondent School Board’s “freedom-of-choice” plan to achieve that end. The School Board contends that it has fully discharged its obligation by adopting a plan by which every student, regardless of race, may “freely” choose the school he will attend. The Board attempts to cast the issue in its broadest form by arguing that its “freedom-of-choice” plan may be faulted only by reading the Fourteenth Amendment as universally requiring “compulsory integration,” a reading it insists the wording of the Amendment will not support. But that argument ignores the thrust of Brown II. In the light of the command of that case, what is involved here is the question whether the Board has achieved the “racially nondiscriminatory school system” Brown II held must be effectuated in order to remedy the established unconstitutional deficiencies of its segregated system. In the context of the state-imposed segregated pattern of long standing, the fact that in 1965 the Board opened the doors of the former “white” school to Negro children and of the “Negro” school to white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry whether the Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, segregated system. Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex and multifaceted problems would arise which would require time and flexibility for a successful resolution. School boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. See Cooper v. Aaron, supra, at 7; Bradley v. School Board, 382 U. S. 103; cf. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 TJ. S. 526. The constitutional rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown I permit no less than this; and it was to this end that Brown II commanded school boards to bend their efforts. In determining whether respondent School Board met that command by adopting its “freedom-of-choice” plan, it is relevant that this first step did not come until some 11 years after Brown I was decided and 10 years after Brown II directed the making of a “prompt and reasonable start.” This deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded the harm of such a system. Such delays are no longer tolerable, for “the governing constitutional principles no longer bear the imprint of newly enunciated doctrine.” Watson v. City of Memphis, supra, at 529; see Bradley v. School Board, supra; Rogers v. Paul, 382 TJ. S. 198. Moreover, a plan that at this late date fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system is also intolerable. “The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out,” Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U. S. 218, 234; “the context in which we must interpret and apply this language [of Brown II] to plans for desegregation has been significantly altered.” Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 683, 689. See Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U. S. 263. The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now. The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation. There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance. It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness. Where the court finds the board to be acting in good faith and the proposed plan to have real prospects for dismantling the state-imposed dual system “at the earliest practicable date,” then the plan may be said to provide effective relief. Of course, the availability to the board of other more promising courses of action may indicate a lack of good faith; and at the least it places a heavy burden upon the board to explain its preference for an apparently less effective method. Moreover, whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed. See No. 805, Raney v. Board of Education, post, at 449. We do not hold that “freedom of choice” can have no place in such a plan. We do not hold that a “freedom-of-choice” plan might of itself be unconstitutional, although that argument has been urged upon us. Rather, all we decide today is that in desegregating a dual system a plan utilizing “freedom of choice” is not an end in itself. As Judge Sobeloff has put it, “'Freedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a constitutionally required end — the abolition of the system of segregation and its effects. If the means prove effective, it is acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end. The school officials have the continuing duty to take whatever action may be necessary to create a ‘unitary, nonracial system.’ ” Bowman v. County School Board, 382 F. 2d 326, 333 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion). Accord, Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F. 2d 178 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, supra. Although the general experience under “freedom of choice” to date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation, there may well be instances in which it can serve as an effective device. Where it offers real promise of aiding a desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove itself in operation. On the other hand, if there are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, “freedom of choice” must be held unacceptable. The New Kent School Board’s “freedom-of-choice” plan cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to “effectuate a transition” to a unitary system. In three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a “white” school and a “Negro” school, but just schools. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it affirmed the District Court and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. E. g., Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218; Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, 304 F. 2d 118 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1962); Adkins v. School Board of City of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (D. C. E. D. Va.), aff'd, 246 F. 2d 325 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1957); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1959); Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S. E. 2d 636 (1959). Congress, concerned with the lack of progress in school desegregation, included provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to deal with the problem through various agencies of the Federal Government. 78 Stat. 246, 252, 266, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000c et seq., 2000d et seq., 2000h-2. In Title VI Congress declared that “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued regulations covering racial discrimination in federally aided school systems, as directed by 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-l, and in a statement of policies, or “guidelines,” the Department’s Office of Education established standards according to which school systems in the process of desegregation can remain qualified for federal funds. 45 CFR §§ 80.1-80.13, 181.1-181.76 (1967). “Freedom-of-choice” plans are among those considered acceptable, so long as in operation such a plan proves effective. 45 CFR § 181.54. The regulations provide that a school system “subject to a final order of a court of the United States for the desegregation of such school . . . system” with which the system agrees to comply is deemed to be in compliance with the statute and regulations. 45 CFR § 80.4(c). See also 45 CFR §181.6. See generally Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 Va. L. Rev. 42 (1967); Note, 55 Geo. L. J. 325 (1966); Comment, 77 Yale L. J. 321 (1967). This case was decided per curiam on the basis of the opinion in Bowman v. County School Board of Charles City County, 382 F. 2d 326, decided the same day. Certiorari has not been sought for the Bowman case itself. “We bear in mind that the court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.” Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 154. Compare the remedies discussed in, e. g., NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1. See also Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U. S. 218, 232-234. The views of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, which we neither adopt nor refuse to adopt, are as follows: “Freedom of choice plans, which have tended to perpetuate racially identifiable schools in the Southern and border States, require affirmative action by both Negro and white parents and pupils before such disestablishment can be achieved. There are a number of factors which have prevented such affirmative action by substantial numbers of parents and pupils of both races: “(a) Fear of retaliation and hostility from the white community continue to deter many Negro families from choosing formerly all-white schools; “(b) During the past school year [1966-1967], as in the previous year, in some areas of the South, Negro families with children attending previously all-white schools under free choice plans were targets of violence, threats of violence and economic reprisal by white persons and Negro children were subjected to harassment by white classmates notwithstanding conscientious efforts by many teachers and principals to prevent such misconduct; “(c) During the past school year, in some areas of the South public officials improperly influenced Negro families to keep their children in Negro schools and excluded Negro children attending formerly all-white schools from official functions; “(d) Poverty deters many Negro families in the South from choosing formerly all-white schools. Some Negro parents are embarrassed to permit their children to attend such schools without suitable clothing. In some districts special fees are assessed for courses which are available only in the white schools; “(e) Improvements in facilities and equipment . . . have been instituted in all-Negro schools in some school districts in a manner that tends to discourage Negroes from selecting white schools.” Southern School Desegregation, 1966-1967, at 88 (1967). See id,., at 45-69; Survey of School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States 1965-1966, at 30-44, 51-52 (U. S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 1966). “In view of the situation found in New Kent County, where there is no residential segregation, the elimination of the dual school system and the establishment of a 'unitary, non-racial system’ could be readily achieved with a minimum of administrative difficulty by means of geographic zoning — simply by assigning students living in the eastern half of the county to the New Kent School and those living in the western half of the county to the Watkins School. Although a geographical formula is not universally appropriate, it is evident that here the Board, by separately busing Negro children across the entire county to the 'Negro’ school, and the white children to the 'white’ school, is deliberately maintaining a segregated system which would vanish with non-racial geographic zoning. The conditions in this county present a classical case for this expedient.” Bowman v. County School Board, supra, n. 3, at 332 (concurring opinion). Petitioners have also suggested that the Board could consolidate the two schools, one site {e. g., Watkins) serving grades 1-7 and the other (e. g., New Kent) serving grades 8-12, this being the grade division respondent makes between elementary and secondary levels. Petitioners contend this would result in a more efficient system by eliminating costly duplication in this relatively small district while at the same time achieving immediate dismantling of the dual system. These are two suggestions the District Court should take into account upon remand, along with any other proposed alternatives and in light of considerations respecting other aspects of the school system such as the matter of faculty and staff desegregation remanded to the court by the Court of Appeals.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NIXON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI v. MISSOURI MUNICIPAL LEAGUE et al. No. 02-1238. Argued January 12, 2004 Decided March 24, 2004 Ronald Molteni, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 02-1238. With him on the briefs were Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, pro se, and James R. Layton, State Solicitor. James A. Feldman argued the cause for the federal petitioners in No. 02-1386. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Pate, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, Andrea Dimmer, John A. Rogovin, and Richard K. Welch. Michael K. Kellogg, Geoffrey M. Klineberg, and Sean A. Lev filed briefs for Southwestern Bell Telephone, L. P., petitioner in No. 02-1405. David A. Strauss argued the cause for Missouri Municipal League et al., respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were James Bailer and Richard B. Geltman. Together with No. 02-1386, Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Missouri Municipal League et al., and No. 02-1405, Southwestern Bell Telephone, L. P, fka Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Missouri Municipal League et al., also on certiorari to the same court. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the United States Telecom Association et al. by Andrew G. McBride, Helgi C. Walker, Michael E. Glover, Edward H. Shakin, Michael T. McMenamin, Carrick B. Inabnett, Marc Gary, and Dorian S. Denburg. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Congressman Rick Boucher, for the town of Abingdon, Virginia, et al., and for Educause by Steven R. Minor; for the City of Abilene, Texas, et al. by Steven A. Porter; for the Consumer Federation of America by James N. Horwood and Scott H. Strauss; for the High Tech Broadband Coalition et al. by Deborah Brand Baum; for Knology, Inc., by David O. Stewart and Thomas B. Smith; for Lincoln Electric System by Scott Gregory Knudson, Douglas L. Curry, and William F. Austin; and for the United Telecom Council by Jill M. Lyon and Brett Kilbourne. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the International Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by Henry W. Underhill, Jr.; and for Sprint Corp. by David P. Murray and John G. Short. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 101(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 70, 47 U. S. C. § 253, authorizes preemption of state and local laws and regulations expressly or effectively “prohibiting the ability of any entity” to provide telecommunications services. The question is whether the class of entities in-eludes the State’s own subdivisions, so as to affect the power of States and localities to restrict their own (or their political inferiors’) delivery of such services. We hold it does not. I In 1997, the General Assembly of Missouri enacted the statute codified as §392.410(7) of the State’s Revised Statutes: “No political subdivision of this state shall provide or offer for sale, either to the public or to a telecommunications provider, a telecommunications service or telecommunications facility used to provide a telecommunications service for which a certificate of service authority is required pursuant to this section.” On July 8, 1998, the municipal respondents, including municipalities, municipal organizations, and municipally owned utilities, petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) for an order declaring the state statute unlawful and preempted under 47 U. S. C. § 253: “No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” § 253(a). “If, after notice and an opportunity for public comment, the Commission determines that a State or local government has permitted or imposed any statute, regulation, or legal requirement that violates subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the Commission shall preempt the enforcement of such statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct such violation or inconsistency.” § 253(d). After notice and comment, the FCC refused to declare the Missouri statute preempted, In re Missouri Municipal League, 16 FCC Rcd. 1157 (2001), relying on its own earlier order resolving a challenge to a comparable Texas law, In re Public Utility Comm’n of Texas, 13 FCC Rcd. 3460 (1997), as well as the affirming opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Abilene v. FCC, 164 F. 3d 49 (1999). The agency concluded that “the term ‘any entity’ in section 253(a) . . . was not intended to include political subdivisions of the state, but rather appears to prohibit restrictions on market entry that apply to independent entities subject to state regulation.” 16 FCC Rcd., at 1162. Like the District of Columbia Circuit in Abilene, the FCC also adverted to the principle of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 (1991), that Congress needs to be clear before it constrains traditional state authority to order its government. 16 FCC Rcd., at 1169. But at the same time the Commission rejected preemption, it also denounced the policy behind the Missouri statute, id., at 1162-1163, and the Commission’s order carried two appended statements (one by Chairman William E. Kennard and Commissioner Gloria Tristani, id., at 1172, and one by Commissioner Susan Ness, id., at 1173) to the effect that barring municipalities from providing telecommunications substantially disserved the policy behind the Telecommunications Act. The municipal respondents appealed to the Eighth Circuit, where a panel unanimously reversed the agency disposition, 299 F. 3d 949 (2002), with the explanation that the plain-vanilla “entity,” especially when modified by “any,” manifested sufficiently clear congressional attention to governmental entities to get past Gregory. 299 F. 3d, at 953-955. The decision put the Eighth Circuit at odds with the District of Columbia Circuit’s Abilene opinion, and we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 539 U. S. 941 (2003). We now reverse. II At the outset, it is well to put aside two considerations that appear in this litigation but fall short of supporting the municipal respondents’ hopes for prevailing on their generous conception of preemption under § 253. The first is public policy, on which the respondents have at the least a respectable position, that fencing governmental entities out of the telecommunications business flouts the public interest. There are, of course, arguments on the other side, against government participation: in a business substantially regulated at the state level, regulation can turn into a public provider’s weapon against private competitors, see, e. g., Brief for Petitioner Southwestern Bell Telephone, L. P., in No. 02-1405 et al., pp. 17-18; and (if things turn out bad) government utilities that fail leave the taxpayers with the bills: Still, the Chairman of the FCC and Commissioner Tristani minced no words in saying that participation of municipally owned entities in the telecommunications business would “further the goal of the 1996 Act to bring the benefits of competition to all Americans, particularly those who live in small or rural communities in which municipally-owned utilities have great competitive potential.” 16 FCC Red., at 1172. Commissioner Ness said much the same, and a number of amicus briefs in this litigation argue the competitive advantages of letting municipalities furnish telecommunications services, drawing on the role of government operators in extending the electric power lines early in the last century. Brief for City of Abilene, Texas, et al. as Amici Curiae 14-18; Brief for Consumer Federation of America as Amicus Curiae 7. As we will try to explain, however, infra, at 133-138, it does not follow that preempting state or local barriers to governmental entry into the market would be an effective way to draw municipalities into the business, and in any event the issue here does not turn on the merits of municipal telecommunications services. The second consideration that fails to answer the question posed in this litigation is the portion of the text that has received great emphasis. The Eighth Circuit trained its analysis on the words “any entity,” left undefined by the statute, with much weight being placed on the modifier “any.” But concentration on the writing on the page does not produce a persuasive answer here. While an “entity” can be either public or private, compare, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 9604(k)(l) (2000 ed., Supp. I) (defining “eligible entity” as a state or local government body or its agent) with 26 U. S. C. §269B(c)(l) (defining “entity” as “any corporation, partnership, trust, association, estate, or other form of carrying on a business or activity”), there is no convention of omitting the modifiers “public and private” when both are meant to be covered. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (exposing States to remedies in antidiscrimination suits comparable to those available “against any public or private entity other than a State”). Nor is coverage of public entities reliably signaled by speaking of “any” entity; “any” can and does mean different things depending upon the setting. Compare, e. g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (suggesting an expansive meaning of the term “‘any other term of imprisonment’” to include state as well as federal sentences), with Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 542-546 (2002) (implying a narrow interpretation of the phrase “ ‘any claim asserted’ ” so as to exclude certain claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds). To get at Congress’s understanding, what is needed is a broader frame of reference, and in this litigation it helps if we ask how Congress could have envisioned the preemption clause actually working if the FCC applied it at the municipal respondents’ urging. See, e. g., New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals of N. J., 338 U. S. 665, 673 (1950) (enquiring into “the practical operation and effect” of a state tax on federal bonds). We think that the strange and indeterminate results of using federal preemption to free public entities from state or local limitations is the key to understanding that Congress used “any entity” with a limited reference to any private entity when it cast the preemption net. Ill A In familiar instances of regulatory preemption under the Supremacy Clause, a federal measure preempting state regulation in some precinct of economic conduct carried on by a private person or corporation simply leaves the private party free to do anything it chooses consistent with the prevailing federal law. If federal law, say, preempts state regulation of cigarette advertising, a cigarette seller is left free from advertising restrictions imposed by a State, which is left without the power to control on that matter. See, e. g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 540-553 (2001). On the subject covered, state law just drops out. But no such simple result would follow from federal preemption meant to unshackle local governments from entrepreneurial limitations. The trouble is that a local government’s capacity to enter an economic market turns not only on the effect of straightforward economic regulation below the national level (including outright bans), but on the authority and potential will of governments at the state or local level to support entry into the market. Preemption of the state advertising restriction freed a seller who otherwise had the legal authority to advertise and the money to do it if that made economic sense. But preempting a ban on government utilities would not accomplish much if the government could not point to some law authorizing it to run a utility in the first place. And preemption would make no difference to anyone if the state regulator were left with control over funding needed for any utility operation and declined to pay for it. In other words, when a government regulates itself (or the subdivision through which it acts) there is no clear distinction between the regulator and the entity regulated. Legal limits on what may be done by the government itself (including its subdivisions) will often be indistinguishable from choices that express what the government wishes to do with the authority and resources it can command. That is why preempting state or local governmental self-regulation (or regulation of political inferiors) would work so differently from preempting regulation of private players that we think it highly unlikely that Congress intended to set off on such uncertain adventures. A few hypotheticals may bring the point home. B Hypotheticals have to rest on some understanding of what §253 means when it describes subjects of its preemption as laws or regulations that prohibit, expressly or in effect, “the ability of any entity” to provide telecommunications. The reference to “ability” complicates things. In customary usage, we speak simply of prohibiting a natural or legal person from doing something. To speak in terms of prohibiting their ability to provide a service may mean something different: it may mean denying the entity a capacity or authority to act in the first place. But this is not clear, and it is possible that a law prohibiting the ability to provide telecommunications means a law that limits or cuts back on some preexisting authority (under a different law) to go into the telecommunications business. If the scope of law subject to preemption under § 253 has the former, broader, meaning, consider how preemption would apply to a state statute authorizing municipalities to operate specified utilities, to provide water and electricity but nothing else. The enumeration would certainly have the effect of prohibiting a municipally owned and operated electric utility from entering the telecommunications business (as Congress clearly meant private electric companies to be able to do, see S. Rep. No. 103-367, p. 55 (1994)), and its implicit prohibition would thus be open to FCC preemption. But what if the FCC did preempt the restriction? The municipality would be free of the statute, but freedom is not authority, and in the absence of some further, authorizing legislation the municipality would still be powerless to enter the telecommunications business. There is, after all, no argument that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is itself a source of federal authority granting municipalities local power that state law does not. Now assume that § 253 has the narrower construction (preempting only laws that restrict authority derived from a different legal source). Consider a State with plenary authority itself, under its constitution, to operate any variety of utility. Assume that its statutes authorized a state-run utility to deliver electric and water services, but drew the line at telecommunications. The restrictive element of that limited authorization would run afoul of § 253 as respondents would construe it. But if, owing to preemption, the state operating utility authority were suddenly free to provide telecommunications and its administrators were raring to enter this new field, where would the necessary capital come from? Surely there is no contention that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by its own force entails a state agency’s entitlement to unappropriated funds from the state treasury, or to the exercise of state bonding authority. Or take the application of § 253 preemption to municipalities empowered by state law to furnish services generally, but forbidden by a special statute to exercise that power for the purpose of providing telecommunications services. If the special statute were preempted, a municipality in that State would have a real option to enter the telecommunications business if its own legislative arm so chose and funded the venture. But in a State next door where municipalities lacked such general authority, a local authority would not be able to, and the result would be a national crazy quilt. We will presumably get a crazy quilt, of coruse, as a consequence of state and local political choices arrived at in the absence of any preemption under §253, but the crazy quilt of this hypothetical would result not from free political choices but from the fortuitous interaction of a federal preemption law with the forms of municipal authorization law. Finally, consider the result if a State that previously authorized municipalities to operate a number of utilities including telecommunications changed its law by narrowing the range of authorization. Assume that a State once authorized municipalities to furnish water, electric, and communications services, but sometime after the passage of §253 narrowed the authorization so as to leave municipalities authorized to enter only the water business. The repealing statute would have a prohibitory effect on the prior ability to deliver telecommunications service and would be subject to preemption. But that would mean that a State that once chose to provide broad municipal authority could not reverse course. A State next door, however, starting with a legal system devoid of any authorization for municipal utility operation, would at the least be free to change its own course by authorizing its municipalities to venture forth. The result, in other words, would be the federal creation of a one-way ratchet. A State or municipality could give the power, but it could not take it away later. Private counterparts could come and go from the market at will, for after any federal preemption they would have a free choice to compete or not to compete in telecommunications; governmental providers could never leave (or, at least, could not leave by a forthright choice to change policy), for the law expressing the government’s decision to get out would be preempted. The municipal respondents’ answer to the one-way ratchet, and indeed to a host of the incongruities that would follow from preempting governmental restriction on the exercise of its own power, is to rely on § 253(b), which insulates certain state actions taken “on a competitively neutral basis.” Respondents contend, that a State or municipality would be able to make a competitively neutral change of mind to leave the telecommunications market after deciding earlier to enter it or authorize entry. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33. But we think this is not much of an answer. The FCC has understood § 253(b) neutrality to require a statute or regulation affecting all types of utilities in like fashion, as a law removing only governmental entities from telecommunications could not be. See, e.g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 15 FCC Red. 15168, 15175-15178, ¶¶ 19-24 (2000) (declaratory ruling). An even more fundamental weakness in respondents’ answer is shown in briefs filed by amici City of Abilene and Consumer Federation of America. We have no reason to doubt them when they explain how highly unlikely it is that a state decision to withdraw would be “neutral” in any sense of the word. There is every reason to expect just the contrary, that legislative choices in this arena would reflect the intent behind the intense lobbying directed to those choices, manifestly intended to impede, not enhance, competition. See, e.g., Chen, Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 835, 866-868 (1997). After all, the notion that the legislative process addressing governmental utility authority is susceptible to capture by competition-averse private utilities is fully consistent with (and one reason for) the FCC’s position that statutes like Missouri’s disserve the policy objects of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Given the unlikely application of § 253(b) to state or local choices driven by policy, not business failure, the fair conclusion is that § 253(a), if read respondents’ way, would allow governments to move solely toward authorizing telecommunications operation, with no alternative to reverse course deliberately later on. In sum, §253 would not work like a normal preemptive statute if it applied to a governmental unit. It would often accomplish nothing, it would treat States differently depending on the formal structures of their laws authorizing municipalities to function, and it would hold out no promise of a national consistency. We think it farfetched that Congress meant § 253 to start down such a road in the absence of any clearer signal than the phrase “ability of any entity.” See, e. g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940) (Court will not construe a statute in a manner that leads to absurd or futile results). C Justice Stevens contends that in our use of the hypothetical examples to illustrate the implausibility of the municipal respondents’ reading of §253, we read the statute in a way that produces anomalous results unnecessarily, whereas a simpler interpretation carrying fewer unhappy consequences is available. The dissent emphasizes the word “ability” in the phrase “prohibit or has the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity” to furnish telecommunications. With its focus on this word, the dissent concludes that “§ 253 prohibits States from withdrawing municipalities’ preexisting authority to enter the telecommunications business, but does not command that States affirmatively grant either that authority or the means with which to carry it out.” Post, at 145. Thus, if a State leaves an earlier grant of authority on the books while limiting it with a legislative ban on telecommunications, the new statute would be preempted, and presumably preemption would also defeat a State’s attempted withdrawal of municipalities’ authority by repealing the preexisting authorization itself. But on the very next page, Justice Stevens allows (in the course of disagreeing about the one-way ratchet) that “[a] State may withdraw comprehensive authorization in favor of enumerating specific municipal powers . . . .” Post, at 146. It turns out, in other words, that withdrawals of preexisting authority are not (or not inevitably, at any rate) subject to preemption. The dissent goes on to clarify that it means to distinguish between withdrawals of authority that are competitively neutral in the sense of being couched in general terms (and therefore not properly the subject of preemption), and those in which the repealing law expressly targets telecommunications (and therefore properly preempted). “[T]he one thing a State may not do,” the dissent explains, “is enact a statute or regulation specifically aimed at preventing municipalities or other entities from providing telecommunications services.” Ibid. But the practical implication of that interpretation is to read out of § 253 the words “or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting,” by which Congress signaled its willingness to preempt laws that produce the unwanted effect, even if they do not advertise their prohibitory agenda on their faces. Even if §253 permitted such a formalistic distinction between implicit and explicit repeals of authority, the result would be incoherence of policy; whether the issue is viewed through the lens of preventing anticom-petitive action or the lens of state autonomy from federal interference, there is no justification for preempting only those laws that self-consciously interfere with the delivery of telecommunications services. In short, instead of supplying a more straightforward interpretation of §253, the dissent ends up reading it in a way that disregards its plain language and entails a policy consequence that Congress could not possibly have intended. IV The municipal respondents’ position holds sufficient promise of futility and uncertainty to keep us from accepting it, but a complementary principle would bring us to the same conclusion even on the assumption that preemption could operate straightforwardly to provide local choice, as in some instances it might. Preemption would, for example, leave a municipality with a genuine choice to enter the telecommunications business when state law provided general authority and a newly unfettered municipality wished to fund the effort. But the liberating preemption would come only by interposing federal authority between a State and its municipal subdivisions, which our precedents teach, “are created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them in its absolute discretion.” Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U. S. 597, 607-608 (1991) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424, 433 (2002). Hence the need to invoke our working assumption that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power, in the absence of the plain statement Gregory requires. What we have said already is enough to show that § 253(a) is hardly forthright enough to pass Gregory: “ability of any entity” is not limited to one reading, and neither statutory structure nor legislative history points unequivocally to a commitment by Congress to treat governmental telecommunications providers on par with private firms. The want of any “unmistakably clear” statement to that effect, 501 U. S., at 460, would be fatal to respondents’ reading. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is, accordingly, reversed. It is so ordered. The provision is subject to some exceptions not pertinent here, and as originally enacted the law was set to expire in 2002. The assembly later pushed the expiration date ahead to 2007. Mo. Rev. Stat. §392.410(7) (Supp. 2003). The line between “political subdivision” and “independent entity” the FCC located by reference to state law. By its terms, the FCC order declined to preempt the statute as it applied to municipally owned utilities not chartered as independent corporations, on the theory that under controlling Missouri law, they were subdivisions of the State. 16 FCC Rcd., at 1158. The Commission implied an opposite view, however, regarding the status, under § 253, of municipal utilities that had been separately chartered. Ibid. The question whether §253 preempts state and municipal regulation of these types of entities is not before us, and we express no view as to its proper resolution. The hypothetical city, in other words, is “general law” rather than “home rule.” See City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U. S. 125, 127 (1983) (In contrast to a general law city, a home rule city has state constitutional authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by state legislation). The Court granted certiorari solely to consider whether municipalities are subsumed under the rubric “any entity,” and our holding reaches only that question. There is, nevertheless, a logical affinity between the question presented and the hypothetical situation in which a State were to decide, directly or effectively, against its own delivery of telecommunications services.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KING, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF PENSIONS AND SECURITY, et al. v. SMITH et al. No. 949. Argued April 23, 1968. Decided June 17, 1968. Mary Lee Stapp, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were MacDonald Oallion, Attorney General, and Carol F. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. Martin Garbus argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Leroy D. Clark, and Charles Stephen Ralston for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al.., and by Helen L. Buttenwieser and Ephraim London for the Child Welfare League of America, Inc., et al. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. Alabama, together with every other State, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, and Guam, participates in the Federal Government’s Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§301-1394. This appeal presents the question whether a regulation of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security, employed in that Department’s administration of the State’s federally funded AFDC program, is consistent with Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-609, and with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue is the validity of Alabama’s so-called “substitute father” regulation which denies AFDC payments to the children of a mother who “cohabits” in or outside her home with any single or married able-bodied man. Appellees brought this class action against appellants, officers, and members of the Alabama Board of Pensions and Security, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and in-junctive relief. A properly convened three-judge District Court correctly adjudicated the merits of the controversy without requiring appellees to exhaust state administrative remedies, and found the regulation to be inconsistent with the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction, 390 U. S. 903 (1968), and, for reasons which will appear, we affirm without reaching the constitutional issue. I. The AFDC program is one of three major categorical public assistance programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935. See U. S. Advisory Commission Report on Intergovernmental Relations, Statutory and Administrative Controls Associated with Federal Grants for Public Assistance 5-7 (1964) (hereafter cited as Advisory Commission Report). The category singled out for welfare assistance by AFDC is the “dependent child,” who is defined in § 406 of the Act, 49 Stat. 629, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. II), as an age-qualified “needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with” any one of several listed relatives. Under this provision, and, insofar as relevant here, aid can be granted only if “a parent” of the needy child is continually absent from the home. Alabama considers a man who qualifies as a “substitute father” under its regulation to be a nonabsent parent within the federal statute. The State therefore denies aid to an otherwise eligible needy child on the basis that his substitute parent is not absent from the home. Under the Alabama regulation, an “able-bodied man,, married or single, is considered a substitute father of all the children of the applicant . . . mother” in three different situations: (1) if “he lives in the home with the child’s natural or adoptive mother for the purpose of cohabitation”; or (2) if “he visits [the home] frequently for the purpose of cohabiting with the child’s natural or adoptive mother”; or (3) if “he does not frequent the home but cohabits with the child’s natural or adoptive mother elsewhere.” Whether the substitute father is actually the father of the children is irrelevant. It is also irrelevant whether he is legally obligated to support the children, and whether he does in fact contribute to their support. What is determinative is simply whether he “cohabits” with the mother. The testimony below by officials responsible for the administration of Alabama’s AFDC program establishes that “cohabitation,” as used in the regulation, means essentially that the man and woman have “frequent” or “continuing” sexual relations. With regard to how frequent or continual these relations must be, the testimony is conflicting. One state official testified that the regulation applied only if the parties had sex at least once a week; another thought once every three months would suffice; and still another believed once every six months sufficient. The regulation itself provides that pregnancy or a baby under six months of age is prima facie evidence of a substitute father. Between June 1964, when Alabama’s substitute father regulation became effective, and January 1967, the total number of AFDC recipients in the State declined by about 20,000 persons, and the number of children recipients by about 16,000, or 22%. As applied in this case, the regulation has caused the termination of all AFDC payments to the appellees, Mrs. Sylvester Smith and her four minor children. Mrs. Smith and her four children, ages 14, 12, 11, and 9, reside in Dallas County, Alabama. For several years prior to October 1, 1966, they had received aid under the AFDC program. By notice dated October 11, 1966, they were removed from the list of persons eligible to receive such aid. This action was taken by the Dallas County welfare authorities pursuant to the substitute father regulation, on the ground that a Mr. Williams came to her home on weekends and had sexual relations with her. Three of Mrs. Smith’s children have not received parental support or care from a father since their natural father’s death in 1955. The fourth child’s father left home in 1963, and the child has not received the support or care of his father since then. All the children live in the home of their mother, and except for the substitute father regulation are eligible for aid. The family is not receiving any other type of public assistance, and has been living, since the termination of AFDC payments, on Mrs. Smith’s salary of between $16 and $20 per week which she earns working from 3:30 a. m. to 12 noon as a cook and waitress. Mr. Williams, the alleged “substitute father” of Mrs. Smith’s children, has nine children of his own and lives with his wife and family, all of whom are dependent upon him for support. Mr. Williams is not the father of any of Mrs. Smith’s children. He is not legally obligated, under Alabama law, to support any of Mrs. Smith’s children. Further, he is not willing or able to support the Smith children, and does not in fact support them. His wife is required to work to help support the Williams household. II. The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism. See generally Advisory Commission Report, supra, at 1-59. It is financed largely by the Federal Government, on a matching fund basis, and is administered by the States. States are not required to participate in the program, but those which desire to take advantage of the substantial federal funds available for distribution to needy children are required to submit an AFDC plan for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 49 Stat. 627, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601, 602, 603, and 604. See Advisory-Commission Report, supra, at 21-23. The plan must conform with several requirements of the Social Security Act and with rules and regulations promulgated by HEW. 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (1964 ed., Supp. II). See also HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IY, §§ 2200, 2300 (hereafter cited as Handbook). One of the statutory requirements is that “aid to families with dependent children . . . shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals . . . 64 Stat. 650, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(9) (1964 ed., Supp. II). As noted above, § 406 (a) of the Act defines a “dependent child” as one who has been deprived of “parental” support or care by reason of the death, continued absence, or incapacity of a “parent.” 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. II). In combination, these two provisions of the Act clearly require participating States to furnish aid to families with children who have a parent absent from the home, if such families are in other respects eligible. See also Handbook, pt. IV, § 2200 (b)(4). The State argues that its substitute father regulation simply defines who is a nonabsent “parent” under § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. II). The State submits that the regulation is a legitimate way of allocating its limited resources available for AFDC assistance, in that it reduces the caseload of its social workers and provides increased benefits to those still eligible for assistance. Two state interests are asserted in support of the allocation of AFDC assistance achieved by the regulation: first, it discourages illicit sexual relationships and illegitimate births; second, it puts families in which there is an informal “marital” relationship on a par with those in which there is an ordinary marital relationship, because families of the latter sort are not eligible for AFDC assistance. We think it well to note at the outset what is not involved in this case. There is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program. See Advisory Commission Report, supra, at 30-59. Further, there is no question that regular and actual contributions to a needy child, including contributions from the kind of person Alabama calls a substitute father, can be taken into account in determining whether the child is needy. In other words, if by reason of such a man’s contribution, the child is not in financial need, the child would be ineligible for AFDC assistance without regard to the substitute father rule. The appellees here, however, meet Alabama’s need requirements; their alleged substitute father makes no contribution to their support; and they have been denied assistance solely on the basis of the substitute father regulation. Further, the regulation itself is unrelated to need, because the actual financial situation of the family is irrelevant in determining the existence of a substitute father. Also not involved in this case is the question of Alabama’s general power to deal with conduct it regards as immoral and with the problem of illegitimacy. This appeal raises only the question whether the State may deal with these problems in the manner that it has here— by flatly denying AFDC assistance to otherwise eligible dependent children. Alabama’s argument based on its interests in discouraging immorality and illegitimacy would have been quite relevant at one time in the history of the AFDC program. However, subsequent developments clearly establish that these state interests are not presently legitimate justifications for AFDC disqualification. Insofar as this or any similar regulation is based on the State’s asserted interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy, it plainly conflicts with federal law and policy. A significant characteristic of public welfare programs during the last half of the 19th century in this country was their preference for the “worthy” poor. Some poor persons were thought worthy of public assistance, and others were thought unworthy because of their supposed incapacity for “moral regeneration.” H. Leyendecker, Problems and Policy in Public Assistance 45-57 (1955); Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 326, 327-328 (1966). This worthy-person concept characterized the mothers’ pension welfare programs, which were the precursors of AFDC. See W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children 3-19 (1965). Benefits under the mothers’ pension programs, accordingly, were customarily restricted to widows who were considered morally fit. See Bell, supra, at 7; Leyendecker, supra, at 53. In this social context it is not surprising that both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the Social Security Act of 1935 indicate that States participating in AFDC were free to impose eligibility requirements relating to the “moral character” of applicants. H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1935). See also 79 Cong. Rec. 5679 (statement by Representative Jenkins) (1935). During the following years, many state AFDC plans included provisions making ineligible for assistance dependent children not living in “suitable homes.” See Bell, supra, at 29-136 (1965). As applied, these suitable home provisions frequently disqualified children on the basis of the alleged immoral behavior of their mothers. Ibid. In the 1940’s, suitable home provisions came under increasing attack. Critics argued, for example, that such disqualification provisions undermined a mother’s confidence and authority, thereby promoting continued dependency; that they forced destitute mothers into increased immorality as a means of earning money; that they were habitually used to disguise systematic racial discrimination; and that they senselessly punished impoverished children on the basis of their mothers’ behavior, while inconsistently permitting them to remain in the allegedly unsuitable homes. In 1945, the predecessor of HEW produced a state letter arguing against suitable home provisions and recommending their abolition. See Bell, supra, at 51. Although 15 States abolished their provisions during the following decade, numerous other States retained them. Ibid. In the 1950’s, matters became further complicated by pressures in numerous States to disqualify illegitimate children from AFDC assistance. Attempts were made in at least 18 States to enact laws excluding children on the basis of their own or their siblings’ birth status. See Bell, supra, at 72-73. All but three attempts failed to pass the state legislatures, and two of the three successful bills were vetoed by the governors of the States involved. Ibid. In 1960, the federal agency strongly disapproved of illegitimacy disqualifications. See Bell, supra, at 73-74. Nonetheless, in 1960, Louisiana enacted legislation requiring, as a condition precedent for AFDC eligibility, that the home of a dependent child be “suitable,” and specifying that any home in which an illegitimate child had been born subsequent to the receipt of public assistance would be considered unsuitable. Louisiana Acts, No. 251 (1960). In the summer of 1960, approximately 23,000 children were dropped from Louisiana’s AFDC rolls. Bell, supra, at 137. In disapproving this legislation, then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Flemming issued what is now known as the Flemming Ruling, stating that as of July 1, 1961, “A State plan . . . may not impose an eligibility condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in the home. Assistance will therefore be continued during the time efforts are being made either to improve the home conditions or to make arrangements for the child elsewhere.” Congress quickly approved the Flemming Ruling, while extending until September 1, 1962, the time for state compliance. 75 Stat. 77, as amended 42 U. S. C. § 604 (b). At the same time, Congress acted to implement the ruling by providing, on a temporary basis, that dependent children could receive AFDC assistance if they were placed in foster homes after a court determination that their former homes were, as the Senate Report stated, “unsuitable because of the immoral or negligent behavior of the parent.” S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1961). See 75 Stat. 76, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 608. In 1962, Congress made permanent the provision for AFDC assistance to children placed in foster homes and extended such coverage to include children placed in child-care institutions. 76 Stat. 180, 185, 193, 196, 207, 42 U. S. C. § 608. See S. Rep! No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1962). At the same time, Congress modified the Flemming Ruling by amending § 404 (b) of the Act. As amended, the statute permits States to disqualify from AFDC aid children who live in unsuitable homes, provided they are granted other “adequate care and assistance.” 76 Stat. 189, 42 U. S. C. § 604 (b). See S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1962). Thus, under the 1961 and 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act, the States are permitted to remove a child from a home that is judicially determined to be so unsuitable as to “be contrary to the welfare of such child.” 42 U. S. C. § 608 (a)(1). The States are also permitted to terminate AFDC assistance to a child living in an unsuitable home, if they provide other adequate care and assistance for the child under a general welfare program. 42 U. S. C. § 604 (b). See S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1962). The statutory approval of the Flemming Ruling, however, precludes the States from otherwise denying AFDC assistance to dependent children on the basis of their mothers’ alleged immorality or to discourage illegitimate births. The most recent congressional amendments to the Social Security Act further corroborate that federal public welfare policy now rests on a basis considerably more sophisticated and enlightened than the “worthy-person” concept of earlier times. State plans are now required to provide for a rehabilitative program of improving and correcting unsuitable homes, §402 (a), as amended by § 201 (a)(1)(B), 81 Stat. 877, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (14) (1964 ed., Supp. Ill); §406, as amended by §201 (f), 81 Stat. 880, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (1964 ed., Supp. Ill) ; to provide voluntary family planning services for the purpose of reducing illegitimate births, § 402 (a), as amended by § 201 (a)(1)(C), 81 Stat. 878, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (15) (1964 ed., Supp. Ill); and to provide a program for establishing the paternity of illegitimate children and securing support for them, § 402 (a), as amended by § 201 (a)(1)(C), 81 Stat. 878, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (17) (1964 ed., Supp. III). In sum, Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that punish dependent children, and that protection of such children is the paramount goal of AFDC. In light of the Flemming Ruling and the 1961, 1962, and 1968 amendments to the Social Security Act, it is simply inconceivable, as HEW has recognized, that Alabama is free to discourage immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification of needy children. Alabama may deal with these problems by several different methods under the Social Security Act. But the method it has chosen plainly conflicts with the Act. III. Alabama's second justification for its substitute father regulation is that “there is a public interest in a State not undertaking the payment of these funds to families who because of their living arrangements would be in the same situation as if the parents were married, except for the marriage.” In other words, the State argues that since in Alabama the needy children of married couples are not eligible for AFDC aid so long as their father is in the home, it is only fair that children of a mother who cohabits with a man not her husband and not their father be treated similarly. The difficulty with this argument is that it fails to take account of the circumstance that children of fathers living in the home are in a very different position from children of mothers who cohabit with men not their fathers: the child's father has a legal duty to support him, while the unrelated substitute father, at least in Alabama, does not. We believe Congress intended the term’“parent” in § 406 (a) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a), to include only those persons with a legal duty of support. The Social Security Act of 1935 was part of a broad legislative program to counteract the depression. Congress was deeply concerned with the dire straits in which all needy children in the Nation then found themselves. In agreement with the President’s Committee on Economic Security, the House Committee Report declared, “the core of any social plan must be the child.” H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). The AFDC program, however, was not designed to aid all needy children. The plight of most children was caused simply by the unemployment of their fathers. With respect to these children, Congress planned that “the work relief program and . . . the revival of private industry” would provide employment for their fathers. S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935). As the Senate Committee Report stated: “Many of the children included in relief families present no other problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner of the family.” Ibid. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that children would in fact be supported by the family “breadwinner.” The AFDC program was designed to meet a need unmet by programs providing employment for breadwinners. It was designed to protect what the House Report characterized as “[o]ne clearly distinguishable group of children.” H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). This group was composed of children in families without a “breadwinner,” “wage earner,” or “father,” as the repeated use of these terms throughout the Report of the President’s Committee, Committee Hearings and Reports and the floor debates makes perfectly clear. To describe the sort of breadwinner that it had in mind, Congress employed the word “parent.” 49 Stat. 629, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a). A child would be eligible for assistance if his parent was deceased, incapacitated or continually absent. The question for decision here is whether Congress could have intended that a man was to be regarded as a child’s parent so as to deprive the child of AFDC eligibility despite the circumstances: (1) that the man did not in fact- support the child; and (2) that he was not legally obligated to support the child. The State correctly observes that the fact that the man in question does not actually support the child cannot be determinative, because a natural father at home may fail actually to support his child but his presence will still render the child ineligible for assistance. On the question whether the man must be legally obligated to provide support before he can be regarded as the child’s parent, the State has no such cogent answer. We think the answer is quite clear: Congress must have meant by the term “parent” an individual who owed to the child a state-imposed legal duty of support. It is clear, as we have noted, that Congress expected “breadwinners” who secured employment would support their children. This congressional expectation is most reasonably explained on the basis that the kind of breadwinner Congress had in mind was one who was legally obligated to support his children. We- think it beyond reason to believe that Congress would have considered that providing employment for the paramour of a deserted mother would benefit the mother’s children whom he was not obligated to support. By a parity of reasoning, we think that Congress must have intended that the children in such a situation remain eligible for AFDC assistance notwithstanding their mother’s impropriety. AFDC was intended to provide economic security for children whom Congress could not reasonably expect would be provided for by simply securing employment for family breadwinners. We think it apparent that neither Congress nor any reasonable person would believe that providing employment for some man who is under no legal duty to support a child would in any way provide meaningful economic security for that child. A contrary view would require us to assume that Congress, at the same time that it intended to provide programs for the economic security and protection of all children, also intended arbitrarily to leave one class of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection. Children who are told, as Alabama has told these appel-lees, to look for their food to a man who is not in the least obliged to support them are without meaningful protection. Such an interpretation of congressional intent would be most unreasonable, and we decline to adopt it. Our interpretation of the term “parent” in § 406 (a) is strongly supported by the way the term is used in other sections of the Act. Section 402 (a) (10) requires that, effective July 1, 1952, a state plan must: “provide for prompt notice to appropriate law-enforcement officials of the furnishing of aid to families with dependent children in respect of a child who has been deserted or abandoned by a parent.” 64 Stat. 550, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10). (Emphasis added.) The “parent” whom this provision requires to be reported to law enforcement officials is surely the same “parent” whose desertion makes a child eligible for AFDC assistance in the first place. And Congress obviously did not intend that a so-called “parent” who has no legal duties of support be referred to law enforcement officials (as Alabama’s own welfare regulations recognize), for the very purpose of such referrals is to institute nonsupport proceedings. See Handbook, pt. IV, §§ 8100-8149. Whatever doubt there might have been over this proposition has been completely dispelled by the 1968 amendments to the Social Security Act, which provide that the States must develop a program: “(i) in the case of a child born out of wedlock who is receiving aid to families with dependent children, to establish the paternity of such child and secure support for him, and “(ii) in the case of any child receiving such aid who has been deserted or abandoned by his parent, to secure support for such child from such parent (or from any other person legally liable for such support) . . . .” § 402 (a), as amended by § 201 (a) (1)(C), 81 Stat. 878, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(17) (1964 ed., Supp. III). (Emphasis added.) Another provision in the 1968 amendments requires the States, effective January 1, 1969, to report to HEW any “parent . . . against whom an order for the support and maintenance of such [dependent] child or children has been issued by” a court, if such parent is not making the required support payments. §402 (a), as amended by §211 (a), 81 Stat. 896, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (21) (1964 ed., Supp. III). (Emphasis added.) Still another amendment requires the States to cooperate with HEW in locating any parent against whom a support petition has been filed in another State, and in securing compliance with any support order issued by another State, § 402 (a), as amended by § 211 (a), 81 Stat. 897, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (22) (1964 ed., Supp. III). The pattern of this legislation could not be clearer. Every effort is to be made to locate and secure support payments from persons legally obligated to support a deserted child. The underlying policy and consistency in statutory interpretation dictate that the “parent” referred to in these statutory provisions is the same parent as that in § 406 (a). The provisions seek to secure parental support in lieu of AFDC support for dependent children. Such parental support can be secured only where the parent is under a state-imposed legal duty to support the child. Children with alleged substitute parents who owe them no duty of support are entirely unprotected by these provisions. We think that these provisions corroborate the intent of Congress that the only kind of “parent,” under § 406 (a), whose presence in the home would provide adequate economic protection for a dependent child is one who is legally obligated to support him. Consequently, if Alabama believes it necessary that it be able to disqualify a child on the basis of a man who is not under such a duty of support, its arguments should be addressed to Congress and not this Court. IV. Alabama’s substitute father regulation, as written and as applied in this case, requires the disqualification of otherwise eligible dependent children if their mother “cohabits” with a man who is not obligated by Alabama law to support the children. The regulation is therefore invalid because it defines “parent” in a manner that is inconsistent with § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act. 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a). In denying AFDC assistance to appellees on the basis of this invalid regulation, Alabama has breached its federally imposed obligation to furnish “aid to families with dependent children . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(9) (1964 ed., Supp. II). Our conclusion makes unnecessary consideration of appellees’ equal-protection claim, upon which we intimate no views. We think it well, in concluding, to emphasize that no legitimate interest of the State of Alabama is defeated by the decision we announce today. The State's interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy may be protected by other means, subject to constitutional limitations, including state participation in AFDC rehabilitative programs. Its interest in economically allocating its limited AFDC resources may be protected by its undisputed power to set the level of benefits and the standard of need, and by its taking into account in determining whether a child is needy all actual and regular contributions to his support. All responsible governmental agencies in the Nation today recognize the enormity and pervasiveness of social ills caused by poverty. The causes of and cures for poverty are currently the subject of much debate. We hold today only that Congress has made at least this one determination: that destitute children who are legally fatherless cannot be flatly denied federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they have a substitute father. Affirmed. The program was originally known as “Aid to Dependent Children.” 49 Stat. 627. Alabama’s program still bears this title. In the 1962 amendments to the Act, however, the name of the program was changed to “Aid and Services to Needy Families With Children,” 76 Stat. 185. Throughout this opinion, the program will be referred to as “Aid to Families With Dependent Children,” or AFDC. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Since appellees sought injunctive relief restraining the appellant state officials from the enforcement, operation, and execution of a statewide regulation on the ground of its unconstitutionality, the three-judge court was properly convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2281. See Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 343, n. 3 (1951). See also Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 (1960); Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535 (1954). Jurisdiction was conferred on the court by 28 U. S. C. §§1343 (3) and (4). The decision we announce today holds Alabama’s substitute father regulation invalid as inconsistent with Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act. We intimate no views as to whether and under what circumstances suits challenging state AFDC provisions only on the ground that they are inconsistent with the federal statute may be brought in federal courts. See generally Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Col. L. Rev. 84 (1967). We reject appellants’ argument that appellees were required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing this action. Pursuant to the requirement of the Social Security Act that States must grant AFDC applicants who are denied aid “an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency,” 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (4) (1964 ed., Supp. II), Alabama provides for administrative review of such denials. Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, § II, pp. V-5 to V-12. Decisions of this Court, however, establish that a plaintiff in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, is not required to exhaust administrative remedies, where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial, as here, to require the convening of a three-judge court. Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). See also McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 180-183 (1961). For a general discussion of review in the federal courts of state welfare practices, see Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Col. L. Rev. 84 (1967). Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (D. C. M. D. Ala. 1967). A needy child, to qualify for the AFDC assistance, must be under the age of 18, or under the age of 21 and a student, as defined by HEW. 79 Stat. 422, 42 U. S. C. §§ 606 (a) (2) (A) and (B) (1964 ed., Supp. II). The States are also permitted to consider as dependent children needy children who have an unemployed parent, as is discussed in n. 13, infra, and needy children without a parent who have under certain circumstances been placed in foster homes or child care institutions. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 607, 608. Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, c. II, § VI. Under the regulation, when “there appears to be a substitute father,” the mother bears the burden of proving that she has discontinued her relationship with the man before her AFDC assistance will be resumed. The mother’s claim of discontinuance must be “corroborated by at least two acceptable references in a position to know. Examples of acceptable references are: law-enforcement officials; ministers; neighbors; grocers.” There is no hearing prior to the termination of aid, but an applicant denied aid may secure state administrative review. Under Alabama statutes, a legal duty of support is imposed only upon a “parent,” who is defined as (1) a “natural legal parent,” (2) one who has “legally acquired the custody of” the child, and (3) “the father of such child, . . . though bom out of lawful wedlock.” Ala. Code, Tit. 34, §§89, 90; Ala. Code, Tit, 27, §§ 12 (1), 12 (4) (1965 Supp.). Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939). The Alabama courts have interpreted the statute to impose a legal duty of support upon one who has “publicly acknowledged or treated the child as his own, in a manner to indicate his voluntary assumption of parenthood” irrespective of whether the alleged parent is in fact the child’s real father. Law v. State, 238 Ala. 428, 430, 191 So. 803, 805 (1939). It seems clear, however, that even a stepfather who is not the child’s natural parent and has not acquired legal custody of him is under an obligation of support only if he has made this “voluntary assumption of parenthood.” See Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 189 So. 751 (1939); Englehardt v. Yung’s Heirs, 76 Ala. 534, 540 (1884); Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala. App. 574, 28 So. 2d 422 (1946). Further, the Alabama Supreme Court has emphasized that the alleged father’s intention to support the child, requisite to a finding of voluntary assumption of parenthood, “should not be slightly [sic] nor hastily inferred . . . .” Englehardt v. Yung’s Heirs, 76 Ala. 534, 540 (1884). Alabama’s substitute father regulation has been neither approved nor disapproved by HEW. There has, however, been considerable correspondence between the Alabama and federal authorities concerning the regulation, as is discussed in n. 23, infra. Unless HEW approves the plan, federal funds will not be made available for its implementation. 42 U. S. C. § 601. Further, HEW may entirely or partially terminate federal payments if “in the administration of the [state] plan there is a failure to comply substantially with any provision required by section 602 (a) of this title to be included in the plan.” § 245, 81 Stat. 918, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §604 (1964 ed., Supp. III). See generally Advisory Commission Report, supra, at 61-80. Commencing in 1961, federal matching funds have been made available under the AFDC subchapter of the Social Security Act for a State which grants assistance to needy children who have two able-bodied parents living in the home, but who have been “deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment . . . of a parent.” 42 U. S. C. § 607. Participation in this program for aid to dependent children of unemployed parents is not obligatory on the States, and the Court has been advised that only 21 States participate. Alabama does not participate. HEW’s Handbook, in pt. IV, §3120, provides that: “A needy individual . . . [under AFDC] is one who does not have income and resources sufficient to assure economic security, the standard of which must be defined by each State. The act recognizes that the standard so defined depends upon the conditions existing in each State.” (Emphasis added.) The legislative history of the Act also makes clear that the States have power to determine who is “needy” for purposes of AFDC. Thus the Reports of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee make clear that the States are free to impose eligibility requirements as to “means.” H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1935). The floor debates corroborate that this was Congress’ intent. For example, Repre-sentativo Vinson explained that “need is to be determined under the State law.” 79 Cong. Rec. 5471 (1935). The rather complicated formula for federal funding is contained in 42 U. S. C. § 603. The level of benefits is within the State’s discretion, but the Federal Government’s contribution is a varying percentage of the total AFDC expenditures within each State. See H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 24 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4, 36 (1935). The benefit levels vary greatly from State to State. For example, for May 1967, the average payment to a family under AFDC was about $224 in New Jersey, $221 in New York, $39 in Mississippi, $20 in Puerto Rico, and $53 in Alabama. Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 296-297 (1967). See generally Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 Albany L. Rev. 210, 226-227 (1967). Indeed, the Act requires that in determining need the state agency “shall . . . taire into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §602 (a)(7) (1964 ed., Supp. II). Regulations of HEW, which clearly comport with the statute, restrict the resources which are to be taken into account under § 602 to those “that are, in fact, available to an applicant or recipient for current use on a regular basis . . . .” This regulation properly excludes from consideration resources which are merely assumed to be available to the needy individual. Handbook, pt. IV, §3131 (7). See also §§ 3120, 3123, 3124, 3131 (10), and 3131 (11). For a discussion of the mothers’ pension welfare programs, see J. Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939, at 26-32 (1940). Bell quotes a case record, for example, where a mother whose conduct with men displeased a social worker was required, as a condition of continued assistance, to sign an affidavit stating that, “I . . . do hereby promise and agree that until such time as the following agreement is rescinded, I will not have any male callers coming to my home nor meeting me elsewhere under improper conditions.” Bell, supra, at 48. State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. (Emphasis added.) The Senate Finance Committee Report explained the purpose of the amendment as follows: “The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in January 1961 advised the State agencies administering title IV of the Social Security Act — aid to dependent children — that after June 30, 1961, grants to States would not be available if the State terminated assistance to children in a home determined to be unsuitable unless the State made other provision for the children affected. Section 4 of your committee’s bill would provide that the requirement made by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare would not become effective in States which took the type of action described, as the result of a State statute requiring such action, before the 61st day after the end of the regular session of such State’s legislature, such regular session beginning following the enactment of this section. One or two of the States affected by the Department’s ruling do not have regular sessions of their legislatures in 1961 and would accordingly be safeguarded against the withholding of funds until such time as their legislatures have had regular sessions and have had an opportunity to modify the State statutes involved.” S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1961). For a discussion by then Secretary of HEW Ribieoff and now Secretary Cohen concerning the 1961 amendments in relation to the Flemming Ruling, see Hearings on H. R. 10032 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-F-297, 305-307 (1962). The new emphasis on rehabilitative services began with the Kennedy Administration. President Kennedy, in his 1962 welfare message to the Congress, observed that communities that had attempted to cut down welfare expenditures through arbitrary cutbacks had met with little success, but that “communities which have tried the rehabilitative road — the road I have recommended today — have demonstrated what can be done with creative . . . programs of prevention and social rehabilitation.” See Hearings on H. R. 10606 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 109 (1962). Some insight into the mood of the Congress that approved the Flemming Ruling in 1961 with respect to this matter is provided by an exchange during the debates on the floor of the House. Representative Gross inquired of Representative Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, concerning the AFDC status of illegitimate children. After a brief discussion in which Representative Mills explained that he was looking into the problem of illegitimacy, Representative Hoffman asked whether Representative Gross was taking the position that “these innocent children, no matter what the circumstances under which they were born, are to be deprived of the necessities of life.” Representative Gross replied, “Oh, no; not at all,” and agreed with Representative Hoffman’s subsequent statement that the proper approach would be to attempt to prevent illegitimate births. 107 Cong. Rec. 3766 (1961). See generally Bell, supra, at 152-173. Both before and after the Flemming Ruling, the Alabama and federal authorities corresponded with considerable frequency concerning the State’s suitable home and substitute father policies. In April 1959, HEW by letter stated that “suitable home” legislation then being proposed by Alabama raised substantial questions of conformity with the Social Security Act, because it seemed to deprive children of AFDC assistance on the basis of illegitimate births in the family. In May 1959 and again in August 1959 new suitable home policies were submitted and were rejected by HEW. Negotiations continued, and in June 1961, HEW responded that the newest legislative proposal was inconsistent with Congress’ statutory approval of the Flemming Ruling because (1) assistance would be denied to children on the basis that their homes were unsuitable but they would be permitted to remain in the homes; and (2) a home could be found unsuitable simply on the basis of the child’s birth status. Still later, on June 12, 1963, HEW rejected another Alabama suitable home provision on-the ground that it provided for denial of AFDC assistance while the child remained in the home without providing for other “adequate care and assistance,” as required by the 1962 amendment to the Federal Act. The evidence below establishes that soon after appellant King’s appointment as Commissioner, he undertook a study that led to the adoption of the substitute father regulation. When this regulation was submitted to HEW, it responded that the regulation did not conform with 42 U. S. C. § 604 (b) for the same reasons as its predecessor legislative proposals. Additional correspondence ensued, but HEW never approved the regulation. See H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9-10 (1935) (characterizing children as “the most tragic victims of the depression”); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1935) (declaring that the “heart of any program for social security must be the child”). See H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5, 29-30 (1935). Hearings on H. It. 4120 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 158-161, 166, 174, 262-264 (1935); Hearings on S. 1130 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 102, 181, 337-338, 647, 654 (1935). See H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17-18 (1935). See 79 Cong. Rec. 5468, 5476, 5786, 5861 (1935). As the Senate Committee Report stated, AFDC was intended to provide for children who “will not be benefited through work programs or the revival of industry.” S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935). Alabama’s own welfare regulations state: “Report parents who ■are legally responsible under Alabama law. These are the natural or adoptive parents of a child. A natural parent includes the father of a child born out of wedlock, if paternity has been legally established. It does not apply to a stepparent.” Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. I, c. II, p. 36. HEW requires States to give notice of desertion only with respect to persons who, “under State laws, are defined as parents . . . for the support of minor children, and against whom legal action may be taken under such laws for desertion or abandonment.” Handbook, pt. IV, §8131 (2). And, as discussed in n. 10, supra, the alleged substitute father in the case at bar is not legally obligated by Alabama law to support the appellee children. See also Handbook, pt. IV, § 3412 (4) (providing that a stepparent not required by state law to support a child need not be considered the child’s parent). Another 1968 amendment provides for the cooperation of the Internal Revenue Service in locating missing “parents.” §410, 81 Stat. 897. We intimate no views whatsoever on the constitutionality of any such hypothetical legislative proposal. There is of course no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed, and that any state law or regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and conditions is to that extent invalid. See Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U. S. 127, 143 (1947). It is equally clear that to the extent HEW has approved any so-called “man-in-the-house” provision which conflicts with § 406 (a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a), such approval is inconsistent with the controlling federal statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PUD NO. 1 OF JEFFERSON COUNTY et al. v. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY et al. No. 92-1911. Argued February 23, 1994 Decided May 31, 1994 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 723. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 724. Howard, E. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Michael A. Swiger, Gary D. Bachman, Albert R. Malanca, and Kenneth G. Kieffer. Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the briefs were Jay J. Manning, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and William C. Frymire, Assistant Attorney General. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, James A. Feldman, and Anne S. Almy. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Forest & Paper Association et al. by John R. Molm, Winifred D. Simpson, and James A Lamberth; for Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. by Edward Berlin, Kenneth G. Jaffe, Paul J. Kaleta, Brian K. Billinson, and Timothy P. Sheehan; for the Northwest Hydroelectric Association by Richard M. Glick and Lory J. Kraut; for Pacific Northwest Utilities by Sherilyn Peterson and R. Gerard Lutz; and for the Western Urban Water Coalition by Benjamin S. Sharp and Guy R. Martin. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Vermont et al. by Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, and Ronald A Shems, Assistant Attorney General, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, and Kathleen Liston Morrison, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Robert A Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Roland A Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Pamela Fanning Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Fred DeVesa, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Jefferey B. Pine, Attorney General of Rhode Island, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Jan Graham, Attorney General of Utah, Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General of Virginia, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming, and John Payton, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia; and for American Rivers et al. by Paul M. Smith. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, a city and a local utility district, want to build a hydroelectric project on the Dosewallips River in Washington State. We must decide whether respondent state environmental agency (hereinafter respondent) properly conditioned a permit for the project on the maintenance of specific minimum stream flows to protect salmon and steelhead runs. I This case involves the complex statutory and regulatory scheme that governs our Nation’s waters, a scheme that implicates both federal and state administrative responsibilities. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., is a comprehensive water quality statute designed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” § 1251(a). The Act also seeks to attain “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife.” § 1251(a)(2). To achieve these ambitious goals, the Clean Water Act establishes distinct roles for the Federal and State Governments. Under the Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required, among other things, to establish and enforce technology-based limitations on individual discharges into the country’s navigable waters from point sources. See §§1311, 1314. Section 303 of the Act also requires each State, subject to federal approval, to institute comprehensive water quality standards establishing water quality goals for all intrastate waters. §§ 1311(b) (1)(C), 1313. These state water quality standards provide “a supplementary basis ... so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U. S. 200, 205, n. 12 (1976). A state water quality standard “shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). In setting standards, the State must comply with the following broad requirements: “Such standards shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational [and other purposes.]” Ibid. See also § 1251(a)(2). A 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act makes clear that § 303 also contains an “antidegradation policy” — that is, a policy requiring that state standards be sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters, preventing their further degradation. Specifically, the Act permits the revision of certain effluent limitations or water quality standards “only if such revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy established under this section.” § 1313(d)(4)(B). Accordingly, EPA’s regulations implementing the Act require that state water quality standards include “a statewide antidegradation policy” to ensure that “[e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected.” 40 CFR § 131.12 (1993). At a minimum, state water quality standards must satisfy these conditions. The Act also allows States to impose more stringent water quality controls. See 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1370. See also 40 CFR § 131.4(a) (1993) (“As recognized by section 510 of the Clean Water Act[, 33 U. S. C. § 1370], States may develop water quality standards more stringent than required by this regulation”). The State of Washington has adopted comprehensive water quality standards intended to regulate all of the State’s navigable waters. See Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-201-010 to 173-201-120 (1986). The State created an inventory of all the State’s waters, and divided the waters into five classes. 173-201-045. Each individual fresh surface water of the State is placed into one of these classes. 173-201-080. The Dosewallips River is classified AA, extraordinary. 173-201-080(32). The water quality standard for Class AA waters is set forth at 173-201-045(1). The standard identifies the designated uses of Class AA waters as well as the criteria applicable to such waters. In addition to these specific standards applicable to Class AA waters, the State has adopted a statewide antidegradation policy. That policy provides: “(a) Existing beneficial uses shall be maintained and protected and no further degradation which would interfere with or become injurious to existing beneficial uses will be allowed. “(b) No degradation will be allowed of waters lying in national parks, national recreation areas, national wildlife refuges, national scenic rivers, and other areas of national ecological importance. “(f) In no case, will any degradation of water quality be allowed if this degradation interferes with or becomes injurious to existing water uses and causes long-term and irreparable harm to the environment.” 173-201-035(8). As required by the Act, EPA reviewed and approved the State’s water quality standards. See 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(3); 42 Fed. Reg. 56792 (1977). Upon approval by EPA, the state standard became “the water quality standard for the applicable waters of that State.” 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(3). States are responsible for enforcing water quality standards on intrastate waters. § 1319(a). In addition to these primary enforcement responsibilities, §401 of the Act requires States to provide a water quality certification before a federal license or permit can be issued for activities that may result in any discharge into intrastate navigable waters. 33 U. S. C. §1341. Specifically, §401 requires an applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct any activity “which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters” to obtain from the State a certification “that any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sections [1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title].” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a). Section 401(d) further provides that “[a]ny certification . . . shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant . . . will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section [1311 or 1312 of this title] . . . and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such certification.” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(d). The limitations included in the certification become a condition on any federal license. Ibid. II Petitioners propose to build the Elkhorn Hydroelectric Project on the Dosewallips River. If constructed as presently planned, the facility would be located just outside the Olympic National Park on federally owned land within the Olympic National Forest.' The project would divert water from a 1.2-mile reach of the river (the bypass reach), run the water through turbines to generate electricity and then return the water to the river below the bypass reach. Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has authority to license new hydroelectric facilities. As a result, petitioners must get a FERC license to build or operate the Elkhorn Project. Because a federal license is required, and because the project may result in discharges into the Dosewallips River, petitioners are also required to obtain state certification of the project pursuant to § 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1341. The water flow in the bypass reach, which is currently undiminished by appropriation, ranges seasonally between 149 and 738 cubic feet per second (cfs). The Dosewallips supports two species of salmon, coho and chinook, as well as steelhead trout. As originally proposed, the project was to include a diversion dam which would completely block the river and channel approximately 75% of the river’s water into a tunnel alongside the streambed. About 25% of the water would remain in the bypass reach, but would be returned to the original riverbed through sluice gates or a fish ladder. Depending on the season, this would leave a residual minimum flow of between 65 and 155 cfs in the river. Respondent undertook a study to determine the minimum stream flows necessary to protect the salmon and steelhead fishery in the bypass reach. On June 11, 1986, respondent issued a § 401 water quality certification imposing a variety of conditions on the project, including a minimum stream flow requirement of between 100 and 200 cfs depending on the season. A state administrative appeals board determined that the minimum flow requirement was intended to enhance, not merely maintain, the fishery, and that the certification condition therefore exceeded respondent’s authority under state law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a-57a. On appeal, the State Superior Court concluded that respondent could require compliance with the minimum flow conditions. Id., at 29a-45a. The Superior Court also found that respondent had imposed the minimum flow requirement to protect and preserve the fishery, not to improve it, and that this requirement was authorized by state law. Id., at 34a. The Washington Supreme Court held that the antidegradation provisions of the State’s water quality standards require the imposition of minimum stream flows. 121 Wash. 2d 179, 186-187, 849 P. 2d 646, 650 (1993). The court also found that § 401(d), which allows States to impose conditions based upon several enumerated sections of the Clean Water Act and “any other appropriate requirement of State law,” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(d), authorized the stream flow condition. Relying on this language and the broad purposes of the Clean Water Act, the court concluded that § 401(d) confers on States power to “consider all state action related to water quality in imposing conditions on section 401 certificates.” 121 Wash. 2d, at 192, 849 P. 2d, at 652. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 810 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the state courts of last resort. See 121 Wash. 2d 179, 849 P. 2d 646 (1993); Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 159 Vt. 639, 628 A. 2d 944 (1992) (table); Power Authority of New York v. Williams, 60 N. Y. 2d 315, 457 N. E. 2d 726 (1983). We now affirm. Ill The principal dispute in this case concerns whether the minimum stream flow requirement that the State imposed on the Elkhorn Project is a permissible condition of a § 401 certification under the Clean Water Act. To resolve this dispute we must first determine the scope of the State’s authority under §401. We must then determine whether the limitation at issue here, the requirement that petitioners maintain minimum stream flows, falls within the scope of that authority. A There is no dispute that petitioners were required to obtain a certification from the State pursuant to §401. Petitioners concede that, at a minimum, the project will result in two possible discharges — the release of dredged and fill material during the construction of the project, and the discharge of water at the end of the tailrace after the water has been used to generate electricity. Brief for Petitioners 27-28. Petitioners contend, however, that the minimum stream flow requirement imposed by the State was unrelated to these specific discharges, and that as a consequence, the State lacked the authority under §401 to condition its certification on maintenance of stream flows sufficient to protect the Dosewallips fishery. If § 401 consisted solely of subsection (a), which refers to a state certification that a “discharge” will comply with certain provisions of the Act, petitioners’ assessment of the scope of the State’s certification authority would have considerable force. Section 401, however, also contains subsection (d), which expands the State’s authority to impose conditions on the certification of a project. Section 401(d) provides that any certification shall set forth “any effluent limitations and other limitations ... necessary to assure that any applicant” will comply with various provisions of the Act and appropriate state law requirements. 33 U. S. C. § 1341(d) (emphasis added). The language of this subsection contradicts petitioners’ claim that the State may only impose water quality limitations specifically tied to a “discharge.” The text refers to the compliance of the applicant, not the discharge. Section 401(d) thus allows the State to jmpose “other limitations” on the project in general to assure compliance with various provisions of the Clean Water Act and with “any other appropriate requirement of State law.” Although the dissent asserts that this interpretation of § 401(d) renders § 401(a)(1) superfluous, post, at 726, we see no such anomaly. Section 401(a)(1) identifies the category of activities subject to certification — namely, those with discharges. And § 401(d) is most reasonably read as authorizing additional conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is satisfied. Our view of the statute is consistent with EPA’s regulations implementing §401. The regulations expressly interpret § 401 as requiring the State to find that “there is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards.” 40 CFR § 121.2(a)(3) (1993) (emphasis added). See also EPA, Wetlands and 401 Certification 23 (Apr. 1989) (“In 401(d), the Congress has given the States the authority to place any conditions on a water quality certification that are necessary to assure that the applicant will comply with effluent limitations, water quality standards,... and with ‘any other appropriate requirement of State law’ ”). • EPA’s conclusion that activities — not merely discharges — must comply with state water quality standards is a reasonable interpretation of § 401, and is entitled to deference. See, e. g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U. S. 91, 110 (1992); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Although § 401(d) authorizes the State to place restrictions on the activity as a whole, that authority is not unbounded. The State can only ensure that the project complies with “any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under [33 U. S. C. §§ 1311, 1312]” or certain other provisions of the Act, “and with any other appropriate requirement of State law.” 33 U. S. C. § 1341(d). The State asserts that the minimum stream flow requirement was imposed to ensure compliance with the state water quality standards adopted pursuant to §303 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S. C. §1313. We agree with the State that ensuring compliance with § 303 is a proper function of the § 401 certification. Although § 303 is not one of the statutory provisions listed in § 401(d), the statute allows States to impose limitations to ensure compliance with §301 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1311. Section 301 in turn incorporates § 303 by reference. See 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-830, p. 96 (1977) (“Section 303 is always included by reference where section 301 is listed”). As a consequence, state water quality standards adopted pursuant to § 303 are among the “other limitations” with which a State may ensure compliance through the § 401 certification process. This interpretation is consistent with EPA’s view of the statute. See 40 CFR § 121.2(a)(3) (1992); EPA, Wetlands and 401 Certification, swpra. Moreover, limitations to assure compliance with state water quality standards are also permitted by §401(d)’s reference to “any other appropriate requirement of State law.” We do not speculate on what additional state laws, if any, might be incorporated by this language. But at a minimum, limitations imposed pursuant to state water quality standards adopted pursuant to §303 are “appropriate” requirements of state law. Indeed, petitioners appear to agree that the State’s authority under § 401 includes limitations designed to ensure compliance with state water quality standards. Brief for Petitioners 9, 21. B Having concluded that, pursuant to §401, States may condition certification upon any limitations necessary to ensure compliance with state water quality standards or any other “appropriate requirement of State law,” we consider whether the minimum flow condition is such a limitation. Under §303, state water quality standards must “consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). In imposing the minimum stream flow requirement, the State determined that construction and operation of the project as planned would be inconsistent with one of the designated uses of Class AA water, namely “[sjalmonid [and other fish] migration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-84a. The designated use of the river as a fish habitat directly reflects the Clean Water Act’s goal of maintaining the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). Indeed, the Act defines pollution as “the man-made or man induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water.” § 1362(19). Moreover, the Act expressly requires that, in adopting water quality standards, the State must take into consideration the use of waters for “propagation of fish and wildlife.” § 1313(c)(2)(A). Petitioners assert, however, that §303 requires the State to protect designated uses solely through implementation of specific “criteria.” According to petitioners, the State may not require them to operate their dam in a manner consistent with a designated “use”; instead, say petitioners, under § 303 the State may only require that the project comply with specific numerical “criteria.” We disagree with petitioners’ interpretation of the language of § 303(c)(2)(A). Under the statute, a water quality standard must “consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The text makes it plain that water quality standards contain two components. We think the language of § 303 is most naturally read to require that a project be consistent with both components, namely, the designated use and the water quality criteria. Accordingly, under the literal terms of the statute, a project that does not comply with a designated use of the water does not comply with the applicable water quality standards. Consequently, pursuant to § 401(d) the State may require that a permit applicant comply with both the designated uses and the water quality criteria of the state standards. In granting certification pursuant to § 401(d), the State “shall set forth any ... limitations ... necessary to assure that [the applicant] will comply with any ... limitations under [§ 303] . . . and with any other appropriate requirement of State law.” A certification requirement that an applicant operate the project consistently with state water quality standards— i. e., consistently with the designated uses of the water body and the water quality criteria — is both a “limitation” to assure “compliance] with . . . limitations” imposed under § 303, and an “appropriate” requirement of state law. EPA has not interpreted §303 to require the States to protect designated uses exclusively through enforcement of numerical criteria. In its regulations governing state water quality standards, EPA defines criteria as “elements of State water quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular use.” 40 CFR § 131.3(b) (1993) (emphasis added). The regulations further provide that “[w]hen criteria are met, water quality will generally protect the designated use.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, the EPA regulations implicitly recognize that in some circumstances, criteria alone are insufficient to protect a designated use. Petitioners also appear to argue that use requirements are too open ended, and that the Act only contemplates enforcement of the more specific and objective “criteria.” But this argument is belied by the open-ended nature of the criteria themselves. As the Solicitor General points out, even “criteria” are often expressed in broad, narrative terms, such as “ ‘there shall be no discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts.’” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. See American Paper Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 996 F. 2d 346, 349 (CADC 1993). In fact, under the Clean Water Act, only one class of criteria, those governing “toxic pollutants listed pursuant to section 1317(a)(1),” need be rendered in numerical form. See 33 U. S. C. § 1313(c)(2)(B); 40 CFR § 131.11(b)(2) (1993). Washington’s Class A A water quality standards are typical in that they contain several open-ended criteria which, like the use designation of the river as a fishery, must be translated into specific limitations for individual projects. For example, the standards state that “[t]oxic, radioactive, or deleterious material concentrations shall be less than those which may affect public health, the natural aquatic environment, or the desirability of the water for any use.” WAC 173-201-045(l)(c)(vii) (1986). Similarly, the state standards specify that “[ajesthetic values shall not be impaired by the presence of materials or their effects, excluding those of natural origin, which offend the senses of sight, smell, touch, or taste.” 173-201-045(l)(c)(viii). We think petitioners’ attempt to distinguish between uses and criteria loses much of its force in light of the fact that the Act permits enforcement of broad, narrative criteria based on, for example, “aesthetics.” Petitioners further argue that enforcement of water quality standards through use designations renders the water quality criteria component of the standards irrelevant. We see no anomaly, however, in the State’s reliance on both use designations and criteria to protect water quality. The specific numerical limitations embodied in the criteria are a convenient enforcement mechanism for identifying minimum water conditions which will generally achieve the requisite water quality. And, in most circumstances, satisfying the criteria will, as EPA recognizes, be sufficient to maintain the designated use. See 40 CFR § 131.3(b) (1993). Water quality standards, however, apply to an entire class of water, a class which contains numerous individual water bodies. For example, in the State of Washington, the Class AA water quality standard applies to 81 specified fresh surface waters, as well as to all “surface waters lying within the mountainous regions of the state assigned to national parks, national forests, and/or wilderness areas,” all “lakes and their feeder streams within the state,” and all “unclassified surface waters that are tributaries to Class A A waters.” WAC 173-201-070 (1986). While enforcement of criteria will in general protect the uses of these diverse waters, a complementary requirement that activities also comport with designated uses enables the States to ensure that each activity— even if not foreseen by the criteria — will be consistent with the specific uses and attributes of a particular body of water. Under petitioners’ interpretation of the statute, however, if a particular criterion, such as turbidity, were missing from the list contained in an individual state water quality standard, or even if an existing turbidity criterion were insufficient to protect a particular species of fish in a particular river, the State would nonetheless be forced to allow activities inconsistent with the existing or designated uses. We think petitioners’ reading leads to an unreasonable interpretation of the Act. The criteria components of state water quality standards attempt to identify, for all the water bodies in a given class, water quality requirements generally sufficient to protect designated uses. These criteria, however, cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate all the water quality issues arising from every activity that can affect the State’s hundreds of individual water bodies. Requiring the States to enforce only the criteria component of their water quality standards would in essence require the States to study to a level of great specificity each individual surface water to ensure that the criteria applicable to that water are sufficiently detailed and individualized to folly protect the water’s designated uses. Given that there is no textual support for imposing this requirement, we are loath to attribute to Congress an intent to impose this heavy regulatory burden on the States. The State also justified its minimum stream flow as necessary to implement the “antidegradation policy” of §303, 33 U. S. C. § 1313(d)(4)(B). When the Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972, the water quality standards of all 50 States had antidegradation provisions. These provisions were required by federal law. See U. S. Dept, of Interior, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Compendium of Department of Interior Statements on Non-degradation of Interstate Waters 1-2 (Aug. 1968); see also Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 643, 658-660 (1977). By providing in 1972 that existing state water quality standards would remain in force until revised, the Clean Water Act ensured that the States would continue their antidegradation programs. See 33 U. S. C. § 1313(a). EPA has consistently required that revised state standards incorporate an antidegradation policy. And, in 1987, Congress explicitly recognized the existence of an “antidegradation policy established under [§303].” § 1313(d)(4)(B). EPA has promulgated regulations implementing §303’s antidegradation policy, a phrase that is not defined elsewhere in the Act. These regulations require States to “develop and adopt a statewide antidegradation policy and identify the methods for implementing such policy.” 40 CFR §131.12 (1993). These “implementation methods shall, at a minimum, be consistent with the . . . [e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected.” Ibid. EPA has explained that under its antidegradation regulation, “no activity is allowable . . . which could partially or completely eliminate any existing use.” EPA, Questions and Answers on Antidegradation 3 (Aug. 1985). Thus, States must implement their antidegradation policy in a manner “consistent” with existing uses of the stream. The State of Washington’s antidegradation policy in turn provides that “[e]xisting beneficial uses shall be maintained and protected and no further degradation which would interfere with or become injurious to existing beneficial uses will be allowed.” WAC 173-201-035(8)(a) (1986). The State concluded that the reduced stream flows would have just the effect prohibited by this policy. The Solicitor General, representing EPA, asserts, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-21, and we agree, that the State’s minimum stream flow condition is a proper application of the state and federal anti-degradation regulations, as it ensures that an “[ejxisting instream water us[e]” will be “maintained and protected.” 40 CFR § 131.12(a)(1) (1993). Petitioners also assert more generally that the Clean Water Act is only concerned with water “quality,” and does not allow the regulation of water “quantity.” This is an artificial distinction. In many cases, water quantity is closely related to water quality' a sufficient lowering of the water quantity in a body of water could destroy all of its designated, uses, be it for drinking water,, recreation* navigation or, as here, as a fishery. In any event, there is recognition in the Clean Water Act itself that reduced stream flow, i. e., diminishment of water quantity, can constitute water pollution. First, the Act’s definition of pollution as “the man-made or man induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water” encompasses the effects of reduced water quantity. 33 U. S. C. § 1362(19). This broad conception of pollution — one which expressly evinces Congress’ concern with the physical and biological integrity of water — refutes petitioners’ assertion that the Act draws a sharp distinction between the regulation of water “quantity” and water “quality.” Moreover, § 304 of the Act expressly recognizes that water “pollution” may result from “changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters .. ., including changes caused by the construction of dams.” 33 U. S. C. § 1314(f). This concern with the flowage effects of dams and other diversions is also embodied in the EPA regulations, which expressly require existing dams to be operated to attain designated uses. 40 CFR § 131.10(g)(4) (1992). Petitioners assert that two other provisions of the Clean Water Act, §§ 101(g) and 510(2), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1251(g) and 1370(2), exclude the regulation of water quantity from the coverage of the Act. Section 101(g) provides “that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(g). Similarly, § 510(2) provides that nothing in the Act shall “be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters ... of such States.” 33 U. S. C. § 1370. In petitioners’ view, these provisions exclude “water quantity issues from direct regulation under the federally controlled water quality standards authorized in §303.” Brief for Petitioners 39 (emphasis deleted). This language gives the States authority to allocate water rights; we therefore find it peculiar that petitioners argue that it prevents the State from regulating stream flow. In any event, we read these provisions more narrowly than petitioners. Sections 101(g) and 510(2) preserve the authority of each State to allocate water quantity as between users; they do not limit the scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users who have obtained, pursuant to state law, a water allocation. In California v. FERC, 495 U. S. 490, 498 (1990), construing an analogous provision of the Federal Power Act, we explained that “minimum stream flow requirements neither reflect nor establish ‘proprietary rights’ ” to water. Cf. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 176, and n. 20 (1946). Moreover, the certification itself does not purport to determine petitioners’ proprietary right to the water of the Dosewallips. In fact, the certification expressly states that a “State Water Right Permit (Chapters 90.03.250 RCW and 508-12 WAC) must be obtained prior to commencing construction of the project.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. The certification merely determines the nature of the use to which that proprietary right may be put under the Clean Water Act, if and when it is obtained from the State. Our view is reinforced by the legislative history of the 1977 amendment to the Clean Water Act adding § 101(g). See 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977 (Committee Print compiled for the Committee on Environment and Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 95-14, p. 532 (1978) (“The requirements [of the Act] may incidentally affect individual water rights. ... It is not the purpose of this amendment to prohibit those incidental effects. It is the purpose of this amendment to insure that State allocation systems are not subverted, and that effects on individual rights, if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality considerations”). IV Petitioners contend that we should limit the State’s authority to impose minimum flow requirements because FERC has comprehensive authority to license hydroelectric projects pursuant to the FPA, 16 U. S. C. §791a et seq. In petitioners’ view, the minimum flow requirement imposed here interferes with FERC’s authority under the FPA. The FPA empowers FERC to issue licenses for projects “necessary or convenient... for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams . . . over which Congress has jurisdiction.” § 797(e). The FPA also requires FERC to consider a project’s effect on fish and wildlife. §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1). In California v. FERC, supra, we held that the California Water Resources Control Board, acting pursuant to state law, could not impose a minimum stream flow which conflicted with minimum stream flows contained in a FERC license. We concluded that the FPA did not “save” to the States this authority. Id., at 498. No such conflict with any FERC licensing activity is presented here. FERC has not yet acted on petitioners’ license application, and it is possible that FERC will eventually deny petitioners’ application altogether. Alternatively, it is quite possible, given that FERC is required to give equal consideration to the protection of fish habitat when deciding whether to issue a license, that any FERC license would contain the same conditions as the state § 401 certification. Indeed, at oral argument the Deputy Solicitor General stated that both EPA and FERC were represented in this proceeding, and that the Government has no objection to the stream flow condition contained in the §401 certification. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43-44. Finally, the requirement for a state certification applies not only to applications for licenses from FERC, but to all federal licenses and permits for activities which may result in a discharge into the Nation’s navigable waters. For example, a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers is required for the installation of any structure in the navigable waters which may interfere with navigation, including piers, docks, and ramps. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151, §10, 33 U. S. C. §403. Similarly, a permit must be obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers for the discharge of dredged or fill material, and from the Secretary of the Interior or Agriculture for the construction of reservoirs, canals, and other water storage systems on federal land. See 33 U. S. C. §§ 1344(a), (e); 43 U. S. C. § 1761 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). We assume that a §401 certification would also be required for some licenses obtained pursuant to these statutes. Because § 401’s certification requirement applies to other statutes and regulatory schemes, and because any conflict with FERC’s authority under the FPA is hypothetical, we are unwilling to read implied limitations into §401. If FERC issues a license containing a stream flow condition with which petitioners disagree, they may pursue judicial remedies at that time. Cf. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U. S. 765, 778, n. 20 (1984). In summary, we hold that the State may include minimum stream flow requirements in a certification issued pursuant to §401 of the Clean Water Act insofar as necessary to enforce a designated use contained in a state water quality standard. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, accordingly, is affirmed. So ordered. WAC 173-201-045(1) (1986) provides in pertinent part: “(1) Class AA (extraordinary). “(a) General characteristic. Water quality of this class shall markedly and uniformly exceed the requirements for all or substantially all uses. “(b) Characteristic uses. Characteristic uses shall include, but not be limited to, the following: “(i) Water supply (domestic, industrial, agricultural). “(ii) Stock watering. “(iii) Fish and shellfish: “Salmonid migration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting. “Other fish migration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting. “(iv) Wildlife habitat. “(v) Recreation (primary contact recreation, sport fishing, boating, and aesthetic enjoyment). “(vi) Commerce and navigation. “(c) Water quality criteria “(i) Fecal coliform organisms. “(A) Freshwater — fecal coliform organisms shall not exceed a geometric mean value of 50 organisms/100 mL, with not more than 10 percent of samples exceeding 100 organisms/100 mL. “(B) Marine water — fecal coliform organisms shall not exceed a geometric mean value of 14 organisms/100 mL, with not more than 10 percent of samples exceeding 43 organisms/100 mL. “(ii) Dissolved oxygen [shall exceed specific amounts]. “(iii) Total dissolved gas shall not exceed 110 percent of saturation at any point of sample collection. “(iv) Temperature shall not exceed [certain levels]. “(v) pH shall be within [a specified range]. “(vi) Turbidity shall not exceed [specific levels]. “(vii) Toxic, radioactive, or deleterious material concentrations shall be less than those which may affect public health, the natural aquatic environment, or the desirability of the water for any use. “(viii) Aesthetic values shall not be impaired by the presence of materials or their effects, excluding those of natural origin, which offend the senses of sight, smell, touch, or taste.” Section 401, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 1341, provides in relevant part: “(a) Compliance with applicable requirements; application; procedures; license suspension “(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State . . . that any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 1311,1312,1313,1316, and 1317 of this title. “(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of certification “Any certification provided under this section shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance under section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this section.” The dissent asserts that §301 is concerned solely with discharges, not broader water quality standards. Post, at 730, n. 2. Although §301 does make certain discharges unlawful, see 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a), it also contains a broad enabling provision which requires States to take certain actions, to wit: “In order to carry out the objective of this chapter [viz. the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s water] there shall be achieved ... not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards,... established pursuant to any State law or regulations____” 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). This provision of §301 expressly refers to state water quality standards, and is not limited to discharges. The relevant text of the Federal Power Act provides: “That nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.” 41 Stat. 1077,16 U. S. C. §821.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA et al. v. CENTRAL LINCOLN PEOPLES’ UTILITY DISTRICT et al. No. 82-1071. Argued January 9, 1984 Decided June 5, 1984 M. Laurence Popofsky argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Eric Redman, Peter A. Wald, and Dian M. Grueneich. Jerrold J. Ganzfried argued the cause for the federal respondents under this Court’s Rule 19.6, urging reversal. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, and Bruce G. Forrest. Jay T. Waldron argued the cause for respondents Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District et al. With him on the brief was Donald A. Haagensen. James W. Durham, Alvin Alexanderson, and Robert T. O’Leary filed a brief for respondents Portland General Electric Co. et al. Robert M. Greening, Jr., filed a brief for respondent Public Power Council. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Public Power Association et al. by Lee C. White and Grace Powers Monaco; and for International Paper Co. et al. by Donald P. Swisher and Allan M. Garten. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Since enactment of the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 781, 16 U. S. C. §832 et seq. (Project Act), the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) has marketed low-cost hydroelectric power generated by a series of dams along the Columbia River. Although § 4(a) of the Project Act, 16 U. S. C. §832c(a), directs the BPA Administrator to “give preference and priority to public bodies and cooperatives” when selling its power, BPA for many years enjoyed a surplus of power that allowed it to satisfy the needs of all customers in the region. As demand for power increased to exceed BPA’s generating capability, however, the allocation of low-cost federal power became an issue of significant area concern. In 1980, Congress moved to avert what appeared to be an emerging customer struggle for BPA power by enacting the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2697, 16 U. S. C. §839 et seq. (Regional Act). That Act required BPA to offer new contracts to its several customers. Some of the respondents brought this suit to challenge the new contracts that BPA signed with certain customers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the contracts violated the statute. We now reverse that judgment, and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. I Before discussing the Regional Act’s provisions that give rise to the dispute, certain aspects of hydroelectric power generation and the Project Act’s allocation scheme must be explained. Because the amount of power generated by BPA depends on streamflow in the Columbia River system, BPA cannot predict with accuracy the amount of power that it can generate. Accordingly, BPA historically has sold two types of power. “Firm power” is energy that BPA expects to produce under predictable streamflow conditions. “Nonfirm” power is energy in excess of firm power, and is provided only when such excess exists. BPA’s customers include three groups that are relevant to this case. The primary group is what the Project Act refers to as “public bodies and cooperatives,” which includes public utilities and other public entities. These entities are “preference” customers, and BPA is required to give priority to their applications for power when competing applications from nonpreference customers are received. See §4(b) of the Project Act, 16 U. S. C. §832c(b). BPA’s other two groups of customers are private, investor-owned utilities (IOUs), and direct-service industrial customers (DSIs). The latter are large industrial end-users that purchase power directly from BPA instead of through a utility. IOUs and DSIs are “nonpreference” customers, and BPA is allowed to contract to sell to them only power for which preference customers do not apply. Once a contract between BPA and a customer is signed, however, the Project Act makes clear that the contract is “binding in accordance with the terms thereof.” §5(a), 16 U. S. C. §832d(a). In the early years of the Project Act, BPA’s contract with each of its customers obligated BPA to supply the customer’s full contractual requirements on a “firm,” noninterruptible basis. In 1948, the increasing demand for power in the Northwest caused BPA to modify its industrial sales policy so as to require that, where feasible, a new contract signed with a DSI provide that some power be supplied on a nonfirm basis. This condition meant that a portion of DSI power could be interrupted when necessary to supply BPA’s preference customers. DSIs are unique among BPA’s customers in their ability to tolerate such interruptions in service; they are able to do so because some of their industrial processes can withstand periodic power interruptions without damage. Utilities, on the other hand, require power on a nonin-terruptible basis because their residential consumers cannot withstand periodic interruptions in service. The increased demand for power in the 1970’s required that BPA alter its sales policies even more drastically. Projections at that time showed that because of increased power demand, preference customers soon would require all of BPA’s power. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-976, pt. 1, pp. 23-27 (1980). Accordingly, BPA announced in 1973 that new contracts for firm power sales to IOUs would not be offered. In addition, when BPA signed contracts with DSIs in 1975, it specified that 25% of their power would be subject to interruption “at any time,” and it advised the DSIs that as their new contracts expired during the 1981-1991 period, they were not likely to be renewed. The increase in demand soon threatened even the ability of BPA’s preference customers to obtain federal power to meet their full power needs. In 1976, BPA informed its preference customers that BPA would not be able to satisfy preference customer load growth after July 1,1983, and BPA began to consider how to divide the available federal power among its preference customers. The high cost of alternative sources of power caused BPA’s nonpreference customers vigorously to pursue ways to regain access to cheap federal power. Most important, many areas that were served by IOUs moved to establish public entities designed to qualify as preference customers and be eligible for administrative allocations of power. Because the Project Act provided no clear way of allocating among preference customers, and because the stakes involved in buying cheap federal power had become very high, this competition for administrative allocations threatened to produce contentious litigation. The uncertainty inherent in the situation greatly complicated the efforts by all BPA customers to plan for their future power needs. To avoid the prospect of unproductive and endless litigation, Congress enacted the Regional Act. The Act provided for future cooperation in the region by establishing a mechanism for comprehensive federal/state power planning. §§4 and 6, 16 U. S. C. §§839b and 839d. For the first time, moreover, BPA was authorized to acquire resources to increase the supply of federal power. In addition, §5 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. §839c, sought to avert disputes over the allocation of power by requiring BPA to enter into an initial set of contracts with its various types of customers. Section 5(d)(1)(B) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 839c(d)(l)(B), required that “[a]fter the effective date of this Act [Dec. 5, 1980], the Administrator shall offer ... to each existing direct service industrial customer an initial long term contract that provides such customer an amount of power equivalent to that to which such customer is entitled under its contract dated January or April 1975 . . . .” These contracts were to replace the existing DSI contracts that were scheduled to expire at various times during the period 1981-1991. Section 5(d)(1)(A) indicated that the sales to the DSIs under the new contracts were to “provide a portion of the Administrator’s reserves for firm power loads within the region.” Pursuant to this statutory directive, the Administrator offered new, 20-year contracts to its DSI customers. The contracts were for the same amount of power specified by the existing 1975 contracts. Based upon his interpretation of the statute and the legislative history of the Act, however, the Administrator concluded that the terms of the power sales were not to be the same as they had been under the 1975 contracts. The 1975 contracts provided that a portion (the “top quartile”) of the power supplied to DSIs could be interrupted “at any time.” This provision made the top quartile of DSI power subject to the preference provisions of the Project Act, and enabled preference utilities to interrupt it whenever they wanted nonfirm power. The Administrator concluded that such a provision in the new contracts would conflict with § 5(d)(l)(A)’s directive that sales to DSIs should “provide a portion of the Administrator’s reserves tor firm power loads” (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Administrator offered DSI customers contracts that allowed interruption only to protect BPA’s firm loads, and not to make sales of nonfirm energy. 46 Fed. Reg. 44340 (1981). This aspect of the new DSI contracts is at the center of the present dispute. Under the Project Act, nonfirm power was allocated hourly on an “if available basis,” and was subject to the preference provisions of that Act. Although nonfirm power is too unreliable for preference utilities to use to satisfy the demands of their consumers on a general basis, it nevertheless is attractive to many preference utilities because it could be used as a substitute for power they generated themselves. In this manner, nonfirm power purchases enabled preference utilities to shut down their own facilities when they required maintenance, or if they could not generate power as cheaply as BPA. Alternatively, preference utilities appear to have been able to “arbitrage” BPA’s nonfirm power by using it to displace their own power, which they then sold to users that could not purchase power directly from BPA. By making DSI power interruptible under the new contracts only to protect BPA’s firm power obligations, the new contracts reduced the amount of nonfirm power available to preference utilities. Shortly after the Administrator’s decision and the execution of new DSI agreements, respondents challenged the contracts by petition for review in the Court of Appeals. The core of their challenge was that the proposed contracts violated the preference to nonfirm power accorded under the 1975 contracts. That preference, it was said, was reserved by §5(a) of the Regional Act, 16 U. S. C. §839c, which states: “All power sales under this Act shall be subject at all times to the preference and priority provisions of the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 . . . .” Respondents also relied on § 10(c) of the Regional Act, 16 U. S. C. § 839g(c), which provides that the Act does not “alter, diminish, abridge, or otherwise affect the provisions of other Federal laws by which public bodies and cooperatives are entitled to preference and priority in the sale of federally generated electric power.” Respondents argue that these provisions require that DSI power be interruptible under the new contracts on the same terms as it was under the 1975 contracts. In addition, respondents assert that the conditions in the new contracts effectively provide the DSIs with a greater “amount of power” than their 1975 contracts, in violation of § 5(d)(1)(B) of the Regional Act, 16 U. S. C. §839c(d)(l)(B). The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents and found the Administrator’s interpretation of the Act to be unreasonable. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District v. Johnson, 686 F. 2d 708 (CA9 1982). The court relied heavily on §§ 5(a) and 10(c) of the Regional Act to conclude that the Act preserved the longstanding practice of allocating nonfirm power under the 1975 contracts. Because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 460 U. S. 1050 (1983). H ¡> Under established administrative law principles, it is clear that the Administrator’s interpretation of the Regional Act is to be given great weight. “We have often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference.” Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 141 (1982). “To uphold [the agency’s interpretation] ‘we need not find that [its] construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.’ ... We need only conclude that it is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions.” American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U. S. 402, 422-423 (1983), quoting Unemployment Compensation Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153 (1946). These principles of deference have particular force in the context of this case. The subject under regulation is technical and complex. BPA has longstanding expertise in the area, and was intimately involved in the drafting and consideration of the statute by Congress. Following enactment of the statute, the agency immediately interpreted the statute in the manner now under challenge. Thus, BPA’s interpretation represents “ ‘a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.”’ Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965), quoting Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961). Giving the Administrator’s interpretation the deference that it is due, we are convinced that his interpretation is a fully reasonable one. Section 5(d)(1)(B) of the Regional Act, 16 U. S. C. § 839c(d)(l)(B), expressly directs the Administrator to offer each existing DSI an initial long-term contract for the same amount of power as provided in its existing contract. It is therefore beyond dispute that the plain language of the statute mandates that contracts be offered. Respondents challenge the contracts, however, because they contain interruptibility provisions different from those in the 1975 contracts. Respondents offer essentially two arguments in support of their position. Neither is persuasive. First, respondents claim that the new contracts violate the statutory directive that the contracts be for the same “amount of power” as the 1975 contracts. Because the proposed contracts curtail the situations in which power can be interrupted, respondents argue that they effectively provide DSIs with a greater amount of power than they would have received under the 1975 contracts. Petitioners and the Administrator contend, on the other hand, that the term “amount of power” refers only to the quantity of power to be sold to the DSIs as measured in kilowatts. They claim that the phrase does not determine the interruptibility or “quality” of the power that is sold under the required contracts. The distinction between power amount and power “quality” is a valid one that can be seen by reference to the 1975 contracts. Under those contracts, the “amount” of power referred simply to the number of kilowatts sold. The contractual terms governing the interruptibility of the power were included in other provisions in the contracts. See contract between BP A and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1975), App. to Pet. for Cert. N-2, N-5. It is reasonable to conclude that the statutory directive that the new contracts be for the same “amount of power” as the 1975 contracts requires simply that the new contracts involve the same number of kilowatts. Respondents do not contend that the new contracts fail to meet this requirement. Sections 5(d)(1)(A) and 3(17) of the Regional Act lend support to this interpretation. The former expressly requires that power sales to the DSIs “shall provide a portion of the Administrator’s reserves for firm power loads.” The latter defines reserves as the power needed to protect BPA’s “firm power customers” from shortages. It is clear from these provisions that at least some portion of DSI power is inter-ruptible to protect the firm needs of other customers. In addition, however, these provisions support the Administrator’s inference that the Regional Act does not require DSI power to be interruptible to meet the nonfirm power desires of preference customers, and the legislative history confirms this view. The Report of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources clearly explains: “[T]he term ‘firm power customers of the Administrator’ is intended to mean the firm power loads of such customers. It is not intended that the Administrator’s reserves will be used to protect other than firm loads” (emphasis supplied). S. Rep. No. 96-272, p. 23 (1979). Because it is clear that the top quartile of DSI power is a part of BPA’s reserves, that power is not to be used to serve nonfirm power loads. Respondents’ claim that the top quartile of power must be interruptible “at any time” in order to provide the DSIs with the same “amount of power” is incorrect even under respondents’ own interpretation of the phrase. The parties agree that the DSIs’ second quartile of power can be interrupted in more situations under the new contracts than under the 1975 contracts, and that the power quality of the second quartile is therefore lower than before. See Respondents’ Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Injunction or Stay Pending Review, filed Sept. 8, 1981, App. 21 (table comparing interruptibility of second quartile of DSI power in 1975 and new contracts). The legislative history of the Regional Act makes clear that Congress expressly endorsed, perhaps even required, that the new contracts contain the conditions making the second quartile power more interruptible than before. If, as respondents would have it, the top quartile of power remained interruptible in the same situations as under the 1975 contracts, but the second quartile became more interruptible than before, it is apparent that the new contracts would provide the DSIs with a smaller total “amount of power,” as respondents seek to define that phrase. In short, Congress could not have contemplated interruptibility terms for the second quartile different from those in the 1975 contracts, and at the same time have insisted that DSIs get the “same amount of power” under respondents’ definition of the phrase; it is clear therefore, that that definition is not what Congress intended. Respondents’ second argument is that the terms of the new contracts conflict with § 5(a) of the Regional Act. It is true, as respondents assert, that that section preserves the priority and preference provisions that existed under the Project Act. But the preference system merely determines the priority of different customers when the Administrator receives “conflicting or competing” applications for power that the Administrator is authorized to allocate administratively. § 4(b) of the Project Act, 16 U. S. C. §832c(b). In the instant case, the initial contracts offered by the Administrator to the DSIs are not part of an administrative allocation of power. The power sold pursuant to those contracts is allocated directly by the statute. Because there is no administrative allocation of power, there can be no competing applications. The preference provisions of the Project Act as incorporated into the Regional Act therefore simply do not apply to the initial contracts that the statute requires the BPA to offer. Respondents’ argument that power sold to DSIs under the new contracts is subject to preference implicitly proves too much. There is nothing in either the rules governing preference or the Project Act that distinguishes the top quartile of DSI power from the other three quartiles. Under the 1975 contracts, the difference between the top quartile and the other quartiles was the provision in those contracts that made the top quartile subject to interruption “at any time.” That contract term allowed the Administrator to treat the top quartile of power as if it were uncommitted, and subjected it to preference. The other three quartiles were not subject to preference simply because the terms of the contracts did not so provide. Thus, the distinction among the different quartiles under the 1975 contracts was a product of the terms of the contracts, not a requirement of the Project Act’s preference provisions. There is likewise nothing in the Regional Act that distinguishes between the top quartile and the other quartiles for purposes of applying preference when offering the new DSI contracts. If respondents are correct that the power sold to the DSIs under the new contracts is subject to preference, then respondents have preference not only for power in the top quartile, but for the other three quartiles as well. For as long as that power is uncommitted, the preference provisions apply. Once committed by contract, the interruptibility of the power is determined by the terms of the contract. § 5a, 16 U. S. C. §832d(a). It appears, therefore, that respondents’ view of the Regional Act would render meaningless the initial contracts contemplated by § 5(d)(1)(B). Respondents’ argument is essentially that the allocation of power under the mandated contracts should be the same as it would be if the preference rules applied. But Congress presumably included § 5(d)(1)(B) precisely because it wanted to achieve an allocation of power that differs from what allocation by preference would produce; preference was the perceived problem, not the chosen solution. The Administrator’s interpretation of the Regional Act also is supported by § 5(g)(7) of that Act, 16 U. S. C. §839c(g)(7). That section “deem[s]” the Administrator “to have sufficient resources for the purpose of entering into the initial contracts” mandated by the statute. Through this express legal fiction, Congress ensured that the initial contracts could not be challenged by a claim that BPA lacked the power to enter into contracts with nonpreference customers. Congress clearly intended BPA to offer the DSI contracts even if that necessitated the acquisition by BPA of additional power through outside purchases and construction of new generating facilities. If preference were to apply to the initial contracts, however, they could be executed only after preference customers have purchased all the power they desire. Such a condition would be truly incongruous, for it could require BPA to obtain an almost unlimited amount of power. When Congress “deemed” the Administrator “to have sufficient resources for the purpose of entering into the initial contracts specified” by the Act, it is only sensible to assume that Congress intended such contracts to be made without regard to the preference rules that govern sales that are not statutorily mandated. B The legislative history of the Regional Act confirms the interpretation put forward by BPA and petitioners. That history shows that Congress paid specific attention to power sales to DSIs, and consulted BPA on the relationship between those sales and the broader purposes of the Act. The record gives no indication that Congress intended the new DSI contracts to have provisions governing interruptibility that were the same as in the 1975 contracts. The Committee Reports of both Houses made particular reference to the DSI contracts and the manner in which those sales would provide the reserves for the Administrator’s other obligations. The Senate Report contains the following explanation of the section dealing with DSI sales. “The power quality provided the direct-service industries is determined by the reserve obligations set forth in their contracts in order to protect service to firm loads of the Administrator. It is intended that these contracts at least provide peaking power reserves similar to those provided in the present contracts, and that the energy reserves shall include a reserve approximately equal to 25 percent of the direct service industrial load to protect firm loads for any reason, including low or critical streamflow conditions ...” (emphasis supplied). S. Rep. No. 96-272, p. 28 (1979). This passage flatly contradicts respondents’ argument. The first sentence makes clear that the “quality” of the power provided to the DSIs is determined by the need to provide reserves to protect “the firm loads of the Administrator.” The sentence is noticeably devoid of any suggestion that the quality of power is to be the same as it was under the 1975 contracts. The rest of the passage reinforces the view that the purpose of the interruptibility provisions is “to protect firm loads.” The House Report indicates a similar understanding: “Approximately 25 percent of the DSI load is to be treated as a firm load for purposes of resource operation and will provide an operating reserve that may be restricted by the BPA at any time in order to protect the Administrator’s firm loads within the region and for any reason, including low or critical streamflow conditions and unanticipated growth of regional firm loads.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-976, pt. 2, p. 48 (1980). This passage confirms that DSI sales were to be interruptible “to protect the Administrator’s firm loads.” Such a requirement would have little meaning if, as respondents would have it, the statute also requires DSI power to be interruptible at any time for any reason. The source of this language in the House Report is significant. While the bill was still under consideration, BPA conferred with the Committee’s staff and furnished the Committee with its understanding of how sales to DSIs would operate. The passage from the Report quoted above is an almost verbatim incorporation of BPA’s understanding of the provision. See Appendix III to Letter dated Aug. 19, 1980, from BPA Administrator to Rep. Kazen, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, App. to Pet. for Cert. 1-23 (discussing the DSI service under the Regional Act). The legislative history therefore indicates that BPA consulted with Congress during the consideration of the Regional Act, and that BPA and Congress shared an understanding of the terms on which the Administrator would sell power to DSIs under the Act. Respondents rely on the legislative history to establish two points, neither of which is controverted. First, respondents use the legislative history to demonstrate what § 5(a) already makes clear — that the Regional Act does not alter the priority provisions of the Project Act. See Brief for Respondents Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District et al. 23-30. Petitioners and the Administrator do not contest this point. But the issue in this case is not whether the preference rules have been changed; the issue is whether the preference rules apply to power that the statute requires BPA to sell to DSIs. Because it is clear that the power sold under the initial contracts is committed to DSIs by statute, it is equally clear that it is not uncommitted power to which preference applies. Respondents’ second use of the legislative history is to show that, under the 1975 contracts, the top quartile of DSI was subject to preference because it was interruptible “at any time.” Id., at 21-23. This point also is uncontroverted. The issue in this case, however, is whether the new contracts mandated by the Regional Act must provide that a portion of DSI power be subject to interruption “at any time.” If so, there is no dispute over whether preference would apply to that power. But respondents have not pointed to anything in the Regional Act that requires that the interruptibility terms of the 1975 contracts be incorporated into the new contracts. C Because the Regional Act does not comprehensively establish the terms on which power is to be supplied to DSIs under the new contracts, it is our view that the Administrator has broad discretion to negotiate them. Such discretion is especially appropriate in this situation, because DSI sales are merely one part of a complicated statutory allocation plan designed to achieve several goals. Most important, sales to DSIs under the Regional Act are intricately related to the “exchange” program established by the Regional Act on behalf of nonpreference utilities. § 5(c), 16 U. S. C. §839c(c). The exchange program is designed to provide rate relief for consumers served by IOUs. As noted supra, the operation of preference under the Project Act produced an allocation of cheap federal power that heavily favored public utilities (preference customers) over private utilities (non-preference customers). As a consequence, consumers that lived in areas served by public utilities enjoyed much cheaper power than consumers served by IOUs. The exchange program operates to reduce this disparity. Very briefly, the program consists of an “exchange” arrangement under which IOUs are allowed to sell power to BPA at their average system cost, and then purchase from BPA an equal quantity of cheaper federal power. The benefits to the IOUs under this program are to be passed on directly to residential consumers. Because this exchange program essentially requires BPA to trade its cheap power for more expensive power, it is obviously a money-losing program for BPA. The Act expressly contemplates that much of the cost of this program is to be covered by power sales to DSIs, which pay a considerably higher price for power than other users. Section 7(c)(1), 16 U. S. C. §839e(c)(l), expressly directs the Administrator initially to charge the DSIs a rate “sufficient to [cover] the net costs incurred by the Administrator” under the exchange program. The House Report explained the interrelationship between sales to DSIs and the exchange program in some detail: “[The DSIs] will also pay significantly higher rates under the new contracts. These higher rates permit the Administrator to enter into contracts with the region’s investor-owned utilities for an exchange of power equal to the utilities’ residential load. This exchange will permit residential customers of investor-owned utilities to share in the benefits of the lower-cost Federal resources. The power sold to BPA will be sold at the utilities’ average system cost and purchased back at the rate paid by the preference customers’ utilization [sic] their general requirements. The loss in revenue to the Administrator is in effect returned by the higher direct service industry rates. By providing these residential customers wholesale rate parity with residential customers of preference utilities, the amendment serves in a substantial way to cure a major part of the allocation problem.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-976, pt. 1, p. 29 (1980). This passage makes clear that the DSI sales and the power exchange program are integrally related. BPA’s ability to finance the exchange program is related to the amount of power that BPAs sell to DSIs, which in turn is determined by the interruptibility terms of the new DSI contracts. It is the responsibility of the Administrator to manage the complex relationship among these various aspects of the statute, and, absent an express statutory statement requiring particular terms in the contracts, it is appropriate that we give him broad discretion to determine them. HH ► — I h — I For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Throughout this opinion, the term “respondents” is used to refer only to those parties who support the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The term does not include the Administrator of BPA and the Secretary of the Department of Energy, who nominally are respondents in this case even though they urge reversal of the judgment below. In addition to the three relevant customer categories, BPA is also authorized to sell power to federal agencies in the region. See § 5(b)(3) of the Regional Act, 16 U. S. C. § 839c(b)(3). Sales to such agencies have no pertinency for this litigation. Section 3 of the Project Act, 16 U. S. C. § 832b, defines “public bodies” as “States, public power districts, counties, and municipalities, including agencies or subdivisions of any thereof.” It defines “cooperatives” as “nonprofit-making . . . organizations of citizens supplying . . . members with any kind of goods, commodities, or services, as nearly as possible at cost.” Because of the preference accorded public utilities over private ones, those States that had a relatively large proportion of public utilities benefited from the federal power more than the States in which most consumers were served by IOUs. Although 80% of the consumers in the State of Washington had access to BPA power because they were served by preference customers, only 20% of the consumers in Oregon had access to such power. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and Conservation: Hearings on H. R. 9020, H. R. 9664, and H. R. 5862 before the Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 9 (1977). Under the Project Act, BPA did not have authority to own, construct, or purchase the output or capability of electricity generating plants except to meet short-term deficiencies; BPA was entirely a marketing agency that disposed of power generated at dams constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers and what was then called the Bureau of Reclamation (now the Water and Power Resources Service). See H. R. Rep. No. 96-976, pt. 2, pp. 26-27 (1980). The statute defines “reserves” as “the electric power needed to avert particular planning or operating shortages for the benefit of firm power customers . . . .” § 3(17), 16 U. S. C. § 839a(17) (emphasis added). Respondents’ discussion of this use of nonfirm power seems to us to be somewhat less than persuasive. The parties agree that the direct resale of BPA power by preference customers is prohibited. Petitioners contend, however, that respondents can and do use nonfirm federal power to displace their own power, which they can resell to other users. See Brief for Petitioners 47; Reply Brief for Petitioners 18, n. 58. Respondents do not specifically deny this, and simply emphasize their “other uses” for nonfirm power and the fact that they use the BPA power to serve their customers. See Brief for Respondent Public Power Council 20-21; Brief for Respondents Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility District et al. 9, n. 25. We therefore take respondents to have conceded that they do arbitrage the nonfirm BPA power. The House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee Report, for example, expressly stated that the second quartile under the new contracts, “will provide a planning reserve to protect the Administrator’s firm loads against the delayed completion or unexpectedly poor performance of regional generating resources or conservation measures implemented or acquired by BPA.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-976, pt. 2, p. 48 (1980). The language in this Report is copied verbatim from a letter written by the BPA Administrator to the House Subcommittee explaining how BPA would serve the DSI load under the Regional Act. See Appendix III to Letter dated Aug. 19, 1980, from BPA Administrator to Rep. Kazen, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources, App. to Pet. for Cert. 1-23. A similar statement is in the Senate Report. S. Rep. No. 96-272, p. 28 (1979). The second quartile interruptibility provisions described similarly in all of these passages differ from those in the 1975 contracts. The dissent apparently concedes that the second quartile interruptibility provisions of the new contracts differ from those in the 1975 contracts, post, at 403-405, and the dissent is presumably aware of the legislative history specifically endorsing the new provisions. Thus, the dissent acknowledges that its interpretation of the phrase “same amount of power” leads to an inconsistency, but claims that Congress was not “aware that it was altering the interruptibility provisions” (emphasis supplied), apparently assuming that Congress simply forgot what was in the 1975 contracts. It seems improvident to assume such ignorance on the part of Congress, not to mention the Administrator of BPA, when Congress clearly had to focus on the terms of the 1975 contracts in drafting several aspects of the statute. The reliance by respondents and the Court of Appeals on § 10(c) of the Regional Act, 16 U. S. C. § 839g(c), is similarly misplaced. Section 10 is entitled “Savings Provisions.” The purpose of § 10(c) was to reassure preference customers in other regions of the country who feared that the Regional Act — by statutorily allocating power directly to nonpreference customers — would set a precedent that would weaken the commitment to preference that exists in other statutes governing the sale of federal power generated in other regions. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-976, pt. 1, pp. 34-35 (1980); cf. 126 Cong. Rec. 29803 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Udall). That section thus is irrelevant to the issue in this case. To say that the preference provisions do not apply to the initial set of contracts does not make preference meaningless. As was the case prior to the Regional Act, preference continues to govern the allocation of all power that is not committed by contract. Thus, the preference rules will apply to any subsequent contracts made with DSIs. Even during the period of the initial contracts, the preference provisions apply to any surplus power that exists. See 16 U. S. C. § 839c(f). Such surplus might exist, for example, because of especially high annual or seasonal streamflow fluctuations, or because BPA’s power acquisition program secures additional power faster than BPA’s increasing contractual commitments. See Mellem, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and Conserving Electricity in the Pacific Northwest: A Primer on the Northwest Power Act, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 245, 269-273 (1983). In holding that the Regional Act does not require that DSI power be interruptible to serve the nonfirm power needs of preference customers, we do not decide whether the Administrator could negotiate for such a condition if he concluded that it would serve the purposes of the Act. One set of respondents argues that we should affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment, but narrow its scope. See Brief for Portland General Electric Company et al. Given our disposition of the ease, we necessarily reject that argument.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

W. E. B. DuBOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA et al. v. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. No. 515. Decided December 11, 1967. William M. Kimstler, Arthur Kinoy, Melvin L. Wulf, David Rein, Monroe H. Freedman and Floyd McKissick for appellants. Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Kevin T. Maroney, George B. Searls and Lee B. Anderson for appellees. Per Curiam. On March 4, 1966, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order, after appropriate hearings, requiring the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America to register with the Attorney General as a Communist-front organization. On April 26, 1966, before hearings were held, appellants attempted to bypass the Board by suing in the District Court. Appellants' complaint in the District Court alleged that the Communist-front registration provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. The complaint also alleged that the “very pendency of these administrative proceedings . . . has resulted and will continue to result . . . in immediate and irreparable injury to fundamental constitutional rights . . . .” Appellants asked the District Court for an order declaring the Communist-front registration provisions unconstitutional and also for an order enjoining the Attorney General and the SACB from enforcing them. A three-judge District Court, convened on appellants’ motion, dismissed the complaint because appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. This appeal followed. Before there may be proceedings to punish appellants for failure to register with the Attorney General, the SACB must first find that the DuBois Clubs is a Communist-front organization and issue an order to that effect. The Act provides for a full evidentiary hearing which is to be held in public. Appellants may be represented by counsel, offer oral or documentary evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and conduct cross-examination. The SACB must make a written report and state its finding of fact. If appellants are aggrieved by the Board’s order, they may obtain review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which may set aside the order if it is not “supported by the preponderance of the evidence.” Upon motion of a party, the Court of Appeals may order the Board to take additional evidence. Of course, if the Board and the Court of Appeals find that the Act does cover appellants, they may challenge its constitutionality either as applied or on its face. Judgments of the Court of Appeals are reviewable by this Court on certiorari. It is evident that Congress has provided a way for appellants to raise their constitutional claims. But appellants, denying that they are within the coverage of the Act, wish to litigate these claims in an injunctive proceeding in the District Court. The effect would be that important and difficult constitutional issues would be decided devoid of factual context and before it was clear that appellants were covered by the Act. We have previously refused to decide the constitutionality of the very provisions involved here because it was not clear that the Act would be applied to the objecting parties. American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U. S. 503, Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 380 U. S. 513. Similarly, the District Court should not be forced to decide these constitutional questions in a vacuum. Appellants rely on Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), to support their contention that the usual rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies should not apply in this case. In Dombrowski, however, the constitutional issues were presented in a factual context. Upon a record demonstrating a history of harassment of appellants in connection with their exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court ordered a federal district court to issue an injunction against pending criminal prosecutions under state statutes. This Court held the statutes “void on their face,” and it concluded that, in the circumstances of that case, if appellants were required to submit to a criminal prosecution, the injury to First Amendment freedoms which had already taken place would be compounded. Accordingly, the Court allowed appellants to assert their claims in an equitable proceeding. In this case, the complaint and .the affidavits constitute no more than conclusory allegations that the purpose of the threatened enforcement of the Act was to “harass” appellants and that harassment was the intended result of the Attorney General’s announcement that he had filed a petition with the SACB. Further, appellants are not being forced to assert their claims in a criminal prosecution. As the court below made clear, “Congress has made careful provision that no tangible sanctions can come into play until the facts have been explored in open hearing [before the Board] and the courts have scrutinized what they show, both in their adequacy to support a registration order and in their constitutional impact upon the statute itself.” In the context of this case, we decline to require the court below to permit substitution of an injunctive proceeding for the civil proceeding which Congress has specifically provided. The motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. The term “Communist-front organization” is defined in § 3 (4) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 989, 50 U. S. C. § 782 (4). Communist-front organizations are required to register with the Attorney General. 50 U. S. C. § 786. When a Communist-front organization does not register, the Attorney General may petition the SACB for an order requiring registration. 50 U. S. C. §792. On April 27, 1966, appellants also filed with the Board a motion to dismiss the Attorney General’s petition. The Board denied this motion and, subsequently, on August 18, 1966, appellants filed an answer to the Attorney General’s petition. According to the District Court, the DuBois Clubs “(1) denied generally that it was a Communist-front organization within the meaning of the Act, and (2) denied various allegations of fact made by the Attorney General in the petition.” Appellants attacked the provisions, 50 U. S. C. §§ 786 (b), (c), and (d), “on their face and as applied” as violations of Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, Art. Ill, and the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Although the Communist-front provisions have been upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit, American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 393, 401, 331 F. 2d 53, 61 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 380 U. S. 503 (1965); Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 404, 413, 331 F. 2d 64, 73 (1963), reversed on other grounds, 380 U. S. 513 (1965); Weinstock v. SACB, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 331 F. 2d 75 (1963); Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 2, 331 F. 2d 76 (1963), their constitutionality has not been specifically determined by this Court, American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U. S. 503 (1965); Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 380 U. S. 513 (1965). Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964). However, the District Court did stay further Board proceedings pending this Court’s disposition of the case. 50 U. S. C. §794 (a). See National Council of American-Soviet Friendship v. SACB, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 162, 322 F. 2d 375 (1963). See 50 U. S. C. §§792 (d), (g), 793 (a). Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-585 (1947). See, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U. S. 540, 543-545 (1946); Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 771-774 (1947); Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U. S. 535, 553 (1954); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U. S. 473, 481-482 (1964). See 50 U. S. C. §§793 (b), 794.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BENTEN et al. v. KESSLER, COMMISSIONER, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, et al. No. A-40. Decided July 17, 1992 Per Curiam. Petitioner Leona Benten wants to use RU-486, a drug not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in order to induce a nonsurgieal abortion. She tried to import a single dosage of the drug for that purpose, but respondent federal officials confiscated her supply at airport customs. Petitioners filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York in order to compel the immediate return of the drug to Benten. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction granting this remedy. Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the injunction pending the appeal. Petitioners have filed an application to vacate the Court of Appeals’ stay. We deny the application. Petitioners contend that Benten is entitled to the return of her RU-486 because an administrative document instructing enforcement officials to seize that drug was promulgated without notice-and-comment procedures assertedly required under both the Administrative Procedure Act and FDA regulations. We conclude that petitioners have failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of these claims. Justice Stevens contends that the Government’s holding the drug would constitute an undue burden upon Benten’s constitutionally protected abortion rights. See post this page and 1086. We express no view on the merits of this assertion. The claim under which Justice Stevens would grant relief was addressed neither by the District Court nor by the Court of Appeals nor by petitioners’ filings in this Court. Accordingly, we conclude that it is not properly before us. Petitioners’ application- to vacate the Court of Appeals’ July 15, 1992, stay pending respondents’ appeal, presented to Justice Thomas and by him referred to the Court, is denied. It is so ordered. Justice Blackmun dissents and would grant the application to vacate the stay.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT v. FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION et al. No. 69. Argued November 13, 1967. Decided March 6, 1968. Walter Herzfeld argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Cecelia H. Goetz, Richard A. Whiting, Robert J. Corber and Stanley J. Madden. Richard A. Posner argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro and Milton J. Grossman. Robert N. Katz argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Federal Maritime Commission. Gary J. Torré argued the cause for respondents Pacific Maritime Association et al. With him on the brief for Pacific Maritime Association were Edward D. Ransom and R. Frederic Fisher. On the brief for Marine Terminals Corp. were Owen Jameson and William W. Schwarzer. Norman Leonard filed a brief for the International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner, a German manufacturer of automobiles, is one of the largest users of the ports on the West Coast of the United States, delivering through them more than 40,000 vehicles each year, the majority transported there by vessels chartered by the petitioner rather than by common carrier. This case grows out of the petitioner’s claim that charges imposed upon the unloading of its automobiles at Pacific Coast ports are in violation of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended. 39 Stat. 728, 46 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. The dispute has a long and somewhat complicated history. The Pacific Maritime Association (the Association) is an employer organization of some 120 principal common carriers by water, stevedoring contractors, and marine terminal operators, representing the Pacific Coast shipping industry. The primary function of the Association is to negotiate and administer collective bargaining contracts with unions representing its members’ employees, of which the International Longshoremen’s and Ware-housemen’s Union (ILWU) is one. In late 1960 the Association and ILWU reached a milestone agreement which, it was hoped, would end a long and troubled history of labor discord on the West Coast waterfront. The ILWU agreed to the introduction of labor-saving devices and the elimination of certain restrictive work practices. In return, the Association agreed to create over the period from 1961 to 1966 a “Mechanization and Modernization Fund” of $29,000,000 (the Mech Fund) to be used to mitigate the impact upon employees of technological unemployment. The agreement specifically reserved to the Association alone the right to determine how to raise the Mech Fund from its members, at the rate of some $5,000,000 a year. A committee of the Association investigated various possible formulas for collecting the Fund from the steve-doring contractors and terminal operators — i. e., those Association members who were employers of workers represented by the ILWU. A majority of the committee recommended that the Mech Fund assessment be based solely on tonnage handled, and this recommendation was adopted by the Association membership. Under this formula, general cargo was assessed at 27per “revenue ton.” A revenue ton is based either on weight (2,000 lbs.=one ton) or measurement (40 cu. ft.=one ton). Whether tonnage declarations on a particular item of cargo were to be by weight or by measurement was to depend, with one exception, upon how that cargo had customarily been manifested (and reported to the Association for dues purposes) in 1959. The one exception was automobiles, for which there had been no uniform manifesting custom. The Association decided that automobiles were to be declared by measurement for Mech Fund purposes, regardless of how they were or had been manifested. Unlike shippers by common carrier, the petitioner must arrange and pay for the unloading of its own chartered vessels upon their arrival in port. For this purpose it has since 1954 contracted with Marine Terminals Corporation and Marine Terminals Corporation of Los Angeles (Terminals), which are members of the Association, for the performance of stevedoring and related services in unloading vehicles from the petitioner’s chartered ships in West Coast ports, at a negotiated price. Prior to the Mech Fund assessment agreement, Terminals’ charge to the petitioner for these unloading services was $10.45 per vehicle, of which about a dollar represented Terminals’ profit. When the vehicles were assessed for the Mech Fund by measurement, the assessment came to $2.35 per vehicle — representing, if passed on to the petitioner, an increase in unloading costs of 22.5%. If the vehicles had been assessed by weight (0.9 tons) rather than by measurement (8.7 tons), the assessment would have been 250 per vehicle — an increase of about 2.4%, comparable to the average Mech Fund assessment of 2.2% for all other general cargo. Assessment by measurement rather than by weight thus resulted in an assessment rate for the petitioner’s automobiles of 10 times that for other West Coast cargo — although automobiles had less to gain than other cargo from the Mech Fund agreement. The petitioner and Terminals both protested these seeming inequities to a committee of the Association set up to handle such claims, but without success. The petitioner refused to pay any additional charge resulting from the Association’s levy, and Terminals, while continuing to unload Volkswagen automobiles for the petitioner, did not pay its resulting assessment to the Association. The Association sued Terminals in a federal court in California for its failure to pay the Mech Fund assessments; Terminals admitted all the allegations of the complaint and impleaded the petitioner as a defendant. The petitioner then obtained a stay of that action to permit it to invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Commission, in order to determine the following issues: “1. Whether the assessments claimed from [the petitioner] are being claimed pursuant to an agreement or understanding which is required to be filed with and approved by the Federal Maritime Commission under Section 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 814 (1961), before it is lawful to take any action thereunder, which agreement has not been so filed and approved. “2. Whether the assessments claimed from [the petitioner] result in subjecting the automobile cargoes of [the petitioner] to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of Section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 815 (1961). “3. Whether the assessments claimed from [the petitioner] constitute an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of Section 17 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U. S. C. 816 (1961).” The petitioner then began the present proceedings by filing a complaint with the Commission raising the above issues. The petitioner alleged that the Association was dominated by common carriers which had agreed upon the assessment formula in order to shift a disproportionate share of the Mech Fund assessment onto the petitioner,, which did not patronize those common carriers. The Commission, after a hearing, upheld the initial decision of its examiner and dismissed the complaint, with two dissents. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, and we granted certiorari to consider important questions under the Shipping Act. I. The petitioner’s primary contention — supported by the United States, a party-respondent — is that implementation of the Association’s formula for levying the Mech Fund assessments was unenforceable, because the agreement among Association members imposing that formula was not filed with the Commission in accord with § 15 of the Act. That section provides that there be filed with the Commission “every agreement” among persons subject to the Act “fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. . . Until submitted to and approved by the Commission, “it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement . . . The Commission is directed to disapprove any agreement be unlawful, and agreements, modifications, and cancellations shall be lawful only when and as long as approved by the Commission; before approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such agreement, modification, or cancellation; except that tariff rates, fares, and charges, and classifications, rules, and regulations explanatory thereof (including changes in special rates and charges covered by section 813a of this title which do not involve a change in the spread between such rates and charges and the rates and charges applicable to non-contract shippers) agreed upon by approved conferences, and changes and amendments thereto, if otherwise in accordance with law, shall be permitted to take effect without prior approval upon compliance with the publication and filing requirements of section 817 (b) of this title and with the provisions of any regulations the Commission may adopt.” 46 U. S. C. § 814. “that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of [the Act]. . . .” “The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing, disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this chapter, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations. No such agreement shall be approved, nor shall continued approval be permitted for any agreement (1) between carriers not members of the same conference or conferences of carriers serving different trades that would otherwise be naturally competitive, unless in the case of agreements between carriers, each carrier, or in the case of agreement between conferences, each conference, retains the right of independent action, or (2) in respect to any conference agreement, which fails to provide reasonable and equal terms and conditions for admission and readmission to conference membership of other qualified carriers in the trade, or fails to provide that any An agreement filed with and approved by the Commission is immunized from challenge under the antitrust laws. The Commission held that, although the Mech Fund assessment formula was a “cooperative working agreement” clearly within the plain language of § 15, it nonetheless was not the kind of agreement required to be filed with the Commission under that section: “Although the literal language of section 15 is broad enough to encompass any ‘cooperative working arrangement’ entered into by persons subject to the Act, the legislative history is clear that the statute was intended by Congress to apply only to those agreements involving practices which affect that competition which in the absence of the agreement would exist between the parties when dealing with the shipping or traveling public or their representatives. “It is not contested that the membership of [the Association] entered into an agreement as to the manner of assessing its own membership for the collection of the ‘Mech’ fund. Such an agreement, however, does not fall within the confines of section 15 as, standing by itself, it has no impact upon outsiders. What must be demonstrated before a section 15 agreement may be said to exist is that there was an additional agreement by the [Association] membership to pass on all or a portion of its assessments to the carriers and shippers served by the terminal operators.” 9 F. M. C., at 82-83. The Court of Appeals affirmed. That court felt itself confined by our decision in Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, to determining simply whether the Commission’s ruling was supported by “substantial evidence.” With “due deference to the expertise of the Commission,” it concluded “(albeit with some hesitation) that there is substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole to support the Commission’s decision.” 125 U. S. App. D. C., at 290, 371 F. 2d, at 755. The issue in this case, however, relates not to the sufficiency of evidence but to the construction of a statute. The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be affirmed if it has a “reasonable basis in law.” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 131; Unemployment Commission v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153-154. But the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction, FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U. S. 374, 385, and “are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.” NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291. “The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia . . . .” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 318. Cf. FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 499-500 (where this Court overturned the Commission’s construction of § 14 of the Shipping Act). In limiting § 15 to agreements which “affect competition” and in finding that the assessment agreement did not so “affect competition,” the Commission in this case used that phrase in a highly artificial sense — by requiring “an additional agreement by the [Association] membership to pass on all or a portion of its assessments . . . There is no question that the assessment agreement necessarily affected the cost structures of, and the charges levied by, individual Association members. Most, though not all, of the stevedoring contractors and terminal operators did pass the assessment on. The economic realities were such that many of them had no choice — a fact of which they apprised the Association at the time the assessment arrangement was being devised. In the case of Terminals, the assessment it had to pay on Volkswagen automobiles was more than twice its profit margin. The Commission thus took an extremely narrow view of a statute that uses expansive language. In support of that view, the Commission argued in this Court that a narrow construction of § 15 should be adopted in order to minimize the number of agreements that may receive antitrust exemption. However, antitrust exemption results, not when an agreement is submitted for filing, but only when the agreement is actually approved; and in deciding whether to approve an agreement, the Commission is required under § 15 to consider antitrust implications. FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, ante, p. 238; see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 211 F. 2d 51. The Commission itself has not heretofore limited § 15 to horizontal agreements among competitors, but has applied it to other types of agreements coming within its literal terms. See, e. g., Agreements Nos. 8225 and 8225-1, Between Greater Baton Rouge Port Commission and Cargill, Inc., 5 F. M. B. 648 (1959), affirmed, 287 F. 2d 86, and Agreement No. T—4: Terminal Lease Agreement at Long Beach, California, 8 F. M. C. 521 (1965), applying § 15 to lease agreements. In the latter case, decided only four months before its decision in the case before us, the Commission said: “Section 15 describes in unambiguous language those agreements that must be filed; it does not speak of agreements per se violative of the Sherman Act. Since the wording of section 15 is clear, we need not refer to the legislative history; there is simply no ambiguity to resolve.” 8 F. M. C., at 531. To limit § 15 to agreements that “affect competition,” as the Commission used that phrase in the present case, simply does not square with the structure of the statute. The legislative history offers no support for a different view. The genesis of the Shipping Act was the “Alexander Report” in 1914. FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 490. While it is true that the attention of that congressional committee was focused primarily upon the practices that had cartelized much of the maritime industry, it is clear that the concerns of its inquiry were far more broadly ranging. The report summed up the testimony before the committee: “Nearly all the steamship line representatives . . . expressed themselves as not opposed to government supervision . .. and approval of all agreements or arrangements which steamship lines may have entered into with other steamship lines, with shippers, or with other carriers and transportation agencies. On the other hand, the shippers who appeared as witnesses . . . were in the great majority of instances favorable to a comprehensive system of government supervision . . . [and] the approval of contracts, agreements, and arrangements, and the general supervision of all conditions of water transportation which vitally affect the interests of shippers.” Alexander Report, at 418. (Emphasis added.) The committee recommended, among other things: “That all carriers engaged in the foreign trade of the United States, parties to any agreements, understandings, or conference arrangements hereinafter referred to, be required to file for approval ... a copy of all written agreements (or a complete memorandum if the understanding or agreement is oral) entered into (1) with any other steamship companies, firms, or lines engaged directly or indirectly in the American trade, or (2) with American shippers, railroads or other transportation agencies.” Alexander Report, at 419-420. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress, in enacting § 15 of the Act, meant to do less than follow this recommendation of the Alexander Report and subject to the scrutiny of a specialized government agency the myriad of restrictive agreements in the maritime industry. This is not to say that the Commission is without power to determine, after appropriate administrative proceedings, that some types or classes of agreements coming within the literal provisions of § 15 are of such a de minimis or routine character as not to require formal fifing. Since the Commission’s decision in the present case, Congress has explicitly given it such authority: “The Federal Maritime Commission, upon application or on its own motion, may by order or rule exempt for the future any class of agreements between persons subject to this chapter or any specified activity of such persons from any requirement of this chapter, or Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, where it finds that such exemption will not substantially impair effective regulation by the Federal Maritime Commission, be unjustly discriminatory, or be detrimental to commerce. “The Commission may attach conditions to any such exemptions and may, by order, revoke any such exemption.” 46 U. S. C. § 833a (1964 ed., Supp. II). But the agreement with which we deal here — levying $29,000,000 over five years, binding all principal carriers, stevedoring contractors, and terminal operators on the Pacific Coast, and necessarily resulting in substantially increased stevedoring and terminal charges — was neither de minimis nor routine. We hold that this agreement was required to be filed under § 15 of the Act. It is to be emphasized that the only agreement involved in this case is the one among members of the Association allocating the impact of the Mech Fund levy. We are not concerned here with the agreement creating the Association or with the collective bargaining agreement between the Association and the ILWTJ. No claim has been made in this case that either of those agreements was subject to the filing requirements of § 15. Those agreements, reflecting the national labor policy of free collective bargaining by representatives of the parties’ own unfettered choice, fall in an area of concern to the National Labor Relations Board, and nothing we have said in this opinion is to be understood as questioning their continuing validity. But in negotiating with the ILWU, the Association insisted that its members were to have the exclusive right to determine how the Mech Fund was to be assessed, and a clause to that effect was included in the collective bargaining agreement. That assessment arrangement, affecting only relationships among Association members and their customers, is all that is before us in this case. Moreover, so far as the record shows, only the assessment on automobiles is now challenged, and there is no reason to suppose that the Commission will not consider expeditious approval of so much of the agreement as is not in dispute. II. The petitioner also attacked the Association’s assessment of its automobiles under § 16 and § 17 of the Shipping Act. Section 16 makes it unlawful “to subject any particular person, locality, or description of trafile to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage,” and § 17 forbids any “unjust or unreasonable” regulation or practice “relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property.” The Commission ruled that neither of these sections had been violated, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. If the agreement is now filed under § 15, the Commission will be called upon again to consider the effect of §§16 and 17, since an agreement that violates a specific provision of the Act must be disapproved. Accordingly, it is not inappropriate, without now passing upon the ultimate merits of the §§16 and 17 issues, to give brief consideration to the Commission’s handling of those issues upon the present record. The Commission ruled that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any “undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage” under § 16 solely because it had not shown any unequal treatment as between its automobiles and other automobiles or cargo competitive with automobiles. In so ruling, the Commission applied the “competitive relationship” doctrine which it has developed in cases concerning rates for carriage of goods by sea. But the Commission, in cases not involving freight rates and the particularized economics that result from a vessel’s finite cargo capacity, has often found § 16 violations even in the absence of a “competitive relationship.” See, e. g., Practices, etc., of San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, 2 U. S. M. C. 588 (1941) and 709 (1944), and Storage Practices at Longview, Washington, 6 F. M. B. 178 (1960), involving storage charges; and New York Foreign Freight Forwarders and Brokers Assn. v. FMC, 337 F. 2d 289, involving freight forwarders’ fees. In a proceeding subsequent to its decision in the present case, the Commission explicitly dispensed with the competitive relationship requirement with respect to port “free time.” Investigation of Free Time Practices — Port of San Diego, 9 F. M. C. 525 (1966); cf. California v. United States, 320 U. S. 577. See also Investigation on Household Goods, North Atlantic Mediterranean Freight Conference, F. M. C. Docket No. 66-49 (June 30,1967). When the agreement in the present case is filed, the Commission may consider anew whether the mere absence of a competitive relationship should foreclose further § 16 inquiry. With respect to § 17, the Commission found that the assessment upon the petitioner’s automobiles was not “unreasonable,” because the petitioner had received “substantial benefits” in return for the assessment, and there was no showing of a deliberate intent to impose an unfair burden upon the petitioner. This, we think, reflects far too narrow a view of § 17. It may be that a relatively small charge imposed uniformly for the benefit of an entire group can be reasonable under § 17, even though not all members of the group receive equal benefits. See Evans Cooperage Co. v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, 6 F. M. B. 415. But here a relatively large charge was unequally imposed. The benefits received by the petitioner may have been substantial, but other cargo received greater benefits at one-tenth the cost. Moreover, the question of reasonableness under § 17 does not depend upon unlawful or discriminatory intent. As the Commission itself has said: “[Sections 16 and 17] proscribe and make unlawful certain conduct, without regard to intent. The offense is committed by the mere doing of the act, and the question of intent is not involved.” Hellenic Lines Ltd. — Violation of Sections 16 (First) and 17, 7 F. M. C. 673, 675-676 (1964). Cf. United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U. S. 515, 523-526; ICC v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 209 U. S. 108. The question under § 17 is not whether the petitioner has received some substantial benefit as the result of the Mech Fund assessment, but whether the correlation of that benefit to the charges imposed is reasonable. The “substantial benefits” measure of unreasonableness used by the Commission in this case is far too blunt an instrument. Nothing in the language or history of the statute supports so tortured a construction of - the phrase “just and reasonable.” The Commission has cited no similar construction of the phrase by any other regulatory agency or court. Indeed, in past decisions the Commission itself has not applied any such test. See California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Stockton Elevators, Inc., 8 F. M. B. 97 (1964), and Practices, etc., of San Francisco Bay Area Terminals, 2 U. S. M. C. 588 (1941), affirmed, 320 U. S. 577, where the Commission found violations of § 17 even though the benefits received were clearly substantial. The proper inquiry under § 17 is, in a word, whether the charge levied is reasonably related to the service rendered. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. r. . , , It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. All parties agree that this agreement was an enlightened, forward-looking step in West Coast longshore labor relations. See Kossoris, Working Rules in West Coast Longshoring, 84 Monthly Labor Rev. 1 (1961); Killingsworth, The Modernization of West Coast Longshore Work Rules, 15 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 295 (1962); ILWU (American Mail Line), 144 N. L. R. B. 1432, 1442 (1963). The agreement was not signed in final form until November 15, 1961, although it was implemented in many respects prior to that date. The agreement has been continued, and the Mech Fund is still being collected and paid out. A minority of the committee recommended that the Mech Fund be raised by the same formula by which the Association’s dues were levied — a formula combining both tonnage handled and man-hours employed, in a ratio of 40/60. Although the Mech Fund was initially assessed entirely on the basis of tonnage, the formula was later amended to assess employers of marine clerks on a man-hour basis. About 12% of the fund was collected in this way. Bulk cargo was assessed at per revenue ton. In December 1961, the rates were increased to 28%0 for general cargo and 90 for bulk cargo. On chartered vessels automobiles are manifested on a unit basis (showing weight and sometimes measurement). On common carriers both weight and measurement are shown. In coastwise trade automobiles are manifested by weight. Some time after the assessment agreement was implemented, Terminals’ charge to the petitioner exclusive of the assessment decreased. The amount of the decrease does not appear in the record. These figures represent a weighted average of the petitioner’s two model lines at the time of the assessment agreement. Passenger models were 0.8 ton by weight and 7.8 tons by measurement; unloading costs initially increased an estimated 22%. Transporter models were 1.1 tons by weight and 11.4 tons by measurement; unloading costs initally increased an estimated 31%. When the Mech Fund agreement was reached, the unloading of automobiles was already so highly mechanized that there was little likelihood of improvement. Hence shippers of automobiles stood to receive from the agreement only the general benefits of a stable labor situation, such as freedom from strikes and slowdowns. The committee did make downward adjustments for scrap metal and lumber. By virtue of the Association’s bylaws, carriers control the Board of Directors and all membership votes. Both the committee which devised the assessment formula and the one which later ruled on claims of inequities were made up entirely of carriers; neither committee had a single member who was a stevedoring contractor or terminal operator. The petitioner is the largest shipper of dry cargo by charter to West Coast ports. It ships more than 75% of its vehicles by charter and most of the rest by common carriers which are not members of the Association. About two-thirds of all automobiles imported through West Coast ports are Volkswagens. It appears that no other importer of automobiles through West Coast ports uses chartered vessels. Most, but not all, of the stevedoring contractors and terminal operators passed the Mech Fund assessment on to their customers. In most instances these customers were common carriers who were members of the Association. The member carriers did not pass the assessment on to shippers. Hence, except in situations like the petitioner’s, the cost of the Mech Fund was borne by Association members. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Marine Terminals Corp., 9 F. M. C. 77. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 282, 371 F. 2d 747. 388 U. S. 909. “Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, shall file immediately with the Commission a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every agreement with another such carrier or other person subject to this chapter, or modification or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The term ‘agreement’ in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrangements.” 46 IT. S. C. § 814. The original statute in 1916 required filing with the United States Shipping Board. 39 Stat. 728, 729, 733. The Shipping Board was succeeded in 1933 by the United States Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce, Exec. Order No. 6166, § 12 (1933); in 1936 by the United States Maritime Commission, 49 Stat. 1985; in 1950 by the Federal Maritime Board, 64 Stat. 1273; and in 1961 by the Federal Maritime Commission, 75 Stat. 840. In this opinion the Federal Maritime Commission and its predecessors are collectively referred to as the Commission. “Any agreement and any modification or cancellation of any agreement not approved, or disapproved, by the Commission shall member may withdraw from membership upon reasonable notice without penalty for such withdrawal. “The Commission shall disapprove any such agreement, after notice and hearing, on a finding of inadequate policing of the obligations under it, or of failure or refusal to adopt and maintain reasonable procedures for promptly and fairly hearing and considering shippers’ requests and complaints.” 46 U. S. C. §814. “Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section, or permitted under section 813a of this title, shall be excepted from the provisions of sections 1-11 and 15 of Title 15, and amendments and Acts supplementary thereto.” 46 U. S. C. §814. The dissenting opinion of Commissioner Patterson vigorously attacked the Commission’s finding that there was no implied understanding among the Association members that the assessment would be passed on. 9 F. M. C., at 101-104. The Court of Appeals found considerable evidence in support of Commissioner Patterson’s view. 125 U. S. App. D. C., at 290, n. 7, 371 F. 2d, at 755, n. 7. However, applying the substantial evidence rule, the court upheld the Commission’s finding, although indicating that it might have found the facts differently itself. 125 U. S. App. D. C., at 290-291, 371 F. 2d, at 755-756. One of the standards for approval under § 15, added in 1961, 75 Stat. 763, is whether or not the agreement is “contrary to the public interest.” See n. 17, supra. “We think it now beyond dispute that ‘the public interest’ within the meaning of section 15 includes the national policy embodied in the antitrust laws.” Mediterranean Pools Investigation, 9 F. M. C. 264, 289. Any agreement subject to § 15 filing that is not both filed and approved is not only illegal under § 15 but also subject to attack under the antitrust laws. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U. S. 213. “[T]he Shipping Act specifically provides machinery for legalizing that which would otherwise be illegal under the anti-trust laws. The condition upon which such authority is granted is that the agency entrusted with the duty to protect the public interest scrutinize the agreement to make sure that the conduct thus legalized does not invade the prohibitions of the anti-trust laws any more than is necessary to serve the purposes of the regulatory statute.” 93 U. S. App. D. C., at 299, 211 F. 2d, at 57. See also statement of Commission Chairman Harllee requesting from Congress the authority for the Commission to exempt from § 15 such otherwise included agreements as those between two freight forwarders in different ports to perform services for each other. H. R. Rep. No. 2248, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1966). Section 15 requires filing of “every agreement” in any of seven categories, and one of the seven comprises all agreements which “regulat[e] . . . competition.” See n. 15, supra. The other six categories would be rendered virtually meaningless by the Commission’s construction. House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Report on Steamship Agreements and Affiliations, H. R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 415-424 (1914). The recommendations of the Alexander Report were incorporated into both the House and Senate Reports on the Shipping Act. H. R. Rep. No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 27-32 (1916); S. Rep. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-12 (1916). The need for this provision is set forth in S. Rep. No. 1459, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966): “The Federal Maritime Commission under the Shipping Act, 1916, regulates certain operations of water carriers and other persons subject to the act which have only slight effect on the foreign commerce of this country and are not significant in the overall design of regulation contemplated by the 1916 act. Exacting compliance with the act under these circumstances has proven unnecessarily costly to the carrier and the Government. “The authority conferred under this legislation will relieve the Commission and affected carriers of an undue regulatory burden. In addition, a general exemption will preclude the necessity for a piecemeal approach in the future.” Prior to this 1966 amendment, the Commission had taken some steps to protect itself from de minimis filings. In Section 15 Inquiry,, 1 U. S. S. B. 121 (1927), the Commission held “routine” intraconference changes and transactions not subject to § 15. In Oranje Line v. Anchor Line, 6 F. M. B. 199, 209 (1961), the Commission construed its decision in Los Angeles By-Products Co. v. Barber S. S. Lines, 2 U. S. M. C. 106 (1939), as holding joint advertising not subject to § 15. Proceeding under general power to issue regulations conferred on it in 1961, 46 U. S. C. § 841a, the Commission exempted at least one class of de minimis agreements in 46 CFR §§ 530.5 (d) (4) and (5), dealing with certain terminal agreements. “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly— “First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . . , .” 46 U. S. C. § 815. “Every such carrier and every other person subject to this chapter shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever the Board finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice.” 46 U. S. C. § 816. See n. 17, supra. See, e. g., Boston Wool Trade Assn. v. M. & M. T. Co., 1 U. S. S. B. 24 (1921); Eagle-Ottawa Leather Co. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 1 U. S. S. B. 101 (1926); Philadelphia Ocean Traffic Bureau v. Export S. S. Corp., 1 U. S. S. B. 538 (1936); Huber Mfg. Co. v. N. V. Stoomvaart Maatschappij “Nederland,” 4 F. M. B. 343 (1953); West Indies Fruit Co. v. Flota Mercante, 7 F. M. C. 66 (1962). See S. Bross, Ocean Shipping 189-190 (1956); C. Cufley, Ocean Freights and Chartering 400-407 (1962). The Interstate Commerce Commission has a competitive relationship rule with respect to § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 902, 49 U. S. C. §3 (1), Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 273 I. C. C. 185; United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 301 I. C. C. 21. However, that Commission has said: “This Commission has never held that competition is an indispensable element in a situation of undue prejudice and preference, although it has frequently said that 'ordinarily/ or 'generally/ a competitive relation must appear.” Joseph A. Goddard Realty Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 229 I. C. C. 497, 501. In the Evans Cooperage ease the Commission upheld a uniform wharfage charge which was imposed on all those who used the wharf, even though the various users of the wharf did not all receive precisely equal benefits from it. But the Commission looked beyond “substantial benefits” to the relationship between the service and the charge: “The [Commission of the Port of New Orleans] has made a charge to help defray its costs of operating facilities as measured by cargo handled in the area and the only question is whether its facilities are being used and the commission is performing a service reasonably related to its charges. The Examiner considered the evidence and found that it was.” (Emphasis added.) 6 F. M. B., at 418-419. See n. 8, supra. 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). Each major port would have its own rules stipulating the number of men needed on gangs. Frequently, the number was more than was needed for the job. Por example, the “four-on four-off” gang required eight men in the hold of a ship, although only four actually worked while the other four rested. Id., at 3. See generally Killingsworth, supra, n. 7; P. Hartman, Union Work Rules: A Brief Theoretical Analysis and Some Empirical Results, U. of Ill. Bull., Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations (1967).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MOHASCO CORP. v. SILVER No. 79-616. Argued March 25, 1980 Decided June 23, 1980 SteveNS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. BlacicmuN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 826. Thomas Mead Santoro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Francis J. Holloway. Judith P. Vladeck argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Sheldon Engelhard. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, and Lutz Alexander Prager. Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell filed a, brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mb. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this Title VII case is whether Congress intended the word “filed” to have the same meaning in subsections (c) and (e) of § 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 260, as amended in 1972, 86 Stat. 104M05, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (c) and (e). The former subsection prohibits the filing of an unfair employment practice charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) until after a state fair employment practices agency has had an opportunity to consider it. The latter subsection requires that in all events the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the occurrence. We hold that a literal reading of the two subsections gives full effect to the several policies reflected in the statute. On August 29, 1975, Mohasco Corp. discharged the respondent from his position as senior marketing economist. On June 15, 1976 — 291 days later — the EEOC received a letter from respondent asserting that Mohasco had discriminated against him because of his religion. The letter was promptly referred to the New York State Division of Human Rights. That state agency reviewed the matter and, in due course, determined that there was no merit in the charge. Meanwhile, on August 20, 1976 — a date more than 60 days after respondent’s letter had been submitted to the EEOC and 357 days after respondent’s discharge — the EEOC notified Mohasco that respondent had filed a charge of employment discrimination. About a year later, on August 24, 1977, the EEOC issued its determination that “there is not reasonable cause to believe the charge is true,” and formally notified respondent that if he wished to pursue the matter further, he had a statutory right to file a private action in a federal district court within 90 days. Respondent commenced this litigation 91 days later in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The District Court granted Mohasco’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that respondent’s failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that June 15, 1976 (the 291st day), could not be treated as the date that respondent’s charge was “filed” with the EEOC, because § 706 (c) provides that in States which have their own fair employment practice agencies — and New York is such a State — “no charge may be filed ... by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated . . . .” Since no proceedings had been commenced before the New York agency prior to June 15, 1976, and since the proceedings that were commenced at that time did not terminate within 60 days, the District Court read § 706 (c) as precluding any filing with the EEOC until 60 days after June 15, 1976. Because that date was 51 days beyond § 706 (e)’s 300-day time limit for filing in so-called “deferral States,” the charge was not timely filed. The District Court refused to apply an EEOC regulation that would have treated respondent’s charge as timely because it was submitted to the EEOC within 300 days of the practice complained of and also within the applicable New York limitations period. The District Court held that the regulation was contrary to the plain language of the statute, and in any event, had not been followed by the EEOC itself in this case. Over the dissent of Judge Meskill, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 602 F. 2d 1083 (1979). It recognized that the District Court had read the statute literally, but concluded that a literal reading did not give sufficient weight to the overriding purpose of the Act. In the majority’s view, in order to be faithful to “the strong federal policy in insuring that employment discrimination is redressed,” id., at 1087, it was necessary “to conclude that a charge is 'filed’ for purposes of § 706 (e) when received, and 'filed’ as required by § 706 (c) when the state deferral period ends.” Ibid. By giving the word “filed” two different meanings, the court concluded that the letter received by the EEOC on June 15, 1976, had been filed within 300 days as required by § 706 (e), but had not been filed during the 60-day deferral period for purposes of § 706 (c). Judge Meskill believed that a literal reading of the statute was not only consistent with its basic purpose, but was also warranted by the additional purpose of “requiring] prompt action on the part of Title VII plaintiffs.” 602 F. 2d, at 1092. He noted that Congress had imposed a general requirement of filing within 180 days, and that the exceptional period of 300 days for deferral States was merely intended to give the charging party a fair opportunity to invoke his state remedy without jeopardizing his federal rights; the exception was not intended to allow residents of deferral States to proceed with less diligence than was generally required. Because there is a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the proper interpretation of the word “filed” in this statute, we granted certiorari. 444 U. S. 990. We now reverse. We first review the plain meaning of the relevant statutory language; we next examine the legislative history of the 1964 Act and the 1972 amendments for evidence that Congress intended the statute to have a different meaning; and finally we consider the policy arguments in favor of a less literal reading of the Act. I Section 706 (e) begins with the general rule that a “charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . Since respondent’s letter was submitted.to the EEOC 291 days after the occurrence, he plainly did not exercise the diligence required by that general rule. Nor, as we shall explain, did he have to; but it should be pointed out that had he sent his charge to either the state agency or the EEOC within 180 days, he would have had no difficulty in complying with the terms of the exception to that general rule allowing a later filing with the EEOC in deferral States. That exception allows a filing with the EEOC after 180 days if “the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice . . . When respondent submitted his letter to the EEOC, he had not yet instituted any state proceedings. Under the literal terms of the statute, it could therefore be argued that he did not bring himself within the exception to the general 180-day requirement. But in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 525, we held that “[n]othing in the Act suggests that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself . . ..” Here, state proceedings were instituted by the EEOC when it immediately forwarded his letter to the state agency on June 15, 1976. Accordingly, we treat the state proceedings as having been instituted on that date. Since the EEOC could not proceed until either state proceedings had ended or 60 days had passed, the proceedings were "initially instituted with a State . . . agency” prior to their official institution with the EEOC. Therefore, respondent came within § 706 (e)’s exception allowing a federal filing more than 180 days after the occurrence. That exception states that “such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier . . . .” Since the state proceedings did not terminate until well after the expiration of the 300-day period, see n. 5, supra, the 300-day limitations period is the one applicable to respondent’s charge. The question, then, is whether the June 15, 1976, letter was “filed” when received by the EEOC within the meaning of subsection (e) of § 706. The answer is supplied by subsection (c), which imposes a special requirement for cases arising in deferral States: “no charge may be filed under subsection [(b)] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated . . . .” Thus, in terms, the statute prohibited the EEOC from allowing the charge to be filed on the date the letter was received. Although, as the Court held in Love v. Pullman Co., supra, it was proper for the EEOC to hold respondent’s “complaint in ‘suspended animation,’ automatically filing it upon termination of the State proceedings,” 404 U. S., at 526 (emphasis added), that means that the charge was filed on the 351st day, not the 291st. By that time, however, the 300-day period had run and the filing was therefore untimely. II In contrast to this rather straightforward reading of the statute, respondent urges us to give the word “filed” two different meanings within the same statutory section in order better to effectuate Congress’ purpose underlying Title VII. Essentially, his argument is that a rule permitting filings for up to 300 days after the discriminatory occurrence — regardless of the rule against filing during the deferral period — would help further the cause of eliminating discriminatory employment practices. We therefore turn to the legislative history, but in doing so we emphasize that the words of the statute are not ambiguous. Nor does a literal reading of them lead to “absurd or futile results,” United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543. For time limitations are inevitably arbitrary to some extent; and the limitations at issue here are not so short that a plaintiff’s remedy is effectively denied for all practical purposes without an opportunity for a hearing. A It is unquestionably true that the 1964 statute was enacted to implement the congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices, and that that basic policy must inform construction of this remedial legislation. It must also be recognized, however, in light of the tempestuous legislative proceedings that produced the Act, that the ultimate product reflects other, perhaps countervailing, purposes that some Members of Congress sought to achieve. The present language was clearly the result of a compromise. It is our task to give effect to the statute as enacted. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U. S. 112, 123-124. The typical time limitations provision in the numerous proposed civil rights bills required the filing of a charge with the new federal fair employment practices agency within six months of the discriminatory conduct. These initial proposals did not provide for mandatory deferral by the federal agency during comparable state administrative proceedings, though some proposals would have authorized the federal agency to enter agreements of cooperation with state agencies, under which the federal agency would refrain from processing charges in specified cases. On February 10, 1964, the House of Representatives passed H. R. 7152, its version of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act. Title VII of that bill contained a 6-month limitations provision for the filing of charges with the EEOC, and directed the EEOC to enter into agreements with state agencies providing for suspension of federal enforcement. In the Senate, H. R. 7152 met with exceptionally strong opposition. The principal opposition focused not on the details of the bill, but on its fundamental purpose. During the course of one of the longest filibusters in the history of the Senate, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate carefully forged the compromise substitute (Dirksen compromise) that was ultimately to become in substantial part the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The purpose of the compromise was to attract sufficient support to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for cloture. This effort was successful. Fifteen days after the Dirksen compromise was offered as an amendment, a cloture motion carried the necessary votes. Section 706 (d) of the compromise provided for a 90-day limitations period for filing discrimination claims with' the EEOC in nondeferral States, the period ultimately adopted in the 1964 version of the Act. It was the first time the 90-day figure appeared in any proposed bill, and its appearance was unaccompanied by any explanation. Section 706 (b) of the compromise introduced the mandatory deferral concept for the first time, providing that during a 60-day deferral period, “no charge may be filed” — language that figures so prominently in this case. In such deferral States, § 706 (d) extended the time for filing with the EEOC to 210 days. Since the Senate did not explain why it adopted a time limitation of only half that adopted by the House, one can only speculate. But it seems clear that the 90-day provision to some must have represented a judgment that most genuine claims of discrimination would be promptly asserted and that the costs associated with processing and defending stale or dormant claims outweigh the federal interest in guaranteeing a remedy to every victim of discrimination. To others it must have represented a necessary sacrifice of the rights of some victims of discrimination in order that a civil rights bill could be enacted. Section 706 (b) was rather clearly intended to increase the role of States and localities in resolving charges of employment discrimination. And § 706 (d)’s longer time of 210 days for filing with the EEOC in deferral States was included to prevent forfeiture of a complainant’s federal rights while participating in state proceedings. But neither this latter provision nor anything else in the legislative history contains any “suggestion that complainants in some' States were to be allowed to proceed with less diligence than those in other states.” Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F. 2d 811, 825, n. 35 (CA7 1972). The history identifies only one reason for treating workers in deferral States differently from workers in other States: to give state agencies an opportunity to redress the evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention unless its need was demonstrated. The statutory plan was not designed to give the worker in a deferral State the option of choosing between his state remedy and his federal remedy, nor indeed simply to allow him additional time in which to obtain state relief. Had that been the plan, a simple statute prescribing a 90-day period in nondeferral States and a 210-day period in deferral States would have served the legislative purpose. Instead, Congress chose to prohibit the filing of any federal charge until after state proceedings had been completed or until 60 days had passed, whichever came sooner. To be sure, in deferral States having fair employment practices agencies over- one year old, Congress in effect gave complainants an additional 60 days in which initially to file a charge and still ensure preservation of their federal rights. In other words, under the 1964 Act, a complainant in such a deferral State could have filed on the 160th day, and then filed with the EEOC on the 210th day at the end of the 60-day deferral period, while a complainant in a nondeferral State had to file on the 90th day with the EEOC. But there is no reason to believe that the 1964 Congress intended deferral state complainants to have the additional advantage of being able to ignore the 210-day limitations period when they failed to invoke their rights early enough to allow the 60-day deferral period to expire within the 210-day period. In sum, the legislative history of the 1964 statute is entirely consistent with the wording of the statute itself. B In 1972, Congress amended § 706 by changing the general limitations period from 90 days to 180 days and correspondingly extended the maximum period for deferral States from 210 days to 300 days. The amendment did not make any change in the procedural scheme, however, although such a change was proposed and rejected. As initially introduced in the House of Representatives, the proposed 1972 amendments to Title VII would have deleted § 706 (b)’s prohibition against the filing of a federal charge until 60 days after the institution of state proceedings, and would have substituted language merely prohibiting the EEOC from taking any action on the charge until the prescribed period had elapsed. The House, however, concluded that no change in this aspect of the 1964 statute should be made, and deleted the amendment prior to passage. The Senate version of the amendments passed with the provision merely prohibiting the EEOC from taking any action on a charge in the deferral period. But at conference, the position of the House prevailed on the understanding that the law as interpreted in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, was controlling. As already noted, our literal reading of the word “filed” in § 706 is fully supported by the Love opinion. It is true that a section-by-section analysis of the 1972 amendments filed by Senator Williams refers to the then recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F. 2d 1222 (1972), see n. 16, supra, with approval, and that that case supports respondent’s reading of the Act. But we do not find that isolated reference — which was first inserted into the legislative history after the completion of the work of both the Senate Committee and House Committee, as well as after the Report of the joint conference just referred to — to represent either a sound interpretation of the 1964 enactment or a conscious intention of Congress to change existing law. The point at which it appears in the legislative history simply refutes any notion that Congress focused on the precise issue, much less adopted the approach of the Vigil case. To the extent that Congress focused on the issue at all in 1972, it expressly rejected the language that would have mandated the exact result that respondent urges. Ill Finally we consider the additional points advanced in support of respondent’s position: (1) that it is unfair to victims of discrimination who often proceed without the assistance of counsel; (2) that it is contrary to the interpretation of the Act by the agency charged with responsibility for its enforcement; and (3) that a less literal reading of the Act would adequately effectuate the policy of deferring to state agencies. The unfairness argument is based on the assumption that a lay person reading the statute would assume that he had 300 days in which to file his first complaint with either a state or federal agency. We find no merit in this argument. We believe that a lay person would be more apt to regard the general obligation of filing within 180 days as the standard of diligence he must satisfy,, and that one who carefully read the entire section would understand it to mean exactly what it says. We must also reject any suggestion that the EEOC may adopt regulations that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate. As we have held on prior occasions, its “interpretation” of the statute cannot supersede the language chosen by Congress. Finally, we reject the argument that the timeliness requirements would be adequately served by allowing the EEOC to treat a letter received on the 291st day as “filed” and interpreting the § 706 (c) prohibition as merely requiring it to postpone any action on the charge for at least 60 days. There are two reasons why this interpretation is unacceptable. By choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, Congress clearly intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination. Under a literal reading of the Act, the EEOC has a duty to commence its investigation no later than 300 days after the alleged occurrence; under respondent's “interpretation” of § 706 (c), that duty might not arise for 360 days. Perhaps the addition of another 60-day delay in the work of an already seriously overburdened agency is not a matter of critical importance. But in a statutory scheme in which Congress carefully prescribed a series of deadlines measured by numbers of days — rather than months or years — we may not simply interject an additional 60-day period into the procedural scheme. We must respect the compromise embodied in the words chosen by Congress. It is not our place simply to alter the balance struck by Congress in procedural statutes by favoring one side or the other in matters of statutory construction. In the end, we cannot accept respondent’s position without unreasonably giving the word “filed” two different meanings in the same section of the statute. Even if the interests of justice might be served in this particular case by a bifurcated construction of that word, in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. So ordered. “In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection [(b)] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.” 86 Stat. 104. “A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant dr seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.” 86 Stat. 105. According to respondent’s complaint, he holds a master’s degree in economics from Columbia University. Record Item No. 1, p. 3. The District Court stated that “[t]he period of limitation for filing a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights is one year. N. Y. Exec. Law § 297 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1977).” App. to Pet. for Cert. A14. The determination by the New York State Division of Human Rights that there was no probable cause to believe Mohasco had engaged in the discriminatory conduct described by respondent was issued on February 9, 1977. That determination was upheld by order of the New York State Human Rights Appeal Board on December 22, 1977. The notice was on a printed form which merely advised Mohasco of the name of the charging party, the date of the alleged violation, and that the nature of the charge was an alleged discharge on the basis of religion. The notice further advised Mohasco that “[bjecause of the Commission’s volume of pending work, we are unable to tell you when we are able to schedule investigation of this charge . . . .” App. 18. One might therefore infer that as of 1976, the EEOC had not overcome its enormous backlog as documented in 1971. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 64 (1971), Legislative History of Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Subcommittee on Labor), p. 124 (1972) (hereinafter 1972 Leg. Hist.); S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 23, 1972 Leg. Hist. 432; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 369, n. 24. App. to Pet. for Cert. A49. App. 19. Petitioner did not assert respondent’s failure to file the action within 90 days as a defense. The pro se complaint prayed for an injunction against alleged continuing unlawful employment practices, compensatory damages against Mohasco and several of its executives jointly and severally in the sum of $100,000, and punitive damages against Mohasco in the sum of $1 million and against each individual defendant in the sum of $100,000. Record Item No. 1, p. 19. The District Court dismissed the complaint against the individual defendants on the ground that they had not been named in the original charge. The validity of that dismissal is not before us. The District Court noted that the EEOC’s letter forwarding respondent’s charge to the state agency had stated that the EEOC would automatically file the charge “at the expiration date of the deferral period, unless the EEOC was notified of an earlier termination of proceedings by the Division of Human Rights.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A15 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court concluded that the EEOC itself did not deem the charge filed until 60 days after June 15, 1976. Ibid. Title 29 CFR § 1601.12 (b) (1) (v) (A) (1977) state: “In cases where the document is submitted to the Commission more than 180 days from the date of the alleged violation but within the period of limitation of the particular 706 Agency, the case shall be deferred pursuant to the procedures set forth above: Provided, however, That unless the Commission is earlier notified of the termination of the State or local proceedings, the Commission will consider the charge to be filed with the Commission on the 300th day following the alleged discrimination and will commence processing the case. Where the State or local agency terminates its proceedings prior to the 300th day following the alleged act of discrimination, without notification to the Commission of such termination, the Commission will consider the charge to be filed with the Commission on the date the person making the charge is notified of the termination.” A current regulation to substantially the same effect is found at 29 CFR §§ 1601.13 (a), (c), (d)(2) (in) (1979). See n. 4, supra. App. to Pet. for Cert. A15. See. n. 11, supra. The 300-day period expired on June 24, 1976. The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is consistent with the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F. 2d 1222 (1972), but is in conflict with the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F. 2d 811 (1972). Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F. 2d 723 (CA6 1972), cited Vigil with approval, though the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s filing in that case was timely would have been the same under the construction of § 706 adopted in the Moore case. The approach of the Eighth Circuit, see Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F. 2d 1228 (1975), also conflicts with the decision of the Second Circuit in this case, but in a way that substantially differs from that of the Seventh Circuit decision in Moore. Olson held that in order to preserve his rights under Title VII, a complainant must under all circumstances initially file his charge with either a state fair employment practices agency or the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory occurrence. See also Geromette v. General Motors Corp., 609 F. 2d 1200 (CA6 1979) (citing Olson with approval, thus perhaps signalling a retreat from Anderson’s endorsement of Vigil); Rodriguez v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 587 F. 2d 980 (CA9 1978). Cf. Ciccone v. Textron Inc., 616 F. 2d 1216 (CA1 1980) (substantially same approach under similar provisions in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 621-634). As indicated in n. 19, infra, we believe that the restrictive approach exemplified by Olson, is not supported by the statute. Under the Moore decision, which we adopt today, a complainant in a deferral State having a fair employment practices agency over one year old need only file his charge within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in order to insure that his federal rights will be preserved. If a complainant files later than that (but not more than 300 days after the practice complained of), his right to seek relief under Title VII will nonetheless be preserved if the State happens to complete its consideration of the charge prior to the end of the 300-day period. In a State with a fair employment practices agency less than one year old, however, a complainant must file within 180 days in order to be sure that his federal rights will be preserved, since the EEOC must defer consideration during proceedings before such a new agency for up to 120 days. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e), n. 1, supra. The District Court refused to consider respondent’s allegations that discrimination in the form of blacklisting had continued beyond the date of his discharge, since in its view that allegation was not fairly comprised by respondent’s June 15, 1976, letter to the EEOC. The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed on that point, and remanded the case to the District Court. Petitioner sought review of that ruling in this Court, but we limited our grant of certiorari to the timeliness question discussed in today’s opinion. For purposes of decision, we assume that the discrimination complained of ended with respondent’s discharge on August 29, 1975. Section 706 (e) is quoted in full in n. 2, supra. This language has been construed to require that the filing with the state agency be made within 180 days. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., see n. 16, supra. Although that construction is consistent with the general rule announced at the beginning of § 706 (e), and is supported by one Congressman’s understanding of the procedures at the time of the 1972 amendment to that section, see 1972 Leg. Hist. 1863 (remarks of Rep. Dent), Congress included no express requirement that state proceedings be initiated by any specific date in the portion of the subsection that relates to time limitations in deferral States. Further, there are contemporaneous indications in the legislative history, which, while not authoritative, contradict Representative Dent’s views. See nn. 41-43, infra. See also Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F. 2d 1326, 1330-1332 (CA4 1976) (rejecting both Olson and its reliance on the analysis of Rep. Dent). In any event, we do not believe that a court should read in a time limitation provision that Congress has not seen fit to include, see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, at least when dealing with “a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers initiate the process.” Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 527. In contrast to the construction of the statute we adopt today, the Olson approach, urged upon us by petitioner and amici, is not compelled by the plain meaning of the statutory language. The Court further noted that “[i]t is clear that Congress found nothing wrong, in this circumstance, with EEOC’s holding the charge in abeyance until a state agency is given a chance to act.” 404 U. S., at 526, n. 6. Compare the 6-month limitations provision for filing complaints with the National Labor Relations Board under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (b). We are not confronted with a case in which it is claimed that the plaintiff was reasonably unaware of the existence of his cause of action until after the expiration of the limitations period. Cf. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111 (medical malpractice action). See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1964) (hereinafter 1964 Senate Report). See also Hodgson v. Lodge 851, Int'l Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 454 F. 2d 545, 562 (CA7 1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e. g, Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons within the Jurisdiction of the United States before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 97, 188, 899, 2294 (1963) (hereinafter 1963 House Judiciary Committee Hearings). Others contained 1-year provisions, see id., at 10, 50, and at one point the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Committee recommended a bill with a 2-year provision. See 1964 Senate Report, at 13. See, e. g., 1963 House Judiciary Committee Hearings, at 9-10, 50. Id., at 2296; 1964 Senate Report, at 16. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2511-2512, 12598 (1964). Id., at 12593-12594 (remarks of Sen. Clark). See id., at 11926, 13327. The 1972 amendment added a new subsection (a) to § 706. Subsections (b) and (d) in the 1964 version with certain changes thus became the current subsections (c) and (e) in the amended 1972 version. See 110 Cong. Ree. 11937 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 8193, 13087 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen): “[W]ith respect to the enforcement of the title, we undertook to keep primary, exclusive jurisdiction in the hands of the State commissions for a sufficient period of time to let them work out their own problems at the local level.” See id., at 12819. At the time, it was believed that 60 days was more than sufficient time for state administrative resolution of employment discrimination complaints. See id., at 13087 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen): “In the case of California, FEPC [Fair Employment Practice Commission] cases are disposed of in an average of about 5 days. In my own State [Illinois] it is approximately 14 days.” 86 Stat. 104-105. H. R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 22, 1972), 1972 Leg. Hist. 4. H. R. 1746, supra, 1972 Leg. Hist. 326. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1971), 1972 Leg. Hist. 1781. S. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 17 (1972), 1972 Leg. Hist. 1815: “The Senate amendment contained two provisions allowing the Commission to defer to state and local equal employment opportunity agencies. It deleted the language of existing law providing that no charge may be filed during the 60-day period allowed for the deferral and substituted a provision prohibiting the Commission from acting on such a charge until the expiration of the 60-day period. The House bill made no change in existing law. The Senate receded with an amendment that would restate the existing law on the deferral-of charges to state agencies. The conferees left existing law intact with the understanding that the decision in Love v. Pullman [Co., 404] U. S. [522 (1972)] interpreting the existing law to allow the Commission to receive a charge (but not act on it) during such deferral period is controlling.” (Emphasis added.) See n. 20, supra. The section-by-section analysis is dated March 6, 1972. The Conference Report quoted in n. 39, supra, is dated March 2, 1972. In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 758, we rejected a similar argument: “Respondent argues finally that a Committee Report that accompanied 1978 ADEA amendments [, which made no change in the language at issue in the case,] supports his construction of § 14 (b). This Committee Report suggested that resort to state remedies should be optional under § 14 (b). See S. Rep. No. 95-493, pp. 6-7 (1978), adopted in Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, pp. 7, 12 (1978). “We are not persuaded. The Senate Report No. 95-493 was written 11 years after the ADEA was passed in 1967, and such ‘[legislative observations . . . are in no sense part of the legislative history.’ United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192, 200 n. 7 (1977). ‘It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [the section] . . . that controls.’ Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 354 n. 39 (1977). Whatever evidence is provided by the 1978 Committee Report of the intent of Congress in 1967, it is plainly insufficient to overcome the clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended § 14 (b) to have the same meaning as § 706 (c). We therefore hold that under § 14 (b) of the ADEA, as under § 706 (c) of Title VII, resort to administrative remedies in deferral States by individual claimants is mandatory, not optional.” (Footnotes omitted.) See also Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., ante, at 116-120. Indeed as we pointed out in n. 19, supra, Congressman Dent had an entirely different understanding of the limitations period that Congress adopted. Representative Dent’s remarks are dated March 8, 1972. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 140-142. S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971), 1972 Leg. Hist. 433.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILKINSON, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, et al. v. AUSTIN et al. No. 04-495. Argued March 30, 2005 Decided June 13, 2005 Jim Petro, Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, and Todd R. Marti and Franklin E. Crawford, Assistant Solicitors. Deanne E. Maynard argued the cause for the United States as amicus curias urging reversal. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Jonathan L. Marcus, and Steven L. Lane. Jules Lobel argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Staughton Lynd. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Frances T. Grander, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, by John TV Suthers, Interim Attorney General of Colorado, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Gregg D. Renkes of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah TV (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, TV A Drew Ed-mondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas TV Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Greg Abbott of Texas, Jerry TV Kilgore of Virginia, and Rob McKenna of Washington. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Corrections Professionals by Walter J. Dickey; for Human Rights Watch et al. by Geoffrey F Aronow, Molly Wieser, Thomas F. Geraghty, and Andrea D. Lyon; for Professors and Practitioners of Psychology and Psychiatry by Michael E. Deutsch; and for Percy Pitzer by Joseph Margulies. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the process by which Ohio classifies prisoners for placement at its highest security prison, known as a “Supermax” facility. Supermax facilities are maximum-security prisons with highly restrictive conditions, designed to segregate the most dangerous prisoners from the general prison population. We must consider what process the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires Ohio to afford to inmates before assigning them to Supermax. We hold that the procedures Ohio has adopted provide sufficient procedural protection to comply with due process requirements. I The use of Supermax prisons has increased over the last 20 years, in part as a response to the rise in prison gangs and prison violence. See generally U. S. Dept, of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, C. Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and General Considerations 1 (1999), http://www.nicic.org/pubs/1999/014937.pdf (as visited June 9, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). About 30 States now operate Supermax prisons, in addition to the two somewhat comparable facilities operated by the Federal Government. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2. In 1998, Ohio opened its only Supermax facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), after a riot in one of its maximum-security prisons. OSP has the capacity to house up to 504 inmates in single-inmate cells and is designed to “ ‘separate the most predatory and dangerous prisoners from the rest of the . . . general [prison] population.’ ” See 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723 (ND Ohio 2002) (Austin I) (quoting deposition of R. Wilkinson, pp. 24-25). Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form of incarceration, in Ohio, including conditions on its death row or in its administrative control units. The latter are themselves a highly restrictive form of solitary confinement. See Austin I, supra, at 724-725, and n. 5 (citing Ohio Admin. Code §5120-9-13 (2001) (rescinded 2004)). In OSP almost every aspect of an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor recreation cells. Incarceration at OSP is synonymous with extreme isolation. In contrast to any other Ohio prison, including any segregation unit, OSP cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all events are conducted through glass walls. It is fair to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact. Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at OSP is for an indefinite period of time, limited only by an inmate’s sentence. For an inmate serving a life sentence, there is no indication how long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there. Austin I, supra, at 740. Inmates otherwise eligible for parole lose their eligibility while incarcerated at OSP. 189 F. Supp. 2d, at 728. Placement at OSP is determined in the following manner: Upon entering the prison system, all Ohio inmates are assigned a numerical security classification from level 1 through level 5, with 1 the lowest security risk and 5 the highest. See Brief for Petitioners 7. The initial security classification is based on numerous factors (e. g., the nature of the underlying offense, criminal history, or gang affiliation) but is subject to modification at any time during the inmate’s prison term if, for instance, he engages in misconduct or is deemed a security risk. Ibid. Level 5 inmates are placed in OSP, and levels 1 through 4 inmates are placed at lower security facilities throughout the State. Ibid. Ohio concedes that when OSP first became operational, the procedures used to assign inmates to the facility were inconsistent and undefined. For a time, no official policy governing placement was in effect. See Austin I, supra, at 726-727. Haphazard placements were not uncommon, and some individuals who did not pose high-security risks were designated, nonetheless, for OSP. In an effort to establish guide-fines for the selection and classification of inmates suitable for OSP, Ohio issued Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Policy 111-07 (Aug. 31, 1998). This policy has been revised at various points but relevant here are two versions: the “Old Policy” and the “New Policy.” The Old Policy took effect on January 28, 1999, but problems with assignment appear to have persisted even under this written set of standards. 189 F. Supp. 2d, at 727-736. After forming a committee to study the matter and retaining a national expert in prison security, Ohio promulgated the New Policy in early 2002. The New Policy provided more guidance regarding the factors to be considered in placement decisions and afforded inmates more procedural protection against erroneous placement at OSP. Although the record is not altogether clear regarding the precise manner in which the New Policy operates, we construe it based on the policy’s text, the accompanying forms, and the parties’ representations at oral argument and in their briefs. The New Policy appears to operate as follows: A classification review for OSP placement can occur either (1) upon entry into the prison system if the inmate was convicted of certain offenses, e. g., organized crime, or (2) during the term of incarceration if an inmate engages in specified conduct, e. g., leads a prison gang. App. 42-43. The review process begins when a prison official prepares a “Security Designation Long Form” (Long Form). Id., at 20. This three-page form details matters such as the inmate’s recent violence, escape attempts, gang affiliation, underlying offense, and other pertinent details. Id., at 20, 38-45. A three-member Classification Committee (Committee) convenes to review the proposed classification and to hold a hearing. At least 48 hours before the hearing, the inmate is provided with written notice summarizing the conduct or offense triggering the review. Id., at 22, 58. At the time of notice, the inmate also has access to the Long Form, which details why the review was initiated. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-17. The inmate may attend the hearing, may “offer any pertinent information, explanation and/or objections to [OSP] placement,” and may submit a written statement. App. 22. He may not call witnesses. If the Committee does not recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. Id., at 62, 65. See also Brief for Petitioners 9. If the Committee does recommend OSP placement, it documents the decision on a “Classification Committee Report” (CCR), setting forth “the nature of the threat the inmate presents and the committee’s reasons for the recommendation,” App. 64, as well as a summary of any information presented at the hearing, id., at 59-65. The Committee sends the completed CCR to the warden of the prison where the inmate is housed or, in the case of an inmate just entering the prison system, to another designated official. Id., at 23. If, after reviewing the CCR, the warden (or the designated official) disagrees and concludes that OSP is inappropriate, the process terminates and the inmate is not placed in OSP. If the warden agrees, he indicates his approval on the CCR, provides his reasons, and forwards the annotated CCR to the Bureau of Classification (Bureau) for a final decision. Id., at 64. (The Bureau is a body of Ohio prison officials vested with final decisionmaking authority over all Ohio inmate assignments.) The annotated CCR is served upon the inmate, notifying him of the Committee’s and warden’s recommendations and reasons. Id., at 65. The inmate has 15 days to file any objections with the Bureau. Ibid. After the 15-day period, the Bureau reviews the CCR and makes a final determination. If it concludes OSP placement is inappropriate, the process terminates. If the Bureau approves the warden’s recommendation, the inmate is transferred to OSP. The Bureau’s chief notes the reasons for the decision on the CCR, and the CCR is again provided to the inmate. Ibid. Inmates assigned to OSP receive another review within 30 days of their arrival. That review is conducted by a designated OSP staff member, who examines the inmate’s file. Id., at 25. If the OSP staff member deems the inmate inappropriately placed, he prepares a written recommendation to the OSP warden that the inmate be transferred to a lower security institution. Brief for Petitioners 9; App. 25. If the OSP warden concurs, he forwards that transfer recommendation to the Bureau for appropriate action. If the inmate is deemed properly placed, he remains in OSP and his placement is reviewed on at least an annual basis according to the initial three-tier classification review process outlined above. Brief for Petitioners 9-10. HH ► — I This action began when a class of current and former OSP inmates brought suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against various Ohio prison officials. We refer to the class of plaintiff inmates, respondents here, collectively as “the inmates.” We refer to the prison officials, petitioners here, as “Ohio.” The inmates’ complaint alleged that Ohio’s Old Policy, which was in effect at the time the suit was brought, violated due process. In addition the inmates brought a claim that certain conditions at OSP violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, but that claim was settled in the District Court. The extent to which the settlement resolved the practices that were the subject of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claim is unclear but, in any event, that issue is not before us. The inmates’ suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On the eve of trial Ohio promulgated its New Policy and represented that it contained the procedures to be followed in the future. The District Court and Court of Appeals evaluated the adequacy of the New Policy, and it therefore forms the basis for our determination here. After an 8-day trial with extensive evidence, including testimony from expert witnesses, the District Court made findings and conclusions and issued a detailed remedial order. First, relying on this Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472 (1995), the District Court found that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Austin I, 189 F. Supp. 2d, at 738-740. Second, the District Court found Ohio had denied the inmates due process by failing to afford a large number of them notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard before transfer; failing to give inmates sufficient notice of the grounds serving as the basis for their retention at OSP; and failing to give the inmates sufficient opportunity to understand the reasoning and evidence used to retain them at OSP. Id., at 749. Third, the District Court held that, although Ohio’s New Policy provided more procedural safeguards than its Old Policy, it was nonetheless inadequate to meet procedural due process requirements. Id., at 736, 750-754. In a separate order it directed extensive modifications to that policy. 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (ND Ohio 2002). The modifications the District Court ordered to Ohio’s New Policy included both substantive and procedural reforms. The former narrowed the grounds that Ohio could consider in recommending assignment to OSP. For instance, possession of drugs in small amounts, according to the District Court, could not serve as the basis for an OSP assignment. Id., at 1028. The following are some of the procedural modifications the District Court ordered: (1) Finding that the notice provisions of Ohio’s New Policy were inadequate, the District Court ordered Ohio to provide the inmates with an exhaustive list of grounds believed to justify placement at OSP and a summary of all evidence upon which the Committee would rely. Matters not so identified, the District Court ordered, could not be considered by the Committee. Id., at 1026. (2) The District Court supplemented the inmate’s opportunity to appear before the Committee and to make an oral or written statement by ordering Ohio to allow inmates to present documentary evidence and call witnesses before the Committee, provided that doing so would not be unduly hazardous or burdensome. The District Court further ordered that Ohio must attempt to secure the participation of any witness housed within the prison system. Id., at 1026-1027. (3) Finding the New Policy’s provision of a brief statement of reasons for a recommendation of OSP placement inadequate, the District Court ordered the Committee to summarize all evidence supporting its recommendation. Id., at 1027. Likewise, the District Court ordered the Bureau to prepare a “detailed and specific” statement “set[ting3 out all grounds” justifying OSP placement including “facts relied upon and reasoning used.” Ibid. The statement shall “not use conclusory,” “vague,” or “boilerplate language,” and must be delivered to the inmate within five days. Id., at 1027-1028. (4) The District Court supplemented the New Policy's 30-day and annual review processes, ordering Ohio to notify the inmate twice per year both in writing and orally of his progress toward a security level reduction. Specifically, that notice must “advise the inmate what specific conduct is necessary for that prisoner to be reduced from Level 5 and the amount of time it will take before [Ohio] reduce[s] the inmate’s security level classification.” Id., at 1028. Ohio appealed. First, it maintained that the inmates lacked a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding placement at OSP. Second, it argued that, even assuming a liberty interest, its New Policy provides constitutionally adequate procedures and thus the District Court’s modifications were unnecessary. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that the inmates had a liberty interest in avoiding placement at OSP. 372 F. 3d 346, 356 (2004). The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court’s procedural modifications in their entirety. Id., at 359-360. Finally, it set aside the District Court’s far-reaching substantive modifications, concluding they exceeded the scope of the District Court’s authority. This last aspect of the Court of Appeals’ ruling is not the subject of review in this Court. We granted certiorari to consider what process an inmate must be afforded under the Due Process Clause when he is considered for placement at OSP. 543 U. S. 1032 (2004). For reasons discussed below, we conclude that the inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. We further hold that the procedures set forth in the New Policy are sufficient to satisfy the Constitution’s requirements; it follows, then, that the procedural modifications ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals were in error. HH t-H KH Withdrawing from the position taken in the Court of Appeals, Ohio in its briefs to this Court conceded that the inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. See Pet. for Cert, i; Brief for Petitioners i. The United States, supporting Ohio as amicus curiae, disagrees with Ohio’s concession and argues that the inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding assignment to a prison facility with more restrictive conditions of confinement. See Brief for United States 10. At oral argument Ohio initially adhered to its earlier concession, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, but when pressed, the State backtracked. See id., at 6-7. We need reach the question of what process is due only if the inmates establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest, so it is appropriate to address this threshold question at the outset. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake. A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word “liberty,” see, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 498-494 (1980) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary psychiatric treatment and transfer to mental institution), or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies, see, e. g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556-558 (1974) (liberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits). We have held that the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 225 (1976) (no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low- to maximum-security prison because “[confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose”). We have also held, however, that a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472 (1995). Sandin involved prisoners’ claims to procedural due process protection before placement in segregated confinement for 30 days, imposed as discipline for disruptive behavior. Sandin observed that some of our earlier cases, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), in particular, had employed a methodology for identifying state-created liberty interests that emphasized “the language of a particular [prison] regulation” instead of “the nature of the deprivation.” Sandin, 515 U. S., at 481. In Sandin, we criticized this methodology as creating a disincentive for States to promulgate procedures for prison management, and as involving the federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons. Id., at 482-483. For these reasons, we abrogated the methodology of parsing the language of particular regulations. “[T]he search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly established in and applied in Wolff and Meachum. Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 483-484 (citations and footnote omitted). After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 484. Applying this refined inquiry, Sandin found no liberty interest protecting against a 30-day assignment to segregated confinement because it did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.” Id., at 485. We noted, for example, that inmates in the general population experienced “significant amounts of ‘lockdown time’ ” and that the degree of confinement in disciplinary segregation was not excessive. Id., at 486. We did not find, moreover, the short duration of segregation to work a major disruption in the inmate’s environment. Ibid. The Sandin standard requires us to determine if assignment to OSP “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id., at 484. In Sandin’s wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison system. Compare, e.g., Beverati v. Smith, 120 F. 3d 500, 504 (CA4 1997), and Keenan v. Hall, 83 F. 3d 1083, 1089 (CA9 1996), with Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F. 3d 846, 847 (CADC 1999). See also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F. 3d 1173, 1177 (CA7 1997). This divergence indicates the difficulty of locating the appropriate baseline, an issue that was not explored at length in the briefs. We need not resolve the issue here, however, for we are satisfied that assignment to OSP imposes an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline. For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. Austin I, 189 F. Supp. 2d, at 728. While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. It follows that respondents have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP. Sandin, supra, at 483. OSP’s harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners. See infra, at 227. That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance. IV A liberty interest having been established, we turn to the question of what process is due an inmate whom Ohio seeks to place in OSP. Because the requirements of due process are “flexible and eal[l] for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972), we generally have declined to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the sufficiency of particular procedures. The framework, established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), requires consideration of three distinct factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id., at 335. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s procedural modifications under the assumption that Sandin altered the first Mathews factor. It reasoned that, “[i]n this first factor, Sandin affects the due process balance: because only those conditions that constitute ‘atypical and significant hardships’ give rise to liberty interests, those interests will necessarily be of a weight requiring greater due process protection.” 372 F. 3d, at 358-359. This proposition does not follow from Sandin. Sandin concerned only whether a state-created liberty interest existed so as to trigger Mathews balancing at all. Having found no liberty interest to be at stake, Sandin had no occasion to consider whether the private interest was weighty vis-á-vis the remaining Mathews factors. Applying the three factors set forth in Mathews, we find Ohio’s New Policy provides a sufficient level of process. We first consider the significance of the inmate’s interest in avoiding erroneous placement at OSP. Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at all. See, e. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975); Wolff, 418 U. S. 539. The private interest at stake here, while more than minimal, must be evaluated, nonetheless, within the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of liberties. The second factor addresses the risk of an erroneous placement under the procedures in place, and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards. The New Policy provides that an inmate must receive notice of the factual basis leading to consideration for OSP placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal. Our procedural due process cases have consistently observed that these are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous deprivations. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 15 (1979); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 543 (1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified’ ” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864))). Requiring officials to provide a brief summary of the factual basis for the classification review and allowing the inmate a rebuttal opportunity safeguards against the inmate’s being mistaken for another or singled out for insufficient reason. In addition to having the opportunity to be heard at the Committee stage, Ohio also invites the inmate to submit objections prior to the final level of review. This second opportunity further reduces the possibility of an erroneous deprivation. Although a subsequent reviewer may overturn an affirmative recommendation for OSP placement, the reverse is not true; if one reviewer declines to recommend OSP placement, the process terminates. This avoids one of the problems apparently present under the Old Policy, where, even if two levels of reviewers recommended against placement, a later reviewer could overturn their recommendation without explanation. If the recommendation is OSP placement, Ohio requires that the decisionmaker provide a short statement of reasons. This requirement guards against arbitrary decisionmaking while also providing the inmate a basis for objection before the next decisionmaker or in a subsequent classification review. The statement also serves as a guide for future behavior. See Greenholtz, supra, at 16. As we have noted, Ohio provides multiple levels of review for any decision recommending OSP placement, with power to overturn the recommendation at each level. In addition to these safeguards, Ohio further reduces the risk of erroneous placement by providing for a placement review within 30 days of an inmate’s initial assignment to OSP. The third Mathews factor addresses the State’s interest. In the context of prison management, and in the specific circumstances of this case, this interest is a dominant consideration. Ohio has responsibility for imprisoning nearly 44,000 inmates. Austin I, 189 P. Supp. 2d, at 727. The State’s first obligation must be to ensure the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and the prisoners themselves. See Hewitt, 459 U. S., at 473. Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop of the State’s interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls. See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 6. Murder of an inmate, a guard, or one of their family members on the outside is a common form of gang discipline and control, as well as a condition for membership in some gangs. See, e. g., United States v. Santiago, 46 P. 3d 885, 888 (CA9 1995); United States v. Silverstein, 732 F. 2d 1338, 1341 (CA7 1984). Testifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own death sentence. It is worth noting in this regard that for prison gang members serving life sentences, some without the possibility of parole, the deterrent effects of ordinary criminal punishment may be substantially diminished. See id., at 1343 (“[T]o many inmates of Marion’s Control Unit the price of murder must not be high and to some it must be close to zero”). The problem of scarce resources is another component of the State’s interest. The cost of keeping a single prisoner in one of Ohio’s ordinary maximum-security prisons is $34,167 per year, and the cost to maintain each inmate at OSP is $49,007 per year. See Austin I, supra, at 734, n. 17. We can assume that Ohio, or any other penal system, faced with costs like these will find it difficult to fund more effective education and vocational assistance programs to improve the lives of the prisoners. It follows that courts must give substantial deference to prison management decisions before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior. The State’s interest must be understood against this background. Were Ohio to allow an inmate to call witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing before ordering transfer to OSP, both the State’s immediate objective of controlling the prisoner and its greater objective of controlling the prison could, be defeated. This problem, moreover, is not alleviated by providing an exemption for witnesses who pose a hazard, for nothing in the record indicates simple mechanisms exist to determine when witnesses may be called without fear of reprisal. The danger to witnesses, and the difficulty in obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value of an adversary-type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious costs. A balance of the Mathews factors yields the conclusion that Ohio’s New Policy is adequate to safeguard an inmate’s liberty interest in not being assigned to OSP. Ohio is not, for example, attempting to remove an inmate from free society for a specific parole violation, see, e. g., Morrissey, 408 U. S., at 481, or to revoke good-time credits for specific, serious misbehavior, see, e. g., Wolff, 418 U. S., at 539, where more formal, adversary-type procedures might be useful. Where the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison administrators, and where the State’s interest implicates the safety of other inmates and prison personnel, the informal, nonadversary procedures set forth in Greenholtz, 442 U. S. 1, and Hewitt v. Helms, supra, provide the appropriate model. Greenholtz, supra, at 16 (level of process due for inmates being considered for release on parole includes opportunity to be heard and notice of any adverse decision); Hewitt, supra, at 473-476 (level of process due for inmates being considered for transfer to administrative segregation includes some notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard). Although Sandin abrogated Greenholtz’s and Hewitt’s methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards. Ohio’s New Policy provides informal, nonadversary procedures comparable to those we upheld in Greenholtz and Hewitt, and no further procedural modifications are necessary in order to satisfy due process under the Mathews test. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals should have ordered the New Policy altered. The effect of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in particular 18 U. S. C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), in this case has not been discussed at any length in the briefs. In view of our disposition it is unnecessary to address its application here. Prolonged confinement in Supermax may be the State’s only option for the control of some inmates, and claims alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments were resolved, or withdrawn, by settlement in an early phase of this case. Here, any claim of excessive punishment in individual circumstances is not before us. The complaint challenged OSP assignments under the Old Policy, and the unwritten policies that preceded it, and alleged injuries resulting from those systems. Ohio conceded that assignments made under the Old Policy were, to say the least, imprecise. The District Court found constitutional violations had arisen under those earlier versions, and held that the New Policy would produce many of the same constitutional problems. Austin I, 189 F. Supp. 2d, at 749-754. We now hold that the New Policy as described in this opinion strikes a constitutionally permissible balance between the factors of the Mathews framework. If an inmate were to demonstrate that the New Policy did not in practice operate in this fashion, resulting in a cognizable injury, that could be the subject of an appropriate future challenge. On remand, the Court of Appeals, or the District Court, may consider in the first instance what, if any, prospective relief is still a necessary and appropriate remedy for due process violations under Ohio’s previous policies. Any such relief must, of course, satisfy the conditions set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). * * * The Court of Appeals was correct to find the. inmates possess a liberty interest in avoiding assignment at OSP. The Court of Appeals was incorrect, however, to sustain the procedural modifications ordered by the District Court. The portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion reversing the District Court’s substantive modifications was not the subject of review upon certiorari and is unaltered by our decision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BADARACCO et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 82-1453. Argued November 28, 1983 Decided January 17, 1984 Barry I. Fredericks argued the cause for petitioners in both cases and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 82-1509. John J. O’Toole and Edwin Fradkin filed a brief for petitioners in No. 82-1458. Albert G. Lauber, Jr., argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Gary R. Allen, and John A. Dudeck, Jr. Together with No. 82-1509, Deleet Merchandising Corp. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases focus upon §6501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 6501. Subsection (a) of that statute establishes a general 3-year period of limitations “after the return was filed” for the assessment of income and certain other federal taxes. Subsection (c)(1) of §6501, however, provides an exception to the 3-year period when there is “a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax.” The tax then may be assessed “at any time.” The issue before us is the proper application of §§ 6501(a) and (c)(1) to the situation where a taxpayer files a false or fraudulent return but later files a nonfraudulent amended return. May a tax then be assessed more than three years after the filing of the amended return? l-H No. 82-11*58. Petitioners Ernest Badaracco, Sr., and Ernest Badaracco, Jr., were partners in an electrical contracting business. They filed federal partnership and individual income tax returns for the calendar years 1965-1969, inclusive. “[F]or purposes of this case,” these petitioners concede the “fraudulent nature of the original returns.” App. 37a. In 1970 and 1971, federal grand juries in New Jersey subpoenaed books and records of the partnership. On August 17, 1971, petitioners filed nonfraudulent amended returns for the tax years in question and paid the additional basic taxes shown thereon. Three months later, petitioners were indicted for filing false and fraudulent returns, in violation of §7206(1) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §7206(1). Each pleaded guilty to the charge with respect to the 1967 returns, and judgments of conviction were entered. United States v. Badaracco, Crim. No. 766-71 (NJ). The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. On November 21,1977, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed to petitioners notices of deficiency for each of the tax years in question. He asserted, however, only the liability under § 6653(b) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6653(b), for the addition to tax on account of fraud (the so-called fraud “penalty”) of 50% of the underpayment in the basic tax. See App. 5a. Petitioners sought redetermination in the United States Tax Court of the asserted deficiencies, contending that the Commissioner’s action was barred by § 6501(a). They claimed that § 6501(c)(1) did not apply because the 1971 filing of nonfraudulent amended returns caused the general 3-year period of limitations specified in § 6501(a) to operate; the deficiency notices, having issued in November 1977, obviously were forthcoming only long after the expiration of three years from the date of filing of the nonfraudulent amended returns. The Tax Court, in line with its then-recent decision in Klemp v. Commissioner, 77 T. C. 201 (1981), appeal pending, No. 81-7744 (CA9), agreed with petitioners. 42 TCM 573 (1981), ¶ 81, 404 P-H Memo TC. No. 82-1509. Petitioner Deleet Merchandising Corp. filed timely corporation income tax returns for the calendar years 1967 and 1968. The returns as so filed, however, did not report certain receipts derived by the taxpayer from its printing supply business. On August 9, 1973, Deleet filed amended returns for 1967 and 1968 disclosing the receipts that had not been reported. Although the taxpayer corporation itself was not charged with criminal tax violations, and although no formal criminal investigation was initiated as to it, there were criminal and civil investigations that centered on certain former officers of the taxpayer. After the completion of those investigations, the Commissioner, on December 14, 1979, issued a notice of deficiency to Deleet. App. 71a. The notice asserted deficiencies in tax and additions under § 6653(b) for 1967 and 1968. Deleet paid the alleged deficiencies and brought suit for their refund in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. On its motion for summary judgment, Deleet contended that the Commissioner’s action was barred by § 6501(a). It claimed that no deficiencies or additions could be assessed more than three years after the amended returns were filed, regardless of whether the original returns were fraudulent. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment for Deleet. 535 F. Supp. 402 (1981). It relied on the Tax Court’s decision in Klemp v. Commissioner, supra, and on Dowell v. Commissioner, 614 F. 2d 1263 (CA10 1980), cert. pending, No. 82-1873. The Appeals. The Government appealed each case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The cases were heard and decided together. That court, by a 2-to-l vote, reversed the decision of the Tax Court in Badaracco and the judgment of the District Court in Deleet. 693 F. 2d 298 (1982). The Third Circuit’s ruling is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Nesmith v. Commissioner, 699 F. 2d 712 (1983), cert. pending, No. 82-2008. The Second Circuit has ruled otherwise. See Britton v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 275 (Vt. 1981), affirmance order, 697 F. 2d 288 (CA2 1982). See also Espinoza v. Commissioner, 78 T. C. 412 (1982). Because of the conflict, we granted certiorari, 461 U. S. 925 (1983). l — i f — Our task here is to determine the proper construction of the statute of limitations Congress has written for tax assessments. This Court long ago pronounced the standard: “Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government, must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.” E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456, 462 (1924). See also Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 245, 249 (1930). More recently, Judge Roney, in speaking for the former Fifth Circuit, has observed that “limitations statutes barring the collection of taxes otherwise due and unpaid are strictly construed in favor of the Government.” Lucia v. United States, 474 F. 2d 565, 570 (1973). We naturally turn first to the language of the statute. Section 6501(a) sets forth the general rule: a 3-year period of limitations on the assessment of tax. Section 6501(e)(1)(A) (first introduced as § 275(c) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 745) provides an extended limitations period for the situation where the taxpayer’s return nonfraudulently omits more than 25% of his gross income; in a situation of that kind, assessment now is permitted “at any time within 6 years after the return was filed.” Both the 3-year rule and the 6-year rule, however, explicitly are made inapplicable in circumstances covered by § 6501(c). This subsection identifies three situations in which the Commissioner is allowed an unlimited period within which to assess tax. Subsection (c)(1) relates to “a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax” and provides that the tax then may be assessed “at any time.” Subsection (c)(3) covers the case of a failure to file a return at all (whether or not due to fraud) and provides that an assessment then also may be made “at any time.” Subsection (c)(2) sets forth a similar rule for the case of a “willful attempt in any manner to defeat or evade tax” other than income, estate, and gift taxes. All these provisions appear to be unambiguous on their face, and it therefore would seem to follow that the present cases are squarely controlled by the clear language of § 6501(c)(1). Petitioners Badaracco concede that they filed initial returns that were “false or fraudulent with the intent to evade tax.” Petitioner Deleet, for present purposes, upon this review of its motion for summary judgment, is deemed to have filed false or fraudulent returns with the intent to evade tax. Section 6501(c)(1), with its unqualified language, then allows the tax to be assessed “at any time.” Nothing is present in the statute that can be construed to suspend its operation in the light of a fraudulent filer’s subsequent repentant conduct. Neither is there anything in the wording of § 6501(a) that itself enables a taxpayer to reinstate the section’s general 3-year limitations period by filing an amended return. Indeed, as this Court recently has noted, Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U. S. 370, 378-380, n. 10 (1983), the Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly provide either for a taxpayer’s filing, or for the Commissioner’s acceptance, of an amended return; instead, an amended return is a creature of administrative origin and grace. Thus, when Congress provided for assessment at any time in the case of a false or fraudulent “return,” it plainly included by this language a false or fraudulent original return. In this connection, we note that until the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Dowell v. Commissioner, 614 F. 2d 1263 (1980), cert. pending, No. 82-1873, courts consistently had held that the operation of § 6501 and its predecessors turned on the nature of the taxpayer’s original, and not his amended, return. The substantive operation of the fraud provisions of the Code itself confirms the conclusion that § 6501(c)(1) permits assessment at any time in fraud cases regardless of a taxpayer’s later repentance. It is established that a taxpayer who submits a fraudulent return does not purge the fraud by subsequent voluntary disclosure; the fraud was committed, and the offense completed, when the original return was prepared and filed. See, e. g., United States v. Habig, 390 U. S. 222 (1968); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F. 2d 299, 302-303 (CA7 1972). “Any other result would make sport of the so-called fraud penalty. A taxpayer who had filed a fraudulent return would merely take his chances that the fraud would not be investigated or discovered, and then, if an investigation were made, would simply pay the tax which he owed anyhow and thereby nullify the fraud penalty.” George M. Still, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T. C. 1072, 1077 (1953), aff’d, 218 F. 2d 639 (CA2 1955). In short, once a fraudulent return has been filed, the case remains one “of a false or fraudulent return,” regardless of the taxpayer’s later revised conduct, for purposes of criminal prosecution and civil fraud liability under § 6653(b). It likewise should remain such a case for purposes of the unlimited assessment period specified by § 6501(c)(1). We are not persuaded by Deleet’s suggestion, Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, p. 15, that § 6501(c)(1) should be read merely to suspend the commencement of the limitations period while the fraud remains uncorrected. The Tenth Circuit, in Dowell v. Commissioner, supra, made an observation to that effect, stating that the 3-year limitations period was “put in limbo” pending further taxpayer action. 614 F. 2d, at 1266. The language of the statute, however, is contrary to this suggestion. Section 6501(c)(1) does not “suspend” the operation of § 6501(a) until a fraudulent filer makes a voluntary disclosure. Section 6501(c)(1) makes no reference at all to § 6501(a); it simply provides that the tax may be assessed “at any time.” And § 6501(a) itself contains no mechanism for its operation when a fraudulent filer repents. By its very terms, it does not apply to a case, such as one of “a false or fraudulent return,” that is “otherwise provided” for in § 6501. When Congress intends only a temporary suspension of the running of a limitations period, it knows how unambiguously to accomplish that result. See, e. g., §§ 6503(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c), and (d). The weakness of petitioners’ proposed statutory construction is demonstrated further by its impact on § 6501(e)(1)(A), which provides an extended limitations period whenever a taxpayer’s return nonfraudulently omits more than 25% of his gross income. Under petitioners’ reasoning, a taxpayer who fraudulently omits 25% of his gross income gains the benefit of the 3-year limitations period by filing an amended return. Yet a taxpayer who nonfraudulently omits 25% of his gross income cannot gain that benefit by filing an amended return; instead, he must live with the 6-year period specified in § 6501(e) (1)(A). We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in the instant cases that Congress could not have intended to “create a situation in which persons who committed willful, deliberate fraud would be in a better position” than those who understated their income inadvertently and without fraud. 693 P. 2d, at 302. We therefore conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of § 6501(c)(1) would permit the Commissioner to assess “at any time” the tax for a year in which the taxpayer has filed “a false or fraudulent return,” despite any subsequent disclosure the taxpayer might make. Petitioners attempt to evade the consequences of this language by arguing that their original returns were “nullities.” Alternatively, they urge a nonliteral construction of the statute based on considerations of policy and practicality. We now turn successively to those proposals. r-H H-4 Petitioners argue that their original returns, to the extent they were fraudulent, were “nullities” for statute of limitations purposes. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 82-1453, pp. 22-27; Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, pp. 32-34. Inasmuch as the original return is a nullity, it is said, the amended return is necessarily “the return” referred to in § 6501(a). And if that return is nonfraudulent, § 6501(c)(1) is inoperative and the normal 3-year limitations period applies. This nullity notion does not persuade us, for it is plain that “the return” referred to in § 6501(a) is the original, not the amended, return. Petitioners do not contend that their fraudulent original returns were nullities for purposes of the Code generally. There are numerous provisions in the Code that relate to civil and criminal penalties for submitting or assisting in the preparation of false or fraudulent returns; their presence makes clear that a document which on its face plausibly purports to be in compliance, and which is signed by the taxpayer, is a return despite its inaccuracies. See, e. g., §§7207, 6531(3), 6653(b). Neither do petitioners contend that their original returns were nullities for all purposes of § 6501. They contend, instead, that a fraudulent return is a nullity only for the limited purpose of applying § 6501(a). See Brief for Petitioners in No. 82-1453, p. 24; Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, pp. 33-34. The word “return,” however, appears no less than 64 times in § 6501. Surely, Congress cannot rationally be thought to have given that word one meaning in § 6501(a), and a totally different meaning in §§ 6501(b) through (q). Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934), which petitioners cite, affords no support for their argument. The Court in Zellerbach held that an original return, despite its inaccuracy, was a “return” for limitations purposes, so that the filing of an amended return did not start a new period of limitations running. In the instant cases, the original returns similarly purported to be returns, were sworn to as such, and appeared on their faces to constitute endeavors to satisfy the law. Although those returns, in fact, were not honest, the holding in Zellerbach does not render them nullities. To be sure, current Regulations, in several places, e. g., Treas. Reg. §§301.6211-l(a), 301.6402-3(a), 1.451-l(a), and 1.461-l(a)(3)(i) (1983), do refer to an amended return, as does § 6213(g)(1) of the Code itself, 26 U. S. C. § 6213(g)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V). None of these provisions, however, requires the filing of such a return. It does not follow from all this that an amended return becomes “the return” for purposes of § 6501(a). We conclude, therefore, that nothing in the statutory language, the structure of the Code, or the decided cases supports the contention that a fraudulent return is a nullity for statute of limitations purposes. IV Petitioners contend that a nonliteral reading should be accorded the statute on grounds of equity to the repentant taxpayer and tax policy. “Once a taxpayer has provided the information upon which the Government may make a knowledgeable assessment, the justification for suspending the limitations period is no longer viable and must yield to the favored policy of limiting the Government’s time to proceed against the taxpayer.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, p. 12. See also Brief for Petitioners in No. 82-1453, p. 17. The cases before us, however, concern the construction of existing statutes. The relevant question is not whether, as an abstract matter, the rule advocated by petitioners accords with good policy. The question we must consider is whether the policy petitioners favor is that which Congress effectuated by its enactment of §6501. Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978). This is especially so when courts construe a statute of limitations, which “must receive a strict construction in favor of the Government.” E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S., at 462. We conclude that, even were we free to do so, there is no need to twist § 6501(c)(1) beyond the contours of its plain and unambiguous language in order to comport with good policy, for substantial policy considerations support its literal language. First, fraud cases ordinarily are more difficult to investigate than cases marked for routine tax audits. Where fraud has been practiced, there is a distinct possibility that the taxpayer’s underlying records will have been falsified or even destroyed. The filing of an amended return, then, may not diminish the amount of effort required to verify the correct tax liability. Even though the amended return proves to be an honest one, its filing does not necessarily “re-mov[e] the Commissioner from the disadvantageous position in which he was originally placed.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 82-1453, p. 12. Second, the filing of a document styled “amended return” does not fundamentally change the nature of a tax fraud investigation. An amended return, however accurate it ultimately may prove to be, comes with no greater guarantee of trustworthiness than any other submission. It comes carrying no special or significant imprimatur; instead, it comes from a taxpayer who already has made false statements under penalty of perjury. A responsible examiner cannot accept the information furnished on an amended return as a substitute for a thorough investigation into the existence of fraud. We see no “tax policy” justification for holding that an amended return has the singular effect of shortening the unlimited assessment period specified in §§ 6501(c)(1) to the usual three years. Fraud cases differ from other civil tax cases in that it is the Commissioner who has the burden of proof on the issue of fraud. See § 7454(a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7454(a). An amended return, of course, may constitute an admission of substantial underpayment, but it will not ordinarily constitute an admission of fraud. And the three years may not be enough time for the Commissioner to prove fraudulent intent. Third, the difficulties that attend a civil fraud investigation are compounded where, as in No. 82-1453, the Commissioner’s initial findings lead him to conclude that the case should be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. The period of limitations for prosecuting criminal tax fraud is generally six years. See § 6531. Once a criminal referral has been made, the Commissioner is under well-known restraints on the civil side and often will find it difficult to complete his civil investigation within the normal 3-year period; the taxpayer’s filing of an amended return will not make any difference in this respect. See United States v. La-Salle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298, 311-313 (1978); see also Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 622. As a practical matter, therefore, the Commissioner frequently is forced to place a civil audit in abeyance when a criminal prosecution is recommended. We do not find petitioners’ complaint of “unfair treatment” persuasive. Petitioners claim that it is unfair “to forever suspend a Sword of Damocles over a taxpayer who at one time may have filed a fraudulent return, but who has subsequently recanted and filed an amended return providing the Government with all the information necessary to properly assess the tax.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, p. 26. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 82-1453, p. 16. But it seems to us that a taxpayer who has filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax hardly is in a position to complain of the fairness of a rule that facilitates the Commissioner’s collection of the tax due. A taxpayer who has been the subject of a tax fraud investigation is not likely to be surprised when a notice of deficiency arrives, even if it does not arrive promptly after he files an amended return. Neither are we persuaded by Deleet’s argument that a literal reading of the statute “punishes” the taxpayer who repentantly files an amended return. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, p. 44. The amended return does not change the status of the taxpayer; he is left in precisely the same position he was in before. It might be argued that Congress should provide incentives to taxpayers to disclose their fraud voluntarily. Congress, however, has not done so in § 6501. That legislative judgment is controlling here. V Petitioners contend, finally, that a literal reading of § 6501(c) produces a disparity in treatment between a taxpayer who in the first instance files a fraudulent return and one who fraudulently fails to file any return at all. This, it is said, would elevate one form of tax fraud over another. The argument centers in § 6501(c)(3), which provides that in a case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed “at any time.” It is settled that this section ceases to apply once a return has been filed for a particular year, regardless of whether that return is filed late and even though the failure to file a timely return in the first instance was due to fraud. See Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 114 (1958), acq., 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 3. See also Rev. Rui. 79-178, 1979-1 Cum. Bull. 435. This, however, does not mean that § 6501 should be read to produce the same result in each of the two situations. From the language employed in the respective subsections of § 6501, we conclude that Congress intended different limitations results. Section 6501(c)(3) applies to a “failure to file a return.” It makes no reference to a failure to file a timely return (cf. §§ 6651(a)(1) and 7203), nor does it speak of a fraudulent failure to file. The section literally becomes inapplicable once a return has been filed. Section 6501(c)(1), in contrast, applies in the case of “a false or fraudulent return.” The fact that a fraudulent filer subsequently submits an amended return does not make the case any less one of a false or fraudulent return. Thus, although there may be some initial superficial plausibility to this argument on the part of petitioners, we conclude that the argument cannot prevail. If the result contended for by petitioners is to be the rule, Congress must make it so in clear and unmistakable language. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases is affirmed. It is so ordered. Section 6501(a) reads in full: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if the tax is payable by stamp, at any time after such tax became due and before the expiration of 3 years after the date on which any part of such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun after the expiration of such period.” Section 6501(c)(1) reads: “In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.” In Klemp, the Tax Court, in a reviewed decision with five judges dissenting on the issue, departed from its earlier holding in Dowell v. Commissioner, 68 T. C. 646 (1977), rev’d, 614 F. 2d 1263 (CA10 1980), cert. pending, No. 82-1873. Deleet asserts that the filing of its amended returns was voluntary. The taxpayer’s correct tax liability has not yet been determined. Although Deleet has not conceded that its original returns were fraudulent, both the District Court, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 82-1509, p. 4d, and the Court of Appeals, see 693 F. 2d 298, 299, n. 3 (CA3 1982), assumed, for purposes of Deleet’s summary judgment motion hereinafter referred to, that they were. We must make the same assumption here. The Tax Court, in cases concerning several of Deleet’s officers, has followed its ruling in Klemp, supra. See Kramer v. Commissioner, 44 TCM 42 (1982), ¶ 82, 308 P-H Memo TC; Elliott Liroff v. Commissioner, 44 TCM 43 (1982), ¶ 82, 309 P-H Memo TC; Derfel v. Commissioner, 44 TCM 45 (1982), ¶82, 311 P-H Memo TC; Richard B. Liroff v. Commissioner, 44 TCM 47 (1982), ¶ 82, 312 P-H Memo TC. See also Galvin v. Commissioner, 45 TCM 221 (1982), ¶ 82, 689 P-H Memo TC. Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3) appeared separately only upon the enactment of the 1954 Code. From 1921 until the 1954 Code, they were combined. See, e. g., Revenue Act of 1921, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265; Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 276(a). Under every general income tax statute since 1918, the filing of a false or fraudulent return has indefinitely extended the period of limitations for assessment of tax. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 250(d), 40 Stat. 1083; Revenue Act of 1921, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265; Revenue Act of 1924, § 278(a), 43 Stat. 299; Revenue Act of 1926, § 278(a), 44 Stat., pt. 2, p. 59; Revenue Act of 1928, § 276(a), 45 Stat. 857; Revenue Act of 1932, § 276(a), 47 Stat. 238; Revenue Act of 1934, § 276(a), 48 Stat. 745; Revenue Act of 1936, § 276(a), 49 Stat. 1726; Revenue Act of 1938, § 276(a), 52 Stat. 540; Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 276(a). The significance of the original, and not the amended, return has been stressed in other, but related, contexts. It thus has been held consistently that the filing of an amended return in a nonfraudulent situation does not serve to extend the period within which the Commissioner may assess a deficiency. See, e. g., Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934); National Paper Products Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 183 (1934); National Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B. T. A. 236 (1924). It also has been held that the filing of an amended return does not serve to reduce the period within which the Commissioner may assess taxes where the original return omitted enough income to trigger the operation of the extended limitations period provided by § 6501(e) or its predecessors. See, e. g., Houston v. Commissioner, 38 T. C. 486 (1962); Goldring v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. 79 (1953). And the period of limitations for filing a refund claim under the predecessor of § 6511(a) begins to run on the filing of the original, not the amended, return. Kaltreider Construction, Inc. v. United States, 303 F. 2d 366, 368 (CA3), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 877 (1962). In both Dowell and Klemp, the Commissioner had issued his deficiency notices more than three years after the amended returns were filed but within the extended 6-year period after the original returns were filed. The courts in those cases nonetheless ruled the notices untimely. That result flows necessarily from petitioners’ proposed statutory construction. It seems to us, however, to be unacceptably anomalous. Petitioners contend that these policy considerations favorable to the Commissioner do not apply on the facts of petitioners’ cases. Brief for Petitioners in No. 82-1453, pp. 33-34; Brief for Petitioner in No. 82-1509, pp. 35-36. This assertion is irrelevant, for the cases involve construction of a statute of limitations, not a question of laches, a defense to which the Government usually is not subject. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U. S. 414, 416 (1940). See generally Brennan, The Uncertain Status of Amended Tax Returns, 7 Rev. of Taxation of Individuals 235, 252-264 (1983).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WATSON et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 290. Argued February 2, 1953. Decided May 18, 1953. Arthur McGregor argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was A. Calder Mackay. Ellis N. Slack argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, Assistant Attorney General Lyon and Hilbert P. Zarky. Chester H. Ferguson and Ceorge W. Ericksen filed a brief for Edwards et al., as amid curiae, supporting petitioners. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This case relates to a taxpayer who, for several years, held an undivided interest in an orange grove and engaged in the business of growing and selling the oranges it produced. In the midst of the 1944 growing season, she sold her interest in the grove, including an unmatured crop then on the trees. The question before us is whether, for federal income tax purposes, she must treat that part of her profit from the sale which is attributable to the unmatured crop as ordinary income or as a capital gain. For the reasons hereafter stated, she must treat it as ordinary income. In 1944, Mrs. M. Gladys Watson, one of the petitioners here, and her two brothers, each owned an undivided one-third interest in a 110-acre navel orange grove near Exeter, Tulare County, California. Its management had been supervised by her brothers since 1912 and, since 1942, she and her brothers had operated it as a partnership. It was the oldest and one of the best groves in the locality. Its production per acre was about twice the average of such production in the county. In each of the last five years the value of its crop had increased over that of the year before. In 1943 it produced 79,851 loose boxes of oranges, yielding a gross income of $136,808.71. After deducting all expenses of cultivation, operation, picking and hauling, a net income of $92,153.05 was left. Anticipating a heavy frost after November, 1944, one of the brothers advocated selling the grove before then. Accordingly, in May or June, it was offered for $197,100, complete, including land, trees, unmatured crop, improvements, equipment and a five-acre peach orchard. At about that time the 1944 orange crop was in bloom. By July the smaller fruit had dropped from the trees and the crop was “set,” but not assured. A purchaser became interested but delayed his decision so as to determine more accurately the probable crop and to cause the sellers to bear more of the expense of its care. He examined past production records and, by early August, received estimates that the 1944 crop might be from 70,000 to 80,000 boxes, which, at current prices, would bring him $120,000 for the crop above expenses. One of Mrs. Watson’s brothers also estimated the 1944 crop at 70,000 boxes if it matured. August 10, the sales price of $197,100 was agreed upon, payable $10,000 in cash and the balance September 1. No allocation of the price between the crop and the rest of the property was specified but the seller bore the expense of caring for the crop up to September 1, amounting to $16,020.54. The sale was carried through and there was no serious frost. The crop filled 74,268 boxes. The purchaser sold them for $146,000, yielding him a net return of $126,000. Mrs. Watson filed a joint return with her husband, taking full deductions for her'one-third share of all of the business expenses incurred in the cultivation of the crop, but treating her gain from the sale of the grove, including the unmatured crop, as a long-term capital gain. On that basis, her net gain from the sale of the grove was shown as $48,819.82, but, treating it as a long-term capital gain, only 50% of it, or $24,409.91, was included in her taxable income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency against petitioners, largely based on his claim that whatever part of Mrs. Watson’s income was attributable to the unmatured crop should be treated as ordinary income. He allocated $122,500, out of the $197,100 received for the grove, as attributable to the unmatured crop. On that premise, he assessed a deficiency of $24,101.35 against petitioners on their joint return. On review, the Tax Court, with two judges dissenting, sustained the Commissioner in principle but reduced to $40,000 the portion of the proceeds attributable to the crop. 15 T. C. 800. With other adjustments, not material here, the Tax Court reduced the deficiency to $6,920.35-. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 197 F. 2d 56. In the meantime, the Tax Court made comparable decisions in McCoy v. Commissioner, 15 T. C. 828, and Owen v. Commissioner, P-H TC Memo, ¶ 50,300, each of which was reversed on appeal, 192 F. 2d 486 (C. A. 10th Cir.), and 192 F. 2d 1006 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Shortly before the latter decisions, the Revenue Act of 1951 amended the statute in relation to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1950, to permit proceeds from certain sales of unharvested crops to be treated as capital gains. We granted certiorari in the instant case to resolve the above-indicated conflict of statutory construction still affecting many sales made before 1951. 344 U. S. 895. The issue before us turns upon the Acts of Congress. In 1951, Congress, for the first time, dealt expressly and specifically with this subject. While that action was prospective only, its terms throw light on the problems of prior years. The adoption of that amendment emphasized the point that the question was one of federal law. Its adoption also recognized that, in order for such income to be a capital gain, an affirmative statement by Congress was needed. Finally, it not only permitted proceeds of unharvested crops to be treated as capital gains under certain circumstances, but it provided that, under those circumstances, the taxpayer could not deduct from his taxable income the expenses attributable to the production of the unharvested crop. Those expenses thereafter must be treated as capital investments added to the basis of the property to which they relate. This emphasizes the impropriety of the interpretation advocated by Mrs. Watson in the instant case. She seeks to deduct her share of the crop cultivation expenses at 100% up to the date of the sale. At the same time, she claims a right to report only 50% of her gain on the sale of those crops to which the cultivation expenses relate. In the instant case, we are dependent upon § 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code, as in effect in 1944. The controlling language in that subsection then required that, in order for gains from the sale of property to be treated as capital gains, the property sold must be “used in the trade or business” of the taxpayer, “held for more than 6 months,” and not “held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade •or business.” In the instant case, the Commissioner contends that, while the land and trees met these and all other tests of the subsection, the unmatured, unharvested crop of oranges met none of the above three. Each day brought the annual crop closer to its availability for sale in the ordinary course of that business. While the uncertainty of its condition at maturity discounted its current value, nevertheless, its presence contributed substantially to the value of the grove. The Commissioner allocated to the unmatured crop, as of September 1, a value of $122,500 out of the $197,100. The Tax Court reduced this to $40,000. We accept the latter amount now confirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is obvious that the parties to this sale did in fact attribute substantial value to the unmatured crop. If, at any moment, the crop had been stripped from the trees or destroyed by frost, there would have resulted at once a substantial reduction in the sales value of the grove. Assuming $40,000 to be the value fairly attributable to the presence of the crop in August and September, 1944, it remains for the taxpayer to demonstrate that § 117 (j) has authorized that value, in addition to the value of the land, trees, improvements and equipment, to be treated as a capital gain. Mrs. Watson and the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have placed emphasis upon a claim that, under the law of the state where the land is situated, an unmatured, unharvested crop, for many purposes, is treated as real property. We regard that as immaterial. Whether or not the crop be real property, the federal income tax upon the gain resulting from its sale is, in its nature, a subject of federal law. The Commissioner urges two grounds in support of his position that § 117 (j) does not authorize the taxpayer’s treatment of the proceeds of the unmatured crop as a capital gain. The first is that the proceeds fairly attributable to the crop are derived from property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. We agree with that contention. Although the property was not sever-able at the date of its sale, there is nothing in the Act requiring it to be severable. While, in previous years, like crops were held for a sale that occurred after maturity, in 1944 the date of that sale came September 1. There is nothing in the Act that distinguishes between the taxable character of a gain derived from a present sale discounting the hazards of the future, and one derived from a later sale when the hazards are past. After the transfer of title to the grove, the crop on the trees retained its character and continued to be held for sale to customers of the grove owner in the ordinary course of the owner’s trade or business. The Commissioner’s treatment of the proceeds of sales of unmatured crops as ordinary income in the absence of a statutory requirement to the contrary is consistent with the policy evidenced in Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. 2d 570, 572, which established in the Second Circuit, in 1945, the doctrine that “upon the sale of a going business it [the sales price] is to be comminuted into its fragments, and these are to be separately matched against the definition in § 117 (a)(1) . . . It is consistent also with the policy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Tax Court, dating, at least, from the statement made by the Bureau in 1946, that, under circumstances comparable to those before us, “regardless of their stage of development, any gain realized from the sale of growing crops is ordinary income.” We do not have here the situation which arises from the sale of land, including coal or other mineral wealth not separated from its natural state and not in the course of annual growth leading to a seasonal separation. See Butler Consolidated Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 183. The instant case also is distinguishable from that of growing timber which is not in itself an annual or short-term product. See Carroll v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 806; Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 467. Having reached this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the Commissioner’s second contention that, because the crop did not come into existence before it was “set” in July, or at least before it was in bloom in May or June, it had not been held by Mrs. Watson for more than six months at the time of its sale. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. In 1942 it yielded 54,939 boxes with a gross income of $82,521.17 and a net of $49,790.10. Its average annual yield from 1934 to 1943 was 55,097 boxes with a gross income of $46,512.68 and a net of $22,141.42. § 117 (b) and (c)(2), I. R. C., as amended by § 150 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 843-844, 26 U. S. C. (1940 ed., Supp. V) § 117 (b) and (c)(2). 65 Stat. 500-501, 26 IT. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 117 (j), 24(f), 113 (b)(1). The Revenue Act of 1951 added to §117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code: “(3) Sale of LAND with unharvested crop.- — In the case of an unharvested crop on land used in the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted as described in paragraph (2)) at the same time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as ‘property used in the trade or business.’ ” 65 Stat. 500, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 117 (j) (3). And, equally important, it added to § 24 of the Internal Revenue Code: “(f) Sale op Land With Unharvested Crop. — Where an unharvested crop sold by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of section 117 (j) (3) as ‘property used in the trade or business,’ in computing net income no deduction (whether or not for the taxable year of the sale and whether for expenses, depreciation, or otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop shall be allowed.” Id,., at 501, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 24 (f). The purpose of Congress to make this amendment prospective, rather than retroactive, is emphasized in the very next section of the 1951 Act. That section made retroactive to 1942 another amendment to §117 (j). It redefined capital gains so as to include the proceeds of certain sales of livestock, provided such stock be held for draft, breeding or dairy purposes. Stock so held is comparable to the orange trees rather than to the orange crop in the instant case. In this connection, the Senate Committee on Finance, when reporting the proposed amendment in 1951, said: “Your committee believes that sales of land together with growing crops or fruit are not such transactions as occur in the ordinary course of business and should thus result in capital gains rather than in ordinary income. Section 323 of the bill so provides. “Your committee recognizes, however, that when the taxpayer keeps his accounts and makes his returns on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, the expenses of growing the unharvested crop or the unripe fruit will be deducted in full from ordinary income, while the entire proceeds from the sale of the crop, as such, will be viewed as a capital gain. Actually, of course, the true gain in such cases is the difference between that part of the selling price attributable to the crop or fruit and the expenses attributable to its production. Therefore, your committee’s bill provides that no deduction shall be allowed which is attributable to the production of such crops or fruit, but that the deductions so disallowed shall be included in the basis of the property for the purpose of computing the capital gain. “The provisions of this section are applicable to sales or other dispositions occurring in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1950. “The revenue loss under this provision is expected to be about $3 million annually.” S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48. Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 56- Stat. 846: “SEC. 117. CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES. “(j) Gains and Losses . . . From the Sale or Exchange op Certain Property Used in the Trade or Business.— “(1) Definition of property used in the trade or business. — • “For the purposes of this subsection, the term ‘property used in the trade or business’ means property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1), held for more than 6 months, and real property used in the trade or business, held for more than 6 months, which is not (A) property of a kind which would properly be in-' cludible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or (B) 'property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. “(2) General rule. — If, during the taxable year, the recognized gains upon sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business . . . exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions, such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 6 months. If such gains do not exceed such losses, such gains and losses shall not be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets. . . .” (Italics supplied.) See 26 U. S. C. §117 (j). “The production of fruit from orchards or groves constitutes a business, and section 117 (j) of the Code, supra, is applicable to the sale of an orchard or grove. The crops are produced with the primary purpose of selling the fruit to customers in the ordinary course of the business. Therefore, regardless of their stage of development, any gain realized from the sale of growing crops is ordinary income. “In view of the foregoing, it is held that, for Federal income tax purposes, where citrus groves are sold with fruit on the trees, a portion of the selling price must be allocated to the fruit and the balance to the land and trees. Gain from the sale of the fruit will constitute ordinary income. Gain from the sale of the land and trees may be treated as capital gain under section 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code, provided the recognized gains from all transactions coming within the purview of that section exceed the recognized losses thereunder.” 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 31.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. v. WILSON, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF NEW YORK, et al. No. 522. Argued April 24, 1952. Decided May 26, 1952. Ephraim S. London argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Charles A. Brind, Jr. and Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief were Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General of New York, and Ruth Kessler Toch, Assistant Attorney General. Morris L. Ernst, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Arthur Garfield Hays, Herbert Monte Levy, Emanuel Redfield, Shad Polier, Will Maslow, Leo Pfeffer, Herman Seid and Eberhard P. Deutsch filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Charles J. Tobin, Edmond B. Butler and Porter R. Chandler filed a brief for the New York State Catholic Welfare Committee, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue here is the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of a New York statute which permits the banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are “sacrilegious.” That statute makes it unlawful “to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel [with specified exceptions not relevant here], unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department . ...” The statute further provides: “The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto.” Appellant is a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures. It owns the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the United States a film produced in Italy entitled “The Miracle.” On November 30, 1950, after having examined the picture, the motion picture division of the New York education department, acting under the statute quoted above, issued to appellant a license authorizing exhibition of “The Miracle,” with English subtitles, as one part of a trilogy-called “Ways of Love.” Thereafter, for a period of approximately eight weeks, “Ways of Love” was exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New York City under an agreement between appellant and the owner of the theater whereby appellant received a stated percentage of the admission price. During this period, the New York State Board of Regents, which by statute is made the head of the education department, received “hundreds of letters, telegrams, post cards, affidavits and other communications” both protesting against and defending the public exhibition of “The Miracle.” The Chancellor of the Board of Regents requested three members of the Board to view the picture and to make a report to the entire Board. After viewing the film, this committee reported to the Board that in its opinion there was basis for the claim that the picture was “sacrilegious.” Thereafter, on January 19, 1951, the Regents directed appellant to show cause, at a hearing to be held on January 30, why its license to show “The Miracle” should not be rescinded on that ground. Appellant appeared at this hearing, which was conducted by the same three-member committee of the Regénts which had previously viewed the picture, and challenged the jurisdiction of the committee and of the Regents to proceed with the case. With the consent of the committee, various interested persons and organizations submitted to it briefs and exhibits bearing upon the merits of the picture and upon the constitutional and statutory questions involved. On February 16, 1951, the Regents, after viewing “The Miracle,” determined that it was “sacrilegious” and for that reason ordered the Commissioner of Education to rescind appellant’s license to exhibit the picture. The Commissioner did so. Appellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review the determination of the Regents. Among the claims advanced by appellant were (1) that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press; (2) that it is invalid under the same Amendment as a violation of the guaranty of separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion; and, (3) that the term “sacrilegious” is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process. The Appellate Division rejected all of appellant’s contentions and upheld the Regents’ determination. 278 App. Div. 253, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 740. On appeal the New York Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). As we view the case, we need consider only appellant’s contention that the New York statute is an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech and a free press. In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 236 U. S. 230 (1915), a distributor of motion pictures sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Ohio statute which required the prior approval of a board of censors before any motion picture could be publicly exhibited in the state, and which directed the board to approve only such films as it adjudged to be “of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character.” The statute was assailed in part as an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected this contention, stating that the first eight Amendments were not a restriction on state action. 215 F. 138, 141 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1914). On appeal to this Court, plaintiff in its brief abandoned this claim and contended merely that the statute in question violated the freedom of speech and publication guaranteed by the Constitution of Ohio. In affirming the decree of the District Court denying injunctive relief, this Court stated: “It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion.” In a series of decisions beginning with Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), this Court held that the liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amendment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. That principle has been followed and reaffirmed to the present day. Since this series of decisions came after the Mutual decision, the present case is the first to present squarely to us the question whether motion pictures are within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of “speech” or “the press.” It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. As was said in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948): “The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.” It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment’s aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures. It is further urged that motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression. Even if one were to accept this hypothesis, it does not follow that motion pictures should be disqualified from First Amendment protection. If there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have here. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, supra, is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it. To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect to other media of communication of ideas. Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule. The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense, speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. This Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). The Court there recounted the history which indicates that a major purpose of the First Amendment guaranty of a free press was to prevent prior restraints upon publication, although it was carefully pointed out that the liberty of the press is not limited to that protection. It was further stated that “the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases.” Id., at 716. In the light of the First Amendment’s history and of the Near decision, the State has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the limitation challenged here presents such an exceptional case. New York’s highest court says there is “nothing mysterious” about the statutory provision applied in this case: “It is simply this: that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule . . . .” This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of “sacrilegious” given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Cf. Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the “sacrilegious” test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment’s guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures. Since the term “sacrilegious” is the sole standard under attack here, it is not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. That is a very different question from the one now before us. We hold only that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments a state may not ban a film on the basis of a censor’s conclusion that it is “sacrilegious.” Reversed. McKinney's N. Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 129. Id., § 122. The motion'picture division had previously issued a license for exhibition of “The Miracle” without English subtitles, but the film was never shown under that license. McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 101; see also N. Y. Const., Art. V, § 4. Stipulation between appellant and appellee, R. 86. The action was brought under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act, Gilbert-Bliss N. Y. Civ. Prac., Vol. 6B, 1944, 1949 Supp., § 1283 et seq. See also McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1947, Education Law, § 124. 236 U. S., at 244. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (1931); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1937); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939). See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938). See Inglis, Freedom of the Movies (1947), 20-24; Klapper, The Effects of Mass Media (1950), passim; Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60 Yale L. J. 696, 704-708 (1951), and sources cited therein. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531 (1945). See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 166 (1948): “We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.” It is not without significance that talking pictures were first produced in 1926, eleven years after the Mutual decision. Hampton, A History of the Movies (1931), 382-383. E. g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941). Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 713-719 (1931); see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 245-250 (1936); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907). 303 N. Y. 242, 258, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672. At another point the Court of Appeals gave “sacrilegious” the following definition: “the act of violating or profaning anything sacred.” Id., at 255, 101 N. E. 2d at 670. The Court of Appeals also approved the Appellate Division’s interpretation: “As the court below said of the statute in question, ‘All it purports to do is to bar a visual caricature of religious beliefs held sacred by one sect or another ....’” Id., at 258, 101 N. E. 2d at 672. Judge Fuld, dissenting, concluded from all the statements in the majority opinion that “the basic criterion appears to be whether the film treats a religious theme in such a manner as to offend the religious beliefs of any group of persons. If the film does have that effect, and it is ‘offered as a form of entertainment,’ it apparently falls within the statutory ban regardless of the sincerity and good faith of the producer of the film, no matter how temperate the treatment of the theme, and no matter how unlikely a public disturbance or breach of the peace. The drastic nature of such a ban is highlighted by the fact that the film in question makes no direct attack on, or criticism of, any religious dogma or principle, and it is not claimed to be obscene, scurrilous, intemperate or abusive.” Id., at 271-272, 101 N. E. 2d at 680. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370 (1931). Cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). See the following statement by Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 (1940): “In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy. “The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own country for a people composed of many races and of many creeds.” In the Near case, this Court stated that “the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.” 283 U. S. 697, 716. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 (1942), Mr. Justice Murphy stated for a unanimous Court: “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 82 (1949): “When ordinances undertake censorship of speech or religious practices before permitting their exercise, the Constitution forbids their enforcement.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MUNIZ et al. v. HOFFMAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 73-1924. Argued March 24, 1975 — Decided June 25, 1975 Victor J. Van Bourg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Sheldon Otis. Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Allan Abbot Tuttle, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, and Norton J. Come Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Frank J. Donner, Winn Newman, Ruth Weyand, Harold I. Cammer, Norman Leonard, and I. Philip Sipser for the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America et al.; by Joseph A. Yablonski and Daniel B. Edelman for the United Mine Workers of America; by Nancy Stearns for the Union Nacional de Trabajadores; and by Jonathan Shapiro for the Labor Committee of the National Lawyers Guild. Nathan R. Berke filed a brief for California Newspapers, Inc., dba San Rafael Independent Journal, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issues in this case are whether a labor union or an individual, when charged with criminal contempt for violating an injunction issued pursuant to § 10 (Í) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as added, 61 Stat. 149, and as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (i), has a right to a jury trial under 18 U. S. C. § 3692, and whether the union has a right to a jury trial under the Constitution when charged with such a violation and a fine of as much as $10,000 is to be imposed. I Early in 1970, Local 21 of the San Francisco Typographical Union commenced picketing a publishing plant of a daily newspaper in San Rafael, Cal. Shortly thereafter, the newspaper filed an unfair labor practice charge against this union activity, and the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board, in response to that filing, petitioned the District Court pursuant to § 10 (l) for a temporary injunction against those activities pending final disposition of the charge by the Board. The District Court, after a hearing, granted the requested relief and, more than two months later, granted a second petition for a temporary injunction filed by the Regional Director in response to other union activities related to the original dispute. On June 24, 1970, Local 21 and certain of its officials were found to be in civil contempt of the latter injunction. After the entry of this contempt order, the tempo of illegal activities in violation of both injunctions increased, with other locals, including Local 70, participating. Various unions and their officers, including petitioners, were subsequently ordered to show cause why they should not be held in civil and criminal contempt of the injunctions. After proceedings in the criminal contempt case had been severed from the civil contempt proceedings, petitioners demanded a jury trial in the criminal case; this request was denied and petitioners were adjudged guilty of criminal contempt after appropriate proceedings. The District Court suspended the sentencing of petitioner Muniz and placed him on probation for one year; the court imposed a fine on petitioner Local 70 which, for purposes of this case, was 110,00o. On appeal of that judgment to the Court of Appeals, petitioners argued, inter alia, that they had a statutory right to a jury trial of any disputed issues of fact, relying on 18 U. S. C. §3692; petitioners also argued that they had a right to a jury trial under Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals rejected these and other claims made by petitioners, 492 F. 2d 929 (CA9 1974), who then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. The writ was granted, 419 U. S. 992 (1974), limited to the questions whether petitioners had a statutory right to a jury trial and whether petitioner Local 70 had a constitutional right to jury trial in this case. II The petitioners’ claim to jury trial under § 3692 is simply stated: that section provides for jury trial in contempt cases arising under any federal law governing the issuance of injunctions in any case growing out of a labor dispute; here, the injunction issued under § 10 (l) arose out of a labor dispute in the most classic sense and hence contempt proceedings were subject to § 3692’s requirement for jury trial. Were we to consider only the language of § 3692, we might be hard pressed to disagree. But it is not unusual that exceptions to the applicability of a statute’s otherwise all-inclusive language are not contained in the enactment itself but are found in another statute dealing with particular situations to which the first statute might otherwise apply. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151 (1972); MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Tomkins Co., 322 U. S. 102 (1944). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., for example, categorically withdraws jurisdiction from the United States courts to issue any injunctions against certain conduct arising out of labor disputes and permits other injunctions in labor disputes only if certain procedural formalities are satisfied. It contains no exceptions with respect to injunctions in those labor disputes dealt with by the Wagner Act, passed in 1935, or by the Taft-Hartley Act passed in 1947. Yet those Acts expressly or impliedly, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), authorized various kinds of injunctions in labor dispute cases and expressly or impliedly exempted those injunctions from the jurisdictional and procedural limitations of Norris-LaGuardia to the extent necessary to effectuate the provisions of those Acts. The crucial issue is whether in enacting the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, Congress not only intended to exempt the injunctions they authorized from NorrisLaGuardia’s limitations, but also intended that civil and criminal contempt proceedings enforcing those injunctions were not to afford contemnors the right to a jury trial. Surely, if § 10 (i) of Taft-Hartley had expressly provided that contempt proceedings arising from the injunctions which the section authorized would not be subject to jury trial requirements, it would be as difficult to argue that § 3692 nevertheless requires a jury trial as it would be to insist that Norris-LaGuardia bars the issuance of any injunctions in the first place. Section 10 (l), of course, does not so provide; we think it reasonably clear from that and related sections and from their legislative history that this result is precisely what Congress intended. The Wagner Act made employers subject to court orders enforcing Board cease-and-desist orders. Those orders, or many of them, were of the kind NorrisLaGuardia, on its face, prohibited; but § 10 (h) of the Wagner Act provided that in “granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order, or . . . enforcing ... or setting aside ... an order of the Board, . . . the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited, by” 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115. In 1947, in passing the Taft-Hartley Act as part of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress provided for unfair labor practice proceedings against unions; and § 10 (j) gave jurisdiction to the courts to issue injunctions in unfair labor practice proceedings, whether against unions or management, pending final disposition by the Board. Section 10 (l) made special provision for interim injunctions “notwithstanding any other provision of law” in particular kinds of unfair labor practice proceedings against unions. Section 10 (h) was retained in its original form. No party in this case suggests that the injunctions authorized by Congress in 1935 and 1947 were subject to the jurisdictional and procedural limitations of NorrisLaGuardia. Neither can it be seriously argued that, at the time of enactment of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, civil or criminal contempt charges arising from violations of injunctions authorized by those statutes were to be tried to a jury. The historic rule at the time was that, absent contrary provision by rule or statute, jury trial was not required in the case of either civil or criminal contempt. See Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, 183, 189 (1958). Section 11 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U. S. C. § 111 (1946 ed.), required jury trials in contempt actions arising out of labor disputes. But §11 was among those sections which § 10 (h) expressly provided would not limit the power of federal courts to enforce Board orders. Moreover, § 11 was limited by its own terms and by judicial decision to cases “arising under” the Norris-LaGuardia Act. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 298 (1947). Injunctions issued pursuant to either the Wagner Act or Taft-Hartley Act were not issued “under,” but in spite of Norris-LaGuardia; and contempt actions charging violations of those injunctions were not “cases arising under” Norris-LaGuardia. Section 11 of Norris-LaGuardia was thus on its face inapplicable to injunctions authorized by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts; petitioners do not contend otherwise. They say: “From the effective date of Taft-Hartley in late summer, 1947, until June 28, 1948, the effective date of the new § 3692, an alleged contemnor of a TaftHartley injunction would probably have been denied the jury trial guaranteed by § 11 of Norris-LaGuardia, because the injunction would not have been one arising under Norris-LaGuardia itself.” Brief for Petitioners 41. It would be difficult to contend otherwise. It seems beyond doubt that since 1935 it had been understood that the injunctions and enforcement orders referred to in § 10 (h) were not subject to the jury requirements of § 11 of Norris-LaGuardia. When Congress subjected labor unions to unfair labor practice proceedings in 1947, and in §§ 10 (j) and 10 (l) provided for interim injunctive relief from the courts pending Board decision in unfair labor practice cases, it was equally plain that § 11 by its own terms would not apply to contempt cases arising out of these injunctions. By providing for labor Act injunctions outside the framework of Norris-LaGuardia, Congress necessarily contemplated that there would be no right to jury trial in contempt cases. That this was the congressional understanding is revealed by the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act. The House Managers' statement in explanation of the House Conference Report on T’aftHartley stated: “Sections 10 (g), (h), and (i) of the present act, concerning the effect upon the Board's orders of enforcement and review proceedings, making inapplicable the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in proceedings before the courts, were unchanged either by the House bill or by the Senate amendment, and are carried into the conference agreement.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 57 (1947) (emphasis added). Such also was the understanding of Senator Ball, unchallenged on this point by his colleagues on the floor of the Senate during the debate on Taft-Hartley. Senator Ball stated: “[T]he . . . Norris-LaGuardia Act is completely suspended ... in the current National Labor Relations Act whenever the Board goes into court to obtain an enforcement order for one of its decisions. Organized labor did not object to the suspension of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in that case, I suppose presumably because under the present act the only ones to whom it could apply are employers. Organized labor was perfectly willing to have the NorrisLaGuardia Act completely wiped off the books when it came to enforcing Board orders in labor disputes against employers.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4835 (1947). This statement was made in the context of Senator Ball’s explanation of his proposed amendment to § 10 (l) as reported out of committee. That section provided generally that the Board would be required, under certain circumstances, to seek injunctive relief in the federal courts against secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes “notwithstanding any other provision of law ....'' Senator Ball's proposed amendment would have had two effects; first, it would have permitted private parties, in addition to the Board, to seek injunctive relief against the identical practices directly in the District Court; and, second, the amendment would have left in effect for such proceedings the provisions of §§11 and 12 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, giving defendants in such proceedings the right to a jury trial. As Senator Ball stated: “[W]hen the regional attorney of the NLRB seeks an injunction [pursuant to § 10 (7) as reported] the Norris-LaGuardia Act is completely suspended .... We do not go quite that far in our amendment. We simply provide that the Norris-LaGuardia Act shall not apply, with certain exceptions. We leave in effect the provisions of sections 11 and 12. Those are the sections which give an individual charged with contempt of court the right to a jury trial.'' 93 Cong. Rec. 4834 (1947). The Ball amendment was defeated, and private injunctive actions were not authorized. But the provisions for Board injunctions were retained and the necessity for them explained in the Senate Report: “Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving the desired objectives — the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the free flow of commerce and encouragement of the practice and procedure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence we have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of all types of unfair labor practices and that it shall also seek such relief in the case of strikes and boycotts defined as unfair labor practices.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1947) (emphasis added). Ill It is argued, however, that whatever the intention of' Congress might have been with respect to jury trial in contempt actions arising out of Taft-Hartley injunctions, all this was changed when § 11 was repealed and replaced by 18 U. S. C. § 3692 as part of the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code, in the course of which some sections formerly in Title 18 were revised and some related provisions in other titles were recodified in Title 18. The new § 3692, it is insisted, required jury trials for contempt charges arising out of any injunctive order issued under the Labor Management Relations Act if a labor dispute of any kind was involved. Thenceforward, it is claimed, contempt proceedings for violations by unions or employers of enforcement orders issued by courts of appeals or of injunctions issued under § 10 (j) or § 10 (1) must provide the alleged contemnor a jury trial. This argument is unpersuasive. Not a word was said in connection with recodifying § 11 as § 3692 of the Criminal Code that would suggest any such important change in the settled intention of Congress, when it enacted the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, that there would be no jury trials in contempt proceedings arising out of labor Act injunctions. Injunctions authorized by the Labor Management Relations Act were limited to those sought by the Board, “acting in the public interest and not in vindication of purely private rights.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1947). We cannot accept the proposition that Congress, without expressly so providing, intended in § 3692 to change the rules for enforcing injunctions which the Labor Management Relations Act authorized the Labor Board, an agency of the United States, to seek in a United States court. Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 269-276. Just as § 3692 may not be read apart from other relevant provisions of the labor law, that section likewise may not be read isolated from its legislative history and the revision process from which it emerged, all of which place definite limitations on the latitude we have in construing it. The revision of the Criminal Code was, as petitioners suggest, a massive undertaking, but, as the Senate Report on that legislation made clear, “[t]he original intent of Congress is preserved.” S. Rep. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1948). Nor is it arguable that there was any intent in the House to work a change in the understood applicability of § 11 in enacting § 3692. The House Report stated that “[rjevision, as distinguished from codification, meant the substitution of plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, omission of superseded sections, and consolidation of similar provisions.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947). Revisions in the law were carefully explained in a series of Reviser’s Notes printed in the House Report. Id., at A1 et seq. But the Reviser’s Note to § 3692 indicates no change of substance in the law: “Based on section 111 of title 29, U. S. C., 1940 ed., Labor (Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 11, 47 Stat. 72). “The phrase ‘or the District of Columbia arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute’ was inserted and the reference to specific sections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (sections 101-115 of title 29, U. S. C., 1940 ed.) were eliminated.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, supra, at A176; 18 U. S. C., pp. 4442-4443. It has long been a “familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892). Whatever may be said with regard to the application of this rule in other contexts, this Court has stated unequivocally that the principle embedded in the rule “has particular application in the construction of labor legislation National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 619 (1967). Moreover, we are construing a statute of Congress which, like its predecessor, created an exception to the historic rule that there was no right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings. To read a substantial change in accepted practice into a revision of the Criminal Code without any support in the legislative history of that revision is insupportable. As this Court said in United States v. Ryder, 110 U. S. 729, 740 (1884): “It will not be inferred that the legislature, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their policy, unless such an intention be clearly expressed.” The general rule announced in Ryder was applied by this Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S. 222 (1957). In that case, the question was whether venue in patent infringement actions was to be governed by 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b), a discrete provision dealing with venue in patent infringement actions, or 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c), a general provision dealing with venue in actions brought against corporations. Both of these provisions underwent some change in wording in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. The respondents in that case, arguing in favor of the applicability of the general venue provision, § 1391 (c), took the position that the plain language of § 1391 (c) was “clear and unambiguous and that its terms include all actions . . . 353 U. S., at 228. This Court, stating that the respondents’ argument “merely points up the question and does nothing to answer it,” ibid., determined that the general provision, § 1391 (c), had to be read in a fashion consistent with the more particular provision, § 1400 (b). The respondents contended, however, that the predecessor of § 1400 (b), which this Court had held to govern venue irrespective of a general revenue provision, Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561 (1942), had undergone a substantive change during the revision of the Judicial Code in 1948 which effectively reversed the result dictated by Stonite. The Court rejected this argument in terms acutely relevant to this case. “[N]o changes of law or policy,” the Court said, “are to be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed.” 353 U. S., at 227. Furthermore, a change in the language of a statute itself was not enough to establish an intent to effect a substantive change, for “every change made in the text is explained in detail in the Revisers’ Notes,” id., at 226, and the Notes failed to express any substantive change. The Court relied on the Senate and House Reports on the 1948 revision to support this position, id., at, 226 nn. 6 and 7; the language quoted by the Court from the House Report is virtually identical to that which appears in the House Report of the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code, see n. 9, supra. In view of the express disavowals in the House and Senate Reports on the revisions of both the Criminal Code, see supra, at 468-469, and the Judicial Code, see n. 10, supra, it would seem difficult at best to argue that a change in the substantive law could nevertheless be effected by a change in the language of a statute without any indication in the Reviser’s Note of that change. It is not tenable to argue that the Reviser’s Note to § 3692, although it explained in detail what words were deleted from and added to what had been § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, simply did not bother to explain at all, much less in detail, that an admittedly substantial right was being conferred on potential contemnors that had been rejected in the defeat of the Ball amendment the previous year and that, historically, contemnors had never enjoyed. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151 (1972), the Court applied the rule that revisions contained in the 1948 Judicial Code should be construed by-reference to the Reviser’s Notes. The question was whether a change in the language of 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1), made in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, had modified a longstanding policy under § 2 of the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29, providing generally that this Court should have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over civil antitrust actions brought by the Government. Section 1292 (a) (1), as revised, was susceptible of two constructions, one of which would have resulted in a change in that policy. After emphasizing that “the function of the Revisers of the 1948 Code was generally limited to that of consolidation and codification,” we invoked the “well-established principle governing the interpretation of provisions altered in the 1948 revision . . . that ‘no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed.’ ” 409 TJ. S., at 162, quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S., at 228. After going to the committee reports, the Court went to the Reviser’s Notes and, in the Note to § 1292 (a)(1), found no affirmative indication of a substantive change. On this basis, the Court refused to give § 1292 (a)(1) as revised the “plausible” construction urged by respondents there. In this case, involving the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code, the House and Senate Reports caution repeatedly against reading substantive changes into the revision, and the Reviser’s Note to § 3692 gives absolutely no indication that a substantive change in the law was contemplated. In these circumstances, our cases and the canon of statutory construction which Congress expected would be applied to the revisions of both the Criminal and Judicial Codes, require us to conclude, along with all the lower federal courts having considered this question since 1948, save one, that § 3692 does not provide for trial by jury in contempt proceedings brought to enforce an injunction issued at the behest of the Board in a labor dispute arising under the Labor Management Relations Act. IY We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the union petitioner had no right to a jury trial under Art. Ill, § 2, and the Sixth Amendment. Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165 (1958), reaffirmed the historic rule that state and federal courts have the constitutional power to punish any criminal contempt without a jury trial. United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681 (1964), and Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373 (1966), presaged a change in this rule. The constitutional doctrine which emerged from later decisions such as Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968) ; Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147 (1969); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974); and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506 (1974), may be capsuled as follows: (1) Like other minor crimes, “petty” contempts may be tried without a jury, but contemnors in serious contempt cases in the federal system have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial; (2) criminal contempt, in and of itself and without regard to the punishment imposed, is not a serious offense absent legislative declaration to the contrary; (3) lacking legislative authorization of more serious punishment, a sentence of as much as six months in prison, plus normal periods of probation, may be imposed without a jury trial; (4) but imprisonment for longer than six months is constitutionally impermissible unless the contemnor has been given the opportunity for a jury trial. This Court has as yet not addressed the question whether and in what circumstances, if at all, the imposition of a fine for criminal contempt, unaccompanied by imprisonment, may require a jury trial if demanded by the defendant. This case presents the question whether a fine of $10,000 against an unincorporated labor union found guilty of criminal contempt may be imposed after denying the union’s claim that it was entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. Local 70 insists that where a fine of this magnitude is imposed, a contempt cannot be considered a petty offense within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 1 (3), and that its demand for a jury trial was therefore erroneously denied. We cannot agree. In determining the boundary between petty and serious contempts for purposes of applying the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee, and in holding that a punishment of more than six months in prison could not be ordered without making a jury trial available to the defendant, the Court has referred to the relevant rules and practices followed by the federal and state regimes, including the definition of petty offenses under 18 U. S. C. § 1 (3). Under that section, petty offenses are defined as those crimes “the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both.” But in referring to that definition, the Court accorded it no talismanie significance; and we cannot accept the proposition that a contempt must be considered a serious crime under all circumstances where the punishment is a fine of more than $500, unaccompanied by imprisonment. It is one thing to hold that deprivation of an individual’s liberty beyond a six-month term should not be imposed without the protections of a jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of the circumstances, a jury is required where any fine greater than $500 is contemplated. Prom the standpoint of determining the seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are intrinsically different. It is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six months in jail is a serious matter for any individual, but it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a $501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union. Indeed, although we do not reach or decide the issue tendered by the respondent — that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in any criminal contempt case where only a fine is imposed on a corporation or labor union, Brief for Respondent 36 — we cannot say that the fine of $10,000 imposed on Local 70 in this case was a deprivation of such magnitude that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or mistake. This union, the respondent suggests, collects dues from some 13,000 persons; and although the fine is not insubstantial, it is not of such magnitude that the union was deprived of whatever right to jury trial it might have under the Sixth Amendment. We thus affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. A fine of $25,000 was imposed initiafiy, but $15,000 of that fine was subsequently remitted by the District Court based on Local 70’s obedience of the injunctions subsequent to the adjudication of contempt. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3692 reads in pertinent part as follows: “In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall have been committed.” Although stating broadly at the outset that “[b]y its own terms [§ 3692] encompasses all cases of contempt arising under any of the several laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions in cases of a ‘labor dispute,' ” dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, post, at 482, that dissent seems to imply that § 3692, after all, does not reach all cases of contempt in labor dispute injunctions. That dissent appears to say that § 3692 provides the right to jury trials only in cases involving criminal, as opposed to civil, contempt. This is so, it is suggested, because that section guarantees the right to “the accused,” the inference being that one charged with civil contempt is not one properly denominated as an “accused.” Post, at 487-488, n. 7. But the phrase “the accused” was taken verbatim from § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 72, 29 U. S. C. § 111 (1946 ed.), and the legislative history of §11 leaves little room to doubt that when Congress enacted § 11, it intended that section to be applicable to both criminal and civil contempt proceedings. That history establishes that § 11 was a compromise between the Senate version of the bill, which provided for a jury trial in all contempt cases, and the House version of the bill, which provided for jury trials in all criminal contempt cases arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The compromise, as explained to the House, gave the right to a jury trial in all contempts, civil or criminal, in cases arising under the Act. 75 Cong. Rec. 6336-6337 (1932). In the Senate, Senator Norris himself explained the compromise as follows: “As the House passed the bill it did not apply to all contempt cases under the act. As the Senate passed it, it applied to aE cases, either under the act or otherwise. As the House passed it, it applied only to criminal contempt. As the Senate passed it, it applied to all contempts. The compromise was to confine it to aE cases under the act and to eliminate the word ‘criminal,’ but the cases must arise under this act.” Id.., at 6450. And, Senator Norris continued: “Under the compromise made, the language of the Senate was agreed to, so that now anyone charged with any kind of a contempt arising under any of the provisions of this act will be entitled to a jury trial in the contempt proceedings.” Id., at 6453. Certainly when Congress used the phrase “the accused” in § 11, it did not mean to limit that phrase to describing only those accused of criminal contempt. The dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart also suggests that this limited reading of § 3692 is “consistent” with the placing of that provision, based on § 11 of Norris-LaGuardia, into Title 18 in 1948. If there is any consistency in this suggestion, it is in that dissent’s consistent position that Congress in 1948, without expressing any intention whatsoever to do so, made substantial changes in the right to jury trial — including outright repeal of whatever statutory right there was to jury trial in civE contempt cases arising out of labor disputes, thereby reversing itself on an issue that had been thoroughly considered and decided some 16 years before in Norris-LaGuardia. In arguing that § 3692 may not reach civil contempt cases, Mr. Justice Stewart also relies on implications which he finds in § 10 (l) of the LMRA that § 3692, despite its language, has no application in those cases. As is clear from this opinion, infra, at 463-467, we too rely on § 10 (l), as well as other provisions, in suggesting that certain contempt cases are not reached by § 3692. There is also a suggestion in the dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart that one charged with contempt of an injunction issued during a national emergency, 29 U. S. C. §§ 176-180, would not have the right to a jury trial notwithstanding § 3692. Apparently this is so because 29 U. S. C. § 178 (b), § 208 of the Taft-Hartley Act, “provided simply and broadly that all the provisions of that [Norris-LaGuardia] Act are inapplicable.” Post, at 486. But the language Congress used in § 178 (b), “the provisions of sections 101 to 115 of this title, shall not be applicable,” is remarkably similar to the language used in the Conference Report of the Taft-Hartley Act to convey the congressional understanding of § 10 (h) of the Wagner Act which it was re-enacting in Taft-Hartley: “making inapplicable the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in proceedings before the courts . . . .” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 57 (1947). See n. 6, infra. Mr. Justice Stewart’s position with respect to the applicability of § 3692 in proceedings brought in the Court of Appeals to enforce Board orders directed against employers is even less clear, but it would seem to be the inescapable conclusion under the dissent’s analysis that, at least in criminal contempts of such orders, the courts of appeals would be required to empanel juries, a result that would certainly represent a novel procedure, see United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 690-691, and n. 7 (1964). On the other hand, if Mr. Justice Stewart would limit § 3692 to apply only to disobedience of those injunctions newly authorized by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, that section, despite its language, would not apply to injunctions issued by the courts of appeals in enforcement actions against employers (it would be otherwise where unions or employees are involved) for the reason that the provisions of the Wagner Act included in the LMRA have the effect of exempting those situations from the reach of § 3692. Very similar reasons furnish sound ground for the inapplicability of § 3692 to contempt cases arising out of any of the injunctions authorized by the TaftHartley Act. Section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 111 (1946 ed.), read, in pertinent part, as follows: “In all cases arising under sections 101-116 of this title in which a person shall be charged with contempt in a court of the United States (as herein defined), the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall have been committed.” The position of Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, post, at 478-479, that injunctions issued pursuant to the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts are or would have been “arising under” the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and therefore subject to § 11 prior to 1948, is contrary to the understanding of the Congresses that passed the Wagner Act, n. 6, infra, and the Taft-Hartley Act, infra, at 46L-467, and of every court to have considered this question, see cases cited n. 12, infra. The only legislative history of the Wagner Act addressing this question was- the statement of a witness, apparently made in reference to the original version of § 10 (h), § 304 (a) of S. 2926, which was uncontradicted by any prior or subsequent history: “The whole theory of enforcement of these orders is through contempt proceedings .... [T]he order of the labor board is made an order of the Federal court, subject to being punished by contempt. Now, in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, there has been considerable change of the ordinary procedure on contempt. I won’t go into detail, but simply state that in a great majority of instances punishment, where the employees are the defendants, must be by trial by jury. This is, of course, not permissible in any case under the Wagner bill.” Hearings on S. 2926 before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 505 (1934). The dissents suggest that the word “jurisdiction” as used in both § 10 (h) and § 10 (l) is to be read in the technical sense and that the reference to all the provisions of Norris-LaGuardia in § 10 (h) was merely “an additional means of identifying” the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Post, at 486. Yet the language quoted in the text from the House Managers’ statement supports only the position that Congress, in re-enacting § 10 (h) in 1947, understood that section as “making inapplicable the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,” not “making inapplicable the jurisdictional provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act” as the dissents would have it. Support for the position that § 10 (h) was understood by Congress in 1947 to make inapplicable all the provisions of Norris-LaGuardia comes not only from the House Managers’ statement but also from a memorandum introduced into the Congressional Record a decade later by Representative Celler, who concluded that “the clear and unequivocal wording of section 10 (h) . . . clearly indicates a waiver of all the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, including the provisions for a jury trial, in cases where the Government was a party to the original action.” 103 Cong. Rec. 8685 (1957). Representative Celler was the chairman of a House subcommittee which had previously held hearings on the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code including § 3692. The dissents offer nothing from the legislative history that should lead us to reject the clear meaning of the House Managers’ statement with respect to the congressional understanding of §10 (h). Petitioners’ contention that § 3692 was Congress’ response to the Court’s decision in United States v. Mine Workers, supra, is particularly insupportable in light of the fact that the Reviser’s Note, as set forth infra, at 469, was taken verbatim from the prior Reviser’s Note to § 3692 that was reported to the House on February 15, 1945, more than two years prior to this Court’s decision in Mine Workers and more than three years prior to the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code. The bill reported to the House in 1945, H. R. 2200, was adopted by the House on July 16, 1946, again prior to the decision in United Mine Workers and prior to February 5, 1947, when the House Committee on Education and Labor began hearings on labor legislation which eventually led to the introduction of the Taft-Hartley bill in the House on April 10, 1947. The identical version of the Criminal Code passed the House for the final time on May 12, 1947, almost two months prior to the House’s acceptance of the conference version of Taft-Hartley. There could be no argument that the change in wording in § 3692 was intended to reach criminal contempt proceedings for violation of those Board injunctions newly authorized in 1947, for the House of Representatives passed § 3692 for the first time more than six months before hearings even commenced in the House to consider the Taft-Hartley legislation, and passed it for the second and final time, unchanged, almost two months before the House accepted the conference version of Taft-Hartley. The House Report states that “[t]he reviser’s notes . . . explain in detail every change made in text.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1947). The Court’s analysis in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S. 222 (1957), is particular!}' relevant to our inquiry in this case because of the parallel courses followed by the revisions of the Criminal and Judicial Codes. The revision to the Criminal Code was prepared by a staff of experts drawn from various sources and, after this staff completed its work on that revision, the same staff turned its attention to the revision of the Judicial Code. The only hearings held in the House on either of the revisions were held jointly by a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings on Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code, before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The House Reports issued subsequent to those hearings parallel one another in many respects, including almost identical statements respecting the purpose and scope of the two revisions. Compare H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947), quoted in the text, swpm, at 469, with H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947): “Revision, as distinguished from codification, required the substitution of plain language for awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, repeal of superseded sections, and consolidation of related provisions.” The Senate Reports on the two revisions likewise expressed the intention of preserving the original meaning of the statutes undergoing revision. Compare S. Rep. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1948), quoted in the text, supra, at 469, with S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948) (“great care has been exercised to make no changes in the existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval”). Testimony in the House joint hearings confirms that the methods and intent of the revisers themselves were the same with respect to both revisions. Hearings, supra, at 6. This point was clearly made by the Law Revision Counsel to the House subcommittee which held joint hearings on the revisions to the Judicial and Criminal Codes: “There is one thing that I would like to point out . . . and that is the rule of statutory construction. “In the work of revision, principally codification, as we have done here, keeping revision to a minimum, I believe the rule of statutory construction is that a mere change of wording will not effect a change in meaning unless a clear intent to change the meaning is evidenced. “To find out the intent, I think the courts would go to the report of the committee on the bills and these reports are most comprehensive. We have incorporated in them . . . notes to each section of the bills, both the criminal code and the judicial code. “It is clearly indicated in each of those revisers’ notes whether any change was intended so that merely because we have changed the language — we have changed the language to get a uniform style, to avoid awkward expression, to state a thing more concisely and succinctly — but a mere change in language will not be interpreted as an intent to change the law unless there is some other clear evidence of an intent to change the law.” Hearings on Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 40 (1947) (emphasis added). This statement is particularly persuasive in view of the fact that its maker, Mr. Zinn, had served as Counsel to the Committee on Revision of the Laws for the previous eight years; the House Report on the revision of the Criminal Code pointed out that Mr. Zinn had, for that Committee, “exercised close and constant supervision” over the work of the revisers who prepared the revision. H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947). The nature of the revision process itself requires the courts, including this Court, to give particular force to the many express disavowals in the House and Senate Reports of any intent to effect substantive changes in the law. Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill Workers, 334 F. 2d 1014 (CA7 1964), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 967 (1965) (§10 (l) proceeding); Schauffler v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen’s Assn., 189 F. Supp. 737 (ED Pa. 1960), rev’d on other grounds, 292 F. 2d 182 (CA3 1961) (§ 10 (Z) proceeding). See United States v. Robinson, 449 F. 2d 925 (CA9 1971) (suit for injunctive relief brought by the United States against employees of a federal agency) ; Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 127 U. S. App. D. C. 23, 380 F. 2d 570, cert. denied, 389 U. S. 327 (1967) (proceeding under Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.); NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 193 F. 2d 979 (CA5 1952) (proceeding brought for violation of § 7 of the Wagner Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, now 29 U. S. C. § 157); In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 386 F. 2d 309 (CA5 1967) (proceedings for violation of § 7 of the Wagner Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, now 29 U. S. C. § 157); Mitchell v. Barbee Lumber Co., 35 F. R. D. 544 (SD Miss. 1964) (proceedings brought for violation of order issued for violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.); In re Piccinini, 35 F. R. D. 548 (WD Pa. 1964) (proceedings brought for violation of consent decree involving Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.). The .only decision to the contrary, In re Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 502 F. 2d 113 (CAI 1974), was decided without express reference to any of the pertinent legislative history of the Wagner and TaftHartley Acts; the panel of the Court of Appeals was itself divided over the correct result, see id., at 121-122 (Campbell, J., dissenting).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. STERN, TRANSFEREE. No. 311. Argued April 7, 1958. Decided June 9, 1958. John F. Davis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and A. F. Prescott. Walter E. Barton argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William H. Beck and William B. Martin. Benj. H. Saunders, K. Martin Worthy and Arthur Peter filed a brief for the Life Insurance Association of America, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination of the liability assessed against her for her deceased husband’s unpaid income tax deficiencies. The Tax Court held that, as beneficiary of proceeds of her husband’s life insurance exceeding the amount of the deficiencies, the respondent was liable for the full amount of the deficiencies. The Court of Appeals reversed, 242 F. 2d 322, holding that the respondent was not liable even to the extent of the amount of the cash surrender values of the policies, which was less than the amount of the deficiencies. We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 810. Dr. Milton J. Stern died a resident of Lexington, Kentucky, on June 12, 1949. Nearly six.years later the Tax Court held that Dr. Stern had been deficient in his income taxes for the years 1944 through 1947 and was liable for the amount, including interest and penalties, of $32,777.51. Because the assets of the estate were insufficient to meet this liability, the Commissioner proceeded under § 311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 against respondent, Dr. Stern’s widow, as the beneficiary of life insurance policies held by him. The proceeds and the cash surrender value of these policies at Dr. Stern’s death totaled $47,282.02 and $27,259.68 respectively.' The right to change the beneficiary and to draw down the cash surrender value of each policy had been retained until death by Dr. Stern. There were no findings that Dr. Stern paid any premiums with intent to defraud his creditors or that he was insolvent at any time prior to this death. The Court of Appeals rested its decision upon two grounds: (1) that the respondent beneficiary was not a transferee within the meaning of § 311, Tyson v. Commissioner, 212 F. 2d 16; and (2) that in any event Kentucky statutes, Ky. R. S., 1948, §§ 297.140, 297.150, limit the beneficiary’s liability to creditors of the deceased insured to the amount of the premiums paid by the insured in fraud of creditors, and consequently there was no liability since there was no evidence that Dr. Stern paid any premium in fraud of his creditors. Without intimating any view as to the correctness of the first holding of the Court of Appeals we find it unnecessary to decide whether the respondent was a transferee within the meaning of § 311 because we hold that the Kentucky statutes govern the question of the beneficiary's liability and create no liability of the respondent to the Government in the circumstances of this case. First. Section 311 (a) provides that “The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property of a taxpayer, in respect of the tax . . . imposed upon the taxpayer by this chapter” shall be “assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of a deficiency in a tax imposed by this chapter . . . The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Tax Court have been in conflict on the question whether the substantive liability enforced under § 311 is to be determined by state or federal law. Compare, e. g., Rowen v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 641, and Botz v. Helvering, 134 F. 2d 538, with United States v. Bess, 243 F. 2d 675, and Stoumen v. Commissioner, 27 T. C. 1014. This Court has expressly left the question open. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 602. The courts have repeatedly recognized that § 311 neither creates nor defines a substantive liability but provides merely a new procedure by which the Government may collect taxes. Phillips v. Commissioner, supra; Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., 50 F. 2d 138; Liquidators of Exchange National Bank v. United States, 65 F. 2d 316; Harwood v. Eaton, 68 F. 2d 12; Weil v. Commissioner, 91 F. 2d 944; Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 F. 2d 350. Prior to the enactment of § 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 61, the predecessor of § 311, the rights of the Government as creditor, enforceable only by bringing a bill in equity or an action at law, depended upon state statutes or legal theories developed by the courts for the protection of private creditors, as in cases where the debtor had transferred his property to another. Phillips v. Commissioner, supra, at 592, n. 2; cf. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398; Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117. This procedure proved unduly cumbersome, however, in comparison with the summary administrative remedy allowed against the taxpayer himself, Rev. Stat. § 3187, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 343. The predecessor section of § 311 was designed “to provide for the enforcement of such liability to the Government by the procedure provided in the act for the enforcement of tax deficiencies.” S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30. “Without in any way changing the extent of such liability of the transferee under existing law, . . . [this section] enforces such liability ... in the same manner as liability for a tax deficiency is enforced; that is, notice by the commissioner to the transferee and opportunity either to pay and sue for refund or else to proceed before the Board of Tax Appeals, with review by the courts. Such a proceeding is in lieu of the present equity proceeding . . . .” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44. Therefore, since § 311 is purely a procedural statute we must look to other sources for definition of the substantive liability. Since no federal statute defines such liability, we are left with a choice between federal decisional law and state law for its definition. Second. The Government urges that, to further “uniformity of liability,” we reject the applicability of Kentucky law in favor of having the federal courts fashion governing rules. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363. But a federal decisional law in this field displacing state statutes as determinative of liability would be a sharp break with the past. Federal courts, in cases where the Government seeks to collect unpaid taxes from persons other than the defaulting taxpayer, have applied state statutes, Hutton v. Commissioner, 59 F. 2d 66; Weil v. Commissioner, supra; United States v. Goldblatt, 128 F. 2d 576; Botz v. Helvering, supra, and the Government itself has urged reliance upon such statutes in similar cases, G. C. M. 2514, VI-2 Cum. Bull. 99; G. C. M. 3491, VII-1 Cum. Bull. 147. The Congress was aware of the use of state statutes when the enactment of the predecessor section to § 311 was under consideration, for the Congress in disclaiming any intention “to define or change existing liability,” S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, identified “existing liability” as liability ensuing “[b]y reason of the trust fund doctrine and various State statutory provisions . . . .” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 356, supra, at 43. It is true that, in addition to reliance upon state statutes, the Government invoked principles judicially developed for the protection of private creditors, in cases where the debtor had transferred his property to another and been left insolvent. Cf. Pierce v. United States, supra; Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., supra. In such cases the federal courts applied a “general law” which did not distinguish between federal and state deci-sional law. But the fact remains that the varying definitions of liability under state statutes resulted in an absence of uniformity of liability. Yet Congress, with knowledge that this was “existing law” at the time the predecessor section to § 311 was enacted, has refrained from disturbing the prevailing practice. Uniformity is not always the federal policy. Under § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, for instance, state law is applied to determine what property of the bankrupt has been transferred in fraud of creditors. 30 Stat. 565, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 110. What is a good transfer in one jurisdiction might not be so in another. Since Congress has not manifested a desire for uniformity of liability, we think that the creation of a federal decisional law would be inappropriate in these cases. In diversity cases, the federal courts must now apply state decisional law in defining state-created rights, obligations, and liabilities. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64. They would, of course, do so in diversity actions brought by private creditors. Since the federal courts no longer formulate a body of federal decisional law for the larger field of creditors’ rights in diversity cases, any such effort for the small field of actions by the Government as a creditor would be necessarily episodic. That effort is plainly not justified when there exists a flexible body of pertinent state law continuously being adapted to changing circumstances affecting all creditors. Accordingly we hold that, until Congress speaks to the contrary, the existence and extent of liability should be determined by state law. Third. The Court of Appeals held in this case that under the applicable Kentucky law the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is not liable to the insured’s creditors, at least where, as here, the premiums have not been paid in fraud of creditors, Ky. R. S., 1948, §§ 297.140, 297.150, and that therefore no liability of the respondent exists under state law to any creditor, including the Government. The parties do not contest this construction of local law. The Government, however, argues in its brief, “Just as in the situation where a tax lien has attached it is held that state law may not destroy that lien, so here, where a tax liability is imposed by'Congress, the state may not provide exemptions.” We agree that state law may not destroy a tax lien which has attached in the insured’s lifetime. We held today in United States v. Bess, post, p. 51, that a New Jersey statute, similar to the Kentucky statutes, could not defeat the attachment in the insured’s lifetime of a federal tax lien under § 3670 against the cash surrender value of the policy, or prevent enforcement of the lien out of the proceeds received by the beneficiary on the insured’s death. We might also agree that a State may not provide exemptions from a tax liability imposed by Congress. The fallacy in the Government’s argument is in the premise that Congress has imposed a tax liability against the beneficiary. We have concluded that Congress has not seen fit to define that liability and that none exists except such as is imposed by state law. Thus there is no problem here of giving effect to state exemption provisions when federal law imposes such liability. The Government’s substantive rights in this case are precisely those which other creditors would have under Kentucky law. The respondent is not liable to the Government because Kentucky law imposes no liability against respondent in favor of Dr. Stem’s other creditors. Affirmed. Section 311 provides: “(a) Method of CollectioN. — The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of a deficiency in a tax imposed by this chapter (including the provisions in case of delinquency in payment after notice and demand, the provisions authorizing distraint and proceedings in court for collection, and the provisions prohibiting claims and suits for refunds): “(1) Transferees. — The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property of a taxpayer, in respect of the tax (including interest, additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided by law) imposed upon the taxpayer by this chapter. “(f) Definition of 'Transferee’. — As used in this section, the term ‘transferee’ includes heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee.” 53 Stat. 90, 91. The Court of Appeals in this case followed its own prior decision in Tyson v. Commissioner, 212 F. 2d 16, in holding that Mrs. Stern as beneficiary was not a “transferee” of any part of the proceeds within the meaning of § 311. Other Courts of Appeals have held that the beneficiary is a transferee only to the extent of the cash surrender value existing at the time of the insured’s death. Rowen v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 641; United States v. Bess, 243 F. 2d 675. The Tax Court, on the other hand, has held that the beneficiary is the transferee of the entire proceeds. Stoumen v. Commissioner, 27 T. C. 1014. The Government argues that since § 311 and § 900 were originally enacted as correlative provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926 a substantive liability is imposed upon the beneficiary for both unpaid income and estate taxes of the decedent. But the 1939 Code “contains no provision in respect to income tax collection comparable to Section 827 (b) of the Code which expressly imposes liability for the estate tax on a 'beneficiary, who receives . . . property included in the gross estate under section [811 (f)].’ ” Rowen v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 641, 646. Kentucky Revised Statutes provided: “297.140 Lije insurance for benefit of a married woman; premiums paid in fraud of creditors. (1) A policy of insurance on the life of any person expressed to be for the benefit of, or duly assigned, transferred or made payable to, any married woman, or to any person in trust for her, or for her benefit, by whomsoever such transfer may be made, shall inure to her separate use and benefit and that of her children, independently of her husband or his creditors or any other person effecting or transferring the policy or his creditors. “(2) A married woman may, without consent of her husband, contract, pay for, take out and hold a policy of insurance upon the life or health of her husband or children, or against loss by his or their disablement by accident. The premiums paid on the policy shall be held to have been her separate estate, and the policy shall inure to her separate use and benefit and that of her children, free from any claim of her husband or others. “(3) If the premium on any policy mentioned in this section is paid by any person with intent to defraud his creditors, an amount equal to the premium so paid, with interest thereon, shall inure to the benefit of the creditors, subject to the statute of limitations. “297.150 Life insurance for benefit of another; premiums paid in fraud of creditors. (1) When a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own life or on another life in favor of some person other than himself having an insurable interest therein, the lawful beneficiary thereof, other than the person effecting the insurance or his legal representatives, shall be entitled to its proceeds against the creditors and representatives of the person effecting the same. “(2) Subject to the statute of limitations, the amount of any premiums for such insurance paid in fraud of creditors, with interest thereon, shall inure to their benefit from the proceeds of the policy, but the company issuing the policy shall be discharged of all liability thereon by payment of its proceeds in accordance with its terms, unless, before such payment, the company received written notice by or in behalf of some creditor, with specification of the amount claimed, claiming to recover for certain premiums paid in fraud of creditors.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. v. THOMPSON et al. No. 87-1815. Argued January 18, 1989 Decided May 15, 1989 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post. p. 465. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 465. Barbara Willett Jones argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs was Leslie Patterson Vose. Joseph S. Elder II argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Tennessee et al. by W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael W. Catalano, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Grace Berg Schaible of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Jim Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Brian McKay of Nevada, W. Cary Eduvrds of New Jersey, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Robert Henry of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Robert A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, Jim Mattox of Texas, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Don J. Hanaway of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we consider whether Kentucky prison regulations give state inmates, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a liberty interest in receiving certain visitors. I In September 1976, Kentucky inmates brought a federal class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 challenging conditions of confinement in the Kentucky State Penitentiary at Eddy-ville. Other cases, one of them relating to the Kentucky State Reformatory at La Grange, were consolidated with the one concerning the penitentiary. The litigation was settled by a consent decree dated 28 May 1980, and supplemented 22 July 1980, containing provisions governing a broad range of prison conditions. App. 2-44, 45-55. See Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 27-50 (WD Ky. 1981); see also Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F. 2d 432 (CA6 1984). Of sole relevance here, the consent decree provides: “The Bureau of Corrections encourages and agrees to maintain visitation at least at the current level, with minimal restrictions,” and to “continue [its] open visiting policy.” See 541 F. Supp., at 37. The Commonwealth in 1981 issued “Corrections Policies and Procedures” governing general prison visitation, including a nonexhaustive list of visitors who may be excluded. Four years later, the reformatory issued its own more detailed “Procedures Memorandum” on the subject of “Visiting Regulations.” The memorandum begins with a Statement of Policy and Purpose: “Although administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits, it is the policy of the Kentucky State Reformatory to respect the right of inmates to have visits in the spirit of the Court decisions and the Consent Decree, while insuring the safety and security of the institution.” App. 106. The memorandum then goes on to state that a visitor may be denied entry if his or her presence would constitute a “clear and probable danger to the safety and security of the institution or would interfere with the orderly operation of the institution.” ¶ K(1)(a), App. 133. A nonexhaustive list of nine specific reasons for excluding visitors is set forth. The memorandum also states that the decision whether to exclude a visitor rests with the duty officer, who is to be consulted by any staff member who “feels a visitor should not be allowed admittance.” ¶ K(3), App. 134. This particular litigation was prompted in large part by two incidents when applicants were denied the opportunity to visit an inmate at the reformatory. The mother of one inmate was denied visitation for six months because she brought to the reformatory a person who had been barred for smuggling contraband. Another inmate’s mother and woman friend were denied visitation for a limited time when the inmate was found with contraband after a visit by the two women. In both instances the visitation privileges were suspended without a hearing. The inmates were not prevented from receiving other visitors. The representatives of the Kendrick-inmate class filed a motion with the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (the court which had issued the consent decree), claiming that the suspension of visitation privileges without a hearing in these two instances violated the decree and the Due' Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By a memorandum dated June 26, 1986, the District Court found that the prison policies did not violate the decree, App. 147, but concluded that the language of the decree was “mandatory in character,” id., at 148, and that, under the standards articulated by this Court in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), respondents “possess a liberty interest in open visitation.” The District Court directed petitioners to develop “minimal due process procedures,” including “an informal, nonadversary review in which a prisoner receives notice of and reasons for” any decision to exclude a visitor, as well as an opportunity to respond. App. 148. A formal order was issued accordingly. Id., at 149. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and remanded the case. 833 F. 2d 614 (1987). Relying not only on the consent decree but also on the regulations and stated policies, the court held that the relevant language was sufficiently mandatory to create a liberty interest. The Court of Appeals found that the relevant prison policies “placed ‘substantive limitations on official discretion.’” Id., at 618-619, quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 249 (1983). The court also found that the language of the consent decree, that “[defendants shall continue their open visiting policy” (emphasis supplied by Court of Appeals), see Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp., at 37, coupled with a provision from the policy statement that “[a]n inmate is allowed three (3) separate visits . . . per week” (emphasis added by Court of Appeals), Reformatory Procedures ¶B(3), App. 108, satisfied the requirement of “mandatory language” articulated by our prior cases. See 833 F. 2d, at 618. Because this case appeared to raise important issues relevant to general prison administration, we granted certiorari. 487 U. S. 1217 (1988). II The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” and protects “the individual against arbitrary action of government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558 (1974). We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 571 (1972); the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 472. The types of interests that constitute “liberty” and “property” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes are not unlimited; the interest must rise to more than “an abstract need or desire,” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577, and must be based on more than “a unilateral hope,” Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 465 (1981). Rather, an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Protected liberty interests “may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 466. Respondents do not argue — nor can it seriously be contended, in light of our prior cases — that an inmate’s interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause. We have rejected the notion that “any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause.” (Emphasis in original.) Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 224 (1976). This is not to say that a valid conviction extinguishes every direct due process protection; “consequences visited on the prisoner that are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime” may invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause even in the absence of a state-created right. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital). However, “[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236, 242 (1976). The denial of prison access to a particular visitor “is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 468, and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause. We have held, however, that state law may create enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting. We have found, for example, that certain regulations granted inmates a protected interest in parole, Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979), in good-time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 556-572, in freedom from involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S., at 487-494, and in freedom from more restrictive forms of confinement within the prison, Hewitt v. Helms, supra. In contrast, we have found that certain state statutes and regulations did not create a protected liberty interest in transfer to another prison. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 225 (intrastate transfer); Olim v. Wakinekona, supra (interstate transfer). The fact that certain state-created liberty interests have been found to be entitled to due process protection, while others have not, is not the result of this Court’s judgment as to what interests are more significant than others; rather, our method of inquiry in these cases always has been to examine closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations. Stated simply, “a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S., at 249. A State may do this in a number of ways. Neither the drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an exact science. Our past decisions suggest, however, that the most common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing “substantive predicates” to govern official decision-making, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 472, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met. Most of our procedural due process cases in the prison context have turned on the presence or absence of language creating “substantive predicates” to guide discretion. For example, the failure of a Connecticut statute governing commutation of sentences to provide “particularized standards or criteria [to] guide the State’s decisionmakers,” Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S., at 467 (Brennan, J., concurring), defeated an inmate’s claim that the State had created a liberty interest. Id., at 465 (majority opinion). See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S., at 249-250 (interstate prison transfer left to “completely unfettered” discretion of administrator); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 228 (intrastate prison transfer at discretion of officials); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S., at 243 (same). In other instances, we have found that prison regulations or statutes do provide decisionmaking criteria which serve to limit discretion. See, e. g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 472 (administrative segregation not proper absent particular substantive predicates); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S., at 381 (parole granted unless certain standards met, even though the decision is “‘necessarily subjective . . . and predictive’”). We have also articulated a requirement, implicit in our earlier decisions, that the regulations contain “explicitly mandatory language,” i. e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 471-472. The regulations at issue in Hewitt mandated that certain procedures be followed, and “that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates.” Id., at 472. In Board of Pardons v. Allen, supra, the relevant statute “use[d] mandatory language (‘shall’) to ‘creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when the designated findings are made,” 482 U. S., at 377-378, quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S., at 12. See also id., at 11 (statute providing that board “shall order” release unless one of four specified conditions is found). In sum, the use of “explicitly mandatory language,” in connection with the establishment of “specified substantive predicates” to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 472. Ill The regulations and procedures at issue in this case do provide certain “substantive predicates” to guide the decisionmaker. See nn. 1 and 2, supra. The state procedures provide that a visitor “may be excluded” when, inter alia, officials find reasonable grounds to believe that the “visitor’s presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution’s security or interfere with [its] orderly operation.” See n. 1, supra. Among the more specific reasons listed for denying visitation are the visitor’s connection to the inmate’s criminal behavior, the visitor’s past disruptive behavior or refusal to submit to a search or show proper identification, and the visitor’s being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Ibid. The reformatory procedures are nearly identical, and include a prohibition on a visit from a former reformatory inmate, without the prior approval of the warden. See n. 2, supra. These regulations and procedures contain standards to be applied by a staff member in determining whether to refer a situation to the duty officer for resolution, and require the staff member to notify the duty officer if the staff member feels that a visitor should not be allowed admittance. Ibid. The same “substantive predicates” undoubtedly are intended to guide the duty officer’s discretion in making the ultimate decision. The regulations at issue here, however, lack the requisite relevant mandatory language. They stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met. The Reformatory Procedures Memorandum begins with the caveat that “administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits,” and goes on to note that “it is the policy” of the reformatory “to respect the right of inmates to have visits.” App. 106. This language is not mandatory. Visitors may be excluded if they fall within one of the described categories, see n. 1, supra, but they need not be. Nor need visitors fall within one of the described categories in order to be excluded. The overall effect of the regulations is not such that an inmate can reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions. Or, to state it differently, the regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them against the prison officials. Because the regulations at issue here do not establish a liberty interest entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The relevant provision states: “Certain visitors who are either a threat to the security or order of the institution or nonconducive to the successful re-entry of the inmate to the community may be excluded. These are, but not restricted to: “A. The visitor’s presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution’s security or interfere with the orderly operation of the institution. “B. The visitor has a past record of disruptive conduct. “C. The visitor is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. “D. The visitor refuses to submit to search, if requested to do so, or show proper identification. “E. The visitor is directly related to the inmate’s criminal behavior. “F. The visitor is currently on probation or parole and does not have special written permission from both his or her Probation or Parole Officer and the institutional Superintendent.” Commonwealth of Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures §403.06 (issued Aug. 28, 1981, effective Sept. 28, 1981); App. 101-102. The memorandum reads in relevant part: “K. Vinitor Ref lined Admittance “1. A visitor may be denied a visit at any time if one or more of the following exists or there are reasonable grounds to believe that: “a. The visitor’s presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the safety and security of the institution or would interfere with the orderly operation of the institution, including, but not limited to: “(1) The visitor has a past record of disruptive conduct. “(2) The visitor is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. “(3) The visitor refuses to submit to search or show proper identification upon request. “(4) The visitor is directly related to the inmate’s criminal behavior. “(5) The visit will be detrimental to the inmate’s rehabilitation. “(6) The visitor is a former resident currently on parole who does not have the approval of his Parole Officer or the Warden. “(7) The visitor is a former resident who has left by maximum expiration of sentence and does not have the prior approval of the Warden. “(8) The visitor has previously violated institutional visiting policies. “(9) Former employees of the Kentucky State Reformatory will not be allowed to visit inmates unless they have authorization from the Warden prior to the time of the visit. “2. A master log will be kept at the Visiting Desk of all visitors who have been denied a visit for any of the reasons listed above. A visitor who is denied a visit will not be allowed to visit an inmate for up to six (6) months following the incident. Persons who bring dangerous drugs or contraband into the institution may be denied visits indefinitely, until permission is granted by the Warden. The Duty Officer has the responsibility of denying a visit for the above reasons. “a. The master log will be furnished to all institutions and updated as required. “3. Any time a staff member feels a visitor should not be allowed admittance for any of the reasons above, the Shift Supervisor and the Duty Officer shall be notified. The final decision will be with the Duty Officer. All decisions will be documented. If it is felt that the individual presents a serious threat of danger to himself or others the Kentucky State Police will be advised of the situation so they may make a decision on whether their intervention is needed.” Kentucky State Reformatory Procedures Memorandum, No. KSR 16-00-01 (issued and effective Sept. 30, 1985); App. 132-134. Petitioners and their amici urge us to adopt a rule that prison regulations, regardless of the mandatory character of their language or the extent to which they limit official discretion, “do not create an entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause when they do not affect the duration or release from confinement, or the very nature of confinement.” See Brief for Petitioners 10. They argue that this bright line would allow prison officials to issue guidelines to prison staff to govern minor decisions, without thereby transforming the details of prison life into “liberty interests” with accompanying procedural rights. Inasmuch as a “bright line" of this kind is not necessary for a ruling in favor of petitioners, we refrain from considering it at this time. We express no view on the proposal and leave its resolution for another day. It should be obvious that the mandatory language requirement is not an invitation to courts to search regulations for any imperative that might be found. The search is for relevant mandatory language that expressly requires the decisionmaker to apply certain substantive predicates in determining whether an inmate may be deprived of the particular interest in question. Thus, one of the examples of mandatory language relied upon by the Court of Appeals is unavailing, that is, the statement that an inmate “is allowed three (3) separate visits in the Visiting Building per week.” App. 108. This directive says nothing about whether any particular visitor must be admitted, and thus has no direct relevance to the decision whether to exclude a particular visitor, which is what is at issue here. Another example of irrelevant mandatory language is the following: “A visitor who is denied a visit will not be allowed to visit an inmate for up to six (6) months following the incident.” (Emphasis added.) See n. 2, supra. This language refers only to the penalty to be imposed once an individual is found to be unfit to visit, and has no role to play in guiding prison officials’ discretion in deciding whether to exclude a visitor in the first instance. The language of the consent decree, that “[defendants shall continue their open visiting policy,” is mandatory only to the extent that it prevents the State from making its regulations more restrictive than they were at the time the decree was entered. Obviously, the promise to leave unchanged a discretionary policy does not transform that policy into a mandatory one. The District Court found that the regulations enacted after the decree was signed were no more restrictive than those already in place. App. 147. For this reason, we need make no judgment as to whether a consent decree can create a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue was not briefed or argued by the parties or discussed below and is not necessary to our decision.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ESTELLE, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, et al. v. GAMBLE No. 75-929. Argued October 5, 1976 Decided November 30, 1976 Bert W. Pluymen, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioners pro hac vice. With him on the brief were John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Joe B. Dibrell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General. Daniel K. Hedges, by appointment of the Court, 425 U. S. 932, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent pro hac vice. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent J. W. Gamble, an inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections, was injured on November 9, 1973, while performing a prison work assignment. On February 11, 1974, he instituted this civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, complaining of the treatment he received after the injury. Named as defendants were the petitioners, W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director of the Department of Corrections, H. H. Husbands, warden of the prison, and Dr. Ralph Gray, medical director of the Department and chief medical officer of the prison hospital. The District Court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the complaint. 516 F. 2d 937 (CA5 1975). We granted certiorari, 424 U. S. 907 (1976). I Because the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, we must take as true its handwritten, pro se allegations. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964). According to the complaint, Gamble was injured on November 9, 1973, when a bale of cotton fell on him while he was unloading a truck. He continued to work but after four hours he became stiff and was granted a pass to the unit hospital. At the hospital a medical assistant, “Captain” Blunt, checked him for a hernia and sent him back to his cell. Within two hours the pain became so intense that Gamble returned to the hospital where he was given pain pills by an inmate nurse and then was examined by a doctor. The following day, Gamble saw a Dr. Astone who diagnosed the injury as a lower back strain, prescribed Zactirin (a pain reliever) and Robaxin (a muscle relaxant), and placed respondent on “cell-pass, cell-feed” status for two days, allowing him to remain in his cell at all times except for showers. On November 12, Gamble again saw Dr. Astone who continued the medication and cell-pass, cell-feed for another seven days. He also ordered that respondent be moved from an upper to a lower bunk for one week, but the prison authorities did not comply with that directive. The following week, Gamble returned to Dr. Astone. The doctor continued the muscle relaxant but prescribed a new pain reliever, Febridyne, and placed respondent on cell-pass for seven days, permitting him to remain in his cell except for meals and showers. On November 26, respondent again saw Dr. Astone, who put respondent back on the original pain reliever for five days and continued the cell-pass for another week. On December 3, despite Gamble's statement that his back hurt as much as it had the first day, Dr. Astone took him off cell-pass, thereby certifying him to be capable of light work. At the same time, Dr. Astone prescribed Febridyne for seven days. Gamble then went to a Major Muddox and told him that he was in too much pain to work. Muddox had respondent moved to “administrative segregation.” On December 5, Gamble wa,s taken before the prison disciplinary committee, apparently because of his refusal to work. When the committee heard his complaint of back pain 'and high blood pressure, it directed that he be seen by another doctor. On December 6, respondent saw petitioner Gray, who performed a urinalysis, blood test, and blood pressure measurement. Dr. Gray prescribed the drug Ser-Ap-Es for the high blood pressure and more Febridyne for the back pain. The following week respondent again saw Dr. Gray, who continued the Ser-Ap-Es for an additional 30 days. The prescription was not filled for four days, however, because the staff lost it. Respondent went to the unit hospital twice more in December; both times he was seen by Captain Blunt, who prescribed Tiognolos (described as a muscle relaxant). For all of December, respondent remained in administrative segregation. In early January, Gamble was told on two occasions that he would be sent to the “farm” if he did not return to work. He refused, nonetheless, claiming to be in too much pain. On January 7, 1974, he requested to go on sick call for his back pain and migraine headaches. After an initial refusal, he saw Captain Blunt who prescribed sodium salicylate (a pain reliever) for seven days and Ser-Ap-Es for 30 days. Respondent returned to Captain Blunt on January 17 and January 25, and received renewals of the pain reliever prescription both times. Throughout the month, respondent was kept in administrative segregation. On January 31, Gamble was brought before the prison disciplinary committee for his refusal to work in early January. He told the committee that he could not work because of his severe back pain and his high blood pressure. Captain Blunt testified that Gamble was in “first class” medical condition. The committee, with no further medical examination or testimony, placed respondent in solitary confinement. Four days later, on February 4, at 8 a. m., respondent asked to see a doctor for chest pains and “blank outs.” It was not until 7:30 that night that a medical assistant examined him and ordered him hospitalized. The following day a Dr. Heaton performed an electrocardiogram; one day later respondent was placed on Quinidine for treatment of irregular cardiac rhythm and moved to administrative segregation. On February 7, respondent again experienced pain in his chest, left arm, and back and asked to see a doctor. The guards refused. He asked again the next day. The guards again refused. Finally, on February 9, he was allowed to see Dr. Heaton, who ordered the Quinidine continued for three more days. On February 11, he swore out his complaint. II The gravamen of respondent’s § 1983 complaint is that petitioners have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. See Robinson v. Califor nia, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). We therefore base our evaluation of respondent’s complaint on those Amendments and our decisions interpreting them. The history of the constitutional prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” has been recounted at length in prior opinions of the Court and need not be repeated here. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 169-173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ. (hereinafter joint opinion)); see also Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969). It suffices to note that the primary concern of the drafters was to proscribe “torture [s] ” and other “bar-bar[ous]” methods of punishment. Id., at 842. Accordingly, this Court first applied the Eighth Amendment by comparing challenged methods of execution to concededly inhuman techniques of punishment. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 136 (1879) (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment . . .”); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447 (1890) (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . .”). Our more recent cases, however, have held that the Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 171 (joint opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910). The Amendment embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,” Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571, 579 (CA8 1968), against which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus, we have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 101; see also Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 172-173 (joint opinion); Weems v. United States, supra, at 378, or which “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 (joint opinion); see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 463 (1947); Wilkerson v. Utah, supra, at 136. These elementary principles establish the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical “torture or a lingering death,” In re Kemmler, supra, the evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment. In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 182-183 (joint opinion). The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codifying the eommonlaw view that “it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.” We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 (joint opinion), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardess of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983. This conclusion does not mean, however, that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. An accident, although it may produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain. In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947), for example, the Court concluded that it was not unconstitutional to force a prisoner to undergo a second effort to electrocute him after a mechanical malfunction had thwarted the first attempt. Writing for the plurality, Mr. Justice Reed reasoned that the second execution would not violate the Eighth Amendment because the first attempt was an “unforeseeable accident.” Id., at 464. Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence, based solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluded that since the first attempt had failed because of “an innocent misadventure,” id., at 470, the second would not be “ ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind,’ ” id., at 471, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 323 (1937). Similarly, in the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or to be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ill Against this backdrop, we now consider whether respondent’s complaint states a cognizable § 1983 claim. The handwritten pro se document is to be liberally construed. As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears “ 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Even applying these liberal standards, however, Gamble’s claims against Dr. Gray, both in his capacity as treating physician and as medical director of the Corrections Department, are not cognizable under § 1983. Gamble was seen by medical personnel on 17 occasions spanning a three-month period: by Dr. Astone five times; by Dr. Gray twice; by Dr. Heaton three times; by an unidentified doctor and inmate nurse on the day of the injury; and by medical assistant Blunt six times. They treated his back injury, high blood pressure, and heart problems. Gamble has disclaimed any objection to the treatment provided for his high blood pressure and his heart problem; his complaint is “based solely on the lack of diagnosis and inadequate treatment of his back injury.” Response to Pet. for Cert. 4; see also Brief for Respondent 19. The doctors diagnosed his injury as a lower back strain and treated it with bed rest, muscle relaxants, and pain relievers. Respondent contends that more should have been done by way of diagnosis and treatment, and suggests a number of options that were not pursued. Id., at 17, 19. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating: “Certainly an X-ray of [Gamble’s] lower back might have been in order and other tests conducted that would have led to appropriate diagnosis and treatment for the daily pain and suffering he was experiencing.” 516 F. 2d, at 941. But the question whether an X-ray — or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment — is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment. At most it is medical malpractice, and as such the proper forum is the state court under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals was in error in holding that the alleged insufficiency of the medical treatment required reversal and remand. That portion of the judgment of the District Court should have been affirmed. The Court of Appeals focused primarily on the alleged actions of the doctors, and did not separately consider whether the allegations against the Director of the Department of Corrections, Estelle, and the warden of the prison, Husbands, stated a cause of action. Although we reverse the judgment as to the medical director, we remand the case to the Court of Appeals to allow it an opportunity to consider, in conformity with this opinion, whether a cause of action has been stated against the other prison officials. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Blackmun concurs in the judgment of the Court. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” It appears that the petitioner-defendants were not even aware of the suit until it reached the Court of Appeals. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 13-15. This probably resulted because the District Court dismissed the complaint simultaneously with granting leave to file it in forma pauperis. His complaint states that the bale weighed “6.00 pound.” The Court of Appeals interpreted this to mean 600 pounds. 516 F. 2d 937, 938 (CA5 1975). The names and descriptions of the drugs administered to respondent are taken from his complaint. App. A-5 — A-11, and his brief, at 19-20. There are a number of terms in the complaint whose meaning is unclear and, with no answer from the State, must remain so. For example, “administrative segregation” is never defined. The Court of Appeals deemed it the equivalent of solitary confinement. 516 F. 2d, at 939. We note, however, that Gamble stated he was in “administrative segregation” when he was in the “32A-7 five building” and “32A20 five building,” but when he was in “solitary confinement,” he was in “3102 five building.” The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” At oral argument, counsel for respondent agreed that his only claim was based on the Eighth Amendment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43. The Amendment also proscribes punishments grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367 (1910), and it imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished, Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). Neither of these principles is involved here. See, e. g., Ala. Code Tit. 45, § 125 (1958); Alaska Stat. § 33.30.050 (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-201.01 (Supp. 1975); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 18-7 (1975); Ga. Code Ann. § 77-309 (e) (1973); Idaho Code § 20-209 (Supp. 1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, § 103-2 (1970); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 11-1-1.1-30.5 (1973); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-5429 (Supp. 1975); Md. Ann. Code Art. 27 § 698 (1976); Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 127, §90A (1974); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.84 (1969); Miss. Code Ann. §47-1-57 (1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. §221.120 (1962); Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-181 (1971); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 619.9 (1974); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 42-2-4 (1972); Tenn. Code Ann. §§41-318, 41-1115, 41-1226 (1975); Utah Code Ann. §§ 64-9-13, 64-9-19, 64-9-20, 64-9-53 (1968); Va. Code Ann.. §§32-81, 32-82 (1973); W. Va. Code Ann. §25-1-16 (Supp. 1976); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-299 (1959). Many States have also adopted regulations which specify, in varying degrees of detail, the standards of medical care to be provided to prisoners. See Comment, The Rights of Prisoners to Medical Care and the Implications for Drug-Dependent Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 705, 708-709 (1975). Model correctional legislation and proposed minimum standards are all in accord. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §§ 303.4, 304.5 (1962); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Standards on Rights of Offenders, Standard 2.6 (1973); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, § 1 (b) (1972); National Sheriffs’ Association, Standards for Inmates’ Legal Rights, Right No. 3 (1974); Fourth United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Rules 22-26 (1955). The foregoing may all be found in U. S. Dept, of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Compendium of Model Correctional Legislation and Standards (2d ed. 1975). Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N. C. 487, 490, 132 S. E. 291, 293 (1926). See, e. g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. 2d 541 (CA2 1974) (doctor’s choosing the “easier and less efficacious treatment” of throwing away the prisoner’s ear and stitching the stump may be attributable to “deliberate indifference . . . rather than an exercise of professional judgment”); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U. S. 879 (1974) (injection of penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction) ; Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 1973) (refusal of paramedic to provide treatment); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 983 (1971) (prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon). See, e. g., Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F. 2d 857 (CA6 1976); Thomas v. Pate, supra, at 158-159; Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F. 2d 1072 (CA6 1972); Hutchens v. Alabama, 466 F. 2d 507 (CA5 1972); Riley v. Rhay, 407 F. 2d 496 (CA9 1969); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F. 2d 993 (CA4 1966); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F. 2d 495 (CA5 1961). See, e. g., Wilbron v. Hutto, 509 F. 2d 621, 622 (CA8 1975); Campbell v. Beto, 460 F. 2d 765 (CA5 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, supra; Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F. 2d 625 (CA9 1970); Edwards v. Duncan, supra. He noted, however, that “a series of abortive attempts” or “a single, cruelly willful attempt” would present a different case. 329 U. S., at 471. The Courts of Appeals are in essential agreement with this standard. All agree that mere allegations of malpractice do not state a claim, and, while their terminology regarding what is sufficient varies, their results are not inconsistent with the standard of deliberate indifference. See Page v. Sharpe, 487 F. 2d 567, 569 (CA1 1973); Williams v. Vincent, supra, at 544 (uses the phrase “deliberate indifference”); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F. 2d 1, 6 (CA3 1970); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F. 2d 318 (CA4 1975); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F. 2d 1320, 1330 n. 14 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 948 (1975) (“callous indifference”); Westlake v. Lucas, supra, at 860 (“deliberate indifference”); Thomas v. Pate, supra, at 158; Wilbron v. Hutto, supra, at 622 (“deliberate indifference”); Tolbert v. Eyman, supra, at 626; Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F. 2d 877, 881-882 (CA10 1974). Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 6252-19, §3 (Supp. 1976). Petitioners assured tbe Court at argument that this statute can be used by prisoners to assert malpractice claims. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Contrary to Mr. Justice Stevens’ assertion in dissent, this case signals no retreat from Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972). In contrast to the general allegations in Haines, Gamble’s complaint provides a detailed factual accounting of the treatment he received. By his exhaustive description he renders speculation unnecessary. It is apparent from his complaint that he received extensive medical care and that the doctors were not indifferent to his needs.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARLESON, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE, et al. v. REMILLARD et al. No. 70-250. Argued April 10, 1972 Decided June 7, 1972 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 604. Jay S. Linderman, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General. Carmen L. Massey, by appointment of the Court, 405 U. S. 951, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees pro hac vice. Solicitor General Griswold and Richard B. Stone filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellees are mother and child. The husband enlisted in the United States Army and served in Vietnam. The mother applied for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits at a time when the amount of the monthly allotment she received by virtue of her husband's military service was less than her “need” as computed by the California agency and less than the monthly AFDC grant an adult with one child receives in California. She was denied relief. Although the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 301-1394, grants aid to families with “dependent children,” and includes in the term “dependent child” one “who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of . . . continued absence from the home,” 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a), California construed “continued absence” as not including military absence. It is unquestioned that her child is in fact “needy.” When the husband's allotment check was stopped, ap-pellee again applied for AFDC benefits. She again was denied the benefits, this time because California had adopted a regulation which specifically prohibited the payment of AFDC benefits to needy families where the absence of a parent was due to military service. This action is a class action seeking a declaration of the invalidity of the regulation and an injunction restraining its enforcement on the ground that it conflicts with the Social Security Act and denies appellees the Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection. “When one parent is physically absent from the home on a temporary basis. Examples are visits, trips made in connection with current or prospective employment, active duty in the Armed Services.” A three-judge District Court was convened and by a divided vote granted the relief sought. 325 F. Supp. 1272. The case is here by appeal. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2101 (b). We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U. S. 1013. Section 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10), places on each State participating in the AFDC program the requirement that “aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” “Eligibility,” so defined, must be measured by federal standards. King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309. There, we were faced with an Alabama regulation which defined a mother’s paramour as a “parent” for § 606 (a)(1) purposes, thus permitting the State to deny AFDC benefits to needy dependent children on the theory that there was no parent who was continually absent from the home. We held that Congress had defined “parent” as a breadwinner who was legally obligated to support his children, and that Alabama was precluded from altering that federal standard. The importance of our holding was stressed in Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286: “King v. Smith establishes that, at least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Townsend, we also expressly disapproved the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) policy which permitted States to vary eligibility requirements from the federal standards without express or clearly implied congressional authorization. Ibid. Townsend involved § 406 (a) (2) (B) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §606 (a)(2)(B), which includes in the definition of “dependent children” those “under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary [of HEW]) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment.” Illinois had defined AFDC eligible dependent children to include 18-20-year-old high school or vocational school children but not children of the same age group attending college. We held that § 606 (a) (2) (B) precluded that classification because it varied from the federal standard for needy dependent children. Involved in the present controversy is another eligibility criterion for federal matching funds set forth in the Act, namely the “continued absence” of a parent from the home. If California’s definition conflicts with the federal criterion then it, too, is invalid under the Supremacy Clause. HEW’s regulations for federal matching funds provide that: “Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for deprivation of parental support or care when the parent is out of the home, the nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent’s functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the child, and the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on the parent’s performance of his function in planning for the present support or care of the child. If these conditions exist, the parent may be absent for any reason, and he may have left only recently or some time previously.” The Solicitor General advises us that although HEW reads the term “continued absence” to permit the payment of federal matching funds to families where the parental absence is due to military service, it has approved state plans under which families in this category are not eligible for AFDC benefits. HEW has included “service in the armed forces or other military service” as an example of a situation falling under the above definition of “continued absence.” HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 3422.2. Our difficulty with that position is that “continued absence from the home” accurately describes a parent on active military duty. The House Report speaks of children “in families lacking a father’s support,” H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10, and the Senate Report refers to “children in families which have been deprived of a father’s support.” S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17. While the Senate Report noted that “[t]hese are principally families with female heads who are widowed, divorced, or deserted,” ibid., it was not stated or implied that eligibility by virtue of a parent’s “continued absence” was limited to cases of divorce or desertion. We agree that “continued absence” connotes, as HEW says, that “the parent may be absent for any reason.” We search the Act in vain, moreover, for any authority to make “continued absence” into an accordion-like concept, applicable to some parents because of “continued absence” but not to others. The presence in the home of the parent who has the legal obligation to support is the key to the AFDC program, King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 327; Lewis v. Martin, 397 U. S. 552, 559. Congress looked to “work relief” programs and “the revival of private industry” to help the parent find the work needed to support the family. S. Rep. No. 628, supra, at 17, and the AFDC program was designed to meet a need unmet by depression-era programs aimed at providing work for breadwinners. King v. Smith, supra, at 328. That need was the protection of children in homes without such a breadwinner. Ibid. It is clear that “military orphans” are in this category, for, as stated by the Supreme Court of Washington, a man in the military service “has little control over his family's economic destiny. He has no labor union or other agency to look to as a means of persuading his employer to pay him a living wage. He is without access to collective bargaining or any negotiating forum or other means of economic persuasion, or even the informal but concerted support of his fellow employees. He cannot quit his job and seek a better paying one. . . . [TJhere is no action he could lawfully take to make his earnings adequate while putting in full time on his job. His was a kind of involuntary employment where legally he could do virtually nothing to improve the economic welfare of his family.” Kennedy v. Dept. of Public Assistance, 79 Wash. 2d 728, 732-733, 489 P. 2d 154, 157. Stoddard v. Fisher, 330 F. Supp. 566, held a Maine regulation invalid under the Supremacy Clause which denied AFDC aid where the father was continually absent because of his military service. Judge Coffin said: “We cannot help but note the irony of a result which would deny assistance to the family of a man who finds that family disqualified from receiving AFDC on the ground that he has removed himself from the possibility of receiving public work relief by voluntarily undertaking, for inadequate compensation, the defense of his country.” Id., at 571 n. 8. We cannot assume here, anymore than we could in King v. Smith, supra, that while Congress “intended to provide programs for the economic security and protection of all children,” it also “intended arbitrarily to leave one class of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection.” 392 U. S., at 330. We are especially confident Congress could not have designed an Act leaving uncared for an entire class who became “needy children” because their fathers were in the Armed Services defending their country. We hold that there is no congressional authorization for States to exclude these so-called military orphans from AFDC benefits. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the three-judge court. Affirmed. Calif. Dept. Soc. Welfare Reg. EAS § 42-350.11 provides that “continued absence” does not exist: 45 CFR §233.90 (c)(1) (iii). The present record reveals that 22 States and the District of Columbia do furnish AFDC benefits to needy families of servicemen, while 19 States and Puerto Rico do not.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ORTWEIN et al. v. SCHWAB et al. No. 72-5431. Decided March 5, 1973 Per Curiam. Appellants contend that Oregon’s $25 appellate court filing fee, as applied in this case, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and, also, the First Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth. The Supreme Court of Oregon decided otherwise. 262 Ore. 375, 498 P. 2d 757 (1972). We affirm that decision for reasons we found persuasive in United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973). Appellant Ortwein (who also was receiving social security and an urban renewal allowance) sustained a reduction of approximately $39 per month in his Oregon old-age assistance when his county welfare agency determined that he shared shelter and expenses with another person in a manner that relieved him of some of the costs upon which his original award had been based. Ortwein appealed to the Oregon Public Welfare Division. The Division conducted a hearing and upheld the county agency’s decision. Appellant Faubion claimed that certain expenses related to work training under a federal program should have been deducted in calculating her income. Most of these deductions were disallowed, after hearing, by the Public Welfare Division. The disallowance resulted in smaller welfare payments to Faubion over a five-month period. Judicial review of these agency decisions is authorized under state law. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 183.480 (1971). In cases that are contested, as these were, jurisdiction for judicial review is conferred upon the Oregon Court of Appeals. § 183.480 (2). All appellants in civil cases in Oregon pay a $25 filing fee in appellate courts. §§ 21.010 and 21.040 (1971). Each of the present appellants alleged that he was an indigent unable to pay the filing fee; each moved to proceed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. The motions were denied without opinions. Appellants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the Court of Appeals to accept appellants’ cases without payment of fees. The Supreme Court of Oregon requested supplemental briefs and then issued its opinion denying the petition for mandamus. 262 Ore. 375, 498 P. 2d 757 (1972). From this denial the present appeal is taken. I Relying on this Court’s opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), and on the remand-for-reconsideration order in Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U. S. 937 (1971), appellants contend that the Oregon appellate filing fee, when applied to indigents seeking to appeal an adverse welfare decision, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973), this Court upheld statutorily imposed bankruptcy filing fees against a constitutional challenge based on Boddie. We emphasized the special nature of the marital relationship and its concomitant associational interests, and noted that they were not affected in that case and that the objective sought by appellant Kras could be obtained through alternative means that did not require a fee. Boddie, of course, was not concerned with post-hearing review. We now conclude that Kras, rather than Boddie, governs the present appeal, and we emphasize that Frederick was remanded, and not summarily reversed. A. In Kras, we observed that one’s interest in a bankruptcy discharge “does not rise to the same constitutional level” as one’s inability to dissolve his marriage except through the courts. 409 U. S., at 445. In this case, appellants seek increased welfare payments. This interest, like that of Kras, has far less constitutional significance than the interest of the Boddie appellants. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971), with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). Each of the present appellants has received an agency hearing at which it was determined that the minimum level of payments authorized by law was being provided. As in Kras, we see “no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending on the availability” of the relief sought by appellants. 409 U. S., at 445. B. In Kras, the Court also stressed the existence of alternatives, not conditioned on the payment of the fees, to the judicial remedy. Id., at 446. The Court has held that procedural due process requires that a welfare recipient be given a pretermination evidentiary hearing. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264, 266-271 (1970). These appellants have had hearings. The hearings provide a procedure, not conditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants have been able to seek redress. This Court has long recognized that, even in criminal cases, due process does not require a State to provide an appellate system. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894); see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 627 (1937); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 77 (1972). Under the facts of this case, appellants were not denied due process. II Appellants urge that the filing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally discriminating against the poor. As in Kras, this litigation, which deals with welfare payments, “is in the area of economics and social welfare.” 409 U. S., at 446; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485-486. No suspect classification, such as race, nationality, or alienage, is present. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). The applicable standard is that of rational justification. United States v. Kras, supra. The purpose of the filing fee, as with the bankruptcy fees in Kras, is apparent. The Oregon court system incurs operating costs, and the fee produces some small revenue to assist in offsetting those expenses. Cf. Ore. Rev. Stat. § 21.590 (1971). Appellants do not contend that the fee is disproportionate or that it is not an effective means to accomplish the State’s goal. The requirement of rationality is met. III Relying on Lindsey v. Normet, supra, appellants contend that the fee is not required of certain classes of litigants, and that an appeal is thus “capriciously and arbitrarily denied” to other appellants, such as themselves, also in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See 405 U. S., at 77. They assert that criminal appeals, habeas corpus petitions from state institutions or civil commitment proceedings, and appeals from terminations of parental rights may be filed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals. Jurisdictional Statement 23. We are not told just why these filings are permitted, but the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon makes it clear that in forma pauperis appeals are allowed only if supervening law requires a right to a free appeal. 262 Ore., at 384, 498 P. 2d, at 761-762. If the Oregon courts have interpreted the applicable law to give special rights in the criminal area, in civil cases that result in loss of liberty, and in cases terminating parental rights, we cannot say that this categorization is capricious or arbitrary. A ,7 Affirmed. The Division found that the county agency “acted within its discretion by determining that the claimant’s living arrangement represented a living situation in which shelter and expenses are shared.” The agency’s order explained that that reduction in the room and board allowance was proper because “[t]he eligibility of recipients who share shelter with non-recipients, and do not pay for room and board, shall be determined on a share/fraction basis at [Public Welfare Division] standards.” Record 9. In his petition for review, Ortwein contended that the order was not supported by “reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the whole record.” Faubion received an incentive training allowance of $120 per month for approximately five months from a program under the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended, 76 Stat. 23, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2571-2574. Record 12. Faubion also was receiving over $210 per month through a state-administered AFDC program. Jurisdictional Statement 4; Record 11. States, in making their income calculations under AFDC, deduct from gross income all expenses “reasonably attributable” to the earning of the income. 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (7); 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (iv) (Sept. 1972). Faubion claimed that she had work-training expenses of $20 per month for essential clothing and grooming, of $20 per month for lunches on the job, of $30 per month for convenience foods for family use made necessary because of her job, of $5 per month for oil, tuneups and repairs, and of $5 per month for miscellaneous school supplies. Record 13. Although the Division allowed some deductions, it determined that the remaining expenses were not “reasonably attributable” to the training program. Record 12. On appeal, Faubion sought to challenge this finding. See also Huffman v. Boersen, 406 U. S. 337 (1972). These evidentiary hearings, of course, must meet the minimal requirements of due process. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 266-271 (1970). Appellants have alleged that the hearings were deficient in several ways, Jurisdictional Statement 9-10, but neither the record nor the opinion of the Oregon court provides support for these contentions. Appellants also claim a violation of their First Amendment right to petition for redress. Our discussion of the Due Process Clause, however, demonstrates that appellants’ rights under the First Amendment have been fully satisfied.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOBER et al., EXECUTORS, v. UNITED STATES. No. 30. Argued October 16, 1953. Decided November 9, 1953. David Stock argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Charles K. Rice argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson, Marvin E. Frankel and Elizabeth B. Davis. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action for an estate tax refund brought by the executors of the estate of Morris Lober. In 1924 he signed an instrument conveying to himself as trustee money and stocks for the benefit of his young son. In 1929 he executed two other instruments, one for the benefit of a daughter, the other for a second son. The terms of these three instruments were the same. Lober was to handle the funds, invest and reinvest them as he deemed proper. He could accumulate and reinvest the income with the same freedom until his children reached twenty-one years of age. When twenty-one they were to be paid the accumulated income. Lober could hold the principal of each trust until the beneficiary reached twenty-five. In case he died his wife was to be trustee with the same broad powers Lober had conveyed to himself. The trusts were declared to be irrevocable, and as the case reaches us we may assume that the trust instruments gave Lober’s children a “vested interest” under state law, so that if they had died after creation of the trusts their interests would have passed to their estates. A crucial term of the trust instruments was that Lober could at any time he saw fit turn all or any part of the principal of the trusts over to his children. Thus he could at will reduce the principal or pay it all to the beneficiaries, thereby terminating any trusteeship over it. Lober died in 1942. By that time the trust property was valued at more than $125,000. The Internal Revenue Commissioner treated this as Lober’s property and included it in his gross estate. That inclusion brought this lawsuit. The Commissioner relied on §811 (d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 811 (1946 ed.). That section, so far as material here, required inclusion in a decedent’s gross estate of the value of all property that the decedent had previously transferred by trust “where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his' death to any change through the exercise of a power ... to alter, amend, or revoke In Commissioner v. Holmes, 326 U. S. 480, we held that power to terminate was the equivalent of power to “alter, amend, or revoke” it, and we approved taxation of the Holmes estate on that basis. Relying on the Holmes case, the Court of Claims upheld inclusion of these trust properties in Lober’s estate. 124 Ct. Cl. 44, 108 F. Supp. 731. This was done despite the assumption that the trust conveyances gave the Lober children an indefeasible “vested interest” in the properties conveyed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had reached a contrary result where the circumstances were substantially the same, in Hays’ Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F. 2d 169, 172-174. Because of this conflict, we granted certiorari. 345 U. S. 969. Petitioners stress a factual difference between this and the Holmes case. The Holmes trust instrument provided that if a beneficiary died before expiration of the trust his children succeeded to his interest, but if he died without children, his interest would pass to his brothers or their children. Thus the trustee had power to eliminate a contingency that might have prevented passage of a beneficiary’s interest to his heirs. Here we assume that upon death of the Lober beneficiaries their part in the trust estate would, under New York law, pass to their heirs. But we cannot agree that this difference should change the Holmes result. We pointed out in the Holmes case that § 811 (d) (2) was more concerned with “present economic benefit” than with “technical vesting of title or estates.” And the Lober beneficiaries, like the Holmes beneficiaries, were granted no “present right to immediate enjoyment of either income or principal.” The trust instrument here gave none of Lober’s children full “enjoyment” of the trust property, whether it “vested” in them or not. To get this full enjoyment they had to wait until they reached the age of twenty-five unless their father sooner gave them the money and stocks by terminating the trust under the power of change he kept to the very date of his death. This father could have given property to his children without reserving in himself any power to change the terms as to the date his gift would be wholly effective, but he did not. What we said in the Holmes case fits this situation too: “A donor who keeps so strong a hold over the actual and immediate enjoyment of what he puts beyond his own power to retake has not divested himself of that degree of control which §811 (d)(2) requires in order to avoid the tax.” Commissioner v. Holmes, supra, at 487. Affirmed. Me. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Jackson dissent.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GASTELUM-QUINONES v. KENNEDY, ATTORNEY GENERAL. Nos. 39 and 293. Argued March 19, 1963. Decided June 17, 1963. David Rein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Joseph Forer. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondent- With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox,- Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, stripped of its procedural complexities, raises the question whether an alien long resident in this country is deportable-because, for a period during 1949 and 1950, he paid' dues to and attended several meetings of a club of the Communist Party in Los Angeles. The Immigration and Naturalization Service sought and obtained an order for petitioner’s deportation on the ground that these facts established petitioner’s membership in the. Communist Party of the United States within the meaning of § 241 (a)(6)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 204-205, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(6)(C). Whether membership was so established turns on the application of- two decisions of this Court which construed the immediate predecessor of. §241 (a)(6)(C), § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 1006, 1008. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 528, it was held that deportability on the ground of Communist Party membership turns on whether the alien was “aware that he was joining an organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a distinct and active political organization . . . ,” and in Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115, 120, it was held, in elaboration of Galvan, that the alien must have had .a “meaningful association” with the Communist Party-in order to be deportable. The evidence, in the record-, to which the standards set forth in these decisions must be applied, was all elicited at hearings before the Service’s special inquiry officer in 1956. This evidence consists solely of the testimony of two government witnesses, petitioner having chosen to introduce no evidence. The special inquiry officer entered a deportation order against petitioner on February 28, 1957. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal on November 14, 1957, on the ground that the record established his voluntary membership in the Communist Party. A few weeks later, this Court decided Rowoldt v. Perfetto, supra, and petitioner asked the Board to reconsider its decision in light of the opinion in that case. The Board denied the application, pointing out that the record as it stood still supported the deportation order. It did, however, order a reopening of the proceedings before the special inquiry officer so that petitioner might have a chance to offer rebuttal testimony and thereby bring himself, possibly, within the framework of the Rowoldt decision. At the reopened hearing, however, petitioner’s counsel took the position that on the record as„ it stood the Government had failed to establish Communist Party membership in the sense contemplated by the Rowoldt decision, and therefore chose not to offer further evidence. The Government also offered no additional evidence. The special inquiry officer reaffirmed his previous decision and the Board of Immigration Appeals on May 18, 1959, dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner thereupon filed an action in Federal District Court for review of the deportation order. That court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 286 F. 2d 324, and this Court denied a petition for certiorari, 365 U. S. 871. Petitioner read the Court of Appeals’ opinion as suggesting that § 241 (a)(6)(C) would not have applied to him if he had introduced evidence that he had not personally advocated the forcible overthrow of the Government. He therefore moved before the Board of Immigration Appeals that the deportation hearing be reopened to permit him to introduce evidénce that he did not personally advocate the violent overthrow of the Government. The Board of Immigration Appeals heard oral argument on the motion and, on August 1,1961, denied it. Petitioner then brought the present action in the District Court, praying that the Board be ordered to reopen the deportation hearing and that the Attorney General and his agents be enjoined from enforcing the outstanding deportation order. A preliminary injunction to the latter effect was also requested. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction on August 14, 1961, and the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed this denial on September 13. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court to review the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, and The Chief Justice ordered deportation stayed until the petition should be disposed of. Meanwhile, summary judgment was granted the Government on the merits of petitioner’s complaint, which was thereupon dismissed, a disposition which was summarily affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 23, 1962. Petitioner filed an additional petition for certiorari to review this judgment. We granted both petitions. 371 U. S. 860. No. 39 involves the preliminary injunction, and No. 293 relates to the ultimate dismissal of petitioner’s complaint on the merits. In determining whether, on the record before us, the Government has fulfilled its burden of proving that petitioner was a “member” of the Communist Party of the United States within the meaning of § 241 (a) (6) (C), we. must recognize at the outset what the history of the times amply demonstrates, that some Americans have joined the Communist Party without understanding its nature as a distinct political entity. The Bowoldt decision, as well as other decisions of this Court, reflects that there is a great practical and legal difference between those who firmly attach themselves to the Communist Party being aware of all of the aims and purposes attributed to it, and those who temporarily join the Party, knowing nothing of its international relationships and believing it to be a group solely trying to remedy unsatisfactory social or economic conditions, carry out trade-union objectives, eliminate racial discrimination, combat unemployment, or alleviate distress and poverty. Although the Court specifically recognized in Galvan, supra, at 528, that “support, or even demonstrated knowledge, of the Communist Party’s advocacy of violence was not intended to be a prerequisite to deportation;” it did condition deportability on the alien’s awareness of the “distinct and active political” nature of the Communist Party,ibid. This, together with the requirement % “meaningful association” enunciated in Bowoldt, supra, at 120, led the Court to declare later that in Galvan and Bowoldt it had “had no difficulty in interpreting ‘membership’ . . . as meaning more than the mere voluntary listing of a person’s name on Party rolls.” Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 222. The operation in practice of this wise distinction is illustrated by Rowoldt, to which .we think the present case is analogous on its facts. In Rowoldt, the sole evidence in the record was Rowoldt’s statement to an inspector of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in the course of which he admitted voluntary membership but said nothing which indicated that he had been aware while a member that the Communist Party was a “distinct' and active political organization.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, concluded that “[f]rom his own testimony in 1947, which is all there is, the dominating impulse to his ‘affiliation’ with the Communist Party may well have been wholly devoid of any‘political’ implications.” 355 U. S., at 120. The Court therefore decided that the record was too insubstantial to support the order of deportation. The same is true here. The testimony of the two government witnesses establishes only that between either late 1948 or early 1949 and the end of 1950 or early 1951 petitioner was a dues-paying member of a club of the Communist Party in Los Angeles, and that he attended about 15 meetings of his Party club, one executive meeting of the group, apd one area Party convention. One witness, Scarletto, testified to having joined the Communist Party in Los Angeles in 1947 “under the supervision of the- F. B. I.” At a date which he did not recall, but which he thought was in late 1948 or early 1949, Scarletto was assigned to the El Sereno Club, which “was one of the large divisions [of the Communist Party] which was split up later.” There were “approximately 32 members in the El Sereno Club at that time,” and Scarletto was the press director of the club. Scarletto was only in the El Sereno Club for “a few months” when it “was split up into smaller units for security reasons.” During these few months, Scarletto testified, he was introduced to petitioner at an El Sereno Club meeting and saw him there one other time. Since attendance at club meetings was restricted to Communist Party members, Scarletto inferred that petitioner was a member of the Party. Scarletto was next assigned, some time in early 1949, to the Mexican Concentration Club, which, he testified, was also a unit of the Communist Party of the United States. Petitioner, he said, was put into the same new group. Scarletto shortly became organization secretary of this group, a job which, among other things, gave him the duty of collecting dues, and he testified that he collected dues from petitioner. Scarletto left the Concentration Club in early 1951, when he was transferred by the Party “to the underground.” Concentration Club meetings were held weekly. Petitioner, Scarletto testified, “just went once in awhile^ but he was a regular member.” Over the approximately two-year period of Scarletto’s membership in the Concentration Club, during which he attended “most” of its meetings, he testified that he saw petitioner at “about 15” meetings. All but “a couple” of these, he said, were restricted to Communist Party members. Although meetings were held in members’ homes, Scarletto did not recall any at petitioner’s home and said that he himself had never been in petitioner’s home. Scarletto did not remember whether petitioner ever held “an official position” in either the El Sereno Club or the Mexican Concentration Club. Finally, Scarletto, who attended Communist Party conventions in the Los Angeles area with some regularity, recalled seeing petitioner at one such convention. He said he himself attended these conventions in an official capacity, but did not know in what capacity petitioner attended, except that membership in the Party was a prerequisite to attendance. The-other witness, one Elorriaga, testified that he, too, joined the Communist Party in Los Angeles in 1947. He, too; was a member of the El Sereno Club, but did not meet petitioner until he was assigned to a smaller unit “known as the Forty-Fifth Concentration,” which apparently was the same entity as the “Mexican Concentration Club” discussed by Scarletto. Elorriaga did not recall petitioner as being a member of the El Sereno Club. Elorriaga’s testimony as to the frequency of petitioner’s attendance at Concentration Club meetings was contradictory. After having testified on direct examination that he saw petitioner at three or four meetings a month, Elorriaga radically revised his estimate the next day on redirect examination to say that he saw petitioner at “about two or three meetings” in total, adding that “I was present at one meeting in 1951 and another- in -1949 with . . . [petitioner].” The over-all lack of precision of Elorriaga’s answers to questions concerning petitioner' is also suggested by a comparison of his assertion that petitioner must have been an official of the club “because he attended a few [of its] executive meetings,” with his immediately following admission that he himself remembered being present at only one executive meeting with petitioner. The evidence contained in the record is thus extremely insubstantial in demonstrating the “meaningful.” character of petitioner’s association with the Party, either directly, by showing that he was, during the time of his membership, sensible to the Party’s nature as a political organization, or indirectly, by showing that he engaged in Party activities to a degree substantially supporting an inference of his awareness of the Party’s political aspect. In one sense, indeed, this record is even less substantial in support of the deportation order than was the record in Rowoldt, because, although Rowoldt stated that he joined thinking the Party’s aim was “to get something to eat for the people,” 355 U. S., at 117, it was also-true that he had worked as a salesman in a bookstore which was “an official outlet for communist literature,” id., at 118, and that he showed some awareness of Communist philosophy and tactics in response to questioning by the immigration inspector. Bearing in mind that the ultimate burden in deportation cases such as this is on the Government, it is apparent that- here, as in Rowoldt, there is insufficient evidence to support the deportation order. As against the slimness of the evidence that it introduced, the Government seeks the. benefit of an inference, based upon petitioner’s failure' to produce or elicit evidence in response to the Government’s proof that he paid dues to the Party and attended some meetings, that his association with the Party was “more than the mere voluntary listing of . . . [his] name on Party rolls.” Scales, supra, at 222. It is a sufficient answer to the Government’s argument to point out that, as recognized in Galvan, supra, at 530, and Rowoldt, supra, at 120, deportation is a drastic sanction,' one which can destroy lives and disrupt families, and that a holding of deportability must therefore be premised upon evidence of “meaningful association” more directly probative than a mere inference based upon the alien’s silence. Moreover, the fact is that the Government might well have asked its two witnesses about petitioner’s knowledge of the Party as a political entity and about the qualitative nature of petitioner’s activities in the Party. If it were the fact that petitioner was more aware of the Party’s nature than this.record shows, the Government’s witnesses could likely have given testimony, either about petitioner’s knowledge or about his Party activities, which would have tended- to prove that awareness. With the facts concerning the nature of petitioner’s association perhaps near at hand, and in light of both the possibility that those facts would not be consistent with a finding of “meaningful association” and the harshness of the deportation sanction, we cannot sustain petitioner’s deportation upon a bare inference which the Government would have us derive from petitioner’s failure to introduce evidence in response to the Government’s proof of his dues-paying membership and sometime attendance at Party meetings. We are hence confronted with a case in which the Government did not sustain its burden of establishing that petitioner was a meaningful member of the Party as contemplated by § 241 (a)(6)(C). To paraphrase the holding of Rowoldt, supra, at 120: from the testimony of the two government witnesses, which is all there is, the dominating impulse to petitioner’s affiliation with the Communist Party may well have been wholly devoid of any “political” implications. We hold that, on the record before us, the deportation order against petitioner is not supported by substantial evidence, Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, and therefore cannot stand. Judgment reversed. “(a) Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who— . . . . . “(6) is or at any time has been after entry, a member of any of the following classes of aliens: . . . . . “(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Com-' munist Party of the United States . . . .” There is no dispute'before this Court, nor .could there be, that under Galvan, supra, at 528, the absence of personal advocacy of violent Overthrow is not by itself a bar to deportability under § 241 (a)(6) (C). See pp. 473-474, infra. See, e. g., Aaron, Writers on the Left (1961), 149-160; Decter, The Profile of Communism (1961), 50-51; Ernst and Loth, Report on the American Communist (1952), passim; Glazer, The Social Basis of American Communism (1961), 115 and passim. Compare Yates v. United. States, 354 U. S. 298, 327-333; Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 222-223, 230-255; Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290. Elorriaga’s testimony on direct examination was as follows: “Q. Now you say you met him in meetings of that club, how often would you say you saw the respondent in meetings of that club? “A. How often, about maybe three or four meetings a month.” One possible explanation of the apparent contradiction. is that Elorriaga understood the question on direct examination as merely an inquiry into how often club meetings were held, and answered accordingly. This is borne out to some extent by the fact that the witness gave his “revised” answer to the question on two separate occasions, some minutes apart, during the redirect examination. Since some activities may be engaged in without-the requisite awareness, satisfaction of the Government’s burden as to the ultimate fact of “meaningful association” by evidence of activities instead of by direct evidence of awareness of the Party’s “distinct and active political” nature must be based upon evidence of activities sufficient to give substantial support to an inference of the alien’s awareness of the Party’s political aspect. The sole aspect of the witness Scarletto’s testimony which might have implied that petitioner’s association with the Party was “meaningful” was his reference to having seen petitioner at one Los Angeles area convention of the Party. However, in contrast to the testimony in Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U. S. 390, note 7, infra, Scarletto neither described what petitioner would have heard at the convention nor suggested that there was any prerequisite such as officership or executive responsibility to petitioner’s attendance at the convention. Scarletto said that the nature of such conventions generally was that “they would have discussions on what was going on in the Party, and what drives were coining up,” but did not elaborate this statement with reference to the convention that petitioner attended or to what petitioner did there. Scarletto could only be sure that petitioner had to be a member to be present. The only facet of Elorriaga’s testimony which touched upon the qualitative aspect of petitioner’s membership was his statement that he had seen petitioner at one executive board meeting of the Party unit. However, in contrast to the testimony in Galvan, supra, at 524, 529, he only supposed petitioner to have been an “official of the club” because of petitioner’s presence at an executive meeting which Elorriaga thought was “probably” limited to “officials of the club,” and he did not elaborate specifically upon the significance of petitioner’s presence at the one meeting, making only the general statement that “[a]t this time I cannot say definitely the purpose [of that meeting] but it was either organizational or to form an agenda for the regular meeting.” Thus, none of the testimony of either Scarletto or Elorriaga was significantly probative of petitioner’s “meaningful association” with the Party. This Court’s later per curiam decision in Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 362 U. S. 390, in no way qualified the meaning of Rowoldt, since the evidence in the record in Niukkanen clearly showed “meaningful association.” See Niukkanen v. McAlexander, 265 F. 2d 825 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1959). Two witnesses testified for the Government. Both confirmed Niukkanen’s Party membership and his regular attendance at meetings In addition, one witness testified that Niukkanen helped in the distribution of a Communist-controlled trade-union newspaper edited by the witness, and actively participated in discussions at the newspaper office and elsewhere pertaining to policies of the Communist Party and circulation of the newspaper as a Communist organ. This, witness also testified that Niukkanen had attended a regional “plenum” of the Party — a meeting wherein all aspects of regional Party activities were reported on. Such a meeting, said the witness, was only for the “anointed people,” the “top fraction” in the Party, to' which, the witness added, Niukkanen belonged. The other witness, who had been a member of the same unit of the Party as Niukkanen, added that Niukkanen, although never an officer of the unit, was a member of its executive board. Nor is Galvan, supra, which was decided before Rowoldt, inconsistent with either that case or the present one. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the Court’s opinions in both Galvan and Rowoldt, stated in Rowoldt that “[t]he differences on the facts between Galvan v. Press, supra, and this case are too obvious to be detailed.” 355 Ú. S., at 121. In the present case, for example, deportation would remove a man who has resided in this country since 1920 when he came from Mexico as a 10-year-old boy, and has raised and supported a family who are all American citizens. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider petitioner’s contention that “at least the spirit” of 28 U. S-. C. § 46 was violated when the panel of'the Court of Appeals assigned to hear petitioner’s appeal in the current series of proceedings transferred the appeal instead to the same panel which had heard his first appeal, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 286 F. 2d 824, it being clearly predictable thht one of the three judges on that panel would not participate, since he had been unable to participate in the disposition of the first appeal.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RICCI et al. v. DeSTEFANO et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 07-1428. Argued April 22, 2009 Decided June 29, 2009 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 594. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 596. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 608. Gregory S. Coleman argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were Edward C. Dawson, Dori K. Goldman, and Karen Lee Torre. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in both cases supporting vacatur and remand. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General King, Deputy Solicitor General Katyal, Lisa S. Blatt, Leondra R. Kruger, Steven H. Rosenbaum, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Gregory B. Friel, Lisa J. Stark, Carol A. DeDeo, Edward D. Sieger, Carolyn L. Wheeler, and Gail S. Coleman. Christopher J. Meade argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Seth P. Waxman, Anne K. Small, Victor A. Bolden, Kathleen M. Foster, David T. Goldberg, and Richard A. Roberts. Together with No. 08-328, Ricci et al. v. DeStefano et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the American Civil Rights Union by Peter J. Ferrara; for Bridgeport Firefighters for Merit Employment, Inc., by Stewart I. Edelstein; for the Cato Institute et al. by Ilya Shapiro and Manuel S. Klausner; for the Center for Individual Rights et al. by Michael E. Rosman; for the Concerned American Firefighters Association, Philadelphia Chapter, by Gregory J. Sullivan; for the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund by Douglas G. Smith; for Law Professors et al. by Martin S. Kaufman; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by J. Scott Detamore; for the National Association of Police Organizations by Scott M. Abeles; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Sharon L. Browne, Alan W. Foutz, and Steven G. Gieseler; and for Joe Oaldey et al. by Henry C. Shelton III, Brian S. Faughnan, and Emily C. Taube. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, Austin C. Schlick, Steven M. Sullivan, and Michele J. McDonald, by Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General of Alaska, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, Tom Miller of Iowa, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Kevin K Russell, Amy Howe, Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Steven R. Shapiro, and Dennis D. Parker; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Vincent A. Eng and Karen K. Narasaki; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Rae T Vann, Jeffrey A. Norris, and Lorence L. Kessler; for Industrial-Organizational Psychologists by David C. Frederick and Derek T. Ho; for the International Association of Black Professional Fire Fighters et al. by Christy B. Bishop and Dennis R. Thompson; for the International Association of Hispanic Firefighters et al. by Marcia L. McCormick; for the International Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by Andrew J. Pincus and Charles Rothfeld; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Michael L. Foreman, Sarah Crawford, Catherine Sun Wood, Marc H. Morial, Angela Ciccolo, and Eva Paterson; for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by John Payton, Jacqueline A Berrien, Debo P. Adegbile, Matthew Colangelo, and Joshua Civin; for the National Partnership for Women & Families et al. by Helen Norton, Judith L. Lichtman, Marcia D. Greenberger, and Jocelyn Samuels; for the New York Law School Racial Justice Project by Elise C. Boddie; for the Opportunity Agenda by Ankur J. Goel and Alan Jenkins; and for the Society for Human Resource Management by Samuel Estreicher, Meir Feder, Donald B. Ayer, and Lawrence D. Rosenberg. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the Anti-Defamation League by Michael F. Smith, Martin E. Karlinsky, Howard W. Goldstein, Steven M. Freeman, and Steven C. Sheinberg; for the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman and Edwin Meese III; and for Kedar Bhatia by Alan Sager. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. In the fire department of New Haven, Connecticut — as in emergency-service agencies throughout the Nation — firefighters prize their promotion to and within the officer ranks. An agency’s officers command respect within the department and in the whole community; and, of course, added responsibilities command increased salary and benefits. Aware of the intense competition for promotions, New Haven, like many cities, relies on objective examinations to identify the best qualified candidates. In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took examinations to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or captain. Promotion examinations in New Haven (or City) were infrequent, so the stakes were high. The results would determine which firefighters would be considered for promotions during the next two years, and the order in which they would be considered. Many firefighters studied for months, at considerable personal and financial cost. When the examination results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous. Some firefighters argued the tests should be discarded because the results showed the tests to be discriminatory. They threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City made promotions based on the tests. Other firefighters said the exams were neutral and fair. And they, in' turn, threatened a discrimination lawsuit if the City, relying on the statistical racial disparity, ignored the test results and denied promotions to the candidates who had performed well. In the end the City took the side of those who protested the test results. It threw out the examinations. Certain white and Hispanic firefighters who likely would have been promoted based on their good test performance sued the City and some of its officials. Theirs is the suit now before us. The suit alleges that, by discarding the test results, the City and the named officials discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their race, in violation of both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 258, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The City and the officials defended their actions, arguing that if they had certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that race-based action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute. Respondents, we further determine, cannot meet that threshold standard. As a result, the City’s action in discarding the tests was a violation of Title VII. In light of our ruling under the statutes, we need not reach the question whether respondents’ actions may have violated the Equal Protection Clause. I This litigation comes to us after the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, so we set out the facts in some detail. As the District Court noted, although “the parties strenuously dispute the relevance and legal import of, and inferences to be drawn from, many aspects of this case, the underlying facts are largely undisputed.” 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (Conn. 2006). A When the City of New Haven undertook to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department (Department), the promotion and hiring process was governed by the City charter, in addition to federal and state law. The charter establishes a merit system. That system requires the City to fill vacancies in the classified civil-service ranks with the most qualified individuals, as determined by job-related examinations. After each examination, the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) certifies a ranked list of applicants who passed the test. Under the charter’s “rule of three," the relevant hiring authority must fill each vacancy by choosing one candidate from the top three scorers on the list. Certified promotional lists remain valid for two years. The City’s contract with the New Haven firefighters’ union specifies additional requirements for the promotion process. Under the contract, applicants for lieutenant and captain positions were to be screened using written and oral examinations, with the written exam accounting for 60 percent and the oral exam 40 percent of an applicant’s total score. To sit for the examinations, candidates for lieutenant needed 30 months’ experience in the Department, a high school diploma, and certain vocational training courses. Candidates for captain needed one year’s service as a lieutenant in the Department, a high school diploma, and certain vocational training courses. After reviewing bids from various consultants, the City hired Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. (IOS), to develop and administer the examinations, at a cost to the City of $100,000. IOS is an Illinois company that specializes in designing entry-level and promotional examinations for fire and police departments. In order to fit the examinations to the New Haven Department, IOS began the test-design process by performing job analyses to identify the tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities that are essential for the lieutenant and captain positions. IOS representatives interviewed incumbent captains and lieutenants and their supervisors. They rode with and observed other on-duty officers. Using information from those interviews and ride-alongs, IOS wrote job-analysis questionnaires and administered them to most of the incumbent battalion chiefs, captains, and lieutenants in the Department. At every stage of the job analyses, IOS, by deliberate choice, oversampled minority firefighters to ensure that the results — which IOS would use to develop the examinations — would not unintentionally favor white candidates. With the job-analysis information in hand, IOS developed the written examinations to measure the candidates’ job-related knowledge. For each test, IOS compiled a list of training manuals, Department procedures, and other materials to use as sources for the test questions. IOS presented the proposed sources to the New Haven fire chief and assistant fire chief for their approval. Then, using the approved sources, IOS drafted a multiple-choice test for each position. Each test had 100 questions, as required by CSB rules, and was written below a 10th-grade reading level. After IOS prepared the tests, the City opened a 3-month study period. It gave candidates a list that identified the source material for the questions, including the specific chapters from which the questions were taken. IOS developed the oral examinations as well. These concentrated on job skills and abilities. Using the job-analysis information, IOS wrote hypothetical situations to test incident-command skills, firefighting tactics, interpersonal skills, leadership, and management ability, among other things. Candidates would be presented with these hypothetical and asked to respond before a panel of three assessors. IOS assembled a pool of 30 assessors who were superior in rank to the positions being tested. At the City’s insistence (because of controversy surrounding previous examinations), all the assessors came from outside Connecticut. IOS submitted the assessors’ resumes to City officials for approval. They were battalion chiefs, assistant chiefs, and chiefs from departments of similar sizes to New Haven’s throughout the country. Sixty-six percent of the panelists were minorities, and each of the nine three-member assessment panels contained two minority members. IOS trained the panelists for several hours on the day before it administered the examinations, teaching them how to score the candidates’ responses consistently using checklists of desired criteria. Candidates took the examinations in November and December 2003. Seventy-seven candidates completed the lieutenant examination — 43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 candidates passed — 25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. 554 F. Supp. 2d, at 145. Eight lieutenant positions were vacant at the time of the examination. As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white. Ibid. Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black candidates to be considered for promotion to lieutenant. Forty-one candidates completed the captain examination— 25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed — 16 whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Ibid. Seven captain positions were vacant at the time of the examination. Under the rule of three, 9 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to captain — 7 whites and 2 Hispanics. Ibid. The City’s contract with IOS contemplated that, after the examinations, IOS would prepare a technical report that described the examination processes and methodologies and analyzed the results. But in January 2004, rather than requesting the technical report, City officials, including the City’s counsel, Thomas Ude, convened a meeting with IOS Vice President Chad Legel. (Legel was the leader of the IOS team that developed and administered the tests.) Based on the test results, the City officials expressed concern that the tests had discriminated against minority candidates. Legel defended the examinations’ validity, stating that any numerical disparity between white and minority candidates was likely due to various external factors and was in line with results of the Department’s previous promotional examinations. Several days after the meeting, Ude sent a letter to the CSB purporting to outline its duties with respect to the examination results. Ude stated that under federal law, “a statistical demonstration of disparate impact,” standing alone, “constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of racial discrimination to serve as a predicate for employer-initiated, voluntar[y] remedies — even . . . race-conscious remedies.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 07-1428, p. 443a; see also 554 F. Supp. 2d, at 145 (issue of disparate impact “appears to have been raised by . . . Ude”). 1 The CSB first met to consider certifying the results on January 22, 2004. Tina Burgett, director of the City’s Department of Human Resources, opened the meeting by telling the CSB that “there is a significant disparate impact on these two exams.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 07-1428, at 466a. She distributed lists showing the candidates’ races and scores (written, oral, and composite) but not their names. Ude also described the test results as reflecting “a very significant disparate impact,” id., at 477a, and he outlined possible grounds for the CSB’s refusing to certify the results. Although they did not know whether they had passed or failed, some firefighter-candidates spoke at the first CSB meeting in favor of certifying the test results. Michael Blatchley stated that “[e]very one” of the questions on the written examination “came from the [study] material.... [I]f you read the materials and you studied the material, you would have done well on the test.” App. in No. 06-4996-cv (CA2), pp. A772-A773 (hereinafter CA2 App.). Frank Ricci stated that the test questions were based on the Department’s own rules and procedures and on “nationally recognized” materials that represented the “accepted standard[s]” for firefighting. Id., at A785-A786. Ricci stated that he had “several learning disabilities,” including dyslexia; that he had spent more than $1,000 to purchase the materials and pay his neighbor to read them on tape so he could “give it [his] best shot”; and that he had studied “8 to 13 hours a day to prepare” for the test. Id., at A786, A789. “I don’t even know if I made it,” Ricci told the CSB, “[b]ut the people who passed should be promoted. When your life’s on the line, second best may not be good enough.” Id., at A787-A788. Other firefighters spoke against certifying the test results. They described the test questions as outdated or not relevant to firefighting practices in New Haven. Gary Tinney stated that source materials “came out of New York. . . . Their makeup of their city and everything is totally different than ours.” Id., at A774-A775; see also id., at A779, A780-A781. And they criticized the test materials, a full set of which cost about $500, for being too expensive and too long. 2 At a second CSB meeting, on February 5, the president of the New Haven firefighters’ union asked the CSB to perform a validation study to determine whether the tests were job related. Petitioners’ counsel in this action argued that the CSB should certify the results. A representative of the International Association of Black Professional Firefighters, Donald Day from neighboring Bridgeport, Connecticut, “beseech[ed]” the CSB “to throw away that test,” which he described as “inherently unfair” because of the racial distribution of the results. Id., at A830-A831. Another Bridgeport-based representative of the association, Ronald Mackey, stated that a validation study was necessary. He suggested that the City could “adjust” the test results to “meet the criteria of having a certain amount of minorities get elevated to the rank of Lieutenant and Captain.” Id., at A838. At the end of this meeting, the CSB members agreed to ask IOS to send a representative to explain how it had developed and administered the examinations. They also discussed asking a panel of experts to review the examinations and advise the CSB whether to certify the results. 3 At a third meeting, on February 11, Legel addressed the CSB on behalf of IOS. Legel stated that IOS had previously prepared entry-level firefighter examinations for the City but not a promotional examination. He explained that IOS had developed examinations for departments in communities with demographics similar to New Haven’s, including Orange County, Florida; Lansing, Michigan; and San Jose, California. Legel explained the exam-development process to the CSB. He began by describing the job analyses IOS performed of the captain and lieutenant positions — the interviews, ride-alongs, and questionnaires IOS designed to “generate a list of tasks, knowledge, skills and abilities that are considered essential to performance” of the jobs. Id., at A931-A932. He outlined how IOS prepared the written and oral examinations, based on the job-analysis results, to test most heavily those qualities that the results indicated were “eritica[l]” or “essential[l].” Id., at A931. And he noted that IOS took the material for each test question directly from the approved source materials. Legel told the CSB that third-party reviewers had scrutinized the examinations to ensure that the written test was drawn from the source material and that the oral test accurately tested real-world situations that captains and lieutenants would face. Legel confirmed that IOS had selected oral-examination panelists so that each three-member assessment panel included one white, one black, and one Hispanic member. Near the end of his remarks, Legel “implor[ed] anyone that had... concerns to review the content of the exam. In my professional opinion, it’s facially neutral. There’s nothing in those examinations ... that should cause somebody to think that one group would perform differently than another group.” Id., at A961. 4 At the next meeting, on March 11, the CSB heard from three witnesses it had selected to “tell us a little bit about their views of the testing, the process, [and] the methodology.” Id., at A1020. The first, Christopher Hornick, spoke to the CSB by telephone. Hornick is an industrial/organizational psychologist from Texas who operates a consulting business that “direct[ly]” competes with IOS. Id., at A1029. Hornick, who had not “studied] the test at length or in detail” and had not “seen the job analysis data,” told the CSB that the scores indicated a “relatively high adverse impact.” Id., at A1028, A1030, A1043. He stated that “[n]ormally, whites outperform ethnic minorities on the majority of standardized testing procedures,” but that he was “a little surprised” by the disparity in the candidates’ scores— although “[s]ome of it is fairly typical of what we’ve seen in other areas of the countrfy] and other tests.” Id., at A1028-A1029. Hornick stated that the “adverse impact on the written exam was somewhat higher but generally in the range that we’ve seen professionally.” Id., at A1030-A1031. When asked to explain the New Haven test results, Hornick opined in the telephone conversation that the collective-bargaining agreement’s requirement of using written and oral examinations with a 60/40 composite score might account for the statistical disparity. He also stated that “[b]y not having anyone from within the [D]epartment review” the tests before they were administered — a limitation the City had imposed to protect the security of the exam questions — “you inevitably get things in there” that are based on the source materials but are not relevant to New Haven. Id., at A1034-A1035. Hornick suggested that testing candidates at an “assessment center” rather than using written and oral examinations “might serve [the City’s] needs better.” Id., at A1039-A1040. Hornick stated that assessment centers, where candidates face real-world situations and respond just as they would in the field, allow candidates “to demonstrate how they would address a particular problem as opposed to just verbally saying it or identifying the correct option on a written test.” Ibid. Hornick made clear that he was “not suggesting that [IOS] somehow created a test that had adverse impacts that it should not have had.” Id., at A1038. He described the IOS examinations as “reasonably good test[s].” Id., at A1041. He stated that the CSB’s best option might be to “certify the list as it exists” and work to change the process for future tests, including by “[r]ewriting the Civil Service Rules.” Ibid. Hornick concluded his telephonic remarks by telling the CSB that “for the future,” his company “certainly would like to help you if we can.” Id., at A1046. The second witness was Vincent Lewis, a fire program specialist for the Department of Homeland Security and a retired fire captain from Michigan. Lewis, who is black, had looked “extensively” at the lieutenant exam and “a little less extensively” at the captain exam. He stated that the candidates “should know that material.” Id., at A1048, A1052. In Lewis’ view, the “questions were relevant for both exams,” and the New Haven candidates had an advantage because the study materials identified the particular book chapters from which the questions were taken. In other departments, by contrast, “you had to know basically the . . . entire book.” Id., at A1053. Lewis concluded that any disparate impact likely was due to a pattern that “usually whites outperform some of the minorities on testing,” or that “more whites . .. take the exam.” Id., at A1054. The final witness was Janet Helms, a professor at Boston College whose “primary area of expertise” is “not with firefighters per se” but in “race and culture as they influence performance on tests and other assessment procedures.” Id., at A1060. Helms expressly declined the CSB’s offer to review the examinations. At the outset, she noted that “regardless of what kind of written test we give in this country ... we can just about predict how many people will pass who are members of under-represented, groups. And your data are not that inconsistent with what predictions would say were the case.” Id., at A1061. Helms nevertheless offered several “ideas about what might be possible factors” to explain statistical differences in the results. Id., at A1062. She concluded that because 67 percent of the respondents to the job-analysis questionnaires were white, the test questions might have favored white candidates, because “most of the literature on firefighters shows that the different groups perform the job differently.” Id., at A1063. Helms closed by stating that no matter what test the City had administered, it would have revealed “a disparity between blacks and whites, Hispanics and whites,” particularly on a written test. Id., at A1072. 5 At the final CSB meeting, on March 18, Ude (the City’s counsel) argued against certifying the examination results. Discussing the City’s obligations under federal law, Ude advised the CSB that a finding of adverse impact “is the beginning, not the end, of a review of testing procedures” to determine whether they violated the disparate-impact provision of Title VII. Ude focused the CSB on determining “whether there are other ways to test for ... those positions that are equally valid with less adverse impact.” Id., at A1101. Ude described Hornick as having said that the written examination “had one of the most severe adverse impacts that he had seen” and that “there are much better alternatives to identifying [firefighting] skills.” Ibid. Ude offered his “opinion that promotions ... as a result of these tests would not be consistent with federal law, would not be consistent with the purposes of our Civil Service Rules or our Charter[,] nor is it in the best interests of the firefighters ... who took the exams.” Id., at A1103-A1104. He stated that previous Department exams “have not had this kind of result,” and that previous results had not been “challenged as having adverse impact, whereas we are assured that these will be.” Id., at A1107, A1108. CSB Chairman Segaloff asked Ude several questions about the Title VII disparate-impact standard. “CHAIRPERSON SEGALOFF: [M]y understanding is the group . . . that is making to throw the exam out has the burden of showing that there is out there an exam that is reasonably probable or likely to have less of an adverse impact. It’s not our burden to show that there’s an exam out there that can be better. We’ve got an exam. We’ve got a result.... “MR. UDE: Mr. Chair, I point out that Dr. Hornick said that. He said that there are other tests out there that would have less adverse impact and that [would] be more valid. “CHAIRPERSON SEGALOFF: You think that’s enough for us to throw this test upside-down... because Dr. Hornick said it? “MR. UDE: I think that by itself would be sufficient. Yes. I also would point out that... it is the employer’s burden to justify the use of the examination.” Id., at A1108-A1109. Karen DuBois-Walton, the City’s chief administrative officer, spoke on behalf of Mayor John DeStefano and argued against certifying the results. DuBois-Walton stated that the results, when considered under the rule of three and applied to then-existing captain and lieutenant vacancies, created a situation in which black and Hispanic candidates were disproportionately excluded from opportunity. DuBoisWalton also relied on Hornick’s testimony, asserting that Hornick “made it extremely clear that . . . there are more appropriate ways to assess one’s ability to serve” as a captain or lieutenant. Id., at A1120. Burgett (the human resources director) asked the CSB to discard the examination results. She, too, relied on Hornick’s statement to show the existence of alternative testing methods, describing Hornick as having “started to point out that alternative testing does exist” and as having “begun to suggest that there are some different ways of doing written examinations.” Id., at A1125, A1128. Other witnesses addressed the CSB. They included the president of the New Haven firefighters’ union, who supported certification. He reminded the CSB that Hornick “also concluded that the tests were reasonable and fair and under the current structure to certify them.” Id., at A1137. Firefighter Frank Ricci again argued for certification; he stated that although “assessment centers in some cases show less adverse impact,” id., at A1140, they were not available alternatives for the current round of promotions. It would take several years, Ricci explained, for the Department to develop an assessment-center protocol and the accompanying training materials. Id., at A1141. Lieutenant Matthew Marcarelli, who had taken the captain’s exam, spoke in favor of certification. At the close of witness testimony, the CSB voted on a motion to certify the examinations. With one member recused, the CSB deadlocked 2 to 2, resulting in a decision not to certify the results. Explaining his vote to certify the results, Chairman Segaloff stated that “nobody convinced me that we can feel comfortable that, in fact, there’s some likelihood that there’s going to be an exam designed that’s going to be less discriminatory.” Id., at A1159-A1160. C The CSB’s decision not to certify the examination results led to this lawsuit. The plaintiffs — who are the petitioners here — are 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations but were denied a chance at promotions when the CSB refused to certify the test results. They include the named plaintiff, Frank Ricci, who addressed the CSB at multiple meetings. Petitioners sued the City, Mayor DeStefano, DuBoisWalton, Ude, Burgett, and the two CSB members who voted against certification. Petitioners also named as a defendant Boise Kimber, a New Haven resident who voiced strong opposition to certifying the results. Those individuals are respondents in this Court. Petitioners filed suit under Rev. Stat. §§ 1979 and 1980, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that respondents, by arguing or voting against certifying the results, violated and conspired to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners also filed timely charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); upon the EEOC’s issuing right-to-sue letters, petitioners amended their complaint to assert that the City violated the disparate-treatment prohibition contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Respondents asserted they had a good-faith belief that they would have violated the disparate-impact prohibition in Title VII, § 2000e-2(k), had they certified the examination results. It follows, they maintained, that they cannot be held liable under Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision for attempting to comply with Title VIPs disparate-impact bar. Petitioners countered that respondents’ good-faith belief was not a valid defense to allegations of disparate treatment and unconstitutional discrimination. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents. 554 F. Supp. 2d 142. It described petitioners’ argument as “boil[ing] down to the assertion that if [respondents] cannot prove that the disparities on the Lieutenant and Captain exams were due to a particular flaw inherent in those exams, then they should have certified the results because there was no other alternative in place.” Id., at 156. The District Court concluded that, “ [notwithstanding the shortcomings in the evidence on existing, effective alternatives, it is not the case that [respondents] must certify a test where they cannot pinpoint its deficiency explaining its disparate impact . . . simply because they have not yet formulated a better selection method.” Ibid. It also ruled that respondents’ “motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact. . . does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent” under Title VII. Id., at 160. The District Court rejected petitioners’ equal protection claim on the theory that respondents had not acted because of “discriminatory animus” toward petitioners. Id., at 162. It concluded that respondents’ actions were not “based on race” because “all applicants took the same test, and the result was the same for all because the test results were discarded and nobody was promoted.” Id., at 161. After full briefing and argument by the parties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a one-paragraph, unpublished summary order; it later withdrew that order, issuing in its place a nearly identical, one-paragraph per curiam opinion adopting the District Court’s reasoning. 580 F. 3d 87 (CA2 2008). Three days later, the Court of Appeals voted 7 to 6 to deny rehearing en bane, over written dissents by Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes. 530 F. 3d 88. This action presents two provisions of Title VII to be interpreted and reconciled, with few, if any, precedents in the courts of appeals discussing the issue. Depending on the resolution of the statutory claim, a fundamental constitutional question could also arise. We found it prudent and appropriate to grant certiorari. 555 U. S. 1091 (2009). We now reverse. II Petitioners raise a statutory claim, under the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII, and a constitutional claim, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A decision for petitioners on their statutory claim would provide the relief sought, so we consider it first. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U. S. 115, 123 (1985); Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam) (“[N]ormally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case”). A Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as “disparate treatment”) as well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as “disparate impact”). As enacted in 1964, Title VII’s principal nondiscrimination provision held employers liable only for disparate treatment. That section retains its original wording today. It makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” §2000e-2(a)(1); see also 78 Stat. 255. Disparate-treatment cases present “the most easily understood type of discrimination,” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977), and occur where an employer has “treated [a] particular person less favorably than others because of” a protected trait, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 985-986 (1988). A disparate-treatment plaintiff must establish “that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive” for taking a job-related action. Id., at 986. The Civil Rights. Act of 1964 did not include an express prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact. But in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), the Court interpreted the Act to prohibit, in some cases, employers’ facially neutral practices that, in fact, are “discriminatory in operation.” Id., at 431. The Griggs Court stated that the “touchstone” for disparate-impact liability is the lack of “business necessity”: “If an employment practice which operates to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.” Ibid.; see also id., at 432 (employer’s burden to demonstrate that practice has “a manifest relationship to the employment in question”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425 (1975). Under those precedents, if an employer met its burden by showing that its practice was job related, the plaintiff was required to show a legitimate alternative that would have resulted in less discrimination. Ibid. (allowing complaining party to show “that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest”). Twenty years after Griggs, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, was enacted. The Act included a provision codifying the prohibition on disparate-impact discrimination. That provision is now in force along with the disparate-treatment section already noted. Under the disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing that an employer uses “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i). An employer may defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” Ibid. Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs. §§ 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) and (C). B Petitioners allege that when the CSB refused to certify the captain and lieutenant exam results based on the race of the successful candidates, it discriminated against them in violation of Title VIPs disparate-treatment provision. The City counters that its decision was permissible because the tests “appeared] to violate Title VIPs disparate-impact provisions.” Brief for Respondents 12. Our analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race— i. e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates. As the District Court put it, the City rejected the test results because “too many whites and not enough minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified.” 554 F. Supp. 2d, at 152; see also ibid, (respondents’ “own arguments . . . show that the City’s reasons for advocating non-certification were related to the racial distribution of the results”). Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race. See § 2000e-2(a)(l). The District Court did not adhere to this principle, however. It held that respondents’ “motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact . . . does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent.” Id., at 160. And the Government makes a similar argument in this Court. It contends that the “structure of Title VII belies any claim that an employer’s intent to comply with Title VIPs disparate-impact provisions constitutes prohibited discrimination on the basis of race.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. But both of those statements turn upon the City’s objective — avoiding disparate-impact liability — while ignoring the City’s conduct in the name of reaching that objective. Whatever the City’s ultimate aim — however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed — the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white. The question is not whether that conduct was discriminatory but whether the City had a lawful justification for its race-based action. We consider, therefore, whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination. Courts often confront cases in which statutes and principles point in different directions. Our task is to provide guidance to employers and courts for situations when these two prohibitions could be in conflict absent a rule to reconcile them. In providing this guidance our decision must be consistent with the important purpose of Title VII — that the workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity. With these principles in mind, we turn to the parties’ proposed means of reconciling the statutory provisions. Petitioners take a strict approach, arguing that under Title VII, it cannot be permissible for an employer to take race-based adverse employment actions in order to avoid disparate-impact liability — even if the employer knows its practice violates the disparate-impact provision. See Brief for Petitioners 43. Petitioners would have us hold that, under Title VII, avoiding unintentional discrimination cannot justify intentional discrimination. That assertion, however, ignores the fact that, by codifying the disparate-impact provision in 1991, Congress has expressly prohibited both types of discrimination. We must interpret the statute to give effect to both provisions where possible. See, e. g., United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U. S. 128,137 (2007) (rejecting an interpretation that would render a statutory provision “a dead letter”). We cannot accept petitioners’ broad and inflexible formulation. Petitioners next suggest that an employer in fact must be in violation of the disparate-impact provision before it can use compliance as a defense in a disparate-treatment suit. Again, this is overly simplistic and too restrictive of Title VIFs purpose. The rule petitioners offer would run counter to what we have recognized as Congress’ intent that “voluntary compliance” be “the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.” Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501, 515 (1986); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 290 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Forbidding employers to act unless they know, with certainty, that a practice violates the disparate-impact provision would bring compliance efforts to a near standstill. Even in the limited situations when this restricted standard could be met, employers likely would hesitate before taking voluntary action for fear of later being proved wrong in the course of litigation and then held to account for disparate treatment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, respondents and the Government assert that an employer’s good-faith belief that its actions are necessary to comply with Title VIFs disparate-impact provision should be enough to justify race-conscious conduct. But the original, foundational prohibition of Title VII bars employers from taking adverse action “because of... race.” § 2000e-2(a)(l). And when Congress codified the disparate-impact provision in 1991, it made no exception to disparate-treatment liability for actions taken in a good-faith effort to comply with the new, disparate-impact provision in subsection (k). Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition based on a mere good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability would encourage race-based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact. A minimal standard could cause employers to discard the results of lawful and beneficial promotional examinations even where there is little if any evidence of disparate-impact discrimination. That would amount to a defacto quota system, in which a “focus on statistics .. . could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures.” Watson, 487 U. S., at 992 (plurality opinion). Even worse, an employer could discard test results (or other employment practices) with the intent of obtaining the employer’s preferred racial balance. That operational principle could not be justified, for Title VII is express in disclaiming any interpretation of its requirements as calling for outright racial balancing. §2000e-2(j). The purpose of Title VII “is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color.” Griggs, 401 U. S., at 434. In searching for a standard that strikes a more appropriate balance, we note that this Court has considered cases similar to this one, albeit in the context of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination — actions that are themselves based on race— are constitutional only where there is a “ ‘strong basis in evidence’” that the remedial actions were necessary. Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). This suit does not call on us to consider whether the statutory constraints under Title VII must be parallel in all respects to those under the Constitution. That does not mean the constitutional authorities are irrelevant, however. Our cases discussing constitutional principles can provide helpful guidance in this statutory context. See Watson, supra, at 993 (plurality opinion). Writing for a plurality in Wygant and announcing the strong-basis-in-evidence standard, Justice Powell recognized the tension between eliminating segregation and discrimination on the one hand and doing away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race on the other. 476 U. S., at 277. The plurality stated that those “related constitutional duties are not always harmonious,” and that “reconciling them requires ... employers to act with extraordinary care.” Ibid. The plurality required a strong basis in evidence because “[ejvidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is challenged in court by nonminority employees.” Ibid. The Court applied the same standard in Croson, observing that “an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination . . . cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.” 488 U. S., at 499. The same interests are at work in the interplay between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII. Congress has imposed liability on employers for unintentional discrimination in order to rid the workplace of “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs, supra, at 431. But it has also prohibited employers from taking adverse employment actions “because of” race. §2000e-2(a)(1). Applying the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to Title VII gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow circumstances. The standard leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to Congress’ efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination. See Firefighters, supra, at 515. And the standard appropriately constrains employers’ discretion in making race-based decisions: It limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when there is a provable, actual violation. Resolving the statutory conflict in this way allows the disparate-impact prohibition to work in a manner that is consistent with other provisions of Title VII, including the prohibition on adjusting employment-related test scores on the basis of race. See §2000e-2(l). Examinations like those administered by the City create legitimate expectations on the part of those who took the tests. As is the case with any promotion exam, some of the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and personal commitment in preparing for the tests. Employment tests can be an important part of a neutral selection system that safeguards against the very racial animosities Title VII was intended to prevent. Here, however, the firefighters saw their efforts invalidated by the City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics. If an employer cannot rescore a test based on the candidates’ race, §2000e-2(0, then it follows a fortiori that it may not take the greater step of discarding the test altogether to achieve a more desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates — absent a strong basis in evidence that the test was deficient and that discarding the results is necessary to avoid violating the disparate-impact provision. Restricting an employer’s ability to discard test results (and thereby discriminate against qualified candidates on the basis of their race) also is in keeping with Title VII’s express protection of bona fide promotional examinations. See § 2000e-2(h) (“[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race”); cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U. S. 701, 710 (2009). For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII. Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken here in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that meeting the strong-basis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case. As we explain below, because respondents have not met their burden under Title VII, we need not decide whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution. Nor do we question an employer’s affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the process by which promotions will be made. But once that process has been established and employers have made clear their selection criteria, they may not then invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of race. Doing so, absent a strong basis in evidence of an impermissible disparate impact, amounts to the sort of racial preference that Congress has disclaimed, §2000e-2(j), and is antithetical to the notion of a workplace where individuals are guaranteed equal opportunity regardless of race. Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race. And when, during the test-design stage, an employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair, that process can provide a common ground for open discussions toward that end. We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action. C The City argues that, even under the strong-basis-in-evidence standard, its decision to discard the examination results was permissible under Title VII. That is incorrect. Even if respondents were motivated as a subjective matter by a desire to avoid committing disparate-impact discrimination, the record makes clear there is no support for the conclusion that respondents had an objective, strong basis in evidence to find the tests inadequate, with some consequent disparate-impact liability in violation of Title VII. On this basis, we conclude that petitioners have met their obligation to demonstrate that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this Court, the City’s only defense is that it acted to comply with Title VII’s disparate-impact provision. To succeed on their motion, then, petitioners must demonstrate that there can be no genuine dispute that there was no strong basis in evidence for the City to conclude it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the examination results. See Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 324 (1986) (where the nonmoving party “will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue,” the nonmoving party bears the burden of production under Rule 56 to “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability. On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates. On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent. The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII. See 29 CFR § 1607.4(D) (2008) (selection rate that is less than 80 percent “of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact”); Watson, 487 U. S., at 995-996, n. 3 (plurality opinion) (EEOC’s 80-percent standard is “a rule of thumb for the courts”). Based on how the passing candidates ranked and an application of the “rule of three,” certifying the examinations would have meant that the City could not have considered black candidates for any of the then-vacant lieutenant or captain positions. Based on the degree of adverse impact reflected in the results, respondents were compelled to take a hard look at the examinations to determine whether certifying the results would have had an impermissible disparate impact. The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results. That is because the City could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the examinations were not job related and consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative that served the City’s needs but that the City refused to adopt. §§2000e-2(k)(l)(A), (C). We conclude there is no strong basis in evidence to establish that the tests were deficient in either of these respects. We address each of the two points in turn, based on the record developed by the parties through discovery — a record that concentrates in substantial part on the statements various witnesses made to the CSB. 1 There is no genuine dispute that the examinations were job related and consistent with business necessity. The City’s assertions to the contrary are “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott, supra, at 380. The CSB heard statements from Chad Legel (the IOS vice president) as well as City officials outlining the detailed steps IOS took to develop and administer the examinations. IOS devised the written examinations, which were the focus of the CSB’s inquiry, after painstaking analyses of the captain and lieutenant positions — analyses in which IOS made sure that minorities were overrepresented. And IOS drew the questions from source material approved by the Department. Of the outside witnesses who appeared before the CSB, only one, Vincent Lewis, had reviewed the examinations in any detail, and he was the only one with any firefighting experience. Lewis stated that the “questions were relevant for both exams.” CA2 App. A1053. The only other witness who had seen any part of the examinations, Christopher Hornick (a competitor of IOS’), criticized the fact that no one within the Department had reviewed the tests — a condition imposed by the City to protect the integrity of the exams in light of past alleged security breaches. But Hornick stated that the exams “appea[r] to be . . . reasonably good” and recommended that the CSB certify the results. Id., at A1041. Arguing that the examinations were not job related, respondents note some candidates’ complaints that certain examination questions were contradictory or did not specifically apply to firefighting practices in New Haven. But Legel told the CSB that IOS had addressed those concerns— that it entertained “a handful” of challenges to the validity of particular examination questions, that it “reviewed those challenges and provided feedback [to the City] as to what we thought the best course of action was,” and that he could remember at least one question IOS had thrown out (“offer-ting] credit to everybody for that particular question”). Id., at A955-A957. For his part, Hornick said he “suspect[ed] that some of the criticisms ... [leveled] by candidates” were not valid. Id., at A1035. The City, moreover, turned a blind eye to evidence that supported the exams’ validity. Although the City’s contract with IOS contemplated that IOS would prepare a technical report consistent with EEOC guidelines for examination-validity studies, the City made no request for its report. After the January 2004 meeting between Legel and some of the City-official respondents, in which Legel defended the examinations, the City sought no further information from IOS, save its appearance at a CSB meeting to explain how it developed and administered the examinations. IOS stood ready to provide respondents with detailed information to establish the validity of the exams, but respondents did not accept that offer. 2 Respondents also lacked a strong basis in evidence of an equally valid, less discriminatory testing alternative that the City, by certifying the examination results, would necessarily have refused to adopt. Respondents raise three arguments to the contrary, but each argument fails. First, respondents refer to testimony before the CSB that a different composite-score calculation — weighting the written and oral examination scores 30/70 — would have allowed the City to consider two black candidates for then-open lieutenant positions and one black candidate for then-open captain positions. (The City used a 60/40 weighting as required by its contract with the New Haven firefighters’ union.) But respondents have produced no evidence to show that the 60/40 weighting was indeed arbitrary. In fact, because that formula was the result of a union-negotiated collective-bargaining agreement, we presume the parties negotiated that weighting for a rational reason. Nor does the record contain any evidence that the 30/70 weighting would be an equally valid way to determine whether candidates possess the proper mix of job knowledge and situational skills to earn promotions. Changing the weighting formula, moreover, could well have violated Title VII’s prohibition of altering test scores on the basis of race. See § 2000e-2(l). On this record, there is no basis to conclude that a 30/70 weighting was an equally valid alternative the City could have adopted. Second, respondents argue that the City could have adopted a different interpretation of the “rule of three” that would have produced less discriminatory results. The rule, in the New Haven city charter, requires the City to promote only from “those applicants with the three highest scores” on a promotional examination. New Haven, Conn., Code of Ordinances, Tit. I, Art. XXX, §160 (1993). A state court has interpreted the charter to prohibit so-called “banding”— the City’s previous practice of rounding scores to the nearest whole number and considering all candidates with the same whole-number score as being of one rank. Banding allowed the City to consider three ranks of candidates (with the possibility of multiple candidates filling each rank) for purposes of the rule of three. See Kelly v. New Haven, No. CV000444614,2004 WL 114377, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct., Jan. 9, 2004). Respondents claim that employing banding here would have made four black and one Hispanic candidates eligible for then-open lieutenant and captain positions. A state court’s prohibition of banding, as a matter of municipal law under the charter, may not eliminate banding as a valid alternative under Title VII. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-7. We need not resolve that point, however. Here, banding was not a valid alternative for this reason: Had the City reviewed the exam results and then adopted banding to make the minority test scores appear higher, it would have violated Title VIPs prohibition of adjusting test results on the basis of race. §2000e-2(Z); see also Chicago Firefighters Local 2 v. Chicago, 249 F. 3d 649, 656 (CA7 2001) (Posner, J.) (“We have no doubt that if banding were adopted in order to make lower black scores seem higher, it would indeed be ... forbidden”). As a matter of law, banding was not an alternative available to the City when it was considering whether to certify the examination results. Third, and finally, respondents refer to statements by Hornick in his telephone interview with the CSB regarding alternatives to the written examinations. Hornick stated his “belie[f]” that an “assessment center process,” which would have evaluated candidates’ behavior in typical job tasks, “would have demonstrated less adverse impac[t].” CA2 App. A1039. But Hornick’s brief mention of alternative testing methods, standing alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that assessment centers were available to the City at the time of the examinations and that they would have produced less adverse impact. Other statements to the CSB indicated that the Department could not have used assessment centers for the 2003 examinations. Supra, at 574. And although respondents later argued to the CSB that Hornick had pushed the City to reject the test results, supra, at 572-574, the truth is that the essence of Hornick’s remarks supported its certifying the test results. See Scott, 550 U. S., at 380. Hornick stated that adverse impact in standardized testing “has been in existence since the beginning of testing,” CA2 App. A1037, and that the disparity in New Haven’s test results was “somewhat higher but generally in the range that we’ve seen professionally,” id., at A1030-A1031. He told the CSB he was “not suggesting” that IOS “somehow created a test that had adverse impacts that it should not have had.” Id., at A1038. And he suggested that the CSB should “certify the list as it exists.” Id., at A1041. Especially when it is noted that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard applies, respondents cannot create a genuine issue of fact based on a few stray (and contradictory) statements in the record. And there is no doubt respondents fall short of the mark by relying entirely on isolated statements by Hornick. Hornick had not “studied] the test at length or in detail.” Id., at A1030. And as he told the CSB, he is a “direct competitor” of IOS’. Id., at A1029. The remainder of his remarks showed that Hornick’s primary concern — somewhat to the frustration of CSB members — was marketing his services for the future, not commenting on the results of the tests the City had already administered. See, e. g., id., at A1026, A1027, A1032, A1036, A1040, A1041. Hornick’s hinting had its intended effect: The City has since hired him as a consultant. As for the other outside witnesses who spoke to the CSB, Vincent Lewis (the retired fire captain) thought the CSB should certify the test results. And Janet Helms (the Boston College professor) declined to review the examinations and told the CSB that, as a society, “we need to develop a new way of assessing people.” Id., at A1073. That task was beyond the reach of the CSB, which was concerned with the adequacy of the test results before it. 3 On the record before us, there is no genuine dispute that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the examination results. In other words, there is no evidence — let alone the required strong basis in evidence — that the tests were flawed because they were not job related or because other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the City. Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions. The City’s discarding the test results was impermissible under Title VII, and summary judgment is appropriate for petitioners on their disparate-treatment claim. * * * The record in this litigation documents a process that, at the outset, had the potential to produce a testing procedure that was true to the promise of Title VII: No individual should face workplace discrimination based on race. Respondents thought about promotion qualifications and relevant experience in neutral ways. They were careful to ensure broad racial participation in the design of the test itself and its administration. As we have discussed at length, the process was open and fair. The problem, of course, is that after the tests were completed, the raw racial results became the predominant rationale for the City’s refusal to certify the results. The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had established for the promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City’s reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe. Confronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test results — and threats of a lawsuit either way — the City was required to make a difficult inquiry. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate-impact violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the racial disparity in the results. Our holding today clarifies how Title VII applies to resolve competing expectations under the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions. If, after it certifies the test results, the City faces a disparate-impact suit, then in light of our holding today it should be clear that the City would avoid disparate-impact liability based on the strong basis in evidence that, had it not certified the results, it would have been subject to disparate-treatment liability. Petitioners are entitled to summary judgment on their Title VII claim, and we therefore need not decide the underlying constitutional question. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HARMON v. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. No. 80. Argued January 14-15, 1958. Decided March 3, 1958. David I. Shapiro argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 80. Victor Rabinowitz argued the cause for petitioner in No. 141. With him on the brief was Leonard B. Boudin. Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade, B. Jenkins Middleton and George W. Hickman, Jr., Judge Advocate General of the Army. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Carl Rachlin for the Workers Defense League in No. 80, and Ben Margolis and John T. McTernan for the Servicemen’s Defense Committee in Nos. 80 and 141. Per Curiam. The Secretary of the Army, relying upon 10 U. S. C. § 652a (Act of June 4, 1920, § 1, subch. II, 41 Stat. 809, as amended) and 38 U. S. C. § 693h (Act of June 22, 1944, 58 Stat. 286, as amended), and upon Department of Defense and Army Regulations deemed to be authorized by those statutes, discharged petitioners from the Army and issued to each of them a discharge certificate in form other than “honorable.” In so doing, he took into account preinduction activities of petitioners rather than basing his action exclusively upon the record of their military service. After having exhausted available administrative remedies, petitioners separately brought these proceedings in the District Court seeking judgments declaring those determinations and actions of the Secretary to be void as in excess of his powers under the circumstances, and directing him to issue “honorable” discharge certificates to them. Being of the view that it was without jurisdiction to consider the actions, the District Court dismissed them, 137 F. Supp. 475, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 190, 256, 243 F. 2d 613, 834. We granted certiorari, 353 U. S. 956 and 354 U. S. 920. The respective contentions made here may be summarized as follows: (1) Petitioners contend (a) that the Secretary acted in excess of his powers, because the statutes referred to did not authorize, nor support Department of Defense and Army Regulations when taken to authorize, consideration of petitioners’ preinduction activities in determining the type of discharges to be issued to them upon separation from the Army, and (b) that the action of respondent in issuing to them less than “honorable” discharges, and the action of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals in refusing review for what they thought was lack of judicial power, deprived petitioners of due process under the Fifth Amendment, and of a judicial trial under the Sixth Amendment, of the Constitution ; (2) Respondent contends (a) that by 10 U. S. C. § 652a, Congress required that, upon separation from the Army, a former soldier be given “a certificate of discharge, ... in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of the Department of the Army . . (b) that, inasmuch as all certificates of discharge are not required to be “honorable” ones, he was authorized to, and did, prescribe various types of discharge certificates running the gamut from the accolade of “Honorable discharge” to the odious “Dishonorable discharge”; (c) that by 38 U. S. C. § 693h, Congress directed the establishment of an Army Review Board with power to review, upon its own motion or that of the former soldier, the type of discharge issued, and “to change, correct, or modify any discharge or dismissal, and to issue a new discharge in accord with the facts presented to the board,” and prescribed that “the findings thereof [shall] be final subject only to review by the Secretary of the Army”; (d) that the findings of the Board, made under those procedures so afforded to and availed of by petitioners, were final subject only to review by the Secretary of the Army; and-(e) that, therefore, such administrative procedure is exclusive and the courts are without jurisdiction to review those findings. In keeping with our duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case, we look first to petitioners’ non-constitutional claim that respondent acted in excess of powers granted him by Congress. Generally, judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 108; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 621-622; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 310. The District Court had not only jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction but also power to construe the statutes involved to determine whether the respondent did exceed his powers. If he did so, his actions would not constitute exercises of his administrative discretion, and, in such circumstances as those before us, judicial relief from this illegality would be available. Moreover, the claims presented in these cases may be entertained by the District Court because petitioners have alleged judicially cognizable injuries. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 159, 160, and see Army Regulation 615-360, par. 7. This brings us to the merits. The Solicitor General conceded that if the District Court had jurisdiction to review respondent’s determinations as to the discharges he issued these petitioners and if petitioners had standing to bring these suits, the action of respondent is not sustainable. On the basis of that concession and our consideration of the law and this record we conclude that the actions of the Secretary of the Army cannot be sustained in law. By § 652a, which provides that no person be discharged from military service “without a certificate of discharge,” Congress granted to the Secretary of the Army authority to issue discharges. By § 693h it provided for review by the Army Review Board of the exercise of such authority. Surely these two provisions must be given an harmonious reading to the end that the basis on which the Secretary’s action is reviewed is coterminous with the basis on which he is allowed to act. Section 693h expressly requires that the findings of the Army Review Board “shall be based upon all available records of the [Army] relating to the person requesting such review . . . We think the word “records,” as used in the statute, means records of military service, and that the statute, properly construed, means that the type of discharge to be issued is to be determined solely by the soldier’s military record in the Army. An authoritative construction of the congressional grant of power is to be found in the regulations of the Department of the Army. Army Regulation 615-375, par. 2 (b) states: “The purpose of a discharge certificate is to record the separation of an individual from the military service and to specify the character of service rendered during the period covered by the discharge.” (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, the Army’s Regulation 615-360, par. 7 (which was in effect during the times here involved), further states: “Because the type of discharge may significantly influence the individual’s civilian rights and eligibility for benefits provided by law, it is essential that all pertinent factors be considered so that the type of discharge will reflect accurately the nature of service rendered. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Court for the relief to which petitioners are entitled in the light of this opinion. Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NYQUIST, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF NEW YORK, et al. v. MAUCLET et al. No. 76-208. Argued March 22, 1977 — Decided June 13, 1977 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 12. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 15. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 17. Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz,. First Assistant Attorney General. Michael Davidson argued the cause for appellee Mauclet. With him on the brief was Kevin Kennedy. Gary J. Greenberg argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee Rabinovitch. MR. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. New York, by statute, bars certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education. N. Y. Educ. Law § 661 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1976). This litigation presents a constitutional challenge to that statute. I New York provides assistance, primarily in three forms, to students pursuing higher education. The first type is the Regents college scholarship. These are awarded to high school graduates on the basis of performance in a competitive examination. §§ 605 (1) and 670. Currently, in the usual case, a recipient is entitled to $250 annually for four years of study without regard to need. §§ 670 (2) and (3)(b). The second and chief form of aid is the tuition assistance award. These are noncompetitive; they are available to both graduate and undergraduate students “enrolled in approved programs and who demonstrate the ability to complete such courses.” §§ 604 (1) and 667 (1). The amount of the award depends on both tuition and income. The ceiling on assistance was $600, although it has been increased for undergraduates to $1,500. §1 667 (3) and (4). The third form of assistance is the student loan. §§ 680-684. The loan is guaranteed by the State; a borrower meeting certain income restrictions is entitled to favorable interest rates and generally to an interest-free grace period of at least nine months after he completes or terminates his course of study. §§ 680, 682 (2) and (3).- There are several general restrictions on eligibility for participation in any of these programs. § 661. For example, there is a modest durational residency requirement. § 661 (5). The instant dispute, however, concerns only § 661 (3). That subsection provides: “Citizenship. An applicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or (b) must have made application to become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified for citizenship, must submit a statement affirming intent to apply for United States citizenship as soon as he has the qualifications, and must apply as soon as eligible for citizenship, or (d) must be an individual of a class of refugees paroled by the attorney general of the United States under his parole authority pertaining to the admission of aliens to the United States.” The statute obviously serves to bar from the assistance programs the participation of all aliens who do not satisfy its terms. Since many aliens, such as those here on student visas, may be precluded by federal law from establishing a permanent residence in this country, see, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15) (F) (i); 22 CFR §41.45 (1976), the bar of § 661 (3) is of practical significance only to resident aliens. The Court has observed of this affected group: “Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society.” In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722 (1973). II Appellee Jean-Marie Mauclet is a citizen of France and has lived in New York since April 1969. He has been a permanent resident of the United States since November of that year. He is married to a United States citizen and has a child by that marriage. The child is also a United States citizen. App. 49. Mauclet by affidavit stated: “Although I am presently qualified to apply for citizenship and intend to reside permanently in the United States, I do not wish to relinquish my French citizenship at this time.” Id., at 50. He applied for a tuition assistance award to aid in meeting the expenses of his graduate studies at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Because of his refusal to apply for United States citizenship, his application was. not processed. Id., at 49-50. Appellee Alan Rabinovitch is a citizen of Canada. He was admitted to this country in 1964 at the age of nine as a permanent resident alien. He is unmarried and, since his admission, has lived in New York with his parents and a younger sister, all of whom are Canadian citizens. He registered with Selective Service on his 18th birthday. He graduated in 1973 from the New York public school system. Id., at 68, 71. As a result of a commendable performance on the competitive Regents Qualifying Examinations, Rabinovitch was informed that he was qualified for, and entitled to, a Regents college scholarship and tuition assistance. He later was advised, however, that the offer of the scholarship was withdrawn since he intended to retain his Canadian citizenship. Id., at 69, 25. Rabinovitch entered Brooklyn College without financial aid from the State. He states that he “does not intend to become a naturalized American, but . . . does intend to continue to reside in New York.” Id., at 65. Mauclet and Rabinovitch each brought suit in United States District Court (Mauclet in the Western District of New York and Rabinovitch in the Eastern District), alleging that the citizenship bar of § 661 (3) was unconstitutional. The same three-judge court was convened for each of the cases. Subsequently, it was ordered that the cases be heard together. App. 45. After cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court in a unanimous opinion ruled in appellees’ favor. It held that § 661 (3) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the citizenship requirement served to discriminate unconstitutionally against resident aliens. 406 F. Supp. 1233 (WDNY and EDNY 1976). Its enforcement was enjoined in separate judgments. App. 103, 106. Appellants — the various individuals and corporate entities responsible for administering the State’s educational assistance programs — challenge this determination. We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 917 (1976). III The Court has ruled that classifications by a State that are based on alienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). See Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 601-602 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 642 (1973). In undertaking this scrutiny, “the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.” Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 605. See In re Griffiths, 413 U. S., at 721-722. Alienage classifications by a State that do not withstand this stringent examination cannot stand. Appellants claim that § 661 (3) should not be subjected to such strict scrutiny because it does not impose a classification based on alienage. Aliens who have applied for citizenship, or, if not qualified for it, who have filed a statement of intent to apply as soon as they are eligible, are allowed to participate in the assistance programs. Hence, it is said, the statute distinguishes “only within the 'heterogeneous’ class of aliens” and “does not distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non.” Brief for Appellants 20. Only statutory classifications of the latter type, appellants assert, warrant strict scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, supra, undermines appellants’ position. In that case, the Court considered an Arizona statute that imposed a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits on aliens but not on citizens. Like the New York statute challenged here, the Arizona statute served to discriminate only within the class of aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled to welfare benefits. The Court nonetheless subjected the statute to strict scrutiny and held it unconstitutional. The important points are that § 661 (3) is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class. Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 504-505, n. 11 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 169, 172 (1972). Appellants also assert that there are adequate justifications for § 661 (3). First, the section is said to offer an incentive for aliens to become naturalized. Second, the restriction on assistance to only those who are or will become eligible to vote is tailored to the purpose of the assistance program, namely, the enhancement of the educational level of the electorate. Brief for Appellants 22-25. Both justifications are claimed to be related to New York’s interest in the preservation of its “political community.” See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642-643, 647-649; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 344 (1972). The first purpose offered by the appellants, directed to what they describe as some “degree of national affinity,” Brief for Appellants 18, however, is not a permissible one for a State. Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere. U. S. Const., Art I, § 8, cl. 4. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 84-85 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410, 419 (1948). But even if we accept, arguendo, the validity of the proffered justifications, we find them inadequate to support the ban. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642, the Court recognized that the State’s interest “in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within 'the basic conception of a political community’ ” might justify some consideration of alienage. But as Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State’s historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters, or of “elective or important nonelective” officials “who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.” Id., at 647. See id., at 648. In re Griffiths, decided the same day, reflects the narrowness of the exception. In that case, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys, the Court found invalid a state-court rule limiting the practice of law to citizens. 413 U. S., at 729. Certainly, the justifications for § 661 (3) offered by appellants sweep far beyond the confines of the exception defined in Sugarman. If the encouragement of naturalization through these programs were seen as adequate, then every discrimination against aliens could be similarly justified. The exception would swallow the rule. Sugarman clearly does not tolerate that result. Nor does the claimed interest in educating the electorate provide a justification; although such education is a laudable objective, it hardly would be frustrated by including resident aliens, as well as citizens, in the State’s assistance programs. Resident aliens are obligated to pay their full share of the taxes that support the assistance programs. There thus is no real unfairness in allowing resident aliens an equal right to participate in programs to which they contribute on an equal basis. And although an alien may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he may play a role — perhaps even a leadership role — in other areas of import to the community. The State surely is not harmed by providing resident aliens the same educational opportunity it offers to others. Since we hold that the challenged statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, we need not reach appellees’ claim that it also intrudes upon Congress’ comprehensive authority over immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 378; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915). The judgments of the District Court are affirmed. It is so ordered. There also are other special competitive awards: Regents professional education in nursing scholarships, N. Y. Educ. Law §§ 605 (2) and 671 (McKinney Supp. 1976); Regents professional education in medicine or dentistry scholarships, §§ 605 (3) and 672; Regents physician shortage scholarships, §§ 605 (4) and 673; Regents war veteran scholarships, §§ 605 (5) and 674; and Regents Cornell University scholarships, § 605 (6). The loan program is largely subsidized by the Federal Government. See 20 U. S. C. §§1071 to 1087-2 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). (In fiscal 1976 the federal expenditure for New York’s loan program was $67,208,000 and the state contribution was $9,466,000. Brief for Appellants 8 n. * and 17 n. *.) Although it appears that federal administrators have not lodged objections to the State’s practice of disqualifying certain resident aliens, see App. 82, the federal standards would make eligible for assistance an alien student who “is in the United States for other than a temporary purpose and intends to become a permanent resident thereof.” 45 CFR§ 177.2 (a) (1976). This requirement is not the subject of challenge here. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U. S. 985 (1971), aff’g 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970). Section 661 (3) replaced former § 602 (2) of the State’s Education Law, in effect at the times appellees’ complaints were filed. 1974 N. Y. Laws, c. 942. Clause (d) was added after the commencement of the suits. 1975 N. Y. Laws, c. 663, § 1. Since clause (d) serves to make a class of aliens eligible for aid without regard to citizenship or intent to apply for citizenship, its inclusion serves to undermine the State’s arguments as to the purposes served by the first three clauses. See n. 13, infra. In order to become a United States citizen, Mauclet would be required to renounce bis French citizenship. 8 U. S. G. § 1448 (a). Other courts also have held that discrimination against resident aliens in the distribution of educational assistance is impermissible. See, e. g., Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F. 2d 577 (CA3 1972); Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F. Supp. 1178 (ND Miss. 1974), appealed on damages and aff’d, 538 F. 2d 1166 (CA5 1976), cert. pending, No. 76-832. Appellants also argue that the District Court should not have reached the question of the applicability of § 661 (3) to the loan program because appellee Rabinovitch, who alone challenged this aspect of the assistance program, had not been denied a loan. Hence, appellants assert, he lacks standing. Early in the litigation, however, Rabinovitch submitted an unrebutted affidavit to the effect that he believed that he “may require student loans to help cover the cost of” his education and that he was “barred from receiving a student loan simply because of [his] status as an alien.” App. 71. Indeed, appellants conceded in the District Court that any application from Rabinovitch for a loan would be refused because of § 661 (3). 406 F. Supp., at 1235. It is clear, therefore, that Art. Ill adverseness existed between the parties and that the dispute is a concrete one. The only obstacle to standing, under the circumstances, would arise from prudential considerations. And we see no reason to postpone resolution of the dispute. Rabinovitch has been denied other forms of aid and little is to be served by requiring him now to go through the formality of submitting an application for a loan, in light of the certainty of its denial. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264 (1977). Until oral argument, appellants suggested no reason why the loan program should differ from the other forms of assistance. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. In the absence of a more timely suggestion supporting a distinction among the forms of aid, we think that nothing is to be gained by adjudicating the validity of § 661 (3) with regard to only two of the three primary assistance programs. After all, the single statutory proscription applies with equal force to all the programs. In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976), the Court applied relaxed scrutiny in upholding the validity of a federal statute that conditioned an alien’s eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on the satisfaction of a durational residency requirement, but imposed no similar burden on citizens. The appellants can draw no solace from the ease, however, because the Court was at pains to emphasize that Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the States. Id., at 84-87. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100-101 (1976); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 358 n. 6 (1976). It is perhaps worthy of note that the Medicare program under consideration in Diaz granted a permanent resident alien eligibility when he had resided in the United States for five years. Five years’ residence is also the generally required period under federal law before an alien may seek to be naturalized. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a). Yet, ironically, this is precisely the point at which, in New York, a resident must petition for naturalization or, irrespective of declared intent, lose his eligibility for higher education assistance. Appellants also seem to assert that strict scrutiny should not be applied because aid to education does not deny an alien “access to the necessities of life.” Brief for Appellants 21. They are joined in this view by The Chief Justice in dissent. Suffice it to say, the statutory statement of purpose for the aid programs reflects the State’s contrary position: “In a world of unmatched scientific progress and technological advance, as well as of unparalleled danger to human freedom, learning has never been more crucial to man’s safety, progress and individual fulfillment. In the state and nation higher education no longer is a luxury; it is a necessity for strength, fulfillment and survival.” 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § Ka). And, in any event, the Court noted in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971), that classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny whether or not a fundamental right is impaired.” The District Court dealt abruptly with appellants’ contention: “This argument defies logic. Those aliens who apply, or agree to apply when eligible, for citizenship are relinquishing their alien status. Because some aliens agree under the statute’s coercion to change their status does not alter the fact that the classification is based solely on alienage.” 406 F. Supp., at 1235. Our Brother Rehnquist argues in dissent that strict scrutiny is inappropriate because under § 661 (3) a resident alien can voluntarily withdraw from disfavored status. But this aspect of the statute hardly distinguishes our past decisions. By the logic of the dissenting opinion, the suspect class for alienage would be defined to include at most only those who have resided in this country for less than five years, since after that time, if not before, resident aliens are generally eligible to become citizens. 8 U. S. C. § 1427 (a). The Court has never suggested, however, that the suspect class is to be defined so narrowly. In fact, the element of voluntariness in a resident alien’s retention of alien status is a recognized element in several of the Court’s decisions. For example, the Court acknowledged that In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973), involved an appellant who was eligible for citizenship, but who had not filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen, and had “no present intention of doing so.” Id., 718 n. 1. And, insofar as the record revealed, nothing precluded the appellees in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), from applying for citizenship. Id., at 650 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent there, just as he does here today, that strict scrutiny was inappropriate in those cases because there was nothing to indicate that the aliens’ status “cannot be changed by their affirmative acts.” Id., at 657. Nonetheless, the Court applied strict scrutiny in the cases. We see no reason to depart from them now. The footnote reads in part: “That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children.” In support of the justifications offered for §661 (3), appellants refer to a statement of purpose in legislation adopted in 1961 that substantially amended the State’s aid programs. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 389, § 1. But the statement speaks only in general terms of encouraging education so as “to provide the broad range of leadership, inventive genius, and source of economic and cultural growth for oncoming generations,” § 1 (a), and of developing fully a “reservoir of talent and future leadership,” § 1 (c)— purposes that would be served by extending aid to resident aliens as well as to citizens — and hardly supports appellants in clear and unambiguous terms. Moreover, the statutory discrimination against aliens with regard to certain Regents scholarships dates from long before. 1920 N. Y. Laws, c. 502, § 1. And the very 1961 legislation on which appellants rely abolished the statutory disqualification of aliens in favor of an administrative rule. 1961 N. Y. Laws, c. 391, §§ 2 and 18. See also §§ 7, 14, and 19. In fact, it appears that the state administrators of the aid programs did not find the purposes in the 1961 legislation that appellants urge, since between 1961 and 1969, when the precursor of § 661 (3) was adopted, resident aliens were allowed to receive tuition assistance awards. Brief for Appellants 15. See also Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (Md. 1974), summarily aff'd, 426 U. S. 913 (1976). Although the record does not reveal the number of aliens who are disqualified by §661 (3), there is a suggestion that the number may be exceedingly small. See Brief for Appellee Mauclet 9 n. 4. Indeed, when asked about the cost of including aliens, appellants conceded at oral argument that “we may not be speaking about very much.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Thus, it appears that the inclusion of resident aliens in the assistance programs will have an insubstantial impact on the cost of the programs. And, in any event, the suggestion that the State can favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of benefits was largely rejected in Graham v. Richardson, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LAMPF, PLEVA, LIPKIND, PRUPIS & PETIGROW v. GILBERTSON et al. No. 90-333. Argued February 19, 1991 Decided June 20, 1991 Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., S. Joel Wilson, and R. Daniel Lindahl. Stephen M. Shapiro and Mark I. Levy filed a brief for Comdisco, Inc., et al., as respondents under this Court’s Rule 12.4, in support of petitioner. F. Gordon Allen argued the cause for respondents Gilbert-son et al. With him on the brief were Barry W. Dod and Gary M. Berne. Eldon Olson, Jon N. Ekdahl, Harris J. Amhowitz, Carl D. Liggio, and Leonard P. Novello filed a brief for Arthur Andersen & Co. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Leonard Barrack filed a brief for the National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Securities and Exchange Commission by Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Michael R. Dreeben, James R. Doty, Paul Gonson, and Jacob H. Stillman; for the American Council of Life Insurance by Laiurence J. Latt-o, John Townsend Rich, Richard E. Bamsback, and Phillip E. Stano; for the Bond Investors Association by David J. Guin, David R. Donaldson, J. Michael Rediker, and Thomas L. Krebs; and for the Securities Industry Association by Thomas C. Walsh, John Michael Clear, Leo J. Asaro, and William J. Fitzpatrick. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-A. In this litigation we must determine which statute of limitations is applicable to a private suit brought pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and to Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1990), promulgated thereunder. I The controversy arises from the sale of seven Connecticut limited partnerships formed for the purpose of purchasing and leasing computer hardware and software. Petitioner Lampf, Pleva, Lipldnd, Prupis & Petigrow is a West Orange, N. J., law firm that aided in organizing the partnerships and that provided additional legal services, including the preparation of opinion letters addressing the tax consequences of investing in the partnerships. The several plaintiff-respondents purchased units in one or more of the partnerships during the years 1979 through 1981 with the expectation of realizing federal income tax benefits therefrom. The partnerships failed, due in part to obsolescence of their wares. In late 1982 and early 1983, plaintiff-respondents received notice that the United States Internal Revenue Service was investigating the partnerships. The IRS subsequently disallowed the claimed tax benefits because of overvaluation of partnership assets and lack of profit motive. On November 3, 1986, and June 4, 1987, plaintiff-respondents filed their respective complaints in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, naming as defendants petitioner and others involved in the preparation of offering memoranda for the partnerships. The complaints alleged that plaintiff-respondents were induced to invest in the partnerships by misrepresentations in the offering memo-randa, in violation of, among other things, § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. The claimed misrepresentations were said to include assurances that the investments would entitle the purchasers to substantial tax benefits; that the leasing of the hardware and software packages would generate a profit; that the software was readily marketable; and that certain equipment appraisals were accurate and reasonable. Plaintiff-respondents asserted that they became aware of the alleged misrepresentations only in 1985 following the disallowance by the IRS of the tax benefits claimed. After consolidating the actions for discovery and pretrial proceedings, the District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the complaints were not timely filed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22A. Following precedent of its controlling court, see, e. g., Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F. 2d 641 (CA9 1980), the District Court ruled that the securities claims were governed by the state statute of limitations for the most analogous forum-state cause of action. The court determined this to be Oregon’s 2-year limitations period for fraud claims, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1) (1989). The court found that reports to plaintiff-respondents detailing the declining financial status of each partnership and allegations of misconduct made known to the general partners put plaintiff-respondents on “inquiry notice” of the possibility of fraud as early as October 1982. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43A. The court also ruled that the distribution of certain fiscal reports and the installation of a general partner previously associated with the defendants did not constitute fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Applying the Oregon statute to the facts underlying plaintiff-respondents’ claims, the District Court determined that each complaint was time barred. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the cases. See, e. g., Reitz v. Leasing Consultants Associates, 895 F. 2d 1418 (1990) (judgment order). In its unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals found that unresolved factual issues as to when plaintiff-respondents discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud precluded summary judgment. Then, as did the District Court, it selected the 2-year Oregon limitations period. In so doing, it implicitly rejected petitioner’s argument that a federal limitations period should apply to Rule 10b-5 claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8A. In view of the divergence of opinion among the Circuits regarding the proper limitations period for Rule 10b-5 claims, we granted certiorari to address this important issue. 498 U. S. 894 (1990). I — l Plaintiff-respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals correctly identified common-law fraud as the source from which § 10(b) limitations should be derived. They submit that the underlying policies and practicalities of § 10(b) litigation do not justify a departure from the traditional practice of “borrowing” analogous state-law statutes of limitations. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that a federal period is appropriate, contending that we must look to the “l-and-3year” structure applicable to the express causes of action in § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77m, and to certain of the express actions in the 1934 Act, see 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), and 78cc(b). The Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission, agrees that use of a federal period is indicated, but urges the application of the 5-year statute of repose specified in §20A of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78t—1(b)(4), as added by § 5 of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4681. The 5-year period, it is said, accords with “Congress’s most recent views on the accommodation of competing interests, provides the closest federal analogy, and promises to yield the best practical and policy results in Rule 10b-5 litigation.” Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae 8. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that a uniform federal period is indicated, but we hold that the express causes of action contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide the source. A It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, a court “borrows” or “absorbs” the local time limitation most analogous to the case at hand. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 266-267 (1985); Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 704 (1966); Campbell v. Ha-verhill, 155 U. S. 610, 617 (1895). This practice, derived from the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652, has enjoyed sufficient longevity that we may assume that, in enacting remedial legislation, Congress ordinarily “intends by its silence that we borrow state law.” Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 147 (1987). The rule, however, is not without exception. We have recognized that a state legislature rarely enacts a limitations period with federal interests in mind, Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 367 (1977), and when the operation of a state limitations period would frustrate the policies embraced by the federal enactment, this Court has looked to federal law for a suitable period. See, e. g., DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 (1983); Agency Holding Corp., supra; McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221, 224 (1958). These departures from the state-borrowing doctrine have been motivated by this Court’s conclusion that it would be “inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.” DelCos-tello, 462 U. S., at 161. Rooted as it is in the expectations of Congress, borrowing doctrine” may not be lightly abandoned. We have described federal borrowing as “a closely circumscribed exception,” to be made “only ‘when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.’” Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U. S. 319, 324 (1989), quoting DelCostello, 462 U. S., at 172. Predictably, this a ognizing, however, that a period must be selected, our cases do provide some guidance as to whether state or federal borrowing is appropriate and as to the period best suited to the cause of action under consideration. From these cases we are able to distill a hierarchical inquiry for ascertaining the appropriate limitations period for a federal cause of action where Congress has not set the time -within which such-an action must be brought. First, the court must determine whether a uniform statute of limitations is to be selected. Where a federal cause of action tends in practice to “encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics,” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S., at 273, such that a single state limitations period may not be consistently applied within a jurisdiction, we have concluded that the federal interests in predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for borrowing purposes. Id., at 273-275. This conclusion ultimately may result in the selection of a single federal provision, see Agency Holding Corp., supra, or of a single variety of state actions. See Wilson v. Garcia (characterizing all actions under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as analogous to a state-law personal injury action). Second, assuming a uniform limitations period is appropriate, the court must decide whether this period should be derived from a state or a federal source. In making this judgment, the court should accord particular weight to the geographic character of the claim: “The multistate nature of [the federal cause of action at issue] indicates the desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility of multiple state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shopping and, at the very least, would ‘virtually guarante[e] . . . complex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward matter.’” Agency Holding Corp., 483 U. S., at 154, quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 392 (1985). Finally, even where geographic considerations counsel federal borrowing, the aforementioned presumption of state borrowing requires that a court determine that an analogous federal source truly affords a “closer fit” with the cause of action at issue than does any available state-law source. Although considerations pertinent to this determination will necessarily vary depending upon the federal cause of action and the available state and federal analogues, such factors as commonality of purpose and similarity of elements will be relevant. B In the present litigation, our task is complicated by the nontraditional origins of the § 10(b) cause of action. The text of § 10(b) does not provide for private claims. Such claims are of judicial creation, having been implied under the statute for nearly half a century. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 1946), cited in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196, n. 16 (1976). Although this Court repeatedly has recognized the validity of such claims, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971), we have made no pretense that it was Congress’ design to provide the remedy afforded. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U. S., at 196 (“[T]here is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy”) (footnotes omitted). It is therefore no surprise that the provision contains no statute of limitations. In a case such as this, we are faced with the awkward task of discerning the limitations period that Congress intended courts to apply to a cause of action it really never knew existed. Fortunately, however, the drafters of § 10(b) have provided guidance. We conclude that where, as here, the claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper limitations period. We can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would have balanced the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck by the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections. See DelCostello, 462 U. S., at 171; United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 69-70 (1981) (opinion concurring in judgment). When the statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be at an end. Only where no analogous counterpart is available should a court then proceed to apply state-borrowing principles. In the present litigation, there can be no doubt that the contemporaneously enacted express remedial provisions represent “a federal statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake here — a statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than any of the suggested state-law parallels.” DelCostello, 462 U. S., at 169. The 1934 Act contained a number of express causes of action, each with an explicit limitations period. With only one more restrictive exception, each of these includes some variation of a 1-year period after discovery combined with a 3-year period of repose. In adopting the 1934 Act, the 73d Congress also amended the limitations provision of the 1933 Act, adopting the l-and-3-year structure for each cause of action contained therein. Section 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 the -willful manipulation of security prices, and §18, 15 U. S. C. §78r, relating to misleading filings, target the precise dangers that are the focus of § 10(b). Each is an integral element of a complex web of regulations. Each was intended to facilitate a central goal: “to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U. S., at 195, citing S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). C We therefore conclude that we must reject the Commission’s contention that the 5-year period contained in § 20A, added to the 1934 Act in 1988, is more appropriate for § 10(b) actions than is the l-and-3-year structure in the Act’s original remedial provisions. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, which became law more than 50 years after the original securities statutes, focuses upon a specific problem, namely, the “purchasing or selling [of] a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information,” 15 U. S. C. §78t-1(a), that is, “insider trading.” Recognizing the unique difficulties in identifying evidence of such activities, the 100th Congress adopted § 20A as one of “a variety of measures designed to provide greater deterrence, detection and punishment of violations of insider trading.” H. R. Rep. No. 100-910, p. 7 (1988). There is no indication that the drafters of §20A sought to extend that enhanced protection to other provisions of the 1934 Act. Indeed, the text of § 20A indicates the contrary. Section 20A(d) states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of this chapter or the availability of any cause of action implied from a provision of this chapter.” 15 U. S. C. § 78t-1(d). The Commission further argues that because some conduct that is violative of § 10(b) is also actionable under § 20A, adoption of a l-and-3-year structure would subject actions based on § 10(b) to two different statutes of limitations. But § 20A also prohibits insider trading activities that violate sections of the 1934 Act with express limitations periods. The language of § 20A makes clear that the 100th Congress sought to alter the remedies available in insider trading cases, and only in insider trading cases. There is no inconsistency. Finally, the year period of repose would frustrate the policies underlying § 10(b). The inclusion, however, of the l-and-3-year structure in the broad range of express securities actions contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts suggests a congressional determination that a 3-year period is sufficient. See Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, 918 F. 2d 349, 363 (CA2 1990). Thus, we agree every called upon to apply a federal statute of limitations to a § 10(b) claim that the express causes of action contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide a more appropriate statute of limitations than does § 20A. See Ceres Partners, supra; Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F. 2d 1385 (CA7 1990), cert. pending, No. 90-526; In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F. 2d 1537 (CA3), cert. denied sub nom. Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U. S. 849 (1988). Necessarily, we that state-law fraud provides the closest analogy to § 10(b). The analytical framework we adopt above makes consideration of state-law alternatives unnecessary where Congress has provided an express limitations period for correlative remedies within the same enactment. M ) — I I — I Finally, we address plaintiff-respondents’ contention that, whatever limitations period is applicable to § 10(b) claims, that period must be subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Plaintiff-respondents note, correctly, that “[t]ime requirements in lawsuits . . . are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling.’” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990), citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). Thus, this Court has said that in the usual case, “where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.” Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348 (1875); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396-397 (1946). Notwithstanding this venerable principle, it is evident that the equitable tolling doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the l-and-3-year structure. The 1-year period, by its terms, begins after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, making tolling unnecessary. The 3-year limit is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling. One commentator explains: “[T]he inclusion of the three-year period can have no significance in this context other than to impose an outside limit.” Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 235, 288 (1989). See also ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions 645, 655 (1986) (advancing “the inescapable conclusion that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply in actions under the securities laws”). Because the purpose of the 3-year limitation is clearly to serve as a cutoff, we hold that tolling principles do not apply to that period. IV Litigation instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 therefore must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation. As there is no dispute that the earliest of plaintiff-respondents’ complaints was filed more than three years after petitioner’s alleged misrepresentations, plaintiff-respondents’ claims were untimely. The judgment of the It is so ordered. See, e. g., Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F. 2d 380 (CA9 1990) (applying state limitations period governing common-law fraud); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F. 2d 817 (CA10 1990) (same); O’Hara v. Kovens, 625 F. 2d 15 (CA4 1980) (applying state blue sky limitations period), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1124 (1981); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 225, 551 F. 2d 411 (1977) (same); In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F. 2d 1537 (CA3) (establishing uniform federal period), cert. denied sub nom. Vitiello v. I. Kahlowsky & Co., 488 U. S. 849 (1988); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F. 2d 1385 (CA7 1990), cert. pending, No. 90-526 (same). Although not identical in language, all these relate to one year after discovery and to three years after violation. On rare occasions, this Court has found it to be Congress’ intent that no time limitation be imposed upon a federal cause of action. See, e. g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355 (1977). No party in the present litigation argues that this was Congress’ purpose in enacting § 10(b), and we agree that there is no evidence of such intent. Section 10 of the 1934 Act provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange— “(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U. S. C. §78j. Commission Rule 10b-5, first promulgated in 1942, now provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, “(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, “(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or “(c) To engage in any act, or course or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1990). Section 16(b), 15 U. S. C. §78p(b), sets a 2-year rather than a 3-year period of repose. Because that provision requires the disgorgement of unlawful profits and differs in focus from § 10(b) and from the other express causes of action, we do not find § 16(b) to be an appropriate source from which to borrow a limitations period here. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act provides: “No action section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.” 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e). Section 18(c) of the 1934 Act provides: “No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued.” 15 U. S. C. §78r(c). Section 13 of the 1933 Act, as so amended, provides: “No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dilligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 77l(l) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under section 77k or 77l(1) of this title more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 77l(2) of this title more than three years after the sale.” 15 U. S. C. § 77m. Justice Kennedy would borrow the 1-year limitations period contained in the 1934 Act but not the accompanying period of repose. In our view, the l-and-3-year scheme represents an indivisible determination by Congress as to the appropriate cutoff point for claims under the statute. It would disserve that legislative determination to sever the two periods. Moreover, we find no support in our cases for the practice of borrowing only a portion of an express statute of limitations. Indeed, such a practice comes close to the type of judicial policymaking that our borrowing doctrine was intended to avoid. The Commission notes, correctly, that the various l-and-3-year periods contained in the 1934 and 1933 Acts differ slightly in terminology. To the extent that these distinctions in the future might prove significant, we select as the governing standard for an action under § 10(b) the language of § 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i(e). Section 313(a) of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5114, reads: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.” Section 313(c) states that the “amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to causes of action accruing on or after the date [December 1, 1990,] of the enactment of this Act.” This new statute obviously has no application in the present litigation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LIVADAS v. BRADSHAW, CALIFORNIA LABOR COMMISSIONER No. 92-1920. Argued April 26, 1994 Decided June 13, 1994 Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Richard G. McCracken argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Michael T Anderson. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Amy L. Wax, Linda Sher, and Norton J. Come. H. Thomas Cadell, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Allied Educational Foundation by Bertram R. Gelfand and Jeffrey C. Dannenberg; and for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Mark Schneider, Marsha S. Berzon, Laurence Gold, and Walter Kamiat. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Marshall B. Babson, Stanley R. Strauss, Stephen A Bokat, Mona C. Zeiberg, Jan Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; and for the Employers Group et al. by Steven G. Drapkin. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. California law requires employers to pay all wages due immediately upon an employee’s discharge, imposes a penalty for refusal to pay promptly, precludes any private contractual waiver of these minimum labor standards, and places responsibility for enforcing these provisions on the State Commissioner of Labor (Commissioner or Labor Commissioner), ostensibly for the benefit of all employees. Respondent, the Labor Commissioner, has construed a further provision of state law as barring enforcement of these wage and penalty claims on behalf of individuals like petitioner, whose terms and conditions of employment are governed by a collective-bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause. We hold that federal law pre-empts this policy, as abridging the exercise of such employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq., and that redress for this unlawful refusal to enforce may be had under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. I Until her discharge on January 2, 1990, petitioner Karen Livadas worked as a grocery clerk in a Vallejo, California, Safeway supermarket. The terms and conditions of her employment were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement between Safeway and Livadas’s union, Local 373 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO. Unexceptionally, the agreement provided that “[disputes as to the interpretation or application of the agreement,” including grievances arising from allegedly unjust discharge or suspension, would be subject to binding arbitration. See Food Store Contract, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 373, AFL-CIO, Solano and Napa Counties §§ 18.2,18.3 (Mar. 1, 1989-Feb. 29, 1992) (Food Store Contract). When notified of her discharge, Livadas demanded immediate payment of wages owed her, as guaranteed to all California workers by state law, see Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §201 (West 1989), but her store manager refused, referring to the company practice of making such payments by check mailed from a central corporate payroll office. On January 5,1990, Livadas received a check from Safeway, in the full amount owed for her work through January 2. On January 9,1990, Livadas filed a claim against Safeway with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE or Division), asserting that under § 203 of the Labor Code the company was liable to her for a sum equal to three days’ wages, as a penalty for the delay between discharge and the date when payment was in fact received. Livadas requested the Commissioner to enforce the claim. By an apparently standard form letter dated February 7, 1990, the Division notified Livadas that it would take no action on her complaint: “It is our understanding that the employees working for Safeway are covered by a collective bargaining agreement which contains an arbitration clause. The provisions of Labor Code Section 229 preclude this Division from adjudicating any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause. “Labor Code Section 203 requires that the wages continue at the ‘same rate’ until paid. In order to establish what the ‘same rate’ was, it is necessary to look to the collective bargaining agreement and ‘apply’ that agreement. The courts have pointed out that such an application is exactly what the provisions of Labor Code § 229 prohibit.” App. 16. The letter made no reference to any particular aspect of Livadas’s claim making it unfit for enforcement, and the Commissioner’s position is fairly taken to be that DLSE enforcement of § 203 claims, as well as other claims for which relief is pegged to an employee’s wage rate, is generally unavailable to employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements. Livadas brought this action in the United States District Court under Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the nonenforcement policy, reflecting the Commissioner’s reading of Labor Code § 229, was pre-empted as conflicting with Livadas’s rights under § 7 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 157, because the policy placed a penalty on the exercise of her statutory right to bargain collectively with her employer. She stressed that there was no dispute about the amount owed and that neither she nor Safeway had begun any grievance proceeding over the penalty. Livadas sought a declaration that the Commissioner’s interpretation of §229 was pre-empted, an injunction against adherence to the allegedly impermissible policy, and an order requiring the Commissioner either to process her penalty claim or (if it would be time barred under state law) pay her damages in the amount the Commissioner would have obtained if the Commissioner had moved against the employer in time. The District Court granted summary judgment for Livadas, holding the labor pre-emption claim cognizable under § 1983, see Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103 (1989) (Golden State II), and the Commissioner’s policy pre-empted as interfering with her § 7 right, see, e. g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U. S. 608 (1986) (Golden State I), by denying her the benefit of a minimum labor standard, namely, the right to timely payment of final wages secured by Labor Code §§201 and 203. 749 F. Supp. 1526 (ND Cal. 1990). The District Court treated as irrelevant the Commissioner’s assertion that the policy was consistent with state law (e. g., Labor Code § 229) and rejected the defense that it was required by federal law, namely, § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), which has been read to pre-empt state-court resolution of disputes turning on the rights of parties under collective-bargaining agreements. The District Court explained that resolution of the claim under § 203 “requires reference only to a calendar, not to the [collective-bargaining agreement],” 749 F. Supp., at 1536, and granted petitioner all requested relief. Id., at 1540. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 987 F. 2d 552 (1993). The court acknowledged that federal law gives Livadas a right to engage in collective bargaining and that § 1983 would supply a remedy for official deprivation of that right, but the panel majority concluded that no federal right had been infringed. The court reasoned that the policy was based on the Commissioner’s reading of Labor Code § 229, whose function of keeping state tribunals from adjudicating claims in a way that would interfere with the operation of federal labor policy is, by definition, consistent with the dictates of federal law. Noting that Livadas did not assert pre-emption of § 229 itself or object to the California courts’ interpretation of it, the majority concluded that her case reduced to an assertion that the Commissioner had misinterpreted state law, an error for which relief could be obtained in California courts. Livadas could not claim to be “penalized,” the Appeals panel then observed, for she stood “in the same position as every other employee in the state when it comes to seeking the Commissioner’s enforcement. Every employee ... is subject to an eligibility determination, and every employee ... is subject to the risk that the Commissioner will get it wrong.” 987 F. 2d, at 559. The Ninth Circuit majority concluded by invoking the “general policies of federal labor law” strongly favoring the arbitration of disputes and reasoning that, “Congress would not want state officials erring on the side of adjudicating state law disputes whenever it is a close call as to whether a claim is preempted.” Id., at 560. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1083 (1994), to address the important questions of federal labor law implicated by the Commissioner’s policy, and we now reverse. II A A state rule predicating benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law poses special dangers of interference with congressional purpose. In Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235 (1967), a unanimous Court held that a state policy of withholding unemployment benefits solely because an employee had filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board had a “direct tendency to frustrate the purpose of Congress” and, if not pre-empted, would “defeat or handicap a valid national objective by . . . withdrawing] state benefits . . . simply because” an employee engages in conduct protected and encouraged by the NLRA. Id., at 239; see also Golden State I, supra, at 618 (city may not condition franchise renewal on settlement of labor dispute). This case is fundamentally no different from Nash. Just as the respondent state commission in that case offered an employee the choice of pursuing her unfair labor practice claim or receiving unemployment compensation, the Commissioner has presented Livadas and others like her with the choice of having state-law rights under §§201 and 203 enforced or exercising the right to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause. This unappetizing choice, we conclude, was not intended by Congress, see infra, at 130, and cannot ultimately be reconciled with a statutory scheme premised on the centrality of the right to bargain collectively and the desirability of resolving contract disputes through arbitration. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 755 (1985) (state law held not pre-empted because it “neither encourage[s] nor discouragefs] the collective-bargaining processes”). B 1 The Commissioner’s answers to this pre-emption conclusion flow from two significant misunderstandings of law. First, the Commissioner conflates the policy that Livadas challenges with the state law on which it purports to rest, Labor Code §229, assuming that if the statutory provision is consistent with federal law, her policy must be also. But on this logic, a policy of issuing general search warrants would be justified if it were adopted to implement a state statute codifying word-for-word the “good-faith” exception to the valid warrant requirement recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984). The relationship between policy and state statute and between the statute and federal law is, in any event, irrelevant. The question presented by this case is not whether Labor Code § 229 is valid under the Federal Constitution or whether the Commissioner’s policy is, as a matter of state law, a proper interpretation of § 229. Pre-emption analysis, rather, turns on the actual content of respondent’s policy and its real effect on federal rights. See Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235 (1967) (holding pre-empted an administrative policy interpreting presumably valid state unemployment insurance law exception for “labor disputes” to include proceedings under NLRB complaints); see also 987 F. 2d, at 561 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Having sought to lead us to the wrong question, the Commissioner proposes the wrong approach for answering it, defending the distinction drawn in the challenged statutory interpretation, between employees represented by unions and those who are not, as supported by a “rational basis,” see, e. g., Brief for Respondent 17. But such reasoning mistakes a standard for validity under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses for what the Supremacy Clause requires. The power to tax is no less the power to destroy, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), merely because a state legislature has an undoubtedly rational and “legitimate” interest in raising revenue. In labor pre-emption cases, as in others under the Supremacy Clause, our office is not to pass judgment on the reasonableness of state policy, see, e. g., Golden State I, 475 U. S. 608 (1986) (city’s desire to remain “neutral” in labor dispute does not determine pre-emption). It is instead to decide if a state rule conflicts with or otherwise “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the federal law. Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 501 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is not to say, of course, that the several rationales for the policy urged on the Court by the Commissioner and amici are beside the point here. If, most obviously, the Commissioner’s policy were actually compelled by federal law, as she argues it is, we could hardly say that it was, simultaneously, pre-empted; at the least, our task would then be one of harmonizing statutory law. But we entertain this and other justifications claimed, not because constitutional analysis under the Supremacy Clause is an open-ended balancing act, simply weighing the federal interest against the intensity of local feeling, see id., at 503, but because claims of justification can sometimes help us to discern congressional purpose, the “ultimate touchstone” of our enquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U. S. 519, 533 (1979) (plurality opinion). 2 We begin with the most complete of the defenses mounted by the Commissioner, one that seems (or seemed until recently, at least) to be at the heart of her position: that the challenged policy, far from being pre-empted by federal law, is positively compelled by it, and that even if the Commissioner had been so inclined, the LMRA § 301 would have precluded enforcement of Livadas’s penalty claim. The non-enforcement policy, she suggests, is a necessary emanation from this Court’s §301 pre-emption jurisprudence, marked as it has been by repeated admonitions that courts should steer clear of collective-bargaining disputes between parties who have provided for arbitration. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202 (1985). Because, this argument runs (and Livadas was told in the DLSE no-action letter), disposition of a union-represented employee’s penalty claim entails the “interpretation or application” of a collective-bargaining agreement (since determining the amount owed turns on the contractual rate of pay agreed) resort to a state tribunal would lead it into territory that Congress, in enacting §301, meant to be covered exclusively by arbitrators. This reasoning, however, mistakes both the functions § 301 serves in our national labor law and our prior decisions according that provision pre-emptive effect. To be sure, we have read the text of § 301 not only to grant federal courts jurisdiction over claims asserting breach of collective-bargaining agreements but also to authorize the development of federal common-law rules of decision, in large part to assure that agreements to arbitrate grievances would be enforced, regardless of the vagaries of state law and lingering hostility toward extrajudicial dispute resolution, see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 455-456 (1957); see also Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U. S. 557, 559 (1968) (“§301 . . . was fashioned by Congress to place sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes”). And in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962), we recognized an important corollary to the Lincoln Mills rule: while § 301 does not preclude state courts from taking jurisdiction over cases arising from disputes over the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, state contract law must yield to the developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions. See 369 U. S., at 103-104. And while this sensible “acorn” of § 301 pre-emption recognized in Lucas Flour has sprouted modestly in more recent decisions of this Court, see, e. g., Lueck, supra, at 210 (“[I]f the policies that animate §301 are to be given their proper range ... the pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations”), it has not yet become, nor may it, a sufficiently “mighty oak,” see Golden State I, 475 U. S., at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), to supply the cover the Commissioner seeks here. To the contrary, the pre-emption rule has been applied only to assure that the purposes animating § 301 will be frustrated neither by state laws purporting to determine “questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement,” Lueck, 471 U. S., at 211, nor by parties’ efforts to renege on their arbitration promises by “relabeling” as tort suits actions simply alleging breaches of duties assumed in collective-bargaining agreements, id., at 219; see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650, 652 (1965) (“[Federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress”) (emphasis deleted). In Lueck and in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U. S. 399 (1988), we underscored the point that §301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law, and we stressed that it is the legal character of a claim, as “independent” of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement, Lueck, supra, at 213 (and not whether a grievance arising from “precisely the same set of facts” could be pursued, Lingle, supra, at 410) that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward. Finally, we were clear that when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished, see Lingle, supra, at 413, n. 12 (“A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information such as rate of pay . . . that might be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker prevailing in a state-law suit is entitled”). These principles foreclose even a colorable argument that a claim under Labor Code §203 was pre-empted here. As the District Court aptly observed, the primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled to a penalty was not the Food Store Contract, but a calendar. The only issue raised by Livadas’s claim, whether Safeway “willfully fail[ed] to pay” her wages promptly upon severance, Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §203 (West 1989), was a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the employer. There is no indication that there was a “dispute” in this case over the amount of the penalty to which Livadas would be entitled, and Lingle makes plain in so many words that when liability is governed by independent state law, the mere need to “look to” the collective-bargaining agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by § 301. See 486 U. S., at 413, n. 12. Beyond the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in computing the penalty, the collective-bargaining agreement is irrelevant to the dispute (if any) between Livadas and Safeway. There is no suggestion here that Livadas’s union sought or purported to bargain away her protections under § 201 or § 203, a waiver that we have said would (especially in view of Labor Code §219) have to be “‘clear and unmistakable,’ ” see Lingle, supra, at 409-410, n. 9 (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U. S. 693, 708 (1983)), for a court even to consider whether it could be given effect, nor is there any indication that the parties to the collective-bargaining agreement understood their arbitration pledge to cover these state-law claims. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 35 (1991); cf. Food Store Contract § 18.8. But even if such suggestions or indications were to be found, the Commissioner could not invoke them to defend her policy, which makes no effort to take such factors into account before denying enforcement. c 1 Before this Court, however, the Commissioner does not confine herself to the assertion that Livadas’s claim would have been pre-empted by LMRA § 301. Indeed, largely putting aside that position, she has sought here to cast the policy in different terms, as expressing a “conscious decision,” see Brief for Respondent 14, to keep the State’s “hands off” the claims of employees protected by collective-bargaining agreements, either because the Division’s efforts and resources are more urgently needed by others or because official restraint will actually encourage the collective-bargaining and arbitral processes favored by federal law. The latter, more ambitious defense has been vigorously taken up by the Commissioner’s amici, who warn that invalidation of the disputed policy would sound the death knell for other, more common governmental measures that take account of collective-bargaining processes or treat workers represented by unions differently from others in any respect. Although there surely is no bar to our considering these alternative explanations, cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970) (party may defend judgment on basis not relied upon below), we note, as is often the case with such late-blooming rationales, that the overlap between what the Commissioner now claims to be state policy and what the state legislature has enacted into law is awkwardly inexact. First, if the Commissioner’s policy (or California law) were animated simply by the frugal desire to conserve the State’s money for the protection of employees not covered by collective-bargaining agreements, the Commissioner’s emphasis, in the letter to Livadas and in this litigation, on the need to “interpret” or “apply” terms of a collective-bargaining agreement would be entirely misplaced. Nor is the nonenforcement policy convincingly defended as giving parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the “benefit of their bargain,” see Brief for Respondent 18, n. 13, by assuring them that their promise to arbitrate is kept and not circumvented. Under the Commissioner’s policy, enforcement does not turn on what disputes the parties agreed would be resolved by arbitration (the bargain struck), see Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 26, or on whether the contractual wage rate is even subject to (arbitrable) dispute. Rather, enforcement turns exclusively on the fact that the contracting parties consented to any arbitration at all. Even if the Commissioner could permissibly presume that state-law claims are generally intended to be arbitrated, but cf. id., at 35 (employees in prior cases “had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims”), her policy goes still further. Even in cases when it could be said with “positive assurance,” Warrior & Gulf, 363 U. S., at 582, that the parties did not intend that state-law claims be subject to arbitration, cf. Food Store Contract § 18.8 (direct wage claim not involving interpretation of agreement may be submitted “to any other tribunal or agency which is authorized and empowered” to enforce it), the Commissioner would still deny enforcement, on the stated basis that the collective-bargaining agreement nonetheless contained “an arbitration clause” and because the claim would, on her view, entail “interpretation,” of the agreement’s terms. Such an irrebuttable presumption is not easily described as the benefit of the parties’ “bargain.” The Commissioner and amici finally suggest that denying enforcement to union-represented employees’ claims under §§201 and 203 (and other Labor Code provisions) is meant to encourage parties to bargain collectively for their own rules about the payment of wages to discharged workers. But with this suggestion, the State’s position simply slips any tether to California law. If California’s goal really were to stimulate such freewheeling bargaining on these subjects, the enactment of Labor Code §219, expressly and categorically prohibiting the modification of these Labor Code rules by “private agreement,” would be a very odd way to pursue it. Cf. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §227.3 (West 1989) (allowing parties to collective-bargaining agreement to arrive at different rule for vacation pay). In short, the policy, the rationales, and the state law are not coherent. 2 Even at face value, however, neither the “hands off” labels nor the vague assertions that general labor law policies are thereby advanced much support the Commissioner’s defense here. The former merely takes the position discussed and rejected earlier, that a distinction between claimants represented by unions and those who are not is “rational,” the former being less “in need” than the latter. While we hardly suggest here that every distinction between union-represented employees and others is invalid under the NLRA, see infra, at 131-132, the assertion that represented employees are less “in need” precisely because they have exercised federal rights poses special dangers that advantages conferred by federal law will be canceled out and its objectives undermined. Cf. Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 756 (“It would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers”). Accordingly, as we observed in Metropolitan Life, the widespread practice in Congress and in state legislatures has assumed the contrary, bestowing basic employment guarantees and protections on individual employees without singling out members of labor unions (or those represented by them) for disability; see id., at 755; accord, tingle, 486 U. S., at 411-412. Nor do professions of “neutrality” lay the dangers to rest. The pre-empted action in Golden State I could easily have been redescribed as following a “hands-off” policy, in that the city sought to avoid endorsing either side in the course of a labor dispute, see 475 U. S., at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (city did not seek “to place its weight on one side or the other of the scales of economic warfare”), and the respondent commission in Nash may have understood its policy as expressing neutrality between the parties in a yet-to-be-decided unfair labor practice dispute. See also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 971 F. 2d 1148, 1154 (CA4 1992) (NLRA forbids state policy, under state law barring “aid or assistance” to either party to a labor dispute, of not arresting picketers who violated state trespass laws). Nor need we pause long over the assertion that nonenforcement of valid state-law claims is consistent with federal labor law by “encouraging” the operation of collective bargaining and arbitration process. Denying represented employees basic safety protections might “encourage” collective bargaining over that subject, and denying union employers the protection of generally applicable state trespass law might lead to increased bargaining over the rights of labor pickets, cf. Rum Creek, supra, but we have never suggested that labor law’s bias toward bargaining is to be served by forcing employees or employers to bargain for what they would otherwise be entitled to as a matter of course. See generally Metropolitan Life, supra, at 757 (Congress did not intend to “remove the backdrop of state law... and thereby artificially create a no-law area”) (emphasis deleted and internal quotation marks omitted). The precedent cited by the Commissioner and amici as supporting the broadest “hands off” view, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1 (1987), is not in point. In that case we held that there was no federal pre-emption of a Maine statute that allowed employees and employers to contract for plant-closing severance payments different from those otherwise mandated by state law. That decision, however, does not even purport to address the question supposedly presented here: while there was mention of state latitude to “balance the desirability of a particular substantive labor standard against the right of self-determination regarding the terms and conditions of employment,” see id., at 22, the policy challenged here differs in two crucial respects from the “unexceptional exercise of the [State’s] police power,” ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), defended in those terms in our earlier case. Most fundamentally, the Maine law treated all employees equally, whether or not represented by a labor organization. All were entitled to the statutory severance payment, and all were allowed to negotiate agreements providing for different benefits. See id., at 4, n. 1. Second, the minimum protections of Maine’s plant-closing law were relinquished not by the mere act of signing an employment contract (or collective-bargaining agreement), but only by the parties’ express agreement on different terms, see id., at 21. While the Commissioner and her amici call our attention to a number of state and federal laws that draw distinctions between union and nonunion represented employees, see, e.g., D. C. Code Ann. §36-103 (1993) (“Unless otherwise specified in a collective agreement . . . [w]henever an employer discharges an employee, the employer shall pay the employee’s wages earned not later than the working day following such discharge”); 29 U. S. C. § 203(o) (“Hours [w]orked” for Fair Labor Standards Act measured according to “express terms of ... or practice under bona fide collective-bargaining agreement”), virtually all share the important second feature observed in Coyne, that union-represented employees have the full protection of the minimum standard, absent any agreement for something different. These “opt out” statutes are thus manifestly different in their operation (and their effect on federal rights) from the Commissioner’s rule that an employee forfeits his state-law rights the moment a collective-bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause is entered into. But cf. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 708. Hence, our holding that the Commissioner’s unusual policy is irreconcilable with the structure and purposes of the Act should cast no shadow on the validity of these familiar and narrowly drawn opt-out provisions. Ill Having determined that the Commissioner’s policy is in fact pre-empted by federal law, we find strong support in our precedents for the position taken by both courts below that Livadas is entitled to seek relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the Commissioner’s abridgment of her NLRA rights. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States, and we have given that provision the effect its terms require, as affording redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980). We have, it is true, recognized that even the broad statutory text does not authorize a suit for every alleged violation of federal law. A particular statutory provision, for example, may be so manifestly precatory that it could not fairly be read to impose a “binding obligatio[n]” on a governmental unit, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27 (1981), or its terms may be so “vague and amorphous” that determining whether a “deprivation” might have occurred would strain judicial competence. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelop ment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 431-432 (1987). And Congress itself might make it clear that violation of a statute will not give rise to liability under § 1983, either by express words or by providing a comprehensive alternative enforcement scheme. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981). But apart from these exceptional cases, §1983 remains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law. See also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U. S. 439, 443 (1991). Our conclusion that Livadas is entitled to seek redress under §1983 is, if not controlled outright, at least heavily foreshadowed by our decision in Golden State II. We began there with the recognition that not every instance of federal pre-emption gives rise to a §1983 cause of action, see 493 U. S., at 108, and we explained that to decide the availability of § 1983 relief a court must look to the nature of the federal law accorded pre-emptive effect and the character of the interest claimed under it, ibid. We had no difficulty concluding, however, as we had often before, see, e. g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1945), that the NLRA protects interests of employees and employers against abridgment by a State, as well as by private actors; that the obligations it imposes on governmental actors are not so “vague and amorphous” as to exceed judicial competence to decide; and that Congress had not meant to foreclose relief under § 1983. In so concluding, we contrasted the intricate scheme provided to remedy violations by private actors to the complete absence of provision for relief from governmental interference, see 493 U. S., at 108-109. Indeed, the only issue seriously in dispute in Golden State II was whether the freedom to resort to “peaceful methods of. . . economic pressure,” id., at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted), which we had recognized as implicit in the structure of the Act, could support § 1983 liability in the same manner as official abridgment of those rights enumerated in the text would do. Ibid. The Court majority said yes, explaining that “[a] rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a statute.” Ibid. The right Livadas asserts, to complete the collective-bargaining process and agree to an arbitration clause, is, if not provided in so many words in the NLRA, see n. 10, supra, at least as immanent in its structure as the right of the cab company in Golden State II. And the obligation to respect it on the part of the Commissioner and others acting under color of law is no more “vague and amorphous” than the obligation in Golden State. Congress, of course, has given no more indication of any intent to foreclose actions like Livadas’s than the sort brought by the cab company. Finding no cause for special caution here, we hold that Livadas’s claim is properly brought under § 1983. IV In an effort to give wide berth to federal labor law and policy, the Commissioner declines to enforce union-represented employees’ claims rooted in nonwaivable rights ostensibly secured by state law to all employees, without regard to whether the claims are valid under state law or preempted by LMRA § 301. Federal labor law does not require such a heavy-handed policy, and, indeed, cannot permit it. We do not suggest here that the NLRA automatically defeats all state action taking any account of the collective-bargaining process or every state law distinguishing union-represented employees from others. It is enough that we find the Commissioner’s policy to have such direct and detrimental effects on the federal statutory rights of employees that it must be pre-empted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is accordingly Reversed. Respondent Bradshaw has succeeded Lloyd Aubry, the original named defendant in this action, as Labor Commissioner and has been substituted as a party before this Court. See this Court’s Rule 35.3. Section 18.1 of the collective-bargaining agreement defines a “grievance” as a “dispute... involving or arising out of the meaning, interpretation, application or alleged violation” of the agreement. Section 18.8 provides that “[i]n the case of a direct wage claim . . . which does not involve an interpretation of any of the provisions of this Agreement, either party may submit such claim for settlement to either the grievance procedure provided for herein or to any other tribunal or agency which is authorized and empowered to effect such a settlement.” California Labor Code §201 provides in pertinent part: “If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately.” It draws no distinction between union-represented employees and others. Under another provision of California law, Labor Code § 219, the protections of §201 (and of other rules governing the frequency and form of wage payments) “can [not] in any way be contravened or set aside by private agreement, whether written, oral, or implied,” although employers are free to pay wages more frequently, in greater amounts, or at an earlier date than ordained by these state rules; c£ § 204.2 (executive, administrative, and professional employees may negotiate through collective bargaining for pay periods different from those required by state law). That section provides that when an employer “willfully fails” to comply with the strictures of §201 and fails to pay “any wages” owed discharged employees, “the wages of such employees shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but such wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §203 (West 1989). In her DLSE claim form, Livadas made plain that she did not dispute Safeway’s calculation of the wages owed, but sought only the penalty for the employer’s late tender. App. 18. Under state law, the Commissioner of Labor is the Division Chief of the DLSE, see Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 79, 82(b) (West 1989), and is authorized either directly to prosecute a wage or penalty claim on an employee’s behalf in state court, § 98.3(a), or, in the alternative, to initiate informal hearings under DLSE auspices, see § 98(a), in which full relief may be awarded, § 98.1. The Commissioner’s policy with respect to claims by employees covered by collective-bargaining agreements appears not to distinguish between these two modes of proceeding, and, accordingly, we will refer, as the parties largely do, to her policy as a categorical refusal to “enforce” such claims. Although Labor Code §218 states that “[n]othing in this article shall limit the right of any wage claimant to sue ... for any wages or penalty due him,” another provision, §218.5, authorizes attorney’s fee awards to prevailing parties in wage and penalty disputes, making individual litigation a somewhat risky prospect, and DLSE enforcement remains in any event the more realistic avenue for modest claims. Labor Code §229 provides: “Actions to enforce the provisions of this article [Labor Code §§ 200-243] for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. This section shall not apply to claims involving any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing such an arbitration agreement.” Cf. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483 (1987) (§ 229 bar to waiver defeated by Federal Arbitration Act policy). All concerned identify the allusion to what “courts” have said to be a reference to a 1975 decision of the California Court of Appeal, Plumbing, Heating and Piping Employers Council v. Howard, 53 Cal. App. 3d 828, 126 Cal. Rptr. 406, where the Commissioner was held barred by the statute from enforcing an “unpaid” wage claim arising from an employee’s assertion that he was entitled, under collective-bargaining agreements then in force, to receive a foreman’s rate of pay and not a journeyman’s. The Commissioner notes that a small minority of collective-bargaining agreements lack provisions either setting wage rates or mandating arbitration (and therefore might potentially be enforced under the challenged policy). But see n. 13, infra; Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U. S. 399, 411, n. 11 (1988) (noting that 99% of sampled collective-bargaining agreements include arbitration clauses). Livadas did file a grievance claiming that the discharge had been improper under the collective-bargaining agreement, ultimately obtaining reinstatement with backpay. While the parties dispute what effect, as a matter of state law, that recovery would have on Livadas’s right under §203, neither the pertinent California statutes nor the Commissioner’s policy at issue here depend on whether a claimant’s termination was for just cause. In the Court of Appeals, Livadas acknowledged that the portion of the District Court’s order awarding monetary relief against the Commissioner in her official capacity was likely barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Brief for Petitioner 43, n. 20. This and other issues arising from the scope of the remedy are better left for the courts below on remand. In dissent, Judge Kozinski countered that by focusing on whether Livadas was entitled to a correct application of state law, the majority had explored the wrong question. The proper enquiry, the dissent maintained, was not whether the Commissioner has discretion under state law not to enforce wage and penalty claims (which she plainly does) or whether she need enforce claims if doing so would actually be pre-empted by federal law (she plainly need not), but whether she may draw the line for enforcement purposes between individuals covered by collective-bargaining agreements containing arbitration clauses (whose claims will sometimes but not always be pre-empted under §301) and those not so covered. Underscoring that Livadas’s claim would not, in fact, have been pre-empted had the federal rule been given its proper scope, the dissent found wanting the majority’s “quasi-pre-emption” rationale, 987t F. 2d, at 562. Judge Kozinski concluded that the Commissioner’s policy, based on an “honest (though flagrant) mistake of law,” id., at 563, could not be squared with the requirements of federal labor law, because the burdened class was defined by the exercise of federal rights and because the burden on collective-bargaining rights, justified only by a mistaken understanding of what §301 requires, served no “legitimate state purpose” at all. Ibid. While the NLRA does not expressly recognize a right to be covered by a collective-bargaining agreement, in that no duty is imposed on an employer actually to reach agreement with represented employees, see 29 U. S. C. § 158(d), a State’s penalty on those who complete the collective-bargaining process works an interference with the operation of the Act, much as does a penalty on those who participate in the process. Cf. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1945) (State may not enforce licensing requirement on collective-bargaining agents). We understand the difference between the position of petitioner (who would place this case within our “Machinists” line of labor pre-emption cases, see Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976)) and that of her amicus, the Solicitor General (who describes it as a case of “conflict” pre-emption, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-15, and n. 4) to be entirely semantic, depending on whether Livadas’s right is characterized as implicit in the structure of the Act (as was the right to self-help upheld in Machinists) or as rooted in the text of §7. See generally Golden State II, 493 U. S. 103, 110-112 (1989) (emphasizing fundamental similarity between enumerated NLRA rights and “Machinists” rights). Neither party here argues for application of the rule of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), which safeguards the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to pass judgment on certain conduct, such as labor picketing, which might be held protected by § 7 of the Act but which might also be prohibited by § 8 of the Act. Despite certain similarities, the question whether federal labor law permits a State to grant or withhold unemployment insurance benefits from striking workers requires consideration of the policies underlying a distinct federal statute, Title IX of the Social Security Act, see 26 U. S. C. §3301 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV); 42 U. S. C. §501 et seq.; 42 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. Thus, straightforward NLRA pre-emption analysis has been held inappropriate. See New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U. S. 519, 536-540 (1979) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 549 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Noting that Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235 (1967), held state action pre-empted that was “like the coercive actions which employers and unions are forbidden to engage in,” see id., at 239, it is argued here, see Brief for Employers Group as Amicus Curiae 7-12, that the NLRA prohibits only state action closely analogous to conduct that would support an unfair labor practice charge if engaged in by a private employer. Our cases, however, teach that parallelism is not dispositive and that the Act sometimes demands a more scrupulous evenhandedness from the States. See generally Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 290 (1986) (State may not debar employers with multiple NLRA violations from government contracting); compare Golden State I, 475 U. S. 608 (1986), with NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46, 49-54 (1964) (private actor may refuse to deal with employer based on impending strike); but cf. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U. S. 218, 227-228 (1993) (the Act does not always preclude a State, functioning as an employer or a purchaser of labor services, from behaving as a private employer would be entitled to do). See also Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 971 F. 2d 1148, 1154 (CA4 1992) (State may not, consistently with the NLRA, withhold protections of state antitrespass law from employer involved in labor dispute, in an effort to apply a facially valid “neutrality statute”). Thus, while the “misinterpretation of a perfectly valid state statute ... does not [in itself] provide grounds for federal relief,” 987 F. 2d, at 559, it does not follow that no federal relief may be had when such misinterpretation results in conflict with federal law. Nor does the opportunity to seek redress in a nonfederal forum determine the existence of a federal right, see ibid. See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961). Of course, the extent to which a course of conduct has deviated from “clearly established” federal law remains crucial to deciding whether an official will be entitled to immunity from individual damage liability, see, e. g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 197 (1984). Similarly, because our analysis here tons not on the “rationality” of the governmental classification, but rather on its effect on federal objectives, the Commissioner’s policy is not saved merely because it happens, at the margins, to be “under-” and “over-inclusive,” i. e., burdening certain employees who are not protected by the NLRA and allowing employees covered by highly unusual collective-bargaining agreements the benefit of enforcement of §§201 and 203 claims. Section 301 states that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties____” 29 U. S. C. § 185(a). Within its proper sphere, §301 has been accorded unusual pre-emptive power. In Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U. S. 557 (1968), for example, we recognized that an action for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement “ar[ose] under” §301 (and therefore was subject to federal removal, see 28 U. S. C. § 1441 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV)), despite the fact that the petitioner’s complaint did not mention the federal provision and appeared to plead an adequate claim for relief under state contract law. That is so, we explained, both because Congress is understood to have legislated against a backdrop of generally applicable labor standards, see, e. g., Lingle, 486 U. S., at 411-412, and because the scope of the arbitral promise is not itself unlimited, see Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582 (1960) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit”). And while contract-interpretation disputes must be resolved in the bargained-for arbitral realm, see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965), §301 does not disable state courts from interpreting the terms of collective-bargaining agreements in resolving non-pre-empted claims, see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502 (1962) (state courts have jurisdiction over § 301 suits but must apply federal common law); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U. S. 421 (1967). We are aware, as an amicus brief makes clear, see Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, that the Courts of Appeals have not been entirely uniform in their understanding and application of the principles set down in Lingle and Lueck. But this case, in which non-pre-emption under § 301 is clear beyond peradventure, see infra this page and 125, is not a fit occasion for us to resolve disagreements that have arisen over the proper scope of our earlier decisions. We do note in this regard that while our cases tend to speak broadly in terms of §301 “pre-emption,” defendants invoke that provision in diverse situations and for different reasons: sometimes their assertion is that a plaintiff’s cause of action itself derives from the collective-bargaining agreement (and, by that agreement, belongs before an arbitrator); in other instances, the argument is different, that a plaintiff’s claim cannot be “resolved" absent collective-bargaining agreement interpretation, i e., that a term of the agreement may or does confer a defense on the employer (perhaps because the employee or his union has negotiated away the state-law right), cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U. S. 386, 398-399 (1987); and in other cases still, concededly “independent” state-law litigation may nonetheless entail some collective-bargaining agreement application. Holding the plaintiff’s cause of action substantively extinguished may not, as amicus AFL-CIO observes, always be the only means of vindicating the arbitrator’s primacy as the bargained-for contract interpreter. Cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, Gulf & Western Systems Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 837 (1971). This is not to say, of course, that a §203 penalty claim could never be pre-empted by §301. In holding the challenged policy pre-empted, we note that there is no equally obvious conflict between what §301 requires and the text of Labor Code § 229 (as against what respondent has read it to mean). The California provision, which concerns whether a promise to arbitrate a claim will be enforced to defeat a direct action under the Labor Code, does not purport generally to deny union-represented employees their rights under §§201 and 203. Rather, it confines its preclusive focus only to “disputéis] concerning the interpretation or application of any collective-bargaining agreement,” in which event an “agreement to arbitrate” such disputes is to be given effect. Nor does the Howard decision, the apparent font of the Commissioner’s policy, appear untrue to §301 teachings: there, an employee sought to have an “unpaid wage” claim do the office of a claim that a collective-bargaining agreement entitled him to a higher wage; that sort of claim, however, derives its existence from the collective-bargaining agreement and, accordingly, falls within any customary understanding of arbitral jurisdiction. See 53 Cal. App. 3d, at 836, 126 Cal. Rptr., at 411. In holding that an agreement to arbitrate an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, Gilmer emphasized its basic consistency with our unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), permitting a discharged employee to bring a Title VII claim, notwithstanding his having already grieved the dismissal under a collective-bargaining agreement. Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver as relying, inter alia, on: the “distinctly separate nature of... contractual and statutory rights” (even when both were “violated as a result of the same factual occurrence”), 415 U. S., at 50; the fact that a labor “arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights,” id., at 53-54; and the concern that in collective-bargaining arbitration, “the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit,” id., at 58, n. 19. The Commissioner avoids such complications simply by omitting any reference to Labor Code § 219. We noted that “Congress [has never] seen fit to exclude unionized workers and employers from laws establishing federal minimum employment standards. We see no reason to believe that for this purpose Congress intended state minimum labor standards to be treated differently .... Minimum state labor standards affect union and nonunion employees equally and neither encourage nor discourage the collective-bargaining processes that are the subject of the NLRA.” Metropolitan Life, 471 U. S., at 755. Were it enough simply to point to a general labor policy advanced by particular state action, the city in Golden State could have claimed to be encouraging the “friendly adjustment of industrial disputes,” 29 U. S. C. § 151, and the State in Gould, the entirely “laudable,” 475 U. S., at 291, purpose of “deter[ring] labor law violations and.. . . rewarding] ‘fidelity to the law,’ ” id., at 287. It bears mention that the law in Fort Halifax pegged the benefit payment to an employee’s wages, meaning that the State Labor Commissioner would “look to” the collective-bargaining agreement in enforcing claims in precisely the same manner that respondent would here. Nor does it seem plausible to suggest that Congress meant to preempt such opt-out laws, as “burdening” the statutory right of employees not to join unions by denying nonrepresented employees the “benefit” of being able to “contract out” of such standards. Cf.. Addendum B to Brief for Employers Group as Amicus Curiae (collecting state statutes containing similar provisions). Thus, Golden State II observed that an NLRA pre-emption claim grounded in the need to vindicate the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), see n. 10, supra, is "fundamentally different” from one stemming from state abridgment of a protected individual interest, see 493 U. S., at 110, a difference that might prove relevant to cognizability under § 1983.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

T. I. M. E. INCORPORATED v. UNITED STATES. No. 68. Argued January 20, 1959. Decided May 18, 1959. W. D. Benson, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No; 68. Brycé Rea, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner in No. 96. With him on the brief was Edgar Watkins. Morton Hollander argued the causes for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Assistant Attorney General Doub. Together witl No. 96, Davidson Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., v. United S&Zbes, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Mr. Justice''Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. ■ Petitioners are interstate motor common carriers, certificated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (I. C. C.) under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Section 217 of that Act, 49 U. S. C. § 317, requires such carriers to file their transportation charges as tariffs with the I.’C. C. These tariffs remain effective until suspended or changed in accordance with specified procedures, and so long as they are effective carriers ape forbidden to charge or collect any rate other than that provided in the applicable tariff. These cases present in common a single question under the Motor Carrier Act: Can a shipper of goods by a certificated motor carrier, challenge in post-shipment litigation the reasonableness of the carrier’s'charges which were made in accordance with the tariff governing the shipment? In No. 68, T. I. M. E. transported several shipments of scientific instruments for the United States from Oklahoma to California. One of the shipments, illustrative of all involved in this litigation, originated at Marion, Oklahoma, and was carried over the lines of petitioner and a connecting carrier to Planehaven, California. At the time, the petitioning carrier had on file with the’ I. C. C. a tariff relating to such shipments which specified \a through rate from Marion to Planehaven of 110.74 per hundredweight. Petitioner was also subject to tariffs which provided a rate of $2.56 per hundredweight from Marion to El Paso, Texas, and of $4.35 per hundredweight from El Paso to Planehaven. The through rate thus exceeded the combination rate by $3.83. T. I. M. E. charged and collected on the basis of the through rate. On postpayment audit by the General Accounting Office under § 322 o'Kthe Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 955, 49 II S. C. § 66, that office concluded, that the combination rather than the through rate was applicable to this shipment and required T. I. M. E. to refund the difference between the sum collected under the through tariff and that which would have been due under the' combination. tariffs. This T. I. M. E. did under protest. Thereafter T. I. M. E. brought suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a) (2), claiming that the through tariff was applicable to the shipment and that it was thus entitled to recover the difference between the through and combination rates. The Government defended on the ground that the combination rate was applicable, and alternatively contended that if the through tariff were applicable the rate specified therein was unreasonably high insofar as it exceeded the combination rate. It asked that T. I. M. E.’s suit be stayed to permit the Government to bring a proceeding before the I. C. C. to determine the reasonableness of the through rate. The District Court in an unreported opinion held that the through rate was applicable; and that neither it nor . the I. C. C. had power to pass upon the Government’s contention that such rate was as to the past unreasonable. Accordingly, the'District Court entered summary judment for T. I. M. E. The Government appealed, accepting the District Court’s determination as to the applicability of the through rate, but contending that the District Court had erred in refusing to refer to the I. C. C. the issue of the reasonableness of that .rate as to past shipments. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Government was entitled to an I. C. C. determination upon the question of reasonableness, and' that the fact that the Motor Carrier Act gives the I. C. C. no power to award reparations as to admittedly governing past rates • does not prevent that body from passing on the question of past reasonableness when that issue arises in litigation in the courts. 252 P. 2d 178. In No. 96, petitioner Davidson transported four shipments of goods for the United States from Poughkeepsie, N. Y., to Bellbluff, Va., and billed the United States on the basis of concededly applicable filed tariffs. On post-payment audit the General Accounting Office concluded that a part of these.charges was unreasonable and should be refunded to the United States. Davidson refunded under protest the sum demanded, which amounted to $18.34, and then brought suit under the Tucker Act to recover the refund. The Government defended on the sole ground that the applicable rate had been unreasonable. The District Court, without opinion, granted Davidson summary judgment, but on the Government’s appeal the judgment was reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that the Government could defend on “unreasonableness” grounds, and directing a referral to the I. C. C. of the issue as to the reasonableness of the rate in question. 104 U. S. App. D. C. 72, 259 F. 2d 802. We granted certiorari in both cases because of the suggestion that the result reached by the Courts of Appeals conflicted with* this Court’s decision in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U. S. 246, and in order to settle thé questions of statutory interpretation involved. 358 U. S. 810. The courts below held that the right of the United States to resist on the ground of unreasonableness the payment of the charges incurred by it was one deriving from the common law and preserved by § 216 (j) of the Motor Carrier' Act. In this Court the Government, although defending this ground of decision, relies primarily on the proposition that the Motor Carrier Act itself creates a judicially enforceable right in a shipper to be free from the exaction of hnreasonable charges as to. past shipments even though such charges reflect applicable rates duly filed with the I. C. C. The Government concedes that whatever the source of the asserted right may be, the question of the reasonableness of past rates cannot itself be decided in the courts, but takes the position that when such question arises in court litigation it may properly be referred to the I. C. C. for decision, and the results of that adjudication used to determine the respective rights of the litigants. I. The contention that the Motor Carrier Act itself creates a cause of action or affords a defense with respect to the recovery of unreasonable rates rests on the provisions of §§ 216 (b) and (d) of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 316 (b), (d>, which provide as to interstate motor carriers: “(b) It shall be the duty of every [such], common carrier ... to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, charges, and classifications, and just and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto .... “(d) All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered by any [such] common carrier . . . shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof, is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. . . .” The Government urges that this language imposes a statutory duty on motor carriers not to charge or collect other than “reasonable” rates, and asks us to imply a cause of action under the Motor Carrier Act for any shipper injured by violation of that duty. We cannot agree. As this Court recognized in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251, language of this sort in a statute which entrusts rate regulation to an administrative agency in itself creates only a “criterion for administrative application in determining a lawful rate” rather than a “justiciable legal right.” In Montana-Dakota it was held that the Federal Power Act, which like the Motor Carrier Act expressly declares unreasonable rates to be “unlawful,” does not create a cause of action for the recovery of allegedly unreasonable past rates. In the absence of any indication, that Congress intended that despite the absence of any reparations power in the Federal Power Commission the féderal courts should entertain suits for reparation of unreasonable rates, and refer to the'Commission the controlling issue of past unreasonableness, the Court declined to permit the Commission to accomplish indirectly through such a proceeding that which Congress did not allow it to accomplish-directly. It is true that under Parts I and III of the Interstate Commerce Act, relating respectively to rail and water carriers, a shipper may litigate as to the reasonableness of .past charges even if those charges were based on the applicable and effective filed, rates. The structure and history of Part II (the Motor’Carrier Act), however, lead to the conclusion that here, as in the Federal Power Act, Congress did not intend, to give shippers a statutory.cause of action for, the recovery of allegedly unreasonable past rates, or to enable them to assert “unreasonableness” as a defense in carrier suits to recover applicable tariff rates. The very provisions of Part I, and their counterparts in Part III, which give a right of action to shippers against carriers for damages incurred by carrier violations of the Act and provide the mechanics for the enforcement of that right are conspicuously absent in the Motor Carrier Act. -Thus, whereas § 8 of Part 1 provides that “any common carrier subject to the provisions of this -chapter [who] shall do . . . any act ... in this chapter . .. . declared to be unlawful . . . shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of the damages sustained ... . ,” Part II has no comparable provision. Again, whereas § 9 of Part 1 gives an injured shipper the right to sue in the I. C. C. or in the Federal District Court, Part II contains no comparable provision. In addition, §§ 13 (1) and 16 of Part 1 give a stopper claiming reparation the right to proceed in the Commission and to enforce his reparation award in the courts, and Part II contains no comparable provisions. To hold that the Motor Carrier Act nevertheless gives shippers a right of reparation with respect to allegedly unreasonable past filed tariff rates would require a complete disregard of these significant omissions, in Part II of the very provisions which, establish and implement a similar right as against rail carriers in Part I. We find it impossible to impute to Congress an intention to .give such a right to shippers under the Motor Carrier Act when the very sections which established that right in Part I were wholly omitted in the Motor Carrier Act. Further, the I. C. C. itself has consistently recognized that nothing in Part II creates a statutory liability on the part of the carrier for past allegedly unreasonable filed rates. In the hearings which preceded the passage of legislation in 1949 adding to the Motor Carrier Act a statute of limitations on suits to recover amounts paid to carriers in excess of applicable filed rates, proposals were also made to amend the statute by-adding to it provisions similar to those already found in §§ 8, 9, 13, and 16 of Part I. The Commission noted that the proposal “would add to-the Interstate Commerce Act a number of new sections which- would make common carriers by motor vehicle . . . hable for the payment of damages to persons injured by them through violations of the act. At present this liability exists only in respect of carriers subject to parts I and .III . . . .” The suggested changes were not adopted. And in 1957 thé Commission again recommended amendment of the Motor Carrier Act to provide a remedy for violation of the statute to persons injured thereby, and once more the measure failed of adoption. In light of the statute and its history, it is plain that if a shipper has a “justiciable legal right” to recover or resist past motor carrier charges alleged to have been unreasonable-, it is necessary to look beyond the Motor Carrier Act for the source of that right. Í — I H-I The Government urges that even if the Motor Carrier Act does not grant the right which is claimed here, the Act must at least be read to preserve a pre-existing common-law right of that kind. It relies on § 216 (j.) of the statute, 49 U. S. C, § 316 (j), as showing a congressional intention to confirm such a right in its statement that nothing in § 216 “shall be held to extinguish any remedy or right of action not inconsistent herewith.” ' The contention is that the common law recognized the right of a shipper by common carrier to recover exorbitant rates paid-under protest, and that although the doctrine of primary ■jurisdiction requires that the issue of whether rates which are retrospectively challenged’were in fact “unreasonable” be determined by the I. C. C., the common-law right may be vindicated in a suit in the courts through referral of the issue of “unreasonableness” to the Commission. The saving clause of § 216 (j) must be read in light of the judicial decisions interpreting Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act before 1935, for the course of those decisions illuminates the significance of the striking differences which Congress saw fit to make between the provisions of Part I and those of the Motor Carrier Act.. The landmark case is Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426. There a shipper sued in a state court to recover the difference between an allegedly unreasonable charge exacted from it by a rail carrier pursuant to tariffs filed by the carrier with the I. C. C. and what was ..claimed. would have been a just and reasonable charge. One of the issues before this Court was whether any common-law right to recover an exorbitant common carrier freight charge paid under protest survived the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Court held, despite the existence in Part I of a saving clause much broader in scope than that here involved, .that because under the statutory scheme only the I. C. C. could decide in the first instance whether.any filed rate was “unreasonable” either as to the past or future, any common-law right was necessarily extinguished as “absolutely inconsistent” with recognition of the Commission’s primary jurisdiction. It is important to note that this conclusion did not rest upon the fact that under Part I the I. C. C. had reparations authority with respect to unreasonable charges paid by shippers, but instead was evidently dictated by the broader conclusion that the crucial question of reasonableness could not be decided by the courts. Since the Government concedes that under Part II, as under Part I, the issue of the unreasonableness of rates cannot be adjudicated in the courts, it would seem to follow that the common-law right which the Government urges as surviving under § 216 (j). cannot in fact survive, since that clause preserves only “any remedy or right of action not inconsistent” with the statutory scheme. The Government urges, however, that there is nothing actually inconsistent with the Commission's primary jurisdiction in recognizing the survival of a common-law right, because the demands of primary jurisdiction can be satisfied by referral of the question of the reasonableness of the assailed rate to the I. C. C., and that although the Commission concededly has no independent authority to .entertain and adjudicate a claim for reparations, it nevertheless should be permitted in-effect to exercise such an authority as an adjunct to a judicial proceeding. The question is, of course, one of statutory intent. We do not think that Congress, which we cannot assume was. unaware of the holding of the Apilene case that a common-law right of action to recover unreasonable common carrier charges is incompatible with a statutory scheme in which the courts have no authority to adjudicate the primary question- in issue, intended by the saving clause of § 216 (j) to sanction a procedure such as that here proposed. It would be anomalous to hold that Congress intended that the sole effect of the omission of reparations provisions in the Motor Carrier Act would be to require the shipper in effect to bring two lawsuits instead of one, with the parties required to file their complaint and answer in a court of competent jurisdiction and then immediately proceed to the I. C. C. to litigate what would ordinarily be the sole controverted issue in the suit, No convincing reason has been suggested to us why Congress would have wished to omit ia direct reparations procedure, as it has concededly here doné, and yet leave open to the shipper the circuitous route contended for. To permit a utilization of the procedure here sought by the Government would be to engage in the very “improvisation” against which this Court cautioned in Montana-Dakota, supra, in order to permit the I. C. C. to accomplish indirectly what Congress has not chosen to give it the authority to accomplish directly. In the absence of the clearest indication that Congress intended that the Motor Carrier Act should preserve rights which could be vindicated only by such an improvisation, we must decline to consider a defense which “involves only issues which a federal court cannot decide and can only refer to a body which also would have no independent jurisdiction to decide . . . .” Montana-Dakota, supra, at p. 255. The Government’s reliance upon United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, is misplaced, for in that case, involving Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, the authority of the I. C. C. to determine the reasonableness of past filed rates in aid of court litigation was undoubted. The case decided no more than that referral to the I. C. C. of the issue of “unreasonableness” involved in the shipper’s defense to the carrier’s timely Tucker Act suit was not foreclosed by the fact that affirmative reparations relief before the Commission would have been barred by limitations. It has no bearing on the question- whether. -!— a judicial remedy in respect of allegedly unreasonable past rates survived the passage of the Motor Carrier Act. It is pointed out that the I. C. C. has long claimed the authority to make findings as to the reasonableness of past motor carrier rates embodied in tariffs duly filed with the Commission. It is true that in a series of cases beginning with Barrows Porcelain Enamel Co. v. Cushman Motor Delivery Co., 11 M. C. C. 365, decided in 1939, divisions of the Commission, and eventually the Commission itself, Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Line, 43 M. C. C. 337, announced that the I. C. C. possessed such authority. But in these cases the anterior question now before us, whether a shipper has a right, derived from outside the statute, to put the question of the reasonableness of past rates in issue in judicial proceedings,- was given only cursory consideration or else wholly ignored. The cases devoted themselves to searching out authorization in the Act for I. C. C. participation, by adjudication as to past unreasonableness, in the vindication of whatever reparation rights might exist. The Government is able to point to only two cases in addition to. the present ones, in the 24 years since passage of the Motor Carrier Act, in which courts have appeared to assume that the issue of reasonableness of past motor carrier rates was litigable, and in neither of these cases was the question given other .than the most cursory attention. Under these circumstances the issue before us cannot fairly be said to be foreclosed by long-standing interpretation and understanding. We are told that Congress has long been aware that the Commission was of the view that a common-law action for recovery of unreasonable rates paid to a motor carrier, with referral to the Commission of the issue of unreasonableness, would lie, and that its failure to legislate in derogation of this view implies an approval and acceptance of it. But it appears that each time the Commission’s views in this regard were communicated to. committees of Congress, it was in connection with a request by the Commission for legislation which would have given to shippers a cause of action under the statute and granted to the Commission the authority to award reparations, and each time that request was rejected. Had Congress been asked legislatively to overrule the doctrines enunciated in Bell Potato Chip, supra, and declined to do so, that fact would no doubt have been entitled to some weight in our interpretation of the Act. But we do not think that from the failure of Congress to grant a new authority any reliable inference can permissibly be drawn to the effect that any authority previously claimed was recognized and confirmed. Finally, it is contended that denial of a remedy to the shipper who has paid unreasonable rates is to sanction injustice. The fact that during the 24-year history of the Motor Carrier Act shippers have sought to secure adjudications in the I. C. C. as to the reasonableness of past rates on only a handful of occasions, despite the Commission’s invitation to shippers to pursue that course in the line of cases culminating in Bell Potato Chip, supra, strongly suggests that few occasions have arisen where the application of filed 'rates has aggrieved shippers by motor carrier. Furthermore, this contention overlooks the fact that Congress has in the Motor Carrier Act apparently sought to strike a balance between the interests of the shipper and those of the carrier, and that the statute cut significantly into pre-existing rights of the carrier to set his own rates and put them into immediate effect, at least so long as they were within the “zone of reasonableness.” ' Under the Act a trucker can raise its rates only on 30 days’ prior notice, and the I. C. C. may, on its own initiative or on complaint, suspend the effectiveness of the proposed rate for an additional seven months while its reasonableness is scrutinized. Even if the new rate is eventually determined to be reasonable, the carrier con-cededly has no avenue whereby to collect the increment of that rate over the previous one for the notice or suspension period. Thus although under the statutory scheme it is possible that a shipper will for a time be forced to pay a rate which he has challenged and which is eventually determined to be unreasonable as to the future, as when the suspension period expires before the I. C. C. has acted on the challenge, it is ordinarily the carrier, rather than the shipper, which is made to suffer by any period of administrative “lag.” For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these cases must fall. Reversed. Interstate Commerce Act, Patt II, 49 Stat. 543, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. See Motor Carrier Act §§ 216 (e),' (g), 217 (b), (c), 49 U. S, C. §§316 (e), (g), 317(b), (c).-. This part of the charges was that represented by a “New York State Surcharge,” included by Davidson in its rate to recoup the cost of a New York ton-mile truck tax. The tariff including the surcharge had been filed to become effective October 8, 1951. The I. C. C. had suspended the tariff for the maximum period permitted by the Act, but since the inquiry as to its reasonableness was not completed within the suspension period it went into effect on May 8, 1952, and was in effect at the time of shipment. The I. C. C. subsequently found the surcharge to be unreasonable and ordered its excision from Davidson’s rates, 62 M. C. C. 117. This order was purely prospective and did not affect the shipments involved here. In our view of these cases it becomes unnecessary to consider Davidson’s alternative contention that in any event the General Accounting Office- had no right under § 322 of the Transportation Act of 1940 to deduct from the carrier’s charges the amount claimed by the United States to have been unreasonable. Section 216. (j), 49 U. S. C. §316 (j), provides that “Nothing in this section shall be held to extinguish any remedy or right of"action not inconsistent herewith.” Section 205 (a) of. the Power Act, 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (a), provides that “All rates and charges . . . and all rules and regulations affecting or .pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not .just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.” CC f pC F CO a 02 O 49 U. S.C.§§ 13 (1), 16. Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1194, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1, 5, 11-12. See Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate and .Foreign Commerce on S. 378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3, 12. Such a right was assumed by this Court to have existed at common law in Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 436, and Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 284 U. S. 370. But see Aitchison, Fair Reward and Just Compensation, Common Carrier Service, p. 10, suggesting that the common-law .right is one to be free from undue- discrimination, rather than from mere exorbitance. Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act provided at the time of the Abilene case, and continues in substance to provide', that: “Nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies.” It is noteworthy that in 1949, when Congress added to the Motor Carrier Act a statute of limitations provision governing suits by and against carriers involving charges, such provision was made applicable only to suits for" “overcharges,” defined to mean “charges for transportation services in excess of those applicable thereto under the tariffs lawfully on file with the Commission.” 49 U. S. C. § 304a. It would be surprising, given the policy of uniformity reflected in this provision, for Congress- not to have also added a statute of limitations provision applicable to suits on account of unreasonable rates, had a cause of'action with respect to such rates been deemed to exist. Compare 49 U. S. C. § 16 (3) (b), providing a limitations provision for complaints for the recovery of_ damages “not based on overcharges” from rail carriers. See, e. g., United States v. Davidson Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., 302 I. C. C. 87, 90A)1, involving the same parties as those now before us in No. 96. Barrows, relied on heavily in the dissenting opinion because it w|s decided by a Division of the I. C. C. of which Commissioner Eastrhan, previously Federal Coordinator of Transportation and a principal architect of the Motor Carrier Act, was a member,- does not even suggest that a common-law action to recover unreasonable rates might be maintainable. Rather it referred to findings as to the reasonableness of past rates only as “valuable future guides to shippers and carriers.” 11 M. C. C., at 367. The Bell case purported to find such authorization in §§ 216 (e) and 204 (c) (49 U. S. C. §§ 316 (e), 304 (c)), although both these provisions appear in terms directed only to the authorization of findings and orders operating solely prospectiyely. It relied also on the provisions of the statute which impose on the carrier the duty of maintaining reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates. 49 U. S. C. § 316(b), (d). But see Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., supra. New York & New Brunswick Auto Express Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 339, 126 F. Supp. 215; United States v. Garner, 134 F. Supp. 16 (D. C. E. D. N. C.). See notes 10,11, supra. It is suggested that Congress was fully informed at the time of passage of the Transportation Act of 1940-of “an existing interpretation” of the Motor Carrier Act which would allow common-law actions for the recovery of unreasonable rates. We do not so read the legislative history relied upon. On the contrary, Commissioner Eastman, testifying before the Senate Committee, appeared to distinguish between the availability of a judicial remedy in respect of inapplicable tariff rates and the unavailability of such a remedy in respect of rates claimed to be “unreasonable” though embodied in a filed tariff. The Commissioner said: “So far as reparation is concerned, there is no reason why these provisions should not be applied to motor carriers as well as to railroads. They were omitted from the Motor Carrier Act only because of the desire to lighten the burdens of the motor carriers in the early stages of regulation, in the absence of any strong indication of public, need. Motor carriers have practically no traffic which is noncompetitive, and there is little danger that they will exact exorbitant charges. Since the Motor Carrier Act became effective in 1935, the. Commission has not once had occasion to condemn- motor-carrier rates as unreasonably high. I don’t think we have had any complaints to that effect. It follows that there is nothing to indicate that shippers need provisions to enable the Commission to award reparation for damages suffered because of unreasonable charges. “The occasion for reparation from motor carriers would chiefly 'arise, therefore, in the event of - overcharges above published tariff rates. Shippers can recover such overcharges in court as the law now stands.” (Emphasis added.) Hearings before Senate' Interstate Commerce Committee on S. 1310, S. 2016, S. 1S69, and S. 2009, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 791-792. See also Hearings at p. 132, where Senator Reed asked a truckers,’ representative opposing the addition of reparations provisions to the Motor Carrier Act “[I]f a shipper by railroad, which is one form of common carrier, now has. a remedy at law in the way of damages which he may have suffered through a collection of an unreasonable . rate, -and if we are trying to make Uniform regulations, why should a common carrier by truck be exempted from the right or remedy of the shipper against an unreasonable charge any more than any other form of common carrier?” The reparations provision was subsequently stricken from the bill. But see Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 577, 589, commenting on Bell Potato Chip, supra: ‘’It is, to be sure, doubtful that reparations in such a case serve a useful function. Rates are under continuous scrutiny. Administrative condemnation implies new circumstances or new understanding rather than serious past injustice. And, as Mr. Justice Jackson observes in the Montana-Dakota case, the overcharge has usually been passed along by the one who paid it to some undiseoverable and unreim-bursable consumer.” It was recognized at the time of passage of the Motor Carrier Act that competitive conditions in the trucking industry were such that the possibility of unreasonably high rates presented no problem. Commissioner Eastman, who had conducted an inquiry into the motor carrier'industry, stated during the hearings preceding passage of the Act that "I do not recall that there were any complaints based upon excessive charges.” Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5262, 6016, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 32. See also his 1939 statement before the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Senate, quoted at note 18, supra. See Motor Carrier Act, §§ 217 (c), 216 (g), 49 U. S. C. §§ 317 (c), 316 (g). Counsel for the Government stated on oral argument that the situation presented in No. 96, where the suspension period expired before the adjudication of the reasonableness of the challenged rate had been completed, arises very infrequently, since the suspension period is ordinarily ample to permit such adjudication.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF KENOSHA et al. v. BRUNO et al. No. 72-658. Argued April 18, 1973 Decided June 11, 1973 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Black-mun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 516. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 516. LeRoy L. Dalton, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, Michael S. Fisher, and Edward A. Krenzke. James A. Walrath argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees Sleepy’s, Inc., et al. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellees, owners of retail liquor establishments, were holders of tavern liquor licenses issued under Wisconsin law by appellants, the cities of Racine and Kenosha. Acting pursuant to Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 176.05 (1), (8) (1957 and Supp. 1973), the cities denied appellees’ applications for renewal of their one-year licenses after holding public “legislative” hearings. Alleging, inter alia, deprivations of their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights in such denials and, by amended complaints, the unconstitutionality of §§ 176.05 (1), (8), appellees brought these federal civil rights actions for declaratory and injunctive relief naming in each case only the appropriate municipality as a defendant. The District Court entered temporary restraining orders commanding the immediate issuance of licenses and convened a three-judge district court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 to rule on the constitutionality of the statutory licensing procedure. Thereafter, the Attorney General of Wisconsin was allowed to intervene as a party defendant on his own motion. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court declared the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. This direct appeal followed. Under the Wisconsin local licensing scheme, the governing bodies of municipalities are authorized to grant liquor licenses “to such persons entitled to a license under this chapter as they deem proper to keep places within their respective towns, villages, or cities for the sale of intoxicating liquors. . . .” Wis. Stat. Ann. § 176.05 (1) (1957). The statutory scheme has been interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to require a “legislative type of hearing wherein one is given notice of the hearing and a fair opportunity to state his position on the issue,” in situations where municipalities have denied an application for renewal of a license. Ruffalo v. Common Council, 38 Wis. 2d 518, 524, 157 N. W. 2d 568, 571 (1968). Such applications may not be rejected “without a statement on the clerk’s minutes as to the reasons for such rejection,” Wis. Stat. Ann. § 176.05 (8) (Supp. 1973), and the state courts have certiorari jurisdiction to review whether such refusals by the councils are arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. Ruff alo v. Common Council, supra. In the case of the Racine denials, it was stipulated that the question of the appellees’ applications for licenses was referred to the License and Welfare Committee of the Common Council and that at public hearings conducted by that Committee, appellees were present and heard oral objections to the renewal of the licenses for their taverns. After holding a public hearing, the Common Council followed the Committee’s recommendation and voted to deny the applications, apparently because of the adverse effects on the community of nude dancing in the bars. It was also stipulated that at all meetings, all persons including appellees were given an opportunity to speak, but no speaker was sworn. None of the testimony was recorded and no verbatim transcript was made. Appellees were not advised that they could cross-examine any of the speakers, and they did not request such an opportunity. And there was no advance written specification of the charges against any of the bars. Relying on two Seventh Circuit decisions, the three-judge court (as had the single judge) held that “in light of the equitable nature of this action” it had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). Concluding that Racine’s interest in being able to deny the renewal of liquor licenses with no other safeguard than a legislative hearing is “minimal,” the court balanced that interest against that of appellees, assertedly their occupations and their investments, and determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires municipalities to grant an “adversary-type hearing in which the applicant is given timely notice of the reasons urged for denial [of renewal of his license] and an opportunity to present, confront, and cross-examine witnesses under oath with a verbatim transcript.” 346 F. Supp. 43, 51. I Neither party to the appeal has questioned the jurisdiction of the District Court, but “it is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction of the [district court], which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded.” Louisville ><&• Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149,152 (1908). Appellees alleged that they brought their action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and that the District Court therefore had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343. The District Court agreed. The only defendants named in the complaints, however, were the municipalities of Kenosha and Racine. In considering the reach of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), this Court examined the legislative history surrounding its enactment and said: “The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word ‘person’ was used in this particular Act to include them.” Id., at 191. The District Court relied on Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F. 2d 1084 (CA7 1969), and Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F. 2d 585 (CA7 1961), in holding that Monroe was limited to actions for damages, and that cities were proper defendants under § 1983 where equitable relief was sought. Adams, supra, in turn, relied on this Court's per curiam opinion in Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955). But in none of the three opinions in Holmes was the issue of whether or not a municipality is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 discussed. The authority of that case as support for the proposition that a city is a “person” under § 1983 where equitable relief is sought, but is not a “person” under the same section where damages are prayed for, is at least seriously weakened by the following observation in Monroe, supra, at 191 n. 50: “In a few cases in which equitable relief has been sought, a municipality has been named, along with city officials, as defendant where violations of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 were alleged. See, e. g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879. The question dealt with in our opinion was not raised in those cases, either by the parties or by the Court. Since we hold that a municipal corporation is not a 'person’ within the meaning of § 1983, no inference to the contrary can any longer be drawn from those cases.” We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the generic word “person” in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them. Since, as the Court held in Monroe, “Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of” § 1983, id., at 187, they are outside of its ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages. The District Court was therefore wrong in concluding that it had jurisdiction of appellees’ complaints under § 1343. As previously noted, after the complaints had been filed and issue joined, the Attorney General of Wisconsin was allowed to intervene as a party defendant in the actions. The District Court, having concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain the original complaints under § 1343, understandably did not address itself to the question of whether the intervention of the Attorney General as a party would cure the jurisdictional defect which we now find to exist in appellees' complaints. The District Court also observed that “were not civil rights jurisdiction proper, each of the plaintiffs herein would be able to assert the necessary . . . controversy requirement of Title 28 U. S. C. § 1331.” 346 F. Supp., at 50. But although appellees in the Racine denials alleged jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1331 as well as § 1343, and in each complaint there was an allegation of an investment in a tavern of at least $20,000, the defendant municipal corporations answered by putting the appellees to their proof as to the amount in controversy. Since the cases were submitted and decided on cross-motions for summary judgment and stipulations of fact, and no stipulation as to the amount in controversy was filed, we cannot say on this state of the record whether or not jurisdiction over the complaints was affirmatively established. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 507-508 (1939), and cases therein cited. With respect to the Kenosha denials, there was a stipulation as to jurisdictional amount in the proceedings before the single-judge District Court, and an allegation of the requisite jurisdictional amount in the amended complaint, which for the first time challenged the constitutional validity of the Wisconsin statutory licensing scheme. No answer was filed to the amended complaint prior to the entry of judgment by the District Court. We have had the benefit of neither briefs, arguments, nor explicit consideration by the District Court of the jurisdictional questions presented by the intervention of the Attorney General as a party, and the availability of § 1331 jurisdiction in view of the state of the record below. We therefore remand the case to the District Court for consideration of these issues. II Appellees’ licenses have been neither revoked nor suspended. Their claim of deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights arises from the failure of the cities of Kenosha and Racine to hold full-blown adversary hearings before refusing to renew their one-year licenses. Our decisions last year in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), discussed the nature of “liberty” and “property” that is protected against denial without due process by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court did not discuss these recent cases, and it followed, in part, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which was reversed in Roth. It, therefore, made no evaluation of “property” or “liberty” interests which might require a due process hearing, or of the nature of such a hearing if it were required in the light of our opinions in Roth, supra, and Perry, supra. The District Court, also, did not have the benefit of this Court’s decision in California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109 (1972). There we held again that while the Twenty-first Amendment did not abrogate a requirement of procedural due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971), it did grant the States broad authority over the distribution and sale of liquor. We also held that regulations prohibiting the sale of liquor by the drink on premises where there were nude but not necessarily obscene performances were facially constitutional. We, therefore, direct the District Court, after addressing the issue of jurisdiction, to reconsider its judgment in the light of Roth, Perry, and LaRue. The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In the case of appellee Misurelli, it appears from the record that his partner was actually the holder of the expired license. The District Court held, however, that in substance his application was no different from those of the other appellees. Wis. Stat. Arm. § 176.05 provides: “(1) Authority to grant licenses. Each town board, village board and common council may grant retail licenses, under the conditions and restrictions in this chapter contained, to such persons entitled to a license under this chapter as they deem proper to keep places within their respective towns, villages, or cities for the sale of intoxicating liquors. No member of any such town board, village board or common council shall sell directly or indirectly or offer for sale, to any person, firm, or corporation that holds or applies for any such license any bond, material, product, or other matter or thing that may be used by any such licensee or prospective licensee in the carrying on of his or its said business.” Wis. Stat. Ann. § 176.05 provides: “(8) Annual license meetings. All town and village boards and common councils, or the duly authorized committees of such councils, shall meet not later than May 15 of each year and be in session from day to day thereafter, so long as it may be necessary, for the purpose of acting upon such applications for license as may be presented to them on or before April 15, and all applications fox license so filed shall be granted, issued or denied not later than June 15 for the ensuing license year, provided that nothing shall prevent any governing body from granting any licenses which are applied for at any other time. As soon as an application has been approved, a duplicate copy thereof shall be forwarded to the secretary of revenue. No application for a license which is in existence at the time of such annual license meeting shall be rejected without a statement on the clerk’s minutes as to the reasons for such rejection.” The Racine denials were utilized by the District Court as the basis for the main opinion holding the Wisconsin scheme unconstitutional and the other cases were decided on the basis of the main opinion. We are therefore primarily considering the factual background of the Racine denials in our disposition. No such stipulation was filed for appellee Robers, however. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F. 2d 1084 (1969), and Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F. 2d 585 (1961). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: “(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides: “Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The court in Schnell v. City of Chicago, supra, simply followed the previous circuit decision in Adams v. City of Park Ridge, supra, with no independent analysis.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. SANDERS No. 75-1443. Argued January 11-12, 1977 Decided February 23, 1977 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 109. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Maurice Rosenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, and Robert E. Kopp. William A. Kowalski argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Dennis M. Sweeney filed a brief for the Administrative Law Center, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions for decision are (1) whether §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706, is an independent grant to district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for social security benefits and (2), if not, whether § 205 (g) of the Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the Secretary’s decision. I Title II of the Social Security Act provides disability benefits for a claimant who demonstrates that he suffers a physical or mental disability within the meaning of the Act and that the disability arose prior to the expiration of his insured status. 42 U. S. C. §§416 (i), 423. The administrative process is begun when he files a claim with the Social Security Administration. 20 CFR §§ 404.905-404.907 (1976). If the claim is administratively denied, regulations permit administrative reconsideration within a six-month period. §§404.909-404.915. Should a request for reconsideration prove unsuccessful, the claimant may, within 60 days, ask for an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), and a discretionary appeal from an adverse determination of the law judge lies to the Appeals Council. 20 CFR §§ 404.945-404.947 (1976). Finally § 205 (g) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), authorizes federal judicial review of “any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which [the claimant] was a party . . . .” The Act and regulations thus create an orderly administrative mechanism, with district court review of the final decision of the Secretary, to assist in the original processing of the more than 7,600,000 claims filed annually with the Administration. See Social Security Administration, The Year in Review—The Administration of Social Security Programs 1975, p. 54 (1976). By regulation, however, the administrative scheme provides for additional consideration of the claim. This is in the form of regulations for reopening of the agency determination within specified time limits after the date of initial determination: 12 months as a matter of right and four years “upon a finding of good cause,” which exists if new material evidence is provided or specific errors are discovered. 20 CFR §§ 404.957 (a), (b), 404.958 (1976). Moreover, the regulations permit reopening “[a]t any time” for the purpose of correcting clerical errors or errors on the face of relevant evidence. § 404.957 (c) (8). On January 30, 1964, respondent filed his initial claim with the agency for disability payments and disability insurance benefits, alleging inability to work because of epilepsy and blackout spells. The claim proceeded through the several steps of the administrative procedures. An Administrative Law Judge found that respondent was ineligible for benefits on the ground that he had not demonstrated a relevant disability of sufficient severity. The Appeals Council, in June 1966, sustained this decision, and respondent did not pursue judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision under § 205 (g). Almost seven years later, on March 5, 1973, respondent filed a second claim alleging the same bases for eligibility. His claim was again processed through administrative channels under the Secretary’s regulations. The Administrative Law Judge viewed the new application as barred by res judicata, see 20 CFR § 404.937 (1976), but also treated the application as requiring the determination “whether the claimant is entitled to have his prior application reopened . . . ." App. 33-34. Concluding that respondent’s evidence was “merely rep[e]titio[u]s and cumulative,” id., at 35, and finding no errors on the face of the evidence, ibid., the Administrative Law Judge denied reopening and dismissed the claim. Respondent thereupon filed this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, challenging the Secretary’s decision not to reopen, and resting jurisdiction on § 205 (g), 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground stated in its unpublished memorandum that “this court is without jurisdiction to consider the subject matter of this suit.” Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F. 2d 1167 (1975). The Court of Appeals agreed that jurisdiction to review a refusal to reopen a claim proceeding on the ground of abuse of discretion was not authorized by the Social Security Act. Id., at 1169. The court held, however, that § 205 (h) did not limit judicial review to those methods “expressly authorize[d]” by the Social Security Act itself. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which “contains an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy,” afforded the District Court jurisdiction of respondent’s complaint. 522 F. 2d, at 1169. We granted certiorari sub nom. Mathews v. Sanders, 426 U. S. 905 (1976). We reverse. II A The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its construction of § 10 of the APA as an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction is contrary to the conclusion reached by several other Courts of Appeals. 522 F. 2d, at 1169. This conflict is understandable. None of the codified statutory sections that constitute § 10 is phrased like the usual grant of jurisdiction to proceed in the federal courts. On the other hand, the statute undoubtedly evinces Congress’ intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials. Consequently, courts and commentators have sharply divided over whether the statute should be read to provide a distinct basis of jurisdiction for the review of agency actions. Three decisions of this Court arguably have assumed, with little discussion, that the APA is an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 372 (1962). However, an Act of Congress enacted since our grant of certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is that the APA is not to be interpreted as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions. On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, which amends 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a) to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount in controversy as a prerequisite to the maintenance of “any [§ 1331] action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.” The obvious effect of this modification, subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action, regardless of whether the APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate. We conclude that this amendment now largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting the APA as an independent jurisdictional provision. As noted previously, the actual text of § 10 of the APA nowhere contains an explicit grant of jurisdiction to challenge agency action in the federal courts. Furthermore, even the advocates of jurisdiction under the APA acknowledge that there is no basis for concluding that Congress, in enacting § 10 of the APA, actually conceived of the Act in jurisdictional terms. See, e. g., Byse & Fiocca, supra, n. 5, at 328. Thus, the argument in favor of APA jurisdiction rests exclusively on the broad policy consideration that, given the shortcomings of federal mandamus jurisdiction, such a construction is warranted by the rational policy of affording federal judicial review of actions by federal officials acting pursuant to federal law, notwithstanding the absence of the requisite jurisdictional amount. See id., at 330-331; Jaffe, supra, n. 5, at 165. We do not find this argument to be compelling in light of Congress’ apparent intention by the 1976 amendment to restructure afresh the scope of federal-question jurisdiction. In amending § 1331, Congress obviously has expressly acted to fill the jurisdictional void created by the pre-existing amount-in-controversy requirement. This new jurisdictional grant was qualified, however, by the retention of § 205 (h) as preclusive of actions such as this that arise under the Social Security Act. Read together, the expansion of § 1331, coupled with the retention of § 205 (h), apparently expresses Congress’ view of the desired contours of federal-question jurisdiction over agency action. A broad reading of the APA in this instance would serve no purpose other than to modify Congress’ new jurisdictional enactment by overriding its decision to limit § 1331 through the preservation of § 205 (h). Squarely faced with the question of APA jurisdiction for the first time, Congress’ explicit entry into the jurisdictional area counsels against our reading the APA as an implied jurisdictional grant designed solely to fill such an interstitial gap in § 1331 jurisdiction. This is particularly so since neither the text nor the history of the APA speaks in favor of such a reading, and the 1976 Congress, in redefining § 1331, appears not to have envisioned the APA as playing any such stopgap role. We thus conclude that the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action. B Respondent contends that notwithstanding the above, the Social Security Act itself, specifically § 205 (g), should be construed to authorize judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary not to reopen a claim of benefits. All Courts of Appeals that have considered this contention have rejected it. We also agree that § 205 (g) cannot be read to authorize judicial review of alleged abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits. The pertinent part of § 205 (g) provides: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) This provision clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a “final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.” But a petition to reopen a prior final decision may be denied without a hearing as provided in § 205 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 405 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V); see Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1, 4 (CA2 1966); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (CA5 1975). Indeed, the opportunity to reopen final decisions and any hearing convened to determine the propriety of such action are afforded by the Secretary’s regulations and not by the Social Security Act. Moreover, an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing—and being denied—a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205 (g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on the initial claim for benefits. 20 CFR § 404.951 (1976). Congress’ determination so to limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits is a policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility claims. Our duty, of course, is to respect that choice. Respondent argues, however, that Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), have rejected this interpretation of § 205 (g). We do not agree. It is true that both cases authorized judicial review under § 205 (g) of the Secretary’s decision to deny or discontinue social security benefits notwithstanding the absence of a prior § 205 (b) hearing. In both instances, however, the claimants challenged the Secretary’s decisions on constitutional grounds. Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions. Furthermore, since federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 is precluded by § 205 (h), Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 761, a decision denying § 205 (g) jurisdiction in Salfi or Eldridge would effectively have closed the federal forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims. Thus those cases merely adhered to the well-established principle that when constitutional questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will not read a statutory scheme to take the “extraordinary” step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Congress’ intent to do so is manifested by “ 'clear and convincing’ ” evidence. 422 U. S., at 762; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). This is not one of those rare instances where the Secretary’s denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional grounds. Respondent seeks only an additional opportunity to establish that he satisfies the Social Security Act’s eligibility standards for disability benefits. Therefore, § 205 (g) does not afford subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Reversed. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The pertinent provisions of § 10, as codified in 6 U. S. C. §§ 701-704, are the following: "§ 701. Application; definitions. “(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that— “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or “ (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” “§ 702. Right of review. “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” “§ 703. Form and venue of proceeding. “The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.” (Sections 702 and 703 were amended by Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, in respects to be discussed infra, at 105-107, insofar as it modifies the scope of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331.) “§ 704. Actions reviewable. “Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.” Section 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as added and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), provides in pertinent part: “Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. . . .” Section 205 (h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §405 (h), provides: “The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under [§ 1331 et seq.] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.” This section has been held to require the exhaustion of available administrative procedures, to foreclose jurisdiction under the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and to route review through § 205 (g). See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 757, 761 (1975). The Courts of Appeals for the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that § 10 of the APA is an independent grant of jurisdiction. See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F. 2d 410 (CA1 1973); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F. 2d 856 (CA4 1961); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005 (CA5 1975); Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F. 2d 1167 (CA7 1975) (case below); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 53 (CA9 1970); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F. 2d 803 (CA10 1967); Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 507 F. 2d 1107 (1974). The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits disagree. Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F. 2d 326 (CA3 1970); Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F. 2d 405 (CA6 1974); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F. 2d 529 (CA8 1967). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit views the question as unsettled. See South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F. 2d 910 (1976). Compare, e. g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and “Nonstatutory” Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308 (1967), K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 23.02 (Supp. 1976), and L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 165 (1965) (all advocating APA jurisdiction), with Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 389 (1970), and C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3568 (1975) (rejecting APA jurisdiction). Title 5 U. S. C. § 702 makes clear that a person wronged by agency action “is entitled to judicial review thereof.” But § 703 suggests that this language was not intended as an independent jurisdictional foundation, since such judicial review is to proceed “in a court specified by statute” or “in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Both of these clauses seem to look to outside sources of jurisdictional authority. Thus, at best, the text of § 10 is ambiguous in providing a separate grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. Respondent argues that Congress intended its modification of § 1331 to be supplementary to the APA, and, therefore, contemplated that the APA would remain as a distinct jurisdictional provision. But the contrary seems true, for the legislative history suggests that Congress believed that the APA does not confer jurisdiction over administrative action, and, therefore, deletion of the jurisdictional amount from § 1331 was warranted. This understanding was made explicit by the Senate Judiciary Committee: “An anomaly in Federal jurisdiction prevents an otherwise competent United States district court from hearing certain cases seeking ‘non-statutory’ review of Federal administrative action, absent the jurisdictional amount in controversy required by 28 U. S. C. section 1331, the general ‘Federal question’ provision. These cases ‘arise under’ the Federal Constitution or Federal statutes, and the committee believes they are appropriate matters for the exercise of Federal judicial power regardless of the monetary amount involved.” S. Rep. No. 94-996, p. 12 (1976) (emphasis supplied); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1656, p. 13 (1976). See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1, 4-5 (CA2 1966); Davis v. Richardson, 460 F. 2d 772, 775 (CA3 1972); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d, at 1007-1008; Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F. 2d 617, 621 (CA6 1972); Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F. 2d 904, 909 (CA9 1973); Neighbors v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 511 F. 2d 80, 81 (CA10 1974).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KRAFT GENERAL FOODS, INC. v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND FINANCE No. 90-1918. Argued April 22, 1992 Decided June 18, 1992 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’Con-nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 82. Jerome B. Libin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs 'were Kathryn L. Moore and John V. Donnelly. Marcia Mason, Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General, and Harry M. Griger, Special Assistant Attorney General. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Gary B. Allen, and Ernest J. Brown. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Avon Products, Inc., et al. by Timothy B. Dyk, Edward, K. Bilieh, and Maryann B. Gall; for Chevron Corp. et al. by Mark L. Evans, Alan I. Horowitz, and Anthony F. Shelley; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Stephan G. Weil, Susan G. Braden, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar. Richard Ruda, Michael G. Dzialo, Martin Label, and James F. Flug filed a brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1981 petitioner Kraft General Foods, Inc. (Kraft), operated a unitary business throughout the United States and in several foreign countries. Because part of its business was conducted in Iowa, Kraft was subject to the Iowa Business Tax on Corporations. At issue in this case is Iowa’s inclusion in the tax base of the dividends that Kraft received from six subsidiaries, each of which was incorporated and conducted its business in a foreign country. While Iowa taxes the dividends that a corporation receives from its foreign subsidiaries, Iowa does not tax dividends received from domestic subsidiaries. The question presented is whether the disparate treatment of dividends from foreign and from domestic subsidiaries violates the Foreign Commerce Clause. I The Iowa statute uses the federal definition of “net income” with certain adjustments. For federal tax purposes, corporations are generally allowed a deduction for dividends received from domestic subsidiaries. As the earnings of the domestic subsidiaries, themselves, are subject to federal taxation, this deduction avoids a second federal tax on those earnings. The Federal Government generally does not tax the earnings of foreign subsidiaries, and the dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries are not deductible. The parent corporation, however, does receive a credit for the foreign taxes paid on the dividends and on the underlying foreign earnings. Like the deduction for domestic subsidiary dividends, the foreign tax credit is intended to mitigate multiple taxation of corporate earnings. In following the federal scheme for the calculation of taxable income, Iowa allows a deduction 'for dividends received from domestic subsidiaries, but not for those received from foreign subsidiaries. Iowa does not directly tax the income of a subsidiary unless the subsidiary, itself, does business in Iowa. Thus, if a domestic subsidiary transacts business in Iowa, its income is taxed, but if it does not do business in Iowa, neither its income nor the dividends paid to its parent are taxed. In the ease of the foreign subsidiary doing business abroad, Iowa does not tax the corporate income,'but does tax the dividends paid to the parent. Unlike the Federal Government, Iowa does not allow a credit for taxes paid to foreign countries. See 465 N. W. 2d 664, 665 (Iowa 1991). In computing its taxable income on its 1981 Iowa return, Kraft deducted foreign subsidiary dividends, notwithstanding contrary provisions of Iowa law. Respondent Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance (Iowa) assessed a defi-cieney. After its administrative protest was denied, Kraft challenged the assessment in Iowa courts, alleging that the disparate treatment of domestic and foreign subsidiary dividends violated the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause claim because petitioner failed to demonstrate “that Iowa businesses receive a commercial advantage over foreign commerce due to Iowa’s taxing scheme.” Id., at 668. In considering Kraft’s challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, the court found that Iowa’s use of the federal formula for calculation of taxable income was convenient both for the taxpayer and for the State. Concluding that the Iowa statute was rationally related to the goal of administrative efficiency, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate equal protection. Id., at 669. We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 1056 (1992). II The principal dispute between the parties concerns whether, on its face, the Iowa statute discriminates against foreign commerce. It is indisputable that the Iowa statute treats dividends received from foreign subsidiaries less favorably than dividends received from domestic subsidiaries. Iowa includes the former, but not the latter, in the calculation of taxable income. While admitting that the two kinds of dividends are treated differently, Iowa and its amici advance several arguments in support of the proposition that this differential treatment does not constitute prohibited discrimination against foreign commerce. Amicus United States notes that a subsidiary’s place of incorporation does not necessarily correspond to the locus of its business operations. A domestic corporation might do business abroad, and its dividends might reflect earnings from its foreign activity. Conversely, a foreign corporation might do business in the United States, with its dividend payments reflecting domestic business operations. On this basis, the United States contends that the disparate treatment of dividends from foreign and domestic subsidiaries does not translate into discrimination based on the location or nature of business activity and is thus not prohibited by the Commerce Clause. We recognize that the domicile of a corporation does not necessarily establish that it is engaged in either foreign or domestic commerce. In this case, however, it is stipulated that the foreign subsidiaries did, in fact, operate in foreign commerce and, further, that the decision to do business abroad through foreign subsidiaries is typically supported by legitimate business reasons. By its nature, a unitary business is characterized by a flow of value among its components. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 178 (1983). The flow of value between Kraft and its foreign subsidiaries clearly constitutes foreign commerce; this flow includes the foreign subsidiary dividends, which, as Iowa acknowledges, themselves constitute foreign commerce. Moreover, through the interplay of the federal and Iowa tax statutes, the applicability of the Iowa tax necessarily depends not only on the domicile of the subsidiary, but also on the location of the subsidiary’s business activities. The Federal Government generally taxes the income that a foreign corporation earns in the United States. To avoid multiple taxation, the Government allows a deduction for foreign subsidiary dividends that reflect such domestic earnings. In adopting the federal pattern, Iowa also allows a deduction for dividends received from a foreign subsidiary if the dividends reflect business activity in the United States. Accordingly, while the dividends of all domestic subsidiaries are excluded from the Iowa tax base, the dividends of foreign subsidiaries are excluded only to the extent they reflect domestic earnings. In sum, the only subsidiary dividend payments taxed by Iowa are those reflecting the foreign business activity of foreign subsidiaries. We do not think that this discriminatory treatment can be justified on the ground that some of the (untaxed) dividend payments from domestic subsidiaries also reflect foreign earnings. In a related argument, Iowa and amicus United States assert that Kraft could conduct its foreign business through domestic subsidiaries instead of foreign subsidiaries or, alternatively, could set up a domestic company to hold the stock of the foreign subsidiaries and receive the foreign dividend payments. In either case, Kraft, itself, would receive no dividends from foreign subsidiaries and would thus avoid paying Iowa tax on income attributable to the foreign operations. Iowa and the United States contend that these alternatives further demonstrate that it is not foreign commerce, but, at most, a particular form of corporate organization that is burdened. This argument is not persuasive. Whether or not the suggested methods of tax avoidance would be practical as a business matter, and whether or not they might generate adverse tax consequences in other jurisdictions, we do not think that a State can force a taxpayer to conduct its foreign business through a domestic subsidiary in order to avoid discriminatory taxation of foreign commerce. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869, 878-879 (1985). We have previously found that the Commerce Clause is not violated when the differential tax treatment of two categories of companies "results solely from differences between the nature of their businesses, not from the location of their activities.” Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S. 66, 78 (1989). We find no authority for the different proposition advanced here that a tax that does discriminate against foreign commerce may be upheld if a taxpayer could avoid that discrimination by changing the domicile of the corporations through which it conducts its business. Our cases suggest the contrary. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 406 (1984); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72 (1963). Repeating the argument that prevailed in the Iowa Supreme Court, Iowa next insists that its tax system does not violate the Commerce Clause because it does not favor local interests. To the extent corporations do business in Iowa, an apportioned share of their entire corporate income is subject to Iowa tax. In the case of a foreign subsidiary doing business abroad, Iowa would tax the dividends paid to the domestic parent, but would not tax the subsidiary’s earnings. Summarizing this analysis, Iowa asserts: “More earnings of the domestic subsidiary, which has income producing activities in Iowa, than earnings of the foreign subsidiary, which has no Iowa activities, are included in the preapportioned net income base for the unitary business as a whole.” Brief for Respondent 19. Far from favoring local commerce, Iowa argues, the tax system places additional burdens on Iowa businesses. We agree that the statute does not treat Iowa subsidiaries more favorably than subsidiaries located elsewhere. We are not persuaded, however, that such favoritism is an essential element of a violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979), we concluded that the constitutional prohibition against state taxation of foreign commerce is broader than the protection afforded to interstate commerce, id., at 445-446, in part because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated, id., at 448-451. Like the Import-Export Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause recognizes that discriminatory treatment of foreign commerce may create problems, such as the potential for international retaliation, that concern the Nation as a whole. Id., at 450. So here, we think that a State’s preference for domestic commerce over foreign commerce is inconsistent with the Commerce Clause even if the State’s own economy is not a direct beneficiary of the discrimination. As the absence of local benefit does not eliminate the international implications of the discrimination, it cannot exempt such discrimination from Commerce Clause prohibitions. Iowa and amicus United States also assert the stronger claim that Iowa’s tax system does not favor business activity in the United States generally over business activity abroad. If true, this would indeed suggest that the statute does not discriminate against foreign commerce. We are not convinced, however, that this description adequately characterizes the relevant features of the Iowa statute. It is true that if a subsidiary were located in another State, its earnings would be subject to taxation by the Federal Government and by the other State (assuming that the State was one of the great majority that impose a corporate income tax). This state and federal tax burden might exceed the sum of the foreign tax that a foreign subsidiary would pay and the tax that Iowa collects on dividends received from a foreign subsidiary. But whatever the tax burdens imposed by the Federal Government or by other States, the fact remains that Iowa imposes a burden on foreign subsidiaries that it does not impose on domestic subsidiaries. We have no reason to doubt the assertion of the United States that “[i]n evaluating the alleged facial discrimination effected by the Iowa tax, it is not proper to ignore the operation of other provisions of the same statute.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14, n. 19 (emphasis added). We find no authority, however, for the principle that discrimination against foreign commerce can be justified if the benefit to domestic subsidiaries might happen to be offset by other taxes imposed not by Iowa, but by other States and by the Federal Government. Finally, Iowa insists that even if discrimination against foreign commerce does result, the statute is valid because it is intended to promote administrative convenience rather than economic protectionism. Iowa contends that the adoption of the federal definition of “taxable income,” which includes foreign subsidiary dividends, provides significant advantages both to the taxpayers and to the taxing authorities. Taxpayers may compute their Iowa tax easily based on their federal calculations, and the Iowa authorities may rely on federal regulations and interpretations and may take advantage of federal efforts to monitor taxpayer compliance. See 465 N. W. 2d, at 669. We do not minimize the value of having state forms and auditing procedures replicate federal practice. Absent a compelling justification, however, a State may not advance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against foreign commerce. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 626-628 (1978); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 148, n. 19 (1986). In this instance, Iowa could enjoy substantially the same administrative benefits by utilizing the federal definition of taxable income, while making adjustments that avoid the discriminatory treatment of foreign subsidiary dividends. Many other States have adopted this approach. It is apparent, then, that this is not a case in which the State’s goals “cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988). Even if such adjustments would diminish the administrative benefits of adopting federal definitions, this marginal loss in convenience would not constitute the kind of serious health and safety concern that we have sometimes found sufficient to justify discriminatory state legislation. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S., at 151; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 956-957 (1982). > — t > — i i-H Iowa need not adopt the federal definition of taxable income. Nor, having chosen to follow the federal system in part, must Iowa duplicate that scheme in all respects. The adoption of the federal system in whole or in part, however, cannot shield a state tax statute from Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Iowa statute cannot withstand this scrutiny, for it facially discriminates against foreign commerce and therefore violates the Foreign Commerce Clause. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.' Iowa Code §422.32 et seq. (1981). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. Kraft owned capital stock representing more than 80% of the voting power and of the total value of the subsidiaries. Ibid. “The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations-” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8. See Iowa Code §422.35 (1981). See 26 U.S.C. §243. See 465 N. W. 2d 664, 665 (Iowa 1991); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 5.05 (5th ed. 1987). See 26 U. S. C. §§901, 902. Instead of taking the credit, the corporation may elect to deduct the foreign tax withheld on dividends from foreign subsidiaries. See § 164. The taxpayer may not take both the credit and the deduction. See § 275(a)(4). The credit is almost always more valuable to the taxpayer. See 3 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 69.14 (2d ed. 1991). See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U. S. 132, 139 (1989); American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 450, 452 (1942); see also Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 17.11. Iowa is not a State that taxes an apportioned share of the entire income of a unitary business, without regard for formal corporate lines. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; cf. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 164-169 (1983). At oral argument, counsel for Kraft offered the following illustration: “If an Iowa parent company had a Kentucky subsidiary, [that] did all its business in Kentucky, and another subsidiary that did all its business in Germany, Iowa would not tax the income of either of those subsidiaries. If each paid a dividend to the Iowa parent, Iowa would tax the German dividends and would not tax the Kentucky dividends.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48. If in calculating its federal tax liability, a taxpayer elects to deduct foreign tax withheld on foreign subsidiary dividends, a taxpayer may also deduct these tax payments in calculating its Iowa taxes. Electing the deduction, then, allows the taxpayer to reduce, but not eliminate, the Iowa tax on foreign subsidiary dividends. In the relevant year, Kraft elected to take the foreign tax credit, see 465 N. W. 2d, at 666, and thus could not deduct the foreign taxes in computing its federal or Iowa taxable income, see n. 7, supra. See 465 N. W. 2d, at 666. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. “No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 1. The parties stipulated as follows: “Domestic Corporations typically do business in foreign countries through corporations organized in the country in which they are doing business for a variety of reasons. Reasons include, but are not limited to, the requirements of the local country, a better ability to limit their liability in that country, the marketing advantage of being perceived by customers as a local company, greater ease in repatriating funds, greater ease in borrowing funds locally, and ability to own property and manufacture in that country.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a-31a. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24,35. See 26 U. S. C. §882. See §246. The dissent presents the example of a subsidiary incorporated in a foreign country, but engaged in business exclusively in the United States. The dissent doubts whether a dividend payment from such a subsidiary is properly characterized as "foreign commerce.” Post, at 85. As discussed above, however, a dividend payment from such a subsidiary would not be taxed by Iowa. Iowa taxes foreign subsidiary dividends only to the extent that they reflect foreign earnings. The dissent does not dispute that this kind of dividend payment does constitute "foreign commerce.” Post, at 84. In Amerada Hess, we rejected the contention that a New Jersey tax violated the Commerce Clause because it “discriminate])!] against oil producers who market their oil in favor of independent retailers who do not produce oil.” 490 U. S., at 78. “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws . . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Corporate income is taxed by 45 States and by the District of Columbia. See 1 J. Hellerstein, State Taxation: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes ¶ 1.6 (1983). If one were to compare the aggregate tax imposed by Iowa on a unitary business which included a subsidiary doing business throughout the United States (including Iowa) with the aggregate tax imposed by Iowa on a unitary business which included a foreign subsidiary doing business abroad, it would be difficult to say that Iowa discriminates against the business with the foreign subsidiary. Iowa would tax an apportioned share of the domestic subsidiary’s entire earnings, but would tax only the amount of the foreign subsidiary’s earnings paid as a dividend to the parent. In considering claims of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause, however, it is necessary to compare the taxpayers who are "most similarly situated.” Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 71 (1963). A corporation with a subsidiary doing business in Iowa is not situated similarly to a corporation with a subsidiary doing business abroad. In the former case, the Iowa operations of the subsidiary provide an independent basis for taxation not present in the case of the foreign subsidiary. A more appropriate comparison is between corporations whose subsidiaries do not do business in Iowa. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a-75a. Having concluded that the Iowa statute violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, we do not reach Kraft's challenge to the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CAPITAL CITIES CABLE, INC., et al. v. CRISP, DIRECTOR, OKLAHOMA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD No. 82-1795. Argued February 21, 1984 Decided June 18, 1984 Brent N. Rushforth argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs for petitioners Cox Cable of Oklahoma City, Inc., et al., were John D. Matthews, David P. Fleming, and J. Christopher Redding. Timothy B. Dyk and Clyde A. Muchmore filed briefs for petitioner Capital Cities Cable, Inc. Michael W. McConnell argued the cause pro hac vice for the Federal Communications Commission as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Richard G. Wilkins, Bruce E. Fein, and C. Grey Pash, Jr. Robert L. McDonald, First Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael C. Turpén, Attorney General, and James B. Franks and Lynn Barnett, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by John G. Koeltl, James C. Goodale, Burt Neu- borne, and Charles S. Sims; for the National Association of Broadcasters et al. by Floyd Abrams, Dean Ringel, and Susan Buckley; for the National Cable Television Association, Inc., et al., by Brenda L. Fox, Robert St. John Roper, Michael S. Schooler, Henry J. Gerken, Ian D. Volner, and Mark L. Pelesh; and for the Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., et al., by Bruce D. Sokler and Peter A. Casciato. Larry Derryberry filed a brief for S. A. N. E., Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Mississippi by Bill Attain, Attorney General, and Peter M. Stockett, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General; for the American Advertising Federation et al. by Eric M. Rubin and Walter E. Diercks; for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Marshall J. Nelson, W. Terry Maguire, and Pamela J. Riley; and for the National League of Cities by Ross D. Davis, David R. Ohlbaum, and Henry Getter. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether Oklahoma may require cable television operators in that State to delete all advertisements for alcoholic beverages contained in the out-of-state signals that they retransmit by cable to their subscribers. Petitioners contend that Oklahoma’s requirement abridges their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and is pre-empted by federal law. Because we conclude that this state regulation is pre-empted, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and do not reach the First Amendment question. Since 1959, it has been lawful to sell and consume alcoholic beverages in Oklahoma. The State Constitution, however, as well as implementing statutes, prohibits the advertising of such beverages, except by means of strictly regulated on-premises signs. For several years, pursuant to this authority, Oklahoma has prohibited television broadcasting stations in the State from broadcasting alcoholic beverage commercials as part of their locally produced programming and has required these stations to block out all such advertising carried on national network programming. See Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Heublein Wines, Int’l, 566 P. 2d 1158, 1160 (Okla. 1977). At the same time, the Oklahoma Attorney General has ruled — principally because of the practical difficulties of enforcement — that the ban does not apply to alcoholic beverage advertisements appearing in newspapers, magazines, and other publications printed outside Oklahoma but sold and distributed in the State. Consequently, out-of-state publications may be delivered to Oklahoma subscribers and sold at retail outlets within the State, even though they contain advertisements for alcoholic beverages. Until 1980, Oklahoma applied a similar policy to cable television operators who were permitted to retransmit out-of-state signals containing alcoholic beverage commercials to their subscribers. In March of that year, however, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion in which he concluded that the retransmission of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by cable television systems operating in the State would be considered a violation of the advertising ban. 11 Op. Okla. Atty. Gen. No. 79-334, p. 550 (Mar. 19, 1980). Respondent Crisp, Director of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, thereafter warned Oklahoma cable operators, including petitioners, that they would be criminally prosecuted if they continued to carry such out-of-state advertisements over their systems. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a; App. 11. Petitioners, operators of several cable television systems in Oklahoma, filed this suit in March 1981 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Oklahoma policy violated the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted petitioners a preliminary injunction and subsequently entered summary judgment and a permanent injunction in December 1981. In granting that relief, the District Court found that petitioners regularly carried out-of-state signals containing wine advertisements, that they were prohibited by federal law from altering or modifying these signals, and that “no feasible way” existed for petitioners to delete the wine advertisements. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a-41a. Addressing petitioners’ First Amendment claim, the District Court applied the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), and concluded that Oklahoma’s advertising ban was an unconstitutional restriction on the cable operators’ right to engage in protected commercial speech. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a-50a. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that, while the wine commercials at issue were protected by the First Amendment, the state ban was a valid restriction on commercial speech. Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp., 699 F. 2d 490 (1983). Although the Court of Appeals noted that “Federal Communication[s] Commission regulations and federal copyright law prohibit cable operators from altering or modifying the television signals, including advertisements, they relay to subscribers,” the court did not discuss the question whether application of the Oklahoma law to these cable operators was pre-empted by the federal regulations. Id., at 492. While petitioners’ petition for certiorari was pending, a brief was filed for the Federal Communications Commission as amicus curiae in which it was contended that the Oklahoma ban on the retransmission of out-of-state signals by cable operators significantly interfered with the existing federal regulatory framework established to promote cable broadcasting. In granting certiorari, therefore, we ordered the parties, in addition to the questions presented by the petitioners concerning commercial speech, to brief and argue the question whether the State’s regulation of liquor advertising, as applied to out-of-state broadcast signals, is valid in light of existing federal regulation of cable broadcasting. 464 U. S. 813 (1983). Although we do not ordinarily consider questions not specifically passed upon by the lower court, see California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 557, n. 2 (1957), this rule is not inflexible, particularly in cases coming, as this one does, from the federal courts. See, e. g., Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320, n. 6 (1971). Here, the conflict between Oklahoma and federal law was plainly raised in petitioners’ complaint, it was acknowledged by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the District Court made findings on all factual issues necessary to resolve this question, and the parties have briefed and argued the question pursuant to our order. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to refrain from addressing the question whether the Oklahoma ban as applied here so conflicts with the federal regulatory framework that it is pre-empted. II Petitioners and the FCC contend that the federal regulatory scheme for cable television systems administered by the Commission is intended to pre-empt any state regulation of the signals carried by cable system operators. Respondent apparently concedes that enforcement of the Oklahoma statute in this case conflicts with federal law, but argues that because the State’s advertising ban was adopted pursuant to the broad powers to regulate the transportation and importation of intoxicating liquor reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment, the statute should prevail notwithstanding the conflict with federal law. As in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), where we held that a California wine-pricing program violated the Sherman Act notwithstanding the State’s reliance upon the Twenty-first Amendment in establishing that system, we turn first before assessing the impact of the Twenty-first Amendment to consider whether the Oklahoma statute does in fact conflict with federal law. See id., at 106-114. Our consideration of that question is guided by familiar and well-established principles. Under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, the enforcement of a state regulation may be pre-empted by federal law in several circumstances: first, when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, has expressed a clear intent to pre-empt state law, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977); second, when it is clear, despite the absence of explicit pre-emptive language, that Congress has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field of regulation and has thereby “left no room for the States to supplement” federal law, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); and, finally, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, ante, at 469. And, as we made clear in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982): “Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. When the administrator promulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law, the court’s inquiry is similarly limited: ‘If [h]is choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’” Id., at 153-154, quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 383 (1961). The power delegated to the FCC plainly comprises authority to regulate the signals carried by cable television systems. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157 (1968), the Court found that the Commission had been given “broad responsibilities” to regulate all aspects of interstate communication by wire or radio by virtue of §2(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 152(a), and that this comprehensive authority included power to regulate cable communications systems. 392 U. S., at 177-178. We have since explained that the Commission’s authority extends to all regulatory actions “necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities.” FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 706 (1979). Accord, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 649, 665-667 (1972) (plurality opinion); id., at 675 (Burger, C. J., concurring in result). Therefore, if the FCC has resolved to pre-empt an area of cable television regulation and if this determination “represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies” that are within the agency’s domain, United States v. Shimer, supra, at 383, we must conclude that all conflicting state regulations have been precluded. A In contrast to commercial television broadcasters, which transmit video signals to their audience free of charge and derive their income principally from advertising revenues, cable television systems generally operate on the basis of a wholly different entrepreneurial principle. In return for service fees paid by subscribers, cable operators provide their customers with a variety of broadcast and nonbroadcast signals obtained from several sources. Typically, these sources include over-the-air broadcast signals picked up by a master antenna from local and nearby television broadcasting stations, broadcast signals from distant television stations imported by means of communications satellites, and non-broadcast signals that are not originated by television broadcasting stations, but are instead transmitted specifically for cable systems by satellite or microwave relay. Over the past 20 years, pursuant to its delegated authority under the Communications Act, the FCC has unambiguously expressed its intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation of this entire array of signals carried by cable television systems. The Commission began its regulation of cable communication in the 1960’s. At that time, it was chiefly concerned that unlimited importation of distant broadcast signals into the service areas of local television broadcasting stations might, through competition, “destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,” and thereby cause a significant reduction in service to households not served by cable systems. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F. C. C. 683, 700 (1965). In order to contain this potential effect, the Commission promulgated rules requiring cable systems to carry the signals of all local stations in their areas, to avoid duplication of the programs of local television stations carried on the system during the same day that such programs were broadcast by the local stations, and to limit their importation of distant broadcast signals into the service areas of the local television broadcasting stations. CATV, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 745-746, 781-782 (1966). It was with respect to that initial assertion of jurisdiction over cable signal carriage that we confirmed the FCC’s general authority under the Communications Act to regulate cable television systems. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., supra, at 172-178. The Commission further refined and modified these rules governing the carriage of broadcast signals by cable systems in 1972. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d 143, on reconsideration, 36 F. C. C. 2d 326 (1972), aff’d sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F. 2d 1344 (CA9 1975). In marking the boundaries of its jurisdiction, the FCC determined that, in contrast to its regulatory scheme for television broadcasting stations, it would not adopt a system of direct federal licensing for cable systems. Instead, the Commission announced a program of “deliberately structured dualism” in which state and local authorities were given responsibility for granting franchises to cable operators within their communities and for overseeing such local incidents of cable operations as delineating franchise areas, regulating the construction of cable facilities, and maintaining rights of way. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d, at 207. At the same time, the Commission retained exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable communication, including signal carriage and technical standards. See id., at 170-176. As the FCC explained in a subsequent order clarifying the scope of its 1972 cable television rules: “The fact that this Commission has pre-empted jurisdiction of any and all signal carriage regulation is unquestioned. Nonetheless, occasionally we receive applications for certificates of compliance which enclose franchises that attempt to delineate the signals to be carried by the franchisee cable operator. Franchising authorities do not have any jurisdiction or authority relating to signal carriage. While the franchisor might want to include a provision requiring the operator to carry all signals allowable under our rules, that is as far as the franchisor can or should go.” Cable Television, 46 F. C. C. 2d 175, 178 (1974) (emphasis added). The Commission has also made clear that its exclusive jurisdiction extends to cable systems’ carriage of specialized, nonbroadcast signals — a service commonly described as “pay cable.” See id., at 199-200. Although the FCC has recently relaxed its regulation of importation of distant broadcast signals to permit greater access to this source of programming for cable subscribers, it has by no means forsaken its regulatory power in this area. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F. C. C. 2d 663 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Malrite T. V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F. 2d 1140 (CA2 1981), cert. denied sub nom. National Football League v. FCC, 454 U. S. 1143 (1982). Indeed, the Commission’s decision to allow unfettered importation of distant broadcast signals rested on its conclusion that “the benefits to existing and potential cable households from permitting the carriage of additional signals are substantial. Millions of households may be afforded not only increased viewing options, but also access to a diversity of services from cable television that presently is unavailable in their communities.” 79 F. C. C. 2d, at 746. See also Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 Law & Contemp. Prob. 77 (Winter 1981). As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in upholding this decision, “[by] shifting its policy toward a more favorable regulatory climate for the cable industry, the FCC has chosen a balance of television services that should increase program diversity . . . .” Malrite T. V. of New York v. FCC, supra, at 1151. Clearly, the full accomplishment of such objectives would be jeopardized if state and local authorities were now permitted to restrict substantially the ability of cable operators to provide these diverse services to their subscribers. Accordingly, to the extent it has been invoked to control the distant broadcast and nonbroadcast signals imported by cable operators, the Oklahoma advertising ban plainly reaches beyond the regulatory authority reserved to local authorities by the Commission’s rules, and trespasses into the exclusive domain of the FCC. To be sure, Oklahoma may, under current Commission rules, regulate such local aspects of cable systems as franchisee selection and construction oversight, see, e. g., Duplicative and Excessive Over- Regulation — CATV, 54 F. C. C. 2d 855, 863 (1975), but, by requiring cable television operators to delete commercial advertising contained in signals carried pursuant to federal authority, the State has clearly exceeded that limited jurisdiction and interfered with a regulatory area that the Commission has explicitly pre-empted. B Quite apart from this generalized federal pre-emption of state regulation of cable signal carriage, the Oklahoma advertising ban plainly conflicts with specific federal regulations. These conflicts arise in three principal ways. First, the FCC’s so-called “must-carry” rules require certain cable television operators to transmit the broadcast signals of any local television broadcasting station that is located within a specified 35-mile zone of the cable operator or that is “significantly viewed” in the community served by the operator. 47 CFR §§ 76.59(a)(1) and (6) (1983). These “must-carry” rules require many Oklahoma cable operators, including petitioners, to carry signals from broadcast stations located in nearby States such as Missouri and Kansas. See App. 22, 35. In addition, under Commission regulations, the local broadcast signals that cable operators are required to carry must be carried “in full, without deletion or alteration of any portion.” 47 CFR § 76.55(b) (1983). Because, in the Commission’s view, enforcement of these nondeletion rules serves to “prevent a loss of revenues to local broadcasters sufficient to result in reduced service to the public,” they have been applied to commercial advertisements as well as to regular programming. In re Pugh, 68 F. C. C. 2d 997, 999 (1978); WAPA-TV Broadcasting Corp., 59 F. C. C. 2d 263, 272 (1976); CATV, 15 F. C. C. 2d 417, 444 (1968); CATV, 2 F. C. C. 2d, at 753, 756. Consequently, those Oklahoma cable operators required by federal law to carry out-of-state broadcast signals in full, including any wine commercials, are subject to criminal prosecution under Oklahoma law as a result of their compliance with federal regulations. Second, current FCC rulings permit, and indeed encourage, cable television operators to import out-of-state television broadcast signals and retransmit those signals to their subscribers. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F. C. C. 2d, at 745-746. For Oklahoma cable operators, this source of cable programming includes signals from television broadcasting stations located in Kansas, Missouri, and Texas, as well as the signals from so-called “superstations” in Atlanta and Chicago. App. 21, 35-36. It is undisputed that many of these distant broadcast signals retransmitted by petitioners contain wine commercials that are lawful under federal law and in the States where the programming originates. Nor is it disputed that cable operators who carry such signals are barred by Commission regulations from deleting or altering any portion of those signals, including commercial advertising. 47 CFR § 76.55(b) (1983). Under Oklahoma’s advertising ban, however, these cable operators must either delete the wine commercials or face criminal prosecution. Since the Oklahoma law, by requiring deletion of a portion of these out-of-state signals, compels conduct that federal law forbids, the state ban clearly “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the federal regulatory scheme. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67; Farmers Union v. IN DAY, Inc., 360 U. S. 525, 535 (1959). Finally, enforcement of the state advertising ban against Oklahoma cable operators will affect a third source of cable programming over which the Commission has asserted exclusive jurisdiction. Aside from relaying local television broadcasting in accordance with the “must-carry” rules, and distant broadcast signals, cable operators also transmit specialized nonbroadcast cable services to their subscribers. This source of programming, often referred to as “pay cable,” includes such advertiser-supported national cable programming as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN). Although the Commission’s “must-carry” and nondeletion rules do not apply to such nonbroadcast cable services, the FCC, as noted earlier, see supra, at 703, has explicitly stated that state regulation of these services is completely precluded by federal law. Petitioners generally receive such signals by antenna, microwave receiver, or satellite dish and restransmit them by wire to their subscribers. But, unlike local television broadcasting stations that transmit only one signal and receive notification from their networks concerning advertisements, cable operators simultaneously receive and channel to their subscribers a variety of signals from many sources without any advance notice about the timing or content of commercial advertisements carried on those signals. Cf. n. 2, supra. As the record of this case indicates, developing the capacity to monitor each signal and delete every wine commercial before it is retransmitted would be a prohibitively burdensome task. App. 25-26, 36-38. Indeed, the District Court specifically found that, in view of these considerations, “[tjhere exists no feasible way for [cable operators] to block out the [wine] advertisements.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a. Accordingly, if the state advertising ban is enforced, Oklahoma cable operators will be compelled either to abandon altogether their carriage of both distant broadcast signals and specialized nonbroadcast cable services or run the risk of criminal prosecution. As a consequence, the public may well be deprived of the wide variety of programming options that cable systems make possible. Such a result is wholly at odds with the regulatory goals contemplated by the FCC. Consistent with its congressionally defined charter to “make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nationwide and world-wide wire and radio communication service . . .,” 47 U. S. C. § 151, the FCC has sought to ensure that “the benefits of cable communications become a reality on a nationwide basis.” Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation — CATV, 54 F. C. C. 2d, at 865. With that end in mind, the Commission has determined that only federal preemption of state and local regulation can assure cable systems the breathing space necessary to expand vigorously and provide a diverse range of program offerings to potential cable subscribers in all parts of the country. While that judgment may not enjoy universal support, it plainly represents a reasonable accommodation of the competing policies committed to the FCC’s care, and we see no reason to disturb the agency’s judgment. And, as we have repeatedly explained, when federal officials determine, as the FCC has here, that restrictive regulation of a particular area is not in the public interest, “States are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a regulation.” Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 178 (1978); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, 774 (1947). Cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 155 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board explicitly pre-empted state due-on-sale clauses in order to afford flexibility and discretion to federal savings and loan institutions). C Although the FCC has taken the lead in formulating communications policy with respect to cable television, Congress has considered the impact of this new technology, and has, through the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541,17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., acted to facilitate the cable industry’s ability to distribute broadcast programming on a national basis. Prior to the 1976 revision, the Court had determined that the retransmission of distant broadcast signals by cable systems did not subject cable operators to copyright infringement liability because such retransmissions were not “performances” within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U. S. 390 (1968). In revising the Copyright Act, however, Congress concluded that cable operators should be required to pay royalties to the owners of copyrighted programs retransmitted by their systems on pain of liability for copyright infringement. At the same time, Congress recognized that “it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate [appropriate royalty payments] with every copyright owner” in order to secure consent for such retransmissions. Copyright Law Revision, H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 89 (1976). Section 111 of the 1976 Act codifies the solution devised by Congress. It establishes a program of compulsory copyright licensing that permits cable systems to retransmit distant broadcast signals without securing permission from the copyright owner and, in turn, requires each system to pay royalty fees to a central royalty fund based on a percentage of its gross revenues. To take advantage of this compulsory licensing scheme, a cable operator must satisfy certain reporting requirements, §§ 111(d)(1) and (2)(A), pay specified royalty fees to a central fund administered by the Register of Copyrights, §§ lll(d)(2)(B)-(D) and (3), and refrain from deleting or altering commercial advertising on the broadcast signals it transmits, § 111(c)(3). Failure to comply with these conditions results in forfeiture of the protections of the compulsory licensing system. In devising this system, Congress has clearly sought to further the important public purposes framed in the Copyright Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8, of rewarding the creators of copyrighted works and of “promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnote omitted); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 428-429 (1984). Compulsory licensing not only protects the commercial value of copyrighted works but also enhances the ability of cable systems to retransmit such programs carried on distant broadcast signals, thereby allowing the public to benefit by the wider dissemination of works carried on television broadcast signals. By requiring cable operators to delete commercial advertisements for wine, however, the Oklahoma ban forces these operators to lose the protections of compulsory licensing. Of course, it is possible for cable systems to comply with the Oklahoma ban by simply abandoning their importation of the distant broadcast signals covered by the Copyright Act. But such a loss of viewing options would plainly thwart the policy identified by both Congress and the FCC of facilitating and encouraging the importation of distant broadcast signals. I — I HH hH Respondent contends that even if the Oklahoma advertising ban is invalid under normal pre-emption analysis, the fact that the ban was adopted pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment rescues the statute from pre-emption. A similar claim was advanced in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc, 445 U. S. 97 (1980). In that case, after finding that a California wine-pricing program violated the Sherman Act, we considered whether § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which reserves to the States certain power to regulate traffic in liquor, “permits California to countermand the congressional policy — adopted under the commerce power — in favor of competition.” 445 U. S., at 106. Here, we must likewise consider whether § 2 permits Oklahoma to override the federal policy, as expressed in FCC rulings and regulations, in favor of promoting the widespread development of cable communication. The States enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor within their borders. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 (1939). At the same time, our prior cases have made clear that the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution. See, e. g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982); California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 115 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436 (1971); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1964). Indeed, “[t]his Court’s decisions . . . have confirmed that the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 206 (1976). Thus, as the Court explained in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324 (1964), §2 reserves to the States power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause. Id., at 330; State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 62-63 (1936). We have cautioned, however, that “[t]o draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would ... be an absurd oversimplification.” Hostetter, supra, at 331-332. Notwithstanding the Amendment’s broad grant of power to the States, therefore, the Federal Government plainly retains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate even interstate commerce in liquor. Ibid. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., supra, at 109-110; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 425, n. 15 (1946); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In rejecting the claim that the Twenty-first Amendment ousted the Federal Government of all jurisdiction over interstate traffic in liquor, we have held that when a State has not attempted directly to regulate the sale or use of liquor within its borders — the core § 2 power — a conflicting exercise of federal authority may prevail. In Hostetter, for example, the Court found that in-state sales of intoxicating liquor intended to be used only in foreign countries could be made under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of Customs, despite contrary state law, because the state regulation was not aimed at preventing unlawful use of alcoholic beverages within the State, but rather was designed “totally to prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” 377 U. S., at 333-334. Similarly, in Midcal Aluminum, supra, we found that “the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State’s wine pricing program,” because the State’s interest in promoting temperance through the program was not substantial and was therefore clearly outweighed by the important federal objectives of the Sherman Act. 445 U. S., at 113-114. Of course, our decisions in Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum were concerned only with conflicting state and federal efforts to regulate transactions involving liquor. In this case, by contrast, we must resolve a clash between an express federal decision to pre-empt all state regulation of cable signal carriage and a state effort to apply its ban on alcoholic beverage advertisements to wine commercials contained in out-of-state signals carried by cable systems. Nonetheless, the central question presented in those cases is essentially the same as the one before us here: whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies. As in Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, resolution of this question requires a “pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers” within the context of the issues and interests at stake in each case. 445 U. S., at 109. There can be little doubt that the comprehensive regulations developed over the past 20 years by the FCC to govern signal carriage by cable television systems reflect an important and substantial federal interest. In crafting this regulatory scheme, the Commission has attempted to strike a balance between protecting noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to competition from cable systems and ensuring that the substantial benefits provided by cable of increased and diversified programming are secured for the maximum number of viewers. See, e. g., CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F. C. C. 2d, at 744-746. To accomplish this regulatory goal, the Commission has deemed it necessary to assert exclusive jurisdiction over signal carriage by cable systems. In the Commission’s view, uniform national communications policy with respect to cable systems would be undermined if state and local governments were permitted to regulate in piecemeal fashion the signals carried by cable operators pursuant to federal authority. See Community Cable TV, Inc., FCC 83-525, pp. 12-13 (released Nov. 15, 1983); Cable Television, 46 F. C. C. 2d, at 178. On the other hand, application of Oklahoma’s advertising ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable operators in that State is designed principally to further the State’s interest in discouraging consumption of intoxicating liquor. See 11 Op. Okla. Atty. Gen. No. 79-334, p. 550 (Mar. 19, 1980). Although the District Court found that “[consumption of alcoholic beverages in Oklahoma has increased substantially in the last 20 years despite the ban on advertising of such beverages,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a, we may nevertheless accept Oklahoma’s judgment that restrictions on liquor advertising represent at least a reasonable, albeit limited, means of furthering the goal of promoting temperance in the State. The modest nature of Oklahoma’s interests may be further illustrated by noting that Oklahoma has chosen not to press its campaign against alcoholic beverage advertising on all fronts. For example, the State permits both print and broadcast commercials for beer, as well as advertisements for all alcoholic beverages contained in newspapers, magazines, and other publications printed outside of the State. The ban at issue in this case is directed only at wine commercials that occasionally appear on out-of-state signals carried by cable operators. By their own terms, therefore, the State’s regulatory aims in this area are narrow. Although a state regulatory scheme obviously need not amount to a comprehensive attack on the problems of alcohol consumption in order to constitute a valid exercise of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment, the selective approach Oklahoma has taken toward liquor advertising suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it asserts here. In contrast to state regulations governing the conditions under which liquor may be imported or sold within the State, therefore, the application of Oklahoma’s advertising ban to the importation of distant signals by cable television operators engages only indirectly the central power reserved by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment — that of exercising “control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” Midcal Aluminum, 445 U. S., at 110. When this limited interest is measured against the significant interference with the federal objective of ensuring widespread availability of diverse cable services throughout the United States — an objective that will unquestionably be frustrated by strict enforcement of the Oklahoma statute — it is clear that the State’s interest is not of the same stature as the goals identified in the FCC’s rulings and regulations. As in Midcal Aluminum, therefore, we hold that when, as here, a state regulation squarely conflicts with the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the State’s central power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold is not directly implicated, the balance between state and federal power tips decisively in favor of the federal law, and enforcement of the state statute is barred by the Supremacy Clause. IV We conclude that the application of Oklahoma’s alcoholic beverage advertising ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable operators in that State is pre-empted by federal law and that the Twenty-first Amendment does not save the regulation from pre-emption. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The Oklahoma Constitution provides in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the State of Oklahoma, except one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words ‘Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store.’ ” Art. XXVII, §5. The Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act similarly prohibits advertising “any alcoholic beverages or the sale of same” except by on-premises signs which must conform to specified size limitations. Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, §516 (1981). In upholding this requirement, the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically noted that it was technically feasible for local television stations to delete alcoholic beverage commercials from the national network programming that they broadcast, because the networks provide sufficient advance notice of such commercials to their Oklahoma affiliates and thereby enable those affiliates to block out those commercials. 566 P. 2d, at 1162. Although the Oklahoma statute defines “alcoholic beverage” as “alcohol, spirits, beer, and wine,” Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, § 506(2) (1981), the definition of “beer” includes only beverages containing more than 3.2% alcohol by weight, § 506(3). Because beer sometimes contains less than 3.2% alcohol, Oklahoma has determined that beer commercials need not be deleted. At the time this case was brought, hard liquor generally was not advertised on television. Accordingly, enforcement of the advertising ban in this case was limited to requiring that wine commercials be deleted. The decision of the Court of Appeals similarly disposed of First Amendment claims asserted by local television broadcasters in a case that was consolidated for purposes of appeal with petitioners’ case. Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp, Nos. Civ. 81-290-W and 81-439-W (WD Okla. 1981), rev’d, 699 F. 2d 490 (1983). These television broadcasters, however, did not petition for certiorari. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” Relying upon the Court’s decision in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689 (1979), respondent contends that the FCC rules and regulations reflecting the agency’s intent to pre-empt all state regulation of cable signal carriage violate the First Amendment rights of cable operators by depriving them of editorial control over the signals they carry, and therefore may not be invoked as a basis for pre-emption. We need not consider the merits of this claim, however, since respondent plainly lacks standing to raise a claim concerning his adversaries’ constitutional rights in a case in which those adversaries have never advanced such a claim. In its early efforts to regulate the cable industry, the Commission generally referred to CATV, or “community antenna television,” which described systems that receive television broadcast signals, amplify them, retransmit them by cable or microwave, and distribute them by wire to subscribers. But, “[b]ecause of the broader functions to be served by such facilities in the future,” the FCC subsequently adopted the “more inclusive term cable television systems.” Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d 143, 144, n. 9 (1972). Congress has also adopted this broader terminology. See Copyright Law Revision, H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 88 (1976). The Commission has explicitly defined the contours of both its own jurisdictional authority and that of state and local government: “[W]e have consistently taken the position that to the degree we deem necessary, we will preempt areas of cable regulation in order to assure the orderly development of this new technology into the national communications structure. . . . The subject areas this agency has preempted include, of course, signal carriage, pay cable, leased channel regulations, technical standards, access, and several aspects of franchisee responsibility. . . . Non-federal officials have responsibility for the non-operational aspects of cable franchising including bonding agreements, maintenance of rights-of-way, franchisee selection and conditions of occupancy and construction.” Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation — CATV, 54 F. C. C. 2d 855, 863 (1975). The Commission explained its initial decision to pre-empt this area as follows: “After considerable study of the emerging cable industry and its prospects for introducing new and innovative communications services, we have concluded that, at this time, there should be no regulation of rates for such services at all by any governmental level. Attempting to impose rate regulation on specialized services that have not yet developed would not only be premature but would in all likelihood have a chilling effect on the anticipated development.” 46 F. C. C. 2d, at 199-200. More recently, the Commission has noted that it “has deliberately preempted state regulation of non-basic program offerings, both non-broadcast programs and broadcast programs delivered to distant markets by satellite. While the nature of that non-basic offering was (and still is) developing, the preemptive intent, and the reasons for that preemption, are clear and discernible. Today, the degree of diversity in satellite-delivered program services reflects the wisdom of freeing cable systems from burdensome state and local regulation in this area.” Community Cable TV, Inc., FCC 83-525, p. 13 (released Nov. 15, 1983). For that reason our decision in Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U. S. 424 (1963), is not controlling here. In that case, we concluded that a State’s authority to ban price-related broadcast advertising for eyeglasses was not pre-empted by the Communications Act, principally because “[n]o specific federal regulations even remotely in conflict with the New Mexico law have been called to our attention. The Commission itself has apparently viewed state regulation of advertising as complementing its regulatory function, rather than in any way conflicting with it.” Id., at 432 (footnote omitted). Here, by contrast, the FCC’s pre-emptive intent could not be more explicit or unambiguous. See Community Cable TV, Inc., FCC 83-525, pp. 11-14 (released Nov. 15, 1983); Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation — CATV, 54 F. C. C. 2d, at 861-863; Cable Television, 46 F. C. C. 2d, at 199-200; Time-Life Broadcast, Inc., 31 F. C. C. 2d 747 (1971); Federal Preemption of CATV Regulations, 20 F. C. C. 2d 741 (1969). At one time, the FCC itself considered a proposal to permit cable systems to substitute commercial advertisements on distant signals, but concluded that such a plan was not feasible. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d, at 165. In developing this approach, Congress was aware that cable operators would face virtually insurmountable technical and logistical problems if they were required to block out all programs as to which they had not directly obtained copyright permission from the owner. See, e. g., Copyright Law Revision, Hearings on H. R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 758 (1975); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1361 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 291-292, 400-401 (1973). The keystone of this system, § 111(c)(1), provides: “Subject to the provisions of clauses (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection, secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a primary transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission . . . and embodying a performance or display of a work shall be subject to compulsory licensing upon compliance with the requirements of subsection (d) where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.” 17 U. S. C. § 111(e)(1). As the House Committee Report explained: “In general, the Committee believes that cable systems are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material and that copyright royalties should be paid by cable operators to the creators of such programs. The Committee recognizes, however, that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system. Accordingly, the Committee has determined to maintain the basic principle of the Senate bill to establish a compulsory copyright license for the retransmission of those over-the-air broadcast signals that a cable system is authorized to carry pursuant to the rules and regulations of the FCC.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 89 (1976). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1733, pp. 75-76 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 31979 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 31984 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id., at 32009 (remarks of Rep. Danielson); Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691F. 2d 125, 132-133 (CA2 1982) (discussing Congress’ decision to establish “a compulsory licensing program to insure that [cable systems] could continue bringing a diversity of broad-casted signals to their subscribers”). Because we have resolved the pre-emption and Twenty-first Amendment issues in petitioners’ favor, we need not consider the additional question whether Oklahoma's advertising ban constitutes an invalid restriction on protected commercial speech, and we therefore express no view on that issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARDONA v. POWER et al. No. 673. Argued April 18, 1966. Decided June 13, 1966. Paul O’Dwyer argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was W. Bernard Richland. Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General, and George C. Mantzoros, Brenda Soloff, Barry J. Lipson and Amy Juviler, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Leo Pfeffer and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress, and by Norman S. Fink for Nathan Straus. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was argued with Katzenbach v. Morgan, ante, p. 641, also decided today. We there sustained the constitutionality of § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and held that, by force of the Supremacy Clause and as provided in § 4 (e), the State of New York’s English literacy requirement cannot be enforced against persons who had successfully completed a sixth grade education in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English. In this case, which was adjudicated by the New York courts before the enactment of § 4 (e), appellant unsuccessfully sought a judicial determination that the New York English literacy requirement, as applied to deny her the right to vote in all elections, violated the Federal Constitution. Appellant was born and educated in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and has lived in New York City since about 1948. On July 23, 1963, she attempted to register to vote, presenting evidence of United States citizenship, her age and residence; and she represented that although she was able to read and write Spanish, she could not satisfy New York’s English literacy requirement. The New York City Board of Elections refused to register her as a voter solely on the ground that she was not literate in English. Appellant then brought this proceeding in state court against the Board of Elections and its members. She alleged that the New York English literacy requirement as applied was invalid under the Federal Constitution and sought an order directing the Board to register her as a duly qualified voter, or, in the alternative, directing the Board to administer a literacy test in the Spanish language, and, if she passed the test, to register her as a duly qualified voter. The trial court denied the relief prayed for and the New York Court of Appeals, three judges dissenting, affirmed. 16 N. Y. 2d 639, 209 N. E. 2d 119, remittitur amended, 16 N. Y. 2d 708, 827, 209 N. E. 2d 556, 210 N. E. 2d 458. We noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U. S. 1008. Although appellant’s complaint alleges that she attended a school in Puerto Rico, it is not alleged therein nor have we been clearly informed in any other way whether, as required by § 4 (e), she successfully completed the sixth grade of a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth. If she had completed the sixth grade in such a school, her failure to satisfy the New York English literacy requirement would no longer be a bar to her registration in light of our decision today in Katzenbach v. Morgan. This case might therefore be moot; appellant would not need any relief if § 4 (e) in terms accomplished the result she sought. Cf., e. g., Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U. S. 115, 119-120. Moreover, even if appellant were not specifically covered by § 4 (e), the New York courts should in the first instance determine whether, in light of this federal enactment, those applications of the New York English literacy requirement not in terms prohibited by § 4 (e) have continuing validity. We therefore vacate the judgment, without costs to either party in this Court, and remand the cause to the Court of Appeals of New York for such further proceedings as it may deem appropriate. u {s so ordered [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 659.] Presumably the predominant classroom language of the school she attended was other than English, and thus that element of § 4 (e) is satisfied. If the predominant classroom language had been English, and if she had successfully completed the sixth grade, then she would be entitled to vote under § 168 of the New York Election Law. See n. 2, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, ante.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HERB’S WELDING, INC., et al. v. GRAY ET al. No. 83-728. Argued October 3, 1984 Decided March 18, 1985 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 428. Wood Brown III argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Carolyn F. Corwin argued the cause for the federal respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Karen I. Ward, Allen H. Feldman, and Joshua T. Gillelan II. T. Gerald Henderson argued the cause for respondent Gray. With him on the brief was David W. Robertson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Kerr-McGee Corp. by Christopher Tompkins and René H. Himel, Jr.; and for Texaco, Inc., et al. hy Robert M. Contois, Jr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., provides compensation for the death or disability of any person engaged in “maritime employment,” §902(3), if the disability or death results from an injury incurred upon the navigable waters of the United States or any adjoining pier or other area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, § 903(a). Thus, a worker claiming under the Act must satisfy both a “status” and a “situs” test. The court below held that respondent Robert Gray, a welder working on a fixed offshore oil-drilling platform in state territorial waters, was entitled to benefits under the Act. We reverse for the reason that Gray was not engaged in maritime employment. I-H Respondent Gray worked for Herb s Welding, Inc., m the Bay Marchand oil and gas field off the Louisiana coast. Herb’s Welding provided welding services to the owners of drilling platforms. The field was located partly in Louisiana territorial waters, i. e., within three miles of the shore, and partly on the Outer Continental Shelf. Gray ate and slept on a platform situated in Louisiana waters. He spent roughly three-quarters of his working time on platforms in state waters and the rest on platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf. He worked exclusively as a welder, building and replacing pipelines and doing general maintenance work on the platforms. On July 11, 1975, Gray was welding a gas flow line on a fixed platform located in Louisiana waters. He burnt through the bottom of the line and an explosion occurred. Gray ran from the area, and in doing so hurt his knee. He sought benefits under the LHWCA for lost wages, disability, and medical expenses. When petitioner United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the workers’ compensation carrier for Herb’s Welding, denied LHWCA benefits, Gray filed a complaint with the Department of Labor. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), relying on our decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U. S. 352 (1969), ruled that because Gray’s work was totally involved in the exploration for, and development and transmission of, oil and gas from submerged lands, it was not relevant to traditional maritime law and lacked any significant maritime connection. Gray therefore did not satisfy the LHWCA’s status requirement. The Benefits Review Board reversed on other grounds. 12 BRBS 752 (1980). By a vote of 2-1, it concluded that irrespective of the nature of his employment, Gray could recover by virtue of a provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq. (Lands Act), that grants LHWCA benefits to offshore oil workers injured on the Outer Continental Shelf. Although Gray had been injured in state waters, the Board felt that his injury nonetheless could be said to have occurred, in the words of the statute, “as a result of” operations on the outer shelf. It considered his work “integrally related” to such operations. 12 BRBS, at 757. The dissenting Board member argued that the Lands Act provides LHWCA benefits only for injuries actually occurring in the geographic area of the outer shelf. Id., at 761-763. The Board reaffirmed its position after the case was remanded to the ALJ for entry of judgment and calculation of benefits, and petitioners sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court affirmed, relying directly on the LHWCA rather than on the Lands Act. 703 F. 2d 176 (1983). With regard to the Act’s situs requirement, it noted that this Court had compared drilling platforms to wharves in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra. Given that the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA extended coverage to accidents occurring on wharves, it would be incongruous if they did not also reach accidents occurring on drilling platforms. Also, since workers injured on movable barges, on fixed platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf, or en route to fixed platforms, are all covered, there would be a “curious hole” in coverage if someone in Gray’s position was not. 703 F. 2d, at 177-178. As for Gray’s status, the Court of Appeals, differing with the ALJ, held that Gray’s work bore “a realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime activity involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters,” id., at 179-180, because it was an integral part of the offshore drilling process, which, the court had held in Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F. 2d 378 (1981), was itself maritime commerce. We granted certiorari. 465 U. S. 1098 (1984). hH I — I A When extractive operations first moved offshore, all claims for injuries on fixed platforms proceeded under state workers’ compensation schemes. See Hearings, at 396, 409, 411. See also Robertson 993. With the 1953 passage of the Lands Act, Congress extended LHWCA coverage to oil workers more than three miles offshore. 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b). Because until 1972 the LHWCA itself extended coverage only to accidents occurring on navigable waters, 33 U. S. C. § 903 (1970 ed.), and because stationary rigs were considered to be islands, Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., swpra, oil rig workers inside the 3-mile limit were left to recover under state schemes. See, e. g., Freeman v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F. 2d 201 (CA5 1975); Gifford v. Aurand Mfg. Co., 207 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 1968). Any worker, inside or outside the 3-mile limit, who qualified as a seaman was not covered by the LHWCA, but could sue under the Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. §688, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U. S. C. §761 et seq., and the general maritime law. Hearings, at 411-414, 450-459, 487; see n. 1, supra. See also Wright, Jurisdiction in the Tidelands, 32 Tulane L. Rev. 175, 186 (1958). So matters stood when Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972. What is known about the congressional intent behind that legislation has been amply described in our prior opinions. See, e. g., Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297 (1983); Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U. S. 715, 717-722 (1980); Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 256-265 (1977). The most important of Congress’ concerns, for present purposes, was the desire to extend coverage to longshoremen, harbor-workers, and others who were injured while on piers, docks, and other areas customarily used to load and unload ships or to repair or build ships, rather than while actually afloat. Whereas prior to 1972 the Act reached only accidents occurring on navigable waters, the amended 33 U. S. C. §903 expressly extended coverage to “adjoining area[s].” At the same time, the amended definition of an “employee” limited coverage to employees engaged in “maritime employment.” The Act, as amended, does not mention offshore drilling rigs or the workers thereon. The legislative history of the amendments is also silent, although early in the legislative process, a bill was introduced to extend the Act to all offshore oil workers. The bill died in Committee. While hardly dispositive, it is worth noting that the same Committee considered the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, and the possible extension of the Lands Act’s application of the LHWCA to drilling platforms, apparently without it ever occurring to anyone that the two might have been duplicative. The concurrent but independent reconsideration of both the Lands Act and the LHWCA, the congressional view that the amendments to the latter involved the “[extension of [coverage to [s]horeside [ajreas,” H. R. Rep. No 92-1441, p. 10 .(1972), and the absence of any mention of drilling platforms in the discussion of the LHWCA, combine to suggest that the 1972 Congress at least did not intentionally extend the LHWCA to workers such as Gray. B The rationale of the Court of Appeals was that offshore drilling is maritime commerce and that anyone performing any task that is part and parcel of that activity is in maritime employment for LHWCA purposes. Since it is doubtful that an offshore driller will pay and maintain a worker on an offshore rig whose job is unnecessary to the venture, this approach would extend coverage to virtually everyone on the stationary platform. We think this construction of the Act is untenable. The Act does not define the term “maritime employment,” but our cases and the legislative history of the amendments foreclose the Court of Appeals’ reading. Rodrigue involved two men killed while working on an offshore drilling rig on the Outer Continental Shelf. Their families brought third-party negligence suits in federal court, claiming recovery under both the Death on the High Seas Act and the state law of Louisiana. The District Court ruled that resort could not be had to state law and that the High Seas Act provided the exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the men had been engaged in maritime activity on the high seas and that maritime law was the exclusive source of relief. We reversed. First, the platforms involved were artificial islands and were to be treated as though they were federal enclaves in an upland State. Federal law was to govern accidents occurring on these islands; but, contrary to the Court of Appeals, we held that the Lands Act and borrowed state law, not the maritime law, constituted the controlling federal law. The platforms “were islands, albeit artificial ones, and the accidents had no more connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers.” 395 U. S., at 360. Indeed, observing that the Court had previously “held that drilling platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction,” we indicated that drilling platforms were not even suggestive of traditional maritime affairs. Id., at 360-361. We also went on to examine the legislative history of the Lands Act and noted (1) that Congress was of the view that maritime law would not apply to fixed platforms unless a statute expressly so provided; and (2) that Congress had seriously considered applying maritime law to these platforms but had rejected that approach because it considered maritime law to be inapposite, a view that would be untenable if drilling from a fixed platform is a maritime operation. The history of the Lands Act at the very least forecloses the Court of Appeals’ holding that offshore drilling is a maritime activity and that any task essential thereto is maritime employment for LHWCA purposes. We cannot assume that Congress was unfamiliar with Rodrigue and the Lands Act when it referred to “maritime employment” in defining the term “employee” in 1972. It would have been a significant departure from prior understanding to use that phrase to reach stationary drilling rigs generally. The Fifth Circuit’s expansive view of maritime employment is also inconsistent with our prior cases under the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA. The expansion of the definition of navigable waters to include rather large shoreside areas necessitated an affirmative description of the particular employees working in those areas who would be covered. This was the function of the maritime employment requirement. But Congress did not seek to cover all those who breathe salt air. Its purpose was to cover those workers on the situs who are involved in the essential elements of loading and unloading; it is “clear that persons who are on the situs but not engaged in the overall process of loading or unloading vessels are not covered.” Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S., at 267. While “maritime employment” is not limited to the occupations specifically mentioned in §2(3), neither can it be read to eliminate any requirement of a connection with the loading or construction of ships. As we have said, the “maritime employment” requirement is “an occupational test that focuses on loading and unloading.” P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U. S. 69, 80 (1979). The Amendments were not meant “to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 11 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 13 (1972). We have never read “maritime employment” to extend so far beyond those actually involved in moving cargo between ship and land transportation. Both Caputo and P. C. Pfeiffer Co. make this clear and lead us to the conclusion that Gray was not engaged in maritime employment for purposes of the LHWCA. Gray was a welder. His work had nothing to do with the loading or unloading process, nor is there any indication that he was even employed in the maintenance of equipment used in such tasks. Gray’s welding work was far removed from traditional LHWCA activities, notwithstanding the fact that he unloaded his own gear upon arriving at a platform by boat. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. He built and maintained pipelines and the platforms themselves. There is nothing inherently maritime about those tasks. They are also performed on land, and their nature is not significantly altered by the marine environment, particularly since exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not themselves maritime commerce. The dissent emphasizes that Gray was generally on or near the water and faced maritime hazards. Post, at 445-449. To the extent this is so, it is relevant to “situs,” not “status.” To hold that Gray was necessarily engaged in maritime employment because he was on a drilling platform would ignore Congress’ admonition that not everyone on a covered situs automatically satisfies the status test. See S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 13 (1972). The dissent considers “[t]he maritime nature of the occupation . . . apparent from examining its location in terms of the expanded situs coverage of the 1972 Amendments.” Post, at 446. We recognize that the nature of a particular job is defined in part by its location. But to classify Gray’s employment as maritime because he was on a covered situs, post, at 448, or in a “maritime environment,” post, at 450, would blur together requirements Congress intended to be distinct. We cannot thus read the status requirement out of the statute. t — i HH J — i Respondents, and the dissenters, object that denying coverage to someone in Gray’s position will result in exactly the sort of inconsistent, checkered coverage that Congress sought to eliminate in 1972. In the words of the court below, it creates a “curious hole” in coverage, 703 F. 2d, at 178, because Gray would have been covered had he been injured on navigable waters or on the outer shelf. We do not find the argument compelling. First, this submission goes far beyond Congress’ undoubted desire to treat equally all workers engaged in loading or unloading a ship, whether they were injured on the ship or on an adjoining pier or dock. The former were covered prior to 1972; the latter were not. Both are covered under the 1972 Amendments. Second, there will always be a boundary to coverage, and there will always be people who cross it during their employment. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212, 223-224 (1969). If that phenomenon was enough to require coverage, the Act would have to reach much further than anyone argues that it does or should. Third, the inconsistent coverage here results primarily from the explicit geographic limitation to the Lands Act’s incorporation of the LHWCA. Gray would indeed have been covered for a significant portion of his work-time, but because of the Lands Act, not because he fell within the terms of the LHWCA. Congress’ desire to make LHWCA coverage uniform reveals little about the position of those for whom partial coverage results from a separate statute. This is especially true because that statute draws a clear geographical boundary that will predictably result in workers moving in and out of coverage. As we have said before in this area, if Congress’ coverage decisions are mistaken as a matter of policy, it is for Congress to change them. We should not legislate for them. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202, 216 (1971). > 1 — I Because Gray’s employment was not “maritime, he does not qualify for benefits under the LHWCA. We need not determine whether he satisfied the Act’s situs requirement. We express no opinion on his argument that he is covered by 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b). The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 2(3) of the Act, 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U. S. C. §902(3), provides: “The term ‘employee’ means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.” Section 3(a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 903(a), provides in part: “Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).” Offshore oil rigs are of two general sorts: fixed and floating. Hearings on S. 2318 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 395-396, 480-486 (1972) (hereinafter Hearings). Floating structures have been treated as vessels by the lower courts. E. g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F. 2d 432, 437 (CA5 1966). Workers on them, unlike workers on fixed platforms, see Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U. S. 352 (1969), enjoy the same remedies as workers on ships. If permanently attached to the vessel as crewmembers, they are regarded as seamen; if not, they are covered by the LHWCA because they are employed on navigable waters. See generally Robertson, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55 Texas L. Rev. 973, 982-992 (1977) (hereinafter Robertson). Gray is not in a position to take advantage of this line of eases. All, or almost all, the platforms in the field were fixed production platforms rather than floating rigs. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 77-LHCA-1308, before Benefits Review Board, p. 12. There has never been any dispute that Gray was injured on a fixed platform, nor any contention that he should be considered to have been on a vessel at the time of his injury. The only question, therefore, is whether Gray is limited to state workers’ compensation remedies or may also recover under the LHWCA. Gray did recover under the Louisiana workers’ compensation scheme, receiving weekly benefits totalling $3,172.50 over two years as well as $1,696.14 for medical expenses. These payments were credited against his later LHWCA recovery. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45. State workers’ compensation and the LHWCA are not mutually exclusive remedies. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U. S. 715 (1980). The relevant section provides: “With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing or transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.” 67 Stat. 463, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b). Petitioners view Congress’ failure to extend LHWCA coverage to all offshore oil workers as an explicit rejection of the position adopted by the court below. However, it appears that the bill, S. 1547, was designed not so much to increase the benefits of those not covered, as to limit the remedies of those workers who could qualify as seamen and so were not confined to the workers’ compensation scheme. See 117 Cong. Rec. 10490-10491 (1971) (statement of Sen. Tower); Hearings, at 396-403, 418-419, 602. The bill was opposed because it would limit recoveries by those who did better without LHWCA coverage. Id., at 589-590, 602. See generally Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F. 2d 1034, 1053 (CA5 1982). The dissent finds “substantial irony” in this analogy in light of the 1972 LHWCA Amendments, which extended coverage landward to piers. Post, at 433-434. The irony dissipates in light of the fact that while Rodrigue did observe that offshore platforms are like piers, its holding was that they are islands. 395 U. S., at 360. It has not been suggested that workers on islands are covered by the amended LHWCA. The dissent considers the Lands Act’s extension of the LHWCA to platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf an indication that work thereon is maritime employment. Post, at 437-438. However, as the dissent acknowledges, the LHWCA has been extended to several emphatically non-maritime locales. Undeterred, the dissent points out that Congress left regulation of offshore platforms to the Coast Guard. Yet one would not have expected otherwise, since geographically the platforms fall within the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction. No one contends that offshore platforms are not offshore. We note also that the LHWCA covered an employee injured on navigable waters if his employer had at least one employee engaged in “maritime employment.” In contrast, in providing for LHWCA coverage of employees working in offshore oil fields, the Lands Act defined the term “employer” as “an employer any of whose employees are employed in such operations,” i. e., “exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural resources ... of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf_” 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b). The LHWCA covers “any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker.” By the use of the term “including,” Congress indicated that the specifically mentioned occupations are not exclusive. See P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U. S. 69, 77-78, n. 7 (1979); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 11 (1972). There have been occasional legislative efforts to limit the definition of “maritime employment” to enumerated tasks. For example, in 1980 Representative Erlenborn proposed deleting the “maritime employment” language and limiting coverage to “a longshoreman, ship repairman, ship builder, ship breaker, or harbor worker” who “was directly engaged in activities relating to such employment” when injured. H. R. 7610, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a) (1980). His bill specifically excluded “any person who, at the time of injury, was engaged in administration, clerical, custodial, delivery, maintenance, or repair of gear or equipment ... or any other employments not direct and integral parts of vessel loading, unloading, repairing, building, or breaking.” Ibid. The bill was referred to Committee, 126 Cong. Rec. 15417 (1980), and was never reported by the Committee. This view of “maritime employment” does not preclude benefits for those whose injury would have been covered before 1972 because it occurred “on navigable waters.” Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297 (1983). No claim is made that Gray was injured “on navigable waters.” Indeed, it was agreed by all counsel at oral argument that prior to 1972 Gray would not have been covered, except arguably by operation of the Lands Act. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 46, 52-54. See also 703 F. 2d, at 179. In light of the dissent’s reliance on Perini, post, at 442-443, we point out that that decision was carefully limited to coverage of an employee “injured while performing his job upon actual navigable waters.” 459 U. S., at 299; see id,., at 305, 311-312, 315, 324. The Court’s rationale was that, first, any employee injured on navigable waters would have been covered prior to 1972, and, second, Congress did not intend to restrict coverage in adopting its “maritime employment” test. The holding was, “of course,” limited to workers covered prior to 1972, id., at 324, n. 34, a group to which Gray does not belong. The opinion says nothing about the contours of the status requirement as applied to a worker, like Gray, who was not injured on navigable waters. To hold that enactment of the status requirement did not constrict prior coverage is wholly different from refusing to view that requirement as a meaningful limit on the Act’s extended coverage. The general counsel to the International Association of Drilling Contractors stated to the Senate Subcommittee in 1972: “Irrespective of design, bottom resting, semi-submersible, or full floating, these structures [drilling platforms] perform only as a base from which the drilling industry conducts its operations. The operations, once the structure is in place, are no different from that which takes place on dry land. All of the equipment and methods utilized in the drilling operations are identical to our land based operations. The exposure to employee injuries are the same. Accident frequency rates and severity of injury are no greater, in fact less, because of crew selection and confinement to an area permits concentrated training and safety programs.” Hearings, at 410-411. Throughout these proceedings, Gray has argued that he need not satisfy the status/situs test because he falls within the Lands Act’s incorporation of LHWCA benefits. See 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b). The Benefits Review Board so held. He repeats that argument in this Court, as he is free to do. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977). However, it has not been fully briefed and argued here and was not discussed by the Court of Appeals. We therefore decline to consider it. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475-476, n. 6 (1970). It is open to the Court of Appeals on remand. Gray traveled between platforms by boat and might have been covered, before or after 1972, had he been injured while in transit. See Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S., at 324. But see id., at 324, n. 34 (“We express no opinion whether such coverage extends to a worker injured while transiently or fortuitously upon actual navigable waters”). Even if he would have been covered for some small fraction of his time independent of the Lands Act, however, he is a far cry from the paradigmatic longshoreman who walked in and out of coverage during his workday and spent substantial amounts of his time “on navigable waters.” Any coverage attributable to the LHWCA itself was de minimis. We also note in passing a substantial difference between a worker performing a set of tasks requiring him to be both on and off navigable waters, and a worker whose job is entirely land-based but who takes a boat to work.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v. TAX ANALYSTS No. 88-782. Argued April 24, 1989 Decided June 23, 1989 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. White, J., concurred in the judgment. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 156. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Knapp, Roy T. Englert, Jr., Jonathan S. Cohen, and Mary Frances Clark. William A. Dobrovir argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Jane E. Kirtley filed a brief for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (1982 ed. and Supp. V), requires the United States Department of Justice (Department) to make available copies of district court decisions that it receives in the course of litigating tax cases on behalf of the Federal Government. We hold that it does. i — I The Department’s Tax Division represents the Federal Government in nearly all civil tax cases in the district courts, the courts of appeals, and the Claims Court. Because it represents a party in litigation, the Tax Division receives copies of all opinions and orders issued by these courts in such cases. Copies of these decisions are made for the Tax Division’s staff attorneys. The original documents are sent to the official files kept by the Department. If the Government has won a district court case, the Tax Division must prepare a bill of costs and collect any money judgment indicated in the decision. If the Government has lost, the Tax Division must decide whether to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment or whether to recommend filing an appeal. The decision whether to appeal involves not only the Tax Division but also the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Solicitor General. A division of the IRS reviews the district court’s decision and prepares a recommendation on whether an appeal should be taken. The court decision and the accompanying recommendation are circulated to the Tax Division, which formulates its own recommendation, and then to the Solicitor General, who reviews the district court decision in light of the IRS and Tax Division’s recommendations. If the Solicitor General ultimately approves an appeal, the Tax Division prepares a record and joint appendix, both of which must contain a copy of the district court decision, for transmittal to the court of appeals. If no appeal is taken, the Tax Division is responsible for ensuring the payment of any court-ordered refund and for defending against any claim for attorney’s fees. Respondent Tax Analysts publishes a weekly magazine, Tax Notes, which reports on legislative, judicial, and regulatory developments in the field of federal taxation to a readership largely composed of tax attorneys, accountants, and economists. As one of its regular features, Tax Notes provides summaries of recent federal-court decisions on tax issues. To supplement the magazine, Tax Analysts provides full texts of these decisions in microfiche form. Tax Analysts also publishes Tax Notes Today, a daily electronic data base that includes summaries and full texts of recent federal-court tax decisions. In late July 1979, Tax Analysts filed a FOIA request in which it asked the Department to make available all district court tax opinions and final orders received by the Tax Division earlier that month. The Department denied the request on the ground that these decisions were not Tax Division records. Tax Analysts then appealed this denial administratively. While the appeal was pending, Tax Analysts agreed to withdraw its request in return for access to the Tax Division’s weekly log of tax cases decided by the federal courts. These logs list the name and date of a case, the docket number, the names of counsel, the nature of the ease, and its disposition. Since gaining access to the weekly logs, Tax Analysts’ practice has been to examine the logs and to request copies of the decisions noted therein from the clerks of the 90 or so district courts around the country and from participating attorneys. In most instances, Tax Analysts procures copies reasonably promptly, but this method of acquisition has proven unsatisfactory approximately 25% of the time. Some court clerks ignore Tax Analysts’ requests for copies of decisions, and others respond slowly, sometimes only after Tax Analysts has forwarded postage and copying fees. Because the Federal Government is required to appeal tax cases within 60 days, Tax Analysts frequently fails to obtain copies of district court decisions before appeals are taken. Frustrated with this process, Tax Analysts initiated a series of new FOIA requests in 1984. Beginning in November 1984, and continuing approximately once a week until May 1985, Tax Analysts asked the Department to make available copies of all district court tax opinions and final orders identified in the Tax Division’s weekly logs. The Department denied these requests and Tax Analysts appealed administratively. When the Department sustained the denial, Tax Analysts filed the instant suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to compel the Department to provide it with access to district court decisions received by the Tax Division. The District Court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B), which confers jurisdiction in the district courts when “agency records” have been “improperly withheld,” had not been satisfied. 643 F. Supp. 740, 742 (1986). The court reasoned that the district court decisions at issue had not been “improperly withheld” because they “already are available from their primary sources, the District Courts,” id., at 743, and thus were “on the public record.” Id., at 744. The court did not address whether the district court decisions are “agency records.” Id., at 742. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 269 U. S. App. D. C. 315, 845 F. 2d 1060 (1988). It first held that the district court decisions were “improperly withheld.” An agency ordinarily may refuse to make available documents in its control only if it proves that the documents fall within one of the nine disclosure exemptions set forth in § 552(b), the court noted, and in this instance, “[n]o exemption applies to the district court opinions.” Id., at 319, 845 F. 2d, at 1064. As for the Department’s contention that the district court decisions are publicly available at their source, the court observed that “no court. . . has denied access to . . . documents on the ground that they are available elsewhere, and several have assumed that such documents must still be produced by the agency unless expressly exempted by the Act.” Id., at 321, 845 F. 2d, at 1066. The Court of Appeals next held that the district court decisions sought by Tax Analysts are “agency records” for purposes of the FOIA. The court acknowledged that the district court decisions had originated in a part of the Government not covered by the FOIA, but concluded that the documents nonetheless constituted “agency records” because the Department has the discretion to use the decisions as it sees fit, because the Department routinely uses the decisions in performing its official duties, and because the decisions are integrated into the Department’s official case files. Id., at 323-324, 845 F. 2d, at 1068-1069. The court therefore remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to enter an order directing the Department “to provide some reasonable form of access” to the decisions sought by Tax Analysts. Id., at 317, 845 F. 2d, at 1062. We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 1003 (1989), and now affirm. HH In enacting the FOIA 23 years ago, Congress sought to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 772 (1989), quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 372 (1976). Congress did so by requiring agencies to adhere to “ ‘a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’” Id., at 360, quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). Congress believed that this philosophy, put into practice, would help “ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 242 (1978). The FOIA confers jurisdiction on the district courts “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.” § 552(a)(4)(B). Under this provision, “federal jurisdiction is dependent on a showing that an agency has (1) ‘improperly’ (2) ‘withheld’ (3) ‘agency records.’” Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 445 U. S. 136, 150 (1980). Unless each of these criteria is met, a district court lacks jurisdiction to devise remedies to force an agency to comply with the FOIA’s disclosure requirements. In this case, all three jurisdictional terms are at issue. Although these terms are defined neither in the Act nor in its legislative history, we do not write on a clean slate. Nine Terms ago we decided three cases that explicated the meanings of these partially overlapping terms. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, supra; Forsham v. Harris, 445 U. S. 169 (1980); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U. S. 375 (1980). These decisions form the basis of our analysis of Tax Analysts’ requests. A We consider first whether the district court decisions at issue are “agency records,” a term elaborated upon both in Kissinger and in Forsham. Kissinger involved three separate FOIA requests for written summaries of telephone conversations in which Henry Kissinger had participated when he served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1969 to 1975, and as Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977. Only one of these requests — for summaries of specific conversations that Kissinger had had during his tenure as National Security Adviser — raised the “agency records” issue. At the time of this request, these summaries were stored in Kissinger’s office at the State Department in his personal files. We first concluded that the summaries were not “agency records” at the time they were made because the FOIA does not include the Office of the President in its definition of “agency.” 445 U. S., at 156. We further held that these documents did not acquire the status of “agency records” when they were removed from the White House and transported to Kissinger’s office at the State Department, a FOIA-covered agency: “We simply decline to hold that the physical location of the notes of telephone conversations renders them ‘agency records.’ The papers were not in the control of the State Department at any time. They were not generated in the State Department. They never entered the State Department’s files, and they were not used by the Department for any purpose. If mere physical location of papers and materials could confer status as an ‘agency record’ Kissinger’s personal books, speeches, and all other memorabilia stored in his office would have been agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA.” Id., at 157. Forsham, in turn, involved a request for raw data that formed the basis of a study conducted by a private medical research organization. Although the study had been funded through federal agency grants, the data never passed into the hands of the agencies that provided the funding, but instead was produced and possessed at all times by the private organization. We recognized that “[r]ecords of a nonagency certainly could become records of an agency as well,” 445 U. S., at 181, but the fact that the study was financially supported by a FOIA-covered agency did not transform the source material into “agency records. ” Nor did the agencies’ right of access to the materials under federal regulations change this result. As we explained, “the FOIA applies to records which have been in fact obtained, and not to records which merely could have been obtained.” Id., at 186 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Two requirements emerge from Kissinger and Forsham, each of which must be satisfied for requested materials to qualify as “agency records.” First, an agency must “either create or obtain” the requested materials “as a prerequisite to its becoming an ‘agency record’ within the meaning of the FOIA.” Id., at 182. In performing their official duties, agencies routinely avail themselves of studies, trade journal reports, and other materials produced outside the agencies both by private and governmental organizations. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 292 (1979). To restrict the term “agency records” to materials generated internally would frustrate Congress’ desire to put within public reach the information available to an agency in its decision-making processes. See id., at 290, n. 10. As we noted in Forsham, “The legislative history of the FOIA abounds with . . . references to records acquired by an agency.” 445 U. S., at 184 (emphasis added). Second, the agency must be in control of the requested materials at the time the FOIA request is made. By control we mean that the materials have come into the agency’s posses-, sion in the legitimate conduct of its official duties. This requirement accords with Kissinger’s teaching that the term “agency records” is not so broad as to include personal materials in an employee’s possession, even though the materials may be physically located at the agency. See 445 U. S., at 157. This requirement is suggested by Forsham as well, 445 U. S., at 183, where we looked to the definition of agency records in the Records Disposal Act, 44 U. S. C. §3301. Under that definition, agency records include “all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business ... .” Ibid, (emphasis added). Furthermore, the requirement that the materials be in the agency’s control at the time the request is made accords with our statement in Forsham that the FOIA does not cover “information in the abstract.” 445 U. S., at 185. Applying these requirements here, we conclude that the requested district court decisions constitute “agency records.” First, it is undisputed that the Department has obtained these documents from the district courts. This is not a case like Forsham, where the materials never in fact had been received by the agency. The Department contends that a district court is not an “agency” under the FOIA, but this truism is beside the point. The relevant issue is whether an agency covered by the FOIA has “create[d] or obtaine[d]” the materials sought, Forsham, 445 U. S., at 182, not whether the organization from which the documents originated is itself covered by the FOIA. Second, the Department clearly controls the district court decisions that Tax Analysts seeks. Each of Tax Analysts’ FOIA requests referred to district court decisions in the agency’s possession at the time the requests were made. This is evident from the fact that Tax Analysts based its weekly requests on the Tax Division’s logs, which compile information on decisions the Tax Division recently had received and placed in official case files. Furthermore, the court decisions at issue are obviously not personal papers of agency employees. The Department counters that it does not control these decisions because the district courts retain authority to modify the decisions even after they are released, but this argument, too, is beside the point. The control inquiry focuses on an agency’s possession of the requested materials, not on its power to alter the content of the materials it receives. Agencies generally are not at liberty to alter the content of the materials that they receive from outside parties. An authorship-control requirement thus would sharply limit “agency records” essentially to documents generated by the agencies themselves. This result is incompatible with the FOIA’s goal of giving the public access to all nonexempted information received by an agency as it carries out its mandate. The Department also urges us to limit “agency records,” at least where materials originating outside the agency are concerned, “to those documents ‘prepared substantially to be relied upon in agency decisionmaking.’” Brief for Petitioner 21, quoting Berry v. Department of Justice, 733 F. 2d 1343, 1349 (CA9 1984). This limitation disposes of Tax Analysts’ requests, the Department argues, because district court judges do not write their decisions primarily with an eye toward agency decisionmaking. This argument, however, makes the determination of “agency records” turn on the intent of the creator of a document relied upon by an agency. Such a mens rea requirement is nowhere to be found in the Act. Moreover, discerning the intent of the drafters of a document may often prove an elusive endeavor, particularly if the document was created years earlier or by a large number of people for whom it is difficult to divine a common intent. B We turn next to the term “withheld,” which we discussed in Kissinger. Two of the requests in that case — for summaries of all the telephone conversations in which Kissinger had engaged while serving as National Security Adviser and as Secretary of State — implicated that term. These summaries were initially stored in Kissinger’s personal flies at the State Department. Near the end of his tenure as Secretary of State, Kissinger transferred the summaries first to a private residence and then to the Library of Congress. Significantly, the two requests for these, summaries were made only after the summaries had been physically delivered to the Library. We found this fact dispositive, concluding that Congress did not believe that an agency “withholds a document which has been removed from the possession of the agency prior to the filing of the FOIA request. In such a case, the agency has neither the custody nor control necessary to enable it to withhold.” 445 U. S., at 150-151. We accordingly refused to order the State Department to institute a retrieval action against the Library. As we explained, such a course “would have us read the ‘hold’ out of ‘withhold. . . . A refusal to resort to legal remedies to obtain possession is simply not conduct subsumed by the verb withhold.’” Id., at 151. The construction of “withholding” adopted in Kissinger readily encompasses Tax Analysts’ requests. There is no claim here that Tax Analysts filed its requests for copies of recent district court tax decisions received by the Tax Division after these decisions had been transferred out of the Department. On the contrary, the decisions were on the Department’s premises and otherwise in the Department’s control, supra, at 146-147, when the requests were made. See n. 6, supra. Thus, when the Department refused to comply with Tax Analysts’ requests, it “withheld” the district court decisions for purposes of § 552(a)(4)(B). The Department’s counterargument is that, because the district court decisions sought by Tax Analysts are publicly available as soon as they are issued and thus may be inspected and copied by the public at any time, the Department cannot be said to have “withheld” them. The Department notes that the weekly logs it provides to Tax Analysts contain sufficient information to direct Tax Analysts to the “original source of the requested documents. ” Brief for Petitioner 23. It is not clear from the Department’s brief whether this argument is based on the term “withheld” or the term “improperly.” But, to the extent the Department relies on the former term, its argument is without merit. Congress used the word “withheld” only “in its usual sense.” Kissinger, 445 U. S., at 151. When the Department refused to grant Tax Analysts’ requests for the district court decisions in its files, it undoubtedly “withheld” these decisions in any reasonable sense of that term. Nothing in the history or purposes of the FOIA counsels contorting this word beyond its usual meaning. We therefore reject the Department’s argument that an agency has not “withheld” a document under its control when, in denying an otherwise valid request, it directs the requester to a place outside of the agency where the document may be publicly available. C The Department is left to argue, finally, that the district court decisions were not “improperly” withheld because of their public availability. The term “improperly,” like “agency records” and “withheld,” is not defined by the Act. We explained in GTE Sylvania, however, that Congress’ use of the word “improperly” reflected its dissatisfaction with § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (1964 ed.), which “had failed to provide the desired access to information relied upon in Government decisionmaking, and in fact had become ‘the major statutory excuse for withholding Government records from public view.’” 445 U. S., at 384, quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966). Under § 3, we explained, agencies had “broad discretion . . . in deciding what information to disclose, and that discretion was often abused.” 445 U. S., at 385. In enacting the FOIA, Congress intended “to curb this apparently unbridled discretion” by “clos[ing] the ‘loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the public.’ ” Ibid, (citation omitted); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 79 (1973). Toward this end, Congress formulated a system of clearly defined exemptions to the FOIA’s otherwise mandatory disclosure requirements. An agency must disclose agency records to any person under § 552(a), “unless they may be withheld pursuant to one of the nine enumerated exemptions listed in § 552(b).” Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1, 8 (1988). Consistent with the Act’s goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have been consistently given a narrow compass. See, e. g., ibid.; FBI v. Abramson, 456 U. S. 615, 630 (1982). More important for present purposes, the exemptions are “explicitly exclusive.” FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U. S. 255, 262 (1975); see also Rose, 425 U. S., at 361; Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S., at 221; Mink, supra, at 79. As Justice O’Connor has explained, Congress sought “to insulate its product from judicial tampering and to preserve the emphasis on disclosure by admonishing that the ‘availability of records to the public’ is not limited, ‘except as specifically stated.’” Abramson, supra, at 642 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original), quoting § 552(c) (now codified at § 552(d)); see also 456 U. S., at 637, n. 5; H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 1. It follows from the exclusive nature of the § 552(b) exemption scheme that agency records which do not fall within one of the exemptions are “improperly” withheld. The Department does not contend here that any exemption enumerated in § 552(b) protects the district court decisions sought by Tax Analysts. The Department claims nonetheless that there is nothing “improper” in directing a requester “to the principal, public source of records.” Brief for Petitioner 26. The Department advances three somewhat related arguments in support of this proposition. We consider them in turn. First, the Department contends that the structure of the Act evinces Congress’ desire to avoid redundant disclosures. An understanding of this argument requires a brief survey of the disclosure provisions of § 552(a). Under subsection (a)(1), an agency must “currently publish in the Federal Register” specific materials, such as descriptions of the agency, statements of its general functions, and the agency’s rules of procedure. Under subsection (a)(2), an agency must “make available for public inspection and copying” its final opinions, policy statements, and administrative staff manuals, “unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale.” Under subsection (a)(3), the general provision covering the disclosure of agency records, an agency need not make available those materials that have already been disclosed under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). Taken together, the Department argues, these provisions demonstrate the inapplicability of the FOIA’s disclosure requirements to previously disclosed, publicly available materials. “A fortiori, a judicial record that is a public document should not be subject to a FOIA request.” Id., at 29. * The Department’s argument proves too much. The disclosure requirements set out in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are carefully limited to situations in which the requested materials have been previously published or made available by the agency itself. It is one thing to say that an agency need not disclose materials that it has previously released; it is quite another to say that an agency need not disclose materials that some other person or group may have previously released. Congress undoubtedly was aware of the redundancies that might exist when requested materials have been previously made available. It chose to deal with that problem by crafting only narrow categories of materials which need not be, in effect, disclosed twice by the agency. If Congress had wished to codify an exemption for all publicly available materials, it knew perfectly well how to do so. It is not for us to add or detract from Congress’ comprehensive scheme, which already “balances, and protects all interests” implicated by Executive Branch disclosure. Mink, supra, at 80, quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Congress, 1st Sess., 3 (1965). It is not surprising, moreover, that Congress declined to exempt all publicly available materials from the FOIA’s disclosure requirements. In the first place, such an exemption would engender intractable fights over precisely what constitutes public availability, unless the term were defined with precision. In some sense, nearly all of the information that comes within an agency’s control can be characterized as publicly available. Although the form in which this material comes to an agency — i. e., a report or testimony — may not be generally available, the information included in that report or testimony may very well be. Even if there were some agreement over what constitutes publicly available materials, Congress surely did not envision agencies satisfying their disclosure obligations under the FOIA simply by handing re-questers a map and sending them on scavenger expeditions throughout the Nation. Without some express indication in the Act’s text or legislative history that Congress intended such a result, we decline to adopt this reading of the statute. The Department’s next argument rests on the fact that the disclosure of district court decisions is partially governed by other statutes, in particular 28 U. S. C. § 1914, and by rules set by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The FOIA does not compel disclosure of district court decisions, the Department contends, because these other provisions are “more precisely drawn to govern the provision of court records to the general public.” Brief for Petitioner 30. We disagree. As with the Department’s first argument, this theory requires us to read into the FOIA a disclosure exemption that Congress did not itself provide. This we decline to do. That Congress knew that other statutes created overlapping disclosure requirements is evident from § 552(b)(3), which authorizes an agency to refuse a FOIA request when the materials sought are expressly exempted from disclosure by another statute. If Congress had intended to enact the converse proposition — that an agency may refuse to provide disclosure of materials whose disclosure is mandated by another statute — it was free to do so. Congress, however, did not take such a step. The Department’s last argument is derived from GTE Syl-vania, where we held that agency records sought from the Consumer Products Safety Commission were not “improperly” withheld even though the records did not fall within one of subsection (b)’s enumerated exemptions. The Commission had not released the records in question because a district court, in the course of an unrelated lawsuit, had enjoined the Commission from doing so. In these circumstances, we held, “[t]he concerns underlying the Freedom of Information Act [were] inapplicable, for the agency. . . made no effort to avoid disclosure.” 445 U. S., at 386. We therefore approved the Commission’s compliance with the injunction, noting that when Congress passed the FOIA, it had not “intended to require an agency to commit contempt of court in order to release documents. Indeed, Congress viewed the federal courts as the necessary protectors of the public’s right to know.” Id., at 387. Although the Department is correct in asserting that GTE Sylvania represents a departure from the FOIA’s self-contained exemption scheme, this departure was a slight one at best, and was necessary in order to serve a critical goal independent of the FOIA — the enforcement of a court order. As we emphasized, GTE Sylvania arose in “a distinctly different context” than the typical FOIA case, id., at 386, where the agency decides for itself whether to comply with a request for agency records. In such a case, the agency cannot contend that it has “no discretion ... to exercise.” Ibid. The present dispute is clearly akin to those typical FOIA cases. No claim has been made that the Department was powerless to comply with Tax Analysts’ requests. On the contrary, it was the Department’s decision, and the Department’s decision alone, not to make the court decisions available. We reject the Department’s suggestion that GTE Syl-vania invites courts in every case to engage in balancing, based on public availability and other factors, to determine whether there has been an unjustified denial of information. The FOIA invests courts neither with the authority nor the tools to make such determinations. HH HH ► — 1 For the reasons stated, the Department improperly withheld agency records when it refused Tax Analysts’ requests for copies of the district court tax decisions in its files. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Tax Analysts also requested copies of tax decisions received from the Claims Court and the courts of appeals. Decisions from these courts are not at issue in this case. Section 552(a)(4)(B) provides: “On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden * is on the agency to sustain its action.” The burden is on the agency to demonstrate, not the requester to disprove, that the materials sought are not “agency records” or have not been “improperly” “withheld.” See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1965) (“Placing the burden of proof upon the agency puts the task of justifying the withholding on the only party able to explain it”); H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1966) (same); cf. Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill, 443 U. S. 340, 352 (1979). Title 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(4), which exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information “obtained from a person,” provides further support for the principle that the term “agency records” includes materials received by an agency. See Forsham, 445 U. S., at 184-185; see also id., at 183-184 (noting that the definition of “records” in the Records Disposal Act, 44 U. S. C. §3301, and in the Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U. S. C. §2201(2), encompassed materials “received” by an agency). In GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U. S. 375, 385 (1980), we noted that Congress intended the FOIA to prevent agencies from refusing to disclose, among other things, agency telephone directories and the names of agency employees. We are confident, however, that requests for documents of this type will be relatively infrequent. Common sense suggests that a person seeking such documents or materials housed in an agency library typically will find it easier to repair to the Library of Congress, or to the nearest public library, rather than to invoke the FOIA’s disclosure mechanisms. Cf. Department of Justices v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 764 (1989) (“[I]f the [requested materials] were ‘freely available,’ there would be no reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access”). To the extent such requests are made, the fact that the FOIA allows agencies to recoup the costs of processing requests from the requester may discourage recourse to the FOIA where materials are readily available elsewhere. See 5 U. S. C. § 662(a)(4)(A). Because requested materials ordinarily will be in the agency’s possession at the time the FOIA request is made, disputes over control should be infrequent. In some circumstances, however, requested materials might be on loan to another agency, “purposefully routed . . . out of agency possession in order to circumvent [an impending] FOIA request,” or “wrongfully removed by an individual after a request is filed.” Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 446 U. S. 136, 156, n. 9 (1980). We leave consideration of these issues to another day. This point is implicit in Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1, 7, and n. 6 (1988), where it was uncontroverted that presentence reports, which had been prepared under district court auspices and turned over to the Department and the Parole Commission, constituted “agency records.” Nonpersonal materials in an agency’s possession may be subject to certain disclosure restrictions. This fact, however, does not bear on whether the materials are in the agency’s control, but rather on the subsequent question whether they are exempted from disclosure under § 562(b)(3). Although a control inquiry for “withheld” replicates part of the test for “agency records,” the FOIA’s structure and legislative history make clear that agency control over requested materials is a “prerequisite to triggering any duties under the FOIA.” Kissinger, 445 U. S., at 151 (emphasis added); see also id., at 152-153; Forsham v. Harris, 445 U. S. 169, 185 (1980). Kissinger’s focus on the agency’s present control of a requested document was based in part on the Act’s purposes and structure. With respect to the former, we noted that because Congress had not intended to “obligate agencies to create or retain documents,” an agency should not be “required to retrieve documents which have escaped its possession, but which it has not endeavored to recover.” 445 U. S., at 152 (citations omitted). As for the Act’s structure, we noted that, among other provisions, § 552(a) (6)(B) gives agencies a 10-day extension of the normal 10-day period for responding to FOIA requests if there is a need to search and collect the requested materials from facilities separate from the office processing the request. The brevity of this extension period indicates that Congress did not expect agencies to resort to lawsuits to retrieve documents within that period. See id., at 153. The Court of Appeals believed that the Department was arguing “that it need not affirmatively make [the district court decisions] available to Tax Analysts because the documents have not been withheld to begin with.” 269 U. S. App. D. C. 315, 319-320, 845 F. 2d 1060, 1064-1065 (1988) (emphasis in original). Even when an agency does not deny a FOIA request outright, the requesting party may still be able to claim “improper” withholding by alleging that the agency has responded in an inadequate manner. Cf. § 552(a) (6)(C); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 445 U. S., at 166 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). No such claim is made in this case. Indeed, Tax Analysts does not dispute the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Department could satisfy its duty of disclosure simply by making the relevant district court opinions available for copying in the public reference facility that it maintains. See 269 U. S. App. D. C., at 321-322, and n. 15, 845 F. 2d, at 1066-1067, and n. 15. The obligations imposed under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are not properly viewed as additions to the disclosure exemptions set out in subsection (b). If an agency refuses to disclose agency records that indisputably fall within one of the subsection (b) exemptions, the agency has “withheld” the records, albeit not “improperly” given the legislative authorization to do so. By contrast, once an agency has complied with the subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) obligations, it can no longer be charged with “withholding” the relevant records. It is unclear, moreover, whether 28 U. S. C. § 1914 permits a private cause of action to compel disclosure of a court decision. On appeal, Tax Analysts limited its requests to the approximately 25% of the district court decisions that it was unable to procure from court clerks or other sources. See 269 U. S. App. D. C., at 318, n. 5, 845 F. 2d, at 1063, n. 5; Brief for Respondent 8, n. 7. The Court of Appeals’ remand thus was limited to these decisions, as is our affirmance. However, the reasoning we have employed applies equally to all of the district court decisions initially sought by Tax Analysts.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIAMOND, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS v. BRADLEY et al. No. 79-855. Argued October 14, 1980 Decided March 9, 1981 Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Litvack, Harriet S. Shapiro, Robert B. Nicholson, Frederic Freilicher, Joseph F. Nakamura, and Thomas E. Lynch. Nicholas Prasinos argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Faith F. Driscoll, Henry L. Hanson, and Ronald T. Reiling. Edward S. Irons, Mary Helen Sears, and Robert P. Beshar filed a brief for National Semiconductor Corp. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Donald R. Dunner, Kenneth E. Kuffner, and Travis Gordon White for the American Patent Law Association, Inc.; by Reed C. Lawlor and James W. Geriak for the Los Angeles Patent Association; and by Morton C. Jacobs for Applied Data Research, Inc., et al. William James Beard and John F. Tregoning filed a brief for Halliburton Services as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. The Chief Justice ..took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 97-147. Argued March 2, 1998 Decided April 21, 1998 Scaxia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. George B. Abramowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dermis L. Allen, M. Kristan Rizzolo, John S. Breckinridge, Jr., and James H. Kenworthy. Kent L. Jones argued the eause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David I. Pincus, and Edward T Perelmuter. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for Ambase Corp. by Peter H. Winslow and Gregory K Oyler; and for the American Insurance Association et al. by Matthew J. Zinn, J. Walker Johnson, Craig A Berrington, Allan J. Stein, and Steven C. Elliott. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Property and casualty insurance companies maintain accounting reserves for “unpaid losses.” Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, increases in loss reserves that constitute “reserve strengthening” do not qualify for a certain one-time tax benefit. We must decide whether the term “reserve strengthening” reasonably encompasses any increase in reserves, or only increases that result from changes in the methods or assumptions used to compute them. HH Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. is the common parent of an affiliated group of corporations, including Centennial Insurance Co., a property and casualty (PC) insurer. From 1985 to 1993, the two corporations (Atlantic) maintained what insurers call “loss reserves.” Loss reserves are estimates of amounts insurers will have to pay for losses that have been reported but not yet paid, for losses that have been incurred but not yet reported, and for administrative costs of resolving claims. Before enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, the Internal Revenue Code gave PC insurers a full deduction for loss reserves as “losses incurred.” In each taxable year, not only losses paid, but the full amount of the loss reserves, reduced by the amount of the loss reserves claimed for the prior taxable year, would be treated as a business expense. 26 U. S. C. §§ 832(b)(5) and (c)(4) (1982 ed.). This designation enabled the PC insurer to take, in effect, a current deduction for future loss payments without adjusting for the “time value of money”— the fact that “ '[a] dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow,’ ” D. Herwitz & M. Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers 221 (2d ed. 1997). Section 1023 of the 1986 Act amended the Code to require PC insurers, for taxable years beginning after December 31,1986, to discount unpaid losses to present value when claiming them as a deduction. 100 Stat. 2399, 2404, 26 U. S. C. §§ 832(b)(5)(A), 846 (1982 ed., Supp. V). Absent a transitional rule, PC insurers would have been left to subtract undiscounted year-end 1986 reserves from discounted year-end 1987 reserves for purposes of computing losses incurred for taxable year 1987 — producing artificially low deductions. The 1986 Act softened this consequence by requiring PC insurers, for purposes of that 1987 tax computation, to discount 1986 reserves as well. 100 Stat. 2404, note following 26 U. S. C. §846. Because the requirement that PC insurers discount 1986 reserves changed the “method of accounting” for computing taxable income, PC insurers, absent another transitional rule, would have been required to recognize as income the difference between undiscounted and discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves. See 26 U. S. C. § 48.1(a) (1988 ed.). To avoid this consequence, § 1023(e)(3)(A) of the 1986 Act afforded PC insurers a “fresh start,” to wit, an exclusion from taxable income of the difference between undiscounted and discounted year-end 1986 loss reserves. 100 Stat. 2404, note following 26 U. S. C. §846. Of course the greater the 1986 reserves, the greater the exclusion. Section 1023(e)(3)(B) of the 1986 Act foreclosed the possibility that insurers would inflate reserves to manipulate the “fresh start” by excepting “reserve strengthening” from the exclusion: “(B) Reserve strengthening in years after 1985. — Subparagraph (A) [the fresh-start provision] shall not apply to any reserve strengthening in a taxable year beginning in 1986, and such strengthening shall be treated as occurring in the taxpayer’s 1st taxable year beginning after December 31, 1986.” 100 Stat. 2404, note following 26 U. S. C. § 846. Regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department set forth rules for determining the amount of “reserve strengthening”: “(1) In general. The amount of reserve strengthening (weakening) is the amount that is determined under paragraph (c)(2) or (3) to have been added to (subtracted from) an unpaid loss reserve in a taxable year beginning in 1986. For purposes of section 1023(e)(3)(B) of the 1986 Act, the amount of reserve strengthening (weakening) must be determined separately for each unpaid loss reserve by applying the rules of this paragraph (e). This determination is made without regard to the reasonableness of the amount of the unpaid loss reserve and without regard to the taxpayer’s discretion, or lack thereof, in establishing the amount of the unpaid loss reserve.... “(3) Accident years before 1986 — (i) In general For each taxable year beginning in 1986, the amount of reserve strengthening (weakening) for an unpaid loss reserve for an accident year before 1986 is the amount by which the reserve at the end of that taxable year exceeds (is less than)— “(A) The reserve at the end of the immediately preceding taxable year; reduced by “(B) Claims paid and loss adjustment expenses paid (“loss payments”) in the taxable year beginning in 1986 with respect to losses that are attributable to the reserve....” Treas. Reg. § 1.846-3(c), 26 CFR § 1.846-3(e) (1997). In short, any net additions to reserves (with two exceptions not here at issue, § 1.846-3(c)(3)(ii)) constitute “reserve strengthening” under the regulation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that Atlantic made net additions to reserves — “reserve strengthening” — during 1986, reducing the “fresh start” entitlement by an amount that resulted in a tax deficiency of $519,987. The Tax Court disagreed, holding that Atlantic had not strengthened its reserves. “Reserve strengthening,” the Tax Court held, refers only to increases in reserves that result from changes in the methods or assumptions used to compute them. (Atlantic’s reserve increases, there is no dispute, did not result from any such change.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court, concluding that the Treasury Regulation’s definition of “reserve strengthening” to include any net additions to reserves is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 111 F. 3d 1056 (1997). (It expressly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion in Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F. 3d 90 (1995), that the Treasury Regulation is invalid.) We granted certiorari. 522 U. S. 931 (1997). II The 1986 Act does not define “reserve strengthening.” Atlantic contends that the term has a plain meaning under the statute: reserve increases attributable to changes in methods or assumptions. If that is what the term plainly means, Atlantic must prevail, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). Atlantic contends that the plain meaning of “reserve strengthening” can be discerned, first, from its use in the PC insurance industry. It presented at trial two expert reports which, by “constructing a working definition of the term” that requires “a material change in methodology and/or assumptions,” App. 68, 74, purport to demonstrate that Atlantic “did not strengthen reserves,” id., at 99. Our task, of course, is to determine not what the term ought to mean, but what it does mean. Atlantic’s first expert, before “constructing” a definition, expressly acknowledged that “reserve strengthening” is “not a well-defined PC insurance or actuarial term of art to be found in PC actuarial, accounting, or insurance regulatory literature.” Id., at 60. On this point she was in agreement with the Commissioner’s experts: “In the property-casualty industry the term ‘reserve strengthening’ has various meanings, rather than a single universal meaning,” id., at 124. If the expert reports establish anything, it is that “reserve strengthening” does not have an established meaning in the PC insurance industry. Atlantic next contends that a plain meaning can be discerned from prior use of the term in life insurance tax legislation. According to Atlantic, the term has its roots in the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959, which provided tax consequences for changes in the “basis” for determining life insurance reserves. 73 Stat. 125, 26 U. S. C. § 810(d) (1958 ed., Supp. I). But that provision does not define, or for that matter even use, the term “reserve strengthening.” Though the regulation that implemented the provision uses the term “reserve strengthening” in a caption, Treas. Reg. § 1.810-3(a), 26 CFR § 1.810-3(a) (1997), its text does not mention the term, and one of its Examples speaks only of “reserve strengthening attributable to the change in basis which occurred in 1959,” § 1.810-3(b), Ex. 2. If, as Atlantic argues, “basis” and “assumptions or methodologies” are interchangeable terms, Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 8, and a change in basis is necessary for “reserve strengthening,” it is redundant to say “reserve strengthening attributable to the change in basis which occurred in 1959,” much as it would be to say “a sunburn attributable to the sun in 1959.” On Atlantic’s assumptions, the more natural formulation would have been simply “reserve strengthening in 1959.” Thus, the 1959 Act and implementing regulation suggest, if anything, that a change in basis is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for “reserve strengthening.” Atlantic further contends that the term “reserve strengthening” draws a plain meaning from a provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 that accorded a “fresh start” adjustment to life insurance reserves. Div. A, 98 Stat. 758, note following 26 U. S. C. § 801 (1984 Act). That provision, like the “fresh start” adjustment for PC insurers in the 1986 Act, said that the “fresh start” would not apply to reserve strengthening, specifically, “to any reserve strengthening reported for Federal income tax purposes after September 27, 1983, for a taxable year ending before January 1,1984.” 98 Stat. 759. Unlike the 1986 Act, however, the 1984 Act expressly provided that “reserve strengthening” would not be excluded from the “fresh start” if the insurer “employs the reserve practice used for purposes of the most recent annual statement filed before September 27, 1988 ....” Ibid. If, as Atlantic contends, reserve strengthening encompasses only reserve increases that result from a change in reserve practices (viz., change in methods or assumptions), the saving clause is superfluous. Thus, to the extent the definition of “reserve strengthening” in the life insurance context is relevant to its meaning here (which is questionable, see 111 F. 3d, at 1061-1062), the 1984 Act, like the regulations under the 1959 Act, tends to contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s interpretation. We conclude that neither prior legislation nor industry use establishes the plain meaning Atlantic ascribes to “reserve strengthening.” III Since the term reserve strengthening is ambiguous, the task that confronts us is to decide, not whether the Treasury Regulation represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one. See Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 554, 560-561 (1991). We conclude that it does. As a purely linguistic matter, the phrase is certainly broad enough to embrace all increases in (all “strengthening of”) the amount of the reserve, for whatever reason and from whatever source. Atlantic contends that this interpretation is unreasonable because, in theory, it produces absurd results, as the following example supposedly illustrates: Assume that in 1985 a PC insurer had four case reserves of $500 each (total reserves of $2,000). If two eases settled in 1986 for $750 each ($1,500 total), the remaining loss reserve would be $1,000. Under the regulation, according to Atlantic, the Commissioner would find “reserve strengthening” of $500 (1986 loss reserves ($1,000) less (first year reserves ($2,000) less second year payments ($1,500))), even though reserves did not increase. The Commissioner denies this consequence, contending that under the stipulation in this ease the increase in the reserve would be “reduced to zero” by an offsetting adjustment when the payment is made, and that adjustments in the IBNR reserve (reserve for claims “incurred but not reported”) may result from payments in excess of prior reserve amounts, offsetting changes in other reserves. Brief for Respondent 36-39. We need not resolve that dispute, because we agree with the Commissioner that Atlantic’s horrific example is in any event unrealistic. The property and casualty insurer that had only four cases would not be in business very long, with or without the benefit of the tax adjustment — or if he would, his talents could be put to better use in Las Vegas. The whole point of the insurance business is to spread the insured risk over a large number of eases, where experience and the law of probabilities can be relied upon. And where hundreds (or more likely thousands) of claims are involved, claims resolved for less than estimated reserves will tend to offset claims that settle for more than estimated reserves. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Discounted Unpaid Losses, PI-139-86, 1991-2 Cum. Bull. 946, 947 (“For most unpaid loss reserves ... any potential inaccuracies are likely to offset each other in the aggregate”). There may, to be sure, be some discrepancy in one direction or the other, but it would not approach the relative proportions claimed by Atlantic. It should be borne in mind that the provision at issue here is a limitation upon an extraordinary deduction accorded to PC insurers. There was certainly no need for that deduction to be microscopically fair, and the interpretation adopted by the Treasury Regulation seems to us a reasonable accommodation — and one that the statute very likely intended — of the competing interests of fairness, administra-bility, and avoidance of abuse. Because the Treasury Regulation represents a reasonable interpretation of the term “reserve strengthening,” we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GULF POWER CO. et al. No. 00-832. Argued October 2, 2001 Decided January 16, 2002 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which Souter and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 347. O’Connor, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. James A. Feldman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 00-843. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Nannes, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert B. Nicholson, Robert J. Wiggers, and Jane E. Mago. Peter D. Keisler argued the cause for petitioner in No. 00-832. With him on the briefs were Paul J. Zid-licky, Daniel L. Brenner, Neal M. Goldberg, David L. Nicoll, Paul Glist, John D. Seiver, and Geoffrey C. Cook. Anthony C. Epstein and William Single IV filed a brief for WorldCom, Inc., respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.6, in support of petitioners in both cases. Thomas P. Steindler argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief for respondents American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. were Shirley S. Fuji-moto, Christine M. Gill, J. Russell Campbell, Andrew W. Tunnell, and Ralph A. Peterson. Robert P. Williams II and Charles A. Zdebski filed a brief for respondents Atlantic City Electric Co. et al. in both cases. Jonathan L. Wiener and Neil Anderson filed a brief for respondent TXU Electric Co. in both cases. Jean G. Howard filed a brief for Florida Power & Light Co., respondent in No. 00-843; Together with No. 00-843, Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Gulf Power Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association for Local Telecommunications Services et al. by Philip L. Verveer, Theodore Case Whitehouse, Joseph M. Sandri, Jr., Howard J Symons, and Douglas I. Brandon; and for the United States Telecom Association et al. by William P. Barr, Michael E. Glover, Edward Shakin, Richard G. Taranto, and John W. Hunter. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Real Access Alliance by William Malone, Matthew C. Ames, and Clarine Nardi Riddle; for the Site Owners and Managers Alliance of the Personal Communications Industry Association by Dennis P. Corbett and H. Anthony Lehv; and for the United Telecom Council et al. by Jill Mace Lyon and Edward Comer. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Consumers Union et al. by Cheryl A. Leanza, Andrew Jay Schwartzman, and Harold J. Feld; and for Earthlink, Inc., by John W. Butler, Earl W. Comstock, and David Baker. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. I Since the inception of cable television, cable companies have sought the means to run a wire into the home of each subscriber. They have found it convenient, and often essential, to lease space for their cables on telephone and electric utility poles. Utilities, in turn, have found it convenient to charge monopoly rents. Congress first addressed these transactions in 1978, by enacting the Pole Attachments Act, 92 Stat. 35, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 224 (1994 ed.), which requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable.” § 224(b). (The Act is set forth in full in the Appendix, infra.) The cases now before us present two questions regarding the scope of the Act. First, does the Act reach attachments that provide both cable television and high-speed (broadband) Internet service? Second, does it reach attachments by wireless telecommunications providers? Both questions require us to interpret what constitutes a “pole attachment” under the Act. In the original Act a “pole attachment” was defined as “any attachment by a cable television system to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility,” § 224(a)(4). The Telecommunications Act of 1996, §703, 110 Stat. 150, expanded the definition to include, as an additional regulated category, “any attachment by a . . . provider of telecommunications service.” § 224(a)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Cable companies had begun providing high-speed Internet service, as well as traditional cable television, over their wires even before 1996. The FCC had interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for these commingled services, and its interpretation had been approved by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Texas Util. Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F. 2d 925, 927, 929 (1993). Finding nothing in the 1996 amendments to change its view on this question, the FCC continued to assert jurisdiction over pole attachments for these particular commingled services. In re Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Amendment of the Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, 13 FCC Rcd. 6777 (1998). In the same order the FCC concluded further that the amended Act covers attachments by wireless telecommunications providers. “[T]he use of the word 'any’ precludes a position that Congress intended to distinguish between wire and wireless attachments.” Id., at 6798. Certain pole-owning utilities challenged the FCC’s order in various Courts of Appeals. See 47 U. S. C. § 402(a) (1994 ed.); 28 U. S. C. § 2842 (1994 ed.). The challenges were consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, see § 2112(a), which reversed the FCC on both points. 208 F. 3d 1263 (2000). On the question of commingled services, the court held that the two specific rate formulas in 47 U. S. C. §§ 224(d)(3) and (e)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V) narrow the general definition of pole attachments. The first formula applies to “any pole attachment used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service,” § 224(d)(3), and the second applies to “pole attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services,” § 224(e)(1). The majority concluded that attachments for commingled services are neither, and that “no other rates are authorized.” 208 F. 3d, at 1276, n. 29. Because it found that neither rate formula covers commingled services, it ruled those attachments must be excluded from the Act’s coverage. On the wireless question, the majority relied on the statutory definition of “utility”: “any person ... who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.” § 224(a)(1). The majority concluded that the definition of “utility” informed the definition of “pole attachment,” restricting it to attachments used, at least in part, for wire communications. Attachments for wireless communications, it held, are excluded by negative implication. Id., at 1274. Judge Carnes dissented on these two issues. In his view, §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) “unambiguously giv[e] the FCC regulatory authority over wireless telecommunications service and Internet service.” Id., at 1281 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 1125 (2001). II We turn first to the question whether the Act applies to attachments that provide high-speed Internet access at the same time as cable television, the commingled services at issue here. As we have noted, the Act requires the FCC to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments,” § 224(b) (1994 ed.), and defines these to include “any attachment by a cable television system,” § 224(a)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V). These provisions resolve the question. No one disputes that a cable attached by a cable television company, which provides only cable television service, is an attachment “by a cable television system.” If one day its cable provides high-speed Internet access, in addition to cable television service, the cable does not cease, at that instant, to be an attachment “by a cable television system.” The addition of a service does not change the character of the attaching entity—the entity the attachment is “by.” And this is what matters under the statute. This is our own, best reading of the statute, which we find unambiguous. If the statute were thought ambiguous, however, the FCC’s reading must be accepted nonetheless, provided it is a reasonable interpretation. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-844 (1984). Respondents’ burden, then, is not merely to refute the proposition that “any attachment” means “any attachment”; they must prove also the FCC’s interpretation is unreasonable. This they cannot do. Some respondents now advance an interpretation of the statute not presented to the Court of Appeals, or, so far as our review discloses, to the FCC. They contend it is wrong to concentrate on whose attachment is at issue; the question, they say, is what does the attachment do? Under this approach, an attachment is only an attachment by a cable television system to the extent it is used to provide cable television. To the extent it does other things, it falls outside the ambit of the Act, and respondents may charge whatever rates they choose. To make this argument, respondents rely on a statutory definition of “cable system” (which the FCC treats as synonymous with “cable television system,” see 47 CFR § 76.5(a) (2000)). The definition begins as follows: “[T]he term ‘cable system’ means a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a community.” 47 U. S. C. § 522(7) (1994 ed., Supp. V). The first part of the definition would appear to cover commingled services, but the definition goes on to exclude “a facility of a common carrier ... except that such facility shall be considered a cable system ... to the extent such facility is used in the transmission of video programming directly to subscribers, unless the extent of such use is solely to provide interactive on-demand services.” Ibid. Respondents assert that “most major cable companies are now common carriers [since they also provide] residential and/or commercial telephone service.” Brief for Respondents American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. 20. If so, they contend, then for purposes of § 224(a)(4), a facility that provides commingled cable television and Internet service is a “cable television system” only “to the extent that” it provides cable television. Even if a cable company is a common carrier because it provides telephone service, of course, the attachment might still fall under the second half of the “pole attachments” definition: “any attachment by a... provider of telecommunications service.” §224(a)(4). This argument, and the related assertion that “most major cable companies are now common carriers,” need not be considered by us in the first instance, when neither the FCC nor the Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to pass upon the points. There is a factual premise here, as well as an application of the statute to the facts, that the FCC and the Court of Appeals ought to have the opportunity to address in the first instance. This does not leave the cases in doubt, however. Even if a “cable television system” is best thought of as a certain “facility” rather than a certain type of entity, respondents still must confront the problem that the statute regulates attachments “by” (rather than “of”) these facilities. The word “by” still limits pole attachments by who is doing the attaching, not by what is attached. So even if a cable television system is only a cable television system “to the extent” it provides cable television, an “attachment ... by a cable television system” is still (entirely) an attachment “by” a cable television system whether or not it does other things as well. The Court of Appeals based its ruling on a different theory. The statute sets two different formulas for just and reasonable rates — one for pole attachments “used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service,” § 224(d)(3), and one for those “used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services,” § 224(e)(1). In a footnote, the Court of Appeals concluded without analysis that “subsections (d) and (e) narrow (b)(l)’s general mandate to set just and reasonable rates.” 208 F. 3d, at 1276, n. 29. In its view, Congress would not have provided two specific rate formulas, and yet left a residual category for which the FCC would derive its own view of just and reasonable rates. “The straightforward language of subsections (d) and (e) directs the FCC to establish two specific just and reasonable rates ...; no other rates are authorized.” Ibid. This conclusion has no foundation in the plain language of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b). Congress did indeed prescribe two formulas for “just and reasonable” rates in two specific categories; but nothing about the text of §§ 224(d) and (e) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), and nothing about the structure of the Act, suggest that these are the exclusive rates allowed. It is true that specific statutory language should control more general language when there is a conflict between the two. Here, however, there is no conflict. The specific controls but only within its self-described scope. The sum of the transactions addressed by the rate formulas — § 224(d)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (attachments “used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service”) and § 224(e)(1) (attachments “used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services”) — is less than the theoretical coverage of the Act as a whole. Section 224(a)(4) reaches “any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service.” The first two subsections are simply subsets of — but not limitations upon — the third. Likewise, nothing about the 1996 amendments suggests an intent to decrease the jurisdiction of the FCC. To the contrary, the amendments’ new provisions extend the Act to cover telecommunications. As we have noted, commingled services were covered under the statute as first enacted, in the views of the FCC and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Texas Util. Elec. Co. v. FCC, 997 F. 2d 925 (1998). Before 1996, it is true, the grant of authority in §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) was coextensive with the application of the single rate formula in § 224(d). The 1996 amendments limited § 224(d) to attachments used by a cable television system “solely to provide cable service,” but — despite Texas Util. Elec. Co. — did not so limit “pole attachment” in § 224(a)(4). At this point, coextensiveness ended. Cable television systems that also provide Internet service are still covered by §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) — just as they were before 1996 — whether or not they are now excluded from the specific rate formula of § 224(d); if they are, this would simply mean that the FCC must prescribe just and reasonable rates for them without necessary reliance upon a specific statutory formula devised by Congress. The Court of Appeals held that §§ 224(d) and (e) implicitly limit the reach of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b); as a result, it was compelled to reach the question of the correct categorization of Internet services — that is, whether these services are “cable service,” § 224(d)(3), or “telecommunications services,” § 224(e)(1). It held that they are neither. By contrast, we hold that §§ 224(d) and (e) work no limitation on §§ 224(a)(4) and (b); for this reason, and because we granted certiorari only to determine the scope of the latter provisions, we need not decide the scope of the former. The FCC had to go a step further, because once it decided that it had jurisdiction over attachments providing commingled services, it then had to set a just and reasonable rate. Again, no rate challenge is before us, but we note that the FCC proceeded in a sensible fashion. It first decided that Internet services are not telecommunications services: “Several commentators suggested that cable operators providing Internet service should be required to pay the Section 224(e) telecommunications rate. We disagree. . . . Under [our] precedent, a cable television system providing Internet service over a commingled facility is not a telecommunications carrier subject to the revised rate mandated by Section 224(e) by virtue of providing Internet service.” 13 FCC Rcd., at 6794-6795 (footnotes omitted). After deciding Internet services are not telecommunications services, the FCC then found that it did not need to decide whether they are cable services: “Regardless of whether such commingled services constitute ‘solely cable services’ under Section 224(d)(3), we believe that the subsection (d) rate should apply. If the provision of such services over a cable television system is a ‘cable service’ under Section 224(d)(3), then the rate encompassed by that section would clearly apply. Even if the provision of Internet service over a cable television system is deemed to be neither ‘cable service’ nor ‘telecommunications service’ under the existing definitions, the Commission is still obligated under Section 224(b)(1) to ensure that the ‘rates, terms and conditions [for pole attachments] are just and reasonable,’... [a]nd we would, in our discretion, apply the subsection (d) rate as a ‘just and reasonable rate.’” Id., at 6795-6796 (footnote omitted). Respondents are frustrated by the FCC’s refusal to categorize Internet services, and doubly frustrated by the FCC’s contingent decision that even if commingled services are not “cable service,” those services nevertheless warrant the § 224(d) rate. On the first point, though, decisionmakers sometimes dodge hard questions when easier ones are dis-positive; and we cannot fault the FCC for taking this approach. The second point, in essence, is a challenge to the rate the FCC has chosen, a question not now before us,' We note that the FCC, subsequent to the order under review, has reiterated that it has not yet categorized Internet service. See, e. g., Pet. for Cert, in No. 00-843, p. 15, n. 4. It has also suggested a willingness to reconsider its conclusion that Internet services are not telecommunications. See, e. g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 19287, 19294 (2000). Of course, the FCC has power to reconsider prior decisions. The order under review in this litigation, however, is both logical and unequivocal. If the FCC should reverse its decision that Internet services are not telecommunications, only its choice of rate, and not its assertion of jurisdiction, would be implicated by the reversal. In this suit, though, we address only whether pole attachments that carry commingled services are subject to FCC regulation at all. The question is answered by §§ 224(a)(4) and (b), and the answer is yes. Even if the FCC decides, in the end, that Internet service is not “cable service,” the result obtained by its interpretation of §§ 224(a)(4) and (b) is sensible. Congress may well have chosen to define a “just and reasonable” rate for pure cable television service, yet declined to produce a prospective formula for commingled cable service. The latter might be expected to evolve in directions Congress knew it could not anticipate. As it was in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), the subject matter here is technical, complex, and dynamic; and as a general rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps where the statutes are silent, id., at 843-844. It might have been thought prudent to provide set formulas for telecommunications service and “solely cable service,” and to leave unmodified the FCC’s customary discretion in calculating a “just and reasonable” rate for commingled services. This result is more sensible than the one for which respondents contend. On their view, if a cable company attempts to innovate at all and provide anything other than pure television, it loses the protection of the Pole Attachments Act and subjects itself to monopoly pricing. The resulting contradiction of longstanding interpretation — on which cable companies have relied since before the 1996 amendments to the Act — would defeat Congress’ general instruction to the FCC to “encourage the deployment” of broadband Internet capability and, if necessary, “to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment.” Pub. L. 104-104, Tit. VII, §§ 706(a), (b), and (c)(1), 110 Stat. 153, note following 47 U. S. C. § 157 (1994 ed., Supp. V). This congressional policy underscores the reasonableness of the FCC’s interpretation: Cable attachments providing commingled services come within the ambit of the Act. t-H The second question presented is whether and to what extent the equipment of wireless telecommunications providers is susceptible of FCC regulation under the Act. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the act does not provide the FCC with authority to regulate wireless carriers.” 208 F. 3d, at 1275. All parties now agree this holding was overstated. “[T]o the extent a wireless carrier seeks to attach a wireline facility to a utility pole... the wireline attachment is subject to Section 224.” Brief for Respondents American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. 31; see also Brief for Respondents Atlantic City Electric Co. et al. 40; Brief for Repondent TXU Electric Co. 18; Brief for Respondent Florida Power & Light Co. 10-11. We agree, and we so hold. The dispute that remains becomes a narrow one. Are some attachments by wireless telecommunications providers — those, presumably, which are composed of distinctively wireless equipment — excluded from the coverage of the Act? Again, the dispositive text requires the FCC to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments,” § 224(b) (1994 ed.), and defines these to include “any attachment by a . . . provider of telecommunications service,” § 224(a)(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V). “Telecommunications service,” in turn, is defined as the offering of telecommunications to the public for a fee, “regardless of the facilities used,” § 153(46). A provider of wireless telecommunications service is a “provider of telecommunications service,” so its attachment is a “pole attachment.” Once more, respondents seek refuge in other parts of the statute. A “utility” is defined as an entity “who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.” § 224(a)(1). The definition, though, concerns only whose poles are covered, not which attachments are covered. Likewise, the rate formula is based upon the poles’ “usable space,” which is defined as “the space above the minimum grade level which can be used for the attachment of wires, cables, and associated equipment,” § 224(d)(2) (1994 ed.). This definition, too, does not purport to limit which pole attachments are covered. In short, nothing in § 224(a)(1) or § 224(d)(2) limits § 224(a)(4) or § 224(b). Even if they did, moreover, respondents still would need to confront the provision for “assoei-ated equipment.” As noted above, respondents themselves concede that attachments of wires by wireless providers of telecommunications service are covered by the Act. See supra, at 339-340. It follows, in our view, that “associated equipment” which is indistinguishable from the “associated equipment” of wire-based telecommunications providers would also be covered. Respondents must demand a distinction between prototypical wire-based “associated equipment” and the wireless “associated equipment” to which they object. The distinction, they contend, is required by the economic rationale of the Act. The very reason for the Act is that — as to wires — utility poles constitute a bottleneck facility, for which utilities could otherwise charge monopoly rents. Poles, they say, are not a bottleneck facility for the siting of at least some, distinctively wireless equipment, like antennas. These can be located anywhere sufficiently high. The economic analysis may be correct as far as it goes. Yet the proposed distinction — between prototypical wire-based “associated equipment” and the wireless “associated equipment” which allegedly falls outside of the rationale of the Act — finds no support in the text, and, based on our present understanding of the record before us, appears quite difficult to draw. Congress may have decided that the difficulties of drawing such a distinction would burden the orderly administration of the Act. In any event, the FCC was not unreasonable in declining to draw this distinction; and if the text were ambiguous, we would defer to its judgment on this technical question. <! Respondents insist that “any attachment” cannot mean “any attachment.” Surely, they say, the Act cannot cover billboards, or clotheslines, or anything else that a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service should fancy attaching to a pole. Since the literal reading is absurd, they contend, there must be a limiting principle. The FCC did not purport either to enunciate or to disclaim a specific limiting principle, presumably because, in its view, the attachments at issue here did not test the margins of the Act. The term “any attachment by a cable television system” covers at least those attachments which do in fact provide cable television service, and “any attachment by a ... provider of telecommunications service” covers at least those which in fact provide telecommunications. Attachments of other sorts may be examined by the agency in the first instance. The attachments at issue in this suit — ones which provide commingled cable and Internet service and ones which provide wireless telecommunications — fall within the heartland of the Act. The agency’s decision, therefore, to assert jurisdiction over these attachments is reasonable and entitled to our deference. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT 47 U. S. C. § 224. Pole attachments (a) Definitions As used in this section: (1) The term “utility” means any person who is a local exchange carrier or an electric, gas, water, steam, or other public utility, and who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications. Such term does not include any railroad, any person who is cooperatively organized, or any person owned by the Federal Government or any State. (2) The term “Federal Government” means the Government of the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof. (3) The term “State” means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. (4) The term “pole attachment” means any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility. (5) For purposes of this section, the term “telecommunications carrier” (as defined in section 153 of this title) does not include any incumbent local exchange carrier as defined in section 251(h) of this title. (b) Authority of Commission to regulate rates, terms, and conditions; enforcement powers; promulgation of regulations (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable, and shall adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to hear and resolve complaints concerning such rates, terms, and conditions. For purposes of enforcing any determinations resulting from complaint procedures established pursuant to this subsection, the Commission shall take such action as it deems appropriate and necessary, including issuing cease and desist orders, as authorized by section 312(b) of this title. (2) The Commission shall prescribe by rule regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. (c) State regulatory authority over rates, terms, and conditions; preemption; certification; circumstances constituting State regulation (1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to, or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way as provided in subsection (f) of this section, for pole attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a State. (2) Each State which regulates the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments shall certify to the Commission that— (A) it regulates such rates, terms, and conditions; and (B) in so regulating such rates, terms, and conditions, the State has the authority to consider and does consider the interests of the subscribers of the services offered via such attachments, as well as the interests of the consumers of the utility services. (3) For purposes of this subsection, a State shall not be considered to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments— (A) unless the State has issued and made effective rules and regulations implementing the State’s regulatory authority over pole attachments; and (B) with respect to any individual matter, unless the State takes final action on a complaint regarding such matter— (i) within 180 days after the complaint is filed with the State, or (ii) within the applicable period prescribed for such final action in such rules and regulations of the State, if the prescribed period does not extend beyond 360 days after the filing of such complaint. (d) Determination of just and reasonable rates; “usable space” defined (1) For purposes of subsection (b) of this section, a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way. (2) As used in this subsection, the term “usable space” means the space above the minimum grade level which can be used for the attachment of wires, cables, and associated equipment. (3) This subsection shall apply to the rate for any pole attachment used by a cable television system solely to provide cable service. Until the effective date of the regulations required under subsection (e) of this section, this subsection shall also apply to the rate for any pole attachment used by a cable system or any telecommunications carrier (to the extent such carrier is not a party to a pole attachment agreement) to provide any telecommunications service. (e) Regulations governing charges; apportionment of costs of providing space (1) The Commission shall, no later than 2 years after February 8, 1996, prescribe regulations in accordance with this subsection to govern the charges for pole attachments used by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services, when the parties fail to resolve a dispute over such charges. Such regulations shall ensure that a utility charges just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates for pole attachments. (2) A utility shall apportion the cost of providing space on a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way other than the usable space among entities so that such apportionment equals two-thirds of the costs of providing space other than the usable space that would be allocated to such entity under an equal apportionment of such costs among all attaching entities. (3) A utility shall apportion the cost of providing usable space among all entities according to the percentage of usable space required for each entity. (4) The regulations required under paragraph (1) shall become effective 5 years after February 8,1996. Any increase in the rates for pole attachments that result from the adoption of the regulations required by this subsection shall be phased in equal annual increments over a period of 5 years beginning on the effective date of such regulations. (f) Nondiscriminatory access (1) A utility shall provide a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a utility providing electric service may deny a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier access to its poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way, on a non-discriminatory basis where there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes. (g) Imputation to costs of pole attachment rate A utility that engages in the provision of telecommunications services or cable services shall impute to its costs of providing such services (and charge any affiliate, subsidiary, or associate company engaged in the provision of such services) an equal amount to the pole attachment rate for which such company would be liable under this section. (h) Modification or alteration of pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way Whenever the owner of a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way intends to modify or alter such pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way, the owner shall provide written notification of such action to any entity that has obtained an attachment to such conduit or right-of-way so that such entity may have a reasonable opportunity to add to or modify its existing attachment. Any entity that adds to or modifies its existing attachment after receiving such notification shall bear a proportionate share of the costs incurred by the owner in making such pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way accessible. (i) Costs of rearranging or replacing attachment An entity that obtains an attachment to a pole, conduit, or right-of-way shall not be required to bear any of the costs of rearranging or replacing its attachment, if such rearrangement or replacement is required as a result of an additional attachment or the modification of an existing attachment sought by any other entity (including the owner of such pole, duet, conduit, or right-of-way).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES et al. v. THE FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC. No. 80-1681. Argued December 9, 1981 Decided March 3, 1982 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 507. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Richard N. Williams argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. Michael L. Pritzker argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for Community Action Against Drug Abuse as amicus curiae urging reversal. Charles A. Trost filed a brief for American Businesses for Constitutional Rights as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Arkansas et al. by Steve Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, and Mitchell D. Franks, David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, James E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, and Paul F. Strain, Dennis M. Sweeney, and Linda H. Lamone, Assistant Attorneys General, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada, James R. Zazzali, Attorney General of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and David S. Crump and James L. Wallace, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Mark White, Attorney General of Texas, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, and Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington; and for the Village of Wilmette, Illinois, by Robert J. Mangier. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a pre-enforcement facial challenge to a drug paraphernalia ordinance on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The ordinance in question requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items that are “designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs.” Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance No. 969-1978. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance is vague on its face. 639 F. 2d 373 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction, 452 U. S. 904 (1981), and now reverse. I For more than three years prior to May 1, 1978, appellee The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (Flipside), sold a variety of merchandise, including phonographic records, smoking accessories, novelty devices, and jewelry, in its store located in the village of Hoffman Estates, Ill. (village). On February 20, 1978, the village enacted an ordinance regulating drug paraphernalia, to be effective May 1, 1978. The ordinance makes it unlawful for any person “to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined by Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a license therefor.” The license fee is $150. A business must also file affidavits that the licensee and its employees have not been convicted of a drug-related offense. Moreover, the business must keep a record of each sale of a regulated item, including the name and address of the purchaser, to be open to police inspection. No regulated item may be sold to a minor. A violation is subject to a fine of not less than $10 and not more than $500, and each day that a violation continues gives rise to a separate offense. A series of licensing guidelines prepared by the Village Attorney define “Paper,” “Roach Clips,” “Pipes,” and “Paraphernalia,” the sale of which is required to be licensed. After an administrative inquiry, the village determined that Flipside and one other store appeared to be in violation of the ordinance. The Village Attorney notified Flipside of the existence of the ordinance, and made a copy of the ordinance and guidelines available to Flipside. Flipside’s owner asked for guidance concerning which items were covered by the ordinance; the Village Attorney advised him to remove items in a certain section of the store “for his protection,” and he did so. App. 71. The items included, according to Flipside’s description, a clamp, chain ornaments, an “alligator” clip, key chains, necklaces, earrings, cigarette holders, glove stretchers, scales, strainers, a pulverizer, squeeze bottles, pipes, water pipes, pins, an herb sifter, mirrors, vials, cigarette rolling papers, and tobacco snuff. On May 30, 1978, instead of applying for a license or seeking clarification via the administrative procedures that the village had established for its licensing ordinances, Flipside filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and requested in-junctive and declaratory relief and damages. The District Court, after hearing testimony, declined to grant a preliminary injunction. The case was tried without a jury on additional evidence and stipulated testimony. The court issued an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, and awarded judgment to the village defendants. 485 F. Supp. 400 (1980). The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face. The court reviewed the language of the ordinance and guidelines and found it vague with respect to certain conceivable applications, such as ordinary pipes or “paper clips sold next to Rolling Stone magazine.” 639 F. 2d, at 382. It also suggested that the “subjective” nature of the “marketing” test creates a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against those with alternative lifestyles. Id., at 384. Finally, the court determined that the availability of administrative review or guidelines cannot cure the defect. Thus, it concluded that the ordinance is impermissibly vague on its face. II In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. The Court of Appeals in this case did not explicitly consider whether the ordinance reaches constitutionally protected conduct and is overbroad, nor whether the ordinance is vague in all of its applications. Instead, the court determined that the ordinance is void for vagueness because it is unclear in some of its applications to the conduct of Flipside and of other hypothetical parties. Under a proper analysis, however, the ordinance is not facially invalid. Ill We first examine whether the ordinance infringes Flip-side’s First Amendment rights or is overbroad because it inhibits the First Amendment rights of other parties. Flipside makes the exorbitant claim that the village has imposed a “prior restraint” on speech because the guidelines treat the proximity of drug-related literature as an indicium that paraphernalia are “marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs.” Flipside also argues that because the presence of drug-related designs, logos, or slogans on paraphernalia may-trigger enforcement, the ordinance infringes “protected symbolic speech.” Brief for Appellee 25. These arguments do not long detain us. First, the village has not directly infringed the noncommercial speech of Flipside or other parties. The ordinance licenses and regulates the sale of items displayed “with” or “within proximity of” “literature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs,” Guidelines, supra n. 3, but does not prohibit or otherwise regulate the sale of literature itself. Although drug-related designs or names on cigarette papers may subject those items to regulation, the village does not restrict speech as such, but simply regulates the commercial marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used for an illicit purpose. The scope of the ordinance therefore does not embrace noncommercial speech. Second, insofar as any commercial speech interest is implicated here, it is only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in the manner that the retailer desires. We doubt that the village’s restriction on the manner of marketing appreciably limits Flipside’s communication of information — with one obvious and telling exception. The ordinance is expressly directed at commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal drug use. If that activity is deemed “speech,” then it is speech proposing an illegal transaction, which a government may regulate or ban entirely. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 557, 563-564 (1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S. 376, 388 (1973). Finally, it is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, because the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. Central Hudson, supra, at 565, n. 8. IV A A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due process. To succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Flipside makes no such showing. The standards for evaluating vagueness were enunciated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 (1972): “Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications” (footnotes omitted). These standards should not, of course, be mechanically applied. The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates — as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement — depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, .economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process. The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. And the Court has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed. Finally, perhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply. B This ordinance simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement with respect to the alternative “marketed for use” standard. The ordinance nominally imposes only civil penalties. However, the village concedes that the ordinance is “quasi-criminal,” and its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect may warrant a relatively strict test. Flipside’s facial challenge fails because, under the test appropriate to either a quasi-criminal or a criminal law, the ordinance is sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside. The ordinance requires Flipside to obtain a license if it sells “any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined by the Illinois Revised Statutes.” ' Flipside expresses no uncertainty about which drugs this description encompasses; as the District Court noted, 485 F. Supp., at 406, Illinois law clearly defines cannabis and numerous other controlled drugs, including cocaine. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 5672, ¶¶703 and 1102(g) (1980). On the other hand, the words “items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing” do not identify the type of merchandise that the village desires to regulate. Flipside’s challenge thus appropriately focuses on the language “designed or marketed for use.” Under either the “designed for use” or “marketed for use” standard, we. conclude that at least some of the items sold by Flipside are covered. Thus, Flipside’s facial challenge is unavailing. 1. “Designed for use” The Court of Appeals objected that “designed ... for use” is ambiguous with respect to whether items must be inherently suited only for drug use; whether the retailer’s intent or manner of display is relevant; and whether the intent of a third party, the manufacturer, is critical, since the manufacturer is the “designer.” 639 F. 2d, at 380-381. For the. reasons that follow, we conclude that this language is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. The Court of Appeals’ speculation about the meaning of “design” is largely unfounded. The guidelines refer to “paper of colorful design” and to other specific items as conclusively “designed” or not “designed” for illegal use. A principal meaning of “design” is “[t]o fashion according to a plan.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 707 (2d ed. 1957). Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 454, n. 3 (1939). It is therefore plain that the standard encompasses at least an item that is principally used with illegal drugs by virtue of its objective features, i. e., features designed by the manufacturer. A business person of ordinary intelligence would understand that this term refers to the design of the manufacturer, not the intent of the retailer or customer. It is also sufficiently clear that items which are principally used for nondrug purposes, such as ordinary pipes, are not “designed for use” with illegal drugs. Moreover, no issue of fair warning is present in this case, since Flipside concedes that the phrase refers to structural characteristics of an item. The ordinance and guidelines do contain ambiguities. Nevertheless, the “designed for use” standard is sufficiently clear to cover at least some of the items that Flipside sold. The ordinance, through the guidelines, explicitly regulates “roach clips.” Flipside’s co-operator admitted that the store sold such items, see Tr. 26, 30, and the village Chief of Police testified that he had never seen a “roach clip” used for any purpose other than to smoke cannabis. App. 52. The Chief also testified that a specially designed pipe that Flipside marketed is typically used to smoke marihuana. Ibid. Whether further guidelines, administrative rules, or enforcement policy will clarify the more ambiguous scope of the standard in other respects is of no concern in this facial challenge. 2. “Marketed for use” Whatever ambiguities the “designed ... for use” standard may engender, the alternative “marketed for use” standard is transparently clear: it describes a retailer’s intentional display and marketing of merchandise. The guidelines refer to the display of paraphernalia, and to the proximity of covered items to otherwise uncovered items. A retail store therefore must obtain a license if it deliberately displays its wares in a manner that appeals to or encourages illegal drug use. The standard requires scienter, since a retailer could scarcely “market” items “for” a particular use without intending that use. Under this test, Flipside had ample warning that its marketing activities required a license. Flipside displayed the magazine High Times and books entitled Marijuana Grower’s Guide, Children’s Garden of Grass, and The Pleasures of Cocaine, physically close to pipes and colored rolling papers, in clear violation of the guidelines. As noted above, Flipside’s co-operator admitted that his store sold “roach clips,” which are principally used for illegal purposes. Finally, in the same section of the store, Flipside had posted the sign, “You must be 18 or older to purchase any head supplies.” Tr. 30. V The Court of Appeals also held that the ordinance provides insufficient standards for enforcement. Specifically, the court feared that the ordinance might be used to harass individuals with alternative lifestyles and views. 639 F. 2d, at 384. In reviewing a business regulation for facial vagueness, however, the principal inquiry is whether the law affords fair warning of what is proscribed. Moreover, this emphasis is almost inescapable in reviewing a pre-enforcement challenge to a law. Here, no evidence has been, or could be, introduced to indicate whether the ordinance has been enforced in a discriminatory manner or with the aim of inhibiting unpopular speech. The language of the ordinance is sufficiently clear that the speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not render the ordinance void for vagueness. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 168-171 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (1971). We do not suggest that the risk of discriminatory enforcement is insignificant here. Testimony of the Village Attorney who drafted the ordinance, the village President, and the Police Chief revealed confusion over whether the ordinance applies to certain items, as well as extensive reliance on the “judgment” of police officers to give meaning to the ordinance and to enforce it fairly. At this stage, however, we are not prepared to hold that this risk jeopardizes the entire ordinance. Nor do we assume that the village will take no further steps to minimize the dangers of arbitrary enforcement. The village may adopt administrative regulations that will sufficiently narrow potentially vague or arbitrary interpretations of the ordinance. In economic regulation especially, such administrative regulation will often suffice to clarify a standard with an otherwise uncertain scope. We also find it significant that the village, in testimony below, primarilyre-lied on the “marketing” aspect of the standard, which does not require the more ambiguous item-by-item analysis of whether paraphernalia are “designed for” illegal drug use, and which therefore presents a lesser risk of discriminatory enforcement. “Although it is possible that specific future applications . . . may engender concrete problems of constitutional dimension, it will be time enough to consider any such problems when they arise.” Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 52 (1966). HH > Many American communities have recently enacted laws regulating or prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia. To determine whether these laws are wise or effective is not, of course, the province of this Court. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 728-730 (1963). We hold only that such legislation is not facially overbroad or vague if it does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and is reasonably clear in its application to the complainant. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Village of Hoffman Estates Ordinance No. 969-1978 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES BY PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF ITEMS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS Whereas, certain items designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs are being retailed within the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook County, Illinois, and Whereas, it is recognized that such items are legal retail items and that their sale cannot be banned, and Whereas, there is evidence that these items are designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and it is in the best interests of the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the Village of Hoffman Estates to regulate within the Village the sale of items designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs. Now Therefore, Be It Ordained by the President and Board of Trustees of the Village of Hoffman Estates, Cook County, Illinois as follows: Section 1: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by adding thereto an additional Section, Section 8-7-16, which additional section shall read as follows: Sec. 8-7-16 — ITEMS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS A. License Required: It shall be unlawful for any person or persons as principal, clerk, agent or servant to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined by Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a license therefor. Such licenses shall be in addition to any or all other licenses held by applicant. B. Application: Application to sell any item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs shall, in addition to requirements of Article 8-1, be accompanied by affidavits by applicant and each and every employee authorized to sell such items that such person has never been convicted of a drug-related offense. C. Minors: It shall be unlawful to sell or give items as described in Section 8-7-16A in any form to any male or female child under eighteen years of age. D. Records: Every licensee must keep a record of every item, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs which is sold and this record shall be open to the inspection of any police officer at any time during the hours of business. Such record shall contain the name and address of the purchaser, the name and quantity of the product, the date and time of the sale, and the licensee or agent of the licensee’s signature, such records shall be retained for not less than two (2) years. E. Regulations: The applicant shall comply with all applicable regulations of the Department of Health Services and the Police Department. Section 2: That the Hoffman Estates Municipal Code be amended by adding to Sec. 8-2-1 Fees: Merchants (Products) the additional language as follows: Items designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs $150.00 Section 3: Penalty. Any person violating any provision of this ordinance shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) for the first offense and succeeding offenses during the same calendar year, and each day that such violation shall continue shall be deemed a separate and distinct offense. Section k: That the Village Clerk be and is hereby authorized to publish this ordinance in pamphlet form. Section 5: That this ordinance shall be in full force and effect May 1, 1978, after its passage, approval and publication according to law. More specifically, the District Court found: “[Flipside] sold literature that included ‘A Child’s Garden of Grass,’ ‘Marijuana Grower’s Guide,’ and magazines such as ‘National Lampoon,’ ‘Rolling Stone,’ and ‘High Times.’ The novelty devices and tobacco-use related items plaintiff displayed and sold in its store ranged from small commodities such as clamps, chain ornaments and earrings through cigarette holders, scales, pipes of various types and sizes, to large water pipes, some designed for individual use, some which as many as four persons can use with flexible plastic tubes. Plaintiff also sold a large number of cigarette rolling papers in a variety of colors. One of plaintiffs displayed items was a mirror, about seven by nine inches with the word ‘Cocaine’ painted on its surface in a purple color. Plaintiff sold cigarette holders, ‘alligator clips,’ herb sifters, vials, and a variety of tobacco snuff.” 485 F. Supp. 400, 403 (ND Ill. 1980). The text of the ordinance is set forth in the Appendix to this opinion. The guidelines provide: “LICENSE GUIDELINES FOR ITEMS, EFFECT, PARAPHERNALIA, ACCESSORY OR THING WHICH IS DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS “Paper — white paper or tobacco oriented paper not necessarily designed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs may be displayed. Other paper of colorful design, names oriented for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and displayed are covered. “Roach Clips — designed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and therefore covered. “Pipes — if displayed away from the proximity of nonwhite paper or tobacco oriented paper, and not displayed within proximity of roach clips, or literature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs are not covered; otherwise, covered. “Paraphernalia — if displayed with roach clips or literature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs it is covered.” Ordinance No. 932-1977, the Hoffman Estates Administrative Procedure Ordinance, was enacted prior to the drug paraphernalia ordinance, and provides that an interested person may petition for the adoption of an interpretive rule. If the petition is denied, the person may place the matter on the agenda of an appropriate village committee for review. The Village Attorney indicated that no interpretive rules had been adopted with respect to the drug paraphernalia ordinance because no one had yet applied for a license. App. 68. A “facial” challenge, in this context, means a claim that the law is “invalid in toto—and therefore incapable of any valid application.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 474 (1974). In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 110 (1972). In making that determination, a court should evaluate the ambiguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the enactment. To this extent, the vagueness of a law affects overbreadth analysis. The Court has long recognized that ambiguous meanings cause citizens to “ ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 372 (1964), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526 (1958); see Grayned, supra, at 109; cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 58-61 (1976). “[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case„ai-hand.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 550 (1975). See United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 92-93 (1975); United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 32-33, 36 (1963). “One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974). The rationale is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant must prove that the enactment is vague “ ‘not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.’ Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 578 (1974). Flipside explained that it placed items that the village considers drug paraphernalia in locations near a checkout counter because some are “point of purchase” items and others are small and apt to be shoplifted. App. 43. Flipside did not assert that its manner of placement was motivated in any part by a desire to communicate information to its customers. Flipside also argues that the ordinance is “overbroad” because it could extend to “innocent” and “lawful” uses of items as well as uses with illegal drugs. Brief for Appellee 10, 33-35. This argument seems to confuse vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. If Flipside is objecting that it cannot determine whether the ordinance regulates items with some lawful uses, then it is complaining of vagueness. We find that claim unpersuasive in this pre-enforcement facial challenge. See infra, at 497-504. If Flipside is objecting that the ordinance would inhibit innocent uses of items found to be covered by the ordinance, it is complaining of denial of substantive due process. The latter claim obviously lacks merit. A retailer’s right to sell smoking accessories, and a purchaser’s right to buy and use them, are entitled only to minimal due process protection. Here, the village presented evidence of illegal drug use in the community. App. 37. Regulation of items that have some lawful as well as unlawful uses is not an irrational means of discouraging drug use. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 124-125 (1978). The hostility of some lower courts to drug paraphernalia laws — and particularly to those regulating the sale of items that have many innocent uses, see, e. g., 639 F. 2d 373, 381-383 (1981); Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F. 2d 916, 928 (CA6 1980), vacated and remanded, 451 U. S. 1013 (1981)—may reflect a belief that these measures are ineffective in stemming illegal drug use. This perceived defect, however, is not a defect of clarity. In the unlikely event that a state court construed this ordinance as prohibiting the sale of all pipes, of whatever description, then a seller of corncob pipes could not complain that the law is unduly vague. He could, of course, object that the law was not intended to cover such items. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972) (dictum; collecting cases). See, e. g., United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 872 U. S. 29 (1963). Cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S., at 574. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 49 (1966); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 428 (1961). See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 137 (1969) (Black, J., with whom Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J., joined, dissenting); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 515 (1948). See, e. g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 395 (1979); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 342 (1952); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101-103 (1945) (plurality opinion). See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 87, n. 98 (1960). See, e. g., Papachristou, supra; Grayned, 408 U. S., at 109. The village stipulated that the purpose of the ordinance is to discourage use of the regulated items. App. 33. Moreover, the prohibitory and stigmatizing effects of the ordinance are clear. As the Court of Appeals remarked, “few retailers are willing to brand themselves as sellers of drug paraphernalia, and few customers will buy items with the condition of signing their names and addresses to a register available to the police.” 639 F. 2d, at 377. The proposed register is entitled, “Retail Record for Items Designed or Marketed for Use with Illegal Cannabis or Drugs.” Record, Complaint, App. B. At argument, counsel for the village admitted that the ordinance is “quasi-criminal.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. The District Court apparently relied principally on the growing vernacular understanding of “paraphernalia” as drug-related items, and therefore did not separately analyze the meaning of “designed or marketed for use.” 485 F. Supp., at 405-407. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a regulation of “paraphernalia” alone would not provide much warning of the nature of the items regulated. 639 F. 2d, at 380. The guidelines explicitly provide that “white paper . . . may be displayed,” and that “Roach Clips” are “designed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs and therefore covered” (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals criticized the latter definition for failing to explain what a “roach clip” is. This criticism is unfounded because that technical term has sufficiently clear meaning in the drug paraphernalia industry. Without undue burden, Flipside could easily determine the meaning of the term. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1122 (1980) (defining “roach” as “[t]he butt of a marijuana cigarette”); R. Lingeman, Drugs from A to Z: A Dictionary 213-214 (1969) (defining “roach” and “roach holder”). Moreover, the explanation that a retailer may display certain paper “not necessarily designed for use” clarifies that the ordinance at least embraces items that are necessarily designed for use with cannabis or illegal drugs. “It is readily apparent that under the Hoffman Estates scheme, the ‘designed for use’ phrase refers to the physical characteristics of items deemed per se fashioned for use with drugs; and that, if any intentional conduct is implicated by the phrase, it is the intent of the ‘designer’ (i. e. patent holder or manufacturer) whose intent for an item or ‘design’ is absorbed into the physical attributes, or structural ‘design’ of the finished product.” Brief for Appellee 42-43. Moreover, the village President described drug paraphernalia as items “[mjanufactured for that purpose and marketed for that purpose.” App. 82 (emphasis added). The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 606 (1980) gives the following alternative definition of “head”: “Slang. One who is a frequent user of drugs.” The theoretical possibility that the village will enforce its ordinance against a paper clip placed next to Rolling Stone magazine, 639 F. 2d, at 382, is of no due process significance unless the possibility ripens into a prosecution. The Court of Appeals also referred to potential Fourth Amendment problems resulting from the recordkeeping requirement, which “implies that a customer who purchases an item ‘designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs’ intends to use the item with illegal cánnabis or drugs. A further implication could be-that a customer is subject to police scrutiny or even to a search warrant on the basis of the purchase of a legal item.” Id., at 384. We will not address these Fourth Amendment issues here. In a pre-enforcement challenge- it is difficult to determine whether Fourth Amendment rights are seriously threatened. Flipside offered no evidence of a concrete threat below. In a postenforcement proceeding Flipside may attempt to demonstrate that the ordinance is being employed in such an unconstitutional manner, and that it has standing to raise the objection. It is appropriate to defer resolution of these problems until such a showing is made.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. CRAFT No. 00-1831. Argued January 14, 2002 — Decided April 17, 2002 Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General O'Connor, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David English Carmack, and Joan I. Oppenheimer. Jeffrey S. Sutton argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Chad A. Readier, Jeffrey A. Moyer, and Michael Dubetz, Jr. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises the question whether a tenant by the entirety possesses “property” or “rights to property” to which a federal tax lien may attach. 26 U. S. C. §6321. Relying on the state law fiction that a tenant by the entirety has no separate interest in entireties property, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such property is exempt from the tax lien. We conclude that, despite the fiction, each tenant possesses individual rights in the estate sufficient to constitute “property” or “rights to property” for the purposes of the lien, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $482,446 in unpaid income tax liabilities against Don Craft, the husband of respondent Sandra L. Craft, for failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a, 72a. When he failed to pay, a federal tax lien attached to “all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to” him. 26 U. S. C. §6321. At the time the lien attached, respondent and her husband owned a piece of real property in Grand Rapids, Michigan, as tenants by the entirety. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. After notice of the lien was filed, they jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the husband’s interest in the property to respondent for one dollar. Ibid. When respondent attempted to sell the property a few years later, a title search revealed the lien. The IRS agreed to release the lien and allow the sale with the stipulation that half of the net proceeds be held in escrow pending determination of the Government’s interest in the property. Ibid. Respondent brought this action to quiet title to the es-crowed proceeds. The Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband’s interest in the tenancy by the entirety. It further asserted that the transfer of the property to respondent was invalid as a fraud on creditors. Id., at 46a-47a. The. District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the federal tax lien attached at the moment of the transfer to respondent, which terminated the tenancy by the entirety and entitled the Government to one-half of the value of the property. No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680, *3 (WD Mich., Sept. 12, 1994). Both parties appealed. The Sixth Circuit held that the tax lien did not attach to the property because under Michigan state law, the husband had no separate interest in property held as a tenant by the entirety. 140 F. 3d 638, 643 (1998). It remanded to the District Court to consider the Government’s alternative claim that the conveyance should be set aside as fraudulent. Id., at 644. On remand, the District Court concluded that where, as here, state law makes property exempt from the claims of creditors, no fraudulent conveyance can occur. 65 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657-658 (WD Mich. 1999). It found, however, that respondent’s husband’s use of nonexempt funds to pay the mortgage on the entireties property, which placed them beyond the reach of creditors, constituted a fraudulent act under state law, and the court awarded the IRS a share of the proceeds of the sale of the property equal to that amount. Id., at 659. Both parties appealed the District Court’s decision, the Government again claiming that its lien attached to the husband’s interest in the entireties property. The Court of Appeals held that the prior panel’s opinion was law of the case on that issue. 233 F. 3d 358, 363-369 (CA6 2000). It also affirmed the District Court’s determination that the husband’s mortgage payments were fraudulent. Id., at 369-375. We granted certiorari to consider the Government’s claim that respondent’s husband had a separate interest in the en-tireties property to which the federal tax lien attached. 533 U. S. 976 (2001). II Whether the interests of respondent’s husband in the property he held as a tenant by the entirety constitutes “property and rights to property” for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute, 26 U. S. C. § 6321, is ultimately a question of federal law. The answer to this federal question, however, largely depends upon state law. The federal tax lien statute itself “creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under state law.” United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, 55 (1958); see also United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 722 (1985). Accordingly, “[w]e look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U. S. 49, 58 (1999). A common idiom describes property as a “bundle of sticks” — a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property. See B. Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science 129 (1928) (reprint 2000); see also Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U. S. 330, 336 (1984). State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle. Whether those sticks qualify as “property” for purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal law. In looking to state law, we must be careful to consider the substance of the rights state law provides, not merely the labels the State gives these rights or the conclusions it draws from them. Such state law labels are irrelevant to the federal question of which bundles of rights constitute property that may be attached by a federal tax lien. In Drye v. United States, supra, we considered a situation where state law allowed an heir subject to a federal tax lien to disclaim his. interest in the estate. The state law also provided that such a disclaimer would “creat[e] the legal fiction” that the heir had predeceased the decedent and would correspondingly be deemed to have had no property interest in the estate. Id., at 53. We unanimously held that this state law fiction did not control the federal question and looked instead to the realities of the heir’s interest. We concluded that, despite the State’s characterization, the heir possessed a “right to property” in the estate — the right to accept the inheritance or pass it along to another — to which the federal lien could attach. Id., at 59-61. Ill We turn first to the question of what rights respondent’s husband had in the entireties property by virtue of state law. In order to understand these rights, the tenancy by the entirety must first be placed in some context. English common law provided three legal structures for the concurrent ownership of property that have survived into modern times: tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and tenancy by the entirety. 1 G. Thompson, Real Property § 4.06(g) (D. Thomas ed. 1994) (hereinafter Thompson). The tenancy in common is now the most common form of concurrent ownership. 7 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Real Property §51.01[3] (M. Wolf ed. 2001) (hereinafter Powell). The common law characterized tenants in common as each owning a separate fractional share in undivided property. Id., § 50.01[1]. Tenants in common may each unilaterally alienate their shares through sale or gift or place encumbrances upon these shares. They also have the power to pass these shares to their heirs upon death. Tenants in common have many other rights in the property, including the right to use the property, to exclude third parties from it, and to receive a portion of any income produced from it. Id., §§50.03-50.06. Joint tenancies were the predominant form of concurrent ownership at common law, and still persist in some States today. 4 Thompson § 31.05. The common law characterized each joint tenant as possessing the entire estate, rather than a fractional share: “[J]oint-tenants have one and the same interest... held by one and the same undivided possession.” 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 180 (1766). Joint tenants possess many of the rights enjoyed by tenants in common: the right to use, to exclude, and to enjoy a share of the property’s income. The main difference between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common is that a joint tenant also has a right of automatic inheritance known as “survivorship.” Upon the death of one joint tenant, that tenant’s share in the property does not pass through will or the rules of intestate succession; rather, the remaining tenant or tenants automatically inherit it. Id., at 183; 7 Powell §51.01 [3]. Joint tenants’ right to alienate their individual shares is also somewhat different. In order for one tenant to alienate his or her individual interest in the tenancy, the estate must first be severed — that is, converted to a tenancy in common with each tenant possessing an equal fractional share. Id., § 51.04[1], Most States allowing joint tenancies facilitate alienation, however, by allowing severance to automatically accompany a conveyance of that interest or any other overt act indicating an intent to sever. Ibid. A tenancy by the entirety is a unique sort of concurrent ownership that can only exist between married persons. 4 Thompson § 33.02. Because of the common-law fiction that the husband and wife were one person at law (that person, practically speaking, was the husband, see J. Cribbet et al., Cases and Materials on Property 329 (6th ed. 1990)), Blackstone did not characterize the tenancy by the entirety as a form of concurrent ownership at all. Instead, he thought that entireties property was a form of single ownership by the marital unity. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 1997 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 35, 38-39. Neither spouse was considered to own any individual interest in the estate; rather, it belonged to the couple. Like joint tenants, tenants by the entirety enjoy the right of survivorship. Also like a joint tenancy, unilateral alienation of a spouse’s interest in entireties property is typically not possible without severance. Unlike joint tenancies, however, tenancies by the entirety cannot easily be severed unilaterally. 4 Thompson § 33.08(b). Typically, severance requires the consent of both spouses, id., § 33.08(a), or the ending of the marriage in divorce, id., § 33.08(d). At common law, all of the other rights associated with the entireties property belonged to the husband: as the head of the household, he could control the use of the property and the exclusion of others from it and enjoy all of the income produced from it. Id., § 33.05. The husband’s control of the property was so extensive that, despite the rules on alienation, the common law eventually provided that he could unilaterally alienate entireties property without severance subject only to the wife’s survivorship interest. Orth, supra, at 40-41. With the passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts in the late 19th century granting women distinct rights with respect to marital property, most States either abolished the tenancy by the entirety or altered it significantly. 7 Powell § 52.01[2]. Michigan’s version of the estate is typical of the modern tenancy by the entirety. Following Blackstone, Michigan characterizes its tenancy by the entirety as creating no individual rights whatsoever: “It is well settled under the law of this State that one tenant by the entirety has no interest separable from that of the other .... Each is vested with an entire title.” Long v. Earle, 277 Mich. 505, 517, 269 N. W. 577, 581 (1936). And yet, in Michigan, each tenant by the entirety possesses the right of survivorship. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 554.872(g) (West Supp. 1997), recodified at § 700.2901(2)(g) (West Supp. Pamphlet 2001). Each spouse — the wife as well as the husband — may also use the property, exclude third parties from it, and receive an equal share of the income produced by it. See §557.71 (West 1988). Neither spouse may unilaterally alienate or encumber the property, Long v. Earle, supra, at 517, 269 N. W., at 581; Rogers v. Rogers, 136 Mich. App. 125, 134, 356 N. W. 2d 288, 292 (1984), although this may be accomplished with mutual consent, Eadus v. Hunter, 249 Mich. 190, 228 N. W. 782 (1930). Divorce ends the tenancy by the entirety, generally giving each spouse an equal interest in the property as a tenant in common, unless the divorce decree specifies otherwise. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.102 (West 1988). In determining whether respondent’s husband possessed “property” or “rights to property” within the meaning of 26 U. S. C. § 6321, we look to the individual rights created by these state law rules. According to Michigan law, respondent’s husband had, among other rights, the following rights with respect to the entireties property: the right to use the property, the right to exclude third parties from it, the right to a share of income produced from it, the right of survivor-ship, the right to become a tenant in common with equal shares upon divorce, the right to sell the property with the respondent’s consent and to receive half the proceeds from such a sale, the right to place an encumbrance on the property with the respondent’s consent, and the right to block respondent from selling or encumbering the property unilaterally. IV We turn now to the federal question of whether the rights Michigan law granted to respondent’s husband as a tenant by the entirety qualify as “property” or “rights to property” under §6321. The statutory language authorizing the tax lien “is broad and reveals on its face that Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have.” United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S., at 719-720. “Stronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes.” Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265, 267 (1945). We conclude that the husband’s rights in the entireties property fall within this broad statutory language. Michigan law grants a tenant by the entirety some of the most essential property rights: the right to use the property, to receive income produced by it, and to exclude others from it. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 384 (1994) (“[T]he right to exclude others” is “ ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property’ ” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979))); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 (1982) (including “use” as one of the “[property rights in a physical thing”). These rights alone may be sufficient to subject the husband’s interest in the entireties property to the federal tax lien. They gave him a substantial degree of control over the entireties property, and, as we noted in Drye, “in determining whether a federal taxpayer’s state-law rights constitute ‘property’ or ‘rights to property,’ [tjhe important consideration is the breadth of the control the [taxpayer] could exercise over the property.” 528 U. S., at 61 (some internal quotation marks omitted). The husband’s rights in the estate, however, went beyond use, exclusion, and income. He also possessed the right to alienate (or otherwise encumber) the property with the consent of respondent, his wife. Loretto, supra, at 435 (the right to “dispose” of an item is a property right). It is true, as respondent notes, that he lacked the right to unilaterally alienate the property, a right that is often in the bundle of property rights. See also post, at 296-297 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). There is no reason to believe, however, that this one stick — the right of unilateral alienation — is essential to the category of “property.” This Court has already stated that federal tax liens may attach to property that cannot be unilaterally alienated. In United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677 (1983), we considered the Federal Government’s power to foreclose homestead property attached by a federal tax lien. Texas law provided that “‘the owner or claimant of the property claimed as homestead [may not], if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the consent of the other spouse.’ ” Id., at 684-685 (quoting Tex. Const., Art. 16, §50). We nonetheless stated that “[i]n the homestead context . . . , there is no doubt... that not only do both spouses (rather than neither) have an independent interest in the homestead property, but that a federal tax lien can at least attach to each of those interests.” 461 U. S., at 703, n. 31; cf. Drye, supra, at 60, n. 7 (noting that “an interest in a spendthrift trust has been held to constitute ‘“property” for purposes of §6321’ even though the beneficiary may not transfer that interest to third parties”). Excluding property from a federal tax lien simply because the taxpayer does not have the power to unilaterally alienate it would, moreover, exempt a rather large amount of what is commonly thought of as property. It would exempt not only the type of property discussed in Rodgers, but also some community property. Community property States often provide that real community property cannot be alienated without the consent of both spouses. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §25-214(0 (2000); Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §1102 (West 1994); Idaho Code §32-912 (1996); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 2347 (West Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 123.230(3) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-13 (1999); Wash. Rev. Code §26.16.030(3) (1994). Accordingly, the fact that respondent’s husband could not unilaterally alienate the property does not preclude him from possessing “property and rights to property” for the purposes of § 6321. Respondent’s husband also possessed the right of survivor-ship — the right to automatically inherit the whole of the estate should his wife predecease him. Respondent argues that this interest was merely an expectancy, which we suggested in Drye would not constitute “property” for the purposes of a federal tax lien. 528 U. S., at 60, n. 7 (“[We do not mean to suggest] that an expectancy that has pecuniary value .. . would fall within § 6321 prior to the time it ripens into a present estate”). Drye did not decide this question, however, nor do we need to do so here. As we have discussed above, a number of the sticks in respondent’s husband’s bundle were presently existing. It is therefore not necessary to decide whether the right to survivorship alone would qualify as “property” or “rights to property” under §6321. That the rights of respondent’s husband in the entireties property constitute “property” or “rights to property” “belonging to” him is further underscored by the fact that, if the conclusion were otherwise, the entireties property would belong to no one for the purposes of § 6321. Respondent had no more interest in the property than her husband; if neither of them had a property interest in the entireties property, who did? This result not only seems absurd, but would also allow spouses to shield their property from federal taxation by classifying it as entireties property, facilitating abuse of the federal tax system. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests, 75 Ind. L. J. 1163, 1171 (2000). Justice Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’ dissents claim that the conclusion that the husband possessed an interest in the entireties property to which the federal tax lien could attach is in conflict with the rules for tax liens relating to partnership property. See post, at 289 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see also post, at 295-296, n. 4 (opinion of Thomas, J.). This is not so. As the authorities cited by Justice Thomas reflect, the federal tax lien does attach to an individual partner’s interest in the partnership, that is, to the fair market value of his or her share in the partnership assets. Ibid. (citing B. Bittker & M. McMahon, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals ¶ 44.5[4][a] (2d ed. 1995 and 2000 Cum. Supp.)); see also 1 A. Bromberg & L. Ribstein, Partnership § 3.05(d) (2002-1 Supp.) (hereinafter Bromberg & Ribstein) (citing Uniform Partnership Act §28, 6 U. L. A. 744 (1995)). As a holder of this lien, the Federal Government is entitled to “receive ... the profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled,” including predissolution distributions and the proceeds from dissolution. Uniform Partnership Act §27(1), id., at 736. There is, however, a difference between the treatment of entireties property and partnership assets. The Federal Government may not compel the sale of partnership assets (although it may foreclose on the partner’s interest, 1 Bromberg & Ribstein § 3.05(d)(3)(iv)). It is this difference that is reflected in Justice Scalia’s assertion that partnership property cannot be encumbered by an individual partner’s debts. See post, at 289. This disparity in treatment between the two forms of ownership, however, arises from our decision in United States v. Rodgers, supra (holding that the Government may foreclose on property even where the co-owners lack the right of unilateral alienation), and not our holding today. In this ease, it is instead the dissenters’ theory that departs from partnership law, as it would hold that the Federal Government’s lien does not attach to the husband’s interest in the entireties property at all, whereas the lien may attach to an individual’s interest in partnership property. Respondent argues that, whether or not we would conclude that respondent’s husband had an interest in the en-tireties property, legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend that a federal tax lien should attach to such an interest. In 1954, the Senate rejected a proposed amendment to the tax lien statute that would have provided that the lien attach to “property or rights to property (including the interest- of such person as tenant by the entirety).” S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 575 (1954). We have elsewhere held, however, that failed legislative proposals are “a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute,” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990), reasoning that “ ‘[congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.’ ” Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 187 (1994). This case exemplifies the risk of relying on such legislative history. As we noted in United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S., at 704, n. 31, some legislative history surrounding the 1954 amendment indicates that the House intended the amendment to be nothing more than a “clarification” of existing law, and that the Senate rejected the amendment only because it found it “superfluous.” See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A406 (1954) (noting that the amendment would “clarif[y] the term ‘property and rights to property’ by expressly including therein the interest of the delinquent taxpayer in an estate by the entirety”); S. Rep. No. 1622, at 575 (“It is not clear what change in existing law would be made by the parenthetical phrase. The deletion of the phrase is intended to continue the existing law”). The same ambiguity that plagues the legislative history accompanies the common-law background of Congress’ enactment of the tax lien statute. Respondent argues that Congress could not have intended the passage of the federal tax lien statute to alter the generally accepted rule that liens could not attach to entireties property. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here a common-law principle is well established ... the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident’”). The common-law rule was not so well established with respect to the application of a federal tax lien that we must assume that Congress considered the impact of its enactment on the question now before us. There was not much of a common-law background on the question of the application of federal tax liens, as the first court of appeals cases dealing with the application of such a lien did not arise until the 1950’s. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F. 2d 326 (CA8 1951); Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F. 2d 620 (CA3 1952). This background is not sufficient to overcome the broad statutory language Congress did enact, authorizing the lien to attach to “all property and rights to property” a taxpayer might have. We therefore conclude that respondent’s husband’s interest in the entireties property constituted “property” or “rights to property” for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute. We recognize that Michigan makes a different choice with respect to state law creditors: “[L]and held by husband and wife as tenants by entirety is not subject to levy under execution on judgment rendered against either husband or wife alone.” Sanford v. Bertrau, 204 Mich. 244, 247, 169 N. W. 880, 881 (1918). But that by no means dictates our choice. The interpretation of 26 U. S. C. §6321 is a federal question, and in answering that question we are in no way bound by state courts’ answers to similar questions involving state law. As we elsewhere have held, “‘exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector.’” Drye v. United States, 528 U. S., at 59. See also Rodgers, supra, at 701 (clarifying that the Supremacy Clause “provides the underpinning for the Federal Government’s right to sweep aside state-created exemptions”). V We express no view as to the proper valuation of respondent’s husband’s interest in the entireties property, leaving this for the Sixth Circuit to determine on remand. We note, however, that insofar as the amount is dependent upon whether the 1989 conveyance was fraudulent, see post, at 290, n. 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting), this case is somewhat anomalous. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment that this conveyance was not fraudulent, and the Government has not sought certiorari review of that determination. Since the District Court’s judgment was based on the notion that, because the federal tax lien could not attach to the property, transferring it could not constitute an attempt to evade the Government creditor, 65 F. Supp. 2d, at 657-659, in future cases, the fraudulent conveyance question will no doubt be answered differently. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DUNN, GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE, et al. v. BLUMSTEIN No. 70-13. Argued November 16, 1971 Decided March 21, 1972 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BreNNAn, Stewart, and White, JJ., joined. BlackmüN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 360. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 363. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Robert H. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were David M. Pack, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Fox, Deputy Attorney General. James F. Blumstein, pro se, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Charles Morgan, Jr., and Norman Siegel. Henry P. Sailer and William A. Dobrovir filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Various Tennessee public officials (hereinafter Tennessee) appeal from a decision by a three-judge federal court holding that Tennessee’s durational residence requirements for voting violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The issue arises in a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by appellee James Blumstein. Blumstein moved to Tennessee on June 12, 1970, to begin employment as an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt University in Nashville. With an eye toward voting in the upcoming August and November elections, he attempted to register to vote on July 1, 1970. The county registrar refused to register him, on the ground that Tennessee law author- / izes the registration of only those persons who, at the time of the next election, will have been residents of the State for a year and residents of the county for three months. After exhausting state administrative remedies, Blum-stein brought this action challenging these residence requirements on federal constitutional grounds. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, concluded that Tennessee’s durational residence requirements were unconstitutional (1) because they im-permissibly interfered with the right to vote and (2) because they created a “suspect” classification penalizing some Tennessee residents because of recent interstate movement. 337 F. Supp. 323 (MD Tenn. 1970). We noted probable jurisdiction, 401 U. S. 934 (1971). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision below. I The subject of this lawsuit is the durational residence requirement. Appellee does not challenge Tennessee’s power to restrict the vote to bona fide Tennessee residents. Nor has Tennessee ever disputed that appellee was a bona fide resident of the State and county when he attempted to register. But Tennessee insists that, in addition to being a resident, a would-be voter must have been a resident for a year in the State and three months in the county. It is this additional durational residence requirement that appellee challenges. Durational residence laws penalize those persons who have traveled from one place to another to establish a new residence during the qualifying period. Such laws divide residents into two classes, old residents and new residents, and discriminate against the latter to the extent of totally denying them the opportunity to vote. The constitutional question presented is whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a State to discriminate in this way among its citizens. To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in essence, to three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30 (1968). In considering laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court has evolved more than one test, depending upon the interest affected or the classification involved. First, then, we must determine what standard of review is appropriate. In the present case, whether we look to the benefit withheld by the classification (the opportunity to vote) or the basis for the classification (recent interstate travel) we conclude that the State must x show a substantial and compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements. A Durational residence requirements completely bar from voting all residents not meeting the fixed durational standards. By denying some citizens the right to vote, such laws deprive them of “ 'a fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all rights.' ” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). There is no need to repeat now the labors undertaken in earlier cases to analyze this right to vote and to explain in detail the Judicial role in reviewing state statutes that selectively distribute the franchise. In decision after decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. See, e. g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S. 419, 421-422, 426 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 626-628 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701, 706 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 667 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 93-94 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, supra. This “equal right to vote,” Evans v. Cornman, supra, at 426, is not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways. See, e. g., Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 91; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 144 (opinion of Douglas, J.), 241 (separate opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), 294 (opinion of Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined). But, as a general matter, “before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny.” Evans v. Cornman, supra, at 422; see Bullock v. Carter, ante, p. 134, at 143. Tennessee urges that this case is controlled by Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U. S. 125 (1965). Drueding was a decision upholding Maryland’s durational residence requirements. The District Court tested those requirements by the equal protection standard applied to ordinary state regulations: whether the exclusions are reasonably related to a permissible state interest. 234 F. Supp. 721, 724-725 (Md. 1964). We summarily affirmed per curiam without the benefit of argument. But if it was not clear then, it is certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for any statute that “place[s] a condition on the exercise of the right to vote.” Bullock v. Carter, supra, at 143. This development in the law culminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra. There we canvassed in detail the reasons for strict review of statutes distributing the franchise, 395 U. S., at 626-630, noting inter alia that such statutes “constitute the foundation of our representative society.” We concluded that if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies the franchise to others, “the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” Id., at 627 (emphasis added); Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 704; City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204, 205, 209 (1970). Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra, at 670. This is the test we apply here. B This exacting test is appropriate for another reason, never considered in Drueding: Tennessee’s dura-tional residence laws classify bona fide residents on the basis of recent travel, penalizing those persons, and only those persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another during the qualifying period. Thus, the dura-tional residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel. “[Fjreedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.” United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 758 (1966). See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C. J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 629-631, 634 (1969); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 237 (separate opinon of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), 285-286 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Burger, C. J., and Black-mun, J., joined). And it is clear that the freedom to travel includes the “freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union,” id., at 285. Obviously, durational residence laws single out the class of bona fide state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such travelers directly. We considered such a durational residence requirement in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, where the pertinent statutes imposed a one-year waiting period for interstate migrants as a condition to receiving welfare benefits. Although in Shapiro we specifically did not decide whether durational residence requirements could be used to determine voting eligibility, id., at 638 n. 21, we concluded that since the right to travel was a constitutionally protected right, “any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.” Id., at 634. This compelling-state-interest test was also adopted in the separate concurrence of Mr. Justice Stewart. Preceded by a long line of cases recognizing the constitutional right to travel, and repeatedly reaffirmed in the face of attempts to disregard it, see Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U. S. 49 (1970), and Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U. S. 1055 (1972), Shapiro and the compelling-state-interest test it articulates control this case. Tennessee attempts to distinguish Shapiro by urging that “the vice of the welfare statute in Shapiro . . . was its objective to deter interstate travel.” Brief for Appellants 13. In Tennessee’s view, the compelling-state-interest test is appropriate only where there is “some evidence to indicate a deterrence of or infringement on the right to travel . . . .” Ibid. Thus, Tennessee seeks to avoid the clear command of Shapiro by arguing that durational residence requirements for voting neither seek to nor actually do deter such travel. In essence, Tennessee argues that the right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally relevant sense. This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other “right to travel” cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-state-interest test would be triggered by “any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] Id., at 634 (emphasis added) ; see id., at 638 n. 21. While noting the frank legislative purpose to deter migration by the poor, and speculating that “[a]n indigent who desires to migrate . . . will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk” the loss of benefits, id., at 629, the majority found no need to dispute the “evidence that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred [from moving] by residence requirements.” Id., at 650 (Warren, C. J., dissenting); see also id., at 671-672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, none of the litigants had themselves been deterred. Only last Term, it was specifically noted that because a durational residence requirement for voting “operates to penalize those persons, and only those persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration . . . , [it] may withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest.” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 238 (separate opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.) (emphasis added). Of course, it is true that the two individual interests affected by Tennessee’s durational residence requirements are affected in different ways. Travel is permitted, but only at a price; voting is prohibited. The right to travel is merely penalized, while the right to vote is absolutely denied. But these differences are irrelevant for present purposes. Shapiro implicitly realized what this Court has made explicit elsewhere: “It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . 'Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be . . . indirectly denied’ . . . .” Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 540 (1965). See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), and cases cited therein; Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511, 515 (1967). The right to travel is an “unconditional personal right,” a right whose exercise may not be conditioned. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 292 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined). Durational residence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who have recently exercised that right. In the present case, such laws force a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose between travel and the basic right to vote. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 582-583 (1968). Absent a compelling state interest, a State may not burden the right to travel in this way. C In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 634 (first emphasis added); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S., at 627. Thus phrased, the. constitutional question may sound like a mathematical formula. But legal “tests” do not have the precision of mathematical formulas. The key words emphasize a matter of degree: that a heavy burden of justification is on the State, and that the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purposes. It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence requirements further a very substantial state interest. In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with “precision,” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 (1967), and must be “tailored” to serve their legitimate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 631. And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose “less drastic means.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). II We turn, then, to the question of whether the State has shown that durational residence requirements are needed to further a sufficiently substantial state interest. We emphasize again the difference between bona fide residence requirements and durational residence requirements. We have in the past noted approvingly that the States have the power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivision. E. g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S., at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S., at 91; Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904). An appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny. But durational residence requirements, representing a separate voting qualification imposed on bona fide residents, must be separately tested by the stringent standard. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 636. It is worth noting at the outset that Congress has, in a somewhat different context, addressed the question whether durational residence laws further compelling state interests. In § 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Congress outlawed state durational residence requirements for presidential and vice-presidential elections, and prohibited the States from closing registration more than 30 days before such elections. 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-1. In doing so, it made a specific finding that durational residence requirements and more restrictive registration practices do “not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-1 (a)(6). We upheld this portion of the Voting Rights Act in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. In our present case, of course, we deal with congressional, state, and local elections, in which the State’s interests are arguably somewhat different; and, in addition, our function is not merely to determine whether there was a reasonable basis for Congress’ findings. However, the congressional finding which forms the basis for the Federal Act is a useful background for the discussion that follows. Tennessee tenders “two basic purposes” served by its durational residence requirements: “(1) INSURE PURITY OF BALLOT BOX— Protection against fraud through colonization and inability to identify persons offering to vote, and “(2) KNOWLEDGEABLE VOTER —Afford some surety that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the community and that as such, he has a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government and is, therefore, more likely to exercise his right more intelligently.” Brief for Appellants 15, citing 18 Am. Jur., Elections, § 56, p. 217. We consider each in turn. A Preservation of the “purity of the ballot box” is a formidable-sounding state interest. The impurities feared, variously called “dual voting” and “colonization,” all involve voting by nonresidents, either singly or in groups. The main concern is that nonresidents will temporarily invade the State or county, falsely swear that they are residents to become eligible to vote, and, by voting, allow a candidate to win by fraud. Surely the prevention of such fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goal. But it is impossible to view durational residence requirements as necessary to achieve that state interest. Preventing fraud, the asserted evil that justifies state lawmaking, means keeping nonresidents from voting. But, by definition, a durational residence law bars newly arrived residents from the franchise along with nonresidents. The State argues that such sweeping laws are necessary to prevent fraud because they are needed to identify bona fide residents. This contention is particularly unconvincing in light of Tennessee’s total statutory scheme for regulating the franchise. Durational residence laws may once have been necessary to prevent a fraudulent evasion of state voter standards, but today in Tennessee, as in most other States, this purpose is served by a system of voter registration. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-301 et seg. (1955 and Supp. 1970); see State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn. 198, 122 S. W. 465 (1909). Given this system, the record is totally devoid of any evidence that durational residence requirements are in fact necessary to identify bona fide residents. The qualifications of the would-be voter in Tennessee are determined when he registers to vote, which he may do until 30 days before the election. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-304. His qualifications — including bona fide residence — are established then by oath. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-309. There is no indication in the record that Tennessee routinely goes behind the would-be voter’s oath to determine his qualifications. Since false swearing is no obstacle to one intent on fraud, the existence of burdensome voting qualifications like durational residence requirements cannot prevent corrupt nonresidents from fraudulently registering and voting. As long as the State relies on the oath-swearing system to establish qualifications, a du-rational residence requirement adds nothing to a simple residence requirement in the effort to stop fraud. The nonresident intent on committing election fraud will as quickly and effectively swear that he has been a resident for the requisite period of time as he would swear that he was simply a resident. Indeed, the durational residence requirement becomes an effective voting obstacle only to residents who tell the truth and have no fraudulent purposes. Moreover, to the extent that the State makes an enforcement effort after the oath is sworn, it is not clear what role the durational residence requirement could play in protecting against fraud. The State closes the registration books 30 days before an election to give officials an opportunity to prepare for the election. Before the books close, anyone may register who claims that he will meet the durational residence requirement at the time of the next election. Although Tennessee argues that this 30-day period between registration and election does not give the State enough time to verify this claim of bona fide residence, we do not see the relevance of that position to this case. As long as the State permits registration up to 30 days before an election, a lengthy dura-tional residence requirement does not increase the amount of time the State has in which to carry out an investigation into the sworn claim by the would-be voter that he is in fact a resident. Even if durational residence requirements imposed, in practice, a pre-election waiting period that gave voting officials three months or a year in which to confirm the bona fides of residence, Tennessee would not have demonstrated that these waiting periods were necessary. At the outset, the State is faced with the fact that it must defend two separate waiting periods of different lengths. It is impossible to see how both could be “necessary” to fulfill the pertinent state objective. If the State itself has determined that a three-month period is enough time in which to confirm bona fide residence in the State and county, obviously a one-year period cannot also be justified as “necessary” to achieve the same purpose. Beyond that, the job of detecting nonresidents from among persons who have registered is a relatively simple one. It hardly justifies prohibiting all newcomers from voting for even three months. To prevent dual voting, state voting officials simply have to cross-check lists of new registrants with their former jurisdictions. See Comment, Residence Requirements for Voting in Presidential Elections, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, 364 and n. 34, 374 (1970); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 637. Objective information tendered as relevant to the question of bona fide residence under Tennessee law — places of dwelling, occupation, car registration, driver's license, property owned, etc. — is easy to doublecheck, especially in light of modern communications. Tennessee itself concedes that “[i]t might well be that these purposes can be achieved under requirements of shorter duration than that imposed by the State of Tennessee . . . .” Brief for Appellants 10. Fixing a constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of degree. It is sufficient to note here that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud — and a year, or three months, too much. This was the judgment of Congress in the context of presidential elections. And, on the basis of the statutory scheme before us, it is almost surely the judgment of the Tennessee lawmakers as well. As the court below concluded, the cutoff point for registration 30 days before an election “reflects the judgment of the Tennessee Legislature that thirty days is an adequate period in which Tennessee’s election officials can effect whatever measures may be necessary, in each particular case confronting them, to insure purity of the ballot and prevent dual registration and dual voting.” 337 F. Supp., at 330. It has been argued that durational residence requirements are permissible because a person who has satisfied the waiting-period requirements is conclusively presumed to be a bona fide resident. In other words, durational residence requirements are justified because they create an administratively useful conclusive presumption that recent arrivals are not residents and are therefore properly barred from the franchise. This presumption, so the argument runs, also prevents fraud, for few candidates will be able to induce migration for the purpose of voting if fraudulent voters are required to remain in the false locale for three months or a year in order to vote on election day. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, this Court considered and rejected a similar kind of argument in support of a similar kind of conclusive presumption. There, the State argued that it was difficult to tell whether persons moving to Texas while in the military service were in fact bona fide residents. Thus, the State said, the administrative convenience of avoiding difficult factual determinations justified a blanket exclusion of all servicemen stationed in Texas. The presumption created there was conclusive — “ 'incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character.’ ” Id., at 96, citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 324 (1932). The Court rejected this “conclusive presumption” approach as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. While many servicemen in Texas were not bona fide residents, and therefore properly ineligible to vote, many servicemen clearly were bona fide residents. Since “more precise tests” were available “to winnow successfully from the ranks . . . those whose residence in the State is bona fide,” conclusive presumptions were impermissible in light of the individual interests affected. Id., at 95. “States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State.” Id., at 96. Carrington sufficiently disposes of this defense of dura-tional residence requirements. The State’s legitimate purpose is to determine whether certain persons in the community are bona fide residents. A durational residence requirement creates a classification that may, in a crude way, exclude nonresidents from that group. But it also excludes many residents. Given the State’s legitimate purpose and the individual interests that are affected, the classification is all too imprecise. See supra, at 343. In general, it is not very difficult for Tennessee to determine on an individualized basis whether one recently arrived in the community is in fact a resident, although of course there will always be difficult cases. Tennessee has defined a test for bona fide residence, and appears prepared to apply it on an individualized basis in various legal contexts. That test could easily be applied to new arrivals. Furthermore, if it is unlikely that would-be fraudulent voters would remain in a false locale for the lengthy period imposed by durational residence requirements, it is just as unlikely that they would collect such objective indicia of bona fide residence as a dwelling, car registration, or driver’s license. In spite of these things, the question of bona fide residence is settled for new arrivals by conclusive presumption, not by individualized inquiry. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96. Thus, it has always been undisputed that appellee Blumstein is himself a bona fide resident of Tennessee within the ordinary state definition of residence. But since Tennessee’s presumption from failure to meet the durational residence requirements is conclusive, a showing of actual bona fide residence is irrelevant, even though such a showing would fully serve the State’s purposes embodied in the presumption and would achieve those purposes with far less drastic impact on constitutionally protected interests. The Equal Protection Clause places a limit on government by classification, and that limit has been exceeded here. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 636; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S., at 542-543; Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). Our conclusion that the waiting period is..not the least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud is bolstered by the recognition that Tennessee has at its disposal a variety of criminal laws that are more than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud may be feared. At least six separate sections of the Tennessee Code define offenses to deal with voter fraud. For example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-324 makes it a crime “for any person to register or to have his name registered as a qualified voter . . . when he is not entitled to be so registered ... or to procure or induce any other person to register or be registered . . . when such person is not legally qualified to be registered as such . . . .” In addition to the various criminal penalties, Tennessee permits the bona tides of a voter to be challenged on election day. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1309 et seq. (1955 and Supp. 1970). Where a State has available such remedial action to supplement its voter registration system, it can hardly argue that broadly imposed political disabilities such as durational residence requirements are needed to deal with the evils of fraud. Now that the Federal Voting Rights Act abolishes those residence requirements as a precondition for voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-l, it is clear that the States will have to resort to other devices available to prevent nonresidents from voting. Especially since every State must live with this new federal statute, it is impossible to believe that durational residence requirements are necessary to meet the State’s goal of stopping fraud. B The argument that durational residence requirements further the goal of having “knowledgeable voters” appears to involve three separate claims. The first is that such requirements “afford some surety that the voter has, in fact, become a member of the community.” But here the State appears to confuse a bona fide residence requirement with a durational residence requirement. As already noted, a State does have an interest in limiting the franchise to bona fide members of the community. But this does not justify or explain the exclusion from the franchise of persons, not because their bona fide residence is questioned, but because they are recent rather than longtime residents. The second branch of the “knowledgeable voters” justification is that durational residence requirements assure that the voter “has a common interest in all matters pertaining to [the community’s] government . . . .” By this, presumably, the State means that it may require a period of residence sufficiently lengthy to impress upon its voters the local viewpoint. This is precisely the sort of argument this Court has repeatedly rejected. In Carrington v. Rash, for example, the State argued that military men newly moved into Texas might not have local interests sufficiently in mind, and therefore could be excluded from voting in state elections. This Court replied: “But if they are in fact residents, . . . they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation, . . . 'Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.” 380 U. S., at 94. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-1 (a)(4). Similarly here, Tennessee’s hopes for voters with a “common interest in all matters pertaining to [the community’s] government” is impermissible. To paraphrase what we said elsewhere, “All too often, lack of a ['common interest’] might mean no more than a different interest.” Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S., at 423. “[Differences of opinion” may not be the basis for excluding any group or person from the franchise. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S., at 705-706. “[T]he fact that newly arrived [Tennesseeans] may have a more national outlook than longtime residents, or even may retain a viewpoint characteristic of the region from which they have come, is a constitutionally impermissible reason for depriving them of their chance to influence the electoral vote of their new home State.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 53-54 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Finally, the State urges that a longtime resident is “more likely to exercise his right [to vote] more intelligently.” To the extent that this is different from the previous argument, the State is apparently asserting an interest in limiting the franchise to voters who are knowledgeable about the issues. In this case, Tennessee argues that people who have been in the State less than a year and the county less than three months are likely to be unaware of the issues involved in the congressional, state, and local elections, and therefore can be barred from the franchise. We note that the criterion of “intelligent” voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of abuse. But without deciding as a general matter the extent to which a State can bar less knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the franchise, cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U. S., at 422; Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S., at 632; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S., at 705, we conclude that dura-tional residence requirements cannot be justified on this basis. In Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, we held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited New York State from limiting the vote in school-district elections to parents of school children and to property owners. The State claimed that since nonparents would be “less informed” about school affairs than parents, id., at 631, the State could properly exclude the class of nonparents in order to limit the franchise to the more “interested” group of residents. We rejected that position, concluding that a “close scrutiny of [the classification] demonstrates that [it does] not accomplish this purpose with sufficient precision . . . .” Id., at 632. That scrutiny revealed that the classification excluding nonparents from the franchise kept many persons from voting who were as substantially interested .as those allowed to vote; given this, the classification was insufficiently “tailored” to achieve the articulated state goal. Ibid. See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, at 706. Similarly, the durational residence requirements in this case founder because of their crudeness as a device for achieving the articulated state goal of assuring the knowledgeable exercise of the franchise. The classifications created by durational residence requirements obviously permit any longtime resident to vote regardless of his knowledge of the issues — and obviously many longtime residents do not have any. On the other hand, the classifications bar from the franchise many other, admittedly new, residents who have become at least minimally, and often fully, informed about the issues. Indeed, recent migrants who take the time to register and vote shortly after moving are likely to be those citizens, such as appellee, who make it a point to be informed and knowledgeable about the issues. Given modern communications, and given the clear indication that campaign spending and voter education occur largely during the month before an election, the State cannot seriously maintain that it is “necessary” to reside for a year in the State and three months in the county in order to be knowledgeable about congressional, state, or even purely local elections. There is simply nothing in the record to support the conclusive presumption that residents who have lived in the State for less than a year and their county for less than three months are uninformed about elections. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 631. These durational residence requirements crudely exclude large numbers of fully qualified people. Especially since Tennessee creates a waiting period by closing registration books 30 days before an election, there can be no basis for arguing that any durational residence requirement is also needed to assure knowledgeability. It is pertinent to note that Tennessee has never made an attempt to further its alleged interest in an informed electorate in a universally applicable way. Knowledge or competence has never been a criterion for participation in Tennessee’s electoral process for longtime residents. Indeed, the State specifically provides for voting by various types of absentee persons. These provisions permit many longtime residents who leave the county or State to participate in a constituency in which they have only the slightest political interest, and from whose political debates they are likely to be cut off. That the State specifically permits such voting is not consistent with its claimed compelling interest in intelligent, informed use of the ballot. If the State seeks to assure intelligent use of the ballot, it may not try to serve this interest only with respect to new arrivals. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 637-638. It may well be true that new residents as a group know less about state and local issues than older residents; and it is surely true that durational residence requirements will exclude some people from voting who are totally uninformed about election matters. But as devices to limit the franchise to knowledgeable residents, the conclusive presumptions of durational residence requirements are much too crude. They exclude too many people who should not, and need not, be excluded. They represent a requirement of knowledge unfairly imposed on only some citizens. We are aware that classifications are always imprecise. By requiring classifications to be tailored to their purpose, we do not secretly require the impossible. Here, there is simply too attenuated a relationship between the state interest in an informed electorate and the fixed requirement that voters must have been residents in the State for a year and the county for three months. Given the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes affecting constitutional rights, we cannot say that durational residence requirements are necessary to further a compelling state interest. Ill Concluding that Tennessee has not offered an adequate justification for its durational residence laws, we affirm the judgment of the court below. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Involved here are provisions of the Tennessee Constitution, as well as portions of the Tennessee Code. Article IV, § 1, of the Tennessee Constitution, provides in pertinent part: “Right to vote — Election precincts . . . . — Every person of the age of twenty-one years, being a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State for twelve months, and of the county wherein such person may offer to vote for three months, next preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, members of the General Assembly and other civil officers for the county or district in which such person resides; and there shall be no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage. “The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws requiring voters to vote in the election precincts in which they may.reside, and laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.” Section 2-201, Tenn. Code Ann. (Supp. 1970) provides: “Qualifications of voters. — Every person of the age of twenty-one (21) years, being a citizen of the United States and a resident of this state for twelve (12) months, and of the county wherein he may offer his vote for three (3) months next preceding the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for members of the general assembly and other civil officers for the county or district in which he may reside.” Section 2-304, Tenn. Code Ann. (Supp. 1970) provides: “Persons entitled to permanently register — Required time for registration to be in effect prior to election. — All persons qualified to vote under existing laws at the date of application for registration, including those who will arrive at the legal voting age by the date of the next succeeding primary or general election established by statute following the date of their application to register (those who become of legal voting age before the date of a general election shall be entitled to register and vote in a legal primary election selecting nominees for such general election), who will have lived in the state for twelve (12) months and in the county for which they applied for registration for three (3) months by the date of the next succeeding election shall be entitled to permanently register as voters under the provisions of this chapter provided, however, that registration or re-registration shall not be permitted within thirty (30) days of any primary or general election provided for by statute. If a registered voter in any county shall have changed his residence to another county, or to another ward, precinct, or district within the same county, or changed his name by marriage or otherwise, within ninety (90) days prior to the date of an election, he shall be entitled to vote in his former ward, precinct or district of registration.” On July 30, the District Court refused to grant a preliminary injunction permitting Blumstein and members of the class he represented to vote in the August 6 election; the court noted that to do so would be “so obviously disruptive as to constitute an example of judicial improvidence.” The District Court also denied a motion that Blumstein be allowed to cast a sealed provisional ballot for the election. At the time the opinion below was filed, the next election was to be held in November 1970, at which time Blumstein would have met the three-month part of Tennessee’s durational residency requirements. The District Court properly rejected the State’s position that the alleged invalidity of the three-month requirement had been rendered moot, and the State does not pursue any mootness argument here. Although appellee now can vote, the problem to voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirements is “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ ” Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). In this case, unlike Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 (1969), the laws in question remain on the books, and Blumstein has standing to challenge them as a member of the class of people affected by the presently written statute. The important question in this case has divided the lower courts. Durational residence requirements ranging from three months to one year have been struck down in Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (Mass. 1970); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (ND Ind. 1970); Lester v. Board of Elections for District of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 505 (DC 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (ED Va. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (MD Ala. 1970); Kohn v. Davis, 320 F. Supp. 246 (Vt. 1070); Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15 (Minn. 1970); Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (MDNC 1971), as well as this case. Other district courts have upheld durational residence requirements of a similar variety. Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (ND Ohio 1970); Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012 (ND Miss. 1971); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (Ariz. 1970); Fitzpatrick v. Board of Election Commissioners (ND Ill. 1970); Piliavin v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (WD Wis. 1970); Epps v. Logan (No. 9137, WD Wash. 1970); Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153 (ED La. 1971). In Sirak v. Brown (Civ. No. 70-164, SD Ohio 1970), the District Judge refused to convene a three-judge court and summarily dismissed the complaint. Noting the lack of dispute on this point, the court below specifically found that Blumstein had no intention of leaving Nashville and was a bona fide resident of Tennessee. 337 F. Supp. 323, 324. While it would be difficult to determine precisely how many would-be voters throughout the country cannot vote because of durational residence requirements, but see Coeanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 477, 478 and n. 8 (1970), it is worth noting that during the period 1947-1970 an average of approximately 3.3% of the total national population moved interstate each year. (An additional 3.2% of the population moved from one county to another intrastate each year.) U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 210, Jan. 15, 1971, Table 1, pp. 7-8. Compare Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942), with Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955); compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964), Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966), and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957), and Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959). Appellants also rely on Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904). Carefully read, that case simply holds that federal constitutionals rights are not violated by a state provision requiring a person who enters the State to make a “declaration of his intention to become a citizen before he can. have the right to be registered as a voter and to vote in the State.” Id., at 634, In other words, the case simply stands for the proposition that a State may require voters to be bona fide residents. See infra, at 343-344. To the extent that dicta in that opinion are inconsistent with the test we apply or the result we reach today, those dicta are rejected. We note that in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, Congress specifically found that a durational residence requirement “denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines . . . .” 84 Stat. 316, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-1 (a)(2). For example, in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868), the tax imposed on persons leaving the State by commercial carrier was only $1, certainly a minimal deterrent to travel. But in declaring the tax unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that “if the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one thousand dollars,” id., at 46. In Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871), the tax on nonresident traders was more substantial, but the Court focused on its discriminatory aspects, without anywhere considering the law’s effect, if any, on trade or tradesmen’s choice of residence. Cf. Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. R. Co., 249 U. S. 522, 527 (1919); but see Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (1900). In Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 79-80 (1920), the Court held that New York could not deny nonresidents certain small personal exemptions from the state income tax allowed residents. The amounts were certainly insufficient to influence any employee’s choice of residence. Compare Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948), with Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415 (1952). Separately concurring, Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that quite apart from any purpose to deter, “a law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional right of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a compelling governmental interest.” Id., at 643-644 (first emphasis added). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 375. In Harman, the Court held that a Virginia law which allowed federal voters to qualify either by paying a poll tax or by filing a certificate of residence six months before the election “handicap [ped] exercise” of the right to participate in federal elections free of poll taxes, guaranteed by the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Id., at 541. Where, for example, an interstate migrant loses his driver’s license because the new State has a higher age requirement, a different constitutional question is presented. For in such a case, the new State’s age requirement is not a penalty imposed solely because the newcomer is a new resident; instead, all residents, old and new, must be of a prescribed age to drive. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 638 n. 21 (1969). As noted infra, at 343-344, States may show an overriding interest in imposing an appropriate bona fide residence requirement on would-be voters. One who travels out of a State may no longer be a bona fide resident, and may not be allowed to vote in the old State. Similarly, one who travels to a new State may, in some cases, not establish bona fide residence and may be ineligible to vote in the new State. Nothing said today is meant to cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements. See n. 7, supra. See Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp., at 167-168 (Wisdom, J., dissenting); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904); and n. 7, supra. See, e. g., Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz. L. Rev., at 499; MacLeod & Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements and Civil Rights, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 93, 113 (1969). Obviously, it could not be argued that the three-month waiting period is necessary to confirm residence in the county, and the one-year period necessary to confirm residence in the State. Quite apart from the total implausibility of any suggestion that one task should take four times as long as the other, it is sufficient to note that if a person is found to be a bona fide resident of a county within the State, he is by definition a bona fide resident of the State as well. See, e. g., Brown v. Hows, 163 Tenn. 178, 42 S. W. 2d 210 (1930); Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S. W. 173 (1905). See generally Tennessee Law Revision Commission, Title 2 — Election Laws, Tentative Draft of October 1971, § 222 and Comment. See n. 22, infra. In the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Congress abolished durational residence requirements as a precondition to voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections, and prohibited the States from cutting off registration more than 30 days prior to those elections. These limits on the waiting period a State may impose prior to an election were made “with full cognizance of the possibility of fraud and administrative difficulty.” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 238 (separate opinion of BreNNAN, White, and Marshall, JJ.). With that awareness, Congress concluded that a waiting-period requirement beyond 30 days “does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa-1 (a) (6). And in sustaining § 202 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we found “no explanation why the 30-day period between the closing of new registrations and the date of election would not provide, in light of modern communications, adequate time to insure against . . . frauds.” Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 239 (separate opinion of BrennaN, White, and Marshall, JJ.). There is no reason to think that what Congress thought was unnecessary to prevent fraud in presidential elections should not also be unnecessary in the context of other elections. See infra, at 354. As a technical matter, it makes no sense to say that one who has been a resident for a fixed duration is presumed to be a resident. In order to meet the durational residence requirement, one must, by definition, first establish that he is a resident. A durational residence requirement is not simply a waiting period after arrival in the State; it is a waiting period after residence is established. Thus it is conceptually impossible to say that a durational residence requirement is an administratively useful device to determine residence. The State’s argument must be that residence would be presumed from simple presence in the State or county for the fixed waiting period. It should be clear that this argument assumes that the State will reliably determine whether the sworn claims of duration in the jurisdiction are themselves accurate. We have already noted that this is unlikely. See supra, at 346. Another recurrent problem for the State’s position is the existence of differential durational residence requirements. If the State presumes residence in the county after three months in the county, there is no rational explanation for requiring a full 12 months’ presence in the State to presume residence in the State. Tennessee’s basic test for bona fide residence is (1) an intention to stay indefinitely in a place (in other words, “without a present intention of removing therefrom,” Brown v. Hows, 163 Tenn., at 182, 42 S. W. 2d, at 211), joined with (2) some objective indication consistent with that intent, see n. 18, supra. This basic test has been applied in divorce cases, see, e. g., Sturdavant v. Sturdavant, 28 Tenn. App. 273, 189 S. W. 2d 410 (1944); Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S. W. 959 (1924); Sparks v. Sparks, 114 Tenn. 666, 88 S. W. 173 (1905); in tax cases, see, e. g., Denny v. Sumner County, 134 Tenn. 468, 184 S. W. 14 (1916); in estate cases, see, e. g., Caldwell v. Shelton, 32 Tenn. App. 45, 221 S. W. 2d 815 (1948); Hascall v. Hafford, 107 Tenn. 355, 65 S. W. 423 (1901); and in voting cases, see, e. g., Brown v. Hows, supra; Tennessee Law Revision Commission, Title 2 — Election Laws, supra, n. 18. Indeed, in Blumstein’s case, the County Election Commission explicitly rejected his offer to treat the waiting-period requirement as “a waivable guide to commission action, but rebuttable upon a proper showing of competence to vote intelligently in the primary and general election.” Complaint at App. 8. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S., at 544-545 (Stone, C. J., concurring). See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S., at 543 (1965) (filing of residence certificate six months before election in lieu of poll tax unnecessary to insure that the election is limited to bona fide residents in light of “numerous devices to enforce valid residence requirements”) ; cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164 (1939) (fear of fraudulent solicitations cannot justify permit requests since “[f]rauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1614 (Supp. 1970) makes it a felony for any person who “is not legally entitled to vote at the time and place where he votes or attempts to vote ... , to vote or offer to do so,” or to aid and abet such illegality. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2207 (1955) makes it a misdemeanor “for any person knowingly to vote in any political convention or any election held under the Constitution or laws of this state, not being legally qualified to vote . . .,” and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2208 (1955) makes it a misdemeanor to aid in such an offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-202 (Supp. 1970) makes it an offense to vote outside the ward or precinct where one resides and is registered. Finally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2209 (1955) makes it unlawful to “bring or aid in bringing any fraudulent voters into this state for the purpose of practising a fraud upon or in any primary or final election . . . .” See, e. g., State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn. 198, 112 S. W. 465 (1909). We note that in the period since the decision below, several elections have been held in Tennessee. We have been presented with no specific evidence of increased colonization or other fraud. It has been noted elsewhere, and with specific reference to Tennessee law, that “[t]he historical purpose of [durational] residency requirements seems to have been to deny the vote to undesirables, immigrants and outsiders with different ideas.” Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz. L. Rev., at 484 and nn. 44, 45, and 46. We do not rely on this alleged original purpose of durational residence requirements in striking them down today. Tennessee may be revealing this impermissible purpose when it observes: “The fact that the voting privilege has been extended to 18 year old persons . . . increases, rather than diminishes, the need for durational residency requirements. ... It is so generally known, as to be judicially accepted, that there are many political subdivisions in this state, and other states, wherein there are colleges, universities and military installations with sufficient student body or military personnel over eighteen years of age, as would completely dominate elections in the district, county or municipality so located. This would offer the maximum of opportunity for fraud through colonization, and permit domination by those not knowledgeable or having a common interest in matters of government, as opposed to the interest and the knowledge of permanent members of the community. Upon completion of their schooling, or service tour, they move on, leaving the community bound to a course of political expediency not of its choice and, in fact, one over which its more permanent citizens, who will continue to be affected, had no control.” Brief for Appellants 15-16. In the 1970 Voting Rights Act, which added § 201, 42 U. S. C. § 1973aa, Congress provided that “no citizen shall be denied, because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election . . . .” The term “test or device” was defined to include, in part, “any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject . . . .” By prohibiting various “test[s]” and “device [s]” that would clearly assure knowledgeability on the part of voters in local elections, Congress declared federal policy that people should be allowed to vote even if they were not well informed about the issues. We upheld § 201 in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra. H. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election 106-113 (1971); Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp., at 77; Cocanower & Rich, 12 Ariz. L. Rev., at 498. The general provisions for absentee voting apply in part to “[a]ny registered voter otherwise qualified to vote in any election to be held in this state or any county, municipality, or other political subdivision thereof, who by reason of business, occupation, health, education, or travel, is required to be absent from the county of his fixed residence on the day of the election . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. §2-1602 (Supp. 1970). See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1601 et seq. (Supp. 1970). An alternative method of absentee voting for armed forces members and federal personnel is detailed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1701 et seq. (Supp. 1970). Both those provisions allow persons who are still technically “residents” of the State or county to vote even though they are not physically present, and even though they are likely to be uninformed about the issues. In addition, Tennessee has an unusual provision that permits persons to vote in their prior residence for a period after residence has been changed. This section provides, in pertinent part: “If a registered voter in any county shall have changed his residence to another county . . . within ninety (90) days prior to the date of an election, he shall be entitled to vote in his former ward, precinct or district of registration.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-304 (Supp. 1970). See also Tenn. Code Ann. §2-204 (1955).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITIES SERVICE GAS CO. v. PEERLESS OIL & GAS CO. et al. No. 153. Argued November 9-10, 1950. Decided December 11, 1950. Glenn W. Clark argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Joe Rolston, Jr., Robert R. Mc-Cracken, R. E. Cullison and O. R. Stites. T. Murray Robinson argued the cause for the State of Oklahoma, Floyd Green for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, and D. A. Richardson for the Peerless Oil & Gas Co., appellees. With them on the brief were Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General, and Fred Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Oklahoma, and Thomas J. Lee and Richard H. Dunn for the Commissioners of the Land Office of Oklahoma. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is the power of a state to fix prices at the wellhead on natural gas produced within its borders and sold interstate. It originates from proceedings before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission which terminated with the promulgation of two orders. The first order set a minimum wellhead price on all gas taken from the Guymon-Hugoton Field, located in Texas County, Oklahoma. The second directed Cities Service, a producer in this field and operator of an interstate gas pipe-line system, to take gas ratably from Peerless, another producer in the same field, at the price incorporated in the first order. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld both orders against contentions that they contravened the constitution and statutes of Oklahoma and the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. 203 Okla. 35, 220 P. 2d 279 (1950). From this judgment Cities Service appealed to this Court. A substantial federal claim having been duly raised and necessarily denied by the highest state court, we noted probable jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). I. The case may be summarized as follows. The Hugoton Gas Field, 120 miles long and 40 miles wide, lies in the States of Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas. The Oklahoma portion, known as the Guymon-Hugoton Field, has approximately 1,062,000 proven acres with some 300 wells, of which 240 are producing. About 90 percent of Guy-mon-Hugoton’s production is ultimately consumed outside the State. Cities Service, operator of a pipe line connected with the field, owns about 300,000 acres and 123 wells. In addition, it has 94 wells dedicated to it by lease for the life of the field and some 19 wells under term lease, giving it control over 236 of the 300 wells. Aside from the holdings of a few small tract owners and the acreages held in trust by the Oklahoma Land Office — some 49,600 acres — the only reserves in the field not owned by or affiliated with a pipe line are those of Harrington-Marsh with some 75,000 acres and Peerless with about 100,000 acres. Under prevailing market conditions, wellhead prices range from 3.6 to 5 cents per thousand cubic feet, varying prices being paid to different producers at the same time. In contrast, there is evidence that the “commercial heat value” of natural gas, in terms of competitive fuel equivalents, is in excess of 10 cents per thousand cubic feet at the wellhead. While the Guymon-Hugoton Field has three principal production horizons, they are so interconnected as to make in effect one large reservoir of gas. Cities’ wells are located in an area in which the gas pressure is considerably lower than that found beneath the wells of Peerless. As a result, production from Cities’ wells was causing drainage from the Peerless section of the field, and Peerless was losing gas even though its wells were not producing. Having no pipe-line outlet of its own, Peerless offered to sell the potential output of its wells to Cities Service. Cities refused except on the condition that Peerless dedicate all gas from its acreage, at a price of 4 cents per thousand cubic feet, for the life of the leases. Dissatisfied with the price and the other terms, Peerless requested the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (a) to order Cities to make a connection with a Peerless well and purchase the output of that well ratably at a price fixed by the Commission, and (b) to fix the price to be paid by all purchasers of natural gas in the Guymon-Hugoton Field. Shortly thereafter, the Oklahoma Land Office intervened as owner in trust of large acreages in the field. The Land Office alleged that no fair, adequate price for natural gas existed in the field; that existing prices were discriminatory, unjust and arbitrary and if continued would deplete, destroy and exhaust the field within a few years. It joined Peerless’ prayer for relief. The Commission thereupon, by written notice, invited all producers and purchasers of gas in the field to appear and participate in the proceedings. The Commission heard testimony to the effect that the field price of gas has a direct bearing on conservation. Witnesses testified that low prices make enforcement of conservation more difficult, retard exploration and development, and result in abandonment of wells long before all recoverable gas has been extracted. They also testified that low prices contribute to an uneconomic rate of depletion and economic waste of gas by promoting “inferior” uses. At the end of the hearings, the Commission concluded that there was no competitive market for gas in the Guymon-Hugoton Field, that the integrated well and pipe-line owners were able to dictate the prices paid to producers without pipe-line outlets, and that as a result gas was being taken from the field at a price below its economic value. It further concluded that the taking of gas at the prevailing prices resulted in both economic and physical waste of gas, loss to producer and royalty owners, loss to the State in gross production taxes, inequitable taking of gas from the common source of supply, and discrimination against various producers in the field. On the basis of these findings, the Commission issued the two orders challenged here. The first provided “that no natural gas shall be taken out of the producing structures or formations in the Guymon-Hugoton field ... at a price, at the wellhead, of less than 7‡ per thousand cubic feet of natural gas measured at a pressure of 14.65 pounds absolute pressure per square inch.” The second directed Cities Service “to take natural gas ratably from . . . [Peerless'] well ... in accordance with the formula for ratable taking prescribed in Order No. 17867 of this Commission” (a provision not under attack here), and at the same price and pressure terms indicated in the general field-price order. On appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Cities Service attacked the orders on the following grounds: (1) that the Commission acted beyond its authority in that Oklahoma statutes did not permit general price-fixing or specific price-fixing at a figure in excess of the prevailing market price, and in that the statutes did not contemplate the prevention of economic, as distinct from physical, waste; (2) that if construed to permit such price-fixing, the statutes and orders thereunder violated the state constitution; (3) that if so construed, the statutes and orders violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that (a) there was no evidence of physical waste in the Guymon-Hugoton Field and the price order cannot be reasonably related to the prevention of waste, (b) the statutes contain no adequate standards governing the Commission’s price-fixing powers, (c) the orders are too vague, (d) the proceedings lacked procedural due process, and (e) the specific order discriminates against Cities Service, and the general order, applying only to the Guymon-Hugoton Field, discriminates against those producing or purchasing in that field; (4) that the orders violate the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, in that they cast an undue burden on, and discriminate against, interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected these claims. It found that the Oklahoma statutes fully empowered the Commission to take the action which it took. The Oklahoma legislature, as early as 1913, declared that gas underlying land is the property of the land owner or his lessee; that gas may be taken from a common source of supply proportionately to the natural flow of the well and that the drilling of a well by an owner or lessee shall be regarded as reducing to possession his share of the gas; that any person taking gas from the field, except in cases not here pertinent, shall take ratably from each owner in proportion to his interest and upon such terms as may be agreed upon; that if no agreement can be reached then the price and terms shall be such as may be fixed by the Corporation Commission after notice and hearing. 52 Okla. Stats. § § 23-25,231-233 (1941). These sections explicitly authorize the order requiring Cities to take gas ratably from Peerless and at a specific price. In 1915, Oklahoma strengthened its gas conservation laws by authorizing regulation of production of gas from a common source when production is in excess of market demand. 52 Okla. Stats. §§ 239-240 (1941). The Commission was authorized to limit the gas taken by any producer to “such proportion of the natural gas that may be marketed without waste” as the natural flow of gas at the wells of such producer bears to the total natural flow of the common source. In authorizing such regulation, the legislature declared that it acted “so as to prevent waste, protect the interests of the public, and of all those having a right to produce therefrom, and to prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of any one such common source of supply as against another.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the 1915 Act to permit the general order setting a minimum price in the field. It further ruled that economic waste was within the contemplation of the statute. Finally, with regard to state questions, it held that the orders did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution. The Oklahoma court also concluded that the statutes so construed and the orders made thereunder do not violate the Federal Constitution on the grounds relied on by Cities Service. We agree. II. The Due Process and Equal Protection issues raised by appellant are virtually without substance. It is now undeniable that a state may adopt reasonable regulations to prevent economic and physical waste of natural gas. This Court has upheld numerous kinds of state legislation designed to curb waste of natural resources and to protect the correlative rights of owners through ratable taking, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932), or to protect the economy of the state. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940). These ends have been held to justify control over production even though the uses to which property may profitably be put are restricted. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300 (1920). Like any other regulation, a price-fixing order is lawful if substantially related to a legitimate end sought to be attained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) and cases therein cited. In the proceedings before the Commission in this case, there was ample evidence to sustain its finding that existing low field prices were resulting in economic waste and conducive to physical waste. That is a sufficient basis for the orders issued. It is no concern of ours that other regulatory devices might be more appropriate, or that less extensive measures might suffice. Such matters are the province of the legislature and the Commission. We have considered the other arguments raised by appellant concerning Due Process and Equal Protection and find them similarly lacking in merit. III. The Commerce Clause gives to the Congress a power over interstate commerce which is both paramount and broad in scope. But due regard for state legislative functions has long required that this power be treated as not exclusive. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851). It is now well settled that a state may regulate matters of local concern over which federal authority has not been exercised, even though the regulation has some impact on interstate commerce. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346 (1939); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938). The only requirements consistently recognized have been that the regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo on interstate commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local interest at stake outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention of state restrictions. Nor should we lightly translate the quiescence of federal power into an affirmation that the national interest lies in complete freedom from regulation. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra. Compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890), decided prior to the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313, with In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891), decided thereafter. That a legitimate local interest is at stake in this case is clear. A state is justifiably concerned with preventing rapid and uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources. The contention urged by appellant that a group of private producers and royalty owners derive substantial gain from the regulations does not contradict the established connection between the orders and a statewide interest in conservation. Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Cas Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937). We recognize that there is also a strong national interest in natural gas problems. But it is far from clear that on balance such interest is harmed by the state regulations under attack here. Presumably all consumers, domestic and industrial alike, want to obtain natural gas as cheaply as possible. On the other hand, groups connected with the production and transportation of competing fuels complain of the competition of cheap gas. Moreover, the wellhead price of gas is but a fraction of the price paid by domestic consumers at the burner-tip, so that the field price as herein set may have little or no effect on the domestic delivered price. Some industrial consumers, who get bargain rates on gas for “inferior” uses, may suffer. But strong arguments have been made that the national interest lies in preserving this limited resource for domestic and industrial uses for which natural gas has no completely satisfactory substitute. See generally, Federal Power Commission, Natural Gas Investigation (1948); Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 657-660 (1944) (dissenting opinion). Insofar as conservation is concerned, the national interest and the interest of producing states may well tend to coincide. In any event, in a field of this complexity with such diverse interests involved, we cannot say that there is a clear national interest so harmed that the state price-fixing orders here employed fall within the ban of the Commerce Clause. Parker v. Brown, supra; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, supra. Nor is it for us to consider whether Oklahoma’s unilateral efforts to conserve gas will be fully effective. See South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra at 190-191. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 (1949), is not inconsistent with this result. The Hood case specifically excepted from consideration the question here raised, whether price-fixing was forbidden as an undue burden on interstate commerce. Moreover, the Court carefully distinguished Eisenberg, which approved price regulations even though applied to a producer whose entire purchases of milk went directly, without processing, into interstate commerce. The vice in the regulation invalidated by Hood was solely that it denied facilities to a company in interstate commerce on the articulated ground that such facilities would divert milk supplies needed by local consumers; in other words,. the regulation discriminated against interstate commerce. There is no such problem here. The price regulation applies to all gas taken from the field, whether destined for interstate or intrastate consumers. Appellant does not contend that the orders conflict with the federal authority asserted by the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §§ 717 et seq. (1948). The Federal Power Commission has not participated in these proceedings. Whether the Gas Act authorizes the Power Commission to set field prices on sales by independent producers, or leaves that function to the states, is not before this Court. We hold that on this record the Oklahoma Corporation Commission issued valid orders, and that the decision of the court below should be Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that the alleged federal constitutional questions are frivolous and that the appeal therefore should be dismissed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRENNER, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS v. MANSON. No. 58. Argued November 17, 1965. Decided March 21, 1966. Paul Bender argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Sherman L. Cohn and Edward Berlin. Dean Laurence argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Herbert I. Sherman and John L. White. W. Brown Morton, Jr., and Ellsworth H. Mosher filed a brief for the American Patent Law Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents two questions of importance to the administration of the patent laws: First, whether this Court has certiorari jurisdiction, upon petition of the Commissioner of Patents, to review decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; and second, whether the practical utility of the compound produced by a chemical process is an essential element in establishing a prima facie case for the patentability of the process. The facts are as follows: In December 1957, Howard Ringold and George Rosen-kranz applied for a patent on an allegedly novel process for making certain known steroids. They claimed priority as of December 17, 1956, the date on which they had filed for a Mexican patent. United States Patent No. 2,908,693 issued late in 1959. In January 1960, respondent Manson, a chemist engaged in steroid research, filed an application to patent precisely the same process described by Ringold and Rosenkranz. He asserted that it was he who had discovered the process, and that he had done so before December 17, 1956. Accordingly, he requested that an “interference” be declared in order to try out the issue of priority between his claim and that of Ringold and Rosenkranz. A Patent Office examiner denied Manson’S application, and the denial was affirmed by the Board of Appeals within the Patent Office. The ground for rejection was the failure “to disclose any utility for” the chemical compound produced by the process. Letter of Examiner, dated May 24, 1960. This omission was not cured, in the opinion of the Patent Office, by Manson’s reference to an article in the November 1956 issue of the Journal of Organic Chemistry, 21 J. Org. Chem. 1333-1335, which revealed that steroids of a class which included the compound in question were undergoing screening for possible tumor-inhibiting effects in mice, and that a homologue adjacent to Manson’s steroid had proven effective in that role. Said the Board of Appeals, “It is our view that the statutory requirement of usefulness of a product cannot be presumed merely because it happens to be closely related to another compound which is known to be useful.” The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (hereinafter CCPA) reversed, Chief Judge Worley dissenting. 52 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 739, 745, 333 F. 2d 234, 237-238. The court held that Manson was entitled to a declaration of interference since “where a claimed process produces a known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product,” so long as the product “is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest.” Certiorari was granted, 380 U. S. 971, to resolve this running dispute over what constitutes “utility” in chemical process claims, as well as to answer the question concerning our certiorari jurisdiction. I. Section 1256 of Title 28 U. S. C. (1964 ed.), enacted in 1948, provides that “Cases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” This unqualified language would seem to foreclose any challenge to our jurisdiction in the present case. Both the Government and the respondent urge that we have certiorari jurisdiction over patent decisions of the CCPA, although the latter would confine our jurisdiction to those petitions filed by dissatisfied applicants and would deny the Commissioner of Patents the right to seek certiorari. This concert of opinion, does not settle the basic question because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. The doubt that does exist stems from a decision of this Court, rendered in January 1927, in Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693, which has been widely interpreted as precluding certiorari jurisdiction over patent and trademark decisions of the CCPA. Postum, however, was based upon a statutory scheme materially different from the present one. Postum involved a proceeding in the Patent Office to cancel a trademark. The Commissioner of Patents rejected the application. An appeal was taken to the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which in 1927 exercised the jurisdiction later transferred to the CCPA. Under the statutory arrangement in effect at the time, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was not definitive because it was not an order to the Patent Office determinative of the controversy. A subsequent bill in equity could be brought in the District Court and it was possible that a conflicting adjudication could thus be obtained. On this basis, the Court held that it could not review the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals was an “administrative decision” rather than a “judicial judgment”: “merely an instruction to the Commissioner of Patents by a court which is made part of the machinery of the Patent Office for administrative purposes.” 272 U. S., at 698-699. Therefore, this Court concluded, the proceeding in the Court of Appeals — essentially administrative in nature — was neither case nor controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. Congress might confer such “administrative” tasks upon the courts of the District of Columbia, wrote Chief Justice Taft, but it could not empower this Court to participate therein. Congress soon amended the statutory scheme. In March of 1927 it provided that an action in the District Court was to be alternative and not cumulative to appellate review, that it could not be maintained to overcome an adjudication in the Court of Appeals. In 1929 Congress transferred appellate jurisdiction over the Commissioner’s decisions from the Court of Appeals to what had been the Court of Customs Appeals and was now styled the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Whereas the Court of Appeals had been empowered to take additional evidence and to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, the CCPA was confined to the record made in the Patent Office. Compare Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 144-145. Despite these changes, however, Postum had acquired a life of its own. It continued to stand in the way of attempts to secure review here of CCPA decisions respecting the Commissioner of Patents. See, e. g., McBride v. Teeple, 311 U. S. 649, denying certiorari for “want of jurisdiction” on the authority of Postum. This was the background against which Congress, in its 1948 codification of statutes pertaining to the judiciary, enacted § 1256, blandly providing in unqualified language for review on certiorari of “[cjases in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.” Nothing in the legislative materials relating to the statute, except its language, is of assistance to us in the resolution of the present problem: Did the statutory changes which followed Postura mean that a patent decision by the CCPA was a “judicial” determination reviewable by this Court under Article III? And, if so, was § 1256 intended to create such jurisdiction? Assistance came with the 1958 revision of the Judicial Code. Congress there declared the CCPA “a court established under article III . . . ,” that is, a constitutional court exercising judicial rather than administrative power. 28 U. S. C. § 211 (1964 ed.). In 1962 this Court addressed itself to the nature and status of the CCPA. Olidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, raised the question whether a judge of the CCPA was an Article III judge, capable of exercising federal judicial power. In answering that question in the affirmative, MR. Justice Harlan's opinion, for three of the seven Justices participating, expressly left open the question whether § 1256 conferred certiorari jurisdiction over patent and trademark cases decided in the CCPA, 370 U. S., at 578 n. 49. It suggested, however, that Postura might be nothing-more than a museum piece. The opinion noted that Postura “must be taken to be limited to the statutory scheme in existence before” 1929. 370 U. S., at 579. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, in which The Chief Justice joined, did not reflect any difference on this point. Thus, the decision sought to be reviewed is that of an Article III court. It is “judicial” in character. It is not merely an instruction to the Commissioner or part of the “administrative machinery” of the Patent Office. It is final and binding in the usual sense. In sum, Postura has no vitality in the present setting, and there remains no constitutional bar to our jurisdiction. Having arrived at this conclusion, we have no difficulty in giving full force and effect to the generality of the language in § 1256. It would be entirely arbitrary for us to assume, despite the statutory language, that Congress in 1948 intended to enshrine Postum — dependent as it was upon a statutory scheme fundamentally altered in 1927 and 1929 — as a hidden exception to the sweep of § 1256. The contrary is more plausible: that by using broad and unqualified language, Congress intended our certiorari jurisdiction over CCPA cases to be as broad as the Constitution permits. This conclusion is reinforced by reference to the anomalous consequences which would result were we to adopt a contrary view of § 1256. Determinations of the Patent Office may be challenged either by appeal to the CCPA or by suit instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U. S. C. § 145, 28 U. S. C. § 1542 (1964 ed.). Where the latter route is elected, the decision obtained may be reviewed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and ultimately in this Court upon writ of certiorari. Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U. S. 79. It would be strange indeed if corresponding certiorari jurisdiction did not exist where the alternative route was elected. Were that so, in the event of conflict between the CCPA and the courts of the District of Columbia, resolution by this Court would be achievable only if the litigants chose to proceed through the latter. Obviously, the orderly administration both of our certiorari jurisdiction and of the patent laws requires that ultimate review be available in this Court, regardless of the route chosen by the litigants. We therefore conclude that § 1256 authorizes the grant of certiorari in the present case. We now turn to the merits. II. Our starting point is the proposition, neither disputed nor disputable, that one may patent only that which is “useful.” In Graham v. John Deere Co., ante, p.' 1, at 5-10, we have reviewed the history of the requisites of patentability, and it need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the concept of utility has maintained a central place in all of our patent legislation, beginning with the first patent law in 1790 and culminating in the present law’s provision that “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” As is so often the case, however, a simple, everyday word can be pregnant with ambiguity when applied to the facts of life. That this is so is demonstrated by the present conflict between the Patent Office and the CCPA over how the test is to be applied to a chemical process which yields an already known product whose utility— other than as a possible object of scientific inquiry — has not yet been evidenced. It was not long ago that agency and court seemed of one mind on the question. In Application of Bremner, 37 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1032, 1034, 182 F. 2d 216, 217, the court affirmed rejection by the Patent Office of both process and product claims. It noted that “no use for the products claimed to be developed by the processes had been shown in the specification.” It held that “It was never intended that a patent be granted upon a product, or a process producing a product, unless such product be useful.” Nor was this new doctrine in the court. See Thomas v. Michael, 35 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1036, 1038-1039, 166 F. 2d 944, 946-947. The Patent Office has remained steadfast in this view. The CCPA, however, has moved sharply away from Bremner. The trend began in Application of Nelson, 47 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1031, 280 F. 2d 172. There, the court reversed the Patent Office’s rejection of a claim on a process yielding chemical intermediates “useful to chemists doing research on steroids,” despite the absence of evidence that any of the steroids thus ultimately produced were themselves “useful.” The trend has accelerated, culminating in the present case where the court held it sufficient that a process produces the result intended and is not “detrimental to the public interest.” 52 C. C. P. A. (Pat.), at 745, 333 F. 2d, at 238. It is not remarkable that differences arise as to how the test of usefulness is to be applied to chemical processes. Even if we knew precisely what Congress meant in 1790 when it devised the “new and useful” phraseology and in subsequent re-enactments of the test, we should have difficulty in applying it in the context of contemporary chemistry where research is as comprehensive as man’s grasp and where little or nothing is wholly beyond the pale of “utility” — if that word is given its broadest reach. Respondent does not — -at least in the first instance— rest upon the extreme proposition, advanced by the court below, that a novel chemical process is patentable so long as it yields the intended product and so long as the product is not itself “detrimental.” Nor does he commit the outcome of his claim to the slightly more conventional proposition that any process is “useful” within the meaning of § 101 if it produces a compound whose potential usefulness is under investigation by serious scientific researchers, although he urges this position, too, as an alternative basis for affirming the decision of the CCPA. Rather, he begins with the much more orthodox argument that his process has a specific utility which would entitle him to a declaration of interference even under the Patent Office’s reading of § 101. The claim is that the supporting affidavits filed pursuant to Rule 204 (b), by reference to Ringold’s 1956 article, reveal that an adjacent homologue of the steroid yielded by his process has been demonstrated to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice, and that this discloses the requisite utility. We do not accept any of these theories as an adequate basis for overriding the determination of the Patent Office that the “utility” requirement has not been met. Even on the assumption that the process would be patentable were respondent to show that the steroid produced had a tumor-inhibiting effect in mice, we would not overrule the Patent Office finding that respondent has not made such a showing. The Patent Office held that, despite the reference to the adjacent homologue, respondent’s papers did not disclose a sufficient likelihood that the steroid yielded by his process would have similar tumor-inhibiting characteristics. Indeed, respondent himself recognized that the presumption that adjacent homologues have the same utility has been challenged in the steroid field because of “a greater known unpredictability of compounds in that field.” In these circumstances and in this technical area, we would not overturn the finding of the Primary Examiner, affirmed by the Board of Appeals and not challenged by the CCPA. The second and third points of respondent’s argument present issues of much importance. Is a chemical process “useful” within the meaning of § 101 either (1) because it works — i. e., produces the intended product? or (2) because the compound yielded belongs to a class of compounds now the subject of serious scientific investigation? These contentions present the basic problem for our adjudication. Since we find no specific assistance in the legislative materials underlying § 101, we are remitted to an analysis of the problem in light of the general intent of Congress, the purposes of the patent system, and the implications of a decision one way or the other. In support of his plea that we attenuate the requirement of “utility,” respondent relies upon Justice Story’s well-known statement that a “useful” invention is one “which may be applied to a beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention injurious to the morals, health, or good order of society, or frivolous and insignificant” — and upon the assertion that to do so would encourage inventors of new processes to publicize the event for the benefit of the entire scientific community, thus widening the search for uses and increasing the fund of scientific knowledge. Justice Story’s language sheds little light on our subject. Narrowly read, it does no more than compel us to decide whether the invention in question is “frivolous and insignificant” — a query no easier of application than the one built into the statute. Read more broadly, so as to allow the patenting of any invention not positively harmful to society, it places such a special meaning on the word “useful” that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended. There are, after all, many things in this world which may not be considered “useful” but which, nevertheless, are totally without a capacity for harm. It is true, of course, that one of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions. And it may be that inability to patent a process to some extent discourages disclosure and leads to greater secrecy than would otherwise be the case. The inventor of the process, or the corporate organization by which he is employed, has some incentive to keep the invention secret while uses for the product are searched out. However, in light of the highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible — while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible — the argument based upon the virtue of disclosure must be warily evaluated. Moreover, the pressure for secrecy is easily exaggerated, for if the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a “use” for that which his process yields, he has every incentive to make his invention known to those able to do so. Finally, how likely is disclosure of a patented process to spur research by others into the uses to which the product may be put? To the extent that the patentee has power to enforce his patent, there is little incentive for others to undertake a search for uses. Whatever weight is attached to the value of encouraging disclosure and of inhibiting secrecy, we believe a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute. Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public. The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point — where specific benefit exists in currently available form — there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field. These arguments for and against the patentability of a process which either has no known use or is useful only in the sense that it may be an object of scientific research would apply equally to the patenting of the product produced by the process. Respondent appears to concede that with respect to a product, as opposed to a process, Congress has struck the balance on the side of non-patentability unless “utility” is shown. Indeed, the decisions of the CCPA are in accord with the view that a product may not be patented absent a showing of utility greater than any adduced in the present case. We find absolutely no warrant for the proposition that although Congress intended that no patent be granted on a chemical compound whose sole “'utility” consists of its potential role as an object of use-testing, a different set of rules was meant to apply to the process which yielded the unpatentable product. That proposition seems to us little more than an attempt to evade the impact of the rules which concededly govern patentability of the product itself. This is not to say that we mean to disparage the importance of contributions to the fund of scientific information short of the invention of something “useful,” or that we are blind to the prospect that what now seems without “use” may tomorrow command the grateful attention of the public. But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion. “[A] patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy. . . .” The judgment of the CCPA is Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas, while acquiescing in Part I of the Court’s opinion, dissents on the merits of the controversy for substantially the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Harlan. The applicants described the products of their process as “2-methyl dihydrotestosterone derivatives and esters thereof as well as 2-methyl dihydrotestosterone derivatives having a C-17 lower alkyl group. The products of the process of the present invention have a useful high anabolic-androgenic ratio and are especially valuable for treatment of those ailments where anabolic or antiestro-genic effect together with a lesser androgenic effect is desired.” 35 U. S. C. § 135 (1964 ed.) provides: “Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, he shall give notice thereof .... The question of priority of invention shall be determined by a board of patent interferences . . . whose decision, if adverse to the claim of an applicant, shall constitute the final refusal by the Patent Office of the claims involved, and the Commissioner may issue a patent to the applicant who is adjudged the prior inventor. . . .” Patent Office Rule 204 (b), 37 CFR § 1.204 (b), provides: “When the filing date or effective filing date of an applicant is subsequent to the filing date of a patentee, the applicant, before an interference will be declared, shall file an affidavit that he made the invention in controversy in this country, before the filing date of the pat-entee . . . and, when required, the applicant shall file an affidavit . . . setting forth facts which would prima facie entitle him to an award of priority relative to the filing date of the patentee.” Judge Thurman Arnold has provided an irreverent description of the way patent claims, including “interferences,” are presented to the Patent Office. See Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe, 79 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 145 F. 2d 18. “A homologous series is a family of chemically related compounds, the composition of which varies from member to member by CH2 (one atom of carbon and two atoms of hydrogen). . . . Chemists knowing the properties of one member of a series would in general know what to expect in adjacent members.” Application of Henze, 37 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1009, 1014, 181 F. 2d 196, 200-201. See also In re Hass, 31 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 895, 901, 141 F. 2d 122, 125; Application of Norris, 37 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 876, 179 F. 2d 970; Application of Jones, 32 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1020, 149 F. 2d 501. With respect to the inferior predictability of steroid homologues, see, infra, p. 532. In addition to the clear conflict between the Patent Office and the CCPA, there arguably exists one between the CCPA and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Petrocarbon Limited v. Watson, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 214, 247 F. 2d 800, cert. denied, 355 U. S. 955. But see Application of Szwarc, 50 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1571, 1576-1583, 319 F. 2d 277, 281-286. The present case is the first in which the Government has taken the position that § 1256 confers jurisdiction upon this Court to review patent decisions in the CCPA. Prior to Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, the Government was of the view that the Court lacked jurisdiction. See, e. g., the Brief in Opposition in Dalton v. Marzall, No. 87, O. T. 1951, cert. denied, 342 U. S. 818. After the decision in Glidden, discussed infra, at 526, the Government conceded the issue was a close one. See, e. g., Brief in Opposition in In re Gruschwitz, No. 579, O. T. 1963, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 967. We find no warrant for this curious limitation either in the statutory language or in the legislative history of § 1256. Nor do we find persuasive the circumstance that the Commissioner may not appeal adverse decisions of the Board of Appeals. 35 U. S. C. §§141, 142, and 145 (1964 ed.). As a member of the Board and the official responsible for selecting the membership of its panels, 35 U. S. C. §7 (1964 ed.), the Commissioner may be appropriately considered as bound by Board determinations. No such consideration operates to prevent his seeking review of adverse decisions rendered by the CCPA. Act of March 2, 1927, c. 273, §11, 44 Stat. 1335, 1336. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra, at 572-579; Kurland & Wolfson, Supreme Court Review of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 192 (1950). This remains the law. 35 U. S. C. §§ 141, 145. Act of March 2, 1929, c. 488, 45 Stat. 1475. See Kurland & Wolfson, op. cit. supra, n. 7, at 196. Apart from Postum, until enactment of § 1256 in 1948 there existed no statutory basis for jurisdiction in these eases. See Robertson & Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of'the United States, §251 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951). This is not to say that a CCPA determination that an applicant is entitled to a patent precludes a contrary result in a subsequent infringement suit, any more than issuance of a patent by the Patent Office or the decision in an earlier infringement action against a different “infringer” has that effect. See, e. g., Graham v. John Deere Co., ante, p. 1, at 4. We review decisions of the District Court under 35 U. S. C. § 145 although these are subject to the same measure of readjudication in infringement suits. See Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U. S. 79. Respondent and the amicus curiae take a different view than does the Government of precisely what the issue on the merits is. They argue that the issue of “patentability” is not properly before us, that the issue actually presented is whether the Primary Examiner in the Patent Office has authority under Rule 204 (b) himself to evaluate the sufficiency of affidavits submitted under that Rule. Both the Board of Appeals and the CCPA rejected this view and focused instead on the question of what averments satisfy the statutory requirement that a claimed chemical process be “useful.” We agree. First, the issue of “patentability” cannot be foreclosed by the circumstance that the Patent Office — which, according to counsel for respondent, processes some 1,800 claims and issues 700 patents each week — has already issued a patent to Ringold and Rosenkranz who asserted in their claim that their process yielded useful products. See note 1, supra. Second, there is no basis for the proposition that even where an applicant for an interference presents a claim which on its face is unpatentable, a complicated and frequently lengthy factual inquiry into priority of invention must 'inexorably take place. On the contrary, Rule 201 (a), 37 CFR § 1.201 (a), defines an interference proceeding as one involving “two or more parties claiming substantially the same patentable invention and may be instituted as soon as it is determined that common patentable subject matter is claimed . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) See Application of Rogoff, 46 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 733, 739, 261 F. 2d 601, 606: “The question as to patentability of claims to an applicant must be determined before any question of interference arises and claims otherwise unpatentable to an applicant cannot be allowed merely in order to set up an interference.” See also Wirkler v. Perkins, 44 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1005, 1008, 245 F. 2d 502, 504. Cf. Glass v. De Roo, 44 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 723, 239 F. 2d 402. The current version of Rule 203 (a), 37 CFR § 1.203 (a), makes it explicit that the examiner, “[bjefore the declaration of interference,” must determine the patentability of the claim as to each party. See also Rule 237, 37 CFR § 1.237. See Act of April 10, 1790, c. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, e. 11, 1 Stat. 318; Act of July 4, 1836, c. 357, 5 Stat. 117; Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198; Rev. Stat. §4886 (1874). 35 U. S. C. § 101 (1964 ed.). Thus, in Application of Wilke, 50 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 964, 314 F. 2d 558, the court reversed a Patent Office denial of a process claim, holding that 35 U. S. C. § 112 (1964 ed.) was satisfied even though the specification recited only the manner in which the process was to be used and not any use for the products thereby yielded. See also Application of Adams, 50 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1185, 316 F. 2d 476. In Application of Szwarc, 50 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1571, 319 F. 2d 277, the court acknowledged that its view of the law respecting utility of chemical processes had changed since Bremner. See generally, Note, The Utility Requirement in the Patent Law, 53 Geo. L. J. 154, 175-181 (1964). Respondent couches the issue in terms of whether the process yields a “known” product. We fail to see the relevance of the fact that the product is “known,” save to the extent that references to a compound in scientific literature suggest that it might be a subject of interest and possible investigation. In light of our disposition of the case, we express no view as to the patentability of a process whose sole demonstrated utility is to yield a product shown to inhibit the growth of tumors in laboratory animals. See Application of Hitchings, 52 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1141, 342 F. 2d 80; Application of Bergel, 48 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1102, 292 F. 2d 955; cf. Application of Dodson, 48 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1125, 292 F. 2d 943; Application of Krimmel, 48 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1116, 292 F. 2d 948. For a Patent Office view, see Marcus, The Patent Office and Pharmaceutical Invention, 47 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 669, 673-676 (1965). See n. 3, supra. See respondent’s letter requesting amendment, dated July 21, 1960, Record, pp. 20-23. See also Application of Adams, 50 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1185, 1190, 316 F. 2d 476, 479-480 (concurring-dissenting opinion). In the present case, the Board of Appeals found support in the Ringold article itself for the view that “minor changes in the structure of a steroid may produce profound changes in its biological activity.” Record, p. 52. Note on the Patent Laws, 3 Wheat. App. 13, 24. See also Justice Story’s decisions on circuit in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 Fed. Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C. C. D. Mass.), and Bedford v. Hunt, 3 Fed. Cas. 37 (No. 1217) (C. C. D. Mass.). “As a reward for inventions and to encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret.” Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U. S. 471, 484. See Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Coe, 79 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 158-161, 145 F. 2d 18, 21-24. See, e. g., the decision below, 52 C. C. P. A. (Pat.), at 744, 333 F. 2d, at 237. See also Application of Bergel, 48 C. C. P. A. (Pat.), at 1105, 292 F. 2d, at 958. Cf. Application of Nelson, 47 C. C. P. A. (Pat.), at 1043-1044, 280 F. 2d, at 180-181; Application of Folkers, 52 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1269, 344 F. 2d 970. The committee reports which preceded enactment of the 1952 revision of the patent laws disclose no intention to create such a dichotomy, and in fact provide some evidence that the contrary was assumed. Sen. Rep. No. 1979, Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5, 17; H. R. Rep. No. 1923, Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 17. Cf. Hoxie, A Patent Attorney’s View, 47 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 630, 636 (1965). Application of Ruschig, 52 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1238, 1245, 343 F. 2d 965, 970 (Rich, J.). See also, Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F. 2d 961 (C. A. 2d Cir.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SAINT FRANCIS COLLEGE et al. v. AL-KHAZRAJI, aka ALLAN No. 85-2169. Argued February 25, 1987 Decided May 18, 1987 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 614. Nick S. Fisfis argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Caroline Mitchell argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Julius LeVonne Chambers and Eric Schnapper . Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Ameriean-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee by James G. Abourezk; for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. by Gregg H. Levy, Mitchell F. Dolin, Meyer Eisenberg, David Brody, Edward N. heavy, Steven M. Freeman, Jill L. Kahn, Robert S. Rifkind, Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, Eileen Kaufman, Harold R. Tyler, James Robertson, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Judith A. Winston, Joseph A. Morris, and Grover G. Hankins; and for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. by Barry Sullivan, William D. Snapp, Antonia Hernandez, E. Richard Larson, and Kenneth Kimerling. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent, a citizen of the United States born in Iraq, was an associate professor at St. Francis College, one of the petitioners here. In January 1978, he applied for tenure; the Board of Trustees denied his request on February 23, 1978. He accepted a 1-year, nonrenewable contract and sought administrative reconsideration of the tenure decision, which was denied on February 6, 1979. He worked his last day at the college on May 26, 1979. In June 1979, he filed complaints with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. The state agency dismissed his claim and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on August 6, 1980. On October 30, 1980, respondent filed a pro se complaint in the District Court alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and claiming discrimination based on national origin, religion, and/or race. Amended complaints were filed, adding claims under 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and state law. The District Court dismissed the §§ 1986 and 1985(3) and Title VII claims as untimely but held that the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims were not barred by the Pennsylvania 6-year statute of limitations. The court at that time also ruled that because the complaint alleged denial of tenure because respondent was of the Arabian race, an action under § 1981 could be maintained. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment came up before a different judge, who construed the pleadings as asserting only discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion, which § 1981 did not cover. Even if racial discrimination was deemed to have been alleged, the District Court ruled that § 1981 does not reach claims of discrimination based on Arabian ancestry. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ claim that the § 1981 claim had not been timely filed. Under the Court of Appeals’ holding in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F. 2d 113 (1985), that the Pennsylvania 2-year statute of limitations governed §1981 cases, respondent’s suit would have been barred. The Court of Appeals, however, relying on Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971), held that Goodman should not be retroactively applied and that this suit was timely under its pre-Goodman cases which had borrowed the State’s 6-year statute. Reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals held that respondent had alleged discrimination based on race and that although under current racial classifications Arabs are Caucasians, respondent could maintain his § 1981 claim. Congress, when it passed what is now § 1981, had not limited its protections to those who today would be considered members of a race different from the race of the defendant. Rather, the legislative history of the section indicated that Congress intended to embrace “at the least, membership in a group that is ethnically and physiognomically distinctive.” 784 F. 2d 505, 517 (1986). Section 1981, “at a minimum,” reaches “discrimination directed against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens.” Ibid. Because respondent had not had full discovery and the record was not sufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to the sort of prejudice § 1981 would redress, respondent was to be given the opportunity to prove his case. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 812 (1986), limited to the statute of limitations issue and the question whether a person of Arabian ancestry was protected from racial discrimination under § 1981, and now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 1 — ( We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent’s claim was not time barred. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985), required that in selecting the applicable state statute of limitations in § 1983 cases, the lower federal courts should choose the state statute applicable to other personal injury-torts. Thereafter, the Third Circuit in Goodman held that Wilson applies to § 1981 cases as well and that the Pennsylvania 2-year statute should apply. The Court of Appeals in this case, however, held that when respondent filed his suit, which was prior to Wilson v. Garcia, it was clearly established in the Third Circuit that a § 1981 plaintiff had six years to bring an action and that Goodman should not be applied retroactively to bar respondent’s suit. Insofar as what the prevailing law was in the Third Circuit, we have no reason to disagree with the Court of Appeals. Under controlling precedent in that Circuit, respondent had six years to file his suit, and it was filed well within that time. See 784 F. 2d, at 512-513. We also assume but do not decide that Wilson v. Garcia controls the selection of the applicable state statute of limitations in § 1981 cases. The Court of Appeals, however, correctly held that its decision in Goodman should not be retroactively applied to bar respondent’s action in this case. The usual rule is that federal cases should be decided in accordance with the law existing at the time of decision. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 473, 486, n. 16 (1981); Thorpe v. Durham Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281 (1969); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801). But Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, supra, counsels against retroactive application of statute of limitations decisions in certain circumstances. There, the Court held that its decision specifying the applicable state statute of limitations should be applied only prospectively because it overruled clearly established Circuit precedent on which the complaining party was entitled to rely, because retroactive application would be inconsistent with the purpose of the underlying substantive statute, and because such application would be manifestly inequitable. The Court of Appeals found these same factors were present in this case and foreclosed retroactive application of its decision in Goodman. We perceive no good reason for not applying Chevron where Wilson has required a Court of Appeals to overrule its prior cases. Nor has petitioner persuaded us that there was any error in the application of Chevron in the circumstances existing in this case. II Section 1981 provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac-tions of every kind, and to no other.” Although § 1981 does not itself use the word “race,” the Court has construed the section to forbid all “racial” discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168, 174-175 (1976). Petitioner college, although a private institution, was therefore subject to this statutory command. There is no disagreement among the parties on these propositions. The issue is whether respondent has alleged racial discrimination within the meaning of § 1981. Petitioners contend that respondent is a Caucasian and cannot allege the kind of discrimination § 1981 forbids. Con-cededly, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U. S. 273 (1976), held that white persons could maintain a § 1981 suit; but that suit involved alleged discrimination against a white person in favor of a black, and petitioner submits that the section does not encompass claims of discrimination by one Caucasian against another. We are quite sure that the Court of Appeals properly rejected this position. Petitioner’s submission rests on the assumption that all those who might be deemed Caucasians today were thought to be of the same race when § 1981 became law in the 19th century; and it may be that a variety of ethnic groups, including Arabs, are now considered to be within the Caucasian race. The understanding of “race” in the 19th century, however, was different. Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981 became law. In the middle years of the 19th century, dictionaries commonly referred to race as a “continued series of descendants from a parent who is called the stock,” N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 666' (New York 1830) (emphasis in original), “[t]he lineage of a family,” 2 N. Webster, A Dictionary of the English Language 411 (New Haven 1841), or “descendants of a common ancestor,” J. Donald, Chambers’ Etymological Dictionary of the English Language 415 (London 1871). The 1887 edition of Webster’s expanded the definition somewhat: “The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe, people or nation, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock.” N. Webster, Dictionary of the English Language 589 (W. Wheeler ed. 1887). It was not until the 20th century that dictionaries began referring to the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro races, 8 The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia 4926 (1911), or to race as involving divisions of mankind based upon different physical characteristics. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 794 (3d ed. 1916). Even so, modern dictionaries still include among the definitions of race “a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1870 (1971); Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 969 (1986). Encyclopedias of the 19th century also described race in terms of ethnic groups, which is a narrower concept of race than petitioners urge. Encyclopedia Americana in 1858, for example, referred to various races such as Finns, vol. 5, p. 123, gypsies, 6 id., at 123, Basques, 1 id., at 602, and Hebrews, 6 id., at 209. The 1863 version of the New American Cyclopaedia divided the Arabs into a number of subsidiary races, vol. 1, p. 739; represented the Hebrews as of the Semitic race, 9 id., at 27, and identified numerous other groups as constituting races, including Swedes, 15 id., at 216, Norwegians, 12 id., at 410, Germans, 8 id., at 200, Greeks, 8 id., at 438, Finns, 7 id., at 513, Italians, 9 id., at 644-645 (referring to mixture of different races), Spanish, 14 id., at 804, Mongolians, 11 id., at 651, Russians, 14 id., at 226, and the like. The Ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica also referred to Arabs, vol. 2, p. 245 (1878), Jews, 13 id., at 685 (1881), and other ethnic groups such as Germans, 10 id., at 473 (1879), Hungarians, 12 id., at 365 (1880), and Greeks, 11 id., at 83 (1880), as separate races. These dictionary and encyclopedic sources are somewhat diverse, but it is clear that they do not support the claim that for the purposes of § 1981, Arabs, Englishmen, Germans, and certain other ethnic groups are to be considered a single race. We would expect the legislative history of § 1981, which the Court held in Runyon v. McCrary had its source in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140, 144, to reflect this common understanding, which it surely does. The debates are replete with references to the Scandinavian races, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 499 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan), as well as the Chinese, id., at 523 (remarks of Sen. Davis), Latin, id., at 238 (remarks of Rep. Kasson during debate of home rule for the District of Columbia), Spanish, id., at 251 (remarks of Sen. Davis during debate of District of Columbia suffrage), and Anglo-Saxon races, id., at 542 (remarks of Rep. Dawson). Jews, ibid., Mexicans, see ibid, (remarks of Rep. Dawson), blacks, passim, and Mongolians, id., at 498 (remarks of Sen. Cowan), were similarly categorized. Gypsies were referred to as a race. Ibid, (remarks of Sen. Cowan). Likewise, the Germans: “Who will say that Ohio can pass a law enacting that no man of the German race . . . shall ever own any property in Ohio, or shall ever make a contract in Ohio, or ever inherit property in Ohio, or ever come into Ohio to live, or even to work? If Ohio may pass such a law, and exclude a German citizen . . . because he is of the German nationality or race, then may every other State do so.” Id., at 1294 (remarks of Sen. Shellabarger). There was a reference to the Caucasian race, but it appears to have been referring to people of European ancestry. Id., at 523 (remarks of Sen. Davis). The history of the 1870 Act reflects similar understanding of what groups Congress intended to protect from intentional discrimination. It is clear, for example, that the civil rights sections of the 1870 Act provided protection for immigrant groups such as the Chinese. This view was expressed in the Senate. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 1536, 3658, 3808 (1870). In the' House, Representative Bingham described § 16 of the Act, part of the authority for § 1981, as declaring “that the States shall not hereafter discriminate against the immigrant from China and in favor of the immigrant from Prussia, nor against the immigrant from France and in favor of the immigrant from Ireland.” Id., at 3871. Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory. The Court of Appeals was thus quite right in holding that § 1981, “at a minimum,” reaches discrimination against an individual “because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens.” It is clear from our holding, however, that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection. If respondent on remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was bora an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will have made out a case under § 1981. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly affirmed. It is so ordered. The § 1983 claim was dismissed for want of state action. The pendent state claims were also dismissed. The Court of Appeals thus rejected petitioners’ claim that respondent’s complaint alleged only national origin and religious discrimination, assertedly not reached by § 1981. The Court of Appeals also held that the individual members of the tenure committee were subject to liability under § 1981. The District Court was also to reconsider its dismissal of the pendent state claims. There is a common popular understanding that there are three major human races — Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. Many modern biologists and anthropologists, however, criticize racial classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the variability of human beings. It is said that genetically homogeneous populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous between populations; therefore, a population can only be described in terms of relative frequencies of various traits. Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little biological significance. It has been found that differences between individuals of the same race are often greater than the differences between the “average” individuals of different races. These observations and others have led some, but not all, scientists to conclude that racial classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature. S. Molnar, Human Variation (2d ed. 1983); S. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (1981); M. Banton & J. Harwood, The Race Concept (1975); A. Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth (1974); A. Montagu, Statement on Race (3d ed. 1972); Science and the Concept of Race (M. Mead, T. Dobzhansky, E. Tobach, & R. Light eds. 1968); A. Montagu, The Concept of Race (1964); R. Benedict, Race and Racism (1942); Littlefield, Lieberman, & Reynolds, Redefining Race: The Potential Demise of a Concept in Physical Anthropology, 23 Current Anthropology 641 (1982); Biological Aspects of Race, 17 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 71 (1965); Washburn, The Study of Race, 65 American Anthropologist 521 (1963). We note that under prior cases, discrimination by States on the basis of ancestry violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 476, 479 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 646 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 32 (1948).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LORANCE et al. v. AT&T TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al. No. 87-1428. Argued March 20, 1989 Decided June 12, 1989 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 913. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 913. O’Connor, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Barry Goldstein argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Julius LeVonne Chambers, Bridget Arimond, and Patrick O. Patterson. Charles A. Shanor argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Richard J. Lazarus, Gwendolyn Young Reams, and Donna J. Brusoski. David W. Carpenter argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Rex E. Lee, Patrick S. Casey, Gerald D. Skoning, Charles C. Jackson, Michael Hi Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, Joel A. DAlba, and Stephen J. Feinberg. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Katrina Grider filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent AT&T Technologies, Inc. (AT&T), manufactures electronics products at its Montgomery Works plant. The three petitioners, all of whom are women, have worked as hourly wage employees in that facility since the early 1970’s, and have been represented by respondent Local 1942, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Until 1979 all hourly wage earners accrued competitive seniority exclusively on the basis of years spent in the plant, and a worker promoted to the more highly skilled and better paid “tester” positions retained this plantwide seniority. A collective-bargaining agreement executed by respondents on July 23, 1979, altered the manner of calculating tester seniority. Thenceforth a tester’s seniority was to be determined not by length of plantwide service, but by time actually spent as a tester (though it was possible to regain full plantwide seniority after spending five years as a tester and completing a prescribed training program). The present action arises from that contractual modification. Petitioners became testers between 1978 and 1980. During a 1982 economic downturn their low seniority under the 1979 collective-bargaining agreement caused them to be selected for demotion; they would not have been demoted had the former plantwide seniority system remained in place. Claiming that the present seniority system was the product of an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex, petitioners filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in April 1983. After the EEOC issued right-to-sue letters, petitioners in September 1983 filed the present lawsuit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and sought certification as class representatives for women employees of AT&T’s Montgomery Works plant who had lost plantwide seniority or whom the new system had deterred from seeking promotions to tester positions. Their complaint alleged that among hourly wage earners the tester positions had traditionally been held almost exclusively by men, and nontester positions principally by women, but that in the 1970’s an increasing number of women took the steps necessary to qualify for tester positions and exercised their seniority rights to become testers. They claimed that the 1979 alteration of the rules governing tester seniority was the product of a “conspir[acy] to change the seniority rules, in order to protect incumbent male testers and to discourage women from promoting into the traditionally-male tester jobs,” and that “[t]he purpose and the effect of this manipulation of seniority rules has been to protect male testers from the effects of the female testers’ greater plant seniority, and to discourage women from entering the traditionally-male tester jobs.” App. 20, 21-22. On August 27, 1986, before deciding whether to certify the proposed class, the District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that petitioners had not filed their complaints with the EEOC within the applicable limitations period. 44 FEP Cases 1817, 1821. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that petitioners’ claims were time barred because “the relevant discriminatory act that triggers the period of limitations occurs at the time an employee becomes subject to a facially neutral but discriminatory seniority system that the employee knows, or reasonably should know, is discriminatory.” 827 F. 2d 163, 167 (1987). We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 887 (1988), to resolve a Circuit conflict on when the limitations period begins to run in a lawsuit arising out of a seniority system not alleged to be discriminatory on its face or as presently applied. Compare, e. g., case below with Cook v. Pan American World Airways, 771 F. 2d 635, 646 (CA2 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1109 (1986). Section 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 260, as amended, provides that “[a] charge . . . shall be filed [with the EEOC] within [the applicable period] after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e). Assessing timeliness therefore “requires us to identify precisely the ‘unlawful employment practice’ of which [petitioners] complai[n].” Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 257 (1980). Under § 703(a) of Title VII, it is an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer “(1) ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or “(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a). Petitioners’ allegation of a disparate impact on men and women would ordinarily suffice to state a claim under § 703 (a)(2), since that provision reaches “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (1971); see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982). “[Seniority systems,” however, “are afforded special treatment under Title VII,” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 81 (1977), by reason of § 703(h), which states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h). We have construed this provision to mean that “absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences.” Hardison, supra, at 82; see American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 65, 69 (1982). Thus, for liability to be incurred “there must be a finding of actual intent to discriminate on [statutorily proscribed] grounds on the part of those who negotiated or maintained the [seniority] system.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289 (1982). Petitioners do not allege that the seniority system treats similarly situated employees differently or that it has been operated in an intentionally discriminatory manner. Rather, they claim that its differential impact on the sexes is unlawful because the system “ha[d] its genesis in [sex] discrimination.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 356 (1977). Specifically, the complaint alleges that respondents “conspired to change the seniority rules, in order to protect incumbent male testers,” and that the resulting agreement effected a “manipulation of seniority rules” for that “purpose.” See App. 20-22 (emphasis added). This is in essence a claim of intentionally discriminatory alteration of their contractual rights. Seniority is a contractual right, Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1533 (1962), and a competitive seniority system establishes a “hierarchy [of such rights] ... according to which . . . various employment benefits are distributed,” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 768 (1976). Under the collective-bargaining agreements in effect prior to 1979, each petitioner had earned the right to receive a favorable position in the hierarchy of seniority among testers (if and when she became a tester), and respondents eliminated those rights for reasons alleged to be discriminatory. Because this diminution in employment status occurred in 1979 — well outside the period of limitations for a complaint filed with the EEOC in 1983 — the Seventh Circuit was correct to find petitioners’ claims time barred under § 706(e). We recognize, of course, that it is possible to establish a different theoretical construct: to regard the employer as having been guilty of a continuing violation which “occurred,” for purposes of § 706(e), not only when the contractual right was eliminated but also when each of the concrete effects of that elimination was felt. Or it would be possible to interpret § 703 in such fashion that when the proviso of § 703(h) is not met (“provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”) and that subsection’s protection becomes unavailable, nothing prevents suits against the later effects of the system on disparate-impact grounds under § 703(a)(2). The answer to these alternative approaches is that our cases have rejected them. The continuing violation theory is contradicted most clearly by two decisions, Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 (1977). In Ricks, we treated an allegedly discriminatory denial of tenure — rather than the resulting nondiscriminatory termination of employment one year later — as the act triggering the limitations period under § 706(e). Because Ricks did not claim that “the manner in which his employment was terminated differed discriminatorily from the manner in which the College terminated other professors who also had been denied tenure,” we held that “the only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks.” 449 U. S., at 258. “That is so,” we found, “even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). We concluded that “ ‘[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.’” Ibid, (emphasis in original); accord, Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U. S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam). In Evans, United Air Lines had discriminatorily dismissed the plaintiff after she had worked several years as a flight attendant, and when it rehired her some years later, gave her no seniority credit for her earlier service. Evans conceded that the discriminatory dismissal was time barred, but claimed that the seniority system impermissibly gave “present effect to a past act of discrimination.” 431 U. S., at 558. While agreeing with that assessment, we concluded under § 703(h) that “a challenge to a neutral system may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event which has no present legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event might at one time have justified a valid claim against the employer.” Id,., at 560. Like Evans, petitioners in the present case have asserted a claim that is wholly dependent on discriminatory conduct occurring well outside the period of limitations, and cannot complain of a continuing violation. The second alternative theory mentioned above would view § 703(h) as merely providing an affirmative defense to a cause of action brought under § 703(a)(2), rather than as making intentional discrimination an element of any Title VII action challenging a seniority system. The availability of this affirmative defense would not alter the fact that the claim asserted is one of discriminatory impact under § 703(a)(2), causing the statute of limitations to run from the time that impact is felt. As an original matter this is a plausible, and perhaps even the most natural, reading of § 703(h). (We have construed § 703(e), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(e) — which deals with bona fide occupational qualifications — in this fashion. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 333 (1977).) But such an interpretation of § 703(h) is foreclosed by our cases, which treat the proof of discriminatory intent as a necessary element of Title VII actions challenging seniority systems. At least as concerns seniority plans, we have regarded subsection (h) not as a defense to the illegality described in subsection (a)(2), but as a provision that itself “delineates which employment practices are illegal and thereby prohibited and which are not.” Franks, 424 U. S., at 758. Thus, in American Tobacco Co. we determined § 703(h) to mean that “the fact that a seniority system has a discriminatory impact is not alone sufficient to invalidate the system; actual intent to discriminate must be proved.” 456 U. S., at 65 (emphasis added). “To be cognizable,” we held, “a claim that a seniority system has discriminatory impact must be accompanied by proof of a discriminatory purpose.” Id., at 69 (emphasis added); accord, Pullman-Standard, 456 U. S., at 277, 289; Hardison, 432 U. S., at 82. Indeed, in California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598 (1980), after deciding that a challenged policy was part of a seniority system, we noted that on remand to the District Court the plaintiff would “remain free to show that . . . the seniority system ... is not ‘bona fide’ or that the differences in employment conditions that it has produced are ‘the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,’” id., at 610-611. Thus, petitioners’ claim depends on proof of intentionally discriminatory adoption of the system, which occurred outside the limitations period. That being the case, Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U. S. 411 (1960), establishes that the limitations period will run from the date the system was adopted (at least where the adoption occurred after the effective date of Title VII, and a cause of action against it was available). Machinists was a decision under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), but we have often observed that the NLRA was the model for Title VII’s remedial provisions, and have found cases interpreting the former persuasive in construing the latter. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U. S. 219, 226, n. 8 (1982); Teamsters, 431 U. S., at 366; Franks, supra, at 768-770; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419 (1975). Such reliance is particularly appropriate in the context presented here, since the highly unusual feature of requiring an administrative complaint before a civil action can be filed against a private party is common to the two statutes. The NLRA’s statute of limitations — which provides that “no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board,” 29 U. S. C. § 160(b) — is even substantively similar to § 706(e) — which states that “[a] charge . . . shall be filed [with the EEOC] within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e). In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385 (1982), we specifically relied on cases construing the NLRA’s timely filing requirement in determining whether § 706(e) — the very provision we construe here — constituted a waivable statute of limitations or rather a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII action. “Because the time requirement for filing an unfair labor practice charge under the National Labor Relations Act operates as a statute of limitations subject to recognized equitable doctrines and not as a restriction of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board,” we said, “the time limitations under Title VII should be treated likewise.” 455 U. S., at 395, n. 11 (citations omitted). Machinists considered and rejected an approach to the limitations period identical to that advanced here. The suit involved the timeliness of an unfair labor practice complaint directed at a so-called “union security clause,” which required all employees to join the union within 45 days of the contract’s execution. Under the NLRB’s precedents, agreeing to such a clause when the union lacked majority status constituted an unfair labor practice, as did continued enforcement of the clause. 362 U. S., at 413-414. The agreement at issue in Machinists had been adopted more than six months before the complaint issued (outside the limitations period), but had been enforced well within the period of limitations. “Conceding that a complaint predicated on the execution of the agreement here challenged was barred by limitations,” the NLRB contended that “its complaint was nonetheless timely since it was ‘based upon’ the parties’ continued enforcement, within the period of limitations, of the union security clause.” Id., at 415 (emphasis in original). We found, however, that “the entire foundation of the unfair labor practice charged was the Union’s time-barred lack of majority status when the original collective-bargaining agreement was signed,” and that “[i]n the absence of that fact enforcement of this otherwise valid union security clause was wholly benign.” Id., at 417. “[W]here a complaint based upon that earlier event is time-barred,” we reasoned, “to permit the event itself” “to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful” “in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair labor practice.” Ibid. This analysis is squarely in point here. Because the claimed invalidity of the facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied tester seniority system is wholly dependent on the alleged illegality of signing the underlying agreement, it is the date of that signing which governs the limitations period. In holding that, when a seniority system is nondiscriminatory in form and application, it is the allegedly discriminatory adoption which triggers the limitations period, we respect not only §706(e)’s general “Value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale [claims],’” Ricks, 449 U. S., at 260 (citation omitted), but also the considerations underlying the “special treatment” accorded to seniority systems under § 703(h), see Hardison, 432 U. S., at 81. This “special treatment” strikes a balance between the interests of those protected against discrimination by Title VII and those who work — perhaps for many years — in reliance upon the validity of a facially lawful seniority system. There is no doubt, of course, that a facially discriminatory seniority system (one that treats similarly situated employees differently) can be challenged at any time, and that even a facially neutral system, if it is adopted with unlawful discriminatory motive, can be challenged within the prescribed period after adoption. But allowing a facially neutral system to be challenged, and entitlements under it to be altered, many years after its adoption would disrupt those valid reliance interests that § 703(h) was meant to protect. In the context of the present case, a female tester could defeat the settled (and worked-for) expectations of her co-workers whenever she is demoted or not promoted under the new system, be that in 1983, 1993, 2003, or beyond. Indeed, a given plaintiff could in theory sue successively for not being promoted, for being demoted, for being laid off, and for not being awarded a sufficiently favorable pension, so long as these acts — even if nondiscriminatory in themselves — could be attributed to the 1979 change in seniority. Our past cases, to which we adhere today, have declined to follow an approach that has such disruptive implications. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The type of seniority at issue here is not “benefit seniority,” which is used to “compute noncompetitive benefits earned under the contract of employment,” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 766 (1976) (emphasis added), but “competitive seniority,” which is “used to allocate entitlements to scarce benefits” such as promotion or nondemotion, id., at 766-767. Under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e), a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unfair employment practice unless the complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or local agency, in which case the period is extended to a maximum of 300 days. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals ruled on the applicable limitations period in the present case, since both courts concluded that petitioners’ claims were time barred even if the applicable period was 300 days. See 827 F. 2d 163, 165, and n. 2 (CA7 1987). We may for the same reason avoid ruling on that point here. The dissent attempts to distinguish Delaware State College v. Ricks on the ground that there “[t]he allegedly discriminatory denial of tenure . . . served notice to the plaintiff that his termination a year later would come as a ‘delayed, but inevitable, consequence.’” Post, at 917 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). This builds on its earlier criticism that “[o]n the day AT&T’s seniority system was adopted, there was no reason to believe that a woman who exercised her plantwide seniority to become a tester would ever be demoted as a result of the new system,” so that at that point the prospect of petitioners’ suffering “concrete] harm” was “speculative.” Post, at 914 (emphasis in original). Of course the benefits of a seniority system, like those of an insurance policy payable upon the occurrence of a noninevitable event, are by their nature speculative — if only because they depend upon the employee’s continuing desire to work for the particular employer. But it makes no more sense to say that no “concrete harm” occurs when an employer provides a patently less desirable seniority guarantee than what the law requires, than it does to say that no concrete harm occurs when an insurance company delivers an accident insurance policy with a face value of $10,000, when what has been paid for is a face value of $25,000. It is true that the injury to the employee becomes substantially more concrete when the less desirable seniority system causes his demotion, just as the injury to the policyholder becomes substantially more concrete when the accident occurs and the payment is $15,000 less than it should be. But that is irrelevant to whether there was any concrete injury at the outset. What the dissent means by “concrete harm” is what Ricks, 449 U. S., at 258, referred to as the point at which the injury becomes “most painful” — and that case rejected it as the point of reference for liability. Accord, Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U. S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam). Like Ricks and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 (1977), our decision in Machinists v. NLRB also rejected an attempt to cure untimeliness by asserting a continuing violation: “The applicability of these principles cannot be avoided here by invoking the doctrine of continuing violation. It may be conceded that the continued enforcement, as well as the execution, of this collective bargaining agreement constitutes an unfair labor practice, and that these are two logically separate violations, independent in the sense that they can be described in discrete terms. Nevertheless, the vice in the enforcement of this agreement is manifestly not independent of the legality of its execution, as would be the case, for example, with an agreement invalid on its face or with one validly executed, but unlawfully administered.” 362 U. S., at 422-423. The dissent is mistaken to equate the application of a facially neutral but discriminatorily adopted system with the application of a system that is facially discriminatory. See post, at 916-917. With a facially neutral system the discriminatory act occurs only at the time of adoption, for each application is nondiscriminatory (seniority accrues for men and women on an identical basis). But a facially discriminatory system (e. g., one that assigns men twice the seniority that women receive for the same amount of time served) by definition discriminates each time it is applied. This is a material difference for purposes of the analysis we employed in Evans and Ricks — which focuses on the timing of the discriminatory acts for purposes of the statute of limitations. It is also why the dissent’s citation, post, at 915, of Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986) — in which “[ejach week’s paycheck . . . deliverfed] less to a black than to a similarly situated white,” id., at 395 — is misplaced.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SWARTHOUT, WARDEN v. COOKE No. 10-333. Decided January 24, 2011 Together with Cate, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Clay (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. Per Curiam. I California’s parole statute provides that the Board of Prison Terms “shall set a release date unless it determines that . . . consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041(b) (West Supp. 2010). If the board denies parole, the prisoner can seek judicial review in a state habeas petition. The California Supreme Court has explained that “the standard of review properly is characterized as whether 'some evidence’ supports the conclusion that the inmate is unsuitable for parole because he or she currently is dangerous.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1191, 190 P. 3d 535, 539 (2008). See also In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1253-1254, 190 P. 3d 573, 580 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 625-626, 59 P. 3d 174, 183 (2002). A Respondent Damon Cooke was convicted of attempted first-degree murder in 1991, and a California court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of seven years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. In November 2002, the board determined that Cooke was not yet suitable for parole, basing its decision on the “especially cruel and callous manner” of his commitment offense, App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a; his failure to participate fully in rehabilitative programs; his failure to develop marketable skills; and three incidents of misconduct while in prison. The board admitted that Cooke had received a favorable psychological report, but it dismissed the report as not credible because it included several inconsistent and erroneous statements. Cooke filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in State Superior Court. The court denied his petition. “The record indicates,” it said, “that there was some evidence, including but certainly not limited to the life offense, to support the board’s denial.” Id., at 42a. Cooke subsequently filed a habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal and a petition for direct review by the California Supreme Court. Both were denied. In October 2004, Cooke filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254 challenging the parole board’s determination. The District Court denied his petition. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that California’s parole statute created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and that “California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement” was a “component” of that federally protected liberty interest. Cooke v. Solis, 606 F. 3d 1206, 1213 (2010). It then concluded that the state court had made an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” under § 2254(d)(2) by finding any evidence at all that Cooke would pose a threat to public safety if released. Id., at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). B Respondent Elijah Clay was convicted of first-degree murder in 1978, and a California court sentenced him to imprisonment for seven years to life with the possibility of parole. In 2003, the board found Clay suitable for parole, but the Governor exercised his authority to review the case and found Clay unsuitable for parole. See Cal. Const., Art. 5, § 8(b); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.2 (West 2000). The Governor cited the gravity of Clay’s crime; his extensive criminal history, which reflected “the culmination of a life of crime,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a; his failure to participate fully in self-help programs; and his unrealistic plans for employment and housing after being paroled. Regarding the last factor, the Governor concluded that Clay would be likely to return to crime, given his propensity for substance abuse and lack of a viable means of employment. Clay filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in State Superior Court. That court denied Clay’s petition, as did the California Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court denied review. Clay subsequently filed a federal petition for a writ of ha-beas corpus, which the District Court granted. The District Court concluded that the Governor’s reliance on the nature of Clay’s long-past commitment offense violated Clay’s right to due. process, and dismissed each of the other factors the Governor cited as unsupported by the record. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court’s conclusion that “the Governor’s decision was an unreasonable application of California’s 'some evidence’ rule and was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” Clay v. Kane, 384 Fed. Appx. 544, 546 (2010). II In granting habeas relief based on its conclusion that the state courts had misapplied California’s “some evidence” rule, the Ninth Circuit must have assumed either that federal habeas relief is available for an error of state law, or that correct application of the State’s “some evidence” standard is required by the federal Due Process Clause. Neither assumption is correct. As to the first: The habeas statute “unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner 'only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, ante, at 5 (per curiam) (quoting 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a)). “We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780 (1990)). As for the Due Process Clause, standard analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U. S. 454, 460 (1989). Here, the Ninth Circuit held that California law creates a liberty interest in parole, see 606 F. 3d, at 1213. While we have no need to review that holding here, it is a reasonable application of our cases. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U. S. 369, 373-381 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979). Whatever liberty interest exists is, of course, a state interest created by California law. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners. Id., at 7. When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication — and federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a parole statute similar to California’s received adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. Id., at 16. “The Constitution,” we held, “does not require more.” Ibid. Cooke and Clay received at least this amount of process: They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was denied. 606 F. 3d, at 1208-1212; App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a-80a; Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 3041, 3041.5 (West Supp. 2010). That should have been the beginning and the end of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry into whether Cooke and Clay received due process. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals reviewed the state courts’ decisions on the merits and concluded that they had unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence. See 606 F. 3d, at 1213-1216; 384 Fed. Appx., at 545-546. Other Ninth Circuit cases have done the same. See, e. g., Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F. 3d 606, 611 (2010) (per curiam). No opinion of ours supports converting California’s “some evidence” rule into a substantive federal requirement. The liberty interest at issue here is the interest in receiving parole when the California standards for parole have been met, and the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection of that interest are those set forth in Greenholtz. See Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F. 3d 546, 559 (CA9 2010) (en banc). Greenholtz did not inquire into whether the constitutionally requisite procedures provided by Nebraska produced the result that the evidence required; a fortiori it is no federal concern here whether California’s “some evidence” rule of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution demands) was correctly applied. It will not do to pronounce California’s “some evidence” rule to be “a component” of the liberty interest, 606 F. 3d, at 1213. Such reasoning would subject to federal-court merits review the application of all state-prescribed procedures in cases involving liberty or property interests, including (of course) those in criminal prosecutions. That has never been the law. To the contrary, we have long recognized that “a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due process.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 121, n. 21 (1982); see also Estelle, 502 U. S., at 67-68. Because the only federal right at issue is procedural, the relevant inquiry is what process Cooke and Clay received, not whether the state court decided the case correctly. The Ninth Circuit’s questionable finding that there was no evidence in the record supporting the parole denials is irrelevant unless there is a federal right at stake, as § 2254(a) requires. See id., at 67. The short of the matter is that the responsibility for ensuring that the constitutionally adequate procedures governing California’s parole system are properly applied rests with California courts, and is no part of the Ninth Circuit’s business. The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondents’ motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgments below are Reversed. Cooke and Clay argue that the greater protections afforded to the revocation of good-time credits should apply, citing In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 657-658, 59 P. 3d 174, 205 (2002), a California Supreme Court ease that refers to our good-time-eredits decision in Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U. S. 445 (1985). But Rosenkrantz did not purport to equate California’s parole system with good-time credits. It cites Hill twice. The first citation merely observes that the court relied upon Hill in an earlier opinion adopting the “some evidence” test for decisions to revoke parole that had previously been granted. 29 Cal. 4th, at 656, 59 P. 3d, at 204. The second citation, which does occur in the part of the opinion discussing the need for “some evidence” review in parole decisions, simply borrows language from Hill to support the proposition that “‘[requiring a modicum of evidence’” can “‘help to prevent arbitrary deprivations.’” 29 Cal. 4th, at 658, 59 P. 3d, at 205 (quoting Hill, 472 U. S., at 455). In any event, the question of which due process requirements apply is one of federal law, not California law; and neither of these citations comes close to addressing that question. Any doubt on that score is resolved by a subsequent footnote stating that the court’s decision is premised only on state law. 29 Cal. 4th, at 658, n. 12, 59 P. 3d, at 205, n. 12.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED GAS PIPE LINE CO. v. MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS AND WATER DIVISION et al. No. 23. Argued October 20-21, 1958, Decided December 8, 1958 Ralph M. Carson argued the causes for petitioners in Nos. 23 and 26. With him on the brief for petitioner in No. 23 were Thomas Fletcher, C. Huffman Lewis, Morton E. Yohalem and James J. Higginson. On the brief for petitioners in No. 26 were John T. Cahill for the Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, William S. Tarver for the Southern Natural Gas Co., and Richard J. Connor and Daniel James, of counsel. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission. With him on the brief were Willard W. Gatchell and William W. Ross. George E. Morrow and Reuben Goldberg argued the causes and filed a brief for the Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division et al., respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in Nos. 23, 25 and 26 were filed by Everett C. McKeage for the State of California et al., Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General, and Wade H. Creekmore, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Mississippi, George F. McCanless, Attorney General, and Allison B. Humphreys, Solicitor General, for the State of Tennessee, Stewart G. Honeck, Attorney General, and Roy G. Tulane, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wisconsin, John J. O’Connell, Attorney General, and Frank P. Hayes, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington, Garner W. Green for the City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, and Roger Arnebergh, John C. Banks, Peter Campbell Brown, J. Elliott Drinard, Marshall F. Hurley, J. Frank McKenna, John C. Melaniphy, Charles S. Rhyne and J. Parker Connor for the Member Municipalities of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. Together with No. 25, Federal Power Commission v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division et al., and No. 26, Texas Gas Transmission Corp. et al. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division et al., also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. We review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit which directed the Federal Power Commission to reject certain rate schedules for natural gas filed with it by petitioner United Gas Pipe Line Company (United) under § 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. United, a regulated natural gas pipeline company, supplies gas to Texas Gas Transmission Corporation (Texas Gas), Southern Natural Gas Company (Southern Gas), and Mississippi Valley Gas Company (Mississippi), under a number of long-term service agreements made and filed with the Commission prior to September 30, 1955, each of which contains the following pricing provision: “All gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller’s Rate Schedule [the appropriate rate schedule designation is inserted here], or any effective superseding rate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission. This agreement in all respects shall be subject to the applicable provisions of such rate schedules and to the General Terms and Conditions attached thereto and filed with the Federal Power Commission which are by reference made a part hereof.” (Italics supplied.) On September 30, 1955, United, proceeding under § 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act, filed with the Commission new rate schedules, together with supporting data, increasing its prices for gas as of November 1, 1955, by amounts estimated to yield total additional annual revenues of $9,978,000 from sales under the agreements here involved and from other sales also subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. Exercising its powers under § 4 (e) of the Act, the Commission ordered a hearing as to the propriety of the new rates, and, except as to those relating to sales of gas for resale for industrial use only, suspended their effectiveness from November 1, 1955, to April 1, 1956, the maximum period of suspension authorized by the statute. Thereafter Texas Gas, Southern Gas, Mississippi, Memphis, and others claiming an interest in the proceedings were permitted to intervene; and on February 6, 1956, the Commission commenced the taking of evidence as to the lawfulness of United’s new rates under the “just and reasonable” standard of § 4 (e). On February 27, 1956, this Court announced its decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, in which it was held that United could not escape a contract obligation to furnish Mobile with natural gas at a single specified price for a term of years by unilaterally filing an increased rate schedule under § 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act. Following that decision the respondents in the present case for the first time moved the Commission to reject United's new rate schedules, claiming that their filing constituted an attempt on the part of United to change unilaterally the terms of its service agreements with Texas Gas, Southern, and Mississippi, and that such an attempt ran afoul of our decision in Mobile. Construing these agreements as in effect constituting undertakings by the purchasers to pay United’s “going” rates, as established from time to time in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Natural Gas Act, the Commission refused to reject United’s filings. It distinguished Mobile on the ground that the contract there involved specified a single fixed rate for the gas. to be supplied under it which United was contractually foreclosed from changing without the agreement of the purchaser. 16 F. P. C. 19, 15 P. U. R. 3d 279. The Court of Appeals reversed. Accepting for the purposes of its decision the Commission’s interpretation of United’s service agreements, the Court of Appeals held that nonetheless the Commission lacked “jurisdiction” to consider under § 4 (e) the lawfulness of United’s new rate schedules. The court regarded Mobile as establishing that § 4 (e) applies only to rate changes whose specific amount has been mutually agreed upon between a seller and purchaser, and that where a purchaser has not so agreed, a rate change can be effected only by action of the Commission under § 5 (a) of the Act. Since the rates set forth in United’s new schedules had not been agreed to by its customers, the Court of Appeals therefore held that the Commission had no jurisdiction to proceed under § 4 (e) to examine them, and that accordingly United’s filings under § 4 (d) should have been rejected. 102 U. S. App. D. C. 77, 250 F. 2d 402. We granted certiorari because of the claim that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted our decision in Mobile, and on the suggestion that its judgment seriously frustrates the proper administration of the Natural Gas Act. 355 U. S. 938. It is apparent that the Court of Appeals misconceived the import of our decision in Mobile. The contract before the Court in that case required United to furnish natural gas to Mobile at a single fixed price of 10.7 cents per MCF (thousand cubic feet) for a period of 10 years. The contract contained no provision for any different rate, or for changing the agreed rate during the term of the agreement. It was argued by United that the Natural Gas Act gave it the right to abrogate this unqualified contract obligation and increase at will its price of gas to Mobile by filing new rate schedules under § 4 (d), subject only to the Commission’s approval of such schedules under §4(e). In rejecting that contention this Court held that the Natural Gas Act, unlike the Interstate Commerce Act, “evinces no purpose to abrogate private rate contracts as such,” that the Act did not "empower natural gas companies to change their contracts unilaterally,” and that in this respect regulated natural gas companies stood in no different position under the Act than they would have in the absence of the Act. 350 U. S., at 338, 340, 343. Since United had contractually bound itself to furnish gas to Mobile throughout the contract term at a particular price, we held that its obligation could be abrogated only by the Commission, in the exercise of its paramount regulatory authority under § 5 (a). Ibid., at 344-345. The United contract now before us, as construed by the Federal Power Commission and as viewed by the Court of Appeals for the purposes of decision, is vitally different from that in Mobile. On this view of the contract United bound itself to furnish gas to these customers during the life of the agreements not at a single fixed rate, as in Mobile, but at what in effect amounted to its current “going” rate. Contractually this left United free to change its rates from time to time, subject, of course, to the procedures and limitations of the Natural Gas Act. In such circumstances there is nothing in Mobile which suggests that United was not entitled to file its new schedules under § 4 (d), or' that the Commission had no jurisdiction to consider them under §4(e). On the contrary we said in Mobile (350 U. S., at 343): “. . . except as specifically limited by the Act, the rate-making powers of natural gas companies were to be no different from those they would possess in the absence of the Act: to establish ex parte, and change at will, the rates offered to prospective customers; or to fix by contract, and change only by mutual agreement, the rate agreed upon with a particular customer. No more is necessary to give full meaning to all the provisions of the Act: consistent with this, § 4 (d) means simply that no change— neither a unilateral change to an ex parte rate nor an agreed-upon change to a contract — can be made by a natural gas company without the proper notice to the Commission. . . .” The Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading Mobile as limiting the procedures prescribed by § 4 (d) and (e) to instances where the parties by mutual agreement had “reformed” a rate contract. The reason these procedures were unavailable to United in Mobile was because the company had bargained away by contract the right to change its rates unilaterally, and not because § 4 does not apply to such rate changes whether made pursuant to or in the absence of a contract. Moreover, we find nothing in the scheme of the Natural Gas Act which would justify the restrictive application which the Court of Appeals’ decision gives to § 4 (d) and (e). Section 4 (c) requires every natural gas company initially to file with the Commission its rates for any “sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, . . . together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such, rates . . . .” Section 4 (d) provides for the giving of notice of any change “in any such rate ... or contract relating thereto . . .” by filing new rate schedules with the Commission and keeping them open for public inspection. And § 4 (e) authorizes Commission review of the lawfulness' of any such changed rate. The record before us affirmatively shows that United in the filings here at issue has complied with all the duties which these sections in terms impose upon it, and there is nothing in these sections which even remotely implies that § 4 (d) and (e) procedures are applicable to the filing and review of only those rate changes whose amount has been agreed upon by the seller and buyer. The important and indeed decisive difference between this case and Mobile is that in Mobile one party to a contract was asserting that the Natural Gas Act somehow gave it the right unilaterally to abrogate its contractual undertaking, whereas here petitioner seeks simply to assert, in accordance with the procedures specified by the Act, rights expressly reserved to it by contract. Mobile makes it plain that “§ 4 (d) on its face indicates no more than that otherwise valid changes cannot be put into effect without giving the required notice to the Commission.” 350 U. S., at 339-340. (Italics supplied.) The necessary corollary of this proposition is that changes which in fact are “otherwise valid” in the light of the relationship between the parties can be put into effect under § 4 (d) by a seller through giving the required notice to the Commission. Mobile expressly notes that in the absence of any contractual relationship rates determined ex parte by the seller may be filed under § 4 (d). 350 U. S., at 343. We perceive no tenable basis of distinction between the filing of such a rate in the absence of contract and a similar filing under an agreement which explicitly permits it. Thus Mobile, properly understood, affirmatively establishes United’s right to proceed under § 4 in the circumstances of this case. As we there said, “The initial rate-making and rate-changing powers of natural gas companies remain undefined and unaffected by the Act.” 350 U. S., at 343. United, like the seller of an unregulated commodity, has the right in the first instance to change its rates as it will, unless it has undertaken by contract not to do so. The Act comes into play as to rate changes only in (1) imposing upon the seller the procedural requirement of filing timely notice of change, (2) giving the Commission authority to review such changes, and (3) authorizing the Commission, in the case of rates for sales of gas for other than exclusively industrial use, to suspend the new rates for a five-month period and thereafter to require the posting of a refund bond pending a determination of the lawfulness of the rates as changed. (See § 4 (d), (e), at note 3, supra.) It seems plain that Congress, in so drafting the statute, was not only expressing its conviction that the public interest requires the protection of consumers from excessive prices for natural gas, but was also manifesting its concern for the legitimate interests of natural gas companies in whose financial stability the gas-consuming public has a vital stake. Business reality demands that natural gas companies should not be precluded by law from increasing the prices of their product whenever that is the economically necessary means of keeping the intake and outgo of their revenues in proper balance; otherwise procurement of the vast sums necessary for the maintenance and expansion of their systems through equity and debt financing would become most difficult, if not impossible. This concern was surely a proper one for Congress to take into account in framing its regulatory scheme for the natural gas industry, cf. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 603, and we think that it did so not only by preserving the “integrity” of private contractual arrangements for the supply of natural gas, 350 U. S., at 344 (subject of course to any overriding authority of the Commission), but also by providing in § 4 for the earliest effectuation of contractually authorized or otherwise permissible rate changes consistent with appropriate Commission review. What has been said disposes of the question whether anything in the Natural Gas Act forbids a seller to change its rates pursuant to § 4 procedures simply because its customers have not agreed to the amount of the rate as changed. There remains the question whether United’s service agreements reserved to it the power to make rate changes in this manner. The Commission found that the agreements so intended, but on its view of the case the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide the question. We think it would be both unnecessary and dilatory for us to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of that issue, which involves matters peculiarly within the area of the Commission’s special competence and as to which we could hardly be aided by a further examination of the record by the Court of Appeals. Indeed neither side suggests such a course, even alternatively, both asking us to decide the case in its present posture. After scrutinizing the record we are satisfied that the Commission’s determination as to the meaning of the service agreements here involved was amply supported both factually and legally. There is no necessity for us to embark upon a detailed discussion of the various contentions made by the parties, none of which appears to have been overlooked or misapprehended by the Commission. It seems sufficient to say that the record shows that these agreements are typical of the “tariff-and-service” arrangements contemplated by Commission Order. No. 144, 18 CFR § 154.1 et seq.; that until this case no one connected with the industry seems to have thought that agreements of this sort precluded natural gas companies from changing their rates in accordance with and subject to § 4 (d) and (e) procedures; and that the respondents’ present contrary contentions had their sole genesis in a mistaken view of our decision in the Mobile case. Beyond this, we find nothing in these agreements, as interpreted by the Federal Power Commission, which is hostile to any of the provisions or purposes of the Natural Gas Act. For the reasons given we hold that the Court of Appeals was in error in concluding that in the circumstances of this case United could not proceed to change its rates by-filing under § 4 (d) of the statute. Reversed. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Mississippi, a natural gas distributing company, also purchases gas from Texas Gas and Southern Gas. Respondent Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division, an agency of the City of Memphis engaged in the distribution of natural gas, purchases gas from Texas Gas, and has no direct contract relations with United. However, it is obligated to reimburse Texas Gas for any increase in the latter’s cost of gas acquired from United. Originally there were seven such agreements, of which five contained the provision quoted in the text. However, the other two were found by the Commission, and assumed by the Court of Appeals, to contain the equivalent of that provision, and one of the two was replaced by a superseding agreement explicitly containing the provision very shortly after the filing here at issue. Sections 4 (d) and 4 (e) of the National Gas Act read as follows: § 4 (d): “Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such [filed] rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract' relating thereto, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days’ notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published.” § 4 (e): “Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, or State commission, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect: Provided, That the Commission shall not have authority to suspend the rate, charge, classification, or service for the sale of natural gas for resale for industrial use only; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded cand an order made at the expiration of the suspension period, on motion of the natural-gas company making the filing, the proposed change of rate, charge, classification, or service shall go into effect. Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond, to be approved by the Commission, to refund any amounts ordered by the Commission, to'keep accurate accounts in detail óf all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts were paid, and, upon completion of the hearing and decision, to order such natural-gas company to refund, with interest, the portion of such increased rates or charges by its decision found not justified. At any hearing involving a rate or charge sought to be increased, the burden of proof to show that the increased rate or charge is just and reasonable shall be upon the natural-gas company, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over other questions pending before it and decide the same as speedily as possible.” The Commission did not suspend the rates applicable to sales for resale for industrial use only, as it has always taken the view that under the statute it is without power to suspend the effectiveness of these rates. § 5 (a): “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, régulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed' by such natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates.” See note 3, supra. See note 3, supra. A majority of the court below thought that such a limitation should be imported into the Act to fend against “debilitating Section 5 (a)” by making it possible for a seller to reserve by contract the right to avoid “the delay and the more stringent proof requirements of Section 5 (a) ” through utilizing § 4 procedures. 102 U. S. App. D. C., at 82, note 3, 250 F. 2d, at 407, note 3. Apart from the fact that this approach seems to assume a negative answer to the very question at issue — whether Congress intended that natural gas companies should be permitted, so far as the statute is concerned, to file rate changes under § 4 (d) without securing prior customer agreement to the changed rate — it may be pointed out that the Commission appears consistently to have viewed the proof requirements under §§ 4 (e) and 5 (a) as equally “stringent.” See FPC, Thirty-fifth Annual Report (1955), at 106; Thirty-fourth Annual Report (1954), at 106; Thirty-third Annual Report (1953), at 99. When the Natural Gas Act became law in 1938, natural gas companies were permitted to file their existing sales contracts as rate schedules under § 4 (c). Schedules in this form were extremely lengthy, unwieldy, and otherwise unsatisfactory in that it was most difficult for customers, competitors, and the Commission itself to ascertain whether rates to various customers were unduly discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable. The Commission therefore proposed regulations requiring the conversion of rate contracts into a “tariff- and-service-agreement” system, and these regulations were promulgated in October 1948 as Order No. 144. Under the tariff-and-service-agreement system, the agreement between buyer and seller does not itself contain a price term, but rather refers to rate schedules of general applicability on file with the Commission. It is noteworthy that Order No. 144 expressly contemplates that a seller may reserve the “privilege” of filing rate changes under § 4 of the Act. 18 CFR § 154.38 (d) (3). Between the date of the Mobile decision and that of the court below it appears that only three purchasers of natural gas under service agreements similar to those here involved (one of them Mississippi, a respondent here) moved to dismiss changed rate schedules on the ground that the agreements did not permit their filing, although some 600 such purchasers were affected by rate changes filed during that period. Respondents argue that the “effective superseding rate” clause of the agreements must be read as referring only to superseding rates established after a § 5 (a) proceeding, because it would be unreasonable to find that the buyer-signatories to the agreements had intended to authorize United to change its “industrial” rates by a §4(d) filing in light of the fact that such rates are not subject to suspension and refund under the statute. Apart from the circumstances that (1) United’s “industrial” sales under these agreements appear to have been a relatively minor factor; (2) the clause would be entirely superfluous if construed as respondents would have it, since as a matter of law rate changes ordered by the Commission after a § 5 (a) proceeding would have been incorporated into the agreements, Northern Pacific R. Co. v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 4 F. 2d 359 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1925), appeal dismissed, 269 U. S. 535; Market Street R. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 6 F. 2d 633 (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1925), appeal dismissed, 271 U. S. 691; and (3) the “industrial” rates of United have consistently been below its other rates, the force of respondents’ contention is wholly destroyed by the fact that it appears that the buyer-signatories to the agreements are entitled by contract with their customers to pass on any rate increases effected by United. Under these circumstances it can hardly be said to be inconceivable, or even unlikely, that the buyers would have been willing to authorize United to change its “going” rates to them under § 4 (d).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WERNER MACHINE CO., INC. v. DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OF NEW JERSEY. No. 63. Argued March 5-6, 1956. Decided March 26, 1956. Charles Goodwin, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Halsey T. Tichenor, III, and Leopold Frankel. Harold Kolovsky, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for- appellee. With him on the brief were Grover C. Richman, Jr., Attorney General, and Lawrence E. Stern and David D. Furman, Deputy Attorneys General. Ned J. Parsekian, Deputy Attorney General, was on a Motion to Dismiss. Per Curiam. The State of New Jersey imposes on each domestic corporation “an annual franchise tax ... for the privilege of having or exercising its corporate franchise” in the State. This tax, as applied to appellant, is measured by the corporation's “net worth,” which is defined as the sum of the corporation’s issued and outstanding capital stock, paid-in or capital surplus, earned surplus and undivided profits, other surplus accounts which will accrue to the shareholders (not including depreciation reserves), and debts owed to shareholders owning 10 percent or more of the corporation’s stock. Appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, and is therefore subject to the tax. In assessing appellant’s tax for 1952, the Tax Commissioner included in appellant’s net worth the value of certain federal bonds held by appellant, thereby increasing the amount due by $320.07. Appellant protested, claiming that under R. S. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742, these bonds were immune from state taxation. The New Jersey courts upheld the Commissioner’s assessment, and this appeal contests the validity of the state statute as so applied. Appellant contends that this tax is not in reality a franchise tax, but is rather in the nature of a direct property tax on the immune federal obligations. Corporate franchises granted by a State create a relationship which may legitimately be made the subject of taxation, Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 599-600; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 162; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 388; and the statute expressly declares this to be a franchise tax. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has, on independent examination, found this to be “a bona fide franchise tax.” While this is, of course, not conclusive here, Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S. 143, we find no basis in this instance for not accepting the state court’s conclusion that this tax is not imposed directly on the property held by the corporation. Cf. Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 495-496. Appellant argues further that even if this is a franchise tax, it must fall because its effect is the same as if it had been imposed directly on the tax-exempt federal securities. Since the tax remains the same whatever the character of the corporate assets may be, no claim can be sustained that this taxing statute discriminates against the federal obligations. And since this is a tax on the corporate franchise, it is valid despite the inclusion of federal bonds in the determination of net worth. This Court has consistently upheld franchise taxes measured by a yardstick which includes tax-exempt income or property, even though a part of the economic impact of the tax may be said to bear indirectly upon such income or property. See, e. g., Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, supra; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, supra. We have only recently adhered to this principle in another aspect of this field of taxation. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, supra, at 147-148. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, on which appellant relies, is distinguishable, in that it did not involve a franchise tax, but rather a tax whose legal incidence this Court found to be upon the intangible assets of the corporation. Since as applied here this is a permissible tax on the corporate franchise, the decision below must be Affirmed. N. J. Laws 1945, c. 162, N. J. S. A. §§ 54:10A-1 et seq. Id., §§ 54:10A-4 (d)(5). Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Division of Taxation, 17 N. J. 121, 125, 110 A. 2d 89, 91.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BALDRIGE, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, et al. v. SHAPIRO, ESSEX COUNTY EXECUTIVE No. 80-1436. Argued December 2, 1981 Decided February 24, 1982 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Elliott Sckulder argued the cause for petitioners in No. 80-1436 and respondents in No. 80-1781. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Leonard Schaitman, Michael Kimmel, and John Cordes. George J. Cerrone, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 80-1781. With him on the briefs was Max P. Zall. David H. Ben-Asher argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 80-1436. Together with No. 80-1781, McNichols, Mayor of Denver, et al. v. Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Wilma S. Martinez and Morris J. Bailer filed briefs for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 80-1436 and reversal in No. 80-1781. John E. Flaherty, Jr., and Malcolm J. Hall filed a brief for Plaintiffs in MDL-444, In re 1980 Decennial Census Adjustment Litigation, as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 80-1781. Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Robert S. Rifkind, Peter Bienstock, and Allen G. Schwartz filed a brief for the State of New York et al. as amici curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to determine whether lists of addresses collected and utilized by the Bureau of the Census are exempt from disclosure, either by way of civil discovery or the Freedom of Information Act, under, the confidentiality provisions of the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. §§8 and 9. HH Under Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution, responsibility for conducting the decennial census rests with Congress. Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Commerce the duty to conduct the decennial census, 13 U. S. C. § 141; the Secretary in turn has delegated this function to the Bureau of the Census. 13 U. S. C. § 21. The 1980 enumeration conducted by the Bureau of the Census indicated that Essex County, N. J., which includes the city of Newark, and Denver, Colo., among other areas, had lost population during the 1970’s. This information was conveyed to the appropriate officials in both Essex County and Denver. Under Bureau procedures a city has 10 working days from receipt of the preliminary counts to challenge the accuracy of the census data. Both Essex County and Denver challenged the census count under the local review procedures. Both proceeded on the theory that the Bureau had erroneously classified occupied dwellings as vacant, and both sought to compel disclosure of a portion of the address lists used by the Bureau in conducting its count in their respective jurisdictions. A BALDRIGE v. SHAPIRO (No. 80-1436) The Essex County Executive filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to compel the Bureau to release the “master address” register under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552. The master address register is a listing of such information as addresses, householders’ names, number of housing units, type of census inquiry, and, where applicable, the vacancy status of the unit. The list was compiled initially from commercial mailing address lists and census postal checks, and was updated further through direct responses to census questionnaires, pre- and post-enumeration canvassing by census personnel, and in some instances by a cross-check with the 1970 census data. The Bureau resisted disclosure of the master address list, arguing that 13 U. S. C. §§ 8(b) and 9(a) prohibit disclosure of all raw census data pertaining to particular individuals, including addresses. The Bureau argued that it therefore could lawfully withhold the information under the FOIA pursuant to Exemption 3, which provides that the FOIA does not apply where information is specifically exempt from disclosure by statute. 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3). The District Court concluded that the FOIA required disclosure of the requested information. The court began its analysis by noting that public policy favors disclosure under the FOIA unless the information falls within the statutory exemptions. The District Court concluded that the Census Act did not provide a “blanket of confidentiality” for all census materials. Rather, the confidentiality limitation is “solely to require that census material be used in furtherance of the Bureau’s statistical mission and to ensure against disclosure of any particular individual’s response.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a. The court noted that Essex County did not seek access to individual census reports or information relative to particular individuals, but sought access to the address list exclusively for statistical purposes in conjunction with the Bureau’s own program of local review. In addition, the Secretary is authorized by the Census Act to utilize county employees if they are sworn to observe the limitations of the statute. The District Court concluded that the Bureau’s claim of confidentiality impeded the goal of accurate and complete enumeration. Finally, the District Court found that the information sought was not derived from the questionnaires received, but rather from data available prior to the census. The District Court ordered the Bureau to make available the address register of all property in the county, with the proviso that all persons using the records be sworn to secrecy. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed for the reasons stated by the District Court. App. to Pet. for Cert. la. Judgment order reported at 636 F. 2d 1210 (1980). B McNICHOLS v. BALDRIGE (No. 80-1781) The city of Denver, through its officials, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado seeking a preliminary injunction to require the Bureau to cooperate with the city in verifying its vacancy data. The District Court did not rule on the preliminary injunction, but instead focused on whether the city of Denver was entitled to the vacancy information contained in the updated master address registers maintained by the Bureau. The District Court granted the city of Denver’s discovery request for this information. The court concluded that the city should have access to the information because without the address list the city was denied any meaningful ability to challenge the Bureau’s data. In light of what it deemed the important constitutional and statutory rights involved, the District Court concluded that the purposes of § 9 of the Census Act could be maintained without denying the city the right of discovery. The District Court entered a detailed order to protect the confidentiality of the information. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 644 F. 2d 844 (1981). The Court of Appeals relied on the “express language” of the statute and on the “'emphatically expressed intent of Congress to protect census information.’ ” Id., at 845, quoting Seymour v. Barabba, 182 U. S. App. D. C. 185, 188, 559 F. 2d 806, 809 (1977). The court reasoned that Congress has the power to make census information immune from direct discovery or disclosure. The court concluded that Congress has neither made nor implied an exception covering this case. The Court of Appeals also found no indication that Congress is constitutionally required to provide the city with information to challenge the census data. The court concluded that the city of Denver’s remedy must lie with Congress. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ordered disclosure of the master address list under the FOIA. App. to Pet. for Cert. la. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied discovery of similar information, concluding that the data was privileged from disclosure. 644 F. 2d 844 (1981). We granted certio-rari in these cases to determine whether such information is to be disclosed under either of the requested procedures. 451 U. S. 936 (1981); 452 U. S. 937 (1981). B < The broad mandate of the FOIA is to provide for open disclosure of public information. The Act expressly recognizes, however, that public disclosure is not always in the public interest and consequently provides that agency records may be withheld from disclosure under any one of the nine exemptions defined in 5 U. S. C. § 552(b). Under Exemption 3 disclosure need not be made as to information “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” if the statute affords the agency no discretion on disclosure, or establishes particular criteria for withholding the data, or refers to the particular types of material to be withheld. The question in Baldrige v. Shapiro, No. 80-1436, is twofold: first, do §§ 8(b) and 9(a) of the Census Act constitute a statutory exception to disclosure within the meaning of Exemption 3; and second, is the requested data included within the protection of §§ 8(b) and 9(a). B Although the national census mandated by Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution fulfills many important and valuable functions for the benefit of the country as a whole, its initial constitutional purpose was to provide a basis for apportioning representatives among the states in the Congress. The census today serves an important function in the allocation of federal grants to states based on population. In addition, the census also provides important data for Congress and ultimately for the private sector. Although Congress has broad power to require individuals to submit responses, an accurate census depends in large part on public cooperation. To stimulate that cooperation Congress has provided assurances that information furnished to the Secretary by individuals is to be treated as confidential. 13 U. S. C. §§ 8(b), 9(a). Section 8(b) of the Census Act provides that subject to specified limitations, “the Secretary [of Commerce] may furnish copies of tabulations and other statistical materials which do not disclose the information reported by, or on behalf of, any particular respondent . . . .” Section 9(a) provides farther assurances of confidentiality: “Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Commerce or bureau or agency thereof, may, except as provided in section 8 of this title— “(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or “(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment or individual under this title can be identified; or “(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.” Sections 8(b) and 9(a) explicitly provide for the nondisclosure of certain census data. No discretion is provided to the Census Bureau on whether or not to disclose the information referred to in §§ 8(b) and 9(a). Sections 8(b) and 9(a) of the Census Act therefore qualify as withholding statutes under Exemption 3. Raw census data is protected under the §§ 8(b) and 9(a) exemptions, however, only to the extent that the data is within the confidentiality provisions of the Act. C Essex County and various amici vigorously argue that § § 8(b) and 9(a) of the Census Act are designed to prohibit disclosure of the identities of individuals who provide raw census data; for this reason, they argue, the confidentiality provisions protect raw data only if the individual respondent can be identified. The unambiguous language of the confidentiality provisions, as well as the legislative history of the Act, however, indicates that Congress plainly contemplated that raw data reported by or on behalf of individuals was to be held confidential and not available for disclosure. We begin first with the language of §§ 8(b) and 9(a). Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U. S. 151 (1981). Section 8(b) allows the Secretary to provide statistical materials “which do not disclose the information reported by, or on behalf of, any particular respondent. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The focus of § 9(a) is also on the information that constitutes the statistical compilation. The Secretary is prohibited from using the “information” except for statistical purposes and is prohibited from publication “whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment or individual under this title can be identified . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The language of each section refers to protection of the “information” or “data” compiled. In addition, the provisions of § 8(b) prohibit disclosure of data provided “by, or on behalf of,” any respondent. By protecting data revealed “on behalf of” a respondent, Congress further emphasized that the data itself was to be protected from disclosure. The legislative history also makes clear that Congress was concerned not solely with protecting the identity of individuals. Since 1879 Congress has expressed its concern that confidentiality of data reported by individuals also be preserved. At that time each census taker was required by law to take an oath “not [to] disclose any information contained in the schedules, lists, or statements.” Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 195, §7, 20 Stat. 475, and Act of Apr. 20, 1880, ch. 57, 21 Stat. 75. As a result of the detailed questions asked in the 1880 and 1890 censuses, Congress amended the Census Act to broaden the confidentiality protections. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 419, §21, 30 Stat. 1020. The law restricted disclosure unless the Director of the Census authorized that the information be revealed. The governor of any state or the chief officer of any municipal government upon request, however, could receive a list of individuals counted within the territory of the jurisdiction. § 30, 30 Stat. 1021. The Director of the Census frequently was asked to disclose information to cities complaining of undercounts. For example, data was revealed to New York City after the 1890 census in order to allow the city to challenge the accuracy of the federal count. House Committee on the Eleventh Census, Reenu-meration of New York City, 51st Cong., 2d Sess. (1890). See also Decennial Census, at 113-138. In 1929 Congress again amended the Census Act and provided the confidentiality provisions of § 9. Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, § 11, 46 Stat. 25. The amendment gave the Director of the Census no discretion to release data, regardless of the claimed beneficial effect of disclosure. The confidentiality provisions extended to all information collected by the Bureau of the Census. Decennial Census, at 116. No special access was granted to states or municipalities. In 1976 the confidentiality provision of § 8 was strengthened “to add further protection of privacy” by prohibiting disclosure of information “reported by, or on behalf of, any respondent.” S. Rep. No. 94-1256, pp. £4 (1976). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1719, p. 10 (1976). The prohibitions of disclosure of “material which might disclose information reported by, or on behalf of, any respondent” extend both to “public and private entities,” S. Rep. No. 94-1256, supra, at 4, further indicating that the municipalities requesting disclosure of raw census data have no special claim to the information. The foregoing history of the Census Act reveals a congressional intent to protect the confidentiality of census information by prohibiting disclosure of raw census data reported by or on behalf of individuals. Subsequent congressional action is consistent with this interpretation. In response to claimed undercounts in the census of 1960 and of 1970, Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, proposals to allow local officials limited access to census data in order to challenge the census count. See H. R. 8871, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Hearings on H. R. 8871 before the Subcommittee on Census and Population of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). A list of vacant addresses is part of the raw census data— the information — intended by Congress to be protected. The list of addresses requested by the County of Essex constitutes “information reported by, or on behalf of,” individuals responding to the census. The initial list of addresses is taken from prior censuses and mailing lists. This information then is verified both by direct mailings and census enumerators who go to areas not responding. See, e. g., 1980 Census Questionnaire, Question No. H4 (“How many living quarters, occupied and vacant, are at this address?”). As with all the census material, the information on vacancies was updated from data obtained from neighbors and others who spoke with the followup census enumerators. The final master address list therefore includes data reported by or on behalf of individuals. Under the clear language of the Census Act it is not relevant that the municipalities seeking the data will use it only for statistical purposes. Section 9(a)(1) permits use of the data only for “the statistical purposes for which it is supplied.” There is no indication in the Census Act that the hundreds of municipal governments in the 50 states were intended by Congress to be the “monitors” of the Census Bureau. In addition, limiting use of data only for “statistical” purposes in no way indicates that raw data may be revealed outside the strict requirements of the Census Act that data be handled by census employees sworn to secrecy. Because §§ 8(b) and 9(a) of the Census Act constitute withholding statutes under Exemption 3 of the FOIA and because the raw census data in this case was intended to be protected from disclosure within those provisions of the Census Act, the requested information is not subject to disclosure under the FOIA. HH HH H-H The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, similar to the FOIA, are designed to encourage open exchange of information by litigants in federal courts. Unlike the FOIA, however, the discovery provisions under the Federal Rules focus upon the need for the information rather than a broad statutory grant of disclosure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides for access to all information “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” unless the information is privileged. If a privilege exists, information may be withheld, even if relevant to the lawsuit and essential to the establishment of plaintiffs claim. It is well recognized that a privilege may be created by statute. A statute granting a privilege is to be strictly construed so as “to avoid a construction that would suppress otherwise competent evidence.” St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 208, 218 (1961). In the case of the city of Denver, the central inquiry is whether §§ 8(b) and 9(a) create a privilege so as to protect against disclosure of the raw census data requested. As noted above, § 8(b) and § 9(a) of the Census Act embody explicit congressional intent to preclude all disclosure of raw census data reported by or on behalf of individuals. This strong policy of nondisclosure indicates that Congress intended the confidentiality provisions to constitute a “privilege” within the meaning of the Federal Rules. Disclosure by way of civil discovery would undermine the very purpose of confidentiality contemplated by Congress. One such purpose was to encourage public participation and maintain public confidence that information given to the Census Bureau would not be disclosed. The general public, whose cooperation is essential for an accurate census, would not be concerned with the underlying rationale for disclosure of data that had been accumulated under assurances of confidentiality. Congress concluded in §§ 8(b) and 9(a) that only a bar on disclosure of all raw data reported by or on behalf of individuals would serve the function of assuring public confidence. This was within congressional discretion, for Congress is vested by the Constitution with authority to conduct the census “as they shall by Law direct.” The wisdom of its classifications is not for us to decide in light of Congress’ 180 years’ experience with the census process. This is not to say that the city of Denver does not also have important reasons for requesting the raw census data for purposes of its civil suit. A finding of “privilege,” however, shields the requested information from disclosure despite the need demonstrated by the litigant. IV We hold that whether sought by way of requests under the FOIA or by way of discovery rules, raw data reported by or on behalf of individuals need not be disclosed. Congress, of course, can authorize disclosure in executing its constitutional obligation to conduct a decennial census. But until Congress alters its clear provisions under §§ 8(b) and 9(a) of the Census Act, its mandate is to be followed by the courts. Accordingly the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in No. 80-1436 is reversed, and the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in No. 80-1781 is affirmed. It is so ordered. Article I, § 2, cl. 3, provides: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. . . .” Article I, § 2, cl. 3, was amended by § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.” The Sixteenth Amendment also altered cl. 3 to provide for direct taxation without apportionment among the states and without regard to any census or enumeration. See Revised Local Review Program Information Booklet (Apr. 1980), App. in No. 80-1436, pp. 22-48. Under 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B), “the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” We note in passing that there is no provision in the FOIA for this procedure. Jurisdiction in the District Court for the District of Colorado was invoked under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1361, 2201, and 2202, under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552, under 5 U. S. C. §§ 702, 704, and 706, and under U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 3. The city argued that as a result of the erroneous undercount, Denver would be underrepresented in Congress and would be deprived of certain federal funds to which it otherwise would be entitled under the federal grant-in-aid programs that distribute funds on the basis of population. The city also argued that it would be underrepresented in the state legislature because under the Colorado Constitution apportionment of state legislative districts is based on the federal census. Colo. Const., Art. V, §48. The city of Denver originally sought a temporary restraining order to require the Bureau to keep open its Denver offices. The parties agreed that the offices could close so long as the Bureau kept its updated master address lists in Denver. The District Court ordered that (1) the Government must produce the updated master address registers, described as “Follow-up Address Registers” (FAR’s), or a list of vacant addresses culled from the FAR’s; (2) all names and other identifying references must be eliminated; (3) all city employees with access to the information must take an oath of secrecy; (4) the information must be used only for adjustment of the census; and (5) Bureau officials may at their option accompany city employees as they verify the information. This principle has been reiterated frequently by this Court. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U. S. 139 (1981); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 220 (1978); EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 80 (1973). As originally enacted the decennial census was to serve both for apportioning representatives and apportioning direct taxes among the states. The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 amended Art. I, § 2, to provide for direct taxation without apportionment. Even the first census takers, who had a relatively small population to deal with, encountered difficulty in taking a national census. 31 The Writings of George Washington 329 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939) (“Returns of the Census have already been made from several of the States and a tolerably just estimate has been formed now in others, by which it appears that we shall hardly reach four millions; but one thing is certain our real numbers will exceed, greatly, the official returns of them; because the religious scruples of some, would not allow them to give in their lists; the fears of others that it was intended as the foundation of a tax induced them to conceal or diminished theirs, and thro’ the indolence of the people, and the negligence of many of the Officers numbers are omitted”); 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 229 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903) (Aug. 24,1791, letter to Wm. Carmi-cl je!) (“I enclose you a copy of our census .... Making very small allowance for omissions, which we know to have been very great, we may safely say we are above four millions”). The information obtained from the national census is used for such varied purposes as computing federal grant-in-aid benefits, drafting of legislation, urban and regional planning, business planning, and academic and so-eial studies. See Subcommittee on Census and Population of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, The Use of Population Data in Federal Assistance Programs, Ser. No. 95-16 (Committee Print compiled by the Library of Congress 1978); S. Rep. No. 94-1256, p. 1 (1976). During congressional debates James Madison emphasized the importance of census information beyond the constitutionally designated purposes and encouraged the new Congress to “embrace some other subjects besides the bare enumeration of the inhabitants.” “This kind of information, [Madison] observed, all legislatures had wished for; but this kind of information had never been obtained in any country. ... If the plan was pursued in taking every future census, it would give them an opportunity of marking the progress of the society, and distinguishing the growth of every interest.” 13 The Papers of James Madison 8-9 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1981) (Debate of Jan. 25,1790). A bill for obtaining information as described by Mr. Madison passed the House of Representatives but “was thrown out by the Senate as a waste of trouble and supplying materials for idle people to make a book.” Letter to Thomas Jefferson, id., at 41. Respondent Shapiro does not dispute this conclusion. See Brief for Respondent in No. 80-1436, p. 8. The legislative history of the FOIA clearly indicates that Congress recognized that the Census Act constituted a specific exemption under Exemption 3. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1621, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1958); 104 Cong. Rec. 6549-6550 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Moss); 112 Cong. Rec. 13646 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Olsen) (“information ... or sources of information” given to the Bureau of the Census will be held confidential under Exemption 3); H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); 122 Cong. Rec. 24211 (1976) (remarks of Reps. Abzug and McCloskey). Concern for confidentiality in census taking was expressed as early as the 1840 census in which each census enumerator was instructed to “consider all communications made to him in the performance of [his] duty, relative to the business of the people, as strictly confidential.” Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Decennial Census: An Analysis and Review, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 113 (Committee Print compiled by the Library of Congress 1980) (hereinafter Decennial Census). See also A. Scott, Census, U. S. A. 29 (1968). The 1870 census instructions emphatically stated that “[a]ll disclosures should be treated as strictly confidential, with the exception hereafter to be noted in the case of the mortality schedule. . . .” Decennial Census, at 114. The 1909 revisions of the Census Act stated that “[n]o publication shall be made by the Census Office whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment can be identified . . . .” Act of July 2, 1909, ch. 2, § 25, 36 Stat. 9 (emphasis added). See also Act of Apr. 2, 1924, ch. 80, § 3, 43 Stat. 31; Act of June 18,1929, ch. 28, § 8, 46 Stat. 23; Act of July 25, 1947, ch. 331, 61 Stat. 458; Act of Aug. 31,1954, Pub. L. 740, 68 Stat. 1013-1014; Act of Oct! 15,1962, Pub. L. 87-813, 76 Stat. 922 (overriding decision in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 208 (1961), by prohibiting disclosure of copy of census report retained by business establishment). For a more detailed history of the provisions of confidentiality see C. Kaplan & T. Van Valey, Census ’80: Continuing the Factfinder Tradition 68-71 (U. S. Dept, of Commerce, 1980). Recognition of the need for some degree of confidentiality of cénsus materials is indicated in the confidentiality provisions of several foreign nations. Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and Sweden make some provision for the confidentiality of census materials. See Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Laws on the Confidentiality of Census Records in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print compiled by the Library of Congress 1976). Congress may well have concluded that the controversy over the “vacant” or “occupied” status of property months after the census was taken could lead to interminable litigation and impair the constitutional and statutory purposes of the census. Approximately 50 lawsuits have been brought by local governments claiming an undercount from the 1980 census. See, e. g., In re 1980 Decennial Census Adjustment Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 648 (J. P. M. D. L. 1981); Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F. 2d 732 (CA2), cert. pending sub nom. Carey v. Baldrige, No. 81-752. Although § 9(a)(1) allows use of census data for “statistical” purposes, it remains subject to § 8(b), which prohibits public disclosure of information reported by or on behalf of individuals. The primary purpose of the FOIA was not to benefit private litigants or to serve as a substitute for civil discovery. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 143, n. 10 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 24 (1974). Most courts have concluded that an FOIA exemption does not automatically constitute a “privilege” within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e. g., Frankel v. SEC, 460 F. 2d 813, 818 (CA2 1972) (information exempt under FOIA may be obtained through discovery if party’s need for information exceeds Government’s need for confidentiality). See Toran, Information Disclosure in Civil Actions: The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Discovery Rules, 49 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 843, 848-854 (1981). Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that “[ejxcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress ... the privilege of a witness . . . [or] government. . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” (Emphasis added.) It is not unlikely that while cheeking the Bureau vacancy figures the city of Denver would speak to individuals who had supplied vacancy data to the Bureau. Even though the city might not be able to identify the individuals who originally gave the information, there would nonetheless be the appearance that confidentiality had been breached. Congress has several times rejected proposals designed to assure availability of census records to historians and other legitimate researchers. See, e. g., S. 3279, H. R. 10686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). “Concerns about the legislation raised by the Bureau of the Census and others soon made it apparent that benefits gained from the release of census records could be easily offset by a loss of credibility for the census, as well as damage to the reputations of individual citizens.” Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Laws on the Confidentiality of Census Records in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print compiled by the Library of Congress 1976) (Foreword by Sen. McGee, Chairperson).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LUNDY No. 94-1785. Argued November 6, 1995 Decided January 17, 1996 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 253. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 253. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Richard Farher, and Regina S. Moriarty. Glenn R Schwartz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Lawrence J. Ross. David M. Kirsch, pro se, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we consider the “look-back” period for obtaining a refund of overpaid taxes in the United States Tax Court under 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B), and decide whether the Tax Court can award a refund of taxes paid more than two years prior to the date on which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, when, on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed, the taxpayer had not yet filed a return. We hold that in these circumstances the 2-year look-back period set forth in § 6512(b)(3)(B) applies, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. I During 1987, respondent Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than the $6,594 the Lundys actually owed in taxes for that year, but the Lundys did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the succeeding 2Nz years. On September 26, 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency, informing him that he owed $7,672 in additional taxes and interest for 1987 and that he was liable for substantial penalties for delinquent filing and negligent underpayment of taxes. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6653(1). Lundy and his wife mailed their joint tax return for 1987 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on December 22,1990. This return indicated that the Lundys had overpaid their income taxes for 1987 by $3,537 and claimed a refund in that amount. Six days after the return was mailed, Lundy filed a timely petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund of the couple’s overpaid taxes. The Commissioner filed an answer generally denying the allegations in Lundy’s petition. Thereafter, the parties negotiated towards a settlement of the claimed deficiency and refund claim. On March 17, 1992, the Commissioner filed an amended answer acknowledging that Lundy had filed a tax return and that Lundy claimed to have overpaid his 1987 taxes by $3,537. The Commissioner contended in this amended pleading that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund. The Commissioner argued that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. See 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B). Under the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B), the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund because Lundy’s withheld taxes were deemed paid on the date that his 1987 tax return was due (April 15, 1988), see § 6513(b)(1), which is more than two years before the date the notice was mailed (September 26, 1990). The Tax Court agreed with the position taken by the Commissioner and denied Lundy’s refund claim. Citing an unbroken line of Tax Court cases adopting a similar interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B), e. g., Allen v. Commissioner, 99 T. C. 475, 479-480 (1992); Galuska v. Commissioner, 98 T. C. 661, 665 (1992); Berry v. Commissioner, 97 T. C. 339, 344-345 (1991); White v. Commissioner, 72 T. C. 1126, 1131-1133 (1979) (renumbered statute); Hosking v. Commissioner, 62 T. C. 635, 642-643 (1974) (renumbered statute), the Tax Court held that if a taxpayer has not filed a tax return by the time the notice of deficiency is mailed, and the notice is mailed more than two years after the date on which the taxes are paid, the look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B) is two years and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund. 65 TCM 3011, 3014-3015 (1993), ¶ 93,278 RIA Memo TC. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the applicable look-back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund. 45 F. 3d 856, 861 (1995). Every other Court of Appeals to have addressed the question has affirmed the Tax Court’s interpretation of § 6512(b)(3)(B). See Davison v. Commissioner, 9 F. 3d 1538 (CA2 1993) (judgt. order); Allen v. Commissioner, 23 F. 3d 406 (CA6 1994) (judgt. order); Galuska v. Commissioner, 5 F. 3d 195, 196 (CA7 1993); Richards v. Commissioner, 37 F. 3d 587, 589 (CA10 1994); see also Rossman v. Commissioner, 46 F. 3d 1144 (CA9 1995) (judgt. order) (aff’g on other grounds). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 515 U. S. 1102 (1995), and now reverse. II A taxpayer seeking a refund of overpaid taxes ordinarily must file a timely claim for a refund with the IRS under 26 U. S. C. §6511. That section contains two separate provisions for determining the timeliness of a refund claim. It first establishes a filing deadline: The taxpayer must file a claim for a refund “within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.” § 6511(b)(1) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). It also defines two “look-back” periods: If the claim is filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed,” ibid., then the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of “the portion of the tax paid within the 3 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” §6511(b)(2)(A) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). If the claim is not filed within that 3-year period, then the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of only that “portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim.” § 6511(b)(2)(B) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). Unlike the provisions governing refund suits in United States District Court or the United States Court of Federal Claims, which make timely filing of a refund claim a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit, see 26 U. S. C. § 7422(a); Martin v. United States, 833 F. 2d 655, 658-659 (CA7 1987), the restrictions governing the Tax Court’s authority to award a refund of overpaid taxes incorporate only the look-back period and not the filing deadline from §6511. See 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3). Consequently, a taxpayer who seeks a refund in the Tax Court, like respondent, does not need to actually file a claim for refund with the IRS; the taxpayer need only show that the tax to be refunded was paid during the applicable look-back period. In this case, the applicable look-back period is set forth in § 6512(b)(3)(B), which provides that the Tax Court cannot award a refund of any overpaid taxes unless it first determines that the taxes were paid: “within the period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2) ... if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed (whether or not filed) stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment.” The analysis dictated by § 6512(b)(3)(B) is not elegant, but it is straightforward. Though some courts have adverted to the filing of a “deemed claim,” see Galuska, 5 F. 3d, at 196; Richards, 37 F. 3d, at 589, all that matters for the proper application of § 6512(b)(3)(B) is that the “claim” contemplated in that section be treated as the only mechanism for determining whether a taxpayer can recover a refund. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) defines the look-back period that applies in Tax Court by incorporating the look-back provisions from § 6511(b)(2), and directs the Tax Court to determine the applicable period by inquiring into the timeliness of a hypothetical claim for refund filed “on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency.” To this end, § 6512(b)(3)(B) directs the Tax Court’s attention to § 6511(b)(2), which in turn instructs the court to apply either a 3-year or a 2-year look-back period. See §§ 6511(b)(2)(A) and (B) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)); see supra, at 240. To decide which of these look-back periods to apply, the Tax Court must consult the filing provisions of § 6511(a) and ask whether the claim described by §6512(b)(3)(B) — a claim filed “on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency” — would be filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed.” See § 6511(b)(2)(A) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). If a claim filed on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency would be filed within that 3-year period, then the look-back period is also three years and the Tax Court has jurisdiction to award a refund of any taxes paid within three years prior to the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. §§ 6511(b)(2)(A) and 6512(b)(3)(B). If the claim would not be filed within that 3-year period, then the period for awarding a refund is only two years. §§ 6511(b)(2)(B) and 6512(b)(3)(B). In this case, we must determine which of these two look-back periods to apply when the taxpayer fails to file a tax return when it is due, and the Commissioner mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency before the taxpayer gets around to filing a late return. The Fourth Circuit held that a taxpayer in this situation is entitled to a 3-year look-back period if the taxpayer actually files a timely claim at some point in the litigation, see infra, at 246, and respondent offers additional reasons for applying a 3-year look-back period, see infra, at 249-252. We think the proper application of § 6512(b)(3)(B) instead requires that a 2-year look-back period be applied. We reach this conclusion by following the instructions set out in § 6512(b)(3)(B). The operative question is whether a claim filed “on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency” would be filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed.” See § 6512(b)(3)(B) (incorporating §§ 6511(b)(2) and 6511(a)). In the case of a taxpayer who does not file a return before the notice of deficiency is mailed, the claim described in § 6512(b)(3)(B) could not be filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed.” No return having been filed, there is no date from which to measure the 3-year filing period described in § 6511(a). Consequently, the claim contemplated in § 6512(b)(3)(B) would not be filed within the 3-year window described in § 6511(a), and the 3-year look-back period set out in § 6511(b)(2)(A) would not apply. The applicable look-back period is instead the default 2-year period described in § 6511(b)(2)(B), which is measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency, see § 6512(b)(3)(B). The taxpayer is entitled to a refund of any taxes paid within two years prior to the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Special rules might apply in some cases, see, e. g., § 6511(c) (extension of time by agreement); § 6511(d) (special limitations periods for designated items), but in the ease where the taxpayer has filed a timely tax return and the IRS is claiming a deficiency in taxes from that return, the interplay of §§ 6512(b)(3)(B) and 6511(b)(2) generally ensures that the taxpayer can obtain a refund of any taxes against which the IRS is asserting a deficiency. In most cases, the notice of deficiency must be mailed within three years from the date the tax return is filed. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6501(a) and 6503(a)(1); Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U. S. 386, 389, 392 (1984). Therefore, if the taxpayer has already filed a return (albeit perhaps a faulty one), any claim filed “on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency” would necessarily be filed within three years from the date the return is filed. In these circumstances, the applicable look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B) would be the 3-year period defined in § 6511(b)(2)(A), and the Tax Court would have jurisdiction to award a refund. Therefore, in the case of a taxpayer who files a timely tax return, § 6512(b)(3)(B) usually operates to toll the filing period that might otherwise deprive the taxpayer of the opportunity to seek a refund. If a taxpayer contesting the accuracy of a previously filed tax return in Tax Court discovers for the first time during the course of litigation that he is entitled to a refund, the taxpayer can obtain a refund from the Tax Court without first filing a timely claim for refund with the IRS. It does not matter, as it would in district court, see § 7422 (incorporating § 6511), that the taxpayer has discovered the entitlement to a refund well after the period for filing a timely refund claim with the IRS has passed, because § 6512(b)(3)(B) applies “whether or not [a claim is] filed,” and the look-back period is measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Ibid. Nor does it matter, as it might in a refund suit, see 26 CFR § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (1995), whether the taxpayer has previously apprised the IRS of the precise basis for the refund claim, because 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B) posits the filing of a hypothetical claim “stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment.” Section 6512(b)(3)(B) treats delinquent filers of income tax returns less charitably. Whereas timely filers are virtually assured the opportunity to seek a refund in the event they are drawn into Tax Court litigation, a delinquent filer’s entitlement to a refund in Tax Court depends on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) tolls the limitations period, in that it directs the Tax Court to measure the look-back period from the date on which the notice of deficiency is mailed and not the date on which the taxpayer actually files a claim for refund. But in the case of delinquent filers, § 6512(b)(3)(B) establishes only a 2-year look-back period, so the delinquent filer is not assured the opportunity to seek a refund in Tax Court: If the notice of deficiency is mailed more than two years after the taxes were paid, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award the taxpayer a refund. The Tax Court properly applied this 2-year look-back period to Lundy’s case. As of September 26, 1990 (the date the notice was mailed), Lundy had not filed a tax return. Consequently, a claim filed on that date would not be filed within the 3-year period described in § 6511(a), and the 2-year period from § 6511(b)(2)(B) applies. Lundy’s taxes were withheld from his wages, so they are deemed paid on the date his 1987 tax return was due (April 15, 1988), see § 6513(b)(1), which is more than two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed (September 26, 1990). Lundy is therefore seeking a refund of taxes paid outside the applicable look-back period, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award such a refund. Ill In deciding Lundy’s case, the Fourth Circuit adopted a different approach to interpreting § 6512(b)(3)(B) and applied a 3-year look-back period. Respondent supports the Fourth Circuit’s rationale, but also offers an argument for applying a uniform 3-year look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B). We find neither position persuasive. The Fourth Circuit held: “[T]he Tax Court, when applying the limitation provision of § 6511(b)(2) in light of § 6512(b)(3)(B), should substitute the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency for the date on which the taxpayer filed the claim for refund, but only for the purpose of determining the benchmark date for measuring the limitation period and not for the purpose of determining whether the two-year or three-year limitation period applies.” 45 F. 3d, at 861. In other words, the Fourth Circuit held that the look-back period is measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency (i. e., the taxpayer is entitled to a refund of any taxes paid within either two or three years prior to that date), but that that date is irrelevant in calculating the length of the look-back period itself. The look-back period, the Fourth Circuit held, must be defined in terms of the date that the taxpayer actually filed a claim for refund. Ibid. (“[T]he three-year limitation period applies because Lundy filed his claim for refund . . . within three years of filing his tax return”). Thus, under the Fourth Circuit’s view, Lundy was entitled to a 3-year look-back period because Lundy’s late-filed 1987 tax return contained a claim for refund, and that claim was filed within three years from the filing of the return. Ibid, (taxpayer entitled to same look-back period that would apply in district court). Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation, the fact that Lundy actually filed a claim for a refund after the date on which the Commissioner mailed the notice of deficiency has no bearing in determining whether the Tax Court has jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund. See supra, at 240-241. Once a taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of a deficiency or to award a refund, see 26 U. S. C. § 6512(a), and the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to award a refund is limited to those circumstances delineated in § 6512(b)(3). Section 6512(b)(3)(C) is the only provision that measures the look-back period based on a refimd claim that is actually filed by the taxpayer, and that provision is inapplicable here because it only applies to refund claims filed “before the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency.” § 6512(b)(3)(C). Under § 6512(b)(3)(B), which is the provision that does apply, the Tax Court is instructed to consider only the timeliness of a claim filed “on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency,” not the timeliness of any claim that the taxpayer might actually file. The Fourth Circuit’s rule also leads to a result that Congress could not have intended, in that it subjects the timely, not the delinquent, filer to a shorter limitations period in Tax Court. Under the Fourth Circuit’s rule, the availability of a refund turns entirely on whether the taxpayer has in fact filed a claim for refund with the IRS, because it is the date of actual filing that determines the applicable look-back period under § 6511(b)(2) (and, by incorporation, § 6512(b)(3)(B)). See 45 F. 3d, at 861; supra, at 246. This rule might “eliminate] the inequities resulting” from adhering to the 2-year look-back period, 45 F. 3d, at 863, but it creates an even greater inequity in the case of a taxpayer who dutifully files a tax return when it is due, but does not initially claim a refund. We think our interpretation of the statute achieves an appropriate and reasonable result in this case: The taxpayer who files a timely income tax return could obtain a refund in the Tax Court under § 6512(b)(3)(B), without regard to whether the taxpayer has actually filed a timely claim for refund. See supra, at 244-245. If it is the actual filing of a refund claim that determines the length of the look-back period, as the Fourth Circuit held, the filer of a timely income tax return might be out of luck. If the taxpayer does not file a claim for refund with his tax return, and the notice of deficiency arrives shortly before the 3-year period for filing a timely claim expires, see §§ 6511(a) and (b)(1), the taxpayer might not discover his entitlement to a refund until well after the commencement of litigation in the Tax Court. But having filed a timely return, the taxpayer would be precluded by the passage of time from filing an actual claim for refund “within 3 years from the time the return was filed,” as § 6511(b) (2)(A) requires. § 6511(b)(2)(A) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)). The taxpayer would therefore be entitled only to a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the mailing of the notice of deficiency. See § 6511(b)(2)(B); 45 F. 3d, at 861-862 (taxpayer entitled to same look-back period as would apply in district court, and look-back period is determined based on date of actual filing). It is unlikely that Congress intended for a taxpayer in Tax Court to be worse off for having filed a timely return, but that result would be compelled under the Fourth Circuit’s approach. Lundy offers an alternative reading of the statute that avoids this unreasonable result, but Lundy’s approach is similarly defective. The main thrust of Lundy’s argument is that the “claim” contemplated in § 6512(b)(3)(B) could be filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed,” such that the applicable look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B) would be three years, if the claim were itself filed on a tax return. Lundy in fact argues that Congress must have intended the claim described in § 6512(b)(3)(B) to be a claim filed on a return, because there is no other way to file a claim for refund with the IRS. Brief for Respondent 28, 30 (citing 26 CFR § 301.6402-3(a)(l) (1995)). Lundy therefore argues that § 6512(b)(3)(B) incorporates a uniform 3-year look-back period for Tax Court cases: If the taxpayer files a timely return, the notice of deficiency (and the “claim” under § 6512(b)(3)(B)) will necessarily be filed within three years of the return and the look-back period is three years; if the taxpayer does not file a return, then the claim contemplated in § 6512(b)(3)(B) is deemed to be a claim filed with, and thus within three years of, a return and the look-back period is again three years. Like the Fourth Circuit’s approach, Lundy’s reading of the statute has the convenient effect of ensuring that taxpayers in Lundy’s position can almost always obtain a refund if they file in Tax Court, but we are bound by the terms Congress chose to use when it drafted the statute, and we do not think that the term “claim” as it is used in § 6512(b)(3)(B) is susceptible of the interpretation Lundy has given it. The Internal Revenue Code does not define the term “claim for refund” as it is used in § 6512(b)(3)(B), cf. 26 U. S. C. § 6696(e)(2) (“For purposes of sections 6694 and 6695 . . . [t]he term ‘claim for refund’ means a claim for refund of, or credit against, any tax imposed by subtitle A”), but it is apparent from the language of § 6512(b)(3)(B) and the statute as a whole that a claim for refund can be filed separately from a return. Section 6512(b)(3)(B) provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to award a refund to the extent the taxpayer would be entitled to a refund “if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed.” (Emphasis added.) It does not state, as Lundy would have it, that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund if on that date “a claim and a return had been filed.” Perhaps the most compelling evidence that Congress did not intend the term “claim” in § 6512 to mean a “claim filed on a return” is the parallel use of the term “claim” in § 6511(a). Section 6511(a) indicates that a claim for refund is timely if it is “filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed,” and it plainly contemplates that a claim can be filed even “if no return was filed.” If a claim could only be filed with a return, as Lundy contends, these provisions of the statute would be senseless, cf. 26 U. S. C. § 6696 (separately defining “claim for refund” and “return”), and we have been given no reason to believe that Congress meant the term “claim” to mean one thing in §6511 but to mean something else altogether in the very next section of the statute. The interrelationship and close proximity of these provisions of the statute “presents a classic case for application of the ‘normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U. S. 851, 860 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The regulation Lundy cites in support of his interpretation, 26 CFR § 301.6402-3(a)(l) (1995), is consistent with our interpretation of the statute. That regulation states only that a claim must “[i]n general” be filed on a return, ibid., inviting the obvious conclusion that there are some circumstances in which a claim and a return can be filed separately. We have previously recognized that even a claim that does not comply with federal regulations might suffice to toll the limitations periods under the Tax Code, see, e. g., United States v. Kales, 314 U. S. 186,194 (1941) (“notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim” tolls the limitations period, even if “it does not comply with formal requirements of the statute and regulations”), and we must assume that if Congress had intended to require that the “claim” described in § 6512(b)(3)(B) be a “claim filed on a return,” it would have said so explicitly. IV Lundy offers two policy-based arguments for applying a 3-year look-back period under § 6512(b)(3)(B). He argues that the application of a 2-year period is contrary to Congress’ broad intent in drafting § 6512(b)(3)(B), which was to preserve, not defeat, a taxpayer’s claim to a refund in Tax Court, and he claims that our interpretation creates an incongruity between the limitations period that applies in Tax Court litigation and the period that would apply in a refund suit filed in district court or the Court of Federal Claims. Even if we were inclined to depart from the plain language of the statute, we would find neither of these arguments persuasive. Lundy correctly argues that Congress intended § 6512(b) (3)(B) to permit taxpayers to seek a refund in Tax Court in circumstances in which they might otherwise be barred from filing an administrative claim for refund with the IRS. This is in fact the way § 6512(b)(3)(B) operates in a large number of cases. See supra, at 244-245. But that does not mean that Congress intended that § 6512(b)(3)(B) would always preserve taxpayers’ ability to seek a refund. Indeed, it is apparent from the face of the statute that Congress also intended § 6512(b)(3)(B) to act sometimes as a bar to recovery. To this end, the section incorporates both the 2-year and the 3-year look-back periods from § 6511(b)(2), and we must assume (contrary to Lundy’s reading, which provides a uniform 3-year period, see supra, at 248-249) that Congress intended for both those look-back periods to have some effect. Cf. Badaracco, 464 U. S., at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the correct standard for construing a statute of limitations ... surely the presumption ought to be that some limitations period is applicable”). (Emphasis deleted.) Lundy also suggests that our interpretation of the statute creates a disparity between the limitations period that applies in Tax Court and the periods that apply in refund suits filed in district court or the Court of Federal Claims. In this regard, Lundy argues that the claim for refund he filed with his tax return on December 28 would have been timely for purposes of district court litigation because it was filed “within 3 years from the time the return was filed,” § 6511(b)(1) (incorporating by reference § 6511(a)); see also Rev. Rui. 76-511, 1976-2 Cum. Bull. 428, and within the 3-year look-back period that would apply under § 6511(b)(2)(A). Petitioner disagrees that there is any disparity, arguing that Lundy’s interpretation of the statute is wrong and that Lundy’s claim for refund would not have been considered timely in district court. See Brief for Petitioner 12, 29-30, and n. 11 (citing Miller v. United States, 38 F. 3d 473, 475 (CA9 1994)). We assume without deciding that Lundy is correct, and that a different limitations period would apply in district court, but nonetheless find in this disparity no excuse to change the limitations scheme that Congress has crafted. The rules governing litigation in Tax Court differ in many ways from the rules governing litigation in the district court and the Court of Federal Claims. Some of these differences might make the Tax Court a more favorable forum, while others may not. Compare 26 U. S. C. § 6213(a) (taxpayer can seek relief in Tax Court without first paying an assessment of taxes) with Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 177 (1960) (28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) requires full payment of the tax assessment before taxpayer can file a refund suit in district court); and compare 26 U. S. C. .§ 6512(b)(3)(B) (Tax Court must assume that the taxpayer has filed a claim “stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court” intends to award a refund) with 26 CFR §301.6402-2(b)(l) (1995) (claim for refund in district court must state grounds for refund with specificity). To the extent our interpretation of § 6512(b) (3)(B) reveals a further distinction between the rules that apply in these forums, it is a distinction compelled by the statutory language, and it is a distinction Congress could rationally make. As our discussion of § 6512(b)(3)(B) demonstrates, see swpra, at 244-245, all a taxpayer need do to preserve the ability to seek a refund in the Tax Court is comply with the law and file a timely return. We are bound by the language of the statute as it is written, and even if the rule Lundy advocates might “accor[d] with good policy,” we are not at liberty “to rewrite [the] statute because [we] might deem its effects susceptible of improvement.” Badaracco, supra, at 398. Applying § 6512(b)(3)(B) as Congress drafted it, we find that the applicable look-back period in this case is two years, measured from the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Accordingly, we find that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund of his overwithheld taxes. The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. In relevant part, § 6511 provides: “(a) Period of limitation on filing claim “Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. Claim for credit or reftmd of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title which is required to be paid by means of a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the tax was paid. “(b) Limitation on allowance of credits and refunds “(1) Filing of claim within prescribed period “No credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) for the filing of a claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer within such period. “(2) Limit on amount of credit or refund “(A) Limit where claim filed within 3-year period “If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period prescribed in subsection (a), the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return. If the tax was required to be paid by means of a stamp, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the 3 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim. “(B) Limit where claim not filed within 3-year period “If the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim. “(C) Limit if no claim filed “If no claim was filed, the credit or refund shall not exceed the amount which would be allowable under subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be, if claim was filed on the date the credit or refund is allowed.” In relevant part, § 6512(b) provides: “(1) Jurisdiction to determine “Except as provided by paragraph (3) and by section 7463, if the Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and further finds that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of income tax for the same taxable year ... in respect of which the Secretary determined the deficiency, or finds that there is a deficiency but that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of such tax, the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to determine the amount of such overpayment, and such amount shall, when the decision of the Tax Court has become final, be credited or refunded to the taxpayer. “(3) Limit on amount of credit or refund “No such credit or refund shall be allowed or made of any portion of the tax unless the Tax Court determines as part of its decision that such portion was paid— “(A) after the mailing of the notice of deficiency, “(B) within the period which would be ápplieable under section 6511(b)(2), (e), or (d), if on the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency a claim had been filed (whether or not filed) stating the grounds upon which the Tax Court finds that there is an overpayment, or “(C) within the period which would be applicable under section 6511(b)(2), (c), or (d), in respect of any claim for refund filed within the applicable period specified in section 6511 and before the date of the mailing of the notice of deficiency— “(i) which had not been disallowed before that date, “(ii) which had been disallowed before that date and in respect of which a timely suit for refund could have been commenced as of that date, or “(iii) in respect of which a suit for refund had been commenced before that date and within the period specified in section 6532.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MOBAY CHEMICAL CORP. v. COSTLE, ADMINISTRATRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY No. 78-308. Decided January 8, 1979 Per Curiam. Appellant contends that the use of one submitter’s data, filed prior to 1970, in the consideration of another person’s application for registration of pesticides under § 3 of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), as added by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 979, and as amended, 89 Stat. 755, 7 U. S. C. § 136a, effects a taking for private use and without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and that the Act is to that extent invalid. A three-judge court was convened under former 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.) and proceeded to reject these contentions. Appellant seeks to appeal directly to this Court. Having examined the Act and the papers before us, however, we are convinced that whatever may be true with respect to data submitted after January 1, 1970, the FIFRA, as amended, does not at all address the issues of the conditions under which pre-1970 data may be used in considering another application. It neither authorizes, forbids, nor requires the existing agency practice with respect to pre-1970 data. As a legal matter, then, appellant’s attack is on agency practice, not on the statute. The three-judge court was thus improperly convened, William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171, 173-174 (1939), and this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from the judgment in such case. See 28 U. S. C. § 1253; Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524, 528-530 (1976). The appeal is accordingly dismissed for want of jurisdiction. So ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. FRUIT & VEGETABLE PACKERS & WAREHOUSEMEN, LOCAL 760, et al. No. 88. Argued February 18-19, 1964. Decided April 20, 1964. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come. David Previant argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Hugh Hafer and Richard P. Donaldson. Alfred J. Schweppe and Mary Ellen Krug filed a brief for the Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee, Inc., as amicus curiae, urging reversal. J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Under § 8 (b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is an unfair labor practice for a union “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person,” with the object of “forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer ... or to cease doing business with any other person . . . .” A proviso excepts, however, “publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.” (Italics supplied.) The question in this case is whether the respondent unions violated this section when they limited their secondary picketing of retail stores to an appeal to the customers of the stores not to buy the products of certain firms against which one of the respondents was on strike. Respondent Local 760 called a strike against fruit packers and warehousemen doing business in Yakima, Washington. The struck firms sold Washington State apples to the Safeway chain of retail stores in and about Seattle, Washington. Local 760,' aided by respondent Joint Council, instituted a consumer boycott against the apples in support of the strike. They placed pickets who walked back and forth before the customers’ entrances of 46 Safeway stores in Seattle. The pickets — two at each of 45 stores and three at the 46th store — wore placards and distributed handbills which appealed to Safeway customers, and to the public generally, to refrain from buying Washington State apples, which were only one of numerous food products sold in the stores. Before the pickets appeared at any store, a letter was delivered to the store manager informing him that the picketing was only an appeal to his customers not to buy Washington State apples, and that the pickets were being expressly instructed “to patrol peacefully in front of the consumer entrances of the store, to stay away from the delivery entrances and not to interfere with the work of your employees, or with deliveries to or pickups from your store.” A copy of written instructions to the pickets— which included the explicit statement that “you are also forbidden to request that the customers not patronize the store” — was enclosed with the letter. Since it was desired to assure Safeway employees that they were not to cease work, and to avoid any interference with pickups or deliveries, the pickets appeared after the stores opened for business and departed before the stores closed. At all times during the picketing, the store employees continued to work, and no deliveries or pickups were obstructed. Washington State apples were handled in normal course by both Safeway employees and the employees of other employers involved. Ingress and egress by customers and others was not interfered with in any manner. A complaint issued on charges that this conduct violated § 8 (b) (4) as amended. The case was submitted directly to the National Labor Relations Board on a stipulation of facts and the waiver of a hearing and proceedings before a Trial Examiner. The Board held, following its construction of the statute in Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Twin City Local No. 61,132 N. L. R. B. 40, that “by literal wording of the proviso [to Section 8 (b) (4)] as well as through the interpretive gloss placed thereon by its drafters, consumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment is prohibited.” 132 N. L. R. B. 1172, 1177. Upon respondents’ petition for review and the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the Board’s order and remanded. The court rejected the Board’s construction and held that the statutory requirement of a showing that respondents’ conduct would “threaten, coerce, or restrain” Safeway could only be satisfied by affirmative proof that a substantial economic impact on Safeway had occurred, or was likely to occur as a result of the conduct. Under the remand the Board was left “free to reopen the record to receive evidence upon the issue whether Safeway was in fact threatened, coerced, or restrained.” 113 U. S. App. D. C. 356, 363, 308 F. 2d 311, 318. We granted certiorari, 374 U. S. 804. The Board’s reading of the statute — that the legislative history and the phrase “other than picketing” in the proviso reveal a congressional purpose to outlaw all picketing directed at customers at a secondary site — necessarily rested on the finding that Congress determined that such picketing always threatens, coerces or restrains the secondary employer. We therefore have a special responsibility to examine the legislative history for confirmation that Congress made that determination. Throughout the history of federal regulation of labor relations, Congress has consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing except where it is used as a means to achieve specific ends which experience has shown are undesirable. “In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing.” Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 284. We have recognized this congressional practice and have not ascribed to Congress a purpose to outlaw peaceful picketing unless “there is the clearest indication in the legislative history,” ibid., that Congress intended to do so as regards the particular ends of the picketing under review. Both the congressional policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment. We have examined the legislative history of the amendments to § 8 (b)(4), and conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and, particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited, as here, to persuading Safeway customers not to buy Washington State apples when they traded in the Safeway stores. All that the legislative history shows in the way of an “isolated evil” believed to require proscription of peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, was its use to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer. .This narrow focus reflects the difference between such conduct and peaceful picketing at the secondary site directed only at the struck product. In the latter case, the union’s appeal to the public is confined to its dispute with the primary employer, since the public is not asked to withhold its patronage from the secondary employer, but only to boycott the primary employer’s goods. On the other hand, a union appeal to the public at the secondary site not to trade at all with the secondary employer goes beyond the goods of the primary employer, and seeks the public’s assistance in forcing the secondary employer to cooperate with the union in its primary dispute. This is not to say that this distinction was expressly alluded to in the debates. It is to say, however, that the consumer picketing carried on in this case is not attended by the abuses at which the statute was directed. The story of the 1959 amendments, which we have detailed at greater length in our opinion filed today in Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., ante, p. 46, begins with the original § 8 (b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act. Its prohibition, in pertinent part, was confined to the inducing or encouraging of “the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal . . . to . . . handle . . . any goods . . .” of a primary employer. This proved to be inept language. Three major loopholes were revealed. Since only inducement of “employees” was proscribed, direct inducement of a supervisor or the secondary employer by threats of labor trouble was not prohibited. Since only a “strike or a concerted refusal” was prohibited, pressure upon a single employee was not forbidden. Finally, railroads, airlines and municipalities were not “employers” under the Act and therefore inducement or encouragement of their employees was not unlawful. When major labor relations legislation was being considered in 1958, the closing of these loopholes was important to the House and to some members of the Senate. But the prevailing Senate sentiment favored new legislation primarily concerned with the redress of other abuses, and neither the Kennedy-Ives bill, which failed of passage in the House in the Eighty-fifth Congress, nor the Kennedy-Ervin bill, adopted by the Senate in the Eighty-sixth Congress, included any revision of § 8(b) (4). Proposed amendments of § 8 (b)(4) offered by several Senators to fill the three loopholes were rejected. The Administration introduced such a bill, and it was supported by Senators Dirksen and Goldwater. Senator Goldwater, an insistent proponent of stiff boycott curbs, also proposed his own amendments. We think it is especially significant that neither Senator, nor the Secretary of Labor in testifying in support of the Administration’s bill, referred to consumer picketing as making the amendments necessary. Senator McClellan, who also offered a bill to curb boycotts, mentioned consumer picketing but only such as was “pressure in the form of dissuading customers from dealing with secondary employers.” (Emphasis supplied.) It was the opponents of the amendments who, in expressing fear of their sweep, suggested that they might proscribe consumer picketing. Senator Humphrey first sounded the warning early in April. Many months later, when the Conference bill was before the Senate, Senator Morse, a conferee, would not support the Conference bill on the express ground that it prohibited consumer picketing. But we have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. “The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.” Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395; see also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 288; United States v. Calamaro, 354 U. S. 351, n. 9, at 358. The silence of the sponsors of amendments is pregnant with significance since they must have been aware that consumer picketing as such had been held to be outside the reach of § 8 (b)(4). We are faithful to our practice of respecting the congressional policy of legislating only against clearly identified abuses of peaceful picketing when we conclude that the Senate neither specified the kind of picketing here involved as an abuse, nor indicated any intention of banning all consumer picketing. The House history is similarly beclouded, but what appears confirms our conclusion. From the outset the House legislation included provisions concerning secondary boycotts. The Landrum-Griffin bill, which was ultimately passed by the House, embodied the Eisenhower Administration’s proposals as to secondary boycotts. The initial statement of Congressman Griffin in introducing the bill which bears his name, contains no reference to consumer picketing in the list of abuses which he thought required the secondary boycott amendments. Later in the House debates he did discuss consumer picketing, but only in the context of its abuse when directed against shutting off the patronage of a secondary employer. In the debates before passage of the House bill he stated that the amendments applied to consumer picketing of customer entrances to retail stores selling goods manufactured by a concern under strike, if the picketing were designed to “coerce or to restrain the employer of [the] second establishment, to get him not to do business with the manufacturer . . . ,” and further that, “of course, this bill and any other bill is limited by the constitutional right of free speech. If the purpose of the picketing is to coerce the retailer not to do business with the manufacturer” — then such a boycott could be stopped. (Italics supplied.) The relevant changes in former § 8 (b)(4) made by the House bill substituted “any individual employed by any person” for the Taft-Hartley wording, “the employees of any employer,” deleted the requirement of a “concerted” refusal, and made it an unfair labor practice “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” where an object thereof was an end forbidden by the statute, e. g., forcing or requiring a secondary employer to cease handling the products of, or doing business with, a primary employer. There is thus nothing in the legislative history prior to the convening of the Conference Committee which shows any congressional concern with consumer picketing beyond that with the “isolated evil” of its use to cut off the business of a secondary employer as a means of forcing him to stop doing business with the primary employer. When Congress meant to bar picketing per se, it made its meaning clear; for example, § 8 (b)(7) makes it an unfair labor practice, “to picket or cause to be picketed . . . any employer . . . .” In contrast, the prohibition of § 8 (b) (4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the conduct, whether it be picketing or otherwise. Senator Kennedy presided over the Conference Committee. He and Congressman Thompson prepared a joint analysis of the Senate and House bills. This analysis pointed up the First Amendment implications of the broad language in the House revisions of § 8 (b) (4) stating, “The prohibition [of the House bill] reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering with freedom of speech. “. . . one of the apparent purposes of the amendment is to prevent unions from appealing to the general public as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute. This is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression.” This analysis was the first step in the development of the publicity proviso, but nothing in the legislative history of the proviso alters our conclusion that Congress did not clearly express an intention that amended § 8 (b)(4) should prohibit all consumer picketing. Because of the sweeping language of the House bill, and its implications for freedom of speech, the Senate conferees refused to accede to the House proposal without safeguards for the right of unions to appeal to the public, even by some conduct which might be “coercive.” The result was the addition of the proviso. But it does not follow from the fact that some coercive conduct was protected by the proviso, that the exception “other than picketing” indicates that Congress had determined that all consumer picketing was coercive. No Conference Report was before the Senate when it passed the compromise bill, and it had the benefit only of Senator Kennedy’s statement of the purpose of the proviso. ' He said that the proviso preserved “the right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor and to refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods. . . . We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but were able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop . . . and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing . . . .” (Italics supplied.) This explanation does not compel the conclusion that the Conference Agreement contemplated prohibiting any consumer picketing at a secondary site beyond that which urges the public, in Senator Kennedy’s words, to “refrain from trading with a retailer who sells such goods.” To read into the Conference Agreement, on the basis of a single statement, an intention to prohibit all consumer picketing at a secondary site would depart from our practice of respecting the congressional policy not to' prohibit peaceful picketing except to curb “isolated evils” spelled out by the Congress itself. Peaceful consumer picketing to shut off all trade with the secondary employer unless he aids the union in its dispute with the primary employer, is poles apart from such picketing which only persuades his customers not to buy the struck product. The proviso indicates no more than that the Senate conferees’ constitutional doubts led Congress to authorize publicity other than picketing which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all trading with him, but not such publicity which has the effect of cutting off his deliveries or inducing his employees to cease work. On the other hand, picketing which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all trading with him was also to be barred. In sum, the legislative history does not support the Board’s finding that Congress meant to prohibit all consumer picketing at a secondary site, having determined that such picketing necessarily threatened, coerced or restrained the secondary employer. Rather, the history shows that Congress was following its usual practice of legislating against peaceful picketing only to curb “isolated evils.” This distinction is opposed as “unrealistic” because, it is urged, all picketing automatically provokes the public to stay away from the picketed establishment. The public will, it is said, neither read the signs and handbills, nor note the explicit injunction that “This is not a strike against any store or market.” Be that as it may, our holding today simply takes note of the fact that Congress has never adopted a broad condemnation ' of peaceful picketing, such as that urged upon us by petitioners, and an intention to do so is not revealed with that “clearest indication in the legislative history,” which we require. Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, supra. We come then to the question whether the picketing in this case, confined as it was to persuading customers to cease buying the product of the primary employer, falls within the area of secondary consumer picketing which Congress did clearly indicate its intention to prohibit under § 8 (b) (4) (ii). We hold that it did not fall within that area, and therefore did not “threaten, coerce, or restrain” Safeway. While any diminution in Safeway’s purchases of apples due to a drop in consumer demand might be said to be a result which causes respondents’ picketing to fall literally within the statutory prohibition, “it is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459. See United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544. When consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy the struck product, the union’s appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded to include the premises of the secondary employer, but if the appeal succeeds, the secondary employer’s purchases from the struck firms are decreased only because the public has diminished its purchases of the struck product. On the other hand, when consumer picketing is employed to persuade customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck product, not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such case, the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer. We disagree therefore with the Court of Appeals that the test of “to threaten, coerce, or restrain” for the purposes of this case is whether Safeway suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss. A violation of § 8 (b) (4) (ii)(B) would not be established, merely because respondents’ picketing was effective to reduce Safeway’s sales of Washington State apples, even if this led or might lead Safeway to drop the item as a poor seller. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded with direction to enter judgment setting aside the Board’s order. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. “Notice to Storage [sic] Manager and Store Employees. “We are advised that you are presently engaged in selling Washington State Apples. “The 1960 crop of Washington State Apples is being packed by non-union firms, including 26 firms in the Yakima Valley. Prior to this year, the 26 Yakima Valley firms had been parties to a collective bargaining contract with Teamsters Union Local 760 of Yakima, Washington, but this year, when a new contract was being negotiated, the employers took the position that many of the basic provisions of the prior contract, such as seniority, overtime, protection against unjust discharge, grievance procedure and union security, should be weakened or eliminated entirely. These extreme demands plus a refusal to bargain in good faith led to a strike against the employer. The union made all possible efforts to avoid this strike as did outside agencies who were assisting in the negotiations. Even the Governor of the State of Washington, the Honorable Albert D. Rosellini, intervened and suggested that the parties agree to a fact finding committee or arbitration. The union agreed to these proposals but the employers declined. “The employer’s refusal to bargain in good faith has caused the Seattle office of the National Labor Relations Board to prepare a complaint against the employers, charging them with unfair labor practices in violation of federal law. “The strike at Yakima is still continuing and in order to win this strike, we must ask the consuming public not to purchase Washington State Apples. “Therefore, we are going to place peaceful pickets at the entrances to your store for the purpose of trying to persuade the public not to buy Washington Apples. These pickets are being instructed to patrol peacefully in front of the consumer entrances of the store, to stay away from the delivery entrances and not to interfere with the work of your employees, or with deliveries to or pickups from your store. A copy of the instructions which have been furnished to the pickets is attached herewith. “We do not intend that any of your employees cease work as a result of the picketing. We ask that you advise your employees of our intentions in this respect, perhaps by posting this notice on your store bulletin board. “If any of your employees should stop work as a result of our program, or if you should have any difficulties as far as pickups and deliveries are concerned, or if you observe any of the pickets disobeying the instructions which they have been given, please notify the undersigned union representative at once and we will take steps to see that the situation is promptly corrected. “As noted above, our information indicates that you are presently selling Washington State Apples. If, however, this information is not correct and you are selling apples exclusively from another state, please notify the undersigned and we will see that the pickets are transferred to another store where Washington State Apples are actually being sold. “Thank you for your cooperation.” The instructions to pickets read as follows; “Instructions to Pickets. “Dear Picket: “You are being asked to help publicize a nationwide consumer boycott aimed at non-union Washington State Apples. To make this program a success your cooperation is essential. Please read these instructions and follow them carefully. “1. At all times you are to engage in peaceful picketing. You are forbidden to engage in any altercation, argument, or misconduct of any kind. “2. You are to walk back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the consumer entrances to the grocery stores. If a particular store is located toward the rear of a parking lot, you are to ask the store manager for permission to walk back and forth on the apron or sidewalk immediately in front of the store; but if he denies you this permission, you are to picket only on the public sidewalk at the entrances to the parking lot. As far as large shipping centers are concerned, you will be given special instruction for picketing in such locations. “3. You are not to picket in front of or in the area of any entrance to the store which is apparently set aside for the use of store employees and delivery men. As noted above, you are to limit your picketing to the consumer entrances to the store. “4. This union has no dispute with the grocery stores, and you are forbidden to make any statement to the effect that the store is unfair or on strike. You are also forbidden to request that the customers not patronize the store. We are only asking that the customers not buy Washington State apples, when they are shopping at the store. “5. Similarly, you are not to interfere with the work of any employees in the store. If you are asked by these employees what the picketing is about, you are to tell them it is an advertising or consumer picket and that they should keep working. Likewise if you are asked by any truck drivers who are making pickups or deliveries what the picket is about, you are to advise that it is an advertising or consumer picket and that it is not intended to interfere with pickups or deliveries (i. e. that they are free to go through). “6. If you are given handbills to distribute, please distribute these handbills in a courteous manner and if the customers throw them on the ground, please see that they are picked up at once and that the area is kept clean. “7. You are forbidden to use intoxicating beverages while on duty or to have such beverages on your person. “8. If a state official or any other private party should complain to you about the picketing, advise them you have your instructions and that their complaints should be registered with the undersigned union representative. “9. These instructions should answer most of your questions concerning this program. However, if you have any additional questions or if specific problems arise which require additional instructions, please call the undersigned.” As amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) §704 (a), 73 Stat. 542-543, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV, 1963) § 158 (b) (4). The firms, 24 in number, are members of the Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee, Inc., which acts as the members’ agent in labor disputes and in collective bargaining with unions which represent employees of the members. The strike was called in a dispute over the terms of the renewal of a collective bargaining agreement. The placard worn by each picket stated: “To the Consumer: Non-Union Washington State apples are being sold at this store. Please do not purchase such apples. Thank you. Teamsters Local 760, Yakima, Washington.” A typical handbill read: “DON’T BUY WASHINGTON STATE APPLES THE 1960 CROP OP WASHINGTON STATE APPLES IS BEING PACKED BY NON-UNION FIRMS Included in this non-union operation are twenty-six firms in the Yakima Valley with which there is a labor dispute. These firms are charged with being UNFAIR by their employees who, with their union, are on strike and have been replaced by non-union strikebreaking workers employed under substandard wage scales and working conditions. In justice to these striking union workers who are attempting to protect their living standards and their right to engage in good-faith collective bargaining, we request that you DON’T BUY WASHINGTON STATE APPLES Teamsters Union Local 760 Yakima, Washington This is not a strike against any store or market. (P.S. — PACIFIC FRUIT & PRODUCE CO. is the only firm packing Washington State Apples under a union contract.)” Copies of the letter delivered to each store manager and of the instructions to pickets are printed in the Appendix. The complaint charged violations of both subsections (i) and (ii) of § 8 (b) (4). The Board held, however, that as the evidence indicated “that Respondents’ picketing was directed at consumers only, and was not intended to 'induce or encourage’ employees of Safeway or of its suppliers to engage in any kind of action, we find that by such picketing Respondents did not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act.” 132 N. L. R. B., at 1177. See also Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., ante, p. 46, decided today. Accord: Burr & Perfection Mattress Co. v. Labor Board, 321 F. 2d 612 (C. A. 5th Cir.). The distinction between picketing a secondary employer merely to “follow the struck goods,” and picketing designed to result in a generalized loss of patronage, was well established in the state cases by 1940. The distinction was sometimes justified on the ground that the secondary employer, who was presumed to receive a competitive benefit from the primary employer’s nonunion, and hence lower, wage scales, was in “unity of interest” with the primary employer, Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N. E. 2d 910, 913; Newark Ladder & Bracket Sales Co. v. Furniture Workers Local 66, 125 N. J. Eq. 99, 4 A. 2d 49; Johnson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, Local 854, 195 So. 791 (Ct. App. La.), and sometimes on the ground that picketing restricted to the primary employer’s product is “a primary boycott against the merchandise.” Chiate v. United Cannery Agricultural Packing & Allied Workers of America, 2 CCH Lab. Cas. 125, 126 (Cal. Super. Ct.). See I Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 123 (1940). S. 748, 105 Cong. Rec. 1259-1293, II Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 975, 987. 105 Cong. Rec. 6190, II Leg. Hist. 1034. 105 Cong. Rec. 1283, 6428, II Leg. Hist. 979, 1079 (Senator Goldwater); 105 Cong. Rec. 1729-1730, II Leg. Hist. 993-994 (remarks of the Secretary of Labor, inserted in the record by Senator Dirksen). It is true that Senator Goldwater referred to consumer picketing when the Conference bill was before the Senate. His full statement reads as follows: “the House bill . . . closed up every loophole in the boycott section of the law including the use of a secondary consumer picket line, an example of which the President gave on his nationwide TV program on August 6. . . .” 105 Cong. Rec. 17904, II Leg. Hist. 1437. The example given by the President was this: “The employees [of a furniture manufacturer] vote against joining a particular union. Instead of picketing the furniture plant itself, unscrupulous organizing officials . . . picket the stores which sell the furniture .... How can anyone justify this kind of pressure against stores which are not involved in any dispute? . . . This kind of action is designed to make the stores bring pressure on the furniture plant and its employees ...” 105 Cong. Rec. 19954, II Leg. Hist. 1842. Senator Goldwater’s own definition of what he meant by a secondary consumer boycott is even more clearly narrow in scope: “A secondary consumer, or customer, boycott involves the refusal of consumers or customers to buy the products or services of one employer in order to force him to stop doing business with another employer.” 105 Cong. Rec. 17674, II Leg. Hist. 1386. 105 Cong. Rec. 6667, II Leg. Hist. 1194. 105 Cong. Rec. 6232, II Leg. Hist. 1037. 105 Cong. Rec. 17882-17883, II Leg. Hist. 1426, United, Wholesale & Warehouse Employees, Local 261, v. Labor Board, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 341, 282 F. 2d 824; Labor Board v. International Union of Brewery Workers, 272 F. 2d 817, 819 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Labor Board v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, 228 F. 2d 553, 559-561 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 962. The Landrum-Griffin bill, H. R. 8400, was substituted on the floor of the House for the bill reported by the House Committee on Education and Labor, H. R. 8342; the language of the two bills with respect to secondary boycotts is compared at II Leg. Hist. 1912. 105 Cong. Ree. 15531-15532, II Leg. Hist. 1568. 105 Cong. Rec. 15673, II Leg. Hist. 1615. The same concern with direct coercion of secondary employers appears in President Eisenhower’s message accompanying the Administration bill. S. Doc. No. 10, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., I Leg. Hist. 81-82. See also minority report of the Senate Committee on the Kennedy-Ervin bill. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., I Leg. Hist. 474-475. 105 Cong. Ree. 16591, II Leg. Hist. 1708. 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, II Leg. Hist. 1432. For example: If a public appeal directed only at a product results in a decline of 25% in the secondary employer’s sales of that product, the corresponding reduction of his purchases of the product is due to his inability to sell any more. But if the appeal is broadened to ask that the public cease all patronage, and if there is a 25% response, the secondary employer faces this decision: whether to discontinue handling the primary product entirely, even though he might otherwise have continued to sell it at the 75% level, in order to prevent the loss of sales of other products.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COUCH v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 71-889. Argued November 14, 1972 Decided January 9, 1973 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 337. Douglas, J., post, p. 338, and Marshall, J., post, p. 344, filed dissenting opinions. John G. Rocovich, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Claude D. Carter. Lawrence G. Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. On the brief were Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Keith A. Jones, John P. Burke, and John M. Brant. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. On January 7, 1970, the Government filed a petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a), seeking enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons in connection with an investigation of petitioner’s tax liability from 1964-1968. The summons was directed to petitioner’s accountant for the production of: “All books, records, bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit ticket copies, workpapers and all other pertinent documents pertaining to the tax liability of the above taxpayer.” The question is whether the taxpayer may invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to prevent the production of her business and tax records in the possession of her accountant. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held the privilege unavailable. We granted certiorari, 405 U. S. 1038. Petitioner is the sole proprietress of a restaurant. Since 1955 she had given bank statements, payroll records, and reports of sales and expenditures to her accountant, Harold Shaffer, for the purpose of preparing her income tax returns. The accountant was not petitioner’s personal employee but an independent contractor with his own office and numerous other clients who compensated him on a piecework basis. When petitioner surrendered possession of the records to Shaffer, she, of course, retained title in herself. During the summer of 1969, Internal Revenue Agent Dennis Groves commenced an investigation of petitioner’s tax returns. After examining her books and records in Shaffer’s office with his permission, Groves found indications of a substantial understatement of gross income. Groves thereupon reported the case to the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service. Special Agent Jennings of the Intelligence Division next commenced a joint investigation with Groves to determine petitioner’s correct tax liability, the possibility of income tax fraud and the imposition of tax fraud penalties, and, lastly, the possibility of a recommendation of a criminal tax violation. Jennings first introduced himself to petitioner, gave her Miranda warnings as required by IRS directive, and then issued the summons to Shaffer after the latter refused to let him see, remove, or microfilm petitioner’s records. When Jennings arrived at Shaffer’s office on September 2, 1969, the return day of the summons, to view the records, he found that Shaffer, at petitioner’s request, had delivered the documents to petitioner’s attorney. Jennings thereupon petitioned the District Court for enforcement of the summons, and petitioner intervened, asserting that the ownership of the records warranted a Fifth Amendment privilege to bar their production. I It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, to issue an Internal Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil and possible criminal consequences. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), the Court upheld such a summons, noting that: “Congress clearly has authorized the use of the summons in investigating what may prove to be criminal conduct. . . . There is no statutory suggestion for any meaningful line of distinction, for civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the point of a special agent’s appearance. ... To draw a line where a special agent appears would require the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to forgo either the use of the summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. We refuse to draw that line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal law.” Id., at 535-536. The Court in Donaldson noted that the taxpayer there had attempted to intervene, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a)(2), to bar production of records “in which the taxpayer has no proprietary interest of any kind, which are owned by the third person, which are in his hands, and which relate to the third person’s business transactions with the taxpayer.” Id., at 523. The Court quite properly concluded that, under those facts, no absolute right to intervene existed. Id., at 530-531. The instant case, however, presents a different question. Here petitioner does own the business records which the Government seeks to review and the courts below did permit her to intervene. The essential inquiry is whether her proprietary interest further enables her to assert successfully a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to bar enforcement of the summons and production of the records, despite the fact that the records no longer remained in her possession. II The importance of preserving inviolate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has often been stated by this Court and need not be elaborated. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). By its very nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation. Historically, the privilege sprang from an abhorrence of governmental assault against the single individual accused of crime and the temptation on the part of the State to resort to the expedient of compelling incriminating evidence from one’s own mouth. United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698 (1944). The Court has thought the privilege necessary to prevent any “recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality,” Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 428 (1956). In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964), the Court articulated the policies and purposes of the privilege: “[0]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government ... in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load/ . . . our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life’ . . . .” It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: “A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production.” Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457, 458 (1913). The Constitution explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness “against himself” ; it necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another. Compulsion upon the person asserting it is an important element of the privilege, and “prohibition of compelling a man ... to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,” Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 252-253 (1910) (emphasis added). It is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense' of justice. In the case before us the ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking. The summons and the order of the District Court enforcing it are directed against the accountant. He, not the taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do anything. And the accountant makes no claim that he may tend to be incriminated by the production. Inquisitorial pressure or coercion against a potentially accused person, compelling her, against her will, to utter self-condemning words or produce incriminating documents is absent. In the present case, no “shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused” is involved. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 765 (1966). The divulgence of potentially incriminating evidence against petitioner is naturally unwelcome. But petitioner’s distress would be no less if the divulgence came not from her accountant but from some other third party with whom she was connected and who possessed substantially equivalent knowledge of her business affairs. The basic complaint of petitioner stems from the fact of divulgence of the possibly incriminating information, not from the manner in which or the person from whom it was extracted. Yet such divulgence, where it does not result from coercion of the suspect herself, is a necessary part of the process of law enforcement and tax investigation. Ill Petitioner’s reliance on Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), is misplaced. In Boyd, the person asserting the privilege was in possession of the written statements in question. The Court in Boyd did hold that “any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime,” violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id., at 630. That case did not, however, address or contemplate the divergence of ownership and possession, and petitioner concedes that court decisions applying Boyd have largely been in instances where possession and ownership conjoined, see, e. g., Hill v. Philpott, 445 F. 2d 144 (CA7 1971); United States v. Judson, 322 F. 2d 460, 63-2 USTC ¶ 9658 (CA9 1963). In Boyd, the production order was directed against the owner of the property who, by responding, would have been forced “to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.” United States v. White, 322 U. S., at 698. But we reiterate that in the instant case there was no enforced communication of any kind from any accused or potential accused. Petitioner would, in effect, have us read Boyd to mark ownership, not possession, as the bounds of the privilege, despite the fact that possession bears the closest relationship to the personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privilege against self-incrimination to a concept of ownership would be to draw a meaningless line. It would hold here that the business records which petitioner actually owned would be protected in the hands of her accountant, while business information communicated to her accountant by letter and conversations in which the accountant took notes, in addition to the accountant’s own workpapers and photocopies of petitioner’s records, would not be subject to a claim of privilege since title rested in the accountant. Such a holding would thus place unnecessary emphasis on the form of communication to an accountant and the accountant’s own working methods, while diverting the inquiry from the basic purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s protections. Other precedents debated by the parties lend no support to petitioner’s contention that ownership of documents should determine the availability of the privilege. In Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), the Court held the privilege unavailable to a party seeking to suppress the admission of incriminating documents and exhibits before a grand jury. The movant’s expectations of privacy in the exhibits had, according to the Court, been destroyed when he voluntarily surrendered the exhibits as evidence in a patent infringement case he had earlier brought in Federal District Court. Petitioner’s claims of ownership failed to overcome this fact. The Court noted pertinently: “But Perlman insists that he owned the exhibits and appears to contend that his ownership exempted them from any use by the Government without his consent. The extent of the insistence is rather elusive of measurement. It seems to be that the owner of property must be considered as having a constructive possession of it wherever it be and in whosesoever hands it be, and it is always, therefore, in a kind of asylum of constitutional privilege. And to be of avail the contention must be pushed to this extreme. It is opposed, however, by all the cited cases. They, as we have said, make the criterion of immunity not the ownership of property but the 'physical or moral compulsion’ exerted.” Id., at 15. Petitioner argues, nevertheless, that grave prejudice will result from a denial of her claim to equate ownership and the scope of the privilege. She alleges that “[i]f the IRS is able to reach her records the instant those records leave her hands and are deposited in the hands of her retainer whom she has hired for a special purpose then the meaning of the privilege is lost.” That is not, however, the import of today’s decision. We do indeed believe that actual possession of documents bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against governmental compulsions upon the individual accused of crime. Yet situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact. But this is not the case before us. Here there was no mere fleeting divestment of possession: the records had been given to this accountant regularly since 1955 and remained in his continuous possession until the summer of 1969 when the summons was issued. Moreover, the accountant himself worked neither in petitioner’s office nor as her employee. The length of his possession of petitioner’s records and his independent status confirm the belief that petitioner’s divestment of possession was of such a character as to disqualify her entirely as an object of any impermissible Fifth Amendment compulsion. IV Petitioner further argues that the confidential nature of the accountant-client relationship and her resulting expectation of privacy in delivering the records protect her, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from their production. Although not in itself controlling, we note that no confidential accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases, Falsone v. United States, 205 F. 2d 734 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 864; Gariepy v. United States, 189 F. 2d 459, 463-464 (CA6 1951); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F. 2d 924, 939 (CA9 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 860; Olender v. United States, 210 F. 2d 795, 806 (CA9 1954). Nor is there justification for such a privilege where records relevant to income tax returns are involved in a criminal investigation or prosecution. In Boyd, a pre-income tax case, the Court spoke of protection of privacy, 116 U. S., at 630, but there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return. What information is not disclosed is largely in the accountant’s discretion, not petitioner’s. Indeed, the accountant himself risks criminal prosecution if he willfully assists in the preparation of a false return. 26 U. S. C. § 7206 (2). His own need for self-protection would often require the right to disclose the information given him. Petitioner seeks extensions of constitutional protections against self-incrimination in the very situation where obligations of disclosure exist and under a system largely dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive. Accordingly, petitioner here cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth or Fifth Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality. V The criterion, for Fifth Amendment immunity remains not the ownership of property but the “ ‘physical or moral compulsion’ exerted.” Perlman, 247 U. S., at 15. We hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can prevail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused. It is important, in applying constitutional principles, to interpret them in light of the fundamental interests of personal liberty they were meant to serve. Respect for these principles is eroded when they leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest of society in enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Sec. 7402. Jurisdiction op District Courts. “(b) To enforce summons. If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.” Sec. 7604. Enforcement op Summons. “(a) Jurisdiction of district court. If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.” App. 59-60. The District Court held that “[s]ince, at the time the summons was served, the taxpayer, Lillian V. Couch, was not in possession of the books, records and documents described in the summons, she may not assert any Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a bar to the enforcement of the summons.” App. 6, 11. The opinion of the District Court (WD Va.) is not reported. The Court of Appeals also noted that the answer to petitioner’s Fifth Amendment contentions lay in the fact that “the records were not in the intervenor’s [taxpayer’s] possession but were in the custody of her accountant,” 449 F. 2d 141, 143 (1971). The summons, which is printed in full in App. 59-60, was issued on August 18, 1969, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, which provides: Examination of Books and Witnesses. “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized— “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person,- or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” Petitioner also claimed that enforcement of the summons would violate her Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. We agree with the Government, however/ that “this claim is not further articulated and does not appear to be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument.” Brief for United States 21-22. See part IV, infra. There is clearly the joint civil and possibly criminal investigatory purpose in the instant case, see supra, at 324. Donaldson cautioned only that the summons be issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 400 U. S., at 536. Neither of those conditions is successfully challenged here. Technically the order to produce the records was directed to petitioner’s attorney since, after the summons was served upon the accountant, he ignored it and surrendered the records to the attorney. But constitutional rights obviously cannot be enlarged by this kind of action. The rights and obligations of the parties became fixed when the summons was served, and the transfer did not alter them. See United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F. 2d 68, 72 (CA7 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1021 (1969); United States v. Lyons, 442 F. 2d 1144 (CA1 1971). A later Court commenting on the Boyd privilege noted that “the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity.” United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944). (Emphasis added.) Brief for Petitioner 13-14. See also United States v. Cohen, 388 F. 2d 464, 468 (CA9 1967), where the court, in upholding the right of a possessor, nonowner, to assert the privilege, noted that “it is possession of papers sought by the government, not ownership, which sets the stage for exercise of the governmental compulsion which it is the purpose of the privilege to prohibit.” Though the instant case concerns the scope of the privilege for an owner, nonpossessor, the Ninth Circuit’s linkage of possession to the purposes served by the privilege was appropriate. We do not; of course, decide what qualifies as rightful possession enabling the possessor to assert the privilege. Brief for Petitioner 11-17. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921), also debated and cited in the briefs, held that the Government may retain for use against their owner in a criminal proceeding incriminating documents which were stolen by private individuals, without any governmental knowledge or complicity, and turned over to the Government. The Court, in denying the owner’s privilege, alluded primarily to the absence of any governmental compulsion against the accused, the precise factor considered in the instant case. It is true, as petitioner argues, that the case turns somewhat on a discussion of governmental versus private compulsion and invasion, but it is equally true that the Court in Burdeau failed to find any impermissible public compulsion on the owner absent his possession: “We know of no constitutional principle which requires the Government to surrender the papers under such circumstances. Had it learned that such incriminatory papers, tending to show a violation of federal law, were in the hands of a person other than the accused, it having had no part in wrongfully obtaining them, we know of no reason why a subpoena might not issue for the production of the papers as evidence. Such production would require no unreasonable search or seizure, nor would it amount to compelling the accused to testify against himself.” Id., at 476. In Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457 (1913), the Court held that the books and records of a bankrupt transferred to a trustee in bankruptcy could be used as evidence against the bankrupt in a prosecution for concealing money from the trustee. Unlike the instant case, both title and possession passed in that transfer and the records were, in one sense, “published” by it. But the Court, in denying the privilege, recognized that the transfer also succeeded in removing the important element of personal compulsion against the accused, id., at 459, just as, in this case, the nature of the divestment of possession did. Brief for Petitioner 13. At oral argument petitioner raised a similar concern: “The Government goes so far as to contend, I believe, with their theory that any time it is out of your actual physical possession it is subject to subpoena .... If I were helping you across Constitution Avenue by carrying your briefcase, the Government holds that they could hand me a summons in the middle of Constitution Avenue and seize your documents to use against you in a criminal trial.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. See, e. g., Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F. 2d 855 (CA8 1956), which involved an attorney’s partially successful motion to quash two subpoenas duces tecum issued in a grand jury proceeding against a corporation where the attorney had stored his office files. See also United States v. Guterma, 272 F. 2d 344 (CA2 1959), concerning the storage of taxpayer’s personal records in a safe in offices of a corporation which the taxpayer had served as Chairman of the Board. Only the taxpayer and an indicted co-defendant knew the combination of the safe, and the corporation had no access to it. The Court of Appeals upheld the taxpayer’s assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege as to his personal records in the face of a grand jury subpoena directed to the corporation. Petitioner argues these cases support her position (Brief for Petitioner 14-15); the Government argues they can be distinguished from the instant case as involving mere custodial safekeeping of records, not disclosure of their information to a third person (Brief for United States 21). We refrain from judging the merits of such distinctions today. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. As we noted, supra, at 324, his status is that of an independent contractor. He actually did “very little work for the petitioner,” had many other clients, and was compensated by the job. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. This is a significant point. The Government noted in oral argument: “In the Internal Revenue Service practice, so long as the taxpayer has retained possession of the records and they are being used only by his full-time employees or others on the taxpayer’s premises, without the taxpayer having relinquished possession and control of the records, we ordinarily in those situations issue the summons to the taxpayer, because it is the taxpayer who has the dominion over the records and the authority to return the summons. And if the taxpayer chooses to plead the privilege against self-incrimination, that is up to the taxpayer.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. See n. 6, supra. The summons satisfied the requirements in United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964), and, as explained above, the necessary expectation of privacy to launch a valid Eourth Amendment claim does not exist. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall implies that the Court has created a “bright-line rule that no constitutional right of petitioner is violated by enforcing a summons of papers not in her possession.” Post, at 344. This implication does not reflect accurately the position of the Court. Indeed, it ignores the language of the Court, supra, at 333-335, and nn. 15-18. We do indeed attach constitutional importance to possession, but only because of its close relationship to those personal compulsions and intrusions which the Fifth Amendment forbids. Yet, contrary to any intimation in the dissent, we do not adopt any per se rule. We also decline to conjecture broadly on the significance of possession in cases and circumstances not before this Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS OF AMERICA (C. I. O.) et al. v. MITCHELL et al. No. 20. Argued December 3, 1945. Reargued October 17, 1946. Decided February 10, 1947. Lee Pressman argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Frank Donner and Milton V. Freeman. Ralph F. Fuchs argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, David L. Kreeger and Abraham J. Harris. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. The Hatch Act, enacted in 1940, declares unlawful certain specified political activities of federal employees. Section 9 forbids officers and employees in the executive branch of the Federal Government, with exceptions, from taking “any active part in political management or in political campaigns.” Section 15 declares that the activities theretofore determined by the United States Civil Service Commission to be prohibited to employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the Civil Service Rules shall be deemed to be prohibited to federal employees covered by the Hatch Act. These sections of the Act cover all federal officers and employees whether in the classified civil service or not and a penalty of dismissal from employment is imposed for violation. There is no designation of a single governmental agency for its enforcement. For many years before the Hatch Act the Congress had authorized the exclusion of federal employees in the competitive classified service from active participation in political management and political campaigns. In June, 1938, the congressional authorization for exclusion had been made more effective by a Civil Service Commission dis-. ciplinary rule. That power to discipline members of. the competitive classified civil service continues in the Commission under the Hatch Act by virtue of the present applicability of the Executive Order No. 8705, March 5, 1941. The applicable Civil Service Commission rules are. printed in the margin. The only change in the Civil Service Rules relating to political activity, caused by the Hatch Act legislation, that is of significance in this case is the elimination on March 5, 1941, of the word “privately” from the phrase “to express privately their opinions.” This limitation to private expression had regulated classified personnel since 1907. The present appellants sought an injunction before a statutory three-judge district court of the District of Columbia against appellees, members of the United States Civil Service Commission, to prohibit them from enforcing against appellants the provisions of the second sentence of § 9 (a) of the Hatch Act for the reason that the sentence is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. A declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of the sentence was also sought. The sentence referred to reads, “No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government . . . shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.” Various individual employees of the federal executive civil service and the United Public Workers of America, a labor union with these and other executive employees as members, as a representative of all its members, joined in the suit. It is alleged that the individuals desire to engage in acts of political management and in political campaigns. Their purposes are as stated in the excerpt from the complaint set out in the margin. From the affidavits it is plain, and we so assume, that these activities will be carried on completely outside of the hours of employment. Appellants challenge the second sentence of § 9 (a) as unconstitutional for various reasons. They are set out below in the language of the complaint. None of the appellants, except George P. Poole, has violated the provisions of the Hatch Act. They wish to act contrary to its provisions and those of § 1 of the Civil Service Rules and desire a declaration of the legally permissible limits of regulation. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of a justiciable case or controversy. The District Court determined that each of these individual appellants had an interest in their claimed privilege of engaging in political activities, sufficient to give them a right to maintain this suit. United Federal Workers of America (C. I. O.) v. Mitchell, 56 F. Supp. 621, 624. The District Court further determined that the questioned provision of the Hatch Act was valid and that the complaint therefore failed to state a cause .of action. It accordingly dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment to defendants. First. The judgment of the District Court was entered on September 26, 1944. An order was duly entered on October 26, 1944, allowing an appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 380a. The same section of the statutes provides: “In the event that an appeal is taken under this section, the record shall be made up and the case docketed in the Supreme Court of the United States within sixty days from the time such appeal is allowed, under such rules as may be prescribed by the proper courts.” This appeal was not docketed in this Court until February 2, 1945, a date after the return date of the order under § 380a. Thereafter the Government suggested a lack of jurisdiction in this Court to consider the appeal because of the failure of appellants to docket the appeal in time. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over this appeal to the hearing. We proceed now to a disposition of this question. To comply with the suggestion of § 380a, this Court adopted Rule 47. In other cases of appeals, Rule 11 governs docketing. If Rule 11 applies also to appeals under § 380a, we may hear this appeal, for the steps for dismissal required by Rule 11 were not taken by the appellees. This is because upon the allowance of an appeal by a judge of the district court as here, Supreme Court Rules 10 and 36, the case, is transferred from the district court to this Court and subsequent steps for dismissal or affirmance are to be taken here. If, however, the above-quoted provision of § 380a as to docketing is a prerequisite to the power of this Court to review, this appeal must fail. Prior to the passage of § 380a, appeals docketed after the return day were governed by Rule 11, 275 U. S. 602. In principle it has long been in existence. By the words of the rule, it appears that dismissal for appellant’s tardiness in docketing requires a step by the appellee. Even after dismissal for failure to docket, the rule permits this Court to allow the appellant to docket. Nothing in the legislative history which has been called to our attention indicates that Congress intended its docketing provision to vary Rule 11. Direct appeal accomplishes the congressional purpose of expediting review, of course, and is consistent with an unchanged practice as to dismissals. The time to docket may have been enlarged from the conventional return day of Rules 10 and 11 to bring continental uniformity, see Rule 10, or to give time for the preparation of a record which would often be large and not transcribed or printed. It will not expedite determination of constitutional questions to dismiss appeals because of errors of practice. In fact the sentence of § 380a on docketing seems deliberately to leave the practice on failure to docket to rules of court. We do not construe the requirement of docketing within sixty days as a limitation on our power to hear this appeal. So far as our Rule 47 is concerned, we construe it as requiring in accordance with § 380a the docketing in sixty days from the allowance of the appeal, instead of the forty days of our Rule 10, and that, as to dismissals, the first sentence of Rule 47 requires the same practice for appeals under § 380a that Rule 11 does for other appeals. We think it desirable to have sufficient flexibility in the rule to permit extensions of the time for return in the unusual situations that occur when large records are involved. In view of the recognized congressional purpose to quicken review under § 380a, the discretion to delay final hearing allowed under Rule 11 will be exercised only on a definite showing of need therefor to assure fair review. This leads us to hear this appeal. [Second. At the threshold of consideration, we are called upon to decide whether the complaint states a controversy cognizable in this Court. We defer consideration of the cause of action of Mr. Poole until section Three of this opinion. The other individual employees have elaborated the grounds of their objection in individual affidavits for use in the hearing on the summary judgment.] We select as an example one that contains the essential averments of all the others and print below the portions with significance in this suit. Nothing similar to the fourth paragraph of the printed affidavit is contained in the other affidavits. The assumed controversy between affiant and the Civil Service Commission as to affiant's right to act as watcher at the polls on November 2, 1943, had long been moot when this complaint was filed. We do not therefore treat this allegation separately. The affidavits, it will be noticed, follow the generality of purpose expressed by the complaint. See note 11 supra. declare a desire to act contrary to the rule against political activity but not that the rule has been violated. In this respect, we think they differ from the type of threat adjudicated in Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88. In that case, the refusal to admit an applicant to membership in a labor union on account of race was involved. Admission had been refused. 326 U. S. at p. 93, note 10. Definite action had also been taken in Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538. In the Hill case an injunction had been sought and allowed against Hill and the union forbidding Hill from acting as the business agent of, the union and the union from further functioning as a union until it complied with the state law. The threats which menaced the affiants of these affidavits in the case now being considered are closer to a general threat by officials to enforce those laws which they are charged to administer, compare Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 400, than they are to the direct threat of punishment against a named organization for a completed act that made the Mail Association arid the Hill cases justiciable.] As is well known, the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of constitutional issues, “concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions,” are requisite. This is as true of declaratory judgments as any other field. These appellants seem clearly to seek advisory opinions upon broad claims of rights protected by the 'First, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. As these appellants are classified employees, they have a right superior to the generality of citizens, compare Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, but the facts of their personal interest in their civil rights, of the general threat of possible interference with those rights by the Civil. Service Commission under its rules, if specified things are done by appellants, does not make a justiciable case or controversy. Appellants want to engage in “political management and political campaigns,” to persuade others to follow appellants’ views by discussion, speeches, articles and other acts reasonably designed to secure the selection of appellants’ political choices. Such generality of objection is really an attack on the political expediency of the Hatch Act, not the presentation of legal issues. It is beyond the competence of courts to render such a decision. Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 258 U. S. 158, 162. [The power of courts, and ultimately of this Court, to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. We can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their publication. It would not accord with judicial responsibility to adjudge, in a matter involving constitutionality, between the freedom of the individual and the requirements of public order except when definite rights appear upon the one side and definite prejudicial interferences upon the other.] The Constitution allots the nation’s judicial power to the federal courts. Unless these courts respect the limits of that unique authority, they intrude upon powers vested in the legislative or executive branches. Judicial adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers preserves the courts for the decision of issues, between litigants, capable of effective determination. Judicial exposition upon political proposals is permissible only when necessary to decide definite issues between litigants. When the courts act continually within these constitutionally imposed boundaries of their power, their ability to perform their function as a balance for the people’s protection against abuse of power by other branches of government remains unimpaired. Should the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories. Such abuse of judicial power would properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches. By these mutual checks and balances by and between the branches of government, democracy undertakes to preserve the liberties of the people from excessive concentrations of authority. No threat of interference by the Commission with rights of these appellants appears beyond that implied by the existence of the law and the regulations. Watson v. Buck, supra, p. 400. We should not take judicial cognizance of the situation presented on the part of the appellants considered in this subdivision of the opinion. [These reasons lead us to conclude that the determination of the trial court, that the individual appellants, other than Poole, could maintain this action, was erroneous.] [Third. The appellant Poole does present by the complaint and affidavit matters appropriate for judicial determination. The affidavits filed by appellees confirm that Poole has been charged by the Commission with political activity and a proposed qrder for his removal from his position adopted subject to his right .under Commission procedure to reply to the charges and to present further evidence in refutation. We proceed to consider the controversy over constitutional power at issue between Poole and the Commission as defined .by the charge and preliminary finding upon one side and the admissions of Poole’s affidavit upon the other. Our determination is limited to those facts. This proceeding so limited meets the requirements of defined rights and a definite threat to interfere with a possessor of the menaced rights by a penalty for an act done in violation of the claimed restraint. Because we conclude hereinafter that the prohibition of § 9 of the Hatch Act and Civil Service Rule 1,] see notes 2 and 6 abovedare valid, it is unnecessary to consider, as this is a declaratory judgment action, whether or not this appellant sufficiently alleges that an irreparable injury to him would result from his removal from his position. Nor need we inquire whether or not a court of equity would enforce by injunction any judgment declaring rights. Since Poole admits that he violated the rule against political activity and that, removal from office is therefore mandatory under the act, there is no question as to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The act provides no administrative or statutory review for the order of the Civil Service Commission.] Compare Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 306-10; Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corporation, 327 U. S. 540. [As no prior proceeding, offering an effective remedy or otherwise, is pending in the courts, there is no problem of judicial discretion as to whether to take cognizance of this case.] Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U. S. 491, 496-97, dissent at 500; Larson v. General Motors Corporation, 134 F. 2d 450, 453. [Under such circumstances, we see no reason why a declaratory judgment action, even though constitutional issues are involved, does not lie.] See Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 57. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U. S. 192, 197, 207; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210, 212, et seq. Fourth. [This brings us to consider the narrow but important point involved in Poole’s situation. Poole’s stated offense is taking an “active part in political management or in political campaigns.” He was a ward executive committeeman of a political party and was politically active on election day as a worker at the polls and a paymaster for the services of other party workers. The issue for decision and the only one we decide is whether such a breach of the Hatch Act and Rule 1 of the Commission can, without violating the Constitution, be made the basis for disciplinary action.] When the issue is thus narrowed, the interference with free expression is seen in better proportion as compared with the requirements of orderly management of administrative personnel. Only while the employee is politically active, in the sense of Rule 1, must he withhold expression of opinion on public subjects. See note 6. We assume that Mr. Poole would be expected to comment publicly as committeeman on political matters, so that indirectly there is an attenuated interference. We accept appellants’ contention that the nature of political rights reserved to the people by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are involved. The right claimed as inviolate may be stated as the right of a citizen to act as a party official or worker to further his own political views. Thus we have a measure of interference by the Hatch Act and the Rules with what otherwise would be the freedom of the civil servant under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments. And, if we look upon due process as a guarantee of freedom in those fields, there is a corresponding impairment of that right under the Fifth Amendment. Appellants' objections under the Amendments are basically the same. We do not find persuasion in appellants' argument that such activities during free time are not subject to regulation even though admittedly political activities cannot be indulged in during working hours. The influence of political activity by government employees, if evil in its effects on the service, the employees or people dealing with them, is hardly less so because that activity takes place after hours. Of course, the question of the need for this regulation is for other branches of government rather than the courts. Our duty in this case ends if the Hatch Act provision under examination is constitutional. Of course, it is accepted constitutional doctrine that these fundamental human rights are not absolutes. The requirements of residence and age must be met. The essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are subject to the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others would be a mockery. The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people. Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must fail. Again this Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of government. As pointed out hereinbefore in this opinion, the practice of excluding classified employees from party offices and personal political activity at the polls has been in effect for several decades. Some incidents similar to those that are under examination here have been before this Court and the prohibition against certain types of political activity by officeholders has been upheld. The leading case was decided in 1882. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371. There a subordinate United States employee was indicted for violation of an act that forbade employees who were not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate from giving or receiving money for political purposes from or to other employees of the government on penalty of discharge and criminal punishment. Curtis urged that the statute was unconstitutional. This Court upheld the right of Congress to punish the infraction of this law. The decisive principle was the power of Congress, within reasonable limits, to regulate, so far as it might deem necessary, the political conduct of its employees. A list of prohibitions against acts by public officials that are permitted to other citizens was given. This Court said, p. 373: “The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope of legislative power, and it is not easy to see why the act now under consideration does not come fairly within the legitimate means to such an end.” The right to contribute money through fellow employees to advance the contributor’s political theories was held not to be protected by any constitutional provision. It was held subject to regulation. A dissent by Mr. Justice Bradley emphasized the broad basis of the Court’s opinion. He contended that a citizen’s right to promote his political views could not be so restricted merely because he was an official of government. No other member of the Court joined in this dissent. The conclusion of the Court, that there was no constitutional bar to regulation of such financial contributions of public servants as distinguished from the exercise of political privileges such as the ballot, has found acceptance in the subsequent practice of Congress and the growth of the principle of required political neutrality for classified public servants as a sound element for efficiency. The conviction that an actively partisan governmental personnel threatens good administration has deepened since Ex parte Curtis. Congress recognizes danger to the service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political connections. In United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, the doctrine of legislative power over actions of governmental officials was held valid when extended to members of Congress. The members of Congress were prohibited from receiving contributions for “any political purpose whatever” from any other federal employees. Private citizens were not affected. The argument of unconstitutionality because of interference with the political rights of a citizen by that time was dismissed in a sentence. Compare United States v. Thayer, 209 U. S. 39. The provisions of § 9 of the Hatch Act and the Civil Service Rule 1 are not dissimilar in purpose from the statutes against political contributions of money. The prohibitions now under discussion are directed at political contributions of energy by government employees. These contributions, too, have a long background of disapproval. Congress and the President are responsible for an efficient public service. If, in their judgment, efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics as party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection. Another Congress may determine that, on the whole, limitations on active political management by federal personnel are unwise. The teaching, of experience has evidently led Congress to enact the Hatch Act provisions. To declare that the present supposed evils of political activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would leave the nation impotent to deal with what many sincere men believe is a material threat to the democratic system. Congress is not politically naive or regardless of public welfare or that of the employees. It leaves untouched full participation by employees in political decisions at the ballot box and forbids only the partisan activity of federal personnel deemed offensive to efficiency. With that limitation only, employees may make their contributions to public affairs or protect their own interests, as before the passage of the Act. The argument that political neutrality is not indispensable to a merit system for federal employees may be accepted. But because it is not indispensable does not mean that it is not desirable or permissible. Modern American politics involves organized political parties. Many classifications of government employees have been accustomed to work in politics—national, state and local— as a matter of principle or to assure their tenure. Congress may reasonably desire to limit party activity of federal employees so as to avoid a tendency toward a one-party system. It may have considered that parties would be more truly devoted to the public welfare if public servants were not overactive politically. Appellants urge that federal employees are protected by the Bill of Rights and that Congress may not “enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.” None would deny such limitations on congressional power but, because there are some limitations, it does not follow that a prohibition against acting as ward leader or worker at the polls is invalid. A reading of the Act and Rule 1, notes 2 and 6, supra, together with the Commission’s determination shows the wide range of public activities with which there is no interference by the legislation. It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active participation in political management and political campaigns. Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public interest, not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by law so long as the government employee does not direct his activities toward party success. It is urged, however, that Congress has gone further than necessary in prohibiting political activity to all types of classified employees. It is pointed out by appellants “that the impartiality of many of these is a matter of complete indifference to the effective performance” of their duties. Mr.;Poole would appear to be a good illustration for appellants' argument. The complaint states that he is a roller in the mint. We take it this is a job calling for the qualities of a skilled mechanic and that it does not involve contact with the public. Nevertheless, if in free time he is engaged in political activity, Congress may have concluded that the activity may promote or retard his advancement or preferment with his superiors. Congress may have thought that government employees are handy elements for leaders in political policy to use in building a political machine. For regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service. There are hundreds of thousands of United States employees with positions no more influential upon policy determination than that of Mr. Poole. Evidently what Congress feared was the cumulative effect on employee morale of political activity by all employees who could be induced to participate actively. It does not seem to us an unconstitutional basis for legislation. There is a suggestion that administrative workers maybe barred, constitutionally, from political management and political campaigns while the industrial workers may not be barred, constitutionally, without an act “narrowly and selectively drawn to define and punish the specific conduct.” A ready answer, it seems to us, lies in the fact that the prohibition of § 9 (a) of the Hatch Act “applies without discrimination to all employees whether industrial or administrative” and that the Civil Service Rules, by § 15 made a part of the Hatch Act, makes clear that industrial workers are covered in the prohibition against political activity. Congress has determined that the presence of government employees, whether industrial or administrative, in the ranks of political party workers is bad. Whatever differences there may be between administrative employees of the government and industrial workers in its employ are differences in detail so far as the constitutional power under review is concerned. Whether there are such differences and what weight to attach to them, are all matters of detail for Congress. We do not know whether the number of federal employees will expand or contract; whether the need for regulation of their political activities will increase or diminish. The use of the constitutional power of regulation is for Congress, not for the courts. We have said that Congress may regulate the political conduct of government employees “within reasonable limits,” even though the regulation trenches to some extent upon unfettered political action. The determination of the extent to which political activities of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with Congress. Courts will interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the generally existing conception of governmental power. That conception develops from practice, history, and changing educational, social and economic conditions. The regulation of such activities as Poole carried on has the approval of long practice by the Commission, court decisions upon similar problems and a large body of informed public opinion. Congress and the administrative agencies have authority over the discipline and efficiency of the public service. When actions of civil servants in the judgment of Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its usefulness is’required. The Hatch Act is the answer of Congress to this need. We cannot say with such a background that these restrictions are unconstitutional. Section 15 of the Hatch Act, note 3 above, defines an active part in political management or political campaigns as the same activities that the United States Civil Service Commission has determined to be prohibited to classified civil service employees by the provisions of the Civil Service Rules when § 15 took effect July 19, 1940. 54 Stat. 767. The activities of Mr. Poole, as ward executive committeeman and a worker at the polls, obviously fall within the prohibitions of § 9 of the Hatch Act against taking an active part in political management and political campaigns. They are also covered by the prior determinations of the Commission. We need to examine no further at this time into the validity of the definition of political activity and § 15. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly Affirmed. Mb. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissents as to Poole for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Black. He does not pass upon the constitutional questions presented by the other appellants for the reason that he feels the controversy as to them is not yet appropriate for the discretionary exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Another controversy under the same act is decided today. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, post, p. 127. August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1147; July 19, 1940, 54 Stat. 767; 56 Stat. 181, 986; 58 Stat. 136, 148, 727; 59 Stat. 108, 658; 60 Stat. 937. Only the first two are important for consideration of this case. 18 U. S. C. § 61h, as amended: ["(a) It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, to use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof, except a part-time officer or part-time employee without compensation or with nominal compensation serving in connection with the existing war effort, other than in any capacity relating to the procurement or manufacture of war material shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns.] All such persons shall retain the right to vote as, they may choose and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates. For the purposes of this section the term 'officer’ or 'employee’ shall not be construed to include (1) the President and Vice President of the United States; (2) persons whose compensation is paid from the appropriation for the office of the President; (3) heads and assistant heads of executive departments; (4) officers who are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who determine policies to be pursued by the United States in its relations with foreign powers or in the Nationwide administration of Federal laws. ["(b) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be immediately removed from the position or office held by him, and thereafter no part of the funds appropriated by any Act of Congress for such position or office shall be used to pay the compensation of such person.” 53 Stat. 1147, 1148; 54 Stat. 767; 56 Stat. 181.] 18 U.S. C. § 61o: “The provisions of this subchapter which prohibit persons to whom such provisions apply from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns shall be deemed to prohibit the same activities on the part of such persons as the United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore determined are at the time this section takes effect prohibited on the-part of employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the provisions of the civil-service rules prohibiting such employees from taking any active part in political management or in political campaigns.” 54 Stat. 767, 771. See Civil Service Act (1883), § 2, 22 Stat. 403-404: “Sec. 2. That it shall be the duty of said commissioners: “First. To aid the President, as he may request, in preparing suitable rules for carrying this act into effect, and when said rules shall have been promulgated it shall be the duty of all officers of the United States in the departments and offices to which any such rules may relate to aid, in all proper ways, in carrying said rules, and any modifications thereof, into effect. “Second. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows: “Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.” 5 U.S.C. § 631: “The President is authorized to . . . establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive appointments in the civil service.” First Annual Report, Civil Service Commission, H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 105, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 45: “In the exercise of the power vested in the President by the Constitution, and by virtue of the 1753d section of the Revised Statutes, and of the civil service act approved January 16, 1883, the following rules for the regulation and improvement of the executive civil service are hereby amended and promulgated: Rule I. “No person in said service shall use his official authority or influence either to coerce the political action of any person or body or to interfere with any election.” Executive Order No. 642, June 3, 1907 (amended to consolidate without changing wording, Executive Order No. 655, June 15, 1907); Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, Civil Service Commission, House Doc. No. 600, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 104: “Section 1 of Rule I of the civil-service rules is hereby amended to read as follows: “No person in the Executive civil service shall use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof. Persons who, by the provisions of these rules are in the competitive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns.” Civil Service Rules 15, 3 Fed. Reg. 1525. 5 C. F. R., Cum. Supp., §1.1: “No interference with elections. No person in the executive civil service shall use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the results thereof. Persons who by the provisions of the rules in this chapter are in the competitive classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and to express their opinion on all political subjects, shall take no active part in political management or in political campaigns.” Section 15.1: “Legal appointment necessary to compensation. Whenever the Commission finds, after due notice and opportunity for explanation, that any person has been appointed to or is holding any position, whether by original appointment, promotion, assignment, transfer, or reinstatement, in violation of the Civil Service Act or Rules, or of any Executive order or any regulation of the Commission, or that any employee subject thereto has violated such Act, Rules, orders, or regulations, it shall certify the facts to the proper appointing officer with specific instructions as to discipline or dismissal of the person or employee affected. If the appointing officer fails to carry out the instructions of the Commission within 10 days after receipt thereof, the Commission shall certify the facts to the proper disbursing and auditing officers, and such officers shall make no payment or allowance of the salary or wages of any such person or employee thereafter accruing.” See E. O. 8705, March 5, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 1313. See note 4, supra, and 5 C. F R. § 1.1, June 1, 1938. A change occurred also in Rule 15. This was to comply with a ruling of the Attorney General that the Hatch Act made removal from office a mandatory penalty for forbidden political activity. 40 Op. A. G., Political Activity by Government Employees, January 8, 1941. See note 5, supra, for Rule 15 prior to Hatch Act. See 28 U. S. C. § 380 (a); § 11-306 District of Columbia Code. Judicial Code § 274d; 28 U. S. C. § 400. No contention that appellant, United Public Workers of America (C. I. O.), lacked capacity to bring this action is made by appellees. We need not consider the question here. McCandless v. Furlaud, 293 U. S. 67, 73-74. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275. “In discharge of their duties of citizenship, of their right to vote, and in exercise of their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and the right to engage in political activity, the individual plaintiffs desire to engage in the following acts: [write for publication letters and articles in support of candidates for office; be connected editorially with publications which are identified with, the legislative program of UFWA [former name of the present union appellant] and candidates who support it; solicit votes, aid in getting out voters, act as accredited checker, watcher, or challenger; transport voters to and from the polls without compensation therefor.; participate in and help in organizing political parades; initiate petitions, and canvass for the signatures of others on such petitions; serve as party ward committeeman or other party official; and perform any and all acts not prohibited by any provision of law other than the second sentence of Section 9 (a)] and. Section 15 [of the Hatch Act, which constitute taking an active part in political management and political campaigns.]” “The second sentence of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States as a deprivation of freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly in violation of the First Amendment. “The second sentence of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States as a deprivation of the fundamental right of the people of the United States to engage in political activity, reserved to the people of the United States by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. “The second sentence of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, since it unreasonably prohibits Federal employees from engaging in activities which may be lawfully carried on by persons who are not Federal employees, thus constituting a deprivation of liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment. “The second sentence of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States since it effects an arbitrary and grossly unreasonable discrimination between employees of the Federal Government in the classified civil service subject to its provisions and employees specifically exempted therefrom, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. “The second sentence of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States since it is so vague and indefinite as to prohibit lawful activities as well as activities which are properly made unlawful by other provisions of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 47: “Appeals to this court under the Act of August 24, 1937, shall be governed, as far as may be, by the rules of this court regulating the procedure on appeal in other cases from courts of the United States; . . . The record shall be made up and the case docketed in this court within sixty days from the time the appeal is allowed.” Id., Rule 11: “1. It shall be the duty of the appellant to docket the case and file the record thereof with the clerk of this court by or before the return day, whether in vacation or in term time. But, for good cause shown, the justice or judge who signed the citation, or any justice of this court, may enlarge the time, before its expiration, the order of enlargement to be filed with the clerk of this court. If the appellant shall fail to comply with this rule, the appellee may have the cause docketed and the appeal dismissed upon producing a certificate, whether in term or vacation, from the clerk of the court wherein the judgment or decree was rendered, stating the case and certifying that such appeal has been duly allowed. And in no case shall the appellant be entitled to docket the cause and file the record after the appeal shall have been dismissed under this rule, unless by special leave of the court.” Steps allowed in the district court after the allowance of appeal, such as preparation of the record, extension of time and cost or supersedeas bonds, are for convenience taken in the court possessed of the record. Rules 10, 11 and 36, Supreme Court; Rule 72, Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Cranch 239; Bingham v. Morris, 7 Cranch 99; Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall. 97, 103. Compare Grigsby v. Purcell, 99 U. S. 505. Compare Georgia Lumber Co. v. Compañía, 323 U. S. 334. “At this time, when the fate of the entire world is in the balance I believe it is not only proper but an obligation for all citizens to participate actively in the making of the vital political decisions on which the success of the war and the permanence' of the peace to follow so largely depend. For the purpose of participating in the making of these decisions it is my earnest desire to engage actively in political management and political campaigns. I wish to engage in such activity upon my own time, as a private citizen. “I wish to engage in such activities on behalf of those candidates for public office who I believe will best serve the needs of this country and with the object of persuading others of the correctness of my judgments and of electing the candidates of my choice. [This objective I wish to pursue by all proper means such as engaging in discussion, by speeches to conventions, rallies and other assemblages, by publicizing my views in letters and articles for publication in newspapers and other periodicals, by aiding in the campaign of candidates for political office by posting banners and posters in public places, by distributing leaflets, by 'ringing doorbells’, by addressing campaign literature, and by doing any and all acts of like character reasonably designed to assist in the election of candidates I favor.] “I desire to engage in these activities freely, openly, and without concealment. However, [I understand that the second sentence of Section 9 (a) of the Hatch Act and the Rules of the C. S. C. provide that if I engage in this activity, the Civil Service Commission will order that I be dismissed from federal employment. Such deprivation of my job in the federal government would be a source of immediate and serious financial loss and other injury to me. “At the last Congressional election I was very much interested in the outcome of the campaign and offered to help the party of my choice by being a watcher at the polls. I obtained a watcher’s certificate but I was advised that there might be some question of my right to use the certificate and retain my federal employment. Therefore, on November 1, 1943, the day before election, I called the regional office of the Civil Service Commission in Philadelphia and spoke to a person who gave his name as . . . Mr. . . . stated that if I used my watcher’s certificate, the Civil Service Commission would see that I was dismissed from my job at the ... for violation of the Hatch Act. I, therefore, did not use the certificate as I had intended.] “I believe that Congress may not constitutionally abridge my right to engage in the political activities mentioned above. However, unless the courts prevent the Civil Service Commission from enforcing this unconstitutional law, I will be unable freely to exercise my rights as a citizen.” (Identifying words omitted.) Correspondence & Public Papers of John Jay, Vol. 3, p. 486; Hayburn’s Case and notes, 2 Dall. 409; Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 291; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U. S. 419, 443; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 423; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra, 461, and cases cited; Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, 323 U. S. 316, 324, and cases cited. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359, 363. It has long been this Court’s “considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, . . . or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its decision, ... or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied, ... or to decide any constitutional question except with reference to the particular facts to which it is to be applied, . . . .” Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461, and cases cited. See Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129. “I have for a long time been interested in political activities. Both before and since my employment in the United States Mint, I have taken an active part in political campaigns and political management. In the 28th Ward, 7th Division in the City of Philadelphia I am and have been a Ward Executive Committeeman. In that position I have on many occasions taken an active part in political management and political campaigns. I have visited the residents of my Ward and solicited them to support my party and its candidates; I have acted as a watcher at the polls; I have contributed money to help pay its expenses; I hav.e circulated campaign literature, placed banners and posters in public places, distributed leaflets, assisted in organizing political rallies and assemblies, and have done any and all acts which were asked of me in my capacity as a Ward Executive Committeeman. I have engaged in these activities both before and after my employment in the United States Mint. I intend to continue to engage in these activities on my own time as a private citizen, openly, freely, and without concealment. “However, I have been served with a proposed order of the United States Civil Service Commission, dated January 12, 1944, which advises me that because of the political activities mentioned above, and for no other reason, ‘it is, . . ., the opinion of this Commission that George P. Poole, an employee of the United States Mint at Philadelphia,' Pennsylvania, has been guilty of political activity in violation of Section 1, Civil Service Rule I’ and that unless I can refute the charges that I have engaged in political activity, I will be dismissed from my position as a Roller in the United States Mint at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.” The tentative charge and finding reads: I. “It is charged: That . . . “The said George P. Poole held the political party office of Democratic Ward Executive Committeeman in the City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. “The said George P. Poole was politically active by aiding and assisting the Democratic Party in the capacity of worker at the polls on general election day, November 5, 1940, and assisted in the distribution of funds in paying party workers for their services on general election day, November 5, 1940.” III. “The above described activity constitutes taking an active part in political management and in a political campaign’in contravention of Section 1, Civil Service Rule I, and the regulations adopted by the Commissioners thereunder.” Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273; Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359, 364; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 260. 28 U. S. C. § 400: “In cases of actual controversy except with respect to Federal taxes the courts of the United States shall have power upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropriate pleadings to declare rights and other legal relations of any interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be prayed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and be reviewable as such.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 264. See White v. Berry, 171 U. S. 366, 377; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 212. In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, a declaratory judgment proceeding, p. 46, prior to the adoption of Rule 57, a proceeding before the N. L. R. B. was required. There is statutory judicial review from that Board’s decisions, however. We agree with the Government that the complaint does not fail to state a cause of action against the Commission because it seeks relief against the Commission’s action under the Hatch .Act instead of Rule 1 of the Commission. So far as Poole’s controversy is concerned, the act and the rule are the same. In labor-management relationships, it has been recognized by this Court that circumstances might justify the prohibition by employers of union activity by employees on the employer’s property, even though carried out during non-working hours. Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S. 793, 803. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 304, 310; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 165; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 169; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145. 106 U. S. 376-77: “. . . every citizen having the proper qualifications has the right to accept office, and to be a candidate therefor. This is a fundamental right of which the legislature cannot deprive the citizen, nor clog its exercise with conditions that are. repugnant to his other fundamental rights. Such a condition I regard that imposed by the law in question to be. It prevents the citizen from co-operating with other citizens of his own choice in the promotion of his political views. . . . The whole thing seems to me absurd. Neither, men’s mouths nor their purses can be constitutionally tied up in that way.” Kaplan, Political Neutrality of the Civil Service, 1 Pub. Pers. Rev. 10; White, Civil Service in the Modern State (1930); Mosher and Kingsley, Public Personnel Administration (1936); White, Government Career Service (1935); Meriam, Public Personnel Problems (1938). Military personnel is restricted in much the same manner. Army Regulations No. 600-10, p. 5: “6. Political activities of persons in military service.—a. General.—No member of the Army, while on active duty, will use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the course or outcome thereof. Such persons, while on active duty, retain the right to vote, to express their opinions privately and informally on all political subjects and candidates, and to become candidates for public office as permitted in these regulations. They will not be permitted to participate in any way in political management or political campaigns.” An interesting discussion of the general subject of interference by federal officers in elections will be found in the Appendix to the Congressional Globe, Dec. 3, 1838-Feb. 19, 1839, pp. 157, 160 and 409, 411. 86 Cong. Rec. 2338-2367, 2426-2442, 2696-2723, 2920-2963, 2969-2987, 9360-9380, 9426-9432, 9434-9463. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1897), Harrison, vol. IV, p. 52; id., Hayes, vol. VII, pp. 450-51. See note 4, supra. When in 1891 New Bedford, Mass., under a rule removed a policeman for political activity, an opinion by Mr. Justice, then Judge, Holmes disposed summarily of McAuliffe’s contention that the rule invaded his right to express his political opinion with the epigram, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517. Several states have similar provisions. Ala. Code (1940), Tit. 12, § 157; Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1939), c. 105a § 698e; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1937), § 486-23; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1942), Tit. 71, § 741.904; R. I. Acts & Resolves, 1939, p. 118. United States Civil Service Commission, Political Activity and Political Assessments, Form 1236, January 1944. “In the light of these wide variations in duties and responsibility for public policy and its fair enforcement, a restriction reasonably designed to preserve the impartiality of a Collector of the Revenue, a U. S. Marshal, an F. B. I. or Treasury agent may be utterly absurd and unjustified when applied to a lens grinder, a stock clerk, a machinist, or an elevator operator. It is therefore impossible both to observe reasonable regard for constitutional rights and to enact sweeping prohibitions as to political rights applicable to all Federal employees whatever the nature of their duties. In dealing with so complicated and varied a subject matter, a hatchet cannot readily be substituted for a scalpel.” United States Civil Service Commission, Political Activity and Political Assessments, Form 1236, September 1939: “15. Committees.—Service on or for any political committee or similar organization is prohibited. . . . “20. Activity at the polls and for candidates.— . . . “It is the duty of an employee to avoid any offensive activity at primary and regular elections. He must refrain from soliciting votes, assisting voters to mark ballots, helping to get out the voters on registration and election days, acting as the accredited checker, watcher, or challenger of any party or faction, assisting in counting the vote, or engaging in any other activity at-the polls except the marking and depositing of his own ballot.” United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 399.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HERNANDEZ et al. v. VETERANS’ ADMINISTRATION et al. No. 72-700. Argued December 11, 1973 Decided March 4, 1974 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 393. Jack R. Petr anker, pro hac vice, and Lawrence L. Cur-tice argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the briefs were Stephen V. Bomse and Charles C. Marson. Gerald P. Norton argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Harriet S. Shapiro, Morton Hollander, and William Ranter. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, like the appellee and his class in Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 361, are Class I-O conscientious objectors who, upon completion of alternative civilian service pursuant to § 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j), and the governing regulations of the Selective Service System, 32 CFR, Part 1660, applied for educational benefits provided by the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. The Veterans’ Administration denied petitioners’ application for the reasons upon which appellee Robison’s request was denied, i. e., because a Class I-O conscientious objector who has performed alternative civilian service does not qualify under 38 U. S. C. § 1652 (a)(1) as a "veteran who . . . served on active duty” (defined in 38 U. S. C. § 101 (21) as “full-time duty in the Armed Forces”), and is therefore not an “eligible veteran” entitled under 38 U. S. C. § 1661 (a) to veterans’ educational benefits provided by the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. Alleging that those sections of the 1966 Act discriminate against conscientious objectors in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and infringe the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, petitioners filed two actions seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief and requesting the convening of a three-judge district court. The District Court consolidated the two cases and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that “plaintiffs’ requests for affirmative relief are not within the jurisdiction of this Court due to the mandate of 38 U. S. C. § 211 (a) ... [and] the plaintiffs’ challenge . . . based on alleged violations of the Fifth and First Amendments to the United States Constitution are [sic] insubstantial and without merit.” 339 F. Supp. 913, 916 (ND Cal. 1972). Notwithstanding the District Court’s dismissal of petitioners’ constitutional claims on the ground of insubstantiality, the Court of Appeals, as we read that court’s opinion, construed the order of dismissal as based solely upon the jurisdictional bar of §211 (a), and affirmed the District Court on that ground. 467 F. 2d 479 (1972). We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument with Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 361. 411 U. S. 981 (1973). We have held today in Johnson v. Robison that § 211 (a) does not bar judicial consideration of constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion hi Johnson v. Robison. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 386.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE et al. v. KLAMATH INDIAN TRIBE No. 83-2148. Argued February 27, 1985 Decided July 2, 1985 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 775. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were William F. Gary, Deputy Attorney General, James E. Mountain, Jr., Solicitor General, and Michael D. Reynolds and Margaret E. Rabin, Assistant Attorneys General. Don B. Miller argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Kim Jerome Gottschalk and Sande Schmidt. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1901 the Klamath Indian Tribe ceded 621,824 acres of reservation land to the United States. The question presented in this case is whether the Tribe thereafter retained a special right to hunt and fish on the ceded lands free of state regulation. In answering that question we consider not only the terms of the 1901 Cession Agreement but also the predecessor 1864 Treaty that established the Tribe’s original reservation and certain other events in the history of the Tribe. I In the early 19th century, the Klamath and Modoc Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians claimed aboriginal title to approximately 22 million acres of land extending east from the Cascade Mountains in southern Oregon. In 1864 these Tribes (now collectively known as the Klamath Indian Tribe) entered into a Treaty with the United States, ceding “all their right, title and claim to all the country claimed by them” and providing that a described tract of approximately 1.9 million acres “within the country ceded” would be set apart for them, to be “held and regarded as an Indian reservation.” 16 Stat. 707, 708. The 1864 Treaty also provided that the Tribes would have “secured” to them “the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes, included in said reservation, and of gathering edible roots, seeds, and berries within its limits.” Ibid. No right to hunt or fish outside the reservation was preserved. The boundaries of the reservation were first surveyed by the United States in 1871. Members of the Tribe immediately complained that the surveyor had erroneously excluded large areas of land from the reservation as described in the 1864.Treaty. These complaints continued after the Government resurveyed the boundaries, and slightly enlarged them, in 1888. In response to these complaints, in 1896 Congress authorized a Boundary Commission to determine the amount and value of the land that had been incorrectly excluded from the reservation. In October 1896, the three-member Boundary Commission visited the reservation, traveled its disputed boundaries with a Klamath Indian guide, and interviewed a number of Klam-ath Indians who had participated in the negotiation of the 1864 Treaty. See Klamath Boundary Commission Report (Dec. 18, 1896), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 93, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-19 (1897). These Indians specifically recalled that the parties to the 1864 Treaty had intended to include the Sycan and Sprague River Valleys within the eastern portion of the reservation because those valleys had been an important source of fish and game for members of the Tribe. Based on its review of the 1864 negotiations and the geographical description provided in the Treaty itself, the Boundary Commission concluded that over 617,000 acres of land had been erroneously excluded from the reservation in previous Government surveys. Id., at 11. The Boundary Commission determined that the excluded land had an average value of 83.36 cents per acre. This figure took into account “the good timber land and the meadows of the Sycan and Sprague River valleys” as well as the “rocky and sterile mountain ranges, producing very ordinary timber and little grass.” The Commission’s valuation was based on the use of the land for stock grazing and as a source of timber. Its report did not discuss hunting or fishing on the excluded lands, nor did it advert to any valuation for the right to conduct such activities on the land. Upon receiving the Boundary Commission’s report, Congress appropriated funds in 1898 for a precise “resurvey of the exterior boundaries of the Klamath Reservation,” and authorized the Secretary of the Interior “to negotiate through an Indian inspector with said Klamath Indians for the relinquishment of all their right and interest in and to” the excluded lands. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 545, 30 Stat. 571, 592. The course of negotiations with the Tribe extended over the next two years. The Tribe was assisted by counsel and actively asserted its interests when those interests diverged from the proposals of the United States. Yet the historical record provided by a number of congressional documents contains no reference to continuation of any special hunting or fishing rights for members of the Tribe after payment for the excluded lands. No objection by the Tribe to resolving the problem by selling the excluded lands to the Government appears anywhere in the record. Although one Government inspector felt that the price recommended by the Boundary Commission was too high, see n. 7, supra, the Commission’s recommendation ultimately was accepted. The final Cession Agreement was signed by 191 adult male members of the Tribe on June 17, 1901. In the 1901 Agreement, the United States agreed to pay the Tribe $537,007.20 for 621,824 acres of reservation land. In return, the Tribe agreed in Article I to “cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title and interest in and to” that land. The reservation was thereby diminished to approximately two-thirds of its original size as described in the 1864 Treaty. The 1901 Agreement also provided in Article IV that “nothing in this agreement shall be construed to deprive [the Tribe] of any benefits to which they are entitled under existing treaties not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement.” The 1901 Agreement was ratified by Congress in 1906. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 367. Between 1901 and 1906, virtually all of the ceded land was closed to settlement entry and placed in national forests or parks, App. 14, a status much of the land retains to this day. The parties have stipulated that members of the Tribe continued to hunt and fish on the ceded lands, from the time of the cession to the commencement of this litigation in 1982. Ibid. During that period, there is no record of any assertion by the State of Oregon, or any denial by the Tribe, of state regulatory jurisdiction over Indian hunting or fishing on the ceded lands. Id., at 15. It is also stipulated that hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering were “crucial to the survival” of the Klamath Indians in 1864, 1901, and 1906, and that these activities continue to “play a highly significant role” in the fives of Klamath Indians. Id., at 19. I l-H In 1954, Congress terminated federal supervision over the Klamath Tribe and its property, including the Klamath Reservation. Pub. L. 587, 68 Stat. 718-723, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §§564-564x. The Termination Act required members of the Tribe to elect either to withdraw from the Tribe and receive the monetary value of their interest in tribal property, or to remain in the Tribe and participate in a nongovernmental tribal management plan. §564d(a)(2). The Termination Act also authorized the sale of that portion of the reservation necessary to provide funds for the compensation of withdrawing members, and the transfer of the unsold portion to a private trustee. §564e(a). The Termination Act further specified that its provisions would not “abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe or the members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty.” § 564m(b). In 1969, the Indian Claims Commission awarded the Tribe $4,162,992.80 as additional compensation for the lands ceded by the 1901 Agreement. Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 20 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 522. As had been the case in 1896 and in 1901, the amount of the Commission’s award was based on the estimated value of the land for stock grazing and timber harvesting, which the parties had agreed constituted the “highest and best uses” for the land. Id., at 525. The Claims Commission’s opinion did not specify a value for, or mention, hunting or fishing rights. Ill In 1982 the Tribe filed this action against the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and various state officials, seeking an injunction against interference with tribal members’ hunting and fishing activities on the lands ceded in 1901. The State conceded that it had no authority to interfere with tribal hunting or fishing on lands sold or transferred pursuant to the 1954 Termination Act, but it asserted the right to enforce state regulations against the Tribe on the lands that had been ceded in 1901. The essential facts were stipulated. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Tribe, declaring that the 1901 Agreement “did not abrogate” the Tribe’s 1864 “treaty rights ... to hunt, fish, trap and gather, free from regulation by the . . . State of Oregon” on the ceded lands. The District Court relied on the language in Article IV of the 1901 Agreement preserving any benefits to which the Tribe was “entitled under existing treaties not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement,” and on the Government’s failure to compensate the Tribe expressly for the loss of hunting and fishing rights either in 1901 or 1969. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 729 F. 2d 609 (1984). It held that the 1864 Treaty had reserved to the Tribe rights to hunt and fish that were not appurtenant to the land itself. Accordingly, when the erroneously excluded lands were ceded to the United States in 1901, that cession did not necessarily include the hunting and fishing rights. Construing the 1901 Agreement in the Indians’ favor, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribe had retained all rights consistent with the cession not expressly conveyed. The court then ruled that continued hunting and fishing by the Indians on the ceded lands was not necessarily inconsistent with the provisions of the 1901 Agreement. The omission of any reference to hunting or fishing rights, and the failure to compensate the Tribe expressly for such rights, supported the conclusion that Congress had not intended to abrogate them, and the State had not otherwise sustained its burden of demonstrating a clear congressional intent to extinguish these tribal treaty rights. Id., at 612-613. Because the Court of Appeals’ decision appeared to conflict in principle with the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 614 F. 2d 1161 (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 905 (1980), we granted certiorari, 469 U. S. 879 (1984). We now reverse. I — I At issue in this case is an asserted right of tribal members to hunt and fish outside the reservation boundaries established in 1901, free of state regulation. The Tribe argues that this special right continued on the lands that were ceded in the 1901 Agreement, even though the reservation boundaries were diminished and the exclusivity of the 1864 Treaty rights necessarily expired on the ceded lands. The Tribe agrees that ceded lands now privately owned may be closed to tribal hunting and fishing, and that the Federal Government validly may regulate Indian activity on the ceded lands now held as national parks or forests. See 729 F. 2d, at 611; Brief for Respondent 12,17. It is also clear that non-Indians may hunt and fish on at least some of the ceded lands and that members of the Tribe are entitled to the same hunting and fishing privileges as all other residents of Oregon. Our inquiry, therefore, is whether a special right, nonexclusive but free of state regulation, was intended to survive in the face of the language of the 1901 Agreement ceding “all. . . right. . . in and to” the ceded lands. The Court of Appeals’ holding was predicated on its understanding that the hunting and fishing rights reserved to the Tribe by the 1864 Treaty were not appurtenant to the land within the reservation boundaries. 729 F. 2d, at 612. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Indians may enjoy special hunting and fishing rights that are independent of any ownership of land, and that, as demonstrated in 25 U. S. C. § 564m(b), the 1954 Termination Act for the Klamath Tribe, such rights may survive the termination of an Indian reservation. Moreover, the Court of Appeals was entirely correct in its view that doubts concerning the meaning of a treaty with an Indian tribe should be resolved in favor of the tribe. See Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 675-676 (1979); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 (1930). Nevertheless, we cannot agree with the court’s interpretation of the 1901 Cession Agreement or with its reading of the 1864 Treaty. V Before the 1864 Treaty was executed, the Tribe claimed aboriginal title to about 22 million acres of land. The Treaty language that ceded that entire tract — except for the 1.9 million acres set apart for the Klamath Reservation — stated only that the Tribe ceded “all their right, title, and claim” to the described area. Yet that general conveyance unquestionably carried with it whatever special hunting and fishing rights the Indians had previously possessed in over 20 million acres outside the reservation. Presumptively, the similar language used in the 1901 Cession Agreement should have the same effect. More importantly, the language of the 1864 Treaty plainly describes rights intended to be exercised within the limits of the reservation. This point can be best understood by consideration of the entire portion of the Treaty in which the right of taking fish is described. The relevant language of the 1864 Treaty is found in Article I: “That the following described tract, within the country ceded by this treaty, shall, until otherwise directed by the President of the United States, be set apart as a residence for said Indians, [and] held and regarded as an Indian reservation.... And the tribes aforesaid agree and bind themselves that, immediately after the ratification of this treaty, they will remove to said reservation and remain thereon, unless temporary leave of absence be granted to them by the superintendent or agent having charge of the tribes. “It is further stipulated and agreed that no white person shall be permitted to locate or remain upon the reservation, except the Indian superintendent and agent, employés of the Indian department, and officers of the army of the United States . . . [and] that in case persons other than those specified are found upon the reservation, they shall be immediately expelled therefrom; and the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and lakes, included in said reservation, and of gathering edible roots, seeds, and berries within its limits, is hereby secured to the Indians aforesaid . . . .” 16 Stat. 708. The fishing right thus reserved is described as a right to take from the streams and lakes “included in said reservation,” and the gathering right is for edible roots, seeds, and berries “within its limits.” This limiting language surely indicates that the fishing and gathering rights pertained to the area that was reserved for the Indians and from which non-Indians were excluded. Although hunting is not expressly mentioned in the Treaty, it is clear that any exclusive right to hunt was also confined to the reservation. The fact that the rights were characterized as “exclusive” forecloses the possibility that they were intended to have existence outside of the reservation; no exclusivity would be possible on lands open to non-Indians. Moreover, in view of the fact that Article I restricted members of the Tribe to the reservation, to “remain thereon, unless temporary leave of absence be granted,” it is manifest that the rights secured to the Indians by that same Article did not exist independently of the reservation itself. The language of the 1901 Agreement must be read with these terms of the 1864 Treaty in mind. In 1954 when Congress terminated the Klamath Reservation, it enacted an express provision continuing the Indians’ right to fish on the former reservation land. 25 U. S. C. § 564m(b); see Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F. 2d 768 (CA9), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 826 (1979). The 1901 Agreement contained no such express provision concerning the right to hunt and fish on the lands ceded by the Tribe. Instead, the 1901 Agreement contained a broad and unequivocal conveyance of the Tribe’s title to the land and a surrender of “all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to” that portion of the reservation. 34 Stat. 367 (emphasis added). The 1901 Agreement thus was both a divestiture of the Tribe’s ownership of the ceded lands and a diminution of the boundaries of the reservation within which the Tribe exercised its sovereignty. In the absence of any language reserving any specific rights in the ceded lands, the normal construction of the words used in the 1901 Agreement unquestionably would encompass any special right to use the ceded lands for hunting and fishing. This conclusion is unequivocally confirmed by the fact that the rights secured by the 1864 Treaty were “exclusive.” Since the 1901 Cession Agreement concededly diminished the reservation boundaries, any tribal right to hunt and fish on the ceded, off-reservation lands can no longer be “exclusive” as specified in the 1864 Treaty. Indeed, even if the Tribe had expressly reserved a “privilege of fishing and hunting” on the ceded lands, our precedents demonstrate that such an express reservation would not suffice to defeat the State’s power to reasonably and evenhandedly regulate such activity. See n. 16, supra. In light of these precedents, the absence of any express reservation of rights, as found in other 19th-century agreements, only serves to strengthen the conclusion that no special off-reservation rights were comprehended by the parties to the 1901 Agreement. As both the District Court and the Court of Appeals noted, Article IV of the 1901 Agreement preserved all of the Klam-ath Indians’ “benefits to which they are entitled under existing treaties, not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement.” Article IV thus made it clear that none of the benefits that the Tribe had preserved within its reservation in the 1864 Treaty would be lost. But because the right to hunt and fish reserved in the 1864 Treaty was an exclusive right to be exercised within the reservation, that right could not consistently survive off the reservation under the clear provisions of cession and diminution contained in Article I. Moreover, a glaring inconsistency in the overall Treaty structure would have been present if the Tribe simultaneously could have exercised an independent right to hunt and fish on the ceded lands outside the boundaries of the diminished reservation while remaining bound to honor its 1864 Treaty commitment to stay within the reservation absent permission. Article IV cannot fairly be construed as an implicit preservation of benefits previously linked to the reservation when those benefits could be enjoyed thereafter only outside the reservation boundaries. In sum, the language of the 1864 Treaty indicates that the Tribe’s rights to hunt and fish were restricted to the reservation. The broad language used in the 1901 Agreement, virtually identical to that used to extinguish off-reservation rights in the 1864 Treaty, accomplished a diminution of the reservation boundaries, and no language in the 1901 Agreement evidences any intent to preserve special off-reservation hunting or fishing rights for the Tribe. Indeed, in light of the 1901 diminution, a silent preservation of off-reservation rights would have been inconsistent with the broad language of cession as well as with the Tribe’s 1864 Treaty agreement to remain within the reservation. í — i > The Tribe acknowledges that the 1901 Agreement is silent with regard to hunting and fishing rights, but argues that that silence itself, viewed in historical context, demonstrates an intent to preserve tribal hunting and fishing rights in the ceded land. The Tribe asserts that Congress’ “singular” purpose in negotiating and ratifying the 1901 Agreement was “to benefit the Indians by honoring the United States’ Treaty obligations,” and that an intent to extinguish hunting and fishing rights would be inconsistent with this purpose. Brief for Respondent 28-30, and n. 13. We disagree for two reasons. First, an end to the Tribe’s special hunting and fishing rights on lands ceded to the Government, if accomplished with the understanding and assent of the Tribe in return for compensation, is not at all inconsistent with an intent to honor the 1864 Treaty. Having acknowledged an intent to remedy its breach of the 1864 Treaty, the United States might have opted to restore the correct boundaries of the reservation and compensate the Indians for any loss occasioned by the erroneous surveys, or, instead, to acquire the erroneously excluded land for a price intended to represent fair compensation. Both options are consistent with an intent to honor the Treaty obligations. Choice of the purchase and compensation option is also consistent with an intent, on both sides, to end any special privileges attaching to the excluded land. Moreover, since the boundary restoration option would have unquestionably preserved such rights for the Tribe, the rejection of that option is also consistent with an intent not to preserve those rights. Second, Congress in 1901 was motivated by additional goals. By 1896, non-Indian settlers had moved onto the disputed reservation lands, the State of Oregon had completed a military road across the reservation, and conflicts between members of the Tribe and non-Indians perceived as interlopers were sufficient to require congressional attention. See S. Doc. No. 129, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. (1894); n. 8, supra. Negotiations with the Tribe were authorized in order to settle these conflicts as well as to honor fairly the terms of the 1864 Treaty. These goals again suggest two equally consistent options: restoration of the correct reservation boundaries and exclusion of non-Indians as the 1864 Treaty required, or purchase of the excluded, entered-upon lands. Rather than restore the excluded lands to the Tribe — an option that would have left intact the Tribe’s exclusive right to hunt and fish on those lands — Congress chose to remove the excluded lands from the reservation, leaving them open for non-Indian use, and to compensate the Indians for the taking. The historical record of the lengthy negotiations between the Tribe and the United States provides no reason to reject the presumption that the 1901 Agreement fairly describes the entire understanding between the parties. The Tribe was represented by counsel, the tribal negotiating committee members spoke and understood English, and the Tribe secured a number of alterations to the United States’ original proposals. H. R. Doc. No. 156, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-30 (1900). Although members of the Tribe had stressed the importance of hunting and fishing on the excluded lands in order to establish their claim to title with the Boundary Commission in 1896, there is no record of even a reference to a right to continue those activities on those lands in the course of negotiating for the cession of the land and all rights “in and to” it. The failure to mention these rights in the face of this language, as well as the specific terms of the 1864 Treaty that would appear to render their continued exercise inconsistent with diminution, strongly supports the conclusion that there existed no contemporary intention specially to preserve those rights. The Tribe finally contends that the absence of any payment expressly in compensation for hunting and fishing rights on the ceded lands demonstrates that the parties did not intend to extinguish such rights in 1901. This contention again rests entirely on the assumption that the 1864 Treaty created hunting and fishing rights that were separate from and not appurtenant to the reservation. As explained above, that assumption is incorrect. Moreover, the fact that there was no separate valuation of the right to hunt and fish on the ceded lands is consistent with the view that the parties did not understand any such separate right to exist, and that the value of fish, game, and vegetation on the ceded lands was subsumed within the estimated value of the land in general. Indeed, had the parties actually intended to preserve independent hunting and fishing rights for the Tribe on the ceded lands, the Boundary Commission presumably would have computed the value of such rights and explicitly subtracted that amount from the price to be paid for land so encumbered. Moreover, the Tribe has since been afforded an opportunity to recover additional compensation for the ceded lands, in light of the “unconscionable” amount paid in 1906. 20 Ind. Cl. Comm’n, at 530. Yet in that proceeding, which resulted in an award to the Tribe of over $4 million, id., at 543, the Tribe apparently agreed that the “highest and best uses” for the ceded lands were commercial lumbering and livestock grazing, again without mention of any hunting or fishing rights. The absence of specific compensation for the rights at issue is entirely consistent with our interpretation of the 1901 Agreement. VII Thus, even though “legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians,” DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U. S. 425, 447 (1975), courts cannot ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a “fair appraisal,” Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S., at 675, clearly runs counter to a tribe’s later claims. Careful examination of the entire record in this case leaves us with the firm conviction that the exclusive right to hunt, fish, and gather roots, berries, and seeds on the lands reserved to the Klamath Tribe by the 1864 Treaty was not intended to survive as a special right to be free of state regulation in the ceded lands that were outside the reservation after the 1901 Agreement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. Treaty of Oct. 14, 1864 (ratified by the Senate on July 2, 1866, and proclaimed by President Grant on February 17, 1870). Relying on our decision in Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the language of the 1864 Treaty also served to reserve for the Tribe a right to hunt and trap game within the reservation, as well as the rights to fish and gather. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F. 2d 564, 566, cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1019 (1974). See also California & Oregon Land Co. v. Worden, 85 F. 94, 97 (CC Ore. 1898) (Klamath’s 1864 Treaty “operates as a reservation of the rights held by the Indians at the time the treaty was entered into”). Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 342. The Act provided: “That the President of the United States is hereby authorized to appoint a commission. . . whose duty it shall be to visit and thoroughly investigate and determine as to the correct location of the boundary lines of the Klam-ath Indian Reservation. . . . [S]aid commission shall ascertain and determine, as nearly as practicable, the number of acres, if any, of the land, the character thereof, and also the value thereof, in a state of nature, that have been excluded from said treaty reservation by the erroneous survey . . . .” Thus, Henry Blow, a former Klamath Tribe chief who had signed the 1864 Treaty, testified as follows: “Q. Was anything said by Mr. Huntington [the United States’ treaty negotiator] or the Indians about Sycan or Sprague River Valley? “A. Yes; the Indians said they wanted to keep these two valleys for the camas roots and pastures, the fish, etc., as well as the game in the mountains.” S. Doc. No. 93, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1897). Mo Ghen Kas Kit, a chief of the Klamath Tribe at the time of the 1864 Treaty negotiations and a Treaty signatory, testified: “At the time of the treaty of Council Grove we, the Indians, told Mr. Huntington, before and after describing these points, that we particularly wanted all the Sycan Valley down to Ish tish e wax [place of small fish], including the Sprague River Valley, because we needed it, especially for the camas and other roots in the valley and the game and the fishing .... “The Indians particularly told Mr. Huntington of this great need of these two valleys for this purpose, and they were dependent upon them principally for their living. All the headmen and leaders among the Indians saying this — and Mr. Huntington said 7 will/ — you shall have them in the treaty.” Id., at 15-16. The Boundary Commission reported: “The character of the excluded areas varies greatly. There are some limited tracts of good meadow and grazing land, but the major portion of the area is of inferior quality. With the exception of the meadows of the Sycan and Sprague River sections, which are the principal bone of contention, the greater part of the excluded land consists of rocky and sterile mountain ranges, producing very ordinary timber and little grass. “The territory in the vicinage of Mounts Scott and Cowhorn on the northwest and north is especially of little or no value. “Being of volcanic formation, the land consists of substrata of basalt and pumice stone lightly covered with volcanic ashes and decomposed pumice, offering scanty sustenance to vegetation. ’ “The extensive areas embraced in the eastern slopes and spurs of Yamsay Mountains and the western of Winter Ridge are likewise of little worth owing to their rugged and rocky formation. “Giving these inferior tracts, the good timber land and the meadows of the Sycan and Sprague River valleys their proportionate valuation, we determine the value of the excluded land to be $533,270, or 617,490 acres at 86.36 cents per acre.” Id., at 11. Citing the Boundary Commission’s report, the parties to this litigation stipulated: “The Boundary Commission did not take the value of the Tribe’s hunting, fishing and trapping rights into account when arriving at its valuation of the land.” App. 12. Negotiation of the final agreement required the efforts of two different negotiators for the United States, first Inspector William J. McConnell and then Inspector James McLaughlin. Throughout the negotiations, the Tribe’s central concerns were that it receive some immediate cash payment as a portion of the purchase price, that the remainder be available for use at the Tribe’s discretion at least to some degree, and that specific expenditures for irrigation of reservation lands be charged only to Tribe members who would benefit directly from the irrigation. See H. R. Doc. No. 156, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 10-12 (1900) (letter from Wm. J. McConnell to Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 2,1899)); id., at 28-30 (letter from J. McLaughlin to Secretary of the Interior (Oct. 29, 1900)); H. R. Doc. No. 79, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1901) (letter from J. McLaughlin to Secretary of the Interior (June 19, 1901)). Inspector McConnell apparently lacked authority to agree to some of these terms and, after the Tribe rejected McConnell’s initial proposals, it proposed a general agreement depositing the full sum recommended by the Boundary Commission with the United States Treasury in the Tribe’s name. H. R. Doc. No. 156, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12 (1900). “As this was their ultimatum,” McConnell reported, “I concluded the agreement.” Id., at 12. Despite his negotiation of this agreement, however, Inspector McConnell also reported that, in his opinion, the excluded land was for the most part “practically worthless,” and that he believed Congress should restore the unentered excluded acreage to the Tribe rather than purchase it. Id., at 10. If Congress nevertheless chose to purchase all the excluded acreage, McConnell recommended, “the sum to be paid [to the Tribe] should not exceed $250,000,” as opposed to the $533,270 that the Boundary Commission had suggested. Ibid. Shortly after McConnell submitted this report, two attorneys for the Tribe wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs criticizing McConnell’s views as gratuitous “individual opinion.” The Tribe’s attorneys requested that “further investigation” be made, “so that full and complete information on this question may be presented to Congress.” Id., at 18-19 (letter from J. McCammon and R. Belt to the Hon. W. Jones (Apr. 10, 1899)). In light of the Tribe’s objections, and because the United States also was not satisfied with McConnell’s agreement in light of his negative report, id., at 21 (letter from A. Tonner to Secretary of the Interior (May 15, 1899)), the second inspector, James McLaughlin, was dispatched to evaluate the excluded lands and negotiate a new agreement. Id., at 22. The excluded lands posed a problem to the Tribe as well as to the United States because after the erroneous 1871 survey some of the excluded lands had been entered upon and settled by non-Indians. See S. Exec. Doc. No. 129, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1894) (extract from annual report of U. S. Indian Agent Joseph Emery for 1887) (noting competing claims of Klamath Indians and “white settlers and cattlemen in the vicinity”); Attachment to S. Exec. Doc. No. 129 (map indicating existence of 34 “townships” outside 1871 reservation boundaries but within the “approximate limits claimed by Indians”). See also T. Stern, The Klamath Tribe 87 (1965). In 1899, Inspector McConnell reported that 62,361 acres of the excluded lands had been “entered” by non-Indians, including 7,080 acres allotted to “proposed settlers,” “leaving a balance of 555,129 acres . . . yet unoccupied.” H. R. Doc. No. 156, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1900) (letter from Wm. J. McConnell to Secretary of the Interior (Jan. 2, 1899)). Although the Boundary Commission and Congress apparently assumed that the United States would pay the Tribe for the excluded land, rather than restore it to the reservation, the United States’ first negotiator, Inspector McConnell, suggested that the unentered excluded acreage should be restored to the Tribe with payment being made only for acres that had already been entered upon. Ibid. As already noted, n. 7, supra, the attorneys for the Tribe objected to McConnell’s report. Although the Department of the Interior considered McConnell’s suggestions, it ultimately decided to recommend to Congress that all the excluded lands be purchased. The second inspector, James McLaughlin, reported that “whilst it is true that there are a great many acres of valueless land in the said tract, yet there are many acres of arable land which already possess considerable value, and an immense amount of pine timber that must become very valuable in the near future; and, when taking into consideration the twenty-nine years that the Klamath Indians have been deprived of these lands, together with the value of the valleys, meadows, and heavily timbered portions, I most heartily indorse the price . . . .” H. R. Doc. No. 156, at 28. The substantive terms of the agreement had been negotiated by McLaughlin with the Tribe’s negotiating committee over a 3-day period in October 1900. Id., at 29. That agreement, however, mistakenly referred to the 1871 survey of the reservation rather than the 1888 survey. To correct this error, McLaughlin returned to the reservation in June 1901 to obtain the Tribe’s assent to an agreement identical to the 1900 agreement but for substitution of the phrase “approved in 1888 by” for “made in 1871 under the authority of” in Article I. H. R. Doc. No. 79, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1901) (letter from J. McLaughlin to the Secretary of the Interior (June 19, 1901)). The Senate Report recommending approval of the 1901 Agreement expressly referred to the “diminished reservation” of the Tribe. S. Rep. No. 198, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1906). Of the 2,133 persons listed on the final tribal roll of 1954, 1,660 elected to withdraw from the Tribe and receive monetary compensation. The remaining 473 tribe members retained a participatory interest in the management of the remainder of the reservation. Kimball v. Callahan, 493 P. 2d, at 567. At least as of 1979, the Klamath Tribe continued to maintain a tribal constitution, a tribal government, and a tribal Game Commission. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 P. 2d 768, 776, and n. 14 (CA9), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 826 (1979). App. 23. The Tribe’s complaint had alleged that the “ceded lands” included 87,000 acres granted, “without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff and without payment of compensation,” by the Secretary of the Interior to the California & Oregon Land Company pursuant to an exchange authorized by Congress in 1906. Id,., at 5-6. The controversy regarding title to and compensation for these exchanged acres has come before this Court on more than one occasion. See United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U. S. 119 (1938); Klamath and Moadoc Tribes v. United States, 296 U. S. 244 (1935); United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 192 U. S. 355 (1904); United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 148 U. S. 31 (1893); United States v. Dalles Military Road Co., 140 U. S. 599 (1891). See generally O’Callaghan, Klamath Indians and the Oregon Wagon Road Grant, 1864-1938, 53 Oregon Historical Quarterly 23 (1952). Although the District Court’s judgment encompassed the right to fish and hunt on these exchanged acres, App. 23, the Court of Appeals did not explicitly address the merits of the Tribe’s allegations relating to those lands, and the parties have not mentioned the issue here. We express no opinion on any separate questions related to those lands. In Red Lake Band, a band of Chippewa Indians had ceded “all our right, title, and interest in and to” two parcels of land in agreements ratified by Congress in 1889 and 1904. 614 F. 2d, at 1162. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Band had thereby given up its tribal “rights to hunt, fish, trap and gather wild rice free of the state’s regulation of such activities,” despite the Band’s claim that diminishment of the reservation boundaries in the 1889 and 1904 Acts did not abrogate such rights absent explicit reference. Ibid. In this sense, the off-reservation rights claimed by the Tribe here are somewhat comparable to the off-reservation right “of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory” explicitly reserved in the Treaty construed in Puyallup Tribe v. Depart ment of Game of Washington, 391 U. S. 392 (1968), and United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371 (1905). See n. 16, infra. We have not previously found such absolute freedom from state regulation on nonreservation lands, even in the face of Indian cession agreements that expressly reserved a right to hunt or fish on ceded non-reservation lands. See, e. g., Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U. S., at 398 (State may regulate “manner” of Indian fishing although treaty reserved right to take fish “at all usual and accustomed places” including places outside the reservation); Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U. S. 556, 563-564 (1916) (Indian fishing subject to “appropriate regulation” despite explicit reservation of “the privilege of fishing and hunting” in cession agreement); United States v. Winans, 198 U. S., at 384 (although reserved right to take fish at “all usual and accustomed places” outside the reservation implies an easement over private lands, it does not otherwise “restrain the state unreasonably ... in the regulation of the right”); see also Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 682-684 (1979) (reserved Indian right to “take fish” off the reservation is not an “untrammeled right” and is subject to “nondiscriminatory” conservation regulation by the State); Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 504, 525, 532 (1964). Indeed, as we have unanimously noted: “Our cases have recognized that tribal sovereignty contains ‘a significant geographical component.’ Thus the off-reservation activities of Indians are generally subject to the prescriptions of a ‘nondiscriminatory state law’ in the absence of ‘express federal law to the contrary.’ ” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 335, n. 18 (1983) (citations omitted). See also Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 75 (1962) (“State authority over Indians is . . . more extensive over activities . . . not on any reservation”). E. g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194 (1976), and cases cited in n. 16, supra. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404 (1968); Kimball v. Callahan, 690 F. 2d, at 772 (Klamath Indians retain right to hunt and fish on lands within “the former reservation at the time of the [1954 Termination] Act’s enactment”). We previously have described such language as “express language of cession.” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 469, n. 10 (1984). In United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371 (1906), Yakima Indians sought to exercise their treaty right to take fish “at all usual and accustomed places,” including places outside the reservation on land previously owned by and open to the Yakima but later ceded. Private owners of land fronting on some of those places subsequently asserted a right to bar Indians from their property. In holding that the Indians retained a right to cross private property to reach their usual fishing places, the Court stated: “New conditions came into existence, to which [the Tribe’s fishing] rights had to be accommodated. Only a limitation of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away.” Id., at 381. The Tribe relies on Winans for the proposition that its right to hunt and fish on the ceded lands similarly should be considered limited by necessity but not extinguished. Winans, however, expressly noted that the State possessed the power to reasonably regulate the Yakima’s off-reservation fishing. Id., at 384; see n. 16, supra. Moreover, the cession agreement in Winans expressly reserved the right to fish on nonreservation lands. The only question presented was whether that clearly stated right was to be frustrated because of subsequent transfers of ceded lands to private parties. The Court found, as a matter of intent, that the 1859 Yakima Treaty could not be so interpreted. 198 U. S., at 381. The present case, however, involves the necessarily precedent question whether any off-reservation rights were intended to be preserved at all. Winans sheds no light on how that question should be resolved. After the 1864 Treaty was proclaimed, a written pass system apparently was implemented to comply with the “temporary leave of absence” provision of Article I. See T. Stern, The Klamath Tribe 91, 125-126 (1965). Although the record establishes that members of the Tribe continued to hunt and fish outside of the boundaries of the diminished reservation after 1901, App. 14, there is no indication of any concern regarding their legal right to do so until commencement of this litigation. The Tribe suggests that, because Congress closed virtually all the ceded lands to entry by 1906, this case is to be distinguished from others in which a congressional purpose to open Indian lands to non-Indian settlement might “reveal a clear Congressional intent” to terminate off-reservation Indian rights. Brief for Respondent 33, n. 16; see Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S., at 471. Of course, in our diminishment cases like Solem, the question has been whether diminishment has occurred — limitation of tribal rights outside a diminished reservation has been presumed. See, e. g., id., at 467; Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 630-632 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 483, n. 1 (1973). In this ease diminution is acknowledged, and the Tribe poses the entirely different question whether special rights nevertheless survived. Moreover, virtually all of the congressional withdrawal of the ceded lands involved in this case occurred after the 1901 Agreement was negotiated and signed. App. 13-14. The Tribe ultimately argues that, because the 1901 Agreement “did not say one word about ceding” hunting and fishing rights specifically, we must presume that “the Tribe would reasonably have believed that failure to mention these express Treaty rights could only result in their continuation.” Brief for Respondent 37. This belief, if it actually existed, was largely correct, of course: the exclusive rights preserved in the 1864 Treaty were indeed continued within the reservation after the 1901 Agreement. Additionally, the 1901 Agreement cannot really be characterized as “silent” with regard to the preservation of off-reservation rights — it expressly stated that the Tribe ceded all its right in and to the land. Viewed in the entirety of its particular historical context, silence concerning specific rights in the 1901 Agreement is consistent only with an intent to end any special rights of the Tribe outside the reservation. Cf. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504 (1896). The Indian Claims Commission’s findings of fact include a reference to the “subsistence” value of nonlumbering and nongrazing areas within the ceded lands, without further definition of the term. 20 Ind. Cl. Comm’n, at 536. To the extent that this indicates that the Commission considered hunting, fishing, and gathering of food in determining the value of the land, however, it further undercuts the Tribe’s reliance on an alleged failure of compensation for hunting and fishing rights.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRAZEE v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al. No. 87-1945. Argued March 1, 1989 Decided March 29, 1989 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. David A. French argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was John W. Whitehead. Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, and Diane Curry Grapsas and Marcy I. Singer, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Amy Adelson, Lois C. Waldman, and Marc D. Stern; for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith by Steven M. Freeman, Meyer Eisenberg, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Jill L. Kahn, and Richard E. Shevitz; for the Council on Religious Freedom et al. by Lee Boothby, Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, Robert W. Nixon, and Rolland Truman; and for Robert Roesser et al. by Bruce N. Cameron. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act provides that “[a]n individual shall be ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed ... or to accept suitable work when offered him . . . .” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, ¶433 (1986). In April 1984, William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by Kelly Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday. Frazee told Kelly that, as a Christian, he could not work on “the Lord’s day.” Frazee then applied to the Illinois Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits claiming that there was good cause for his refusal to work on Sunday. His application was denied. Frazee appealed the denial of benefits to the Department of Employment Security’s Board of Review, which also denied his claim. The Board of Review stated: “When a refusal of work is based on religious convictions, the refusal must be based upon some tenets or dogma accepted by the individual of some church, sect, or denomination, and such a refusal based solely on an individual’s personal belief is personal and noncompelling and does not render the work unsuitable.” App. 18-19. The Board of Review concluded that Frazee had refused an offer of suitable work without good cause. The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Peoria County, affirmed, finding that the agency’s decision was “not contrary to law nor against the manifest weight of the evidence,” thereby rejecting Frazee’s claim based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id., at 23. Frazee’s free exercise claim was again rejected by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District. 159 Ill. App. 3d 474, 512 N. E. 2d 789 (1987). The court characterized Frazee’s refusal to work as resting on his “personal professed religious belief,” and made it clear that it did “not question the sincerity of the plaintiff,” id., at 475, 477, 512 N. E. 2d, at 790, 791. It then engaged in a historical discussion of religious prohibitions against work on the Sabbath and, in particular, on Sunday. Nonetheless, the court distinguished Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136 (1987), from the facts of Frazee’s case. Unlike the claimants in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect or church, nor did he claim that his refusal to work resulted from a “tenet, belief or teaching of an established religious body.” 159 Ill. App. 3d, at 477, 512 N. E. 2d, at 791. To the Illinois court, Frazee’s position that he was “a Christian” and as such felt it wrong to work on Sunday was not enough. For a Free Exercise Clause claim to succeed, said the Illinois Appellate Court, “the injunction against Sunday labor must be found in a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect. [Frazee] does not profess to be a member of any such sect.” Id., at 478-479, 512 N. E. 2d, at 792. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Frazee leave to appeal. The mandatory appellate jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 U. S. C. §1257(2), since the state court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Illinois’ statutory “good cause” requirement as applied in this case. We noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S. 814 (1988), and now reverse. We have had more than one occasion before today to consider denials of unemployment compensation benefits to those who have refused work on the basis of their religious beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 410, the Court held that a State could not “constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions [of its unemployment-compensation program] so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., supra, also held that the State’s refusal to award unemployment compensation benefits to one who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade participation in the production of armaments violated the First Amendment right to free exercise. Just two years ago, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, supra, Florida’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an employee discharged for her refusal to work on her Sabbath because of religious convictions adopted subsequent to employment was also declared to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In each of these cases, the appellant was “forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and . . . employment,” id., at 144, and we found “the forfeiture of unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful coercion to bear on the employee’s choice,” ibid. In each of these cases, we concluded that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true, as the Illinois court noted, that each of the claimants in those cases was a member of a particular religious sect, but none of those decisions turned on that consideration or on any tenet of the sect involved that forbade the work the claimant refused to perform. Our judgments in those cases rested on the fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religion required him or her to refrain from the work in question. Never did we suggest that unless a claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what his job requires, his belief, however sincere, must be deemed a purely personal preference rather than a religious belief. Indeed, in Thomas, there was disagreement among sect members as to whether their religion made it sinful to work in an armaments factory; but we considered this to be an irrelevant issue and hence rejected the State’s submission that unless the religion involved formally forbade work on armaments, Thomas’ belief did not qualify as a religious belief. Because Thomas unquestionably had a sincere belief that his religion prevented him from doing such work, he was entitled to invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. There is no doubt that “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,” Thomas, supra, at 713. Purely secular views do not suffice. United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163 (1965); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215-216 (1972). Nor do we underestimate the difficulty of distinguishing between religious and secular convictions and in determining whether a professed belief is sincerely held. States are clearly entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free Exercise Clause. We do not face problems about sincerity or about the religious nature of Frazee’s convictions, however. The courts below did not question his sincerity, and the State concedes it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Furthermore, the Board of Review characterized Frazee’s views as “religious convictions,” App. 18, and the Illinois Appellate Court referred to his refusal to work on Sunday as based on a “personal professed religious belief,” 159 Ill. App. 3d, at 475, 512 N. E. 2d, at 790. Frazee asserted that he was a Christian, but did not claim to be a member of a particular Christian sect. It is also true that there are assorted Christian denominations that do not profess to be compelled by their religion to refuse Sunday work, but this does not diminish Frazee’s protection flowing from the Free Exercise Clause. Thomas settled that much. Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination, especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to work on Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization. Here, Frazee’s refusal was based on a sincerely held religious belief. Under our cases, he was entitled to invoke First Amendment protection. The State does not appear to defend this aspect of the decision below. In its brief and at oral argument, the State conceded that the Free Exercise Clause does not demand adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect. Instead, the State proposes its own test for identifying a “religious” belief, asserts that Frazee has not met such a test, and asks that we affirm on this basis. We decline to address this submission; for as the case comes to us, Frazee’s conviction was recognized as religious but found to be inadequate because it was not claimed to represent a tenet of a religious organization of which he was a member. That ground for decision was clearly erroneous. The State offers no justification for the burden that the denial of benefits places on Frazee’s right to exercise his religion. The Illinois Appellate Court ascribed great significance to America’s weekend way of life. The Illinois court asked: “What would Sunday be today if professional football, baseball, basketball, and tennis were barred. Today Sunday is not only a day for religion, but for recreation and labor. Today the supermarkets are open, service stations dispense fuel, utilities continue to serve the people and factories continue to belch smoke and tangible products,” concluding that “[i]f all Americans were to abstain from working on Sunday, chaos would result.” 159 Ill. App. 3d, at 478, 512 N. E. 2d, at 792. We are unpersuaded, however, that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employ if William Frazee succeeds in his claim. As was the case in Thomas where there was “no evidence in the record to indicate that the number of people who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefits and religious beliefs is large enough to create ‘widespread unemployment,’ or even to seriously affect unemployment,” 450 U. S., at 719, there is nothing before us in this case to suggest that Sunday shopping, or Sunday sporting, for that matter, will grind to a halt as a result of our decision today. And, as we have said in the past, there may exist state interests sufficiently compelling to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion. No such interest has been presented here. The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. From the very first report of the Illinois Division of Unemployment Insurance claims adjudicator, Frazee’s refusal of Sunday work has been described as “due to his religious convictions.” In his application for reconsideration of the referee’s determination, Frazee stated: “I refused the job which required me to work on Sunday based on Biblical principles, scripture Exodus 20: 8, 9, 10. Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days you shall labour and do all your work but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your God. On it you shall not do any work.” We noted in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 715 (1981), that an asserted belief might be “so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.” But that avails the State nothing in this case. As the discussion of the Illinois Appellate Court itself indicates, claims by Christians that their religion forbids Sunday work cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PATSY v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA No. 80-1874. Argued March 2, 1982 Decided June 21, 1982 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III-B of which White, J., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 516. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 517. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Part II of which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 519. Charles S. Sims argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., E. Richard Larson, Steven R. Shapiro, and Joel M. Gora. Mitchell D. Franks argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jeffrey H. Klink. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Bill Lann Lee, and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; and by Ellen Josephson and Steven H. Steinglass for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, and James P. Manak for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.; and by John C. Ross, Jr., for the Texas Municipal League et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Washington et al. by Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Malachy R. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, and Thomas R. Bjorgen, Assistant Attorney General, and the Attorneys General for their respective States or jurisdictions as follows: Aviata F. Faalevad of American Samoa, Charles A. Graddick of Alabama, Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Robert Corbin of Arizona, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Tany S. Hong of Hawaii, David H. Leroy of Idaho, Tyrone C. Fahner of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Steven L. Beshear of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Warren R. Spannaus of Minnesota, William A. Attain of Mississippi, John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Richard H. Bryan of Nevada, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, JamesR. Zazzali ofNew Jersey, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert 0. Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Mark White of Texas, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, John J. Easton, Jr., of Vermont, Chauncey H. Broum-ing, Jr., of West Virginia, Bronson C. LaFollette of Wisconsin, and Steven F. Freudenthal of Wyoming; and for the National Education Association et al. by Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, Jeremiah A. Collins, Richard C. Dinkelspiel, William L. Robinson, and Norman J. Chachkin. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Petitioner Georgia Patsy filed this action, alleging that her employer, Florida International University (FIU), had denied her employment opportunities solely on the basis of her race and sex. By a divided vote, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that petitioner was required to exhaust “adequate and appropriate” administrative remedies, and remanded the case to the District Court to consider the adequacy of the administrative procedures. Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F. 2d 900 (1981) (en banc). We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 813, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. I Petitioner alleges that even though she is well qualified and has received uniformly excellent performance evaluations from her supervisors, she has been rejected for more than 13 positions at FIU. She further claims that FIU has unlawfully filled positions through intentional discrimination on the basis of race and sex. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief or, in the alternative, damages. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted respondent Board of Regents’ motion to dismiss because petitioner had not exhausted available administrative remedies. On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612 F. 2d 946 (1980). The full court then granted respondent’s petition for rehearing and vacated the panel decision. The Court of Appeals reviewed numerous opinions of this Court holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required, and concluded that these cases did not preclude the application of a “flexible” exhaustion rule. 634 F. 2d, at 908. After canvassing the policy arguments in favor of an exhaustion requirement, the Court of Appeals decided that a § 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust administrative remedies if the following minimum conditions are met: (1) an orderly system of review or appeal is provided by statute or agency rule; (2) the agency can grant relief more or less commensurate with the claim; (3) relief is available within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures are fair, are not unduly burdensome, and are not used to harass or discourage those with legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief is available, in appropriate cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiff’s rights during the administrative process. Where these minimum standards are met, a court must further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiff’s interest, and the values served by the exhaustion doctrine in order to determine whether exhaustion should be required. Id., at 912-913. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether exhaustion would be appropriate in this case. II The question whether exhaustion of administrative remedies should ever be required in a § 1983 action has prompted vigorous debate and disagreement. See, e. g., Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Cases in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1979); Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975); Comment, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537 (1974). Our resolution of this issue, however, is made much easier because we are not writing on a clean slate. This Court has addressed this issue, as well as related issues, on several prior occasions. Respondent suggests that our prior precedents do not control our decision today, arguing that these cases can be distinguished on their facts or that this Court did not “fully” consider the question whether exhaustion should be required. This contention need not detain us long. Beginning with McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671-673 (1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a §1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63, n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 312, n. 4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 472-473 (1974) (“When federal claims are premised on [§1983] — as they are here — we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights”). Respondent may be correct in arguing that several of these decisions could have been based on traditional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. Nevertheless, this Court has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983. and we have not deviated from that position in the 19 years since McNeese. Therefore, we do not address the question presented in this case as one of first impression. ► — < ( » — 4 Respondent argues that we should reconsider these decisions and adopt the Court of Appeals’ exhaustion rule, which was based on McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 (1969). This Court has never announced a definitive formula for determining whether prior decisions should be overruled or reconsidered. However, in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978), we articulated four factors that should be considered. Two of these factors — whether the decisions in question misconstrued the meaning of the statute as revealed in its legislative history and whether overruling these decisions would be inconsistent with more recent expressions of congressional intent — are particularly relevant to our decision today. Both concern legislative purpose, which is of paramount importance in the exhaustion context because I Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts. Of course, courts play an important role in determining the limits of an exhaustion requirement and may impose such a requirement even where Congress has not expressly so provided. However, the initial question whether exhaustion is required should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. Therefore, in deciding whether we should reconsider our prior decisions and require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, we look to congressional intent as reflected in the legislative history of the predecessor to § 1983 and in recent congressional activity in this area. A In determining whether our prior decisions misconstrued the meaning of § 1983, we begin with a review of the legislative history to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13, the precursor to § 1983. Although we recognize that the 1871 Congress did not expressly contemplate the exhaustion question, we believe that the tenor of the debates over § 1 supports our conclusion that exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, along with the Fourteenth Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingredients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction Era. During that time, the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions by state power. As we recognized in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1880)), “[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’ ” At least three recurring themes in the debates over § 1 cast serious doubt on the suggestion that requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies would be consistent with the intent of the 1871 Congress. First, in passing § 1, Congress assigned to the federal courts a paramount role in protecting constitutional rights. Representative Dawes expressed this view as follows: “The first remedy proposed by this bill is a resort to the courts of the United States. Is that a proper place in which to find redress for any such wrongs? If there be power to call into courts of the United States an offender against these rights, privileges, and immunities, and hold him to an account there, either civilly or criminally, for their infringement, I submit to the calm and candid judgment of every member of this House that there is no tribunal so fitted, where equal and exact justice would be more likely to be meted out in temper, in moderation, in severity, if need be, but always according to the law and the fact, as that great tribunal of the Constitution.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 476 (1871) (hereinafter Globe). See also id., at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 375 (remarks of Rep. Lowe); id., at 448-449 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Cobum). The 1871 Congress intended § 1 to “throw open the doors of the United States courts” to individuals who were threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights, id., at 376 (remarks of Rep. Lowe), and to provide these individuals immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law to the contrary. For example, Senator Edmunds, who introduced the bill in the Senate, stated in his closing remarks that the bill was similar in principle to an earlier act upheld by this Court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842): “[T]he Supreme Court decided . . . that it was the solemn duty of Congress under the Constitution to secure to the individual, in spite of the State, or with its aid, as the case might be, precisely the rights that the Constitution gave him, and that there should be no intermediate authority to arrest or oppose the direct performance of this duty by Congress.” Globe 692 (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Elliott viewed the issue as whether “the Government of the United States [has] the right, under the Constitution, to protect a citizen in the exercise of his vested rights as an American citizen by . . . the assertion of immediate jurisdiction through its courts, without the appeal or agency of the State in which the citizen is domi-died.” Id., at 389 (emphasis added). See, e. g., id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 807 (remarks of Rep. Garfield); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); Globe App. 141 (remarks of Rep. Shanks). A second theme in the debates further suggests that the 1871 Congress would not have wanted to impose an exhaustion requirement. A major factor motivating the expansion of federal jurisdiction through §§ 1 and 2 of the bill was the belief of the 1871 Congress that the state authorities had been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights. See, e. g., Globe 321 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) (“The State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to check the evil or punish the criminals”); id., at 374 (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (“the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective”); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id., at 609 (remarks of Sen. Pool); id., at 687 (remarks of Sen. Shurz); id., at 691 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); Globe App. 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt). Of primary importance to the exhaustion question was the mistrust that the 1871 Congress held for the factfinding processes of state institutions. See, e. g., Globe 320 (testimony of Hon. Thomas Settle, Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, before the House Judiciary Committee) (“The defect lies not so much with the courts as with the juries”); id., at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); Globe App. 311 (remarks of Rep. Maynard). This Congress believed that federal courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to the existing defects in the factfinding processes of the state courts. See, e. g., Globe 322 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); id., at 459 (remarks of Rep. Cobum). This perceived defect in the States’ factfinding processes is particularly relevant to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies: exhaustion rules are often applied in deference to the superior factfinding ability of the relevant administrative agency. See, e. g., McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 192-196. A third feature of the debates relevant to the exhaustion question is the fact that many legislators interpreted the bill to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked”). For example, Senator Thurman noted: “I object to [§ 1], first, because of the centralizing tendency of transferring all mere private suits, as well as the punishment of offenses, from the State into the Federal courts. I do not say that this section gives to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not suppose that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the option of the person who imagines himself to be injured to sue in the State court or in the Federal court, an option that he who has been the least injured, but who has some malice to gratify, will be the most likely to avail himself of.” Globe App. 216. See also Globe 578, 694-695 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id., at 384 (remarks of Rep. Hoar); id., at 514 (remarks of Rep. Famworth); Globe App. 85 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) (“Admitting that the States have concurrent power to enforce the Constitution of the United States within their respective limits, must we wait for their action?”). This legislative history supports the conclusion that our prior decisions, holding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983, did not misperceive the statutory intent: it seems fair to infer that the 1871 Congress did not intend that an individual be compelled in every case to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing an action under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. We recognize, however, that drawing such a conclusion from this history alone is somewhat precarious: the 1871 Congress was not presented with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, nor was it aware of the potential role of state administrative agencies. Therefore, we do not rely exclusively on this legislative history in deciding the question presented here. Congress addressed the question of exhaustion under § 1983 when it recently enacted 42 U. S. C. §1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The legislative history of § 1997e provides strong evidence of congressional intent on this issue. B The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted pri-manly to ensure that the United States Attorney General has “legal standing to enforce existing constitutional rights and Federal statutory rights of institutionalized persons.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, p. 9 (1980) (Conf. Rep.). In § 1997e, Congress also created a specific, limited exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions pursuant to § 1983. Section 1997e and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not generally required in § 1983 actions, and that it decided to carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with Congress’ decision to adopt § 1997e and would usurp policy judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. In considering whether an exhaustion requirement should be incorporated into the bill, Congress clearly expressed its belief that a decision to require exhaustion for certain § 1983 actions would work a change in the law. Witnesses testifying before the Subcommittee that drafted the bill discussed the decisions of this Court holding that exhaustion was not required. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 2439 and H. R. 5791 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1977) (1977 Hearings); id., at 47, 69, 77, 323; Hearings on H. R. 10 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 48 (1979) (1979 Hearings). During these hearings, Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of this Subcommittee, stated: “Another thing that I think requires some discussion within the committee, and is a point of argument, ... is whether there ought to be an exhaustion of remedies requirement. “. . . In fact, I think it has been pointed out that if [we] were to require it, particularly in 1983, that would constitute regression from the current state of the law. It would set the law back, because presently it is clearly held, that is the Supreme Court has held, that in 1983 civil rights suits the litigant need not necessarily fully exhaust State remedies.” 1977 Hearings 57-58. See also id., at 272 (remarks of Rep. Drinan) (Representative Railsback “grounds his bill on doing something which the Supreme Court has consistently refused to do, namely require exhaustion of remedies”); 1979 Hearings 26 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (adopting §1997e “was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983”). The debates over adopting an exhaustion requirement also reflect this understanding. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. 11988 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Volkmer and Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 15445 (remarks of Rep. Ertel); id., at 23180 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) (“it is settled law that an exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required as a precondition of maintaining a 1983 action”); 125 Cong. Rec. 12496 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Butler) (“Under existing law there is no requirement that a complainant first ask the State prison system to help him”). With the understanding that exhaustion generally is not required, Congress decided to adopt the limited exhaustion requirement of § 1997e in order to relieve the burden on the federal courts by diverting certain prisoner petitions back through state and local institutions, and also to encourage the States to develop appropriate grievance procedures. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; 124 Cong. Rec. 11976 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 11976, 11983 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id., at 15442 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 15445 (remarks of Rep. Ertel); id., at 23176 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id., at 23179-23180 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id., at 23180 (remarks of Rep. Ertel). Implicit in this decision is Congress’ conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left standing with respect to other § 1983 suits. A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would also be inconsistent with the extraordinarily detailed exhaustion scheme embodied in § 1997e. Section 1997e carves out a narrow exception to the general no-exhaustion rule to govern certain prisoner claims, and establishes a procedure to ensure that the administrative remedies are adequate and effective. The exhaustion requirement is expressly limited to § 1983 actions brought by an adult convicted of a crime. 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a)(l) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Section 1997e(b)(l) instructs the Attorney General to “promulgate minimum standards for the development and implementation of a plain, speedy, and effective system” of administrative remedies, and §1997e(b)(2) specifies certain minimum standards that must be included. A court may require exhaustion of administrative remedies only if “the Attorney General has certified or the court has determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b).” § 1997e(a)(2). Before exhaustion may be required, the court must further conclude that it “would be appropriate and in the interests of justice.” § 1997e(a)(l). Finally, in those § 1983 actions meeting all the statutory requirements for exhaustion, the district court may not dismiss the case, but may only “continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days in order to require exhaustion.” Ibid. This detailed scheme is inconsistent with discretion to impose, on an ad hoc basis, a judicially developed exhaustion rule in other cases. Congress hoped that § 1997e would improve prison conditions by stimulating the development of successful grievance mechanisms. See, e. g., Conf. Rep. 9; H. R. Rep. No. 96-80, p. 4 (1979)' 1979 Hearings 4 (remarks of Rep. Rails-back); 124 Cong. Rec. 11976 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Rails-back); 125 Cong. Rec. 12492 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 126 Cong. Rec. 10780 (1980) (remarks of Rep.. Kastenmeier). To further this purpose, Congress provided for the deferral of the exercise of federal jurisdiction over certain §1983 claims only on the condition that the state prisons develop adequate procedures. This purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance procedures capable of certification, because prisoner § 1983 cases could be diverted to state administrative remedies in any event. In sum, the exhaustion provisions of the Act make sense, and are not superfluous, only if exhaustion could not be required before its enactment and if Congress intended to carve out a narrow exception to this no-exhaustion rule. The legislative history of § 1997e demonstrates that Congress has taken the approach of carving out specific exceptions to the general rule that federal courts cannot require exhaustion under §1983. It is not our province to alter the balance struck by Congress in establishing the procedural framework for bringing actions under § 1983. C Respondent and the Court of Appeals argue that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be required because it would further various policies. They argue that an exhaustion requirement would lessen the perceived burden that § 1983 actions impose on federal courts; would further the goal of comity and improve federal-state relations by postponing federal-court review until after the state administrative agency had passed on the issue; and would enable the agency, which presumably has expertise in the area at issue, to enlighten the federal court’s ultimate decision. As we noted earlier, policy considerations alone cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is consistent with congressional intent. See supra, at 501-502, and n. 4. Furthermore, as the debates over incorporating the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e demonstrate, the relevant policy considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them. The very difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress’ superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable. Cf. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145, 150, 153 (1965). Beyond the policy issues that must be resolved in deciding whether to require exhaustion, there are equally difficult questions concerning the design and scope of an exhaustion requirement. These questions include how to define those categories of § 1983 claims in which exhaustion might be desirable; how to unify and centralize the standards for judging the kinds of administrative procedures that should be exhausted; what tolling requirements and time limitations should be adopted; what is the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect of particular administrative determinations; what consequences should attach to the failure to comply with procedural requirements of administrative proceedings; and whether federal courts could grant necessary interim in-junctive relief and hold the action pending exhaustion, or proceed to judgment without requiring exhaustion even though exhaustion might otherwise be required, where the relevant administrative agency is either powerless or not inclined to grant such interim relief. These and similar questions might be answered swiftly and surely by legislation, but would create costly, remedy-delaying, and court-burdening litigation if answered incrementally by the judiciary in the context of diverse constitutional claims relating to thousands of different state agencies. The very variety of claims, claimants, and state agencies involved in §1983 cases argues for congressional consideration of the myriad of policy considerations, and may explain why Congress, in deciding whether to require exhaustion in certain § 1983 actions brought by adult prisoners, carved out such a narrow, detailed exception to the no-exhaustion rule. After full debate and consideration of the various policy arguments, Congress adopted § 1997e, taking the largest class of §1983 actions and constructing an exhaustion requirement that differs substantially from the McKart-type standard urged by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals. See n. 18, supra. It is not for us to say whether Congress will or should create a similar scheme for other categories of § 1983 claims or whether Congress will or should adopt an altogether different exhaustion requirement for nonprisoner § 1983 claims. IV Based on the legislative histories of both §1983 and § 1997e, we conclude that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983. We decline to overturn our prior decisions holding that such exhaustion is not required. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Because this case is here on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations in petitioner’s amended complaint. In her initial complaint, petitioner named FIU as the defendant. Relying on Byron v. University of Florida, 403 F. Supp. 49 (ND Fla. 1975), the District Court granted FIU’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Board of Regents and not the individual university had the capacity to sue and be sued under Florida law. The District Court granted petitioner leave to amend, and she amended her complaint to name the Board of Regents “on behalf of” FIU. Petitioner requested the District Court to “[r]equire Defendants to remedy the discrimination practiced upon Plaintiff by promoting her to the next available position consistent with those previously applied for and for which she is qualified or in the alternative, to require the Defendants to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $500,000 as actual and exemplary damages.” Record 47. Petitioner also requested that the District Court “order further equitable and injunctive relief as it deems appropriate and necessary to correct the conditions of discrimination complained of herein.” Id., at 48. The other factors discussed in Monell — whether the decisions in question constituted a departure from prior decisions and whether overruling these decisions would frustrate legitimate reliance on their holdings — do not support overruling these decisions. McNeese was not a departure from prior decisions — this Court had not previously addressed the application of the exhaustion rule to § 1983 actions. Overruling these decisions might injure those § 1983 plaintiffs who had forgone or waived their state administrative remedies in reliance on these decisions. Congressional intent is important in determining the application of the exhaustion doctrine to cases in which federal administrative remedies are available, as well as to those in which state remedies are available. Of course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain administrative remedies shall be exclusive. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Even where the statutory requirement of exhaustion is not explicit, courts are guided by congressional intent in determining whether application of the doctrine would be consistent with the statutory scheme. In determining whether exhaustion of federal administrative remedies is required, courts generally focus on the role Congress has assigned to the relevant federal agency, and tailor the exhaustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme created by Congress. See McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193-195 (1969). With state administrative remedies, the focus is not so much on the role assigned to the state agency, but the role of the state agency becomes important once a court finds that deferring its exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with statutory intent. Some of the debates relating to § 2, which created certain federal crimes in addition to those defined in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27, aimed primarily at the Ku Klux Klan, are also relevant to our discussion of §1. Opponents of the bill also recognized this purpose and complained that the bill would usurp the States’ power, centralize the government, and perhaps ultimately destroy the States. See, e. g., Globe 337, 338 (remarks of Rep. Whitthorne); id., at 352 (remarks of Rep. Beck); id., at 361 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id., at 365 (remarks of Rep. Arthur); id., at 385 (remarks of Rep. Lewis); id., at 429, 431 (remarks of Rep. McHenry); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); id., at 510, 511 (remarks of Rep. Eldridge); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 46 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr) (hereinafter Globe App.); id., at 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman); id., at 243 (remarks of Sen. Bayard). Opponents criticized this provision on this very ground. For example, Representative Storm lamented: “[Section one] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to show whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or not. It takes the whole question away from them in the beginning.” Id., at 86. See also Globe 416 (remarks of Rep. Biggs) (“for the violation of the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizen a civil remedy is to be had by proceedings in the Federal courts, State authorization in the premises to the contrary notwithstanding”); id., at 337 (remarks of Rep. Whitthome); id., at 373 (remarks of Rep. Archer); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). This view was expressed in the Presidential message urging the passing of corrective legislation. See Globe 244 (“That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt”) (message of President Grant). The inability of state authorities to protect constitutional rights was also expressed in the findings of the House Judiciary Committee, which had been directed to investigate the situation. See id., at 320. The resolution introduced by Senator Sherman instructing the Senate Judiciary Committee to report a bill expressed a similar view. See Globe App. 210 (state “courts are rendered utterly powerless by organized perjury to punish crime”). Opponents viewed the bill as a declaration of mistrust for state tribunals. See, e. g., Globe 361 (remarks of Rep. Swann); id., at 397 (remarks of Rep. Rice); id., at 454 (remarks of Rep. Cox); Globe App. 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). Representative McHenry found particularly offensive the removal of the factfinding function from the local institutions. See Globe 429. Representative Kastenmeier explains why juveniles were not included in § 1997e: “I think very candidly we should admit that the first reluctance to resort to this mechanism embodied in [§ 1997e] was resisted as a possible encroachment on civil liberties; that is to say, in the free, unimpeded resort to 1983; because it does deflect 1983 petitions back into — temporarily in any event— back into the State system. Therefore, to the extent that it is even so viewed, notwithstanding the limited form of [§ 1997e], that it should also extend to juveniles was rejected.” 1979 Hearings 26. Section 1997e(b)(2) states: “The minimum standards shall provide— “(A) for an advisory role for employees and inmates of any jail, prison, or other correctional institution (at the most decentralized level as is reasonably possible), in the formulation, implementation, and operation of the system; “(B) specific maximum time limits for written replies to grievances with reasons thereto at each decision level within the system; “(C) for priority processing of grievances which are of an emergency nature, including matters in which delay would subject the grievant to substantial risk of personal injury or other damages; “(D) for safeguards to avoid reprisals against any grievant or participant in the resolution of a grievance; and “(E) for independent review of the disposition of grievances, including alleged reprisals, by a person or other entity not under the direct supervision or direct control of the institution.” The Committee Reports state that Congress did not intend that every § 1983 action brought by an adult prisoner in institutions with appropriate grievance procedures be delayed pending exhaustion: “It is the intent of the Congress that the court not find such a requirement appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to [§ 1983] raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent danger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement, such as those which center on events outside of the institution, would not appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution system.” Conf. Rep. 15. See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-80, p. 25 (1979); S. Rep. No. 96-416, p. 34 (1979). Of course, this burden alone is not sufficient to justify a judicial decision to alter congressionally imposed jurisdiction. See Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 344 (1976); Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U. S. 145, 150-151 (1965). In any event, it is by no means clear that judicial discretion to impose an exhaustion requirement in § 1983 actions would lessen the caseload of the federal courts, at least in the short run. See infra, at 513-514, and n. 18. The application of these federalism principles to actions brought pursuant to § 1983 has prompted criticism by several commentators. See, e. g., Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 Loyola L. Rev. 659 (1979); Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 838 (1964). For example, there is serious disagreement over whether judicial or administrative procedures offer § 1983 plaintiffs the swiftest, least costly, and most reliable remedy. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 263-264; id., at 232-233; Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201, 1207 (1968). Similarly, there is debate over whether the specialization of federal courts in constitutional law is more important than the specialization of administrative agencies in their areas of expertise, and over whether the symbolic and institutional function of federal courts in defining, legitimizing, and enforcing constitutional claims outweighs the educational function that state and local agencies can serve. See, e. g., Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 23 (1980); Note, 68 Colum. L. Rev., supra, at 1208. Finally, it is uncertain whether the present “free market” system, under which litigants are free to pursue administrative remedies if they truly appear to be cheaper, more efficient, and more effective, is more likely to induce the creation of adequate remedies than a McKart-type standard under which plaintiffs have no initial choice. See, e. g., Note, 8 Ind. L. Rev. 565 (1975). Cf. 1977 Hearings 21, 34, 51; Hearings on S. 1393 before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 442 (1977). Section 1997e resolved this problem by directing the Attorney General to promulgate minimum standards and to establish a procedure by which prison administrative remedies could be reviewed and certified. §§ 1997e(b) and (c). If a procedure has not been certified, the court is directed to compare the procedure with the Attorney General’s standards and to continue the case pending exhaustion only if the procedure is in substantial compliance with the standards of the Attorney General. § 1997e(a)(2). Unless the doctrine that statutes of limitations are not tolled pending exhaustion were overruled, see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980), a judicially imposed exhaustion requirement might result in the effective repeal of § 1983. Congress avoided this problem in § 1997e by directing the court to merely continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 days. The initial bill proposing to include an exhaustion requirement in § 1997e provided: “Relief shall not be granted by a district court in an action brought pursuant to [§ 1983] by an individual involuntarily confined in any State institution . . . , unless it appears that the individual has exhausted such plain, speedy, and efficient State administrative remedy as is available.” H. R. 5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §4 (1977). Congress declined to adopt this McKart-type standard after witnesses testified that this procedure would bog down the courts in massive procedural litigation thereby frustrating the purpose of relieving the caseloads of the federal courts, that state procedures are often not effective and take too much time, and that the court would have to judge a myriad of state procedures without much guidance. See, e. g., 1977 Hearings 34-35, 51, 164-165, 169-170, 263-264, 323; 1979 Hearings 48-49. The question was posed from the bench at oral argument whether the Eleventh Amendment might bar this suit on the ground that the Board of Regents is an arm of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Cf. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). Compare Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), with Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981). The District Court dismissed this action on the pleadings, and no Eleventh Amendment issue had been raised. The Board of Regents first raised this issue in its brief to the original panel on appeal, but did not argue it in its brief on rehearing en banc. Neither the original panel nor the en banc court addressed this issue. Although the State mentioned a possible Eleventh Amendment defense in its response in opposition to the petition for certiorari, it did not brief the issue or press it at oral argument. Indeed, counsel for respondent urged that we affirm the Court of Appeals solely on its exhaustion holding. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, 27. We have noted that “the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar” that it may be raised by the State for the first time on appeal. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974). However, because of the importance of state law in analyzing Eleventh Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain circumstances, waive this defense, we have never held that it is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977). Where, as here, the Board of Regents expressly requested that we address the exhaustion question and not pass on its potential Eleventh Amendment immunity, and, as a consequence, the parties have not briefed the issue, we deem it appropriate to address the issue that was raised and decided below and vigorously pressed in this Court. Nothing in this opinion precludes the Board of Regents from raising its Eleventh Amendment claim on remand. The District Court is in the best position to address in the first instance the competing questions of fact and state law necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue, and at this stage it has the discretion to permit amendments to the pleadings that might cure any potential Eleventh Amendment problems.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DOLAN v. CITY OF TIGARD No. 93-518. Argued March 23, 1994 Decided June 24, 1994 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connoe, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Ginsbueg, JJ., joined, post, p. 396. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 411.- David B. Smith argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Timothy V. Ramis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James M. Coleman and Richard J. Lazarus. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, James E. Brookshire, and Martin W. Matzen Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by James D. Holzhauer, Timothy S. Bishop, John J. Rademacher, and Richard L. Krause; for Defenders of Property Rights et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Georgia Public Policy Foundation et al. by G. Stephen Parker; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor III, Clint Bolick, and Richard A Epstein; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by William H. Ethier, Mary DiCrescenzo, and Stephanie McEvily; for the National Association of Realtors et al. by Richard M. Stephens; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A Zumbrun, Robin L. Rivett, James S. Burling, Deborah J La Fetra, and John M. Groen; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar; for Jon A. Chandler, pro se; and for Terence Wellner et al. by Daniel G. Marsh. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Jack M. Sabatino and Mary Carol Jacobson, Assistant Attorneys General, and Rachel J. Horowitz, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson of Guam, Robert A Marks of Hawaii, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazwrek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, G. Oliver Koppell of New York, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Rosalie S. Ballentine of the Virgin Islands, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for the State of Oregon by Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Thomas A Balmer, Deputy Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Michael D. Reynolds and John T. Bagg, Assistant Attorneys General; for Broward County by John J. Copelan, Jr., and Anthony C. Musto; for the City of New York by Paul A Crotty, Leonard J. Koerner, and Linda H. Young; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold; for the Association of State Floodplan Managers by Michael J. Bean; for the Rails-to-Trails Conservancy et al. by Andrea C. Ferster, Daniel L. Rabinowitz, and Glenn P. Sugameli; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, Lee Fennell, and Barbara E. Etkind; for the National Audubon Society by John D. Echeverría; and for 1000 Friends of Oregon et al. by H. Bissell Carey III, Dwight H. Merriam, and Edward J. Sullivan. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by William Perry Pendley; for the Northwest Legal Foundation by Jeanette R. Burr age; and for Thomas H. Nelson, pro se, et al. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner challenges the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court which held that the city of Tigard could condition the approval of her building permit on the dedication of a portion of her property for flood control and traffic improvements. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 437 (1993). We granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), of what is the required degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development. I The State of Oregon enacted a comprehensive land use management program in 1973. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991). The program required all Oregon cities and counties to adopt new comprehensive land use plans that were consistent with the statewide planning goals. §§ 197.175(1), 197.250. The plans are implemented by land use regulations which are part of an integrated hierarchy of legally binding goals, plans, and regulations. §§ 197.175, 197.175(2)(b). Pursuant to the State’s requirements, the city of Tigard, a community of some 30,000 residents on the southwest edge of Portland, developed a comprehensive plan and codified it in its Community Development Code (CDC). The CDC requires property owners in the area zoned Central Business District to comply with a 15% open space and landscaping requirement, which limits total site coverage, including all structures and paved parking, to 85% of the parcel. CDC, ch. 18.66, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-16 to G-17. After the completion of a transportation study that identified congestion in the Central Business District as a particular problem, the city adopted a plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway intended to encourage alternatives to automobile transportation for short trips. The CDC requires that new development facilitate this plan by dedicating land for pedestrian pathways where provided for in the pedestrian/bicycle pathway plan. The city also adopted a Master Drainage Plan (Drainage Plan). The Drainage Plan noted that flooding occurred in several areas along Fanno Creek, including areas near petitioner’s property. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 2, pp. 2-5 to 2-8; 4-2 to 4-6; Figure 4-1. The Drainage Plan also established that the increase in impervious surfaces associated with continued urbanization would exacerbate these flooding problems. To combat these risks, the Drainage Plan suggested a series of improvements to the Fanno Creek Basin, including channel excavation in the area next to petitioner’s property. App. to Pet. for Cert. G-13, G-38. Other recommendations included ensuring that the floodplain remains free of structures and that it be preserved as greenways to minimize flood damage to structures. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 5, pp. 5-16 to 5-21. The Drainage Plan concluded that the cost of these improvements should be shared based on both direct and indirect benefits, with property owners along the waterways paying more due to the direct benefit that they would receive. Id., ch. 8, p. 8-11. CDC Chapters 18.84 and 18.86 and CDC §18.164.100 and the Tigard Park Plan carry out these recommendations. Petitioner Florence Dolan owns a plumbing and electric supply store located on Main Street in the Central Business District of the city. The store covers approximately 9,700 square feet on the eastern side of a 1.67-acre parcel, which includes a gravel parking lot. Fanno Creek flows through the southwestern corner of the lot and along its western boundary. The year-round flow of the creek renders the area within the creek’s 100-year floodplain virtually unusable for commercial development. The city’s comprehensive plan includes the Fanno Creek floodplain as part of the city’s greenway system. Petitioner applied to the city for a permit to redevelop the site. Her proposed plans called for nearly doubling the size of the store to 17,600 square feet and paving a 39-space parking lot. The existing store, located on the opposite side of the parcel, would be razed in sections as construction progressed on the new building. In the second phase of the project, petitioner proposed to build an additional structure on the northeast side of the site for complementary businesses and to provide more parking. The proposed expansion and intensified use are consistent with the city’s zoning scheme in the Central Business District. CDC § 18.66.030, App. to Brief for Petitioner C-l to C-3. The City Planning Commission (Commission) granted petitioner’s permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city’s CDC. The CDC establishes the following standard for site development review approval: “Where landfill and/or development is allowed within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, the City shall require the dedication of sufficient open land area for greenway adjoining and within the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a suitable elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway within the floodplain in accordance with the adopted pedestrian/ bicycle plan.” CDC § 18.120.180.A.8, App. to Brief for Respondent B-45 to B-46. Thus, the Commission required that petitioner dedicate the portion of her property lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system along Fanno Creek and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. The dedication required by' that condition encompasses approximately 7,000 square feet, or roughly 10% of the property. In accordance with city practice, petitioner could rely on the dedicated property to meet the 15% open space and landscaping requirement mandated by the city’s zoning scheme. App. to Pet. for Cert. G-28 to G-29. The city would bear the cost of maintaining a landscaped buffer between the dedicated area and the new store. Id., at G-44 to G-45. Petitioner requested variances from the CDC standards. Variances are granted only where it can be shown that, owing to special circumstances related to a specific piece of the land, the literal interpretation of the applicable zoning provisions would cause “an undue or unnecessary hardship” unless the variance is granted. CDC §18.134.010, App. to Brief for Respondent B-47. Rather than posing alternative mitigating measures to offset the expected impacts of her proposed development, as allowed under the CDC, petitioner simply argued that her proposed development would not conflict with the policies of the comprehensive plan. Id., at E-4. The Commission denied the request. The Commission made a series of findings concerning the relationship between the dedicated conditions and the projected impacts of petitioner’s project. First, the Commission noted that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their transportation and recreational needs.” City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-24. The Commission noted that the site plan has provided for bicycle parking in a rack in front of the proposed building and “[i]t is reasonable to expect that some of the users of the bicycle parking provided for by the site plan will use the pathway adjacent to Fanno Creek if it is constructed.” Ibid. In addition, the Commission found that creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation “could offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.” Ibid. The Commission went on to note that the required floodplain dedication would be reasonably related to petitioner’s request to intensify the use of the site given the increase in the impervious surface. The Commission stated that the “anticipated increased storm water flow from the subject property to an already strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the public need to manage the stream channel and floodplain for drainage purposes.” Id., at G-37. Based on this anticipated increased storm water flow, the Commission concluded that “the requirement of dedication of the floodplain area on the site is related to the applicant’s plan to intensify development on the site.” Ibid. The Tigard City Council approved the Commission’s final order, subject to one minor modification; the city council reassigned the responsibility for surveying and marking the floodplain area from petitioner to the city’s engineering department. Id., at G-7. Petitioner appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) on the ground that the city’s dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore, those requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of her property under the Fifth Amendment. In evaluating the federal taking claim, LUBA assumed that the city’s findings about the impacts of the proposed development were supported by substantial evidence. Dolan v. Tigard, LUBA 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992), reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. D-15, n. 9. Given the undisputed fact that the proposed larger building and paved parking area would increase the amount of impervious surfaces and the runoff into Fanno Creek, LUBA concluded that “there is a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the proposed development and the requirement to dedicate land along Fanno Creek for a greenway.” Id., at D-16. With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, LUBA noted the Commission’s finding that a significantly larger retail sales building and parking lot would attract larger numbers of customers and employees and their vehicles. It again found a “reasonable relationship” between alleviating the impacts of increased traffic from the development and facilitating the provision of a pedestrian/ bicycle pathway as an alternative means of transportation. Ibid. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s contention that in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), we had abandoned the “reasonable relationship” test in favor of a stricter “essential nexus” test. 113 Ore. App. 162, 832 P. 2d 853 (1992). The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. 317 Ore. 110, 854 P. 2d 437 (1993). The court also disagreed with petitioner’s contention that the Nollan Court abandoned the “reasonably related” test. 317 Ore., at 118, 854 P. 2d, at 442. Instead, the court read Nollan to mean that an “exaction is reasonably related to an impact if the exaction serves the same purpose that a denial of the permit would serve.” 317 Ore., at 120, 854 P 2d, at 443. The court decided that both the pedestrian/bicycle pathway condition and the storm drainage dedication had an essential nexus to the development of the proposed site. Id., at 121, 854 P. 2d, at 443. Therefore, the court found the conditions to be reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of petitioner’s business. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 989 (1993), because of an alleged conflict between the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision and our decision in Nollan, supra. II The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chi cago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred. Nollan, supra, at 831. Such public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). On the other side of the ledger, the authority of state and local governments to engage in land use planning has been sustained against constitutional challenge as long ago as our decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922). A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” and does not “den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.” Agins. v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just cited, however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present case. First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city. In Nollan, supra, we held that governmental authority to exact such a condition was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the well-settled doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right— here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use — in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to choose between the building permit and her right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for the public easements. Petitioner does not quarrel with the city’s authority to exact some forms of dedication as a condition for the grant of a building permit, but challenges the showing made by the city to justify these exactions. She argues that the city has identified “no special benefits” conferred on her, and has not identified any “special quantifiable burdens” created by her new store that would justify the particular dedications required from her which are not required from the public at large. Ill In evaluating petitioner’s claim, we must first determine whether the “essential nexus” exists between the “legitimate state interest” and the permit condition exacted by the city. Nollan, 483 U. S., at 837. If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development. We were not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we concluded that the connection did not meet even the loosest standard. Id., at 838. Here, however, we must decide this question. A We addressed the essential nexus question in Nollan. The California Coastal Commission demanded a lateral public easement across the Nollans’ beachfront lot in exchange for a permit to demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom house. Id., at 828. The public easement was designed to connect two public beaches that were separated by the Nollans’ property. The Coastal Commission had asserted that the public easement condition was imposed to promote the legitimate state interest of diminishing the “blockage of the view of the ocean” caused by construction of the larger house. We agreed that the Coastal Commission’s concern with protecting visual access to the ocean constituted a legitimate public interest. Id., at 835. We also agreed that the permit condition would have been constitutional “even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.” Id., at 836. We resolved, however, that the Coastal Commission’s regulatory authority was set completely adrift from its constitutional moorings when it claimed that a nexus existed between visual access to the ocean and a permit condition requiring lateral public access along the Nollans’ beachfront lot. Id., at 837. How enhancing the public’s ability to “traverse to and along the shorefront” served the same governmental purpose of “visual access to the ocean” from the roadway was beyond our ability to countenance. The absence of a nexus left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an easement through gimmickry, which converted a valid regulation of land use into “ ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’ ” Ibid., quoting J. E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 584, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981). No such gimmicks are associated with the permit conditions imposed by the city in this case. Undoubtedly, the prevention of flooding along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld. Agins, 447 U. S., at 260-262. It seems equally obvious that a nexus exists between preventing flooding along Fanno Creek and limiting development within the creek’s 100-year floodplain. Petitioner proposes to double the size of her retail store and to pave her now-gravel parking lot, thereby expanding the impervious surface on the property and increasing the amount of storm water runoff into Fanno Creek. The same may be said for the city’s attempt to reduce traffic congestion by providing for alternative means of transportation. In theory, a pedestrian/bicycle pathway provides a useful alternative means of transportation for workers and shoppers: “Pedestrians and bicyclists occupying dedicated spaces for walking and/or bicycling ... remove potential vehicles from streets, resulting in an overall improvement in total transportation system flow.” A. Nelson, Public Provision of Pedestrian and Bicycle Access Ways: Public Policy Rationale and the Nature of Private Benefits 11, Center for Planning Development, Georgia Institute of Technology, Working Paper Series (Jan. 1994). See also Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (recognizing pedestrian and bicycle facilities as necessary components of any strategy to reduce traffic congestion). B The second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city’s permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development. Nollan, supra, at 834, quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 127 (1978) (“ ‘[A] use restriction may constitute a “taking” if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose’”). Here the Oregon Supreme Court deferred to what it termed the “city’s unchallenged factual findings” supporting the dedication conditions and found them to be reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of petitioner’s business. 317 Ore., at 120-121, 854 P. 2d, at 443. The city required that petitioner dedicate “to the City as Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek]... and all property 15 feet above [the floodplain] boundary.” Id., at 113, n. 3, 854 P. 2d, at 439, n. 3. In addition, the city demanded that the retail store be designed so as not to intrude into the green-way area. The city relies on the Commission’s rather tentative findings that increased storm water flow from petitioner’s property “can only add to the public need to manage the [floodplain] for drainage purposes” to support its conclusion that the “requirement of dedication of the floodplain area on the site is related to the applicant’s plan to intensify development on the site.” City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G-37. The city made the following specific findings relevant to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway: “In addition, the proposed expanded use of this site is anticipated to generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing congestion on nearby collector and arterial streets. Creation of a convenient, safe pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of transportation could offset some of the traffic demand on these nearby streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.” Id., at G-24. The question for us is whether these findings are constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on petitioner’s building permit. Since state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have, we turn to representative decisions made by them. In some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. See, e. g., Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P. 2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966). We think this standard is too lax to adequately protect petitioner’s right to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose. Other state courts require a very exacting correspondence, described as the “specifi[c] and uniquely attributable” test. The Supreme Court of Illinois first developed this test in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N. E. 2d 799, 802 (1961). Under this standard, if the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need, the exaction becomes “a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations.” Id., at 381,176 N. E. 2d, at 802. We do not think the Federal Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved. A number of state courts have taken an intermediate position, requiring the municipality to show a “reasonable relationship” between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed development. Typical is the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245, 292 N. W. 2d 297, 301 (1980), where that court stated: “The distinction, therefore, which must be made between an appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain is whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or permit.” Thus, the court held that a city may not require a property owner to dedicate private property for some future public use as a condition of obtaining a building permit when such future use is not “occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted.” Id., at 248, 292 N. W. 2d, at 302. Some form of the reasonable relationship test has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. See, e. g., Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976) (requiring a showing of a reasonable relationship between the planned subdivision and the municipality’s need for land); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S. W. 2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979) (affirming use of the reasonable relation test). Despite any semantical differences, general agreement exists among the courts “that the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the [development].” Ibid. See generally Note, “‘Take’ My Beach Please!”: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 823 (1989); see also Parks v. Watson, 716 F. 2d 646, 651-653 (CA9 1983). We think the “reasonable relationship” test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed. But we do not adopt it as such, partly because the term “reasonable relationship” seems confusingly similar to the term “rational basis” which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think a term such as “rough proportionality” best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. Justice Stevens’ dissent relies upon a law review article for the proposition that the city’s conditional demands for part of petitioner’s property are “a species of business regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of constitutional validity.” Post, at 402. But simply denominating a governmental measure as a “business regulation” does not immunize it from constitutional challenge on the ground that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights. In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), we held that a statute authorizing a warrantless search of business premises in order to detect OSHA violations violated the Fourth Amendment. See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colo. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861 (1974); New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 (1987). And in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), we held that an order of the New York Public Service Commission, designed to cut down the use of electricity because of a fuel shortage, violated the First Amendment insofar as it prohibited advertising by a utility company to promote the use of electricity. We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances. We turn now to analysis of whether the findings relied upon by the city here, first with respect to the floodplain easement, and second with respect to the pedestrian/bicycle path, satisfied these requirements. It is axiomatic that increasing the amount of impervious surface will increase the quantity and rate of storm water flow from petitioner’s property. Record, Doc. No. F, ch. 4, p. 4-29. Therefore, keeping the floodplain open and free from development would likely confine the pressures on Fanno Creek created by petitioner’s development. In fact, because petitioner’s property lies within the Central Business District, the CDC already required that petitioner leave 15% of it as open space and the undeveloped floodplain would have nearly satisfied that requirement. App. to Pet. for Cert. G-16 to G-17. But the city demanded more — it not only wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner’s property along Fanno Creek for its greenway system. The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control. The difference to petitioner, of course, is the loss of her ability to exclude others. As we have noted, this right to exclude others is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 176. It is difficult to see why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner’s floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city’s legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request. The city contends that the recreational easement along the greenway is only ancillary to the city’s chief purpose in controlling flood hazards. It further asserts that unlike the residential property at issue in Nollan, petitioner’s property is commercial in character and, therefore, her right to exclude others is compromised. Brief for Respondent 41, quoting United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 142 (1973) (“ ‘The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home’”). The city maintains that “[t]here is nothing.to suggest that preventing [petitioner] from prohibiting [the easements] will unreasonably impair the value of [her] property as a [retail store].” PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 83 (1980). Admittedly, petitioner wants to build a bigger store to attract members of the public to her property. She also wants, however, to be able to control the time and manner in which they enter. The recreational easement on the greenway is different in character from the exercise of state-protected rights of free expression and petition that we permitted in PruneYard. In PruneYard, we held that a major private shopping center that attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons had to provide access to persons exercising their state constitutional rights to distribute pamphlets and ask passers-by to sign their petitions. Id., at 85. We based our decision, in part, on the fact that the shopping center “may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions.” Id., at 83. By contrast, the city wants to impose a permanent recreational easement upon petitioner’s property that borders Fanno Creek. Petitioner would lose all rights to regulate the time in which the public entered onto the greenway, regardless of any interference it might pose with her retail store. Her right to exclude would not be regulated, it would be eviscerated. If petitioner’s proposed development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some alternative greenway space for the public either on her property or elsewhere. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836 (“Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end”). But that is not the case here. We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the petitioner’s proposed new building. With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, we have no doubt that the city was correct in finding that the larger retail sales facility proposed by petitioner will increase traffic on the streets of the Central Business District. The city estimates that the proposed development would generate roughly 435 additional trips per day. Dedications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use. But on the record before us, the city has not met its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips generated by petitioner’s development reasonably relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The city simply found that the creation of the pathway “could offset some of the traffic demand ... and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.” As Justice Peterson of the Supreme Court of Oregon explained in his dissenting opinion, however, “[t]he findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system ‘could offset some of the traffic demand’ is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand.” 317 Ore., at 127, 854 P. 2d, at 447 (emphasis in original). No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated. IV Cities have long engaged in the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization, particularly in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city’s goals of reducing flooding hazards and traffic congestion, and providing for public greenways, are laudable, but there are outer limits to how this may be done. “A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U. S., at 416. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. The record does not tell us the dollar value of petitioner Florence Dolan’s interest in excluding the public from the greenway adjacent to her hardware business. The mountain of briefs that the case has generated nevertheless makes it obvious that the pecuniary value of her victory is far less important than the rule of law that this case has been used to establish. It is unquestionably an important case. Certain propositions are not in dispute. The enlargement of the Tigard unit in Dolan’s chain of hardware stores will have an adverse impact on the city’s legitimate and substantial interests in controlling drainage in Fanno Creek and minimizing traffic congestion in Tigard’s business district. That impact is sufficient to justify an outright denial of her application for approval of the expansion. The city has nevertheless agreed to grant Dolan’s application if she will comply with two conditions, each of which admittedly will mitigate the adverse effects of her^ proposed development. The disputed question is whether the city has violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by refusing to allow Dolan’s planned construction to proceed unless those conditions are met. The Court is correct in concluding that the city may not attach arbitrary conditions to a building permit or to a variance even when it can rightfully deny the application outright. I also agree that state court decisions dealing with ordinances that govern municipal development plans provide useful guidance in a case of this kind. Yet the Court’s description of the doctrinal underpinnings of its decision, the phrasing of its fledgling test of “rough proportionality,” and the application of that test to this case run contrary to the traditional treatment of these cases and break considerable and unpropitious new ground. I Candidly acknowledging the lack of federal precedent for its exercise in rulemaking, the Court purports to find guidance in 12 “representative” state court decisions. To do so is certainly appropriate. The state cases the Court consults, however, either fail to support or decidedly undermine the Court’s conclusions in key respects. First, although discussion of the state cases permeates the Court’s analysis of the appropriate test to apply in this case, the test on which the Court settles is not naturally derived from those courts’ decisions. The Court recognizes as an initial matter that the city’s conditions satisfy the “essential nexus” requirement announced in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), because they serve the legitimate interests in minimizing floods and traffic congestions. Ante, at 387-388. The Court goes on, however, to erect a new constitutional hurdle in the path of these conditions. In addition to showing a rational nexus to a public purpose that would justify an outright denial of the permit, the city must also demonstrate “rough proportionality” between the harm caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained by the condition. Ante, at 391. The Court also decides for the first time that the city has the burden of establishing the constitutionality of its conditions by making an “individualized determination” that the condition in question satisfies the proportionality requirement. See ibid. Not one of the state cases cited by the Court announces anything akin to a “rough proportionality” requirement. For the most part, moreover, those cases that invalidated municipal ordinances did so on state law or unspecified grounds roughly equivalent to Nollan’s “essential nexus” requirement. See, e.g., Simpson v. North Platte, 206 Neb. 240, 245-248, 292 N. W. 2d 297, 301-302 (1980) (ordinance lacking “reasonable relationship” or “rational nexus” to property’s use violated Nebraska Constitution); J. E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 583-585, 432 A. 2d 12, 14-15 (1981) (state constitutional grounds). One case purporting to apply the strict “specifically and uniquely attributable” test established by Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N. E. 2d 799 (1961), nevertheless found that test was satisfied because the legislature had decided that the subdivision at issue created the need for a park or parks. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 33-36, 394 P. 2d 182, 187-188 (1964). In only one of the seven cases upholding a land use regulation did the losing property owner petition this Court for certiorari. See Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965), appeal dism’d, 385 U. S. 4 (1966) (want of substantial federal question). Although 4 of the 12 opinions mention the Federal Constitution — 2 of those only in passing — it is quite obvious that neither the courts nor the litigants imagined they might be participating in the development of a new rule of federal law. Thus, although these state cases do lend support to the Court’s reaffirmance of Nollan’s reasonable nexus requirement, the role the Court accords them in the announcement of its newly minted second phase of the constitutional inquiry is remarkably inventive. In addition, the Court ignores the state courts’ willingness to consider what the property owner gains from the exchange in question. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example, found it significant that the village’s approval of a proposed subdivision plat “enables the subdivider to profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as home-building sites and thus realizing a greater price than could have been obtained if he had sold his property as unplatted lands.” Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d, at 619-620; 137 N. W. 2d, at 448. The required dedication as a condition of that approval was permissible “[i]n return for this benefit.” Ibid. See also Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 11-13, 246 N. W. 2d 19, 23-24 (1976) (citing Jordan); College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S. W. 2d 802, 806 (Tex. 1984) (dedication requirement only triggered when developer chooses to develop land). In this case, moreover, Dolan’s acceptance of the permit, with its attached conditions, would provide her with benefits that may well go beyond any advantage she gets from expanding her business. As the United States pointed out at oral argument, the improvement that the city’s drainage plan contemplates would widen the channel and reinforce the slopes to increase the carrying capacity during serious floods, “confer[ring] considerable benefits on the property owners immediately adjacent to the creek.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. The state court decisions also are enlightening in the extent to which they required that the entire parcel be given controlling importance. All but one of the cases involve challenges to provisions in municipal ordinances requiring developers to dedicate either a percentage of the entire parcel (usually 7 or 10 percent of the platted subdivision) or an equivalent value in cash (usually a certain dollar amount per lot) to help finance the construction of roads, utilities, schools, parks, and playgrounds. In assessing the legality of the conditions, the courts gave no indication that the transfer of an interest in realty was any more objectionable than a cash payment. See, e. g., Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N. Y. 2d 78, 218 N. E. 2d 673 (1966); Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965); Collis v. Bloomington, 310 Minn. 5, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (1976). None of the decisions identified the surrender of the fee owner’s “power to exclude” as having any special significance. Instead, the courts uniformly examined the character of the entire economic transaction. II It is not merely state cases, but our own cases as well, that require the analysis to focus on the impact of the city’s action on the entire parcel of private property. In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), we stated that takings jurisprudence “does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.” Id., at 130-131. Instead, this Court focuses “both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.” Ibid. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 (1979), reaffirmed the nondivisibility principle outlined in Penn Central, stating that “[a]t least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.” 444 U. S., at 65-66. As recently as last Term, we approved the principle again. See Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 644 (1993) (explaining that “a claimant’s parcel of property [cannot] first be divided into what was taken and what was left” to demonstrate a compensable taking). Although limitation of the right to exclude others undoubtedly constitutes a significant infringement upon property ownership, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 179-180 (1979), restrictions on that right do not alone constitute a taking, and do not do so in any event unless they “unreasonably impair the value or use” of the property. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 82-84 (1980). The Court’s narrow focus on one strand in the property owner’s bundle of rights is particularly misguided in a case involving the development of commercial property. As Professor Johnston has noted: “The subdivider is a manufacturer, processer, and marketer of a product; land is but one of his raw materials. In subdivision control disputes, the developer is not defending hearth and home against the king’s intrusion, but simply attempting to maximize his profits from the sale of a finished product. As applied to him, subdivision control exactions are actually business regulations.” Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for A Rationale, 52 Cornell L. Q. 871, 923 (1967). The exactions associated with the development of a retail business are likewise a species of business regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of constitutional validity. In Johnston’s view, “if the municipality can demonstrate that its assessment of financial burdens against subdividers is rational, impartial, and conducive to fulfillment of authorized planning objectives, its action need be invalidated only in those extreme and presumably rare cases where the burden of compliance is sufficiently great to deter the owner from proceeding with his planned development.” Id., at 917. The city of Tigard has demonstrated that its plan is rational and impartial and that the conditions at issue are “conducive to fulfillment of authorized planning objectives.” Dolan, on the other hand, has offered no evidence that her burden of compliance has any impact at all on the value or profitability of her planned development. Following the teaching of the cases on which it purports to rely, the Court should not isolate the burden associated with the loss of the power to ex-elude from an evaluation of the benefit to be derived from the permit to enlarge the store and the parking lot. The Court’s assurances that its “rough proportionality” test leaves ample room for cities to pursue the “commendable task of land use planning,” ante, at 396 — even twice avowing that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required,” ante, at 391, 395 — are wanting given the result that test compels here. Under the Court’s approach, a city must not only “quantify its findings,” ante, at 395, and make “individualized determination[s]” with respect to the nature and the extent of the relationship between the conditions and the impact, ante, at 391, 393, but also demonstrate “proportionality.” The correct inquiry should instead concentrate on whether the required nexus is present and venture beyond considerations of a condition’s nature or germaneness only if the developer establishes that a concededly germane condition is so grossly disproportionate to the proposed development’s adverse effects that it manifests motives other than land use regulation on the part of the city. The heightened requirement the Court imposes on cities is even more unjustified when all the tools needed to resolve the questions presented by this case can be garnered from our existing case law. Ill Applying its new standard, the Court finds two defects in the city’s case. First, while the record would adequately support a requirement that Dolan maintain the portion of the floodplain on her property as undeveloped open space, it does not support the additional requirement that the floodplain be dedicated to the city. Ante, at 392-395. Second, while the city adequately established the traffic increase that the proposed development would generate, it failed to quantify the offsetting decrease in automobile traffic that the bike path will produce. Ante, at 395-396. Even under the Court’s new rule, both defects are, at most, nothing more than harmless error. In her objections to the floodplain condition, Dolan made no effort to demonstrate that the dedication of that portion of her property would be any more onerous than a simple prohibition against any development on that portion of her property. Given the commercial character of both the existing and the proposed use of the property as a retail store, it seems likely that potential customers “trampling along petitioner’s floodplain,” ante, at 393, are more valuable than a useless parcel of vacant land. Moreover, the duty to pay taxes and the responsibility for potential tort liability may well make ownership of the fee interest in useless land a liability rather than an asset. That may explain why Dolan never conceded that she could be prevented from building on the floodplain. The city attorney also pointed out that absent a dedication, property owners would be required to “build on their own land” and “with their own money” a storage facility for the water runoff. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31. Dolan apparently “did have that option,” but chose not to seek it. Id., at 31. If Dolan might have been entitled to a variance confining the city’s condition in a manner this Court would accept, her failure to seek that narrower form of relief at any stage of the state administrative and judicial proceedings clearly should preclude that relief in this Court now. The Court’s rejection of the bike path condition amounts to nothing more than a play on words. Everyone agrees that the bike path “could” offset some of the increased traffic flow that the larger store will generate, but the findings do not unequivocally state that it will do so, or tell us just how many cyclists will replace motorists. Predictions on such matters are inherently nothing more than estimates. Certainly the assumption that there will be an offsetting benefit here is entirely reasonable and should suffice whether it amounts to 100 percent, 35 percent, or only 5 percent of the increase in automobile traffic that would otherwise occur. If the Court proposes to have the federal judiciary micromanage state decisions of this kind, it is indeed extending its welcome mat to a significant new class of litigants. Although there is no reason to believe that state courts have failed to rise to the task, property owners have surely found a new friend today. IV The Court has made a serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan. Even more consequential than its incorrect disposition of this case, however, is the Court’s resurrection of a species of substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago. The Court begins its constitutional analysis by citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), for the proposition that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is “applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ante, at 383. That opinion, however, contains no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth Amendment; it held that the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to matters of substance as well as procedure, and that the substance of “the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth. Amendment requires compensation to be made or adequately secured to the owner of private property taken for public use under the authority of a State.” 166 U. S., at 235, 236-241. It applied the same kind of substantive due process analysis more frequently identified with, a better known case that accorded similar. substantive protection to a baker’s liberty interest in working 60 hours a week and 10 hours a day. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). Later cases have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive protection against uncompensated deprivations of private property by the States as though it incorporated the text of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. See, e. g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 481, n. 10 (1987). There was nothing problematic about that interpretation in cases enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment against state action that involved the actual physical invasion of private property. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 427-433 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 178-180. Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when he opined that a state law making it “commercially impracticable to mine certain coal” had “very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 414 (1922). The so-called “regulatory takings” doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled has an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner exemplified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair. This case inaugurates an even more recent judicial innovation than the regulatory takings doctrine: the application of the “unconstitutional conditions” label to a mutually beneficial transaction between a property owner and a city. The Court tells us that the city’s refusal to grant Dolan a discretionary benefit infringes her right to receive just compensation for the property interests that she has refused to dedicate to the city “where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit.” Although it is well settled that a government cannot deny a benefit on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected interests — “especially [one’s] interest in freedom of speech,” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972) — the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine provides an inadequate framework in which to analyze this case. Dolan has no right to be compensated for a taking unless the city acquires the property interests that she has refused to surrender. Since no taking has yet occurred, there has not been any infringement of her constitutional right to compensation. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U. S. 1, 11-17 (1990) (finding takings claim premature because property owner had not yet sought compensation under Tucker Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 294-295 (1981) (no taking where no one “identified any property ... that has allegedly been taken”). Even if Dolan should accept the city’s conditions in exchange for the benefit that she seeks, it would not necessarily follow that she had been denied “just compensation” since it would be appropriate to consider the receipt of that benefit in any calculation of “just compensation.” See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 415 (noting that an “average reciprocity of advantage” was deemed to justify many laws); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U. S. 704, 715 (1987) (such “ ‘reciprocity of advantage’ ” weighed in favor of a statute’s constitutionality). Particularly in the absence of any evidence on the point, we should not presume that the discretionary benefit the city has offered is less valuable than the property interests that Dolan can retain or surrender at her option. But even if that discretionary benefit were so trifling that it could not be considered just compensation when it has “little or no relationship” to the property, the Court fails to explain why the same value would suffice when the required nexus is present. In this respect, the Court’s reliance on the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine is assuredly novel, and arguably incoherent. The city’s conditions are by no means immune from constitutional scrutiny. The level of scrutiny, however, does not approximate the kind of review that would apply if the city had insisted on a surrender of Dolan’s First Amendment rights in exchange for a building permit. One can only hope that the Court’s reliance today on First Amendment cases, see ante, at 385 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, supra, and Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968)), and its candid disavowal of the term “rational basis” to describe its new standard of review, see ante, at 391, do not signify a reassertion of the kind of superlegislative power the Court exercised during the Lochner era. The Court has decided to apply its heightened scrutiny to a single strand — the power to exclude — in the bundle of rights that enables a commercial enterprise to flourish in an urban environment. That intangible interest is undoubtedly worthy of constitutional protection — much like the grandmother’s interest in deciding which of her relatives may share her home in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). Both interests are protected from arbitrary state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, however, a curious irony that Members of the majority in this case would impose an almost insurmountable burden of proof on the property owner in the Moore case while saddling the city with a heightened burden in this case. In its application of what is essentially the doctrine of substantive due process, the Court confuses the past with the present. On November 13, 1922, the village of Euclid, Ohio, adopted a zoning ordinance that effectively confiscated 75 percent of the value of property owned by the Ambler Realty Company. Despite its recognition that such an ordinance “would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive” at an earlier date, the Court (over the dissent of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler) upheld the ordinance. Today’s majority should heed the words of Justice Sutherland: “Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387 (1926). In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize predictions about the impact of new urban developments on the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental harms. When there is doubt concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the public interest in averting them must outweigh the private interest of the commercial entrepreneur. If the government can demonstrate that the conditions it has imposed in a land use permit are rational, impartial and conducive to fulfilling the aims of a valid land use plan, a strong presumption of validity should attach to those conditions. The burden of demonstrating that those conditions have unreasonably impaired the economic value of the proposed improvement belongs squarely on the shoulders of the party challenging the state action’s constitutionality. That allocation of burdens has served us well in the past. The Court has stumbled badly today by reversing it. I respectfully dissent. ‘CDC §18.86.040.A.l.b provides: “The development shall facilitate pedestrian/bicycle circulation if the site is located on a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated greenway/open space/park. Specific items to be addressed [include]: (i) Provision of efficient, convenient and continuous pedestrian and bicycle transit circulation systems, linking developments by requiring dedication and construction of pedestrian and bikepaths identified in the comprehensive plan. If direct connections cannot be made, require that funds in the amount of the construction cost be deposited into an account for the purpose of constructing paths.” App. to Brief for Respondent B-33 to B-34. The city’s decision includes the following relevant conditions: “1. The applicant shall dedicate to the City as Greenway all portions of the site that fall within the existing 100-year floodplain [of Fanno Creek] (i. e., all portions of the property below elevation 150.0) and all property 15 feet above (to the east of) the 150.0 foot floodplain boundary. The building shall be designed so as not to intrude into the greenway area.” App. to Pet. for Cert. G-43. CDC § 18.134.050 contains the following criteria whereby the decision-making authority can approve, approve with modifications, or deny a variance request: “(1) The proposed variance will not be materially detrimental to the purposes of this title, be in conflict with the policies of the comprehensive plan, to any other applicable policies and standards, and to other properties in the same zoning district or vicinity; “(2) There are special circumstances that exist which are peculiar to the lot size or shape, topography or other circumstances over which the applicant has no control, and which are not applicable to other properties in the same zoning district; “(3) The use proposed will be the same as permitted under this title and City standards will be maintained to the greatest extent possible, while permitting some economic use of the land; “(4) Existing physical and natural systems, such as but not limited to traffic, drainage, dramatic land forms, or parks will not be adversely affected any more than would occur if the development were located as specified in the title; and “(5) The hardship is not self-imposed and the variance requested is the minimum variance which would alleviate the hardship.” App. to Brief for Kespondent B-49 to B-50. The Supreme Court of Oregon did not address the consequences of petitioner’s failure to provide alternative mitigation measures in her variance application and we take the case as it comes to us. Accordingly, we do not pass on the constitutionality of the city’s variance provisions. Justice Stevens’ dissent suggests that this ease is actually grounded in “substantive” due process, rather than in the view that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But there is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 122 (1978); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825, 827 (1987). Nor is there any doubt that these cases have relied upon Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), to reach that result. See, e. g., Penn Central, supra, at 122 (“The issu[e] presented . . . [is] whether the restrictions imposed by New York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the Terminal site effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’ property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897)”). There can be no argument that the permit conditions would deprive petitioner of “economically beneficial us[e]” of her property as she currently operates a retail store on the lot. Petitioner assuredly is able to derive some economic use from her property. See, e. g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, at 124. The “specifically and uniquely attributable” test has now been adopted by a minority of other courts. See, e. g., J. E. D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N. H. 581, 585, 432 A. 2d 12, 15 (1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Wayne, 66 N. J. 582, 600-601, 334 A. 2d 30, 40 (1975); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm’n, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 176, 270 N. E. 2d 370, 374 (1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 107 R. I. 63, 69, 264 A. 2d 910, 913 (1970). Justice Stevens’ dissent takes us to task for placing the burden on the city to justify the required dedication. He is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city. See Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836. This conclusion is not, as he suggests, undermined by our decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977), in which we struck down a housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance at issue in Moore intruded on choices concerning family living arrangements, an area in which the usual deference to the legislature was found to be inappropriate. Id., at 499. The city uses a weekday average trip rate of 53.21 trips per 1,000 square feet. Additional Trips Generated = 53.21 X (17,600 - 9,720). App. to Pet. for Cert. G-15. In rejecting petitioner’s request for a variance from the pathway dedication condition, the city stated that omitting the planned section of the pathway across petitioner’s property would conflict with its adopted policy of providing a continuous pathway system. But the Takings Glause requires the city to implement its policy by condemnation unless the required relationship between petitioner’s development and added traffic is shown. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 513-521 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). In Nollan the Court recognized that a state agency may condition the grant of a land use permit on the dedication of a property interest if the dedication serves a legitimate police-power purpose that would justify a refusal to issue the permit. For the first time, however, it held that such a condition is unconstitutional if the condition “utterly fails” to further a goal that would justify the refusal. 483 U. S., at 837. In the Nollan Court’s view, a condition would be constitutional even if it required the Nollans to provide a viewing spot for passers-by whose view of the ocean was obstructed by their new house. Id., at 836. “Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the Commission’s assumed power to forbid construction of the house in order to protect the public’s view of the beach must surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same end.” Ibid. Similarly, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 498-499 (1987), we concluded that “[t]he 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes” and that “[t]here is no basis for treating the less than 2% of petitioners’ coal as a separate parcel of property.” Johnston’s article also sets forth a fair summary of the state cases from which the Court purports to derive its “rough proportionality” test. See 52 Cornell L. Q., at 917. Like the Court, Johnston observed that cases requiring a “rational nexus” between exactions and public needs created by the new subdivision — especially Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N. W. 2d 442 (1965) — “stee[r] a moderate course” between the “judicial obstructionism” of Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N. E. 2d 799 (1961), and the “excessive deference” of Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P. 2d 182 (1964). 52 Cornell L. Q., at 917. Dolan’s attorney overstated the danger when he suggested at oral argument that without some requirement for proportionality, “[t]he City could have found that Mrs. Dolan’s new store would have increased traffic by one additional vehicle trip per day [and] could have required her to dedicate 75, 95 percent of her land for a widening of Main Street.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963). An earlier ease deemed it “well settled” that the Takings Clause “is a limitation on the power of the Federal government, and not on the States.” Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 177 (1872). The Court held that a State “may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing forms of procedure in the courts and give the parties interested the fullest opportunity to be heard, and yet it might be that its final action would be inconsistent with that amendment. In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not to form.” Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 234-235 (1897). The Lochner Court refused to presume that there was a reasonable connection between the regulation and the state interest in protecting the public health. 198 U. S., at 60-61. A similar refusal to identify a sufficient nexus between an enlarged building with a newly paved parking lot and the state interests in minimizing the risks of flooding and traffic congestion proves fatal to the city’s permit conditions in this case under the Court’s novel approach. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at 484 (explaining why this portion of the opinion was merely “advisory”). Ante, at 385. The Court’s entire explanation reads: “Under the well-settled doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right — here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use — in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.” Although it has a long history, see Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 451 (1874), the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching principle of constitutional law that operates with equal force regardless of the nature of the rights and powers in question. See, e. g., Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B. U. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1990) (doctrine is “too crude and too general to provide help in contested cases”); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415, 1416 (1989) (doctrine is “riven with inconsistencies”); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321, 322 (1935) (“The Supreme Court has sustained many such exertions of power even after announcing the broad doctrine that would invalidate them”). As the majority’s case citations suggest, ante, at 385, modern decisions invoking the doctrine have most frequently involved First Amendment liberties, see also, e. g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143-144 (1983); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 361-363 (1976) (plurality opinion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 518-519 (1958). But see Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328, 345-346 (1986) (“[T]he greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling”). The necessary and traditional breadth of municipalities’ power to regulate property development, together with the absence here of fragile and easily “chilled” constitutional rights such as that of free speech, make it quite clear that the Court is really writing on a clean slate rather than merely applying “well-settled” doctrine. Ante, at 385. The author of today’s opinion joined Justice Stewart’s dissent in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). There the dissenters found it sufficient, in response to my argument that the zoning ordinance was an arbitrary regulation of property rights, that “if the ordinance is a rational attempt to promote ‘the city’s interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods,’ Young v. American Mini Theatres, [Inc.,] 427 U. S. 60, 71 (opinion of Stevens, J.), it is ... a permissible restriction on the use of private property under Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183.” Id., at 540, n. 10. The dissent went on to state that my calling the city to task for failing to explain the need for enacting the ordinance “place[d] the burden on the wrong party.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Recently, two other Members of today’s majority severely criticized the holding in Moore. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 40-42 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also id., at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (calling the doctrine of substantive due process “an oxymoron”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP et al. v. CARLISLE et al. No. 08-146. Argued March 3, 2009 Decided May 4, 2009 M. Miller Baker argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Paul M. Thompson, Jeffrey W. Mikoni, Jeffrey E. Stone, Douglas E. Whitney, Jocelyn D. Francoeur, Rory K. Little, Robert B. Craig, and Donald L. Stepner. Paul M. De Marco argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stanley M. Chesley, James R. Cummins, and Jean M. Geoppinger Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Virginia W. Hoptman, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Thomas S. Jones, Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) entitles litigants in federal court to a stay of any action that is “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.” 9 U. S. C. § 3. Section 16(a)(1)(A), in turn, allows an appeal from “an order... refusing a stay of any action under section 3.” We address in this case whether appellate courts have jurisdiction under § 16(a) to review denials of stays requested by litigants who were not parties to the relevant arbitration agreement, and whether §3 can ever mandate a stay in such circumstances. I Respondents Wayne Carlisle, James Bushman, and Gary Strassel set out to minimize their taxes from the 1999 sale of their construction-equipment company. Arthur Andersen LLP, a firm that had long served as their company’s accountant, auditor, and tax adviser, introduced them to Bricolage Capital, LLC, which in turn referred them for legal advice to Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP. According to respondents, these advisers recommended a “leveraged option strategy” tax shelter designed to create illusory losses through foreign-currency-exchange options. As a part of the scheme, respondents invested in various stock warrants through newly created limited liability companies (LLCs), which are also respondents in this case. The respondent LLCs entered into investment-management agreements with Bricolage, specifying that “[a]ny controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the br[ea]ch thereof, shall be settled by arbitration conducted in New York, New York in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.” App. 80-81, 99-100, 118-119. As with all that seems too good to be true, a controversy did indeed arise. The warrants respondents purchased turned out to be almost entirely worthless, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined in August 2000 that the “leveraged option strategy” scheme was an illegal tax shelter. The IRS initially offered conditional amnesty to taxpayers who had used such arrangements, but petitioners failed to inform respondents of that option. Respondents ultimately entered into a settlement program in which they paid the IRS all taxes, penalties, and interest owed. Respondents filed this diversity suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky against Bricolage, Arthur Andersen, and others (all except Bricolage and its employees hereinafter referred to as petitioners), alleging fraud, civil conspiracy, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. Petitioners moved to stay the action, invoking §3 of the FA A and arguing that the principles of equitable estoppel demanded that respondents arbitrate their claims under their investment agreements with Bricolage. The District Court denied the motions. Petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F. 3d 597, 602 (2008). We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1010 (2008). II Ordinarily, courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over “final decisions” of district courts. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. The FAA, however, makes an exception to that finality requirement, providing that “[a]n appeal may be taken from ... an order... refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title.” 9 U. S. C. § 16(a)(1)(A). By that provision’s clear and unambiguous terms, any litigant who asks for a stay under §3 is entitled to an immediate appeal from denial of that motion — regardless of whether the litigant is in fact eligible for a stay. Because each petitioner in this case explicitly asked for a stay pursuant to § 3, App. 52,54,63,65, the Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial. The courts that have declined jurisdiction over § 3 appeals of the sort at issue here have done so by conflating the jurisdictional question with the merits of the appeal. They reason that because stay motions premised on equitable estoppel seek to expand (rather than simply vindicate) agreements, they are not cognizable under §§3 and 4, and therefore the relevant motions are not actually “under” those provisions. See, in addition to the opinion below, 521 F. 3d, at 602, DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F. 3d 679, 682-685 (CADC 2003); In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice Litigation v. Sprint Communications Co., 428 F. 3d 940, 944-945 (CA10 2005). The dissent makes this step explicit, by reading the appellate jurisdictional provision of § 16 as “calling for a look-through” to the substantive provisions of §3. Post, at 634. Jurisdiction over the appeal, however, “must be determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 311 (1996). The jurisdictional statute here unambiguously makes the underlying merits irrelevant, for even utter frivolousness of the underlying request for a § 3 stay cannot turn a denial into something other than “[a]n order ... refusing a stay of any action under section 3.” 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). Respondents argue that this reading of § 16(a) will produce a long parade of horribles, enmeshing courts in fact-intensive jurisdictional inquiries and permitting frivolous interlocutory appeals. Even if these objections could surmount the plain language of the statute, we would not be persuaded. Determination of whether § 3 was invoked in a denied stay request is immeasurably more simple and less factbound than the threshold determination respondents would replace it with: whether the litigant was a party to the contract (an especially difficult question when the written agreement is not signed). It is more appropriate to grapple with that merits question after the court has accepted jurisdiction over the case. Second, there are ways of minimising the impact of abusive appeals. Appellate courts can streamline the disposition of meritless claims and even authorize the district court’s retention of jurisdiction when an appeal is certified as frivolous. See Behrens, supra, at 310-311. And, of course, those inclined to file dilatory appeals must be given pause by courts’ authority to “award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee” whenever an appeal is “frivolous.” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 38. Ill Even if the Court of Appeals were correct that it had no jurisdiction over meritless appeals, its ground for finding this appeal meritless was in error. We take the trouble to address that alternative ground, since if the Court of Appeals is correct on the merits point we will have awarded petitioners a remarkably hollow victory. We consider, therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s underlying determination that those who are not parties to a written arbitration agreement are categorically ineligible for relief. Section 2 — the FAA’s substantive mandate — makes written arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.” That provision creates substantive federal law regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements, requiring courts “to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 478 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 3, in turn, allows litigants already in federal court to invoke agreements made enforceable by § 2. That provision requires the court, “on application of one of the parties,” to stay the action if it involves an “issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.” 9 U.S. C. §3. Neither provision purports to alter background principles of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements (including the question of who is bound by them). Indeed § 2 explicitly retains an external body of law governing revocation (such grounds “as exist at law or in equity”). And we think §3 adds no substantive restriction to §2’s enforceability mandate. “[S]tate law,” therefore, is applicable to determine which contracts are binding under §2 and enforceable under § 3 “if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 493, n. 9 (1987). See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995). Because “traditional principles” of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the contract through “assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel,” 21 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2001), the Sixth Circuit’s holding that nonparties to a contract are categorically barred from § 3 relief was error. Respondents argue that, as a matter of federal law, claims to arbitration by nonparties are not “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing,” 9 U. S. C. § 3 (emphasis added), because they “seek to bind a signatory to an arbitral obligation beyond that signatory’s strictly contractual obligation to arbitrate,” Brief for Respondents 26. Perhaps that would be true if §3 mandated stays only for disputes between parties to a written arbitration agreement. But that is not what the statute says. It says that stays are required if the claims are “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.” If a written arbitration provision is made enforceable against (or for the benefit of) a third party under state contract law, the statute’s terms are fulfilled. Respondents’ final fallback consists of reliance upon dicta in our opinions, such as the statement that “arbitration . . . is a way to resolve those disputes — but only those disputes— that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration,” First Options, supra, at 943, and the statement that “[i]t goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty,” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U. S. 279, 294 (2002). The former statement pertained to issues parties agreed to arbitrate, and the latter referred to an entity (the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) which obviously had no third-party obligations under the contract in question. Neither these nor any of our other cases have presented for decision the question whether arbitration agreements that are otherwise enforceable by (or against) third parties trigger protection under the FAA. Respondents may be correct in saying that courts’ application of equitable estoppel to impose an arbitration agreement upon strangers to the contract has been “somewhat loose.” Brief for Respondents 27, n. 15. But we need not decide here whether the relevant state contract law recognizes equitable estoppel as a ground for enforcing contracts against third parties, what standard it would apply, and whether petitioners would be entitled to relief under it. These questions have not been briefed before us and can be addressed on remand. It suffices to say that no federal law bars the State from allowing petitioners to enforce the arbitration agreement against respondents and that § 3 would require a stay in this case if it did. * * * We hold that the Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the denial of petitioners’ requests for a §3 stay and that a litigant who was not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement may invoke § 3 if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce the agreement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Souter, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Stevens join, dissenting. Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion under § 3 to stay a district-court action pending arbitration. The question is whether it opens the door to such an appeal at the behest of one who has not signed a written arbitration agreement. Based on the longstanding congressional policy limiting interlocutory appeals, I think the better reading of the statutory provisions disallows such an appeal, and I therefore respectfully dissent. Section 16(a) of the FAA provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from ... an order... refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title.” 9 U. S. C. § 16(a). The Court says that any litigant who asks for and is denied a § 3 stay is entitled to an immediate appeal. Ante, at 627. The majority’s assumption is that “under section 3” is merely a labeling requirement, without substantive import, but this fails to read § 16 in light of the “firm congressional policy against interlocutory or ‘piecemeal’ appeals.” Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 656 (1977). The right of appeal is “a creature of statute,” ibid., and Congress has granted the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final decisions,” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. “This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of justice.” DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121, 124 (1962). Congress has, however, “recognized the need of exceptions for interlocutory orders in certain types of proceedings where the damage of error unreviewed before the judgment is definitive and complete ... has been deemed greater than the disruption caused by intermediate appeal.” Ibid. Section 16 functions as one such exception, but departures from “the dominant rule in federal appellate practice,” 9 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & B. Ward, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.06 (2d ed. 1996), are extraordinary interruptions to the normal process of litigation and ought to be limited carefully. An obvious way to limit the seope of such an extraordinary interruption would be to read the § 16 requirement that the stay have been denied “under section 3” as calling for a look-through to the provisions of §3, and to read §3 itself as offering a stay only to signatories of an arbitration agreement. It is perfectly true that in general a third-party beneficiary can enforce a contract, but this is a weak premise for inferring an intent to allow third parties to obtain a § 3 stay and take a § 16 appeal. While it is hornbook contract law that third parties may enforce contracts for their benefit as a matter of course, interlocutory appeals are a matter of limited grace. Because it would therefore seem strange to assume that Congress meant to grant the right to appeal a § 3 stay denial to anyone as peripheral to the core agreement as a nonsignatory, it follows that Congress probably intended to limit those able to seek a § 3 stay. Asking whether a §3 movant is a signatory provides a bright-line rule with predictable results to aid courts in determining jurisdiction over § 16 interlocutory appeals. And that rule has the further virtue of mitigating the risk of intentional delay by savvy parties who seek to frustrate litigation by gaming the system. Why not move for a §3 stay? If granted, arbitration will be mandated, and if denied, a lengthy appeal may wear down the opponent. The majority contends, ante, at 629, that “there are ways of minimizing the impact of abusive appeals.” Yes, but the sanctions suggested apply to the frivolous, not to the farfetched; and as the majority’s opinion concludes, such an attenuated claim of equitable estoppel as petitioners raise here falls well short of the sanctionable. Because petitioners were not parties to the written arbitration agreement, I would hold they could not move to stay the District Court proceedings under §3, with the consequence that the Court of Appeals would have no jurisdiction under §16 to entertain their appeal. I would accordingly affirm the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. Also named in the suit were two employees of Bricolage (Andrew Beer and Samyak Veera); Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP; William Bricker (the lawyer respondents worked with at the law firm); Prism Connectivity Ventures, LLC (the entity from whom the worthless warrants were purchased); Integrated Capital Associates, Ine. (a prior owner of the worthless warrants who had also been a client of the law firm); and Intercontinental Pacific Group, Inc. (a firm with the same principals as Integrated Capital Associates). Bricolage also moved for a stay under §3, but it filed for bankruptcy while its motion was pending, and the District Court denied the motion as moot. Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when an asserted federal claim is “‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 666 (1974)). Respondents have not relied upon this line of cases as an alternative rationale for rejection of jurisdiction, and there are good reasons for treating subject-matter jurisdiction differently, in that respect, from the appellate jurisdiction here conferred. A frivolous federal claim, if sufficient to confer jurisdiction, would give the court power to hear related state-law claims, see 28 U. S. C. §1367; no such collateral consequences are at issue here. And while an insubstantial federal claim can be said not to “axis[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” § 1331, insubstantiality of the merits can hardly convert a judge’s “order ... refusing a stay” into an “order ... refusing” something else. But we need not resolve this question today. Respondents do not contest that the term “parties” in §3 refers to parties to the litigation rather than parties to the contract. The adjacent provision, which explicitly refers to the “subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties,” 9 U. S. C. §4, unambiguously refers to adversaries in the action, and “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning,” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007). Even without benefit of that canon, we would not be disposed to believe that the statute allows a party to the contract who is not a party to the litigation to apply for a stay of the proceeding. We have said many times that federal law requires that “questions of arbitrability ... be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Whatever the meaning of this vague prescription, it cannot possibly require the disregard of state law permitting arbitration by or against nonparties to the written arbitration agreement. We thus reject the dissent’s contention that contract law’s longstanding endorsement of third-party enforcement is “a weak premise for inferring an intent to allow third parties to obtain a § 3 stay,” post, at 634. It seems to us not weak at all, in light of the terms of the statute. There is no doubt that, where state law permits it, a third-party claim is “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.” It is not our role to conform an unambiguous statute to what we think “Congress probably intended,” ibid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. KIZER, DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, et al. No. 86-863. Argued November 10, 1987 Decided March 23, 1988 Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, and Richard Olderman. Ralph Johnson, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, and Evelyn R. Frank. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Henry T. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: W. J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Nicholas J. Spaeth of North Dakota, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, and Ken Eikenberry of Washington; and for the California Association of Public Hospitals et al. by Mark S. Windisch. Per Curiam. We granted the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ petition for certiorari, 479 U. S. 1083 (1987), in order to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Secretary unlawfully rejected a California Medicaid plan amendment because an internal agency manual stating approval of the type of provision in question was a binding regulation, and because acceptance of the amendment was required by § 2373(c) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1112, note following 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (1982 ed., Supp. III). Cubanski v. Heckler, 781 F. 2d 1421 (1986). After the case had been briefed and argued, Congress enacted § 4106 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330, which required the Secretary to approve the proposed California amendment, retroactively to the date of its proposal. The Secretary has complied with that requirement. The parties agree that these developments have rendered the controversy moot. In accordance with our established practice, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions to dismiss the suit. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 200, 204 (1988); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 (1950). It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. TRUITT MANUFACTURING CO. No. 486. Argued March 29, 1956. Decided May 7, 1956. David P. Findling argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Theophil C. Kafnmholz, Dominick L. Manoli and Frederick U. Reel. R. D. Douglas, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Whitejord S. Blakeney. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith with the representative of his employees. The question presented by this case is whether the National Labor Relations Board may find that an employer has not bargained in good faith where the employer claims it cannot afford to pay higher wages but refuses requests to produce information substantiating its claim. The dispute here arose when a union representing certain of respondent’s employees asked for a wage increase of 10 cents per hour. The company answered that it could not afford to pay such an increase, it was undercapitalized, had never paid dividends, and that an increase of more than 2% cents per hour would put it out of business. The union asked the company to produce some evidence substantiating these statements, requesting permission to have a certified public accountant examine the company’s books, financial data, etc. This request being denied, the union asked that the company submit “full and complete information with respect to its financial standing and profits,” insisting that such information was pertinent and essential for the employees to determine whether or not they should continue to press their demand for a wage increase. A union official testified before the trial examiner that “[W]e were wanting anything relating to the Company’s position, any records or what have you, books, accounting sheets, cost expenditures, what not, anything to back the Company’s position that they were unable to give any more money.” The company refused all the requests, relying solely on the statement that “the information ... is not pertinent to this discussion and the company declines to give you such information; You have no legal right to such.” On the basis of these facts the National Labor Relations Board found that the company had “failed to bargain in good faith with respect to wages in violation of Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act.” 110 N. L. R. B. 856. The Board ordered the company to supply the union with such information as would “substantiate the Respondent’s position of its economic inability to pay the requested wage increase.” The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board’s order, agreeing with respondent that it could not be held guilty of an unfair labor practice because of its refusal to furnish the information requested by the union. 224 F. 2d 869. In Labor Board v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F. 2d 680, the Second Circuit upheld a Board finding of bad-faith bargaining based on an employer’s refusal to supply financial information under circumstances similar to those here. Because of the conflict and the importance of the question we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 922. The company raised no objection to the Board’s order on the ground that the scope of information required was too broad or that disclosure would put an undue burden on the company. Its major argument throughout has been that the information requested was irrelevant to the bargaining process and related to matters exclusively within the province of management. Thus we lay to one side the suggestion by the company here that the Board’s order might be unduly burdensome or injurious to its business. In any event, the Board has heretofore taken the position in cases such as this that “It is sufficient if the information is made available in a manner not so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the process of bargaining.” And in this case the Board has held substantiation of the company’s position requires no more than “reasonable proof.” We think that in determining whether the obligation of good-faith bargaining has been met the Board has a right to consider an employer’s refusal to give information about its financial status. While Congress did not compel agreement between employers and bargaining representatives, it did require collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result. Section 204 (a)(1) of the Act admonishes both employers and employees to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions . ...” In their effort to reach an agreement here both the union and the company treated the company’s ability to pay increased wages as highly relevant. The ability of an employer to increase wages without injury to his business is a commonly considered factor in wage negotiations. Claims for increased wages have sometimes been abandoned because of an employer’s unsatisfactory business condition; employees have even voted to accept wage decreases because of such conditions. Good-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy. And it would certainly not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach the conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an employer mechanically repeats a claim of inability to pay without making the slightest effort to substantiate the claim. Such has been the holding of the Labor Board since shortly after the passage of the Wagner Act. In Pioneer Pearl Button Co., decided in 1936, where the employer’s representative relied on the company’s asserted “poor financial condition,” the Board said: “He did no more than take refuge in the assertion that the respondent’s financial condition was poor; he refused either to prove his statement, or to permit independent verification. This is not collective bargaining.” 1 N. L. R. B. 837, 842-843. This was the position of the Board when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in 1947 and has been its position ever since. We agree with the Board that a refusal to attempt to substantiate a claim of inability to pay increased wages may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good faith. The Board concluded that under the facts and circumstances of this case the respondent was guilty of an unfair labor practice in failing to bargain in good faith. We see no reason to disturb the findings of the Board. We do not hold, however, that in every case in which economic inability is raised as an argument against increased wages it automatically follows that the employees are entitled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met. Since we conclude that there is support in the record for the conclusion of the Board here that respondent did not bargain in good faith, it was error for the Court of Appeals to set aside the Board’s order and deny enforcement. Reversed. “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a). “(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . .” 49 Stat. 452-453, as amended, 61 Stat. 140-142, 29 TJ. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5), 158 (d). Old Line Life Ins. Co., 96 N. L. R. B. 499, 503; Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 N. L. R. B. 592, 593. 61 Stat. 154, 29 U. S. C. § 174 (a)(1). See Sherman, Employer’s Obligation to Produce Data for Collective Bargaining, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 24; Dunlop, The Economics of Wage-Dispute Settlement, 12 Law & Contemp. Prob. 281, 290; What Kind of Information Do Labor Unions Want in Financial Statements?, 87 J. Accountancy 368; How Collective Bargaining Works (Twentieth Century Fund, 1942) 453. Daily Labor Report, No. 156: A4-A5 (Bureau of National Affairs, Aug. 12, 1954); 35 Lab. Rel. Rep. 106; Union Votes Wage Freeze to Aid Rice-Stix, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 25, 1954, p. 1, col. 4; Studebaker Men Vote for Pay Cuts, N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1954, p. 1, col. 5. See, e. g., Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N. L. R. B. 1205, 1206-1207; McLean-Arkansas Lumber Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 1022, 1035-1038; Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 94 N. L. R. B. 1214, 1221-1222, enforced, 196 F. 2d 680; and cases therein cited. See Labor Board v. American Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 409-410.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. LION OIL CO. et al. No. 4. Argued October 8, 1956. Decided January 22, 1957. Theophil C. Kammholz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Marvin E. Frankel and Dominick L. Manoli. Jeff Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were B. L. Allen and Sam Pickard, Jr. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are called upon again to interpret § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270. In particular we are concerned with §8 (d)(4), which provides that a party who wishes to modify or terminate a collective bargaining contract must continue “in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after . . . notice [of his wish to modify or terminate] is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.” Since § 8 (d) defines the duty to bargain collectively, a violation of § 8 (d) (4) constitutes a refusal to bargain, an unfair labor practice for employers, §8 (a) (5), and unions, § 8 (b)(3). The last sentence of § 8 (d) contains an additional sanction: an employee who strikes within the specified 60-day period loses his status as an employee for the purposes of §§ 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. The sole question presented by the petition for certiorari is: Whether the requirement of this Section is satisfied where a contract provides for negotiation and adoption of modifications at an intermediate date during its term, and a strike in support of modification demands occurs after the date on which such modifications may become effective — and after the 60-day notice period has elapsed — but prior to the terminal date of the contract. We are told by the Solicitor General that the question is of major importance in the negotiation and administration of hundreds of collective bargaining agreements throughout the country; that there is a decided trend among unions and employers to execute contracts of longer duration than formerly and to include provisions for reopening to negotiate changes during the contract term. Because of the importance of the question, we granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 986, to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to the effect that § 8 (d) (4) bans strikes to obtain modifications of a contract until the contract by its terms or by the action of the parties has terminated. On October 23, 1950, respondent Lion Oil Co. and the Oil Workers International Union, CIO, entered into a contract which provided: “This agreement shall remain in full force and effect for the period beginning October 23, 1950, and ending October 23, 1951, and thereafter until canceled in the manner hereinafter in this Article provided. “This agreement may be canceled and terminated by the Company or the Union as of a date subsequent to October 23, 1951, by compliance with the following procedure: “(a) If either party to this agreement desires to amend the terms of this agreement, it shall notify the other party in writing of its desire to that effect, by registered mail. No such notice shall be given prior to August 24, 1951. Within the period of 60 days, immediately following the date of the receipt of said notice by the party to which notice is so delivered, the Company and the Union shall attempt to agree as to the desired amendments to this agreement. “(b) If an agreement with respect to amendment of this agreement has not been reached within the 60-day period mentioned in the sub-section immediately preceding, either party may terminate this agreement thereafter upon not less than sixty days’ written notice to the other. Any such notice of termination shall state the date upon which the termination of this agreement shall be effective.” On August 24, 1951, the union served written notice on the company of its desire to modify the contract. Negotiations began on the contractual changes proposed by the union. The union members voted for a strike on February 14, 1952, but the strike, thrice postponed as negotiations continued, did not actually begin until April 30, 1952. The union never gave notice to terminate the contract as contemplated by the quoted contractual provision. Therefore, at all relevant times a collective bargaining agreement was in effect. On August 3, a new contract was executed, and the strikers began to return to work the following day. Certain actions of the company during the strike were the basis of unfair labor practice charges by the union upon which a complaint issued. The Labor Board found that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under §8 (a)(1), (3) and (5) of the Act. The company defended on the ground that the strike, because it occurred while the contract was in effect, was in violation of § 8 (d) (4). A majority of the Board rejected this defense, holding that “The term 'expiration date’ as used in Section 8 (d)(4) . . . has a twofold meaning; it connotes not only the terminal date of a bargaining contract, but also an agreed date in the course of its existence when the parties can effect changes in its provisions.” The Board held that since, under the contract in dispute, October 23, 1951, was such an “agreed date,” the notice given August 24 followed by a wait of more than 60 days satisfied the statute. The company was ordered to cease and desist and, affirmatively, to make whole employees found to have been discriminated against. 109 N. L. R. B. 680, 683. On the company’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals set aside the Board’s order. 221 F. 2d 231. The court held that the “expiration date” of the contract was the date on which all rights and obligations under it would cease; that the second notice required to bring about this termination not having been given, the strike violated § 8 (d) (4) and the strikers therefore lost their status as employees entitled to the protection of the Act. In Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, we had before us another provision of §8(d). What we said there in ruling out a narrowly literal construction of the words of the statute is equally apropos here. “If the above words are read in complete isolation from their context in the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, Tn expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ United States v. Boisdoré's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122.” 350 U. S., at 285. Moreover, in Mastro Plastics we cautioned against accepting a construction that “would produce incongruous results.” Id., at 286. That §8 (d)(4) is susceptible of various interpretations is apparent when § 8 (d) is read as a whole. Its ambiguity was recognized by the Joint Committee of Congress created by the very act of which § 8 (d) was a part to study the operation of the federal labor laws. Members of the National Labor Relations Board, the agency specially charged by Congress with effectuating the purposes of the national labor legislation, have expressed divergent views on the proper construction of § 8 (d) (4); none of them has taken the position adopted by the court below. In the face of this ambiguity it will not do simply to say Congress could' have made itself clearer and automatically equate' the phrase “expiration date” only with the date when a contract comes to an end. We find our guide to the general context of the statute in Mastro Plastics. In that case we recognized a “dual purpose” in the Taft-Hartley Act — to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their own benefit. 350 U. S., at 284. A construction which serves neither of these aims is to be avoided unless the words Congress has chosen clearly compel it. The restriction on employees’ concerted activities which would result from the construction placed upon § 8 (d) (4) by the Court of Appeals is obvious. Too, we think it would discourage the development of long-term bargaining relationships. Unions would be wary of entering into long-term contracts with machinery for reopening them for modification from time to time, if they thought the right to strike would be denied them for the entire term of such a contract, though they imposed no such limitations on themselves. We do not believe that the language used by Congress requires any such result. Section 8 (d)(1) provides that no party to an existing collective bargaining contract “shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification — (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof . . . .” The phrase “expiration date” is repeated in §8 (d)(1) and again in the “whichever occurs later” clause of § 8 (d) (4) upon which this case turns. The use of the three words “termination,” “modification” and “expiration” is significant. We conceive that a notice of desired modification would typically be served in advance of the date when the contract by its own terms was subject to modification. Notice of desired termination would ordinarily precede the date when the contract would come to an end by its terms or would be automatically renewed in the absence of notice to terminate. Therefore we conclude that Congress meant by “expiration date” in § 8 (d) (1) to encompass both situations, and the same phrase in § 8 (d) (4) must carry the same meaning. “Expiration” has no such fixed and settled meaning as to make this an unduly strained reading. Our conclusion is buttressed by a provision of § 8 (d) which was added by the Conference Committee. “[T]he duties . . . imposed [by subsections (2), (3) and (4)] shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.” The negative implication seems clear: Congress recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining. It would be anomalous for Congress to recognize such a duty and at the same time deprive the union of the strike threat which, together with “the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at satisfactory settlements.” Although a 1948 committee report is no part of the legislative history of a statute enacted in 1947, we note that the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, made up of members of the Congress which passed the Taft-Hartley Act, in its final report reached the same conclusion we do: “Reading section 8 (d) as a whole seems to lead to the conclusion that the act permits a strike, after a 60-day notice, in the middle of a contract which authorizes a reopening on wages. Use of the words ‘or modify’ and ‘or modification’ in the proviso, and use of ‘or modification’ in section 8 (d)(1), and the statement in the final paragraph of the section that the parties are not required to agree to any modification effective before the contract may be reopened under its terms, all seem to contemplate the right of either party to insist on changes in the contract if they have so provided. The right of the union would be an empty one without the right to strike after a 60-day notice.” The contemporary legislative history manifests no real recognition of the problem before us. A reading of the committee reports and the floor debates alone could well lead to the conclusion that both the sponsors and the opponents of the bill saw in § 8 (d) (4) no more than a means for preventing “quickie” strikes by requiring a “cooling-off” period which would not in any circumstances exceed 60 days. But the language used in the statute goes beyond this limited purpose. Significance must be given to the clause, “or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.” We believe our construction gives meaning to the congressional language which accords with the general purpose of the Act. Applying that construction to the facts of this case, we hold that the notice and waiting requirements of § 8 (d) were fully satisfied. October 23, 1951, was the first date upon which- the contract by its terms was subject to amendment. Notice of proposed amendments was served 60 days in advance. The strike did not occur until long afterward. The fact that on October 23 the contract became terminable upon further notice by either party is immaterial. One thing the most authoritative legislative gloss on § 8 (d), the report of the Senate Committee, makes clear is that the statutory notice requirement operates wholly independently of whatever notice requirement the parties have fixed for themselves. The situation here is not different, so far as the applicability of the statute is concerned, from that of a fixed-term contract with a clause providing for reopening at some specific time. Nor can we accept respondents' alternative contention that, even apart from § 8 (d), the strike was in breach of contract and the strikers were for that reason not entitled to relief at the hand of the Board. Respondents rely upon Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332. In Sands, as in this case, the contract did not contain an express no-strike clause. Employees there refused in the course of the contract to continue work “in accordance with their contract.” Id., at 344. The refusal occurred midway in a fixed-term contract which did not provide for modifications during its term. This Court sustained the propriety of the employer’s action in discharging the employees. Here the strike occurred at a time when the parties were bargaining over modifications after notice and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Where there has been no express waiver of the right to strike, a waiver of the right during such a period is not to be inferred. We do not believe that the two-phase provision for terminating this contract means that it was not within the contemplation of the parties that economic weapons might be used to support demands for modification before the notice to terminate was given. The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “Sec. 8. . . . “(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification— “(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; “ (2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modification; "(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and “(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later: The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9 (a), and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer." 61 Stat. 140, 142-143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). BNA, Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contract Service, 36:301. Copies of the notice were sent to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and to the Arkansas Labor Commissioner to comply with § 8 (d) (2). The only other case in the Courts of Appeals involving the question presented here is Local No. 3, United Packinghouse Workers v. Labor Board, 210 F. 2d 325, cert. denied, 348 U. S. 822, also decided by the Eighth Circuit. The court there construed § 8 (d) (4) as it did here, although on its facts the decision is reconcilable with the Board’s construction of the section in this case. Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 986, Pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63. The Board’s original view in Wilson & Co., 89 N. L. R. B. 310, was that § 8 (d) permitted strikes in support of contract changes any time after 60 days’ notice. Member Peterson, concurring specially in the present case, adhered to that view. ' Member Murdock dissented on the same ground on which he had concurred specially in Wilson & Co., namely, that § 8 (d) applies only during the period around the termination of a contract. Cf. § 13 of the Act: “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided fo.r herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” 61 Stat. 151, 29 ü. S. C. §163. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35. Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations, Factors in Successful Collective Bargaining, S. Rep. under S. Res. 71, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Committee Print). S. Rep. No. 986, Pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 62. In 1949 Senator Taft, who was a member of the Joint Committee, introduced a clarifying amendment to § 8 (d). See S. Rep. No. 99, Pt. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (minority report). The amendment, along with a group of others, passed the Senate, 95 Cong. Rec. 8717, but did not become law. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24; id,., Pt. 2, pp. 21-22; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35. See also 93 Cong. Rec. 3835, 3839, 4036, 4904-4905, 5005, 5014, 6385, 6389, 6444, 6503-6504, 7530. The minority members of the Senate Committee which reported out the bill containing § 8 (d) did say that the effect of it was to incorporate no-strike clauses into labor contracts “by legislative fiat.” The context, however, makes it tolerably clear that they were referring to a ban on strikes during the 60-day notice period. S. Rep. No. 105, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22. Section 8 (d) originated in the Senate. The Committee said, “It should be noted that this section [§ 8 (d)] does not render inoperative the obligation to conform to notice provisions for longer periods, if the collective agreement so provides. Failure to give such notice, however, does not become an unfair labor practice if the 60-day provision is complied with.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24. A no-strike clause was one of the company’s demands during the negotiations in this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. NEUSTADT et ux. No. 533. Argued May 2, 1961. Decided May 29, 1961. Assistant Attorney General Orrick argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, former Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Morton Hollander, John G. Laughlin, Jr. and Sherman L. Cohn. Lawrence J. Latto argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. Pursuant to the provisions of the National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is authorized, in certain instances, to insure the partial repayment of loans secured by mortgages executed to finance the purchase of private residential properties. When duly requested to do so by a qualified lender, the FHA, through its appraisal staff, makes an inspection of property offered for sale in order to determine whether the property is eligible for FHA mortgage insurance, and to assign an appraised value establishing the maximum amount of mortgage insurance obtainable. The question for decision in this case is whether the United States may be held liable, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b), to a purchaser of residential property who has been furnished a statement reporting the results of an inaccurate FHA inspection and appraisal, and who, in reliance thereon, has been induced by the seller to pay a purchase price in excess of the property’s fair market value. The answer turns upon the correct interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), which precludes recovery under the Tort Claims Act upon “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation.” The material facts giving rise to the controversy are not in dispute, and may be summarized as follows. Early in 1957, the property in question, consisting of a 16-year-old single-family brick house and lot located in Alexandria, Virginia, was offered for sale by its owners. To assure that FHA mortgage insurance would be available to secure a loan in the event that the purchaser, when ascertained, might desire to finance the purchase by that method, the owners requested a qualified lending institution to take the necessary steps to have the property inspected and appraised by the FHA; and pursuant to the lending agent’s application, an FHA appraiser visited and inspected the premises. On the basis of that inspection, which disclosed no defects that would disqualify the property for mortgage insurance, the FHA issued to the lending agency a “conditional commitment,” stating that the property had been approved for mortgage insurance and, for that purpose, had been assigned an appraised value of $22,750. Under § 203 (b) (2) of the National Housing Act, the maximum amount of mortgage insurance obtainable on an appraised value of $22,750 was $18,800. Shortly thereafter, the respondents,- Mr. and Mrs. Stanley S. Neustadt, examined the property and became interested in buying it. After negotiations extending over the period of a month, in the course of which respondents were advised by the sellers that the property had been appraised by the FHA at a value of $22,750 for mortgage insurance purposes, respondents entered into a conditional contract to purchase the property at a price of $24,000. The contract was conditioned upon the respondents’ obtaining a loan secured by an FHA-insured mortgage in the amount of $18,800. In accordance with § 226 of the National Housing Act, the contract also provided that the sellers would deliver to respondents, prior to the sale of the property, a written statement setting forth the FHA-appraised value. Both conditions were fulfilled, and on the settlement date, July 2, 1957, respondents took title to the property, and acknowledged by their signatures that they had been furnished with a written “Statement of FHA Appraisal.” This was an official FHA document, stating that the FHA “has appraised the property identified . . . and for mortgage insurance purposes has placed an FHA-appraised value of $22,750 on such property as of the date of this statement. (The FHA appraised value does not establish sales price.)” (Emphasis in original.) Respondents moved into the house on July 10, 1957. According to their testimony, they had previously inspected the house “quite carefully,” and had found “absolutely nothing which would indicate the necessity for any redecoration at all.” The house was “immaculately clean” and the walls and ceilings “looked fine.” However, within a month after respondents moved in, substantial cracks developed in the ceilings and in the interior and exterior walls throughout the house. When building repair contractors were unable to ascertain the cause of the cracks, the original builder of the house and four FHA field inspectors were summoned, and a thorough investigation was made by them. By drilling a hole through the concrete floor of the basement, it was discovered that the subsoil was composed of a type of clay which becomes pliable when moist. Due to poor drainage conditions on the surface, water had seeped into the clay, causing it to shift beneath the foundations of the house and to produce the cracks which had appeared in the walls and ceilings. Ten months thereafter, respondents commenced this action against the Government, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking recovery of the difference between the fair market value of the property and the purchase price of $24,000. The complaint alleged that the FHA’s inspection and appraisal of the property for mortgage insurance purposes had been conducted negligently; that respondents were justified in relying upon the results of that inspection and appraisal; and that they “would not have purchased the property for $24,000 but for the carelessness and negligence of [FHA].” After trial, the District Court found that respondents “in good faith relied upon the [FHA’s] appraisal in consummating their contract of purchase,” and that “reasonable care by a qualified appraiser would have warned” respondents of the “serious structural defects” in the house which had been “preponderantly proved.” On that basis, the court adjudged the Government liable in the amount of $8,000, which it found to be the difference between the property’s fair market value at the time of sale ($16,000) and the purchase price ($24,000). On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 281 F. 2d 596, over the Government’s sedulous objection that recovery was barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), which excepts from the coverage of the Tort Claims Act “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation.” Because of- the importance of the question, and to resolve an apparent conflict between the Fourth Circuit’s decision and the holdings of other Circuits uniformly construing the “misrepresentation” exception of § 2680 (h) to preclude recovery on closely analogous facts, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 926. We have concluded that the interpretation adopted by the Fourth Circuit is erroneous, and that the Government must be absolved from liability. In its complete form, § 2680 (h) excludes recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act upon “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” (Emphasis added.) The Government’s position is that, since Congress employed both the terms “misrepresentation” and “deceit” in § 2680 (h), it clearly meant to exclude claims arising out of negligent, as well as deliberate, misrepresentation; and therefore, even assuming that the District Court correctly found that the inaccurate FHA appraisal in this case resulted from a negligent inspection, and that respondents relied upon that appraisal to their detriment, the claim must nevertheless fail as one “arising out of . . . [negligent] misrepresentation. ” We are in accord with the view urged by the Government, and unanimously adopted by all Circuits which have previously had occasion to pass on the question, that § 2680 (h) comprehends claims arising out of negligent, as well as willful, misrepresentation. The leading precedent has been the Second Circuit’s decision in Jones v. United States, 207 F. 2d 563, which involved, a statement issued to the plaintiffs-by the United States Geological Survey erroneously estimating the oil-producing capacity of certain land. In reliance upon that statement, plaintiffs sold securities representing oil and gas rights in the land for less than their actual value, and later sought to recoup their loss from the Government under the Tort Claims Act on a complaint alleging negligent misrepresentation. Affirming a dismissal of the complaint, the -Second Circuit tersely, pointed out that § 2680 (h) applies to both “misrepresentation” and “deceit,” and, “[a]s ‘deceit’ means fraudulent misrepresentation, ‘misrepresentation’ must have been meant to include negligent misrepresentation, since otherwise the word ‘misrepresentation’ would be duplicative.” 207 F. 2d, at 564. Following this interpretation, in an unbroken line, are the cases of National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Clark v. United States, 218 F. 2d 446 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Miller Harness Co. v. United States, 241 F. 2d 781 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Anglo-American Corp. v. United States, 242 F. 2d 236 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Hall v. United States, 274 F. 2d 69 (C. A. 10th Cir.). In accord also are Social Security Adm’n v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 639 (D. C. D. Md.), and United States v. Van Meter, 149 F. Supp. 493 (D. C. N. D. Cal.). Throughout this line of decisions, the argument has been made by plaintiffs, and consistently rejected by the courts, until this case, that the bar of § 2680 (h) does not apply when the gist of the claim lies in negligence underlying the inaccurate representation, i. e., when the claim is phrased as one “arising out of” negligence rather than “misrepresentation.” But this argument, as was forcefully demonstrated by the Tenth Circuit in Hall v. United States, supra, is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent § 2680 (h) by denying that it applies to negligent misrepresentation. In the Hall case, it was alleged that agents of the Department of Agriculture had negligently inspected the plaintiff’s cattle and, as a result, mistakenly reported that the cattle were diseased. Relying upon that report, plaintiff sold the cattle at less than their fair value, and sought recovery from the Government of his loss on the ground that it had been caused by the negligent inspection underlying the agents’ report, rather than by the report itself. The Tenth Circuit rejected the claim, stating: “We must then look beyond the literal meaning of the language to ascertain the real cause of complaint. . . . Plaintiff’s loss came about when the Government agents misrepresented the condition of the cattle, telling him they were diseased when, in fact, they were free from disease. . . . This stated a cause of action predicated on a misrepresentation. Misrepresentation as used in the exclusionary provision [of § 2680 (h)] was meant to include negligent misrepresentation.” 274 F. 2d, at 71. In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit took the opposite view, and held that respondents could recover on the sole basis of the underlying negligence. Although it agreed that § 2680 (h) embraces both “negligent” and “willful” misrepresentation, and that respondents’ claim “might form the basis of an action for misrepresentation under general common-law principlés,” 281 F. 2d, at 601, it deemed § 2680 (h) inapplicable here for the reason that the misrepresentation was “merely incidental” to the “gravamen” of the claim, i. e., “the careless making of an excessive appraisal so that [respondents were] . . . deceived and suffered substantial loss.” Id., at 602. Since § 226 of the National Housing Act requires that a seller of property approved for FHA mortgage insurance “shall agree to deliver, prior to the sale of the property, to the person purchasing such [property], a written statement setting forth the amount of the [FHA] appraised value . . . ,” the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the FHA appraisal procedure was designed to protect prospective home' purchasers; that the Government (through the FHA) therefore “owed a specific duty” to respondents to make a careful appraisal; and that “if the government assumes a duty and negligently performs it, a party injured thereby may recover damages from the United States even though the careless performance of the duty may have been accompanied by some misrepresentation of fact.” Id., at 599. Whether or not this analysis accords with the law of States which have seen fit to allow recovery under analogous circumstances, it does not meet the question of whether this claim is outside the intended scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which depends solely upon what Congress meant by the language it used in §2680 (h). To say, as the Fourth Circuit did, that a claim arises out of “negligence,” rather than “misrepresentation,” when the loss suffered by the injured party is caused by the breach of a “specific duty” owed by the Government to him, i. e., the duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which that party may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his economic affairs, is only to state the traditional and commonly understood legal definition of the tort of “negligent misrepresentation,” as is clearly, if not conclusively, shown by the authorities set forth in the margin, and which there is every reason to believe Congress had in mind when it placed the word “misrepresentation” before the word “deceit” in § 2680 (h). As the Second Circuit observed in Jones v. United States, supra, “deceit” alone would have been sufficient had Congress intended only to except deliberately false representations. Certainly there is no warrant for assuming that Congress was unaware of established tort definitions when it enacted the Tort Claims Act in 1946, after spending “some twenty-eight years of congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and counter-amendment.” United States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 219-220. Moreover, as we have said in considering other aspects of the Act: “There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that Congress intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 68. Regarding the Court of Appeals’ assertion that the Government owed respondents a “specific duty” to make and communicate an accurate appraisal of the property, by virtue of the provisions of the National Housing Act, we have carefully examined the rather extensive legislative history of that statute, giving particular attention to § 226 thereof, and have found nothing from which we may reasonably infer that Congress intended, in a case such as this, to limit or suspend the application of the “misrepresentation” exception of the Tort Claims Act. Long before § 226 was added to the National Housing Act, in 1954, requiring sellers to inform prospective buyers of FHA-appraised value, it had been recognized in Congress that FHA appraisals would be a matter of public record, and would thus inure, incidentally, to the benefit of prospective home purchasers, by affording them the “benefit of knowing the appraised value set upon the property ... by a trained valuator acting in accordance with a procedure designed to reduce to a minimum, errors that might result from casual or hasty conclusions.” But at the same time, it was repeatedly emphasized that the primary and predominant objective of the appraisal system was the “protection of the Government and its insurance funds”; that the mortgage insurance program was not designed to insure anything other than the repayment of loans made by lender-mortgagees; and that “there is no legal relationship between the FHA and the individual mortgagor.” Never once was it even intimated that, by an FHA appraisal, the Government would, in any sense, represent or guarantee to the purchaser that he was receiving a certain value for his money. Nor is there any indication that Congress intended, by its 1954 addition of § 226, to modify the legislation's fundamental design from a system of mortgage repayment insurance to one of guaranty or warranty to the purchaser of value received. On its face, § 226 goes no further than to require that a seller of property approved for FHA mortgage insurance shall furnish to the buyer, prior to sale, a written statement disclosing the FHA-appraised value. That Congress did not thereby intend to convert the FHA appraisal into a warranty of value, or otherwise to extend to the purchaser any actionable right of redress against the Government in the event of a faulty appraisal, was made irrefutably clear in the Committee Hearings in both Houses of Congress, the pertinent excerpts from which are set forth in the margin. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, at the time § 226 was adopted, Congress was aware of the “misrepresentation” exception in the Tort Claims Act, and that it had been construed by the courts to include “negligent misrepresentation.” The compulsory disclosure provision of § 226 is but one of numerous instances in which Congress has relegated to a governmental agency the duty either to disclose directly', or to require private persons to disclose, information for the assistance and guidance of other persons in the conduct of their economic and commercial affairs. In practically all such instances, it may be said that the Government owes a “specific duty” to obtain and communicate information carefully, lest the intended recipient be misled to his financial harm. While we do not condone carelessness by government employees in gathering and promulgating such information, neither can we justifiably ignore the plain words Congress has used in limiting the scope of the Government’s tort liability. It follows that respondents’ claim is one “arising out of . . . misrepresentation,” within the meaning of § 2680 (h), and hence is not actionable against the Government under the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the judgment below must be Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 48 Stat. 1246, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1701 et seq. Section 203 of the National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1709, provided at the times here pertinent that: “(a) . . . The [Federal Housing] Commissioner is authorized, upon application by the mortgagee, to insure as hereinafter provided any mortgage offered to him which is eligible for insurance as hereinafter provided, and, upon such terms as the Commissioner may prescribe, to make commitments for the insuring of such mortgages prior to the date of their execution or disbursement thereon .... “(b) . . . To be eligible for insurance under this section a mortgage shall— “(2) Involve a principal obligation . . . not to exceed an amount equal to the sum of (i) 95 per centum ... of $9,000. of the [FHA] appraised value (as of the date the mortgage is accepted for insurance), and (ii) 75 per centum of such value in excess of $9,000 . . . 24 CFR §§200.145, 200.146, 200.148 (1959 ed.). “[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” An application for FHA mortgage insurance may be made only by a financial institution approved as a mortgagee by the FHA. §203 (a), National Housing Act, supra, 12 U. S. C. § 1709 (a). Applications may be, and commonly are, made in advance of actual sale and execution of the mortgage, 24 CFR §221.9 (1959 ed.), in order that the seller may have the property inspected, approved, and appraised for mortgage insurance while the purchaser is still unknown. The commitment to insure a mortgage is conditioned upon the mortgagor’s being found financially able to carry the mortgage. 24 CFR §§200.147, 200.148 (1) (1959 ed.). Note 2, supra. Under § 203 (b) (2), the maximum insurable amount was $18,862.50 (95% of $9,000, plus 75% of $13,750). By FHA regulations, mortgages were insurable only in multiples of $100. 24 CFR § 221.17 (a) (1958 Supp.). Section 226 was enacted in 1954 (68 Stat. 607, 12 U. S. C. § 1715q) and provides in pertinent part as follows: “The Commissioner is hereby authorized and directed to require that, in connection with any property . . . approved for mortgage insurance . . . the seller or builder . . . shall agree to deliver, prior to the sale of the property, to the person purchasing such dwelling for his own occupancy, a written statement setting forth the amount of the appraised value of the property as determined by the Commissioner. . . .” There is no right to a jury trial under the Tort Claims Act. 28 U. S. C. § 2402. The cases are cited and discussed at pp. 702-705, infra. Neither in the Court of Appeals, nor in this Court, has the Government chosen to contest these findings. In Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 242 F. 2d 236, the Second Circuit analyzed a similar claim and exposed its true basis: “[Plaintiff] contracted to sell tomato paste to the United States, which required as a condition precedent to its acceptance of the paste that it satisfy the standards of the Food and Drug Administration. The paste was imported; and the Food and Drug Administration, after sampling it, issued ‘release notices’ that notified Customs officers that the tomato paste could enter the country. [Plaintiff] then accepted delivery. When it in turn delivered the paste to the government, federal officials once again inspected the paste, found that it did not satisfy the standards of the Food and Drug Administration, and ordered it destroyed. [Plaintiff] sues now on the ground that the negligence of officials of the Food and Drug Administration in sampling the tomato paste and in issuing the ‘release notices’ induced it to accept the paste and thus suffer damages. “This claim, it is clear, ‘arose out of’ the assertedly negligent representation of the quality of the tomato paste by federal employees. Such a claim is barred by . . . Section 2680 (h) . . . [which excepts] from liability negligent as well as intentional misrepresentation.” Id., at 237. Note 9, supra. The Fourth Circuit sought primary support from the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, in which the defendants, who were public weighers, were requested by a vendor to weigh certain goods and to issue a certificate of weight to the buyer. The goods were weighed inaccurately, and on the strength of the erroneous weight certificate, the buyer paid an excessive purchase price. In allowing the buyer to recover from defendants, the New York court looked primarily to the negligence in performing the act of weighing, and stated that defendants were liable both for their “careless words” and their “careless performance of a service.” The case has been widely discussed by tort authorities as epitomizing “negligent misrepresentation.” See, e. g., 1 Harper and James, Torts, 546-548 (1956); Prosser, Torts, 734, 737 (1941 ed.); Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud? 18 Va. L. Rev. 703, 708 (1932). Glanzer has been followed in a number of States which have broken from the earlier, virtually unanimous, American view subscribing to the English case of Derry v. Peek, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337, 58 L. J. Rep. Ch. 864 (1889) (refusing to allow recovery for negligent misrepresentation). See cases cited in 1 Harper and James, Torts, 546, n. 5 (1956). Cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, when a claim is not barred by one of the Act’s exclusionary provisions, the liability of the Government must be determined “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b). The Fourth Circuit’s opinion, although it concluded that § 2680 (h) did not bar respondents’ claim, did not indicate whether Virginia law follows the New York rule of Glanzer v. Shepard, supra. In view of our conclusion that § 2680 (h) applies, we need not explore this question. The American Law Institute’s Restatement of Torts (1938), c. 22, “Deceit: Business Transactions,” Topic 3, “Negligent Misrepresentations,” states as follows: “§ 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others. “One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if “(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and “(b) the harm is suffered “ (i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and “(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.” Prosser, Torts (1941 ed.), c. 16, “Misrepresentation,” §87, “Basis of Responsibility,” states: “Responsibility for misrepresentation may be divided into the usual tort classifications. It may rest upon: “a. An intent to deceive, consisting of belief that the representation is false .... [S]uch an intent is required for the action of deceit. “b. Negligence in obtaining information or in making the representation. . . . “c. A policy holding the maker strictly responsible for the truth of the representation See also Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 735-739 (1929); 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, §126, “Negligent Representations” (1939). See 2 Harper and James, Torts, § 29.13, The Federal Tort Claims Act: Exceptions to Liability, p. 1655 (1956). 78 Cong. Rec. 11980 et seq.; 1st Annual Report of FHA (1935) (passim); 100 Cong. Rec. 12349-12360; S. Rep. No. 1472, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1429, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the Housing Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on Housing Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. First Annual Report of FHA 17 (1935). See also 90 Cong. Rec. A2985; 78 Cong. Rec. 11981. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 66. 78 Cong. Rec. 11981; 1st Annual Report of FHA 15 (1935). H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2271, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 66-67. Note 9, supra. It was stated by Representative Dollinger, in the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency on “Housing Constructed Under VA and FHA Programs,” 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 163: “The Government did not guarantee, on your getting the home, that the home would be in good condition. As I pointed out before, there has been a misconception of the idea. The Government never approved the building. All it says is that the FHA loans are guaranteed to the builder or to the bank.” In the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Housing Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1402-1403, the following colloquy was recorded between Senator Bennett and Home Finance Administrator Cole: “Mr. Cole: ... I agree with the Senator that the home buyer should understand that the Federal Government is not guaranteeing his home. “Senator Bennett: That is correct. . . . The idea of the inspection service under title II is to protect the Federal Government, which undertakes to insure the'loan. The fact that the inspection is made, provides collateral benefits to the property owner. There is no question about that. But in the last analysis the property owner cannot say to the Federal Government, ‘Well, your inspector inspected my house, and now look what’s happened; therefore, you are responsible; therefore, you must come down here and fix it up.’ ” Jones v. United States, supra, and National Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra, had both been decided, by the Second and Eighth Circuits, respectively, when Congress enacted § 226 in 1954. Our conclusion neither conflicts with nor impairs the authority of Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, which held cognizable a Torts Act claim for property damages suffered when a vessel ran aground as a result of the Coast Guard’s allegedly negligent failure to maintain the beacon lamp in a lighthouse. Such a claim does not “arise out of . . . misrepresentation,” any more than does one based upon a motor vehicle operator’s negligence in giving a misleading turn signal. As Dean Prosser has observed, many familiar forms of negligent conduct may be said to involve an element of “misrepresentation,” in the generic sense of that word, but “[s]o far as misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified with the common law action of deceit,” and has been confined “very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings.” Prosser, Torts, § 85, “Remedies for Misrepresentation,” at 702-703 (1941 ed.). See also 2 Harper and James, Torts, §29.13, at 1655 (1956).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VITEK, CORRECTIONAL DIRECTOR, et al. v. JONES No. 78-1155. Argued December 3, 1979 Decided March 25, 1980 White, J., announced the Court’s judgment and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV-A, and V, in which Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-B , in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 497. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 500. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 501. Melvin Kent Kammerlohr, Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General. Thomas A. Wurtz, by appointment of the Court, 441 U. S. 960, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-B. The question in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a prisoner convicted and incarcerated in the State of Nebraska to certain procedural protections, including notice, an adversary hearing, and provision of counsel, before he is transferred involuntarily to a state mental hospital for treatment of a mental disease or defect. I Nebraska Rev. Stat. § 83-176 (2) (1976) authorizes the Director of Correctional Services to designate any available, suitable, and appropriate residence facility or institution as a place of confinement for any state prisoner and to transfer a prisoner from one place of confinement to another. Section 83-180 (1), however, provides that when a designated physician or psychologist finds that a prisoner “suffers from a mental disease or defect” and “cannot be given proper treatment in that facility,” the director may transfer him for examination, study, and treatment to another institution within or without the Department of Correctional Services. Any prisoner so transferred to a mental hospital is to be returned to the Department if, prior to the expiration of his sentence, treatment is no longer necessary. Upon expiration of sentence, if the State desires to retain the prisoner in a mental hospital, civil commitment proceedings must be promptly commenced. § 83-180 (3). On May 31, 1974, Jones was convicted of robbery and sentenced to a term of three to nine years in state prison. He was transferred to the penitentiary hospital in January 1975. Two days later he was placed in solitary confinement, where he set his mattress on fire, burning himself severely. He was treated in the burn unit of a private hospital. Upon his release and based on findings required by § 83-180 that he was suffering from a mental illness or defect and could not receive proper treatment in the penal complex, he was transferred to the security unit of the Lincoln Regional Center, a state mental hospital under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Institutions. Jones then intervened in this case, which was brought by other prisoners against the appropriate state officials (the State) challenging on procedural due process grounds the adequacy of the procedures by which the Nebraska statutes permit transfers from the prison complex to a mental hospital. On August 17, 1976, a three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.). denied the State’s motion for summary judgment and trial ensued. On September 12, 1977, the District Court declared § 83-180 unconstitutional as applied to Jones, holding that transferring Jones to a mental hospital without adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing deprived him of liberty without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and that such transfers must be accompanied by adequate notice, an adversary hearing before an independent decisionmaker, a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision, and the availability of appointed counsel for indigent prisoners. Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569 (Neb. 1977). Counsel was requested to suggest appropriate relief. In response to this request, Jones revealed that on May 27, 1977, prior to the District Court’s decision, he had been transferred from Lincoln Regional Center to the psychiatric ward of the penal complex but prayed for an injunction against further transfer to Lincoln Regional Center. The State conceded that an injunction should enter if the District Court was firm in its belief that the section was unconstitutional. The District Court then entered its judgment declaring § 83-180 unconstitutional as applied to Jones and permanently enjoining the State from transferring Jones to Lincoln Regional Center without following the procedures prescribed in its judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction 434 U. S. 1060 (1978). Meanwhile, Jones had been paroled, but only on condition that he accept psychiatric treatment at a Veterans’ Administration Hospital. We vacated the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case to that court for consideration of the question of mootness. Vitek v. Jones, 436 U. S. 407 (1978). Both the State and Jones at this juncture insisted that the case was not moot. The State represented that because “Jones’ history of mental illness indicates a serious threat to his own safety, as well as to that of others . . . there is a very real expectation” that he would again be transferred if the injunction was removed. App. to Juris Statement 24. Jones insisted that he was receiving treatment for mental illness against his will and that he was continuing to suffer from the stigmatizing consequences of the previous determination that he was mentally ill. On these representations, the District Court found that the case was not moot because Jones “is subject to and is in fact under threat of being transferred to the state mental hospital under § 83-180.” Ibid. The District Court reinstated its original judgment. We postponed consideration of jurisdiction to a hearing on the merits. 441 U. S. 922 (1979). Meanwhile, Jones had violated his parole, his parole had been revoked, and he had been reincarcerated in the penal complex. II We agree with the parties in this case that a live controversy exists and that the case is not moot. Jones was declared to be mentally ill pursuant to § 83-180 and was transferred to a mental hospital and treated. He was later paroled but only on condition that he accept mental treatment. He violated that parole and has been returned to the penal complex. On our remand to consider mootness, the District Court, relying on Jones’ history of mental illness and the State’s representation that he represented a serious threat to his own safety as well as to that of others, found that Jones “is in fact under threat of being transferred to the state mental hospital under § 83-180.” We see no reason to disagree with the District Court’s assessment at that time, and the reality of the controversy between Jones and the State has not been lessened by the cancellation of his parole and his return to the state prison, where he is protected from further transfer by the outstanding judgment and injunction of the District Court. The State, believing that the case is not moot, wants the injunction removed by the reversal of the District Court’s judgment. Jones, on the other hand, insists that the judgment of the District Court be sustained and the protection against transfer to a mental hospital, except in accordance with the specified procedures, be retained. Against this background, it is not “absolutely clear,” absent the injunction, “that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 (1953). Furthermore, as the matter now stands, the § 83-180 determination that Jones suffered from mental illness has been declared infirm by the District Court. Vacating the District Court’s judgment as moot would not only vacate the injunction against transfer but also the declaration that the procedures employed by the State afforded an inadequate basis for declaring Jones to be mentally ill. In the posture of the case, it is not moot. Ill On the merits, the threshold question in this case is whether the involuntary transfer of a Nebraska state prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. The District Court held that it did and offered two related reasons for its conclusion. The District Court first identified a liberty interest rooted in § 83-180 (1), under which a prisoner could reasonably expect that he would not be transferred to a mental hospital without a finding that he was suffering from a mental illness for which he could not secure adequate treatment in the correctional facility. Second, the District Court was convinced that characterizing Jones as a mentally ill patient and transferring him to the Lincoln ^Regional Center had “some stigmatizing” consequences which, together with the mandatory behavior modification treatment to which Jones would be subject at the Lincoln Center, constituted a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a “grievous loss” that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and an adequate hearing. We agree with the District Court in both respects. A We have repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no “constitutional or inherent right” to parole, Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 7 (1979), but once a State grants a prisoner the conditional liberty properly dependent on the observance of special parole restrictions, due process protections attach to the decision to revoke parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). The same is true of the revocation of probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), we held that a state-created right to good-time credits, which could be forfeited only for serious misbehavior, constituted a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. We also noted that the same reasoning could justify extension of due process protections to a decision to impose “solitary” confinement because “[it] represents a major change in the conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct.” Id., at 571-572, n. 19. Once a State has granted prisoners a liberty interest, we held that due process protections are necessary “to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Id., at 557. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976), we held that the transfer of a prisoner from one prison to another does not infringe a protected liberty interest. But in those cases transfers were discretionary with the prison authorities, and in neither case did the prisoner possess any right or justifiable expectation that he would not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occurrence of other specified events. Hence, “the predicate for invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed and applied in Wolff v. McDonnell [was] totally nonexistent.” Meachum v. Fano, supra, at 226-227. Following Meachum v. Fano and Montanye v. Haymes, we continued to recognize that state statutes may grant prisoners liberty interests that invoke due process protections when prisoners are transferred to solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978), summarily aff'g 462 F. Supp. 397 (ND Cal. 1976). Similarly, in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, we held that state law granted petitioners a sufficient expectancy of parole to entitle them to some measure of constitutional protection with respect to parole decisions. We think the District Court properly understood and applied these decisions. Section 83-180 (1) provides that if a designated physician finds that a prisoner “suffers from a mental disease or defect” that “cannot be given proper treatment” in prison, the Director of Correctional Services may transfer a prisoner to a mental hospital. The District Court also found that in practice prisoners are transferred to a mental hospital only if it is determined that they suffer from a mental disease or defect that cannot adequately be treated within the penal complex. This “objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official Penal Complex practice,” that a prisoner would not be transferred unless he suffered from a mental disease or defect that could not be adequately treated in the prison, gave Jones a liberty interest that entitled him to the benefits of appropriate procedures in connection with determining the conditions that warranted his transfer to a mental hospital. Under our cases, this conclusion of the District Court is unexceptionable. Appellants maintain that any state-created liberty interest that Jones had was completely satisfied once a physician or psychologist designated by the director made the findings required by §83-180(1) and that Jones was not entitled to any procedural protections. But if the State grants a prisoner a right or expectation that adverse action will not be taken against him except upon the- occurrence of specified behavior, “the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 558. These minimum requirements being a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action. In Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff, the States had adopted their own procedures for determining whether conditions warranting revocation of parole, probation, or good-time credits had occurred; yet we held that those procedures were constitutionally inadequate. In like manner, Nebraska’s reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist for determining whether the conditions warranting a transfer exist neither removes the prisoner’s interest from due process protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the Constitution. “The plurality opinion evidently reasons that the nature of appellee’s interest in continued federal employment is necessarily defined and limited by the statutory procedures for discharge and that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process accords to appellee no procedural protections against arbitrary or erroneous discharge other than those expressly provided in the statute. The plurality would thus conclude that the statute governing federal employment determines not only the nature of appellee’s property interest, but also the extent of the procedural protections to which he may lay claim. It seems to me that this approach is incompatible with the principles laid down in [Board of Regents v.] Roth[, 408 U. S. 564 (1972)] and [Perry v.] Sindermann[, 408 U. S. 593 (1972)]. Indeed, it would lead directly to the conclusion that whatever the nature of an individual’s statutorily created property interest, deprivation of that interest could be accomplished without notice or a hearing at any time. This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. As our cases have consistently recognized, the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statu- B The District Court was also correct in holding that independently of § 83-180 (1), the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital must be accompanied by appropriate procedural protections. The issue is whether after a conviction for robbery, Jones retained a residuum of liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital without complying with minimum requirements of due process. We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces “a massive curtailment of liberty,” Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 509 (1972), and in consequence “requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring). The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental hospital “can engender adverse social consequences to the individual” and that “[w]hether we label this phenomena 'stigma’ or choose to call it something else ... we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.” Addington v. Texas, supra, at 425-426. See also Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 600 (1979). Also, “[a]mong the historic liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause is the “right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977). Compelled treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification programs, to which the District Court found Jones was exposed in this case, was a proper factor to be weighed by the District Court. Cf. Addington v. Texas, supra, at 427. torily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Perry v. Sindermann, supra.” Id., at 166-167. The District Court, in its findings, was sensitive to these concerns: “[T]he fact of greater limitations on freedom of action at the Lincoln Regional Center, the fact that a transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center has some stigmatizing consequences, and the fact that additional mandatory behavior modification systems are used at the Lincoln Regional Center combine to make the transfer a 'major change in the conditions of confinement’ amounting to a 'grievous loss’ to the inmate.” Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp., at 573. Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily to these consequences, it is undeniable that protected liberty interests would be unconstitutionally infringed absent compliance with the procedures required by the Due Process Clause. We conclude that a convicted felon also is entitled to the benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances before he is found to have a mental disease and transferred to a mental hospital. Undoubtedly, a valid criminal conviction and prison sentence extinguish a defendant’s right to freedom from confinement. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S., at 7. Such a conviction and sentence sufficiently extinguish a defendant’s liberty “to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S., at 224 (emphasis deleted). It is also true that changes in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner are not alone sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause “[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him.” Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S., at 242. Appellants maintain that the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital is within the range of confinement justified by imposition of a prison sentence, at least after certification by a qualified person that a prisoner suffers from a mental disease or defect. We cannot agree. None of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime entitles a State not only to confine the convicted person but also to determine that he has a mental illness and to subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental hospital. Such consequences visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime. Our cases recognize as much and reflect an understanding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605 (1967); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 724-725 (1972). A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual’s right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections. In light of the findings made by the District Court, Jones’ involuntary transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center pursuant to § 83-180, for the purpose of psychiatric treatment, implicated a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Many of the restrictions on the prisoner’s freedom of action at the Lincoln Regional Center by themselves might not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest retained by a prisoner, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 572, n. 19; cf. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 323 (1976). But here, the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections. IV The District Court held that to afford sufficient protection to the liberty interest it had identified, the State was required to observe the following minimum procedures before transferring a prisoner to a mental hospital: “A. Written notice to the prisoner that a transfer to a mental hospital is being considered; “B. A hearing, sufficiently after the notice to permit the prisoner to prepare, at which disclosure to the prisoner is made of the evidence being relied upon for the transfer and at which an opportunity to be heard in person and to present documentary evidence is given; “C. An opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state, except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting such presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination; “D. An independent decisionmaker; “E. A written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for transferring the inmate; “F. Availability of legal counsel, furnished by the state, if the inmate is financially unable to furnish his own; and “G. Effective and timely notice of all the foregoing rights.” 437 F. Supp., at 575. A We think the District Court properly identified and weighed the relevant factors in arriving at its judgment. Concededly the interest of the State in segregating and treating mentally ill patients is strong. The interest of the prisoner in not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to unwelcome treatment is also powerful, however; and as the District Court found, the risk of error in making the determinations required by § 83-180 is substantial enough to warrant appropriate procedural safeguards against error. We recognize that the inquiry involved in determining whether or not to transfer an inmate to a mental hospital for treatment involves a question that is essentially medical. The question whether an individual is mentally ill and cannot be treated in prison “turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 429. The medical nature of the inquiry, however, does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is precisely “[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses” that justify the requirement of adversary hearings. Id., at 430. Because prisoners facing involuntary transfer to a mental hospital are threatened with immediate deprivation of liberty interests they are currently enjoying and because of the inherent risk of a mistaken transfer, the District Court properly determined that procedures similar to those required by the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), were appropriate in the circumstances present here. The notice requirement imposed by the District Court no more than recognizes that notice is essential to afford the prisoner an opportunity to challenge the contemplated action and to understand the nature of what is happening to him. Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 564. Furthermore, in view of the nature of the determinations that must accompany the transfer to a mental hospital, we think each of the elements of the hearing specified by the District Court was appropriate. The interests of the State in avoiding disruption was recognized by limiting in appropriate circumstances the prisoner’s right to call witnesses, to confront and cross examine. The District Court also avoided unnecessary intrusion into either medical or correctional judgments by providing that the independent decisionmaker conducting the transfer hearing need not come from outside the prison or hospital administration. 437 F. Supp., at 574. B The District Court did go beyond the requirements imposed by prior cases by holding that counsel must be made available to inmates facing transfer hearings if they are financially unable to furnish their own. We have not required the automatic appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners facing other deprivations of liberty, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S., at 790; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 569-570; but we have recognized that prisoners who are illiterate and uneducated have a greater need for assistance in exercising their rights. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 786-787; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at 570. A prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental disease or defect requiring involuntary treatment probably has an even greater need for legal assistance, for such a prisoner is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his rights. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State seeks to treat as mentally ill. V Because Mr. Justice Powell, while believing that Jones was entitled to competent help at the hearing, would not require the State to furnish a licensed attorney to aid him, the judgment below is affirmed as modified to conform with the separate opinion filed by Mr. Justice Powell. So ordered. Section 83-180 (1) provides: “When a physician designated by the Director of Correctional Services finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a physical disease or defect, or when a physician or psychologist designated by the director finds that a person committed to the department suffers from a mental disease or defect, the chief executive officer may order such person to be segregated from other persons in the facility. If the physician or psychologist is of the opinion that the person cannot be given proper treatment in that facility, the director may arrange for his transfer for examination, study, and treatment to any medical-correctional facility, or to another institution in the Department of Public Institutions where proper treatment is available. A person who is so transferred shall remain subject to the jurisdiction and custody of the Department of Correctional Services and shall be returned to the department when, prior to the expiration of his sentence, treatment in such facility is no longer necessary.” Section 83-180 (3) provides: “When two psychiatrists designated by the Director of Correctional Services find that a person about to be released or discharged from any facility suffers from a mental disease or defect of such a nature that his release or discharge will endanger the public safety or the safety of the offender, the director shall transfer him to, or if he has already been transferred, permit him to remain in, a psychiatric facility in the Department of Public Institutions and shall promptly commence proceedings applicable to the civil commitment and detention of persons suffering from such disease or defect.” After initially certifying this case as a class action, the District Court decertified the class, but permitted intervention by three individual plaintiffs, including Jones. The District Court subsequently dismissed the claims of all plaintiffs except Jones, who is the sole appellee in this Court. The statute authorizing the convening of a three-judge court, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), was repealed by Pub. L. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119, effective for actions commenced after August 12, 1976. Because the instant action was filed on November 12, 1975, the three-judge court was properly convened. Because Jones has not completed serving his sentence, he remains subject to the transfer procedures he challenges, unlike the plaintiff in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975), where a challenge to parole procedures was held to be moot because plaintiff had completed his sentence and there was no longer any likelihood whatsoever that he would again be subjected to the parole procedures he challenged. A majority of the Justices rejected an identical position in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 166-167 (1974) (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J.), 177-178 (opinion of White, J.), 210-211 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and BrennaN, JJ.). As Mr. Justice Powell’s opinion observed: This part is joined only by Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Me. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. TRAVELERS HEALTH ASSOCIATION. No. 51. Argued December 10, 1959. Decided March 28, 1960. Charles H. Weston argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bicks, Daniel J. McCauley, Jr. and Alan B. Hobbes. C. C. Fraizer argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General of Nebraska, filed a brief, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. The following States joined in this brief: Alabama, by MacDonald Gallion, Attorney General; Arkansas, by Bruce Bennett, Attorney General; California, by Stanley Mosk, Attorney General; Colorado, by Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General; Florida, by Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General; Indiana, by Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General; Iowa, by Norman A. Erbe, Attorney General; Kansas, by John Anderson, Jr., Attorney General; Kentucky, by Jo M. Ferguson, Attorney General; Louisiana, by Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General; Maine, by Frank A. Hancock, Attorney General; Maryland, by C. Ferdinand Sybert, Attorney General; Massachusetts, by Edward J. McCormack, Jr., Attorney General; Michigan, by Paul L. Adams, Attorney General; Nevada, by Roger D. Foley, Attorney General; New Hampshire, by Louis C. Wyman, Attorney General; New York, by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General; North Carolina, by Malcolm B. Sea-well, Attorney General; North Dakota, by Leslie Bur-gum, Attorney General; Ohio, by Mark McElroy, Attorney General; South Carolina, by Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General; South Dakota, by Parnell J. Donohue, Attorney General; Tennessee, by George F. McCanless, Attorney General; Texas, by Will’ Wilson, Attorney General; Utah, by Walter L. Budge, Attorney General; Vermont, by Frederick M. Reed, Attorney General; and Virginia, by A. S. Harrison, Jr., Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were also filed by Grenville Beardsley, Attorney General of Illinois; and by Whitney North Seymour for the Health Insurance Association of America et al. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 2 (b) of the MeCarran-Ferguson Act provides that “[T]he Federal Trade Commission Act, . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.” The State in which the respondent is incorporated prohibits unfair or decéptive practices in the insurance business there or “in any other state.” The question presented is whether the respondent’s interstate mail order insurance business is thereby “regulated by State law” so as to insulate its practices in commerce from the regulative authority of the Federal Trade Commission. The respondent, a Nebraska corporation, is engaged in the business of selling health insurance. Licensed only in the States of Nebraska and Virginia, the respondent sells no policies through agents, but from its office in Omaha transacts business by mail with residents of every State. It solicits business by mailing circular letters to prospective buyers recommended by existing policyholders. All business is carried on by direct mail from the Omaha office; it is from there that policies are issued, and there that premiums are paid and claims filed. A Nebraska statute provides: “No person shall engage in this state in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance. No person domiciled in or resident of this state shall engage in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance in any other state, territory, possession, province, country, or district.” The Court of Appeals set aside a cease-and-desist order of the Federal Trade Commission prohibiting the respondent from making certain statements and representations in its circular letters found by the Commission to be misleading and deceptive in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U. S. C. § 45. The court concluded that “[w]ith every activity of the [respondent], in the conduct of its business, subject to the supervision and control of the Director of Insurance of Nebraska, we think that the [respondent’s] practices in the solicitation of insurance by mail in Nebraska or elsewhere reasonably and realistically cannot be held to be unregulated by State law.” The court accordingly decided that the Commission was “without authority to regulate the practices of the [respondent] in soliciting insurance.” 262 F. 2d 241, 244. Judge Yogel dissented, stating his belief that it was “impractical and ineffective” to “force the citizens of other states to rely upon Nebraska’s regulation of the long distance advertising practices of the [respondent] in the promotion and sale by mail or otherwise of insurance outside the State of Nebraska.” It was his view that Nebraska’s regulation of deceptive practices “in any other state” is not “the kind of regulation by state law Congress had in mind” in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 262 F. 2d 241, 245. Certiorari was granted, 359 U. S. 988, to resolve an important question left undecided in Federal Trade Comm’n v. National Casualty Co., 357 U. S. 560. In that case the issue involved the effect of state laws regulating the advertising practices of insurance companies which were licensed to do business within the States and which were engaged in advertising programs requiring distribution of material by local agents. In those circumstances the Court found there was “no question but that the States possess ample means to regulate this advertising within their respective boundaries.” 357 U. S., at 564. It was held that § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act “withdrew from the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate respondents’ advertising practices in those States which are regulating those practices under their own laws.” 357 U. S., at 563. The Court expressed no view as to “the intent of Congress with regard to interstate insurance practices which the States cannot for constitutional reasons regulate effectively . . . .” 357 U. S., at 564. The question here is thus quite different from that presented in National Casualty. In this case the state regulation relied on to displace the federal law is not the protective legislation of the States whose citizens are the targets of the advertising practices in question. Rather, we are asked to hold that the McCarran-Ferguson Act operates to oust the Commission of jurisdiction by reason of a single State’s attempted regulation of its domiciliary’s extraterritorial activities. But we cannot believe that this kind of law of a single State takes from the residents of every other State the protection of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In our opinion the state regulation which Congress provided should operate to displace this federal law means regulation by the State in which the deception is practiced and has its impact. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in 1945. Its basic purpose was to allay doubts, thought to have been raised by this Court’s decision of the previous year in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, as to the continuing power of the States to tax and regulate the business of insurance. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 429-433; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U. S. 409, 413; Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Variable Annuity Co., 359 U. S. 65, 99 (dissenting opinion). The original bills as passed by both the Senate and the House would have made the Federal Trade Commission Act completely inapplicable to the insurance business. S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 Cong. Rec. 478-488, 1085, 1093-1094. During the debate in the House, however, several members objected to the provision exempting the business of insurance from this federal statute (91 Cong. Rec. 1027-1028, 1086, 1089, 1092-1093), and Representative Sum-ners, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, stated that in conference he would support an amendment which would make the Federal Trade Commission Act applicable to the same extent as the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 91 Cong. Rec. 1093. Thus it was that § 2 (b) in the form finally enacted first appeared as a recommendation of the Conference Committee of the two Houses. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. Since the House accepted the Conference Report without debate, 91 Cong. Rec. 1396, the only discussion of § 2 (b) in its present form occurred in the Senate. Yet, from that somewhat limited debate, as well as the earlier debate in both Houses as to the effect of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it is clear that Congress viewed state regulation of insurance solely in terms of regulation by the law of the State where occurred the activity sought to be regulated. There was no indication of any thought that a State could regulate activities carried on beyond its own borders. Thus the report on the original House bill stated: “It is not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the business of insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Southeastern Underwriters Association case. Briefly, your committee is of the opinion that we should provide for the continued regulation and taxation of insurance by the States, subject always, however, to the limitations set out in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, as, for instance, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (165 U. S. 578), St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas (260 U. S. 346), and Connecticut General Insurance Co. v. Johnson (303 U. S. 77), which hold, inter alia, that a State does not have power to tax contracts of insurance or reinsurance entered into outside its jurisdiction by individuals or corporations resident or domiciled therein covering risks within the State or to regulate such transactions in any way.” (H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3.) Significantly, when Senator McCarran presented to the Senate the bill agreed to in conference, he began by reading most of the foregoing quotation from the original House Report as part of his explanation of the bill. 91 Cong. Rec. 1442. The ensuing Senate debate centered around §2(b). The three Senate conferees, Senators McCarran, O’Mahoney, and Ferguson, repeatedly emphasized that the provision did not authorize state regulation of extraterritorial activities. See, e. g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1481, 1483, 1484. Typical is the following statement by Senator O’Mahoney: “When the moratorium period passes, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act come to life again in the field of interstate commerce, and in the field of interstate regulation. Nothing in the proposed law' would authorize a State to try to regulate for other States, or authorize any private group or association to regulate in the field of interstate commerce.” 91 Cong. Rec. 1483. Not only this specific legislative history, but also a basic motivating policy behind the legislative movement that culminated in the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act serve to confirm the conclusion that when Congress provided that the Federal Trade Commission Act would be displaced to the extent that the insurance business was “regulated” by state law, it referred only to regulation by the State where the business activities have their operative force. One of the major arguments advanced by proponents of leaving regulation to the States was that the States were in close proximity to the people affected by the insurance business and, therefore, were in a better position to regulate that business than the Federal Government. See, e. g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1087; 90 Cong. Rec. 6532. Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H. R. 3269, H. R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 37, 117, 238-239, 242-243, 244, 252. Such a purpose would hardly be served by delegating to any one State sole legislative and administrative control of the practices of an insurance business affecting the residents of every other State in the Union. This Court has referred before to the “unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting policyholders to seek redress only in some distant state where the insurer is incorporated.” Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643, 649. Because of our view as to the meaning of § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, we do not need to consider the constitutional questions that might arise as to the applicability of the Nebraska statute to misrepresentations made to residents of other States. Compare Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542; Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. Suffice it to note that the impediments, contingencies, and doubts which constitutional limitations might create as to Nebraska’s power to regulate any given aspect of extraterritorial activity serve only to confirm the reading we have given to § 2 (b) of the Act. It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be vacated, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Vacated and remanded. The here pertinent portions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are as follows: “That the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. “Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. “(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose, of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act, . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law. . . 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 61 Stat. 448. Section 44-1503 of Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, as amended by the Emergency Act of May 14, 1957, Laws of Nebraska, 1957, c. 191, § 2. This provision is part of the Nebraska “Unfair Competition and Trade Practices” Act of 1947, as amended. (§§ 44-1501 to 44-1521, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943, 1957 Cumulative Supplement, Laws of Nebraska, 1957, c. 191.) Other provisions of the Act empower the Director of Insurance (1) to prefer charges against any such insurer if he has reason to believe that it has, in Nebraska or elsewhere, engaged “in any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of such business,” and to give the insurer notice of a hearing on the charges (§44-1506); (2) to take evidence at the hearing (§ 44-1507); and (3) to issue a cease-and-desist order if he determines that the insurer has engaged in the wrongful acts and practices with which it is charged (§44-1509). This basic difference was effectively emphasized in Commissioner Gwynne’s separate opinion concurring in the Commission’s action in the present proceeding. He pointed out that he had dissented from the Commission’s assumption of jurisdiction in the American Hospital proceeding, where the “insurance company operated exclusively through agents in various states, in which it was duly licensed under the respective state laws,” where “every such state had adopted the Model Code, or equivalent legislation,” and where the “advertising practice complained of involved bundles of advertising matter mailed from the home office to the company’s agents in the several states and disseminated there by such agents.” 53 F. T. C. 548, 558-559. (Commissioner Gwynne’s view as to the Commission’s lack of jurisdiction in the American Hospital proceeding was ultimately upheld here in Federal Trade Comm’n v. National Casualty Co., 357 U. S. 560, which disposed of both the order against National Casualty Company and the order against American Hospital & Life Insurance Company.) In the present case, by contrast, Commissioner Gwynne pointed out that the respondent was making representations to induce sales of insurance in States where it was not licensed and had no agents. He concluded that “this type of law (that is, a law purporting to protect the people of another state from deceptive advertising) can hardly be said to be the type of law referred to in Section 2 (b) of the McCarran Act. Section 2 (b) makes the Federal Trade Commission Act applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law. I think this refers to the laws of the state whose citizens are being affected by the advertising and not to laws of some other state operating extra-territorially.” 53 F. T. C. 548, 563. Commissioner Gwynne, as a member of Congress, participated in the debates leading to the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 91 Cong. Rec. 1089, 1090. See also 90 Cong. Rec. 6534-6536. The respondent has argued in this Court that the Federal Trade Commission lacked jurisdiction because the respondent’s advertising practices are regulated not only by Nebraska, but also by “all other states” in which the respondent conducts its mail order business. To this the petitioner replies that (1) the respondent did not raise this argument before the Commission and, therefore, has waived it; (2) the statutes of the “other” States do not purport to apply to misrepresentations mailed to their residents by unlicensed, nonresident insurance companies having no local agents; and (3) even if these state statutes purported to be applicable to misrepresentations by such insurers, there still would not be regulation by state law within the meaning of the § 2 (b) proviso because the statutes could not be effectively enforced against the respondent. The Court of Appeals gave no consideration to the effect of “regulation” by any State other than Nebraska. In accord with accepted principles, we decline to consider these issues on the present record, leaving them “to be considered for what they are worth by the court below, if duly presented and relied upon Marconi Wireless Co. v. Simon, 246 U. S. 46, 57. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S. 210, 214; United States v. Beach, 324 U. S. 193, 196; Federal Communications Comm’n v. WJR, 337 U. S. 265, 285. While the appeal in South-Eastern Underwriters was pending here, there had been abortive attempts in the Seventy-eighth Congress to immunize the business of insurance from the federal antitrust laws. See H. R. 3270, S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.; 89 Cong. Rec. 7686, 10532, 10659-10664.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET, ELECTRIC RAILWAY & MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, DIVISION 998, et al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD. NO. 329. Argued January 9-10, 1951. Decided February 26, 1951. David Previant argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 329. Arthur J. Goldberg argued the cause for petitioners in No. 438. With him on the brief were Thomas E. Harris and Max Raskin. Malcolm L. Riley and Beatrice Lampert, Assistant Attorneys General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent. With Mr. Riley on the brief were Vernon W. Thomson, Attorney General, Thomas E. Fairchild, then Attorney General, and Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Perlman, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner for the National Labor Relations Board; and J. Albert Woll, James A. Glenn and Herbert S. Thatcher for the American Federation of Labor. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General, for the State of Kansas; Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, and Bert L. Overcash, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Nebraska; Theodore D. Parsons, Attorney General, and Benjamin C. Van Tine for the State of New Jersey; and Charles J. Margiotti, then Attorney General, and M. Louise Rutherford, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. In these cases, the constitutionality of labor legislation of the State of Wisconsin known as the Public Utility Anti-Strike Law, has been drawn in question. Petitioners in No. 329 are the union and its officers who represent the employees of the Milwaukee Electric Railway and Transport Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for collective-bargaining purposes. For many years, the transit workers entered into collective-bargaining agreements with the transit company without resorting to strike. In 1948, however, the collective agreement was terminated when the parties were unable to agree on wages, hours and working conditions and the transit workers’ union called a strike to enforce union demands. The respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board secured immediately an ex parte order from a State Circuit Court restraining the strike and, in compliance with that order, the union postponed its strike. Thereafter, the same Circuit Court entered a judgment under which petitioners are “perpetually restrained and enjoined from calling a strike . . . which would cause an interruption of the passenger service of the [transit company].” The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, 257 Wis. 43, 42 N. W. 2d 471 (1950), and we granted certiorari, 340 U. S. 874 (1950), to review the important questions decided below. Petitioners in No. 438 are the union and its officers who represent employees of the Milwaukee Gas Light Company and its subsidiary, the Milwaukee Solvay Coke Company, both of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pursuant to a certification of the National Labor Relations Board. In 1949, the collective agreement between petitioners and the gas company was terminated and, upon failure of further bargaining and conciliation to resolve the dispute, a strike was called and the gas workers left their jobs. Respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board obtained forthwith an ex parte restraining order from a State Circuit Court requiring that petitioners “absolutely desist and refrain from calling a strike [or] going out on strike . . . which would cause an interruption of the service of the [gas company]” and ordering petitioners to “take immediate steps to notify all employes called out on strike to resume service forthwith.” Although the strike was settled soon thereafter, the Circuit Court found that petitioners had not obeyed the restraining order and entered a judgment of contempt, imposing fines of $250 upon each petitioner. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, 258 Wis. 1, 44 N. W. 2d 547 (1950), and we granted certiorari, 340 U. S. 903 (1950), since this case raises the same substantial questions as those before the Court in No. 329. The injunctions were issued in each case upon the complaint of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, charged by statute with the enforcement of the Public Utility Anti-Strike Law. That act vests in the state circuit courts jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the act, Wis. Stat., 1949, § 111.63, the substantive provision involved in these cases providing as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any group of employes of a public utility employer acting in concert to call a strike or to go out on strike, or to cause any work stoppage or slowdown which would cause an interruption of an essential service; it also shall be unlawful for any public utility employer to lock out his employes when such action would cause an interruption of essential service; and it shall be unlawful for any person or persons to instigate, to induce, to conspire with, or to encourage any other person or persons to engage in any strike or lockout or slowdown or work stoppage which would cause an interruption of an essential service. Any violation of this section by any member of a group of employes acting in concert or by any employer or by any officer of an employer acting for such employer, or by any other individual, shall constitute a misdemeanor.” Wis. Stat., 1949, § 111.62. This provision is part of a statutory pattern designed to become effective whenever collective bargaining results in an “impasse and stalemate” likely to cause interruption of the supply of an “essential public utility service,” Wis. Stat., 1949, § 111.50, that service including water, heat, gas, electric power, public passenger transportation and communications. Id., § 111.51. Whenever such an “impasse” occurs, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board is empowered to appoint a conciliator to meet with the parties in an effort to settle the dispute. Id., § 111.54. In the event of a failure of conciliation, the Board is directed to select arbitrators who shall “hear and determine” the dispute. Id., § 111.55. The act establishes standards to govern the decision of the arbitrators, id., §§ 111.57-111.58, and provides that the order of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the parties, id., § 111.59, subject to judicial review, id., § 111.60. In summary, the act substitutes arbitration upon order of the Board for collective bargaining whenever an impasse is reached in the bargaining process. And, to insure conformity with the statutory scheme, Wisconsin denies to utility employees the right to strike. In upholding the constitutionality of the Public Utility Anti-Strike Act, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stressed the importance of utility service to the public welfare and the plenary power which a state is accustomed to exercise over such enterprises. Petitioners’ claim that the Wisconsin law conflicts with federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8) was overruled, as were petitioners’ contentions that the Wisconsin Act violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Thirteenth Amendment. Respondents controvert each of these contentions and, apart from the questions of res judicata discussed in No. 302, decided this day, post, p. 411, raise no other grounds in support of the judgments below. We deal only with the question of conflicting federal legislation as we have found that issue dispositive of both cases. First. We have recently examined the extent to which Congress has regulated peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries affecting commerce. Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1950). We noted that Congress, in § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, expressly safeguarded for employees in such industries the “right ... to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” “e. g., to strike.” We also listed the qualifications and regulations which Congress .itself has imposed upon its guarantee of the right to strike, including requirements that notice be given prior to any strike upon termination of a contract, prohibitions on strikes for certain objectives declared unlawful by Congress, and special procedures for certain strikes which might create national emergencies. Upon review of these federal legislative provisions, we held, 339 U. S. at 457: “None of these sections can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation. Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 338 U. S. 953 (1950); La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 18 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947); Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945).” Second. The Wisconsin court sought to distinguish Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, supra, on the ground that the industry to which Michigan applied its notice and strike-vote provisions was a national manufacturing organization rather than a local public utility. Congress drew no such distinction but, instead, saw fit to regulate labor relations to the full extent of its constitutional power under the Commerce Clause, Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 607 (1939). Ever since the question was fully argued and decided in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938), it has been clear that federal labor legislation, encompassing as it does all industries “affecting commerce,” applies to a privately owned public utility whose business and activities are carried on wholly within a single state. The courts of appeal have uniformly held enterprises similar to and no more important to interstate commerce than the Milwaukee gas and transit companies before us in these cases subject to the provisions of the federal labor law. No distinction between public utilities and national manufacturing organizations has been drawn in the administration of the Federal Act and, when separate treatment for public utilities was urged upon Congress in 1947, the suggested differentiation was expressly rejected. Creation of a special classification for public utilities is for Congress, not for this Court. Third. As we have noted, in 1947 Congress enacted special procedures to deal with strikes which might create national emergencies. Respondents rely upon that action as showing a congressional intent to carve out a separate field of “emergency” labor disputes and, pointing to the fact that Congress acted only in respect to “national emergencies,” respondents ask us to hold that Congress intended, by silence, to leave the states free to regulate “local emergency” disputes. However, the Wisconsin Act before us is not “emergency” legislation but a comprehensive code for the settlement of labor disputes between public-utility employers and employees. Far from being limited to “local emergencies,” the act has been applied to disputes national in scope, and application of the act does not require the existence of an “emergency.” In any event, congressional imposition of certain restrictions on petitioners’ right to strike, far from supporting the Wisconsin Act, shows that Congress has closed to state regulation the field of peaceful strikes in industries affecting commerce. Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, supra, at 457. And where, as here, the state seeks to deny entirely a federally guaranteed right which Congress itself restricted only to a limited extent in case of national emergencies, however serious, it is manifest that the state legislation is in conflict with federal law. Like the majority strike-vote provision considered in O’Brien, a proposal that the right to strike be denied, together with the substitution of compulsory arbitration in cases of “public emergencies,” local or national, was before Congress in 1947. This proposal, closely resembling the pattern of the Wisconsin Act, was rejected by Congress as being inconsistent with its policy in respect to enterprises covered by the Federal Act, and not because of any desire to leave the states free to adopt it. Michigan, in O’Brien, sought to impose conditions on the right to strike and now Wisconsin seeks to abrogate that right altogether insofar as petitioners are concerned. Such state legislation must yield as conflicting with the exercise of federally protected labor rights. Fourth. Much of the argument generated by these cases has been considerably broader than the legal questions presented. The utility companies, the State of Wisconsin and other states as amici stress the importance of gas and transit service to the local community and urge that predominantly local problems are best left to local governmental authority for solution. On the other hand, petitioners and the National Labor Relations Board, as amicus, argue that prohibition of strikes with reliance upon compulsory arbitration for ultimate solution of labor disputes destroys the free collective bargaining declared by Congress to be the bulwark of the national labor policy. This, it is said, leads to more labor unrest and disruption of service than is now experienced under a system of free collective bargaining accompanied by the right to strike. The very nature of the debatable policy questions raised by these contentions convinces us that they cannot properly be resolved by the Court. In our view, these questions are for legislative determination and have been resolved by Congress adversely to respondents. When it amended the Federal Act in 1947, Congress was not only cognizant of the policy questions that have been argued before us in these cases, but it was also well aware of the problems in balancing state-federal relationships which its 1935 legislation had raised. The legislative history of the 1947 Act refers to the decision of this Court in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947), and, in its handling of the problems presented by that case, Congress demonstrated that it knew how to cede jurisdiction to the states. Congress knew full well that its labor legislation “preempts the field that the act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the act is concerned” and demonstrated its ability to spéll out with particularity those areas in which it desired state regulation to be operative. This Court, in the exercise of its judicial function, must take the comprehensive and valid federal legislation as enacted and declare invalid state regulation which impinges on that legislation. Fifth. It would be sufficient to state that the Wisconsin Act, in forbidding peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries covered by the Federal Act, has forbidden the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the Federal Act. In addition, it is not difficult to visualize situations in which application of the Wisconsin Act would work at cross-purposes with other policies of the National Act. But we content ourselves with citation of examples of direct conflict found in the records before us. In the case of the transit workers, the union agreed to continue collective bargaining after the strike became imminent, whereas the company insisted upon invocation of the compulsory arbitration features of the Wisconsin Act. That act requires that collective bargaining continue until an “impasse” is reached, Wis. Stat., 1949; § 111.52, whereas the Federal Act requires that both employer and employees continue •to bargain collectively, even though a strike may actually be in progress. Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 345 (1938). Further, the transit company was able to avoid entirely any determination of certain union demands when the arbitrators, in accordance with Wis. Stat., 1949, § 111.58, ruled that the matter of assigning of workers to certain shifts “infringe [s] upon the right of the employer to manage his business.” Yet similar problems of work scheduling and shift assignment have been held to be appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under the Federal Act as administered by the National Labor Relations Board. See Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 42, 54-55 (1940); American National Ins. Co., 89 N. L. R. B. 185 (1950), and eases cited therein. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, passed by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause, are the supreme law of the land under Art. VI of the Constitution. Having found that the Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law conflicts with that federal legislation, the judgments enforcing the Wisconsin Act cannot stand. Reversed. Wis. .Stat., 1949, §§ 111.50 et seq. The National Labor Relations Board has exercised jurisdiction' over the transit company and its employees in conducting a so-called union shop election pursuant to § 9 (e) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 159 (e) (1). The National Labor Relations Board is presently investigating a charge filed by the transit workers’ union in respect to an alleged unfair labor practice said to have been committed in respect to the controversy out of which this case arose. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 50 N. L. R. B. 809, as amended, 52 N. L. R. B. 1213 (1943). The N. L. R. B. has also conducted a union shop election under § 9 (e) (1) of the Federal Act, supra, note 2, in respect to the supervisory employees of the gas company. And a union complaint that the gas company, committed an unfair labor practice in respect to the dispute out of which this proceeding arose has been filed with the N. L. R. B. Under Wis. Stat., 1949, §111.64, the following is applicable to the above provision: “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to require any individual employe to render labor or service without his consent, or to make illegal the quitting of his labor or service or the withdrawal from his place of employment unless done in concert or agreement with others. No court shall have power to issue any process to compel an individual employe to render labor or service or to remain at his place of employment without his consent. It is the intent of this subchapter only to forbid employes of a public utility employer to engage in a strike or to engage in a work slowdown or stoppage in concert, and to forbid a public utility employer to lock out his employes, where such acts would cause an interruption of essential service.” We have before us, then, a statute aimed only at “concerted” activities of public utility employees. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 141 et seq. Section 7 of both acts, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 157. See also §§ 2 (3) and 13, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) §§ 15.2 (3), 163; S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1935); House Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1947). In the “Declaration of Policy” of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress stated: “It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce ...” 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 141 (b). The “Findings and Policies” of the National Labor Relations Act provides, inter alia: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice arid procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 151. H. R. Rep. No. 245,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947). Section 8 (d) of the 1947 Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158 (d). Petitioners in both cases had complied with all notice requirements before strike action was taken. Section 8 (b) (4) of the 1947 Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158 (b) (4). See also §§ 10 (j) and 10 (1), 29 U. S. C. (Supp: III) §§ 160 (j), 160 (1), empowering and directing the N. L. R. B. to obtain injunctive relief against such unlawful strikes. Sections 206-210 of the 1947 Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 176-180. Our decision in O’Brien, supra, followed shortly after our reversal, per curiam, in Plankinton Packing Co., supra, where the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board had, with the approval of the State Supreme Court, ordered reinstatement of an employee discharged because of his failure to join a union, even though his employment was not covered by a union shop or similar contract. Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only guarantees the right of self-organization and the right to strike, but also guarantees to individual employees the “right to refrain from any or all of such activities,” at least in the absence of a union shop or similar contractual arrangement applicable to the individual. Since the N. L. R. B. was given jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the employees, it was clear that the Federal Act had occupied this field to the exclusion of state regulation. Plankinton and O’Brien both show that states may not regulate in respect to rights guaranteed by Congress in § 7. E. g., Labor Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F. 2d 51, 53-54 (C. A. 4th Cir., 1944) (local transit company); Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co. v. Labor Board, 118 F. 2d 304, 305-306 (C. A. 10th Cir., 1941) (local gas company); Labor Board v. Western Massachusetts Electric Co., 120 F. 2d 455, 456-457 (C. A. 1st Cir., 1941); Labor Board v. Gulf Public Service Co., 116 F. 2d 852, 854 (C. A. 5th Cir., 1941); Consumers Power Co. v. Labor Board, 113 F. 2d 38, 39-41 (C. A. 6th Cir., 1940); Southern Colorado Power Co. v. Labor Board, 111 F. 2d 539, 541-543 (C. A. 10th Cir., 1940) (local power companies). See also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Labor Board, 115 F. 2d 414, 415-416 (C. A. 4th Cir., 1940), upheld on the question of jurisdiction in Labor Board v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 476 (1941). The question of the applicability of the federal labor laws to local utilities is rarely litigated today. The Milwaukee Gas Light Company, employer in No. 438, conceded before the N. L. R. B. that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Federal Act. 50 N. L.R.B.809, 810 (1943). In 1947, it was proposed that the coverage of the Federal Act be limited so as to exclude utilities and other enterprises whose productive effort did not extend across state lines. H. R. 1095, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (b). Congress did not adopt any such limitation on the application of the National Labor Relations Act, but, instead, amended that Act with full appreciation of the extent of its coverage. See H. R. Rep. No. 245,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40,44 (1947); S. Rep. No. 105,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947). The N. L. R. B. has specifically rejected the suggestion that in granting the right to strike or in the other provisions of the Federal Act Congress intended that there be any distinction between public utility employees and those otherwise employed. El Paso Electric Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 213, 240 (1939), enforced in El Paso Electric Co. v. Labor Board, 119 F. 2d 581 (C. A. 5th Cir., 1941). In a recent statement of policy, the N. L. R. B. declared that, in view of the “important impact on commerce,” jurisdiction will be exercised in “all cases” involving the type of public utilities before us in these cases. Local Transit Lines, 91 N. L. R. B. 623, 26 LRR Man. 1547 (1950). 93 Cong. Rec. 3835 (1947), statement of Senator Taft, quoted in note 21, infra. The Case Bill, H. R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), passed by both Houses of Congress during the session immediately preceding the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, proposed special techniques, including a temporary denial of the right to strike, in connection with “labor dispute [s] affecting commerce, involving a public utility whose rates are fixed by some governmental agency.” § 6 (a). In his veto message, the President criticized the special treatment accorded to public utilities, 92 Cong. Rec. 6674, 6676, (1946). Congress did not override the veto and, while such special treatment for public utilities was again proposed in 1947, note 16, infra, no such distinction is found in the 1947 legislation as finally enacted by Congress. Sections 206-210 of the 1947 Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 176-180. These so-called national emergency provisions call for the appointment of a board of inquiry to report the facts of the dispute, followed by a vote of the employees on whether to strike. An injunction to maintain the status quo for a limited period pending the exhaustion of these remedies is authorized by the Act. The House version of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., contained a broader provision calling for a temporary prohibition on strikes whenever interstate commerce in an essential public service was threatened, during which time an advisory settlement board would recommend specific terms for settlement. A similar plan was proposed on a temporary basis in H. R. 2861, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., and approved by H. R. Rep. No. 235, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). This plan was rejected in favor of the Senate version which permitted a temporary injunction against strikes only when the “national health or safety” was imperiled and then only while a board of inquiry sifted the facts without making recommendations. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64 (1947). The Wisconsin Act applies generally to “labor disputes between public utility employers and their employes which cause or threaten to cause an interruption in the supply of an essential public utility service.” Wis. Stat., 1949, § 111.50. Communications Workers of America, C. I. O., Div. 23, and Wisconsin Telephone Co., Wis. E. R. B. Decision No. 2358-C (1950), (arbitrators appointed to determine the Wisconsin phase of the national telephone strike threatened in the spring of 1950). Far from being legislation aimed at “emergencies,” the Wisconsin Act has been invoked to avert a threatened strike of clerical workers of a utility. Wisconsin Telephone Clerical Union and Wisconsin Telephone Co., Wis. E. R. B. Case No. 2273 PU-9 (1949). See Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Wisconsin E. R. B., 253 Wis. 584, 34 N. W. 2d 844 (1948), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to set aside the Board order appointing a conciliator in the same proceeding on the ground that the order was not appealable. H. R. 17; H. R. 34; H. R. 68; H. R. 75; H. R. 76, all of the 80th Cong., 1st Sess. In addition to granting federal authority to ban strikes under certain circumstances, § 6 (a) of each act would have permitted the operation of state anti-strike legislation. This legislative proposal is discussed by Representative Case in 93 Cong. Rec. A1007-A1009 (1947). See also the other proposals before the same Session of Congress to deny the right to strike in specified instances. H. R. 90 and H. R. 1095, both of the 80th Cong., 1st Sess. The reasoning behind the congressional rejection of any proposals similar to the Wisconsin Act was stated by Senator Taft as follows, 93 Cong. Rec. 3835-3836 (1947): “Basically, I believe that the committee feels, almost unanimously, that the solution of our labor problems must rest on a free economy and on free collective bargaining. The bill is certainly based upon that proposition. That means that we recognize freedom to strike when the question involved is the improvement of wages, hours, and working conditions, when a contract has expired and neither side is bound by a contract. We recognize that right in spite of the inconvenience, and in some cases perhaps danger, to the people of the United States which may result from the exercise of such right. In the long run, I do not believe that that right will be abused. In the past few disputes finally reached the point where there was a direct threat to and defiance of the rights of the people of the United States. “We have considered the question whether the right to strike can be modified. I think it can be modified in cases which do not involve the basic question of wages, prices, and working conditions. But if we impose compulsory arbitration, or if we give the Government power to fix wages at which men must work for another year or for two years to come, I do not see how in the end we can escape a collective economy. If we give the Government power to fix wages, I do not see how we can take from the Government the power to fix prices; and if the Government fixes wages and prices, we soon reach the point where all industry is under Government control, and finally there is a complete socialization of our economy. “I feel very strongly that so far as possible we should avoid any system which attempts to give to the Government this power finally to fix the wages of any man. Can we do so constitutionally? Can we say to all the people of the United States, ‘You must work at wages fixed by the Government’? I think it is a long step from free-dona and a long step from a free economy to give the Government such a right. “It is suggested that we might do so in the case of public utilities; and I suppose the argument is stronger there, because we fix the rates of public utilities, and we might, I suppose,, fix the wages of public-utility workers. Yet we have hesitated to embark even on that course, because if we once begin a process of the Government fixing wages, it must end in more and more wage fixing and finally Government price fixing. It may be a popular thing to do. Today people seem to think that all that it is necessary to do is to forbid strikes, fix wages, and compel men to continue working, without consideration of the human and constitutional problems involved in that process. “If we begin with public utilities, it will be said that coal and steel are just as important as public utilities. I do not know where we could draw the line. So far as the bill is concerned, we have proceeded on the theory that there is a right to strike and that labor peace must be based on free collective bargaining. We have done nothing to outlaw strikes for basic wages, hours, and working conditions after proper opportunity for mediation. “We did not feel that we should put into the law, as a part of the collective-bargaining machinery, an ultimate resort to compulsory arbitration, or to seizure, or to any other action. We feel that it would interfere with the whole process of collective bargaining. If such a remedy is available as a routine remedy, there will always be pressure to resort to it by whichever party thinks it will receive better treatment through such a process than it would receive in collective bargaining, and it will back out of collective bargaining. It will not make a bona-fide attempt to settle if it thinks it will receive a better deal under the final arbitration which may be provided.” See also S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, 28 (1947). Congress demonstrated its ability to deny in express terms the right to strike when it so desired. See § 305 of the 1947 Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 188, making it unlawful for employees of the United States or its agencies to participate in any strike. Section 10 (a) of the 1947 Act, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (a). A proviso of § 10 (a) authorizes cession of jurisdiction to the states only where the state law is consistent with the federal legislation. This insures that the national labor policy will not be thwarted even in the predominantly local enterprises to which the proviso applies. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947). See also minority views to same report, id., pt. 2, 38, agreeing as to this feature of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 245,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947). See §§ 8 (d), 14 (b), 202 (c) and 203 (b), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 158 (d), 164 (b), 172 (c), and 173 (b), in addition to § 10 (a) of the 1947 Act for examples of congressional direction as to the role that states were to play in the area of labor regulation covered by the Federal Act. And §§2 (2) and 2 (3) of the Federal Act,- 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 152 (2), 152 (3), specifically exclude from its operation the employees of “any State or political subdivision thereof.” §§ 8 (a) (5) and 8 (b) (3); 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 158 (a) (5), 158 (b) (3).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GREAT AMERICAN FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION et al. v. NOVOTNY No. 78-753. Argued April 18, 1979 — Decided June 11, 1979 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and BlacemuN, Powell, RehNQUist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. Powell, J., post, p. 378, and SteveNS, J., post, p. 381, filed concurring opinions. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 385. Eugene K. Connors argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Walter G. Bleil. Stanley M. Stein argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Louis F. Claiborne, Walter W. Barnett, Mildred M. Matesich, Lutz Alexander Prager, and Paul E. Mirengoff Avrum M. Goldberg, William R. Weissman, Robert E. Williams, and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Isabelle Katz Pinzler filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. More than a century after their passage, the Civil Rights Acts of the Reconstruction Era continue to present difficult problems of statutory construction. Cf. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600. In the case now before us, we consider the scope of 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), the surviving version of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The respondent, John R. Novotny, began his career with the Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter Association) in Allegheny County, Pa., in 1950. By 1975, he was secretary of the Association, a member of its board of directors, and a loan officer. According to the allegations of the complaint in this case the Association “intentionally and deliberately embarked upon and pursued a course of conduct the effect of which was to deny to female employees equal employment opportunity . . . When Novotny expressed support for the female employees at a meeting of the board of directors, his connection with the Association abruptly ended. He was not re-elected as secretary; he was not reelected to the board; and he was fired. His support for the Association’s female employees, he alleges, was the cause of the termination of his employment. Novotny filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Eights Act of 1964. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, he brought this lawsuit against the Association and its directors in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. He claimed damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), contending that he had been injured as the result of a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection of and equal privileges and immunities under the laws. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It held that § 1985 (3) could not be invoked because the directors of a single corporation could not, as a matter of law and fact, engage in a conspiracy. 430 F. Supp. 227, 230. Novotny appealed. After oral argument before a three-judge panel, the case was reargued before the en banc Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which unanimously reversed the District Court’s judgment. 584 F. 2d 1235. The Court of Appeals ruled that Novotny had stated a cause of action under § 1985 (3). It held that conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against women fall within § 1985 (3), and that Novotny, a male allegedly injured as a result of such a conspiracy, had standing to bring suit under that statutory provision. It ruled that Title VII could be the source of a right asserted in an action under § 1985 (3), and that intra-corporate conspiracies come within the intendment of the section. Finally, the court concluded that its construction of § 1985 (3) did not present any serious constitutional problem. We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1066, to consider the applicability of § 1985 (3) to the facts alleged in Novotny’s complaint. II The legislative history of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, of which § 1985 (3) was originally a part, has been reviewed many times in this Court. The section as first enacted authorized both criminal and civil actions against those who have conspired to deprive others of federally guaranteed rights. Before the 19th century ended, however, the Court found the criminal provisions of the statute unconstitutional because they exceeded the scope of congressional power, United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, and the provisions thus invalidated were later formally repealed by Congress. The civil action provided by the Act remained, but for many years was rarely, if ever, invoked. The provisions of what is now § 1985 (3) were not fully considered by this Court until 1951, in the case of Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651. There the Court concluded that the section protected citizens only from injuries caused by conspiracies “under color of state law.” Twenty years later, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, the Court unanimously concluded that the Collins Court had accorded to the provisions of § 1985 (3) too narrow a scope. The fears concerning congressional power that had motivated the Court in the Collins case had been dissolved by intervening cases. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, at 96-97, 104-106. Therefore, the Court found that § 1985 (3) did provide a cause of action for damages caused by purely private conspiracies. The Court’s opinion in Griffin discerned the following criteria for measuring whether a complaint states a cause of action under § 1985 (3): “To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) ‘conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another’ (2) ‘for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.’ It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, ‘any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,’ whereby another was (4a) ‘injured in his person or property’ or (4b) ‘deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.’ ” 403 U. S., at 102-103. Section 1985 (3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. The primary question in the present case, therefore, is whether a person injured by a conspiracy to violate § 704 (a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is deprived of “the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws” within the meaning of § 1985 (3). Under Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are subject to a detailed administrative and judicial process designed to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and nonadversary resolution of claims. As the Court explained in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44: “Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seg., to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and local employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.” As part of its comprehensive plan, Congress provided that a complainant in a State or locality with a fair employment commission must first go to that commission with his claim. Alternatively, an employee who believes himself aggrieved must first file a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The time limitations for administrative and judicial filing are controlled by express provisions of the statute. At several different points, the statutory plan prevents immediate filing of judicial proceedings in order to encourage voluntary conciliation. The EEOC has the power to investigate and to prosecute a civil action in a complainant's case. The Act provides for injunctive relief, specifically including backpay relief. The majority of the federal courts have held that the Act does not allow a court to award general or punitive damages. The Act expressly allows the prevailing party to recover his attorney’s fees, and, in some cases, provides that a district court may appoint counsel for a plaintiff. Because the Act expressly authorizes only equitable remedies, the courts have consistently held that neither party has a right to a jury trial. If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985 (3), a complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of the law. Section 1985 (3) éxpressly authorizes compensatory damages; punitive damages might well follow. The plaintiff or defendant might demand a jury trial. The short and precise time limitations of Title VII would be grossly altered. Perhaps most importantly, the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress in Title VII. The problem in this case is closely akin to that in Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820. There, we held that § 717 of Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims of those federal employees that it covers. Our conclusion was based on the proposition that “[t]he balance, completeness, and structural integrity of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner’s contention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717 (c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief.” 425 U. S., at 832. Here, the case is even more compelling. In Brown, the Court concluded that § 717 displaced other causes of action arguably available to .assert substantive rights similar to those granted by § 717. Section 1985 (3), by contrast, creates no rights. It is a purely remedial statute, providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right — to equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws — is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section. Thus, we are not faced in this case with a question of implied repeal. The right Novotny claims under § 704 (a) did not even arguably exist before the passage of Title VII. The only question here, therefore, is whether the rights created by Title VII may be asserted within the remedial framework of § 1985 (3). This case thus differs markedly from the cases recently decided by this Court that have related the substantive provisions of last century’s Civil Rights Acts to contemporary legislation conferring similar substantive rights. In those cases we have held that substantive rights conferred in the 19th century were not withdrawn, sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the modern statutes. Thus, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 413-417, we considered the effect of the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on the property rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1982. And in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 457-461, we held that the passage of Title VII did not work an implied repeal of the substantive rights to contract conferred by the same 19th-century statute and now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1981. See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229, 237-238; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 174-175. Somewhat similarly, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, the Court upheld an employee’s invocation of two alternative remedies for alleged employment discrimination: arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement, and litigation under Title VII. As the Court pointed out: “In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.” Id., at 49-50. This case, by contrast, does not involve two “independent” rights, and for the same basic reasons that underlay the Court’s decision in Brown v. GSA, supra, reinforced by the other considerations discussed in this opinion,.we conclude that § 1985 (3) may not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII. It is true that a § 1985 (3) remedy would not be coextensive with Title VII, since a plaintiff in an action under § 1985 (3) must prove both a conspiracy and a group animus that Title VII does not require. While this incomplete congruity would limit the damage that would be done to Title VII, it would not eliminate it. Unimpaired effectiveness can be given to the plan put together by Congress in Title VII only by holding that deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for a cause of action under § 1985 (3). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Title 42 U. S. C. §1985 (3) (1976 ed., Supp. II), Rev. Stat. § 1980, provides: “If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1). His complaint also alleged, as a second cause .of action, that his discharge was in retaliation for his efforts on behalf of equal employment opportunity, and thus violated § 704 (a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat. 109. Section 704 (a), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3 (a), reads in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees .. . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subehapter.” As to the Title VII claim, the District Court held that Novotny was not a proper plaintiff under § 704 (a). The Court of Appeals ruled that Novotny had also stated a valid cause of action under Title YII. It held that § 704 (a) applies to retaliation for both formal and informal actions taken to advance the purposes of the Act. That holding is not now before this Court. We note the relative narrowness of the specific issue before the Court. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether a plaintiff would have a cause of action under § 1985 (3) where the defendant was not subject to suit under Title VII or a comparable statute. Cf. United, States v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 563. Nor do we think it necessary to consider whether § 1985 (3) creates a remedy for statutory rights other than those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution. Cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88. A partial list of the opinions in this Court that have discussed the Act’s legislative history includes Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 608-612 (opinion of the Court); id., at 650-658 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 627-640 (Powell, J., concurring); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 665-689; District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 423, 425-429; Griffin v. Breckenridge, supra, at 99-101; Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U. S. 144, 162-166 (opinion of the Court); id., at 215-231 (BrenNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-185 (opinion of the Court); id., at 194-198 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 225-236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At least two earlier cases in this Court involved causes of action based upon what is now § 1985 (3). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, the plaintiff had stated claims based on the predecessors of both § 1985 (3) and 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The opinions of Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Stone both discussed the § 1983 cause of action, but neither discussed the conspiracy claim. In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, the plaintiff had also stated claims under the predecessors of both sections. The Court held that no constitutional violation had been shown, and did not consider whether the statutes could have been utilized if such a showing had been made. Mr. Justice Burton dissented, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas. 341 U. S., at 663. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, with one reservation. He found it unnecessary to rely, as the Court did in part, on the defendants’ alleged interference with the right of interstate travel. 403 U. S., at 107. For the purposes of this question, we assume but certainly do not decide that the directors of a single corporation can form a conspiracy within the meaning of § 198.5 (3). Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b) provides for filing charges with the federal Commission. When a State or locality has a “State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto,” filing a complaint with that authority is a predicate for assertion of the federal rights involved. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (c). If a member of the EEOC files a charge alleging violations in such a State or locality, the federal Commission must notify the state or local authority of the charge before taking any action. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(d). Cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522. The statute requires that a complaint be filed with the federal agency within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . If the complainant has filed a charge with a state or local agency, the time is extended to 300 days from the event, or 30 days from the end of state or local proceedings, whichever is sooner. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). After a “right to sue” letter issues from the EEOC, the complainant is given another 90 days to bring a civil action in a federal district court. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553. Within 10 days of the Commission’s receipt of a complaint, it must notify the employer of the charge, including the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged violation. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000&-5 (b), (e). Only if the Commission has been unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer within 30 days of the filing of the charge may it bring a civil action against the employer. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(1). The complainant must await notice from the Commission of his right to bring a suit. This notice is provided if (1) the Commission dismisses his charge, (2) neither the Commission nor the Attorney General has filed a civil action in his case within 180 days of the filing of the charge, or (3) the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which he is a party. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1). Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (a), (b), (f)(1). See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, supra. Section 706 (g) of the Act, as amended, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (g), provides: “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3 (a) of this title.” See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F. 2d 301, 308-310 (CA6 1975); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F. 2d 918, 926-928 (CA3 1977); cases collected in id., at 926 n. 13. Title 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k) provides: “In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412. Title 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1) provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.” See Slack v. Havens, 522 F. 2d 1091, 1094 (CA9 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., supra, at 308; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F. 2d 1122, 1125 (CA5 1969); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F. 2d 577, 581 (CA4 1966) (en bane). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, at 441-445 (RehNQüist, J., concurring). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently applied a 6-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations to employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 681 F. 2d 335, 337 (1978). See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 462-466. Another difference between those cases and this one is to be found in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. As the Court noted in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 were explicitly discussed during the course of the legislative debates on both the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the 1972 amendments t’o the 1964 Act, and the view was consistently expressed that the earlier statutes would not be implicitly repealed. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 457-459; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra, at 413-417. Specific references were made to §§ 1981 and 1983, but, significantly, no notice appears to have been taken of § 1985. See case below, 584 F. 2d 1235, 1252 n. 86.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. EURODIF S. A. et al. No. 07-1059. Argued November 4, 2008 Decided January 26, 2009 Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the United States in No. 07-1059. On the briefs in No. 07-1059 were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leondra R. Kruger, John B. Bellinger III, Daniel J. DeWOrto, John D. Mclnerney, David R. Mason, Jr., Quentin M. Baird, and David R. Hill. H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for petitioners USEC Inc. et al. in No. 07-1078. With him on the briefs were Sheldon E. Hochberg, Eric C. Emerson, Charles G. Cole, Michael A. Vatis, John P. Nolan, Peter B. Saba, and James A. Schoettler, Jr. Caitlin J. Halligan argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With her on the brief for respondent Eurodif S. A. et al. were Stuart M. Rosen, Gregory Silbert, W. Andrew Ryu, and Lisa R. Eskow. Nancy A. Fischer, Stephan E. Becker, David J. Cynamon, Joshua D. Fitzhugh, and Christine J. Sohar filed a brief for respondent Ad Hoc Utilities Group, Together with No. 07-1078, USEC Inc. et al. v. Eurodif S. A. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. David A. Hartquist, Kathleen W. Cannon, Jonathan P. Hiatt, and Paul Whitehead filed a brief for the Committee to Support U. S. Trade Laws et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Alcoa, Inc., by Catherine E. Stetson, Lewis E. Leibowitz, and Jessica L. Ellsworth; for the National Atomic Co. “Kazatomprom” by Thomas B. Wilner and Robert S. LaRussa; and for Teehsnabexport by Carolyn B. Lamm, Frank J. Schweitzer, Adams C. Lee, and Joanna M. Ritcey-Donohue. Gregory S. Coleman, Edward C. Dawson, Marc S. Tabolsky, and Stephen R. McAllister filed a brief for Raj Bhala as amicus curiae. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930 calls for “antidumping” duties on “foreign merchandise” sold in the United States at “less than its fair value,” 19 U. S. C. § 1673, but does not touch international sales of services. These cases test the application of this antidumping provision to imports of low enriched uranium (LEU), a highly processed derivative of natural uranium used as nuclear fuel, when domestic utilities contract to obtain LEU for cash plus unenriched uranium delivered to a foreign enricher. Although the parties’ contracts call these transactions sales of uranium enrichment services, the Commerce Department treats them as sales of “foreign merchandise” subject to the antidumping provision. The issue is whether the Commerce Department’s way of seeing the transactions as sales of goods rather than services reflects a permissible interpretation and application of § 1673. We hold that it does. I There are five steps in transforming elemental uranium into fuel rods for nuclear powerplants. After uranium ore is mined, it is milled into uranium concentrate called “yellow-cake,” which is next converted into uranium hexafluoride gas or “feed uranium.” The fissionable isotope in unenriched feed uranium is then concentrated, producing LEU in pellet form, which is in turn made into uranium fuel rods. These cases are about the fourth step: enriching uranium feedstock into LEU. The uranium isotope needed for a nuclear reaction, U-235, amounts only to 0.711 percent by weight of natural uranium. Uranium whose concentration or “assay,” of U-235 has been enhanced to 20 percent or more is weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium, whereas LEU has a U-235 assay of 3 to 5 percent, making it useful as nuclear fuel. One way to produce LEU, and the method at issue in these cases, is gaseous diffusion, whereby gaseous feed uranium is pushed through a long series of filters, separating the gas into two streams. The stream passing through the filters (the “product stream”) gains a higher concentration of the lighter U-235 isotope than the stream that is filtered out (the “tails”). Because the concentration reached at each individual filter is minor, the gas must be forced through hundreds or even thousands of filters, at great expenditure of electricity, before the product stream reaches the desired assay. The amount of energy required to enrich a quantity of feed uranium to a given assay is measured in terms of an industry standard called a “separative work unit” or SWU (pronounced “swoo”). In practice, however, a given degree of enrichment will depend on adjusting the quantities of two separate variables, feed uranium and electricity, in inverse proportions. Thus, if the electric rate is stable but the value of feed uranium falls, an enricher may produce LEU by “overfeeding,” subjecting a greater quantity of feed uranium to fewer SWUs, and when the value of feed uranium goes up and electricity does not, “underfeeding” can use more SWUs to squeeze extra U-235 from the tails. Nuclear utilities generally get LEU in one of two ways. Under an “enriched uranium product” or “EUP” contract, a utility simply buys a desired quantity and assay of LEU for cash. Under a “SWU contract,” the utility provides a quantity of feed uranium and pays the enricher for the SWUs to produce the quantity and assay of LEU called for. Despite their name, SWU contracts do not require that the contractual number of SWUs actually be applied to the quantity of uranium provided, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Low Enriched Uranium From France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65877, 65884 (2001) (hereinafter LEU from France); rather, the enricher remains free to overfeed or underfeed so long as it delivers the specified LEU. Moreover, because feed uranium is fungible, and “for all intents and purposes, trades like a commodity,” ibid., and because profitable operation of an enrichment plant requires the constant processing of feed uranium from the enricher’s undifferentiated stock, the LEU provided to a utility under a SWU contract cannot be traced to the particular unenriched uranium the utility provided. Petitioners, USEC Inc. and its subsidiary, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC collectively), run the only uranium enrichment factory in the United States, which was built by the United States Government in the 1950s and run by various federal agencies until it was leased to USEC in 1998. In December 2000, USEC petitioned the Commerce Department for relief under § 731 of the Tariff Act, alleging that LEU imported from France and other European countries under both EUP and SWU contracts was being sold in the United States at less than fair value and was materially harming domestic industry. Notice of Initiation of Anti-dumping Duty Investigations: Low Enriched Uranium From France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 66 Fed. Reg. 1080 (2001). Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by § 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 162, as amended, 19 U. S. C. § 1673, provides a two-step process to address harm to domestic manufacturing from foreign goods sold at an unfair price: “If— “(1) the administering authority [the Secretary of Commerce] determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and “(2) the [United States International Trade] Commission determines that— “(A) an industry in the United States— “(i) is materially injured, or “(ii) is threatened with material injury, or “(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, “by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation, “then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) for the merchandise. ...” See also § 1677(1) (designating the Secretary of Commerce as the “ ‘administering authority’ ”); § 1677(2) (explaining that the term “ ‘Commission’ ” refers to the United States International Trade Commission). The Tariff Act’s antidumping provision derives from similar terms in the Anti-Dumping Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 11, which were adopted to “protec[t] our industries and labor against a now common species of commercial warfare of dumping goods on our markets at less than cost or home value if necessary until our industries are destroyed . . ..” H. R. Rep. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1921). Following the USEC charges, the Commerce Department opened an investigation into the practices of respondents, a French enricher, Eurodif S. A., its owner, Compagnie Général des Matiéres Nucléaires (now ARE VA NC), its U. S. subsidiary, COGEMA (now AREVA NC, Inc.), and United States utilities that consume LEU (Eurodif collectively). Eurodif conceded that EUP contracts were for the sale of LEU, but argued that SWU contracts involved only the sale of uranium enrichment services, and were therefore outside the scope of §1673. LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65882-65883. In its final determination, the Commerce Department concluded that LEU from France, including LEU acquired under SWU contracts, was being sold, or likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair value. Id., at 65878. In deciding that SWU contracts are for a sale of LEU, not enrichment services, the Department stressed several features of the transactions. First, because the enrichment process accounts for approximately 60 percent of the value of LEU and works a “substantial transformation” on uranium feedstock, id., at 65881, enrichment creates “the essential character” of LEU, id., at 65884. Second, “enrichers not only have complete control over the enrichment process, but in fact control the level of usage of the natural uranium provided.” Ibid. Third, the utilities themselves take no part in the manufacture of LEU and are the sole purchasers of the product. Ibid. The Commerce Department also rejected the argument that LEU transferred pursuant to SWU contracts should not be considered “sold” in light of a “tolling” regulation then (but no longer) in effect. Ibid. The regulation stated that a “toller,” a subcontractor who sells processing services in, or material for incorporation into, subject merchandise, would not be considered a manufacturer or producer “where the toller or subcontractor does not acquire ownership, and does not control the relevant sale, of the subject merchandise.” 19 CFR § 351.401(h) (2000) (withdrawn in Import Administration, Withdrawal of Regulations Governing the Treatment of Subcontractors (“Tolling” Operations), 73 Fed. Reg. 16517 (2008) (hereinafter Tolling Operations)). This regulation, the Commerce Department explained, was intended to apply in situations where a good is first sold by a manufacturer and then resold by an exporter or reseller. LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65880. The regulation provides that in such a situation the second sale should be used to calculate the U. S. price and normal value of the manufactured good; however, the Commerce Department concluded, the regulation was not meant to preclude antidumping duties where a manufacturer makes the only relevant sale that can be used to establish U. S. price and normal value. Ibid,.; id., at 65884-65885. Finally, the Commerce Department reasoned that language in SWU contracts speaking of the transactions as the sale of enrichment services could not control, lest deferring to the parties’ characterizations allow them to “convert trade in goods into trade in so-called ‘manufacturing services,’.. . thereby exposing industries to injury by unfair trade practices without the remedy of the [antidumping] laws.” Id., at 65881. In economic reality, the Commerce Department said, “the contracts designated as SWU contracts are functionally equivalent to those designated as EUP transactions.” Id., at 65885. Eurodif challenged the Department’s determination before the Court of International Trade (CIT), which remanded for “a more persuasive explanation” of the tolling regulation. USEC Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1326 (2003). On remand, the Commerce Department repeated that the tolling regulation governed which price should be used to calculate antidumping duties, not whether imports are subject to the antidumping provision in the first instance. Final Remand Determination, USEC Inc. and United States Enrichment Corp. v. United States (June 23, 2003), App. G to Pet. for Cert. 211a (hereinafter Final Remand Determination). The Department further explained its conclusion that SWU contracts lead to transfers of LEU for consideration. The contracts and other evidence in the record convinced the Department that “enrichers own, and hold title to, all the LEU they produce,” id., at 217a, a conclusion grounded on findings that “enrichers hold inventories of uranium from various sources, including uranium owned by the enricher itself, and produce LEU without relying solely upon the input from a particular customer.” Id., at 221a. Finally, the Department emphasized that the enrichers “have complete control over the enrichment process and control the amount of uranium and energy actually used in producing the LEU.” Id., at 231a. The CIT was unconvinced and reversed, relying on what it candidly recognized as a “legal fiction” expressed in SWU contracts, “that the very feed uranium delivered by a utility to an enricher is enriched and then returned as LEU to the utility.” USEC Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (2003). The CIT reasoned, because “nothing in the record support[ed] a determination that the enricher has any ownership rights,” the Commerce Department’s determination was “unsupported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with law.” Id., at 1340. USEC challenged this conclusion in an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed. Eurodif S. A. v. United States, 411 F. 3d 1355 (2005) (Eurodif I). The court approached the issues much as the CIT had, with the observation that “the SWU contracts in this case do not evidence any intention by the parties to vest the enrichers with ownership rights in the delivered unenriched uranium or the finished LEU.” Id., at 1362. It recalled that in a previous case, Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 307 F. 3d 1364 (CA Fed. 2002), it had accepted the Government’s position that SWU contracts were for services, not for “ ‘disposal of personal property,’ ” and so were outside the cause of action provided by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. Eurodif I, supra, at 1363, and n. 3 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 1373). While the court conceded that SWU agreements “do ‘not fall neatly’ either into the category of contracts for services or the category of contracts for the sale of goods,” 411 F. 3d, at 1364 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 1373-1374), it still concluded that “even under the deferential standard of review that we apply in this case, we choose not to ignore our previous holdings,” Eurodif I, supra, at 1363. Shortly after this decision, we held in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982-983 (2005), that a court’s choice of one reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute does not preclude an implementing agency from later adopting a different reasonable interpretation. On rehearing, the Federal Circuit responded to National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. by explaining that it had not rejected the Commerce Department’s position because it conflicted with the prior interpretive choice that carried the day in Florida Power & Light. Eurodif S. A. v. United States, 423 F. 3d 1275, 1277-1278 (2005). The Circuit, rather, saw no statutory uncertainty to be resolved: “the antidumping duty statute unambiguously applies to the sale of goods and not services” and “it is clear that [SWU] contracts are contracts for services and not goods.” Id., at 1278. After final judgment was entered, Eurodif S. A. v. United States, 506 F. 3d 1051, 1053 (CA Fed. 2007), we granted certiorari, 553 U. S. 1003 (2008), to consider whether transactions under SWU contracts may be subjected to antidumping duties under the Tariff Act. We now reverse. II The issue is not whether, for purposes of 19 U. S. C. § 1673, the better view is that a SWU contract is one for the sale of services, not goods. The statute gives this determination to the Department of Commerce in the first instance, § 1677(1), and when the Department exercises this authority in the course of adjudication, its interpretation governs in the absence of unambiguous statutory language to the contrary or unreasonable resolution of language that is ambiguous. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229-230 (2001) (citing Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)). This is so even after a change in regulatory treatment, which “is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.” National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545 U. S., at 981. “ ‘[T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.’” Ibid, (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996)). In approaching the Department’s position on the application of § 1673, two threshold propositions must be taken as given. First, we think the Department reasonably concluded that §1673 is not limited by its terms to cash-only sales. Otherwise, any sale of a manufactured product could be exempted from the operation of § 1673 by a contractual term stating part of the purchase price in terms of a commodity. Second, in applying § 1673, the Commerce Department is not bound by the “legal fiction [created by SWU contracts] that the very feed uranium delivered by a utility to an en-richer is enriched and then returned as LEU to the utility.” USEC, 281 F. Supp. 2d, at 1339. The parties are free to contract as they wish, and they may genuinely regard SWU agreements as contracts for the sale of enrichment services. But, whatever the significance of such a term in a contract dispute, cf. Florida Power & Light Co., 307 F. 3d 1364, it is well settled that in reading regulatory and taxation statutes, “form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality,” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967). See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561, 573 (1978) (“Tn the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding’ ” (quoting Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252, 255 (1939))). Surrender to private contractual terms is especially uncalled for in dealing with international tariffs, as Congress saw when it amended the Tariff Act to say that the sale of foreign merchandise includes “the entering into of any leasing arrangement regarding the merchandise that is equivalent to the sale of the merchandise. ” Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 602(b)(2), 98 Stat. 3024, 19 U. S. C. § 1673. Since public law is not constrained by private fiction, the test of the Department’s position turns first on whether the statute clearly excludes a transaction involving mixed payment for LEU that may and almost certainly will be produced from uranium feed distinct from what the utility provides. No one disputes that § 1673 applies to the sale of goods, not services, LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65882-65883. Nor do we think anyone would deny that the exchange of cash combined with a commodity for a product that uses that very commodity as a constituent material is sometimes a sale of services and sometimes a sale of goods, the distinction being clear at the extremes. A customer who comes to a laundry with cash and dirty shirts is clearly purchasing cleaning services, not clean shirts. And a customer who provides cash and sand to a manufacturer of generic silicon processors is clearly buying computer chips rather than sand enhancement services. But the line blurs when the facts get more complicated, and SWU contracts exemplify a class of transactions that the Federal Circuit recognized does “ ‘not fall neatly’ either into the category of contracts for services or the category of contracts for the sale of goods.” Eurodif I, 411 F. 3d, at 1364 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 1373-1374). The agreement is not like the laundry ticket, which says that the same shirts are supposed to come back, just minus the dirt around the collar. And it is not on all fours with the agreement of the chip buyer and the manufacturer, in which it is inescapable that the silicon processors delivered are a separate good from the sand provided. Section 1673 simply does not speak with the precision necessary to say definitively whether it applies to the LEU and the agreement that gives the utility a right to get it. This is the very situation in which we look to an authoritative agency for a decision about the statute’s scope, which is defined in cases at the statutory margin by the agency’s application of it, and once the choice is made we ask only whether the department’s application was reasonable. As to that, the Commerce Department relied on two related characteristics of these transactions in deciding SWU contracts should be treated as a sale of LEU. It stressed that the utility in a SWU contract provides cash plus a fungible commodity that is not tracked after its delivery to the en-richer, in exchange for a product owned by the enricher. And it recognized that the enrichment process results in a substantial transformation of the unenriched uranium. The combination of these characteristics reasonably captures a common understanding of the sale of a good. Because an individual’s shirts are not fungible, they are tracked during the cleaning process and returned to the same customer who brought them in; there are no good reasons to treat them as owned for a time by the laundry, and no one does. And without any transfer of ownership, the salient feature of the transaction is the cleaning of the shirt, a service. Conversely, where a constituent material is untracked and fungible, ownership is usually seen as transferred, and the transaction is less likely to be a sale of services, as the Court explained years ago in distinguishing a common law bailment from a sale: “[W]here logs are delivered to be sawed into boards, or leather to be made into shoes, rags into paper, olives into oil, grapes into wine, wheat into flour, if the product of the identical articles delivered is to be returned to the original owner in a new form, it is said to be a bailment, and the title never vests in the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, the manufacturer is not bound to return the same wheat or flour or paper, but may deliver any other of equal value, it is said to be a sale or a loan, and the title to the thing delivered vests in the manufacturer.” Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. 110, 116 (1878). And when the manufacturer is not only free to return different material, but also substantially transforms the material it uses, it is even more likely that the object of the transaction will be seen as a new product, not work on enduring material of primary interest to the buyer. After all, what makes the hypothetical exchange of sand for silicon processors so obviously a sale of goods is the extreme transformation brought about by the chip manufacturer. These are good analytical grounds to show that SWU transactions are reasonably placed within the ambit of sale of goods, and the Department’s reliance on them is reinforced by practical reasons aimed at preserving the effectiveness of antidumping duties. There is no dispute that LEU sold under an EUP contract at less than fair value must be subjected to antidumping duties under §1673, there being a clear sale of goods when a domestic utility pays a single sale price in cash for the feed uranium and enrichment components represented by LEU. If foreign enrichers set this price below the fair value of LEU, the domestic enrichment industry is obviously open to material injury, the very threat the antidumping statute was meant to counter, see H. R. Rep. No. 1, at 23. But the same injury would occur if a SWU contract were untouchable. Under a SWU contract, the domestic utility pays cash to a third party for unenriched uranium and provides this along with additional cash in exchange for LEU; any EUP contract could be structured as a SWU contract simply by splitting the transaction in two, one contract to buy unenriched uranium and another to enrich it. And the restructuring would not stop with uranium; contracts for imported pasta would be replaced by separate contracts for wheat and wheat processing services, sweater imports would give way to separate contracts for wool and knitting services, and antidumping duties would primarily chastise the uncreative. The Commerce Department’s attempt to foreclose this absurd result by treating SWU transactions as sales of goods is eminently reasonable. Ill Where a domestic buyer’s cash and an untracked, fungible commodity are exchanged with a foreign contractor for a substantially transformed version of the same commodity, the Commerce Department may reasonably treat the transaction as the sale of a good under § 1673. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. LEU can also be produced through a centrifuge method or by back-blending unenriched uranium with weapons-grade uranium. Many SWU contracts give the utility the option of providing a comparable quantity of uranium concentrate in lieu of the specified feed uranium. App. 13, 83, 268-269 (Sealed). There are only five major uranium enrichers in the world, a scarcity that illustrates the “huge financial investment in facilities and a technically skilled work force” necessary to support the enrichment process. LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65884. The Commerce Department concluded in a separate determination that LEU from the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands was not being sold, or likely to be sold, at less than fair value. Notice of Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value: Low Enriched Uranium From the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, id., at 65886. . In February 2002, the International Trade Commission found that imports of LEU from France materially injured the enrichment industry in the United States, allowing the imposition of antidumping duties. U. S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Low Enriched Uranium From France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Pub. No. 3486). The specific factual findings on which an agency relies in applying its interpretation are conclusive unless unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S. C. § 706(2)(E). Respondents’ assertion that the Commerce Department’s prior tolling regulation is inconsistent with its position in these cases is therefore beside the point. For the reasons given by the Department in its remand determination, we are not convinced that the tolling regulation precludes viewing SWU transactions as the sale of LEU; but even if it did, it has since been withdrawn, Tolling Operations, 73 Fed. Reg. 16517, and cannot now constrain the Commerce Department’s interpretive authority under Chevron. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545 U. S., at 981 (“Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act”). Likewise, even if the position taken by the Department of Energy in Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 307 F. 3d 1364 (CA Fed. 2002), was inconsistent with the Government’s position here, it would not speak to the deference owed the Commerce Department under Chevron. Respondents argue that, after determining that SWU contracts involved the sale of LEU, the Commerce Department employed an impermissible methodology by constructing the normal value of the LEU based on the combined costs to Eurodif of obtaining feed uranium and enrichment. Brief for Respondent Eurodif S. A. et al. 48-50. These calculations, respondents argue, “were a charade, underscoring that the anti-dumping law[s] cannot be applied to these SWU contracts.” Id., at 48. To the degree respondents’ argument is that antidumping duties may never be applied to mixed cash-commodity sales, it is doomed by implausibility. If respondents are contending that the Commerce Department’s dumping determination improperly assessed the normal value of LEU, they are raising an issue well outside the scope of our grant of certiorari. Eurodif argues that the Commerce Department erred in concluding that enrichers own LEU prior to its delivery under a SWU contract. Id., at 36-37. While the precise form of this argument is unclear, it fails under any reading. Respondents seem to mean that the Commerce Department’s interpretation of § 1673 is impermissible as being inconsistent with the formal terms of SWU contracts, an argument we rejected above. The argument could also be read to suggest that the Commerce Department lacked substantial evidence to conclude that, contractual formalities aside, enrichers in fact own the LEU provided under SWU contracts prior to its delivery. But the evidence in the record not only supports the Department’s conclusion, it compels it. It is undisputed that the LEU delivered under a SWU contract is not actually derived from the feed uranium provided as consideration; as the CIT observed, the notion that the same feed uranium delivered by a utility to an enricher is enriched and then returned as LEU to the utility is “a legal fiction.” USEC Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (2003). Moreover, the enricher is free to vary the amount of feed uranium used to produce an order of LEU, either stockpiling feed uranium or supplementing its stores from other sources. Finally, the SWU contracts at issue provide that the utility retains title to the feed uranium until delivery of the LEU, at which point it obtains title in the LEU. In light of this process, some entity must own the LEU prior to delivery and obtain title to the feed uranium after delivery, absent some modern analog to the abhorrent possibility of an abeyance of seizen; the enricher is the only serious candidate. Common law definitions do not necessarily control the meaning of terms in modern trade laws; we merely mean to show the long pedigree of the distinction relied upon by the Commerce Department. This would be particularly easy in these cases, since COGEMA, Eurodif’s parent company, “is a major world supplier of natural uranium for the production of LEU.” Final Remand Determination, App. G to Pet. for Cert. 221a, n. 38. In fact, many SWU contracts provide that if a utility fails to deliver feed uranium, the enrieher will substitute feed uranium of its own, which may then be purchased from the enrieher. App. 13-14, 185-186, 537 (Sealed). Eurodif suggests the Commerce Department could combat such circumvention of antidumping duties by taxing domestic downstream sales of such products. Brief for Respondent Eurodif S. A. et al. 58-54. But this ignores the substantial number of manufactured goods that are not resold. More fundamentally, this argument fails to explain why the Commerce Department should be required to chase after downstream resellers when the first sale has the same economic substance.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. STANDARD OIL CO. No. 24. Argued November 14, 18, 1957. Decided January 27, 1958. Earl E. Pollock argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Earl W. Kintner and James E. Corkey. Hammond E. Chaffetz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Weymouth Kirkland, Howard Ellis, W. H. Van Oosterhout, Frederick M. Rowe and Thomas E. Sunderland. Cyrus Austin filed a brief for the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, Inc., et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. William Simon, Robert L. Wald and John Bodner, Jr. for the Empire State Petroleum Association et al. and Otis H. Ellis for the National Oil Jobbers Association, Inc., et al. filed a brief, as amici curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a sequel to Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 340 U. S. 231 (1951), wherein the Court held that § 2 (b) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b), afforded a seller a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination if its lower price was “made in good faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor.” 340 U. S., at 246. We remanded the case with instructions that the Federal Trade Commission make findings on Standard’s contention that its discriminatory prices were so made. The subsequent findings are not altogether clear. The Commission, acting on the same record, seemingly does not contest the fact that Standard’s deductions were made to meet the equally low prices of its competitors. However, Standard was held not to have acted in good faith, and the § 2 (b) defense precluded, because of the Commission’s determination that Standard's reduced prices were made pursuant to a price system rather than being “the result of departures from a nondiscriminatory price scale.” 49 F. T. C. 923, 954. The Court of Appeals found no basis in the record for such a finding and vacated the order of the Commission, holding that Standard’s “ 'good faith’ defense was firmly established.” 233 F. 2d 649, 655. In view of our former opinion and the importance of bringing an end to this protracted litigation, we granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 950 (1956). Having concluded that the case turns on a factual issue, decided by the Court of Appeals upon a fair assessment of the record, we affirm the decision below. The long history of this 17-year-old case may be found both in the original opinion of the Court of Appeals, 173 F. 2d 210, and in the original opinion of this Court, supra. The case arose as a companion to similar complaints filed by the Commission against Gulf Oil Company, the Texas Company, and Shell Oil Company. In its petition for certiorari, the Commission stresses the existence of an industry-wide “dual price system,” asserting that the decision below would “insulate from attack a price pattern deeply entrenched in the industry — not only in the Detroit area, but also elsewhere in the country.” The pendency of the Gulf, Texas, and Shell complaints is mentioned twice, and the Commission states in a footnote that “[proceedings thereon have been deferred until the disposition of this case.” However, on April 3, 1957, the Commission decided that “it will not now be practicable to try the issues raised” in the companion complaints “irrespective of the final outcome of . . . the matter of Standard Oil Company,” and dismissed all three of the companion cases. The claim that the asserted dual pricing system was of industry-wide scope is not vital to the Commission’s position here, was not alleged in its complaint, and is not included among its findings; therefore, we limit our consideration of the pricing system contention to Standard alone. The Commission urges us to examine its 8-volume record of over 5,500 pages and determine if its finding that Standard reduced prices to four “jobbers” pursuant to a pricing system was erroneous, as held by the Court of Appeals. The Commission contends that a § 2 (b) defense is precluded if the reductions were so made. If wrong in this, it maintains that the “good faith” element of a § 2 (b) defense is not made out by showing that competitors employ such a pricing system, and in any event is negatived by Standard’s failure to make a bona fide effort to review its pricing system upon passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. On the present posture of the case we believe that further review of the evidence is unwarranted. As stated in Federal Trade Comm’n v. American Tobacco Co., 274 U. S. 543, 544 (1927), although “[t]he statement of the petition for certiorari that the judgment and opinion below might seriously hinder future administration of the law was grave and sufficiently probable to justify issuance of the writ,” it now appears that “[p] roper decision of the controversy depends upon a question of fact,” and therefore “we adhere to the usual rule of non-interference where conclusions of Circuit Courts of Appeals depend on appreciation of circumstances which admit of different interpretations.” Moreover, in Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, 491 (1951), we decided that substantiality of evidence on the record as a whole to support agency findings “is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” We do no more on the issue of insubstantiality than decide that the Court of Appeals has made a “fair assessment” of the record. That conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the finding made by the Court of Appeals accords with that of the trial examiner, two dissenting members of the Commission, and another panel of the Court of Appeals when the case was first before that court in 1949, all of them being agreed that the prices were reduced in good faith to meet offers of competitors. Both parties acknowledge that discrimination pursuant to a price system would preclude a finding of “good faith.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948); Federal Trade Comm’n v. National Lead Co., 352 U. S. 419 (1957). The sole question then is one of fact: were Standard’s reduced prices to four “jobber” buyers — Citrin-Kolb, Stikeman, Wayne, and Ned’s — made pursuant to a pricing system rather than to meet individual competitive situations? We have examined the findings of the Commission, which relies most heavily on the fact that no competitors’ offers were shown to have been made to Citrin-Kolb, Stikeman, or Wayne prior to the time Standard initially granted them the reduced tank-car price. All three of these “jobbers,” however, were granted the tank-car price before the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936, and the trial examiner excluded proof of pre-1936 offers on the ground of irrelevancy. The Commission approved this ruling, and on remand failed to reopen the record to take any further proof. In our former opinion in this case, we said, “There is no doubt that under the Clayton Act, before its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act, [such] evidence would have been material and, if accepted, would have established a complete defense to the charge of unlawful discrimination.” 340 U. S., at 239-240. The proof should have been admitted; its absence can hardly be relied on by the Commission now as a ground for reversal. In any event, the findings that were made are sufficient for our disposition of the case. It appears to us that the crucial inquiry is not why reduced prices were first granted to Citrin-Kolb, Stikeman, and Wayne, but rather why the reduced price was continued subsequent to passage of the Act in 1936. The findings show that both major and local suppliers made numerous attempts in the 1936-1941 period to lure these “jobbers” away from Standard with cut-rate prices, oftentimes much lower than the one-and-one-half-cent reduction Standard was giving them. It is uncontradicted, as pointed out in one of the Commission dissents, that Standard lost three of its seven “jobbers” by not meeting competitors’ pirating offers in 1933-1934. All of this occurred in the context of a major gasoline price war in the Detroit area, .created by an extreme overabundance of supply — a setting most unlikely to lend itself to general pricing policies. The Commission itself stated: “It may well be that [Standard] was convinced that if it ceased granting tank-car prices to Citrin-Kolb, Wayne, and Stikeman and continued to refuse the tank-car price to Ned’s Auto Supply Company it would lose these accounts. It had substantial reasons for believing this to be the case, for all of these concerns, except Ned’s Auto Supply Company, had already been recognized as entitled to the tank-car price under the commonly accepted standards of the industry, and Ned’s had achieved a volume of distribution which brought it within the range where it was likely to be so recognized by a major oil company at any time.” 49 F. T. C., at 952-953. The findings as to Ned’s, the only one of the “jobbers” initially to receive the tank-car price post Robinson-Patman, are highly significant. After a prolonged period of haggling, during which Ned’s pressured Standard with information as to numerous more attractive price offers made by other suppliers, Standard responded to an ultimatum from Ned’s in 1936 with a half-cent-per-gallon reduction from the tank-wagon price. The Commission concedes that this first reduction occurred at a time when Ned’s did not meet the criteria normally-insisted upon by Standard before giving any reduction. Two years later, after a still further period of haggling and another Ned’s ultimatum, Standard gave a second reduction of still another cent. In determining that Standard’s prices to these four "jobbers” were reduced as a response to individual competitive situations rather than pursuant to a pricing system, the Court of Appeals considered the factors just mentioned, all of which weigh heavily against the Commission’s position. The Commission’s own findings thus afford ample witness that a “fair assessment” of the record has been made. Standard’s use here of two prices, the lower of which could be obtained under the spur of threats to switch to pirating competitors, is a competitive deterrent far short of the discriminatory pricing of Staley, Cement, and National Lead, supra, and one which we believe within the sanction of § 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Affirmed. The Commission admits that not all of the major suppliers were using the asserted dual price system, stating in its brief that Standard’s two largest competitors in the Detroit area, Socony-Vacuum and Sun Oil Company, sold only at the higher tank-wagon price. The Commission findings reveal that those suppliers who did offer a tank-car price to the Standard customers in question were not offering a uniform price: both Shell and the Texas Company, for example, made offers of two cents per gallon off the tank-wagon price, as contrasted with Standard’s one-and-one-half-cent reduction. The particular tag “jobbers” is of no significance here in the light of our affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the reductions in price complained of were not made pursuant to a pricing system. Standard’s use of the word, while not an accurate description of the economic function performed by the four purchasers, is as consistent with a desire to placate customers to whom Standard was not forced by lower offers to give a reduced price as it would be with any asserted reduction of prices pursuant to a pricing system. “. . . [W]e are unable to discern any basis for the conclusion that petitioner’s prices ‘were not the result of departures from a nondiscriminatory price scale.’ The record affirmatively demonstrates to the contrary. Petitioner sold invariably at its uniform tank-wagon price, except when at different times it reduced its price to meet competitive offers in order to retain a customer.” Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 233 F. 2d 649, 654. (Emphasis added.) This contention falls of its own weight, for the conclusion that the reductions here were not made pursuant to a pricing system negates the fact assumption underlying the Commission’s argument that there is no good faith when one price system is being matched against another. There is no showing or serious contention by the Commission that the offers of Standard’s competitors were unlawful. Indeed, the Court of Appeals stated, “[I]n the instant situation there is no finding, no contention and not even a suspicion but that the competing prices which petitioner met were lawful.” 233 F. 2d, at 654. The Commission admits that it “did not actually adjudicate the legality of the competing prices which Standard allegedly met . . . .” In the manner of a casual aside, the Commission belatedly suggests now that the competitors’ prices were unlawful since they were similar to Standard’s reductions and the latter were unlawful because made pursuant to a pricing system. If this be thought sufficient to raise the question, the foundation of the Commission’s logic is destroyed by our affirmance of the finding that Standard’s reductions were not made pursuant to any price system. Our disposition eliminates the necessity of considering this last point. Nor need we consider the Commission’s claim that the Court of Appeals held the question involved here to be one of law. An examination of the court’s statement, 233 F. 2d, at 651, indicates it had reference to the broader issue of Standard’s “good faith” under §2 (b). Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498, 502-503 (1951); see also Labor Board v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 409-410 (1952). Those cases cannot be distinguished from the present one on the basis of the statutes involved. Compare National Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. § 160(e), with Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5 (c) and (d), 52 Stat. 112-113, 15 U. S. C. §45 (c), (d). In Universal Camera, supra, the Court indicated that the review standard established in that case would apply to all instances of court review of agency decisions. 340 U. S., at 488-490. The Commission brief also claims that reduction pursuant to a pricing system was admitted in the 1940 answer filed by Standard. That portion of the answer referred to, however, was concerned with establishing an alternative and altogether different defense, namely, cost justification on the basis of functional customer classification. Such defense could be argued even if the reductions were held made pursuant to a pricing method, and therefore is consistent with the claim of good faith meeting of competition. The Commission places great importance on the fact that only one of these offers was a standing offer. This is not a situation involving only one or two competitive raids, however; continuation of reductions once granted is warranted by § 2 (b) when competitors’ reduced price offers are recurring again and again in a cutthroat market. The findings indicate that similar haggling over an extended period of time occurred before each of the other “jobbers” obtained a reduced price. The great time consumed in the haggling process tends to negate any idea that the participants were only deciding whether a given purchaser met Standard's four well-defined “jobber” criteria— annual volume of one to two million gallons, own delivery facilities, bulk'storage capable of taking tank-car delivery, and responsible credit rating.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

YOUNG et ux. v. UNITED STATES No. 00-1567. Argued January 9, 2002 — Decided March 4, 2002 Grenville Clark III argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General O’Connor, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Bruce R. Ellisen, and Thomas J. Sawyer. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. A discharge under the Bankruptcy Code does not extinguish certain tax liabilities for which a return was due within three years before the filing of an individual debt- or’s petition. 11 U. S. C. §§ 523(a)(1)(A), 507(a)(8)(A)(i). We must decide whether this “three-year lookback period” is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. I Petitioners Cornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, due and filed on October 15, 1993 (petitioners had obtained an extension of the April 15 deadline). About $15,000 was owing. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed the tax liability on January 3, 1994, and petitioners made modest monthly payments ($40 to $300) from April 1994 until November 1995. On May 1,1996, they sought protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire. The bulk of their tax liability (about $13,000, including accrued interest) remained due. Before a reorganization plan was confirmed, however, the Youngs moved on October 23, 1996, to dismiss their Chapter 13 petition, pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 1307(b). On March 12, 1997, one day before the Bankruptcy Court dismissed their Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs filed a new petition, this time under Chapter 7. This was a “no asset” petition, meaning that the Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. A discharge was granted June 17, 1997; the case was closed September 22,1997. The IRS subsequently demanded payment of the 1992 tax debt. The Youngs refused and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to reopen their Chapter 7 case and declare the debt discharged. In their view, the debt fell outside the Bankruptcy Code’s “three-year lookback period,” §§ 523(a)(1)(A), 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and had therefore been discharged, because it pertained to a tax return due on October 15,1993, more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing on March 12, 1997. The Bankruptcy Court reopened the case but sided with the IRS. Although the Youngs’ 1992 income tax return was due more than three years before they filed their Chapter 7 petition, it was due less than three years before they filed their Chapter 13 petition on May 1, 1996. Holding that the “three-year lookback period” is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the 1992 tax debt had not been discharged. The District Court for the District of New Hampshire and Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed. 233 F. 3d 56 (2000). We granted certiorari. 533 U. S. 976 (2001). II Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts certain individual debts from discharge, including any tax “of the kind and for the periods specified in section . . . 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed.” § 523(a)(1)(A). Section 507(a), in turn, describes the priority of certain claims in the distribution of the debt- or’s assets. Subsection 507(a)(8)(A)(i) gives eighth priority to “allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent that such claims are for— ... a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts— . . . for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions, after three years before the date of the filing of the petition ....” (Emphasis added.) This is commonly known as the “three-year lookback period.” If the IRS has a claim for taxes for which the return was due within three years before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the claim enjoys eighth priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(1)(A). The terms of the lookback period appear to create a loophole: Since the Code does not prohibit back-to-back Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filings (as long as the debtor did not receive a discharge under Chapter 13, see §§ 727(a)(8), (9)), a debtor can render a tax debt dischargeable by first filing a Chapter 13 petition, then voluntarily dismissing the petition when the lookback period for the debt has lapsed, and finally refiling under Chapter 7. During the pendency of the Chapter 13 petition, the automatic stay of § 362(a) will prevent the IRS from taking steps to collect the unpaid taxes, and if the Chapter 7 petition is filed after the lookback period has expired, the taxes remaining due will be dischargeable. Petitioners took advantage of this loophole, which, they believe, is permitted by the Bankruptcy Code. We disagree. The three-year lookback period is a limitations period subject to traditional principles of equitable tolling. Since nothing in the Bankruptcy Code precludes equitable tolling of the lookback period, we believe the courts below properly excluded from the three-year limitation the period during which the Youngs’ Chapter 13 petition was pending. A The lookback period is a limitations period because it prescribes a period within which certain rights (namely, priority and nondischargeability in bankruptcy) may be enforced. 1 H. Wood, Limitations of Actions § 1, p. 1 (4th D. Moore ed. 1916). Old tax claims — those pertaining to returns due more than three years before the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition — become dischargeable, so that a bankruptcy decree will relieve the debtor of the obligation to pay. The period thus encourages the IRS to protect its rights — by, say, collecting the debt, 26 U. S. C. §§6501,6502 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), or perfecting a tax lien, §§6322, 6323(a), (f) (1994 ed.)— before three years have elapsed. If the IRS sleeps on its rights, its claim loses priority and the debt becomes dis-chargeable. Thus, as petitioners concede, the lookback period serves the same “basic policies [furthered by] all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000). It is true that, unlike most statutes of limitations, the lookback period bars only some, and not all, legal remedies for enforcing the claim (viz., priority and nondischargeability in bankruptcy); that makes it a more limited statute of limitations, but a statute of limitations nonetheless. Petitioners argue that the lookback period is a substantive component of the Bankruptcy Code, not a procedural limitations period. The lookback period commences on the date the return for the tax debt “is last due,” § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), not on the date the IRS discovers or assesses the unpaid tax. Thus, the IRS may have less than three years to protect itself against the risk that a debt will become dischargeable in bankruptcy. To illustrate, petitioners offer the following variation on this case: Suppose the Youngs filed their 1992 tax return on October 15, 1993, but had not received (as they received here) an extension of the April 15, 1993, due date. Assume the remaining facts of the case are unchanged: The IRS assessed the tax on January 3,1994; petitioners filed a Chapter 13 petition on May 1,1996; that petition was voluntarily dismissed and the Youngs filed a new petition under Chapter 7 on March 12, 1997. In this hypothetical, petitioners argue, their tax debt would have been dischargeable in the first petition under Chapter 13. Over three years would have elapsed between the due date of their return (April 15,1993) and their Chapter 13 petition (May 1,1996). But the IRS— which may not have discovered the debt until petitioners filed a return on October 15,1993 — would have enjoyed less than three years to collect the debt or prevent the debt from becoming dischargeable in bankruptcy (by perfecting a tax lien). The Code even contemplates this possibility, petitioners believe. Section 523(a)(l)(B)(ii) renders a tax debt non-dischargeable if it arises from an untimely return filed within two years before a bankruptcy petition. Thus, if petitioners had filed their return on April 30,1994 (more than two years before their Chapter 13 petition), and if the IRS had been unaware of the debt until the return was filed, the IRS would have had only two years to act before the debt became dis-chargeable in bankruptcy. For these reasons, petitioners believe the lookback period is not a limitations period, but rather a definition of dischargeable taxes. We disagree. In the sense in which petitioners use the term, all limitations periods are “substantive”: They define a subset of claims eligible for certain remedies. And the lookback is not distinctively “substantive” merely because it commences on a date that may precede the date when the IRS discovers its claim. There is nothing unusual about a statute of limitations that commences when the claimant has a complete and present cause of action, whether or not he is aware of it. See 1 C. Corman, Limitation of Actions §6.1, pp. 370, 378 (1991); 2 Wood, supra, §276c(l), at 1411. As for petitioners’ reliance on § 523(a)(l)(B)(ii), that section proves, at most, that Congress put different limitations periods on different kinds of tax debts. All tax debts falling within the terms of the three-year lookback period are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. §§ 523(a)(1)(A), 507(a)(8)(A)(i). Even if a tax debt falls outside the terms of the lookback period, it is nonetheless nondischargeable if it pertains to an untimely return filed within two years before the bankruptcy petition. § 523(a)(l)(B)(ii). These provisions are complementary; they do not suggest that the lookback period is something other than a limitations period. B It is hornbook law that limitations periods are “customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling,’ ” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990), unless tolling would be “inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute,” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 48 (1998). See also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 558-559 (1974); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946); Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 349-350 (1875). Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background principle. Cf. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U. S. 582, 589-590 (1995); United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 13 (1994). That is doubly true when it is enacting limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of equity and “appl[y] the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence.” Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 304 (1939); see also United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U. S. 545, 549 (1990). This Court has permitted equitable tolling in situations “where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin, supra, at 96 (footnotes omitted). We have acknowledged, however, that tolling might be appropriate in other cases, see, e.g., Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U. S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam), and this, we believe, is one. Cf. Amy v. Watertown (No. 2), 130 U. S. 320, 325-326 (1889); 3 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence §1974, pp. 558-559 (14th W. Lyon ed. 1918). The Youngs’ Chapter 13 petition erected an automatic stay under §362, which prevented the IRS from taking steps to protect its claim. When the Youngs filed a petition under Chapter 7, the three-year lookback period therefore excluded time during which their Chapter 13 petition was pending. The Youngs’ 1992 tax return was due within that three-year period. Hence the lower courts properly held that the tax debt was not discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. Tolling is in our view appropriate regardless of petitioners’ intentions when filing back-to-back Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 petitions — whether the Chapter 13 petition was filed in good faith or solely to run down the lookback period. In either case, the IRS was disabled from protecting its claim during the pendency of the Chapter 13 petition, and this period of disability tolled the three-year lookback period when the Youngs filed their Chapter 7 petition. C Petitioners invoke several statutory provisions which they claim display an intent to preclude tolling here. First they point to § 523(b), which, they believe, explicitly permits discharge in a Chapter 7 proceeding of certain debts that were nondischargeable (as this tax debt was) in a prior Chapter 13 proceeding. Petitioners, misread the provision. Section 523(b) declares that “a debt that was excepted from discharge under subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), or (a)(8) of this section ... in a prior case concerning the debtor ... is dischargeable in a case under this title unless, by the terms of subsection (a) of this section, such debt is not dischargeable in the case under this title.” (Emphasis added.) The phrase “excepted from discharge” in this provision is not synonymous (as petitioners would have it) with “nondis-chargeable.” It envisions a prior bankruptcy proceeding that progressed to the discharge stage, from which discharge a particular debt was actually “excepted.” It thus has no application to the present case; and even if it did, the very same arguments in favor of tolling that we have found persuasive with regard to §507 would apply to §523 as well. One might perhaps have expected an explicit tolling provision in § 523(b) if that subsection applied only to those debts “excepted from discharge” in the earlier proceeding that were subject to the three-year lookback — but in fact it also applies to excepted debts (see § 523(a)(3)) that were subject to no limitations period. And even the need for tolling as to debts that were subject to the three-year lookback is minimal, since a separate provision of the Code, § 727(a)(9), constrains successive discharges under Chapters 13 and 7: Generally speaking, six years must elapse between filing of the two bankruptcy petitions, which would make the need for tolling of the three-year limitation nonexistent. The absence of an explicit tolling provision in § 523 therefore suggests nothing. Petitioners point to two provisions of the Code, which, in their view, do contain a tolling provision. Its presence there, and its absence in § 507, they argue, displays an intent to preclude equitable tolling of the lookback period. We disagree. Petitioners point first to § 108(c), which reads: “Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor . . . , and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of — (1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay . . . with respect to such claim.” Petitioners believe § 108(c)(1) contains a tolling provision. The lower courts have split over this issue, compare, e. g., Rogers v. Corrosion Products, Inc., 42 F. 3d 292, 297 (CA5), cert. denied, 515 U. S. 1160 (1995), with Garbe Iron Works, Inc. v. Priester, 99 Ill. 2d 84, 457 N. E. 2d 422 (1983); we need not resolve it here. Even assuming petitioners are correct, we would draw no negative inference from the presence of an express tolling provision in § 108(c)(1) and the absence of one in § 507. It would be quite reasonable for Congress to instruct nonbankruptcy courts (including state courts) to toll nonbankruptcy limitations periods (including state-law limitations periods) while, at the same time, assuming that bankruptcy courts will use their inherent equitable powers to toll the federal limitations periods within the Code. Finally, petitioners point to a tolling provision in § 507(a)(8)(A), the same subsection that sets forth the three-year lookback period. Subsection 507(a)(8)(A) grants eighth priority to tax claims pertaining to returns that were due within the three-year lookback period, §507(a)(8)(A)(i), and to claims that were assessed within 240 days before the debt- or’s bankruptcy petition, § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii). Whereas the three-year lookback period contains no express tolling provision, the 240-day lookback period is tolled “any time plus 30 days during which an offer in compromise with respect to such tax that was made within 240 days after such'assessment was pending.” §507(a)(8)(A)(ii). Petitioners believe this express tolling provision, appearing in the same subsection as the three-year lookback period, demonstrates a statutory intent not to toll the three-year lookback period. If anything, § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) demonstrates that the Bankruptcy Code incorporates traditional equitable principles. An “offer in compromise” is a settlement offer submitted by a debtor. When §507(a)(8)(A)(ii) was enacted, it was IRS practice — though no statutory provision required it — to stay collection efforts (if the Government’s interests would not be jeopardized) during the pendency of an “offer in compromise,” 26 CFR § 301.7122 — 1(d)(2) (1978); M. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 15.07[1], p. 15-47 (1981). Thus, a court would not have equitably tolled the 240-day lookback period during the pendency of an “offer in compromise,” since tolling is inappropriate when a claimant has voluntarily chosen not to protect his rights within the limitations period. See, e. g., Irwin, 498 U. S., at 96. Hence the tolling provision in §507(a)(8)(A)(ii) supplements rather than displaces principles of equitable tolling. * * * We conclude that the lookback period of 11 U. S. C. § 5Q7(a)(8)(A)(i) is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Equitable remedies may still be available. Traditionally, for example, a mortgagee could sue in equity to foreclose mortgaged property even though the underlying debt was time barred. Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U. S. 756, 765-766 (1885); 2 G. Glenn, Mortgages §§ 141-142, pp. 812-818 (1943); see also Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U. S. 410, 415-416 (1998) (recoupment is available after a limitations period has lapsed); United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 611 (1990) (same). The Code was amended in 1998 to prohibit collection efforts during the pendency of an offer in compromise. See 26 U. S. C. § 6331(k) (1994 ed., Supp. V).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ERIKA, INC. No. 80-1594. Argued March 1, 1982 Decided April 20, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, David M. Cohen, Dwight D. Meier, and Robert P. Jaye. Stephen H. Oleskey argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Timothy H. Gailey. Frederick B. Bellamy and Alan G. Gilchrist filed a brief for the American Academy of Family Physicians as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to review determinations by private insurance carriers of the amount of benefits payable under Part B of the Medicare statute. I Part B of the Medicare program, 79 Stat. 301, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), is a federally subsidized, voluntary health insurance system for persons who are 65 or older or who are disabled. The companion Part A Medicare program covers institutional health costs such as hospital expenses. Part B supplements Part A’s coverage by insuring against a portion of some medical expenses, such as certain physician services and X-rays, that are excluded from the Part A program. Eligible individuals pay monthly premiums if they choose to enroll in Part B. These premiums, together with contributions from the Federal Government, are deposited in the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund that finances the Part B program. See §§ 1395j, 1395r, 1395s, 1395t, and 1395w (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The Secretary of Health and Human Services administers the Medicare program. “In order to provide for the administration of the benefits . . . with maximum efficiency and convenience for individuals entitled to benefits,” the Secretary is authorized to assign the task of paying Part B claims from the Trust Fund to private insurance carriers experienced in such matters. § 1395u. See H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1965); S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 53 (1965). After Part B enrollees receive medical care, they (or, after their assignment, their medical providers) bill the private insurance carrier. If the carrier determines that a claim meets all Part B coverage criteria such as medical necessity and reasonable cost, the carrier pays the claim out of the federal funds. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u; Schweiker v. McClure, ante, p. 188. If the carrier decides that reimbursement in full is not warranted, the statute and the regulations designate an appeal procedure available to dissatisfied claimants. All may request a “review determination,” which is a de novo written review hearing before a carrier employee different from the one who initially decided the claim. Claimants who remain dissatisfied and whose appeal involves more than $100 then may petition for an oral hearing before a hearing officer designated by the carrier. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C); 42 CFR § 405.820 (1980). Unless the carrier or the hearing officer decides to reopen the proceeding, the hearing officer’s decision is “final and binding upon all parties to the hearing . . . .” § 405.835. Neither the statute nor the Secretary’s regulations make further provision for review of hearing officer decisions. II Respondent, a major distributor of kidney dialysis supplies, sold its products to institutions and individuals. About half of such sales were covered by the Part B program. Persons purchasing dialysis supplies assigned their Medicare Part B claims to respondent. See 42 U. S. C. § 426(e); § 426-1 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (establishing Part B coverage for renal disease). Respondent in turn billed the Prudential Insurance Company of America, the private insurance carrier for the New Jersey area in which it is based. According to its contract with the Secretary, Prudential was required to reimburse 80% of what it determined to be a “reasonable charg[e]” for these supplies. See § 1395l(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Prudential interpreted the relevant statute and regulations to define the “reasonable charges” for respondent’s products to be their catalog price as of July 1 of the preceding calendar year. For example, Prudential reimbursed respondent’s Part B invoices from July 1, 1975, to June 30, 1976, on the basis of prices contained in respondent’s July 1,1974, catalog. Prudential began reimbursing respondent on this basis in 1974. Early in 1976 the respondent learned about the grounds for Prudential’s partial reimbursement of its invoices. At that time it requested Prudential to adjust past and future reimbursements to reflect price increases effective after July 1, 1974. Prudential agreed to adjust prospectively the basis for payment for the drug heparin, the price of which apparently had increased sharply. Cf. U. S. Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual § 5010.2 (1980) (permitting adjustments to customary charges in “highly unusual situations where equity clearly indicates that the increases are warranted”)- But the carrier refused to make either retroactive adjustments for heparin or any adjustments at all for other products. Respondent sought review of this refusal before one of Prudential’s hearing officers pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1395 u(b)(3)(C). The hearing officer affirmed Prudential’s decision. Respondent then brought the instant action against the United States in the Court of Claims seeking reimbursement on the basis of its current charges, asserting that Prudential’s refusal to set “reasonable charges” on the basis of respondent’s interim price increases contravened the Fifth Amendment as well as the Social Security Act and applicable regulations. The Court of Claims ruled that respondent’s suit was within the jurisdictional grant of the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, which permits the Court of Claims to hear “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.” 225 Ct. Cl. 252, 256-262, 634 F. 2d 580, 584-588 (1980) (en banc), opinion clarified, 225 Ct. Cl. 273, 647 F. 2d 129 (1981). On the merits, the court decided that Prudential’s calculation of respondent’s maximum allowable charge erred in several respects. 225 Ct. Cl., at 262-268, 634 F. 2d, at 588-590. The court remanded the case to Prudential for redetermination of these matters. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over suits of this kind. 451 U. S. 982 (1981). We now reverse. H — I H — I H-t The United States argues that Congress, by enacting the Medicare statute, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), specifically precluded review in the Court of Claims of adverse hearing officer determinations of the amount of Part B payments. We agree. Our lodestar is the language of the statute. Congress has specified in the Medicare statute that disputed carrier Part B determinations are to be subject to review in “a fair hearing by the carrier, in any case where the amount in controversy is $100 or more . . . 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added). See Schweiker v. McClure, ante, p. 188. Congress also provided explicitly for review by the Secretary of “determination[s] of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and [of] the determination of the amount of benefits under part A § 1395ff(a) (emphasis added). Individuals dissatisfied with the Secretary’s decision on such matters are granted the right to additional administrative review, together with a further option of judicial review, in two instances only: when the dispute relates to their eligibility to participate in either Part A or Part B, and when the dispute concerns the amount of benefits to which they are entitled under Part A. § 1395ff(b). Section 1395ff thus distinguishes between two types of administrative decisions: eligibility determinations (that decide whether an individual is 65 or over or “disabled” within the meaning of the Medicare program) and amount determinations (that decide the amount of the Medicare payment to be made on a particular claim). Conspicuously, the statute fails to authorize further review for determinations of the amount of Part B awards. In the context of the statute’s precisely drawn provisions, this omission provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims. See, e. g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 162-163 (1981); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 512-513 (1981). IV The legislative history confirms this view and explains its logic. The Committee Reports accompanying the original enactment of the Medicare program stated that the supplemental payments under the Part B program generally were expected to be smaller than those under the primary Part A program. Apparently, it was for this reason that the proposed bill did not provide for judicial review of “a determination concerning the amount of benefits under [P]art B . . . .” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1965). This intent to limit the review of the generally smaller Part B awards was reiterated when Congress amended § 1395ff(b) in 1972. When introducing this amendment, Senator Bennett stated that it was intended to clarify the intent of existing law, which “greatly restricted” the appealability of Medicare decisions “in order to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor matters.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972). The Senator explained that the amendment would assure that judicial review would be available as to questions of “eligibility to any benefits of medicare but not [as] to decisions on a claim for payment for a given service.” Ibid. The Conference Committee advanced an identical explanation for this amendment: “CLARIFICATION OF MEDICARE APPEAL PROCEDURES “Amendment No. 561: The Senate amendment added a new section to the House bill which would make clear that there is no authorization for an appeal to the Secretary or for judicial review on matters solely involving amounts of benefits under Part B, and that insofar as Part A amounts are concerned, appeal is authorized only if the amount in controversy is $100 or more and judicial review only if the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more. “The House recedes.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 61 (1972). These expressions of legislative intent unambiguously support our reading of the statutory language. Respondent advances no persuasive evidence of contrary congressional will. In such circumstances, our task is at an end. The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed. So ordered. For example, the private insurance carrier involved in this suit is the Prudential Insurance Company of America. Claimants’ reimbursable “reasonable charge” cannot exceed the “prevailing charge” calculated for “the locality.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). In an effort to control the extent to which the Medicare program contributes to the inflation of medical costs, the “prevailing charge” formula is based on typical local rates for the preceding year. See 42 CFR § 405.504(a)(2)(i) (1980) (defining “prevailing charge” as the fee that “would cover 75 percent of the customary charges made for similar services in the same locality during the calendar year preceding the start of the 12-month period (beginning July 1 of each year) in which the claim is submitted or the request for payment is made”) (emphasis added). Prudential defined respondent’s own catalog price as the relevant “prevailing charge” because respondent was virtually the only provider of dialysis supplies within Prudential’s locality. Respondent claimed that its July 1, 1974, catalog contained a substantial printing error for one product. This claim has been settled and is no longer at issue. The court added: “The plaintiff also asserts we have jurisdiction under section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 703. In view of our holding that we have jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, we find it unnecessary to consider this additional basis of jurisdiction. But cf. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977).” 225 Ct. Cl., at 256, n. 5, 634 F. 2d, at 585, n. 5. Respondent’s arguments were directed in large measure against the actions of Prudential. Prudential, however, was not made a party to this litigation. The Secretary’s regulations specify that the Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration “is the real party of interest in any litigation involving the administration of the [Medicare] program.” 42 CFR § 421.5(b) (1980). The court found respondent’s constitutional claims “insubstantial,” citing Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 225 Ct. Cl., at 268, 634 F. 2d, at 591. One judge wrote separately to express regret regarding the “short shrift” that the majority gave these claims. Id., at 272, 634 F. 2d, at 593. He reasoned that “Erika may have, probably has, made its constitutional allegations mostly to aid our jurisdiction, and we should not spurn this aid.” Id., at 272, 634 F. 2d, at 594 (Nichols, J., concurring). Respondent does not press these constitutional claims before us. As we find the language of the statute dispositive, we do not reach the Government’s alternative contentions that 42 U. S. C. § 405(h) controls or that the respondent has failed to show that the United States unequivocally has waived sovereign immunity. Although the statute in terms affords this right of review only to an “individual enrolled under [Part B],” 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C), the Secretary’s regulations make clear this right extends to suppliers of Part B services to whom individual beneficiaries have assigned their claims. 42 CFR § 405.801(a) (1980). See 42 U. S. C. § 405(b); 20 CFR part 404, subpart J (1981). See 42 U. S. C. § 405(g). “§ 1395ff. Determinations of Secretary “(a) Entitlement to and amount of benefits “The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and the determination of the amount of benefits under part A, shall be made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by him. “(b) Appeal by individuals “(1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to— “(A) whether he meets the conditions of section 426 or section 426a of this title [which set forth eligibility requirements to be satisfied before an individual is permitted to participate in Part A of the Medicare program], or “(B) whether he is eligible to enroll and has enrolled pursuant to the provisions of part B of [the Medicare program] ... , or, “(C) the amount of the benefits under part A (including a determination where such amount is determined to be zero) shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title and to judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.” With respect to “Appeals” the Senate Committee Report stated: “The committee’s bill provides for the Secretary to make determinations, under both the hospital insurance plan [Part A] and the supplementary plan [Part B], as to whether individuals are entitled to [Part A] hospital insurance benefits or [Part B] supplementary medical insurance benefits and for hearings by the Secretary and judicial review where an individual is dissatisfied with the Secretary’s determination. Hearings and judicial review are also provided for where an individual is dissatisfied with a determination as to the amount of benefits under the [Part A] hospital insurance plan if the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more. (Under the supplementary plan [Part B], carriers, not the Secretary, would review beneficiary complaints regarding the amount of benefits, and the bill does not provide for judicial review of a determination concerning the amount of benefits under part B where claims will probably be for substantially smaller amounts than under part A.) Hospitals, extended care facilities, and home health agencies would be entitled to hearing and judicial review if they are dissatisfied with the Secretary’s determination regarding their eligibility to participate in the program. It is intended that the remedies provided by these review procedures shall be exclusive.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 54-55 (1965) (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1965). Congressional limitation of the amount of procedure available to Part B claimants must be understood in light of the magnitude of the Part B program. In 1980, for instance, 158 million Part B claims were processed. Schweiker v. McClure, ante, at 190. As originally enacted, this section provided: “Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to entitlement under part A or part B, or as to amount of benefits under part A where the matter in controversy is $100 or more, shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title, and, in the case of a determination as to entitlement or as to amount of benefits where the amount in controversy is $1,000 or more, to judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.” 79 Stat. 330, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b) (1970 ed.) (emphasis added). The 1972 amendment replaced the emphasized language, including the first word “entitlement,” to create the current wording quoted in n. 10, supra. Senator Bennett’s entire opening statement was as follows: “. . . Mr. President, the purpose of the amendment is to make sure existing law, which gives the right of a person to go to court on the question of eligibility to receive welfare, is not interpreted to mean he can take the question of the Federal claim to court. If he did we would never have an end to it. This is to reconfirm the original intention of the law that the courts can determine only eligibility. “The situations in which medicare decisions are appealable to the courts were intended in the original law to be greatly restricted in order to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor matters. The law refers to ‘entitlement’ as being an issue subject to court review and the word was intended to mean eligibility to any benefits of medicare but not to decisions on a claim for payment for a given service. “If judicial review is made available where any claim is denied, as some court decisions have held, the resources of the Federal court system would be unduly taxed and little real value would be derived by the enrollees. The proposed amendment would merely clarify the original intent of the law and prevent the overloading of the courts with trivial matters because the intent is considered unclear.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972). The Senate agreed to the amendment without further discussion. Ibid. In addition to its substantive money claim assertedly arising under the Medicare statute, respondent argues that it derives such a substantive claim from an implied-in-faet contract with the United States, or as a third-party beneficiary to Prudential’s contract with the United States. These arguments fail because any such contracts with the United States necessarily would include the statutory preclusion of review of hearing officers’ determinations regarding the amount of Part B benefits. In response to questioning at oral argument, respondent’s counsel answered that it was asserting a constitutional right to judicial review of Prudential’s Part B determination. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. Respondent, however, neither argued this ground in the Court of Claims, included it among the questions presented to this Court in its brief in opposition or in its brief on the merits, nor devoted any substantial briefing to it. We consequently do not address the issue. See this Court’s Rules 34.2 and 22.1; cf. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc., 386 U. S. 317, 330 (1967).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. POWELL et al. No. 54. Argued October 14-15, 1964. Decided November 23, 1964. Bruce 3. Terris argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Joseph M. Howard, Meyer Rothwacks and Norman Sepenuk. Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briéf was Samuel D. Slade. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. In March 1963, the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to powers afforded the Commissioner by § 7602 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, summoned respondent Powell to appear before Special Agent Tiberino to give testimony and produce records relating to the 1958 and 1959 returns of the William Penn Laundry (the taxpayer), of which Powell was president. Powell appeared before the agent but refused to produce the records. Because the taxpayer’s returns had been once previously examined, and because the three-year statute of limitations barred assessment of additional deficiencies for those years except in cases of fraud (the asserted basis for this summons), Powell contended that before he could be forced to produce the records the Service had to indicate some grounds for its belief that a fraud had been committed. The agent declined to give any such indication and the meeting terminated. Thereafter the Service petitioned the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for enforcement of the administrative summons. With this petition the •agent filed an affidavit stating that he had been investigating the taxpayer’s returns for 1958 and 1959; that based on this investigation the Regional Commissioner of the Service had determined an additional examination of the taxpayer’s records for those years to be necessary and had sent Powell a letter to that effect; and that the agent had reason to suspect that the taxpayer had fraudulently falsified its 1958 and 1959 returns by overstating. expenses. At the court hearing Powell again stated his objections to producing the records and asked the Service to show some basis for its suspicion of fraud. The Service chose to stand on the petition and the agent’s affidavit,, and, after argument, the District Court ruled that the agent be given one hour in which to re-examine the records. The Court of Appeals reversed, 325 P. 2d 914. It reasoned that since the returns in question could only be reopened for fraud, re-examination of the taxpayer’s records must be barred by the prohibition of § 7605 (b) of the Code against “unnecessary examination” unless the Service possessed information “which might cause a reasonable man to suspect that there has been fraud in the return for the otherwise closed year”; and whether this standard has been met is to be decided “on the basis of the showing made in the normal course of an adversary proceeding . ...” The court concluded that the affidavit in itself was not sufficient to satisfy its test of probable cause. Consequently, enforcement of the summons was withheld. Because of the differing views in the circuits on the standards the Internal Revenue Service must meet to obtain judicial enforcement of its orders, we granted certiorari, 377 U. S. 929. We reverse, and. hold that the Government need make no showing of probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question that judicial enforcement of the administrative summons would be an abusive use of the court’s process, predicated on more than the fact of re-examination' and the running of the statute of limitations on ordinary tax liability. I. This enforcement proceeding was brought by the Government pursuant to § 7604 (b) of the Code. In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, decided last Term subsequent to the rendering of the decision below, this Court stated that § 7604 (b) “was intended only to cover persons who were summoned and wholly made default or contumaciously refused to comply.” 375 U. S:, at 448. There was no contumacious refusal in this case. Thus the Government’s conceded error in bringing its enforcement proceeding under § 7604 (b) instead of § 7402 (b) or § 7604 (a), each of which grants courts the general power to enforce the Commissioner’s summonses “by appropriate process,” raises a threshold question whether we must dismiss this case and force the Government to recommence enforcement proceedings under the appropriate sections. Since the Government did not apply for the prehearing sanctions of attachment and arrest peculiar to § 7604 (b), and since these constitute the major substantive differences between the sections, we think it would be holding too strictly to the forms of pleading to require the suit to be recommenced, and therefore treat the enforcement proceeding as having been brought under §§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a). II. Respondent primarily relies on § 7605 (b) to show that the Government must establish probable cause for suspecting fraud, and that the existence of probable cause is subject to challenge by the taxpayer at the hearing. That section provides: “No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer’s books of account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.” We do not equate necessity as contemplated by this .provision with probable cause or any like notion. If a taxpayer has filed fraudulent returns, a tax liability exists without regard to any period of limitations. Section 7602 authorizes the Commissioner to investigate any such liability. If, in order to determine the existence or nonexistence of fraud in the taxpayer’s returns, information in the taxpayer’s records is needed which is not already in the Commissioner’s possession, we think the examination is not “unnecessary” within the meaning of § 7605 (b). Although a more stringent interpretation is possible, one which would require some showing of cause for suspecting fraud, we reject such an interpretation because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject . which he desires to investigate, and because the legislative history of § 7605 (b) indicates that no severe restriction was intended. Section 7605 (b) first appeared as § 1309 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 310. Its purpose and operation were explained by the manager of the bill, Senator Penrose, on the Senate floor: “Mr. PENROSE. Mr. President, the provision is entirely in the interest of the taxpayer and for his relief from unnecessary annoyance. Since these income taxes and direct taxes have been in force very general complaint has been made, especially in the large centers of wealth and accumulation of money, at the repeated visits of tax examiners, who perhaps are overzealous or do not use the best of judgment in the exercise of their functions. I know that from many of the cities of the country very bitter complaints have reached me and have reached the department of unnecessary visits and inquisitions after a thorough examination is supposed to have been had. This section is purely in the interest of quieting all this trouble and in the interest of the peace of mind of the honest taxpayer. “Mr. WALSH; ... So that up to the present time an inspector could visit the office of an individual or corporation and inspect the books as many times as he chose? “Mr. PENROSE. And he often did so. “Mr. WALSH. . . . And this provision of the Senate committee seeks, to limit the inspection to one visit unless the commissioner indicates that there is necessity for further examination? “Mr. PENROSE. That is the purpose of the amendment. “Mr. WALSH. ... I heartily agree with the beneficial results that the amendment will produce to the taxpayer. “Mr. PENROSE. I knew the Senator would agree to the amendment, and it will go a long way toward relieving petty annoyances on the part of honest taxpayers.” . 61 Cong. Rec. 5855 (Sépt. 28, 1921). Congress recognized a need for a curb on the investigating powers of low-echelon revenue agents, and considered that it met this need simply and fully by requiring such agents to clear any repetitive examination with a superior. For us to import a probable cause standard to be enforced by the courts would substantially overshoot the goal which the legislators sought to attain. There is no intimation in the legislative history that Congress intended the courts to oversee the Commissioner’s determinations to investigate. No mention was made of the statute of limitations and the exception for fraud. We are asked to read § 7605 (b) together with the limitations sections, in such a way as to impose a probable cause standard upon the Commissioner from the expiration date of the ordinary limitations period forward. Without some solid indication in the legislative history that such a gloss was intended, we find it unacceptable. Our reading of the statute is said to render the first clause of § 7605 (b) surplusage to a large extent, fbr, as interpreted, the clause adds little beyond the relevance and materiality requirements of § 7602. That clause does appear to require that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, but we think its primary purpose was no more than to emphasize the responsibility of agents to exercise prudent judgment in wielding the extensive powers granted to them by the Internal Revenue Code. This view of the statute is reinforced by the general rejection of probable cause requirements in like circumstances involving other agencies. In Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 216, in reference to the Administrator’s subpoena power under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court said “his investigative function, in searching out violations with a view to securing enforcement of the Act, is essentially the same as the grand jury’s, or the court’s in issuing other pretrial orders for the discovery of evidence, and is governed by the same limitations,” and accordingly applied the view that inquiry must not be “ ‘limited ... by forecasts of the probable result of the investigation.’ ” In United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643, the Court said of the Federal Trade Commission, “It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.” While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue derives from a different body of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force when the scope of the Commissioner’s power is called in question. III. Reading the statutes as we do, the Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of his summons, either before or after the three-year statute of limitations on ordinary tax Labil-ities has expired. He must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed-j-in particular, that the “Secretary or his delegate,” after investigation, has determined the further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing to that effect. This does not make meaningless the adversary hearing to which the taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered. At the hearing he “may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground,” Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, at 449. Nor does our reading of the statutes mean that under no circumstances may the court inquire into the underlying reasons for the examination. It is the court’s process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such, as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation. The burden of showing an abuse, of the court’s process is on the taxpayer, and it is not met by a mere showing, as was made in this case, that the statute of limitations for ordinary deficiencies has run or that the records in question have already been once examined. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. I. R. C., §6501 (a). I. R. C., § 6501 (c) (1), which in relevant part provides: “In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.” The parties subsequently agreed that if the Government was upheld in its claim of right to examine without showing probable cause, the one-hour time limitation would be removed. See page 52, infra. 325 F. 2d 914, 915-916. Id,., at 916. “Probable cause” as used hi this opinion is meant to include the full range of formulations offered by lower courts. Compare Foster v. United States, 265 F. 2d 183 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Ryan, 320 F. 2d 500 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1963), affirmed today, post, p. 61, with O’Connor v. O’Connell, 253 F. 2d 365 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1958), followed in Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F. 2d 185 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1959); Globe Construction Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F. 2d 148 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1956); De Masters v. Arend, 313 F. 2d 79 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1963). Section 7604 (b) provides: “Whenever ■ any person summoned under section 6420 (e) '(2), 6421 (f)(2), or 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required, the Secretary or his delegate may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States commissioner for the district within which the person so summoned resides or is found for an attachment against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before him to proceed to a hearing of the ease; and upon such hearing the judge or the United States commissioner shall have power to make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his default or disobedience.” The two sections are virtually identical. Section 7402 (b) provides: “If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.” See n. 18, infra. Section 7602 provides; “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of' any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized— “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer'or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” Other relevant legislative history to like effect may be found in H. R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1921) ; S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1921) ; 61 Cong. Rec. 5202 (Aug. 18, 1921), remarks of Mr. Hawley. The provision was. re-enacted in 1926. In the Senate, a substitute measure was adopted which would have limited the Commissioner to two examinations appertaining to returns of any one year. Senator Reed’s objection to the original provision was: “By merely claiming fraud the Government at any time can make examination after examination, subject only to one limitation, that it must give notice that it is going to make the examination. That, in ordinary course, is • done by the mere writing of a letter,” 67 Cong. Rec. 3856 (Feb. 12, 1926). There is no indication in the discussion that the courts were thought to play any significant limiting role. The Senate substitute was ultimately deleted by the Conference Committee and the original provision resubstituted. H. R. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 55. The section was re-enacted in 1939 and 1954 without substantial change and without further elaboration of the congressional intent. Respondent contends that in re-enacting the provision, Congress must have been aware of, and acquiesced in, decisions of lower courts that a showing of probable cause is required. In re Andrews’ Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804 (1937); Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F. 2d 583 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1939); In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, 39 F. Supp. 304 (1941); Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. 2d 731 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1942). These cases represent neither a settled judicial construction, see In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746 (1937),; nor one which we would be justified in presuming Congress, by its silence, impliedly approved. Compare Shapiro v. United States, 355 U. S. 1. Revenue Act of 1921, §250 (d), 42 Stat. 265, provided a four-year period of limitation on ordinary tax liability. The contrary view derives no support from the characterization •■of the limitations provision as a' “statute of repose.” The present three-year limitation on assessment of ordinary deficiencies relieves the taxpayer.of concern for further assessments of that type, but it by no means follows that it limits the right of the Government to investigate with respect to deficiencies for which no statute of limitations is imposed. The Court of Appeals 'appears to have been led astray by the fact that the Government argued its case on the premise that § 7604 (b) was the governing statute. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law, §3.12 (1958). Because § 7604 (a) contains no provision specifying the procedure to be followed in invoking the court’s jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply, Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. 2d 731. The proceedings are instituted by filing a complaint, followed, by answer and hearing. If the taxpayer has contumaciously refused to comply with the administrative summons and the Service fears he may flee the jurisdiction, application for the sanctions available under § 7604 (b) might be made simultaneously with the filing of the complaint. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law, § 3.12 (1958). See Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 865 (1963).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. GAUBERT No. 89-1793. Argued November 26, 1990 Decided March 26, 1991 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 334. Assistant Attorney General Gerson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and John F. Daly. Abbe David Lowell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Max Hathaway and Eugene Gressman. Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. When the events in this case occurred, the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1461-1470, provided for the chartering and regulation of federal savings and loan associations (FSLA’s). Section 1464(a) authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) “under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation” of FSLA’s, and to issue charters, “giving primary consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States.” In this case the FHLBB and the Federal Home Loan Bank--Dallas (FHLB-D) undertook to advise about and oversee certain aspects of the operation of a thrift institution. Their conduct in this respect was challenged by a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (FTCA), asserting that the FHLBB and FHLB-D had been negligent in carrying out their supervisory activities. The question before us is whether certain actions taken by the FHLBB and FHLB-D are within the “discretionary function” exception to the liability of the United States under the FTCA. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit answered this question in the negative. We have the contrary view and reverse. 8-4 This FTCA suit arises from the supervision by federal regulators of the activities of Independent American Savings Association (IASA), a Texas-chartered and federally insured savings and loan. Respondent Thomas M. Gaubert was IASA’s chairman of the board and largest shareholder. In 1984, officials at the FHLBB sought to have IASA merge with Investex Savings, a failing Texas thrift. Because the FHLBB and FHLB-D were concerned about Gaubert’s other financial dealings, they requested that he sign a “neutralization agreement” which effectively removed him from IASA’s management. They also asked him to post a $25 million interest in real property as security for his personal guarantee that IASA’s net worth would exceed regulatory mínimums. Gaubert agreed to both conditions. Federal officials then provided regulatory and financial advice to enable IASA to consummate the merger with Investex. Throughout this period, the regulators instituted no formal action against IASA. Instead, they relied on the likelihood that IASA and Gaubert would follow their suggestions and advice. In the spring of 1986, the regulators threatened to close IASA unless its management and board of directors were replaced; all of the directors agreed to resign. The new officers and directors, including the chief executive officer who was a former FHLB-D employee, were recommended by FHLB-D. After the new management took over, FHLB-D officials became more involved in IASA’s day-today business. They recommended the hiring of a certain consultant to advise IASA on operational and financial matters; they advised IASA concerning whether, when, and how its subsidiaries should be placed into bankruptcy; they mediated salary disputes; they reviewed the draft of a complaint to be used in litigation; they urged IASA to convert from state to federal charter; and they actively intervened when the Texas Savings and Loan Department attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA. In each instance, FHLB-D’s advice was followed. Although IASA was thought to be financially sound while Gaubert managed the thrift, the new directors soon announced that IASA had a substantial negative net worth. On May 20, 1987, Gaubert filed an administrative tort claim with the FHLBB, FHLB-D, and FSLIC, seeking $75 million in damages for the lost value of his shares and $25 million for the property he had forfeited under his personal guarantee. That same day, the FSLIC assumed the receivership of IASA. After Gaubert’s administrative claim was denied six months later, he filed the instant FTCA suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. His amended complaint sought $100 million in damages for the alleged • negligence of federal officials in selecting the new officers and directors and in participating in the day-today management of IASA. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the United States, finding that all of the challenged actions of the regulators fell within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, found in 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a). No. CA 3-87-2989-T (Sept. 28, 1988), App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 885 F. 2d 1284 (1989). Relying on this Court’s decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955), the court distinguished between “policy decisions,” which fall within the exception, and “operational actions,” which do not. 885 F. 2d, at 1287. After claiming further support for this distinction in this Court’s decisions in United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S. 797 (1984), and Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U. S. 531 (1988), the court explained: “The authority of the FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas to take the actions that were taken in this case, although not guided by regulations, is unchallenged. The FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas officials did not have regulations telling them, at every turn, how to accomplish their goals for IASA; this fact, however, does not automatically render their decisions discretionary and immune from FTC A suits. Only policy oriented decisions enjoy such immunity. Thus, the FHLBB and FHLB-Dallas officials were only protected by the discretionary function exception until their actions became operational in nature and thus crossed the line established in Indian Towing.” 885 F. 2d, at 1289 (citations and footnote omitted). In the court’s view, that line was crossed when the regulators “began to advise IASA management and participate in management decisions.” Id., at 1290. Consequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the claims which concerned the merger, neutralization agreement, personal guarantee, and replacement of IASA management, but reversed the dismissal of the claims which concerned the regulators’ activities after they assumed a supervisory role in IASA’s day-to-day affairs. We granted certiorari, 496 U. S. 935 (1990), and now reverse. H-l 1 — 1 The liability of the United States under the FTC A is subject to the various exceptions contained in §2680, including the “discretionary function” exception at issue here. That exception provides that the Government is not liable for “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a). The exception covers only acts that are discretionary in nature, acts that “involv[e] an element of judgment or choice,” Berkovitz, supra, at 536; see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 34 (1953); and “it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor” that governs whether the exception applies. Varig Airlines, supra, at 813. The requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a “federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,” because “the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.” Berkovitz, 486 U. S., at 536. Furthermore, even “assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment,” it remains to be decided “whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Ibid. See Varig Airlines, 467 U. S., at 813. Because the purpose of the exception is to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,” id., at 814, when properly construed, the exception “protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.” Berkovitz, supra, at 537. Where Congress has delegated the authority to an independent agency or to the Executive Branch to implement the general provisions of a regulatory statute and to issue regulations to that end, there is no doubt that planning-level decisions establishing programs are protected by the discretionary function exception, as is the promulgation of regulations by which the agencies are to carry out the programs. In addition, the actions of Government agents involving the necessary element of choice and grounded in the social, economic, or political goals of the statute and regulations are protected. Thus, in Dalehite, the exception barred recovery for claims arising from a massive fertilizer explosion. The fertilizer had been manufactured, packaged, and prepared for export pursuant to detailed regulations as part of a comprehensive federal program aimed at increasing the food supply in occupied areas after World War II. 346 U. S., at 19-21. Not only was the cabinet-level decision to institute the fertilizer program discretionary, but so were the decisions concerning the specific requirements for manufacturing the fertilizer. Id., at 37-38. Nearly 30 years later, in Varig Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration’s actions in formulating and implementing a “spot-check” plan for airplane inspection were protected by the discretionary function exception because of the agency’s authority to establish safety standards for airplanes. 467 U. S., at 815. Actions taken in furtherance of the program were likewise protected, even if those particular actions were negligent. Id., at 820. Most recently, in Berkovitz, we examined a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the licensing of laboratories to produce polio vaccine and the release to the public of particular drugs. 486 U. S., at 533. We found that some of the claims fell outside the exception, because the agency employees had failed to follow the specific directions contained in the applicable regulations, i. e., in those instances, there was no room for choice or judgment. Id., at 542-543. We then remanded the case for an analysis of the remaining claims in light of the applicable regulations. Id., at 544. Under the applicable precedents, therefore, if a regulation mandates particular conduct, and the employee obeys the direction, the Government will be protected because the action will be deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the promulgation of the regulation. See Dalehite, supra, at 36. If the employee violates the mandatory regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to policy. On the other hand, if a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regulations. Not all agencies issue comprehensive regulations, however. Some establish policy on a case-by-case basis, whether through adjudicatory proceedings or through administration of agency programs. Others promulgate regulations on some topics, but not on others. In addition, an agency may rely on internal guidelines rather than on published regulations. In any event, it will most often be true that the general aims and policies of the controlling statute will be evident from its text. When established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion. For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a finding .that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis. 1 — 1 I — i 1 — l In light of our eases and their interpretation of § 2680(a), it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or management level of the bank involved in this case. A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in that description that refers exclusively to policy-making or planning functions. Day-to-day management of banking affairs, like the management of other businesses, regularly requires judgment as to which of a range of permissible courses is the wisest. Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level. “[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case.” Varig Airlines, supra, at 813. In Varig Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration had devised a system of “spot-checking” airplanes. We held that not only was this act discretionary but so too were the acts of agency employees in executing the program since they had a range of discretion to exercise in deciding how to carry out the spot-check activity. 467 U. S., at 820. Likewise in Berkovitz, although holding that some acts on the operational level were not discretionary and therefore were without the exception, we recognized that other acts, if held to be discretionary on remand, would be protected. 486 U. S., at 545. The Court’s first use of the term “operational” in connection with the discretionary function exception occurred in Dalehite, where the Court noted that “[t]he decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the Government’s fertilizer program.” 346 U. S., at 42. Gaubert relies upon this statement as support for his argument that the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate analysis to the allegations of the amended complaint, but the distinction in Dalehite was merely description of the level at which the challenged conduct occurred. There was no suggestion that decisions made at an operational level could not also be based on policy. Neither is the decision below supported by Indian Towing. There the Coast Guard had negligently failed to maintain a lighthouse by allowing the light to go out. The United States was held liable, not because the negligence occurred at the operational level but because making sure the light was operational “did not involve any permissible exercise of policy judgment.” Berkovitz, 486 U. S., at 538, n. 3. Indeed, the Government did not even claim the benefit of the exception but unsuccessfully urged that maintaining the light was a governmental function for which it could not be liable. The Court of Appeals misinterpreted Berkovitz’s reference to Indian Towing as perpetuating a nonexistent dichotomy between discretionary functions and operational activities. 885 F. 2d, at 1289. Consequently, once the court determined that some of the actions challenged by Gaubert occurred at an operational level, it concluded, incorrectly, that those actions must necessarily have been outside the scope of the discretionary function exception. } — 1 We now inquire whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that some of the acts alleged in Gaubert’s amended complaint were not discretionary acts within the meaning of § 2680(a). The decision we review was entered on a motion to dismiss. We therefore “accept all of the factual allegations in [Gaubert’s] complaint as true” and ask whether the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Berkovitz, supra, at 540. The Court of Appeals dismissed several of the allegations in the amended complaint on the ground that the challenged activities fell within the discretionary function exception. These allegations concerned “the decision to merge IASA with Investex and seek a neutralization agreement from Gaubert,” as well as “the decision to replace the IASA Board of Directors with FHLBB approved persons, and the actions taken to effectuate that decision.” 885 F. 2d, at 1290. Gaubert has not challenged this aspect of the court’s ruling. Consequently, we review only those allegations in the amended complaint which the Court of Appeals viewed as surviving the Government’s motion to dismiss. These claims asserted that the regulators had achieved “a constant federal presence” at IASA. App. 14, ¶ 33. In describing this presence, the amended complaint alleged that the regulators “consulted] as to day-to-day affairs and operations of IASA,” id., at 14, ¶ 33a; “participated in management decisions” at IASA board meetings, id., at 14, ¶33^ “became involved in giving advice, making recommendations, urging, or directing action or procedures at IASA,” id., at 14, ¶33€; and.“advised their hand-picked directors and officers on a variety of subjects,” id., at 14, ¶34. Specifically, the complaint enumerated seven instances or kinds of objectionable official involvement. First, the regulators “arranged for the hiring for IASA of . . . consultants on operational and financial matters and asset management. ” Id., at 14, ¶ 34a. Second, the officials “urged or directed that IASA convert from a state-chartered savings and loan to a federally-chartered savings and loan in part so that it could become the exclusive government entity with power to control IASA.” Id., at 14, ¶ 34b. Third, the regulators “gave advice and made recommendations concerning whether, when, and how to place IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy.” Id., at 15, ¶34c. Fourth, the officials “mediated salary disputes between IASA and its senior officers.” Id., at 15, ¶34d. Fifth, the regulators “reviewed a draft complaint in litigation” that IASA’s board contemplated filing and were “so actively involved in giving advice, making recommendations, and directing matters related to IASA’s litigation policy that they were able successfully to stall the Board of Directors’ ultimate decision to file the complaint until the Bank Board in Washington had reviewed, advised on, and commented on the draft.” Id., at 15, ¶346 (emphasis in original). Sixth, the regulators “actively intervened with the Texas Savings and Loan Department (IASA’s principal regulator) when the State attempted to install a supervisory agent at IASA.” Id., at 15, ¶ 34f. Finally, the FHLB-D president wrote the IASA board of directors “affirming that his agency had placed that Board of Directors into office, and describing their mutual goal to protect the FSLIC insurance fund.” Id., at 15-16, ¶ 34g. According to Gaubert, the losses he suffered were caused by the regulators’ “assumption of the duty to participate in, and to make, the day-to-day decisions at IASA and [the] negligent discharge of that assumed duty.” Id., at 17, ¶39. Moreover, he alleged that “[t]he involvement of the FHLB-Dallas in the affairs of IASA went beyond its normal regulatory activity, and the agency actually substituted its decisions for those of the directors and officers of the association.” Id., at 19, ¶55. We first inquire whether the challenged actions were discretionary, or whether they were instead controlled by mandatory statutes or regulations. Berkovitz, supra, at 536. Although the FHLBB, which oversaw the other agencies at issue, had promulgated extensive regulations which were then in effect, see 12 CFR §§500-591 (1986), neither party has identified formal regulations governing the conduct in question. As already noted, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a) authorizes the FHLBB to examine and regulate FSLA’s, “giving primary consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States.” Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that the agencies possessed broad statutory authority to supervise financial institutions. The relevant statutory provisions were not mandatory, but left to the judgment of the agency the decision of when to institute proceedings against a financial institution and which mechanism to use. For example, the FSLIC had authority to terminate an institution’s insured status, issue cease-and-desist orders, and suspend or remove an institution’s officers, if “in the opinion of the Corporation” such action was warranted because the institution or its officers were engaging in an “unsafe or unsound practice” in connection with the business of the institution. 12 U. S. C. §§ 1730(b)(1), (e)(1), (g)(1). The FHLBB had parallel authority to issue cease- and-desist orders and suspend or remove an institution’s officers. §§ 1464(d)(2)(A), (d)(4)(a). Although the statute enumerated specific grounds warranting an appointment by the FHLBB of a conservator or receiver, the determination of whether any of these grounds existed depended upon “the opinion of the Board.” § 1464(d)(6)(A). The agencies here were not bound to act in a particular way; the exercise of their authority involved a great “element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz, supra, at 536. We are unconvinced by Gaubert’s assertion that because thé agencies did not institute formal proceedings against IASA, they had no discretion to take informal actions as they did. Although the statutes provided only for formal proceedings, there is nothing in the language or structure of the statutes that prevented the regulators from invoking less formal means of supervision of financial institutions. Not only was there no statutory or regulatory mandate which compelled the regulators to act in a particular way, but there was no prohibition against the use of supervisory mechanisms not specifically set forth in statute or regulation. This is the view of the FHLBB; for in a resolution passed in 1982, the FHLBB adopted “a formal statement of policy regarding the Bank Board’s use of supervisory actions,” which provided in part: “In carrying out its supervisory responsibilities with respect to thrift institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (‘FSLIC’), . . . it is the policy of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that violations of law or regulation, and unsafe or unsound practices will not be tolerated and will result in the initiation of strong supervisory and/or enforcement action by the Board. It is the Bank Board’s goal to minimize, and where possible, to prevent losses occasioned by violations or unsafe and unsound practices by taking prompt and effective supervisory action. . . . “The Board recognizes that supervisory actions must be tailored to each case, and that such actions will vary according to the severity of the violation of law or regulation or the unsafe or unsound practice, as well as to the responsiveness and willingness of the association to take corrective action. The following guidance should be considered for all supervisory actions. “In each case, based upon an assessment of management’s willingness to take appropriate corrective action and the potential harm to the institution if corrective action is not effected, the staff must weigh the appropriateness of available supervisory actions. If the potential harm is slight and there is a substantial probability that management will correct the situation, informal supervisory guidance and oversight is appropriate. If some potential harm to the institution or its customers is likely, a supervisory agreement should be promptly negotiated and implemented. If substantial financial harm may occur to the institution, its customers, or the FSLIC and there is substantial doubt that corrections will be made promptly, a cease-and-desist order should be sought immediately through the Office of General Counsel.” FHLBB Resolution No. 82-381 (May 26, 1982), reprinted in Brief for Respondent 4a-6a. From this statement it is clear that the regulators had the discretion to supervise I AS A through informal means, rather than invoke statutory sanctions. Gaubert also argues that the challenged actions fall outside the discretionary function exception because they involved the mere application of technical skills and business expertise. Brief for Respondent 33. But this is just another way of saying that the considerations involving the day-to-day management of a business concern such as IASA are so precisely formulated that decisions at the operational level never involve the exercise of discretion within the meaning of § 2680(a), a notion that we have already rejected in disapproving the rationale of the Court of Appeals’ decision. It may be that certain decisions resting on mathematical calculations, for example, involve no choice or judgment in carrying out the calculations, but the regulatory acts alleged here are not of that genre. Rather, it is plain to us that each of the challenged actions involved the exercise of choice and judgment. We are also convinced that each of the regulatory actions in question involved the kind of policy judgment that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. The FHLBB Resolution quoted above, coupled with the relevant statutory provisions, established governmental policy which is presumed to have been furthered when the regulators exercised their discretion to choose from various courses of action in supervising IASA. Although Gaubert contends that day-to-day decisions concerning IASA’s affairs did not implicate social, economic, or political policies, even the Court of Appeals recognized that these day-to-day “operational” decisions were undertaken for policy reasons of primary concern to the regulatory agencies: “[T]he federal regulators here had two discrete purposes in mind as they commenced day-to-day operations at IASA. First, they sought to protect the solvency of the savings and loan industry at large, and maintain the public’s confidence in that industry. Second, they sought to preserve the assets of IASA for the benefit of depositors and shareholders, of which Gaubert was one.” 885 F. 2d, at 1290. Consequently, Gaubert’s assertion that the day-to-day involvement of the regulators with IASA is actionable because it went beyond “normal regulatory activity” is insupportable. We find nothing in Gaubert’s amended complaint effectively alleging that the discretionary acts performed by the regulators were not entitled to the exemption. By Gaubert’s own admission, the regulators replaced IASA’s management in order to protect the FSLIC’s insurance fund; thus it cannot be disputed that this action was based on public policy considerations. The regulators’ actions in urging IASA to convert to federal charter and in intervening with the state agency were directly related to public policy considerations regarding federal oversight of the thrift industry. So were advising the hiring of a financial consultant, advising when to place IASA subsidiaries into bankruptcy, intervening on IASA’s behalf with Texas officials, advising on litigation policy, and mediating salary disputes. There are no allegations that the regulators gave anything other than the kind of advice that was within the purview of the policies behind the statutes. There is no doubt that in advising IASA the regulators used the power of persuasion to accomplish their goals. Nevertheless, we long ago recognized that regulators have the authority to use such tactics in supervising financial institutions. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321 (1963), the Court considered the wide array of supervisory tools available to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve System in overseeing banks. Noting the “frequent and intensive” nature of bank examinations and the “detailed periodic reports” banks were required to submit, the Court found that “the agencies maintain virtually a day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system.” Id., at 329. Moreover, the agencies’ ability to terminate a bank’s insured status and invoke other less drastic sanctions meant that “recommendations by the agencies concerning banking practices tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of formal compliance proceedings.” Id., at 330. These statements apply with equal force to supervision by federal agencies of the savings and loan industry. More than 30 years ago, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made similar observations in a case involving allegations that the FHLBB had improperly pressured a savings and loan’s directors to resign. See Miami Beach Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Callander, 256 F. 2d 410 (1958). The court noted that “[w]hen a governmental agency holds such great powers over its offspring, even to the point of appointing a conservator or receiver to replace the management ... , it is difficult to hold that an informal request, even demand, to clean house would amount to an abuse of the statutory powers and discretion of the agency.” Id., at 414-415. Consequently, neither the pervasiveness of the regulators’ presence at IASA nor the forcefulness of their recommendations is sufficient to alter the supervisory nature of the regulators’ actions. In the end, Gaubert’s amended complaint alleges nothing more than negligence on the part of the regulators. Indeed, the two substantive counts seek relief for “negligent selection of directors and officers” and “negligent involvement in day-to-day operations.” App. 17, 18. Gaubert asserts that the discretionary function exception protects only those acts of negligence which occur in the course of establishing broad policies, rather than individual acts of negligence which occur in the course of day-to-day activities. Brief for Respondent 39. But we have already disposed of that submission. See supra, at 325. If the routine or frequent nature of a decision were sufficient to remove an otherwise discretionary act from the scope of the exception, then countless policy-based decisions by regulators exercising day-to-day supervisory authority would be actionable. This is not the rule of our cases. V Because from the face of the amended complaint, it is apparent that all of the challenged actions of the federal regulators involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of public policy goals, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to find the claims barred by the discretionary function exception of the FTC A. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Subsequent to the events at issue here, and in response to the current crisis in the thrift industry, Congress enacted comprehensive changes to the statutory scheme concerning thrift regulation by means of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. FIRREA abolished the FHLBB and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), two of the agencies at issue here, and repealed the statutory provisions governing those agencies’ conduct. §§ 401, 407, 103 Stat. 354-357, 363. At the same time, it granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the newly established Office of Thrift Supervision discretionary enforcement authority similar to that enjoyed by the former agencies. §§ 201, 301, 103 Stat. 187-188, 277-343. Section 1464(a) stated in full: “In order to provide thrift institutions for the deposit or investment of funds and for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and services, the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as Federal savings and loan associations, or Federal savings banks, and to issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States. The lending and investment authorities are conferred by this section to provide such institutions the flexibility necessary to maintain their role of providing credit for housing.” FHLB-D was one of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB’s) established by the FHLBB pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1423. The FHLBB was specifically empowered to authorize the performance by FHLB personnel of “any function” of the FHLBB, except for adjudications and the promulgation of rules and regulations. 12 U. S. C. § 1437(a). The FTCA, subject to various exceptions, waives sovereign immunity from suits for negligent or wrongful acts of Government employees. Gaubert was required by statute to seek relief from the agencies prior to filing an FTCA suit. See 28 U. S. C. § 2675. Citing 12 U. S. C. § 1464, the court determined that the FHLBB had broad discretionary authority to regulate the savings and loan industry. Although acknowledging that most of Gaubert’s allegations involved the regulators’ activity prior to the date of receivership, the court stressed that had the regulators invoked their statutory authority to place IASA in receivership earlier, all of the challenged actions would have fallen within the exception. The court also pointed out that had IASA and Gaubert failed to cooperate with the regulators, receivership likely would have followed sooner. In the District Court’s view, “[t]he fact that [Gaubert] cooperated when he could have refused will not give [him] a cause of action where he otherwise would have none.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a-25a. Moreover, because the decision to place IASA in receivership involved the exercise of discretion, the decision not to do so at an earlier date was necessarily discretionary as well. The court viewed the decision to supervise IASA’s activities first by informal means as an extension of the discretionary decision to postpone receivership. There are obviously discretionary acts performed by a Government agent that are within the scope of his employment but not within the discretionary function exception because these acts cannot be said to be based on the purposes that the regulatory regime seeks to accomplish. If one of the officials involved in this case drove an automobile on a mission connected with his official duties and negligently collided with another car, the exception would not apply. Although driving requires the constant exercise of discretion, the official’s decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory policy. As explained above, the agencies at issue here have since been abolished, although they have been replaced by agencies possessing similar discretionary authority. See n. 1, supra. We note that in a recent opinion by Judge Garza, who also wrote the opinion at issue here, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to extend its decision in Gaubert to impose liability on the FDIC for failure to institute statutory receivership proceedings against a thrift. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mmakat, 907 F. 2d 546, 552 (1990).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL WOODWORK MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 110. Argued January 18 and 19, 1967. Decided April 17, 1967. Charles B. Mahin argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in No. 110 and for respondents in No. 111. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondent in No. 110 and for petitioner in No. 111. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall; Arnold Ordman and Norton J. Come. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by William B. Barton and Harry J. Lambeth for the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.; by Gerard D. Reilly and Winthrop A. Johns for the Associated' General Contractors of America et al.; by Kenneth C. McGuiness and Stanley R. Strauss for the American Boiler Manufacturers Association; and by /. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Laurence Gold and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. Together with No. Ill, National Labor Relations Board v. National Woodwork Manufacturers Association’ et al., also on certiorari to the same court! Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Landrum-Griffin Act amendments enacted in 1959, 73 Stat. 542, § 8 (b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, became § 8 (b) (4) (B) and § 8 (e) was added. The questions here are whether, in the circumstances of these cases, the Metropolitan District Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (hereafter the Union), committed the unfair labor practices prohibited by §§8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). Frouge Corporation, a Bridgeport, Connecticut, concern, was the general contractor on a housing project in Philadelphia. Frouge had a collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters’ International Union under which Frouge agreed to be bound by the rules and regulations agreed upon by local unions with' contractors in areas in which Frouge had jobs. Frouge was therefore subject to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and an organization of Phila-' delphia contractors, the General Building Contractors Association, Inc. A sentence in a provision of that agreement entitled Rule 17 provides that “. . . No member of this District Council will handle . . . any doors . . . which have been fitted prior to being furnished on the job ....” Frouge’s Philadelphia project called for 3,600 doors. Customarily, before the doors could be hung on such projects, “blank” or “blind” doors would be mortised for the knob, routed for the hinges, and beveled to make them fit between jambs. These are tasks traditionally performed' in the Philadelphia area by the carpenters employed on the jobsite. However, precut and prefitted doors ready to hang may be purchased from door manufacturers. Although Frouge’s contract and job specifications did not call for premachined doors, and “blank” or “blind” doors could have been ordered, Frouge contracted for the purchase of premachined doors from, a Pennsylvania door manufacturer which is a member of the National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, petitioner in No. 110 and respondent in No. 111. The Union ordered its carpenter members not to hang the doors when they arrived at the jobsite; Frouge thereupon withdrew the prefabricated doors and substituted “blank” doors which were fitted and cut by its carpenters on the jobsite. The National Woodwork Manufacturers Association and another filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the Union alleging that by including the “will not handle” sentence of Rule 17 in the collective bargaining agreement the Union committed the unfair labor practice under § 8 (e) of entering into an “agreement . . . whereby [the] employer . . . agrees to cease or refrain from handling . . . any of the products of any other employer . '. . ,” and alleging further that in enforcing the sentence against Frouge, the Union committed the unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (B) of “forcing or requiring any person to cease using . . , the products of any other . . . manufacturer . . . .” The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges, 149 N. L. R. B. 646. The Board adopted the findings of the Trial Examiner that the “will not handle" sen- ■ tence in Rule 17 was language used by the parties to protect and preserve cutting out and fitting as unit work to be performed by the jobsite carpenters. The Board also adopted the holding of the Trial Examiner that both the sentence of Rule 17 itself and its maintenance against Frouge were therefore “primary” activity outside the prohibitions of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B). The following statement of the Trial Examiner was adopted by the Board: “I am convinced and find that , the tasks of cutting out and fitting millwork, including doors, has, at least customarily, been performed by the carpenters employed -on the jobsite. ■ Certainly, this provision of rule 17 is not concerned with the nature of the employer with whom the contractor does business nor with the employment conditions of other employers or employees, nor does it attempt to control such other employers or employees. The provision guards against encroachments on the cutting out and fitting work of the contract unit employees who have performed that work in the past. Its purpose is plainly to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his Qwn employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the employees by preserving their unit work. Merely because it incidentally also affects other parties is no basis for invalidating this provision. “I find that ,. . [the provision] is a lawful work-protection or work-preservation provision and that Respondents have not violated Section 8 (e) of the Act by entering into agreements containing this provision and by thereafter maintaining and enforcing this provision.” 149 N. L. R. B., at 657. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board in this respect. 354 F. 2d 594, 599. The court held that the “will not handle” agreement violated § 8 (e) without regard to any “primary” or “secondary” objective, and remanded to the Board with instructions to enter an order accordingly. In the court’s view, the sentence was designed to effect a product boycott like the one condemned in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, and Congress meant, in enacting § 8 (e) and §8 (b)(4)(B), to prohibit such agreements and conduct forcing employers to enter into them. The Court of Appeals sustained, however, the dismissal of the- § 8 (b)(4)(B)* charge. The court agreed with the Board that the Union’s conduct as to Frouge involved only a primary dispute with it and held that the conduct was therefore not prohibited by that section but expressly protected by the proviso “ft]hat nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing . . . .” 354 F. 2d, at 597. We granted certiorari on the petition of the Woodwork Manufacturers Association in No. 110 and on the petition of the Board in No. 111. 384 U. S. 968. We affirm in No. 110 and reverse in No. 111. I. Even on the doubtful premise that the words of § 8 (e) unambiguously embrace the sentence of Rule 17, this does not end inquiry into Congress’ purpose in enacting the section. It is a “familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459. That principle has particular application in the construction of labor legislation which is “to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.” Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, 99-100. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58; Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46; Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274; Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270; Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665; Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667. Strongly held opposing views have invariably marked controversy over labor's use of the boycott to further its aims by involving an employer in disputes not his own. But congressional action to deal with such conduct has .stopped short of proscribing identical activity having the object of pressuring the employer for agreements regulat- ■ ing relations between him and his own employees. That Congress meant §§ 8 (e) and 8(b)(4)(B) to prohibit only “secondary” objectives clearly appears from an examination of the history of congressional action on the subject; we may, by such an examination, “recon.- ' stitute the gamut of values current at the time when the words were uttered.” The history begins with judicial application of the Sherman Act (26 Stat. 209) to labor activities. Federal court injunctions freely issued against all manner of strikes and boycotts under rulings that condemned virtually every collective activity of labor as an unlawful restraint of trade. The first congressional response to vehement labor protests came with § 20 of the Clayton Act in 1914. That section purported drastically to limit the injunction power of federal courts in controversies “involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms .or conditions of employment.” In terms, it prohibited restraining any person from “ceasing to perform any work or labor” or “from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do.” 38 Stat. 738. Labor hailed the law as a charter immunizing its activities from the antitrust laws. This expectation was disappointed when Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Assn., 274 U. S. 37, held that § 20 immunized only trade union activities directed against an employer by his own employees. In Duplex, the union carried on an elaborate scheme to coerce and restrain neutral customers of the complainant manufacturer from dealing with it, with the object of using these customers as an economic lever to bring the nonunion manufacturer to terms. The Court there stated: “The substance of the matters here complained of is an interference with complainant’s interstate trade, intended to have coercive effect upon complainant, and produced by what is commonly known as a ‘secondary boycott,’ that is, a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise, or by peaceful means persuade complainant’s customers to refrain (‘primary boycott’), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal with it.” Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Peering, supra, at 466. Thus “primary” but" not “secondary” pressures were excepted from the antitrust laws. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 330, defined “secondary boycott” as one “where many combine to injure one in his business by coercing third persons against their will to cease patronizing him by threats of similar injury.'. . . The question in such cases is whether the moral - coercion exercised over a stranger to the original controversy by steps in themselves legal becomes a legal wrong.” See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 1.45 (1940). Commentators of the day, while noting the ambiguity which lurked in the definition, discerned its core concept: union pressure directed at a neutral employer the object of which was to induce or coerce him to cease doing business with an employer with whom the union was engaged in a labor dispute. In 1932 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act and tipped the scales the other way. Its provisions “established that the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in the Duplex case, to an immediate employer-employee relation.” United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 231. Congress abolished, for purposes of labor immunity, the distinction ■ between primary activity between the “immediate disputants” and secondary activity in which the employer disputants and the members of the union do not stand “in the proximate relation of employer and employee....” H. R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1932). Thus, in Hutcheson, supra, the Court held that the Norris--LaGuardia Act immunized a jurisdictional strike trapping a neutral employer in the middle of an “internecine struggle between two unions seeking the favor of the same employer,” supra, at 232. Commentators of the post-Norris-LaGuardia era, as those before, while continuing to deplore the chameleon-like qualities of the term “secondary boycott,” agreed upon its central aspect: pressure tactically directed toward a neutral employer in a labor dispute not his own. Labor abuses of the broad immunity granted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act resulted in the Taft-Hartley Act prohibitions against secondary activities enacted in §8 (b)(4)(A), which, as amended in 1969, is now § 8 (b)(4)(B). As will appear, the basic thrust of the accommodation there effected by Congress was not expanded by the Landrum-Griitin amendments. The congressional design in enacting . § 8 (b)(4)(A) is therefore crucial to the determination of the scope of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B). Senator Taft said of its purpose: “This provision- makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third ;person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees-. . . . [UJnder the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of a strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.” (Emphasis supplied.) Senator Taft and others frequently sounded this note that § 8 (b)(4)(A) was designed to eliminate the “secondary boycott,” and its proponents uniformly cited examples of union conduct which evidenced labor efforts to draw in neutral employers through pressure calculated to induce them to cease doing business with the primary employer. And the Senate Committee Report carefully characterized the conduct prohibited by §8 (b)(4) (A) in the same terms: “Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B; nor would it be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with, employer B (with whom the union has a dispute).” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22,1 1947 Leg. Hist. 428. The other subsections of § 8 (b) (4) of the Act were similarly limited to protecting employers in the position' of neutrals between contending parties. The prohibition of subsection (B) against a noncertified union’s forcing recognition from an employer was designed to protect the employer trapped between the union and his employees, a majority of whom may not desire to choose the union as their representative. The prohibition of subsection (C) against a demand for recognition when another union has been certified protects the employer trapped between the noncertified and the certified unions. The prohibition of subsection (D) against coercion to force an employer to assign certain work to one of two unions contesting for it protects the employer trapped between the two claims. The central theme pervading these provisions of protection for the neutral employer confirms the assurances of those sponsoring the section that in subsection (A) Congress likewise meant to protect the employer only from union pressures designed to involve him in disputes not his own. Judicial decisions interpreting the broad language of § 8 (b)(4)(A) of the Act uniformly limited its’application to such “secondary” situations. This limitation was in “conformity with the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their Own.” Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 692. This Court accordingly refused to read ? 8 (b) (4) (A) to ban traditional primary strikes and picketing having an impact on neutral employers even though the activity fell within its sweeping terms; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665; see Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667. Thus, however severe the impact of primary activity on neutral employers; it was not thereby transformed into activity with a secondary objective. The literal terms .of § 8 (b)(4)(A) also were not applied in the so-calléd “ally doctrine” cases, in which'the union’s pressure was aimed toward employers performing the work.of the primary employer’s striking employees. The rationale, again, was the inapplicability of the provision’s central theme, the protection of neutrals against secondary pressure, where the secondary employer against whom the union’s pressure is directed has entangled himself in the vortex of the primary dispute. “[T]he union was not extending its activity to a front remote from the immediate dispute but to one intimately’ añd indeed inextricably united to it.” Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1948); see Labor Board v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F. 2d 553 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1955). We summarized our reading of §8 (b)(4)(A) just a year before enactment'of § 8 (e): “It aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict . insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious, widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice' of unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a primary labor dispute, through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods.” Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, 100. Despite this virtually overwhelming support for the limited reading of § 8 (b)(4)(A), the Woodwork Manufacturers Association relies on Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, as requiring that the successor section, § 8 (b)(4)(B), be read-as proscribing the District Council’s conduct in enforcing the “will not handle” sentence of Rule 17 against Frouge. The Association points to the references to Allen Bradley in the legislative debates leading to the enactment of the predecessor § 8 (b) (4) (A). We think that this is an erroneous reading of the legislative history. Allen Bradley held violative of the antitrust laws a combination between Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and both electrical contractors and manufacturers of electrical fixtures in New York City to restrain the bringing in of such equipment from outside the city. The contractors obligated themselves to confine their purchases to local manufacturers, who in turn obligated themselves to confine their New York City sales to contractors employing members of the local, and this scheme was supported by threat of boycott by the contractors’ employees. While recognizing that the union might have had an immunity for its contribution to-the trade boycott had it acted alone, citing Hutcheson, supra, the Court held immunity was not intended by the. Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts in cases in which the union’s activity was part of a larger conspiracy to abet contractors and manufacturers to create a monopoly. The argument that the references to Allen Bradley in the debates over § 8 (b)(4)(A) have broader significance in the determination of the reach of that section is that there was no intent on Local 3’s part to influence the internal labor policies of the boycotted out-of-state manufacturers of electrical equipment. There are three answers to this argument: First, the boycott 6f out-of-state electrical equipment by the electrical contractors’ employees was not in pursuance of any objective relating to pressuring their employers in the matter of their wages, hours, and working conditions; there was no work preservation or other primary objective rjelated to. the union employees’ relations with their contractor employers. On the contrary, the object of the boycott was to secure benefits for the New York City electrical manufacturers and their employees. “This is a secondary object because the cessation of business was being used tactically, with an eye to its effect on conditions elsewhere.” . Second, and of even greater significance on the question of the inferences to be drawn from the references to Allen Bradley, Senator Taft regarded the Local 3 boycott as in effect saying, “We will not permit any material made by any other union or. by any nonunion workers to come into New York City and be put into- any building in New York City.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4199, II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1107. This clearly shows that the Senator viewed the pressures applied by Local 3 on the employers of its members as having solely a secondary objective. The Senate Committee Report échoes the same view: '“[It is] an unfair labor practice for. a union to engage in the type of secondary boycott that has been conducted in New York City by local No. 3 of the IBEW, whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products of manufacturers employing electricians who are members of some labor organization other than local No. 8.” S. Rep. No.'105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 428. (Emphasis supplied.) Other statements on the floor of Congress repeat the same refrain. Third, even on the • premise that Congress meant to prohibit boycotts such as that in Allen Bradley without regard to whether they were carried on to affect labor conditions elsewhere, the fact is that the boycott in Allen Bradley was carried on, not as a shield to preserve the jobs of Local 3 members, traditionally a primary labor activity, but as a sword, to reach out and monopolize all the manufacturing job tasks for Local 3 members. It is arguable that Congress may have viewed the use of the boycott as a sword as different from labor’s traditional concerns with wages, hours, and working conditions. But the boycott in the present cases was not used as a sword; it was a shield carried solely to preserve the members’ jobs. We therefore have no occasion today to decide the questions which might arise where the workers carry on a boycott to reach out to monopolize jobs or acquire new job tasks when their own jobs are not threatened by the boycotted product. It is true that the House bill proposed to amend the Clayton Act to narrow labor’s immunity from the antitrust laws. H. R. 3020, § 301 (b), I 1947 Leg. Hist. 220. This was omitted from the Conference agreement. It is suggested that this history evidences that Congress meant § 8 (b) (4) (A) to reach all product boycotts with work preservation motives. The argument is premised on a statement by the House Managers in the House Conference Report that “[sjincethe matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the conference agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference agreement.” H. R. Conf. Rep, No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 569. The statement is hardly probative that § 8 (b) (4) (A) enacted a broad prohibition in face of the overwhelming evidence that' its Senate sponsors intended the narrower reach. Actually the statement at best reflects that the House may have receded from a broader position and accepted that of the Senate. For §8 (b)(4)(A) constituted the “effective provisions” referred to and the House Managers’, understanding of and agreement with the reach of the section as intended by its Senate sponsors is expressed at page 43 of-the same Report, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 547: “Under clause (A) strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce or encourage such action, were made unfair . labor practices if the purpose was to force an employer or other person to cease using,. selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of another, or to cease doing business with any other person. Thus it was made an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B. Similarly it would not be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals in the goods of, or does business with, employer B.” In effect Congress, in enacting §8 (b)(4) (A) of the Act, returned to the regime of Duplex Printing Press Co. and Bedford Cut Stone Co., supra, and barred as a secondary boycott union activity directed against a neutral employer, including the immediate employer when in fact the activity directed against him was carried on for its effect elsewhere. Indeed, Congress in rewriting §8 (b)(4) (A) as §8 (b)(4)(B) took pains to confirm the limited application of the section to such “secondary” conduct. The word “concerted” in former §8 (b)(4) was deleted to reach secondary conduct directed to only one individual. This was in response to the Court’s holding in Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co,, 341 U. S. 665, that “concerted” required proof , of inducement of two or more employees. But to make clear that the deletion was not. to be read; as ^supporting a construction of the statute as prohibiting the incidental effects of traditional primary activity, Congress added the proviso that nothing in the amended section “shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” Many statements and examples proffered in the 1959 debates confirm this congressional acceptance of the distinction between primary and secondary activity. II. The Landrum-Griffin Act amendments in 1959 were adopted only to close various loopholes in the application of § 8 (b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions. We discussed some of these loopholes, and the particular amendments adopted to close them, in Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46, 51-54. We need not repeat that discussion, here, except to emphasize, as we there said, that “these changes did not expand the type of conduct which §.8 (b)(4)(A) condemned, that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their employer to cease dealing with the primary employer.” Id., at 52-53. . Section 8 (e) simply closed still another loophole. In Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, the Court held that it was no defense to an unfair labor practice .charge under § 8 (b) (4) (A) that the struck employer had agreed, in a contract with the union, not to handle nonunion material.' However, the Court emphasized that the mere execution of such a contract provision (known as a “hot cargo” clause because of its prevalence in Teamsters Union contracts), or its voluntary observance by the employer, was not unlawful under- § 8 (b)(4).(A). Section 8 (e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by making the “hot cargo” clause itself unlawful. The Sand Door decision was believed by Congress not only to create the possibility of damage actions against employers for breaches of “hot cargo” clauses, but also'to create a situation in which such clauses might be employed to exert subtle pressures upon employers to engage in “voluntary” boycotts. Hearings in late 1958 before the Senate Select Committee explored seven cases of “hot cargo” clauses in Teamsters Union contracts, the use of which the Committee found conscripted neutral employers in Teamsters organizational campaigns. This loophole-closing measure likewise did not expand the type of conduct which §8 (b)(4) (A) condemned. Although the language of § 8 (e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of § 8 (b)(4)(A), and just as the latter and its successor §8 (b)(4)(B) did not reach employees’ activity to pressure their employer to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them, § 8 (e) does not prohibit agreements made and maintained for that purpose. The legislative history of § 8 (e) confirms this con-clúsion. The Kennedy-Ervin bill as originally reported proposed no remedy for abuses of the “hot cargo” clauses revealed at the hearings of the Select Committee. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen filed a minority report urging that a prohibition against “hot cargo” clauses should be enacted to close that loophole. Their statement expressly acknowledged their acceptance of the reading of §8 (b)(4) (A) as applicable only “to protect genuinely neutral employers and their employees, not themselves involved in a labor dispute, against economic coercion designed to give a labor union victory in a dispute with some other' employer.” They argued that a prohibition against “hot cargo” clauses was necessary to further that objective. They were joined by Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Select Committee, in their proposal to add such a provision. Their statements in support consistently defined the evil to be prevented in terms of agreements which obligated neutral employers not to do business with other employers involved in labor disputes with the union. Senator Gore initially proposed, and the Senate first passed, a “hot cargo” amendment to the Kenn'edy-Ervin bill which outlawed such agreements only for “common carriers subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act.” This reflected the testimony at the Select Committee hearings which, attributed abuses of such clauses primarily to the Teamsters Union. Significantly, such alleged abuses by the Teamsters invariably involved uses of the clause , to pressure neutral trucking employers not to handle goods of other employers involved in disputes with the Teamsters Union. The House Labor Committee first reported out a bill containing a provision substantially identical to the Gore amendment. The House Report expressly noted that since that proposal tracked the language of § 8 (b) (4) (A) “it preserved the established distinction between primary activities and secondary boycotts.” The substitute Landrum-Griffin bill, however, expanded the proposal to cover all industry and not common carriers alone. H. R. 8400, § 705 (b)(1) in I 1959 Leg. Hist. 683. Representative Landrum stated, “I submit if such contracts are bad in one segment of our economy, they are undesirable in all segments.” 105 Cong. Rec. 14343, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1518. In describing the substitute bill, Representative Landrum pointedly spoke of the situation “where the union, in a dispute with one employer, puts pressure upon another employer or his employees, in order to force the second employer or his employees, to- stop doing business with the first employer, and ‘bend his knee to' the union’s will.’ ” Ibid. An analysis of the shbstitute bill submitted by Representative Griffin referred to the need to plug the various loopholes in the “secondary boycott” provisions, one of which is the “hot cargo” agreement. In Conference Committee, the Landrum-Griffin application to all industry, and not just to common carriers, was adopted. However, provisos were added to § 8 (e) to preserve the status quo in the construction industry, and exempt the garment industry from the prohibitions of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (bX4)(B). This action of the Congress is strong confirmation that Congress meant that , both .§§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B) reach only secondary pressures. If the body of § 8 (e) applies only to secondary activity, the garment industry proviso, is a justifiable exception which allows what the legislative history shows it was designed to allow, secondary pressures to counteract the effects of' sweatshop conditions in an industry with a highly integrated process of production between jobbers, manufacturers, contractors and subcontractor^. First, this motivation for the proviso sheds light on the central theme of the body of § 8 (e), to which the proviso is an exception. Second, if the body of that provision and § 8 (b) (4) (B) were construed to prohibit primary agreements and their maintenance, such as those concerning work preservation, the proviso would have the highly unlikely effect, unjustified in any of the statute’s history, of" permitting garmient workers, but garment workers only, to preserve their jobs against subcontracting or prefabrication by such agreements and by strikes and boycotts to .enforce them. Similarly, the construction industry proviso, which permits “hot cargo” agreements only for jobsite work, would have the curious and unsupported result of allowing the construction worker to make agreements preserving his traditional tasks against jobsite prefabrication and subcontracting, but not against nonjobsite prefabrication and subcontracting. On the other hand, if the heart of § 8 (e) is construed to be directed only to secondary activities, the construction proviso becomes; as it was intended to be, a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain- secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there, but to ban secondary-objective agreements concerning nonjob-site work, in which respect the construction industry is no different from any other. The provisos are therefore substantial probative support that primary work preservation agreements were not to be within the ban of § 8 (e). The only mention of a broader reach for § 8 (e) appears in isolated statements by opponents of that provision, expressing fears that work preservation agreements would be banned. These statements have scant probative value against the backdrop of the strong evidence to the contrary. Too, “we have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach.” Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 66. “It is the sponsors that we 'look to when the meaning, of the statutory words is in doubt.” Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 288. In addition to all else, “[t]he silence of the sponsors of [the] amendments is pregnant with significance. . . .” Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, supra, at 66. Before we may say that Congress meant to strike from workers' .hands the economic weapons traditionally used against their employers’ efforts to abolish their jobs, that meaning should plainly appear. • “[I]n this era of automation and onrushing technological change; no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern, than those involving job security and employment stability. ■ Because of the potentially cruel impact upon the lives and fortunes of the working men and women of the Nation, these problems have understandably' engaged the • solicitous attention of government, of responsible private business, and particularly of organized labor.” Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Labor Board, 379 U. S. 203, 225 (concurring opinion of Stewaíit, J.). We would expect that legislation curtailing the‘ability of management and labor voluntarily to negotiate for solutions to these significant and difficult problems would be preceded by extensive congressional study and debate, and consideration of voluminous .economic, scientific, and statistical data. The silence regarding such matters in the Eighty-sixth Congress is itself evidence that Congress, in enacting § 8 (e), had no thought of prohibiting agreements directed to work preservation. In fact, since the enactment of § 8 (e), the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Senate' Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation, and the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee o.n Education and Labor have been extensively studying the threats to workérs posed by increased technology and automation, and some legislation directed to the problem has been passed. We cannot lightly impute to Congress an intent in § 8 (e) to preclude labor-management agreements to ease these effects through collective bargaining on this most vital problem created by advanced technology. Moreover, our decision in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., supra, implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of work preservation clauses like that involved here. Indeed, in the circumstances presented in Fibreboard, we held that bargaining on the subject was' made mandatory by § 8(a) (6) of the Act, concerning as it does “terms and conditions of employment,” §8(d). Fibreboard involved an alleged refusal to bargain with respect to the contracting-out of plant maintenance work previously performed by employees 'in the bargaining unit. The Court recognized that the “termination of employment which . . . necessarily results from the contracting out of work performed by members of the established bargaining unit,” supra, at 210, is “a problem of vital concern to labor and management . . . ,” supra, at 211. We further noted, supra, at 211-212: “Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process. Experience illustrates that contracting out in one form or another has been brought, widely a,nd successfully, within the collective bargaining framework. Provisions relating to contracting out exist in numerous collective bargaining agreements, and ‘[°] extracting out work is the basis of many grievances; and that type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators.’ United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 584.” See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283, 294. It would therefore be incongruous to interpret § 8 (e) to invalidate clauses over which the parties may be mandated to bargain and which have been successfully incorporated through collective bargaining in many of this Nation’s major .labor agreements. Finally, important parts of the historic accommodation by Congress of the powers of labor and management are §§ 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, passed as part of the Wagner Act in 1935 and amended in 1947. The former section assures to labor “the right ... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” Section 13 preserves the right to strike, of which the boycott is a form, except as specifically provided in the Act. In the absence of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary, these provisions caution against reading statutory prohibitions as embracing employee activities to pressure their own employers into improving the employees’ wages, hours, and working conditions. See Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 672-673; Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 687; Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at 284, 287. The Woodwork Manufacturers Association and amici who support its position advance several reasons, grounded in economic and technological factors, why “will not handle” clauses should be invalid in all circumstances. Those arguments are addressed to the wrong branch of government. It may be “that the time has come for a re-evaluation of the basic content of collective bargaining as contemplated by the federal legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has demonstrated its capacity to adjust the Nation’s labor legislation to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory pattern appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in the country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in 1947 and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of opinion that greater stress should be put on . . . eliminating more and more economic weapons from the . . . [Union’s] grasp .... But Congress’ policy has .not yet moved to this point . . . .” Labor Board v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U. S. 477, 500. m. The determination whether the “will not handle” sentence of Rule 17 and its enforcement violated § 8 (e) and § 8 (b j (4) (B) cannot be made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union’s objective was preservation of work for Frouge’s employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter the case, Frouge, the boycotting employer, would be a neutral bystander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress, become secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of the- agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott, secondary in its aim. The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees. This will not always be a simple test to apply. But “[hjowever difficult the drawing of lines more nice than obvious, the statute compels the task.” Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667, 674. That the “will not handle” provision was not an unfair labor practice in these cases is clear. The finding of the Trial Examiner, adopted by the Board, was that the objective of the sentence was preservation of work traditionally performed by the jobsite carpenters. This finding is supported by substantial evidence, and therefore the Union's making of the “will not handle” agreement was not a violation of § 8 (e). Similarly, the Union’s maintenance of the provision was not a violation of § 8 (b)(4)(B). The Union refused to hang prefabricated doors whether or not they bore a union label; and even refused to install prefabricated doors manufactured off the jobsite by members of the Union. This ’and other substantial evidence supported the finding- that the conduct of the Union on the Frouge jobsite related solely to preservation of the traditional tasks of the jobsite carpenters. The judgment is affirmed in No. 110, and reversed in No. 111. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. The relevant provisions- of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 141, 73 Stat. 542, .29 U. S. C. § 158), are as follows: 8 (b) It shall- be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— (4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case .an object thereof is— (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person ... to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by-section 8 (e) ; (B) forcing or requiring-any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person .... Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing; (e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter -into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer, ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, dr other work: Provided farther, That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8 (b)(4)(B) the terms “any employer,” “any person engaged in commerce Or an industry affecting commerce,” and “any person” when used in relation to the terms “any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,” “any other employer,” or “any other person” shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Harlan. In joining the .Court’s opinion, I am constrained to add these few words by way of underscoring the salient factors which, in my judgment, make for th.e decision that has been reached in these difficult cases. 1. The facts as found by the Board and the Court of Appeals show that the contractual restrictive-product rule in question, and the boycott in support of its enforcement, had ^s their sole objective the protection of union members from a diminution of work flowing from changes in technology. Union members. traditionally had performed the task of fitting doors on the jobsite, and there is no evidence of any motive for this contract provision and its companion boycott other than the preservation of that work. This, then, is not a case of a union seeking to restrict by contract or boycott an employer with respect to the products he uses, for the purpose of acquiring for its members work that had not previously been theirs. • 2. The only question thus to be decided, and which is decided, is whether Congress meant, in enacting §§8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, to prevent this kind of labor-management arrangement designed to forestall possible adverse effects upon workers arising from changing technology. 3. Because of the possibly profound impacts that the answer to this question may have upon labor-management relations and upon other aspects of the economy, both sides of today’s division in the Court agree that we must be especially careful to eschew a resolution of the issue according to our own economic ideas arid to find one in what Congress has done. It is further agreed that in pursuing the search for the true intent of Congress we should not stop with the language of the statute itself, bqt must look beneath its surface to the legislative history. 4. It is recognized by court and counsel on both sides that the legislative history of § 8 (b)(4)(B), with which § 8 (e), it is agreed, is to be taken pari passu, contains only the most tangential references to problems connected with changing technology. Also, a circumspect reading of the legislative record evincing Congress’ belief that the statutory provisions in question prohibited agreements and conduct of the kind involved in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, will not support a confident assertion that Corigress also had in mind the sort of union-management activity before us here. And although it is arguable that Congress, in the temper of the times,, would have readily accepted a proposal to outlaw work-preservation agreements and boycotts, even, as here, in their most limited sense, such a-surmise can hardly serve as a basis for thé construction of an existing statute. 5. We are thus left with a legislative history which, on the precise point at issue, is essentially negative, which shows with fair conclusiveness only that Congress was not squarely faced with the problem these cases present. In view-of Congress’ deep commitment to the resolution of matters of vital importance to management and labor through the collective bargaining process, and its recognition of the boycott as a legitimate weapon in that process, it would be urifortunate were this Court to attribute to Congress, on the basis of such an opaque legislative record, a purpose to outlaw the kind of collective bargaining and conduct involved in these cases. Especially at a time when Congress is continuing to explore methods for meeting the economic problems increasingly arising in this technological age from scientific advances, this. Court should not take such a step until Congress has made unmistakably clear. that it wishes wholly to exclude collective bargaining as one avenue of approach to solutions in this elusive aspect of our economy. The text of these sections appears in the Appendix. The full text of Rule 17 is as follows: “No employee shall work on any job on which cabinet work, fixtures, milhvork, sash, doors, trim or other detailed millwork is used unless the same is Union-made and bears the Union Label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. No member of this District Council will handle material coming from a mill where cutting out and fitting has been done for butts, locks, letter plates, or hardware of any description, nor any doors or transoms which have been fitted prior to being furnished on job, including base,- chair, rail, picture moulding, which has been previously fitted. This section to exempt partition work furnished in sections.” The National Labor Relations Board determined that" the first sentence violated §8 (e), 149 N. L. R. B. 646, 655-656, and the Union did not seek judicial review of that determination. There were also charges of violation of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b) (4) (B) arising from the enforcement of the Rule 17 provision against three other contractors whose contracts with the owners of the construction projects involved specified that the contractors should furnish and install preeut and prefinished doors. The Union refused to permit its members to hang these doors. The Board held that this refusal violated §8 (b)(4)(B). The Board "reasoned that, since these contractors (in contrast to Frouge) did not have “control” over the work that the Union sought to preserve for its members, the Union’s objective was secondary — to compel the project owners to stop specifying préeut doors in their contracts with the employer-contractors. 149 N. L. R. B., at 658. The Union petitioned the Court of Appeals to set aside the remedial order issued by the Board on this finding, but the court sustained the Board. 354 F. 2d 594, 597. The Union did not seek review of the question here. Not before us, therefore, is the issue argued by the AFL-CIO in its brief amicus curiae, namely, whether the Board’s “right-to-control doctrine — that employees can never strike against their own employer about a matter over which he lacks the legal power to grant their demand” — is an incorrect rule of law inconsistent with the Court’s decision in Labor Board v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U. S. 477, 497-498. The statutory language of § 8 (e) is far from unambiguous. It prohibits agreements to “cease . . . from handling , . . any of the products oj any other employer . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Since both the product and its source are mentioned, the provision might be read not to prohibit an agreement relating solely to the nature of the product itself, such as a work-preservation agreement, but only to prohibit one arising from an objection to the other employers or a definable group of employers who are the source of the product, for example, their nonunion status. Letter of Judge Learned Hand, quoted in Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 Col. L. Rev. 1363, 1393-1394, n. 155 (1962). See 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 321 (Horack ed. 1943): “Before the true meaning of the statute can be determined consideration must be given to the problem in society to which the legislature addressed itself, prior legislative consideration of the problem, the legislative history of the statute under litigation, and to the operation and administration of the statute prior to litigation.” See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, and 235 U. S. 522 (Danbury Hatters’ Case). The history of this development .under the Sherman Act is traced in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, 800-803. See generally Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930). Collective activity was also being restrained through the doctrine of “malicious combination.” See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra, at 484-485 (Brandéis, J., dissenting); see generally Laidler, Boycotts and the Labor Struggle 189-194 (1914). Painters District Council v. United States, 284 U. S. 582, which summarily affirmed 44 F. 2d 58, also involved secondary activity within the rubric of Duplex-, the union, whose members’ primary employers were painting contractors, sought to “compel manufacturers to bring their products into the state unfinished . . . .” 44 F. 2d, at 59. (Emphasis supplied.) See Laidler, op. cit. supra, n. 6, at 64; Clark, The Law of the Employment of Labor 289-290 (1911); Oakes, Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts § 408 (1927); Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 43 (1930). Section 13 (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provided that the term labor dispute and thus the scope of immunity “includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.” 47 Stat. 73. (Emphasis supplied.) See 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 145 (1940); Barnard & Graham, _ Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 Wash. L. R.ev. 137 (1940); Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in Labor Disputes — The Secondary Boycott, 1 La. L. Rev. 277 (1939); Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 Yale L. J. 341, 364 (1938). 93 Cong. Rec. 4198, II Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (hereafter 1947 Leg. Hist.), 1106. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 8, 22, 54, in I 1947 Leg. Hist. 413, 414', 428, 460; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 43, in I 1947 Leg. Hist. 547 ; 93 Cohg. Rec. 4131, 4138, 4837-4838, 4843, 4844, 4858, 4859, 4865/5005, 5011, 5014, 6445-6446, 7537, in II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1055, 1068, 1354-1355, 1364, 1365, 1370-1371, 1372-1373/1383, 1479, 1491, 1497, 1544, 1654. A statement of Senator Javits, an opponent of the bill,- at 93 Cong-. Rec. 6296, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 876, that might suggest a broader reading was merely one of the “isolated references . . . [that] appear more as asides in a debate . . . Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 286-287. See, e. g., 93 Cong. Rec. 3424 (Rep. Hartley), 3432 (Rep. Landis), 3449 (Rep. Buck), A1910-A1911 (Rep.'Meade), 1844 (Senator Morse), 3838 (Senator Taft); 5014 (Senator Ball), in I 1947 Leg. Hist. 614, 630, 658, 869, and II 1947 Leg. Hist. 982, 1012, 1497. See also a similar statement in H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, su-pra, at 43, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 547, in which the House Managers limit the “boycotts,” referred to at 65, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 569. Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285 ; Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282, 288. See, e. g., Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. Labor Board, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 191 F. 2d 642, cert. denied, 342 U. S. 869 (1951); J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. Labor Board, 251 F. 2d 771 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1958) ; Rabouin v. Labor Board, 195 F. 2d 906, 912 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1952); Piezonki v. Labor Board, 219 F. 2d 879 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1955); Labor Board v. General Drivers Local 968, 225 F. 2d 205 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914; Local 618, Automotive Petroleum Employees Union v. Labor Board, 249 F. 2d 332 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1957); Labor Board v. Local Union No. 65, 218 F. 2d 226 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1954). An oft-cited definition of the conduct banned by § 8 (b) (4) (A) was that of Judge Learned Hand in International Bro. of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 181 F. 2d 34, 37: “The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its.^im is'to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his employees’ demands.” For the scholarly acceptance of this primary-secondary dichotomy in the scope of § 8 (b) (4) (A), see Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and .Boycotts — A'New Chapter, 37 Cornell L. Q. 235 (1952); Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 Lab. L. J. 727 (1951); Cushman, Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Law, 6. Syracuse L. Rev. 109 (1954); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 Col. L. Rev. 1363 (1962); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 271 (1959); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1112 (1960). For the NLRB’s vacillations during the period, see Lesnick, supra, 62 Col. L. Rev., at 1366-1392. Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8 (b)(4). and 8 (e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1017-4018 (1965). It is suggested that the boycott in Allen Bradley is indistinguishable from the activity today held protected in Houston Insulation Contractors Association v. Labor Board, post. p. 664. The crucial distinction is that- in Houston Insulation Contractors Association the boycott was being carried out to affect the labor policies of- the emploj-er of the boycotting employees, the primary employer, and not, as in Allen Bradley, for its effect elsewhere. See 93 Cong. Rec. 4132 (Senator Ellender), II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1056: “A secondary boycott, as all of us know, is a concerted attempt on the part of a strong union to compel employers to deal with them, even though the employees of that employer desire to be represented by other unions, or not to be represented at all. . . . [An] example is the New York .Electrical Workers Union, the IBEW.” See also Statement of- Senator Ball, 93 Cong. Rec. 5011, II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1491, who described “one of the worst situations which has arisen, such as that in New York where a local of the IBEW is using the secondary boycott to maintain a tight little monopoly for its own employees, its own members, and a few employers in that area.” We likewise do not. have before us in these cases, and express no view upon, the antitrust limitations, if any, upon union-employer work-preservation or work-extension agreements. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 662-665. The proviso was added in the Conference Committee, the report of which stated its purpose to be, “to make it clear that the changes in section 8 (b) (4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1959), in I Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (hereafter 1959 Leg. Hist.), 942. See Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667, 681. See 105 Cong. Rec. 1729-1730, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 993-994 (remarks of the Secretary of Labor, inserted into the record by Senator Dirksen); 105 Cong. Rec. 3951-3952, 6290, 6667, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1007, 1052, 1193-1194 (Senator McClellan); 105 Cong. Rec. 6285, ÍI 1959 Leg. Hist. 1046 (Senator Ervin); 105 Cong. Rec. 6300-6301, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1059 (Senator Mundt); 105 Cong. Rec. 6390, 6428, 17674, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1061, 1079, 1386 (Senator Goldwater); 105 Cong. Rec. 6670, 17907-17908, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1197, 1440-1441 (Senator Curtis); 105 Cong. Rec. 1426, 15674, II 1959 Leg. Hist.' 1462, 1616 (Rep. Bosch); 105 Cong. Rec. 3926-3927, 3928, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1469-1470, -1471 (Rep. Lafore); 105 Cong. Rec. 14343-14344, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1518-1519 (Rep. Landrum); 105 'Cong. Rec. 14347-14348, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1522-1523 (analysis of Landrum-Griffin bill inserted into the record by Rep. Griffin);. 105 Cong. Rec. 15532, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1568 (Rep. Griffin); 105 Cong. Rec. 15195, 15544-15545, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1543, 1580-1581 (Rep. Rhodes); 105 Cong. Rec.' 15529, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1565 (Rep. Shelley); 105 Cong. Rec. 15551-15552, II .1959 Leg. Hist. 1587-1588 (report prepared by Rep. Elliott); 105 Cong. Rec. 15688, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1630 (Rep. Riehlman); 105 Cong. Rec. 15691, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1633 (Rep. Arends). Throughout the committee reports and debates on § 8 (e), it was referred to as a measure designed to close & loophole in § 8 (b) (4) (A) of the 1947 Act. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78-79, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 474-475 (1959) (Minority Views); H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 778-779. See Cox, supra, n. 16, at 272. See Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or. Management Field, S. Rep. No. 1139, 86th Cong.,‘2d Sess., 3 (1960). The Final Report, ordered to be printed after enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act, defined a “hot-cargo” clause as “an agreement between a union and a unionized employer that his employees shall not be required to work on or handle 'hot- goods’ or ‘hot cargo’ being manufactured or transferred by another employer with whom the union has a labor dispute or whom the union considers and labels as being unfair to organized labor.” Ibid. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess,, 78,1 1959 Leg. Hist. 474. The Senators explained, at 79, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 475: “Hot-cargo clauses. — It has become common to find clauses in union 'contracts whereby the employer agrees not to handle what the -union chooses to call ‘hot goods,’ ‘unfair materials,’ and 'blacklisted products.’ Such clauses have become standard in contracts entered intq by the Teamsters Union. Here, employer A, who has a dispute with a union or whose employees are being solicited for union membership, is in real trouble. He may have customers waiting for his product or he may have suppliers eager to send him raw material, but both his delivery of products and supply of raw material cannot move from or to his place' of business because, the carriers in either instance have ‘hot cargo’ clauses in their contracts with the Teamsters Union. His alternative- is . . . [to] go out of business or yield to the union’s demand, which often is a demand for a compulsory membership contract with a union which his employees do not want.” See statements of these Senators, cited n. 21, supra. Both Senators Dirksen and McClellan introduced unsuccessful “hot cargo” legislation in substantially the same terms as' enacted in § 8 (e-), 105 Cong. Rec. 3948, 6411-6412, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1007 (Senator McClellan), 1071 (Senator Dirksen). See, e. g., remarks of Secretary of Labor Mitchell inserted into the record by Senator Dirksen, 105 Cong. Rec: 1730, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 993: “The testimony before the select committee again and again illustrated the method by which certain unions, particularly the Teamsters, utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary boycott provisions to force employers to.do business with only those people approved by union officials.” H. R. 8342, §705 (a) (2) (Elliott bill), in I 1959 Leg. Hist. 755-757. H. R. Rep. No. 741, -86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 779. 105 Cong. Ree. 14347, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1522-1523. Rep. Griffin noted that the present law did not “prohibit resort to . . . [secondary] activity to force [secondary] employers to sign contracts or agreements not to handle or transport goods coming from a source characterized by a union as ‘unfair.’ ” See, e. g., 105 Cong. Rec. 6668, 17327, II 1959 Leg. Hist. .1195, 1377 (Senator Kennedy). See Essex County and Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Labor Board, 332 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1964); Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 Yale L. J. 673, 684-689 (1961). See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 285-286, and cases there cited. 105 Cong. Rec. 17884, II 1959 Leg. Hi§t. 1428 (Senator Morse);. 105 Cong. Rec. 16590, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1708 (analysis of “Sec- ’ ondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo Contracts” by Senator Kennedy and Rep. Thompson). It is somewhat unclear whether statements by Senator McNamara and Reps. Thompson and Kearns respecting plumbing prefabrication clauses for construction projects concerned agreements with a primary or a secondary objective. 105 Cong. Rec. 19785, 19809, 20004-20005, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1815, 1816, 1861. As described by Senator McNamara, the clause in question permitted fabrication, so long'as it was accomplished by members of a local union of the pipefitters. 105 Cong. Rec. 19785, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1815. Moreover, the statements purported only to indicate their interpretation of the construction industry proviso. In any event, these statements could represent only the personal views of these legislators, since the statements were inserted in the Congressional Record after passage of the Act. In fact, Rep. Alger introduced a bill which would have banned union attempts to limit prefabrication of building materials, which .-bill was given no attention whatever and failed of adoption. 105 ’/long. Rec. 12137, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1508. The understanding of Congress with regard to that issue might have been best reflected in a statement on the House floor by Rep. Holland: “When the labor reform bill is out of the way — labor and management could, as they eventually must, sit down together and work toward a solution of our most serious problem — automation—which has already affected the employment picture through more productivity and less employment. If allowed to go unchecked, automation will eventually create many thousands of' displaced persons, and unless this problem is properly worked out, it portends a serious threat to our national economy.” 105 Cong. Rec. 13133, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1511. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-9 (1963), 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 10 (1964), on the Nation’s Manpower Revolution (concluding with recommendations for a National Commission on Automation and Technological Progress), and Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), on Manpower Retraining; Hearings before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), on H. R. 10310- and Related Bills “To Establish a National Commission on Automation and Technological Progress”; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st .Sess. (1961), on H. R. 7373, a “Bill Relating to the Occupational Training, Development, and -Use of the Manpower Resources of the Nation.” - See statement in these latter hearings of then Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, at 3: “Many achievements in<attempting to overcome the difficulties created by radical technological change can and should be accomplished through collective bargaining and joint labor-management efforts. Much has been achieved through such efforts in recent years. Even greater concentration by labor and management on these problems is needed in the period ahead.” See the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, §102 (1), 76 Stat 24, which directs the Secretary of Labor to “evaluate the impact of, and benefits and problems created by automation, technological-progress, and other changes in the structure of production- and demand on -the use of the Nation’s human resources; establish techniques and methods for detecting in advance the potential impact of such developments; develop solutions to these problems, and publish findings pertaining thereto.” The Secretary has, pursuant to this direction, published numerous bulletins. See, e. g., Technological Trends in Major American Industries, Dept, of Labor Bulletin No. 1474. As a general proposition, such circumstances might include the remoteness of the threat of displacement by the banned product or services, the history of labor relations between the union and the employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of the industry. See Comment, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 1176, 1185 et seq. (1964). See Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8 (b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1018, 1040(1965). See Orange Belt District Council of Painters v. Labor Board, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 233, 328 F. 2d 534 (1964); Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor Board, 111 U. S. App. D. C. 246, 296 F. 2d 368 (1961); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbldg. Workers, 344 F. 2d 107 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965); Labor Board v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 326 F. 2d 218 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1964); Labor Board v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F. 2d 23, 28 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1964); Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union (Minnesota Milk Co.), 133 N. L. R. B. 1314, enforced, 314 F. 2d 761 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1963); Ohio Valley Carpenters District Council (Cardinal Industries), 136 N. L. R. B. 977 (1962). See, e. g,, Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor Board, 111 U. S. App. D. C. 246, 296 F. 2d 368 (1961); Baltimore Lithographers (Alco-Gravure), 160 N. L. R. B. No. 90, 63 L. R. R. M. 1126 (1966); Joliet Contractors Assn. v. Labor Board, 202 F. 2d 606 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 824; Labor Board v. Local 11, United Bro. of Carpenters, 242 F. 2d 932 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1957). See generally Lesnick, supra, n. 39; Comment, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 1176 (1964).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. ALLIS-CHALMERS MANUFACTURING CO. et al. No. 216. Argued March 15, 1967. Decided June 12, 1967. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Robert S. Rijkind, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Gome. John Silard argued the cause for respondent International Union, UAW-AFL-CIO (Locals 248 and 401), on behalf of the petitioner. With him on the brief were Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Stephen I. Schlossberg and Harriett R. Taylor. Howard C. Equitz argued the cause for respondent Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. With him on the brief were Maxwell H. Herriott, James A. Urdan, John L. Waddleton, Edward L. Welch and William J. McGowan. Martin C. Seham argued the cause and filed a brief for the New York Times Display Advertising Salesmen Steering Committee, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether a union which threatened and imposed fines, and brought suit for their collection, against members who crossed the union’s picket line and went to work during an authorized strike against their employer, committed the unfair labor practice under §8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act of engaging in conduct “to restrain or coerce” employees in the exercise of their right guaranteed by § 7 to “refrain from” concerted activities. Employees at the West Allis, and La Crosse, Wisconsin, plants of respondent Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company were represented by locals of the United Automobile Workers. Lawful economic strikes were conducted at both plants in support of new contract demands. In compliance with the UAW constitution, the strikes were called with the approval of the International Union after at least two-thirds of the members of each local voted by secret ballot to strike. Some members of each local crossed the picket lines and worked during the strikes. After the strikes were over, the locals brought proceedings against these members charging them with violation of the International constitution and bylaws. The charges were heard by local trial committees in proceedings at which the charged members were represented by counsel. No claim of unfairness in the proceedings is made. The trials resulted in each charged member being found guilty of “conduct unbecoming a Union member” and being fined in a sum from $20 to $100. Some of the fined members did not pay the fines and one of the locals obtained a judgment in the amount of the fine against one of its members, Benjamin Natzke, in a test suit brought in the Milwaukee County Court. An appeal from the judgment is pending in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Allis-Chalmers filed unfair labor practice charges against the locals alleging violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A). A complaint issued and after hearing a trial examiner recommended its dismissal. The National Labor Relations Board sustained the examiner on the ground that, in the circumstances of this case, the actions of the locals, even if restraint or coercion prohibited by § 8 (b) (1) (A), constituted conduct excepted from the section's prohibitions by the proviso that such prohibitions “shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” 149 N. L. R. B. 67. Upon Allis-Chalmers’ petition for review to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a panel of that court upheld the Board's decision. Following a rehearing en bctnc, however, the court, three judges dissenting, withdrew the panel opinion, held that the locals’ conduct violated §8 (b)(1)(A), and remanded to the Board for appropriate proceedings. 358 F. 2d 656. We granted certiorari, 385 U. S. 810. We reverse. I. The panel and the majority en banc of the Court of Appeals thought that reversal of the NLRB order would be required under a literal reading of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A); under that reading union members who cross their own picket lines would be regarded as exercising their rights under § 7 to refrain from engaging in a particular concerted activity, and union discipline in the form of fines for such activity would therefore “restrain or coerce” in violation of § 8 (b)(1)(A) if the section’s proviso is read to sanction no form of discipline other than expulsion from the union. The panel rejected that literal reading. The majority en banc adopted it, stating that the panel “mistakenly took the position that such a literal reading was unwarranted in the light of the history and purposes” of the sections, 358 F. 2d, at 659, and holding that “[t]he statutes in question present no ambiguities whatsoever, and therefore do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification.” Id,., at 660. It is highly unrealistic to regard §8 (b)(1), and particularly its words “restrain or coerce,” as precisely and unambiguously covering the union conduct involved in this case. On its face court enforcement of fines imposed on members for violation of membership obligations is no more conduct to “restrain or coerce” satisfaction of such obligations than court enforcement of penalties imposed on citizens for violation of their obligations as citizens to pay income taxes, or court awards of damages against a contracting party for nonperformance of a contractual obligation voluntarily undertaken. But even if the inherent imprecision of the words “restrain or coerce” may be overlooked, recourse to legislative history to determine the sense in which Congress used the words is not foreclosed. We have only this Term again admonished that labor legislation is peculiarly the product of legislative compromise of strongly held views, Local 1976, Carpenters’ Union v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93, 99-100, and that legislative history may not be disregarded merely because it is arguable that a provision may unambiguously embrace conduct called in question. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 619-620. Indeed, we have applied that principle to the construction of §8(b)(1)(A) itself in holding that the section must be construed in light of the fact that it “is only one of many interwoven sections in a complex Act, mindful of the manifest purpose of the Congress to fashion a coherent national labor policy.” Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 292. National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual employee’s power to order his own relations with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen representative to act in the interests of all employees. “Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents . . . .” Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 202. Thus only the union may contract the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for processing his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line. The employee may disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by them. “The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy.” “The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 338. It was because the national labor policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with their employer that this Court found it necessary to fashion the duty of fair representation. That duty “has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182. For the same reason Congress in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, 73 Stat. 519, enacted a code of fairness to assure democratic conduct of union affairs by provisions guaranteeing free speech and assembly, equal rights to vote in elections, to attend meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business conducted at the meetings. Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion its status under that policy through reasonable discipline of members who violate rules and regulations governing membership. That power is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor’s arsenal for achieving agreement upon its terms, and “[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent . ...” Provisions in union constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of recalcitrants, including strikebreakers, are therefore commonplace and were commonplace at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments. In addition, the judicial view current at the time §8 (b)(1)(A) was passed was that provisions defining punishable conduct and the procedures for trial and appeal constituted part of the contract between member and union and that “The courts’ role is but to enforce the contract.” In Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 618, we recognized that “[t]his contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country . . . .” Although state courts were reluctant to intervene in internal union affairs, a body of law establishing standards of fairness in the enforcement of union discipline grew up around this contract doctrine. See Parks v. Electrical Workers, 314 F. 2d 886, 902-903. To say that Congress meant in 1947 by the § 7 amendments and § 8 (b) (1) (A) to strip unions of the power to fine members for strikebreaking, however lawful the strike vote, and however fair the disciplinary procedures and penalty, is to say that Congress preceded the Landrum-Griffin amendments with an even more pervasive regulation of the internal affairs of unions. It is also to attribute to Congress an intent at war with the understanding of the union-membership relation which has been at the heart of its effort “to fashion a coherent labor policy” and which has been a predicate underlying action by this Court and the state courts. More importantly, it is to say that Congress limited unions in the powers necessary to the discharge of their role as exclusive statutory bargaining agents by impairing the usefulness of labor’s cherished strike weapon. It is no answer that the proviso to § 8 (b)(1)(A) preserves to the union the power to expel the offending member. Where the union is strong and membership therefore valuable, to require expulsion of the member visits a far more severe penalty upon the member than a reasonable fine. Where the union is weak, and membership therefore of little value, the union faced with further depletion of its ranks may have no real choice except to condone the member’s disobedience. Yet it is just such weak unions for which the power to execute union decisions taken for the benefit of all employees is most critical to effective discharge of its statutory function. Congressional meaning is of course ordinarily to be discerned in the words Congress uses. But when the literal application of the imprecise words “restrain or coerce” Congress employed in §8 (b)(1)(A) produces the extraordinary results we have mentioned we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the legislative history of the section. II. The explicit wording of § 8 (b)(2), which is concerned with union powers to affect a member’s employment, is in sharp contrast with the imprecise words of § 8 (b)(1) (A). Section 8(b)(2) limits union power to compel an employer to discharge a terminated member other than for “failure [of the employee] to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” It is significant that Congress expressly disclaimed in this connection any intention to interfere with union self-government or to regulate a union’s internal affairs. The Senate Report stated: “The committee did not desire to limit the labor organization with respect to either its selection of membership or expulsion therefrom. But the committee did wish to protect the employee in his job if unreasonably expelled or denied membership. The tests provided by the amendment are based upon facts readily ascertainable and do not require the employer to inquire into the internal affairs of the union.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 20, I Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (hereafter Leg. Hist.) 426. (Emphasis supplied.) Senator Taft, in answer to protestations by Senator Pepper that § 8 (b) (2) would intervene in the union’s internal affairs and “deny it the right to protect itself against a man in the union who betrays the objectives of the union . . . ,” stated: “The pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to the internal affairs of unions. They still will be able to fire any members they wish to fire, and they still will be able to try any of their members. All that they will not be able to do, after the enactment of this bill, is this: If they fire a member for some reason other than nonpayment of dues they cannot make his employer discharge him from his job and throw him out of work. That is the only result of the provision under discussion.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 8(b)(1)(A) was under consideration when Senator Taft said this. Congressional emphasis that § 8 (b) (2) insulated an employee’s membership from his job, but left internal union affairs to union self-government, is therefore significant evidence against reading § 8 (b)(1)(A) as contemplating regulation of internal discipline. This is borne out by the fact that provision was also made in the Taft-Hartley Act for a special committee to study, among other things, “the internal organization and administration of labor unions . . . .” § 402 (3), 61 Stat. 160. What legislative materials there are dealing with § 8 (b)(1)(A) contain not a single word referring to the application of its prohibitions to traditional internal union discipline in general, or disciplinary fines in particular. On the contrary there are a number of assurances by its sponsors that the section was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions. The provision was not contained in the Senate or House bills reported out of committee, but was introduced as an amendment on the Senate floor by Senator Ball. The amendment was adopted in the Conference Committee, without significant enlightenment from the report of that committee. The first suggestion that restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of § 7 rights should be an unfair labor practice appears in the Statement of Supplemental Views to the Senate Report, in which a minority of the Senate Committee, including Senators Ball, Taft, and Smith, concurred. The mischief against which the Statement inveighed was restraint and coercion by unions in organizational campaigns. “The committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees such as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence.” S. Rep. No. 105, supra, at 50, I Leg. Hist. 456. Senator Ball proposed § 8 (b)(1)(A) as an amendment to the Senate bill, and stated, “The purpose of the amendment is simply to provide that where unions, in their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which, if an employer indulged in them, would be unfair labor practices, such as making threats or false promises or false statements, the unions also shall be guilty of unfair labor practices.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4016, II Leg. Hist. 1018. Senator Ball gave numerous examples of the kind of union conduct the amendment was to cover. Each one related to union conduct during organizational campaigns. Senator Ball reiterated this purpose several times thereafter, including remarks added after passage of the amendment. The consistent thrust of his arguments was the necessity of controlling union conduct in organizational campaigns. Indeed, when Senator Holland introduced the proviso eliminating from the reach of §8 (b)(1)(A) “the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership . . . ,” Senator Ball replied, “I merely wish to state to the Senate that the amendment offered by the Senator from Florida is perfectly agreeable to me. It was never the intention of the sponsors of the pending amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions.” (Emphasis supplied.) After acceptance of the proviso, and on the same day as the vote on the amendment itself, Senator Ball said of the proviso: “That modification is designed to make it clear that we are not trying to interfere with the internal affairs of a union which is already organized. All we are trying to cover is the coercive and restraining acts of the union in its effort to organize unorganized employees.” Another co-sponsor of the amendment, Senator Smith, echoed this purpose: “The pending measure is designed to protect employees in their freedom to decide whether or not they desire to join labor organizations, to prevent them from being restrained or coerced.” Senatpr Taft also initially confined his comments on the amendment to examples of organizational tactics. However, in debate with Senator Pepper, he suggested a broader but still limited application: “If there is anything clear in the development of labor union history in the past 10 years it is that more and more labor union employees have come to be subject to the orders of labor union leaders. The bill provides for the right to protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders.” (Emphasis supplied.) In reply to Senator Pepper’s protest that union members can protect themselves against such “tyranny,” Senator 'Taft stated, “I think it is fair to say that in the case of many of the unions, the employee has a good deal more of an opportunity to select his employer than he has to select his labor-union leader,” Senator Taft further observed that union leaders sometimes penalize those who vote against them. Senator Pepper then attempted to draw an analogy between union members and shareholders in a corporation, to which Senator Taft replied, “The Congress has gone much further in protecting the rights of minority stockholders in corporations than it has in protecting the rights of members of unions. Even in this bill we do not tell the unions how they shall vote or how they shall conduct their affairs . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Senator Pepper attempted twice to clarify the effect of the amendment on internal affairs, but Senator Taft answered only that the amendment applied to nonunion men as well. It was one week after this debate between Senator Taft and Senator Pepper that §8(b)(l)(A) was adopted by the Senate as an amendment to the bill. There was no further reference in the debates to the applicability of the section to internal union affairs, by Senator Taft or anyone else, despite the repeated statements by Senator Ball that it bore no relationship to the conduct of such affairs. At one point, Senator Saltonstall asked Senator Taft to provide examples of the kind of union conduct covered by the section. Senator Taft responded with examples of threats of bodily harm, economic coercion, and mass picketing in organizational campaigns and coercion which prevented employees not involved in a labor dispute from going to work. But any inference that Senator Taft envisioned that § 8 (b)(1)(A) intruded into and regulated internal union affairs is negated by his categorical statements to the contrary in the contemporaneous debates on § 8 (b)(2). It is true that there are references in the Senate debate on § 8 (b)(1)(A) to an intent to impose the same prohibitions on unions that applied to employers as regards restraint and coercion of employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. However apposite this parallel might be when applied to organizational tactics, it clearly is inapplicable to the relationship of a union member to his own union. Union membership allows the member a part in choosing the very course of action to which he refuses to adhere, but he has of course no role in employer conduct, and nonunion employees have no voice in the affairs of the union. Cogent support for an interpretation of the body of §8 (b)(1) as not reaching the imposition of fines and attempts at court enforcement is the proviso to § 8 (b)(1). It states that nothing in the section shall “impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .” Senator Holland offered the proviso during debate and Senator Ball immediately accepted it, stating that it was not the intent of the sponsors in any way to regulate the internal affairs of unions. At the very least it can be said that the proviso preserves the rights of unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion, and to impose fines which carry the explicit or implicit threat of expulsion for nonpayment. Therefore, under the proviso the rule in the UAW constitution governing fines is valid and the fines themselves and expulsion for nonpayment would not be an unfair labor practice. Assuming that the proviso cannot also be read to authorize court enforcement of fines, a question we need not reach, the fact remains that to interpret the body of §8 (b)(1) to apply to the imposition and collection of fines would be to impute to Congress a concern with the permissible means of enforcement of union fines and to attribute to Congress a narrow and discrete interest in banning court enforcement of such fines. Yet there is not one word in the legislative history evidencing any such congressional concern. And, as we have pointed out, a distinction between court enforcement and expulsion would have been anomalous for several reasons. First, Congress was operating within the context of the “contract theory” of the union-member relationship which widely prevailed at that time. The efficacy of a contract is precisely its legal enforceability. A lawsuit is and has been the ordinary way by which performance of private money obligations is compelled. Second, as we have noted, such a distinction would visit upon the member of a strong union a potentially more severe punishment than court enforcement of fines, while impairing the bargaining facility of the weak union by requiring it either to condone misconduct or deplete its ranks. There may be concern that court enforcement may permit the collection of unreasonably large fines. However, even were there evidence that Congress shared this concern, this would not justify reading the Act also to bar court enforcement of reasonable fines. The 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, thought to be the first comprehensive regulation by Congress of the conduct of internal union affairs, also negate the reach given §8 (b)(1)(A) by the majority en banc below. “To be sure, what Congress did in 1959 does not establish what it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration. Courts may properly take into account the later Act when asked to extend the reach of the earlier Act’s vague language to the limits which, read literally, the words might permit.” Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 291-292. In 1959 Congress did seek to protect union members in their relationship to the union by adopting measures to insure the provision of democratic processes in the conduct of union affairs and procedural due process to members subjected to discipline. Even then, some Senators emphasized that “in establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be taken not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective-bargaining agents.” S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7. The Eighty-sixth Congress was thus plainly of the view that union self-government was not regulated in 1947. Indeed, that Congress expressly recognized that a union member may be “fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined,” and enacted only procedural requirements to be observed. 73 Stat. 523, 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(5). Moreover, Congress added a proviso to the guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly disclaiming any intent “to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §411 (a)(2). The 1959 provisions are significant for still another reason. We have seen that the only indication in the debates over § 8 (b)(1)(A) of a reach beyond organizational tactics which restrain or coerce nonmembers was Senator Taft’s concern with arbitrary and undemocratic union leadership. The 1959 amendments are addressed to that concern. The kind of regulation of internal union affairs which Senator Taft said protected stockholders of a corporation, and made necessary a “right of protest against arbitrary powers which have been exercised by some of the labor union leaders,” is embodied in the 1959 Act. The requirements of adherence to democratic principles, fair procedures and freedom of speech apply to the election of union officials and extend into all aspects of union affairs. In the present case the procedures followed for calling the strikes and disciplining the recalcitrant members fully comported with these requirements, and were in every way fair and democratic. Whether §B(b)(l)(A) proscribes arbitrary imposition of fines, or punishment for disobedience of a fiat of a union leader, are matters not presented by this case, and upon which we express no view. Thus this history of congressional action does not support a conclusion that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions against restraint or coercion of an employee to refrain from concerted activities included a prohibition against the imposition of fines on members who decline to honor an authorized strike and attempts to collect such fines. Rather, the contrary inference is more justified in light of the repeated refrain throughout the debates on § 8 (b) (1)(A) and other sections that Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union’s internal regulations to affect a member’s employment status. III. The collective bargaining agreements with the locals incorporate union security clauses. Full union membership is not compelled by the clauses: an employee is required only to become and remain “a member of the Union ... to the extent of paying his monthly dues . .. .” The majority en banc below nevertheless regarded full membership to be “the result not of individual voluntary choice but of the insertion of [this] union security provision in the contract under which a substantial minority of. the employees may have been forced into membership.” 358 F. 2d, at 660. But the relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member’s full membership but whether the Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures against a full member who crossed his union’s picket line. It is clear that the fined employees involved herein enjoyed full union membership. Each executed the pledge of allegiance to the UAW constitution and took the oath of full membership. Moreover, the record of the Milwaukee County Court case against Benjamin Natzke discloses that two disciplined employees testified that they had fully participated in the proceedings leading to the strike. They attended the meetings at which the secret strike vote and the renewed strike vote were taken. It was upon this and similar evidence that the Milwaukee County Court found that Natzke “had by his actions become a member of the union for all purposes ....’’ Allis-Chalmers offered no evidence in this proceeding that any of the fined employees enjoyed other than full union membership. We will not presume the contrary. Cf. Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 774. Indeed, it is and has been Allis-Chalmers’ position that the Taft-Hartley prohibitions apply whatever the nature of the membership. Whether those prohibitions would apply if the locals had imposed fines on members whose membership was in fact limited to the obligation of paying monthly dues is a question not before us and upon which we intimate no view. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The relevant provisions of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1)(A), 61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. §§157 and 158 (b)(1)(A), are “Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities . . . , and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .” “Sec. 8 (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ...” Two locals were involved, Local 248 at the West Allis plant, and Local 401 at the La Crosse plant. Although Allis-Chalmers' charges of unfair labor practices mentioned threats of fines as well as imposition of fines, the only proof that fines were specifically threatened during a strike consisted of a letter to strikebreaking West Allis members of Local 248 in 1959. As to the 1962 strike at West Allis and both the 1959 and 1962 strikes at La Crosse, mention of fines first occurred after the strikes were over. The threat of court enforcement of the fines was first made in 1960 in letters sent to fined members of Local 248 who had not paid their fines; the letter informed them of the outcome of a Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion holding fines enforceable, UAW, Local 756 v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N. W. 2d 336 (1958). Local 401’s test suit was brought after the 1962 strike. See J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 678; ILGWU v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 731, 737. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 280. See Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U. S. 71. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L. J. 1327, 1333 (1958). See, e. g., Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951); Philip Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions 117-180 (1954); Taylor, The Role of Unions in a Democratic Society, Selected Readings on Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members, prepared for the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 17 (Committee Print, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958) (hereafter Selected Readings); Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing, Selected Readings, supra, at 106, 109. Summers, supra, n. 7, at 1049. “Strikebreaking is uniformly considered sufficient reason for expulsion whether or not there is an express prohibition, for it undercuts the union’s principal weapon and defeats the economic objective for which the union exists.” Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 495 (1950). National Industrial Conference Board, The Union, The Leader, and The Members, Selected Readings, at 40, 69-71; Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 508-512 (1950); Disciplinary Powers and Procedures in Union Constitutions, U. S. Dept. of Labor Bulletin No. 1350, Bur. Lab. Statistics (1963). It is suggested that while such provisions for fines and expulsion were a common element of union constitutions at the time of the enactment of §8 (b)(1), such background loses its cogency here because such provisions did not explicitly call for court enforcement. However the potentiality of resort to courts for enforcement is implicit in any binding obligation. Surely it cannot be said that the absence of a “court enforceability” clause in a contract of sale implies that the parties do not foresee resort to the courts as a possible means of enforcement. It is also suggested that court enforcement of fines is “a rather recent innovation.” Yet such enforcement was known as early as 1867. Master Stevedores’ Assn. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1 (N. Y.). Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L. J. 175, 180 (1960). See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930); Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 983 (1963); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 835-836 (1960). “Since the union’s effectiveness is based largely on the degree to which it controls the available labor, expulsions tend to weaken the union. If large numbers are expelled, they become a threat to union standards by undercutting union rates, and in case of a strike they may act as strikebreakers. . . . Therefore, expulsions must be limited to very small numbers unless the union is so strongly entrenched that it cannot be effectively challenged by the employer or another union.” Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 487-488 (1950). 93 Cong. Rec. 4193, II Leg. Hist. 1097. 93 Cong. Rec. 4016-4017, II Leg. Hist. 1018-1021. Examples were given in debate of threats by unions to double the dues of employees who waited until later to join. It is suggested that this is no less within the ambit of internal union affairs than the fines imposed in the present case. But the significant distinction is that the cited examples necessarily concern threats against nonmembers designed to coerce them into joining, and are therefore further evidence of the primary concern of Congress with organizational tactics. 93 Cong. Rec. 4271, 4432, 4434, II Leg. Hist. 1139,1199,1203. 93 Cong. Rec. A-2252, II Leg. Hist. 1524-1525. 93 Cong. Rec. 4272, II Leg. Hist. 1141. 93 Cong. Rec. 4433, II Leg. Hist. 1200. 93 Cong. Rec. 4435, II Leg. Hist. 1204. 93 Cong. Rec. 4021-4022, II Leg. Hist. 1025-1027. 93 Cong. Rec. 4023, II Leg. Hist. 1028. See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483: “It is significant that among the major changes made in the Wagner Act by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was the addition of sections purported to be aimed at protecting individual union members against undemocratic and corrupt leaders.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4023, II Leg. Hist. 1028. 93 Cong. Rec. 4024, II Leg. Hist. 1030. It was in the context of the quoted limiting statements that, in answer to Senator Ives’ suggestion that the matter of union coercion should be further investigated, Senator Taft made the broad remark that “[m]erely to require that unions be subject to the same rules that govern employers, and that they do not have the right to interfere with or coerce employees, either their own members or those outside their union, is such a clear matter, and seems to me so easy to determine, that I would hope we would all agree.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4025, II Leg. Hist. 1032. 93 Cong. Rec. 4023, 4024, II Leg. Hist. 1029, 1030. It is this colloquy to which the dissent apparently refers in its statement that in answer to Senator Pepper’s charge that the amendment protected workers against their own leaders, “Senator Taft did not deny it.” It may be more accurate to say that Senator Taft evaded the issue. 93 Cong. Rec. 4435-4436, II Leg. Hist. 1205-1206. The following statement of Senator Taft had no reference to the conduct of a union vis-a-vis a member who crossed the union’s picket line but referred to union conduct in preventing employees not in the bargaining unit from going to work — “mass picketing, which absolutely prevents all the office force from going into the office of a plant.” “The effect of the pending amendment is that the Board may call the union before them, exactly as it has called the employer, and say, ‘Here are the rules of the game. You must cease and desist from coercing and restraining the employees who want to work from going to work “and earning the money which they are entitled to earn.’ The Board may say, ‘You can persuade them; you can put up signs; you can conduct any form of propaganda you want to in order to persuade them, but you cannot, by threat of force or threat of economic reprisal, prevent them from exercising their right to work.’ As I see it, that is the effect of the amendment.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4436, II Leg. Hist. 1206. His statements in a colloquy with Senator Morse were made in the same context. 93 Cong. Rec. 4436, II Leg. Hist. 1207. We read his “Supplementary Analysis of Labor Bill as Passed” as also referring to coercion of nonmembers of the striking bargaining unit. 93 Cong. Rec. 6859, II Leg. Hist. 1623. That he distinguished members from nonmembers also appears from his statement concerning the section that “[i]ts application to labor organizations may have a slightly different implication, but it seems to me perfectly clear that from the point of view of the employee the two cases are parallel.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4023, II Leg. Hist. 1028. (Emphasis supplied.) It is not true that “the sponsors of the section repeatedly announced that it would protect union members from their leaders.” Only Senator Taft’s statements provide limited support for the proposition. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 50, I Leg. Hist. 456; 93 Cong. Rec. 4025, 4436, II Leg. Hist. 1032, 1207. Cf. statement of Justice Stone in South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 184-185, n. 2: “State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even though.Congress has not acted. [Citations omitted.] “Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.” (Emphasis supplied.) A commentator has noted that “the ballot in a free election is the individual union member’s weapon for inducing performance in accordance with his desire.” Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L. J. 1327, 1329 (1958). 93 Cong. Rec. 4272, 4433, II Leg. Hist. 1141, 1200. Our conclusion that § 8 (b) (1) (A) does not prohibit the locals' actions makes it unnecessary to pass on the Board holding that the proviso protected such actions. The notification by Local 248 to its strikebreaking employees that each day they continued to work might constitute a separate offense punishable by a fine of $100 was sent only to members of Local 248, not those of Local 401, and only during one of the two strikes called by Local 248. The notification was sent only to those employees who had already decided to work during the strike. Most important, no inference can be drawn from that notification that court enforcement would be the means of collection. Therefore, at least under the proviso, if not the body of § 8 (b) (1)', such notification would not be an unfair labor practice. It is not argued that the fines for which court enforcement was actually sought were unreasonably large. Senator Wiley’s reference in a speech after § 8 (b) (1) was passed to $20,000 fines for crossing a picket line was not directed to the section. 93 Cong. Rec. 5000, II Leg. Hist. 1471. It has been noted that the state courts, in reviewing the imposition of union discipline, find ways to strike down “discipline [which] involves a severe hardship.” Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1078 (1951). It is suggested that reading §8 (b)(1) to allow court enforcement of fines adds a’“new weapon to the union’s economic arsenal,” and is inconsistent with the mood of Congress to curtail the powers of imions. The question here, however, is not whether Congress gave to unions a new power, but whether it eliminated, without debate, a power which the unions already possessed. In 1958, in Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 620, we said: “[T]he protection of union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied.” See Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 852: “The act is the first major step in the regulation of the internal affairs of labor unions. It expands the national labor policy into the area of relations between the employees and the labor union. Previously national policy was confined to relationships between management and union.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4023, II Leg. Hist. 1028. 29 U. S. C. §§ 411-415, 431 (c), 461-464, 481-482. Significantly, the Landrum-Griffin amendments expressly rendered it unlawful for any union “to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled . . .” under that Act. 29 U. S. C. § 529. In Machinists v. Street, we held that employees who were members of a union under a union security agreement authorized by the Railway Labor Act, had a right to relief against a union using their dues payments for political purposes. We said, at 774: “Any remedies, however, would properly be granted only to employees who have made known to the union officials that they do not desire their funds to be used for political causes to which they object. The safeguards of [the Act] ... were added for the protection of dissenters’ interest, but dissent is not to be presumed — it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee. . . . Thus we think that only those who have identified themselves as opposed to political uses of their funds are entitled to relief in this action.” Under § 8 (a) (3) the extent of an employee’s obligation under a union security agreement is “expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. . . . ‘Membership’ as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.” Labor Board v. General Motors Corp., 373 U. S. 734, 742. Not before us is the question of the extent to which union action for enforcement of disciplinary penalties is pre-empted by federal labor law. Compare Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617; Plumbers’ Union v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. et al. No. 85-1385. Argued January 13, 1987 Decided April 22, 1987 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Powell, and Scalia, JJ., joined. O’Con-nor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 247. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Olsen, David English Carmack, and William A. Whitledge. Lynne E. McNown argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Keith F. Bode. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether an accrual-basis taxpayer providing medical benefits to its employees may deduct at the close of the taxable year an estimate of its obligation to pay for medical care obtained by employees or their qualified dependents during the final quarter of the year, claims for which have not been reported to the employer. H-t Taxpayers, respondents herein, are the General Dynamics Corporation and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries (General Dynamics). General Dynamics uses the accrual method of accounting for federal tax purposes; its fiscal year is the same as the calendar year. From 1962 until October 1, 1972, General Dynamics purchased group medical insurance for its employees and their qualified dependents from two private insurance carriers. Beginning in October 1972, General Dynamics became a self-insurer with regard to its medical care plans. Instead of continuing to purchase insurance from outside carriers, it undertook to pay medical claims out of its own funds, while continuing to employ private carriers to administer the medical care plans. To receive reimbursement of expenses for covered medical services, respondent’s employees submit claims forms to employee benefits personnel, who verify that the treated persons were eligible under the applicable plan as of the time of treatment. Eligible claims are then forwarded to the plan’s administrators. Claims processors review the claims and approve for payment those expenses that are covered under the plan. Because the processing of claims takes time, and because employees do not always file their claims immediately, there is a delay between the provision of medical services and payment by General Dynamics. To account for this time lag, General Dynamics established reserve accounts to reflect its liability for medical care received, but still not paid for, as of December 31, 1972. It estimated the amount of those reserves with the assistance of its former insurance carriers. Originally, General Dynamics did not deduct any portion of this reserve in computing its tax for 1972. In 1977, however, after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began an audit of its 1972 tax return, General Dynamics filed an amended return, claiming it was entitled to deduct its reserve as an accrued expense, and seeking a refund. The IRS disallowed the deduction, and General Dynamics sought relief in the Claims Court. The Claims Court sustained the deduction, holding that it satisfied the “all events” test embodied in Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2), 26 CFR § 1.461-l(a)(2) (1986), since “all events” which determined the fact of liability had taken place when the employees received covered services, and the amount of liability could be determined with reasonable accuracy. Thus, the court held that General Dynamics was entitled to a refund. 6 Cl. Ct. 250 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, largely on the basis of the Claims Court opinion. 773 F. 2d 1224, 1226 (1985). The United States sought review of the question whether all the events necessary to fix liability had occurred. We granted certiorari, 476 U. S. 1181 (1986). We reverse. I — I hH As we noted in United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U. S. 593, 600 (1986), whether a business expense has been “incurred” so as to entitle an accrual-basis taxpayer to deduct it under § 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 162(a), is governed by the “all events” test that originated in United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422, 441 (1926). In Anderson, the Court held that a taxpayer was obliged to deduct from its 1916 income a tax on profits from munitions sales that took place in 1916. Although the tax would not be assessed and therefore would not formally be due until 1917, all the events which fixed the amount of the tax and determined the taxpayer’s liability to pay it had occurred in 1916. The test is now embodied in Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2), 26 CFR § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1986), which provides that “[ujnder an accrual method of accounting, an expense is deductible for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which determine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.” It is fundamental to the “all events” test that, although expenses may be deductible before they have become due and payable, liability must first be firmly established. This is consistent with our prior holdings that a taxpayer may not deduct a liability that is contingent, see Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 452 (1930), or contested, see Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 321 U. S. 281, 284 (1944). Nor may a taxpayer deduct an estimate of an anticipated expense, no matter how statistically certain, if it is based on events that have not occurred by the close of the taxable year. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 201 (1934); cf. American Automobile Assn. v. United States, 367 U. S. 687, 693 (1961). We think that this case, like Brown, involves a mere estimate of liability based on events that had not occurred before the close of the taxable year, and therefore the proposed deduction does not pass the “all events” test. We disagree with the legal conclusion of the courts below that the last event necessary to fix the taxpayer’s liability was the receipt of medical care by covered individuals. A person covered by a plan could only obtain payment for medical services by filling out and submitting a health-expense-benefits claim form. App. 23. Employees were informed that submission of satisfactory proof of the charges claimed would be necessary to obtain payment under the plans. Id., at 58. General Dynamics was thus liable to pay for covered medical services only if properly documented claims forms were filed. Some covered individuals, through oversight, procrastination, confusion over the coverage provided, or fear of disclosure to the employer of the extent or nature of the services received, might not file claims for reimbursement to which they are plainly entitled. Such filing is not a mere technicality. It is crucial to the establishment of liability on the part of the taxpayer. Nor does the failure to file a claim represent the type of “extremely remote and speculative possibility” that we held in Hughes, 476 U. S., at 601, did not render an otherwise fixed liability contingent. Cf. Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U. S. 11, 13 (1930) (where executory contract of sale was created in 1916 but papers necessary to effect transfer were not prepared until 1917, unconditional liability for the purchase price was not created in 1916, and the gain from the sale was therefore not realized until 1917). Mere receipt of services for which, in some instances, claims will not be submitted does not, in our judgment, constitute the last link in the chain of events creating liability for purposes of the “all events” test. The parties stipulated in this case that as of December 31, 1972, the taxpayer had not received all claims for medical treatment services rendered in 1972, and that some claims had been filed for services rendered in 1972 that had not been processed. App. 26. The record does not reflect which portion of the claims against General Dynamics for medical care had been filed but not yet processed and which portion had not even been filed at the close of the 1972 tax year. The taxpayer has the burden of proving its entitlement to a deduction. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507, 514 (1935). Here, respondent made no showing that, as of December 31, 1972, it knew of specific claims which had been filed but which it had not yet processed. Because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that any of the deducted reserve represented claims for which its liability was firmly established as of the close of 1972, all the events necessary to establish liability were not shown to have occurred, and therefore no deduction was permissible. This is not to say that the taxpayer was unable to forecast how many claims would be filed for medical care received during this period, and estimate the liability that would arise from those claims. Based on actuarial data, General Dynamics may have been able to make a reasonable estimate of how many claims would be filed for the last quarter of 1972. But that alone does not justify a deduction. In Brown, supra, the taxpayer, a general agent for insurance companies, sought to take a deduction for a reserve representing estimated liability for premiums to be returned on the percentage of insurance policies it anticipated would be cancelled in future years. The agent may well have been capable of estimating with a reasonable degree of accuracy the ratio of cancellation refunds to premiums already paid and establishing its reserve accordingly. Despite the “strong probability that many of the policies written during the taxable year” would be cancelled, 291 U. S., at 201, the Court held that “no liability accrues during the taxable year on account of cancellations which it is expected may occur in future years, since the events necessary to create the liability do not occur during the taxable year.” Id., at 200. A reserve based on the proposition that a particular set of events is likely to occur in the future may be an appropriate conservative accounting measure, but does not warrant a tax deduction. See American Automobile Assn. v. United States, supra, at 692; Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S., at 452. That these estimated claims were not intended to fall within the “all events” test is further demonstrated by the fact that the Internal Revenue Code specifically permits insurance companies to deduct additions to reserves for such “incurred but not reported” (IBNR) claims. See 26 U. S. C. § 832(b)(5) (providing that an insurance company may treat as losses incurred “all unpaid losses outstanding at the end of the taxable year”); § 832(c)(4) (permitting deduction of losses incurred as defined in § 832(b)(5)). If the “all events” test permitted the deduction of an estimated reserve representing claims that were actuarially likely but not yet reported, Congress would not have needed to maintain an explicit provision that insurance companies could deduct such reserves. General Dynamics did not show that its liability as to any medical care claims was firmly established as of the close of the 1972 tax year, and is therefore entitled to no deduction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Respondents filed a consolidated federal income tax return for 1972, the year at issue here. We therefore treat them as a single entity. The United States did not seek review of whether the amount of liability in this case could be determined with reasonable accuracy. See Pet. for Cert. 13, n. 2. The regulation in force in 1972 was identical to the present version. See 26 CFR § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1972). The “all events” test has been incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat 598, 607, 26 U. S. C. § 461(h)(4) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Section 461(h) imposed limits on the application of the test, providing that “in determining whether an amount has been incurred with respect to any item during any taxable year, the all events test shall not be treated as met any earlier than when economic performance with respect to such item occurs.” § 461(h)(1). The pertinent portions of the 1984 amendments were retained in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Section 461(h) does not apply in this ease. It became effective as of July 18, 1984, the date of the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act. See § 91(g)(1)(A), 26 U. S. C. § 461 note (1982 ed., Supp. III). While that statute permits a taxpayer to elect the application of § 461(h) to amounts incurred on or before July 18, 1984, see § 91(g)(2), there is no indication that the taxpayer here has done so. We do not address how this case would be decided under § 461(h), but note that the legislative history of the Act indicates that, “[i]n the case of. . . employee benefit liabilities, which require a payment by the taxpayer to another person, economic performance occurs as the payments to such person are made.” H. R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, p. 1255 (1984); see also H. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 872 (1984). We do not challenge the Claims Court’s factual conclusion that the processing of the claims was “routine,” “clerical,” and “ministerial in nature,” 6 Cl. Ct. 250, 254 (1984). The Claims Court did not, however, make any factual findings with respect to the jfiling of claims. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the filing of a claim was necessary to create liability. General Dynamics could not avoid its obligation to pay for services after they were received by, for example, discharging the employee. If an employee were terminated after receiving covered services but before filing a claim, the taxpayer would still be obliged to reimburse that employee, App. 22 — but only in the event that the employee filed a claim form. The filing of the claim is thus a true condition precedent to liability on the part of the taxpayer. During the time that private insurance carriers provided insurance coverage for General Dynamics employees, the insurers maintained reserves for IBNR claims and deducted those reserves in the tax year in which the services were received. 6 Cl. Ct., at 252. Respondent has never sought to be treated as an insurance company-entitled to take IBNR deductions under the provisions of Subchapter L.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. AMERADA PETROLEUM CORP. et al. No. 585. Decided February 1, 1965. Solicitor General Cox, Richard A. Solomon, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell and Peter H. Schiff for petitioner. William H. Webster, Edwin S. Nail and Joseph W. Morris for Amerada Petroleum Corp., and William R. Allen and Cecil E. Munn for Signal Oil & Gas Co., respondents. Per Curiam Montana-Dakota (MDU) is an interstate natural gas pipeline company, selling and transporting gas in Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The lines involved here run to the east and west from the Tioga processing plant in North Dakota, jointly owned by. Amerada and Signal, producers of natural gas in North Dakota. Also, running north from the Tioga point is a line extending to the gasoline extraction plants of Hunt-Herbert and TXL (now Texaco), both in North Dakota. On a peak winter day in 1962-1963 MDU was expected to purchase a total of 70,000 Mcf of North Dakota-produced gas from these four producers: 55,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, 10,000 Mcf from TXL, and 5,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert. Of the 55,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, 50,000 Mcf would flow to the east and be consumed in North Dakota. All of the Hunt-Herbert and TXL gas, plus the remaining 5,000 Mcf of the Amerada; Signal gas, would flow to the west — a total of 20,000 Mcf. Of this westward-flowing gas, 10,200 Mcf would be consumed in North Dakota; the remaining 9,800 Mcf would flow across the state boundary into Montana for consumption outside of North Dakota. On an average summer day MDU would take about 45,000 Mcf from Amerada-Signal, while continuing to take about 15,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert and TXL. Of the Amerada-Signal gas, 13,000 Mcf would flow westward, commingled with the 15,000 Mcf from Hunt-Herbert and TXL. Only 1,680 Mcf of this stream would be consumed in North Dakota; the remaining 26,320 Mcf would flow into Montana to be held in storage for ultimate redelivery to all parts of MDU’s interstate system. 32,000 Mcf of gas would flow eastward, all from .Amerada-Signal. In contrast to the situation on a peak winter day, only 7,280 Mcf of this eastward-flowing gas would be consumed in North Dakota, while 24,720 Mcf would cross the state boundary and go into storage. The contracts for the purchase of gas from Hunt-Herbert .and TXL admittedly constitute sales of gas for resale within the meaning of § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717. These sellers applied for and were granted certificates of public convenience and necessity by the Commission. 27 F. P. C. 1092. Prior to entering into the Hunt-Herbert-TXL contracts, MDU entered into contracts with Amerada and Signal which are here in issue. First, MDU concluded the so-called “North Dakota Contracts" with both Amerada and Signal. Under these contracts MDU must buy at least two-thirds of its annual North Dakota requirements from Amerada-Signal, and it may buy up to all of its North Dakota requirements from them if it só elects. The contracts recite that “all gas purchased by Buyer under this agreement shall be transported, used and consumed entirely within the State of North Dakota.” Soon thereafter, MDU entered its separate “Interstate Contracts” With Amerada and Signal. These contracts provide that MDU must take or pay for a certain number of Mcf per year (and per day) if available, “less the quantity of gas which Buyer shall pay for with respect- to such calendar year under the Amerada [or Signal] North Dakota Contract.” Respondents Amerada and Signal contended before the Federal Power Commission that sales to MDU under the “North Dakota Contracts” would be “nonjurisdictional” since they were not sales in interstate commerce for resale. Relying on its decision in Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 26 F. P. C. 606 (reversed, 323 F. 2d 190, reversed, ante, p. 366), the Commission rejected the contention and asserted its jurisdiction over the sales. 30 F. P. C. 200. The Court of Appeals reversed. 334 F. 2d 404. The Commission has petitioned for writ of certiorari. All of the gas purchased by MDU from Amerada-Signal under both sets of contracts is delivered into the pipeline at the-Tioga plant. According to the testimony of MDU’s engineer, on a peak winter day the pipeline would elect to purchase all of the Amerada-Signal. gas under the “North Dakota Contracts.” Yet, as previously shown, on such a day some of the Amerada-Signal gas flows westward, in a commingled stream with gas from other sources, and is resold outside of North Dakota. On an average summer day MDU would elect to purchase about 9,000 Mcf of the Amerada-Signal gas under the “North Dakota Contracts,” and the remaining 36,000 Mcf under the “Interstate Contracts.” Yet, as previously shown, 1,680 Mcf of the 9,000 Mcf consumed in North Dakota would have to be metered off from the westward-flowing commingled stream that is destined in major part for resale out-of-state. Factually, therefore, the present case is on all fours with California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., ante, p. 366. The Court of Appeals thought that its decision in North Dakota v. Federal Power Comm’n, 247 F. 2d 173, brought collateral estoppel into play in the present case. 334 F. 2d 404, 411-412. But that rule has no place here for no judgment governing past events is in jeopardy, only the scope of future regulation that involves different events and transactions. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 601-602. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEST v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION. No. 489. Argued March 29-30, 1948. Decided June 14, 1948. Frank T. McCoy argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were John R. Pearson and Frank Mahan. R. F. Barry and Joe M. Whitaker argued the cause for appellee. With them on the brief was C. W. King. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns the power of the State of Oklahoma to levy an inheritance tax on the estate of a restricted Osage Indian. Specifically, the problem is whether property held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Indian may be included within the taxable estate. Charles West, Jr., was a restricted, full-blood, unallot-ted, adult Osage Indian. He died intestate in 1940, a resident of Oklahoma. No certificate of competency was ever issued to him. Surviving him was his. mother, appellant herein, who is a restricted, full-blood Osage Indian. The entire estate passed to her as the sole heir at law. The Oklahoma Tax Commission entered an order levying a tax on the transfer of the net estate, valued at $111,219.18. With penalties, the total tax imposed was $5,313.35. Appellant made timely objection to the inclusion of certain items in the taxable estate. These items formed the bulk of the estate and had been held in trust for the decedent by the United States, acting through the Secretary of the Interior. Act of June 28, 1906, 34 Stat. 539, as amended, 41 Stat. 1249, 45 Stat. 1478, 52 Stat. 1034. The trust properties involved were as follows: (1) One and 915/2520ths Osage mineral headrights. This item represented the decedent's undivided interest in the oil, gas, coal and other minerals under the lands in Osage County, Oklahoma, said minerals having been reserved to the use of the Osage Tribe by the Act of June 28,1906. (2) Surplus funds in the United States Treasury, representing accruals of income to the decedent from the headrights. (3) Stocks and bonds purchased by and in the name of the United States and held for the decedent by the Secretary of the Interior. These purchases were made with the surplus funds accruing from the headrights. (4) Trust funds in the hands of the Treasurer of the United States, representing decedent’s share of the proceeds of the sale of the Osage Tribe’s lands in Kansas. (5) Personal property purchased with surplus funds. Appellant claimed that these properties were immune from state taxation by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States; hence the Oklahoma Inheritance and Transfer Tax Act of 1939 (§§ 989-989t, Title 68, Okla. Stat. 1941) which authorized the assessment on the properties was invalid in this respect. The Oklahoma Tax Commission rejected this contention and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed. 200 Okla. —, 193 P. 2d 1017. It is essential at the outset to understand the history and nature of the arrangement whereby the United States holds in trust the properties involved in this case. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1945) 446-455. In 1866, the United States and the Cherokee Nation of Indians executed a comprehensive treaty covering their various relationships. 14 Stat. 799. It was there agreed that the United States might settle friendly Indians in certain areas of Cherokee territory, including what is now Osage County, Oklahoma; these areas had previously been conveyed by the United States to the Cherokees. The treaty further provided that the areas in question were to be conveyed in fee simple to the tribes settled by the United States "to be held in common or by their members in severalty as the United States may decide.” The Osage Indians subsequently moved to the Indian Territory and settled in what is now Osage County. In 1883, pursuant to the 1866 treaty, the Cherokees conveyed this area to the United States “in trust nevertheless and for the use and benefit of the said Osage and Kansas Indians.” It is significant that fee simple title to the land was not conveyed at this time to the Osages; instead, the United States received that title as trustee for the Osages. Nor was any distinction here made between the land and the minerals thereunder, legal title to both being transferred to the United States. On June 28, 1906, the Osage Allotment Act, providing for the distribution of Osage lands and properties, became effective. 34 Stat. 539. See Levindale Lead Co. v. Coleman, 241 U. S. 432. Provision was there made for the allotment to each tribal member of a 160-acre homestead, plus certain additional surplus lands. These allotted lands, said § 7, were to be set aside “for the sole use and benefit of the individual members of the tribe entitled thereto, or to their heirs, as herein provided.” The homestead was to be inalienable and nontaxable for 25 years or during the life of the allottee. The surplus lands, however, were to be inalienable for 25 years and nontaxable for 3 years, except that th.e Secretary of the Interior might issue a certificate of competence to an adult, authorizing him to sell all of his surplus lands; upon the issuance of such a certificate, or upon the death of the allottee, the surplus lands were to become immediately taxable. §2, Seventh; Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691. Section 3 of the Act stated that the minerals covered by these lands were to be reserved to the Osage Tribe for a period of 25 years and that mineral leases and royalties were to be approved by the United States. Section 4 then provided that all money due or to become due to the tribe was to be held in trust by the United States for 25 years; but these funds were to be segregated and credited pro rata to the individual members or their heirs, with interest accruing and being payable quarterly to the members. Royalties from the mineral leases were to be placed in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribal members and distributed to the individual members in the same manner and at the same time as interest payments on other moneys held in trust. In this connection, it should be noted that quarterly payments of interest and royalties became so large that Congress later limited the amount of payments that could be made to those without certificates of competence; provision was also made for investing the surplus in bonds, stocks, etc. According to § 5 of this 1906 statute, at the end of the 25-year trust period “the lands, mineral interests, and moneys, herein provided, for and held in trust by the United States shall be the absolute property of the individual members of the Osage tribe, according to the role herein provided for, or their heirs, as herein provided, and deeds to said lands shall be issued to said members, or to their heirs, as herein provided, and said moneys shall be distributed to said members, or to their heirs, as herein provided, and said members shall have full control of said lands, moneys, and mineral interests, except as here-inbefore provided.” It was also stated in § 2, Seventh, that the minerals upon the allotted lands “shall become the property of the individual owner of said land” at the expiration of 25 years, unless otherwise provided by Congress. Moreover, § 6 provided that the lands, moneys and mineral interests of any deceased member of the Osage Tribe “shall descend to his or her legal heirs, according to the laws of the Territory of Oklahoma.” Congress subsequently provided, in § 8 of the Act of April 18, 1912, 37 Stat. 86, 88, that any adult member of the tribe who was not mentally incompetent could by will dispose of “any or all of his estate, real, personal, or mixed, including trust funds, from which restrictions as to alienation have not been removed,” in accordance with the laws of the State of Oklahoma. Such wills could not be probated, however, unless approved by the Secretary of the Interior before the death of the testator. The 25-year trust period established by the 1906 statute has been extended several times by Congress, first to 1946 (41 Stat. 1249), then to 1958 (45 Stat. 1478), and finally to 1984 (52 Stat. 1034). The last extension provided that the “lands, moneys, and other properties now or hereafter held in trust or under the supervision of the United States for the Osage Tribe of Indians, the members thereof, or their heirs and assigns, shall continue subject to such trusts and supervision until January 1, 1984, unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress.” Application of the foregoing provisions to the estate in issue produces this picture: Legal title to the mineral interests, the funds and the securities constituting the corpus of the trust estate is in the United States as trustee. The United States received legal title to the mineral interests in 1883, when it took what is now Osage County from the Cherokees in trust for the Osages; and that title has not subsequently been transferred. Legal title to the various funds and securities adhered to the United States as the pertinent trusts were established and developed. Beneficial title to these properties was vested in the decedent and is now held by his sole heir, the appellant. The beneficiary at all times has been entitled to at least a limited amount of interest and royalties arising out of the corpus. And the beneficiary has a reversionary interest in the corpus, an interest that will materialize only when the legal title passes from the United States at the end of the trust period. But until that period ends, the beneficiary has no control over the corpus. See Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce, 81 F. 2d 143, 150. Since 1819, when McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, was decided, it has been established that the property of the United States is immune from any form of state taxation, unless Congress expressly consents to the imposition of such liability. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174. This tax immunity grows out of the supremacy of the Federal Government and the necessity that it be able to deal with its own property free from any interference or embarrassment that state taxation might impose. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra; Wisconsin Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496. In United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, the same rule was held to apply where the United States holds legal title to land in trust for an Indian or a tribe. The United States there held legal title to certain lands in trust for a band of Sioux Indians which was in actual possession of the lands. This Court held that neither the lands nor the permanent improvements thereon were subject to state or local ad valorem taxes. It was emphasized that the fee title remained in the United States in obvious execution of its protective policy toward its wards, the Sioux Indians. To tax these lands and the improvements thereon, without congressional consent, would be to tax a means employed by the Government to accomplish beneficent objects relative to a dependent class of individuals. Moreover, the United States had agreed to convey the lands to the allottees in fee at the end of the trust period "free of all charge or incumbrances whatsoever.” If the tax in question were assessed and unpaid, the lands could be sold by the tax authorities. The United States would thus be so burdened that it could not discharge its obligation to convey unencumbered land without paying the taxes imposed from year to year. Further application of the tax immunity rule to land held in trust by the United States for the benefit of Indians was made in McCurdy v. United States, 264 U. S. 484. That case involved surplus lands that had been allotted to members of the Osage Tribe. It will be recalled that the Osage Allotment Act of June 28,1906, had made these surplus lands expressly taxable after three years or at the death of the allottee. The allottees in the Mc-Curdy case died within the three-year period but before deeds to their allotted lands had been executed and delivered to them. Oklahoma sought to place a tax on the lands, the taxable date being within the three-year period and before the execution and delivery of the deeds to the heirs of the allottees. This Court held that legal title to the lands in issue was still in the United States as trustee on the taxable date, title not passing until the execution and delivery of the deeds. In reliance on the Rickert case, the conclusion was reached that the lands were not taxable while held in trust by the United States. See also United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Fremont County, Wyo., 145 F. 2d 329; United States v. Thurston County, 143 F. 287. Since the property here involved is all held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the decedent and his heirs, it is thought to be immune from any form of state taxation under the decisions in the Rickert and McCurdy cases. Reference is made to certain provisions of the Oklahoma Inheritance and Transfer Tax Act which indicate that the inheritance tax in issue might have a very real and direct effect upon the property to which the United States holds title, an effect similar to that which was emphasized in the Rickert case. The Act applies, of course, to the transfer of estates held in trust. § 989. Specific provision is then made in § 989i that “Taxes levied under this Act shall be and remain a lien upon all the property transferred until paid.” Provision is also made for the sale of estate property if necessary to satisfy the tax. §§ 989í and 989L It is therefore possible that if the tax were unpaid Oklahoma might try to place a lien upon the property which is being transferred, property as to which the United States holds legal title. Complications might arise as to the validity of such a lien. And the United States would be burdened to the extent of opposing the imposition of the lien or seeing that the tax was paid so as to avoid the lien. Moreover, insofar as the inheritance tax is paid out of the surplus and trust funds held by the United States, there is a depletion of the corpus to which the United States holds legal title. Such depletion makes that much smaller the estate which the Government has seen fit to hold in trust for the decedent’s heirs. If the estate is to be tapped repeatedly by Oklahoma until 1984 by the deaths of the various heirs, the result may be a substantial decrease in the amount then available for distribution. But our decision in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, has foreclosed an application of the Rickert and McCurdy cases to the estate and inheritance tax situation. Among the properties involved in the Oklahoma Tax Commission case were restricted cash and securities, which could not be freely alienated or used by the Indians without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. We held that the restriction, without more, was not the equivalent of a congressional grant of estate tax immunity for the transfer of the cash and securities. Moreover, express repudiation was made of the concept that these restricted properties were federal in-strumentalities and therefore constitutionally exempt from estate tax consequences. See also Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376. The very foundation upon which the Rickert case rested was thus held to be inapplicable. We fail to see any substantial difference for estate tax purposes between restricted property and trust property. The power of Congress over both types of property is the same. Board of Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 717; United States v. Ramsey, 271 U. S. 467, 471. Both devices have the common purpose of protecting those who have been found by Congress to be unable yet to assume a fully independent status relative to property. The effect which an estate or inheritance tax may have is the same in both instances; liens may be placed on both restricted and trust properties and lead to complications; and both types of property may of necessity be depleted to assure payment of the tax. The fact that the United States holds legal title as to trust property but not as to restricted property affords no distinguishing characteristic from the standpoint of an estate tax. In addition, Congress has given no indication whatever that trust properties in general are to be given any greater tax exemption than restricted properties. Hence the Oklahoma Tax Commission case must control our disposition of this proceeding. Implicit in this Court’s refusal to apply the Rickert doctrine to an estate or inheritance tax situation is a recognition that such a tax rests upon a basis different from that underlying a property tax. An inheritance or estate tax is not levied on the property of which an estate is composed. Rather it is imposed upon the shifting of economic benefits and the privilege of transmitting or receiving such benefits. United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U. S. 57, 60; Whitney v. Tax Commission, 309 U. S. 530, 538. In this case, for example, the decedent had a vested interest in his Osage headright; and he had the right to receive the annual income from the trust properties and to receive all the properties at the end of the trust period. At his death, these interests and rights passed to his heir. It is the transfer of these incidents, rather than the trust properties themselves, that is the subject of the inheritance tax in question. In this setting, refinements of title are immaterial. Whether legal title to the properties is in the United States or in the decedent and his heir is of no consequence to the taxability of the transfer. The result of permitting the imposition of the inheritance tax on the transfer of trust properties may be, as we have noted, to deplete the trust corpus and to create lien difficulties. But those are normal and intended consequences of the inheritance tax. And until Congress has in some affirmative way indicated that these burdens require that the transfer be immune from the inheritance tax liability, the Oklahoma Tax Commission case permits that liability to be imposed. But that case also makes clear that should any of the properties transferred be exempted by Congress from direct taxation they cannot be included in the estate for inheritance tax purposes. No such properties are here involved, however. We have considered the other points raised by the appellant but deem them to be without merit. The judgment below is therefore Affirmed: The Chief Justice, MR. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent. The decedent was also survived by a widow. But she was prohibited by law from inheriting any part of- the estate unless she was of Indian blood, a matter which was in dispute. A settlement was reached whereby the widow received a certain amount from the estate, apparently in return for giving up her claim as an heir. An Osage headlight has been defined by one court as “the interest that a member of the tribe has in the Osage tribal trust estate, and the trust consists of the oil, gas, and mineral rights, and the funds which were placed to the credit of the Osage tribe, all fully set out in the above act [Act of June 28,1906, 34 Stat. 539]In re Denison, 38 F. 2d 662, 664. Another court has made this definition: “The right to receive the trust funds and the mineral interests at the end of the trust period, and during that period to participate in the distribution of the bonuses and royalties arising from the mineral estates and the interest on the trust funds, is an Osage headright.” Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce, 81 F. 2d 143, 148-149. Headrights are not transferable and do not pass to a trustee in bankruptcy. Taylor v. Tayrien, 51 F. 2d 884; Taylor v. Jones, 51 F. 2d 892. The trust under which these funds were to be held was established in 1865 by treaty between the United States and the Great and Little Osage Indians, 14 Stat. 687. By the terms of this treaty, the proceeds of the sale of Osage lands in Kansas were to be placed in the United States Treasury to the credit of the tribe. Provisions for carrying out the terms of this treaty were made by Congress in 1880, 21 Stat. 291. By the Act of March 3, 1921, 41 Stat. 1249, Congress provided that so long as the income should be sufficient the adult Osage Indian without a certificate of competency should be paid $1,000 quarterly. See also Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1008. In the Act of June 24, 1938, 52 Stat. 1034, it was provided that where the restricted Osage had surplus funds in excess of $10,000 he was to be paid $1,000 quarterly, but if he had surplus funds of less than $10,000 he was to receive quarterly only his current income, not to exceed $1,000 quarterly.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HODGSON, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. LOCAL UNION 6799, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al. No. 655. Argued March 23, 1971 Decided June 14, 1971 Marshall, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., post, p. 341, and White, J., post, p. 343, filed dissenting opinions. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Gray, Richard B. Stone, Peter G. Nash, George T. Avery, Beate Bloch, and Cornelius S. Donoghue, Jr. Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bernard Kleiman, George H. Cohen, Carl Frankel, and Jerome Smith. Opinion of the. Court by Mr. Justice Marshall, announced by Mr. Justice Stewart. Petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, instituted this action under § 402 (b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 534, 29 U. S. C. § 482 (b) , against Local 6799, United Steelworkers of America, to set aside a general election of officers conducted by the union. The lawsuit arose after Nicholas Hantzis, an unsuccessful candidate for president of the local, protested the election to both the local and international union organizations. His protest concerned several matters including the use of union facilities to prepare campaign materials for the incumbent president who was re-elected. After failing to obtain relief through the internal procedures of either union organization, Hantzis filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to § 402 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 482 (a). The complaint repeated the charge that union facilities had been used to promote the candidacy of the incumbent president and raised, for the first time, an additional objection concerning a meeting-attendance requirement imposed as a condition of . candidacy for union office. . At no time during his internal union protests did Hantzis challenge the attendance requirement. Following an investigation of the complaint, the Secretary concluded that union facilities had been used improperly to aid the re-election of the incumbent president in violation of § 401 (g) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 481 (g). The Secretary also concluded that § 401 (e) had been violated because the meeting-attendance requirement had not been uniformly administered and because the requirement itself was not a reasonable qualification on the right of union members to hold office. Respondents were advised of these conclusions and were asked to take voluntary remedial action. When they failed to comply with the request, the Secretary brought this proceeding in the District Court for the Central District of California. The District Court held that § 401 (g) had been vio-, lated by the use of union facilities for the benefit of the incumbent president’s campaign and ordered a new election for the office of president. The District Court also held, however, that the meeting-attendance rule was reasonable and that Local 6799 had not violated § 401 (e) by imposing the rule as a qualification on candidacies for union office. ■ On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed without reaching the question whether the attendance requirement was reasonable. In the court’s view, Hantzis’ failure to challenge the requirement during his pursuit of internal union remedies precluded the Secretary from later raising the issue. The court reasoned that since the Act requires that union members protesting the conduct of elections exhaust their internal union remedies before complaining to the Secretary, Congress intended to empower the Secretary to assert only “those violations that are fairly' apparent from a member’s protest to the union . . . 426 F. 2d 969, 971. Because the case presents an important issue concerning the scope of the Secretary’s authority under the Act, we granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 940. We conclude’ that Hántzis’ failure to object to the attendance rule during pursuit of his internal union remedies bars the Secretary from later challenging the rule in a § 402 (b) action. We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of, Appeals. Section 402 (b) provides that once a member challenging an election has exhausted his internal union remedies and filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary “shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this title has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization . ...” At the outset, petitioner contends that the language of the section empowers the Secretary to investigate and litigate • any and all violations that may have affected ■the outcome of an election pnce a union member has exhausted his internal union remedies concerning any violation that occurred during that election. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the Secretary is authorized to act if his' investigation uncovers “a violation” — this, it is said, means that the Secretary is not limited to seeking redress only in respect of the claims earlier presented by the union member to his union. However, the statutory language is not so devoid , of ambiguity that it alone can bear the weight of the Secretary’s expansive view of his authority. While the words “a violation” might mean “any violation whatever, revealed by .the investigation,” the words are susceptible of other readings. In particular, they can fairly be read to mean, “any of the violations raised by the union member during his internal union election protest.” In Wirtz v. Laborers’ Union, 389 U. S. 477 (1968), this Court noted'that the range of the Secretary’s authority under § 402 (b) must be determined “by inference since there is lacking an explicit provision regarding the permissible scope of' the Secretary’s complaint,” 389 U. S., at 481. We must, therefore, examine the legislative history and statutory policies behind § 402 and the rest of the Act to decide the issue presented by this case. Examination of the relevant legislative materials reveals a clear congressional concern for the neéd to remedy abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from- the longstanding congressional policy against unnecessary governmental interference with internal union affairs, Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U. S. 463, 470-471 (1968). The introduction to the Senate report accompanying the Act summarizes the general objectives of Congress: “A strong independent labor movement is a vital part of American institutions. The shocking abuses revealed by recent investigations have been confined to a few unions. The overwhelming majority are honestly and democratically run. In providing remedies for existing evils the Senate should be careful neither to undermine self-government within the labor movement nor to weaken unions in their role as the bargaining representatives of' employees.” S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1959). The requirement of § 402 (a), that a union member first seek redress of alleged election violations within the union before enlisting the aid of the Secretary, was similarly designed to harmonize the need to eliminate election abuses with a desire to avoid unnecessary governmental intervention. The same Senate Report, in reference to Title IV of the Act arid to the exhaustion requirement, states: “In .filing a complaint the member must, show that he has pursued any remedies available to him within the union.and any parent body in a timely manner. This rule preserves a maximum amount of independence and self-government by giving every international union the opportunity to correct improper local elections.” Id,., at 21. Plainly Congress intended to foster a situation in which the unions themselves could remedy as many election violations as possible without the Government’s ever becoming involved. Achieving this objective would not only preserve and strengthen unions as self-regulating institutions, but also avoid unnecessary expenditure of the limited resources of the Secretary of Labor. Petitioner contends that the congressional concerns underpinning the exhaustion requirement were in fact-adequately served in this case, because the election in question was actually protested by a union member within the union, and because the union was later given á chance to remedy specific violations before being taken to court by the Secretary. In this view, it is irrelevant that Hantzis himself did not focus his election challenge on the attendance requirement when seeking internal union remedies. In sum, the Secretary urges that' § 402 (b) empowers him to act so long as a union member objects in any way to an election and so long as the union is given the opportunity to remedy voluntarily any violations that the Secretary determines may have affected the outcome of that election, regardless whether the member objected to the violations during his protest to the union. However, under petitioner’s limited, view of congressional objectives, the exhaustion requirement of § 402 (a) is left with virtually no purposé or part to play in the statutory scheme. “Exhaustion” would be accomplished given any sort of protest within the union, no matter how remote' the complaint made there from the alleged violation later litigated. The obvious purpose of an exhaustion requirement is not met when the union, during “ex-haüstion,” is given no notice of the defects to be cured. Indeed, the primary objective of the exhaustion requirement is to preserve the vitality of internal union mechanisms for resolving election disputes — mechanisms to decide complaints brought by members of the union themselves. To accept petitioner’s contention that a union member, who is aware of the facts underlying an alleged violation, need not-first protest this violation to his union before complaining to the Secretary would be needlessly to weaken union self-government. Plainly petitioner’s approach slights the interest in protecting union self-regulation and is out of harmony with the congressional' purpose reflected in § 402 (a). Of course, any interpretation of the exhaustion requirement must reflect the needs of rank and file union members — those people the requirement is designed ultimately to serve. We are not" unmindful that union members may use broad or imprecise language in framing their internal union protests and that members, will often lack .the necessary information to be aware of.the existence or scope of many election violations. Union democracy •is far too important to permit these deficiencies to foreclose relief from election violations; and in determining whether the exhaustion requirement of § 402 (a) has been satisfied, courts should impose a heavy burden on the union to show that it could not in any way discern that a member was complaining of the violation in question. But when a union member is aware of the facts supporting an alleged election violation, the member must, in some discernible. fashion, indicate to his union his dissatisfaction with those facts if he is to meet the exhaustion requirement. ' In this case, it is clear that the protesting member knew of the existence of the meeting-attendance provision and that his election protests to the local and international unions concerned matters wholly unrelated to the rule. We therefore hold that internal union remedies were not ■properly exhausted and that the Secretary was barred from litigating the claim. Given this holding, we do not reach the question whether the meeting-attendance rule itself is reasonable. The judgment is Affirmed. The United Steelworkers of America, • an international union under which Local 6799 is chartered, intervened as a party defendant. Hantzis’ written protest consisted of a letter to the International Union which purported to describe the election’s operation. Since the letter did not make specific allegations, it is difficult precisely to define Hantzis’ objections. However, in addition to his general charge that union machinery had been used to aid incumbents, Hantzis also protested several procedural matters including the methods 'used to nominate and swear in officers. . The Secretary of Labor subsequently concluded that none of these procedural matters constituted a violation of the Act. The attendance rule, which is contained in the constitution of the International Union, provides that a union member, in order to be eligible for election as a local union officer or grievance committeeman, must have attended at least one-half of the regular meetings of his local 'union for 36 months previous to the election unless union activities or working hours prevented his attendance. It is unclear from Hantzis’ complaint whether he objected to the attendance rule itself or to the way in which the rule was administered during the election. Hantzis himself qualified under the rule. This facet of the District Court’s decision is not challenged here. “Sec. 402. (a) A member of a labor organization— “(1) who has exhausted the remedies avaliable under , the constitution and bylaws of such organization and of any parent body, or “(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months after their invocation, “may file a complaint with the Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any provision of section 401 (including violation of the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization pertaining to the election and removal of officers). The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon (as hereinafter provided) and in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be conducted by the officers elected or in such other manner as its constitution and bylaws may provide. “(b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this title has occurred and has riot been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the United States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon the removal of officers under the supervision -of the Secretary and in accordance wtih the provisions of this title and such rules and regulations as the Secretary may. prescribe. The court shalL have power to take such action as it deems.proper to preserve the assets of the labor organization. “(c) If, upon a preponderance of the-evidence after a trial upon the merits, the court finds— “(1) that an election has not been held within the time prescribed by section 401, or “(2) that the yiolation of section 401 may have affected the outcome of an election, “the court • shall declare the election, if any, to be void and direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of the Secretary and, so far as lawful and practicable, in .conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization. The Secretary shall promptly certify to the court the names of the persons elected, and the court shall thereupon enter a decree declaring such persons to be the officers of the labor organization. If the proceeding is for the removal of officers .pursuant to subsection (h) of section 401, the Secretary shall certify the results of the vote and the court shall enter a decree declaring whether such persons have been removed as officers of the labor organization. “(d) An order directing an election, dismissing a complaint, or designating elected officers of a labor organization shall be appealable in the same manner as the final'judgment in a civil action, but- an order directing an election shall not be stayed pending appeal.” For much the same reasons, members should not be held to procedural niceties while seeking redress within their union, and exhaustion- is not required when internal union remedies are unnecessarily complex or otherwise operate to confuse or inhibit union protestors.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UPHAM et al. v. SEAMON et al. No. 81-1724. Decided April 1, 1982 Per Curiam. After the 1980 census, Texas’ congressional delegation increased from 24 to 27 members. A reapportionment plan, Senate Bill No. 1 (SB1), was enacted on August 14, 1981, and then submitted to the Attorney General for preclearance. While it was pending before him, suit was filed in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas challenging the constitutionality of SB1 and its validity under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973. A three-judge court was empaneled, held a hearing, and delayed any further action until after the Attorney General acted. On January 29, 1982, the Attorney General entered an objection to SB1. Specifically, he objected to the lines drawn for two contiguous districts in south Texas, Districts 15 and 27. He stated that the State “has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the submitted plan is nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect” with respect to the other 25 districts. In the face of this objection, which made SB1 unenforceable, and the obvious unconstitutionality of the prior apportionment plan, the court ordered the parties to provide written submissions along with maps, plats, and other data to aid the court in reaching a court-ordered reapportionment plan. A hearing was held on February 9. The court then proceeded to resolve the Attorney General’s objection to Districts 15 and 27. 536 F. Supp. 931. All other districts of the court’s plan, except for those in Dallas County, were identical to those of SB1. The court devised its own districts for Dallas County, and it is that part of the District Court’s judgment that is on appeal here. A stay and expedited consideration are requested. Judge Sam Johnson and Judge Justice wrote separately, but agreed that SBl’s plan for Dallas County could not be implemented. Judge Justice alone determined that the SB1 plan for Dallas County was unconstitutional. In Judge Johnson’s view, since SB1 was a nullity, the entire plan had to be a court-ordered plan which must conform to § 5, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, standards, including the “no retrogression rule” of Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). However, he thought that in two respects the standards applicable to court-ordered plans were stricter than those that must be observed by a legislature: population equality and racial fairness. Judicial application of the no retrogression standard, in his view, is limited to consideration of purely numerical factors; unlike a legislature, a court cannot consider the “innumerable political factors that may affect a minority group’s access to the political process.” 536 F. Supp., at 948. Although a court must defer to legislative judgments on reapportionment as much as possible, it is forbidden to do so when the legislative plan would not meet the special standards of population equality and racial fairness that are applicable to court-ordered plans. SBl’s treatment of Dallas County failed to meet the test of racial fairness for a court-ordered plan. Under SB1, minority strength in District 5, in Dallas County, would have gone from 29.1 percent to 12.1 percent. Apparently, the minority votes had been shifted to District 24, which increased in minority population from 37.4 percent to 63.8 percent. Judge Johnson reasoned that this change would reduce minority effectiveness in District 5 substantially and would not guarantee a “safe” seat in District 24. This “would result in a severe retrogression in the Dallas County area.” Id., at 957, n. 39. He specifically recognized that SBl’s plans for Dallas County had been formulated in response to the interests expressed by minority voters in creating a “safe” seat. He did not hold this legislative response to be unconstitutional, nor did he criticize it as inconsistent with § 5 as it applied to legislative redistricting. A court, however, could not, in his view, consider the same factors as a legislature. The court, therefore, redrew the boundaries of Districts 5 and 24, and the two adjoining Districts, 3 and 26. Under the court-ordered plan, District 5 would have a minority population of 31.87 percent and District 24 would have 45.7 percent. Appellants, who are Republican Party officials in Texas, contend that the District Court simply substituted its own reapportionment preferences for those of the state legislature and that this is inconsistent with Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535 (1978); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130 (1981); and White v. Weiser, 412 U. S. 783 (1973). They argue that in the absence of any objection to the Dallas County districts by the Attorney General, and in the absence of any finding of a constitutional or statutory violation with respect to those districts, a court must defer to the legislative judgments the plans reflect, even under circumstances in which a court order is required to effect an interim legislative apportionment plan. We agree and, therefore, summarily reverse. The relevant principles that govern federal district courts in reapportionment cases are well established: “From the beginning, we have recognized that ‘reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.’ We have adhered to the view that state legislatures have ‘primary jurisdiction’ over legislative reapportionment. . . . Just as a federal district court, in the context of legislative reapportionment, should follow the policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution, we hold that a district court should similarly honor state policies in the context of congressional reapportionment. In fashioning a reapportionment plan or in choosing among plans, a district court should not pre-empt the legislative task nor ‘intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.’” White v. Weiser, 412 U. S., at 794-795 (citations omitted). Weiser itself presents a good example of when such an intrusion is not necessary. We held there that the District Court erred when, in choosing between two possible court-ordered plans, it failed to choose that plan which most closely approximated the state-proposed plan. The only limits on judicial deference to state apportionment policy, we held, were the substantive constitutional and statutory standards to which such state plans are subject. Id., at 797. We reached a similar conclusion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 160-161 (1971), in which we held that the District Court erred in fashioning a court-ordered plan that rejected state policy choices more than was necessary to meet the specific constitutional violations involved. Indeed, our decision in Whitcomb directly conflicts with the lower court’s order in this case. Specifically, we indicated that the District Court should not have rejected all multimember districts in the State, absent a finding that those multimember districts were unconstitutional. Ibid. We reached this conclusion despite the fact that we had previously held that “when district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, single-member districts are preferable to large multimember districts as a general matter.” Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690, 692 (1971). See also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 19 (1975) (indicating that court-ordered plans should, in some circumstances, defer to, or respect, a state policy of multimember districting). It is true that this Court has held that court-ordered reapportionment plans are subject in some respects to stricter standards than are plans developed by a state legislature. Wise v. Lipscomb, supra, at 540; Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 414 (1977). This stricter standard applies, however, only to remedies required by the nature and scope of the violation: “The remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 161. We have never said that the entry of an objection by the Attorney General to any part of a state plan grants a district court the authority to disregard aspects of the legislative plan not objected to by the Attorney General. There may be reasons for rejecting other parts of the State’s proposal, but those reasons must be something other than the limits on the court’s remedial actions. Those limits do not come into play until and unless a remedy is required; whether a remedy is required must be determined on the basis of the substantive legal standards applicable to the State’s submission. Whenever a district court is faced with entering an interim reapportionment order that will allow elections to go forward it is faced with the problem of “reconciling the requirements of the Constitution with the goals of state political policy.” Connor v. Finch, supra, at 414. An appropriate reconciliation of these two goals can only be reached if the district court’s modifications of a state plan are limited to those necessary to cure any constitutional or statutory defect. Thus, in the absence of a finding that the Dallas County reapportionment plan offended either the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act, the District Court was not free, and certainly was not required, to disregard the political program of the Texas State Legislature. Although the District Court erred, it does not necessarily follow that its plan should not serve as an interim plan governing the forthcoming congressional elections. The filing date for candidates, which was initially postponed by the District Court, has now come and gone. The District Court has also adjusted other dates so that the primary elections scheduled for May 1 may be held. The State of Texas, although it disagrees with the judgment of the District Court with respect to Dallas County, urges that the election process should not now be interrupted and a new schedule adopted, even for Dallas County. It is urged that because the District Court’s plan is only an interim plan and is subject to replacement by the legislature in 1983, the injury to appellants, if any, will not be irreparable. It is true that we have authorized District Courts to order or to permit elections to be held pursuant to apportionment plans that do not in all respects measure up to the legal requirements, even constitutional requirements. See, e. g., Bullock v. Weiser, 404 U. S. 1065 (1972); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 396 U. S. 1055 (1970). Necessity has been the motivating factor in these situations, Because we are not now as familiar as the District Court with the Texas election laws and the legal and practical factors that may bear on whether the primary elections should. be rescheduled, we vacate the District Court judgment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings. See Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 4 (1964). Having indicated the legal error of the District Court, we leave it to that court in the first instance to determine whether to modify its judgment and reschedule the primary elections for Dallas County or, in spite of its erroneous refusal to adopt the SB1 districts for Dallas County, to allow the election to go forward in accordance with the present schedule. The judgment of the Court shall issue forthwith. So ordered. His objection, however, went to the entire plan, and on February 23, he refused the State’s request that the objection be severed and addressed to only a portion of SB1 (but see n. 7, infra). The existing apportionment plan created only 24, not 27 districts, and the changes in population over the past 10 years had created extreme numerical variations between the districts, which were unconstitutional under the one-man, one-vote rule. Judge Parker dissented from the relevant part of the court order — he would have followed SB1 in Dallas County. The relevant passage of Judge Johnson’s opinion reads as follows: “This Court recognizes that certain minority group members expressed a desire for a ‘safe’ minority district in Dallas County. After consideration of numerous political factors, and substantial legislative battling, the Texas Legislature decided on the configurations in S.B.l .... The legislature was at liberty to engage in such considerations. This Court, in fashioning a nonretrogressive apportionment plan does not have that privilege. It must evaluate the new plan without access to questions regarding the ability of separate minority groups to form coalitions or other political concerns. ... It is not before this Court to determine whether considerations valid in the legislative context justify simply increasing swing-vote influence in one district at the expense of the influence previously enjoyed in a neighboring district. This Court determines, however, that, in the context of a court-ordered apportionment plan, such a trade-off would result in a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” 536 F. Supp., at 957, n. 9. Appellants are supported in this appeal by the State of Texas. While Texas agrees with them on the merits of this case and supports a summary reversal of the District Court decision, it asks that this Court delay any remedial action until after the 1982 elections. In other words, Texas chai-lenges the merits of the District Court decision, but contends that it would be too disruptive and expensive to attempt to alter the 1982 elections at this point. Appellants propose two other arguments. First, under Texas law an invalid statutory provision is severable. Therefore, the fact that the Attorney General objected to the validity of SBl’s district lines for 2 districts did not invalidate the plans for the other 25 districts. Second, the “stricter standards” applicable to court-ordered plans apply only to the use of multimember districts and population variations beyond a de minimis amount. In particular, this “stricter standard” does not apply to plans that have already been precleared by the Attorney General. In light of our disposition of the case, we need not reach either of these arguments. The Attorney General took the same position in declining to grant preclearance to that portion of SB1 that he did not find objectionable: “Since the federal district courts will be acting in the stead of the Legislature we believe that the courts should attempt to effectuate the legislative judgment to the extent possible and modify the Legislature’s plans only as necessary to meet the concerns raised in the objection letters. In other words, we believe the court should make such modifications to the plans as would normally be made by the Legislature if it were in session.” App. to Juris. Statement F-3 (letter of Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, to Texas Secretary of State). In this Court, the Solicitor General takes a slightly different position. He contends that the question of what weight a district court should give to a legislative plan that is partially objected to by the Attorney General is substantial and, therefore, merits plenary consideration by this Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PARISI v. DAVIDSON et al. No. 70-91. Argued October 19-20, 1971 Decided February 23, 1972 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BrenNan, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 46. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Richard L. Goff argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were George A. Blackstone and Stephen V. Bomse. William Terry Bray argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Mardian, William Bradford Reynolds, Robert L. Keuch, and Robert A. Crandall. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. When a member of the armed forces has applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector and has exhausted all avenues of administrative relief, it is now settled that he may seek habeas corpus relief in a federal district court on the ground that the denial of his application had no basis in fact. The question in this case is whether the district court must stay its hand when court-martial proceedings are pending against the serviceman. The petitioner, Joseph Parisi, was inducted into the Army as a draftee in August 1968. Nine months later he applied for a discharge as a conscientious objector, claiming that earlier doubts about military service had crystallized into a firm conviction that any form of military activity conflicted irreconcilably with his religious beliefs. He was interviewed by the base chaplain, the base psychiatrist, and a special hearing officer. They all attested to the petitioner’s sincerity and to the religious content of his professed beliefs. In addition, the commanding general of the petitioner’s Army training center and the commander of the Army hospital recommended that the petitioner be discharged as a conscientious objector. His immediate commanding officer, an Army captain, disagreed, recommending disapproval of the application on the ground that the petitioner’s beliefs were based on essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or on a merely personal moral code. In November 1969, the Department of the Army denied the petitioner conscientious objector status, on the grounds that his professed beliefs had become fixed prior to entering the service and that his opposition to war was not truly based upon his religious beliefs. On November 24, 1969, the petitioner applied to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (hereafter sometimes ABCMR) for administrative review of that determination. Four days later the petitioner commenced the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming that the Army’s denial of his conscientious objector application was without basis in fact. He sought discharge from the Army and requested a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer out of the jurisdiction of the District Court and to prohibit further training preparatory to being transferred to Vietnam. The District Court declined at that time to consider the merits of the habeas corpus petition, but it retained jurisdiction pending a decision by the ABCMR, and in the meantime enjoined Army authorities from requiring the petitioner to participate in activity or training beyond his current noncombatant duties. Shortly thereafter the petitioner received orders to report to Fort Lewis, Washington, for deployment to Vietnam, where he was to perform noncombatant duties similar to those that had been assigned to him in this country. He sought a stay of this redeployment order pending appeal of the denial of habeas corpus, but his application was denied by the Court of Appeals, on the condition that the Army would produce him if the appeal should result in his favor. A similar stay application was subsequently denied by Mr. Justice Douglas as Ninth Circuit Justice, Parisi v. Davidson, 396 U. S. 1233. The petitioner then reported to Fort Lewis. He refused, however, to obey a military order to board a plane for Vietnam. As a result, he was charged with violating Art. 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 890, and, on April 8, 1970, a court-martial convicted him of that military offense. While the court-martial charges were pending, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records notified the petitioner that it had rejected his application for relief from the Army’s denial of his conscientious objector application. The District Court then ordered the Army to show cause why the pending writ of habeas corpus should not issue. On the Government’s motion, the District Court, on March 31, 1970, entered an order deferring consideration of the habeas corpus petition until final determination of the criminal charge then pending in the military court system. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this order, concluding that “habeas proceedings were properly stayed pending the final conclusion of Parisi’s military trial and his appeals therefrom,” 435 F. 2d 299, 302. We granted certiorari, 402 U. S. 942. In affirming the stay of the petitioner’s federal habeas corpus proceeding until completion of the military courts’ action, the Court of Appeals relied on the related doctrines of exhaustion of alternative remedies and comity between the federal civilian courts and the military system of justice. We hold today that neither of these doctrines required a stay of the habeas corpus proceedings in this case. With respect to available administrative remedies, there can be no doubt that the petitioner has fully met the demands of the doctrine of exhaustion — a doctrine that must be applied in each case with an “understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved.” McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193. The basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence — to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies. Id., at 194-195; McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 485; K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.01 etseq. (Supp. 1970). In this case the petitioner fully complied with Army Regulation 635-20, which dictates the procedures to be followed by a serviceman seeking classification as a conscientious objector on the basis of beliefs that develop after induction. Moreover, following a rule of the Ninth Circuit then in effect, he went further and appealed to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records. The procedures and corrective opportunities of the military administrative apparatus had thus been wholly utilized at the time the District Court entered its order deferring consideration of the petitioner’s habeas corpus application. It is clear, therefore, that, if the court-martial charge had not intervened, the District Court would have been wrong in not proceeding to an expeditious consideration of the merits of the petitioner’s claim. For the writ of habeas corpus has long been recognized as the appropriate remedy for servicemen who claim to be unlawfully retained in the armed forces. See, e. g., Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, 312; Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U. S. 233, 235; Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U. S. 487, 489. And, as stated at the outset, that writ is available to consider the plea of an in-service applicant for discharge as a conscientious objector who claims that exhaustion of military administrative procedures has led only to a factually baseless denial of his application. In re Kelly, 401 F. 2d 211 (CA5); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F. 2d 705 (CA2). But since a court-martial charge was pending against the petitioner when he sought habeas corpus in March 1970, the respondents submit that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the District Court must await the final outcome of those charges in the military judicial system before it may consider the merits of the petitioner’s habeas corpus claim. Although this argument, too, is framed in terms of “exhaustion,” it may more accurately be understood as based upon the appropriate demands of comity between two separate judicial systems. Requiring tile District Court to defer to the military courts in these circumstances serves the interests of comity, the respondents argue, by aiding the military judiciary in its task of maintaining order and discipline in the armed services and by eliminating “needless friction” between the federal civilian and military judicial systems. The respondents note that the military'constitutes a “specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian,” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94; Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128, and that in recognition of the special nature of the military community, Congress has created an autonomous military judicial system, pursuant to Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. They further point out that civilian courts, out of respect for the separation-of-powers doctrine and for the needs of the military, have rightly been reluctant to interfere with military judicial proceedings. But the issue in this case does not concern a federal district court’s direct intervention in a case arising in the military court system. Cf. Gusik v. Schilder, supra; Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683. The petitioner’s application for an administrative discharge — upon which the habeas corpus petition was based — antedated and was independent of the military criminal proceedings. The question here, therefore, is whether a federal court should postpone adjudication of an independent civil lawsuit clearly within its original jurisdiction. Under accepted principles of comity, the court should stay its hand only if the relief the petitioner seeks — discharge as a conscientious objector — would also be available to him with reasonable promptness and certainty through the machinery of the military judicial system in its processing of the court-martial charge. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 229; Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678, 690-691; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U. S. 713, 716-717. For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded that such relief would be even potentially available, much less that it would be either prompt or certain. Courts-martial are not convened to review and rectify administrative denials of conscientious objector claims or to release conscientious objectors from military service. They are convened to adjudicate charges of criminal violations of military law. It is true that the Court of Military Appeals has held that a soldier charged in a court-martial with refusal to obey a lawful order may, in certain limited circumstances, defend upon the ground that the order was not lawful because he had wrongfully been denied an administrative discharge as a conscientious objector. United States v. Noyd, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 483, 40 C. M. R. 195. The scope of the Noyd doctrine is narrow, United States v. Wilson, 19 U. S. C. M. A. 100, 41 C. M. R. 100, and its present vitality not wholly clear, United States v. Stewart, 20 U. S. C. M. A. 272, 43 C. M. R. 112. A Noyd defense, therefore, would be available, even arguably, only in an extremely limited category of court-martial proceedings. But even though we proceed on the assumption that Noyd offered this petitioner a potential affirmative defense to the court-martial charge brought against him, the fact remains that the Noyd doctrine offers, at best, no more than a defense to a criminal charge. Like any other legal or factual defense, it would, if successfully asserted at trial or on appeal, entitle the defendant to only an acquittal — not to the discharge from military service that he seeks in the habeas corpus proceeding. The respondents acknowledge, as they must, the limited function of a Noyd defense in the trial and appeal of the court-martial proceeding itself. But they suggest that, if the military courts should eventually acquit the petitioner on the ground of his Noyd defense, then the petitioner may have “an available remedy by way of habeas corpus in the Court of Military Appeals.” In support of this suggestion, the respondents point to the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a), and to cases in which the Court of Military Appeals has exercised power under that Act to order servicemen released from military imprisonment pending appeals of their court-martial convictions. See Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S., at 695; Levy v. Resor, 17 U. S. C. M. A. 135, 37 C. M. R. 399; United States v. Jennings, 19 U. S. C. M. A. 88, 41 C. M. R. 88; Johnson v. United States, 19 U. S. C. M. A. 407, 42 C. M. R. 9. But the All Writs Act only empowers courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . . ,” and the jurisdiction of the Court of Military Appeals is limited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice to considering appeals from court-martial convictions. 10 U. S. C. § 867; United States v. Snyder, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 480, 40 C. M. R. 192. That court has been given no “jurisdiction” to consider a serviceman’s claim for discharge from the military as a conscientious objector. Whether this conceptual difficulty might somehow be surmounted is a question for the Court of Military Appeals itself ultimately to decide. See United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 10, 12, 39 C. M. R. 10, 12. But the short answer to the respondents’ suggestion in this case is the respondents’ own concession that that court has, to date, never so much as intimated that it has power to issue a writ of habeas corpus granting separation from military service to a conscientious objector. We conclude here, therefore, as in Noyd v. Bond, supra, at 698 n. 11, that the petitioner cannot “properly be required to exhaust a remedy which may not exist.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to give expeditious consideration to the merits of the petitioner’s habeas corpus application. In holding as we do today that the pendency of court-martial proceedings must not delay a federal district court’s prompt determination of the conscientious objector claim of a serviceman who has exhausted all administrative remedies, we no more than recognize the historic respect in this Nation for valid conscientious objection to military service. See 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j); United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163. As the Defense Department itself has recognized, “the Congress . . . has deemed it more essential to respect a man’s religious beliefs than to force him to serve in the Armed Forces.” Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (May 10, 1968). But our decision today should not be understood as impinging upon the basic principles of comity that must prevail between civilian courts and the military judicial system. See, e. g., Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137; Orloft v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83; Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128. Accordingly, a federal district court, even though upholding the merits of the conscientious objector claim of a serviceman against whom court-martial charges are pending, should give careful consideration to the appropriate demands of comity in effectuating its habeas corpus decree. The judgment is reversed. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. At the time of oral argument of the present case, an appeal from this conviction was pending in a court of military review. The right of a person in the armed forces to be classified as a conscientious objector after induction is bottomed on Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 (May 10, 1968), issued by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to his authority under 10 U. S. C. § 133. The purpose of the directive is to provide “uniform procedures for the utilization of conscientious objectors in the Armed Forces and consideration of requests for discharge on the grounds of conscientious objection.” Army Regulation 635-20 was issued to effectuate the broader policies announced in DOD Directive No. 1300.6. Under the rule of Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F. 2d 587 (CA9 1969), the petitioner was required to appeal the Department of the Army’s decision to the civilian Army Board for Correction of Military Records in order to exhaust military administrative remedies and have access to federal court. Current governmental policy rejects Craycroft. Compliance with Army Regulation 635-20, not perfection of an ABCMR appeal, marks the point when military administrative procedures have been exhausted. Department of Justice Memo. No. 652 (Oct. 23, 1969). In Craycroft v. Ferrall, 397 U. S. 335, this Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit that the petitioner there had to appeal to the Board for the Correction of Naval Records before proceeding in federal court. But our decision was announced on March 30, 1970, more than four months after the present petitioner had appealed to the ABCMR. In 1946, Congress enacted legislation empowering the service secretaries, acting through boards of civilian officers of their respective departments, to alter military records when necessary to prevent injustice. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 207, 60 Stat. 837, as amended by 70A Stat. 116, 10 U. S. C. § 1552 (1952 ed., Supp. IV). Pursuant to this legislation, each service established a board for the correction of military records whose function is, on application by a serviceman, to review the military record and intervene where necessary to correct error or remove injustice. 10 U. S. C. § 1552 (a). The Department of Justice, in consultation with the Department of Defense, has accepted the holdings of the Kelly and Hammond cases. Department of Justice Memo. No. 652 (Oct. 23, 1969). See United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F. 2d 700, 701 (CA4). Compare Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F. 2d 538 (CA10), with Polsky v. Wetherill, 403 U. S. 916, vacating judgment in 438 F. 2d 132 (CA10). The respondents do not contend that the military courts have a special competence in determining if a conscientious objector application has been denied without basis in fact. As they acknowledge in their brief: “Plainly, judicial review of the factual basis for the Army’s denial of petitioner’s conscientious objector claim does not require an interpretation of ‘extremely technical provisions of the Uniform Code [of Military Justice] which have no analogs in civilian jurisprudence,’ ” quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683, 696. Thus,, it is not contended that exhaustion of military court remedies — like exhaustion of military administrative remedies- — -is required by the principles announced in McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, and McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479. The concept of “exhaustion” in the context of the demands of comity between different judicial systems is closely analogous to the doctrine of abstention. For a discussion of the exhaustion and abstention doctrines in the federal-state context, see generally C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts 186-188, 196— 208 (2d ed. 1970). Barker, Military Law — A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. Cin. L. Rev. 223 (1967); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 181 (1962). Military courts are legislative courts; their jurisdiction is independent of Art. Ill judicial power. Following World War II, Congress, in an attempt to reform and modernize the system of military law, created the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Act of May 5, 1950, c. 169, 64 Stat. 107. In 1968, the Code was amended by the Military Justice Act, 10 U. S. C. § 819, to improve court-martial and review procedures. See Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F. 2d 705, 710 (CA2 1968): “Judicial hesitancy when faced with matters touching on military affairs is hardly surprising in view of the doctrine of separation of powers and the responsibility for national defense which the Constitution . . . places upon the Congress and the President. Moreover, the ever-present and urgent need for discipline in the armed services would alone explain the relative freedom of the military from judicial supervision.” Army Regulation 635-20 provides that “individuals who have submitted formal applications [for conscientious objector' status] . . . will be retained in their units and assigned duties providing the minimum practicable conflict with their asserted beliefs pending a final decision on their applications.” Noyd involved an Air Force officer who, after being denied conscientious objector status, refused to obey an order to instruct student pilots to fly a fighter plane used in Vietnam. Noyd’s commanding officer had refrained from ordering the accused to give such instruction until the application had been processed and denied. As the Court of Military Appeals said: “The validity of the order [to instruct students], therefore, depended upon the validity of the Secretary’s decision [rejecting the conscientious objector application] ... If the Secretary’s decision was illegal, the order it generated was also illegal.” United States v. Noyd, 18 U. S. C. M. A. 483, 492, 40 C. M. R. 195, 204. The petitioner did, in fact, interpose a Noyd defense at his court-martial trial, and it was rejected upon the military judge’s finding that “the ruling of the Secretary of the Army was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or an abusive [sic] discretion.” We have been referred to no reported military court decision (including Noyd itself) that has yet acquitted a defendant upon the basis of a Noyd defense. If the military courts should ultimately acquit the petitioner on grounds other than wrongful denial of his conscientious objector application, the respondents acknowledge that he could not seek habeas corpus in the military judicial system. In this event, therefore, the petitioner could clearly not obtain the relief that he seeks in the military court system. This result is not inconsistent with the need to maintain order and discipline in the military and to avoid needless friction between the federal civilian and military judicial systems. If the Noyd defense is available and if the order that the petitioner disobeyed was unlawful if his conscientious objector claim is valid, then allowing him to proceed in federal district court as soon as military administrative remedies have been exhausted does not affect military-discipline. For if the conscientious objector claim is valid, the Army can have no interest in punishing him for disobedience of an unlawful order. If the conscientious objector claim is invalid, then the Army can, of course, prosecute the petitioner for his alleged disobedience of a lawful order. Correlatively, if the charges in military court would be unaffected by the validity of the conscientious objector claim, both the petitioner’s habeas corpus action and the criminal trial in military court could proceed concurrently. See n. 15, infra. Needless to say, the question whether wrongful denial of conscientious objector status may be raised as a defense against various types of military charges must remain with the military courts, as they exercise their special function of administering military law. See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? 48-51 (1967); Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection (1950); Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector Recognition in the United States, 20 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 409 (1952); Comment, God, the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 379 (1968). In the present case the respondents acknowledge that if the administrative denial of the petitioner’s conscientious objector claim had no basis in fact, then the court-martial charge against him is invalid. It follows that, if he should prevail in the habeas corpus proceeding, he is entitled to his immediate release from the military. At the other end of the spectrum is the hypothetical case of a court-martial charge that has no real connection with the conscientious objector claim — e. g., a charge of stealing a fellow soldier’s watch. In such a case, a district court, even though upholding the serviceman’s conscientious objector claim, might condition its order of discharge upon the completion of the court-martial proceedings and service of any lawful sentence imposed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHAIDEZ v. UNITED STATES No. 11-820. Argued November 1, 2012 Decided February 20, 2013 Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 358. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GlNSBURG, J., joined, post, p. 359. Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Pamela S. Karlan, Kathleen Sand-erson, Angela Vigil, Gerardo S. Gutierrez, Chuck Roth, Thomas C. Goldstein, and Kevin K. Russell. Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General VerriUi, Assistant Attorney General Brener, Ginger Anders, and Joel M. Gershowitz Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Active and Former State and Federal Prosecutors by Heidi Altman and Michael K. Gottlieb; for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Ira J. Kurzban and Rebecca Sharpless; for Habeas Scholars et al. by Douglas T. Kendall and Elizabeth B. Wydra; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Craig Louis Siegel, Joshua L. Dratel, Edwin A. Burnette, and Dawn M. Seibert; and for the National Association of Federal Defenders by Stephen B. Kinnaird and Sarah S. Gannett. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Luther Strange of Alabama, Michael C. Geraghty of Alaska, Torn Horne of Arizona, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Joseph R. Biden III of Delaware, Samuel S. Olens of Georgia, David M. Louie of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Gregory F. Zoeller of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Jack Conway of Kentucky, William J. Schneider of Maine, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Bill Schuette of Michigan, Chris Koster of Missouri, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Michael A. Delaney of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, E. Scott Pruitt of Oklahoma, Linda L. Kelly of Pennsylvania, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II of Virginia, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, J. B. Van Hallen of Wisconsin, and Gregory A. Phillips of Wyoming; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea. We consider here whether that ruling applies retroactively, so that a person whose conviction became final before we decided Padilla can benefit from it. We conclude that, under the principles set out in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), Padilla does not have retroactive effect. I Petitioner Roselva Chaidez hails from Mexico, but became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1977. About 20 years later, she helped to defraud an automobile insurance company out of $26,000. After federal agents uncovered the scheme, Chaidez pleaded guilty to two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. The District Court sentenced her to four years of probation and ordered her to pay restitution. Chaidez’s conviction became final in 2004. Under federal immigration law, the offenses to which Chaidez pleaded guilty are “aggravated felonies,” subjecting her to mandatory removal from this country. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). But according to Chaidez, her attorney never advised her of that fact, and at the time of her plea she remained ignorant of it. Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009, after an application she made for citizenship alerted them to her prior conviction. To avoid removal, Chaidez sought to overturn that conviction by filing a petition for a writ of coram nobis in Federal District Court. She argued that her former attorney’s failure to advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. While Chaidez’s petition was pending, this Court decided Padilla. Our ruling vindicated Chaidez’s view of the Sixth Amendment: We held that criminal defense attorneys must inform non-citizen clients of the risks of deportation arising from guilty pleas. See 559 U. S., at 374. But the Government argued that Chaidez could not benefit from Padilla because it announced a “new rule” and, under Teague, such rules do not apply in collateral challenges to already-finál convictions. The District Court determined that Padilla “did not announce a new rule for Teague purposes,” and therefore should apply to Chaidez’s case. 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (ND Ill. 2010). It then found that Chaidez’s counsel had performed deficiently under Padilla and that Chaidez suffered prejudice as a result. Accordingly, the court vacated Chaidez’s conviction. See No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664 (ND Ill., Oct. 6, 2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla had declared a new rule and so should not apply in a challenge to a final conviction. “Before Padilla,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned, “the [Supreme] Court had never held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to provide advice about matters not directly related to [a] client’s criminal prosecution,” including the risks of deportation. 655 F. 3d 684, 693 (2011). And state and lower federal courts had uniformly concluded that an attorney need not give “advice concerning [such a] collateral (as opposed to direct) consequenc[e] of a guilty plea.” Id., at 690. According to the Seventh Circuit, Padilla’s holding was new because it ran counter to that widely accepted “distinction between direct and collateral consequences.” 655 F. 3d, at 691. Judge Williams dissented. Agreeing with the Third Circuit’s view, she argued that Padilla “broke no new ground” because it merely applied established law about a lawyer’s “duty to consult” with a client. 655 F. 3d, at 695 (quoting United States v. Orocio, 645 F. 3d 630, 638-639 (CA3 2011); internal quotation marks omitted). We granted certiorari, 566 U. S. 974 (2012), to resolve a split among federal and state courts on whether Padilla applies retroactively. Holding that it does not, we affirm the Seventh Circuit. II Teague makes the retroactivity of our criminal procedure decisions turn on whether they are novel. When we announce a “new rule,” a person whose conviction is already final may not benefit from the decision in a habeas or similar proceeding. Only when we apply a settled rule may a person avail herself of the decision on collateral review. Here, Chaidez filed her coram nobis petition five years after her guilty plea became final. Her challenge therefore fails if Padilla declared a new rule. “[A] case announces a new rule,” Teague explained, “when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation” on the government. 489 U. S., at 301. “To put it differently,” we continued, “a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Ibid. And a holding is not so dictated, we later stated, unless it would have been “apparent to all reasonable jurists.” Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U. S. 518, 527-528 (1997). But that account has a flipside. Teague also made clear that a case does not “announce a new rule [when] it '[is] merely an application of the principle that governed’ ” a prior decision to a different set of facts. 489 U. S., at 307 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U. S. 211, 217 (1988)). As Justice Kennedy has explained, “[w]here the beginning point” of our analysis is a rule of “general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.” Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 309 (1992) (concurring in judgment); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 391 (2000). Otherwise said, when all we do is apply a general standard to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to address, we will rarely state a new rule for Teague purposes. Because that is so, garden-variety applications of the test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not produce new rules. In Strickland, we held that legal representation violates the Sixth Amendment if it falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as indicated by “prevailing professional norms,” and the defendant suffers prejudice as a result. Id., at 687-688. That standard, we later concluded, “provides sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all” claims of ineffective assistance, even though their particular circumstances will differ. Williams, 529 U. S., at 391. And so we have granted relief under Strickland in diverse contexts without ever suggesting that doing so required a new rule. See, e. g., ibid.) Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U. S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510 (2003). In like manner, Padilla would not have created a new rule had it only applied Strickland’s general standard to yet another factual situation—that is, had Padilla merely made clear that a lawyer who neglects to inform a client about the risk of deportation is professionally incompetent. But Padilla did something more. Before deciding if failing to provide such advice “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Padilla considered a threshold question: Was advice about deportation “categorically removed” from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it involved only a “collateral consequence” of a conviction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence? 559 U. S., at 365-366. In other words, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied (“Did this attorney act unreasonably?”), Padilla asked whether the Strickland test applied (“Should we even evaluate if this attorney acted unreasonably?”). And as we will describe, that preliminary question about Strickland’s ambit came to the Padilla Court unsettled—so that the Court’s answer (“Yes, Strickland governs here”) required a new rule. The relevant background begins with our decision in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52 (1985), which explicitly left open whether advice concerning a collateral consequence must satisfy Sixth Amendment requirements. Hill pleaded guilty to first-degree murder after his attorney misinformed him about his parole eligibility. In addressing his claim of ineffective assistance, we first held that the Strickland standard extends generally to the plea process. See Hill, 474 U. S., at 57. We then determined, however, that Hill had failed to allege prejudice from the lawyer’s error and so could not prevail under that standard. See id., at 60. That conclusion allowed us to avoid another, more categorical question: whether advice about parole (however inadequate and prejudicial) could possibly violate the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals, we noted, had held “that parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which a defendant need not be informed.” Id., at 55. But our ruling on prejudice made “it unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which” advice about a matter deemed collateral violates the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 60. That non-decision left the state and lower federal courts to deal with the issue; and they almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction’s collateral consequences, including deportation. All 10 federal appellate courts to consider the question decided, in the words of one, that “counsel’s failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is never” a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F. 3d 327, 334 (CA5 2008). That constitutional guarantee, another typical decision expounded, “assures an accused of effective assistance of counsel in ‘criminal ’prosecutions’ accordingly, advice about matters like deportation, which are “not a part of or enmeshed in the criminal proceeding,” does not fall within the Amendment’s scope. United States v. George, 869 F. 2d 333, 337 (CA7 1989). Appellate courts in almost 30 States agreed. By contrast, only two state courts held that an attorney could violate the Sixth Amendment by failing to inform a client about deportation risks or other collateral consequences of a guilty plea. That imbalance led the authors of the principal scholarly article on the subject to call the exclusion of advice about collateral consequences from the Sixth Amendment’s scope one of “the most widely recognized rules of American law.” Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 706 (2002). So when we decided Padilla, we answered a question about the Sixth Amendment’s reach that we had left open, in a way that altered the law of most jurisdictions—and our reasoning reflected that we were doing as much. In the normal Strickland case, a court begins by evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney’s conduct in light of professional norms, and then assesses prejudice. But as earlier indicated, see supra, at 349, Padilla had a different starting point. Before asking whether the performance of Padilla’s attorney was deficient under Strickland, we considered (in a separately numbered part of the opinion) whether Strickland applied at all. See 559 U. S., at 364-366. Many courts, we acknowledged, had excluded advice about collateral matters from the Sixth Amendment’s ambit; and deportation, because the consequence of a distinct civil proceeding, could well be viewed as such a matter. See id., at 365, and n. 9. But, we continued, no decision of our own committed us to “appl[y] a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope” of the right to counsel. Id., at 365. And however apt that distinction might be in other contexts, it should not exempt from Sixth Amendment scrutiny a lawyer’s advice (or non-advice) about a plea’s deportation risk. Deportation, we stated, is “unique.” Ibid. It is a “particularly severe” penalty, and one “intimately related to the criminal process”; indeed, immigration statutes make it “nearly an automatic result” of some convictions. Id., at 365-366. We thus resolved the threshold question before us by breaching the previously chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences: Notwithstanding the then-dominant view, “Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.” Id., at 366. If that does not count as “breaking] new ground” or “imposing] a new obligation,” we are hard pressed to know what would. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. Before Padilla, we had declined to decide whether the Sixth Amendment had any relevance to a lawyer’s advice about matters not part of a criminal proceeding. Perhaps some advice of that kind would have to meet Strickland’s reasonableness standard— but then again, perhaps not: No precedent of our own “dictated” the answer. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. And as the lower courts filled the vacuum, they almost uniformly insisted on what Padilla called the “categorica[l] removfal]” of advice about a conviction’s non-criminal consequences— including deportation—from the Sixth Amendment’s scope. 559 U. S., at 366. It was Padilla that first rejected that categorical approach—and so made the Strickland test operative—when a criminal lawyer gives (or fails to give) advice about immigration consequences. In acknowledging that fact, we do not cast doubt on, or at all denigrate, Padilla. Courts often need to, and do, break new ground; it is the very premise of Teague that a decision can be right and also be novel. All we say here is that Padilla’s, holding that the failure to advise about a non-criminal consequence could violate the Sixth Amendment would not have been—in fact, was not—“apparent to all reasonable jurists” prior to our decision. Lambrix, 520 U. S., at 527-528. Padilla thus announced a “new rule.” Ill Chaidez offers, and the dissent largely adopts, a different account of Padilla, in which we did no more than apply Strickland to a new set of facts. On Chaidez’s view, Strickland insisted “[f]rom its inception” that all aspects of a criminal lawyer’s performance pass a test of “‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms’”: The decision thus foreclosed any “categorical distinction between direct and collateral consequences.” Brief for Petitioner 21-22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688; emphasis deleted). Indeed, Chaidez contends, courts prior to Padilla recognized Strickland’s all-encompassing scope and so applied its reasonableness standard to advice concerning deportation. See Brief for Petitioner 25-26; Reply Brief 10-12. She here points to caselaw in three federal appeals courts allowing ineffective assistance claims when attorneys affirmatively misled their clients about the deportation consequences of guilty pleas. The only question left for Padilla to resolve, Chaidez claims, was whether professional norms also require criminal lawyers to volunteer advice about the risk of deportation. In addressing that issue, she continues, Padilla did a run-of-the-mill Strickland analysis. And more: It did an especially easy Strickland analysis. We had earlier noted in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 (2001)—a case raising an issue of immigration law unrelated to the Sixth Amendment—that a “competent defense counsel” would inform his client about a guilty plea’s deportation consequences. Id., at 323, n. 50. All Padilla had to do, Chaidez -concludes, was recite that prior finding. But Chaidez’s (and the dissent’s) story line is wrong, for reasons we have mostly already noted: Padilla had to develop new law, establishing that the Sixth Amendment applied at all, before it could assess the performance of Padilla’s lawyer under Strickland. See supra, at 349, 352. Our first order of business was thus to consider whether the widely accepted distinction between direct and collateral consequences categorically foreclosed Padilla’s claim, whatever the level of his attorney’s performance. We did not think, as Chaidez argues, that Strickland barred resort to that distinction. Far from it: Even in Padilla we did not eschew the direct-collateral divide across the board. See 559 U. S., at 365 (“Whether that distinction is [generally] appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case”). Rather, we relied on the special “nature of deportation”—the severity of the penalty and the “automatic” way it follows from conviction—to show that “[t]he collateral versus direct distinction [was] ill-suited” to dispose of Padilla’s claim. Id., at 365-366. All that reasoning came before we conducted a Strickland análysis (by examining professional norms and so forth), and none of it followed ineluctably from prior law. Predictably, then, the caselaw Chaidez and the dissent cite fails to support their claim that lower courts “accepted that Strickland applied to deportation advice.” Brief for Petitioner 25; see post, at 366-369. True enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state courts) held before Padilla that misstatements about deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim. But those decisions reasoned only that a lawyer may not affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively mislead his client on any important matter, however related to a criminal prosecution. See, e. g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005). They co-existed happily with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all others), holding that deportation is not “so unique as to warrant an exception to the general rule that a defendant need not be advised of the [collateral] consequences of a guilty plea.” United States v. Campbell, 778 F. 2d 764, 769 (CA11 1985). So at most, Chaidez has shown that a minority of courts recognized a separate rule for material misrepresentations, regardless whether they concerned deportation or another collateral matter. That limited rule does not apply to Chaidez’s case. And because it lived in harmony with the exclusion of claims like hers from the Sixth Amendment, it does not establish what she needs to—that all reasonable judges, prior to Padilla, thought they were living in a Padilla-like world. Nor, finally, does St. Cyr have any relevance here. That decision stated what is common sense (and what we again recognized in Padilla): A reasonably competent lawyer will tell a non-citizen client about a guilty plea’s deportation consequences because “ ‘[preserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.’ ” Padilla, 559 U. S., at 368 (quoting St. Cyr, 538 U. S., at 322). But in saying that much, St Cyr did not determine that the Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer to provide such information. Courts had held to the contrary not because advice about deportation was insignificant to a client—really, who could think that, whether before or after St Cyrl—but because it concerned a matter collateral to the criminal prosecution. On those courts’ view, the Sixth Amendment no more demanded competent advice about a plea’s deportation consequences than it demanded competent representation in the deportation process itself. Padilla decided that view was wrong. But to repeat: It was Padilla that did so. In the years following St Cyr, not a single state or lower federal court considering a lawyer’s failure to provide deportation advice abandoned the distinction between direct and collateral consequences, and several courts reaffirmed that divide. See, e. g., Santos- Sanchez, 548 F. 3d, at 335-336; Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251, 1256-1257 (CA10 2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F. 3d 1198, 1200-1201 (CA9 2003). It took Padilla to decide that in assessing such a lawyer’s performance, the Sixth Amendment sets the standard. {—1 C This Court announced a new rule in Padilla. Under Teague, defendants whose convictions became final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It is so ordered. A petition for a writ of coram nobis provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a person, like Chaidez, who is no longer “in custody” and therefore cannot seek collateral relief under 28 U. S. C. §2255 or habeas relief under §2241. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 507, 510-511 (1954). Chaidez and the Government agree that nothing in this case turns on the difference between a corara nobis petition and a habeas petition, and we assume without deciding that they are correct. Compare 655 F. 3d 684 (CA7 2011) (case below) (not retroactive); United States v. Amer, 681 F. 3d 211 (CA5 2012) (same); United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F. 3d 1147 (CA10 2011) (same); State v. Gaitan, 209 N. J. 339, 37 A. 3d 1089 (2012) (same), with United States v. Orocio, 645 F. 3d 630 (CA3 2011) (retroactive); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 949 N. E. 2d 892 (2011) (same). Teague stated two exceptions: “[W]atershed rules of criminal procedure” and rules placing “conduct beyond the power of the [government] to proscribe” apply on collateral review, even if novel. 489 U. S., at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chaidez does not argue that either of those exceptions is relevant here. We did not consider Teague in Williams, Rompilla, and Wiggins, but we granted habeas relief pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) because state courts had unreasonably applied “clearly established” law. And, as we have explained, “clearly established” law is not “new” within the meaning of Teague. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 412. We have never attempted to delineate the world of “collateral consequences,” see Padilla, 559 U. S., at 364, n. 8, nor do we do so here. But other effects of a conviction commonly viewed as collateral include civil commitment, civil forfeiture, sex offender registration, disqualification from public benefits, and disfranchisement. See id., at 376 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (listing other examples). In saying that much, we declined to rule not only on whether advice about a conviction’s collateral consequences falls outside the Sixth Amendment’s scope, but also on whether parole eligibility should be considered such a consequence, as the Court of Appeals held. See Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F. 3d 1251, 1256 (CA10 2004); United States v. Fry, 322 F. 3d 1198, 1200-1201 (CA9 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F. 3d 20, 25 (CA1 2000); Russo v. United States, 1999 WL 164951, *2 (CA2, Mar. 22, 1999); Ogunbase v. United States, 1991 WL 11619, *1 (CA6, Feb. 5, 1991); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F. 2d 55, 58-59 (CADC 1990); United States v. George, 869 F. 2d 333, 337 (CA7 1989); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F. 2d 6, 7-8 (CA4 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F. 2d 764, 768-769 (CA11 1985). Rumpel v. State, 847 So. 2d 399, 402-405 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); Tafoya v. State, 500 P. 2d 247, 252 (Alaska 1972); State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 423, 904 P. 2d 1245, 1247 (App. 1995); Niver v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 1, 3-5, 919 A. 2d 1073, 1075-1076 (2007) (per curiam); State v. Christie, 655 A. 2d 836, 841 (Del. Super. 1994); Matos v. United States, 631 A. 2d 28, 31-32 (D. C. 1993); Major v. State, 814 So. 2d 424, 431 (Fla. 2002); People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 68-71, 571 N. E. 2d 736, 740-741 (1991); State v. Ramirez, 636 N. W. 2d 740, 743-746 (Iowa 2001); State v. Muriithi, 273 Kan. 952, 961, 46 P. 3d 1145, 1152 (2002); Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 170 S. W. 3d 384, 385-386 (Ky. 2005); State v. Montalban, 2000-2739, p. 4 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106, 1110; Commonwealth v. Fraire, 55 Mass. App. 916, 917, 774 N. E. 2d 677, 678-679 (2002); People v. Davidovich, 463 Mich. 446, 452, 618 N. W. 2d 579, 582 (2000) (per curiam); State ex rel. Nixon v. Clark, 926 S. W. 2d 22, 25 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 693-696, 651 N. W. 2d 215, 221-223 (2002); Barajas v. State, 115 Nev. 440, 441-442, 991 P. 2d 474, 475-476 (1999) (per curiam); State v. Chung, 210 N. J. Super. 427, 434, 510 A. 2d 72, 76 (App. Div. 1986); People v. Ford, 86 N. Y. 2d 397, 403-404, 657 N. E. 2d 265, 268-269 (1995); State v. Dalman, 520 N. W. 2d 860, 863-864 (N. D. 1994); Commonwealth v. Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555-557, 555 A. 2d 92, 93-94 (1989); State v. Alejo, 655 A. 2d 692, 692-693 (R. I. 1995); Nikolaev v. Weber, 2005 S. D. 100, ¶¶11-12, 705 N. W. 2d 72, 75-77 (per curiam); Bautista v. State, 160 S. W. 3d 917, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Perez v. State, 31 S. W. 3d 365, 367-368 (Tex. App. 2000); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, ¶¶ 15-20, 125 P. 3d 930, 934-935; State v. Martinez-Lazo, 100 Wash. App. 869, 876-878, 999 P. 2d 1275, 1279-1280 (2000); State v. Santos, 136 Wis. 2d 528, 531, 401 N. W. 2d 856, 858 (App. 1987). People v. Pozo, 746 P. 2d 523, 527-529 (Colo. 1987); State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶¶17-19, 136 N. M. 533, 539, 101 P. 3d 799, 805. The dissent is therefore wrong to claim that we emphasize “the absence of lower court authority” holding that an attorney’s failure to advise about deportation violated the Sixth Amendment. Post, at 368 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). We instead point to the presence of lower court authority—in case after case and jurisdiction after jurisdiction—holding that such a failure, because relating to a collateral matter, could not do so. The separate opinions in Padilla objected to just this aspect of the Court’s ruling. Dissents have been known to exaggerate the novelty of majority opinions; and “the mere existence of a dissent,” like the existence of conflicting authority in state or lower federal courts, does not establish that a rule is new. Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 416, n. 5 (2004); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 410 (2000). But the concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla were on to something when they described the line the Court was crossing. “Until today,” Justice Alito wrote, “the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.” 559 U. S., at 375-376 (opinion concurring in judgment). Or again, this time from Justice Scalia: “[Ujntil today,” the Sixth Amendment guaranteed only “legal advice directly related to defense against prosecution” of a criminal charge. Id., at 389 (dissenting opinion). One need not agree with any of the separate opinions’ criticisms of Padilla to concur with their view that it modified governing law. See United States v. Kwan, 407 F. 3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F. 3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F. 2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11 1985). The dissent’s entire analysis founders on this most basic point. In its lengthy description of Padilla, the dissent picks up in the middle—after the Court concluded that the direct-collateral distinction did not preclude finding that Padilla’s lawyer provided ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. See post, at 361-363. The dissent justifies ignoring that threshold conclusion on the ground that “Padilla declined to embrace the ... distinction between collateral and direct consequences” and “stated very clearly that it found the distinction irrelevant” to the case. Post, at 364. But it is exactly in refusing to apply the direct-collateral distinction that the Padilla Court did something novel. Before then, as the Court forthrightly acknowledged, that distinction would have doomed Padilla’s claim in well nigh every court in the United States. See 559 U. S., at 364-365, and n. 9; supra, at 352. See also Resendiz v. Kovensky, 416 F. 3d 952, 957 (CA9 2005) (“[B]e-cause immigration consequences remain collateral, the failure of counsel to advise his client of the potential immigration consequences of a conviction does not violate the Sixth Amendment”); Russo v. United, States, 1999 WL 164951, *2 (“[C]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for the mere failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a plea, such as deportation” (relying on United States v. Santelises, 509 F. 2d 703, 704 (CA2 1975) (per curiam))). The dissent claims the opposite, averring that lower court “decisions show nothing more than that the underlying professional norms had not yet evolved to require attorneys to provide advice about deportation consequences.” Post, at 365-366. But the dissent cannot point to a single decision stating that a lawyer’s failure to offer advice about deportation met professional norms; all the decisions instead held that a lawyer’s breach of those norms was constitutionally irrelevant because deportation was a collateral consequence. See supra, at 350. Had courts in fact considered professional standards in the slew of cases before Padilla that presented Padilla-like claims, they would have discovered as early as 1968 that the American Bar Association instructed criminal lawyers to advise their non-citizen clients about the risks of deportation. See 3 ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.2(b), Commentary, p. 71 (App. Draft 1968). The difficulty in upholding such claims prior to Padilla had nothing to do with courts’ view of professional norms and everything to do with their use of the direct-collateral divide. Chaidez makes two back-up arguments in her merits briefs—that Teague’s, bar on retroactivity does not apply when a petitioner challenges a federal conviction, or at least does not do so when she makes a claim of ineffective assistance. Brief for Petitioner 27-39. But Chaidez did not include those issues in her petition for certiorari. Nor, still more critically, did she adequately raise them in the lower courts. Only her petition for rehearing en banc in the Seventh Circuit at all questioned Teague’s applicability, and her argument there—that a “Teague-light” standard should apply to challenges to federal convictions—differs from the ones she has made in this Court. See Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc in No. 10-3623 (CA7), p. 13. Moreover, we cannot find any case in which a federal court has considered Chaidez’s contention that Teague should not apply to ineffective assistance claims. “[M]indful that we are a court of review, not of first view,” we decline to rule on Chaidez’s new arguments. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEWIS, COMPTROLLER OF FLORIDA v. BT INVESTMENT MANAGERS, INC., et al. No. 79-45. Argued January 15, 1980 Decided June 9, 1980 BlacKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Eugene J. Celia and Franklyn J. Wollett. John L. Warden argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were John E. Mathews, Jr., Stephen E. Day, and Vincent J. Rio III Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Erwin N. Griswold and James F. Bell for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors; and by J. Thomas Cardwell and Michael P. McMahon for the Florida Bankers Association. John L. Warden and Robert D. Owen filed a brief for the New York Clearing House Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the constitutionality of two Florida statutes regulating the conduct of-investment advisory and trust services within that State. A three-judge United States District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), held that the statutes violate the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, because in combination they discriminate against bank holding companies that operate principally outside Florida. It also held that such discrimination is not authorized by federal legislation regulating the interstate operations of bank holding companies. The case was brought here on direct appeal, see 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction to resolve the substantial constitutional and statutory issues presented. 444 U. S. 822 (1979). I Appellee Bankers Trust New York Corporation (Bankers Trust) is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York. It maintains its principal place of business in that State. It is a bank holding company within the meaning of § 2 (a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1841 (a) (1976 ed. and Supp. II) (Act). Accordingly, it is subject to federal restrictions on the kinds of subsidiaries it may own or control. Upon authorization from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, however, it is permitted to own or control shares of any company the business of which is “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.” § 4 (c) (8) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (c)(8). By regulation, the Board has designated both the provision of investment or financial advice and the performance of certain trust functions as “closely related” business within the meaning of this statute. See 12 CFR §§ 225.4 (a)(4) and (5) (1979). In 1972, the management of Bankers Trust decided to seek tijie Board’s approval for an investment management subsidiary to operate in Florida. On October 3 of that year, Bankers Trust filed a formal proposal for such a subsidiary, which it planned to operate from offices in Palm Beach. Appellee BT Investment Managers, Inc. (BTIM), was Bankers Trust’s intended vehicle for entry into the Florida market. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware as a wholly owned subsidiary on November 24, 1972. Three days later it qualified to do business in Florida. The application to the Board proposed that BTIM would provide “portfolio investment advice,” as well as “general economic information and advice, general economic statistical forecasting services and industry studies” to persons other than banks. See Complaint ¶ 7, App. 9-10, and appellant’s Answer ¶ 7, App. 19. When. Bankers Trust filed its application with.the Board, certain Florida statutes restricted the ability of out-of-state bank holding companies to compete in the State’s financial market. At that time Fla. Stat. § 659.141 (1), added by 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-96, § 1, and effective March 28, 1972, prohibited Bankers Trust from owning or controlling a bank or trust company located within the State; the same statute also prohibited it from owning businesses furnishing investment advisory services to local banks or trust companies. In addition, Fla. Stat. § 660.10 prohibited any corporation, other than a state-chartered bank and trust company or a national banking association located in Florida, from performing certain trust and fiduciary functions. Neither statute, however, directly prohibited an out-of-state bank holding company from owning or controlling a business furnishing investment advisory services to the general public. Thus, at the time Bankers Trust filed its application with the Board, it appeared that ownership of BTIM would not violate Florida law, although BTIM would be restricted in the types of financial services it could perform and the customers it could serve. The reaction of the Florida financial community to Bankers Trust’s proposed investment subsidiary was decidedly negative. The State Comptroller, the Florida Bankers Association, and the Palm Beach County Bankers Association, Inc., all filed comments with the Board objecting to the Bankers Trust proposal. More importantly for present purposes, the state legislature was persuaded to take action. On November 30, 1972, shortly after BTIM had qualified to do business in the State, a special session of the legislature amended Fla. Stat. § 659.141 (1). That statute, which had been on the books only since March 28 of that year, was expanded to prohibit an out-of-state bank holding company from owning or controlling a business within the State that sells investment advisory services to any customer, rather than just to “trust companies or banks” in Florida, as the statute theretofore had read. This amendment took effect, without the Governor’s approval, on December 21, 1972. There is evidence that the amendment was a direct response to Bankers Trust’s pending application, and that it had the strong backing of the local financial community. On April 26, 1973, the Board rejected Bankers Trust’s proposal on the ground that it would conflict with state law. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 364. The Board observed that the proposal contemplated de novo entry into the Florida investment management market rather than acquisition of an existing concern, and it noted that de novo entry ordinarily has a desirable procompetitive impact. Absent evidence of a contrary effect in this case, the Board intimated that it would have been favorably inclined toward the proposal. But it found that the December amendment to Fla. Stat. § 659.141 (1) "was intended to, and does, prohibit the performance of investment advisory services in Florida by non-Florida bank holding companies.” 59 Fed. Res. Bull., at 365. In view of its obligation to respect the dictates of state law, the Board found itself constrained to reject the proposal. See 12 U. S. C. § 1846; Whitney Nat. Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 424-425 (1965). Within six months of the Board’s decision, the two appellees filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Count I of their complaint alleged that Fla. Stat. § 659.141 (1) “is not designed to promote lawful regulatory objectives, but is intended to shelter those organizations presently conducting an investment advisory business in Florida from competition by [BTIM].” Complaint ¶ 11, App. 11. The complaint alleged violations of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violation of the Commerce Clause. Count II alleged similar constitutional defects as the result of the joint operation of §§ 659.141 (1) and 660.10. Appellees alleged that “[b]ut for the exist-énce of the challenged statutes,” Bankers Trust would seek authority from the Board to establish “a subsidiary trust company having a national bank charter or a Florida state charter” that would engage exclusively in one or more of the functions regulated by § 660.10. Complaint ¶ 21, App. 14-15. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), and the case was submitted for summary judgment on a stipulated set of facts. The District Court, by a divided vote, initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that it should abstain from decision under either Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), or Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943). BT Investment Managers, Inc. v. Dickinson, 379 F. Supp. 792 (ND Fla. 1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for consideration of the merits. 559 F. 2d 950 (1977). On remand, the District Court held that the challenged portions of the two statutes violate the Commerce Clause. 461 F. Supp. 1187 (1978). Without reaching appellees’ due process and equal protection arguments, it found that the statutes under attack discriminate against interstate commerce. The court reasoned that § 659.141 (1) “erects an insuperable barrier to the entry of foreign-based bank holding companies, through their subsidiaries, into the Florida investment advisory market,” and that § 660.10 “similarly cordons off Florida trust companies from competition by out-of-state concerns.” 461 F. Supp., at 1196. It ruled that the statutes are “parochial legislation” that “must be deemed per se unconstitutional.” Ibid. Moreover, it held that the legislative purposes proffered by appellant, including a purported desire to curb anticompetitive abuses arising from agglomeration of financial power, failed to justify the discriminatory impact of the statutes. Finally, the District Court held that the federal Bank Holding Company Act does not foster or permit the types of discrimination against out-of-state bank holding companies reflected in the Florida statutes. The court eschewed the argument that either § 3 (d) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (d), or § 7 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1846, authorized the statutes in question. It recognized that § 3 (d) prohibits bank holding companies from acquiring banking subsidiaries in other States without local authorization. But it rejected the contention that this prohibition implicitly extends as well to related businesses, such as the providing of investment advice. The court issued an order granting declaratory relief against both statutes but enjoining the enforcement of only § 659.141 (1) against appellees. II This appeal presents two distinct but related questions with respect to the validity of the challenged' Florida statutes. The first is whether the statutes, viewed independently of federal legislation regulating the banking industry, burden interstate commerce in a manner contrary to the Commerce Clause. The second is whether Congress, by its own legislation in this area, has created an area in which the States may regulate free from Commerce Clause restraints. Since there is no contention that federal legislation pre-empts the state laws in question, federal law becomes important only if it appears that the Florida statutes cannot survive without federal authorization. Thus, the second question becomes pertinent only if we reach an affirmative answer to the first. These questions arise against a backdrop of familiar principles. The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Although the Clause thus speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 326 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 623 (1978); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 534-538 (1949); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852). This limitation upon state power, of course, is by no means absolute. In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, the States retain authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of “legitimate local concern,” even though interstate commerce may be affected. See, e. g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429, 440 (1978); Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 371 (1976). Where such legitimate local interests are implicated, defining the appropriate scope for state regulation is often a matter of “delicate adjustment.” Ibid., quoting H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S., at 553 (Black, J., dissenting). Yet even in regulating to protect local interests, the States generally must act in a manner consistent with the “ultimate . . . principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.” Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 527 (1935). However important the state interest at hand, “it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 626-627. Over the years, the Court has used a variety of formulations for the Commerce Clause limitation upon the States, but it consistently has distinguished between outright protectionism and more indirect burdens on the free flow of trade. The Court has observed that “where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.” Id., at 624. In contrast, legislation that visits its effects equally upon both interstate and local business may survive constitutional scrutiny if it is narrowly drawn. The Court stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970): “Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” Id., at 142. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S., at 336; Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 353 (1977); Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S., at 371-372; Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960). The principal focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute, since the validity of state laws must be judged chiefly in terms of their probable effects. See Hughes v. Oklahoma. 441 U. S., at 336; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454, 455-456 (1940). Ill With these principles in mind, we first turn to § 659.141 (1). This statute has been the chief object of controversy, since it is the statute that prevents appellees from setting up their projected investment advisory business within Florida. The statute prohibits ownership of local investment or trust businesses by firms possessing two characteristics: a certain kind of business organization and purpose, whether it be as a bank, trust company, or a bank holding company; and location of principal operations outside Florida. Appellant and the amici supporting his position argue that the District Court's analysis of § 659.141 (1) is flawed in three respects: First, the statute assertedly affects only matters of local character that have insufficient interstate attributes to bring federal constitutional limitations into play. Second, the District Court erroneously labeled the statute protectionist legislation and thus incorrectly relied upon the “per se rule of invalidity” identified in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 624. Appellant argues that the statute should be treated as neutral legislation subject to the less stringent standards of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra, and he argues that it meets this test. Third, the District Court failed to accord proper significance, in appellant’s view, to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Appellant argues that the Act grants authority to the States to prohibit out-of-state bank holding companies from owning local subsidiaries that provide bank-related services. A The first of these arguments needs only brief mention. We readily accept the submission that, both as a matter of history and as a matter of present commercial reality, banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern. As appellees freely concede, Brief for Appellees 17, n. 10, sound financial institutions and honest financial practices are essential to the health of any State’s economy and to the well-being of its people. Thus, it is not surprising that ever since the early days of our Republic, the States have chartered banks and have actively regulated their activities. Nonetheless, it does not follow that these same activities lack important interstate attributes. An impressive array of federal statutes regulating not only the provision of banking services but also the formation of banking organizations, the rendering of investment advice, and the conduct of national investment markets, is substantial evidence to the contrary. We do not understand appellant to dispute the validity of these enactments, all of which rest primarily on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, appellant’s arguments under the Bank Holding Company Act assume the validity of federal regulation in this sphere. This Court has observed that the same interstate attributes that establish Congress’ power to regulate commerce also support constitutional limitations on the powers of the States. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 622-623. For present purposes, it is clear that those limitations apply. B The contentions that the District Court erred by applying too stringent a standard in defining the limits of Florida’s regulatory authority, and that § 659.141 (1) is evenhanded local regulation, are more substantial. We nonetheless agree with the District Court’s conclusion that this statute is “parochial” in the sense that it overtly prevents foreign enterprises from competing in local markets. The statute makes the out-of-state location of a bank holding company’s principal operations an explicit barrier to the presence of an investment subsidiary within the State. As Bankers Trust’s application before the Board itself indicates, it thus prevents competition in local markets by out-of-state firms with the kinds of resources and business interests that make them likely to attempt de novo entry. Appellant virtually concedes this effect, Brief for Appellant 59, and the circumstances of enactment suggest that it was the legislature’s principal objective. Appellant argues, however, that the statute ought not to be declared per se invalid because it does not prevent all out-of-state investment enterprises from entering local markets. Investment enterprises that are not bank holding companies, banks, or trust companies either may own investment subsidiaries in Florida or may enter the state investment market directly by obtaining a license to do business. Furthermore, locally incorporated bank holding companies are subject to the same restrictions as their foreign counterparts if they maintain their principal operations elsewhere. Appellant thus analogizes § 659.141 (1) to the Maryland statute prohibiting local retail operations by vertically integrated petroleum companies that the Court upheld in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 (1978). The statute, it is said, discriminates against a particular kind of corporate organizational structure more than it does against the origin or citizenship of a particular business enterprise. The statute involved in Exxon flatly prohibited producers and refiners of petroleum products from opening or operating retail services within Maryland under a variety of corporate or contractual arrangements. Id., at 120, n. 1. It was enacted in response to perceived inequities in the allocation of petroleum products to retail outlets during the fuel shortage of 1973. Various oil companies, all of which engaged in production and refining as well as in sale of petroleum products, challenged the statute on a number of grounds. Among other arguments, they claimed that the statute violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against producers and refiners, all of which were interstate concerns, in favor of independent retailers, most of which were local businesses. The Court rejected this contention. After holding that the statute served the legitimate state purpose of “controlling the gasoline retail market/’ id., at 125, the Court separately analyzed its effect on interstate commerce in the producing-refining and retailing ends of the petroleum industry. The Court concluded that the statute could not discriminate against interstate petroleum producers and refiners in favor of locally based competitors because, as a matter of fact, there were no such local producers or refiners to be favored. Ibid. For the same reason, it concluded that the flow of petroleum products in interstate commerce would not be reduced. Id., at 127. It also rejected a claim of discrimination at the retail level because the statute placed “no barriers whatsoever” on competition in local markets by “interstate independent dealers” that did not own production or refining facilities. Id., at 126. Despite the fact that the number of stations operated by independent dealers was small relative to the number operated by producer-refiners, the Court concluded that neither the placing of a disparate burden on some interstate competitors nor the shifting of business from one part of the interstate market to another was enough, under the circumstances, to establish a Commerce Clause violation. Id., at 126-127. There are some points of similarity between Exxon and the present case. In the former, the statute in issue discriminated against vertical organization in the petroleum industry. Section 659.141 (1) similarly discriminates against a particular kind of conglomerate organization in the investment and financial industries. And the Maryland statute permitted some kinds of interstate competitors free entry into the local market, as does the Florida statute at issue here. We disagree, however, with the suggestion that Exxon should be treated as controlling precedent for this case. Section 659.141 (1) engages in an additional form of discrimination that is highly significant for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis. Under the Florida statute, discrimination against affected business organizations is not evenhanded because only banks, bank holding companies, and trust companies with principal operations outside Florida are prohibited from operating investment subsidiaries or giving investment advice within the State. It follows that § 659.141 (1) discriminates among affected business entities according to the extent of their contacts with the local economy. The absence of a similar discrimination between interstate and local producer-refiners was a most critical factor in Exxon. Both on its face and in actual effect, § 659.141 (1) thus displays a local favoritism or protectionism that significantly alters its Commerce Clause status. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 626-627; Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S., at 527. We need not decide whether this difference is sufficient to render the Florida legislation per se invalid, for we are convinced that the disparate treatment of out-of-state bank holding companies cannot be justified as an incidental burden necessitated by legitimate local concerns. In the District Court and to some extent on this appeal, appellant and supporting amici have argued that the Florida legislation advances several important state policies. Among those that have been specifically identified are an interest in discouraging undue economic concentration in the arena of high finance; an interest in regulating financial practices, presumably to protect local residents from fraud; and an interest in mn.-yTmW™;r local control over locally based financial activities. We think that these alleged purposes fail to justify the extent of the burden placed upon out-of-state bank holding companies. Discouraging economic concentration and protecting the citizenry against fraud are undoubtedly legitimate state interests. But we are not persuaded that these interests justify the heavily disproportionate burden this statute places on bank holding companies that operate principally outside the State. Appellant has demonstrated no basis for an inference that all out-of-state bank holding companies are likely to possess the evils of monopoly power, that they are more likely to do so than their homegrown counterparts, or that they are any more inclined to engage in sharp practices than bank holding companies that are locally based. Nor is there any reason to conclude that outright prohibition of entry, rather than some intermediate form of regulation, is the only effective method of protecting against the presumed evils, particularly when other out-of-state businesses that may be just as large or far-flung are permitted to compete in the local market. We conclude that these asserted state interests simply do not suffice to eliminate § 659.141 (l)’s apparent constitutional defect. Cf. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S., at 353-354; Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S., at 375-376. With regard to the asserted interest in promoting local control over financial institutions, we doubt that the interest itself is entirely clear of any tinge of local parochialism. In almost any Commerce Clause case it would be possible for a State to argue that it has an interest in bolstering local ownership, or wealth, or control of business enterprise. Yet these arguments are at odds with the general principle that the Commerce Clause prohibits a State from using its regulatory power to protect its own citizens from outside competition. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S., at 638; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1925); cf. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 403-404 (1948). In any event, the interest is not well served by the present legislation. The statute, for example, does not restrict out-of-state ownership of local bank holding companies. Nor, as appellant concedes, does it prevent entry by out-of-state entities other than those having the prohibited organizational forms. There is thus no reason to believe that the State's interest in local control, to the extent it legitimately exists, has been significantly or evenhandedly advanced by the statutory means that have been employed. For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court did not err in holding that § 659.141 (1) directly burdens interstate commerce in a manner that contravenes the Commerce Clause’s implicit limitation on state power. C Ordinarily, at this point we would have reached the end of our inquiry. But in this instance appellant has another string to his bow: the contention that by Act of Congress the State has been given additional authority to regulate entry by bank holding companies into the local investment advisory market. Congress, of course, has power to regulate the flow of interstate commerce in ways that the States, acting independently, may not. And Congress, if it chooses, may exercise this power indirectly by conferring upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwiseenjoy. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S., at 542-543; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 423-424 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 315 (1945). It is appellant’s view that the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, is enabling legislation of this very kind, and that it authorizes the restrictions on bank holding companies embodied in § 659.141 (1). This argument rests on two provisions in the federal legislation. Section 3 (d) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (d), prohibits the Board from approving an application by a bank holding company to acquire “any additional bank” located outside the State in which the holding company has its principal operations, unless that acquisition is specifically authorized by the statutory law of the State in which the proposed acquisition is located. Section 7 of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1846, reserves to the States a continuing role in the regulation of bank holding companies. Appellant argues that either or both of these provisions authorize the State to prohibit out-of-state bank holding companies from acquiring local investment subsidiaries. :i The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was enacted to accomplish two primary objectives. First, it was designed to prevent the concentration of banking resources in the hands of a few financial giants. Second, it was intended to implement a congressional policy against control of banking and nonbanking enterprises by a single.business entity., See S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (195.5); Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U. S. 234, 242-243 (1978). Underlying both objectives was a desire to prevent anticom-petitive tendencies in national credit markets. See S. Rep. No. 91-1084, pp. 2-3 (1970). Congress sought to accomplish these twin goals through separate statutory provisions. Section 3 of the Act placed limitations on the creation of bank holding companies and their expansion within the banking field. Section 3 (a) required Board approval for such activities as formation of bank holding companies, acquisition of bank stock or assets by such holding companies or their subsidiaries, and merger of bank holding companies. Section 3 (c) specified criteria to be considered by the Board in determining whether to grant approval. Section 4 sharply curtailed acquisition of nonbanking enterprises. Section 4 (a) generally forbade future acquisition of nonbanking enterprises. What was then § 4 (c) (6), however, carved out an exception for companies “of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature” if the Board determined that they are “so closely related to the business of banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.” 70 Stat. 137. When this legislation was first proposed to the Senate, neither § 3 nor § 4 contained explicit limitations on interstate expansion by bank holding companies. See S. 2577, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3, 4 (1955). But Senator Douglas introduced an amendment to § 3 prohibiting bank holding companies from expanding into banking across state lines. He argued that such an amendment was desirable in order to ensure that national banks would not use bank holding companies as mechanisms to evade state-law restrictions on branching of banks recognized and made applicable to national banks by the McFadden Act, 12 U. S. C. § 36. See 102 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Douglas). The Senate agreed to the amendment. A similar provision had been included in the companion bill introduced in the House of Representatives. See H. R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-5, 15, 24 (1955). The “Douglas Amendment” emerged as § 3 (d) of the Act, the first of the two provisions on which appellant relies. We conclude that § 3 (d) offers scant support for the portions of § 659.141 (1) subject to challenge in this proceeding. Preliminarily, it is doubtful that § 3 (d) authorizes state restrictions of any nature on bank holding company activities. The language of the statute establishes a general federal prohibition on the acquisition or expansion of banking subsidiaries across state lines. The only authority granted to the States is the authority to create exceptions to this general prohibition, that is, to permit expansion of banking across state lines where it otherwise would be federally prohibited. Furthermore, the structure of the Act reveals that § 3 (d) applies only to holding company acquisitions of banks. Non-banking activities are regulated separately in § 4, which does not contain a parallel provision. Even if § 3 (d) could be interpreted to authorize additional state regulation, ordinary canons of interpretation thus would lead to the inference that restraints so authorized could apply only to a holding company’s banking activities. In contrast to § 3 (d), §7 of the Act does reserve to the States a general power to enact regulations applicable to bank holding companies. This section was intended to preserve existing state regulations of bank holding companies, even if they were more restrictive than federal law. See S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1955). But we find nothing in its language or legislative history to support the contention that it also was intended to extend to the States new powers to regulate banking that they would not have possessed absent the federal legislation. Rather, it appears that Congress’ concern was to define the extent of the federal legislation’s pre-emptive effect on state law. In response to criticisms of the provision on the ground that it might be interpreted to expand state authority, one Committee Report stated that it was intended “to preserve to the States those powers which they now have in our dual banking system,” yet “to make it clear that a State could not enact legislation inconsistent with the [Act] and therefore nullify its effect.” S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 5 (1956). Par from creating a new state power to discriminate between foreign and local bank holding companies, the legislative history evinces an intent to forestall such a broad interpretation. We therefore conclude that § 7 applies only to state legislation that operates within the boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause. Since neither of these provisions authorizes state legislation of the variety contained in the challenged portions of § 659.141 (1), we agree with the District Court that appellant’s reliance on the Bank Holding Company Act is misplaced. The effects of the Florida statute on interstate commerce have not been permitted by Congress, and its Commerce Clause defects have not been removed. Therefore, the District Court’s injunction against enforcement of the statute must be sustained. IY This brings us, finally, to § 660.10. That statute prohibits all corporations except state-chartered banks and national banks having their operations in Florida from performing specified fiduciary functions. It does not purport to regulate the ownership of such institutions by bank holding companies. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that its constitutionality has been neither fully placed in issue nor fully determined by the District Court’s decision. We therefore vacate the judgment with respect to § 660.10 and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary in light of this opinion. As we have already noted, appellees’ complaint challenged the constitutionality of § 660.10 only insofar as it operated in conjunction with § 659.141 (1). The District Court followed the same approach, and it granted declaratory relief against § 660.10 on that basis. Jointly, of course, the statutes not only limit the kinds of corporations that may perform fiduciary functions within Florida, but also prevent out-of-state bank holding companies from owning such corporations as their subsidiaries. It was this joint effect that led the District Court to find that § 660.10 “cordons off Florida trust companies from competition by out-of-state concerns.” 461 F. Supp., at 1196. Having so found, the District Court did not address the constitutionality of § 660.10 standing alone. It did not consider, for example, which of the many functions regulated by § 660.10 were in issue, or whether any of the exceptions created by that statute might apply. Indeed, it refused to grant injunctive relief against that statute and ruled that any challenge to its enforcement was premature. 461 F. Supp., at 1201. On this appeal the argument over the constitutionality of § 66Ó.10 has focused not on the concatenation of the two statutes, but on the power of a State under the Commerce Clause to require local incorporation as a condition of doing business in local markets. Cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 (1931). Because of the approach taken in the District Court, however, there has been no definitive ruling on this issue. The court may have touched obliquely on the question when it declared, on a motion for clarification, that a State may not wholly exclude foreign corporations from doing business in the State. See App. to Juris. Statement E2. But it made no specific determination whether § 660.10 would have such an effect, and it refused to speculate about the impact that enforcement of the statute might have upon appellees. Nor is it clear that there is a present case or controversy with respect to the validity of the separate requirements imposed by § 660.10. As we have noted, appellees’ complaint does not expressly join battle on this issue. The facts of the case show, moreover, that it was § 659.141 (1) that prevented BTIM’s entry into Florida. The application before the Board specified that BTIM would perform only investment advisory services that are outside the scope of § 660.10. Bankers Trust had not yet processed an application to the Board for permission to form a Florida trust subsidiary, and the Board had not yet determined whether such a subsidiary could be approved as a matter of federal law. The parties did stipulate that Bankers Trust would attempt to organize a Florida subsidiary having fiduciary powers were it not prohibited by state law from doing so. But we interpret this stipulation to mean that Bankers Trust was willing to comply with a local incorporation requirement, without contesting its validity, so long as it was not prohibited entirely from establishing a trust subsidiary in the State. Accordingly, the District Court may not have been in a position to decide the broad question the parties now ask us to resolve, even if that question had been clearly raised by the pleadings. One further consideration counsels against our attempting to evaluate the validity of § 660.10 at this juncture. Since we noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal, Congress has amended § 3 (d) of the Bank Holding Company Act to extend its restrictions on interstate expansion to fiduciary organizations of the kind Bankers Trust has stipulated it would attempt to organize in Florida. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 712 (b), Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 189 (Mar. 31, 1980). It thus appears that Bankers Trust is presently prohibited by federal law from establishing a Florida trust subsidiary. This amendment is “repealed” by its own terms, § 712 (c), as of October 1, 1981, and there are indications in the legislative history that it was intended as a temporary moratorium on approval of trust company applications rather than as a prelude to more permanent restrictions. Nevertheless, we must review the judgment below in the light of both state and federal law as it now stands. See Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U. S. 412, 414 (1972). This enactment raises new questions, both jurisdictional and substantive, that should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court. For these reasons, we determine that the constitutionality of § 660.10’s limitation on the types of corporations that may perform trust responsibilities is not properly before us at this stage in the proceedings. y In summary, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it declares unconstitutional the challenged portions of § 659.141 (1) and enjoins their enforcement. We vacate that portion of the judgment that relates to the constitutionality of § 660.10, and we remand the case for such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. This action was filed on October 24, 1973, and is therefore unaffected by the subsequent repeal of 28 U. S. C. § 2281, which by its terms was made inapplicable to any action commenced on or before August 12, 1976. See Pub. L. 94-381, § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. See 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-726, §§ 1-7. As so- amended, § 659.141 (1) reads in pertinent part: “[N]o bank, trust company, or holding company, the operations of which are principally conducted outside this state, shall acquire, [or] retain, or own, directly or indirectly, all, or substantially all the assets of, or control over, any bank or trust company having a place of business in this state where the business of banking or trust business or functions are conducted, or acquire, [or] retain, or own all, or substantially all, of the assets of, or control over, any business organization having a place of business in this state where or from which it furnishes investment advisory services [to trust companies or banks] in this state.” The italicized words were added, and the bracketed words were deleted, by the December 1972 amendment. Bankers Trust in November 1973 petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review of the Board’s order denying the proposal. That petition has been withdrawn, with leave to reinstate, pending the outcome of this suit. Initially the court declared the entire first sentence of § 659.141 (1) unconstitutional. App. to Juris. Statement Al. It amended that order, however, to limit its declaration to that portion of the sentence dealing with investment advisory and trust services. See id., at D1-D2. The court rendered no decision on the constitutionality of those portions of the statute that govern acquisition of Florida banks by out-of-state banks, bank holding companies, or trust companies. The court refused to grant injunctive relief against § 660.10 because appellees had yet to attempt establishment of a trust company in Florida; the court accordingly determined that injunctive relief against that statute would be premature. 461 F. Supp. 1187, 1201 (ND Fla. 1978). Because the District Court granted injunctive relief with respect to §659.141 (1), we have jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, over the appeal. See White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 761 (1973). See, however, Part IV, infra. While this case was pending in the District Court, the Florida Division of Securities, acting pursuant to a “grandfather” clause, Fla. Stat. §659.141 (3), authorized Bankers Trust to conduct investment advisory services from a single Florida office. This authorization does not moot the controversy, because the District Court’s injunction leaves Bankers Trust free to establish additional offices that § 659.141 (1) would otherwise prohibit. Appellant advanced this argument in the District Court but has substantially departed from it on appeal. Supporting amici, however, con-time to press the contention. See, e. g., Brief for Conference of State Bank Supervisors as Amicus Curiae 8-12. Some of the leading examples of federal regulation of banking, trust, and investment businesses include the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 21 et seq.; the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §77a et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq.; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77aaa et seq.; and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq. For an express finding on the effect of investment advisory activities on interstate commerce, see Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 201, 54 Stat. 847, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-1. Appellant also argues that the present statute, like the one in Exxon Cory. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S., at 125, has no discernible impact on the flow of goods in interstate commerce. Locally owned investment businesses are as free to channel their clients’ investments into interstate markets as their interstate competitors. The validity of this argument cannot be determined on this record. In the Exxon case, as we have noted, all petroleum products sold in the State were produced and refined elsewhere. In contrast, investments may be directed into local as well as interstate markets. Since it is at least conceivable that an investment subsidiary owned by a locally operating bank holding company would be more likely to recommend investments in local businesses, we decline to assign any weight to this argument in the absence of proof concerning the actual effect of the Florida statute. Appellant’s argument that §659.141 (1) could also apply to locally organized bank holding companies, if they maintained their principal operations outside the State, is significantly weakened by federal restrictions on interstate expansion of a-bank holding company’s banking activities discussed in Part III-C, infra. As a result of these statutes, it is unlikely that many local bank holding companies would have their principal operations elsewhere. In any event, discrimination based on the extent of local operations is itself enough to establish the kind of local protectionism we have identified. Both in-state and out-of-state bank holding companies, of course, are subject to extensive regulation by the Federal Government designed to protect against these same evils. Appellant relies on that part of § 3 (d) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 135, as amended, 80 Stat. 238, 12 U. S. C. § 1842 (d), which provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application shall be approved under this section which will permit any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any additional bank located outside of the State in which the operations of such bank holding company’s banking subsidiaries were principally conducted on the effective date of this amendment [July 1, 1966] or the date on which such company became a bank holding company, whichever is later, unless the acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank holding company is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication. For the purposes of this section, the State in which the operations of a bank holding company’s subsidiaries are principally conducted is that State in which total deposits of all such banking subsidiaries are largest.” A new subsection was added to this statute effective March 31, 1980. See Part IV, infra. Section 7 provides: “The enactment by the Congress of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 shall not be construed as preventing any State 'from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof.” 70 Stat. 138, Appellant attempts to answer the latter of these observations by-arguing that the restrictions of § 3 (d) implicitly placed geographical limitations on the expansion of nonbanking activities as well. Appellant asserts that the Board initially gave § 4 (c) a narrow interpretation that effectively prohibited holding companies from owning nonbanking subsidiaries unless they were closely related to an existing banking operation controlled by the parent company. See, e. g., Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014, 1016-1017 (1957). Since such banking operations were geographically confined by virtue of § 3 (d), the Board’s restrictive application of § 4 (c) assertedly applied the same limitation to nonbanking operations. We agree with appellees that this argument has been significantly undercut by 1970 amendments to the Act that revised the language of §4 (c). Although the principal purpose of those amendments was to extend the regulatory controls of the Act to one-bank holding companies that were formerly exempt, Congress also adopted changes designed to give the Board greater discretion in administering the Act. See S. Rep. No. 91-1084, pp. 12-13 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 91-387, p. 14 (1969); see also Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 Geo. L. J. 1225, 1236-1237 (1972). The Federal Reserve Board proposed several changes in § 4 (c) designed to liberalize the standards for expansion into “related” nonbanking enterprises. These proposals met with different receptions in the two Houses of Congress, and the final product was a compromise. A proposal to substitute the phrase “functionally related” for “closely related” was not adopted; but the phrase “financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature” was dropped from the statute, and “business of banking” was changed simply to “banking.” Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-607, § 103, 84 Stat. 1763; see Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1200, 1219-1223 (1971). There was substantial disagreement among House and Senate conferees over the exact import of these changes with respect to the breadth of non-banking activities that the amendments would permit. Compare H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1747, p. 21 (1970), and 116 Cong. Ree. 41950-41952 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Patman), with id., at 41953-41954 (remarks of Rep. Widnall); id., at 42424 (remarks of Sen. Sparkman); id., at 42435-42436 (remarks of Sen. Bennett). See also Note, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1170, 1206-1207 (1973). We need not enter that debate at this juncture. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the change from “business of banking” to “banking” was explicitly proposed in order to free the Board from its prior requirement of relationship to a bank holding company’s existing banking enterprises. See S. Rep. No. 91-1084, p. 12 (1970); Letter dated November 23, 1970, from Arthur Bums, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, to Representative Patman, reprinted in 116 Cong. Rec. 41959 (1970); see also Note, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 1220. Once that change was made, the implicit geographical limitation appellant infers from previous applications of the Act was removed along with the language from which it was derived. This statute provides: “Section 3 (d) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 XJ. S. C. § 1842 (d)) is amended by inserting (1) after (d) and by adding at the end thereof the following: “(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the restrictions contained in paragraph (1) regarding the acquisition of shares or assets of, or interests in, an additional bank shall apply to the acquisition of shares or assets of, or interests in, a trust company. “(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to the acquisition of shares or assets of, or interests in, a trust company if such acquisition was approved by the Board on or before March 5, 1980, and if such trust company opened for business and was operating on or before March 5, 1980. “(C) For the purpose of this paragraph, the term ‘trust company’ means any company whose powers are limited to the powers specified in subsection (a) of the first section of the Act entitled ‘An Act to place authority over the trust powers of national banks in the Comptroller of the Currency,’ approved September 28, 1962 (12 U. S. C. §92a), for a national bank located in the same State in which such trust company is located. “(c) The amendments made by this section are hereby repealed on October 1, 1981.” Florida’s Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-168, § 3 (2)(t), repeals, as of July 1, 1980, chs. 659 and 660 of the Florida Statutes “relating to banking.” These chapters include §§ 659.141 (1) and 660.10. Section 2 of ch. 76-168 recites that it is “the intent of the Legislature ... [t]o provide systematic legislative review of [licensing and regulation of businesses] ... by a periodic review and termination, modification, or reestablishment of such programs and functions.” We are advised that pending in the Florida Legislature at the present time are S. B. 347 and a House substitute for S. B. 347; that both bifis leave the substance of §§ 659.141 (1) and 660.10 intact for the express purpose of not mooting out pending litigation; and that action on these bills will be taken before the legislature adjourns. As of the date this opinion is filed, §§ 659.141 (1) and 660.10 remain in effect so the case has not become moot, whatever the ultimate disposition of the pending bills.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION v. CITIZEN BAND POTAWATOMI INDIAN TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA No. 89-1322. Argued January 7, 1991 Decided February 26, 1991 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 514. David Allen Miley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Joe Mark Elkouri. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Robert L. Klarquist. Michael Minnis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was G. Lindsay Simmons Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma et al. by Melody L. McCoy, Yvonne Teresa Knight, Kim Jerome Gottschalk, Reid P. Chambers, Jeanne S. Whiteing, Robert S. Thompson III, Thomas W. Fredericks, Bertram E. Hirsch, and Jack F. Trope; for the Inter-Tribal Council of the Five Civilized Tribes by Bob Rabón; for the Iroquois Businesspersons Association by Joseph E. Zdarsky; for the Sac and Fox Nation et al. by G. William Rice and Gregory H. Bigler; and for the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma et al. by Glenn M. Feldman. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented in this case is whether a State that has not asserted jurisdiction over Indian lands under Public Law 280 may validly tax sales of goods to tribesmen and nonmembers occurring on land held in trust for a federally recognized Indian tribe. We conclude that under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the State may not tax such sales to Indians, but remains free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers of the tribe. Respondent, the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (Potawatomis or Tribe), owns and operates a convenience store in Oklahoma on land held in trust for it by the Federal Government. For many years, the Potawatomis have sold cigarettes at the convenience store without collecting Oklahoma’s state cigarette tax on these sales. In 1987, petitioner, the Oklahoma Tax Commission (Oklahoma or Commission), served the Potawatomis with an assessment letter, demanding that they pay $2.7 million for taxes on cigarette sales occurring between 1982 and 1986. The Potawato-mis filed suit to enjoin the assessment in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Oklahoma counterclaimed, asking the District Court to enforce its $2.7 million claim against the Tribe and to enjoin the Potawatomis from selling cigarettes in the future without collecting and remitting state taxes on those sales. The Pota-watomis moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that the Tribe had not waived its sovereign immunity and therefore could not be sued by the State. The District Court denied the Potawatomis’ motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial. On the merits, the District Court concluded that the Commission lacked the authority to tax the on-reservation cigarette sales to tribal members or to tax the Tribe directly. It held, therefore, that the Tribe was immune from Oklahoma’s suit to collect past unpaid taxes directly from the Tribe. Nonetheless, the District Court held that Oklahoma could require the Tribe to collect taxes prospectively for on-reservation sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. Accordingly, the court ordered the Tribe to collect taxes on sales to non-tribal members, and to comply with all statutory recordkeep-ing requirements. The Tribe appealed the District Court’s denial of its motion to dismiss and the court’s order requiring it to collect and remit taxes on sales to nonmembers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 888 F. 2d 1303 (1989). That court held that the District Court erred in entertaining Oklahoma’s counterclaims because the Potawa-tomis enjoy absolute sovereign immunity from suit, and had not waived that immunity by filing an action for injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals further held that Oklahoma lacked the authority to impose a tax on any sales that occur on the reservation, regardless of whether they are to tribesmen or nonmembers. It concluded that “because the convenience store is located on land over which the Potawatomis retain sovereign powers, Oklahoma has no authority to tax the store’s transactions unless Oklahoma has received an independent jurisdictional grant of authority from Congress.” Id., at 1306. Finding no independent jurisdictional grant of authority to tax the Potawatomis, the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to grant the Potawatomis’ request for an injunction. We granted certiorari to resolve an apparent conflict with this Court’s precedents and to clarify the law of sovereign immunity with respect to the collection of sales taxes on Indian lands. 498 U. S. 806 (1990). We now affirm in part and reverse in part. I Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations” that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831). Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 58 (1978). Petitioner acknowledges that Indian tribes generally enjoy sovereign immunity, but argues that the Potawato-mis waived their sovereign immunity by seeking an injunction against the Commission’s proposed tax assessment. It argues that, to the extent that the Commission’s counterclaims were “compulsory” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), the District Court did not need any independent jurisdictional basis to hear those claims. We rejected an identical contention over a half-century ago in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 511-512 (1940). In that case, a surety bondholder claimed that a federal court had jurisdiction to hear its state-law counterclaim against an Indian Tribe because the Tribe’s initial action to enforce the bond constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. We held that a tribe does not waive its sovereign immunity from actions that could not otherwise be brought against it merely because those actions were pleaded in a counterclaim to an action filed by the tribe. Id., at 513. “Possessing . . . immunity from direct suit, we are of the opinion [the Indian nations] possess a similar immunity from cross-suits.” Ibid. Oklahoma does not argue that it received congressional authorization to adjudicate a counterclaim against the Tribe, and the case is therefore controlled by Fidelity & Guaranty. We uphold the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity merely by filing an action for injunctive relief. Oklahoma offers an alternative, and more far-reaching, basis for reversing the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of its counterclaims. It urges this Court to construe more narrowly, or abandon entirely, the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Oklahoma contends that the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine impermissibly burdens the administration of state tax laws. At the very least, Oklahoma proposes that the Court modify Fidelity & Guaranty, because tribal business activities such as cigarette sales are now so detached from traditional tribal interests that the tribal-sovereignty doctrine no longer makes sense in this context. The sovereignty doctrine, it maintains, should be limited to the tribal courts and the internal affairs of tribal government, because no purpose is served by insulating tribal business ventures from the authority of the States to administer their laws. A doctrine of Indian tribal sovereign immunity was originally enunciated by this Court and has been reaffirmed in a number of cases. Turner v. United States, 248 U. S. 354, 358 (1919); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, at 58. Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it. Although Congress has occasionally authorized limited classes of suits against Indian tribes, it has never authorized suits to enforce tax assessments. Instead, Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine. See, e. g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq. These Acts reflect Congress’ desire to promote the “goal of Indian self-government, including its ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202, 216 (1987). Under these circumstances, we are not disposed to modify the long-established principle of tribal sovereign immunity. Finally, Oklahoma asserts that even if sovereign immunity applies to direct actions against tribes arising from activities on the reservation, that immunity should not apply to the facts of this case. The State contends that the Potawatomis’ cigarette sales do not, in fact, occur on a “reservation.” Relying upon our decision in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), Oklahoma argues that the tribal convenience store should be held subject to state tax laws because it does not operate on a formally designated “reservation,” but on land held in trust for the Potawatomis. Neither Mesca-lero nor any other precedent of this Court has ever drawn the distinction between tribal trust land and reservations that Oklahoma urges. In United States v. John, 437 U. S. 634 (1978), we stated that the test for determining whether land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that land is denominated “trust land” or “reservation.” Rather, we ask whether the area has been “‘validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.’” Id., at 648-649; see also United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 539 (1938). Mescalero is not to the contrary; that case involved a ski resort outside of the reservation boundaries operated by the Tribe under a 30-year lease from the Forest Service. We said that “[ajbsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.” 411 U. S., at 148-149. Here, by contrast, the property in question is held by the Federal Government in trust for the benefit of the Potawa-tomis. As in John, we find that this trust land is “validly set apart” and thus qualifies as a reservation for tribal immunity purposes. 437 U. S., at 649. II Oklahoma attacks the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the sovereign immunity of the Tribe prevents it from being liable for the collection of state taxes on the sale of cigarettes to nonmembers of the Tribe. The Tribe, in turn, argues that this issue is not properly before us. It observes that the only issue presented in its prayer for an injunction was whether Oklahoma could require it to pay the challenged assessment for previously uncollected taxes. The complaint did not challenge Oklahoma’s authority to require the Tribe to collect the sales tax prospectively, and thus, the Tribe argues, that question was never put in issue. We do not agree. The Tribe’s complaint alleged that Oklahoma lacked authority to impose a sales tax directly upon the Tribe. The District Court held that the Tribe could be required to collect the tax on sales to nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court on this point. While neither of these courts need have reached that question, they both did. The question is fairly subsumed in the “questions presented” in the petition for certiorari, and both parties have briefed it. We have the authority to decide it and proceed to do so. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258-259, n. 5 (1980). Although the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity applies to the Potawatomis, that doctrine does not excuse a tribe from all obligations to assist in the collection of validly imposed state sales taxes. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980). Oklahoma argues that the Potawatomis’ tribal immunity notwithstanding, it has the authority to tax sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the Tribe at the Tribe’s convenience store. We agree. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), this Court held that Indian retailers on an Indian reservation may be required to collect all state taxes applicable to sales to non-Indians. We determined that requiring the tribal seller to collect these taxes was a minimal burden justified by the State’s interest in assuring the payment of these concededly lawful taxes. Id., at 483. “Without the simple expedient of having the retailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian purchasers, it is clear that wholesale violations of the law by the latter class will go virtually unchecked.” Id., at 482. Only four years later we reiterated this view, ruling that tribal sellers are obliged to collect and remit state taxes on sales to nonmembers at Indian smoke-shops on reservation lands. Colville, supra. The Court of Appeals thought this case was distinguishable from Moe and Colville. It observed the State of Washington had asserted jurisdiction over civil causes of action in Indian country as permitted by Public Law 280. Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, 28 U. S. C. § 1360. The court contrasted Colville to this case, in which Oklahoma disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian lands upon entering the Union and did not reassert jurisdiction over these lands pursuant to Public Law 280. The Court of Appeals concluded that because Oklahoma did not elect to assert jurisdiction under Public Law 280, the Pota-watomis were immune from any requirement of Oklahoma state tax law. Neither Moe nor Colville depended upon the State’s assertion of jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Those cases stand for the proposition that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not prevent a State from requiring Indian retailers doing business on tribal reservations to collect a state-imposed cigarette tax on their sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. Colville’s only reference to Public Law 280 relates to a concession that the statute did not furnish a basis for taxing sales to tribe members. 447 U. S., at 142, n. 8. Public Law 280 merely permits a State to assume jurisdiction over “civil causes of action” in Indian country. We have never held that Public Law 280 is independently sufficient to confer authority on a State to extend the full range of its regulatory authority, including taxation, over Indians and Indian reservations. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 734, n. 18 (1983); Cabazon, 480 U. S., at 208-210, and n. 8. Thus, it is simply incorrect to conclude that Public Law 280 was the essential (yet unspoken) basis for this Court’s decision in Colville. In view of our conclusion with respect to sovereign immunity of the Tribe from suit by the State, Oklahoma complains that, in effect, decisions such as Moe and Colville give them a right without any remedy. There is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State from pursuing the most efficient remedy, but we are not persuaded that it lacks any adequate alternatives. We have never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable for damages in actions brought by the State. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). And under today’s decision, States may of course collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, Colville, supra, at 161-162, or by assessing wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores, City Vending of Muskogee, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 898 F. 2d 122 (CA10 1990). States may also enter into agreements with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactory regime for the collection of this sort of tax. See 48 Stat. 987, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 476. And if Oklahoma and other States similarly situated find that none of these alternatives produce the revenues to which they are entitled, they may of course seek appropriate legislation from Congress. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. CENTRAL EUREKA MINING CO. et al. No. 29. Argued January 7, 1958. Decided June 16, 1958. Assistant Attorney General Doub argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Melvin Richter, Paul A. Sweeney and John G. Laughlin, Jr. Edward W. Bourne argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Mr. Bourne, Eugene Z. Du Bose, Edward, E. Rigney and J. Kenneth Campbell for the Homestake Mining Co., Phillip Barnett, Ralph D. Pittman and Rodney H. Robertson for the Central Eureka Mining Co., O. R. McGuire, Jr. and V. A. Montgomery for the Alaska-Pacific Consolidated Mining Co., George Herrington and William H. Orrick, Jr. for the Idaho Maryland Mines Corporation, and John Ward Cutler for the Bald Mountain Mining Co. et al., respondents. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. In the interest of national defense, the War Production Board, in 1942, issued its Limitation Order L-208 ordering nonessential gold mines to close down. This litigation was instituted in the Court of Claims to recover compensation from the United States for its alleged taking, under such order, of respondents’ rights to operate their respective gold mines. Two issues are now presented. First, whether the Act of July 14, 1952, granting jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to entertain the claims arising out of L-208, was a mandate to that court to award compensation for whatever losses were suffered as a result of L-208, or whether it amounted merely to a waiver by the United States of defenses based on the passage of time. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it was the latter. We, therefore, reach the second question — whether L-208 constituted a taking of private property for public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it did not. Early in 1941, it became apparent to those in charge of the Nation’s defense mobilization that we faced a critical shortage of nonférrous metals, notably copper, and a comparable shortage of machinery and supplies to produce them. Responsive to this situation, the Office of Production Management (OPM) and its successor, the War Production Board (WPB), issued a series of Preference Orders. These gave the producers of mining machinery and supplies relatively high priorities for the acquisition of needed materials. They also gave to those mines, which were deemed important from the standpoint of defense or essential civilian needs, a high priority in the acquisition of such machinery. Gold mines were classified as nonessential and eventually were relegated to the lowest priority rating. These orders prevented the mines operated by respondents from acquiring new machinery or supplies so that, by March of 1942, respondents were reduced to using only the machinery and supplies which they had on hand. Soon thereafter, a severe shortage of skilled labor developed in the nonferrous metal mines. This was due in part to the expanding need for nonferrous metals, and in part to a depletion of mining manpower as a result of the military draft and the attraction of higher wages paid by other industries. It became apparent that the only reservoir of skilled mining labor was that which remained in the gold mines. Pressure was brought to bear on the WPB to close down the gold mines with the expectation that many gold miners would thus be attracted to the nonferrous mines. As a part of this conservation program, WPB, on October 8, 1942, issued Limitation Order L-208 now before us. That order was addressed exclusively to the gold mining industry which it classified as nonessential. It directed each operator of a gold mine to take steps immediately to close down its operations and, after seven days, not to acquire, use or consume any material or equipment in development work. The order directed that, within 60 days, all operations should cease, excepting only the minimum activity necessary to maintain mine buildings, machinery and equipment, and to keep the workings safe and accessible. Applications to the WPB were permitted to meet special needs and several exceptions were made under that authority. Small mines were defined and exempted from the order. The WPB did not take physical possession of the gold mines. It did not require the mine owners to dispose of any of their machinery or equipment. On November 19, 1942, Order L-208 was amended to prohibit the disposition of certain types of machinery or supplies without the permission of an officer of the WPB. Each mine operator was required to submit an itemized list of all such equipment held in inventory and to indicate which items he would be willing to sell or rent. On August 31, 1943, L-208 was further amended to permit disposition of equipment, without approval of the WPB, to persons holding certain preference ratings. The order, thus amended, remained in effect until revoked on June 30, 1945. The first legal action against the Government arising out of L-208 was brought in the Court of Claims in 1950. It was there alleged that the order had amounted to a taking of the complainant’s right to mine gold during the life of the order. The Government demurred, taking its present position that the order was merely a lawful regulation of short supplies relevant to the war effort. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that the damages were not compensable. Oro Fino Consolidated Mines, Inc., v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 18, 92 F. Supp. 1016. Accord, Alaska-Pacific Consolidated Mining Co. v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 307. Somewhat later, the instant action was brought in the Court of Claims by the Idaho Maryland Mines Corporation. Relying on the Oro Fino decision, the Government again demurred. This time, however, the court overruled the demurrer on the ground that this complaint contained detailed allegations which, if true, in its opinion demonstrated that L-208 was an arbitrary order without rational connection with the war effort. On that basis, the court authorized a commissioner to hear this case and several similar ones, solely to determine the Goverment’s liability, leaving determination of the amount of recovery, if any, to further proceedings. 122 Ct. Cl. 670, 104 F. Supp. 576. The commissioner heard the cases and filed his report. The Court of Claims, with two judges dissenting, held that the six respondents now before us were entitled to just compensation. 134 Ct. Cl. 1, 53, 56, 138 F. Supp. 281, 310, 312. A new trial was denied. 134 Ct. Cl. 130, 146 F. Supp. 476. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari in order to consider the important constitutional issue presented. 352 U. S. 964. Before reaching the merits, we face the suggestion of respondents that the Special Jurisdictional Act of July 14, 1952, 66 Stat. 605, did more than waive the statute of limitations and the defense of laches. Respondents contend that this Act was a congressional mandate to the Court of Claims to award compensation to such of the respondents as established any loss which was, in fact, caused by L-208. We conclude that the language of the Act and its legislative history demonstrate that it was no more than a waiver of defenses based on the passage of time. The entire Act reads as follows: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States Court of Claims be, and hereby is, given jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment, notwithstanding any statute of limitations, laches, or lapse of time, on the claim of any owner or operator of a gold mine or gold placer operation for losses incurred allegedly because of the closing or curtaihiient or prevention of operations of such mine or placer operation as a result of the restrictions imposed by War Production Board Limitation Order L-208 during the effective life thereof: Provided, That actions on such claims shall be brought within one year from the date this Act becomes effective.” The Act thus contains no language prejudging the validity of the claims on their merits. On the other hand, it expressly permits the filing of actions, based on L-208, within one year from the taking effect of the Act, “notwithstanding any statute of limitations, laches, or lapse of time . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) That this was the motivating purpose of Congress is further indicated by the fact that the statute of limitations had recently run against many of these claims by the time the Court of Claims, in the instant case, upheld the claim on the pleadings of the Idaho Maryland Mines Corporation. 122 Ct. Cl. 670, 104 F. Supp. 576. This was explained to Congress as follows in the House Report recommending passage of the bill: “At the present time many other claimants who may have as good a right for an adjudication of their claims as does the Idaho Maryland Mines Corp. may not prosecute such claims due to the running of the statute of limitations. Many of the claimants after the ruling in the Oro Fina case undoubtedly felt that to file in the Court of Claims would be useless and, therefore, allowed the statute to run against them.” H. R. Rep. No. 2220, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2. See also, S. Rep. No. 1605, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2. The legislative history also discloses repeated failures to induce Congress to act upon the merits of the claims. In view of such history, it is hard to believe that the successful passage of this Act of July 14, 1952, would have taken place, as it did, without opposition had it included a concession of liability. On the other hand, as explained in the above-quoted House Committee Report, its passage is readily undérstood if it merely granted an extension, for one year, of the time within which to file an action to recover a claim, the merits of which would be determined by the Court of Claims. For these reasons, we hold that this Jurisdictional Act is fairly interpreted as amounting only to a waiver of defenses based on the passage of time. Turning to the merits, it is clear from the record that the Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment connected with them. Cf. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114. All that the Government sought was the cessation of the consumption of mining equipment and manpower in the gold mines and the conservation of such equipment and manpower for more essential war uses. The Government had no need for the gold or the gold mines. The mere fact that L-208 was in the form of an express prohibition of the operation of the mines, rather than a prohibition of the use of the scarce equipment in the mines, did not convert the order into a “taking” of a right to operate the mines. Obviously, if the use of equipment were prohibited, the mines would close and it did not make that order a “taking” merely because the order was, in form, a direction to close down the mines. The record shows that the WPB expected that L-208 would release substantial amounts of scarce mining equipment for use in essential industries, and also that experienced gold miners would transfer to other mines whose product was in gravely short supply. The purpose of L-208 was to encourage voluntary reallocation of scarce resources from the unessential to the essential. Respondents contend that L-208 was arbitrary and without rational connection with the war effort. They contend that, if it were arbitrary, there is no distinction in law between this case and one where the Government consciously exercises its power to take for public use. Respondents base their assertion of arbitrariness on several circumstances. For example, they urge that the preamble to L-208 recited as its sole purpose the conservation of scarce materials. If that alone were the purpose, they contend, it had already been achieved by priority orders which prevented the gold mines from obtaining any scarce equipment. Order L-208 did more than merely prohibit the acquisition of scarce equipment — it also prohibited the use of equipment previously acquired. The fact that L-208 did not require the mine owners to sell their inventory of scarce equipment to essential users was a reasonable course of action. The WPB could properly rely on the profit motive to induce the mine owners to liquidate their inventories, and it was thought that the people who would be interested in purchasing used mining equipment probably would be the owners of essential mines. In any event, L-208 was soon amended to prohibit sales to nonessential users. Respondents also urge that the record shows that the shortage of experienced miners was the dominant, if not the sole, consideration for the issuance of L-208. They contend that the WPB had no authority to compel gold miners to transfer to other mines. The record shows that a dominating consideration in the issuance of L-208 was the expectation that it would release experienced miners for work in the nonferrous mines, but the record does not support a finding that such was the sole purpose of the order. It was lawful for the WPB to consider the impact of its material orders on the manpower situation. Order L-208 did not draft gold miners into government service as copper miners. It sought only to make the gold miners available for more essential work if they chose to move. Although the record indicates that the number of gold miners who transferred to nonferrous mines was disappointingly small, yet there were some who did, and others moved to other essential wartime services. The record shows a careful official consideration of the subject and a well-considered decision to accomplish a proper result. There is no suggestion that any of the officials who were responsible for the order were motivated by anything other than appropriate concern for the war effort. Thus the WPB made a reasoned decision that, under existing circumstances, the Nation’s need was such that the unrestricted use of mining equipment and manpower in gold mines was so wasteful of wartime resources that it must be temporarily suspended. Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a particular governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416. In doing so, we have recognized that action in the form of regulation can so diminish the value of property as to constitute a taking. E. g., United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799; United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256. However, the mere fact that the regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his property is not necessarily enough to establish the owner’s right to compensation. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 664, 668, 669. In the context of war, we have been reluctant to find that degree of regulation which, without saying so, requires compensation to be paid for resulting losses of income. E. g., Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146; Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503; and see United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U. S. 149. The reasons are plain. War, particularly in modern times, demands the strict regulation of nearly all resources. It makes demands which otherwise would be insufferable. But wartime economic restrictions, temporary in character, are insignificant'when compared to the widespread uncompensated loss of life and freedom of action which war traditionally demands. We do not find in the temporary restrictions here placed on the operation of gold mines a taking of private property that would justify a departure from the trend of the above decisions. The WPB here sought, by reasonable regulation, to conserve the limited supply of equipment used by the mines and it hoped that its order would divert available miners to more essential work. Both purposes were proper objectives; both matters were subject to regulation to the extent of the order. L-208 did not order any disposal of property or transfer of men. Accordingly, since the damage to the mine owners was incidental to the Government’s lawful regulation of matters reasonably deemed essential to the war effort, the judgment is Reversed. Issued October 8,1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 7992-7993. Amended, November 19, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 9613-9614; November 25, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 9810-9811; and August 31, 1943, 8 Fed. Reg. 12007-12008. Revoked, June 30, 1945, 10 Fed. Reg. 8110. For text of the order as issued October 8, 1942, see note 4, infra. The Act is set forth in the text of this opinion at p. 163, infra. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U. S. Const., Amend. V. War Production Board Limitation Order L-208, 7 Fed. Reg. 7992-7993, provided as follows: “The fulfillment of requirements for the defense of the United States has created a shortage in the supply of critical materials for defense, for private account and for export which are used in the maintenance and operation of gold mines; and the following order is deemed necessary and appropriate in the public interest and to promote the national defense. “§ 3093.1 Limitation Order L-208 — (a) Definitions. For the purposes of this order, 'nonessential mine’ means any mining enterprise in which gold is produced, whether lode or placer, located in the United States, its territories or possessions, unless the operator of such mining enterprise is the holder of a serial number for such enterprise which has been issued under Preference Rating Order P-56. "(b) Restrictions upon production. (1) On and after the issuance date of this order, each operator of a nonessential mine shall immediately take all such steps as may be necessary to close down, and shall close down, in the shortest possible time, the operations of such mine. “ (2) In no event on or after 7 days from the issuance date of this order shall any operator of a nonessential mine acquire, consume, or use any material, facility, or equipment to break any new ore or to proceed with any development work or any new operations in or about such mine. “(3) In no event on or after 60 days from the issuance date of this order shall any operator of a nonessential mine acquire, consume, or use any material, facility, or equipment to remove any ore or waste from such mine, either above or below ground, or to conduct any other operations in or about such mine, except to the minimum amount necessary to maintain its buildings, machinery, and equipment in repair, and its access and development workings safe and accessible. “ (4) The provisions of this order shall not apply to any lode mine which produced 1200 tons or less of commercial ore in the year 1941, provided the rate of production of such mine, after the issuance date of this order, shall not exceed 100 tons per month, nor to any placer mine which treated less than 1000 cubic yards of material in the year 1941, provided that the rate of treatment of such placer mine, after the issuance date of this order, shall not exceed 100 cubic yards per month. “(5) Nothing contained in this order shall limit or prohibit the use or operation of the mill, machine shop, or other facilities of a nonessential mine in the manufacture of articles to be delivered pursuant to orders bearing a preference rating of A-l-k or higher, or in milling ores for the holder of a serial number under Preference Rating Order P-56. “(e) Restrictions on application of preference ratings. No person shall apply any preference rating, whether heretofore or hereafter assigned, to acquire any material or equipment for consumption or use in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a nonessential mine, except with the express permission of the Director General for Operations issued after application made to the Mining Branch, War Production Board. “(d) Assignment of preference ratings. The Director General for Operations, upon receiving an application in accordance with paragraph (c) above, may assign such preference ratings as may be required to obtain the minimum amount of material necessary to maintain such nonessential mine on the basis set forth in paragraph (b) (3) above. “(e) Records. All persons affected by this order shall keep and preserve, for not less than two years, accurate and complete records concerning inventory, acquisition, consumption, and use of materials, and production of ore. “(f) Reports. All persons affected by this order shall execute and file with the War Production Board such reports and questionnaires as said Board shall from time to time prescribe. “(g) Audit and inspection. All records required to be kept by this order shall, upon request, be submitted to audit and inspection by duly authorized representatives of the War Production Board. “(h) Communications. All reports to be filed, appeals, and other communications concerning this order should be addressed to: War Production Board, Mining Branch, Washington, D. C., Ref.: D-208. “(i) Violations. Any person who wilfully violates any provision of this order, or who, in connection with this order, wilfully conceals a material fact or furnishes false information to any department or agency of the United States, is guilty of a crime, and upon conviction may be punished by fine or imprisonment. In addition, any such person may be prohibited from making or obtaining further deliveries of, or from processing or using, material under priority control and may be deprived of priorities assistance. “ (j) Appeal. Any person affected by this order who considers that compliance therewith would work an exceptional and unreasonable hardship upon him may appeal to the War Production Board, by letter, in triplicate, setting forth the pertinent facts and the reason he considers he is entitled to relief. The Director General for Operations may thereupon take such action as he deems appropriate. “(k) Applicability of priorities regulations. This order and all transactions affected thereby are subject to all applicable provisions of the priorities regulations of the War Production Board, as amended from time to time. “(P. D. Reg. 1, as amended, 6 F. R. 6680; W. P. B. Reg. 1, 7 F. R. 561; E. O. 9024, 7 F. R. 329; E. O. 9040, 7 F. R. 527; E. O. 9125, 7 F. R. 2719; sec. 2 (a), Pub. Law 671, 76th Cong., as amended by Pub. Laws 89 and 507, 77th Cong.) “Issued this 8th day of October 1942. “ERNEST KANZLER, “Director General for Operations.” Section 6 (e), added to the original order on November 19, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 9613, provided: “(e) Restrictions on disposition of machinery and equipment. No person shall sell or otherwise dispose of any machinery or equipment of the types listed in Schedule A to Preference Rating Order P-56, which has been used in a nonessential mine, and no person shall accept delivery thereof, except with specific permission of the Director General for Operations. On or before November 19, 1942, or within sixty days after the effective date, whichever is later, each operator of a nonessential mine shall file with the War Production Board, Washington, D. C., Reference: L-208, an itemized list of such machinery and equipment, signed by such operator or an authorized official, indicating each item available for sale or rental. Upon receipt of such itemized list, the War Production Board will furnish to the operator appropriate forms to be filled out for each item which the operator desires to dispose of.” 8 Fed. Reg. 12007-12008. 10 Fed. Reg. 8110. See also, Homestake Mining Co. v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 690, and Central Eureka Mining Co. v. United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 691. The Court of Claims concluded that respondents had shown not only that L-208 was arbitrary, but also that they had a sufficient inventory of machinery and supplies so that they would have been able to operate had it not been for the order. However, as to the following companies, it ordered their petitions dismissed on the ground that they had not shown that they would have been able to continue operations, thus failing to show that L-208 was the proximate cause of their loss: Alabama-California Gold Mines Co., Consolidated Chollar Gould & Savage Mining Co., and Oro Fino Consolidated Mines, Inc. 134 Ct. Cl., at 53, 138 F. Supp., at 310. Bills were first introduced in the 78th Congress, 1st Session (1943), for the relief of the owners and operators of gold mines. Early efforts were directed at recision of L-208. H. R. 3009, 89 Cong. Rec. 6181, was referred to the House Committee on Banking and Currency and never reported out; H. R. 3682, 89 Cong. Rec. 9653, was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and never reported out. At the same session of Congress, Senator McCarran introduced a bill, S. 27, 89 Cong. Rec. 34, which provided legislative relief to the mine owners vis-á-vis their creditors. This bill, referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, was favorably reported, 89 Cong. Rec. 5187, S. Rep. No. 271, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., and, after amendment, it passed the Senate, 89 Cong. Rec. 6094-6095. In the House, S. 27 was referred to the House Committee on Mines and Mining, 89 Cong. Rec. 6180, and was never reported out. In the following session of Congress, a similar bill was introduced in the House by Representative Engle. H. R. 5093, 90 Cong. Rec. 6587. It too was referred to the House Committee on Banking and Currency and was never reported out. In the 79th Congress, 1st Session (1945), Representative Engle introduced the first bill calling for compensation for losses arising out of L-208. H. R. 4393, 91 Cong. Rec. 9726. This bill was referred to the House Committee on War Claims which, in turn, referred the matter to a Subcommittee. The Subcommittee held hearings over several days and issued a report to the full Committee recommending approval. (This report was quoted at length in the Reports to both Houses favoring passage of the Jurisdictional Act.) The bill was never reported out of the full Committee. In the 81st Congress, 1st Session (1949), Senator McCarran introduced S. 45, 95 Cong. Rec. 39, substantively similar to H. R. 4393 introduced by Representative Engle. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary which reported it favorably. S. Rep. No. 79, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. It was objected to, however, by Senator Donnell, 95 Cong. Rec. 2764; Senator Hendrickson, by request, id., at 13297; Senator Schoeppel, id., at 14722; Senator Williams, 96 Cong. Rec. 1278; Senator Hendrickson, id., at 14691; and Senators Hendrickson and Williams, id., at 16592, and consequently never came to a vote. In the same Congress, Representative White introduced H. R. 7851, 96 Cong. Rec. 4066, a bill of the same type, which was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and never reported out. The Special Jurisdictional Act was passed on the Consent Calendar. 98 Cong. Rec. 6322-6323, 8931. The seriousness of a concession of liability is evidenced by the Government’s recent estimate that its potential liability, if respondents prevail, can be measured in “terms of thirty to sixty million dollars.” Ordinarily the remedy for arbitrary governmental action is an injunction, rather than an action for just compensation. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579. Our view of the case makes it unnecessary to reach that question. See pp. 160-161, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, et al. No. 97-42. Argued March 4, 1998 Decided June 25, 1998 by Chief Justice, Justice Scaiia, and Justice Thomas, concluded: declaratory judgment and injunction petitioner seeks are an appropriate remedy for the taking alleged in this case, and it is within the district courts’ power to award such equitable relief The Tucker Act may require that a just compensation claim under the Takings Clause be filed in the Court of Federal Claims, but petitioner does not seek compensation from the Government. In situations analogous to the one here, this Court has assumed the lack of a compensatory remedy and has granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations without discussing the Tucker Act’s applicability. See, e. g., Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U. S. 234, 234-235. Pp. 519-522. 2. The Coal Act’s allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings Clause. Pp. 522-537. (a) Economic regulation such as the Coal Aet may effect a taking. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 78. The party challenging the government action bears a substantial burden, for not every destruction or injury to property by such action is a constitutional taking. A regulation’s constitutionality is evaluated by examining the governmental action’s “justice and fairness.” See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65. Although that inquiry does not lend itself to any set formula, three factors traditionally have informed this Court’s regulatory takings analysis: “[Tjhe economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164,175. Pp. 522-524. (b) The analysis in this ease is informed by previous decisions considering the constitutionality of somewhat similar legislative schemes: Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 (Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 476 U. S. 211 (Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980); and Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602 (same). Those opinions make clear that Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic legislation, including the power to affect contractual commitments between private parties; and that it may impose retroactive liability to some degree, particularly where it is “‘confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation,’ ” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. B. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 731. The decisions, however, have left open the possibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and if the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience. Pp. 524-529. (c) The Coal Act’s allocation scheme, as applied to Eastern, presents such a case, when the three traditional factors are considered. As to the economic impact, Eastern’s Coal Aet liability is substantial, and the company is clearly deprived of the $50 to $100 million it must pay to the Combined Fund. An employer’s statutory liability for multiem-ployer plan benefits should reflect some proportionality to its experience with the plan. Concrete Pipe, supra, at 645. Eastern contributed to the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, but ceased its coal mining operations in 1965 and neither participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contributions in connection with the Benefit Plans established under the 1974, 1978, or subsequent NBCWA’s. It is the latter agreements, however, that first suggest an industry commitment to funding lifetime health benefits for retirees and their dependents. During the years that Eastern employed miners, such benefits were far less extensive than under the 1974 NBCWA, were unvested, and were fully subject to alteration or termination. To the extent that Eastern may be able to seek indemnification from EACC or Peabody under contractual arrangements that might insure Eastern against liabilities arising out of its former coal operations, that indemnity is neither enhanced nor supplanted by the Coal Act and does not affect the availability of the declaratory relief sought here. Respondents’ argument that the Coal Act moderates and mitigates the economic impact by allocating some of Eastern’s former employees to signatories of the 1978 NBCWA is unavailing. That Eastern is not forced to bear the burden of lifetime benefits for all of its former employees does not mean that its liability is not a significant economic burden. For similar reasons, the Coal Act substantially interferes with Eastern’s reasonable investment-backed expectations. It operates retroactively, reaching back 30 to 50 years to impose liability based on Eastern’s activities between 1946 and 1965. Retroactive legislation is generally disfavored. It presents problems of unfairness because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U. S. 181,191. The distance into the past that the Coal Act reaches back to impose liability on Eastern and the magnitude of that liability raise substantial fairness questions. The pre-1974 NBCWA’s do not demonstrate that there was an implicit indus-trywide agreement to fund lifetime health benefits at the time that Eastern was involved in the coal industry. The 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, in which Eastern participated, operated on a pay-as-you-go basis and the classes of beneficiaries were subject to the trustees’ discretion. Not until 1974, when ERISA forced revisions to the 1950 W&R Fund and when Eastern was no longer in the industry, could lifetime medical benefits have been viewed as promised. Thus, the Coal Act’s scheme for allocating Combined Fund premiums is not calibrated either to Eastern’s past actions or to any agreement by the company. Nor would the Federal Government’s pattern of involvement in the coal industry have given Eastern sufficient notice that lifetime health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees several decades later. Eastern’s liability for such benefits also differs from eoal operators’ responsibility under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which spread the cost of employment-related disabilities to those who profited from the fruits of the employees’ labor, Turner Elkhom, supra, at 18. Finally, the nature of the governmental action in this case is quite unusual in that Congress’ solution to the grave funding problem that it identified singles out certain employers to bear a substantial burden, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused. Pp. 529-537. Justice Kennedy concluded that application of the Coal Act to Eastern would violate the proper bounds of settled due process principles. Although the Court has been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process scrutiny as a general matter, this country’s law has harbored a singular distrust of retroactive statutes, and that distrust is reflected in this Court's due process jurisprudence. For example, in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15, the Court held that due process requires an inquiry into whether a legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way when enacting a retroactive law. This formulation has been repeated in numerous recent cases, e. g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 31, which reflect the recognition that retroactive lawmaking is a particular concern because of the legislative temptation to use it as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals, Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511U. S. 244,266. Because change in the legal consequences of transactions long closed can destroy the reasonable certainty and security which are the very objects of property ownership, due process protection for property must be understood to incorporate the settled tradition against retroactive laws of great severity. The instant case presents one of those rare instances where the legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by due process. The Coal Act’s remedy bears no legitimate relation to the interest which the Government asserts supports the statute. The degree of retroactive effect, which is a significant determinant in a statute's constitutionality, e. g., United States v. Carlton, supra, at 32, is of unprecedented scope here, since the Coal Act created liability for events occurring 35 years ago. While the Court has upheld the imposition of liability on former employers based on past employment relationships when the remedial statutes were designed to impose an actual, measurable business cost which the employer had been able to avoid in the past, e. g., Turner Elkhorn, supra, at 19, the Coal Act does not serve this purpose. The beneficiaries’ expectation of lifetime benefits was created by promises and agreements made long after Eastern left the coal business, and Eastern was not responsible for the perilous condition of the 1950 and 1974 Plans which jeopardized the benefits. Pp. 547-550. O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J, filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 538. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, post, p. 539. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ, joined, post, p. 550. Breyer, J, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ, joined, post, p. 553, John T Montgomery argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John H. Mason and L. William Law. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Douglas N. Letter, and Sushma Soni. Peter Buscemi argued the eause for respondents UMWA Combined Benefit Fund et al. With him on the brief were Stanley F. Lechner, David Lubitz, John R. Mooney, Paul A. Green, and David W. Allen. Kenneth A. Sweder filed a brief for respondents Peabody Holding Co., Inc., et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AlliedSignal Inc. et al. by Donald B. Ayer, Jonathan C. Rose, James E. Gauch, and Gregory G. Katsas; for Davon, Ine., by John W. Fischer II; for Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co. et al. by Arthur Newbold, Ethan D. Fogel, and Andrew S. Miller; for Unity Real Estate Co. et al. by Robert H. Bork, David J. Laurent, Patrick M. McSweeney, William B. Ellis, and JohnL. Marshall; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Timothy S. Bishop, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar. ■ Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, Inc., by Clifford M. Sloan and Paul L. Joffe; for California Cities and Counties et al. by John R. Calhoun, John D. Echeverría, James K Hahn, Anthony Saul Alperin, Samuel L. Jackson, Joan R.- Gallo, George Rios, Louise H. Renne, Gary T Ragghianti, and S. Shane Stark; for Cedar Coal Co. et al. by David M. Cohen; for Freeman United Coal Mining Co. by Kathryn S. Matkov; for Ohio Valley Coal Co. et al. by John G. Roberts, Jr.; and for the United Mine Workers of America by Grant Crandall. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Midwest Motor Express, Inc., by Hervey H. Aitken, Jr., and Roy A Sheetz; and for Pittston Co. by A E. Dick Howard, Stephen M. Hodges, Wade W. Massie, and Gregory B. Robertson. Justice O’Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join. In this ease, the Court considers a challenge under the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Constitution to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act), 26 ü. S. C. §§9701-9722 (1994 ed. and Supp. II), which establishes a mechanism for funding health care benefits for retirees from the coal industry and their dependents. We conclude that the Coal Act, as applied to petitioner Eastern Enterprises, effects an unconstitutional taking. I A For a good part of this century, employers in the coal industry have been involved in negotiations with the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA or Union) regarding the provision of employee benefits to coal miners. When petitioner Eastern Enterprises (Eastern) was formed in 1929, coal operators provided health care to their employees through a prepayment system funded by payroll deductions. Because of the rural location of most mines, medical facilities were frequently substandard, and many of the medical professionals willing to work in mining areas were “company doctors,” often selected by the eoal operators for reasons other than their skills or training. The health care available to coal miners and their families was deficient in many respects. In addition, the cost of company-provided services, such as housing and medical care, often consumed the bulk of miners' compensation. See generally U. S. Dept, of Interior, Report of the Coal Mines Administration, A Medical Survey of the Bituminous-Coal Industry (1947) (Boone Report); Report of United States Coal Commission, S. Doc. No. 195,68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925). In the late 1930’s, the UMWA began to demand changes in the manner in which essential services were provided to miners, and by 1946, the subject of miners’ health care had become a critical issue in collective bargaining negotiations between the Union and bituminous coal companies. When a breakdown in those negotiations resulted in a nationwide strike, President Truman issued an Executive order directing Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug to take possession of all bituminous coal mines and to negotiate “appropriate changes in the terms and conditions of employment” of miners with the UMWA. 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (1946). A week of negotiations between Secretary Krug and UMWA President John L. Lewis produced the historic Krug-Lewis Agreement that ended the strike. See App. in No. 96-1947 (CAI), p. 610 (hereinafter App. (CA1)). That agreement, described as “an almost complete victory for the miners,” M. Fox, United We Stand 405 (1990), led to the creation of benefit funds, financed by royalties on coal produced and payroll deductions. The funds compensated miners and their dependents and survivors for wages lost due to disability, death, or retirement. The funds also provided for the medical expenses of miners and their dependents, with the precise benefits determined by UMWA-appointed trustees. In addition, the Krug-Lewis Agreement committed the Government to undertake a comprehensive survey of the living conditions in coal mining areas in order to assess the improvements necessary to bring those communities up to “recognized American standards.” Krug-Lewis Agreement §5, App. (CA1) 613. That study concluded that the medical needs of miners and their dependents would be more effectively served through “a broad prepayment system, based on sound actuarial principles.” Boone Report 226-227. Shortly after the study was issued, the mines returned to private control and the UMWA and several coal operators entered into the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1947 (1947 NBCWA), App. (CA1) 615, which established the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund (1947 W&R Fund), modeled after the Krug-Lewis benefit trusts. The Fund was to use the proceeds of a royalty on coal production to provide pension and medical benefits to miners and their families. The 1947 NBCWA did not specify the benefits to which miners and their dependents were entitled. Instead, three trustees appointed by the parties were given authority to determine “coverage and eligibility, priorities among classes of benefits, amounts of benefits, methods of providing or arranging for provisions for benefits, investment of trust funds, and all other related matters.” 1947 NBCWA 146, App. (CA1) 619. Disagreement over benefits continued, however, leading to the execution of another NBCWA in 1950, which created a new multiemployer trust, the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950 (1950 W&R Fund). The 1950 W&R Fund established a 30-eents-per-ton royalty on coal produced, payable by signatory operators on a “several and not joint” basis for the duration of the 1950 Agreement. 1950 NBCWA 63, App. (CA1) 640. As with the 1947 W&R Fund, the 1950 W&R Fund was governed by three trustees chosen by the parties and vested with responsibility to determine the level of benefits. Id., at 59-61, App. (CA1) 638-639. Between 1950 and 1974, the 1950 NBCWA was amended on occasion, and new NBCWA’s were adopted in 1968 and 1971. Except for increases in the amount of royalty payments, however, the terms and structure of the 1950 W&R Fund remained essentially unchanged. A 1951 amendment recognized the creation of the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association (BCOA), a multiemployer bargaining association, which became the primary representative of coal operators in negotiations with the Union. See App. (CA1) 647-648. Under the 1950 W&R Fund, miners and their dependents were not promised specific benefits. As the 1950 W&R Fund’s Annual Report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, explained: “Under the legal and financial obligations ... imposed [by the Trust Agreement], the Fund is operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, maintaining a sound relationship between revenues and expenditures. Resolutions adopted by the Trustees governing Fund Benefits — Pensions, Hospital and Medical Care, and Widows and Survivors Benefits — specifically provide that all these Benefits are subject to termination, revision, or amendment, by the Trustees in their discretion at any time. No vested interest in the Fund extends to any beneficiary.” Id., at 8-4, App. (CA1) 869-870. See also Mine Workers Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U. S. 562, 565, and n. 2 (1982). Thus, the Fund operated using a fixed amount of royalties, with the trustees , having the authority to establish and adjust the level of benefits provided so as to remain within the budgetary constraints. Subsequent annual reports of the 1950 W&R Fund reiterated that benefits were subject to change. See, e. g., 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1956 (1956 Annual Report), p. 30, App. (CA1) 929 (“Resolutions adopted by the Trustees governing Fund Benefits— Pensions, Hospital and Medical Care, and Widows and Survivors Benefits — specifically provide that all these Benefits are subject to termination, revision, or amendment, by the Trustees in their discretion at any time”); 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30,1958, pp. 20-21, App. (CA1) 955-956 (“Trustee regulations governing Benefits specifically provide that all Benefits which have been authorized are subject to termination, suspension, revision, or amendment by the Trustees in their discretion at any time. Each beneficiary is officially notified of this governing provision at the time his Benefit is authorized”). Thus, although persons involved in the coal industry may have made occasional statements intimating that the 1950 W&R Fund promised lifetime health benefits, see App. (CAl) 1899,1971-1972, it is clear that the 1950 W&R Fund did not, by its terms, guarantee lifetime health benefits for retirees and their dependents. In fact, as to -widows of miners, the 1950 W&R Fund expressly limited health benefits to the time period during which -widows would also receive death benefits. See, e. g., Robinson, supra, at 565-566; 1956 Annual Report 14, App. (CA1) 913. Between 1950 and 1974, the trustees often exercised their prerogative to alter the level of benefits according to the Fund’s budget. In 1960, for instance, “[t]he Trustees of the Fund, recognizing their legal and fiscal obligation to soundly administer the Trust Fund, took action prior to the close of the fiscal year, to curtail the excess of expenditures over income,” by “limit[ing] or terminat[ing] eligibility for [certain] Trust Fund Benefits.” 1960 Annual Report 2, App. (CAl) 1011. Similar concerns prompted the trustees to reduce monthly pension benefits by 25% at one point, and to limit the range of medical and pension benefits available to miners employed by operators who did not pay the required royalties. See 1961 Annual Report 2, 11-12, App. (CAl) 1044, 1053-1054; 1963 Annual Report 13, 16, App. (CAl) 1121,1124. Reductions in benefits were not always acceptable to the miners, and some wildcat strikes erupted in the 1960’s. See Secretary of Labor’s Advisory Commission on United Mine Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits, Coal Commission Report 22-23 (1990) (Coal Comm’n Report), App. (CAl) 1352-1353. Nonetheless, the 1950 W&R Fund continued to provide benefits on a “pay-as-you-go” basis, with the level of benefits fully subject to revision, until the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 Ü. S. C. §1001 et seq., introduced specific funding and vesting requirements for pension plans. To comply with ERISA, the UMWA and the BCOA entered into a new agreement, the 1974 NBCWA, which created four trusts, funded by royalties on coal production and premiums based on hours worked by miners, to replace the 1950 W&R Fund. See Robinson, supra, at 566. Two of the new trusts, the UMWA 1950 Benefit Plan and Trust (1950 Benefit Plan) and the UMWA 1974 Benefit Plan and Trust (1974 Benefit Plan), provided nonpension benefits, including medical benefits. Miners who retired before January 1,1976, and their dependents were covered by the 1950 Benefit Plan, while active miners and those who retired after 1975 were covered by the 1974 Benefit Plan. The 1974 NBCWA thus was the first agreement between the UMWA and the BCOA to expressly reference health benefits for retirees; prior agreements did not specifically mention retirees, and the scope of their benefits was left to the discretion of fund trustees. The 1974 NBCWA explained that it was amending previous medical benefits to provide a Health Services card for retired miners until their death, and to their widows until their death or remarriage. 1974 NBCWA 99, 105 (Summary of Principal Provisions, UMWA Health and Retirement Benefits), App. (CA1) 755, 758. Despite the expanded benefits, the 1974 NBCWA did not alter the employers’ obligation to contribute only a fixed amount of royalties, nor did it extend employers’ liability beyond the life of the agreement. See id., Art. XX, § (d), App. (CA1) 749. As a result of the broadened coverage under the 1974 NBCWA, the number of eligible benefit recipients jumped dramatically. See 1977 Annual Report of the UMWA Wei-fare and Retirement Funds 3, App. (CA1) 1253. A1993 Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means explained: "The 1974 agreement was the first NBCWA to mention retiree health benefits. As part of a substantial liberalization of benefits and eligibility under both the pension and health plans, the 1974 contract provided lifetime health benefits for retirees, disabled mine workers, and spouses, and extended the benefits to surviving spouses . . ..” House Committee on Ways and Means, Financing UMWA Coal Miner “Orphan Retiree” Health Benefits, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (Comm. Print 1993) (House Report). The increase in benefits, combined with various other circumstances — such as a decline in the amount of coal produced, the retirement of a generation of miners, and rapid escalation of health care costs — quickly resulted in financial problems for the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans. In response, the next NBCWA, executed in 1978, assigned responsibility to signatory employers for the health care of their own active and retired employees. See 1978 NBCWA, Art. XX, § (c)(3), App. (CA1) 778. The 1974 Benefit Plan remained in effect, but only to cover retirees whose former employers were no longer in business. To ensure the Benefit Plans’ solvency, the 1978 NBCWA included a “guarantee” clause obligating signatories to make sufficient contributions to maintain benefits during that agreement, and “evergreen” clauses were incorporated into the Benefit Plans so that signatories would be required to contribute as long as they remained in the coal business, regardless of whether they signed a subsequent agreement. See id., §(h), App. (CA1) 787-788; House Report 5. As a result, the coal operators’ liability to the Benefit Plans shifted from a defined contribution obligation, under which employers were responsible only for a predetermined amount of royalties, to a form of defined benefit obligation, under which employers were to fund specific benefits. Despite the 1978 changes, the Benefit Plans continued to suffer financially as costs increased and employers who had signed the 1978 NBCWA withdrew from the agreement, either to continue in business with nonunion employees or to exit the coal business altogether. As more and more coal operators abandoned the Benefit Plans, the remaining signatories were forced to absorb the increasing cost of covering retirees left behind by exiting employers. A spiral soon developed, with the rising cost of participation leading more employers to withdraw from the Benefit Plans, resulting in more onerous obligations for those that remained. In 1988, the UMWA and BGOA attempted to relieve the situation by imposing withdrawal liability on NBCWA signatories who seceded from the Benefit Plans. See 1988 NBCWA, Art. XX, §§(i) and (j), App. (CA1) 805, 828-829. Even so, by 1990, the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans had incurred a deficit of about $110 million, and obligations to beneficiaries were continuing to surpass revenues. See House Report 9; Coal Comm’n Report 43-44, App. (CA1) 1373-1374. B In response to unrest among miners, such as the lengthy strike that followed Pittston Coal Company’s refusal to sign the 1988 NBCWA, Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole announced the creation of the Advisory Commission on United Mine Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits (Coal Commission or Commission). The Coal Commission was charged with “recommending] a solution for ensuring that orphan retirees in the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Trusts will continue to receive promised medical care.” Coal Comm’n Report 2, App. (CA1) 1333. The Commission explained that “[hjealth care benefits are an emotional subject in the coal industry, not only because coal miners have been promised and guaranteed health care benefits for life, but also because coal miners in their labor contracts have traded lower pensions over the years for better health care benefits.” Coal Comm’n Report, Executive Summary vii, App. (CAl) 1324. The Commission agreed that “a statutory obligation to contribute to the plans should be imposed on current and former signatories to the [NBCWA],” but disagreed about “whether the entire [coal] industiy should contribute to the resolution of the problem of orphan retirees.” Id., at vii-viii, App. (CAl) 1324-1325. Therefore, the Commission proposed two alternative funding plans for Congress’ consideration. First, the Commission recommended that Congress establish a fund financed by an industrywide fee to provide health care to orphan retirees at the level of benefits they were entitled to receive at that fund’s inception. To cover the cost of medical benefits for retirees from signatories to the 1978 or subsequent NBCWA’s who remained in the coal business, the Commission proposed the creation of another fund financed by the retirees’ most recent employers. Id., at 61, App. (CAl) 1390. The Commission also recommended that Congress codify the “evergreen” obligation of the 1978 and subsequent NBCWA’s. Id., at 63, App. (CAl) 1392. As an alternative to imposing industrywide liability, the Commission suggested that Congress spread the cost of retirees’ health benefits across “a broadened base of current and past signatories to the contracts,” apparently referring to the 1978 and subsequent NBCWA’s. See id., at 58, 65, App. (CAl) 1387, 1394. Not all Commission members agreed, however, that it would be fair to assign such a burden to signatories of the 1978 agreement. Four Commissioners explained that “[i]ssues of elemental fairness are involved” in imposing obligations on “respectable operators who made decisions in the past to move to different locales, invest in different technology, or pursue their business with or without respect to union presence.” Id., at 85, App. (CAl) 1414 (statement of Commissioners Michael J. Mahoney, Carl J. Schramm, Arlene Holen, Richard M. Holsten); see also id., at 81-82, App. (CA1) 1410-1411 (statement of Commissioner Richard M. Holsten). After the Coal Commission issued its report, Congress considered several proposals to fund health benefits for UMWA retirees. At a 1991 hearing, a Senate subcommittee was advised that more than 120,000 retirees might not receive “the benefits they were promised.” Coal Commission Report on Health Benefits of Retired Coal Miners: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Medicare and Long-Term Care of the Senate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 45 (1991) (statement of BCOA Chairman Michael K. Reilly). The Coal Commission’s Chairman submitted a statement urging that Congress’ assistance was needed “to fulfill the promises that began in the collective bargaining process nearly 50 years ago ....” Id., at 306 (prepared statement of W. J. Usery, Jr.). Some Senators expressed similar concerns that retired miners might not receive the benefits promised to them. See id., at 16 (statement of Sen. Dave Durenberger) (describing issue as involving “a whole bunch of promises made to a whole lot of people back in the 1940s and 1950s when the cost consequences of those problems were totally unknown”); id., at 59 (prepared statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (stating that “miners and their families . . . were led to believe by their own union leaders and the companies for which they worked that they were guaranteed lifetime [health] benefits”). In 1992, as part of a larger bill, both Houses passed legislation based on the Coal Commission’s first proposal, which required signatories to the 1978 or any subsequent NBCWA to fund their own retirees’ health care costs and provided for orphan retirees’ benefits through a tax on future coal production. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 102-461, pp. 268-295 (1992). President Bush, however, vetoed the entire bill. See H. R. Doe. No. 102-206, p. 1 (1992). Congress responded by passing the Coal Act, a modified version of the Coal Commission’s alternative funding plan. In the Act, Congress purported “to identify, persons most responsible for [1950 and 1974 Benefit Plan] liabilities in order to stabilize plan funding and allow for the provision of health care benefits to ... retirees.” § 19142(a)(2), 106 Stat. 3037, note following 26 U. S. C. § 9701; see also 138 Cong. Rec. 34001 (1992) (Conference Report on Coal Act) (explaining that, under the Coal Act, “those companies which employed the retirees in question, and thereby benefitted from their services, will be assigned responsibility for providing the health care benefits promised in their various collective bargaining agreements”). The Coal Act merged the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans into a new multiemployer plan called the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund (Combined Fund). See 26 U. S. C. §§ 9702(a)(1), (2). The Combined Fund provides “substantially the same” health benefits to retirees and their dependents that they were receiving under the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans. See §§ 9703(b)(1), (f). It is financed by annual premiums assessed against “signatory coal operators,” i. e., coal operators that signed any NBCWA or any other agreement requiring contributions to the 1950 or 1974 Benefit Plans. See §§ 9701(b)(1), (3); § 9701(c)(1). Any signatory operator who “conducts or derives revenue from any business activity, whether or not in the coal industry,” may be liable for those premiums. §§ 9706(a), 9701(c)(7). Where a signatory is no longer involved in any business activity, premiums may be levied against “related personfe],” including successors in interest and businesses or corporations under common control. §§ 9706(a), 9701(c)(2)(A). The Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) calculates the premiums due from any signatory operator based on the following formula, by which retirees are assigned to particular operators: “For purposes of this chapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall... assign each coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which (or any related person with respect to which) remains in business in the following order: “(1) First, to the signatory operator which— “(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage agreement, and “(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for at least 2 years. “(2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1), to the signatory operator which— “(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage agreement, and “(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal industry. “(3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1) or (2), to the signatory operator which employed the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for a longer period of time than any other signatory operator prior to the effective date of the 1978 coal wage agreement.” § 9706(a). It is the application of the third prong of the allocation formula, § 9706(a)(3), to Eastern that we review in this case. > — H HH A Eastern was organized as a Massachusetts business trust in 1929, under the name Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates. Its current holdings include Boston Gas Company and a barge operator. Therefore, although Eastern is no longer involved in the coal industry, it is “in business” within the meaning of the Coal Act. Until 1965, Eastern conducted extensive coal mining operations centered in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. As a signatory to each NBCWA executed between 1947 and 1964, Eastern made contributions of over $60 million to the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds. Brief for Petitioner 6. In 1963, Eastern decided to transfer its coal-related operations to a subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. (EACC). The transfer was completed by the end of 1965, and was described in Eastern's federal income tax return as an agreement by EACC to assume all of Eastern’s liabilities arising out of coal mining and marketing operations in exchange for Eastern’s receipt of EACC’s stock. EACC made similar representations in Security and Exchange Commission filings, describing itself as the successor to Eastern’s coal business. See App. (CAI) 117-118. At that time, the 1950 W&R Fund had a positive balance of over $145 million. 1966 Annual Report 3, App. (CA1) 1207. Eastern retained its stock interest in EACC through a subsidiary corporation, Coal Properties Corp. (CPC), until 1987, and it received dividends of more than $100 million from EACC during that period. See Brief for Petitioner 6, n. 13. In 1987, Eastern sold its interest in CPC to respondent Peabody Holding Company, Inc. (Peabody). Under the terms of the agreement effecting the transfer, Peabody, CPC, and EACC assumed responsibility for payments to certain benefit plans, including the “Benefit Plan for UMWA Represented Employees of EACC and Subs.” App. 206a, 210a. As of June 30,1987, the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans reported surplus assets, totaling over $33 million. House Report 9. B Following enactment of the Coal Act, the Commissioner assigned to Eastern the obligation for Combined Fund premiums respecting over 1,000 retired miners who had worked for the company before 1966, based on Eastern’s status as the pre-1978 signatory operator for whom the miners had worked for the longest period of time. See 26 U. S. C. § 9706(a). Eastern’s premium for a 12-month period exceeded $5 million. See Brief for Petitioner 16. Eastern responded by suing the Commissioner, as well as the Combined Fund and its trustees, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Eastern asserted that the Coal Act, either on its face or as applied, violates substantive due process and constitutes a taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Eastern also challenged the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Coal Act. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents on all claims, upholding both the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Coal Act and the Act’s constitutionality. Eastern Enterprises v. Shalala, 942 F. Supp. 684 (Mass. 1996). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Eastern Enterprises v. Chater, 110 F. 3d 150 (1997). The court rejected Eastern’s challenge to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Coal Act. Addressing Eastern’s substantive due process claim, the court described the Coal Act as “entitled to the most deferential level of judicial scrutiny,” explaining that, “[w]here, as here, a piece of legislation is purely economic and does not abridge fundamental rights, a challenger must show that the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.” Id., at 155-156 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the court’s view, the retroactive liability imposed by the Act was permissible “[a]s long as the retroactive application... is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means,” for “judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches.” Id., at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that Congress’ purpose in enacting the Coal Act was legitimate and that Eastern’s obligations under the Act are rationally related to those objectives, because Eastern’s execution of pre-1974 NBCWA’s contributed to miners’ expectations of lifetime health benefits. Id., at 157. The court rejected Eastern’s argument that costs of retiree health benefits should be borne by post-1974 coal operators, reasoning that Eastern’s proposal would require coal operators to fund health benefits for miners whom the operators had never employed. Id., at 158, n. 5. The court also noted the substantial dividends that Eastern had received from EACC. Id., at 158. The court analyzed Eastern’s claim that the Coal Act effects an uncompensated taking under the. three factors set out in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211, 225 (1986): “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with the claimant’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (S) the nature of the governmental action.” 110 F. 3d, at 160. With respect to the Act’s economic impact on Eastern, the court observed that the Act “does not involve the total deprivation of an asset.” Ibid. The Act’s terms, the court found, “reflec[t] a sufficient degree of proportionality” because Eastern is assigned liability only for miners “whom it employed for a relevant (and relatively long) period of time,” and then only if no post-1977 NBCWA signatory (or related person) can be found. Ibid. The court also rejected Eastern’s contention that the Act unreasonably interferes with its investment-backed expectations, explaining that the pattern of federal intervention in the coal industry and Eastern’s role in fostering an expectation of lifetime health benefits meant that Eastern “had every reason to anticipate that it might be called upon to bear some of the financial burden that this expectation engendered.” Id., at 161. Finally, in assessing the nature of the challenged governmental action, the court determined that the Coal Act does not result in the physical invasion or permanent appropriation of Eastern’s property, but merely “adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that the premiums are disbursed to the privately operated Combined Fund, not to a government entity. For those reasons, the court concluded, “there is no basis whatever for [Eastern’s] claim that the [Coal Act] transgresses the Takings Clause.” Ibid. Other Courts of Appeals have also upheld the Coal Act against constitutional challenges. In view of the importance of the issues raised in this case, we granted certiorari. 522 U. S. 931 (1997). Ill We begin with a threshold jurisdictional question, raised in the federal respondent’s answer to Eastern’s complaint: Whether petitioner’s takings claim was properly filed in Federal District Court rather than the United States Court of Federal Claims. See App. (CAI) 40. Although the Commissioner no longer challenges the Court’s adjudication of this action, see Brief for Federal Respondent 38-39, n. 30, it is appropriate that we clarify the basis of our jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1), the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States for money damages exceeding $10,000 that is “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in eases not sounding in tort.” Accordingly, a claim for just compensation under the Takings Clause must be brought to the Court of Federal Claims in the first instance, unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute. See, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1016-1019 (1984). In this case, however, Eastern does not seek compensation from the Government. Instead, Eastern requests a declaratory judgment that the Coal Act violates the Constitution and a corresponding injunction against the Commissioner’s enforcement of the Act as to Eastern. Such equitable relief is arguably not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 216 (1983) (explaining that, in order for a claim to be “cognizable under the Tucker Act,” it “must be one for money damages against the United States”); see also, e. g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 905 (1988). Some Courts of Appeals have accepted the view that the Tucker Act does not apply to suits seeking only equitable relief, see In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F. 3d 478, 493 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala, 516 U. S. 913 (1995); Southeast Kansas Community Action Program, Inc. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 967 F. 2d 1452, 1455-1456 (CA10 1992), while others have concluded that a claim for equitable relief under the Takings Clause is hypothetical, and therefore not within the district courts’ jurisdiction, until compensation has been sought and refused in the Court of Federal Claims, see Bay View, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F. 3d 1281, 1286 (CA9 1997); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F. 2d 670, 673-674 (CA7), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 820 (1992). On the one hand, this Court’s precedent can be read to support the latter conclusion that regardless of the nature of relief sought, the availability of a Tucker Act remedy renders premature any takings claim in federal district court. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U. S. 1, 11 (1990); see also Monsanto, supra, at 1016. On the other hand, in a ease such as this one, it cannot be said that monetary relief against the Government is an available remedy. See Brief for Federal Respondent 38-39, n. 30. The payments mandated by the Coal Act, although calculated by a Government agency, are paid to the privately operated Combined Fund. Congress could not have contemplated that the Treasury would compensate coal operators for their liability under the Act, for “[e]very dollar paid pursuant to a statute would be presumed to generate a dollar of Tucker Act compensation.” In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F. 3d, at 493. Accordingly, the “presumption of Tucker Act availability must be reversed where the challenged statute, rather than burdening real or physical property, requires a direct transfer of funds” mandated by the Government. Ibid. In that situation, a claim for compensation “would entail an utterly pointless set of activities.” Student Loan Marketing Assn. v. Riley, 104 F. 3d 397, 401 (CADC), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 913 (1997). Instead, as we explained in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 71, n. 15 (1978), the Declaratory Judgment Act “allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially uneompen-sable damages are sustained.” Moreover, in situations analogous to this case, we have assumed the lack of a compensatory remedy and have granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations without discussing the applicability of the Tucker Act. See, e. g., Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U. S. 234, 243-245 (1997); Hodel v. Ir ving, 481 U. S. 704, 716-718 (1987). Without addressing the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction, we have also upheld similar statutory schemes against Takings Clause challenges. See Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 641-647 (1993); Connolly, 475 U. S., at 221-228. ‘While we are not bound by previous exercises of jurisdiction in cases in which our power to act was not questioned but was passed sub silentio, neither should we disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper” in previous cases. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962) (citations omitted). Based on the nature of the taking alleged in this ease, we conclude that the declaratory judgment and injunction sought by petitioner constitute an appropriate remedy under the circumstances, and that it is within the district courts’ power to award such equitable relief. IV A The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The aim of the Clause is to prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). This ease does not present the “classi[c] taking” in which the government directly appropriates private property for its own use. See United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 78 (1982). Although takings problems are more commonly presented when “the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good,” Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted), economic regulation such as the Coal Act may nonetheless effect a taking, see Security Industrial Bank, supra, at 78. See also Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“It is against all reason and justice” to presume that the legislature has been entrusted with the power to enact “a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B”). By operation of the Act, Eastern is “permanently deprived of those assets necessary to satisfy its statutory obligation, not to the Government, but to [the Combined Fund],” Connolly, supra, at 222, and “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change,” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416 (1922). Of course, a party challenging governmental action as an unconstitutional taking bears a substantial burden. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52, 60 (1989). Government regulation often “curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property,” Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979), and “not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense,” Armstrong, supra, at 48. In light of that understanding, the process for evaluating a regulation’s constitutionality involves an examination of the “justice and fairness” of the governmental action. See Andrus, 444 U. S., at 65. That inquiry, by its nature, does not lend itself to any set formula, see ibid., and the determination whether “‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action [must] be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons,” is essentially ad hoc and fact intensive, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have identified several factors, however, that have particular significance: “[T]he economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.” Ibid.; see also Connolly, supra, at 224-225. B Our analysis in this ease is informed by previous decisions considering the constitutionality of somewhat similar legislative schemes. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 (1976), we had occasion to review provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., which required coal operators to compensate certain miners and their survivors for death or disability due to black lung disease caused by employment in coal mines. Coal operators challenged the provisions of the Act relating to miners who were no longer employed in the industry, arguing that those provisions violated substantive due process by imposing “an unexpected liability for past, completed acts that were legally proper and, at least in part, unknown to be dangerous at the time.” 428 U. S., at 15. In rejecting the operators’ challenge, we explained that “legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and . . . the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.” Ibid. We observed that stricter limits may apply to Congress’ authority when legislation operates in a retroactive manner, id., at 16-17, but concluded that the assignment of liability for black lung benefits was “justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor,” id., at 18. Several years later, we confronted a due process challenge to the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 94 Stat. 1208. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717 (1984). The MPPAA was enacted to supplement ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., which established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to administer an insurance program for vested pension benefits. Por a temporary period, the PBGC had discretionary authority to pay benefits upon the termination of multiemployer pension plans, after which insurance coverage would become mandatory. If the PBGC exercised that authority, employers who had contributed to the plan during the five years before its termination faced liability for an amount proportional to their share of contributions to the plan during that period. See 467 U. S., at 720-721. Despite Congress’ effort to insure multiemployer plan benefits through ERISA, many multiemployer plans were in a precarious financial position as the date for mandatory coverage approached. After a series of hearings and debates, Congress passed the MPPAA, which imposed a payment obligation upon any employer withdrawing from a multi-employer pension plan, the amount of which depended on the employer’s share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits. The MPPAA applied retroactively to withdrawals within the five months preceding the statute’s enactment. Id., at 721-725. In Gray, an employer that had participated in a multiem-ployer pension plan brought a due process challenge to the statutory liability stemming from its withdrawal from the plan four months before the MPPAA was enacted. Relying on our decision in Turner Elkhorn, we rejected the employer’s claim. It was rational, we determined, for Congress to impose retroactive liability “to prevent employers from taking advantage of a lengthy legislative process [by] withdrawing while Congress debated necessary revisions in the statute.” 467 U. S., at 731. In addition, we explained, “as the [MPPAA] progressed through the legislative process, Congress advanced the effective date chosen so that it would encompass only that retroactive time period that Congress believed would be necessary to accomplish its purposes.” Ibid. Accordingly, we concluded that the MPPAA exemplified the “customary congressional practice” of enacting “retroactive statutes confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court again considered the constitutionality of the MPPAA in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211 (1986), which presented the question whether the MPPAA’s withdrawal liability provisions effected an unconstitutional taking. The action was brought by trustees of a multiemployer pension plan that, under collective bargaining agreements, received contributions from employers on the basis of the hours worked by their employees. We agreed that the liability imposed by the MPPAA constituted a permanent deprivation of assets, but we rejected the notion that “such a statutory liability to a private party always constitutes an uncompensated taking prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.” Id., at 222. “In the course of regulating commercial and other human affairs,” we explained, “Congress routinely creates burdens for some that directly benefit others.” Id., at 228. Consistent with our decisions in Gray and Turner Elkhorn, we reasoned that legislation is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. Moreover, given our holding in Gray that the MPPAA did not violate due process, we concluded that “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that the statute effected a taking. 475 U. S., at 223. Although the employers in Connolly had contractual agreements expressly limiting their contributions to the multiemployer plan, we observed that “[c]on-traets, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress” and .“the fact that legislation disregards or destroys existing contractual rights does not always transform the regulation into an illegal taking.” Id., at 223-224 (internal quotation marks omitted). Focusing on the three factors oí “particular significance” — the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action — we determined that the MPPAA did not violate the Takings Clause. Id., at 225. The governmental action at issue in Connolly was not a physical invasion of employers’ assets; rather, it “safeguarded] the participants in multiemployer pension plans by requiring a withdrawing employer to fund its share of the plan obligations incurred during its association with the plan.” Ibid. In addition, although the amounts assessed under the MPPAA were substantial, we found it important that “[t]he assessment of withdrawal liability [was] not made in a vacuum,... but directly depended] on the relationship between the employer and the plan to which it had made contributions.” Ibid. Further, “a significant number of provisions in the Act . . . moderated] and mitigate[d] the economic impact of an individual employer’s liability.” Id., at 225-226. Accordingly, we found “nothing to show that the withdrawal liability actually imposed on an employer w[ould] always be out of proportion to its experience with the plan.” Id., at 226. Nor did the MPPAA interfere with employers’ reasonable investment-backed expectations, for, by the time of the MPPAA’s enactment, “[p]rudent employers ... had more than sufficient notice not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations.” Id., at 227. For those reasons, we determined that “fairness and justice” did not require anyone other than the withdrawing employers and the remaining parties to the pension agreements to bear the burden of funding employees’ vested benefits. Ibid. We once more faced challenges to the MPPAA under the Due Process and Takings Clauses in Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602 (1993). In that case, the employer focused on the fact that its contractual commitment to the multiemployer plan did not impose withdrawal liability. We first rejected the employer’s substantive due process challenge based on our decisions in Gray and Turner Elkhorn, notwithstanding the employer’s argument that the MPPAA imposed upon it a higher liability than its contract contemplated. 508 U. S., at 636-641. The claim under the Takings Clause, meanwhile, was resolved by Connolly. We explained that, as in that ease, the Government had not occupied or destroyed the employer’s property. 508 U. S., at 643-644. As to the severity of the MPPAA’s impact, we concluded that the employer had not shown that its withdrawal liability was “ ‘out of proportion to its experience with the plan’” Id., at 645 (quoting Connolly, supra, at 226). Turning to the employer’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, we repeated our observation in Connolly that “pension plans had long been subject to federal regulation.” 508 U. S., at 645. Moreover, although the employer’s liability under the MPPAA exceeded ERISA’s original cap on withdrawal liability, we found that there was “no reasonable basis to expect that [ERISA’s] legislative ceiling would never be lifted.” Id., at 646. In sum, as in Connolly, the employer “voluntarily negotiated and maintained a pension plan which was determined to be within the strictures of ERISA,” making the burden the MPPAA imposed upon it neither unfair nor unjust. 508 U. S., at 646-647 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our opinions in Turner Elkhorn, Connolly, and Concrete Pipe make clear that Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic legislation, including the power to affect contractual commitments between private parties. Congress also may impose retroactive liability to some degree, particularly where it is “confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation.” Gray, 467 U. S., at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our decisions, however, have left open the possibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the . extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience. C We believe that the Coal Act’s allocation scheme, as applied to Eastern, presents such a case. We reach that conclusion by applying the three factors that traditionally have informed our regulatory takings analysis. Although Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer would pursue a'different course in evaluating the constitutionality of the Coal Act, they acknowledge that this Court’s opinions in Connolly and Concrete Pipe indicate that the regulatory takings framework is germane to legislation of this sort. See post, at 545-546 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part); post, at 555-556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As to the first factor relevant in assessing whether a regulatory taking has occurred, economic impact, there is no doubt that the Coal Act has forced a considerable financial burden upon Eastern. The parties estimate that Eastern’s cumulative payments under the Act will be on the order of $50 to $100 million. See Brief for Petitioner 2 ($100 million); Brief for Respondents UMWA Combined Benefit Fund et al. 46 ($51 million). Eastern’s liability is thus substantial, and the company is clearly deprived of the amounts it must pay the Combined Fund. See Connolly, 475 U. S., at 222. The fact that the Federal Government has not specified the assets that Eastern must use to satisfy its obligation does not negate that impact. It is clear that the Act requires Eastern to turn over a dollar amount established by the Commissioner under a timetable set by the Act, with the threat of severe penalty if Eastern fails to comply. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 9704(a) and (b) (directing liable operators to pay annual premiums as computed by the Commissioner); § 9707 (imposing, with limited exceptions, a penalty of $100 per day per eligible beneficiary if payment is not made in accordance with § 9704). That liability is not, of course, a permanent physical occupation of Eastern’s property of the kind that we have viewed as a per se taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 441 (1982). But our decisions upholding the MPPAA suggest that an employer’s statutory liability for multiemployer plan benefits should reflect some “proportionality] to its experience with the plan.” Concrete Pipe, 508 U. S., at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Connolly, supra, at 225 (noting that employer’s liability under the MPPAA “directly depended] on the relationship between the employer and the plan to which it had made contributions”). In Concrete Pipe and Connolly, the employers had “voluntarily negotiated and maintained a pension plan which was determined to be within the strictures of ERISA,” Concrete Pipe, supra, at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted); Connolly, supra, at 227, and consequently, the statutory liability was linked to the employers’ conduct. Here, however, while Eastern contributed to the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, it ceased its coal mining operations in 1965 and neither participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contributions in connection with the Benefit Plans under the 1974, 1978, or subsequent NBCWA’s. It is the latter agreements that first suggest an industry commitment to the funding of lifetime health benefits for both retirees and their family members. Although EACC continued mining coal until 1987 as a subsidiary of Eastern, Eastern’s liability under the Act bears no relationship to its ownership of EACC; the Act assigns Eastern responsibility for benefits relating to miners that Eastern itself, not EACC, employed, while EACC would be assigned the responsibility for any miners that it had employed. See 26 U. S. C. § 9706(a). Thus, the Act does not purport, as Justice Breyer suggests, post, at 566, to assign liability to Eastern based on the “ ‘last man out’ problem” that developed after benefits were significantly expanded in 1974. During the years in which Eastern employed miners, retirement and health benefits were far less extensive than under the 1974 NBCWA, were unvested, and were fully subject to alteration or termination. Before 1974, as Justice Breyer notes, Eastern could not have contemplated liability for the provision of lifetime benefits to the widows of deceased miners, see post, at 562-568, a beneficiary class that is likely to be substantial. See General Accounting Office, Human Resources Division Report, Retired Coal Miners’ Health Benefits 7 (July 1992) (reporting to Congress that widows composed 45% of beneficiaries in Jan. 1992); see also Brief for Petitioner 45, n. 54 (citing affidavit that 75% of the beneficiaries assigned to Eastern are spouses or dependent children of miners). Although Eastern at one time employed the Combined Fund beneficiaries that it has been assigned under the Coal Act, the correlation between Eastern and its liability to the Combined Fund is tenuous, and the amount assessed against Eastern resembles a calculation “made in a vacuum.” See Connolly, supra, at 225. The company’s obligations under the Act depend solely on its roster of employees some 30 to 50 years before the statute’s enactment, without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern accepted under any benefit plan the company itself adopted. It is true that Eastern may be able to seek indemnification from EACC or Peabody. But although the Act preserves Eastern’s right to pursue indemnification, see 26 U. S. C. § 9706(f)(6), it does not confer any right of reimbursement. See also Conference Report on Coal Act, 138 Cong. Rec., at 34004 (explaining that the Coal Act allows parties to “enter into private litigation to enforce ... contracts for indemnification,” but “does not create new private rights of action”). Moreover, the possibility of indemnification does not alter the fact that Eastern has been assessed over $5 million in Combined Fund premiums and that its liability under the Coal Act will continue for many years. To the extent that Eastern may have entered into contractual arrangements to insure itself against liabilities arising out of its former coal operations, that indemnity is neither enhanced nor supplanted by the Coal Act and does not affect the availability of the declaratory relief Eastern seeks. We are also not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the Coal Act “moderate^] and mitigate[s] the economic impact” upon Eastern. See Connolly, 475 U. S., at 225-226. Although Eastern is not assigned the premiums for former employees who later worked for companies that signed the 1978 NBCWA, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 9706(a)(1), (2), Eastern had no control over the activities of its former employees subsequent to its departure from the coal industry in 1965. By contrast, the provisions of the MPPAA that we identified as potentially moderating the employer’s liability in Connolly were generally within the employer’s control. See 475 U. S., at 226, n. 8. The mere faet that Eastern is not forced to bear the burden of lifetime benefits respecting all of its former employees does not mean that the company’s liability for some of those employees is not a significant economic burden. For similar reasons, the Coal Act substantially interferes with Eastern’s reasonable investment-backed expectations. The Act’s beneficiary allocation scheme reaches back 80 to 50 years to impose liability against Eastern based on the company’s activities between 1946 and 1965. Thus, even though the Act mandates only the payment of future health benefits, it nonetheless “attaches new legal consequences to [an employment relationship] completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 270 (1994). Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 208 (1988), in accordance with “fundamental notions of justice” that have been recognized throughout history, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also, e. g., Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. *477, *503 (NY 1811) (“It is a principle in the Eng lish common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect”); H. Broom, Legal Maxims 24 (8th ed. 1911) (“Retrospective laws are, as a rule, of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law”). In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story reasoned: “Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution §1398 (5th ed. 1891). A similar principle abounds in the laws of other nations. See, e. g., Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 66 D. L. R. 3d 449, 462 (Can. 1975) (discussing rule that statutes should not be construed in a manner that would impair existing property rights); The French Civil Code, Preliminary Title, Art. 2, p. 2 (“Legislation only provides for the future; it has no retroactive effect”) (J. Crabb transí., rev. ed. 1995); Aarnio, Statutory Interpretation in Finland 151, in Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (D. MaeCormiek & R. Summers eds. 1991) (discussing prohibition against retroactive legislation). “Retroactive legislation,” we have explained, “presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.” General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U. S. 181, 191 (1992). Our Constitution expresses concern with retroactive laws through several of its provisions, including the Ex Post Facto and Takings Clauses. Landgraf, supra, at 266. In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), this Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is directed at the retroactivity of penal legislation, while suggesting that the Takings Clause provides a similar safeguard against retrospective legislation concerning property rights. See id., at 394 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered, by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision, ‘that private property should not be taken for public use, without just compensation,’ was unnecessary”). In Security Industrial Bank, we considered a Takings Clause challenge to a Bankruptcy Code provision permitting debtors to avoid certain liens, possibly including those predating the statute’s enactment. We expressed “substantial doubt whether the retroactive destruction of the appellees’ liens . . . comport[ed] with the Fifth Amendment,” and therefore construed the statute as applying only to lien interests vesting after the legislation took effect. 459 U. S., at 78-79. Similar concerns led this Court to strike down a bankruptcy provision as an unconstitutional talcing where it affected substantive rights acquired before the provision was adopted. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 601-602 (1935). Like those provisions, the Coal Act operates retroactively, divesting Eastern of property long after the company believed its liabilities under'the 1950 W&R Fund to have been settled. And the extent of Eastern’s retroactive liability is substantial and particularly far reaching. Even in areas in which retroactivity is generally tolerated, such as tax legislation, some limits have been suggested. See, e.g., United States v. Darusmont, 449 U. S. 292, 296-297 (1981) (per curiam) (noting Congress’ practice of confining retroactive application of tax provisions to “short and limited periods”). The distance into the past that the Act reaches back to impose a liability on Eastern and the magnitude of that liability raise substantial questions of fairness. See Connolly, supra, at 229 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (questioning constitutionality of imposing liability on “employers for unfunded benefits that accrued in the past under a pension plan whether or not the employers had agreed to ensure that benefits would be fully funded”); see also Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 265 (“Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted”). Respondents and their amici curiae assert that the extent of retroactive liability is justified because there was an implicit, industrywide agreement during the time that Eastern was involved in the coal industry to fund lifetime health benefits for qualifying miners and their dependents. That contention, however, is not supported by the pre-1974 NBCWA’s. No contrary conclusion can be drawn from the few isolated statements of individuals involved in the coal industry, see, e. g., Brief for Respondents Peabody Holding Company, Inc., et al. 8-10, or from statements of Members of Congress while considering legislative responses to the issue of funding retiree benefits. Moreover, even though retirees received medical benefits before 1974, and perhaps developed a corresponding expectation that those benefits would continue, the Coal Act imposes liability respecting a much broader range of beneficiaries. In any event, the question is not whether miners had an expectation of lifetime benefits, but whether Eastern should bear the cost of those benefits as to miners it employed before 1966. Eastern only participated in the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, which operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, and under which the degree of benefits and the classes of beneficiaries were subject to the trustees’ discretion. Not until 1974, when ERISA forced revisions to the 1950 W&R Fund, could lifetime medical benefits under the multiemployer agreement have been viewed as promised. Eastern was no longer in the industry when the evergreen and guarantee clauses of the 1978 and subsequent NBCWA’s shifted the 1950 and 1974 Benefit Plans from a defined contribution framework to a guarantee of defined benefits, at least for the life of the agreements. See Connolly, 475 U. S., at 230-231 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (imposition of liability “without regard to the extent of a particular employer’s actual responsibility for [a benefit] plan’s promise of fixed benefits to employees” could raise serious concerns under the Takings Clause). Thus, unlike the pension withdrawal liability upheld in Concrete Pipe and Connolly, the Coal Act’s scheme for allocation of Combined Fund premiums is not calibrated either to Eastern’s past actions or to any agreement — implicit or otherwise — by the company. Nor would the pattern of the Federal Government’s involvement in the coal industry have given Eastern “sufficient notice” that lifetime health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees several decades later. See Connolly, supra, at 227. Eastern’s ¿ability also differs from coal operators’ responsibility for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. That legislation merely imposed “liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past [that] is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor.” Turner Elkhorn, 428 U. S., at 18. Likewise, Eastern might be responsible for employment-related health problems of all former employees whether or not the cost was foreseen at the time of employment, see id., at 16, but there is no such connection here. There is no doubt that many coal miners sacrificed their health on behalf of this country’s industrial development, and we do not dispute that some members of the industry promised lifetime medical benefits to miners and their dependents during the 1970’s. Nor do we, as Justice Stevens suggests, post, at 558, question Congress’ policy decision that the miners are entitled to relief. But the Constitution does not permit a solution to the problem of funding miners’ benefits that imposes such a disproportionate and severely retroactive burden upon Eastern. Finally, the nature of the governmental action in this ease is quite unusual. That Congress sought a legislative remedy for what it perceived to be a grave problem in the funding of retired coal miners’ health benefits is understandable; complex problems of that sort typically call for a legislative solution. When, however, that solution singles out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused, the governmental action implicates fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings Clause. Eastern cannot be forced to bear the expense of lifetime health benefits for miners based on its activities decades before those benefits were promised. Accordingly, in the specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the Coal Act’s application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional taking. D Eastern also claims that the manner in which the Coal Act imposes liability upon it violates substantive due process. To succeed, Eastern would be required to establish that its liability under the Act is “arbitrary and irrational.” Turner Elkhorn, supra, at 15. Our analysis of legislation under the Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some extent, see Connolly, supra, at 223, and there is a question whether the Coal Act violates due process in light of the Act’s severely retroactive impact. At the same time, this Court has expressed concerns about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 731 (1963) (noting “our abandonment of the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believ[e] to be economically unwise” (footnote omitted)); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike down . . . laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought”). Because we have determined that the third tier of the Coal Act’s allocation scheme violates the Takings Clause as applied to Eastern, we need not address Eastern’s due process claim. Nor do we consider the first two tiers of the Act’s allocation scheme, 26 U. S. C. §§ 9706(a)(1) and (2), as the liability that has been imposed on Eastern arises only under the third tier. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 934-935 (1997). V In enacting the Coal Act, Congress was responding to a serious problem with the funding of health benefits for retired coal miners. While we do not question Congress’ power to address that problem, the solution it crafted improperly places a severe, disproportionate, and extremely retroactive burden on Eastern. Accordingly, we conclude that the Coal Act’s allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings Clause, and that 26 U. S. C. § 9706(a)(3) should be enjoined as applied to Eastern. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the ease is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. See also 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1959, pp. 27-28, App. (CA1) 995-996; 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1960 (1960 Annual Report), pp. 19-20, App. (CA1) 1028-1029; 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1961 (1961 Annual Report), p. 5, App. (CA1) 1047; 1950 W&R Fluid Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30,1962, p. 5, App. (CA1) 1080; 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1963 (1963 Annual Report), p. 5, App. (CAl) 1113; 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1964, p. 8, App. (CAl) 1146; 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30,1965, p. 18, App. (CAl) 1191; 1950 W&R Fund Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1966 (1966 Annual Report), p. 19, App. (CAl) 1223. The Coal Act also established another fund, the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan, which is not at issue here. See 26 U. S. C. § 9712. The Coal Act also provides for an allocation of liability for nnassigned beneficiaries. See 26 U. S. C. § 9704(d). That liability, however, has thus far been covered through the transfer of funds from other sources. See § 9705; 30 U. S. C. § 1232(h). This case presents no question regarding the assignment to Eastern of liability for any retirees other than its own former employees. See, e. g., Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F. 3d 736, 739-742 (CA4 1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F. 3d 688, 693-695 (CA3 1996); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F. 3d 516, 521-526 (CA6 1996), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1055 (1997); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F. 3d 1114, 1121-1130 (CA7), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 808 (1996); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F. 3d 478, 486-496 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala, 516 U. S. 913 (1995).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GABELLI et al. v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION No. 11-1274. Argued January 8, 2013 Decided February 27, 2013 Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Lewis J. Liman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Michael R. Lazerwitz, Edward A. McDonald, Kathleen N. Massey, and Joshua I. Sherman. Jeffrey B. Wall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Mark D. Cahn, Michael A. Conley, Jacob H. Stillman, and Dominick V Freda. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bankers Association by Clifford M. Sloan, Joseph L. Barloon, Ananá S. Raman, and Thomas Pinder; for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by John F. Savarese, George T. Conway III, and Kevin S. Schwartz; for the Cato Institute by Brian J. Murray and Ilya Shapiro; for DRI-The Voice of the Defense Bar by Mary Massaron Ross, Lisa S. Blatt, and Christopher S. Rhee; for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials by Lee S. Richards; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Shirley Cassin Woodward, Joshua M. Salzman, and Joshua L. Dratel; and for the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association et al. by Mark A. Perry, Joshua S. Lipshutz, Kevin Carroll, Robin S. Conrad, and Rachel Brand. Akshat Tewary filed a brief for Occupy the SEC as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. The Investment Advisers Act makes it illegal for investment advisers to defraud their clients, and authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek civil penalties from advisers who do so. Under the general statute of limitations for civil penalty actions, the SEC has five years to seek such penalties. The question is whether the five-year clock begins to tick when the fraud is complete or when the fraud is discovered. I A Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it is unlawful for an investment adviser “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client” or “to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.” 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 80b—6(1), (2). The SEC is authorized to bring enforcement actions against investment advisers who violate the Act, or individuals who aid and abet such violations. § 80b-9(d). As part of such enforcement actions, the SEC may seek civil penalties, §§80b-9(e), (f) (2006 ed. and Supp. V), in which ease a five-year statute of limitations applies: “Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.” 28 U. S. C. §2462. This statute of limitations is not specific to the Investment Advisers Act, or even to securities law; it governs many penalty provisions throughout the U. S. Code. Its origins date back to at least 1839, and it took on its current form in 1948. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, §4, 5 Stat. 322. B Gabelli Funds, LLC, is an investment adviser to a mutual fund formerly known as Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF). Petitioner Bruce Alpert is Gabelli Funds’ chief operating officer, and petitioner Marc Gabelli used to be GGGF’s portfolio manager. In 2008, the SEC brought a civil enforcement action against Alpert and Gabelli. According to the complaint, from 1999 until 2002 Alpert and Gabelli allowed one GGGP investor—Headstart Advisers, Ltd.—to engage in “market timing” in the fund. As this Court has explained, “[m]arket timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual funds’ daily valuation system.” Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U. S. 135, 139, n. 1 (2011). Mutual funds are typically valued once a day, at the close of the New York Stock Exchange. Because funds often hold securities traded on different exchanges around the world, their reported valuation may be based on stale information. If a mutual fund’s reported valuation is artificially low compared to its real value, market timers will buy that day and sell the next to realize quick profits. Market timing is not illegal but can harm long-term investors in a fund. See id., at 139, and n. 1. The SEC’s complaint alleged that Alpert and Gabelli permitted Headstart to engage in market timing in exchange for Headstart’s investment in a hedge fund run by Gabelli. According to the SEC, petitioners did not disclose Head-start’s market timing or the quid pro quo agreement, and instead banned others from engaging in market timing and made statements indicating that the practice would not be tolerated. The complaint stated that during the relevant period, Headstart earned rates of return of up to 185%, while “the rate of return for long-term investors in GGGF was no more than negative 24.1 percent.” App. 73. The SEC alleged that Alpert and Gabelli aided and abetted violations of §§ 80b-6(l) and (2), and it sought civil penalties under §80b-9. Petitioners moved to dismiss, arguing in part that the claim for civil penalties was untimely. They invoked the five-year statute of limitations in § 2462, pointing out that the complaint alleged market timing up until August 2002 but was not filed until April 2008. The District Court agreed and dismissed the SEC’s civil penalty claim as time barred. The Second Circuit reversed. It acknowledged that §2462 required an action for civil penalties to be brought within five years “from the date when the claim first accrued,” but accepted the SEC’s argument that because the underlying violations sounded in fraud, the “discovery rule” applied to the statute of limitations. As explained by the Second Circuit, “[u]nder the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for a particular claim does not accrue until that claim is discovered, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, by the plaintiff.” 653 F. 3d 49, 59 (2011). The court concluded that while “this rule does not govern the accrual of most claims,” it does govern the claims at issue here. Ibid. As the court explained, “for claims that sound in fraud a discovery rule is read into the relevant statute of limitation.” Id., at 60. We granted certiorari. 567 U. S. 968 (2012). HH A This case centers around the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2462: “an action ... for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture . . . shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.” Petitioners argue that a claim based on fraud accrues—and the five-year clock begins to tick—when a defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct occurs. That is the most natural reading of the statute. “In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence . . . .” United States v. Lindsay, 346 U. S. 568, 569 (1954). Thus the “standard rule” is that a claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997); Clark v. Iowa City, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875). That rule has governed since the 1830’s when the predecessor to § 2462 was enacted. See, e. g., Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32, 56 (1838); Evans v. Gee, 11 Pet. 80, 84 (1837). And that definition appears in dictionaries from the 19th century up until today. See, e. g., 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 17 (1850) (“an action accrues when the plaintiff has a right to commence it”); Black's Law Dictionary 23 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “accrue” as “[t]o come into existence as an enforceable claim or right”). This reading sets a fixed date when exposure to the specified Government enforcement efforts ends, advancing “the basic policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 555 (2000). Statutes of limitations are intended to “promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342, 348-349 (1944). They provide “security and stability to human affairs.” Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 139 (1879). We have deemed them “vital to the welfare of society,” ibid., and concluded that “even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten,” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 271 (1985). B Notwithstanding these considerations, the Government argues that the discovery rule should apply instead. Under this rule, accrual is delayed “until the plaintiff has ‘discovered’” his cause of action. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 644 (2010). The doctrine arose in 18th-century fraud cases as an “exception” to the standard rule, based on the recognition that “something different was needed in the case of fraud, where a defendant’s deceptive conduct may prevent a plaintiff from even knowing that he or she has been defrauded.” Ibid. This Court has held that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946) (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348 (1875)). And we have explained that “fraud is deemed to be discovered when, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered.” Merck & Co., supra, at 645 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). But we have never applied the discovery rule in this context, where the plaintiff is not a defrauded victim seeking recompense, but is instead the Government bringing an enforcement action for civil penalties. Despite the discovery rule’s centuries-old roots, the Government cites no lower court case before 2008 employing a fraud-based discovery rule in a Government enforcement action for civil penalties. See Brief for Respondent 23 (citing SEC v. Tambone, 550 F. 3d 106, 148-149 (CA1 2008); SEC v. Koenig, 557 F. 3d 736, 739 (CA7 2009)). When pressed at oral argument, the Government conceded that it was aware of no such case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. The Government was also unable to point to any example from the first 160 years after enactment of this statute of limitations where it had even asserted that the fraud discovery rule applied in such a context. Id., at 26-27 (citing only United States v. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. 1140, 1142 (No. 15,709) (SDNY 1871), a “fraudulent concealment” case, see n. 2, supra). Instead the Government relies heavily on Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435 (1918), in an attempt to show that the discovery rule should benefit the Government to the same extent as private parties. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 10-11, 16, 17, 33-34, 41-45. In that case, a company had fraudulently procured land from the United States, and the United States sued to undo the transaction. The company raised the statute of limitations as a defense, but this Court allowed the case to proceed, concluding that the rule “that statutes of limitations upon suits to set aside fraudulent transactions shall not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud” applied “in favor of the Government as well as a private individual.” Exploration Co., supra, at 449. But in Exploration Co., the Government was itself a victim; it had been defrauded and was suing to recover its loss. The Government was not bringing an enforcement action for penalties. Exploration Co. cannot save the Government’s case here. There are good reasons why the fraud discovery rule has not been extended to Government enforcement actions for civil penalties. The discovery rule exists in part to preserve the claims of victims who do not know they are injured and who reasonably do not inquire as to any injury. Usually when a private party is injured, he is immediately aware of that injury and put on notice that his time to sue is running. But when the injury is self-concealing, private parties may be unaware that they have been harmed. Most of us do not live in a state of constant investigation; absent any reason to think we have been injured, we do not typically spend our days looking for evidence that we were lied to or defrauded. And the law does not require that we do so. Instead, courts have developed the discovery rule, providing that the statute of limitations in fraud cases should typically begin to run only when the injury is or reasonably could have been discovered. The same conclusion does not follow for the Government in the context of enforcement actions for civil penalties. The SEC, for example, is not like an individual victim who relies on apparent injury to learn of a wrong. Rather, a central “mission” of the SEC is to “investigate] potential violations of the federal securities laws.” SEC, Enforcement Manual 1 (2012). Unlike the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the SEC’s very purpose is to root it out, and it has many legal tools at hand to aid in that pursuit. It can demand that securities brokers and dealers submit detailed trading information. Id., at 44. It can require investment advisers to turn over their comprehensive books and records at any time. 15 U. S. C. § 80b-4 (2006 ed. and Supp. Y). And even without filing suit, it can subpoena any documents and witnesses it deems relevant or material to an investigation. See §§77s(c), 78u(b), 80a-41(b), 80b-9(b) (2006 ed.). The SEC is also authorized to pay monetary awards to whistleblowers, who provide information relating to violations of the securities laws. § 78u-6 (2006 ed., Supp. V). In addition, the SEC may offer “cooperation agreements” to violators to procure information about others in exchange for more lenient treatment. See Enforcement Manual, at 119-137. Charged with this mission and armed with these weapons, the SEC as enforcer is a far cry from the defrauded victim the discovery rule evolved to protect. In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief. The discovery rule helps to ensure that the injured receive recompense. But this case involves penalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers. See Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412, 423 (1915) (a penalty covered by the predecessor to §2462 is “something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law”); see also Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 422 (1987) (penalties are “intended to punish culpable individuals,” not “to extract compensation or restore the status quo”). Chief Justice Marshall used particularly forceful language in emphasizing the importance of time limits on penalty actions, stating that it “would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws” if actions for penalties could “be brought at any distance of time.” Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805). Yet grafting the discovery rule onto §2462 would raise similar concerns. It would leave defendants exposed to Government enforcement action not only for five years after their misdeeds, but for an additional uncertain period into the future. Repose would hinge on speculation about what the Government knew, when it knew it, and when it should have known it. See Rotella, 528 U. S., at 554 (dispproving a rule that would have “extended the limitations period to many decades” because such a rule was “beyond any limit that Congress could have contemplated” and “would have thwarted the basic objective of repose underlying the very notion of a limitations period”). Determining when the Government, as opposed to an individual, knew or reasonably should have known of a fraud presents particular challenges for the courts. Agencies often have hundreds of employees, dozens of offices, and several levels of leadership. In such a case, when does “the Government” know of a violation? Who is the relevant actor? Different agencies often have overlapping responsibilities; is the knowledge of one attributed to all? In determining what a plaintiff should have known, we ask what facts “a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered.” Merck & Co., 559 U. S., at 644. It is unclear whether and how courts should consider agency priorities and resource constraints in applying that test to Government enforcement actions. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F. 3d 1453, 1461 (CADC 1994) (“An agency may experience problems in detecting statutory violations because its enforcement effort is not sufficiently funded; or because the agency has not devoted an adequate number of trained personnel to the task; or because the agency’s enforcement program is ill designed or inefficient; or because the nature of the statute makes it difficult to uncover violations; or because of some combination of these factors and others”). And in the midst of any inquiry as to what it knew when, the Government can be expected to assert various privileges, such as law enforcement, attorney-client, work product, or deliberative process, further complicating judicial attempts to apply the discovery rule. See, e. g., App. in No. 10-3581 (CA2), p. 147 (Government invoking such privileges in this case, in response to a request for documents relating to the SEC’s investigation of Headstart); see also Rotella, supra, at 559 (rejecting a rule in part due to “the controversy inherent in divining when a plaintiff should have discovered” a wrong). To be sure, Congress has expressly required such inquiries in some statutes. But in many of those instances, the Government is itself an injured victim looking for recompense, not a prosecutor seeking penalties. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§2415, 2416(c) (Government suits for money damages founded on contracts or torts). Moreover, statutes applying a discovery rule in the context of Government suits often couple that rule with an absolute provision for repose, which a judicially imposed discovery rule would lack. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. § 335b(b)(3) (limiting certain Government civil penalty actions to “6 years after the date when facts material to the act are known or reasonably should have been known by the Secretary but in no event more than 10 years after the date the act took place”). And several statutes applying a discovery rule to the Government make some effort to identify the official whose knowledge is relevant. See 31 U. S. C. § 3731(b)(2) (relevant knowledge is that of “the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances”). Applying a discovery rule to Government penalty actions is far more challenging than applying the rule to suits by defrauded victims, and we have no mandate from Congress to undertake that challenge here. * * * As we held long ago, the cases in which “a statute of limitation may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself. . . are very limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; otherwise the court would make the law instead of administering it.” Amy v. Watertown (No. 2), 130 U. S. 320, 324 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the lack of textual, historical, or equitable reasons to graft a discovery rule onto the statute of limitations of § 2462, we decline to do so. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The SEC also sought injunctive relief and disgorgement, claims-the District Court found timely on the ground that they were not subject to §2462. Those issues are not before us. The court distinguished the discovery rule, which governs when a claim accrues, from doctrines that toll the running of an applicable limitations period when the defendant takes steps beyond the challenged conduct itself to conceal that conduct from the plaintiff. 653 F. 3d, at 59-60. The SEC abandoned any reliance on such doctrines below, and they are not before us. See Response and Reply Brief for SEC Appellant/Cross-Appellee in No. 10-3581 (CA2), p. 34 (“The Commission is not seeking application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine or other equitable tolling principles”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD v. ISBRANDTSEN COMPANY, INC., et al. No. 73. Argued December 11, 1957. Decided May 19, 1958. Warner W. Gardner argued the causes for the Federal Maritime Board, petitioner in No. 73 and respondent in No. 74. With him on the brief were E. Robert Seaver, Robert E. Mitchell, Edward Aptaker and Edward Schmeltzer. Elkan Turk argued the cause for petitioners in No. 74. With him on the brief were James M. Landis, Wallace M. Cohen, Seymour J. Rubin, Carl A. Auerbach, Herman Goldman, Benjamin Wiener and Elkan Turk, Jr. Philip Elman argued the causes for the United States and the Secretary of Agriculture, respondents in both cases. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Daniel M. Friedman, Robert L. Farrington, Neil Brooks and Donald A. Campbell. John J. O’Connor argued the causes for the Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were John J. O’Connor, Jr. and Robert J. Crotty. John R. Mahoney, Elmer C. Maddy, Alan B. Aldwell, Walter Carroll, Allen E. Charles and David Orlin filed a brief in both cases for the Steamship Conferences et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Together with No. 74, Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference et al. v. United States et al., also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to review, under 5 U. S. C. § 1034, an order of the Federal Maritime Board approving a rate system proposed by the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf Freight Conference (the Conference). Under the proposed system a shipper would pay less than regular freight rates for the same service if he signs an exclusive-patronage contract with the Conference. Contract rates would be set at levels 9% percent below noncontract rates. The Court of. Appeals set aside the Board’s order on the ground that this system of dual rates was illegal per se under § 14 of the Shipping Act, 1916, 39 Stat. 733, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 812 Third. We granted certiorari. 353 U. S. 908. The Conference is a voluntary association of 17 common carriers by water serving the inbound trade from Japan, Korea, and Okinawa to ports on the United States Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Five of the carriers are American lines, eight are Japanese, and four are of other nationalities. The Conference presently operates under a Board-approved Conference Agreement made in 1934. Prior to World War II, the Conference had no direct liner competition and little tramp competition. After the war, Isbrandtsen entered the trade as the sole non-Conference line maintaining a regular berth service in the Japan-Atlantic trade. From 1947 to early 1949, Isbrandtsen operated from Japan to Atlantic Coast ports via the Suez Canal. Since 1949 Isbrandtsen has operated an approximately fortnightly service from Japan to United States Atlantic Coast ports via the Panama Canal as part of its Eastbound, Round-the-World Service. Although Conference membership is open to any common carrier regularly operating in the trade, Isbrandtsen has refused to join. Isbrandtsen’s practice, between 1947 and March 12, 1953, was to maintain rates at approximately 10 percent below the corresponding Conference rates. The general understanding of shippers and carriers in the trade was that Isbrandtsen underquoted Conference rates by 10 percent. This practice of undercutting Conference rates during the years 1950, 1951, and 1952, captured for Isbrandtsen 30 percent of the total cargo in the trade although Isbrandtsen provided only 11 percent of the sailings. Since outbound tonnage from the United States exceeds the inbound tonnage, the Japan-Atlantic and Gulf trade is presently overtonnaged, and both Isbrandtsen and Conference vessels have had substantial unused cargo space after loading cargoes in Japan. Total sailings in the trade rose from 109 in 1949 to more than 300.in 1953. (Cf. note 6.) The re-entry of the Japanese lines in the trade after World War II, four in 1951 and four in 1952, greatly contributed to the excess of tonnage. For the years 1951, 1952, and the first 6 months of 1953, the Japanese lines carried approximately 15 percent, 49 percent, and 66 percent, respectively, of the trade’s total liner cargo. For the years 1950, 1951, 1952, and the first 6 months of 1953, American flag lines, including Isbrandtsen but excluding two others, carried 53 percent, 46 percent, 34 percent, and 21 percent respectively. When, in late 1952, Isbrandtsen announced a plan to increase sailings from two to three or four sailings a month, the Conference foresaw a further increase in Isbrandtsen’s participation which, because of the nationalistic preference of Japanese shippers, would probably be at the expense of the non-Japanese Conference lines. To meet this outside competition the Conference first attempted, in November of 1952, a 10-percent reduction in rates, but Isbrandtsen answered with a reduction of its rates 10 percent under the Conference rates. On December 24, 1952, the Conference proposed the dual-rate system and filed its plan with the Board as required by the Board’s General Order 76, 46 CFR § 236.3, which permitted proposed rate changes to become effective after 30 days unless postponed by the Board on its own motion or on the protest of interested persons. Protests were filed by Isbrandtsen and the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened as an interested commercial shipper opposed to the proposal. On January 21, 1953, the Board ordered a hearing on the protests but refused, pending the Board’s determination, to suspend operations of the dual-rate system. Isbrandtsen, therefore, filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for a stay of the Board’s order insofar as it authorized the Conference to institute the dual-rate system. The court announced on February 3, 1953, that the Board’s order would be stayed and the stay was entered on March 23, 1953. The Conference response to the stay was to open rates to allow each line to fix its own rates. At a meeting on March 12, 1953, the Conference voted to open Conference rates on 10 of the major commodities moving in the trade. The action was primarily directed at Isbrandt-sen’s competition; the Board found that “it was hoped that the rate war would lead to Isbrandtsen’s joining the Conference or to the institution of the dual rate system or other system.” On succeeding dates in the spring of that year, the Conference opened rates on most of the major items in the trade. In the resulting rate war, the level of rates dropped to about 80 percent and later to about 30 percent to 40 percent of the pre-March 12 rates. In some instances, rates fell below handling costs. Isbrandtsen attempted to keep on a competitive basis in the rate war but, when pegging of minimum rates in May did not improve its position, in July it set its rates at 50 percent of the pre-March 12 Conference rates. Since that date, Isbrandtsen has carried little cargo in the trade. Meanwhile the Board proceeded with the hearing and issued its report on December 14, 1955, followed on December 21, 1955, and January 11, 1956, by orders approving the proposed dual-rate system. The question for our decision is whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the Board’s orders. It has long been almost universal practice for American and foreign steamship lines engaging in ocean commerce to operate under conference arrangements and agreements. At least by 1913 it was recognized that such agreements might run counter to the policy of the antitrust laws; several cases were pending against foreign and domestic water carriers for alleged violations of the Sherman Act. The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the 62d Congress, of which committee Representative J. W. Alexander was Chairman, undertook an exhaustive inquiry into the practices of shipping conferences. The work of this Committee is set forth in two volumes of hearings, a volume of diplomatic and consular reports, and a fourth volume containing the Committee’s report, known as the Alexander Report. Contemporaneously a British inquiry was conducted by the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings. The Royal Commission’s report was available to the House Committee and was considered by it in formulating recommended legislation. See Hearings, at 369. Both inquiries brought to light a number of predatory practices by shipping conferences designed to give the conferences monopolies upon particular trades by forestalling outside competition and driving out all outsiders attempting to compete. The crudest form of predatory practice was the fighting ship. The conference would select a suitable steamer from among its lines to sail on the same days and between the same ports as the nonmember vessel, reducing the regular rates low enough to capture the trade from the outsider. The expenses and losses from the lower rates were shared by the members of the conference. The competitor by this means was caused to exhaust its resources and withdraw from competition. More sophisticated practices depended upon a tie between the conference and the shipper. The most widely used tie, because the most effective, was the system of deferred rebates. Under this system a shipper signed a contract with the conference exclusively to patronize its steamers, and if he did so during the contract term, and for a designated period thereafter, a rebate of a certain percentage of his freight payments was made to him at the end of the latter period. In this way, the shipper was under constant obligation to give his patronage exclusively to the conference lines or suffer the loss of the rebate, which often amounted to a considerable sum. But the Alexander Committee also found evidence of other predatory practices. Shippers who patronized outside competitors were denied accommodations for future shipments even at full rates of freight, or were discriminated against in the matter of lighterage and other services. Outside competition was also met by dual-rate contracts, by contracts with large shippers at lower rates for volume shipments, and by contracts with American railroads giving conference vessels preference in the handling of cargoes at the docks, and delivering through shipments of freight to conference vessels. Report, at 287-293. The Alexander Committee recommended against a flat prohibition of shipping combinations because it found that the restoration of unrestricted competition among carriers would operate against the public interest by depriving American shippers of desirable advantages of conference arrangements honestly and fairly conducted. The Committee mentioned advantages such as “greater regularity and frequency of service, stability and uniformity of rates, economy in the cost of service, better distribution of sailings, maintenance of American and European rates to foreign markets on a parity, and equal treatment of shippers through the elimination of secret arrangements and underhanded methods of discrimination.” Id., at 416. The Committee believed that these advantages could be preserved “only by permitting the several lines in any given trade to cooperate through some form of rate and pooling arrangement under Government supervision and control,” ibid., and further “that the disadvantages and abuses connected with steamship agreements and conferences as now conducted are inherent, and can only be eliminated by effective government control; and it is such control that the Committee recommends as the means of preserving to American exporters and importers the advantages enumerated, and of preventing the abuses complained of.” Id., at 418. In passing the Shipping Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 728, 733, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 812 Third, Congress followed the basic recommendations of the Alexander Committee. The Act does not forbid shipping conferences in foreign commerce but requires all conference agreements covering the subjects mentioned in § 15 to be submitted for Board approval. No power to fix rates is granted to the Board. Subject to familiar limitations, the power vested in the Board is to approve agreements not found to be unjustly or unfairly discriminatory in violation of §§16 and 17 or otherwise in violation of the Act. Approved agreements are exempted from the antitrust laws. But it must be emphasized that the freedom allowed conference members to agree upon terms of competition subject to Board approval is limited to the freedom to agree upon terms regulating competition among themselves. The Congress in § 14 has flatly prohibited practices of conferences which have the purpose and effect of stifling the competition of independent carriers. Thus the deferred-rebate system (§14 First) and the fighting ship (§14 Second) are specifically outlawed. Similarly, § 14 Third prohibits another practice, common in 1913: to “[rjetaliate against any shipper by refusing . . . space accommodations when such are available . . that prohibition, moreover, is enlarged to condemn retaliation not only when taken “because such shipper has patronized any other carrier” but also when taken because the shipper “has filed a complaint charging unfair treatment, or for any other reason.” (Emphasis added.) But in addition to these specifically proscribed abuses, Congress, as previously noted, was aware that other devices — some known but not so widely used, and others that might be contrived — might be employed to achieve the same results. Therefore, coordinate with these three clauses aimed at specific practices, a fourth category, couched in general language, was added: “resort to other discriminating or unfair methods . . . In the context of § 14 this clause must be construed as constituting a catchall clause by which Congress meant to prohibit other devices not specifically enumerated but similar in purpose and effect to those barred by § 14 First, Second, and the “retaliate” clause of § 14 Third. The reason the “resort to” clause was added to the statute as an independent prohibition of practices designed to stifle outside competition is revealed in the Alexander Report. From information contained in the Report of the British Royal Commission and a communication from a major New York carrier organization, the Alexander Committee was aware that the outlawing of the deferred-rebate system would lead conferences to adopt a contract system to accomplish the same result. The British Royal Commission believed that ties to shippers were justified and that the abuses of the deferred-rebate system should be tolerated in the interest of achieving a strong conference system. Hearings, 369-381. However, the Alexander Committee, and the Congress in adopting the Committee’s proposals, reached a different conclusion. Congress was unwilling to tolerate methods involving ties between conferences and shippers designed to stifle independent carrier competition. Thus Congress struck the balance by allowing conference arrangements passing muster under §§ 15, 16, and 17 limiting competition among the conference members while flatly outlawing conference practices designed to destroy the competition of independent carriers. Ties to shippers not designed to have the effect of stifling outside competition are not made unlawful. Whether a particular tie is designed to have the effect of stifling outside competition is a question for the Board in the first instance to determine. Since the Board found that the dual-rate contract of the Conference was “a necessary competitive measure to offset the effect of non-conference competition” required “to meet the competition of Isbrandtsen in order to obtain for its members a greater participation in the cargo moving in this trade,” it follows that the contract was a “resort to other discriminating or unfair methods” to stifle outside competition in violation of § 14 Third. The Board argues, however, that Congress, although aware of the use of such contracts, did not specifically outlaw them and therefore implicitly approved them. But the contracts called to the attention of Congress bear little resemblance to the contracts here in question. Those joint contracts were described by the Alexander Committee as follows: “Such contracts are made for the account of all the lines in the agreement, each carrying its proportion of the contract freight as tendered from time to time. The contracting lines agree to furnish steamers at regular intervals and the shipper agrees to confine all shipments to conference steamers, and to announce the quantity of cargo to be shipped in ample time to allow for the proper supply of tonnage. The rates on such contracts are less than those specified in the regular tariff, but the lines generally pursue a policy of giving the small shipper the same contract rates as the large shippers, i. e. are willing at all times to contract with all shippers on the same terms.” Report, at 290. These contracts were very similar to ordinary requirements contracts. They obligated all members of the Conference to furnish steamers at regular intervals and at rates effective for a reasonably long period, sometimes a year. The shipper was thus assured of the stability of service and rates which were of paramount importance to him. Moreover, a breach of the contract subjected the shipper to ordinary damages. By contrast, the dual-rate contracts here require the carriers to carry the shipper’s cargo only “so far as their regular services are available”; rates are “subject to reasonable increase” within two calendar months plus the unexpired portion of the month after notice of increase is given; “[e]ach Member of the Conference is responsible for its own part only in this Agreement”; the agreement is terminable by either party on three months’ notice; and for a breach, “the Shipper shall pay as liquidated damages to the Carriers fifty percentum (50%) of the amount of freight which the Shipper would have paid had such shipment been made in a vessel of the Carriers at the Contract rate currently in effect.” Until payment of the liquidated damages the shipper is denied the reduced rate, and if he violates the agreement more than once in 12 months, he suffers cancellation of the agreement and the denial of another until all liquidated damages have been paid in full. Thus under this agreement not only is there no guarantee of services and rates for a reasonably long period, but the liquidated-damages provision bears a strong resemblance to the feature which Congress particularly objected to in the outlawed deferred-rebate system. Certainly the coercive force of having to pay so large a sum of liquidated damages ties the shipper to the Conference almost as firmly as the prospect of losing the rebate. It would be anomalous for Congress to strike down deferred rebates and at the same time fail to strike down dual-rate contracts having the same objectionable purpose and effect. Events have proved the accuracy of the prediction that the outlawing of the deferred-rebate system would lead conferences to adopt a contract system, as here, specially designed to accomplish the same result. It is urged that our construction “produces a flat and unqualified prohibition of any discrimination by a carrier for any reason” and converts the rest of the statute into surplusage. But that argument overlooks the revealed congressional purpose in § 14 Third. That purpose, as we have said, was to outlaw practices in addition to those specifically prohibited elsewhere in the section when such practices are used to stifle the competition of independent carriers. The characterizations “unjustly discriminatory” and “unjustly prejudicial” found in other sections (§§ 15, 16 and 17) imply a congressional intent to allow some latitude in practices dealt with by those sections, but the practices outlawed by the “resort to” clause of § 14 Third take their gloss from the abuses specifically proscribed by the section; that is, they are confined to practices designed to stifle outside competition. Petitioners argue that our construction of § 14 Third is foreclosed by this Court’s decisions in United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 284 U. S. 474, and Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570. A reading of those opinions immediately refutes any suggestion either that this issue was expressly decided in those cases or that our holding here is not fully consistent with the disposition of those cases. In Cunará the petitioner had filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that respondents had conspired to maintain “a general tariff rate and a lower contract rate, the latter to be made available only to shippers who agree to confine their shipments to the lines of respondents.” 284 U. S., at 479. The differentials were alleged to be unrelated to volume or regularity of shipments, but to be wholly arbitrary and unreasonable and designed “for the purpose of coercing shippers to deal exclusively with respondents and refrain from shipping by the vessels of petitioner, and thus exclude it entirely from the carrying trade between the United States and Great Britain.” Id., at 480. An injunction was sought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The Court held that the questions raised by this complaint were within the primary jurisdiction of the Shipping Board and therefore the courts could not entertain the suit until the Board had considered the matter. In Far East Conference the Court similarly held that the Board’s primary jurisdiction' precluded the United States from bringing antitrust proceedings against a shipping-conference maintaining dual rates. The Board and the Conference argue that, if the Court in these earlier cases had thought that § 14 Third in anyway makes dual rates per se illegal and thus not within the power of the Board to authorize, it would not have found it necessary to require that the Board first pass upon the claims. But in the Cunará case the Court said: “Whether a given agreement among such carriers should be held to contravene the act may depend upon a consideration of economic relations, of facts peculiar to the business or its history, of competitive conditions in respect of the shipping of foreign countries, and of other relevant circumstances, generally unfamiliar to a judicial tribunal, but well understood by an administrative body especially trained and experienced in the intricate and technical facts and usages of the shipping trade; and with which that body, consequently, is better able to deal.” 284 U. S., at 485. Similarly, in the Far East Conference case: “The Court [in Cunará] thus applied a principle, now firmly established, that in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraiseá by specializeá competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be juáicially áefmeá. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.” 342 U. S., at 574-575. (Emphasis added.) It is, therefore, very clear that these cases, while holding that the Board had primary jurisdiction to hear the case in the first instance, did not signify that the statute left the Board free to approve or disapprove the agreements under attack. Rather, those cases recognized that in certain kinds of litigation practical considerations dictate a division of functions between court and agency under which the latter makes a preliminary, comprehensive investigation of all the facts, analyzes them, and applies to them the statutory scheme as it is construed. Compare Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. Producers Livestock Marketing Assn., ante, p. 282. It is recognized that the courts, while retaining the final authority to expound the statute, should avail themselves of the aid implicit in the agency’s superiority in gathering the relevant facts and in marshaling them into a meaningful pattern. Cases are not decided, nor the law appropriately understood, apart from an informed and particularized insight into the factual circumstances of the controversy under litigation. Thus the Court’s action in Cunará and Far East Conference is to be taken as a deferral of what might come to be the ultimate question — the construction of § 14 Third — rather than an implicit holding that the Board could properly approve the practices there involved. The holding that the Board had primary jurisdiction, in short, was a device to prepare the way, if the litigation should take its ultimate course, for a more informed and precise determination by the Court of the scope and meaning of the statute as applied to those particular circumstances. To have held otherwise would, necessarily, involve the Court in comparatively abstract exposition. This consideration, moreover, is particularly compelling in light of our present holding. Since, as we hold, § 14 Third strikes down dual-rate systems only where they are employed as predatory devices, then precise findings by the Board as to a particular system’s intent and effect would become essential to a judicial determination of the system’s validity under the statute. In neither Cunará nor Far East Conference did the Court have the assistance of such findings on which to base a determination of validity. We conclude, therefore, that the present holding is not foreclosed by these two cases. Finally, petitioners argue that this Court should not construe the Shipping Act in such a way as to overturn the Board’s consistent interpretation. “[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [particular agency] . . . , while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. But we are here confronted with a statute whose administration has been shifted several times from one agency to another, and it is by no means clear that the Board and its predecessors have taken uniform and consistent positions in regard to the validity of dual-rate systems under § 14 Third. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883, 889-891. In view of the fact that in the present case the dual-rate system was instituted for the purpose of curtailing Isbrandtsen’s competition, thus becoming a device made illegal by Congress in § 14 Third, we need not give controlling weight to the various treatments of dual rates by the Board under different circumstances. Affirmed. 4 F. M. B. 706. The Federal Maritime Board and its predecessors are hereinafter referred to as “the Board.” Its predecessors were the United States Shipping Board (1916 to 1933); the United States Shipping Board Bureau in the Department of Commerce (1933 to 1936); and the United States Maritime Commission (1936 to 1950). The Federal Maritime Board was named a respondent in Is-brandtsen’s petition. The United States was also named as statutory respondent pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 1034 but, appearing by the Department of Justice, joined Isbrandtsen in attacking the Board order. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened and joined in the Justice Department's brief. The Conference intervened by leave of the court. The same parties are before this Court. 99 U. S. App. D. C. 312, 239 F. 2d 933. Section 14 provides: “No common carrier by water shall, directly or indirectly, in respect to the transportation by water of passengers or property between a port of a State, Territory, District, or possession of the United States and any other such port or a port of a foreign country — ■ “First. Pay or allow, or enter into any combination, agreement, or understanding, express or implied, to pay or allow a deferred rebate to any shipper. The term ‘deferred rebate’ in this chapter means a return of any portion of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a consideration for the giving of all or any portion of his shipments to the same or any other carrier, or for any other purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the completion of the service for which it is paid, and is made only if, during both the period for which computed and the period of deferment, the shipper has complied with the terms of the rebate agreement or arrangement. “Second. Use a fighting ship either separately or in conjunction with any other carrier, through agreement or otherwise. The term ‘fighting ship’ in this chapter means a vessel used in a particular trade by a carrier or group of carriers for the purpose of excluding, preventing, or reducing competition by driving another carrier out of said trade. “Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or threatening to refuse, space accommodations when such are available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair methods, because such shipper has patronized any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair treatment, or for any other reason. “Fourth. Make any unfair or unjustly discriminatory contract with any shipper based on the volume of freight offered, or unfairly treat or unjustly discriminate against any shipper in the matter of (a) cargo space accommodations or other facilities, due regard being had for the proper loading of the vessel and the available tonnage; (b) the loading and landing of freight in proper condition; or (c) the adjustment and settlement of claims. “Any carrier who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $25,000 for each offense.” Isbrandtsen’s vessels are not equipped with refrigerated space or silkrooms, as are many of the Conference vessels, and do not compete for cargoes requiring these facilities. The comparative sailings and carryings are indicated in the following table: On January 21, 1954, the Court of Appeals handed down its final decision holding that § 15 of the Shipping Act required the Board to hold a hearing on the proposed dual-rate system before approval. 93 U. S. App. D. C. 293, 211 F. 2d 51. The Board did modify the exclusive-patronage contracts to delete from their coverage refrigerated cargoes for which Isbrandtsen did not compete. Proceedings of the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the Investigation of Shipping Combinations under House Resolution 587, Hearings, 62d Cong. (Hereinafter “Hearings.”) H. R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (Hereinafter “Report.”) H. R. Rep. No. 659, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 27; see S. Rep. No. 689, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7. The Alexander Report was submitted in 1914 to the 63d Congress and a bill to carry out its recommendations was introduced but not passed. H. R. 17328, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. In the following Congress substantially the same bill was reintroduced, H. R. 15455, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., and became the Shipping Act of 1916. Section 15 provides: “Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, shall file immediately with the Federal Maritime Board a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every agreement, with another such carrier or other person subject to this chapter, or modification or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The term 'agreement’ in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrangements. “The Board may by order disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be in violation of this chapter, and shall approve all other agreements, modifications, or cancellations. “Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful under this section shall be excepted from the provisions of [the Antitrust Acts] . . . .” 39 Stat. 733, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 814. Both the section which became § 14 Third and the section which became § 15, as originally proposed, used the language “discriminating or unfair.” H. R. 17328, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. The bill which became the Shipping Act, H. R. 15455, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., substituted “unjustly discriminatory or unfair” in § 15 but left untouched “discriminating or unfair” in § 14 Third. The Board estimated that Isbrandtsen would lose approximately two-thirds of its 1952 volume. “. . . [I]t [is] probable that Is-brandtsen will retain 10 percent or more of the cargo moving in the trade as against the 26 percent carried by it in 1952 . . . .” 4 F. M. B. 706, 737, 1956 Am. Mar. Cas. 414, 451. The Court of Appeals made a partial application of the rule of ejusdem generis and related the “resort to” clause to retaliation, holding the dual-rate contract or suit was retaliatory and within the ban of the section. The Board urges that the Court of Appeals did not carry the rule of ejusdem generis far enough, that by carrying the rule “a hand’s breadth farther” and also relating- — and limiting— the “resort to” clause to the refusal of space accommodations and similar services to shippers, the dual-rate contract falls without the prohibition because the contract is concerned only with charges for services and not with denial of services. We do not believe that these constructions can be reconciled with the language of the statute or the scope of the congressional plan. Certainly it must be assumed that the Court would refrain from settling sub silentio an issue of such obvious importance and difficulty plainly requiring a clearly expressed disposition. Petitioners’ reliance on Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd., v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, is similarly misplaced. In that case the Court upheld the administrative determination that a dual-rate system gave an “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage” under § 16 of the Shipping Act. Because the Court sustained the finding as supported by substantial evidence it did not need to reach the more contentious problem of whether that particular contract was illegal under § 14 Third. Compare, e. g., Eden Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S. S. Co., 1 U. S. S. B. 41, and Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U. S. M. C. 220, 226-227, with W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Stoomvart, 1 U. S. S. B. 285, 290.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IVAN ALLEN CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 74-22. Argued April 14-15, 1975 — Decided June 26, 1975 Kirk McAlpin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Herschel M. Bloom and Michael C. Buss. Assistant Attorney General Crampton argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Stuart A. Smith, and Elmer J. Kelsey Carolyn E. Agger, Walter J. Rockier, and John S. McDaniel, Jr., filed a brief for American Trading and Production Corp. as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Sections 531-537, inclusive, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U. S. C. §§ 531-537, constitute Part I of subchapter G of the Income Tax Subtitle. These sections subject most corporations to an “accumulated earnings tax.” Section 531 imposes the tax upon the “accumulated taxable income” of every corporation that, as § 532 (a) states, is “formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders ... by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.” And § 533 (a) provides that “the fact that the earnings and profits . . . are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.” The issue here is whether, in determining the application of § 533 (a), listed and readily marketable securities owned by the corporation and purchased out of its earnings and profits, are to be taken into account at their cost to the corporation or at their net liquidation value, that is, fair market value less the expenses of, and taxes resulting from, their conversion into cash. I The pertinent facts are admitted by the pleadings or are stipulated: The petitioner, Ivan Allen Company (the taxpayer), is a Georgia corporation incorporated in 1902 and actively engaged in the business of selling office furniture, equipment, and supplies in the metropolitan Atlanta area. It files its federal income tax returns on the accrual basis and for the fiscal year ended June 30. For its fiscal years 1965 and 1966, the taxpayer paid in due course the federal corporation income taxes shown on its returns as filed. Taxable income so reported was $341,045.82 for 1965 and $629,512.19 for 1966. App. 59, 84. During fiscal 1965 the taxpayer paid dividends consisting of cash in the amount of $48,945.30 and 870 shares of Xerox Corporation common that had been carried on its books at a cost of $6,564.34. During fiscal 1966 the taxpayer paid cash dividends of $50,267.49'; it also declared a 10% stock dividend. Id., at 56. The dividends paid were substantially less than taxable income less federal income taxes for those years. Throughout fiscal 1965 and 1966, the taxpayer owned various listed and unlisted marketable securities. Prominent among these were listed shares of common stock and listed convertible debentures of Xerox Corporation that, in prior years, had been purchased out of earnings and profits. Specifically, on June 30, 1965, the corporation owned 11,140 shares of Xerox common, with a cost of $116,701 and a then fair market value of $1,573,525, and $30,600 Xerox convertible debentures, with a cost to it of $30,625 and a then fair market value of $48,424. On June 30, 1966, the corporation owned 10,090 shares of Xerox common, with a cost of $102,479 and a then fair market value of $2,479,617, and the same $30,600 convertible debentures, with their cost of $30,625 and a then fair market value of $69,768. Id., at 55. According to its returns as filed, the taxpayer’s undistributed earnings as of June 30, 1965, and June 30, 1966, were $2,200,184.77 and $2,360,146.52, respectively. Id., at 70, 91. The taxpayer points out that the marketable portfolio assets represented an investment, as measured by cost, of less than 7% of its undistributed earnings and of less than 5% of its total assets. Brief for Petitioner 4. It is also apparent, however, that the Xerox debentures and common shares had proved to be an extraordinarily profitable investment, although, of course, because these securities continued to be retained, the gains thereon were unrealized for federal income tax purposes. The debentures had increased in fair market value more than 50% over cost by the end of June 1965, and more than 100% over cost one year later; the common shares had increased in fair market value more than 13 times their cost by June 30, 1965, and more than 24 times their cost by June 30, 1966. Throughout fiscal 1965 and 1966 the taxpayer’s two major shareholders, Ivan Allen, Sr., and Ivan Allen, Jr., respectively owned 31.20% and 45.46% of the taxpayer’s outstanding voting stock. App. 78, 104. Following an examination of the taxpayer’s federal income tax returns for fiscal 1965 and 1966, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the taxpayer had permitted its earnings and profits for each of those years to accumulate beyond the reasonable and reasonably anticipated needs of its business, and that one of the purposes of the accumulation for each year was to avoid income tax with respect to its shareholders. Based upon this determination, the Commissioner assessed against the corporation accumulated earnings taxes of $77,383.98 and $73,131.87 for 1965 and 1966, respectively. The taxpayer paid these taxes and thereafter timely filed claims for refund. The claims were not allowed, and the taxpayer then instituted this refund suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. It is agreed that the taxpayer had reasonable business needs for operating capital amounting to $1,198,309 and $1,455,222 at the close of fiscal 1965 and fiscal 1966, respectively. Id., at 56. It is stipulated, in particular, that if the taxpayer’s marketable securities are to be taken into account at cost, its net liquid assets (current assets less current liabilities), at the end of each of those taxable years, and fully available for use in its business, were then exactly equal to its reasonable business needs for operating capital, that is, the above-stated figures of $1,198,309 and $1,455,222. It would follow, accordingly, that the earnings and profits of the two taxable years had not been permitted to accumulate beyond the taxpayer’s reasonable and reasonably anticipated business needs, within the meaning of § 533 (a), App. 57, and no accumulated earnings taxes were incurred. It is still further stipulated, however, that if the taxpayer’s marketable securities are to be taken into account at fair market value (less the cost of converting them into cash), as of the ends of those fiscal years, the taxpayer’s net liquid assets would then be $2,235,029 and $3,152,009, respectively. Id., at 56. From this it would follow that the earnings and profits of the two taxable years had been permitted to accumulate beyond the taxpayer’s reasonable and reasonably anticipated business needs. Then, if those accumulations had been for “the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders,” under § 532 (a), accumulated earnings taxes would be incurred. The issue, therefore, is clear and precise: whether, for purposes of applying § 533 (a), the taxpayer’s readily marketable securities should be taken into account at cost, as the taxpayer contends, or at net liquidation value, as the Government contends. The District Court held that the taxpayer’s readily marketable securities were to be taken into account at cost. Accordingly, it entered judgment for the petitioner-taxpayer. 349 F. Supp. 1075 (1972). The court observed: “Corporate taxpayers should not be penalized for wise investments; they should be allowed to maximize their capital gains tax advantages in accordance with internal business policies and stock market conditions rather than being forced to sell securities which may have a high value on an arbitrarily selected date merely because the unrealized fair market value of the securities on that date would trigger the accumulated earnings tax.” Id., at 1077. (Footnote omitted.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 493 F. 2d 426 (1974). It observed: “[T]he securities involved in the case at bar are of such a highly liquid character as to be readily available for business needs that might arise. Thus the appreciated value of these securities should be taken into account when determining whether the corporation has accumulated profits in excess of reasonable business needs. “This decision does not force the corporation to liquidate these securities at any time when a sale would be financially unwise, but only compels the corporation to comply with the proscriptions of the Code and refrain from accumulating excessive earnings and profits.” Id., at 428. The case was remanded, as the parties had agreed, App. 57-58, “for the additional factual determination [under § 532 (a)] of whether one purpose for the accumulation was to avoid income tax on behalf of the shareholders.” 493 F. 2d, at 428. Because this conclusion was claimed by the taxpayer to conflict in principle with American Trading & Production Corp. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 801 (Md. 1972), aff’d without published opinion, 474 F. 2d 1341 (CA4 1973), and because of the importance of the issue in the administration of the accumulated earnings tax, we granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1067 (1974). II Under our system of income taxation, corporate earnings are subject to tax at two levels. First, there is the tax imposed upon the income of the corporation. Second, when the corporation, by way of a dividend, distributes its earnings to its shareholders, the distribution is subject to the tax imposed upon the income of the shareholders. Because of the disparity between the corporate tax rates and the higher gradations of the rates on individuals, a corporation may be utilized to reduce significantly its shareholders’ overall tax liability by accumulating earnings beyond the reasonable needs of the business. Without some method to force the distribution of unneeded corporate earnings, a controlling shareholder would be able to postpone the full impact of income taxes on his share of the corporation’s earnings in excess of its needs. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 8.01 (3d ed. 1971); B. Wolfman, Federal Income Taxation of Business Enterprise 864 (1971). In order to foreclose this possibility of using the corporation as a means of avoiding the income tax on dividends to the shareholders, every Revenue Act since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 has imposed a tax upon unnecessary accumulations of corporate earnings effected for the purpose of insulating shareholders. The Court has acknowledged the obvious purpose of the accumulation provisions of the successive Acts: “As the theory of the revenue acts has been to tax corporate profits to the corporation, and their receipt only when distributed to the stockholders, the purpose of the legislation is to compel the company to distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of its business so that, when so distributed, individual stockholders will become liable not only for normal but for surtax on the dividends received.” Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U. S. 693, 699 (1943). This was reaffirmed in United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U. S. 297, 303 (1969). It is to be noted that the focus and impositions of the accumulated earnings tax are upon “accumulated taxable income,” § 531. This is defined in § 535 (a) to mean the corporation’s “taxable income,” as adjusted. The adjustments consist of the various items described in § 535 (b), including federal income tax, the deduction for dividends paid, defined in § 561, and the accumulated earnings credit defined in § 535 (c). The adjustments prescribed by §§ 535 (a) and (b) are designed generally to assure that a corporation’s “accumulated taxable income” reflects more accurately than “taxable income” the amount actually available to the corporation for business purposes. This explains the deductions for dividends paid and for federal income taxes; neither of these enters into the computation of taxable income. Obviously, dividends paid and federal income taxes deplete corporate resources and must be recognized if the corporation’s economic condition is to be propérly perceived. Conversely, § 535 (b) (3) disallows, for example, the deduction, available to a corporation for income tax purposes under § 243, on account of dividends received ; dividends received are freely available for use in the corporation’s business. The purport of the accumulated earnings tax structure established by §§ 531-537, therefore, is to determine the corporation’s true economic condition before its liability for tax upon “accumulated taxable income” is determined. The tax, although a penalty and therefore to be strictly construed, Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U. S. 87, 91 (1959), is directed at economic reality. It is important to emphasize that we are concerned here with a tax on “accumulated taxable income,” § 531, and that the tax attaches only when a corporation has permitted “earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed,” § 532 (a). What is essential is that there be “income” and “earnings and profits.” This at once eliminates, from the measure of the tax itself, any unrealized appreciation in the value of the taxpayer’s portfolio securities over cost, for any such unrealized appreciation does not enter into the computation of the corporation’s “income” and “earnings and profits.” The corporation’s readily marketable portfolio securities and their unrealized appreciation, nonetheless, are of profound importance in making the entirely discrete determination whether the corporation has permitted what, coneededly, are earnings and profits to accumulate beyond its reasonable business needs. If the securities, as here, are readily available as liquid assets, then the recognized earnings and profits that have been accumulated may well have been unnecessarily accumulated, so far as the reasonable needs of the business are concerned. On the other hand, if those portfolio securities are not liquid and are not readily available for the needs of the business, the accumulation of earnings and profits may be viewed in a different light. Upon this analysis, not only is such accumulation as has taken place important, but the liquidity otherwise available to the corporation is highly significant. In any event — and we repeat — the tax is directed at the accumulated taxable income and at earnings and profits. The tax itself is not directed at the unrealized appreciation of the liquid assets in the securities portfolio. The latter becomes important only-in measuring reasonableness of accumulation of the earnings and profits that otherwise independently exist. What we look at, then, in order to determine its reasonableness or unreasonableness, in the light of the needs of the business, is any failure on the part of the corporation to distribute the earnings and profits it has. Accumulation beyond the reasonable needs of the business, by the language of § 533 (a), is “determinative of the purpose” to avoid tax with respect to shareholders unless the corporation proves the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of proof, thus, is on the taxpayer. A rebuttable presumption is statutorily imposed. To be sure, we deal here, in a sense, with a state of mind. But it has been said that the statute, without the support of the presumption, would “be practically unenforceable . . . .” United Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 754, 755 (CA2), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933). What is required, then, is a comparison of accumulated earnings and profits with “the reasonable needs of the business.” Business needs are critical. And need, plainly, to use mathematical terminology, is a function of a corporation's liquidity, that is, the amount of idle current assets at its disposal. The question, therefore, is not how much capital of all sorts, but how much in the way of quick or liquid assets, it is reasonable to keep on hand for the business. United Block Co. v. Helvering, 123 F. 2d 704, 705 (CA2 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 812 (1942); Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F. 2d 495, 501 (CA4), cert. denied, 362 U. S. 976 (1960) (liquid assets provide “a strong indication” of the purpose of the accumulation); Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F. 2d 339, 344 (CA2 1964); Novelart Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T. C. 794, 806 (1969), aff’d, 434 F. 2d 1011 (CA6 1970), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 918 (1971); John P. Scripps Newspapers v. Commissioner, 44 T. C. 453, 467 (1965). The taxpayer itself recognizes, and accepts, the liquidity concept as a basic factor, for it “has agreed that the full amount of its realized earnings invested in its liquid assets — their cost — should be taken into account in determining the applicability of Section 533 (a).” Brief for Petitioner 15. It concedes that if this were not so, “the tax could be avoided by any form of investment of earnings and profits.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 5. But the taxpayer would stop at the point of cost and, when it does so, is compelled to compare earnings and profits— not the amount of readily available liquid assets, net— with reasonable business needs. We disagree with the taxpayer and conclude that cost is not the stopping point; that the application of the accumulated earnings tax, in a given case, may well depend on whether the corporation has available readily marketable portfolio securities; and that the proper measure of those securities, for purposes of the tax, is their net realizable value. Cost of the marketable securities on the assets side of the corporation’s balance sheet would appear to be largely an irrelevant gauge of the taxpayer’s true financial condition. Certainly, a lender would not evaluate a potential borrower’s marketable securities at cost. Realistic financial condition is the focus of the lender’s inquiry. It also must be the focus of the Commissioner’s inquiry in determining the applicability of the accumulated earnings tax. This taxpayer’s securities, being liquid and readily marketable, clearly were available for the business needs of the corporation, and their fair market value, net, was such that, according to the stipulation, the taxpayer’s undistributed earnings and profits for the two fiscal years in question were permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable and reasonably anticipated needs of the business. Ill Bearing directly upon the issue before us is Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282 (1938). There the fact situation was the reverse of the present case inasmuch as that taxpayer corporation had unrealized losses in the value of marketable securities it was continuing to hold. After the Court upheld the accumulated earnings tax against constitutional attack, id., at 286-290, it observed: “Depreciation in any of the assets is evidence to be considered by the Commissioner and the Board [of Tax Appeals] in determining the issue of fact whether the accumulation of profits was in excess of the reasonable needs of the business.” Id., at 291. It went on to hold, however, that such depreciation “does not, as matter of law, preclude a finding that the accumulation of the year’s profits was in excess of the reasonable needs of the business.” Ibid. Indeed, the Court held that the evidence supported the Board’s finding that the accumulation of surplus by the taxpayer was to enable its sole shareholder to escape surtaxes. It focused on bonds and stocks held by the corporation, described them as in no way related to the business, and concluded that “there was no need of accumulating any part of the year’s earnings for the purpose of financing the business.” Id., at 291-292. That language forecloses the present taxpayer’s case. The precedent of National Grocery has been applied in accumulated earnings tax cases, with courts taking into account the fair market value of liquid, appreciated securities. Battelstein Investment Co. v. United States, 442 F. 2d 87, 89 (CA5 1971); Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F. 2d 429, 434-435 (CA10 1974); Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. M. 1765, 1779 (1964), aff’d, 364 F. 2d 746 (CA10 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 956 (1967); Golconda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T. C. 139, supplemental opinion, 58 T. C. 736, 737-739 (1972), rev’d on other grounds, 507 F. 2d 594 (CA9 1974); Ready Paving & Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T. C. 826, 840-841 (1974). But see Harry A. Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F. Supp. 782, 784 (Neb. 1964). American Trading & Production Corp. v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 801 (Md. 1972), aff’d without pub-fished opinion, 474 F. 2d 1341 (CA4 1973), which the taxpayer continues to assert is in conflict with the present case, deserves mention. The taxpayer there had accumulated earnings and profits of something less than $10 million. Its anticipated business needs were about $12 million. But it owned stocks, primarily oil shares, having a total cost of $5,593,319 and an aggregate current market value in excess of $100 million. The District Court excluded these stocks in making its determination whether earnings had accumulated in excess of reasonable business needs. It did so on several grounds: that the shares constituted “original capital,” a term the court used in the sense that the stocks “were properly held and retained as an integral part of [the taxpayer’s] business and were utilized ... as a base for borrowings for the needs of other parts of its business,” 362 F. Supp., at 810; that the statute was not intended to require the conversion of assets of that kind into cash in order to meet business needs, even though that capital “has explosively increased in value,” id., at 808; and that “there was substantial evidence” that the stocks “were not readily saleable,” id., at 809. Whatever may be the merit or demerit of the other grounds asserted by the District Court in American Trading — and we express no view thereon — we are satisfied that the court’s determination as to the absence of ready salability, under all the circumstances, provides a sufficient point of distinction of that case from this one, so that it provides meager, if any, contrary precedent of substance to our conclusion here. IV The arguments advanced by the taxpayer do not persuade us: 1. The taxpayer, of course, quite correctly insists that unrealized appreciation of portfolio securities does not enter into the determination of “earnings and profits,” within the meaning of § 533 (a). As noted above, we agree. The Government does not contend otherwise. It does not follow, however, that unrealized appreciation is never to be taken into account for purposes of the accumulated earnings tax. As has been pointed out, the tax is imposed only upon accumulated taxable income, and this is defined to mean taxable income as adjusted by factors that have been described. The question is not whether unrealized appreciation enters into the determination of earnings and profits, which it does not, but whether the accumulated taxable income, in the determination of which earnings and profits have entered, justifiably may be retained rather than distributed as dividends. The tax focuses, therefore, on current income and its retention or distribution. If the corporation has freely available liquid assets in excess of its reasonable business needs, then accumulation of taxable income may be unreasonable and the tax may attach. Utilizable availability of the portfolio assets is measured realistically only at net realizable value. The fact that this value is not included in earnings and profits does not foreclose its being considered in determining whether the corporation is subject to the accumulated earnings tax. 2. We see nothing in the “realization of income” concept of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920), that has significance for the issue presently under consideration. There the Court held that a dividend of common shares issued by a corporation having only common outstanding was not includable in the shareholder’s gross income for income tax purposes. The decision may have prompted the shift, noted above and effected by the Revenue Act of 1921, of the incidence of the accumulated earnings tax from the shareholders to the corporation. The case also emphasizes the realization of income with respect to a tax on the shareholder. We note again, however, that the accumulated earnings tax is not on unrealized appreciation of the portfolio securities. It rests upon, and only upon, the corporation's current taxable income adjusted to constitute “accumulated taxable income.'' 3. The taxpayer also argues that the effect of the Court of Appeals decision is to force the taxpayer to convert its appreciated assets in order to meet its business needs. It suggests that management should be entitled to finance business needs without resorting to unrealized appreciation. The argument, plainly, goes too far. On the taxpayer's own theory that marketable securities may be taken into account at their cost, a situation easily may be imagined where some conversion into cash becomes necessary, if the corporation is to avoid the accumulated earnings tax. That our decision does not interfere with corporate management's exercise of sound business judgment, and that it does not amount to a dictation to management as to when appreciated assets are to be liquidated, was aptly answered by the Court of Appeals: “This decision does not force the corporation to liquidate these securities at any time when a sale would be financially unwise, but only compels the corporation to comply with the proscriptions of the Code and refrain from accumulating excessive earnings and profits. That taxpayer, as a consequence of its own sound judgment in making profitable investments, must sell, exchange or distribute to the shareholders assets in order to avoid an excessive accumulation of earnings and thus comply with the Code’s requirements is no justification for precluding its application.” 493 F. 2d, at 428. We might add that the existence of the Code’s provisions for the accumulated earnings tax, of course, will affect management’s decision. So, too, does the very existence of the corporate income tax itself. In this respect, the one is no more offensive than the other. Astute management in these tax-conscious days is not that helpless, and shrinkage, upon liquidation, of one-fourth of the appreciation hardly equates with loss. Such business decision as is necessitated was expressly intended by the Congress. All that is required is the disgorging, at the most, of the taxable year’s “accumulated taxable income.” 4. It is no answer to suggest that our decision here may conflict with standard accounting practice. The Court has not hesitated to apply congressional policy underlying a revenue statute even when it does conflict with an established accounting practice. See, e. g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U. S. 128 (1963); American Automobile Assn. v. United States, 367 U. S. 687, 692-694 (1961). It is of some interest that the taxpayer itself, for the tax years under consideration, reflected the market value as well as the cost of its marketable securities on its balance sheets. App. 112, 118. This appears to be in line with presently accepted practice. See R. Kester, Advanced Accounting 117-118, 122-124 (4th ed. 1946). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. “§531. Imposition of accumulated earnings tax. “In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the accumulated taxable income (as defined in section 535) of every corporation described in section 532, an accumulated earnings tax equal to the sum of— “(1) 27% percent of the accumulated taxable income not in excess of $100,000, plus “(2) 38% percent of the accumulated taxable income in excess of $100,000.” “§532. Corporations subject to accumulated earnings tax. “(a) General rule. “The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531 shall apply to every corporation (other than those described in subsection (b)) formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.” “§ 533. Evidence of purpose to avoid income tax. “(a) Unreasonable accumulation determinative of purpose. “For purposes of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.” In a proceeding before the United States Tax Court, § 534 allows the taxpayer to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Section 535 defines “accumulated taxable income” to mean the corporation’s taxable income adjusted as specified; a credit is given for “such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business,” with a minimum “lifetime” credit of $100,000 ($150,000 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1974, Pub. L. 9A-12, § 304, 89 Stat. 45, 26 U. S. C. § 535 (c) (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Finally, § 537 provides that the term “reasonable needs of the business” includes “the reasonably anticipated needs of the business.” It is stipulated that the cost of converting the taxpayer’s marketable securities into cash would have been the sum of a maximum of 6% of the fair market value of the securities (payable as a brokerage commission) and a maximum of 25% of such amount of the fair market value as exceeds the sum of the brokerage commission and the cost of the securities (payable as capital gains taxes). App. 55. American Trading and Production Corporation, pursuant to our Rule 42, was granted permission to file a brief as amicus curiae in the present case. It asserts that no conflict exists between the decisions in this case and in its own case. The income tax rates for a corporation are 22% of the first $25,000 of taxable income and 48% of the excess over $25,000. § 11 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 11. The graduated rates for an individual taxpayer range from 14% to 70%. § 1, 26 U. S. C. § 1. The accumulated earnings tax originated in § II A, Subdivision 2, of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 166. This imposed a tax on the shareholders of a corporation “formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.” Accumulations “beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be prima facie evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape such tax.” Id., at 167. The same provision appeared as § 3 of the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 758, and again as § 220 of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1072 (1919), except that in the 1918 Act the word “fraudulently” was deleted. This change was effected inasmuch as the Senate felt that the former phraseology “has proved to be of little value, because it was necessary to its application that intended fraud on the revenue be established in each case.” S. Rep. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 5 (1918). This pattern of tax on the shareholders was changed with the Revenue Act of 1921, § 220, 42 Stat. 247. The incidence of the tax was shifted from the shareholders to the corporation itself. Judge Learned Hand opined that the change was due to doubts “as to the validity of taxing income which the taxpayers had never received, and in 1921 it was thought safer to tax the company itself.” United Business Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F. 2d 754, 756 (CA2), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 635 (1933). Although the statutory language has varied somewhat from time to time, the income tax law, since the change effected by the Revenue Act of 1921, consistently has imposed the tax on the corporation, rather than upon the shareholders. Revenue Act of 1924, § 220, 43 Stat. 277; Revenue Act of 1926, § 220, 44 Stat. 34; Revenue Act of 1928, § 104, 45 Stat. 814; Revenue Act of 1932, § 104, 47 Stat. 195; Revenue Act of 1934, § 102, 48 Stat. 702; Revenue Act of 1936, § 102, 49 Stat. 1676; Revenue Act of 1938, § 102, 52 Stat. 483; Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 102. In this case we are concerned only with readily marketable securities. We express no view with respect to items of a different kind, such as inventory or accounts receivable. “The tax should be administered with its purpose in mind at all times, i. e., to prevent accumulations of income by the corporation for the purpose of avoiding the income tax ordinarily incident to the shareholders. It is not intended to serve as an obstacle to sound profit-oriented corporate management. The ultimate goal must be to administer the tax fairly, in light of the total economic reality of the corporation. Valuing liquid assets at cost invariably produces a poor and inaccurate picture of the corporate financial position. Adjusted fair market value may have shortcomings of its own, but it does, undeniably, come much closer to furthering the intent of the accumulated earnings tax.” Note, Accumulated Earnings Tax: Should Marketable Securities be Valued at Cost or at Fair Market Value in Determining the Reasonableness of Further Accumulations of Income?, 40 Brooklyn L. Rev. 192, 209-210 (1973). We see little force in any observation that our emphasis on liquid assets means that a corporate taxpayer may avoid the accumulated earnings tax by merely investing in nonliquid assets. If such a step, in a given case, amounted to willful evasion of the accumulated earnings tax, it would be subject to criminal penalties. See, e. g., § 7201 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 7201. The cost basis for petitioner’s Xerox securities for the 1966 tax year was some $14,000 less than for 1965, apparently reflecting the payment as a dividend of 870 shares of Xerox stock in 1965. The "appreciation” figures used herein come from Petitioner’s Brief and vary somewhat from the figures used by the Government, but the differences are insignificant in the context of this case. Rounded figures are used throughout this opinion. The Court refers to net liquidation value, which reflects the asset’s current market price less the costs and expenses attendant to its liquidation. The Court thus seeks to identify the sum that would be made available by a hypothetical sale of the asset in question, although nothing in the statute requires such a liquidation. For the purpose of discussion, I will refer simply to market value or market price.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

POAFPYBITTY et al. v. SKELLY OIL CO. No. 65. Argued January 24, 1968. Decided March 18, 1968. Charles Hill Johns argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Houston Bus Hill. John H. Cantrell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was 8. W. Wells. Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Williams and Roger P. Marquis filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of of Court. The question presented is whether petitioners, who are Comanche Indians, have standing to sue under an oil and gas lease approved by the Department of the Interior for use on land held by Indians under trust patents issued by the United States. In 1947 the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs approved an oil and gas lease which petitioners had executed to respondent, Skelly Oil Company, on the form prescribed by the Department of the Interior. The first well was drilled in 1956, and seven producing wells were soon completed. In 1961 petitioners retained counsel with the approval of the Department of the Interior and brought this damage action against respondent in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, alleging that respondent had breached the express and implied covenants in the lease and had thereby impaired petitioners’ royalties. Respondent notified the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the litigation, but the Government made no attempt to intervene in the proceedings. The petition filed in the District Court asserted that respondent had permitted natural gas being produced from the wells to escape despite the fact that there was a pipeline less than a mile from the land. Petitioners claimed that respondent ignored their request that the gas be marketed and continued to allow the gas to be wasted in violation of the terms of the lease. The District Court sustained respondent’s demurrer and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed on the ground that petitioners were precluded from suing by the provisions of the lease and by the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior to control oil and gas leases on restricted Indian land. We granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 814 (1967), to determine whether the federal restrictions imposed on the Indians prevented them from vindicating their rights. In our view, the decision below unduly restricts the right of the Indians to seek judicial relief for a claimed injury to their interests under the oil and gas lease. The trust patents to the land in question were issued, to petitioners under the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §§ 331-358, which provided that individual Indians were to be allotted land on their reservations and that the United States was to hold the land “in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian” allottees for a 25-year period. 25 U. S. C. § 348. During the trust period, which has been repeatedly extended, restricted Indian land may be sold or leased only with the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. In our view, these restrictions on the Indian’s control of his land are mere incidents of the promises made by the United States in various treaties to protect Indian land and have no effect on the Indian’s capacity to institute the court action necessary to protect his property. In order to fulfill these national promises to safeguard Indian land and at the same time “to prepare the Indians to take their place as independent, qualified members of the modern body politic,” Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715 (1943), the allotment system was created with the Indians receiving ownership rights in the land while the United States retained the power to scrutinize the various transactions by which the Indian might be separated from that property. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 9 (1956). See, e. g., 18 Cong. Rec. 190-192 (1886). This dual purpose of the allotment system would be frustrated unless both the Indian and the United States were empowered to seek judicial relief to protect the allotment. The obligation and power of the United States to institute such litigation to aid the Indian in the protection of his rights in his allotment were recognized in United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912); and United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432 (1926). See generally Federal Indian Law 326-341 (Dept, of Interior, 1958). In Heckman, an action brought by the United States to set aside an improper conveyance of restricted land, this Court realized that the allotment system created interests in both the Indian and the United States. “A transfer of the allotments is not simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the Indian. It violates the governmental rights of the United States.” 224 U. S., at 438. In holding that the United States could sue to protect the allotment, the Court indicated that the Government could either bring the necessary suit itself or allow the litigation to be prosecuted by the Indian. “In what cases the United States will undertake to represent Indian owners of restricted lands in suits of this sort is left under the acts of Congress to the discretion of the Executive Department. The allottee may be permitted to bring his own action, or if so brought the United States may aid him in its conduct .... And when the United States itself undertakes to represent the allottees of lands under restriction and brings suit to cancel prohibited transfers, such action necessarily precludes the prosecution by the allottees of any other suit for a similar purpose relating to the same property.” Id., at 446. Later decisions followed the implications of Heckman and held that the right of the United States to institute a suit to protect the allotment did not diminish the Indian’s right to sue on his own behalf. In Creek Nation v. United States, 318 U. S. 629 (1943), this Court held that Indian tribes had the power to sue a railroad for the improper use of Indian land even though the tribes could not sue the United States for its failure to collect the sums allegedly due. The Court stated, “That the United States also had a right to sue did not necessarily preclude the tribes from bringing their own actions.” Id., at 640. Accord, Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U. S. 110 (1919); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F. 2d 555 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1969). Nor does the existence of the Government’s power to sue affect the rights of the individual Indian. “A restricted Indian is not without capacity to sue or to be sued with respect to his affairs, including his restricted property. . . . Both the Act of April 12, 1926 and the decision ... in Heck-man v. United States . . . recognize capacity in a restricted Indian to sue or defend actions in his own behalf subject only to the right of the Government to intervene.” Sadler v. Public Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 172 F. 2d 870, 874 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1949). And in Choctaw & Chickasaw Nations v. Seitz, 193 F. 2d 456, 459 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1951), the court stated that Heckmcm, supra, Lane, supra, and Candelaria, supra, “clearly recognized the rights of restricted Indians and Indian tribes or pueblos to maintain actions with respect to their lands, although the United States would not be bound by the judgment in such an action, to which it was not a party, brought by the restricted Indian or an Indian tribe or pueblo.” In Brown v. Anderson, 61 Okla. 136, 160 P. 724 (1916), the Oklahoma Supreme Court itself held that Heckman had “fully answered” the argument that only the United States as guardian of the Indian could bring a suit to cancel an improper conveyance of a restricted Indian allotment. The court held: “Osborne Anderson, the defendant in error, although a full blood Indian, was a citizen of the United States and of the state of Oklahoma. No good reason appears why he should be denied the privilege of appealing to the courts of the state the same as any other citizen to enforce his rights to property, even though such property be land upon which restrictions against alienation have been imposed by an act of Congress.” 61 Okla., at 138-139, 160 R, at 726. See Bell v. Fitzpatrick, 53 Okla. 574, 157 P. 334 (1916) ; L. Mills, Oklahoma Indian Land Laws §328 (1924). We agree that the federal restrictions preventing the Indian from selling or leasing his allotted land without the consent of a governmental official do not prevent the Indian landowner, like other property owners, from maintaining suits appropriate to the protection of his rights. There remains the question whether the terms of the oil and gas lease or the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior to govern those leases prevent the Indians from seeking judicial relief for an alleged impairment of their interests under the lease. Respondent argues that the Secretary has such complete control over the lease that only he can institute the necessary court action. The leasing of allotted land for mining purposes “by said allottee” is expressly authorized by 25 U. S. C. § 396. Although the approval of the Secretary is required, he is not the lessor and he cannot grant the lease on his own authority. The Secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations controlling the operation and development of the lease and to issue necessary written instructions to the lessee. Ibid. See generally 25 CFR §§ 172.1-172.33 (1967); 30 CFR §§ 221.1-221.67 (1967). The lessee is required to furnish a surety bond, in an amount satisfactory to the Secretary, guaranteeing compliance with the terms of the lease, which incorporate the regulations of the Secretary. 25 U. S. C. § 396c. The Secretary has the power to inspect the leased premises and the books and records of the lessee. 25 CFR § 172.25 (1967). The Secretary also has the power to impose such restrictions as to the time for the drilling of wells or the production from any well “as in his judgment may be necessary or proper for the protection of the natural resources of the leased land and in the interests of the Indian lessor.” 25 CFR § 172.24 (1967). The lessee must furnish the Secretary with a monthly report disclosing all operations conducted on the lease, 30 CFR §§ 221.60-221.65 (1967), and must pay the royalties to the Secretary who deposits them to the credit of the Indian lessor. 25 CFR §§ 172.14, 172.16 (1967). The lessee agrees to drill wells which the Secretary determines are necessary to protect the leased land from drainage by another well on adjoining property. 30 CFR § 221.21 (1967). Finally, the lessee is obligated to prevent the waste of oil and gas and agrees to pay the Indian lessor the full value of all gas wasted, unless the Secretary determines at the request of the lessee that the waste was sanctioned by state and federal law. 30 CFR §§ 221.18, 221.35 (1967). While the United States has exercised its supervisory authority over oil and gas leases in considerable detail, we find nothing in this regulatory scheme which would preclude petitioners from seeking judicial relief for an alleged violation of the lease. If the Government does determine that there has been waste in violation of a lease, it will of course satisfy its trust obligations by filing the necessary court action. However, there is nothing in the lease or regulations requiring the Indians to seek administrative action- from the Government instead of instituting legal proceedings on their own. The existence of the power of the United States to sue upon a violation of the lease no more diminishes the right of the Indian to maintain an action to protect that lease than the general power of the United States to safeguard an allotment affected the capacity of the Indian to protect that allotment. Furthermore, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which is the agency of the Department of the Interior charged with fulfilling the trust obligations of the United States, is faced “with an almost staggering problem in attempting to discharge its trust obligations with respect to thousands upon thousands of scattered Indian allotments. In some cases, the adequate fulfillment of trust responsibilities on these allotments would undoubtedly involve administrative costs running many times the income value of the property.” H. R. Rep. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1952). Recognizing these administrative burdens and realizing that the Indian’s right to sue should not depend on the good judgment or zeal of a. government attorney, the United States has indicated its support of petitioners’ position that Indians have a capacity to sue under the oil and gas lease. The regulations do empower the Secretary to cancel a lease “for good cause upon application of the lessor or lessee, or if at any time the Secretary is satisfied that the provisions of the lease or of any regulations heretofore or hereafter prescribed have been violated.” 25 CFR § 172.23 (1967). However, there is no justification for concluding that the severe sanction of cancellation of the lease is the only relief for all breaches of the lease terms or for any failure to pay royalties. Both the lessor and the lessee may wish to resolve their disagreement by the payment of damages and not by the cancellation of a basically satisfactory lease. Nor is the capacity of the Indian defeated by § 6 of the lease, which provides that the Secretary may cancel the lease “before restrictions are removed,” and concludes, “Provided, That after restrictions are removed the lessor shall have and be entitled to any available remedy in law or equity for breach of this contract by the lessee.” There is no warrant for implying by negative inference from this proviso a denial of all remedies otherwise available to the Indian prior to the removal of the federal restrictions on his power to alienate the land. Section 6 merely provides that when the federal restrictions on alienation are terminated, the federal supervision over the lease will likewise come to an end, without impairing the continuing rights of the Indian. Compare 25 CFR § 172.28 (1967). Respondent's argument that the judgment in its favor should be sustained on available adequate state procedural grounds is untenable. Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision rested solely on federal grounds, that court must have either rejected or failed to reach the asserted state grounds. Furthermore, we intimate no view on the merits of the case. If the lessee has conformed to all of the requirements of the federal regulations and has not breached any of the terms of the lease, the suit may fail. We merely hold that the Indian lessors have the capacity to maintain an action seeking damages for the alleged breach of the oil and gas lease. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs approved a contract between petitioners and an attorney for legal services to be rendered in connection with this litigation. The Area Director has been delegated the authority to approve the employment of attorneys for individual Indians who may be compensated on a quantum meruit basis from restricted trust funds. Section 269 of Order 551 of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 16 Fed. Reg. 2939 (1951), as amended, 22 Fed. Reg. 6066 (1957). The petition also alleged that the waste of natural gas violated § 86.3 of the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Okla. Stat. Tit. 52, §86.3 (1951). In response to a motion to require petitioners to elect between or state separately a cause of action under the lease and one based on tort, the District Court, with the approval of the parties, struck the alleged violation of the conservation statute from the petition. After petitioners announced that the petition then stated only one cause of action which sought recovery for the breach of the lease, the District Court denied the motion. The lease provides: “3. In consideration of the foregoing, the lessee hereby agrees: “(f) Diligence, prevention of waste. — To exercise reasonable diligence in drilling and operating wells for oil and gas on the lands covered hereby, while such products can be secured in paying quantities; to carry on all operations hereunder in a good and workmanlike manner in accordance with approved methods and practice, having due regard for the prevention of waste of oil or gas developed on the land . . . .” See 30 CFR, §§221.18, 221.35 (1967). The opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court is not reported. Indians are expressly authorized to institute proceedings against the United States to establish their right to an allotment. 25 U. S. C. § 345. See note following 25 U. S. C. § 348. And see 25 U. S. C. § 462, which provides: “The existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation thereof are extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress.” “This national interest is not to be expressed in terms of property, or to be limited to the assertion of rights incident to the ownership of a reversion or to the holding of a technical title in trust.” Heckman v. United, States, 224 U. S. 413, 437 (1912), quoted with approval in United States v. Hellard, 322 U. S. 363, 366 (1944). Indians of course are now authorized to bring claims against the United States. See Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946), 25 U. S. C. §§ 70-70w. For claims arising after August 13, 1946, see 28 U. S. C. § 1505, conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims. “[T]he rights of restricted Indians and Indian tribes or pueblos to maintain actions with respect to their lands are clearly recognized, although the United States might not be bound by a judgment in such an action to which it was not a party.” Federal Indian Law 336 (1958). A proviso to § 396 does give the Secretary the power to offer leases on his own if the allottee is deceased and the heirs have not been determined or cannot be found. 25 U. S. C. § 396. The Memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae states, at 7: “In sum, respondent’s contention that, until the trusteeship is ended, the Indian landowners are disabled from maintaining suit for breach of a lease they have granted of their own property is unsupported in the governing statutes, the implementing regulations, or the terms of the lease.” Section 6 of the lease provides: “6. Cancellation and forfeiture. — When, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, there has been a violation of any of the terms and conditions of this lease before restrictions are removed, the Secretary of the Interior shall have the right at any time after 30 days notice to the lessee, specifying the terms and conditions violated, and after a hearing, if the lessee shall so request within 30 days of receipt of notice, to declare this lease null and void, and the lessor shall then be entitled and authorized to take immediate possession of the land: Provided, That after restrictions are removed the lessor shall have and be entitled to any available remedy in law or equity for breach of this contract by the lessee.” The regulation dealing with the removal of restrictions avoids the danger of a negative inference by stating: “Oil and gas leases ... on land from all of which restrictions against alienation have been or shall be removed, even if such leases contain provisions authorizing supervision by the Department, shall, after such removal of restrictions against alienation, be operated entirely free from such supervision, and the authority and power delegated to the Secretary of the Interior in said leases shall cease 25 CFR § 172.28 (1967).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUNAL v. LARGE, SUPERINTENDENT, FEDERAL PRISON CAMP. NO. 535. Argued April 1, 1947. Decided June 23, 1947. No. 535. No. 840. Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner in No. 840 and respondent in No. 535. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Washington and Robert S. Erdahl. Frederick Bernays Wiener was also on the brief in No. 840. Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent in No. 840 and petitioner in No. 535. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Sunal and Kulick registered under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 57 Stat. 597, 50 U. S. C. App. § 301, et seq. Each is a Jehovah’s Witness and each claimed the exemption granted by Congress to regular or duly ordained ministers of religion. § 5 (d). The local boards, after proceedings unnecessary to relate here, denied the claimed exemptions and classified these registrants as I-A. They exhausted their administrative remedies but were unable to effect a change in their classifications. Thereafter they were ordered to report for induction — Sunal on October 25, 1944, Kulick on November 9, 1944. Each reported but refused to submit to induction. Each was thereupon indicted, tried and convicted under § 11 of the Act for refusing to submit to induction. Sunal was sentenced on March 22, 1945, Kulick on May 7, 1945, each to imprisonment for a term of years. Neither appealed. At the trial each offered evidence to show that his selective service classification was invalid. The trial courts held, however, that such evidence was inadmissible, that the classification was final and not open to attack in the criminal trial. On February 4, 1946, we decided Estep v. United States and Smith v. United States, 327 U. S. 114. These cases held on comparable facts that a registrant, who had exhausted his administrative remedies and thus obviated the rule of Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, was entitled, when tried under § 11, to defend on the ground that his local board exceeded its jurisdiction in making the classification — for example, that it had no basis in fact. 327 U. S. pp. 122-123. It is plain, therefore, that the trial courts erred in denying Sunal and Kulick the defense which they tendered. Shortly after the Estep and Smith cases were decided, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed on behalf of Sunal and Kulick. In each case it was held that habeas corpus was an available remedy. In Sunal’s case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that there was a basis in fact for the classification and affirmed a judgment discharging the writ. 157 F. 2d 165. In Kulick’s case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a District Court holding that there was evidence to support the classification, 66 F. Supp. 183, and ruled, without examining the evidence, that since Kulick had been deprived of the defense he should be discharged from custody without prejudice to further prosecution. 157 F. 2d 811. The cases are here on petitions for writs of certiorari, which we granted because of the importance of the questions presented. The normal and customary method of correcting errors of the trial is by appeal. Appeals could have been taken in these cases, but they were not. It cannot be said that absence of counsel made the appeals unavailable as a practical matter. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 467. Defendants had counsel. Nor was there any other barrier to the perfection of their appeals. Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255. Moreover, this is not a situation where the facts relied on were dehors the record and therefore not open to consideration and review on appeal. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104; United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U. S. 220, 221. And see Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274-275. The error was of record in each case. It is said, however, that the failure to appeal was excusable, since under the decisions as they then stood — March 22, 1945, and May 7, 1945— the lower courts had consistently ruled that the selective service classification could not be attacked in a prosecution under § 11. See Estep v. United States, supra, p. 123, n. 15. It is also pointed out that on April 30, 1945, we had denied certiorari in a case which sought to raise the same point, and that Estep v. United States, supra, and Smith v. United States, supra, were brought here and decided after Sunal’s and Kulick’s time for appeal had passed. The argument is that since the state of the law made the appeals seem futile, it would be unfair to those registrants to conclude them by their failure to appeal. We put to one side comparable problems respecting the use of habeas corpus in the federal courts to challenge convictions obtained in the state courts. See New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 104-105; United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 116-117. So far as convictions obtained in the federal courts are concerned, the general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, supra, p. 274. There have been, however, some exceptions. That is to say, the writ has at times been entertained either without consideration of the adequacy of relief by the appellate route or where an appeal would have afforded an adequate remedy. Illustrative are those instances where the conviction was under a federal statute alleged to be unconstitutional, where there was a conviction by a federal court whose jurisdiction over the person or the offense was challenged, where the trial or sentence by a federal court violated specific constitutional guaranties. It is plain, however, that the writ is not designed for collateral review of errors of law committed by the trial court — the existence of any evidence to support the conviction, irregularities in the grand jury procedure, departure from a statutory grant of time in which to prepare for trial, and other errors in trial procedure which do not cross the jurisdictional line. Cf. Craig v. Hecht, 263 U. S. 255. Yet the latter rule is not an absolute one; and the situations in which habeas corpus has done service for an appeal are the exceptions. Thus where the jurisdiction of the federal court which tried the case is challenged or where the constitutionality of the federal statute under which conviction was had is attacked, habeas corpus is increasingly denied in case an appellate procedure was available for correction of the error. Yet, on the other hand, where the error was flagrant and there was no other remedy available for its correction, relief by habeas corpus has sometimes been granted. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27, the rule which requires resort to appellate procedure for the correction of errors “is not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power.” That rule is, therefore, “not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Id. p. 27. That case was deemed to involve “exceptional circumstances” by reason of the fact that it indicated “a conflict between state and federal authorities on a question of law involving concerns of large importance affecting their respective jurisdictions.” Id. p. 27. The Court accordingly entertained the writ to examine into the jurisdiction of the court to render the judgment of conviction. The same course was followed in Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, where petitioner was adjudged guilty of contempt for committing perjury. The Court did not require the petitioner to pursue any appellate route but issued an original writ and discharged him, holding that perjury without more was not punishable as a contempt. That situation was deemed exceptional in view of “the nature of the case, of the relation which the question which it involves bears generally to the power and duty of courts in the performance of their functions, of the dangerous effect on the liberty of the citizen when called upon as a witness in a court which might result if the erroneous doctrine upon which the order under review was based were not promptly corrected ....’’ Id. p. 384. Cf. Craig v. Hecht, supra. The Circuit Courts of Appeals thought that the facts of the present cases likewise presented exceptional circumstances which justified resort to habeas corpus though no appeals were taken. In their view the failure to appeal was excusable, since relief by that route seemed quite futile. But denial of certiorari by this Court in the earlier case imported no expression of opinion on the merits. House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42, 48, and cases cited. The same chief counsel represented the defendants in the present cases and those in the Estep and Smith cases. At the time these defendants were convicted the Estep and Smith cases were pending before the appellate courts. The petition in the Smith case was, indeed, filed here about two weeks before Kulick’s conviction and about a month after Sunal’s conviction. The same road was open to Sunal and Kulick as the one Smith and Estep took. Why the legal strategy counseled taking appeals in the Smith and Estep cases and not in these we do not know. Perhaps it was based on the facts of these two cases. For the question of law had not been decided by the Court; and counsel was pressing for a decision here. The case, therefore, is not one where the law was changed after the time for appeal had expired. Cf. Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F. 2d 642. It is rather a situation where at the time of the convictions the definitive ruling on the question of law had not crystallized. Of course, if Sunal and Kulick had pursued the appellate course and failed, their cases would be quite different. But since they chose not to pursue the remedy which they had, we do not think they should now be allowed to justify their failure by saying they deemed any appeal futile. We are dealing here with a problem which has radiations far beyond the present cases. The courts which tried the defendants had jurisdiction over their persons and over the offense. They committed an error of law in excluding the defense which was tendered. That error did not go to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Congress, moreover, has provided a regular, orderly method for correction of all such errors by granting an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and by vesting us with certiorari jurisdiction. It is not uncommon after a trial is ended and the time for appeal has passed to discover that a shift in the law or the impact of a new decision has given increased relevance to a point made at the trial but not pursued on appeal. Cf. Warring v. Colpoys, supra. If in such circumstances, habeas corpus could be used to correct the error, the writ would become a delayed motion for a new trial, renewed from time to time as the legal climate changed. Error which was not deemed sufficiently adequate to warrant an appeal would acquire new implications. Every error is potentially reversible error; and many rulings of the trial court spell the difference between conviction and acquittal. If defendants who accept the judgment of conviction and do not appeal can later renew their attack on the judgment by habeas corpus, litigation in these criminal cases will be interminable. Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels against such course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court. An endeavor is made to magnify the error in these trials to constitutional proportions by asserting that the refusal of the proffered evidence robbed the trial of vitality by depriving defendants of their only real defense. But as much might be said of many rulings during a criminal trial. Defendants received throughout an opportunity to be heard and enjoyed all procedural guaranties granted by the Constitution. Error in ruling on the question of law did not infect the trial with lack of procedural due process. As stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 494, “When a hearing is allowed but there is error in conducting it or in limiting its scope, the remedy is by appeal. When an opportunity to be heard is denied altogether, the ensuing mandate of the court is void, and the prisoner confined thereunder may have recourse to habeas corpus to put an end to the restraint.” It is said that the contrary position was indicated by the following statement in Estep v. United States, supra, pp. 124-125, “But if we now hold that a registrant could not defend at his trial on the ground that the local board had no jurisdiction in the premises, it would seem that the way would then be open to him to challenge the jurisdiction of the local board after conviction by habeas corpus. The court would then be sending men to jail today when it was apparent that they would have to be released tomorrow.” We were there examining the alternative pressed on us— that the classification could not be attacked at the trial. If we denied the defense, we concluded that habeas corpus would lie the moment after conviction.' For one convicted of violating an illegal order of a selective service board, like one convicted of violating an unconstitutional statute, should be afforded an opportunity at some stage to establish the fact. And where no other opportunity existed, habeas corpus would be the appropriate remedy. But that was an additional reason for allowing the defense in the criminal trial, not a statement that defendants prosecuted under § 11 had an alternative of'defending at the trial on the basis of an illegal classification or resorting to habeas corpus after conviction. These registrants had available a method of obtaining the right to defend their prosecutions under § 11 on that ground. They did not use it. And since we find no exceptional circumstances which excuse their failure, habeas corpus may not now be used as a substitute. Accordingly Sunal v. Large will be affirmed and Alexander v. Kulick will be reversed. So ordered. Mr. Justice Burton concurs in the result. Sunal in 1942 was classified as a conscientious objector and ordered to report for work of national importance. On his failure to do so he was convicted under the Act and a fine and term of imprisonment were imposed. The events with which we are now concerned relate to his classification after his discharge from prison. The Smith case was decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals on April 4, 1945, 148 F. 2d 288; the petition for certiorari was filed April 25, 1945, and granted May 28, 1945. 325 U. S. 846. The Estep case was decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals on July 6, 1945, 150 F. 2d 768; the petition for certiorari was filed August 3, 1945, and granted October 8, 1945. 326 U. S. 703. We therefore lay to one side cases such as Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304, and Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, where the order of the agency under which petitioner was detained was not subject to judicial review. Rinko v. United States, 325 U. S. 851. We also denied certiorari in Flakowicz v. United States, 325 U. S. 851; but it, like Falbo v. United States, supra, was one where the administrative remedies had not been exhausted, there being an additional examination which the registrant had not taken. See Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338. See note 2, supra. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731; Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488; Matter of Gregory, 219 U. S. 210; Baender v. Barnett, 255 U. S. 224. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (double jeopardy); In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274 (same); In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 (same); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (self-incrimination); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (requirement of indictment); Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1 (same); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, supra (right to counsel); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275 (same); Waley v. Johnston, supra (coerced plea of guilty). Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442. Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782; Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146. McMicking v. Schields, 238 U. S. 99. The rule is even more strict where habeas corpus is sought before trial. See Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245. In re Lincoln, 202 U. S. 178; Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542; Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U. S. 420. Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U. S. 20 (removal case). In removal cases habeas corpus is available not to weigh the evidence to support the accusation but to determine whether there is an entire lack of evidence to support it. Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62, 84. It is also available to determine whether removal to the district in question violates a constitutional right of the accused, Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, or whether the court before which it is proposed to take and try the accused has jurisdiction over the offense. Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224. But habeas corpus will not be entertained to pass on the question of jurisdiction where it involves consideration of many facts and seriously controverted questions of law. Rodman v. Pothier; 264 U. S. 399; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219. The remedy of habeas corpus extends to a ease where a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law ... of the United States ...” R. S. § 753,28 U. S. C. § 453.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PORTLAND GOLF CLUB v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 89-530. Argued April 17, 1990 Decided June 21, 1990 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, MARSHALL, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in which O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined except as to Parts III-B and IV. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 171. Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Allen B. Bush. Clifford M. Sloan argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Alan I. Horowitz, and Robert S. Pomerance. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to determine the circumstances under which a social club, in calculating its liability for federal income tax, may offset losses incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers against the income realized from its investments. I Petitioner Portland Golf Club is a nonprofit Oregon corporation, most of whose income is exempt from federal income tax under § 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(7). Since 1914 petitioner has owned and operated a private golf and country club with a golf course, restaurant and bar, swimming pool, and tennis courts. The great part of petitioner’s income is derived from membership dues and other receipts from the club’s members; that income is exempt from tax. Portland Golf also has two sources of nonexempt “unrelated business taxable income”: sales of food and drink to nonmembers, and return on its investments. The present controversy centers on Portland Golf’s federal income tax liability for its fiscal years ended September 30, 1980, and September 30, 1981, respectively. Petitioner received investment income in the form of interest in the amount of $11,752 for fiscal 1980 and in the amount of $21,414 for fiscal 1981. App. 18. It sustained net losses of $28,433 for fiscal 1980 and $69,608 for fiscal 1981 on sales of food and drink to nonmembers. Petitioner offset these losses against the earnings from its investments and therefore reported no unrelated business taxable income for the two tax years. In computing these losses, petitioner identified two different categories of expenses incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers. First, petitioner incurred variable (or direct) expenses, such as the cost of food, which varied depending on the amount of food and beverages sold (and therefore would not have been incurred had no sales to nonmembers been made). For each year in question, petitioner’s gross income from nonmember sales exceeded these variable costs. Petitioner also included as an unrelated business expense a portion of the fixed (or indirect) overhead expenses of the club — expenses which would have been incurred whether or not petitioner had made sales to nonmembers. In determining what portions of its fixed expenses were attributable to nonmember sales, petitioner employed an allocation formula, described as the “gross-to-gross method,” based on the ratio that nonmember sales bore to total sales. When fixed expenses, so calculated, were added to petitioner’s variable costs, the total exceeded Portland Golf’s gross income from nonmember sales. On audit, the Commissioner took the position that petitioner could deduct expenses associated with nonmember sales up to the amount of receipts from the sales themselves, but that it could not use losses from those activities to offset its investment income. The Commissioner based that conclusion on the belief that a profit motive was required if losses from these activities were to be used to offset income from other sources, and that Portland Golf had failed to show that its sales to nonmembers were undertaken with an intent to profit. The Commissioner therefore determined deficiencies of $1,828 for 1980 and $3,470 for 1981; these deficiencies reflected tax owed on petitioner’s investment income. App. 48-51. Portland Golf sought redetermination in the Tax Court. That court ruled in petitioner’s favor. 55 TCM 212 (1988), ¶ 88,076 P-H Memo TC. The court assumed, without deciding, that losses incurred in the course of sales to nonmembers could be used to offset other nonexempt income only if the sales were undertaken with an intent to profit. The court, however, held that Portland Golf had adequately demonstrated a profit motive, since its gross receipts from sales to nonmembers consistently exceeded the variable costs associated with those activities. The court therefore held that “petitioner is entitled to offset its unrelated business taxable income from interest by its loss from its nonmember food and beverage sales computed by allocating a portion of its fixed expenses to the nonmember food and beverage sales activity in a manner which respondent agrees is acceptable.” Id., at 217, ¶ 88,076 P-H Memo TC, at 413. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded. App. to Pet. for Cert, la, judgt. order reported at 876 F. 2d 897 (1989). The Court of Appeals held that the Tax Court had applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that Portland Golf had demonstrated an intent to profit from sales to nonmembers. The appellate court relied on its decision in North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 877 F. 2d 750 (1989), where it had ruled that a social club “can properly deduct losses from a non-member activity only if it undertakes that activity with the intent to profit, where profit means the production of gains in excess of all direct and indirect costs.” Id., at 756. The same court in the present case concluded: “Because Portland Golf Club could have reported gains in excess of direct and indirect costs, but did not do so, relying on a method of allocation stipulated to be reasonable by the Commissioner, we REMAND this case to the tax court for a determination of whether Portland Golf Club engaged in its non-member activities with the intent required under North Ridge to deduct its losses from those activities.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a-3a. Because of a perceived conflict with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Cleveland Athletic Club, Inc. v. United States, 779 F. 2d 1160 (1985), and because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 1041 (1990). I — i I — i Virtually all tax-exempt business organizations are required to pay federal income tax on their “unrelated business taxable income.” The law governing social clubs, however, is significantly different from that governing other tax-exempt entities. As to exempt organizations other than social clubs, the Code defines “unrelated business taxable income” as “the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in section 513) regularly carried on by it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the carrying on of such trade or business.” 26 U. S. C. § 512(a)(1). As to social clubs, however, “unrelated business taxable income” is defined as “the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income).” § 512(a)(3)(A). The salient point is that § 512(a)(1) (which applies to most exempt organizations) limits “unrelated business taxable income” to income derived from a “trade or business,” while § 512(a)(3)(A) (which applies to social clubs) contains no such limitation. Thus, a social club’s investment income is subject to federal income tax, while the investment income of most other exempt organizations is not. This distinction reflects the fact that a social club’s exemption from federal income tax has a justification fundamentally different from that which underlies the grant of tax exemptions to other nonprofit entities. For most such organizations, exemption from federal income tax is intended to encourage the provision of services that are deemed socially beneficial. Taxes are levied on “unrelated business income” only in order to prevent tax-exempt organizations from gaining an unfair advantage over competing commercial enterprises. See United States v. American College of Physi cians, 475 U. S. 834, 838 (1986) (“Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the tax laws”). Since Congress concluded that investors reaping tax-exempt income from passive sources would not be in competition with commercial businesses, it excluded from tax the investment income realized by exempt organizations. The exemption for social clubs rests on a totally different premise. Social clubs are exempted from tax not as a means of conferring tax advantages, but as a means of ensuring that the members are not subject to tax disadvantages as a consequence of their decision to pool their resources for the purchase of social or recreational services. The Senate Report accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 536, explained that that purpose does not justify a tax exemption for income derived from investments: “Since the tax exemption for social clubs and other groups is designed to allow individuals to join together to provide recreational or social facilities or other benefits on a mutual basis, without tax consequences, the tax exemption operates properly only when the sources of income of the organization are limited to receipts from the membership. Under such circumstances, the individual is in substantially the same position as if he had spent his income on pleasure or recreation (or other benefits) without the intervening separate organization. However, where the organization receives income from sources outside the membership, such as income from investments . . . upon which no tax is paid, the membership receives a benefit not contemplated by the exemption in that untaxed dollars can be used by the organization to provide pleasure or recreation (or other benefits) to its membership. ... In such a case, the exemption is no longer simply allowing individuals to join together for recreation or pleasure without tax consequences. Rather, it is bestowing a substantial additional advantage to the members of the club by allowing tax-free dollars to be used for their personal recreational or pleasure purposes. The extension of the exemption to such investment income is, therefore, a distortion of its purpose.” S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 71 (1969). In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress extended the tax on “unrelated business income” to social clubs. As to these organizations, however, Congress defined “unrelated business taxable income” to include income derived from investments. Our review of the present case must therefore be informed by two central facts. First, Congress intended that the investment income of social clubs should be subject to federal tax, and indeed Congress devised a definition of “unrelated business taxable income” with that purpose in mind. Second, the statutory scheme for the taxation of social clubs was intended to achieve tax neutrality, not to provide these clubs a tax advantage: Even the exemption for income derived from members’ payments was designed to ensure that members are not disadvantaged as compared with persons who pursue recreation through private purchases rather than through the medium of an organization. h-i I — I Petitioner’s principal argument is that it may deduct losses incurred through sales to nonmembers without demonstrating that these sales were motivated by an intent to profit. In the alternative, petitioner contends (and the Tax Court agreed) that if the Code does impose a profit-motive requirement, then that requirement has been satisfied in this case. We address these arguments in turn. A We agree with the Commissioner and the Court of Appeals that petitioner may use losses incurred in sales to nonmem-; bers to offset investment income only if those sales were motivated by an intent to profit. The statute provides that, as to social clubs, “the term ‘unrelated business taxable income’ means the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income). ” § 512(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). As petitioner concedes, the italicized language limits deductions from unrelated business income to expenses allowable as deductions under Chapter 1 of the Code. See Brief for Petitioner 21-22. In our view, the deductions claimed in this case — expenses for food, payroll, and overhead in excess of gross receipts from nonmember sales — are allowable, if at all, only under § 162 of the Code. See North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 877 F. 2d, at 753; Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F. 2d 833, 838 (CA2 1986). Section 162(a) provides a deduction for “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.” Although the statute does not expressly require that a “trade or business” must be carried on with an intent to profit, this Court has ruled that a taxpayer’s activities fall within the scope of § 162 only if an intent to profit has been shown. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U. S. 23, 35 (1987) (“[T]o be engaged in a [§ 162] trade or business, . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit”). Thus, the losses that Portland Golf incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers will constitute “deductions allowed by this chapter” only if the club’s nonmember sales were performed with an intent to profit. We see no basis for dispensing with the profit-motive requirement in the present case. Indeed, such an exemption would be in considerable tension with the statutory scheme devised by Congress to govern the taxation of social clubs. Congress intended that the investment income of social clubs (unlike the investment income of most other exempt organizations) should be subject to the same tax consequences as the investment income of any other taxpayer. To allow such an offset for social clubs would run counter to the principle of tax neutrality which underlies the statutory scheme. Petitioner concedes that “[generally a profit motive is a necessary factor in determining whether an activity is a trade or business.” Brief for Petitioner 23. Petitioner contends, however, that by including receipts from sales to nonmembers within § 512(a)(3)(A)’s definition of “unrelated business taxable income,” the Code has defined nonmember sales as a “trade or business,” and has thereby obviated the need for an inquiry into the taxpayer’s intent to profit. We disagree. In our view, Congress’ use of the term “unrelated business taxable income” to describe all receipts other than payments from the members hardly manifests an intent to define as a “trade or business” activities otherwise outside the scope of § 162. Petitioner’s reading would render superfluous the words “allowed by this chapter” in § 512(a)(3)(A): If each taxable activity of a social club is “deemed” to be a trade or business, then all of the expenses “directly connected” with those activities would presumably be deductible. Moreover, Portland Golf’s interpretation ignores Congress’ general intent to tax the income of social clubs according to the same principles applicable to other taxpayers. We therefore conclude that petitioner may offset losses incurred in sales to nonmembers against investment income only if its nonmember sales are motivated by an intent to profit. B Losses from Portland Golf’s sales to nonmembers may be used to offset investment income only if those activities were undertaken with a profit motive — that is, an intent to generate receipts in excess of costs. The parties and the other courts in this case, however, have taken divergent positions as to the range of expenses that qualify as costs of the nonexempt activity and are to be considered in determining whether petitioner acted with the requisite profit motive. In the view of the Tax Court, petitioner’s profit motive was established by the fact that the club’s receipts from nonmember sales exceeded its variable costs. Since Portland Golf’s fixed costs, by definition, have been incurred even in the absence of sales to nonmembers, the Tax Court concluded that these costs should be disregarded in determining petitioner’s intent to profit. The Commissioner has taken no firm position as to the precise manner in which Portland Golf’s fixed costs are to be allocated between member and nonmember sales. Indeed, the Commissioner does not even insist that any portion of petitioner’s fixed costs must be attributed to nonmember activities in determining intent to profit. He does insist, however, that the same allocation method is to be used in determining petitioner’s intent to profit as in computing its actual profit or loss. See Brief for Respondent 44-46. In the present case the parties have stipulated that the gross-to-gross method provides a reasonable formula for allocating fixed costs, and Portland Golf has used that method in calculating the losses incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers. The Commissioner contends that petitioner is therefore required to demonstrate an intent to earn gross receipts in excess of fixed and variable costs, with the allocable share of fixed costs being determined by the gross-to-gross method. Although the Court of Appeals’ opinion is not entirely clear on this point, see n. 8, supra, that court seems to have taken a middle ground. The Court of Appeals expressly rejected the Tax Court’s assertion that profit motive could be established by a showing that gross receipts exceeded variable costs; the court insisted that some portion of fixed costs must be considered in determining intent to profit. The court appeared, however, to leave open the possibility that Portland Golf could use the gross-to-gross method in calculating its actual losses, while using some other allocation method to demonstrate that its sales to nonmembers were undertaken with a profit motive. We conclude that the Commissioner’s position is the correct one. Portland Golf’s argument rests, as the Commissioner puts it, on an “inherent contradiction.” Brief for Respondent 44. Petitioner’s calculation of actual losses rests on the claim that a portion of its fixed expenses is properly regarded as attributable to the production of income from nonmember sales. Given this assertion, we do not believe that these expenses can be ignored (or, more accurately, attributed to petitioner’s exempt activities) in determining whether petitioner acted with the requisite intent to profit. Essentially the same criticism applies to the Court of Appeals’ approach. That court required petitioner to include some portion of fixed expenses in demonstrating its intent to profit, but it left open the possibility that petitioner could employ an allocation method different from that used in calculating its actual losses. Under that approach, some of petitioner’s fixed expenses could be attributed to exempt functions in determining intent to profit and to nonmember sales in establishing the club’s actual loss. This, like the rationale of the Tax Court, seems to us to rest on an “inherent contradiction.” Petitioner’s principal response is that § 162 requires an intent to earn an economic profit, and that this is quite different from an intent to earn taxable income. Portland Golf emphasizes that numerous provisions of the Code establish deductions and preferences which do not purport to mirror economic reality. Therefore, petitioner argues, taxpayers may frequently act with an intent to profit, even though the foreseeable (and, indeed, the intended) result of their efforts is that they suffer (or achieve) tax losses. Much of the Code, in petitioner’s view, would be rendered a nullity if the mere fact of tax losses sufficed to show that a taxpayer lacked an intent to profit, thereby rendering the deductions unavailable. In Portland Golf’s view, the parties have stipulated only that the gross-to-gross formula provides a reasonable method of determining what portion of fixed expenses is “directly connected” with the nonexempt activity for purposes of computing taxable income. That stipulation, Portland Golf contends, is irrelevant in determining the portion of fixed expenses that represents the actual economic cost of the activity in question. We accept petitioner’s contention that § 162 requires only an intent to earn an economic profit. We acknowledge, moreover, that many Code provisions are designed to serve purposes (such as encouragement of certain types of investment) other than the accurate measurement of economic income. A taxpayer who takes advantage of deductions or preferences of that kind may establish an intent to profit even though he has no expectation of realizing taxable income. The fixed expenses that Portland Golf seeks to allocate to its nonmember sales, however, are deductions of a different kind. The Code does not state that fixed costs are allocable on a gross-to-gross basis irrespective of economic reality. Rather, petitioner’s right to use the gross-to-gross method rests on the club’s assertion that this allocation formula reasonably identifies those expenses that are “directly connected” to the nonmember sales, § 512(a)(3)(A), and are “the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred” in selling food and drink to nonmembers, see § 162(a). Language such as this, it seems to us, reflects an attempt to measure economic income — not an effort to use the tax law to serve ancillary purposes. Having calculated its actual losses on the basis of the gross-to-gross formula, petitioner is therefore foreclosed from attempting to demonstrate its intent to profit by arguing that some other allocation method more accurately reflects economic reality. IV We hold that any losses incurred as a result of petitioner’s nonmember sales may be offset against its investment income only if the nonmember sales were undertaken with an intent to profit. We also conclude that in demonstrating the requisite profit motive, Portland Golf must employ the same method of allocating fixed expenses as it uses in calculating its actual loss. Petitioner has failed to show that it intended to earn gross income from nonmember sales in excess of its total (fixed plus variable) costs, where fixed expenses are allocated using the gross-to-gross method. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. Section 501(c)(7) grants an exemption from federal income tax to “[c]lubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder.” Section 511 of the Code provides that the “unrelated business taxable income” of an exempt organization shall be taxed at the ordinary corporate rate. The term “unrelated business taxable income,” as applied to the income of a club such as petitioner, is defined in § 512(a)(3)(A). That definition encompasses all sources of income except receipts from the club’s members. For 1980, gross receipts from nonmember sales in the bar and dining room totaled $84,422, while variable expenses were $61,821. For 1981, gross receipts totaled $106,547, while variable expenses were $78,407. App. 85. For example, if 10% of petitioner’s gross receipts were derived from nonmember sales, 10% of petitioner’s fixed costs would be allocated to the nonexempt activity. That method of allocation appears rather generous to Portland Golf. The club charges nonmembers higher prices for food and drink than members are charged, even though nonmembers' meals presumably cost no more to prepare and serve. It therefore seems likely that the gross-to-gross method overstates the percentage of fixed costs properly attributable to nonmember sales. The parties, however, stipulated that this allocation method was reasonable. Id., at 17. The following table shows petitioner’s losses when fixed costs are allocated using the gross-to-gross method: 1980 1981 Gross income $84,422 $106,547 Variable expenses (61,821) (78,407) Allocated fixed expenses (51,034) (97,748) Net loss ($28,433) ($69,608) It is of interest to note that if petitioner’s fixed costs had been allocated using an alternative formula, known as the “square foot and hours of actual use” method, see id., at 29, its gross receipts exceeded the sum of variable and allocated fixed costs for both years: 1980 1981 Gross income $84,422 $106,547 Variable expenses (61,821) (78,407) Allocated fixed expenses (3,153) (4,666) Net profit $19,448 $23,474 The general rule under the Code is that losses incurred in a profit-seeking venture may be deducted from unrelated income; expenses of a not-for-profit activity may be offset against the income from that activity, but losses may not be applied against income from other sources. See 1 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶¶20.1.2, 22.5.4, pp. 20-6, 22-63 to 22-64 (2d ed. 1989). The Tax Court stated that Portland Golf “did intend to make a profit, and did make a profit between the amount received from sales to nonmembers and the costs related to those sales which would not have been incurred absent those sales.” 55 TCM, at 216, 188,076 P-H Memo TC, at 416. The Tax Court, in articulating this standard for determining whether intent to profit had been shown, relied on its earlier reviewed decision in North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 89 T. C. 563 (1987). That decision subsequently was reversed. 877 F. 2d 750 (CA9 1989). The basis for the Court of Appeals’ remand order is not entirely clear to us. It appears, however, that the court left open the possibility that petitioner could establish its intent to profit by using some other method of allocating fixed costs (such as the “actual use” method, see n. 5, supra), while continuing to use the gross-to-gross formula in computing actual losses. Both parties interpret the Court of Appeals’ decision in this manner, and both express disapproval of that approach. See Brief for Respondent 47, n. 25 (“[T]his argument is untenable”); Brief for Petitioner 48 (“While the Ninth Circuit’s formula is better than that of the Government, it is basically unprincipled”). Our disposition of the case makes unnecessary precise interpretation of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. See also Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1986); Rev. Rui. 81-69, 1981-1 Cum. Bull. 351-352; A. Scialabba, The Unrelated Business Taxable Income of Social Clubs, 10 Campbell L. Rev. 249 (1988). Section 513(a) defines “unrelated trade or business” as “any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption.” Section 512(a)(3)(B) defines “exempt function income” as “the gross income from dues, fees, charges, or similar amounts paid by members of the organization as consideration for providing such members or their dependents or guests goods, facilities, or services in furtherance of the purposes constituting the basis for the exemption of the organization to which such income is paid.” See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1950) (“The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of [these] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits remaining after taxes”); H. R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36 (1950). The tax on “unrelated business income” was added to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906. See S. Rep. No. 2375, at 30-31; H. R. Rep. No. 2319, at 38. Portland Golf appears to concede this point, too. See Brief for Petitioner 10 (“The parties agree that all of the expenses in issue . . . are the types of corporate expenses allowed as deductions by Code Section 162”). Petitioner does not identify any other Code provision which would serve as a basis for the deduction claimed in this case. Section 183 of the Code permits a taxpayer to offset expenses incurred in a not-for-profit activity against income from that activity up to the amount of the income. Even before the enactment of § 183, moreover, the courts and the Commissioner had not required that revenues earned in activities showing a net loss be declared as taxable income. See 1 Bittker & Lokken, n. 6, supra, ¶22.5.4, p. 22-63. Although § 183 is inapplicable to a nonprofit corporation such as Portland Golf, the Commissioner has followed longstanding tax principles in permitting the deduction of expenses incurred in nonmember sales up to the amount of petitioner’s receipts. See Brief for Respondent 33. At issue in this case is petitioner's right to offset losses from nonmember sales against income from unrelated investments. The Code distinguishes a social club’s “exempt function income” from its “unrelated business taxable income” by looking to the source of the payment: “[EJxempt function income” is limited to money received from the members. § 512(a)(3)(B). However, a social club could easily organize events whose primary purpose was to benefit the membership, yet arrange for nonmembers to make modest contributions toward the cost of the events. Those contributions would constitute “unrelated business taxable income”; but if losses incurred in such activities could be used to offset investment income, it would be relatively easy for clubs to avoid taxation on their investments. The general rule that losses incurred in a not-for-profit activity may not be used to offset unrelated income rests on the recognition that one who incurs expenses without an intent to profit presumably derives some intrinsic pleasure or benefit from the activity. The Code’s limitation on deductibility (expenses may be deducted up to, but not above, the gross income produced by the activity) reflects the view that taxpayers should not be allowed to deduct what are, in essence, personal expenses simply because the activity in question generates some receipts. Just as an individual taxpayer may not offset personal expenses against income from other sources, a social club should not be allowed to deduct expenses incurred for the benefit of the membership from unrelated business income. The parties stipulated that the gross-to-gross formula was a reasonable method of allocating fixed expenses. App. 17. In his brief to this Court, however, the Commissioner states: “There may be room to debate whether the fixed costs allocated by petitioner to its nonmember sales constitute true economic costs of that activity that ought to be treated as ‘directly connected’ to the production of the nonmember sales income. It might be argued that only the variable costs are ‘directly connected with’ the nonmember activity, and therefore that only those variable costs should offset the gross receipts from the nonmember income." Brief for Respondent 45, n. 24. See n. 8, supra. The Tax Court noted that petitioner would have shown a profit on sales to nonmembers in both 1980 and 1981 if fixed costs had been allocated under the “actual use” method. See 55 TCM 212, 213 (1988), ¶ 88,076 P-H Memo TC 412, 413. The Tax Court consistently has held that the possibility of realizing tax benefits should be disregarded in determining whether an intent to earn an economic profit has been shown. (That is, the reduction in tax liability cannot itself be the “profit.”) See, e. g., Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T. C. 1471, 1490 (1986) (“A transaction has economic substance and will be recognized for tax purposes if the transaction offers a reasonable opportunity for economic profit, that is, profit exclusive of tax benefits”); Seaman v. Commissioner, 84 T. C. 564, 588 (1985) (‘“[PJrofit' means economic profit, independent of tax savings”); Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T. C. 210, 233 (1983) (same). Accord, Simon v. Commissioner, 830 F. 2d 499, 500 (CA3 1987). Portland Golf does not dispute this principle. See Brief for Petitioner 39 (“The cases have uniformly held that taxable businesses, in order to deduct expenses in excess of income, need only show an ‘economic profit’ independent of tax savings, or ‘economic gain’ independent of tax savings”) (footnotes omitted). We therefore assume, without deciding, that potential reductions in tax liability are irrelevant to the determination whether a profit motive exists. As stated earlier, § 512(a)(3)(A) limits deductions from unrelated business taxable income to “deductions allowed by this chapter.” In the present case, petitioner may offset losses from nonmember sales against investment income only if those losses are deductible under § 162. That Code provision states: “There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.” Thus, the expenses petitioner seeks to deduct will constitute “deductions allowed by this chapter” only if they are “the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred” in selling food and drink to nonmembers. We do not hold that, for other cases, any particular method of allocating fixed expenses must be used by social clubs. We hold only that the allocation method used in determining actual profit or loss must also be used in determining whether the taxpayer acted with a profit motive. Petitioner here has stipulated, however, to the reasonableness of the gross-to-gross method and has used that method in calculating its actual losses. We note that no other allocation method, used consistently, would have produced a result more favorable to petitioner. Had petitioner employed the actual-use method, or ignored fixed costs entirely, it could have established its intent to profit, but it would have realized a net gain from nonmember sales and its “unrelated business taxable income” would have been higher. The fact that petitioner suffered actual losses in 1980 and 1981 does not, by itself, prove that Portland Golf lacked a profit motive. A taxpayer's intent to profit is not disproved simply because no profit is realized during a particular year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183 — l(c)(l)(ii), 26 CFR § 1.183 — l(c)(l)(ii) (1989) (most activities presumed to be engaged in for profit if gross income exceeds costs in any two of five consecutive years); Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(6), 26 CFR § L183-2(b)(6) (1989) (“A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit"). Petitioner could offset these losses against investment income if it could demonstrate that it intended to earn gross income in excess of total costs, with fixed expenses being allocated under the gross-to-gross formula. Portland Golf has not asserted, however, that it possessed such a motive. The club’s reluctance to make that argument is understandable: In every year from 1975 through 1984, petitioner incurred losses from its sales to nonmembers when fixed costs are allocated on a gross-to-gross basis. 55 TCM, at 213. *88,076 P-H Memo TC, at 413.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NIJHAWAN v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 08-495. Argued April 27, 2009 Decided June 15, 2009 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas E. Moseley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Peter C. Salerno. Curtis E. Gannon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Acting Assistant Attorney. General Hertz, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, Jennifer J. Keeney, W. Manning Evans, Holly M. Smith, Andrew C. MacLachlan, Saul Greenstein, and Erica B. Miles. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Jayashri Srikantiah, Cecillia D. Wang, Lucas Guttentag, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Vincent A. Eng, Karen K. Narasaki, David A. Kettel, and Donald W. Yoo; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Iris E. Bennett, Michael A. Hoffman, and Joshua L. Dratel; and for Akio Kawashima et al. by Jenny Lin-Alva, Edward O. C. Ord, and Thomas J. Whalen. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal immigration law provides that any “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). A related statute defines “aggravated felony” in terms of a set of listed offenses that includes “an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (emphasis added). See Appendix A, infra. The question before us is whether the italicized language refers to an element of the fraud or deceit “offense” as set forth in the particular fraud or deceit statute defining the offense of which the alien was previously convicted. If so, then in order to determine whether a prior conviction is for the kind of offense described, the immigration judge must look to the criminal fraud or deceit statute to see whether it contains a monetary threshold of $10,000 or more. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990) (so interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act). We conclude, however, that the italicized language does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit crime. Rather it refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed a (more broadly defined) fraud or deceit crime on a particular occasion. I Petitioner, an alien, immigrated to the United States in 1985. In 2002 he was indicted for conspiring to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering. 18 U. S. C. §§371, 1341, 1343, 1344, 1956(h). A jury found him guilty. But because none of these statutes requires a finding of any particular amount of victim loss, the jury made no finding about the amount of the loss. At sentencing petitioner stipulated that the loss exceeded $100 million. The court then imposed a sentence of 41 months in prison and required restitution of $683 million. In 2005 the Government, claiming that petitioner had been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” sought to remove him from the United States. The Immigration Judge found that petitioner’s conviction was for crimes of fraud and deceit; that the sentencing stipulation and restitution order showed that the victims’ loss exceeded $10,000; and that petitioner’s conviction consequently fell within the immigration statute’s “aggravated felony” definition. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), (U) (including within the definition of “aggravated felony” any “attempt or conspiracy to commit” a listed “offense”). The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a-51a. So did the Third Circuit. 523 F. 3d 387 (2008). The Third Circuit noted that the statutes of conviction were silent as to amounts, but, in its view, the determination of loss amounts for “aggravated felony” purposes “requires an inquiry into the underlying facts of the case.” Id., at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Courts of Appeals have come to different conclusions as to whether the $10,000 threshold in subparagraph (M)(i) refers to an element of a fraud statute or to the factual circumstances surrounding commission of the crime on a specific occasion. Compare Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F. 3d 45, 55 (CA1 2006) (fact-based approach); 523 F. 3d 387 (case below) (same); Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F. 3d 171, 178 (CA5 2008) (same), with Dulal-Whiteway v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 501 F. 3d 116, 131 (CA2 2007) (definitional approach); Kawashima v. Mukasey, 530 F. 3d 1111, 1117 (CA9 2008) (same); Obasohan v. United States Atty. Gen., 479 F. 3d 785, 791 (CA11 2007) (same). We granted certiorari to decide the question. II The interpretive difficulty before us reflects the linguistic fact that in ordinary speech words such as “crime,” “felony,” “offense,” and the like sometimes refer to a generic crime, say, the crime of fraud or theft in general, and sometimes refer to the specific acts in which an offender engaged on a specific occasion, say, the fraud that the defendant planned and executed last month. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U. S. 122, 125 (2009). The question here, as we have said, is whether the italicized statutory words “offense that involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the . . . victims exceeds $10,000” should be interpreted in the first sense (which we shall call “categorical”), i. as referring to a generic crime, or in the second sense (which we shall call “circumstance-specific”), as referring to the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion. If the first, we must look to the statute defining the offense to determine whether it has an appropriate monetary threshold; if the second, we must look to the facts and circumstances underlying an offender’s conviction. A The basic argument favoring the first — i. e., the “generic” or “categorical” — interpretation rests upon Taylor, Chambers, and James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007). Those cases concerned the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a statute that enhances the sentence imposed upon certain firearm-law offenders who also have three prior convictions for “a violent felony.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e). See Appendix B, infra. ACCA defines “violent felony” to include, first, felonies with elements that involve the use of physical force against another; second, felonies that amount to “burglary, arson, or extortion” or that involve the use of explosives; and third, felonies that “otherwise involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B). In Taylor and James we held that ACCA’s language read naturally uses the word “felony” to refer to a generic crime as generally committed. Chambers, supra, at 125 (discussing Taylor, supra, at 602); James, supra, at 201-202. The Court noted that such an interpretation of the statute avoids “the practical difficulty of trying to ascertain” in a later proceeding, “perhaps from a paper record” containing only a citation (say, by number) to a statute and a guilty plea, “whether the [offender’s] prior crime ... did or did not involve,” say, violence. Chambers, supra, at 125. Thus in James, referring to Taylor, we made clear that courts must use the “categorical method” to determine whether a conviction for “attempted burglary” was a conviction for a crime that, in ACCA’s language, “involve[d] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). That method required the court to “examine, not the unsuccessful burglary the defendant attempted on a particular occasion, but the generic crime of attempted burglary.” Chambers, supra, at 125 (discussing James, supra, at 204-206). We also noted that the categorical method is not always easy to apply. That is because sometimes a separately numbered subsection of a criminal statute will refer to several different crimes, each described separately. And it can happen that some of these crimes involve violence while others do not. A single Massachusetts statute section entitled “Breaking and Entering at Night,” for example, criminalizes breaking into a “building, ship, vessel or vehicle.” Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, § 16 (West 2006). In such an instance, we have said, a court must determine whether an offender’s prior conviction was for the violent, rather than the nonviolent, break-ins that this single five-word phrase describes (e. g., breaking into a building rather than into a vessel), by examining “the indictment or information and jury instructions,” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 602, or, if a guilty plea is at issue, by examining the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or “some comparable judicial record” of the factual basis for the plea, Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 26 (2005). Petitioner argues that we should interpret the subsection of the “aggravated felony” statute before us as requiring use of this same “categorical” approach. He says that the statute’s language, read naturally as in Taylor, refers to a generic kind of crime, not a crime as committed on a particular occasion. He adds that here, as in Taylor, such a reading avoids the practical difficulty of determining the nature of prior conduct from what may be a brief paper record, perhaps noting only a statutory section number and a guilty plea; or, if there is a more extensive record, combing through that record for evidence of underlying conduct. Also, the categorical approach, since it covers only criminal statutes with a relevant monetary threshold, not only provides assurance of a finding on the point, but also assures that the defendant had an opportunity to present evidence about the amount of loss. B Despite petitioner’s arguments, we conclude that the “fraud and deceit” provision before us calls for a “circumstance-specific,” not a “categorical,” interpretation. The “aggravated felony” statute of which it is a part differs in general from ACCA, the statute at issue in Taylor. And the “fraud and deceit” provision differs specifically from ACCA’s provisions. 1 Consider, first, ACCA in general. That statute defines the “violent” felonies it covers to include “burglary, arson, or extortion” and “crime[s]” that have “as an element” the use or threatened use of force. 18 U. S. C. §§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). This language refers directly to generic crimes. The statute, however, contains other, more ambiguous language, covering “crime[s]” that “involv[eJ conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Ibid. (emphasis added). While this language poses greater interpretive difficulty, the Court held that it too refers to crimes as generically defined. James, supra, at 202. Now compare the “aggravated felony” statute before us. 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43). We concede that it resembles ACC A in certain respects. The “aggravated felony” statute lists several of its “offenses” in language that must refer to generic crimes. Subparagraph (A), for example, lists “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” See, e. g., Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F. 3d 1147, 1152 (CA9 2008) (en banc) (applying the categorical approach to “sexual abuse”); Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F. 3d 144, 164 (CA3 2004) (same); Santos v. Gonzales, 436 F. 3d 323, 324 (CA2 2005) (per curiam) (same). Subparagraph (B) lists “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” See Gousse v. Ashcroft, 339 F. 3d 91, 95-96 (CA2 2003) (applying categorical approach); Fernandez v. Mukasey, 544 F. 3d 862, 871-872 (CA7 2008) (same); Steele v. Blackman, 236 F. 3d 130, 136 (CA3 2001) (same). And subparagraph (C) lists “illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices.” Other sections refer specifically to an “offense described in” a particular section of the Federal Criminal Code. See, e. g., subparagraphs (E), (H), (I), (J), (L). More importantly, however, the “aggravated felony” statute differs from ACCA in that it lists certain other “offenses” using language that almost certainly does not refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances. For example, subparagraph (P), after referring to “an offense” that amounts to “falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport,” adds, “except in the case of a first offense for which the alien . . . committed the offense for the purpose of assisting ... the alien’s spouse, child, or parent... to violate a provision of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) The language about (for example) “forging . . . passport[s]” may well refer to a generic crime, but the italicized exception cannot possibly refer to a generic crime. That is because there is no such generic crime; there is no criminal statute that contains any such exception. Thus if the provision is to have any meaning at all, the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed the crime on a particular occasion. See also subparagraph (N) (similar exception). The statute has other provisions that contain qualifying language that certainly seems to call for circumstance-specific application. Subparagraph (K)(ii), for example, lists “offense[s]... described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18 (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage.” (Emphasis added.) Of the three specifically listed criminal statutory sections only one subsection (namely, § 2423(d)) says anything about commercial advantage. Thus, unless the “commercial advantage” language calls for circumstance-specific application, the statute’s explicit references to §§2421 and 2422 would be pointless. But see Gertsenshteyn v. United States Dept. of Justice, 544 F. 3d 137, 144-145 (CA2 2008). Subparagraph (M)(ii) provides yet another example. It refers to an offense “described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000.” (Emphasis added.) There is no offense “described in section 7201 of title 26” that has a specific loss amount as an element. Again, unless the “revenue loss” language calls for circumstance-specific application, the tax-evasion provision would be pointless. The upshot is that the “aggravated felony” statute, unlike ACCA, contains some language that refers to generic crimes and some language that almost certainly refers to the specific circumstances in which a crime was committed. The question before us then is to which category subparagraph (M)(i) belongs. 2 Subparagraph (M)(i) refers to “an offense that... involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” (Emphasis added.) The language of the provision is consistent with a circumstance-specific approach. The words “in which” (which modify “offense”) can refer to the conduct involved “m” the commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the offense. Moreover, subparagraph (M)(i) appears just prior to subparagraph (M)(ii), the internal revenue provision we have just discussed, and it is identical in structure to that provision. Where, as here, Congress uses similar statutory language and similar statutory structure in two adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar interpretations. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005). Moreover, to apply a categorical approach here would leave subparagraph (M)(i) with little, if any, meaningful application. We have found no widely applicable federal fraud statute that contains á relevant monetary loss threshold. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), 1344 (bank fraud), 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States), 666 (theft in federally funded programs), 1028 (fraud in connection with identification documents), 1029 (fraud in connection with access devices), 1030 (fraud in connection with computers), 1347 (health care fraud), and 1348 (securities fraud). Petitioner has found only three federal fraud statutes that do so, and those three contain thresholds not of $10,000, but of $100,000 or $1 million, §§ 668 (theft by fraud of an artwork worth $100,000 or more), 1031(a) (contract fraud against the United States where the contract is worth at least $1 million), and 1039(d) (providing enhanced penalties for fraud in obtaining telephone records, where the scheme involves more than $100,000). Why would Congress intend subparagraph (M)(i) to apply to only these three federal statutes, and then choose a monetary threshold that, on its face, would apply to other, nonexistent statutes as well? We recognize, as petitioner argues, that Congress might have intended subparagraph (M)(i) to apply almost exclusively to those who violate certain state fraud and deceit statutes. So we have examined state law. See Appendix C, infra. We have found, however, that in 1996, when Congress added the $10,000 threshold in subparagraph (M)(i), see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility-Act § 321(a)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-628, 29 States had no major fraud or deceit statute with any relevant monetary threshold. In 13 of the remaining 21 States, fraud and deceit statutes contain relevant monetary thresholds but with amounts significantly higher than $10,000, leaving only 8 States with statutes in respect to which subparagraph (M)(i)’s $10,000 threshold, as categorically interpreted, would have full effect. We do not believe Congress would have intended (M)(i) to apply in so limited and so haphazard a manner. Cf. United States v. Hayes, 555 U. S. 415, 427 (2009) (reaching similar conclusion for similar reason in respect to a statute referring to crimes involving “domestic violence”). Petitioner next points to 8 U. S. C. § 1326, which criminalizes illegal entry after removal and imposes a higher maximum sentence when an alien’s removal was “subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.” § 1326(b)(2). Petitioner says that a circumstance-specific approach to subparagraph (M)(i) could create potential constitutional problems in a subsequent criminal prosecution under that statute, because loss amount would not have been found beyond a reasonable doubt in the prior criminal proceeding. The Government, however, stated in its brief and at oral argument that the later jury, during the illegal reentry trial, would have to find loss amount beyond a reasonable doubt, Brief for Respondent 49-50; Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40, eliminating any constitutional concern. Cf. Hayes, supra, at 426. We conclude that Congress did not intend subparagraph (M)(i)’s monetary threshold to be applied categorically, i. e., to only those fraud and deceit crimes generically defined to include that threshold. Rather, the monetary threshold applies to the specific circumstances surrounding an offender’s commission of a fraud and deceit crime on a specific occasion. III Petitioner, as an alternative argument, says that we should nonetheless borrow from Taylor what that case called a “modified categorical approach.” He says that, for reasons of fairness, we should insist that a jury verdict, or a judge-approved equivalent, embody a determination that the loss involved in a prior fraud or deceit conviction amounted to at least $10,000. To determine whether that is so, petitioner says, the subsequent immigration court applying subparagraph (M)(i) should examine only charging documents, jury instructions, and any special jury finding (if one has been requested). If there was a trial but no jury, the subsequent court should examine the equivalent judge-made findings. If there was a guilty plea (and no trial), the subsequent court should examine the written plea documents or the plea colloquy. To authorize any broader examination of the prior proceedings, petitioner says, would impose an unreasonable administrative burden on immigration judges and would unfairly permit him to be deported on the basis of circumstances that were not before judicially determined to have been present and which he may not have had an opportunity, prior to conviction, to dispute. We agree with petitioner that the statute foresees the use of fundamentally fair procedures, including procedures that give an alien a fair opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior conviction involved a fraud with the relevant loss to victims. But we do not agree that fairness requires the evidentiary limitations he proposes. For one thing, we have found nothing in prior law that so limits the immigration court. Taylor, James, and Shepard, the cases that developed the evidentiary list to which petitioner points, developed that list for a very different purpose, namely, that of determining which statutory phrase (contained within a statutory provision that covers several different generic crimes) covered a prior conviction. See supra, at 34-35; Taylor, 495 U. S., at 602; Shepard, 544 U. S., at 26. For another, petitioner’s proposal itself can prove impractical insofar as it requires obtaining from a jury a special verdict on a fact that (given our Part II determination) is not an element of the offense. Further, a deportation proceeding is a civil proceeding in which the Government does not have to prove its claim “beyond a reasonable doubt.” At the same time the evidence that the Government offers must meet a “clear and convincing” standard. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). And, as the Government points out, the “loss” must “be tied to the specific counts covered by the conviction.” Brief for Respondent 44; see, e. g., Alaka v. Attorney General of United States, 456 F. 3d 88, 107 (CA3 2006) (loss amount must be tethered to offense of conviction; amount cannot be based on acquitted or dismissed counts or general conduct); Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F. 3d 733, 739-740 (CA7 2005) (same). And the Government adds that the “sole purpose” of the “aggravated felony” inquiry “is to ascertain the nature of a prior conviction; it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.” Brief for Respondent 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the Board of Immigration Appeals, too, has recognized that immigration judges must assess findings made at sentencing “with an eye to what losses are covered and to the burden of proof employed.” In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 319 (2007). These considerations, taken together, mean that petitioner and those in similar circumstances have at least one and possibly two opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the earlier sentencing and the second at the deportation hearing itself. They also mean that, since the Government must show the amount of loss by clear and convincing evidence, uncertainties caused by the passage of time are likely to count in the alien’s favor. We can find nothing unfair about the Immigration Judge’s having here relied upon earlier sentencing-related material. Petitioner’s own stipulation, produced for sentencing purposes, shows that the conviction involved losses considerably greater than $10,000. The court’s restitution order shows the same. In the absence of any conflicting evidence (and petitioner mentions none), this evidence is clear and convincing. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner’s prior federal conviction consequently falls within the scope of subparagraph (M)(i). And we affirm its judgment. It is so ordered. APPENDIXES A Section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43), provides: “The term ‘aggravated felony’ means— “(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; “(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18); “(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title); “(D) an offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of monetary instruments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specific unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded $10,000; “(E) an offense described in— “(i) section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title (relating to explosive materials offenses); “(ii) section 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p), or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18 (relating to firearms offenses); or “(iii) section 5861 of title 26 (relating to firearms offenses); “(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year; “(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year; “(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom); “(I) an offense described in section 2251,2251A, or 2252 of title 18 (relating to child pornography); “(J) an offense described in section 1962 of title 18 (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organizations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a second or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to gambling offenses), for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed; “(K) an offense that— “(i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business; “(ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of title 18 (relating to transportation for the purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial advantage; or “(iii) is described in any of sections 1581-1585 or 1588-1591 of title 18 (relating to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons); “(L) an offense described in— “(i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or 2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18; “(ii) section 421 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover intelligence agents); or “(iii) section 421 of title 50 (relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents); “(M) an offense that— “(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000; or “(ii) is described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000; “(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 1324(a) of this title (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter “(O) an offense described in section 1325(a) or 1326 of this title committed by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph of this paragraph; “(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of title 18 or is described in section 1546(a) of such title (relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien’s spouse, child, or parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this chapter; “(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more; “(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; “(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; “(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment or more may be imposed; and “(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph. “The term applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30,1996.” (Footnotes omitted.) B Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e), provides: “(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g). “(2) As used in this subsection— “(A) the term ‘serious drug offense’ means— “(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U. S. C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46, for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law; or “(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law; “(B) the term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that— “(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or “(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another; and “(C) the term ‘conviction’ includes a finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.” C We examined state statutes involving fraud or deceit in effect in 1996, when Congress added the $10,000 threshold in subparagraph (M)(i). See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 321(a)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-628. While perhaps questions could be raised about whether certain of the statutes listed below involve “fraud or deceit” as required by subparagraph (M)(i), we give petitioner the benefit of any doubt and treat the statute as relevant. 1 In 29 States plus the District of Columbia, the main statutes in effect in 1996 involving fraud and deceit either did not have any monetary threshold or set a threshold lower than $10,000 even for the most serious grade of the offense. Alabama: see, e. g., Ala. Code §§ 13A-8-2, 13A-8-3, 13A-9-14, 13A-9-14.1,13A-9-46, 13A-9-47,13A-9-73 (1994). Arkansas: see, e. g., Ark. Code Ann. §§5-36-103 (Supp. 1995), 5- 37-203 (1993), 5-37-204, 5-37-207, 5-37-211. California: see, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 484, 487 (West 1985), 502.7 (West Supp. 1998). District of Columbia: see, e. g., D. C. Code §§22-3821, 22-3823 (1996). Georgia: see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-8-3, 16-8-12, 16-9-33 (1996). Idaho: see, e. g., Idaho Code §§ 18-2403 (Lexis 1987), 18-2407 (Lexis Supp. 1996). Kentucky: see, e. g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 514.040 (Lexis Supp. 1996). Louisiana: see, e. g., La. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:67, 14:67.11, 14:70.1, 14:70.4, 14:71, 14:71.1 (West 1997). Maryland: see, e. g., Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §§340, 342, 145, 230A, 230C, 230D (Lexis 1996). Massachusetts: see, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, §§ 30, 37C (West 1996). Michigan: see, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§750.218, 750.271, 750.280, 750.219a, 750.356c (West 1991). Mississippi: see, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-19-21, 97-19-35, 97-19-39, 97-19-71, 97-19-83 (1994). Missouri: see, e. g., Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 570.030, 570.120, 570.130, 570.180 (1994). Montana: see, e. g., Mont. Code Ann. §§45-6-301, 45-6-313, 45-6- 315, 45-6-317 (1995). Nebraska: see, e. g., Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§28-512, 28-518, 28-631 (1995). Nevada: see, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§205.0832, 205.0835, 205.370, 205.380 (1995). New Hampshire: see, e.g., N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§637:4, 637:11, 638:5, 638:20 (West 1996). North Carolina: see, e. g., N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§14-100, 14-106, 14-113.13 (Lexis 1993). Oklahoma: see, e.g., Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §§1451 (West 1991), 1462 (West Supp. 1993), 1541.1, 1541.2, 1541.3 (West 1991), 1541.4, 1550.2, 1662, 1663 (West Supp. 1993). Pennsylvania: see, e. g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3903, 3922, 4110,4111 (1983), 4117 (Supp. 2009); but see §4105 (bad check statute amended 1996 to introduce $75,000 threshold). Rhode Island: see, e. g., R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-18-6,11-18-7, 11-18-8, 11-18-9, 11-41-4, 11-41-5, 11-41-29 (1994), 11-41-30 (Supp. 1999). South Carolina: see, e. g., S. C. Code Ann. § 16-13-240 (2003). South Dakota: see, e. g., S. D. Codified Laws §§ 22-30A-3,22-30A-10 (1988), 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1997). Utah: see, e. g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-405, 76-6-412, 76-6-521, 76-10-1801 (Lexis 1996). Vermont: see, e. g., Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §§2001, 2002, 2024, 2531, 2582 (1996). Virginia: see, e. g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-178, 18.2-95, 18.2-195 (Lexis 1996). Washington: see, e. g., Wash. Rev. Code §§9A.56.020 (1994), 9A.56.030 (Supp. 2005). West Virginia: see, e. g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-3-24 (Lexis Supp. 1997). Wisconsin: see, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§943.20, 943.395, 943.41 (1993-1994). Wyoming: see, e. g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-3-407, 6-3-607, 6-3-802 (1997). 2 In 13 States, conviction under the main fraud and deceit statutes in effect in 1996 could categorically qualify under subparagraph (M)(i). But the relevant monetary thresholds for these offenses — that is, the thresholds such that conviction categorically would satisfy the monetary requirement of subparagraph (M)(i) — were significantly higher than $10,000. Additionally, a number of these States had statutes targeted at particular kinds of fraud without any relevant monetary threshold. Alaska: see, e.g., Alaska Stat. §§11.46.120, 11.46.180 (1996) ($25,000); but see, e. g., § 11.46.285 (fraudulent use of a credit card, no relevant monetary threshold). Arizona: see, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1802 (West 1989), 13-2109 (West 2000) ($25,000); but see, e. g., §§ 13-2103 (receipt of anything of value by fraudulent use of a credit card), 13-2204 (defrauding secured creditors), 13-2205 (defrauding judgment creditors), 13-2206 (West 1989) (fraud in insolvency), all with no relevant monetary threshold. Colorado: see, e. g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-4-401 (Supp. 1996) ($15,000), but see, e.g., §§ 18-5-205 (fraud by check), 18-5-207 (1986) (purchase on credit to defraud), both with no relevant monetary threshold. Delaware: see, e. g., Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§841, 843 (1995) ($50,000); but see, e. g., §§903 (unlawful use of credit card), 913 (insurance fraud), 916 (home improvement fraud), all with no relevant monetary threshold. Hawaii: see, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. §§708-830, 708-830.5 (Lexis 1994) ($20,000); but see, e. g., §§708-873 (defrauding secured creditors), 708-8100 (fraudulent use of a credit card), 708-8100.5 (fraudulent encoding of a credit card), 708-8103 (credit card fraud by a provider of goods or services), all with no relevant monetary threshold. Indiana: see, e.g., Ind. Code §§35-43-4-1, 35-43-4-2 (West 1993) ($100,000), 35-43-5-7.1 (West Supp. 1996) ($50,000); but see, e.g., §§35-43-5-3 (deception), 35-43-5-4 (West 1993) (insurance and credit card fraud), 35-43-5-7 (welfare fraud), 35-43-5-8 (fraud on financial institutions), all with no relevant monetary threshold. Kansas: see, e. g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §§21-3701 (1995), 21-3707 (Supp. 1996), 21-3729 (1995), 21-3846 (Supp. 1996) ($25,000). Minnesota: see, e. g., Minn. Stat. § 609.52 (1996) ($35,000). New Jersey: see, e. g., N. J. Stat. Ann. §§2C:20-2, 2C:20-4, 2C:21-13, 2C:21-17 (West 1995) ($75,000); but see, e.g., §§2C:21-6 (credit cards), 2C:21-12 (defrauding secured creditors), both without a relevant monetary threshold. New Mexico: see, e. g., N. M. Stat. Ann. §§30-16-6 (1994), 30-33-13 (1997), 30-44-7 (1989), 30-50-4 (1997) ($20,000); but see, e. g., § 30-16-33 (1994) (credit card fraud, no relevant monetary threshold). New York: see, e. g., N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§ 155.05 (West 1988), 155.40, 158.20 (West Supp. 1998), 176.25 ($50,000); but see, e. g., §§190.65 (scheme to defraud), 185.00 (fraud in insolvency), 185.05 (fraud involving security interest), all with no relevant monetary threshold. Ohio: see, e. g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2913.02, 2913.11, 2913.21, 2913.40, 2913.45, 2913.47, 2913.48 (Lexis 1996) ($100,000). Texas: see, e. g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§31.02 (West 1994), 31.03, 35.02 (West Supp. 2003) ($20,000); but see, e.g., §32.31 (credit card or debit card abuse, no relevant monetary threshold). 3 In eight States, the main fraud and deceit statutes in effect in 1996 had relevant monetary thresholds of $10,000. However, a number of these States also had statutes targeted at particular kinds of fraud without any relevant monetary threshold. Connecticut: see, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§53a-119 (West Supp. 1996), 53a-122 (West 1994); but see, e.g., §§53a-128e, 53a~128i (credit card crimes, no relevant monetary threshold). Florida: see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §§812.012 (1994), 812.014 (West Supp. 1996); but see, e.g., §§817.234 (insurance fraud), 817.61 (fraudulent use of credit cards), both without a relevant monetary threshold. Illinois: see, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, §5/16-1 (West Supp. 1995 and 1995 Ill. Laws pp. 3925-3926); but see, e. g., §§ 5/17-6 (West 1993) (state benefits fraud), 5/17-9 (public aid wire fraud), 5/17-10 (public aid mail fraud), 5/17-13 (1995 Ill. Laws, at 2888) (fraudulent land sales), all without a relevant monetary threshold. Iowa: see, e. g., Iowa Code Ann. §§714.1, 714.2 (West 1993), 714.8 (West 1993 and 1994 Iowa Acts p. 46), 714.9 (West 1993). Maine: see, e. g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17A, §§354, 362 (1983); but see, e.g., §§902 (defrauding a creditor), 908 (1995 Me. Acts pp. 893-894) (home repair fraud), both without relevant monetary thresholds. North Dakota: see, e.g., N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 12.1-23-02, 12.1-23-05 (Lexis 1997). Oregon: see, e. g., Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.085, 164.057 (1991); but see, e. g., §§ 165.055 (1993 Ore. Laws p. 1826) (fraudulent use of a credit card), 165.692 (1995 Ore. Laws p. 1285), 165.990 (1991 and 1995 Ore. Laws, at 1285-1286) (false claims for health care payments), both without a relevant monetary threshold. Tennessee: see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§39-14-101, 39-14-105, 39-14-118, 39-14-133 (1991).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION No. 97-1625. Argued January 13, 1999 Decided May 24, 1999 Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 781. Peter M. Sfikas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Scott M. Mendel, Erik F. Dyhrkopp, and Edward M. Graham. Deputy Solicitor respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Klein, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Debra A. Valentine, John F. Daly, Joanne L. Levine, and Elizabeth R. Hilder. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for the American College for Advancement in Medicine by Elizabeth Toni Guarino, William C. MacLeod, and Robert A. Skitol; for the American Dental Association et al. by Jack R. Bierig and Virginia A. Seitz; for the American Soeiety of Association Executives by Jerry A. Jacobs, Paul M. Smith, and Nory Miller; and for the National Collegiate Athletic Association by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Donald M. Falk, Gregory L. Curtner, Stephen M. Shapiro, Michael W. McConnell, Michele L. Odorizzi, and Elsa Kircher Cole. the State of A brief of amici curiae Arizona et al. by James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Don R. Sampen, Assistant Attorney General, Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, and Thomas G. Lindgren, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for then- respective jurisdictions as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Rickard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, HubeH H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, José A Fuentes-Agostini of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sor-rell of Vermont, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraiv, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin. James S. Turner and Betsy E. Lehrfeld filed a brief for the Consumer Dental Choice Project of the National Institute for Science, Law and Public Policy, Inc., as amicus curiae. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. There are two issues in this case: whether the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission extends to the California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit professional association, and whether a “quick look” sufficed to justify finding that certain advertising restrictions adopted by the CDA violated the antitrust laws. We hold that the Commission’s jurisdiction under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) extends to an association that, like the CDA, provides substantial economic benefit to its for-profit members, but that where, as here, any anticompetitive effects of given restraints are far from intuitively obvious, the rule of reason demands a more thorough enquiry into the consequences of those restraints than the Court of Appeals performed. HH The CDA is a voluntary nonprofit association of local dental societies to which some 19,000 dentists belong, including about three-quarters of those practicing in the State. In re California Dental Assn., 121 P. T. C. 190, 196-197 (1996). The CDA is exempt from federal income tax under 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(6), covering “[bjusiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, [and] boards of trade,” although it has for-profit subsidiaries that give its members advantageous access to various sorts of insurance, including liability coverage, and to financing for their real estate, equipment, cars, and patients’ bills. The CDA lobbies and litigates in its members’ interests, and conducts marketing and public relations campaigns for their benefit. 128 F. 3d 720, 723 (CA9 1997). The dentists who belong to the CDA through these associations agree to abide by a Code of Ethics (Code) including the following § 10: “Although any dentist may advertise, no dentist shall advertise or solicit patients in any form of communication in a manner that is false or misleading in any material respect. In order to properly serve the public, dentists should represent themselves in a manner that contributes to the esteem of the public. Dentists should not misrepresent their training and competence in any way that would be false or misleading in any material respect.” App. 33. The CDA has issued a number of advisory opinions interpreting this section, and through separate advertising guidelines intended to help members comply with the Code and with state law the CDA has advised its dentists of disclosures they must make under state law when engaging in discount advertising. Responsibility for enforcing the Code rests in the first instance with the local dental societies, to which applicants for CDA membership must submit copies of their own advertisements and those of their employers or referral services to assure compliance with the Code. The local societies also actively seek information about potential Code violations by applicants or CDA members. Applicants who refuse to withdraw or revise objectionable advertisements may be denied membership; and members who, after a hearing, remain similarly recalcitrant are subject to censure, suspension, or expulsion from the CDA. 128 F. 3d, at 724. The Commission brought a leging that it applied its guidelines so as to restrict truthful, nondeceptive advertising, and so violated § 5 of the FTC Act, 38 Stat. 717, 15 U. S. C. § 45. The complaint alleged that the CDA had unreasonably restricted two types of advertising: price advertising, particularly discounted fees, and advertising relating to the quality of dental services. Complaint ¶ 7. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held the Commission to have jurisdiction over the CDA, which, the ALJ noted, had itself “stated that a selection of its programs and services has a potential value to members of between $22,739 and $65,127,” 121 F. T. C., at 207. He found that, although there had been no proof that the CDA exerted market power, no such proof was required to establish an antitrust violation under In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F. T. C. 549 (1988), since the CDA had unreasonably prevented members and potential members from using truthful, nondeceptive advertising, all to the detriment of both dentists and consumers of dental services. He accordingly found a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. 121 F. T. C., at 272-273. The Commission except for his conclusion that the CDA lacked market power, with which the Commission disagreed. The Commission treated the CDA’s restrictions on discount advertising as illegal per se. 128 F. 3d, at 725. In the alternative, the Commission held the price advertising (as well as the nonprice) restrictions to be violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. One Commissioner concurred separately, arguing that the Commission should have applied the Mass. i3d. standard, not the per se analysis, to the limitations on price advertising. Another Commissioner dissented, finding the evidence insufficient to show either that the restrictions had an anticompetitive effect under the rule of reason, or that the CDA had market power. 128 F. 3d, at 725. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, sustaining the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over the CDA and its ultimate conclusion on the merits. Id., at 730. The court thought it error for the Commission to have applied per se analysis to the price advertising restrictions, finding analysis under the rule of reason required for all the restrictions. But the Court of Appeals went on to explain that the Commission had properly “applied an abbreviated, or 'quick look,’ rule of reason analysis designed for restraints that are not per se un-lawffil but are sufficiently anticompetitive on their face that they do not require a full-blown rule of reason inquiry. See [National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 109-110, and n. 39 (1984)] ('The essential point is that the rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye.’ [Ibid, (citing P. Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37-38 (Federal Judicial Center, June 1981) (parenthetical omitted)).] It allows the condemnation of a 'naked restraint’ on price or output without an 'elaborate industry analysis.’ Id., at 109.” Id., at 727. The Court of Appeals thought truncated rule-of-reason analysis to be in order for several reasons. As for the restrictions on discount advertising, they “amounted in practice to a fairly 'naked’ restraint on price competition itself,” ibid. The CDA’s procompetitive justification, that the restrictions encouraged disclosure and prevented false and misleading advertising, carried little weight because “it is simply infeasible to disclose all of the information that is required,” id., at 728, and “the record provides no evidence that the rule has in fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of dental pricing,” ibid. As to nonpriee advertising restrictions, the court said that “[t]hese restrictions are in effect a form of output limitation, as they restrict the supply of information about individual dentists’ services. See Areeda & Hoven-kamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1505 at 693-94 (Supp. 1997).... The restrictions may also affect output more directly, as quality and comfort advertising may induce some customers to obtain nonemergeney care when they might not otherwise do so. . . . Under these circumstances, we think that the restriction is a sufficiently naked restraint on output to justify quick look analysis.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the Commission’s findings with respect to the CDA’s agreement and intent to restrain trade, as well as on the effect of the restrictions and the existence of market power, were all supported by substantial evidence. Id., at 728-730. In dissent, Judge Real took the position that the Commission’s jurisdiction did not cover the CDA as a nonprofit professional association engaging in no commercial operations. Id., at 730. But even assuming jurisdiction, he argued, full-bore rule-of-reason analysis was called for, since the disclosure requirements were not naked restraints and neither fixed prices nor banned nondeceptive advertising. Id., at 730-731. We granted certiorari to resolve conflicts among the Circuits on the Commission’s jurisdiction over a nonprofit professional association and the occasions for abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. 524 U. S. 980 (1998). We now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand. W The FTC Act gives the Commission authority over “persons, partnerships, or corporations,” 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(2), and defines “corporation” to include “any company ... or association, incorporated or unincorporated, without shares of capital or capital stock or certificates of interest, except partnerships, which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members,” §44. Although the Circuits have not agreed on the precise extent of this definition, see n. 4, supra, the Commission has long held that some circumstances give it jurisdiction over an entity that seeks no profit for itself. While the Commission has claimed to have jurisdiction over a nonprofit entity if a substantial part of its total activities provides pecuniary benefits to its members, see In re American Medical Assn., 94 F. T. C. 701, 983-984 (1980), respondent now advances the slightly different formulation that the Commission has jurisdiction “over anti-competitive practices by nonprofit associations whose activities provid[e] substantial economic benefits to their for-profit members’ businesses.” Brief for Respondent 20. urges deference to this interpretation of the Commission’s jurisdiction as reasonable. Id., at 25-26 (citing Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U. S. 354, 380-382 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Chevron deference applies to agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction)). But we have no occasion to review the call for deference here, the interpretation urged in respondent’s brief being clearly the better reading of the statute under ordinary principles of construction. The FTC Act is at pains to an ganized to carry on business for its own profit,” 15 U. S. C. §44, but also one that carries on business for the profit “of its members,” ibid. While such a supportive organization may be devoted to helping its members in ways beyond immediate enhancement of profit, no one here has claimed that such an entity must devote itself single-mindedly to the profit of others. It could, indeed, hardly be supposed that Congress intended such a restricted notion of covered supporting organizations, with the opportunity this would bring with it for avoiding jurisdiction where the purposes of the FTC Act would obviously call for asserting it. Just as the FTC Act does not require that a organization must devote itself entirely to its members' profits, neither does the Act say anything about how much of the entity’s activities must go to raising the members’ bottom lines. There is accordingly no apparent reason to let the statute’s application turn on meeting some threshold percentage of activity for this purpose, or even satisfying a softer formulation calling for a substantial part of the nonprofit entity’s total activities to be aimed at its members’ pecuniary benefit. To be sure, proximate relation to lucre must appear; the FTC Act does not cover all membership organizations of profit-making corporations without more, and an organization devoted solely to professional education may lie outside the FTC Act’s jurisdictional reach, even though the quality of professional services ultimately affects the profits of those who deliver them. There is no line drawing exercise in this case, however, where the CDA’s contributions to the profits of its individual members are proximate and apparent. Through for-profit subsidiaries, the CDA provides advantageous insurance and preferential financing arrangements for its members, and it engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for the benefit of its members’ interests. This congeries of activities confers far more than de minimis or merely presumed economic benefits on CDA members; the economic benefits conferred upon the CDA’s profit-seeking professionals plainly fall within the object of enhancing its members’ “profit,” which the FTC Act makes the jurisdictional toueh-stone. There is no difficulty in concluding that the Commission has jurisdiction over the CDA. The logic and purpose result. The FTC Act directs the Commission to “prevent” the broad set of entities under its jurisdiction “from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(2). Nonprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have the same capacity and derivatively, at least, the same incentives as for-profit organizations to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive acts. It may even be possible that a nonprofit entity up to no good would have certain advantages, not only over a for-profit member but over a for-profit membership organization as well; it would enjoy the screen of superficial disinterest while devoting itself to serving the interests of its members without concern for doing more than breaking even. Nor, contrary to petitioner’s argument, history inconsistent with this interpretation of the Commission’s jurisdiction. Although the versions of the FTC Act first passed by the House and the Senate defined “corporation” to refer only to incorporated, joint stock, and share-capital companies organized to carry on business for profit, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 11, 14 (1914), the Conference Committee subsequently revised the definition to its present form, an alteration that indicates an intention to include nonprofit entities. And the legislative history, like the text of the FTC Act, is devoid of any hint at an exemption for professional associations as such. Commission had jurisdiction to pursue the claim here, and turn to the question whether the Court of Appeals devoted sufficient analysis to sustain the claim that the advertising restrictions promulgated by the CDA violated the FTC Act. The Court of Appeals treated as distinct questions the sufficiency of the analysis of anticompetitive effects and the substantiality of the evidence supporting the Commission’s conclusions. Because we decide that the Court of Appeals erred when it held as a matter of law that quick-look analysis was appropriate (with the consequence that the Commission’s abbreviated analysis and conclusion were sustainable), we do not reach the question of the substantiality of the evidence supporting the Commission’s conclusion. In National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85 (1984), we held that a “naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive jus-tifieation even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.” Id., at 110. Elsewhere, we held that “no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of” horizontal agreements among competitors to refuse to discuss prices, National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 692 (1978), or to withhold a particular desired service, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting National Soc. of Professional Engineers, supra, at 692). In each of these eases, which have formed the basis for what has come to be called abbreviated or “quick-look” analysis under the rule of reason, an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets. In National Collegiate Athletic Assn., the league's television plan expressly limited output (the number of games that could be televised) and fixed a minimum price. 468 U. S., at 99-100. In National Soc. of Professional Engineers, the restraint was “an absolute ban on competitive bidding.” 435 U. S., at 692. In Indiana Federation of Dentists, the restraint was “a horizontal agreement among the participating dentists to withhold from their customers a particular service that they desire.” 476 U. S., at 459. As in such cases, quick-look analysis carries the day when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained. See Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 134 F. 3d 1010, 1020 (CA10 1998) (explaining that quick-look analysis applies “where a practice has obvious anticompeti-tive effects”); Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Assn., 961 F. 2d 667, 674-676 (CA7 1992) (finding quick-look analysis adequate after assessing and rejecting logic of proffered procompetitive justifications); cf. United States v. Brown University, 5 F. 3d 658, 677-678 (CA3 1993) (finding full rule-of-reason analysis required where universities sought to provide financial aid to needy students and noting by way of contrast that the agree-merits in National Soc. of Professional Engineers and Indiana Federation of Dentists “embodied a strong economic self-interest of the parties to them”). case us, however, fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious. Even on Justice Breyer’s view that bars on truthful and verifiable price and quality advertising are prima facie anticompetitive, see post, at 784-785 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), and place the burden of procompetitive justification on those who agree to adopt them, the very issue at the threshold of this case is whether professional price and quality advertising is sufficiently verifiable in theory and in fact to fall within such a general rule. Ultimately our disagreement with Justice Breyer turns on our different responses to this issue. Whereas he accepts, as the Ninth Circuit seems to have done, that the restrictions here were like restrictions on advertisement of price and quality generally, see, e. g., post, at 785, 787, 790, it seems to us that the CDA’s advertising restrictions might plausibly be thought to have a net procom-petitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition. The restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising are, at least on their face, designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking disparities between the information available to the professional and the patient. Cf. Carr & Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J. Law & Econ. 307,309 (1990) (explaining that in a market for complex professional services, “inherent asymmetry of knowledge about the product” arises because “professionals supplying the good are knowledgeable [whereas] consumers demanding the good are uninformed”); Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970) (pointing out quality problems in market characterized by asymmetrical information). In a market for professional services, in which advertising is relatively rare and the comparability of service packages not easily established, the difficulty for customers or potential competitors to get and verify information about the price and availability of services magnifies the dangers to competition associated with misleading advertising. What is more, the quality of professional services tends to resist either calibration or monitoring by individual patients or clients, partly because of the specialized knowledge required to evaluate the services, and partly because of the difficulty in determining whether, and the degree to which, an outcome is attributable to the quality of services (like a poor job of tooth filling) or to something else (like a very tough walnut). See Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1328,1330 (1979); 1 B. Furrow, T. Greaney, S. Johnson, T. Jost, & R. Schwartz, Health Law §3-1, p. 86 (1995) (describing the common view that “the lay public is incapable of adequately evaluating the quality of medical services”). Patients’ attachments to particular professionals, the rationality of which is difficult to assess, complicate the picture even further. Cf. Evans, Professionals and the Production Function: Can Competition Policy Improve Efficiency in the Licensed Professions?, in Occupational Licensure and Regulation 235-236 (S. Rotten-berg ed. 1980) (describing long-term relationship between professional and client not as “a series of spot contracts” but rather as “a long-term agreement, often implicit, to deal with each other in a set of future unspecified or incompletely specified circumstances according to certain rules,” and adding that "CQt is not clear how or if these [implicit contracts] can be reconciled with the promotion of effective price competition in individual spot markets for particular services”). The existence of such significant challenges to informed deci-sionmaking by the customer for professional services immediately suggests that advertising restrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading or irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic horizontal agreements to limit output or price competition. The explanation proffered by the Court of Appeals for the likely anticompetitive effect of the CDAs restrictions on discount advertising began with the unexceptionable statements that “price advertising is fundamental to price competition,” 128 F. 3d, at 727, and that “[r]estrictions on the ability to advertise prices normally make it more difficult for consumers to find a lower price and for dentists to compete on the basis of price,” ibid, (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 364 (1977); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992)). The court then acknowledged that, according to the CDA, the restrictions nonetheless furthered the “legitimate, indeed proeompetitive, goal of preventing false and misleading price advertising.” 128 F. 3d, at 728. The Court of Appeals might, at this juncture, have recognized that the restrictions at issue here are very far from a total ban on price or discount advertising, and might have considered the possibility that the particular restrictions on professional advertising could have different effects from those “normally5’ found in the commercial world, even to the point of promoting competition by reducing the occurrence of unverifiable and misleading across-the-board discount advertising. Instead, the Court of Appeals confined itself to the brief assertion that the “CDA’s disclosure requirements appear to prohibit aeross-the-board discounts because it is simply infeasible to disclose all of the information that is required,” ibid., followed by the observation that “the record provides no evidence that the rule has in fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of dental pricing,” ibid. But these text and describe no anticompetitive effects. Assuming that the record in fact supports the conclusion that the CDA disclosure rules essentially bar advertisement of across-the-board discounts, it does not obviously follow that such a ban would have a net anticompetitive effect here. Whether advertisements that announced discounts for, say, first-time customers, would be less effective at conveying information relevant to competition if they listed the original and discounted prices for checkups, X-rays, and fillings, than they would be if they simply specified a percentage discount across the board, seems to us a question susceptible to empirical but not a priori analysis. In a suspicious world, the discipline of specific example may well be a necessary condition of plausibility for professional claims that for all practical purposes defy comparison shopping. It is also possible in principle that, even if aeross-the-board discount advertisements were more effective in drawing customers in the short run, the recurrence of some measure of intentional or accidental misstatement due to the breadth of their claims might leak out over time to make potential patients skeptical of any such across-the-board advertising, so undercutting the method’s effectiveness. Cf. Akerlof, 84 Q. J. Eeon., at 495 (explaining that “dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the market”). It might be, too, that across-the-board discount advertisements would continue to attract business indefinitely, but might work precisely because they were misleading customers, and thus just because their effect would be anticompetitive, not procompetitive. Put another way, the CDA’s rule appears to reflect the prediction that any costs to competition associated with the elimination of across-the-board advertising will be outweighed by gains to consumer information (and hence competition) created by discount advertising that is exact, accurate, and more easily verifiable (at least by regulators). As a matter of economics this view may or may not be correct, but it is not implausible, and neither a court nor the Commission may initially dismiss it as presumptively wrong. In theory, it is true, the Court of Appeals neither ruled out the plausibility of some procompetitive support for the CDA’s requirements nor foreclosed the utility of an eviden-tiary discussion on the point. The court indirectly acknowledged the plausibility of procompetitive justifications for the CDA’s position when it stated that “the record provides no evidence that the rule has in fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of dental pricing,” 128 F. 3d, at 728. But because petitioner alone would have had the incentive to introduce such evidence, the statement sounds as though the Court cf Appeals may have thought it was justified without further analysis to shift a burden to the CDA to adduce hard evidence of the proeompetitive nature of its policy; the court’s adversión to empirical evidence at the moment of this implicit burden shifting underscores the leniency of its enquiry into evidence of the restrictions’ anticompetitive effects. The Court of Appeals was comparably ing the sufficiency of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis as to the nonpriee advertising restrictions. The court began with the argument that “[t]hese restrictions are in effect a form of output limitation, as they restrict the supply of information about individual dentists’ services.” Ibid, (citing P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1505, pp. 693-694 (1997 Supp.)). Although this sentence does indeed appear as cited, it is puzzling, given that the relevant output for antitrust purposes here is presumably not information or advertising, but dental services themselves. The question is not whether the universe of possible advertisements has been limited (as assuredly it has), but whether the limitation on advertisements obviously tends to limit the total delivery of dental services. The court came closest to addressing this latter question when it went on to assert that limiting advertisements regarding quality and safety “prevents dentists from fully describing the package of services they offer,” 128 F. 3d, at 728, adding that “[t]he restrictions may also affect output more directly, as quality and comfort advertising may induce some customers to obtain nonemer-gency care when they might not otherwise do so,” ibid. This suggestion about output is also puzzling. If quality advertising actually induces some patients to obtain more care than they would in its absence, then restricting such advertising would reduce the demand for dental services, not the supply; and it is of course the producers’ supply of a good in relation to demand that is normally relevant in determining whether a producer-imposed output limitation has the anti-competitive effect of artificially raising prices, see General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Assn., 744 P. 2d 588, 594-595 (CA7 1984) (“An agreement on output also equates to a price-fixing agreement. If firms raise price, the market’s demand for their product will fall, so the amount supplied will fall too — in other words, output will be restricted. If instead the firms restrict output directly, price will as mentioned rise in order to limit demand to the reduced supply. Thus, with exceptions not relevant here, raising price, reducing output, and dividing markets have the same anticompetitive effects”). of Appeals acknowledged the CDA’s view that “claims about quality are inherently unverifiable and therefore misleading,” 128 F. 3d, at 728, it responded that this concern “does not justify banning all quality claims without regard to whether they are, in fact, false or misleading,” ibid. As a result, the court said, “the restriction is a sufficiently naked restraint on output to justify quick look analysis.” Ibid. The court assumed, in these words, that some dental quality claims may escape justifiable censure, because they are both verifiable and true. But its implicit assumption fails to explain why it gave no weight to the countervailing, and at least equally plausible, suggestion that restricting difficult-to-verify claims about quality or patient comfort would have a procompetitive effect by preventing misleading or false claims that distort the market. It is, indeed, entirely possible to understand the CDA’s restrictions on unverifiable quality and comfort advertising as nothing more than a procompetitive ban on puffery, ef. Bates, 438 U. S., at 366 (claims relating to the quality of legal services “probably are not susceptible of precise measurement or verification and, under some circumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false”); id., at 383-384 (“[Advertising claims as to the quality of services ... are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction”), notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s citation (to a Commission discussion that never faces the issue of the unverifiability of professional quality claims, raised in Bates), post, at 785. The point have the procompetitive effect claimed by the CD A; it is possible that banning quality claims might have no effect at all on competitiveness if, for example, many dentists made very much the same sort of claims. And it is also of course possible that the restrictions might in the final analysis be anti-competitive. The point, rather, is that the plausibility of competing claims about the effects of the professional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently abbreviated review to which the Commission’s order was treated. The obvious anticompetitive effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown. In light of our focus on the adequacy of the Court of Appeals’s analysis, Justice Breyer’s thorough-going, de novo antitrust analysis contains much to impress on its own merits but little to demonstrate the sufficiency of the Court of Appeals’s review. The obligation to give a more deliberate look than a quick one does not arise at the door of this Court and should not be satisfied here in the first instance. Had the Court of Appeals engaged in a painstaking discussion in a league with Justice Breyer’s (compare his 14 pages with the Ninth Circuit’s 8), and had it confronted the comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable advertising, its reasoning might have sufficed to justify its conclusion. Certainly Justice Breyer’s treatment of the antitrust issues here is no “quick look,” Lingering is more like it, and indeed Justice Breyer, not surprisingly, stops short of endorsing the Court of Appeals’s discussion as adequate to the task at hand. Saying here that the Court of Appeals’s conclusion at least required a more extended examination of the possible factual underpinnings than it received is not, of course, necessarily to call for the fullest market analysis. Although we have said that a challenge to a “naked restraint on price and output” need not be supported by “a detailed market analysis” in order to “requirfe] some competitive justification,” National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 468 U. S., at 110, it does not follow that every ease attacking a less obviously anticompeti-tive restraint (like this one) is a candidate for plenary market examination. The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of reason” tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for example, that “there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis,” since “considerable inquiry into market conditions” may be required before the application of any so-called “per se” condemnation is justified. Id., at 104, n. 26. “[Wjhether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same— whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.” Id., at 104. Indeed, the scholar who enriched antitrust law with the metaphor of “the twinkling of an eye” for the most condensed rule-of-reason analysis himself cautioned against the risk of misleading even in speaking of a “spectrum” of adequate reasonableness analysis for passing upon antitrust claims: “There is always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for. . . . Nevertheless, the quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.” P. Areeda, Antitrust Law f 1507, p. 402 (1986). At the same time, Professor Areeda also emphasized the necessity, particularly great in the quasi-common law realm of antitrust, that courts explain the logic of their conclusions. “By exposing their reasoning, judges ... are subjected to others’ critical analyses, which in turn can lead to better understanding for the future.” Id., ¶ 1500, at 364. As the circumstances here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint. The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case after ease reach identical conclusions. Por now, at least, a less quick look was required for the initial assessment of the tendency of these professional advertising restrictions. Because the Court of Appeals did not scrutinize the assumption of relative anticompetitive tendencies, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for a fuller consideration of the issue. It is so ordered. The advisory opinions, which substantially mirror parts of the California Business and Professions Code, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. §§ 651, 1680 (West 1999), include the following propositions: “A statement or claim is false or misleading in any material respect when it: “a. contains a misrepresentation of fact; “b. is likely to mislead or deceive because in context it makes only a partial disclosure of relevant facts; “e. is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified expectations of favorable results and/or costs; "d. relates to fees for specific types of services without fully and specifically disclosing all variables and other relevant factors; “e. contains other representations or implications that in reasonable probability will cause an ordinarily prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived. “Any communication or advertisement which refers to the cost of dental services shall be exact, without omissions, and shall make each service clearly identifiable, without the use of such phrases as ‘as low as,’ ‘and up,’ ‘lowest prices,’ or words or phrases of similar import. which refers to the cost of dental services and uses words of comparison or relativity — for example, ‘low fees’ — must be based on verifiable data substantiating the comparison or statement of relativity. The burden shall be on the dentist who advertises in such terms to establish the accuracy of the comparison or statement of relativity.” as to the quality of services are not susceptible to measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims are likely to be false or misleading in any material respect.” 128 F. 3d 720,723-724 (CA9 1997) (some internal quotation marks The disclosures include: “1. The dollar amount of the nondiseounted fee for the service!.] amount of the discount fee or the percentage of the discount for the specific service!.] length of time that the discount will be offered!.] ' “4. Verifiable fees!.] discount or any other terms and conditions or restrictions for qualifying for the discount.” Id., at 724. The FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair competition and deceptive acts or practices, 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(1), overlaps the scope of §1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, aimed at prohibiting restraint of trade, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 454-455 (1986), and the Commission relied upon Sherman Act law in adjudicating this ease, In re California Dental Assn., 121 F. T. C. 190, 292, n. 5 (1996). Compare In re American Medical Assn., 94 F. T. C. 701, 983-984, aff’d, 638 F. 2d 443 (CA2 1980), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U. S. 676 (1982) (per curiam), and FTC v. National Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F. 2d 485, 487-488 (CA7 1975), with Community Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F. 2d 1011, 1017 (CA8 1969). Cf. Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F. 3d 509, 514, and n. 6 (CA2 1999); United States v. Brown University, 5 F. 3d 658, 669 (CA3 1993); Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Assn., 961 F. 2d 667,674-676 (CA7 1992); Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 134 F. 3d 1010, 1020 (CA10 1998); U S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F. 2d 589, 594-595 (CA1 1993). This conclusion is consistent with holdings by a number of Courts of Appeals. In FTC v. National Comm’n on Egg Nutrition, the Court of Appeals held that a nonprofit association "organized for the profit of the egg industry,” 517 F. 2d, at 488, fell within the Commission’s jurisdiction. In American Medical Assn. v. FTC, 638 F. 2d 443 (CA2 1980), the Court of Appeals held that the “business aspects,” id., at 448, of the AJVLA’s activities brought it within the Commission’s reach. These cases are consistent with our conclusion that an entity organized to carry on activities that will confer greater than de minimis or presumed economic benefits on profit-seeking members certainly falls within the Commission’s jurisdiction. In Community Blood Bank v. FTC, the Court of Appeals addressed the question whether the Commission had jurisdiction over a blood bank and an association of hospitals. It held that “the question of the jurisdiction over the corporations or other associations involved should be determined on an ad hoc basis,” 405 F. 2d, at 1018, and that the Commission’s jurisdiction extended to “any legal entity without shares of capital which engages in business for profit within the traditional meaning of that language,” ibid, (emphasis deleted). The Court of Appeals also said that “Recording to a generally accepted definition ‘profit’ means gain from business or investment over and above expenditures, or gain made on business or investment where both receipts or payments are taken into account,” id., at 1017, although in the same breath it noted that the term’s “meaning must be derived from the context in which it is used,” id., at 1016. Our decision here is fully consistent with Community Blood Bank, because the CDA contributes to the profits of at least some of its members, even on a restrictive definition of profit as gain above expenditures. (It should go without saying that the FTC Act does not require for Commis.sion jurisdiction that members of an entity turn a profit on their membership, but only that the entity be organized to carry on business for members’ profit.) Nonetheless, we do not, and indeed, on the facts here, could not, decide today whether the Commission has jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations that do not confer profit on for-profit members but do, for example, show annual income surpluses, engage in significant commerce, or compete in relevant markets with for-profit players. We therefore do not foreclose the possibility that various paradigms of profit might fall within the ambit of the FTC Act. Nor do we decide whether a purpose of contributing to profit only in a presumed sense, as by enhancing professional educational efforts, would implicate the Commission's jurisdiction. A letter from Bureau of Corporations Commissioner Joseph E. Davies to Senator Francis G. Newlands, the bill’s sponsor and a member of the Conference Committee, written August 8, 1914, before the Conference Committee revisions, included a memorandum dated August 7,1914, that expressed concern that the versions of the bill passed by the House and the Senate would not extend jurisdiction to purportedly nonprofit organizations, which might “furnish convenient vehicles for common understandings looking to the limitation of output and the fixing of prices contrary to law." Trade Commission Bill: Letter from the Commissioner of Corporations to the Chairman of the Senate Comm, on Interstate Commerce, Transmitting Certain Suggestions Relative to the Bill (H. R. 15613) to Create a Federal Trade Commission, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1914). on remand it can effectively assess the Commission’s decision for substantial evidence on the record, or whether it must remand to the Commission for a more extensive rule-of-reason analysis on the basis of an enhanced record. That false or misleading advertising has an anticompetitive effect, as that term is customarily used, has been long established. Cf. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67, 79-80 (1934) (finding a false advertisement to be unfair competition). «The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.” Goldfarb v. Virginia, State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 788-789, n. 17 (1975). Justice Breyek claims that “the Court of Appeals did consider the relevant differences.” Post, at 790. But the language he cites says nothing more than that per se analysis is inappropriate here and that “some caution” was appropriate where restrictions purported to restrict false advertising, see 128 F. 3d, at 726-727. Caution was of course appropriate, but this statement by the Court of Appeals does not constitute a consideration of the possible differences between these and other advertising restrictions. Justice Breyer suggests that our analysis is "of limited relevance,” post, at 791, because “[t]he basic question is whether this ... theoretically redeeming virtue in fact offsets the restrictions’ anticompetitive effects in this case,” ibid. He thinks that the Commission and the Court of Appeals “adequately answered that question,” ibid., but the absence of any empirical evidence on this point indicates that the question was not answered, merely avoided by implicit burden shifting of the kind accepted by Justice Breyer. The point is that before a theoretical claim of anticompeti-tive effects can justify shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires, there must be some indication that the court making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually are anticompetitive. Where, as here, the circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex, assumption alone will not do. Justice Breyer wonders if we “mea[n] this statement as an argument against the anticompetitive tendencies that flow from an agreement not to advertise service quality.” Post, at 791. But as the preceding sentence shows, we intend simply to question the logic of the Court of Appeals’s suggestion that the restrictions are anticompetitive because they somehow “affect output,” 128 F. 3d, at 728, presumably with the intent to raise prices by limiting supply while demand remains constant. We do not mean to deny that an agreement not to advertise service quality might have anticompetitive effects. We merely mean that, absent further analysis of the kind Justice Breyer undertakes, it is not possible to conclude that the net effect of this particular restriction is anticompetitive. The Commission said only that ““mere puffing’ deceives no one and has never been subject to regulation.” 121 F. T. C., at 318. The question here, of course, is not whether puffery may be subject to governmental regulation, but whether a professional organization may ban it. Other commentators have expressed similar views. See, e.g., Ko-lasky, Counterpoint: The Department of Justice’s “Stepwise” Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on Parties to Horizontal Agreements, Antitrust 41,43 (spring 1998) (“[I]n applying the rule of reason, the courts, as with any balancing test, use a sliding scale to determine how much proof to require”); Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1753, 1771 (1994) (“[C]ourts will have to undertake varying degrees of inquiry depending upon the type of restraint at issue. The legality of certain restraints will be easy to determine because their competitive effects are obvious. Other restrictions will require a more detailed analysis because their competitive impact is more ambiguous”). But see Klein, A “Stepwise” Approach for Analyzing Horizontal Agreements Will Provide a Much Needed Structure for Antitrust Review, Antitrust 41, 42 (spring 1990) (examination of procompetitive justifications “is by no means a full scrutiny of the proffered efficiency justification. It is, rather, a hard look at the justification to determine if it meets the defendant’s burden of coming forward with — but not establishing — a valid efficiency justification”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. WINSTAR CORP. et al. No. 95-865. Argued April 24, 1996 Decided July 1, 1996 Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in which O’Connor, J., joined except as to Parts IV-A and IV-B. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 910. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 919. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV, post, p. 924. Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, James A. Feldman, Douglas Letter, and Jacob M. Lewis. Joe G. Hollingsworth argued the cause for respondent Glendale Federal Bank, FSB. With him on the brief were Jerry Stouck, Donald W. Fowler, Catherine R. Baumer, Carter G. Phillips, Richard D. Bernstein, Theodore R. Posner, and Jesse H. Choper. Charles J. Cooper argued the cause for respondents Winstar Corp. et al. With him on the brief were Michael A. Carvin, Robert J. Cynkar, and Vincent J. Colatriano. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Herbert L. Fenster, Tami Lyn Azor-sky, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., et al. by Clarence T. Kipps, Jr., Alan I. Horowitz, and Mac S. Dunaway; for AmBase Corp. et al. by Laurence H. Tribe, Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Harvey Silverglate, and John C. Millian; for the American Association of State Colleges and Universities et al. by Joseph N. Onek, Kent R. Morrison, Robert P. Charrow, Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, and J Mark Waxman; for Coast Federal Bank, FSB, by Daniel J Goldberg and Matthew G. Ash; for Dollar Bank, FSB, by Paul Blankenstein, John K. Bush, and Robert T. Messner; for the Franklin Financial Group, Inc., et al. by Thomas M. Buchanan, Paul M. Fish, Ronald R. Glancz, John F. Cooney, Don S. Willner, and Jerrold J. Ganzfried; for Keystone Holdings, Inc., et al. by Melvin C. Garbow and Edward H. Sisson; for Long Island Savings Bank, FSB, by Russell E. Brooks and Fred W. Reinke; for Trinity Ventures, Ltd., et al. by John C. Millian, John K. Bush, and Wesley G. Howell, Jr.; for the Watts Health Foundation, Inc., et al. by Peter J. Gregora and Kenneth R. Heitz; and for the Western Federal Savings and Loan Association et al. by Dennis A. Winston. Justice Souter announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer join, and in which Justice O’Connor joins except as to Parts IV-A and IV-B. The issue in this case is the enforceability of contracts between the Government and participants in a regulated industry, to accord them particular regulatory treatment in exchange for their assumption of liabilities that threatened to produce claims against the Government as insurer. Although Congress subsequently changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government from specifically honoring its agreements, we hold that the terms assigning the risk of regulatory change to the Government are enforceable, and that the Government is therefore liable in damages for breach. hH We said in Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 250 (1947), that “[blanking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public callings.” That is particularly true of the savings and loan, or “thrift,” industry, which has been described as “a federally-conceived and assisted system to provide citizens with affordable housing funds.” H. R. Rep. No. 101-54, pt. 1, p. 292 (1989) (House Report). Because the contracts at issue in today’s case arise out of the National Government’s efforts over the last decade and a half to preserve that system from collapse, we begin with an overview of the history of federal savings and loan regulation. A The modern savings and loan industry traces its origins to the Great Depression, which brought default on 40 percent of the Nation’s $20 billion in home mortgages and the failure of some 1,700 of the Nation’s approximately 12,000 savings institutions. Id., at 292-293. In the course of the debacle, Congress passed three statutes meant to stabilize the thrift industry. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board), which was authorized to channel funds to thrifts for loans on houses and for preventing foreclosures on them. Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified, as amended, at 12 U. S. C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988 ed.)); see also House Report, at 292. Next, the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 authorized the Bank Board to charter and regulate federal savings and loan associations. Ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified, as amended, at 12 U. S. C. §§ 1461-1468 (1988 ed.)). Finally, the National Housing Act created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), under the Bank Board’s authority, with responsibility to insure thrift deposits and regulate all federally insured thrifts. Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified, as amended, at 12 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1750g (1988 ed.)). The resulting regulatory regime worked reasonably well until the combination of high interest rates and inflation in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s brought about a second crisis in the thrift industry. Many thrifts found themselves holding long-term, fixed-rate mortgages created when interest rates were low; when market rates rose, those institutions had to raise the rates they paid to depositors in order to attract funds. See House Report, at 294-295. When the costs of short-term deposits overtook the revenues from long-term mortgages, some 435 thrifts failed between 1981 and 1983. Id., at 296; see also General Accounting Office, Thrift Industry: Forbearance for Troubled Institutions 1982-1986, p. 9 (May 1987) (GAO, Forbearance for Troubled Institutions) (describing the origins of the crisis). The first federal response to the rising tide of thrift failures was “extensive deregulation,” including “a rapid expansion in the scope of permissible thrift investment powers and a similar expansion in a thrift’s ability to compete for funds with other financial services providers.” House Report, at 291; see also id., at 295-297; Breeden, Thumbs on the Scale: The Role that Accounting Practices Played in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 Ford. L. Rev. S71, S72-S74 (1991) (describing legislation permitting nonresidential real estate lending by thrifts and deregulating interest rates paid to thrift depositors). Along with this deregulation came moves to weaken the requirement that thrifts maintain adequate capital reserves as a cushion against losses, see 12 CFR §563.13 (1981), a requirement that one commentator described as “the most powerful source of discipline for financial institutions.” Breeden, supra, at S75. The result was a drop in capital reserves required by the Bank Board from five to four percent of assets in November 1980, see 45 Fed. Reg. 76111, and to three percent in January 1982, see 47 Fed. Reg. 3543; at the same time, the Board developed new “regulatory accounting principles” (RAP) that in many instances replaced generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for purposes of determining compliance with its capital requirements. According to the House Banking Committee, “[t]he use of various accounting gimmicks and reduced capital standards masked the worsening financial condition of the industry, and the FSLIC, and enabled many weak institutions to continue operating with an increasingly inadequate cushion to absorb future losses.” House Report, at 298. The reductions in required capital reserves, moreover, allowed thrifts to grow explosively without increasing their capital base, at the same time deregulation let them expand into new (and often riskier) fields of investment. See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 Ford. L. Rev. S301, S311 (1991); Breeden, supra, at S74-S75. While the regulators tried to mitigate the squeeze on the thrift industry generally through deregulation, the multitude of already-failed savings and loans confronted FSLIC with deposit insurance liabilities that threatened to exhaust its insurance fund. See Olympic Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 732 F. Supp. 1183, 1185 (DC 1990). According to the General Accounting Office, FSLIC’s total reserves declined from $6.46 billion in 1980 to $4.55 billion in 1985, GAO, Forbearance for Troubled Institutions 12, when the Bank Board estimated that it would take $15.8 billion to close all institutions deemed insolvent under GAAP. General Accounting Office, Troubled Financial Institutions: Solutions to the Thrift Industry Problem 108 (Feb. 1989) (GAO, Solutions to the Thrift Industry Problem). By 1988, the year of the last transaction involved in this case, FSLIC was itself insolvent by over $50 billion. House Report, at 304. And by early 1989, the GAO estimated that $85 billion would be needed to cover FSLIC’s responsibilities and put it back on the road to fiscal health. GAO, Solutions to the Thrift Industry Problem 43. In the end, we now know, the cost was much more even than that. See, e. g., Horowitz, The Continuing Thrift Bailout, Investor’s Business Daily, Feb. 1, 1996, p. A1 (reporting an estimated $140 billion total public cost of the savings and loan crisis through 1995). Realizing that FSLIC lacked the funds to liquidate all of the failing thrifts, the Bank Board chose to avoid the insurance liability by encouraging healthy thrifts and outside investors to take over ailing institutions in a series of “supervisory mergers.” See GAO, Solutions to the Thrift Industry Problem 52; L. White, The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation 157 (1991) (White). Such transactions, in which the acquiring parties assumed the obligations of thrifts with liabilities that far outstripped their assets, were not intrinsically attractive to healthy institutions; nor did FSLIC have sufficient cash to promote such acquisitions through direct subsidies alone, although cash contributions from FSLIC were often part of a transaction. See M. Lowy, High Rollers: Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle 37 (1991) (Lowy). Instead, the principal inducement for these supervisory mergers was an understanding that the acquisitions would be subject to a particular accounting treatment that would help the acquiring institutions meet their reserve capital requirements imposed by federal regulations. See Investigation of Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn.: Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, p. 447 (1989) (testimony of M. Danny Wall, Director, Office of Thrift Supervision) (noting that acquirers of failing thrifts were allowed to use certain accounting methods “in lieu of [direct] federal financial assistance”). B Under GAAP there are circumstances in which a business combination may be dealt with by the “purchase method” of accounting. See generally R. Kay & D. Searfoss, Handbook of Accounting and Auditing 23-21 to 23-40 (2d ed. 1989) (describing the purchase method); Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16 (1970) (establishing rules as to what method must be applied to particular transactions). The critical aspect of that method for our purposes is that it permits the acquiring entity to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of all identifiable assets acquired as an intangible asset called “goodwill.” Id., ¶ 11, p. 284; Kay & Searfoss, supra, at 23-38. In the ordinary case, the recognition of goodwill as an asset makes sense: a rational purchaser in a free market, after all, would not pay a price for a business in excess of the value of that business’s assets unless there actually were some intangible “going concern” value that made up the difference. See Lowy 39. For that reason, the purchase method is frequently used to account for acquisitions, see A. Phillips, J. Butler, G. Thompson, & R. Whitman, Basic Accounting for Lawyers 121 (4th ed. 1988), and GAAP expressly contemplated its application to at least some transactions involving savings and loans. See Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 9 (Feb. 1976). Goodwill recognized under the purchase method as the result of an FSLIC-sponsored supervisory merger was generally referred to as “supervisory goodwill.” Recognition of goodwill under the purchase method was essential to supervisory merger transactions of the type at issue in this case. Because FSLIC had insufficient funds to make up the difference between a failed thrift’s liabilities and assets, the Bank Board had to offer a “cash substitute” to induce a healthy thrift to assume a failed thrift’s obligations. Former Bank Board Chairman Richard Pratt put it this way in testifying before Congress: “The Bank Board ... did not have sufficient resources to close all insolvent institutions, [but] at the same time, it had to consolidate the industry, move weaker institutions into stronger hands, and do everything possible to minimize losses during the transition period. Goodwill was an indispensable tool in performing this task.” Savings and Loan Policies in the Late 1970’s and 1980’s: Hearings before the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 101-176, p. 227 (1990). Supervisory goodwill was attractive to healthy thrifts for at least two reasons. First, thrift regulators let the acquiring institutions count supervisory goodwill toward their reserve requirements under 12 CFR §563.13 (1981). This treatment was, of course, critical to make the transaction possible in the first place, because in most cases the institution resulting from the transaction would immediately have been insolvent under federal standards if goodwill had not counted toward regulatory net worth. From the acquiring thrift’s perspective, however, the treatment of supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital was attractive because it inflated the institution’s reserves, thereby allowing the thrift to leverage more loans (and, it hoped, make more profits). See White 84; cf. Breeden, 59 Ford. L. Rev., at S75-S76 (explaining how loosening reserve requirements permits asset expansion). A second and more complicated incentive arose from the decision by regulators to let acquiring institutions amortize the goodwill asset over long periods, up to the 40-year maximum permitted by GAAP, see Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, ¶ 29, p. 340 (1970). Amortization recognizes that intangible assets such as goodwill are useful for just so long; accordingly, a business must “write down” the value of the asset each year to reflect its waning worth. See Kay & Searfoss, Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, at 15-36 to 15-37; Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, supra, ¶ 27, at 339-340. The amount of the write down is reflected on the business’s income statement each year as an operating expense. See generally E. Paris, Accounting and Law in a Nutshell §12.2(q) (1984) (describing amortization of goodwill). At the same time that it amortizes its goodwill asset, however, an acquiring thrift must also account for changes in the value of its loans, which are its principal assets. The loans acquired as assets of the failed thrift in a supervisory-merger were generally worth less than their face value, typically because they were issued at interest rates below the market rate at the time of the acquisition. See Black, Ending Our Forebearers’ Forbearances: FIRREA and Supervisory Goodwill, 2 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 102, 104-105 (1990). This differential or “discount,” J. Rosenberg, Dictionary of Banking and Financial Services 233 (2d ed. 1985), appears on the balance sheet as a “contra-asset” account, or a deduction from the loan’s face value to reflect market valuation of the asset, R. Estes, Dictionary of Accounting 29 (1981). Because loans are ultimately repaid at face value, the magnitude of the discount declines over time as redemption approaches; this process, technically called “accretion of discount,” is reflected on a thrift’s income statement as a series of capital gains. See Rosenberg, supra, at 9; Estes, supra, at 39-40. The advantage in all this to an acquiring thrift depends upon the fact that accretion of discount is the mirror image of amortization of goodwill. In the typical case, a failed thrift’s primary assets were long-term mortgage loans that earned low rates of interest and therefore had declined in value to the point that the thrift’s assets no longer exceeded its liabilities to depositors. In such a case, the disparity between assets and liabilities from which the accounting goodwill was derived was virtually equal to the value of the discount from face value of the thrift’s outstanding loans. See Black, 2 Stan. L. & Policy Rev., at 104-105. Thrift regulators, however, typically agreed to supervisory merger terms that allowed acquiring thrifts to accrete the discount over the average life of the loans (approximately seven years), see id., at 105, while permitting amortization of the goodwill asset over a much longer period. Given that goodwill and discount were substantially equal in overall values, the more rapid accrual of capital gain, from accretion resulted in a net paper profit over the initial years following the acquisition. See ibid.; Lowy 39-40. The difference between amortization and accretion schedules thus allowed acquiring thrifts to seem more profitable than they in fact were. Some transactions included yet a further inducement, described as a “capital credit.” Such credits arose when FSLIC itself contributed cash to further a supervisory merger and permitted the acquiring institution to count the FSLIC contribution as a permanent credit to regulatory capital. By failing to require the thrift to subtract this FSLIC contribution from the amount of supervisory goodwill generated by the merger, regulators effectively permitted double counting of the cash as both a tangible and an intangible asset. See, e. g., Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F. 2d 598, 604 (CADC 1992). Capital credits thus inflated the acquiring thrift’s regulatory capital and permitted leveraging of more and more loans. As we describe in more detail below, the accounting treatment to be accorded supervisory goodwill and capital credits was the subject of express arrangements between the regulators and the acquiring institutions. While the extent to which these arrangements constituted a departure from prior norms is less clear, an acquiring institution would reasonably have wanted to bargain for such treatment. Although GAAP demonstrably permitted the use of the purchase method in acquiring a thrift suffering no distress, the relevant thrift regulations did not explicitly state that intangible goodwill assets created by that method could be counted toward regulatory capital. See 12 CFR §563.13 (a)(3) (1981) (permitting thrifts to count as reserves any “items listed in the definition of net worth”); § 561.13(a) (defining “net worth” as “the sum of all reserve accounts . . . , retained earnings, permanent stock, mutual capital certificates . . . , and any other non-withdrawable accounts of an insured institution”). Indeed, the rationale for recognizing goodwill stands on its head in a supervisory merger: ordinarily, goodwill is recognized as valuable because a rational purchaser would not pay more than assets are worth; here, however, the purchase is rational only because of the accounting treatment for the shortfall. See Black, supra, at 104 (“GAAP’s treatment of goodwill... assumes that buyers do not overpay when they purchase an S&L”). In the end, of course, such reasoning circumvented the whole purpose of the reserve requirements, which was to protect depositors and the deposit insurance fund. As some in Congress later recognized, “[gjoodwill is not cash. It is a concept, and a shadowy one at that. When the Federal Government liquidates a failed thrift, goodwill is simply no good. It is valueless. That means, quite simply, that the taxpayer picks up the tab for the shortfall.” 135 Cong. Rec. 11795 (1989) (remarks of Rep. Barnard); see also White 84 (acknowledging that in some instances supervisory goodwill “involved the creation of an asset that did not have real value as protection for the FSLIC”). To those with the basic foresight to appreciate all this, then, it was not obvious that regulators would accept purchase accounting in determining compliance with regulatory criteria, and it was clearly prudent to get agreement on the matter. The advantageous treatment of amortization schedules and capital credits in supervisory mergers amounted to more clear-cut departures from GAAP and, hence, subjects worthy of agreement by those banking on such treatment. In 1983, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the font of GAAP) promulgated Statement of Financial. Accounting Standards No. 72 (SFAS 72), which applied specifically to the acquisition of a savings and loan association. SFAS 72 provided that “[i]f, and to the extent that, the fair value of liabilities assumed exceeds the fair value of identifiable assets acquired in the acquisition of a banking or thrift institution, the unidentifiable intangible asset recognized generally shall be amortized to expense by the interest method over a period no longer than the discount on the long-term interest-bearing assets acquired is to be recognized as interest income.” Accounting Standards, Original Pronouncements (July 1973-June 1, 1989), p. 725. In other words, SFAS 72 eliminated any doubt that the differential amortization periods on which acquiring thrifts relied to produce paper profits in supervisory mergers were inconsistent with GAAP. SFAS 72 also barred double counting of capital credits by requiring that financial assistance from regulatory authorities must be deducted from the cost of the acquisition before the amount of goodwill is determined. SFAS 72, ¶9. Thrift acquirers relying on such credits, then, had every reason for concern as to the continued availability of the RAP in effect at the time of these transactions. C Although the results of the forbearance policy, including the departures from GAAP, appear to have been mixed, see GAO, Forbearance for Troubled Institutions 4, it is relatively clear that the overall regulatory response of the early and mid-1980’s was unsuccessful in resolving the crisis in the thrift industry. See, e. g., Transohio Savings Bank, 967 F. 2d, at 602 (concluding that regulatory measures “actually aggravated] the decline”). As a result, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, with the objects of preventing the collapse of the industry, attacking the root causes of the crisis, and restoring public confidence. FIRREA made enormous changes in the structure of federal thrift regulation by (1) abolishing FSLIC and transferring its functions to other agencies; (2) creating a new thrift deposit insurance fund under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (3) replacing the Bank Board with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), a Treasury Department office with responsibility for the regulation of all federally insured savings associations; and (4) establishing the Resolution Trust Corporation to liquidate or otherwise dispose of certain closed thrifts and their assets. See note following 12 U. S. C. § 1437, §§ 1441a, 1821. More importantly for the present case, FIRREA also obligated OTS to “prescribe and maintain uniformly applicable capital standards for savings associations” in accord with strict statutory requirements. § 1464(t)(l)(A). In particular, the statute required thrifts to “maintain core capital in an amount not less than 3 percent of the savings association’s total assets,” § 1464(t)(2)(A), and defined “core capital” to exclude “unidentifiable intangible assets,” § 1464(t)(9)(A), such as goodwill. Although the reform provided a “transition rule” permitting thrifts to count “qualifying supervisory goodwill” toward half the core capital requirement, this allowance was phased out by 1995. § 1464(t)(3)(A). According to the House Report, these tougher capital requirements reflected a congressional judgment that “[t]o a considerable extent, the size of the thrift crisis resulted from the utilization of capital gimmicks that masked the inadequate capitalization of thrifts.” House Report, at 310. The impact of FIRREA’s new capital requirements upon institutions that had acquired failed thrifts in exchange for supervisory goodwill was swift and severe. OTS promptly issued regulations implementing the new capital standards along with a bulletin noting that FIRREA “eliminates [capital and accounting] forbearances” previously granted to certain thrifts. Office of Thrift Supervision, Capital Adequacy: Guidance on the Status of Capital and Accounting Forbear-ances and Capital Instruments held by a Deposit Insurance Fund, Thrift Bulletin No. 38-2, Jan. 9, 1990. OTS accordingly directed that “[a]ll savings associations presently operating with these forbearances . . . should eliminate them in determining whether or not they comply with the new minimum regulatory capital standards.” Ibid. Despite the statute’s limited exception intended to moderate transitional pains, many institutions immediately fell out of compliance with regulatory capital requirements, making them subject to seizure by thrift regulators. See Black, 2 Stan. L. & Policy Rev., at 107 (“FIRREA’s new capital mandates have caused over 500 S&Ls ... to report that they have failed one or more of the three capital requirements”). D This case is about the impact of FIRREA’s tightened capital requirements on three thrift institutions created by way of supervisory mergers. Respondents Glendale Federal Bank, FSB, Winstar Corporation, and The Statesman Group, Inc., acquired failed thrifts in 1981, 1984, and 1988, respectively. After the passage of FIRREA, federal regulators seized and liquidated the Winstar and Statesman thrifts for failure to meet the new capital requirements. Although the Glendale thrift also fell out of regulatory capital compliance as a result of the new rules, it managed to avoid seizure through a massive private recapitalization. Believing that the Bank Board and FSLIC had promised them that the supervisory goodwill created in their merger transactions could be counted toward regulatory capital requirements, respondents each filed suit against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking monetary damages on both contractual and constitutional theories. That court granted respondents’ motions for partial summary judgment on contract liability, finding in each case that the Government had breached contractual obligations to permit respondents to count supervisory goodwill and capital credits toward their regulatory capital requirements. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990) (Winstar I) (finding an implied-in-fact contract but requesting further briefing on contract issues); 25 Cl. Ct. 541 (1992) (Winstar II) (finding contract breached and entering summary judgment on liability); Statesman Savings Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 904 (1992) (granting summary judgment on liability to Statesman and Glendale). In so holding, the Court of Federal Claims rejected two central defenses asserted by the Government: that the Government could not be held to a promise to refrain from exercising its regulatory authority in the future unless that promise was unmistakably clear in the contract, Winstar I, supra, at 116; Winstar II, supra, at 544-549; Statesman, supra, at 919-920, and that the Government’s alteration of the capital reserve requirements in FIRREA was a sovereign act that could not trigger contractual liability, Winstar II, supra, at 550-553; Statesman, supra, at 915-916. The Court of Federal Claims consolidated the three cases and certified its decisions for interlocutory appeal. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the parties did not allocate to the Government, in an unmistakably clear manner, the risk of a subsequent change in the regulatory capital requirements. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F. 2d 797, 811-813 (1993). The full court, however, vacated this decision and agreed to rehear the case en banc. After rebriefing and reargument, the en banc court reversed the panel decision and affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ rulings on liability. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F. 3d 1531 (1995). The Federal Circuit found that FSLIC had made express contracts with respondents, including a promise that supervisory goodwill and capital credits could be counted toward satisfaction of the regulatory capital requirements. Id., at 1540, 1542-1543. The court rejected the Government’s unmistakability argument, agreeing with the Court of Federal Claims that that doctrine had no application in a suit for money damages. Id., at 1545-1548. Finally, the en banc majority found that FIRREA’s new capital requirements “single[d] out supervisory goodwill for special treatment” and therefore could not be said to be a “public” and “general act” within the meaning of the sovereign acts doctrine. Id., at 1548-1551. Judge Nies dissented, essentially repeating the arguments in her prior opinion for the panel majority, id., at 1551-1552, and Judge Lourie also dissented on the ground that FIRREA was a public and general act, id., at 1552-1553. We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1087 (1996), and now affirm. H-t ) — I We took this case to consider the extent to which special rules, not generally applicable to private contracts, govern enforcement of the governmental contracts at issue here. We decide whether the Government may assert four special defenses to respondents’ claims for breach: the canon of contract construction that surrenders of sovereign authority must appear in unmistakable terms, Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. 41, 52 (1986); the rule that an agent’s authority to make such surrenders must be delegated in express terms, Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 (1908); the doctrine that a government may not, in any event, contract to surrender certain reserved powers, Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1880); and, finally, the principle that a Government’s sovereign acts do not give rise to a claim for breach of contract, Horowitz v. United States, 267 U. S. 458, 460 (1925). The anterior question whether there were contracts at all between the Government and respondents dealing with regulatory treatment of supervisory goodwill and capital credits, although briefed and argued by the parties in this Court, is not strictly before us. See Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535 (1992) (noting that “we ordinarily do not consider questions outside those presented in the petition for cer-tiorari”); this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). And although we may review the Court of Federal Claims’ grant of summary judgment de novo, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U. S. 451, 465, n. 10 (1992), we are in no better position than the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims to evaluate the documentary records of the transactions at issue. Our resolution of the legal issues raised by the petition for certiorari, however, does require some consideration of the nature of the underlying transactions. A The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he three plaintiff thrifts negotiated contracts with the bank regulatory agencies that allowed them to include supervisory goodwill (and capital credits) as assets for regulatory capital purposes and to amortize that supervisory goodwill over extended periods of time.” 64 F. 3d, at 1545. Although each of these transactions was fundamentally similar, the relevant circumstances and documents vary somewhat from case to case. 1 In September 1981, Glendale was approached about a possible merger by the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County, which then had liabilities exceeding the fair value of its assets by over $734 million. At the time, Glendale’s accountants estimated that FSLIC would have needed approximately $1.8 billion to liquidate Broward, only about $1 billion of which could be recouped through the sale of Broward’s assets. Glendale, on the other hand, was both profitable and well capitalized, with a net worth of $277 million. After some preliminary negotiations with the regulators, Glendale submitted a merger proposal to the Bank Board, which had to approve all mergers involving savings and loan associations, see 12 U. S. C. §§ 1467a(e)(l)(A) and (B); § 1817(j)(l); that proposal assumed the use of the purchase method of accounting to record supervisory goodwill arising from the transaction, with an amortization period of 40 years. The Bank Board ratified the merger, or “Supervisory Action Agreement” (SAA), on November 19, 1981. The SAA itself said nothing about supervisory goodwill, but did contain the following integration clause: “This Agreement . . . constitutes the entire agreement between the parties thereto and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings of the parties in connection herewith, excepting only the Agreement of Merger and any resolutions or letters issued contemporaneously herewith.” App. 598-599. The SAA thereby incorporated Bank Board Resolution No. 81-710, by which the Board had ratified the SAA. That resolution referred to two additional documents: a letter to be furnished by Glendale’s independent accountant identifying and supporting the use of any goodwill to be recorded on Glendale’s books, as well as the resulting amortization periods; and “a stipulation that any goodwill arising from this transaction shall be determined and amortized in accordance with [Bank Board] Memorandum R-31b.” Id., at 607. Memorandum R-31b, finally, permitted Glendale to use the purchase method of accounting and to recognize goodwill as an asset subject to amortization. See id., at 571-574. The Government does not seriously contest this evidence that the parties understood that goodwill arising from these transactions would be treated as satisfying regulatory requirements; it insists, however, that these documents simply reflect statements of then-current federal regulatory policy rather than contractual undertakings. Neither the Court of Federal Claims nor the Federal Circuit so read the record, however, and we agree with those courts that the Government’s interpretation of the relevant documents is fundamentally implausible. The integration clause in Glendale’s SAA with FSLIC, which is similar in all relevant respects to the analogous provisions in the Winstar and Statesman contracts, provides that the SAA supersedes “all prior agreements and understandings ... excepting only ... any resolutions or letters issued contemporaneously” by the Board, id., at 598-599; in other words, the SAA characterizes the Board’s resolutions and letters not as statements of background rules, but as part of the “agreements and understandings” between the parties. To the extent that the integration clause leaves any ambiguity, the other courts that construed the documents found that the realities of the transaction favored reading those documents as contractual commitments, not mere statements of policy, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts §202(1) (1981) (“Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight”), and we see no reason to disagree. As the Federal Circuit noted, “[i]t is not disputed that if supervisory goodwill had not been available for purposes of meeting regulatory capital requirements, the merged thrift would have been subject to regulatory noncompliance and penalties from the moment of its creation.” 64 F. 3d, at 1542. Indeed, the assumption of Broward’s liabilities would have rendered Glendale immediately insolvent by approximately $460 million, but for Glendale’s right to count goodwill as regulatory capital. Although one can imagine cases in which the potential gain might induce a party to assume a substantial risk that the gain might be wiped out by a change in the law, it would have been irrational in this case for Glendale to stake its very existence upon continuation of current policies without seeking to embody those policies in some sort of contractual commitment. This conclusion is obvious from both the dollar amounts at stake and the regulators’ proven propensity to make changes in the relevant requirements. See Brief for United States 26 (“[I]n light of the frequency with which federal capital requirements had changed in the past... , it would have been unreasonable for Glendale, FSLIC, or the Bank Board to expect or rely upon the fact that those requirements would remain unchanged”); see also infra, at 909-910. Under the circumstances, we have no doubt that the parties intended to settle regulatory treatment of these transactions as a condition of their agreement. See, e.g., The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, 78 (1866) (refusing to construe charter in such a way that it would have been “madness” for private party to enter into it). We accordingly have no reason to question the Court of Appeals’s conclusion that “the government had an express contractual obligation to permit Glendale to count the supervisory goodwill generated as a result of its merger with Broward as a capital asset for regulatory capital purposes.” 64 F. 3d, at 1540. 2 In 1983, FSLIC solicited bids for the acquisition of Windom Federal Savings and Loan Association, a Minnesota-based thrift in danger of failing. At that time, the estimated cost to the Government of liquidating Windom was approximately $12 million. A group of private investors formed Winstar Corporation for the purpose of acquiring Windom and submitted a merger plan to FSLIC; it called for capital contributions of $2.8 million from Winstar and $5.6 million from FSLIC, as well as for recognition of supervisory goodwill to be amortized over a period of 35 years. The Bank Board accepted the Winstar proposal and made an Assistance Agreement that incorporated, by an integration clause much like Glendale’s, both the Board’s resolution approving the merger and a forbearance letter issued on the date of the agreement. See App. 112. The forbearance letter provided that “[f]or purposes of reporting to the Board, the value of any intangible assets resulting from accounting for the merger in accordance with the purchase method may be amortized by [Winstar] over a period not to exceed 35 years by the straight-line method.” Id., at 123. Moreover, the Assistance Agreement itself contained an “Accounting Principles” section with the following provisions: “Except as otherwise provided, any computations made for the purposes of this Agreement shall be governed by generally accepted accounting principles as applied on a going concern basis in the savings and loan industry, except that where such principles conflict with the terms of this Agreement, applicable regulations of the Bank Board or the [FSLIC], or any resolution or action of the Bank Board approving or adopted concurrently with this Agreement, then this Agreement, such regulations, or such resolution or action shall govern. ... If there is a conflict between such regulations and the Bank Board’s resolution or action, the Bank Board’s resolution or action shall govern. For purposes of this section, the governing regulations and the accounting principles shall be those in effect on the Effective Date or as subsequently clarified, interpreted, or amended by the Bank Board or the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), respectively, or any successor organization to either.” Id., at 108-109. The Government emphasizes the last sentence of this clause, which provides that the relevant accounting principles may be “subsequently clarified ... or amended,” as barring any inference that the Government assumed the risk of regulatory change. Its argument, however, ignores the preceding sentence providing that the Bank Board’s resolutions and actions in connection with the merger must prevail over contrary regulations. If anything, then, the accounting principles clause tilts in favor of interpreting the contract to lock in the then-current regulatory treatment of supervisory goodwill. In any event, we do not doubt the soundness of the Federal Circuit’s finding that the overall “documentation in the Win-star transaction establishes an express agreement allowing Winstar to proceed with the merger plan approved by the Bank Board, including the recording of supervisory goodwill as a capital asset for regulatory capital purposes to be amortized over 35 years.” 64 F. 3d, at 1544. As in the Glendale transaction, the circumstances of the merger powerfully support this conclusion: The tangible net worth of the acquired institution was a negative $6.7 million, and the new Winstar thrift would have been out of compliance with regulatory capital standards from its very inception, without including goodwill in the relevant calculations. We thus accept the Court of Appeals’s conclusion that “it was the intention of the parties to be bound by the accounting treatment for goodwill arising in the merger.” Ibid. 3 Statesman, another nonthrift entity, approached FSLIC in 1987 about acquiring a subsidiary of First Federated Savings Bank, an insolvent Florida thrift. FSLIC responded that if Statesman wanted Government assistance in the acquisition it would have to acquire all of First Federated as well as three shaky thrifts in Iowa. Statesman and FSLIC ultimately agreed on a complex plan for acquiring the four thrifts; the agreement involved application of the purchase method of accounting, a $21 million cash contribution from Statesman to be accompanied by $60 million from FSLIC, and (unlike the Glendale and Winstar plans) treatment of $26 million of FSLIC’s contribution as a permanent capital credit to Statesman’s regulatory capital. The Assistance Agreement between Statesman and FSLIC included an “accounting principles” clause virtually identical to Winstar’s, see App. 402-403, as well as a specific provision for the capital credit: “For the purposes of reports to the Bank Board . . . , $26 million of the contribution [made by FSLIC] shall be credited to [Statesman’s] regulatory capital account and shall constitute regulatory capital (as defined in §561.13 of the Insurance Regulations).” Id., at 362a. As with Glendale and Winstar, the agreement had an integration clause incorporating contemporaneous resolutions and letters issued by the Board. Id., at 407-408. The Board’s resolution explicitly acknowledged both the capital credits and the creation of supervisory goodwill to be amortized over 25 years, id., at 458-459, and the Forbearance Letter likewise recognized the capital credit provided for in the agreement. Id., at 476. Finally, the parties executed a separate Regulatory Capital Maintenance Agreement stating that, “[i]n consideration of the mutual promises contained [t]herein,” id., at 418, Statesman would be obligated to maintain the regulatory capital of the acquired thrifts “at the level... required by § 563.13(b) of the Insurance Regulations . . . or any successor regulation . . . .” The agreement further provided, however, that “[f]or purposes of this Agreement, any determination of [Statesman’s] Required Regulatory Capital. . . shall include . . . amounts permitted by the FSLIC in the Assistance Agreement and in the forbearances issued in connection with the transactions discussed herein.” Id., at 418-419. Absent those forbearances, Statesman’s thrift would have remained insolvent by almost $9 million despite the cash infusions provided by the parties to the transaction. For the same reasons set out above with respect to the Glendale and Winstar transactions, we accept the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that “the government was contractually obligated to recognize the capital credits and the supervisory goodwill generated by the merger as part of the Statesman’s regulatory capital requirement and to permit such goodwill to be amortized on a straight line basis over 25 years.” 64 F. 3d, at 1543. Indeed, the Government’s' position is even weaker in Statesman’s case because the capital credits portion of the agreement contains an express commitment to include those credits in the calculation of regulatory capital. The Government asserts that the reference to §563.13 of FSLIC regulations, which at the time defined regulatory capital for thrift institutions, indicates that the Government’s obligations could change along with the relevant regulations. But, just as in Winstar’s case, the Government would have us overlook the specific incorporation of the then-current regulations as part of the agreement. The Government also cites a provision requiring Statesman to “comply in all material respects with all applicable statutes, regulations, orders of, and restrictions imposed by the United States or ... by any agency of [the United States],” App. 407, but this simply meant that Statesman was required to observe FIRREA’s new capital requirements once they were promulgated. The clause was hardly necessary to oblige Statesman to obey the law, and nothing in it barred Statesman from asserting that passage of that law required the Government to take action itself or be in breach of its contract. B It is important to be clear about what these contracts did and did not require of the Government. Nothing in the documentation or the circumstances of these transactions purported to bar the Government from changing the way in which it regulated the thrift industry. Rather, what the Federal Circuit said of the Glendale transaction is true of the Winstar and Statesman deals as well: “the Bank Board and the FSLIC were contractually bound to recognize the supervisory goodwill and the amortization periods reflected” in the agreements between the parties. 64 F. 3d, at 1541-1542. We read this promise as the law of contracts has always treated promises to provide something beyond the promi-sor’s absolute control, that is, as a promise to insure the promisee against loss arising from the promised condition’s nonoccurrence. Holmes’s example is famous: “[i]n the case of a binding promise that it shall rain to-morrow, the immediate legal effect of what the promisor does is, that he takes the risk of the event, within certain defined limits, as between himself and the promisee.” Holmes, The Common Law (1881), in 3 The Collected Works of Justice Holmes 268 (S. Novick ed. 1995). Contracts like this are especially appropriate in the world of regulated industries, where the risk that legal change will prevent the bargained-for performance is always lurking in the shadows. The drafters of the Restatement attested to this when they explained that, “[w]ith the trend toward greater governmental regulation . . . parties are increasingly aware of such risks, and a party may undertake a duty that is not discharged by such supervening governmental actions . . . .” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §264, Comment a. “Such an agreement,” according to the Restatement, “is usually interpreted as one to pay damages if performance is prevented rather than one to render a performance in violation of law.” Ibid. When the law as to capital requirements changed in the present instance, the Government was unable to perform its promise and, therefore, became liable for breach. We accept the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the Government breached these contracts when, pursuant to the new regulatory capital requirements imposed by FIRREA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(t), the federal regulatory agencies limited the use of supervisory goodwill and capital credits in calculating respondents’ net worth. 64 F. 3d, at 1545. In the case of Winstar and Statesman, the Government exacerbated its breach when it seized and liquidated respondents’ thrifts for regulatory noncompliance. Ibid. In evaluating the relevant documents and circumstances, we have, of course, followed the Federal Circuit in applying ordinary principles of contract construction and breach that would be applicable to any contract action between private parties. The Government’s case, however, is that the Federal Circuit’s decision to apply ordinary principles was error for a variety of reasons, each of which we consider, and reject, in the sections ahead. < J-H The Government argues for reversal, first, on the principle that “contracts that limit the government’s future exercises of regulatory authority are strongly disfavored; such contracts will be recognized only rarely, and then only when the limitation on future regulatory authority is expressed in unmistakable terms.” Brief for United States 16. Hence, the Government says, the agreements between the Bank Board, FSLIC, and respondents should not be construed to waive Congress’s authority to enact a subsequent bar to using supervisory goodwill and capital credits to meet regulatory capital requirements. The argument mistakes the scope of the unmistakability doctrine. The thrifts do not claim that the Bank Board and FSLIC purported to bind Congress to ossify the law in conformity to the contracts; they seek no injunction against application of FIRREA’s new capital requirements to them and no exemption from FIRREA’s terms. They simply claim that the Government assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law might prevent it from performing, and agreed to pay damages in the event that such failure to perform caused financial injury. The question, then, is not whether Congress could be constrained but whether the doctrine of unmistakability is applicable to any contract claim against the Government for breach occasioned by a subsequent Act of Congress. The answer to this question is no. A The unmistakability doctrine invoked by the Government was stated in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment: “ '[Sovereign power . . . governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.’” 477 U. S., at 52 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 148 (1982)). This doctrine marks the point of intersection between two fundamental constitutional concepts, the one traceable to the theory of parliamentary sovereignty made familiar by Blackstone, the other to the theory that legislative power may be limited, which became familiar to Americans through their experience under the colonial charters, see G. Wood, Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, pp. 268-271 (1969). In his Commentaries, Blackstone stated the centuries-old concept that one legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors: “Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.. .. Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it’s [sic] ordinances could bind the present parliament.” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 90 (1765). In England, of course, Parliament was historically supreme in the sense that no “higher law” limited the scope of legislative action or provided mechanisms for placing legally enforceable limits upon it in specific instances; the power of American legislative bodies, by contrast, is subject to the overriding dictates of the Constitution and the obligations that it authorizes. See Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 379, 392-393 (observing that the English rationale for precluding a legislature from binding its successors does not apply in America). Hence, although we have recognized that “a general-law ... may be repealed, amended or disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,” and “is not binding upon any subsequent legislature,” Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 487 (1905), on this side of the Atlantic the principle has always lived in some tension with the constitutionally created potential for a legislature, under certain circumstances, to place effective limits on its successors, or to authorize executive action resulting in such a limitation. The development of this latter, American doctrine in federal litigation began in cases applying limits on state sovereignty imposed by the National Constitution. Thus Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810), where the Court held that the Contract Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, barred the State of Georgia’s effort to rescind land grants made by a prior state legislature. Marshall acknowledged “that one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” 6 Cranch, at 135. “The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation,” he said, “can never be controverted.” Ibid. Marshall went on to qualify the principle, however, noting that “if an act be done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it. The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power.” Ibid. For Marshall, this was true for the two distinct reasons that the intrusion on vested rights by the Georgia Legislature’s Act of repeal might well have gone beyond the limits of “the legislative power,” and that Georgia’s legislative sovereignty was limited by the Federal Constitution’s bar against laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Id., at 135-136. The impetus for the modern unmistakability doctrine was thus Chief Justice Marshall’s application of the Contract Clause to public contracts. Although that Clause made it possible for state legislatures to bind their successors by entering into contracts, it soon became apparent that such contracts could become a threat to the sovereign responsibilities of state governments. Later decisions were accordingly less willing to recognize contractual restraints upon legislative freedom of action, and two distinct limitations developed to protect state regulatory powers. One came to be known as the “reserved powers” doctrine, which held that certain substantive powers of sovereignty could not be contracted away. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (1848) (holding that a State’s contracts do not surrender its eminent domain power). The other, which surfaced somewhat earlier in Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 (1830), and Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (1837), was a canon of construction disfavoring implied governmental obligations in public contracts. Under this rule that “[a]ll public grants are strictly construed,” The Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 225 (1874), we have insisted that “[njothing can be taken against the State by presumption or inference,” ibid., and that “neither the right of taxation, nor any other power of sovereignty, will be held ... to have been surrendered, unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.” Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436, 446 (1862). The posture of the government in these early unmistaka-bility cases is important. In each, a state or local government entity had made a contract granting a private party some concession (such as a tax exemption or a monopoly), and a subsequent governmental action had abrogated the contractual commitment. In each case, the private party was suing to invalidate the abrogating legislation under the Contract Clause. A requirement that the government’s obligation unmistakably appear thus served the dual purposes of limiting contractual incursions on a State’s sovereign powers and of avoiding difficult constitutional questions about the extent of state authority to limit the subsequent exercise of legislative power. Cf. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress”); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (same). The same function of constitutional avoidance has marked the expansion of the unmistakability doctrine from its Contract Clause origins dealing with state grants and contracts to those of other governmental sovereigns, including the United States. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S., at 148 (deriving the unmistakability principle from St. Louis v. United Railways Co., 210 U. S. 266 (1908), a Contract Clause suit against a state government). Although the Contract Clause has no application to acts of the United States, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 732, n. 9 (1984), it is clear that the National Government has some capacity to make agreements binding future Congresses by creating vested rights, see, e. g., Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934). The extent of that capacity, to be sure, remains somewhat obscure. Compare, e. g., United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 26 (1977) (heightened Contract Clause scrutiny when States abrogate their own contractual obligations), with Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, supra, at 733 (contrasting less exacting due process standards governing federal economic legislation affecting private contracts). But the want of more developed law on limitations independent of the Contract Clause is in part the result of applying the un-mistakability canon of construction to avoid this doctrinal thicket, as we have done in several cases involving alleged surrenders of sovereign prerogatives by the National Government and Indian tribes. First, we applied the doctrine to protect a tribal sovereign in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, supra, which held that long-term oil and gas leases to private parties from an Indian Tribe, providing for specific royalties to be paid to the Tribe, did not limit the Tribe's sovereign prerogative to tax the proceeds' from the lessees’ drilling activities. Id., at 148. Because the lease made no reference to the Tribe’s taxing power, we held simply that a waiver of that power could not be “inferred . . . from silence,” ibid., since the taxing power of any government remains “unless it is has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. 41 (1986), this Court confronted a state claim that § 103 of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, 97 Stat. 71, 42 U. S. C. § 418(g) (1982 ed., Supp. II), was unenforceable to the extent it was inconsistent with the terms of a prior agreement with the National Government. Under the law before 1983, a State could agree with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to cover the State’s employees under the Social Security scheme subject to a right to withdraw them from coverage later. When the 1983 Act eliminated the right of withdrawal, the State of California and related plaintiffs sought to enjoin application of the new law to them, or to obtain just compensation for loss of the withdrawal right (a remedy which the District Court interpreted as tantamount to the injunction, since it would mandate return of all otherwise required contributions, see 477 U. S., at 51). Although we were able to resolve the case by reading the terms of a state-federal coverage agreement to reserve the Government’s right to modify its terms by subsequent legislation, in the alternative we rested the decision on the more general principle that, absent an “unmistakable” provision to the contrary, “contractual arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is a party, ‘remain subject to subsequent legislation’ by the sovereign.” Id., at 52 (quoting Merrion, supra, at 147). We thus rejected the proposal “to find that a ‘sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in’ the contract,” Bowen, supra, at 52 (quoting Merrion, supra, at 148), and held instead that unmistakability was needed for waiver, not reservation. Most recently, in United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U. S. 700 (1987), we refused to infer a waiver of federal sovereign power from silence. There, an Indian Tribe with property rights in a riverbed derived from a Government treaty sued for just compensation for damage to its interests caused by the Government’s navigational improvements to the Arkansas River. The claim for compensation presupposed, and was understood to presuppose, that the Government had conveyed to the Tribe its easement to control navigation; absent that conveyance, the Tribe’s property included no right to be free from the Government’s riverbed improvements. Id., at 704. We found, however, that the treaty said nothing about conveying the Government’s navigational easement, see id., at 706, which we saw as an aspect of sovereignty. This, we said, could be “ ‘surrendered [only] in unmistakable terms,’ ” id., at 707 (quoting Bowen, supra, at 52), if indeed it could be waived at all. Merrion, Bowen, and Cherokee Nation thus announce no new rule distinct from the canon of construction adopted in Providence Bank and Charles River Bridge; their collective holding is that a contract with a sovereign government will not be read to include an unstated term exempting the other contracting party from the application of a subsequent sovereign act (including an Act of Congress), nor will an ambiguous term of a grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or surrender of sovereign power. The cases extending back into the 19th century thus stand for a rule that applies when the Government is subject either to a claim that its contract has surrendered a sovereign power (e. g., to tax or control navigation), or to a claim that cannot be recognized without creating an exemption from the exercise of such a power (e. g., the equivalent of exemption from Social Security obligations). The application of the doctrine thus turns on whether enforcement of the contractual obligation alleged would block the exercise of a sovereign power of the Government. Since the criterion looks to the effect of a contract’s enforcement, the particular remedy sought is not dispositive and the doctrine is not rendered inapplicable by a request for damages, as distinct from specific performance. The respondents in Cherokee Nation sought nothing beyond damages, but the case still turned on the unmistakability doctrine because there could be no claim to harm unless the right to be free of the sovereign power to control navigation had been conveyed away by the Government. So, too, in Bowen: the sole relief sought was dollars and cents, but the award of damages as requested' would have been the equivalent of exemption from the terms of the subsequent statute. The application of the doctrine will therefore differ according to the different kinds of obligations the Government may assume and the consequences of enforcing them. At one end of the wide spectrum are claims for enforcement of contractual obligations that could not be recognized without effectively limiting sovereign authority, such as a claim for rebate under an agreement for a tax exemption. Granting a rebate, like enjoining enforcement, would simply block the exercise of the taxing power, cf. Bowen, 477 U. S., at 51, and the unmistakability doctrine would have to be satisfied. At the other end are contracts, say, to buy food for the army; no sovereign power is limited by the Government’s promise to purchase and a claim for damages implies no such limitation. That is why no one would seriously contend that enforcement of humdrum supply contracts might be subject to the unmistakability doctrine. Between these extremes lies an enormous variety of contracts including those under which performance will require exercise (or not) of a power peculiar to the Government. So long as such a contract is reasonably construed to include a risk-shifting component that may be enforced without effectively barring the exercise of that power, the enforcement of the risk allocation raises nothing for the unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and there is no reason to apply it. The Government argues that enforcement of the contracts in this case would implicate the unmistakability principle, with the consequence that Merrion, Bowen, and Cherokee Nation are good authorities for rejecting respondents’ claims. The Government’s position is mistaken, however, for the complementary reasons that the contracts have not been construed as binding the Government’s exercise of authority to modify banking regulation or of any other sovereign power, and there has been no demonstration that awarding damages for breach would be tantamount to any such limitation. As construed by each of the courts that considered these contracts before they reached us, the agreements do not purport to bind the Congress from enacting regulatory measures, and respondents do not ask the courts to infer from silence any such limit on sovereign power as would violate the holdings of Merrion and Cherokee Nation. The contracts have been read as solely risk-shifting agreements and respondents seek nothing more than the benefit of promises by the Government to insure them against any losses arising from future regulatory change. They seek no injunction against application of the law to them, as the plaintiffs did in Bowen and Merrion, cf. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315 (1932), and they acknowledge that the Bank Board and FSLIC could not bind Congress (and possibly could not even bind their future selves) not to change regulatory policy. Nor do the damages respondents seek amount to exemption from the new law, in the manner of the compensation sought in Bowen, see 477 U. S., at 51. Once general jurisdiction to make an award against the Government is conceded, a requirement to pay money supposes no surrender of sovereign power by a sovereign with the power to contract. See, e. g., Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 515, 525, 372 F. 2d 485, 491 (“The Government cannot make a binding contract that it will not exercise a sovereign power, but it can agree in a contract that if it does so, it will pay the other contracting party the amount by which its costs are increased by the Government’s sovereign act”), cert. denied, 889 U. S. 846 (1967). Even if respondents were asking that the Government be required to make up any capital deficiency arising from the exclusion of goodwill and capital credits from the relevant calculations, such relief would hardly amount to an exemption from the capital requirements of FIRREA; after all, Glendale (the only respondent thrift still in operation) would still be required to maintain adequate tangible capital reserves under FIRREA, and the purpose of the statute, the protection of the insurance fund, would be served. Nor would such a damages award deprive the Government of money it would otherwise be entitled to receive (as a tax rebate would), since the capital require-merits of FIRRE A govern only the allocation of resources to a thrift and require no payments to the Government at all. We recognize, of course, that while agreements to insure private parties against the costs of subsequent regulatory change do not directly impede the exercise of sovereign power, they may indirectly deter needed governmental regulation by raising its costs. But all regulations have their costs, and Congress itself expressed a willingness to bear the costs at issue here when it authorized FSLIC to “guarantee [acquiring thrifts] against loss” that might occur as a result of a supervisory merger. 12 U. S. C. § 1729(f)(2) (1988 ed.) (repealed 1989). Just as we have long recognized that the Constitution “ ‘barfs] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,’ ” Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960)), so we must reject the suggestion that the Government may simply shift costs of legislation onto its contractual partners who are adversely affected by the change in the law, when the Government has assumed the risk of such change. The Government’s position would not only thus represent a conceptual expansion of the unmistakability doctrine beyond its historical and practical warrant, but would place the doctrine at odds with the Government’s own long-run interest as a reliable contracting partner in the myriad workaday transaction of its agencies. Consider the procurement contracts that can be affected by congressional or executive scale backs in federal regulatory or welfare activity; or contracts to substitute private service providers for the Government, which could be affected by a change in the official philosophy on privatization; or all the contracts to dispose of federal property, surplus or otherwise. If these contracts are made in reliance on the law of contract and without specific provision for default mechanisms, should all the private'contractors be denied a remedy in damages unless they satisfy the unmistakability doctrine? The answer is obviously no because neither constitutional avoidance nor any apparent need to protect the Government from the consequences of standard operations could conceivably justify applying the doctrine. Injecting the opportunity for un-mistakability litigation into every common contract action would, however, produce the untoward result of compromising the Government’s practical capacity to make contracts, which we have held to be “of the essence of sovereignty” itself. United States v. Bekins, 304 U. S. 27, 51-52 (1938). From a practical standpoint, it would make an inroad on this power, by expanding the Government’s opportunities for contractual abrogation, with the certain result of undermining the Government’s credibility at the bargaining table and increasing the cost of its engagements. As Justice Brandéis recognized, “[pjunctilious fulfillment of contractual obligations is essential to the maintenance of the credit of public as well as private debtors.” Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S., at 580. The dissent’s only answer to our concern is to recognize that “Congress may not simply abrogate a statutory provision obligating performance without breaching the contract and rendering itself liable for damages.” Post, at 929 (citing Lynch, supra, at 580). Yet the only grounds that statement suggests for distinguishing Lynch from the present case is that there the contractual obligation was embodied in a statute. Putting aside the question why this distinction should make any difference, we note that the dissent seemingly does not deny that its view would apply the unmistakability doctrine to the vast majority of governmental contracts, which would be subject to abrogation arguments based on subsequent sovereign acts. Indeed, the dissent goes so far as to argue that our conclusion that damages are available for breach even where the parties did not specify a remedy in the contract depends upon “reading of additional terms into the contract.” Post, at 930. That, of course, is not the law; damages are always the default remedy for breach of contract. And we suspect that most Government contractors would be quite surprised by the dissent’s conclusion that, where they have failed to require an express provision that damages will be available for breach, that remedy must be “implied in law” and therefore unavailable under the Tucker Act, ibid. Nor can the dissenting view be confined to those contracts that are “regulatory” in nature. Such a distinction would raise enormous analytical difficulties; one could ask in this case whether the Government as contractor was regulating or insuring. The dissent understandably does not advocate such a distinction, but its failure to advance any limiting principle at all would effectively compromise the Government’s capacity as a reliable, straightforward contractor whenever the subject matter of a contract might be subject to subsequent regulation, which is most if not all of the time. Since the facts of the present case demonstrate that the Government may wish to further its regulatory goals through contract, we are unwilling to adopt any rule of construction that would weaken the Government’s capacity to do business by converting every contract it makes into an arena for unmistakability litigation. In any event, we think the dissent goes fundamentally wrong when it concludes that “the issue of remedy for . . . breach” can arise only “[i]f the sovereign did surrender its power unequivocally.” Post, at 929. This view ignores the other, less remarkable possibility actually found by both courts that construed these contracts: that the Government agreed to do something that did not implicate its sovereign powers at all, that is, to indemnify its contracting partners against financial losses arising from regulatory change. We accordingly hold that the Federal Circuit correctly refused to apply the unmistakability doctrine here. See 64 F. 3d, at 1548. There being no need for an unmistakably clear “second promise” not to change the capital requirements, it is sufficient that the Government undertook an obligation that it subsequently found itself unable to perform. This conclusion does not, of course, foreclose the assertion of a defense that the contracts were ultra vires or that the Government’s obligation should be discharged under the common-law doctrine of impossibility, see infra, at 888-891, 904-910, but nothing in the nature of the contracts themselves raises a bar to respondents’ claims for breach. B The answer to the Government’s unmistakability argument also meets its two related contentions on the score of ultra vires: that the Bank Board and FSLIC had no authority to bargain away Congress’s power to change the law in the future, and that we should in any event find no such authority conferred without an express delegation to that effect. The first of these positions rests on the reserved powers doctrine, developed in the course of litigating claims that States had violated the Contract Clause. See supra, at 874. It holds that a state government may not contract away “an essential attribute of its sovereignty,” United States Trust, 431 U. S., at 23, with the classic example of its limitation on the scope of the Contract Clause being found in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1880). There a corporation bargained for and received a state legislative charter to conduct lotteries, only to have them outlawed by statute a year later. This Court rejected the argument that the charter immunized the corporation from the operation of the statute, holding that “the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State.” Id., at 817. The Government says that “[t]he logic of the doctrine . . . applies equally to contracts alleged to have been made by the federal government.” Brief for United States 38. This may be so but is also beside the point, for the reason that the Government’s ability to set capital requirements is not limited by the Bank Board’s and FSLIC’s promises to make good any losses arising from subsequent regulatory changes. See supra, at 882-883. The answer to the Government’s contention that the State cannot barter away certain elements of its sovereign power is that a contract to adjust the risk of subsequent legislative change does not strip the Government of its legislative sovereignty. The same response answers the Government’s demand for express delegation of any purported authority to fetter the exercise of sovereign power. It is true, of course, that in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S., at 273, we said that “[t]he surrender, by contract, of a power of government, though in certain well-defined cases it may be made by legislative authority, is a very grave act, and the surrender itself, as well as the authority to make it, must be closely scrutinized.” Hence, where “a contract has the effect of extinguishing pro tanto an undoubted power of government,” we have insisted that “both [the contract’s] existence and the authority to make it must clearly and unmistakably appear, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the continuance of the power.” Ibid. But Home Telephone & Telegraph simply has no application to the present case, because there were no contracts to surrender the Government’s sovereign power to regulate. There is no question, conversely, that the Bank Board and FSLIC had ample statutory authority to do what the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit found they did do, that is, promise to permit respondents to count supervisory goodwill and capital credits toward regulatory capital and to pay respondents’ damages if that performance became impossible. The organic statute creating FSLIC as an arm of the Bank Board, 12 U. S. C. § 1725(c) (1988 ed.) (repealed 1989), generally empowered it “[t]o make contracts,” and § 1729(f)(2), enacted in 1978, delegated more specific powers in the context of supervisory mergers: “Whenever an insured institution is in default or, in the judgment of the Corporation, is in danger of default, the Corporation may, in order to facilitate a merger or consolidation of such insured institution with another insured institution ... guarantee such other insured institution against loss by reason of its merging or consolidating with or assuming the liabilities and purchasing the assets of such insured institution in or in danger of default.” 12 U. S. C. § 1729(f)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1989). Nor is there any reason to suppose that the breadth of this authority was not meant to extend to contracts governing treatment of regulatory capital. Congress specifically recognized FSLIC’s authority to permit thrifts to count goodwill toward capital requirements when it modified the National Housing Act in 1987: “No provision of this section shall affect the authority of the [FSLIC] to authorize insured institutions to utilize subordinated debt and goodwill in meeting reserve and other regulatory requirements.” 12 U. S. C. § 1730h(d) (1988 ed.) (repealed 1989). See also S. Rep. No. 100-19, p. 55 (1987) (“It is expected .. . that the [Bank Board] will retain its own authority to determine . .. the components and level of capital to be required of FSLIC-insured institutions”); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 275 (1974) (“[Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to significant weight”). There is no serious question that FSLIC (and the Bank Board acting through it) was authorized to make the contracts in issue. IV The Government’s final line of defense is the sovereign acts doctrine, to the effect that “ ‘[w]hatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons.’” Horowitz v. United States, 267 U. S., at 461 (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865)). Because FIRREA’s alteration of the regulatory capital requirements was a “public and general act,” the Government says, that act could not amount to a breach of the Government’s contract with respondents. The Government’s position cannot prevail, however, for two independent reasons. The facts of this case do not warrant application of the doctrine, and even if that were otherwise the doctrine would not suffice to excuse liability under this governmental contract allocating risks of regulatory change in a highly regulated industry. In Horowitz, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for breach of a contract to purchase silk from the Ordnance Department. The agreement included a promise by the Department to ship the silk within a certain time, although the manner of shipment does not appear to have been a subject of the contract. Shipment was delayed because the United States Railroad Administration placed an embargo on shipments of silk by freight, and by the time the silk reached Horowitz the price had fallen, rendering the deal unprofitable. This Court barred any damages award for the delay, noting that “[i]t has long been held by the Court of Claims that the United States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign.” 267 U. S., at 461. This statement was not, however, meant to be read as broadly as the Government urges, and the key to its proper scope is found in that portion of our opinion explaining that the essential point was to put the Government in the same position that it would have enjoyed as a private contractor: “‘The two characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign cannot be thus fused; nor can the United States while sued in the one character be made liable in damages for their acts done in the other. Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons.... In this court the United States appear simply as contractors; and they are to be held liable only within the same limits that any other defendant would be in any other court. Though their sovereign acts performed for the general good may work injury to some private contractors, such parties gain nothing by having the United States as their defendants.’” Ibid, (quoting Jones v. United States, supra, at 384). The early Court of Claims cases upon which Horowitz relied anticipated the Court’s emphasis on the Government’s dual and distinguishable capacities and on the need to treat the Government-as-contractor the same as a private party. In Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865), the Court of Claims rejected a suit by a supplier of army rations whose costs increased as a result of Congress’s passage of the Legal Tender Act. The Deming court thought it “grave error” to suppose that “general enactments of Congress are to be construed as evasions of [the plaintiff’s] particular contract.” Id., at 191. “The United States as a contractor are not responsible for the United States as a lawgiver,” the court said. “In this court the United States can be held to no greater liability than other contractors in other courts.” Ibid. Similarly, Jones v. United States, supra, refused a suit by surveyors employed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, whose performance had been hindered by the United States’s withdrawal of troops from Indian country. “The United States as a contractor,” the Claims Court concluded, “cannot be held liable directly or indirectly for the public acts of the United States as a sovereign.” Id., at 385. The Government argues that “[t]he relevant question [under these cases] is whether the impact [of governmental action] ... is caused by a law enacted to govern regulatory policy and to advance the general welfare.” Brief for United States 45. This understanding assumes that the dual characters of Government as contractor and legislator are never “fused” (within the meaning of Horowitz) so long as the object of the statute is regulatory and meant to accomplish some public good. That is, on the Government’s reading, a regulatory object is proof against treating the legislature as having acted to avoid the Government’s contractual obligations, in which event the sovereign acts defense would not be applicable. But the Government’s position is open to serious objection. As an initial matter, we have already expressed our doubt that a workable line can be drawn between the Government’s “regulatory” and “nonregulatory” capacities. In the present case, the Government chose to regulate capital reserves to protect FSLIC’s insurance fund, much as any insurer might impose restrictions on an insured as a condition of the policy. The regulation thus protected the Government in its capacity analogous to a private insurer, the same capacity in which it entered into supervisory merger agreements to convert some of its financial insurance obligations into responsibilities of private entrepreneurs. In this respect, the supervisory mergers bear some analogy to private contracts for reinsurance. On the other hand, there is no question that thrift regulation is, in fact, regulation, and that both the supervisory mergers of the 1980’s and the subsequent passage of FIRREA were meant to advance a broader public interest. The inescapable conclusion from all of this is that the Government’s “regulatory” and “nonregulatory” capacities were fused in the instances under consideration, and we suspect that such fusion will be so common in the modern regulatory state as to leave a criterion of “regulation” without much use in defining the scope of the sovereign acts doctrine. An even more serious objection is that allowing the Government to avoid contractual liability merely by passing any “regulatory statute” would flout the general principle that, “[w]hen the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.” Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S., at 579. Careful attention to the cases shows that the sovereign acts doctrine was meant to serve this principle, not undermine it. In Horowitz, for example, if the defendant had been a private shipper, it would have been entitled to assert the common-law defense of impossibility of performance against Horowitz’s claim for breach. Although that defense is traditionally unavailable where the barrier to performance arises from the act of the party seeking discharge, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261; 2 E. Farnsworth, Contracts §9.6, p. 551 (1990); cf. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U. S. 757, 767-768, n. 10 (1983), Horowitz held that the “public and general” acts of the sovereign are not attributable to the Government as contractor so as to bar the Government’s right to discharge. The sovereign acts doctrine thus balances the Government’s need for freedom to legislate with its obligation to honor its contracts by asking whether the sovereign act is properly attributable to the Government as contractor. If the answer is no, the Government’s defense to liability depends on the answer to the further question, whether that act would otherwise release the Government from liability under ordinary principles of contract law. Neither question can be answered in the Government’s favor here. A If the Government is to be treated like other contractors, some line has to be drawn in situations like the one before us between regulatory legislation that is relatively free of Government self-interest and therefore cognizable for the purpose of a legal impossibility defense and, on the other hand, statutes tainted by a governmental object of self-relief. Such an object is not necessarily inconsistent with a public purpose, of course, and when we speak of governmental “self-interest,” we simply mean to identify instances in which the Government seeks to shift the costs of meeting its legitimate public responsibilities to private parties. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S., at 49 (The Government may not “forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which . . . should be borne by the public as a whole”). Hence, while the Government might legitimately conclude that a given contractual commitment was no longer in the public interest, a government seeking relief from such commitments through legislation would obviously not be in a position comparable to that of the private contractor who willy-nilly was barred by law from performance. There would be, then, good reason in such circumstance to find the regulatory and contractual characters of the Government fused together, in Horowitz’s terms, so that the Government should not have the benefit of the defense. Horowitz’s criterion of “public and general act” thus reflects the traditional “rule of law” assumption that generality in the terms by which the use of power is authorized will tend to guard against its misuse to burden or benefit the few unjustifiably. See, e. g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535-536 (1884) (“Law .. . must be not a special rule for a particular person or a particular case, but... ‘[t]he general law...’ so ‘that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society’” (citation omitted)). Hence, governmental action will not be held against the Government for purposes of the impossibility defense so long as the action’s impact upon public contracts is, as in Horowitz, merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective. See O’Neill v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (noting that the sovereign acts doctrine recognizes that “the Government’s actions, otherwise legal, will occasionally incidentally impair the performance of contracts”). The greater the Government’s self-interest, however, the more suspect becomes the claim that its private contracting partners ought to bear the financial burden of the Government’s own improvidence, and where a substantial part of the impact of the Government’s action rendering performance impossible falls on its own contractual obligations, the defense will be unavailable. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 768, 572 F. 2d 786, 817 (1978) (rejecting sovereign acts defense where the Secretary of the Interior’s actions were “ ‘directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs’ contractual right’ ”). The dissent would adopt a different rule that the Government’s dual roles of contractor and sovereign may never be treated as fused, relying upon Deming’s pronouncement that “ ‘[t]he United States as a contractor are not responsible for the United States as a lawgiver.’ ” Post, at 931 (quoting 1 Ct. Cl., at 191). But that view would simply eliminate the “public and general” requirement, which presupposes that the Government’s capacities must be treated as fused when the Government acts in a nongeneral way. Deming itself twice refers to the “general” quality of the enactment at issue, 1 Ct. Cl., at 191, and notes that “[t]he statute bears upon [the governmental contract] as it bears upon all similar contracts between citizens, and affects it in no other way.” Ibid. At the other extreme, of course, it is clear that any benefit at all to the Government will not disqualify an act as “public and general”; the silk embargo in Horowitz, for example, had the incidental effect of releasing the Government from its contractual obligation to transport Mr. Horowitz’s shipment. Our holding that a governmental act will not be public and general if it has the substantial effect of releasing the Government from its contractual obligations strikes a middle course between these two extremes. B In the present case, it is impossible to attribute the exculpatory “public and general” character to FIRREA. Although we have not been told the dollar value of the relief the Government would obtain if insulated from liability under contracts such as these, the attention given to the regulatory contracts prior to passage of FIRREA shows that a substantial effect on governmental contracts is certain. The statute not only had the purpose of eliminating the very accounting gimmicks that acquiring thrifts had been promised, but the specific object of abrogating enough of the acquisition contracts as to make that consequence of the legislation a focal point of the congressional debate. Opponents of FIRREA’s new capital requirements complained that “[i]n its present form, [FIRREA] would abrogate written agreements made by the U. S. government to thrifts that acquired failing institutions by changing the rules in the middle of the game.” 135 Cong. Rec. 12145 (1989) (statement of Rep. Ackerman). Several Congressmen observed that, “[sjimply put, [Congress] has reneged on the agreements that the government entered into concerning supervisory goodwill.” House Report, at 498 (additional views of Reps. Annunzio, Kanjorski, and Flake). A similar focus on the supervisory merger contracts is evident among proponents of the legislation; Representative Rostenkowski, for example, insisted that “the Federal Government should be able to change requirements when they have proven to be disastrous and contrary to the public interest. The contracts between the savings and loan owners when they acquired failing institutions in the early 1980’s are not contracts written in stone.” 135 Cong. Rec., at 12077. This evidence of intense concern with contracts like the ones before us suffices to show that FIRREA had the substantial effect of releasing the Government from its own contractual obligations. Congress obviously expected FIRREA to have such an effect, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary we accept its factual judgment that this would be so. Nor is Congress’s own judgment neutralized by the fact, emphasized by the Government, that FIRREA did not formally target particular transactions. Legislation can almost always be written in a formally general way, and the want of an identified target is not much security when a measure’s impact nonetheless falls substantially upon the Government’s contracting partners. For like reason, it does not answer the legislative record to insist, as the Government does, that the congressional focus is irrelevant because the broad purpose of FIRREA was to “advance the general welfare.” Brief for United States 45. We assume nothing less of all congressional action, with the result that an intent to benefit the public can no more serve as a criterion of a “public and general” sovereign act than its regulatory character can. While our limited en-quiry into the background and evolution of the thrift crisis leaves us with the understanding that Congress acted to protect the public in the FIRREA legislation, the extent to which this reform relieved the Government of its own contractual obligations precludes a finding that the statute is a “public and general” act for purposes of the sovereign acts defense. c Even if FIRREA were to qualify as “public and general,” however, other fundamental reasons would leave the sovereign acts doctrine inadequate to excuse the Government’s breach of these contracts. As Horowitz makes clear, that defense simply relieves the Government as contractor from the traditional blanket rule that a contracting party may not obtain discharge if its own act rendered performance impossible. But even if the Government stands in the place of a private party with respect to “public and general” sovereign acts, it does not follow that discharge will always be available, for the common-law doctrine of impossibility imposes additional requirements before a party may avoid liability for breach. As the Restatement puts it, “[w]here, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261. See also 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 9.6, at 543-544 (listing four elements of the impossibility defense). Thus, since the object of the sovereign acts defense is to place the Government as contractor on par with a private contractor in the same circumstances, Horowitz, 267 U. S., at 461, the Government, like any other defending party in a contract action, must show that the passage of the statute rendering its performance impossible was an event contrary to the basic assumptions on which the parties agreed, and must ultimately show that the language or circumstances do not indicate that the Government should be liable in any case. While we do not say that these conditions can never be satisfied when the Government contracts with participants in a regulated industry for particular regulatory treatment, we find that the Government as such a contractor has not satisfied the conditions for discharge in the present case. 1 For a successful impossibility defense the Government would have to show that the nonoccurrence of regulatory amendment was a basic assumption of these contracts. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261; 2 Farnsworth, supra, § 9.6, at 549-550. The premise of this requirement is that the parties will have bargained with respect to any risks that are both within their contemplation and central to the substance of the contract; as Justice Traynor said, “[i]f [the risk] was foreseeable there should have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.” Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P. 2d 47, 50 (1944). That inference is particularly compelling, where, as here, the contract provides for particular regulatory treatment (and, a fortiori, allocates the risk of regulatory change). Such an agreement reflects the inescapable recognition that regulated industries in the modern world do not live under the law of the Medes and the Persians, and the very fact that such a contract is made at all is at odds with any assumption of regulatory stasis. In this particular case, whether or not the reach of the FIRREA reforms was anticipated by the parties, there is no doubt that some changes in the regulatory structure governing thrift capital reserves were both foreseeable and likely when these parties contracted with the Government, as even the Government agrees. It says in its brief to this Court that “in light of the frequency with which federal capital requirements had changed in the past ... , it would have been unreasonable for Glendale, FSLIC, or the Bank Board to expect or rely upon the fact that those requirements would remain unchanged.” Brief for United States 26; see also id., at 3, n. 1 (listing the changes). The Federal Circuit panel in this case likewise found that the regulatory capital requirements “have been the subject of numerous statutory and regulatory changes over the years,” and “changed three times in 1982 alone.” 994 F. 2d, at 801. Given these fluctuations, and given the fact that a single modification of the applicable regulations could, and ultimately did, eliminate virtually all of the consideration provided by the Government in these transactions, it would be absurd to say that the nonoccurrence of a change in the regulatory capital rules was a basic assumption upon which these contracts were made. See, e.g., Moncrief v. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 880 F. Supp. 1495, 1508 (Wyo. 1995); Vollmar v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1154, 1176 (ED Va. 1989), aff’d, 898 F. 2d 413 (CA4 1990). 2 Finally, any governmental contract that not only deals with regulatory change but allocates the risk of its occurrence will, by definition, fail the further condition of a successful impossibility defense, for it will indeed indicate that the parties’ agreement was not meant to be rendered nugatory by a change in the regulatory law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261 (no impossibility defense where the “language or the circumstances” indicate allocation of the risk to the party seeking discharge). The mere fact that the Government’s contracting agencies (like the Bank Board and FSLIC) could not themselves preclude Congress from changing the regulatory rules does not, of course, stand in the way of concluding that those agencies assumed the risk of such change, for determining the consequences of legal change was the point of the agreements. It is, after all, not uncommon for a contracting party to assume the risk of an event he cannot control, even when that party is an agent of the Government. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, “[Government] contracts routinely include provisions shifting financial responsibility to the Government for events which might occur in the future. That some of these events may be triggered by sovereign government action does not render the relevant contractual provisions any less binding than those which contemplate third party acts, inclement weather and other force majeure.” Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F. 2d 953, 958-959 (CA Fed. 1993). As to each of the contracts before us, our agreement with the conclusions of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit forecloses any defense of legal impossibility, for those courts found that the Bank Board resolutions, Forbearance Letters, and other documents setting forth the accounting treatment to be accorded supervisory goodwill generated by the transactions were not mere statements of then-current regulatory policy, but in each instance were terms in an allocation of risk of regulatory change that was essential to the contract between the parties. See supra, at 861-864. Given that the parties went to considerable lengths in procuring necessary documents and drafting broad integration clauses to incorporate their terms into the contract itself, the Government’s suggestion that the parties meant to say only that the regulatory treatment laid out in these documents would apply as an initial matter, subject to later change at the Government’s election, is unconvincing. See ibid. It would, indeed, have been madness for respondents to have engaged in these transactions with no more protection than the Government’s reading would have given them, for the very existence of their institutions would then have been in jeopardy from the moment their agreements were signed. * * * We affirm the Federal Circuit’s ruling that the United States is liable to respondents for breach of contract. Because the Court of Federal Claims has not yet determined the appropriate measure or amount of damages in this case, we remand for farther proceedings. It is so ordered. The easing of federal regulatory requirements was accompanied by similar initiatives on the state level, especially in California, Florida, and Texas. The impact of these changes was substantial, since as of 1980 over 50 percent of federally insured thrifts were chartered by the States. See House Report, at 297. “Regulatory and statutory accounting gimmicks included permitting thrifts to defer losses from the sale of assets with below market yields; permitting the use of income capital certificates, authorized by Congress, in place of real capital; letting qualifying mutual capital certificates be included as RAP capital; allowing FSLIC members to exclude from liabilities in computing net worth, certain contra-asset accounts, including loans in process, unearned discounts, and deferred fees and credits; and permitting the inclusion of net worth certificates, qualifying subordinated debentures and appraised equity capital as RAP net worth.” House Report, at 298. The result of these practices was that “[b]y 1984, the difference between RAP and GAAP net worth at S&L’s stood at $9 billion,” which meant “that the industry’s capital position, or . . . its cushion to absorb losses was overstated by $9 billion.” Ibid. See also White 157 (noting that “[t]he FSLIC developed lists of prospective acquirers, made presentations, held seminars, and generally tried to promote the acquisitions of these insolvents”); Grant, The FSLIC: Protection through Professionalism, 14 Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal 9-10 (Feb. 1981) (describing the pros and cons of various default-prevention techniques from FSLIC’s perspective). Over 300 such mergers occurred between 1980 and 1986, as opposed to only 48 liquidations. GAO, Forbearance for Troubled Institutions 13. There is disagreement as to whether the Government actually saved money by pursuing this course rather than simply liquidating the insolvent thrifts. Compare, e. g., Brief for Franklin Financial Group, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 7, quoting remarks by H. Brent Beasley, Director of FSLIC, before the California Savings and Loan League Management Conference (Sept. 9, 1982) (concluding that FSLIC-assisted mergers have “ ‘[hjistorically . . . cost about 70% of [the] cost of liquidation’ ”), with GAO, Solutions to the Thrift Industry Problem 52 (“FSLIC’s cost analyses may . . . understate] the cost of mergers to the government”). See also Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17, ¶ 26, p. 339 (1970) (providing that “[i]ntangible assets acquired ... as part of an acquired company should ... be recorded at cost,” which for unidentifiable intangible assets like goodwill is “measured by the difference between the cost of the ... enterprise acquired and the sum of the assigned costs of individual tangible and identifiable intangible assets acquired less liabilities assumed”). See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U. S. 546, 556 (1993) (describing “goodwill” as “the total of all the imponderable qualities that attract customers to the business”). Justice Story defined “goodwill” somewhat more elaborately as “the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value- of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient partialities, or prejudices.” J. Story, Law of Partnership § 99, p. 139 (1841). See also 135 Cong. Ree. 12061 (1989) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (observing that FSLIC used goodwill as “an inducement to the healthy savings and loans to merge with the sick ones”); Brief for Franklin Financial Group, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 9, quoting Deposition of Thurman Connell, former official at the Atlanta Federal Home Loan Bank, Joint App. in Charter Federal Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, Nos. 91-2647, 91-2708 (CA4), p. 224 (recognizing that treating supervisory goodwill as regulatory capital was “‘a very important aspect of [the acquiring thrifts’] willingness to enter into these agreements,’ ” and concluding that the regulators “ ‘looked at [supervisory goodwill] as kind of the engine that made this transaction go. Because without it, there wouldn’t have been any train pulling out of the station, so to speak’ ”). In this context, “amortization” of an intangible asset is equivalent to depreciation of tangible assets. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, supra, at 571, n. 1 (Souter, J., dissenting); Gregorcich, Amortization of Intangibles: A Reassessment of the Tax Treatment of Purchased Goodwill, 28 Tax Lawyer 251, 253 (1975). Both the majority opinion and dissent in Newark Morning Ledger agreed that “goodwill” was not subject to depreciation (or amortization) for federal tax purposes, see 507 U. S., at 565, n. 13; id., at 573 (Souter, J., dissenting), although we disagreed as to whether one could accurately estimate the useful life of certain elements of goodwill and, if so, permit depreciation of those elements under Internal Revenue Service regulations. Id., at 566-567; id., at 576-577 (Souter, J., dissenting). Neither of the Newark Morning Ledger opinions, however, denied the power of another federal agency, such as the Bank Board or FSLIC, to decide that goodwill is of transitory value and impose a particular amortization period to be used for its own regulatory purposes. See also National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, Origins and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform, A Report to the President and Congress of the United States 38-39 (July 1993) (explaining the advantages of different amortization and accretion schedules to an acquiring thrift). The downside of a faster accretion schedule, of course, was that it exhausted the discount long before the goodwill asset had been fully amortized. As a result, this treatment resulted in a net drag on earnings over the medium and long terms. See Lowy 40-41; Black, Ending Our Forebearers’ Forbearances: FIRREA and Supervisory Goodwill, 2 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 102, 104-105 (1990). Many thrift managers were apparently willing to take the short-term gain, see Lowy 40-41, and others sought to stave off the inevitable losses by pursuing farther acquisitions, see Black, supra, at 105. The 1981 regulations quoted above were in effect at the time of the Glendale transaction. The 1984 regulations relevant to the Winstar transaction were identical in all material respects, and although substantial changes had been introduced into §563.13 by the time of the Statesman merger in 1988, they do not appear to resolve the basic ambiguity as to whether goodwill could qualify as regulatory capital. See 12 CFR § 563.13 (1988). Section 563.13 has since been superseded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act. Although the Glendale transaction in this ease occurred before the promulgation of SFAS 72 in 1983, the proper amortization period for goodwill under GAAP was uncertain prior to that time. According to one observer, “when the accounting profession designed the purchase accounting rules in the early 1970s, they didn’t anticipate the case of insolvent thrift institutions .... The rules for that situation were simply unclear until September 1982,” when the SEAS 72 rules were first aired. Lowy 39-40. See 135 Cong. Ree. 18863 (1989) (remarks of Sen. Riegle) (emphasizing that these capital requirements were at the “heart” of the legislative reform); id., at 18860 (remarks of Sen. Chafee) (describing capital standards as FIRREA’s “strongest and most critical requirement” and “the backbone of the legislation”); id., at 18853 (remarks of Sen. Dole) (describing the “[t]ough new capital standards [as] perhaps the most important provisions in this bill”). Glendale’s premerger net worth amounted to 5.45 percent of its total assets, which comfortably exceeded the 4 percent capital/asset ratio, or net worth requirement, then in effect. See 12 GFR § 568.13(a)(2) (1981). See also Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U. S. 408, 413 (1926) (“It is not reasonable to suppose that the grantees would pay $12,000 . . . and leave to the city authorities the absolute right completely to nullify the chief consideration for seeking this property,... or that the parties then took that view of the transaction”). As part of the contract, the Government’s promise to count supervisory goodwill and capital credits toward regulatory capital was alterable only by written agreement of the parties. See App. 408. This was also true of the Glendale and Winstar transactions. See id., at 112, 600. To be sure, each side could have eliminated any serious contest about the correctness of their interpretive positions by using clearer language. See, e. g., Guaranty Financial Services, Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F. 2d 994, 999-1000 (CA11 1991) (finding, based on very different contract language, that the Government had expressly reserved the right to ehange the capital requirements without any responsibility to the acquiring thrift). The failure to be even more explicit is perhaps more surprising here, given the size and complexity of these transactions. But few contract cases would be in court if contract language had articulated the parties’ postbreach positions as clearly as might have been done, and the failure to specify remedies in the contract is no reason to find that the parties intended no remedy at all. The Court of Claims and Federal Circuit were thus left with the familiar task of determining which party’s interpretation was more nearly supported by the evidence. See also Day v. United States, 245 U. S. 159, 161 (1917) (Holmes, J.) (“One who makes a contract never can be absolutely certain that he will be able to perform it when the time comes, and the very essence of it is that he takes the risk within the limits of his undertaking”). See, e. g., Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F. 2d 953, 957-959 (CA Fed. 1993) (interpreting contractual incorporation of then-current Government policy on space shuttle launches not as a promise not to change that policy, but as a promise “to bear the cost of changes in launch priority and scheduling resulting from the revised policy”); Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F. 2d 514, 516-517 (CA Fed. 1992) (interpreting contract to incorporate safety regulations extant when contract was signed and to shift responsibility for costs incurred as a result of new safety regulations to the Government); see generally 18 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1934, pp. 19-21 (3d ed. 1978) (“Although a warranty in effect is a promise to pay damages if the facts are not as warranted, in terms it is an undertaking that the facts exist. And in spite of occasional statements that an agreement impossible in law is void there seems no greater difficulty in warranting the legal possibility of a performance than its possibility in fact .... [T]here seems no reason of policy forbidding a contract to perform a certain act legal at the time of the contract if it remains legal at the time of performance, and if not legal, to indemnify the promisee for non-performance” (footnotes omitted)); 5A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1170, p. 254 (1964) (noting that in some cases where subsequent legal change renders contract performance illegal, “damages are still available as a remedy, either because the promisor assumed the risk or for other reasons,” but specific performance will not be required). See also H. Hart, The Concept of Law 145 (1961) (recognizing that Parliament is “sovereign, in the sense that it is free, at every moment of its existence as a continuing body, not only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but also from its own prior legislation”). See also Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years”); Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 Yale L. J. 189, 191 (1972) (characterizing this “most familiar and fundamental principle]” as “so obvious as rarely to be stated”). See also Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1880) (State may not contract away its police power); Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U. S. 746 (1884) (same); see generally Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 277, 290-299 (1990) (recounting the early development of the reserved powers doctrine). We discuss the application of the reserved powers doctrine to this case infra, at 888-889. United Railways is in the line of cases stretching back to Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514 (1830), and Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (1837). Justice Day’s opinion in United Railways relied heavily upon New Orleans City & Lake R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192 (1892), which in turn relied upon classic Contract Clause unmistakability cases like Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665 (1886), Memphis Gas Light Co. v. Taxing Dish of Shelby Cty., 109 U. S. 398 (1883), and Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (1854). And Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), upon which Merrion also relied, cites Charles River Bridge directly. See 290 U. S., at 435; see also Note, Forbearance Agreements: Invalid Contracts for the Surrender of Sovereignty, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 453 (1992) (linking the unmistakability principle applied in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. 41 (1986), to the Charles River Bridge/Providence Bank line of cases). “Sovereign power” as used here must be understood as a power that could otherwise affect the Government’s obligation under the contract. The Government could not, for example, abrogate one of its contracts by a statute abrogating the legal enforceability of that contract, Government contracts of a class including that one, or simply all Government contracts. No such legislation would provide the Government with a defense under the sovereign acts doctrine, see infra, at 891-899. The Government’s right to take the Tribe’s property upon payment of compensation, of course, did not depend upon the navigational servitude; where it applies, however, the navigational easement generally obviates the obligation to pay compensation at all. See, e. g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799, 808 (1950) (“When the Government exercises [the navigational] servitude, it is exercising its paramount power in the interest of navigation, rather than taking the private property of anyone”); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900) (“Whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front of his upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has no direct connection with the navigation of such water. It is a qualified title ... to be held at all times subordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or demanded by the public right of navigation”). Because an order to pay compensation would have placed the Government in the same position as if the navigational easement had been surrendered altogether, the holding of Cherokee Nation is on all fours with the approach we describe today. The dissent is mistaken in suggesting there is question begging in speaking of what a Government contract provides without first applying the unmistakability doctrine, see post, at 929. A contract may reasonably be read under normal rules of construction to contain a provision that does not satisfy the more demanding standard of unmistakable clarity. If an alleged term could not be discovered under normal standards, there would be no need for an unmistakability doctrine. It would, of course, make good sense to apply the unmistakability rule if it was clear from the start that a contract plaintiff could not obtain the relief sought without effectively barring exercise of a sovereign power, as in the example of the promisee of the tax exemption who claims a rebate. See also Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F. 2d, at 958 (finding the unmistakability doctrine inapplicable to “the question of how liability for certain contingencies was allocated by the contract”); Sunswick Corp. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 772, 798, 75 F. Supp. 221, 228 (“We know of no reason why the Government may not by the terms of its contract bind itself for the consequences of some act on its behalf which, but for the contract, would be nonactionable as an act of the sovereign. As shown in United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53, 69 [(1877)], the liability of the Government in such circumstances rests upon the contract and not upon the act of the Government in its sovereign capacity”), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 827 (1948); see generally Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 379, 424 (observing that limiting the Government’s obligation to “compensating for the financial losses its repudiations engender . . . affords the current legislature the freedom to respond to constituents’ needs, while at the same time protecting those whose contractual interests are impaired”); Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93 Yale L. J. 918, 928-929 (1984) (“A damage remedy is superior to an injunction because damages provide the states with the flexibility to impair contracts retroactively when the benefits exceed the costs. So long as the victims of contract impairments are made whole through compensation, there is little reason to grant those victims an in-junctive remedy”). This point underscores the likelihood that damages awards will have the same effect as an injunction only in eases, like Bowen, where a private party seeks the return of payments to the Government. The classic examples, of course, are tax eases like St. Louis v. United Railways Co., 210 U. S. 266 (1908). Because a request for rebate damages in that case would effectively have exempted the plaintiffs from the law by forcing the reimbursement of their tax payments, the dissent is quite wrong to suggest, see post, at 928-929, that the plaintiffs could have altered the outcome by pleading their case differently. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Studies 83,88-89 (1977) (noting that parties generally rely on contract law “to reduce the costs of contract negotiation by supplying contract terms that the parties would probably have adopted explicitly had they negotiated over them”). See also Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S., at 52 (“[T]he Federal Government, as sovereign, has the power to enter contracts that confer vested rights, and the concomitant duty to honor those rights . . .”); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 353 (1935) (“[T]he right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty”); cf. Hart, The Concept of Law, at 145-146 (noting that the ability to limit a body’s future authority is itself one aspect of sovereignty). See also Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1146 (1996) (“If we allowed the government to break its contractual promises without having to pay compensation, such a policy would come at a high cost in terms of increased default premiums in future government contracts and increased disenchantment with the government generally”). See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346, Comment a (1981) (“Every breach of contract gives the injured party a right to damages against the party in breach” unless “[t]he parties ... by agreement vary the rules”); 3 E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, p. 185 (1990) (“The award of damages is the common form of relief for breach of contract. Virtually any breach gives the injured party a claim for damages”). The dissent justifies its all-devouring view of unmistakability not by articulating any limit, but simply by reminding us that “ ‘[m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.’” Post, at 937 (quoting Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143 (1920) (Holmes, J.)). We have also recognized, however, that “ ‘[i]t is no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in dealing with their government.’” Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U. S. 51, 61, n. 13 (1984) (quoting St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 387-388 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should turn square corners. But there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way street”). Justice Scalia offers his own theory of unmistakability, see post, at 919-922, which would apply in a wide range of cases and so create some tension with the general principle that the Government is ordinarily treated just like a private party in its contractual dealings, see, e. g., Perry v. United States, 294 U. S., at 352, but which would be satisfied by an inference of fact and therefore offer a only a low barrier to litigation of constitutional issues if a party should, in fact, prove a governmental promise not to change the law. Justice Scalia seeks to minimize the latter concern by quoting Holmes’s pronouncement on damages as the exclusive remedy at law for breach of contract, see post, at 919-920, but this ignores the availability of specific performance in a nontrivial number of eases, see, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§357-359, including the Contract Clause cases in which the unmistakability doctrine itself originated. See, e. g., Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317, 322 (1885) (stating that “the only right secured” by the Contract Clause is “to have a judicial determination, declaring the nullity of the attempt to impair [the contract’s] obligation”); Note, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1447, 1462 (1984) (suggesting that “analysis under the contract clause is limited to declaring the statute unconstitutional. The provision does not authorize the courts to award damages in lieu of requiring the state to adhere to the original terms of the contract”); ef. C. Fried, Contract as Promise 117-118 (1981) (arguing that “Holmes’s celebrated dictum . . . goes too far, is too simple”). Finally, we have no need to consider the close relationship that Justice Scalia sees between the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines, see post, at 923-924, because, even considered separately, neither one favors the Government in this case. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 (1914) (“[T]he power of the State to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community . . . can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express grant”); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,, 6 How. 507 (1848) (State’s contracts do not relinquish its eminent domain power). To the extent that Justice Scalia finds the reserved powers doctrine inapplicable because “the private party to the contract does not seek to stay the exercise of sovereign authority, but merely requests damages for breach of contract,” post, at 923, he appears to adopt a distinction between contracts of indemnity and contracts not to change the law similar to the unmistakability analysis he rejects. He also suggests that the present case falls outside the “core governmental powers” that cannot be surrendered under the reserved powers doctrine, but this suggestion is inconsistent with our precedents. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 817 (1880) (“[T]he legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State”); Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn. of Newark, 310 U. S. 32, 38 (1940) (recognizing that thrift regulation is within the police power). See Speidel, Implied Duties of Cooperation and the Defense of Sovereign Acts in Government Contracts, 51 Geo. L. J. 516, 542 (1968) (“[W]hile the contracting officers of Agency X cannot guarantee that the United States will not perform future acts of effective government, they can agree to compensate the contractor for damages resulting from justifiable acts of the United States in its ‘sovereign capacity’ ” (footnotes omitted)). See also 1 R. Nash & J. Cibinic, Federal Procurement Law 5 (3d ed. 1977) (“The authority of the executive to use contracts in carrying out authorized programs is . . . generally assumed in the absence of express statutory prohibitions or limitations”). Nor is there any substance to the claim that these were contracts that only the Government could make. The regulatory capital or net worth requirements at issue applied only to thrifts choosing to carry federal deposit insurance, see Federal Home Loan Bank System, A Guide to the Federal Home Loan Bank System 69 (5th ed. 1987), and institutions choosing to self-insure or to seek private insurance elsewhere would have been free to make similar agreements with private insurers. Moreover, if the dissent were correct that the sovereign acts doctrine permits the Government to abrogate its contractual commitments in “regulatory” cases even where it simply sought to avoid contracts it had come to regret, then the Government’s sovereign contracting power would be of very little use in this broad sphere of public activity. We rejected a virtually identical argument in Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935), in which Congress had passed a resolution regulating the payment of obligations in gold. We held that the law could not be applied to the Government’s own obligations, noting that “the right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to sovereignty.” Id., at 353. See also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 369 (1943) (“ ‘The United States does business on business terms’ ”) (quoting United States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U. S. 527, 534 (1926)); Perry v. United States, supra, at 352 (1935) (“When the United States, with constitutional authority, makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of individuals who are parties to such instruments. There is no difference except that the United States cannot be sued without its consent” (citation omitted)); United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53, 66 (1877) (“The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf”); Cooke v. United States, 91 U. S. 389, 398 (1875) (explaining that when the United States “comes down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there”). See Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 385 (1865) (“Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will lie against the supposed defendant”); O’Neill v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 823, 826 (1982) (sovereign acts doctrine applies where, “[w]ere [the] contracts exclusively between private parties, the party hurt by such governing action could not claim compensation from the other party for the governing action”). The dissent ignores these statements (including the statement from Jones, from which ease Horowitz drew its reasoning literally verbatim), when it says, post, at 931, that the sovereign acts cases do not emphasize the need to treat the government-as-contractor the same as a private party. Our Contract Clause cases have demonstrated a similar concern with governmental self-interest by recognizing that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.” United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 26 (1977); see also Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 412-413, and n. 14 (1983) (noting that a stricter level of scrutiny applies under the Contract Clause when a State alters its own contractual obligations); cf. Perry, supra, at 350-351 (drawing a “clear distinction” between Congress’s power over private contracts and “the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements”). The generality requirement will almost always be met where, as in Denting, the governmental action “bears upon [the Government’s contract] as it bears upon all similar contracts between citizens.” Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190, 191 (1865). Denting is less helpful, however, in cases where, as here, the public contracts at issue have no obvious private analogs. The dissent accuses us of transplanting this due process principle into alien soil, see post, at 931-932. But this Court did not even wait until the Term following Hurtado before applying its principle of generality to a case that, like this one, involved the deprivation of property rights. See Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 708 (1884). More importantly, it would be surprising indeed if the sovereign acts doctrine, resting on the inherent nature of sovereignty, were not shaped by fundamental principles about how sovereigns ought to behave. See also Speidel, 51 Geo. L. J., at 539-540 (observing that “the commonly expressed conditions to the availability of the sovereign acts defense” are not only that “the act... must have been ‘public and general,’ ” but also that “the damage to the contractor must have been caused indirectly”); cf. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 191-192 (1983) (distinguishing between direct and incidental impairments under the Contract Clause). Cf. also Resolution Trust Corporation v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 25 F. 3d 1493, 1501 (CA10 1994) (“The limits of this immunity [for sovereign acts] are defined by the extent to which the government’s failure to perform is the result of legislation targeting a class of contracts to which it is a party”); South Louisiana Grain Services, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 281, 287, n. 6 (1982) (rejecting sovereign acts defense where the Government agency’s actions “were directed specifically at plaintiff’s alleged contract performance”). Despite the dissent’s predictions, the sun is not, in fact, likely to set on the sovereign acts doctrine. While an increase in regulation by contract will produce examples of the “fusion” that bars the defense, we may expect that other sovereign activity will continue to occasion the sovereign acts defense in cases of incidental effect. A different intermediate position would be possible, at least in theory. One might say that a governmental action was not “public and general” under Horowitz if its predominant purpose or effect was avoidance of the Government’s contractual commitments. The difficulty, however, of ascertaining the relative intended or resulting impacts on governmental and purely private contracts persuades us that this test would prove very difficult to apply. We note that whether or not Congress intended to abrogate supervisory merger agreements providing that supervisory goodwill would count toward regulatory capital requirements has been the subject of extensive litigation in the Courts of Appeals, and that every Circuit to consider the issue has concluded that Congress did so intend. See Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F. 2d 598, 617 (CADC 1992); Carteret Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963 F. 2d 567, 581-582 (CA3 1992); Security Sav. & Loan v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 960 F. 2d 1318, 1322 (CA5 1992); Far West Federal Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 951 F. 2d 1093, 1098 (CA9 1991); Guaranty Financial Services, Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F. 2d 994, 1006 (CA11 1991); Franklin Federal Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 927 F. 2d 1332, 1341 (CA6), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 937 (1991); cf. Resolution Trust Corporation, supra, at 1502 (observing that “FIRREA’s structure leaves little doubt that Congress well knew the crippling effects strengthened capital requirements would have on mergers that relied on supervisory goodwill,” but concluding that Congress sought to mitigate the impact by giving OTS authority to exempt thrifts until 1991); Charter Federal Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F. 2d 203, 210 (CA4 1992) (accepting the conclusions of the other Circuits in dictum), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 1004 (1993). See also House Report, at 534 (additional views of Reps. Hiler, Ridge, Bartlett, Dreier, MeCandless, Saiki, Baker, and Paxon) (“For the institutions with substantial supervisory goodwill, the bill radically changes the terms of previously negotiated transactions”); id., at 507-508 (additional views of Rep. LaFalce) (“Those institutions which carry intangible assets on their books do so generally under written agreements they have entered into with the U. S. government, agreements which generally state that they cannot be superseded by subsequent regulations”); id., pt. 5, at 27 (additional views of Rep. Hyde) (“[Thrifts] were told that they would be able to carry this goodwill on their books as capital for substantial periods of time. .. . The courts could well construe these agreements as formal contracts. Now, . . . Congress is telling these same thrifts that they cannot count this goodwill toward meeting the new capital standards”); 135 Cong. Rec. 12063 (1989) (statement of Rep. Crane) (FIRREA “would require these S&Ls to write off this goodwill in a scant 5 years. This legislation violates the present agreements that these institutions made with the Federal Government”). Although there was less of a focus on the impact of FIRREA on supervisory goodwill in the Senate, at least two Senators noted that the new capital requirements would have the effect of abrogating government contracts. See id., at 9563 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (“The new tangible capital standards in the legislation specifically exclude supervisory goodwill, and in doing so effectively abrogate agreements made between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, on behalf of the U. S. Government, and certain healthy thrift institutions”); id., at 18874 (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (asking “whether any future transactions involving failed or failing institutions will be possible after this bill sanctions a wholesale reneging of Federal agency agreements”). See also House Report, at 545 (Supplemental Views of Reps. Schumer, Morrison, Roukema, Gonzalez, Vento, McMillen, and Hoagland) (“[A]n overriding public policy would be jeopardized by the continued adherence to arrangements which were blithely entered into by the FSLIC”); 135 Cong. Rec., at 12062 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez) (“[I]n blunt terms, the Bank Board and FSLIC insurance fund managers entered into bad deals— I might even call them steals”); id., at 11789 (statement of Rep. Saxton) (“In short[,] goodwill agreements were a mistake and as the saying goes . . . ‘Two wrongs don’t make a right’ ”). These proponents defeated two amendments to FIRREA, proposed by Reps. Quillen and Hyde, which would have given thrifts that had received capital forbearances from thrift regulators varying degrees of protection from the new rules. See Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, supra, at 616— 617; see also 135 Cong. Rec. 12068 (1989) (statement of Rep. Price) (“[T]he proponents of [the Hyde] amendment say a ‘Deal is a Deal’ .... But to claim that Congress can never change a regulator’s decision ... in the future is simply not tenable”); Franklin Federal Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, supra, at 1340-1341 (reviewing the House debate and concluding that “[njobody expressed the view that FIRREA did not abrogate forbearance agreements regarding supervisory goodwill” (emphasis in original)). Despite the claims of the dissent, our test does not turn upon “some sort of legislative intent,” post, at 933. Rather, we view Congress’s expectation that the Government’s own obligations would be heavily affected simply as good evidence that this was, indeed, the case. We have, indeed, had to reject a variant of this argument before. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 580 (1934) (acknowledging a public need for governmental economy, but holding that “[t]o abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen governmental expenditure, would be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation”); see also Speidel, 51 Geo. L. J., at 522 (noting that even when “the Government’s acts are motivated or required by public necessity ... [t]he few decisions on point seem to reject public convenience or necessity as a defense, particularly where [the Government’s action] directly alters the terms of the contract”). The dissent contends that FIRREA must be a “public and general” act because it “occupies 372 pages in the Statutes at Large, and under 12 substantive titles contains more than 150 numbered sections.” Post, at 934. But any act of repudiation can be buried in a larger piece of legislation, and if that is enough to save it then the Government’s contracting power will not count for much. To the extent that The Chief Justice relies on the fact that FIRREA’s core capital requirements applied to all thrift institutions, we note that neither he nor the Government has provided any indication of the relative incidence of the new statute in requiring capital increases for thrifts subject to regulatory agreements affecting capital and those not so subject. See also Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F. 2d 312, 315 (CADC 1966) (requiring that the contingency rendering performance impossible be “ ‘something’ unexpected”); Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasiliero v. C. G. Blake Co., 34 F. 2d 616, 619 (CA2 1929) (L. Hand, J.) (asking “how unexpected at the time [the contract was made] was the event which prevented performance”); see also Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 70 N. Y. 2d 900, 902, 524 N. E. 2d 295, 296 (1987) (“[T]he impossibility must be produced by an unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the contract”); Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N. W. 2d 655, 659 (Minn. 1978) (asking “whether the risk of the given contingency was so unusual or unforeseen and would have such severe consequences that to require performance would be to grant the promisee an advantage for which he could not be said to have bargained in making the contract”); Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 129, 310 N. E. 2d 363, 367 (1974) (“The question is . . . [w]as the contingency which developed one which the parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a real possibility which could affect performance?”); Krell v. Henry, 2 K. B. 740, 752 (1903) (“The test seems to be whether the event which causes the impossibility was or might have been anticipated and guarded against”); 18 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1931, p. 8 (3d ed. 1978) (“The important question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract. If so, the risk should not fairly be thrown upon the promisor”). Although foreseeability is generally a relevant, but not dispositive, factor, see 2 E. Farnsworth, Contracts §9.6, at 665-656; Opera Company of Boston, Inc. v. Wolf Trap Foundation for the Performing Arts, 817 F. 2d 1094, 1101 (CA4 1987), there is no reason to look further where, as here, the risk was foreseen to be more than minimally likely, went to the central purpose of the contract, and could easily have been allocated in a different manner had the parties chosen to do so, see id., at 1099-1102; 18 Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1953, at 119. The Government confirmed this point at oral argument. When asked whether FIRREA’s tightening of the regulatory capital standards was “exactly the event that the parties assumed might happen when they made their contracts,” the Government responded, “Exactly. Congress had changed capital standards many times over the years.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. See, e. g., Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (eliminating any fixed limits to Bank Board discretion in setting reserve requirements); Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 160 (conferring discretionary authority on the Bank Board to set reserve requirements between 3 and 6 percent); 47 Fed. Reg. 3543 (lowering the reserve ratio from 4 to 3 percent); id., at 31859 (excluding certain “contra-asset” accounts from reserve calculations); id., at 52961 (permitting thrifts to count appraised equity capital toward reserves); see also Charter Federal Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F. 2d, at 212 (noting that because “[ejapital requirements have been an evolving part of the regulatory scheme since its inception,” the Bank Board “would have expected changes in statutory requirements, including capital requirements”); Carteret Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 963 F. 2d, at 581 (observing that “[i]n the massively regulated banking industry,... the rules of the game change with some regularity”). See also Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F. 2d, at 957-959 (rejecting sovereign acts defense where contract was interpreted as expressly allocating the risk of change in governmental policy); Posner & Rosenfield, 6 J. Legal Studies, at 98 (noting that, subject to certain constraints, “[t]he contracting parties’ chosen allocation of risk” should always be honored as the most efficient one possible). See, e. g., Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hoyt, 149 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1893) (“There can be no question that a party may by an absolute contract bind himself or itself to perform things which subsequently become impossible, or to pay damages for the nonperformance”). This is no less true where the event that renders performance impossible is a change in the governing law. See, e.g., 4 R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615:34, p. 286 (3d ed. 1983) (“Often in regard to impossibility due to change of law ... there would be no difficulty in a promisor’s assuming the risk of the legal possibility of his promise”); 6 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1346, p. 432 (1962) (“Just as in other cases of alleged impossibility, the risk of prevention by courts and administrative officers can be thrown upon a contractor by a provision in the contract itself or by reason of established custom and general understanding”). See generally Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F. 2d 514, 516, n. 2 (CA Fed. 1992) (“[T]he [sovereign acts] doctrine certainly does not prevent the government as contractor from affirmatively assuming responsibility for specific sovereign acts”); D & L Construction Co. v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 736, 752, 402 F. 2d 990, 999 (1968) (“It has long been established that while the United States cannot be held liable directly or indirectly for public acts which it performs as a sovereign, the Government can agree in a contract that if it doe,s exercise a sovereign power, it will pay the other contracting party the amount by which its costs are increased by the Government’s sovereign act, and that this agreement can be implied as well as expressed”); Amino Brothers Co. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 515, 525, 372 F. 2d 485, 491 (same), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 846 (1967); Gerhardt F. Meyne Co. v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 527, 550, 76 F. Supp. 811, 815 (1948) (same). A common example of such an agreement is mandated by Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.222-43, which requires Government entities entering into certain fixed price service contracts to include a price adjustment clause shifting tó the Government responsibility for cost increases resulting from compliance with Department of Labor wage and fringe benefit determinations. 48 CFR § 52.222-43 (1995).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HUNT, GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al. v. WASHINGTON STATE APPLE ADVERTISING COMMISSION No. 76-63. Argued February 22, 1977 Decided June 20, 1977 BurgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except RehNQuist, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. John R. Jordan, Jr., argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Millard R. Rich, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Edward B. Mackie, Deputy Attorney General, and James Arneil, Special Assistant Attorney General. Me. Chief Justice Burgee delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1973, North Carolina enacted a statute which required, inter alia, all closed containers of apples sold, offered for sale, or shipped into the State to bear “no grade other than the applicable TJ. S. grade or standard.” N. C. Gen. Stat. § 106-189.1 (1973). In an action brought by the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a three-judge Federal District Court invalidated the statute insofar as it prohibited the display of Washington State apple grades on the ground that it unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The specific questions presented on appeal are (a) whether the Commission had standing to bring this action; (b) if so, whether it satisfied the jurisdictional-amount requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1331; and (c) whether the challenged North Carolina statute constitutes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. (1) Washington State is the Nation's largest producer of apples, its crops accounting for approximately 30% of all apples grown domestically and nearly half of all apples shipped in closed containers in interstate commerce. As might be expected, the production and sale of apples on this scale is a multimillion dollar enterprise which plays a significant role in Washington's economy. Because of the importance of the apple industry to the State, its legislature has undertaken to protect and enhance the reputation of Washington apples by establishing a stringent, mandatory inspection program, administered by the State’s Department of Agriculture, which requires all apples shipped in interstate commerce to be tested under strict quality standards and graded accordingly. In all cases, the Washington State grades, which have gained substantial acceptance in the trade, are the equivalent of, or superior to, the comparable grades and standards adopted by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Compliance with the Washington inspection scheme costs the State’s growers approximately $1 million each year. In addition to the inspection program, the state legislature has sought to enhance the market for Washington apples through the creation of a state agency, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, charged with the statutory duty of promoting and protecting the State’s apple industry. The Commission itself is composed of 13 Washington apple growers and dealers who are nominated and elected within electoral districts by their fellow growers and dealers. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 15.24.020, 15.24.030 (1974). Among its activities are the promotion of Washington apples in both domestic and foreign markets through advertising, market research and analysis, and public education, as well as scientific research into the uses, development, and improvement of apples. Its activities are financed entirely by assessments levied upon the apple industry, § 15.24.100; in the year during which this litigation began, these assessments totaled approximately $1.75 million. The assessments, while initially fixed by statute, can be increased only upon the majority vote of the apple growers themselves. § 15.24.090. In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted an administrative regulation, unique in the 50 States, which in effect required all closed containers of apples shipped into or sold in the State to display either the applicable USDA grade or a notice indicating no classification. State grades were expressly prohibited. In addition to its obvious consequence — prohibiting the display of Washington State apple grades on containers of apples shipped into North Carolina, the regulation presented the Washington apple industry with a marketing problem of potentially nationwide significance. Washington apple growers annually ship in commerce approximately 40 million closed containers of apples, nearly 500,000 of which eventually find their way into North Carolina, stamped with the applicable Washington State variety and grade. It is the industry’s practice to purchase these containers preprinted with the various apple varieties and grades, prior to harvest. After these containers are filled with apples of the appropriate type and grade, a substantial portion of them are placed in cold-storage warehouses where the grade labels identify the product and facilitate its handling. These apples are then shipped as needed throughout the year; after February 1 of each year, they constitute approximately two-thirds of all apples sold in fresh markets in this country. Since the ultimate destination of these apples is unknown at the time they are placed in storage, compliance with North Carolina’s unique regulation would have required Washington growers to obliterate the printed labels on containers shipped to North Carolina, thus giving their product a damaged appearance. Alternatively, they could have changed their marketing practices to accommodate the needs of the North Carolina market, i. e., repack apples to be shipped to North Carolina in containers bearing only the USD A grade, and/or store the estimated portion of the harvest destined for that market in such special containers. As a last resort, they could discontinue the use of the preprinted containers entirely. None of these costly and less efficient options was very attractive to the industry. Moreover, in the event a number of other States followed North Carolina’s lead, the resultant inability to display the Washington grades could force the Washington growers to abandon the State’s expensive inspection and grading system which their customers had come to know and rely on over the 60-odd years of its existence. With these problems confronting the industry, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission petitioned the North Carolina Board of Agriculture to amend its regulation to permit the display of state grades. An administrative hearing was held on the question but no relief was granted. Indeed, North Carolina hardened its position shortly thereafter by enacting the regulation into law: “All apples sold, offered for sale or shipped into this State in closed containers shall bear on the container, bag or other receptacle, no grade other than the applicable U. S. grade or standard or the marking ‘unclassified,’ ‘not graded’ or ‘grade not determined.’ ” N. C. Gen. Stat. § 106-189.1 (1973). Nonetheless, the Commission once again requested an exemption which would have permitted the Washington apple growers to display both the United States and the Washington State grades on their shipments to North Carolina. This request, too, was denied. Unsuccessful in its attempts to secure administrative relief, the Commission instituted this action challenging the constitutionality of the statute in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Its complaint, which invoked the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1343, sought a declaration that the statute violated, inter alia, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, insofar as it prohibited the display of Washington State grades, and prayed for a permanent injunction against its enforcement in this manner. A three-judge Federal District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284 to consider the Commission’s constitutional attack on the statute. After a hearing, the District Court granted the requested relief. 408 F. Supp. 857 (1976). At the outset, it held that the Commission had standing to challenge the statute both in its own right and on behalf of the Washington State growers and dealers, and that the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of § 1331 had been satisfied. 408 F. Supp., at 858. Proceeding to the merits, the District Court found that the North Carolina statute, while neutral on its face, actually discriminated against Washington State growers and dealers in favor of their local counterparts. Id., at 860-861. This discrimination resulted from the fact that North Carolina, unlike Washington, had never established a grading and inspection system. Hence, the statute had no effect on the existing practices of North Carolina producers; they were still free to use the USDA grade or none at all. Washington growers and dealers, on the other hand, were forced to alter their long-established procedures, at substantial cost, or abandon the North Carolina market. The District Court then concluded that this discrimination against out-of-state competitors was not justified by the asserted local interest — the elimination of deception and confusion from the marketplace — arguably furthered by the statute. Indeed, it noted that the statute was “irrationally” drawn to accomplish that alleged goal since it permitted the marketing of closed containers of apples without any grade at all. Id., at 861-862. The court therefore held that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against commerce, insofar as it affected the interstate shipment of Washington apples, and enjoined its application. This appeal followed and we postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits sub nom. Holshouser v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 429 U. S. 814 (1976). (2) In this Court, as before, the North Carolina officials vigorously contest the Washington Commission’s standing to prosecute this action, either in its own right, or on behalf of that State’s apple industry which it purports to represent. At the outset, appellants maintain that the Commission lacks the “personal stake” in the outcome of this litigation essential to its invocation of federal-court jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The Commission, they point out, is a state agency, not itself engaged in the production and sale of Washington apples or their shipment into North Carolina. Rather, its North Carolina activities are limited to the promotion of Washington apples in that market through advertising. Appellants contend that the challenged statute has no impact on that activity since it prohibits only the display of state apple grades on closed containers of apples. Indeed, since the statute imposed no restrictions on the advertisement of Washington apples or grades other than the labeling ban, which affects only those parties actually engaged in the apple trade, the Commission is said to be free to carry on the same activities that it engaged in prior to the regulatory program. Appellants therefore argue that the Commission suffers no injury, economic or otherwise, from the statute’s operation, and, as a result, cannot make out the “case or controversy” between itself and the appellants needed to establish standing in the constitutional sense. E. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 260-264 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498-499 (1975). Moreover, appellants assert, the Commission cannot rely on the injuries which the statute allegedly inflicts individually or collectively on Washington apple growers and dealers in order to confer standing on itself. Those growers and dealers, appellants argue, are under no disabilities which prevent them from coming forward to protect their own rights if they are, in fact, injured by the statute’s operation. In any event, appellants contend that the Commission is not a proper representative of industry interests. Although this Court has recognized that an association may have standing to assert the claims of its members even where it has suffered no injury from the challenged activity, e. g., Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 511; National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States, 372 U. S. 246 (1963), the Commission is not a traditional voluntary membership organization such as a trade association, for it has no members at all. Thus, since the Commission has no members whose claims it might raise, and since it has suffered no “distinct and palpable injury” to itself, it can assert no more than an abstract concern for the well-being of the Washington apple industry as the basis for its standing. That type of interest, appellants argue, cannot “substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976). If the Commission were a voluntary membership organization — a typical trade association — its standing to bring this action as the representative of its constituents would be clear under prior decisions of this Court. In Warth v. Seldin, supra, we stated: “Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members. . . . The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.... So long as this can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” 422 U. S., at 511. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 39-40; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 355-356, n. 5 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972); National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States, supra. We went on in Worth to elaborate on the type of relief that an association could properly pursue on behalf of its members: “[W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court’s remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper ease the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Indeed, in all cases in which we have expressly recognized standing in associations to represent their members, the relief sought has been of this kind.” 422 U. S., at 515. Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The prerequisites to “assoeiational standing” described in Warth are clearly present here. The Commission’s complaint alleged, and the District Court found as a fact, that the North Carolina statute had caused some Washington apple growers and dealers (a) to obliterate Washington State grades from the large volume of closed containers destined for the North Carolina market at a cost ranging from 5 to 15 cents per carton; (b) to abandon the use of preprinted containers, thus diminishing the efficiency of their marketing operations; or (c) to lose accounts in North Carolina. Such injuries are direct and sufficient to establish the requisite “case or controversy” between Washington apple producers and appellants. Moreover, the Commission’s attempt to remedy these injuries and to secure the industry’s right to publicize its grading system is central to the Commission’s purpose of protecting and enhancing the market for Washington apples. Finally, neither the interstate commerce claim nor the request for declaratory and injunctive relief requires individualized proof and both are thus properly resolved in a group context. The only question presented, therefore, is whether, on this record, the Commission’s status as a state agency, rather than a traditional voluntary membership organization, precludes it from asserting the claims of the Washington apple growers and dealers who form its constituency. We think not. The Commission, while admittedly a state agency, for all practical purposes performs the functions of a traditional trade association representing the Washington apple industry. As previously noted, its purpose is the protection and promotion of the Washington apple industry; and, in the pursuit of that end, it has engaged in advertising, market research and analysis, public education campaigns, and scientific research. It thus serves a specialized segment of the State’s economic community which is the primary beneficiary of its activities, including the prosecution of this kind of litigation. Moreover, while the apple growers and dealers are not “members” of the Commission in the traditional trade association sense, they possess all of the indicia of membership in an organization. They alone elect the members of the Commission; they alone may serve on the Commission; they alone finance its activities, including the costs of this lawsuit, through assessments levied upon them. In a very real sense, therefore, the Commission represents the State’s growers and dealers and provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect their collective interests. Nor do we find it significant in determining whether the Commission may properly represent its constituency that "membership” is “compelled” in the form of mandatory assessments. Membership in a union, or its equivalent, is often required. Likewise, membership in a bar association, which may also be an agency of the State, is often a prerequisite to the practice of law. Yet in neither instance would it be reasonable to suggest that such an organization lacked standing to assert the claims of its constituents. Finally, we note that the interests of the Commission itself may be adversely affected by the outcome of this litigation. The annual assessments paid to the Commission are tied to the volume of apples grown and packaged as “Washington Apples.” In the event the North Carolina statute results in a contraction of the market for Washington apples or prevents any market expansion that might otherwise occur, it could reduce the amount of the assessments due the Commission and used to support its activities. This financial nexus between the interests of the Commission and its constituents coalesces with the other factors noted above to “assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204; see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 459-460 (1958). Under the circumstances presented here, it would exalt form over substance to differentiate between the Washington Commission and a traditional trade association representing the individual growers and dealers who collectively form its constituency. We therefore agree with the District Court that the Commission has standing to bring this action in a representational capacity. (3) We turn next to the appellants' claim that the Commission has failed to satisfy the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 1331. As to this, the appellants maintain that the Commission itself has not demonstrated that its right to be free of the restrictions imposed by the challenged statute is worth more than the requisite $10,000. Indeed, they argue that the Commission has made no real effort to do so, but has instead attempted to rely on the actual and threatened injury to the individual Washington apple growers and dealers upon whom the statute has a direct impact. This, they claim, it cannot do, for those growers and dealers are not parties to this litigation. Alternatively, appellants argue that even if the Commission can properly rely on the claims of the individual growers and dealers, it cannot establish the required jurisdictional amount without aggregating those claims. Such aggregation, they argue, is impermissible under this Court’s decisions in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332 (1969), and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.291 (1973). Our determination that the Commission has standing to assert the rights of the individual growers and dealers in a representational capacity disposes of the appellants’ first contention. Obviously, if the Commission has standing to litigate the claims of its constituents, it may also rely on them to meet the requisite amount in controversy. Hence, we proceed to the question of whether those claims were sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the District Court. In resolving this issue, we have found it unnecessary to reach the aggregation question posed by the appellants for it does not appear to us “to a legal certainty” that the claims of at least some of the individual growers and dealers will not amount to the required $10,000. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 288-289 (1938). In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation. E. g., McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 181 (1936); Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U. S. 121, 126 (1915); Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U. S. 322, 336 (1907); 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶¶ 0.95, 0.96 (2d ed. 1975); C. Wright, A Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3708 (1976). Here, that object is the right of the individual Washington apple growers and dealers to conduct their business affairs in the North Carolina market free from the interference of the challenged statute. The value of that right is measured by the losses that will follow from the statute’s enforcement. McNutt, supra, at 181; Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U. S. 95, 100 (1939); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lutz, 299 U. S. 300, 301 (1936); Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 142 (1924). Here the record demonstrates that the growers and dealers have suffered and will continue to suffer losses of various types. For example, there is evidence supporting the District Court’s finding that individual growers and shippers lost accounts in North Carolina as a direct result of the statute. Obviously, those lost sales could lead to diminished profits. There is also evidence to support the finding that individual growers and dealers incurred substantial costs in complying with the statute. As previously noted, the statute caused some growers and dealers to manually obliterate the Washington grades from closed containers to be shipped to North Carolina at a cost of from 5 to 15 cents per carton. Other dealers decided to alter their marketing practices, not without cost, by repacking apples or abandoning the use of preprinted containers entirely, among other things. Such costs of compliance are properly considered in computing the amount in controversy. Buck v. Gallagher, supra; Packard v. Banton, supra; Allway Taxi, Inc. v. New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (SDNY), aff’d, 468 F. 2d 624 (CA2 1972). In addition, the statute deprived the growers and dealers of their rights to utilize most effectively the Washington State grades which, the record demonstrates, were of long standing and had gained wide acceptance in the trade. The competitive advantages thus lost could not be regained without incurring additional costs in the form of advertising, etc. Cf. Spock v. David, 502 F. 2d 953, 956 (CA3 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 424 U. S. 828 (1976). Moreover, since many apples eventually shipped to North Carolina will have already gone through the expensive inspection and grading procedure, the challenged statute will have the additional effect of causing growers and dealers to incur inspection costs unnecessarily. Both the substantial volume of sales in North Carolina— the record demonstrates that in 1974 alone, such sales were in excess of $2 million — and the continuing nature of the statute’s interference with the business affairs of the Commission’s constituents, preclude our saying “to a legal certainty,” on this record, that such losses and expenses will not, over time, if they have not done so already, amount to the requisite $10,000 for at least some of the individual growers and dealers. That is sufficient to sustain the District Court’s jurisdiction. The requirements of § 1331 are therefore met. (4) We turn finally to the appellants’ claim that the District Court erred in holding that the North Carolina statute violated the Commerce Clause insofar as it prohibited the display of Washington State grades on closed containers of apples shipped into the State. Appellants do not really contest the District Court’s determination that the challenged statute burdened the Washington apple industry by increasing its costs of doing business in the North Carolina market and causing it to lose accounts there. Rather, they maintain that any such burdens on the interstate sale of Washington apples were far outweighed by the local benefits flowing from what they contend was a valid exercise of North Carolina’s inherent police powers designed to protect its citizenry from fraud and deception in the marketing of apples. Prior to the statute’s enactment, appellants point out, apples from 13 different States were shipped into North Carolina for sale. Seven of those States, including the State of Washington, had their own grading systems which, while differing in their standards, used similar descriptive labels (e. g., fancy, extra fancy, etc.). This multiplicity of inconsistent state grades, as the District Court itself found, posed dangers of deception and confusion not only in the North Carolina market, but in the Nation as a whole. The North Carolina statute, appellants claim, was enacted to eliminate this source of deception and confusion by replacing the numerous state grades with a single uniform standard. Moreover, it is contended that North Carolina sought to accomplish this goal of uniformity in an evenhanded manner as evidenced by the fact that its statute applies to all apples sold in closed containers in the State without regard to their point of origin. Nonetheless, appellants argue that the District Court gave “scant attention” to the obvious benefits flowing from the challenged legislation and to the long line of decisions from this Court holding that the States possess “broad powers” to protect local purchasers from fraud and deception in the marketing of foodstuffs. E. g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 (1963); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 (1935); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U. S. 427 (1919). As the appellants properly point out, not every exercise of state authority imposing some burden on the free flow of commerce is invalid. E. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 371 (1976); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). Although the Commerce Clause acts as a limitation upon state power even without congressional implementation, e. g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra, at 370-371; Freeman v. Hewit, supra, at 252; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), our opinions have long recognized that, “in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 767 (1945). Moreover, as appellants correctly note, that “residuum” is particularly strong when the State acts to protect its citizenry in matters pertaining to the sale of foodstuffs. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., supra, at 146. By the same token, however, a finding that state legislation furthers matters of legitimate local concern, even in the health and consumer protection areas, does not end the inquiry. Such a view, we have noted, “would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action . . . save for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.” Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354 (1951). Rather, when such state legislation comes into conflict with the Commerce Clause's overriding requirement of a national “common market,” we are confronted with the task of effecting an accommodation of the competing national and local interests. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra, at 370-372. We turn to that task. As the District Court correctly found, the challenged statute has the practical effect of not only burdening interstate sales of Washington apples, but also discriminating against them. This discrimination takes various forms. The first, and most obvious, is the statute’s consequence of raising the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts unaffected. As previously noted, this disparate effect results from the fact that North Carolina apple producers, unlike their Washington competitors, were not forced to alter their marketing practices in order to comply with the statute. They were still free to market their wares under the USDA grade or none at all as they had done prior to the statute’s enactment. Obviously, the increased costs imposed by the statute would tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of Washington apple growers and dealers who are already at a competitive disadvantage because of their great distance from the North Carolina market. Second, the statute has the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry the competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its expensive inspection and grading system. The record demonstrates that the Washington apple-grading system has gained nationwide acceptance in the apple trade. Indeed, it contains numerous affidavits from apple brokers and dealers located both inside and outside of North Carolina who state their preference, and that of their customers, for apples graded under the Washington, as opposed to the USDA, system because of the former’s greater consistency, its emphasis on color, and its supporting mandatory inspections. Once again, the statute had no similar impact on the North Carolina apple industry and thus operated to its benefit. Third, by prohibiting Washington growers and dealers from marketing apples under their State’s grades, the statute has a leveling effect which insidiously operates to the advantage of local apple producers. As noted earlier, the Washington State grades are equal or superior to the USDA grades in all corresponding categories. Hence, with free market forces at work, Washington sellers would normally enjoy a distinct market advantage vis-a-vis local producers in those categories where the Washington grade is superior. However, because of the statute’s operation, Washington apples which would otherwise qualify for and be sold under the superior Washington grades will now have to be marketed under their inferior USDA counterparts. Such “downgrading” offers the North Carolina apple industry the very sort of protection against competing out-of-state products that the Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit. At worst, it will have the effect of an embargo against those Washington apples in the superior grades as Washington dealers withhold them from the North Carolina market. At best, it will deprive Washington sellers of the market premium that such apples would otherwise command. Despite the statute’s facial neutrality, the Commission suggests that its discriminatory impact on interstate commerce was not an unintended byproduct and there are some indications in the record to that effect. The most glaring is the response of the North Carolina Agriculture Commissioner to the Commission’s request for an exemption following the statute’s passage in which he indicated that before he could support such an exemption, he would “want to have the sentiment from our apple producers since they were mainly responsible for this legislation being passed . . . .” App. 21 (emphasis added). Moreover, we find it somewhat suspect that North Carolina singled out only closed containers of apples, the very means by which apples are transported in commerce, to effectuate the statute’s ostensible consumer protection purpose when apples are not generally sold at retail in their shipping containers. However, we need not ascribe an economic protection motive to the North Carolina Legislature to resolve this case; we conclude that the challenged statute cannot stand insofar as it prohibits the display of Washington State grades even if enacted for the declared purpose of protecting consumers from deception and fraud in the marketplace. When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S., at 354. See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 424 U. S., at 373; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142; Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U. S. 361, 375 n. 9 (1964); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 524 (1935). North Carolina has failed to sustain that burden on both scores. The several States unquestionably possess a substantial interest in protecting their citizens from confusion and deception in the marketing of foodstuffs, but the challenged statute does remarkably little to further that laudable goal at least with respect to Washington apples and grades. The statute, as already noted, permits the marketing of closed containers of apples under no grades at all. Such a result can hardly be thought to eliminate the problems of deception and confusion created by the multiplicity of differing state grades; indeed, it magnifies them by depriving purchasers of all information concerning the quality of the contents of closed apple containers. Moreover, although the statute is ostensibly a consumer protection measure, it directs its primary efforts, not at the consuming public at large, but at apple wholesalers and brokers who are the principal purchasers of closed containers of apples. And those individuals are presumably the most knowledgeable individuals in this area. Since the statute does nothing at all to purify the flow of information at the retail level, it does little to protect consumers against the problems it was designed to eliminate. Finally, we note that any potential for confusion and deception created by the Washington grades was not of the type that led to the statute’s enactment. Since Washington grades are in all cases equal or superior to their USDA counterparts, they could only “deceive’’ or “confuse” a consumer to his benefit, hardly a harmful result. In addition, it appears that nondiscriminatory alternatives to the outright ban of Washington State grades are readily available. For example, North Carolina could effectuate its goal by permitting out-of-state growers to utilize state grades only if they also marked their shipments with the applicable USDA label. In that case, the USDA grade would serve as a benchmark against which the consumer could evaluate the quality of the various state grades. If this alternative was for some reason inadequate to eradicate problems caused by state grades inferior to those adopted by the USDA, North Carolina might consider banning those state grades which, unlike Washington’s, could not be demonstrated to be equal or superior to the corresponding USDA categories. Con-cededly, even in this latter instance, some potential for “confusion” might persist. However, it is the type of “confusion" that the national interest in the free flow of goods between the States demands be tolerated. The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Section 1331 provides in pertinent part: “ (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs . . . The North Carolina regulation, as amended, provides in pertinent part: “(6) Apple containers must show the applicable U. S. Grade on the principal display panel or marked ‘Unclassified/ ‘Not Graded/ or ‘Grade Not Determined.’ State grades shall not be shown.” § 3-24.5 (6), Rules, Regulations, Definitions and Standards of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture. Under Washington law, the Commission is a corporation and is specifically granted the power to sue and be sued. Wash. Rev. Code §15.24.070 (8) (1974). In this regard, it adopted the ruling of the single District Judge who had previously denied appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint brought on the same grounds. App. 51-58. That judge had found it unnecessary to determine whether jurisdiction was also proper under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 in view of his determination that jurisdiction had been established under §1331. App. 57 n. 2. As an alternative ground for its holding,'the District Court found that the statute would have constituted an undue burden on commerce even if it had been neutral and nondiscriminatory in its impact. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970). 408 F. Supp., at 862 n. 9. During 1974, the Commission spent in excess of $25,000 advertising Washington apples in the North Carolina market. Id., at 859. In addition, apples worth approximately 30 to 40 percent of that amount were transshipped into North Carolina in 1974 after direct shipment to apple brokers and wholesalers located in other States. Indeed, the District Court specifically indicated in its findings of fact that there had been no showing that the Washington State grades had caused any confusion in the North Carolina market. 408 F. Supp., at 859. Our conclusion in this regard necessarily rejects North Carolina’s suggestion that the burdens on commerce imposed by the statute are justified on the ground that the standardization required by the statute serves the national interest in achieving uniformity in the grading and labeling of foodstuffs.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO. et al. No. 88-1474. Argued November 1, 1989 Decided December 11, 1989 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Robert S. Pomerance. Barring Coughlin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stephen L. Buescher and Deborah Z. Read. Wüliam H. Allen, John B. Jones, Jr., Frances M. Horner, Robert T. Cole, and Gilbert W. Rubloff filed a brief for the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Dennis I. Meyer, C. David Swenson, Leonard B. Terr, and Thomas A. O’Donnell filed a brief for Vulcan Materials Co. as amicus curiae. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we must decide whether “accumulated profits” in the indirect tax credit provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 902 (1970 ed.), are to be measured in accordance with United States or foreign tax principles. We conclude that “accumulated profits” are to be measured in accordance with United States principles. I Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain) Limited (Goodyear G. B.) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear), a domestic corporation. Goodyear brought this suit seeking a refund of federal income taxes collected for the years 1970 and 1971. During those years, Goodyear G. B. filed income tax returns in, and paid taxes to, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Goodyear G. B. also distributed dividends to Goodyear, its sole shareholder. Goodyear reported these dividends on its federal tax return, as required by 26 U. S. C. §§301, 316 (1970 ed.). Goodyear thereafter sought credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by Goodyear G. B. in the amount specified in § 902. Section 902 provides a parent of a foreign subsidiary with an “indirect” or “deemed paid” credit on its domestic income tax return to reflect foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary. The credit protects domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries from double taxation of the same income: taxation first by the foreign jurisdiction, when the income is earned by the subsidiary, and second by the United States, when the income is received as a dividend by the parent. In some circumstances, a foreign subsidiary may choose to distribute only a portion of its available profit as a dividend to its domestic parent. For that reason, a domestic parent cannot automatically claim credit for all foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary: §902 limits a domestic parent’s credit to the amount of tax paid by the subsidiary attributable to the dividend issued. The foreign tax deemed paid by the domestic parent is calculated by multiplying the total foreign tax paid (T) by that portion of the subsidiary’s after-tax accumulated profits (AP-T) that is actually issued to the domestic parent in the form of a taxable dividend (D). In 1978, Goodyear G. B. reported a net loss on its British tax return and carried back that loss to offset substantial portions of its 1970 and 1971 income. Based on the 1973 carried-back losses, British taxing authorities recalculated Goodyear G. B.’s income and tax liability for the years 1970 and 1971. Goodyear G. B. thereafter received a refund of a substantial portion of its 1970 and 1971 foreign tax payments. In response to the refunds, and pursuant to § 905(c) of the Code which permits redetermination of the foreign tax credit whenever “any tax paid is refunded in whole or in part,” the Commissioner of Internal Revenue recalculated the indirect tax credit available to Goodyear for the tax years 1970 and 1971. The Commissioner lowered the foreign taxes paid (T) to reflect the refund. He refused, however, to lower accumulated profits (AP) for those years to reflect British tax authorities’ redetermination of Goodyear G. B.’s income. The deductions that created, for British tax purposes, the 1973 loss would not have been allowable in the computation of United States income tax if Goodyear G. B. had been a United States corporation filing a United States return. See App. 19-29 (Stipulation of Facts). In the Commissioner’s view, accumulated profits are to be calculated in accordance with United States tax principles; accordingly, the Commissioner regarded Goodyear G. B.’s 1970 and 1971 accumulated profits as unaffected by the deductions allowed under British law. In view of the reduced amount of Goodyear’s tax deemed paid, the Commissioner assessed substantial tax deficiencies for the tax years 1970 and 1971. Goodyear paid the deficiencies and, following the IRS’ denial of its administrative refund claim, brought this action in the United States Claims Court, averring that foreign tax law principles govern the calculation of “accumulated profits” in §902’s tax credit. Calculating “accumulated profits” in accordance with British tax law principles, Goodyear maintained that Goodyear G. B.’s after-tax accumulated profits for 1970 and 1971 were insufficient to cover the dividends paid in those years. In such a circumstance, § 902 requires that, for the purpose of computing the indirect credit, the excess of the dividend be deemed paid out of the after-tax accumulated profits of the preceding year. If in that year the remaining portion of the dividend exceeds the after-tax accumulated profits, the remainder of the dividend is allocated or “sourced” to the next most recent year, until the dividend is exhausted. Thus, Goodyear argued that the dividends it received from Goodyear G. B. in 1970 and 1971 should have been sourced to prior tax years, 1968 and 1969, until Goodyear G. B.’s after-tax accumulated profits covered the dividends. Through this sourcing mechanism, Goodyear would, in computing its domestic tax liability for the dividends issued by Goodyear G. B., receive credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by Goodyear G. B. in 1968 and 1969. Because Goodyear G. B. paid substantial foreign taxes in those tax years, allocation of the dividend to those years would yield a tax deemed paid by Goodyear in excess of £1 million, over four times greater than the tax the Commissioner deemed paid. If the term “accumulated profits” is defined in accordance with domestic tax principles, as the Commissioner advocated, the dividends issued in 1970 and 1971 are fully exhausted by the accumulated profits of those years, resulting in a tax deemed paid of £247,124. The Claims Court rejected Goodyear’s claim. 14 Cl. Ct. 23 (1987). Viewing the statutory definition of “accumulated profits” in §902(c)(1)(A) as inconclusive, id., at 28-29, the court turned to the purposes underlying § 902 and found that they favored calculation of “accumulated profits” in accordance with United States tax concepts, id., at 29-31. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 856 F. 2d 170 (1988). The court held that the “plain meaning” of § 902 “requires [accumulated profits] to be determined under foreign law.” Id., at 172. The court also held that the fundamental congressional purpose underlying § 902, “ ‘elimination of international double taxation,’” ibid, (quoting H. H. Robertson Co. v. Commissioner, 59 T. C. 53, 74 (1972), aff’d, 500 F. 2d 1399 (CA3 1974)), would be defeated if the taxes paid by a foreign subsidiary, but not its accumulated profits, were calculated in terms of foreign law. 856 F. 2d, at 172. The Court of Appeals’ decision has important consequences for the calculation of the indirect tax credit of domestic parents that have received dividends from their subsidiaries abroad. To clarify the operation of the § 902 credit in the tax years to which it applies, we granted certiorari, 490 U. S. 1045 (1989), and now reverse. 1 1 — I Our starting point, as in all cases involving statutory interpretation, “must be the language employed by Congress.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). We find that the text of § 902 does not resolve whether “accumulated profits” are to be calculated in accordance with foreign or domestic tax concepts. It is true, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, that §§ 902 (a)(1) and 902(c)(1)(A) link “accumulated profits” to the foreign tax imposed on the subsidiary. The link is forged by describing the foreign tax as that tax imposed “on or with respect to” accumulated profits. The provisions also, however, link “accumulated profits” to “dividends” by describing “accumulated profits” as the pool from which the “dividends” are issued. Section 316(a), in turn, makes clear that domestic principles control whether a payment is a “dividend” subject to domestic tax. On the basis of this link, a leading treatise has concluded that “[ajccumulated profits of the foreign corporation . . . are, in general, equated with earnings and profits of the foreign corporation and are determined in accordance with domestic law principles.” B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶17.11, p. 17-44 (5th ed. 1987) (“Adoption of these principles has the virtue of correlating the denominator of the § 902 computation with the definition of dividends (the numerator), thus avoiding the possible distortions that could arise if different definitional approaches were used for the numerator and denominator of the §902 fraction”). Because § 902 relates “accumulated profits” both to the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary, calculated in accordance with foreign law, and to the dividend issued by the subsidiary, calculated in accordance with domestic law, we are unpersuaded that the statutory language is dispositive. We must therefore look beyond the statute’s language to the legislative history, purposes, and operation of the indirect tax credit. Ill A The history of the indirect credit clearly demonstrates that the credit was intended to protect a domestic parent from double taxation of its income. Congress first established the indirect tax credit in § 240(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1082, permitting a domestic parent to receive a credit for a portion of the foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary during the year in which the subsidiary issued a dividend to the parent. This Court subsequently described the purpose of § 240 (c) as protection against double taxation. American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 450, 452 (1942); see also Bittker & Eustice, supra, at ¶17.11, p. 17-40. The legislative history of the indirect credit also clearly reflects an intent to equalize treatment between domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and those that operate through unincorporated foreign branches. In § 238(e) of the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 259, Congress amended § 240(c) to permit a domestic corporation to claim credit for taxes its subsidiary paid in years other than those in which the dividend was issued. Prior to the amendment, a domestic corporation could not receive credit for foreign taxes paid on distributed income if its subsidiary issued the dividend out of income earned in prior years, see 316 U. S., at 453, because § 240(c) limited the credit to taxes paid by the subsidiary “during the taxable year” in which the dividend was issued. The amendment corrected this deficiency by relating the credit to the accumulated profits out of which the dividends were paid. In defending the amended version of the indirect credit, one sponsor described the purpose of the credit as securing, for domestic corporations that receive income in the form of dividends from foreign subsidiaries, the same sort of deduction available to domestic corporations that receive income from foreign branches. 61 Cong. Rec. 7184 (1921). This goal of equalized treatment is reflected as well in testimony regarding the amendment before the Senate Committee on Finance, in which a spokesperson for the Department of the Treasury described the proposal as intended “to give this American corporation about the same credit as if conducting a branch.” Hearings on H. R. 8245 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 389 (1921). More recently, the Senate Report on the 1962 amendments to the indirect credit confirms Congress’ intent to treat foreign branches and foreign subsidiaries alike in terms of the tax credits they generate for their domestic companies. See S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 66-67 (1962). B Given these purposes, we now turn to the operation of the indirect tax credit. Goodyear contends that the failure to calculate accumulated profits in terms of foreign law subjects domestic corporations that receive dividends from their foreign subsidiaries to double taxation. This undesirable result occurs, in Goodyear’s view, because calculation of accumulated profits in accordance with domestic principles may disconnect the relationship in § 902’s formula between accumulated profits and the foreign tax paid by the subsidiary. A subsidiary incurs foreign tax liability in proportion to its foreign defined income. To recover foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary, a domestic parent’s dividend must be allocated or sourced to years in which its subsidiary paid foreign tax. If, however, accumulated profits are defined in domestic terms, the dividends of a domestic parent may be allocated to years in which the subsidiary paid little or no tax. In such a scenario, the parent may not be credited with foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary. To avoid this mismatching of accumulated profits and foreign tax, Goodyear contends that accumulated profits should be determined in accordance with the same principles that govern the imposition of the tax: those found in foreign law. The Government contests Goodyear’s characterization of this case as one of “double taxation.” In the Government’s view, the dividends received by Goodyear should not be allocated to prior years because to do so would permit Goodyear to avoid taxation altogether on domestically defined income that its subsidiary earned in 1970 and 1971. Under domestic rules, Goodyear G. B. earned sufficient income in 1970 and 1971 to cover the dividends it issued to Goodyear in those years. That British taxing authorities recognized little income in those years should not, in the Government’s view, prevent the United States from recognizing the substantial income attributable to those years under domestic rules. According to the Government, the foreign tax paid in 1968 and 1969 by Goodyear G. B.— the years to which Goodyear seeks to source its dividends — relates to income that Goodyear G. B. chose not to distribute during those years as dividends to Goodyear. To credit Goodyear with taxes paid on undistributed income, the Government concludes, would be inequitable because it would provide domestic parents that operate through foreign subsidiaries favorable treatment visa-vis' domestic corporations that use foreign branches. Goodyear attempts to avoid the force of the Government’s-analysis by exploring hypothetical situations in which the calculation of accumulated profits in accordance with domestic rules presents a more plausible claim of double taxation than does this case. For example, if a subsidiary earns an equal amount of income under foreign and domestic rules, but those rules regard the income as being earned in different years, the domestic parent would be credited with a lower portion of the tax paid by the subsidiary if domestic timing rules govern. This result appears anomalous because the same credit should be available where foreign and domestic tax principles recognize equal amounts of income and the amount of tax paid remains constant. The effect of the divergence in foreign and domestic tax principles is particularly clear when a subsidiary pays a substantial foreign tax in a given year and the amount of income recognized under domestic rules in that year is zero. In such a circumstance, none of the tax paid by the subsidiary can be credited to the parent because a dividend cannot be sourced to a year in which there are no accumulated profits. Goodyear’s hypotheticals persuade us that if accumulated profits are calculated according to domestic tax principles, situations can arise in which § 902’s statutory goal of avoiding double taxation will be disserved. Equally persuasive, however, is the Government’s claim that defining accumulated profits in terms of foreign tax principles can unfairly advantage domestic parents that operate through foreign subsidiaries over companies operating through unincorporated branches. Thus, no definitional approach to “accumulated profits” uniformly and unqualifiedly satisfies the dual purposes underlying the indirect credit. C We nonetheless believe that the Government’s interpretation of “accumulated profits” is more faithful to congressional intent. Our view is informed first and most significantly by our assessment that the risk of double taxation outlined by Goodyear is less substantial than the risk of unequal treatment cited by the Government. Defining “accumulated profits” in accordance with domestic tax concepts results in double taxation only when a dividend is sourced to a year in which domestic tax concepts recognize little or no income and yet a subsidiary pays substantial foreign tax. Goodyear offers no basis for the suggestion that such mismatching commonly occurs. Goodyear’s approach, on the other hand, leads to unequal tax treatment of subsidiaries and branches whenever the foreign taxing authority calculates income more or less generously than the United States. A domestic corporation must pay tax on all income of a foreign branch that is recognized under domestic law. Under Goodyear’s interpretation, a domestic corporation may in some cases receive credit for taxes paid on income that, under domestic rules, the parent never received. This result is difficult to square with the express congressional purpose of ensuring tax parity between domestic corporations that operate through foreign subsidiaries and those that operate through foreign branches. The Government’s approach is also supported by administrative interpretations of § 902. In defining the credits available against foreign tax under the predecessor to § 902, the Commissioner stated that “[i]t is important in establishing the amount of the accumulated profits that it be based as a fundamental principle upon all income of the foreign corporation available for distribution to its shareholders whether such profits be taxable by the foreign country or not.” I. T. 2676, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 48, 50 (1933) (emphasis added). The Commissioner’s approach requires a domestic assessment of income for the purposes of calculating accumulated profits. The Commissioner’s position is reflected as well in a formal regulation promulgated by the Treasury in 1965, Treas. Reg. § 1.902-3(c)(l), 26 CFR § 1.902-3(c)(l) (1972), which defines “accumulated profits” under § 902(a)(1) as “the sum of [t]he earnings and profits of [the foreign subsidiary] for such year, and [t]he foreign income taxes imposed on or with respect to the gains, profits, and income to which such earnings and profits are attributable.” Defining a subsidiary’s “accumulated profits” as its “earnings and profits” reflects an intent to calculate accumulated profits according to domestic principles, because “earnings and profits” in this context is a domestic tax concept. Lastly, we find support for the Government’s position in the statutory canon adopted in Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 573, 578 (1938), that tax provisions should generally be read to incorporate domestic tax concepts absent a clear congressional expression that foreign concepts control. This canon has particularly strong application here where a contrary interpretation would leave an important statutory goal regarding equal tax treatment of foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches to the varying tax policies of foreign tax authorities. IV “Accumulated profits,” as that term appears in § 902’s indirect tax credit, should be calculated in accordance with domestic tax principles. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 902(a) provides: “For purposes of this subpart, a domestic corporation which owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any taxable year shall— “(1) to the extent such dividends are paid by such foreign corporation out of accumulated profits (as defined in subsection (c)(1)(A)) of a year for which such foreign corporation is not a less developed country corporation, be deemed to have paid the same proportion of any income, war profits, or excess profits taxes paid or deemed to be paid by such foreign corporation to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States on or with respect to such accumulated profits, which the amount of such dividends (determined without regard to section 78) bears to the amount of such accumulated profits in excess of such income, war profits, and excess profits taxes (other than those deemed paid). . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 902 (1970 ed.). The formula for calculating the §902 credit is as follows: The operation of this sourcing principle is described in General Foods Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T. C. 209, 215 (1944). Calculation of the indirect credit for tax years beginning after 1986 is governed by the amended version of § 902 established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 2528, 26 U. S. C. §902 (1982 ed., Supp. V). The amended version substantially overhauls the method of calculating the credit and removes the controversy regarding the definition of “accumulated profits.” The current version of § 902(c)(1) replaces “accumulated profits” with “undistributed earnings,” which are defined as the “earnings and profits of the foreign corporation (computed in accordance with sections 964 and 986).” Section 964(a) in turn provides that “the earnings and profits of any foreign corporation . . . shall be determined according to rules substantially similar to those applicable to domestic corporations." 26 U. S. C. §964(a) (1982 ed.). Senator Smoot stated: “[A] foreign subsidiary is much like a foreign branch of an American corporation. If the American corporation owned a foreign branch, it would include the earnings or profits of such branch in its total income, but it would also be entitled to deduct from the tax based upon such income any income or profits taxes paid to foreign countries by the branch in question. Without special legislation, however, no credit can be obtained where the branch is incorporated under foreign laws.” The 1962 amendment addresses a tax preference that results if a domestic parent is credited with foreign taxes paid on subsidiary income that is used to satisfy the subsidiary’s foreign tax obligations. In such a circumstance, the parent receives credit for taxes paid on undistributed income. This Court sought to eliminate this tax advantage in American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 450, 452 (1942), by including in the § 902 credit only those taxes paid on a subsidiary’s after-tax income. The 1962 amendment addressed the problem differently, permitting a domestic parent to include all foreign taxes paid in its § 902 calculation but also requiring the parent to treat such taxes as a deemed dividend from its subsidiary. The amendment thus requires domestic parents to “gross up” the dividend income they receive by the amount of the foreign taxes attributable to such income. See S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 69 (1962). The Senate Report, describing the purpose of the amendment as removing an “unjustified tax advantage” for domestic parents, illustrates how foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches are treated unequally absent the “grossing up” requirement, even under the American Chicle rule. S. Rep. No. 1881, supra, at 66-67.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NASH et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 678. Argued April 21, 1970 Decided May 18, 1970 Harold I. Apolinsky argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Joseph S. Bluestein and Alex W. Newton. Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Walters, Gilbert E. Andrews, and Stuart A. Smith. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners were partners operating eight finance offices in Alabama. The partnership reported its income on the accrual method of accounting and instead of deducting bad debts within the taxable year as permitted by § 166 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 it used the reserve method of accounting as permitted by § 166 (c). Under the reserve method of accounting a taxpayer includes in his income the full face amount of a receivable on its creation and adjusts at the end of each taxable year the reserve account so that it equals that portion of current accounts receivable that is estimated to become worthless in subsequent years. Any additions necessary to increase the reserve are currently deductible. When an account receivable becomes worthless during the year, the reserve account is decreased and no additional bad debt deduction is allowed. As of May 31, 1960, the partnership books showed accounts receivable of $486,853.69 and a reserve for bad debts of $73,028.05. On June 1, 1960, petitioners formed eight new corporations and transferred the assets of the eight partnership offices, including the accounts receivable, to the corporations in exchange for shares of the corporations— a transfer that concededly provided no gain or loss under § 351 of the Code. The Commissioner determined that the partnership should have included in income the amount of the bad debt reserve ($73,028.05) applicable to the accounts receivable that had been transferred. Tax deficiencies were computed; and petitioners, having paid them, brought this suit for refunds. The District Court allowed recovery and the Court of Appeals reversed, 414 F. 2d 627. We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits on this question of law. 396 U. S. 1000. We share the view of the Ninth Circuit and reverse the present judgment. There is no provision of the Code that deals precisely with this question. But the Commissioner’s basic premise rests on the so-called tax benefit rule, viz., that a recovery of an item that has produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to be added to income in the year of recovery. The Commissioner argues that that rule, applicable here, means that unused amounts in a bad debt reserve must be restored to income when the reserve is found to be no longer necessary, as it was here, when the partnership’s “need” for the reserve ended with the termination of its business. Congress could make the end of “need” synonymous with “recovery” in the meaning of the tax benefit rule and make the rule read: “[A] bad debt reserve that has produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to be added to income in the year when it was recovered or when its need is ended.” The semantics would then be honored by the Commissioner’s ruling. But we do not feel free to state the tax benefit rule in those terms in the present context. We deal with § 351 (a) of the Code which provides: “No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control ... of the corporation.” All that petitioners received from the corporations were securities equal in value to the net worth of the accounts transferred, that is the face value less the amount of the reserve for bad debts. If, as conceded, there is no “gain” or “loss” recognized as a result of the transaction, it seems anomalous to treat the bad debt reserve as “income” to the transferor. Deduction of the reserve from the face amount of the receivables transferred conforms to the reality of the transaction, as the risk of noncollection was on the transferee. Since the reserve for purposes of this case was deemed to be reasonable and the value of the stock received upon the transfer was equal to the net value of the receivables, there does not seem to us to have been any “recovery.” A tax benefit was received by the partnership when the bad debt reserve was originally-taken as a deduction from income. There would be a double benefit to the partnership if securities were issued covering the face amount of the receivables. We do not, however, understand how there can be a “recovery” of the benefit of the bad debt reserve when the receivables are transferred less the reserve. That merely perpetuates the status quo and does not tinker with it for any double benefit out of the bad debt reserve. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals in the Schmidt case held that although the “need” for the reserve ended with the transfer, the end of that need did not mark a “recovery” within the meaning of the tax benefit cases, 355 F. 2d, at 113. We agree and accordingly reverse the judgment below. Reversed. Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F. 2d 111. See Rev. Rui. 62-128, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 139. Section 111 (a) of the 1954 Code provides: “Gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount, to the extent of the amount of the recovery exclusion with respect to such debt, tax, or amount.” As stated in Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 96, 100: “A reserve consists of entries upon books of account. It is neither an asset nor a liability. It has no existence except upon the books, and, unlike an asset or a liability, it can not be transferred to any other entity.” “[T]he infirmities in the accounts receivable which justify the bad debt reserve carry over to those accounts in the hands of the corporation. Presumably the amount that will ultimately be collected by the corporation will not be the gross amount of the receivables, but rather the net amount after deducting the bad debt reserve. Thus, the stock received in exchange for such accounts receivable can only be worth what the receivables themselves are worth, namely, the net collectable amount rather than the gross amount.” Arent, Reallocation of Income and Expenses in Connection with Formation and Liquidation of Corporations, 40 Taxes 995, 998 (1962). N. 1, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?