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United States Supreme Court ILLINOIS v. CABALLES(2005) No. 03-923 Argued: November 10, 2004Decided: January 24, 2005 </s> After an Illinois state trooper stopped respondent for speeding and radioed in, a second trooper, overhearing the transmission, drove to the scene with his narcotics-detection dog and walked the dog around respondent's car while the first trooper wrote respondent a warning ticket. When the dog alerted at respondent's trunk, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent. At respondent's drug trial, the court denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence, holding, inter alia, that the dog's alerting provided sufficient probable cause to conduct the search. Respondent was convicted, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that because there were no specific and articulable facts to suggest drug activity, use of the dog unjustifiably enlarged a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation. Held:A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp.2-4. 207 Ill. 2d 504, 802 N.E. 2d 202, vacated and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined. Rehnquist, C.J., took no part in the decision of the case. </s> ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ROY I. CABALLES on writ of certiorari to the supreme court ofillinois [January 24, 2005] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Illinois State Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped respondent for speeding on an interstate highway. When Gillette radioed the police dispatcher to report the stop, a second trooper, Craig Graham, a member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction Team, overheard the transmission and immediately headed for the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. When they arrived, respondent's car was on the shoulder of the road and respondent was in Gillette's vehicle. While Gillette was in the process of writing a warning ticket, Graham walked his dog around respondent's car. The dog alerted at the trunk. Based on that alert, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent. The entire incident lasted less than 10 minutes. </s> Respondent was convicted of a narcotics offense and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a $256,136 fine. The trial judge denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence and to quash his arrest. He held that the officers had not unnecessarily prolonged the stop and that the dog alert was sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to conduct the search. Although the Appellate Court affirmed, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, concluding that because the canine sniff was performed without any "'specific and articulable facts'" to suggest drug activity, the use of the dog "unjustifiably enlarg[ed] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." 207 Ill. 2d 504, 510, 802 N.E. 2d 202, 205 (2003). </s> The question on which we granted certiorari, 541 U.S. 972 (2004), is narrow: "Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop." Pet. for Cert. i. Thus, we proceed on the assumption that the officer conducting the dog sniff had no information about respondent except that he had been stopped for speeding; accordingly, we have omitted any reference to facts about respondent that might have triggered a modicum of suspicion. </s> Here, the initial seizure of respondent when he was stopped on the highway was based on probable cause, and was concededly lawful. It is nevertheless clear that a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984). A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. In an earlier case involving a dog sniff that occurred during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop, the Illinois Supreme Court held that use of the dog and the subsequent discovery of contraband were the product of an unconstitutional seizure. People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N. E. 2d 275 (2002). We may assume that a similar result would be warranted in this case if the dog sniff had been conducted while respondent was being unlawfully detained. </s> In the state-court proceedings, however, the judges carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gillette's conversations with respondent and the precise timing of his radio transmissions to the dispatcher to determine whether he had improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur. We have not recounted those details because we accept the state court's conclusion that the duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop. </s> Despite this conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the initially lawful traffic stop became an unlawful seizure solely as a result of the canine sniff that occurred outside respondent's stopped car. That is, the court characterized the dog sniff as the cause rather than the consequence of a constitutional violation. In its view, the use of the dog converted the citizen-police encounter from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation, and because the shift in purpose was not supported by any reasonable suspicion that respondent possessed narcotics, it was unlawful. In our view, conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Our cases hold that it did not. </s> Official conduct that does not "compromise any legitimate interest in privacy" is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), we treated a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as "sui generis" because it "discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item." Id., at 707; see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). Respondent likewise concedes that "drug sniffs are designed, and if properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal only the presence of contraband." Brief for Respondent 17. Although respondent argues that the error rates, particularly the existence of false positives, call into question the premise that drug-detection dogs alert only to contraband, the record contains no evidence or findings that support his argument. Moreover, respondent does not suggest that an erroneous alert, in and of itself, reveals any legitimate private information, and, in this case, the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to conduct a full-blown search of the trunk. </s> Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog--one that "does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view," Place, 462 U.S., at 707--during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement. </s> This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity--in that case, intimate details in a home, such as "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." Id., at 38. The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. </s> The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of this case. </s> ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ROY I. CABALLES on writ of certiorari to the supreme court ofillinois [January 24, 2005] </s> Justice Souter, dissenting. </s> I would hold that using the dog for the purposes of determining the presence of marijuana in the car's trunk was a search unauthorized as an incident of the speeding stop and unjustified on any other ground. I would accordingly affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and I respectfully dissent. </s> In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), we categorized the sniff of the narcotics-seeking dog as "sui generis" under the Fourth Amendment and held it was not a search. Id., at 707. The classification rests not only upon the limited nature of the intrusion, but on a further premise that experience has shown to be untenable, the assumption that trained sniffing dogs do not err. What we have learned about the fallibility of dogs in the years since Place was decided would itself be reason to call for reconsidering Place's decision against treating the intentional use of a trained dog as a search. The portent of this very case, however, adds insistence to the call, for an uncritical adherence to Place would render the Fourth Amendment indifferent to suspicionless and indiscriminate sweeps of cars in parking garages and pedestrians on sidewalks; if a sniff is not preceded by a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment notice, it escapes Fourth Amendment review entirely unless it is treated as a search. We should not wait for these developments to occur before rethinking Place's analysis, which invites such untoward consequences.1 </s> At the heart both of Place and the Court's opinion today is the proposition that sniffs by a trained dog are sui generis because a reaction by the dog in going alert is a response to nothing but the presence of contraband.2 See ibid. ("[T]he sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item"); ante, at 3-4 (assuming "that a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics dog will only reveal 'the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item'" (quoting Place, supra, at 707)). Hence, the argument goes, because the sniff can only reveal the presence of items devoid of any legal use, the sniff "does not implicate legitimate privacy interests" and is not to be treated as a search. Ante, at 4. </s> The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (CA10 1997) (describing a dog that had a 71% accuracy rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378, n.3 (CA10 1997) (describing a dog that erroneously alerted 4 times out of 19 while working for the postal service and 8% of the time over its entire career); United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (CA7 2001) (accepting as reliable a dog that gave false positives between 7 and 38% of the time); Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 159, 60 S. W. 3d 464, 476 (2001) (speaking of a dog that made between 10 and 50 errors); United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (CA11 2003) (noting that because as much as 80% of all currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert "is of little value"), vacated on other grounds by rehearing en banc, 357 F.3d 1225 (CA11 2004); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214-1217 (CA3 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A] substantial portion of United States currency ... is tainted with sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine to alert to their presence"). Indeed, a study cited by Illinois in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are "generally reliable" shows that dogs in artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5 to 60% of the time, depending on the length of the search. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 13; K. Garner etal., Duty Cycle of the Detector Dog: A Baseline Study 12 (Apr. 2001) (prepared under Federal Aviation Administration grant by the Institute for Biological Detection Systems of Auburn University). In practical terms, the evidence is clear that the dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times. </s> Once the dog's fallibility is recognized, however, that ends the justification claimed in Place for treating the sniff as sui generis under the Fourth Amendment: the sniff alert does not necessarily signal hidden contraband, and opening the container or enclosed space whose emanations the dog has sensed will not necessarily reveal contraband or any other evidence of crime. This is not, of course, to deny that a dog's reaction may provide reasonable suspicion, or probable cause, to search the container or enclosure; the Fourth Amendment does not demand certainty of success to justify a search for evidence or contraband. The point is simply that the sniff and alert cannot claim the certainty that Place assumed, both in treating the deliberate use of sniffing dogs as sui generis and then taking that characterization as a reason to say they are not searches subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. And when that aura of uniqueness disappears, there is no basis in Place's reasoning, and no good reason otherwise, to ignore the actual function that dog sniffs perform. They are conducted to obtain information about the contents of private spaces beyond anything that human senses could perceive, even when conventionally enhanced. The information is not provided by independent third parties beyond the reach of constitutional limitations, but gathered by the government's own officers in order to justify searches of the traditional sort, which may or may not reveal evidence of crime but will disclose anything meant to be kept private in the area searched. Thus in practice the government's use of a trained narcotics dog functions as a limited search to reveal undisclosed facts about private enclosures, to be used to justify a further and complete search of the enclosed area. And given the fallibility of the dog, the sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose "intimate details" without revealing contraband, just as a thermal-imaging device might do, as described in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).3 </s> It makes sense, then, to treat a sniff as the search that it amounts to in practice, and to rely on the body of our Fourth Amendment cases, including Kyllo, in deciding whether such a search is reasonable. As a general proposition, using a dog to sniff for drugs is subject to the rule that the object of enforcing criminal laws does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth Amendment intrusions. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000). Since the police claim to have had no particular suspicion that Caballes was violating any drug law,4 this sniff search must stand or fall on its being ancillary to the traffic stop that led up to it. It is true that the police had probable cause to stop the car for an offense committed in the officer's presence, which Caballes concedes could have justified his arrest. See Brief for Respondent 31. There is no occasion to consider authority incident to arrest, however, see Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), for the police did nothing more than detain Caballes long enough to check his record and write a ticket. As a consequence, the reasonableness of the search must be assessed in relation to the actual delay the police chose to impose, and as Justice Ginsburg points out in her opinion, post, at 3-4, the Fourth Amendment consequences of stopping for a traffic citation are settled law. </s> In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-440 (1984), followed in Knowles, supra, at 488, we held that the analogue of the common traffic stop was the limited detention for investigation authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). While Terry authorized a restricted incidental search for weapons when reasonable suspicion warrants such a safety measure, id., at 25-26, the Court took care to keep a Terry stop from automatically becoming a foot in the door for all investigatory purposes; the permissible intrusion was bounded by the justification for the detention, id., at 29-30.5 Although facts disclosed by enquiry within this limit might give grounds to go further, the government could not otherwise take advantage of a suspect's immobility to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the detention. That has to be the rule unless Terry is going to become an open-sesame for general searches, and that rule requires holding that the police do not have reasonable grounds to conduct sniff searches for drugs simply because they have stopped someone to receive a ticket for a highway offense. Since the police had no indication of illegal activity beyond the speed of the car in this case, the sniff search should be held unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and its fruits should be suppressed. </s> Nothing in the case relied upon by the Court, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), unsettled the limit of reasonable enquiry adopted in Terry. In Jacobsen, the Court found that no Fourth Amendment search occurred when federal agents analyzed powder they had already lawfully obtained. The Court noted that because the test could only reveal whether the powder was cocaine, the owner had no legitimate privacy interest at stake. 466 U.S., at 123. As already explained, however, the use of a sniffing dog in cases like this is significantly different and properly treated as a search that does indeed implicate Fourth Amendment protection. </s> In Jacobsen, once the powder was analyzed, that was effectively the end of the matter: either the powder was cocaine, a fact the owner had no legitimate interest in concealing, or it was not cocaine, in which case the test revealed nothing about the powder or anything else that was not already legitimately obvious to the police. But in the case of the dog sniff, the dog does not smell the disclosed contraband; it smells a closed container. An affirmative reaction therefore does not identify a substance the police already legitimately possess, but informs the police instead merely of a reasonable chance of finding contraband they have yet to put their hands on. The police will then open the container and discover whatever lies within, be it marijuana or the owner's private papers. Thus, while Jacobsen could rely on the assumption that the enquiry in question would either show with certainty that a known substance was contraband or would reveal nothing more, both the certainty and the limit on disclosure that may follow are missing when the dog sniffs the car.6 </s> The Court today does not go so far as to say explicitly that sniff searches by dogs trained to sense contraband always get a free pass under the Fourth Amendment, since it reserves judgment on the constitutional significance of sniffs assumed to be more intrusive than a dog's walk around a stopped car, ante, at 4. For this reason, I do not take the Court's reliance on Jacobsen as actually signaling recognition of a broad authority to conduct suspicionless sniffs for drugs in any parked car, about which Justice Ginsburg is rightly concerned, post, at 5-6, or on the person of any pedestrian minding his own business on a sidewalk. But the Court's stated reasoning provides no apparent stopping point short of such excesses. For the sake of providing a workable framework to analyze cases on facts like these, which are certain to come along, I would treat the dog sniff as the familiar search it is in fact, subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.7 </s> ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. ROY I. CABALLES on writ of certiorari to the supreme court ofillinois [January 24, 2005] </s> Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter joins, dissenting. </s> Illinois State Police Trooper Daniel Gillette stopped Roy Caballes for driving 71 miles per hour in a zone with a posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour. Trooper Craig Graham of the Drug Interdiction Team heard on the radio that Trooper Gillette was making a traffic stop. Although Gillette requested no aid, Graham decided to come to the scene to conduct a dog sniff. Gillette informed Caballes that he was speeding and asked for the usual documents--driver's license, car registration, and proof of insurance. Caballes promptly provided the requested documents but refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. After calling his dispatcher to check on the validity of Caballes' license and for outstanding warrants, Gillette returned to his vehicle to write Caballes a warning ticket. Interrupted by a radio call on an unrelated matter, Gillette was still writing the ticket when Trooper Graham arrived with his drug-detection dog. Graham walked the dog around the car, the dog alerted at Caballes' trunk, and, after opening the trunk, the troopers found marijuana. 207 Ill. 2d 504, 506-507, 802 N.E. 2d 202, 203 (2003). </s> The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the drug evidence should have been suppressed. Id., at 506, 802 N.E. 2d, at 202. Adhering to its decision in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462, 782 N.E. 2d 275 (2002), the court employed a two-part test taken from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to determine the overall reasonableness of the stop. 207 Ill. 2d, at 508, 802 N.E. 2d, at 204. The court asked first "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and second "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Ibid. (quoting People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518-519, 713 N.E. 2d 556, 565 (1999) (in turn quoting Terry, 392 U.S., at 19-20)). "[I]t is undisputed," the court observed, "that the traffic stop was properly initiated"; thus, the dispositive inquiry trained on the "second part of the Terry test," in which "[t]he State bears the burden of establishing that the conduct remained within the scope of the stop." 207 Ill. 2d, at 509, 802 N.E. 2d, at 204. </s> The court concluded that the State failed to offer sufficient justification for the canine sniff: "The police did not detect the odor of marijuana in the car or note any other evidence suggesting the presence of illegal drugs." Ibid. Lacking "specific and articulable facts" supporting the canine sniff, ibid. (quoting Cox, 202 Ill. 2d, at 470-471, 782 N.E. 2d, at 281), the court ruled, "the police impermissibly broadened the scope of the traffic stop in this case into a drug investigation." 207 Ill. 2d, at 509, 802 N.E. 2d, at 204.1 I would affirm the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment and hold that the drug sniff violated the Fourth Amendment. </s> In Terry v. Ohio, the Court upheld the stop and subsequent frisk of an individual based on an officer's observation of suspicious behavior and his reasonable belief that the suspect was armed. See 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) (examining, under Terry, both "the length and intrusiveness of the stop and detention"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop [and] ... the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion ...."). </s> "A routine traffic stop," the Court has observed, "is a relatively brief encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop ... than to a formal arrest.'" Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)); see also ante, at 6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (The government may not "take advantage of a suspect's immobility to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the detention.").2 I would apply Terry's reasonable-relation test, as the Illinois Supreme Court did, to determine whether the canine sniff impermissibly expanded the scope of the initially valid seizure of Caballes. </s> It is hardly dispositive that the dog sniff in this case may not have lengthened the duration of the stop. Cf. ante, at 2 ("A seizure ... can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the initial] mission."). Terry, it merits repetition, instructs that any investigation must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." 392 U.S., at 20 (emphasis added). The unwarranted and nonconsensual expansion of the seizure here from a routine traffic stop to a drug investigation broadened the scope of the investigation in a manner that, in my judgment, runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.3 </s> The Court rejects the Illinois Supreme Court's judgment and, implicitly, the application of Terry to a traffic stop converted, by calling in a dog, to a drug search. The Court so rules, holding that a dog sniff does not render a seizure that is reasonable in time unreasonable in scope. Ante, at 2-3. Dog sniffs that detect only the possession of contraband may be employed without offense to the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasons, because they reveal no lawful activity and hence disturb no legitimate expectation of privacy. Ante, at 3-4. </s> In my view, the Court diminishes the Fourth Amendment's force by abandoning the second Terry inquiry (was the police action "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances [justifiying] the [initial] interference"). 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), the sniff surely broadened the scope of the traffic-violation-related seizure. </s> The Court has never removed police action from Fourth Amendment control on the ground that the action is well calculated to apprehend the guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies to police monitoring of a beeper in a house even if "the facts [justify] believing that a crime is being or will be committed and that monitoring the beeper wherever it goes is likely to produce evidence of criminal activity."); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Fourth Amendment protection, reserved for the innocent only, would have little force in regulating police behavior toward either the innocent or the guilty."). Under today's decision, every traffic stop could become an occasion to call in the dogs, to the distress and embarrassment of the law-abiding population. </s> The Illinois Supreme Court, it seems to me, correctly apprehended the danger in allowing the police to search for contraband despite the absence of cause to suspect its presence. Today's decision, in contrast, clears the way for suspicionless, dog-accompanied drug sweeps of parked cars along sidewalks and in parking lots. Compare, e.g., United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1526-1527 (CA10 1993) (upholding a search based on a canine drug sniff of a parked car in a motel parking lot conducted without particular suspicion), with United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153, 159 (CA1 1987) (officers must have reasonable suspicion that a car contains narcotics at the moment a dog sniff is performed), and Place, 462 U.S., at 706-707 (Fourth Amendment not violated by a dog sniff of a piece of luggage that was seized, pre-sniff, based on suspicion of drugs). Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for complaint should police with dogs, stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars waiting for the red signal to turn green. </s> Today's decision also undermines this Court's situation-sensitive balancing of Fourth Amendment interests in other contexts. For example, in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-339 (2000), the Court held that a bus passenger had an expectation of privacy in a bag placed in an overhead bin and that a police officer's physical manipulation of the bag constituted an illegal search. If canine drug sniffs are entirely exempt from Fourth Amendment inspection, a sniff could substitute for an officer's request to a bus passenger for permission to search his bag, with this significant difference: The passenger would not have the option to say "No." </s> The dog sniff in this case, it bears emphasis, was for drug detection only. A dog sniff for explosives, involving security interests not presented here, would be an entirely different matter. Detector dogs are ordinarily trained not as all-purpose sniffers, but for discrete purposes. For example, they may be trained for narcotics detection or for explosives detection or for agricultural products detection. See, e.g., U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Canine Enforcement Training Center, Training Program Course Descriptions, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/canines/training_program.xml (all Internet materials as visited Dec. 16, 2004, and available in the Clerk of Court's case file) (describing Customs training courses in narcotics detection); Transportation Security Administration,Canine and Explosives Program, http://www.tsa.gov/public/display? theme=32 (describing Transportation Security Administration's explosives detection canine program); U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA's Detector Dogs: Pro-tecting American Agriculture (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/detdogs.pdf (describing USDA Beagle Brigade detector dogs trained to detect prohibited fruits, plants, and meat); see also Jennings, Origins and History of Security and Detector Dogs, in Canine Sports Medicine and Surgery 16, 18-19 (M. Bloomberg, J. Dee, & R. Taylor eds. 1998) (describing narcotics detector dogs used by Border Patrol and Customs, and bomb detector dogs used by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Secret Service, but noting the possibility in some circumstances of cross training dogs for multiple tasks); S. Chapman, Police Dogs in North America 64, 70-79 (1990) (describing narcotics- and explosives-detection dogs and noting the possibility of cross training). There is no indication in this case that the dog accompanying Trooper Graham was trained for anything other than drug detection. See 207 Ill. 2d, at 507, 802 N.E. 2d, at 203 ("Trooper Graham arrived with his drug-detection dog ...."); Brief for Petitioner 3 ("Trooper Graham arrived with a drug-detection dog ...."). </s> This Court has distinguished between the general interest in crime control and more immediate threats to public safety. In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), this Court upheld the use of a sobriety traffic checkpoint. Balancing the State's interest in preventing drunk driving, the extent to which that could be accomplished through the checkpoint program, and the degree of intrusion the stops involved, the Court determined that the State's checkpoint program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 455. Ten years after Sitz, in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, this Court held that a drug interdiction checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. Despite the illegal narcotics traffic that the Nation is struggling to stem, the Court explained, a "general interest in crime control" did not justify the stops. Id., at 43-44. The Court distinguished the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz on the ground that those checkpoints were designed to eliminate an "immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb." 531 U.S., at 43. </s> The use of bomb-detection dogs to check vehicles for explosives without doubt has a closer kinship to the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz than to the drug checkpoints in Edmond. As the Court observed in Edmond: "[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack ...." 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions to the warrant and probable-cause requirements for a search when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," make those requirements impracticable (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment))). *** </s> For the reasons stated, I would hold that the police violated Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights when, without cause to suspect wrongdoing, they conducted a dog sniff of his vehicle. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1I also join Justice Ginsburg's dissent, post, p. ___. Without directly reexamining the soundness of the Court's analysis of government dog sniffs in Place, she demonstrates that investigation into a matter beyond the subject of the traffic stop here offends the rule in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the analysis I, too, adopt. Footnote 2Another proffered justification for sui generis status is that a dog sniff is a particularly nonintrusive procedure. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the introduction of a dog to a traffic stop (let alone an encounter with someone walking down the street) can in fact be quite intrusive. Post, at 4-5 (dissenting opinion). Footnote 3Kyllo was concerned with whether a search occurred when the police used a thermal-imaging device on a house to detect heat emanations associated with high-powered marijuana-growing lamps. In concluding that using the device was a search, the Court stressed that the "Government [may not] us[e] a device ... to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion." 533 U.S., at 40. Any difference between the dwelling in Kyllo and the trunk of the car here may go to the issue of the reasonableness of the respective searches, but it has no bearing on the question of search or no search. Nor is it significant that Kyllo's imaging device would disclose personal details immediately, whereas they would be revealed only in the further step of opening the enclosed space following the dog's alert reaction; in practical terms the same values protected by the Fourth Amendment are at stake in each case. The justifications required by the Fourth Amendment may or may not differ as between the two practices, but if constitutional scrutiny is in order for the imager, it is in order for the dog. Footnote 4Despite the remarkable fact that the police pulled over a car for going 71 miles an hour on I-80, the State maintains that excessive speed was the only reason for the stop, and the case comes to us on that assumption. Footnote 5Thus, in Place itself, the Government officials had independent grounds to suspect that the luggage in question contained contraband before they employed the dog sniff. 462 U.S., at 698 (describing how Place had acted suspiciously in line at the airport and had labeled his luggage with inconsistent and fictional addresses). Footnote 6It would also be error to claim that some variant of the plain-view doctrine excuses the lack of justification for the dog sniff in this case. When an officer observes an object left by its owner in plain view, no search occurs because the owner has exhibited "no intention to keep [the object] to himself." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In contrast, when an individual conceals his possessions from the world, he has grounds to expect some degree of privacy. While plain view may be enhanced somewhat by technology, see, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (allowing for aerial surveillance of an industrial complex), there are limits. As Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001), explained in treating the thermal-imaging device as outside the plain-view doctrine, "[w]e have previously reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception" turns mere observation into a Fourth Amendment search. While Kyllo laid special emphasis on the heightened privacy expectations that surround the home, closed car trunks are accorded some level of privacy protection. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, n. 4 (1981) (holding that even a search incident to arrest in a vehicle does not itself permit a search of the trunk). As a result, if Fourth Amendment protections are to have meaning in the face of superhuman, yet fallible, techniques like the use of trained dogs, those techniques must be justified on the basis of their reasonableness, lest everything be deemed in plain view. Footnote 7I should take care myself to reserve judgment about a possible case significantly unlike this one. All of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no individualized suspicion. Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search depends in part on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly material if suicide bombs are a societal risk. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The Illinois Supreme Court held insufficient to support a canine sniff Gillette's observations that (1) Caballes said he was moving to Chicago, but his only visible belongings were two sport coats in the backseat; (2) the car smelled of air freshener; (3) Caballes was dressed for business, but was unemployed; and (4) Caballes seemed nervous. Even viewed together, the court said, these observations gave rise to "nothing more than a vague hunch" of "possible wrongdoing." 207 Ill. 2d 504, 509-510, 802 N.E. 2d 202, 204-205 (2003). This Court proceeds on "the assumption that the officer conducting the dog sniff had no information about [Caballes]." Ante, at 2. Footnote 2The Berkemer Court cautioned that by analogizing a traffic stop to a Terry stop, it did "not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop." 434 U.S. 106, 109-110 (1977) (per curiam), and later reaffirmed the Terry analogy when evaluating a police officer's authority to search a vehicle during a routine traffic stop, Knowles, 525 U.S., at 117. Footnote 3The question whether a police officer inquiring about drugs without reasonable suspicion unconstitutionally broadens a traffic investigation is not before the Court. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (police questioning of a bus passenger, who might have just said "No," did not constitute a seizure).

United States Supreme Court KIMBERLIN v. QUINLAN(1995) No. 93-2068 Argued: Decided: June 12, 1995 </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Johnson v. Jones, ante, p. ___. Page I

United States Supreme Court GOLDLAWR, INC. v. HEIMAN(1962) No. 101 Argued: March 19, 1962Decided: April 30, 1962 </s> Petitioner brought this private antitrust action for treble damages and other relief under 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 4 of the Clayton Act in a Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. On a motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue and want of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, that Court found that venue was improperly laid as to two of the corporate defendants because they were not inhabitants of, "found" or transacting business in Pennsylvania; but, instead of dismissing the action, it used its authority under 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a) to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York, where venue was proper because the defendants could be found and transacted business there and personal jurisdiction over them could be obtained by service of process under 12. These two corporate defendants then moved the Federal District Court in New York to dismiss the action on the ground that the District Court in Pennsylvania did not have personal jurisdiction over them and, therefore, lacked power under 1406 (a) to transfer the action. Held: Section 1406 (a) is not limited to cases in which the transferring court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and the District Court in Pennsylvania acted within its authority. Pp. 464-467. </s> 288 F.2d 579, reversed. </s> Edwin P. Rome argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> C. Russell Phillips argued the cause for Select Operating Corp. et al., respondents. With him on the briefs were Gerald Schoenfeld, Bernard B. Jacobs, Aaron Lipper and C. Brewster Rhoads. </s> Aaron Lipper argued the cause for Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, respondent. With him on the brief was Richard B. Dannenberg. [369 U.S. 463, 464] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This private antitrust action for treble damages and other relief under 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 1 and 4 of the Clayton Act 2 was brought by the petitioner against a number of defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After hearings on a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the Pennsylvania District Court agreed that venue was improperly laid as to two of the corporate defendants 3 because they were neither inhabitants of, "found" nor transacting business in Pennsylvania, these being the alternative prerequisites for venue under 12 of the Clayton Act. 4 That court refused to dismiss the action as to these defendants, however, choosing instead to use its authority under 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a) to transfer it to the Southern District of New York where, because the defendants could be found and transacted business, venue was proper and personal jurisdiction could be obtained over them by service of process under 12. These two corporate defendants then appeared in the New York District Court and moved to have the case dismissed by that court on the ground that the Pennsylvania District Court had not had personal jurisdiction over them and, lacking such personal jurisdiction, it had not had power under 1406 (a) to transfer the [369 U.S. 463, 465] action. 5 The New York District Court granted this motion on the ground asserted, 6 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Judge Hincks dissenting, affirmed on the same ground. 7 Because this decision presented a conflict with the uniform course of decisions previously made on this same question by other Courts of Appeal, 8 we granted certiorari. 9 </s> Section 1406 (a), under which the Pennsylvania District Court transferred this case, provides: </s> "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." </s> Nothing in that language indicates that the operation of the section was intended to be limited to actions in which the transferring court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. And we cannot agree that such a restrictive interpretation can be supported by its legislative history [369 U.S. 463, 466] - either that relied upon by the Court of Appeals 10 or any other that has been brought to our attention. The problem which gave rise to the enactment of the section was that of avoiding the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn. Indeed, this case is itself a typical example of the problem sought to be avoided, for dismissal here would have resulted in plaintiff's losing a substantial part of its cause of action under the statute of limitations merely because it made a mistake in thinking that the respondent corporations could be "found" or that they "transact . . . business" in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 11 The language and history of 1406 (a), both as originally enacted 12 and as amended in 1949, 13 show a congressional purpose to provide as effective a remedy as possible to avoid precisely this sort of injustice. </s> The language of 1406 (a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not. The section is thus in accord with the general purpose which has prompted many of the procedural changes of the past few years - that of removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies [369 U.S. 463, 467] on their merits. When a lawsuit is filed, that filing shows a desire on the part of the plaintiff to begin his case and thereby toll whatever statutes of limitation would otherwise apply. The filing itself shows the proper diligence on the part of the plaintiff which such statutes of limitation were intended to insure. If by reason of the uncertainties of proper venue a mistake is made, Congress, by the enactment of 1406 (a), recognized that "the interest of justice" may require that the complaint not be dismissed but rather that it be transferred in order that the plaintiff not be penalized by what the late Judge Parker aptly characterized as "time-consuming and justice-defeating technicalities." 14 It would at least partially frustrate this enlightened congressional objective to import ambiguities into 1406 (a) which do not exist in the language Congress used to achieve the procedural reform it desired. </s> The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the District Court's order dismissing this action as to these two corporate defendants. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2. </s> [Footnote 2 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. 15. </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court also found venue improper as to a number of individual defendants, but that fact is not relevant to any issue properly before us. See note 5, infra. </s> [Footnote 4 38 Stat. 736, 15 U.S.C. 22. This section, which deals with both venue and personal jurisdiction in antitrust actions against corporations, also provides that process may be served in the district of which the corporation "is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." </s> [Footnote 5 The Pennsylvania District Court also transferred the action against the individual defendants as to whom venue had been found improper. Only one of these, Marcus Heiman, moved in the New York District Court to have the action dismissed as to him for lack of power in the transferring court. Heiman's motion was granted on this ground and on a second entirely independent ground. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal as to Heiman on both grounds and the petitioner did not seek certiorari as to the second and independent ground. The writ is therefore dismissed as to Heiman. </s> [Footnote 6 175 F. Supp. 793. </s> [Footnote 7 288 F.2d 579. </s> [Footnote 8 See Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc., v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514; Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. United States, 247 F.2d 755; Amerio Contact Plate Freezers, Inc., v. Knowles, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 81, 274 F.2d 590; Hayes v. Livermont, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 43, 279 F.2d 818. </s> [Footnote 9 368 U.S. 810 . </s> [Footnote 10 Senate Report No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., discussed by the court below at 288 F.2d 579, 583. </s> [Footnote 11 As illustrating the difficulties which may arise in determining where corporations can be found or transact business, see Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . </s> [Footnote 12 62 Stat. 937. </s> [Footnote 13 63 Stat. 101. </s> [Footnote 14 Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc., v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514, 517. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting. </s> The notion that a District Court may deal with an in personam action in such a way as possibly to affect a defendant's substantive rights without first acquiring jurisdiction over him is not a familiar one in federal [369 U.S. 463, 468] jurisprudence. No one suggests that Congress was aware that 28 U.S.C. 1406 (a) might be so used when it enacted that statute. The "interest of justice" of which the statute speaks and which the Court's opinion emphasizes in support of its construction of 1406 (a) is assuredly not a one-way street. And it is incongruous to consider, as the Court's holding would seem to imply, that in the "interest of justice" Congress sought in 1406 (a) to deal with the transfer of cases where both venue and jurisdiction are lacking in the district where the action is commenced, while neglecting to provide any comparable alleviative measures for the plaintiff who selects a district where venue is proper but where personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained. * </s> In these circumstances I think the matter is better left for further action by Congress, preferably after the Judicial Conference of the United States has expressed its views on the subject. Cf. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 -652. Meanwhile, substantially for the reasons elaborated in the opinion of Judge Moore, 288 F.2d 579, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote * In an ordinary diversity suit, for example, a plaintiff may bring suit in the judicial district where he resides. 28 U.S.C. 1391 (a). But if he is unable to get personal service on the defendant in the territory defined by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4 (f), his suit will be dismissed. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 ; cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 -443. Since this would not be "a case laying venue in the wrong division or district," 1406 (a) would be inapplicable. </s> [369 U.S. 463, 469]

United States Supreme Court MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS R. CO. v. U.S.(1959) No. 12 Argued: Decided: December 14, 1959 </s> Under 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission was confronted with rival applications by several railroads for authority to acquire control of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, an independent, short-line, "bridge carrier" of through east-west traffic by-passing the congested Chicago and St. Louis gateways and connecting with 16 other railroads. After extended hearings, the Commission found that the plan for joint control of Western by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania Railroads contemplated that Western would continue to be operated as a separate and independent carrier with responsible local management and that all existing routes via Western would be maintained and kept open without discrimination between connecting lines of railroads; but that the plan of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad to acquire sole control of Western contemplated its disappearance as an independent and neutral connection for 15 other carriers, that it would be extremely harmful to other carriers and that it would result in termination of the employment of most of Western's 24 executives and 225 other employees. The Commission concluded that the acquisition and plan of operation by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, subject to stated conditions, was within the scope of 5 (2) of the Act, that the proposed terms and conditions were just and reasonable, and that the transaction would be consistent with the public interest. It, therefore, approved the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application, dismissed the Minneapolis application, and denied applications by several intervening railroads for permission to participate in the acquisition of Western's stock. The District Court sustained the Commission's order. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 176-194. [361 U.S. 173, 174] </s> 1. The record shows that the Commission's finding that continued operation of Western as a "separate and independent carrier" was required by the "public interest" did not deprive the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad of "fair comparative consideration" and that it was made after full and fair consideration; and the District Court did not err in so holding. Pp. 184-185. </s> 2. Notwithstanding appellants' contention that acquisition of Western by Santa Fe and Pennsylvania would create a combination in restraint of commerce in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act and would lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of 7 of the Clayton Act, the record shows that the Commission fully estimated the scope and appraised the effects of any resulting curtailment of competition and concluded that the proposed acquisition and plan of operation would not result in any significant lessening of competition; and this determination rests upon adequate findings, supported by substantial evidence, and is well within the limits of the Commission's discretion under the Act. Pp. 185-189. </s> (a) Although 5 (11) does not authorize the Commission to "ignore" the antitrust laws, it does authorize the Commission to approve acquisitions which might otherwise violate the antitrust laws, if it finds that such acquisitions are in the public interest, and, upon approval of the acquisitions by the Commission, it relieves the acquiring carriers from the operation of the antitrust laws. Pp. 185-187. </s> (b) As respects railroad acquisitions, the Commission is not so bound by the antitrust laws that it must permit them to overbear what it finds to be in the public interest, and the wisdom and experience of the Commission, not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed acquisition is in the public interest. Pp. 187-188. </s> (c) The Commission gave extensive consideration to this contention of appellants and determined that the acquisition of Western by Santa Fe and Pennsylvania and their plan of operation of Western would not result in any significant lessening of competition; and that determination was based upon adequate findings, supported by substantial evidence, and was well within the limits of the Commission's discretion under the Act. Pp. 188-189. </s> 3. Notwithstanding appellants' contention that Pennsylvania actually contracted to purchase 50% of Western's stock from a trust company which had four common directors with Pennsylvania and that such purchase would violate 10 of the Clayton [361 U.S. 173, 175] Act, the Commission's action in approving Pennsylvania's acquisition of the stock, after fully considering all factors bearing thereon, did not exceed the statutory limits of the Commission's discretion. Pp. 189-191. </s> 4. Whether or not 5 (11) operates only in futuro is immaterial in this case, since the existing contractual arrangements through which Pennsylvania asked authority to acquire 50% of Western's stock looked entirely to the future. Pp. 191-192. </s> 5. Notwithstanding appellants' contention that the Commission violated 8 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to make findings which, they think, were compelled by the evidence, the record discloses that the Commission made adequate subsidiary findings upon all material issues and made the ultimate findings required by 5 (2), that they support the Commission's order and that they are, in turn, supported by substantial evidence. Pp. 192-194. </s> 6. The District Court fairly considered and decided all of the issues raised by appellants, accorded to them a full and fair judicial review, and reached a right result. P. 194. </s> 165 F. Supp. 893, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 27, South Dakota et al. v. United States et al., and No. 28, Minnesota et al. v. United States et al., also on appeals from the same Court. </s> Max Swiren and Harold J. Soderberg argued the cause for appellants. Max Swiren, John G. Dorsey and Richard Musenbrock were on the brief for the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co., appellant in No. 12; Parnell Donohue, Attorney General of South Dakota, Herman L. Bode, Assistant Attorney General, and Ernest W. Stephens for the State of South Dakota et al., appellants in No. 27; and Miles Lord, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Harold J. Soderberg, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota et al., appellants in No. 28. </s> Robert W. Ginnane and Starr Thomas argued the cause for appellees. Solicitor General Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bicks, Richard A. Solomon, Robert W. Ginnane and B. Franklin Taylor, Jr. were on the brief for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission; Grenville Beardsley, Attorney General of Illinois, and Harry R. Begley, Special Assistant Attorney General, [361 U.S. 173, 176] for the State of Illinois; Starr Thomas, Carl E. Bagge and Edwin A. Lucas for the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al.; and Robert H. Walker for certain municipalities and shippers et al., appellees. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These appeals present questions arising out of rival applications by several rail carriers to the Interstate Commerce Commission under 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act 1 for authority to acquire control of Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company. [361 U.S. 173, 177] </s> "Western" is an independent, short-line "bridge carrier" 2 of through east-west traffic by-passing the congested Chicago gateway. Its line is about 234 miles long, extending from its connection with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company ("Pennsylvania") at Effner, on the Illinois-Indiana state line, westward, through Peoria, to its connection with the main line of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company ("Santa Fe") at Lomax, Illinois, and thence southwesterly a short distance to Keokuk, Iowa. Its headquarters, shops and yards are located in East Peoria where it has 24 executives and where, and elsewhere along its line, it has about 225 other employees. It has connections for the interchange of traffic with 16 railroads, the principal ones being with the Pennsylvania at Effner, with the Santa Fe at Lomax, and with the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company ("Nickel Plate"), the Illinois Terminal Railroad Company, the [361 U.S. 173, 178] Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company ("Burlington") and the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company ("Minneapolis") at Peoria. Its interchange connections with the other 10 railroads are at 17 other towns along its line. </s> Western has outstanding 90,000 shares of common capital stock, 82% of which is owned by the testamentary trustees of the estate of George P. McNear - Wilmington Trust Company and Guy Gladson - and the remaining 18% is owned by members of the McNear family, a bank and the president of Western. In 1954, the trustees determined to sell their Western stock, and rival efforts were commenced by Minneapolis, on the one hand, and by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, on the other hand, to purchase it. (Four of Wilmington Trust Company's directors were also directors of Pennsylvania.) Those negotiations culminated in a contract between the trustees and the Santa Fe, dated May 26, 1955, providing for the sale by the former and purchase by the latter of the stock at a price of $135 per share, subject to the Commission's approval. 3 Soon afterward, like agreements [361 U.S. 173, 179] were made by the Santa Fe with the holders of the remaining 18% of the Western stock. </s> On June 28, 1955, the Santa Fe entered into a contract to sell to the Pennsylvania Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pennsylvania, 50% of the outstanding capital stock of Western at $135 per share, 4 subject to approval of the Commission. </s> On July 8, 1955, the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania Company and its parent, Pennsylvania, applied to the Commission under 5 (2) of the Act 5 for approval of [361 U.S. 173, 180] those stock purchase agreements and the consequent joint control of Western. The Minneapolis intervened and objected to the application, as did also the States of Minnesota and South Dakota and their respective public service regulatory commissions. </s> Thereafter, on October 13, 1955, the Minneapolis applied to the Commission, under the same section of the Act, for authority to acquire sole control of Western, expressing its willingness to enter into contracts with Western's stockholders to purchase their stock at the same price and on the same terms as set forth in their existing contracts with the Santa Fe. The Santa Fe, the Pennsylvania Company and Pennsylvania intervened in the latter proceeding and objected to the Minneapolis application. </s> On motion of Minneapolis, the Commission consolidated the two proceedings. Thereafter, seven other railroads having interchange connections with Western's line intervened. Two of them sought authority, at all events, 6 and two others of them sought authority, under stated conditions, 7 to participate, under 5 (2) (d) of the Act. [361 U.S. 173, 181] in the acquisition of the Western stock on an equal basis with the successful applicant. The State of Illinois, 18 cities or towns and seven chambers of commerce located on or along Western's line, two labor organizations representing Western's employees, and a large number of shippers over Western's line, intervened in support of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application and in opposition to the Minneapolis application. </s> After an extended consolidated hearing before him, the Commission's examiner issued a proposed report recommending approval of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application and dismissal of the Minneapolis application. Thereafter, upon exceptions, and briefs and arguments in their support, Division 4 of the Commission issued its report. It was confronted, as it said, with four alternative proposals, (1) for authorization of joint control of Western by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, (2) for authorization of sole control by the Minneapolis, (3) for authorization of two other railroads, at all events, and of two more railroads, under stated conditions, to participate in the acquisition of the Western stock on an equal basis with the successful applicant, 8 and (4) denial of both applications. </s> The Commission observed that "[t]hese proceedings represent a new and more complicated phase in the administration of section 5, since [they involve] 2 applications for authority to control the same property, and petitions by 4 other carriers for inclusion in the transaction under varying circumstances." It recognized that, under 5 (2) [361 U.S. 173, 182] of the Act and the National Transportation Policy, 9 it was required to "weigh whether each application is consistent with the public interest, with or without inclusion of other railroads, considering not only other intervening petitioners seeking such inclusion but also the other applicant and nonparticipating railroads as well." It thought that the burden of proof was "most heavy for an applicant in a proceeding like this, because it must not only overbalance the claims of those seeking to share in the control but also of those seeking to exclude it from the transaction." It conceived it to be its duty, under the Act and the National Transportation Policy, to "arrive at a standard of public interest and determine which of the various plans of control most nearly approximates it." </s> The Commission found that the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania plan contemplates that Western "will continue to be operated as a separate and independent carrier with responsible management located along its lines"; that it "will continue to maintain its own solicitation forces and will be entirely free to solicit traffic in such manner as best to serve the interests of the Western," and that all "existing routes and channels of trade via the Western will be maintained and kept open without discrimination between connecting lines of railroad." It found, on the other hand, that the Minneapolis plan "unequivocally contemplates the disappearance of the Western as an independent and neutral connection for the other 15 carriers with which it presently works"; that "[f]or all practical purposes the Western would be integrated, consolidated, and merged into the Minneapolis for ownership, management, and operation"; that features of the Minneapolis plan "would be extremely harmful to other carriers"; that Western's headquarters office at Peoria would be eliminated, leaving only a trainmaster and a roadmaster at [361 U.S. 173, 183] that point, and that the employment of most of Western's 24 executives and 225 other employees would be severed. </s> The Commission further found that "[o]nly the Minneapolis and its supporting interveners, the States of Minnesota and South Dakota, advocate the disappearance of the Western as a separate and independent operating carrier," and that all other parties to, and intervenors in, the proceedings "insist that the separate and independent operation of the Western under its present local management is a public necessity." It then found that the "[p]ublic interest demands that the present policies of the Western in all respects be continued." It thereupon made the ultimate finding, required by 5 (2) (b) of the Act, that the acquisition and plan of operation by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, subject to stated conditions, was "within the scope of section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended; that the terms and conditions proposed [by them] are just and reasonable, and that the transaction will be consistent with the public interest." The Commission then entered its order approving the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application, dismissing the Minneapolis application, and denying the petitions of the several intervening railroads which sought to participate in the acquisition of the Western stock. 295 I. C. C. 523. </s> Thereafter, Minneapolis petitioned the whole Commission for a reconsideration, and alternatively requested that, if the approval of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application be permitted to stand, it be authorized to participate equally with those railroads in the purchase of Western's stock on the same terms. That petition was denied. </s> Minneapolis then timely filed a complaint in the District Court for Minnesota against the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission to vacate the Commission's order. The States of Minnesota and South Dakota and their respective regulatory commissions. [361 U.S. 173, 184] being interested in strengthening the Minneapolis, which operates in those States, intervened in support of the complaint. The defendants answered, asserting the full legality of the Commission's order. The Santa Fe, the Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Company, the State of Illinois, the 18 cities and seven chambers of commerce and the numerous shippers who were intervenors before the Commission, intervened in opposition to the complaint. The Nickel Plate intervened, complaining that the Commission had improperly denied its request to participate in the purchase of the Western stock. </s> A three-judge court was convened and, after hearing, rendered its opinion and judgment sustaining the Commission's order. 165 F. Supp. 893. On separate appeals by the Minneapolis, the State of Minnesota and its regulatory commission, and the State of South Dakota and its regulatory commission, the case was brought here and we noted probable jurisdiction. 359 U.S. 933 . All of those who were defendants and intervenors in opposition to the complaint in the District Court, except the Nickel Plate, are appellees in this Court. </s> Minneapolis, supported by the States of Minnesota and South Dakota, contends, first, that the Commission improperly adopted at the outset of its report the standard of "separate and independent management" of Western as the criterion governing the comparative merits of the rival plans, which was antithetic to its application, and thereby deprived it of "fair comparative consideration," and that the District Court erred in approving the Commission's action. </s> The record does not support that contention. Rather, it shows that the Commission's governing standard was the "public interest," although it ultimately did find that the public interest would be best served by Western's continued operation as a "separate and independent carrier." We believe that the recited findings show that the Commission [361 U.S. 173, 185] carefully "weighed" and considered "each application" in its labors to determine which, if either, of them was "consistent with the public interest." Its subsidiary findings (a) that the Minneapolis plan "unequivocally contemplates the disappearance of the Western as an independent and neutral connection for the other 15 carriers with which it presently works," (b) that certain features of the Minneapolis plan "would be extremely harmful to other carriers," (c) that the Minneapolis plan contemplates the elimination of Western's office and the separation of its employees, and (d) that numerous witnesses insisted "that the separate and independent operation of the Western under its present local management is a public necessity," fully support its conclusional finding that the "[p]ublic interest demands that the present policies of the Western in all respects be continued." That finding, though antithetic to Minneapolis' application, did not deprive it of "fair comparative consideration," but, on the contrary, it seems to us, was made by the Commission after full and fair consideration, and the District Court did not err in so holding. </s> Appellants' principal contention appears to be that acquisition of control of Western by Santa Fe and Pennsylvania will create a combination in restraint of commerce in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act 10 and will lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in violation of 7 of the Clayton Act, 11 and that the Commission's approval of their application was an abuse of power. </s> On their face these contentions would seem to run in the teeth of the language and purpose of 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act. That section, in substance, provides that "The authority conferred by this section shall be exclusive and plenary, and any carrier or corporation [361 U.S. 173, 186] participating in . . . any transaction approved by the Commission thereunder, shall have full power . . . to carry such transaction into effect and to own and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through said transaction . . . and any carriers . . . participating in a transaction approved or authorized under the provisions of this section shall be and they are hereby relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law . . . insofar as may be necessary to enable [it] to carry into effect the transaction so approved or provided for in accordance with the terms and conditions, if any, imposed by the Commission, and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties and exercise any control or franchises acquired through such transaction." 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 54 Stat. 908, 49 U.S.C. 5 (11). </s> Section 5 (11) is both a more recent and a more specific expression of congressional policy than 1 of the Sherman Act and 7 of the Clayton Act, and in terms relieves the acquiring carrier, upon approval by the Commission of the acquisition, "from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . ." Although 5 (11) does not authorize the Commission to "ignore" the antitrust laws, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 , there can be "little doubt that the Commission is not to measure proposals for [acquisitions] by the standards of the antitrust laws." 321 U.S., at 85 -86. The problem is one of accommodation of 5 (2) and the antitrust legislation. The Commission remains obligated to "estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of competition which will result from the proposed [acquisition] and consider them along with the advantages of improved service [and other matters in the public interest] to determine whether the [acquisition] will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation policy." 321 U.S., at 87 . [361 U.S. 173, 187] </s> Even though such acquisitions might otherwise violate the antitrust laws, Congress has authorized the Commission to approve them, if it finds they are in the public interest, "because it recognized that in some circumstances they were appropriate for effectuation of the national transportation policy. It was informed that this policy would be furthered by `encouraging the organization of stronger units' in the . . . industry. And in authorizing those [acquisitions] it did not import the general policies of the anti-trust laws as a measure of their permissibility. It in terms relieved participants in appropriate [acquisitions] from the requirements of those laws. 5 (11)." 321 U.S., at 85 . It must be presumed that, in enacting this legislation, Congress took account of the fact that railroads are subject to strict regulation and supervision. "Against this background, no other inference is possible but that, as a factor in determining the propriety of [railroad acquisitions] the preservation of competition among carriers, although still a value, is significant chiefly as it aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy." 321 U.S., at 85 -86. </s> As respects railroad acquisitions, the Commission is not so bound by the antitrust laws that it must permit them to overbear what it finds to be in "the public interest." A contrary view would, in effect, permit the Commission to authorize only those acquisitions which would not offend those laws. "As has been said, this would render meaningless the exemption relieving the participants in a properly approved [acquisition] of the requirements of those laws . . . ." 321 U.S., at 86 . Resolution of the conflicting considerations "is a complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the transportation industry. Congress left that task to the Commission `to the end that the wisdom and experience of that Commission may be used not only in connection with this form of transportation, [361 U.S. 173, 188] but in its coordination of all other forms.' 79 Cong. Rec. 12207. `The wisdom and experience of that commission,' not of the courts, must determine whether the proposed [acquisition] is `consistent with the public interest.' Cf. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central R. Co., 215 U.S. 452 ; Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 351 ; United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 ; Purcell v. United States, 315 U.S. 381 ." 321 U.S., at 87 -88. </s> Here, the Commission gave extensive consideration to the anti-competitive contentions advanced by appellants, devoting more than five pages of its report to that matter. It found that "[a]ll the carriers endeavoring to participate in its control are in competition with Western"; that the "important thing is not whether there is possibility of competition, but whether there is probability of existing or potential competition being diminished or strangled by the Western under the control of the Santa Fe and the Pennsylvania." After an extended analysis of the complex facts and conflicting evidence, the Commission found that control of Western by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania would not result in any significant lessening of competition. It pointed to the fact that although the Santa Fe's "long haul" is to Chicago and the Pennsylvania's "next to longest haul" is also to Chicago (its longest haul being to St. Louis) the Santa Fe has agreed, and is bound, "to place Lomax on a parity with Chicago from a solicitation standpoint, and . . . the Pennsylvania will recognize Effner as one of its principal interchanges along with Chicago and St. Louis"; that "there may be some diversion of traffic, but such diversion would not jeopardize the maintenance of adequate transportation service by the objecting intervening carriers." </s> The Commission also pointed to the fact that Western had been in a prolonged receivership until 1927 when George P. McNear acquired its stock at a receiver's sale, [361 U.S. 173, 189] Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. Acquisition, 124 I. C. C. 181. It further found that Western's modern existence began at that time and, under the guidance of McNear, was built into a fine railroad; that since McNear's death, in 1947, the present management has continued, with much success, the policies he established. Those policies, the Commission found, were, and are, "to maintain strict neutrality between all connections, and to participate in any haul of traffic no matter how slight [as a bridge] carrier through Peoria as an alternative route, bypassing the congested terminals of Chicago and St. Louis," and that those policies are to be continued under the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania plan. </s> We think it is clear from this summary of its analysis and findings that the Commission fully estimated the scope and appraised the effects of any curtailment of competition which might result from the acquisition of Western by the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania, and, after having done so, concluded that their acquisition and plan of operation of Western would not result in any significant lessening of competition. Congress has left the task of making that determination to the wisdom and experience of the Commission. The determination it has made rests upon adequate findings which are, in turn, supported by substantial evidence and is well within the limits of its discretion under the Act. </s> Appellants argue that the Pennsylvania, in actuality, contracted to purchase 50% of the Western stock from Wilmington Trust Company, a co-trustee of the McNear trust, and that, since four persons were directors of both companies, that proposed stock purchase violates 10 of the Clayton Act; that the Commission was without power to approve it; that, in any event, its action in "condoning" it was an abuse of power; and that the District Court, for those reasons also, erred in upholding the Commission's order. [361 U.S. 173, 190] </s> The Commission found that the Santa Fe in entering into the contract of May 26, 1955, with the trustees of the McNear trust was "acting on behalf of that carrier alone." But even if we assume, for present purposes, that it was acting as well for the Pennsylvania, the result must be the same. Section 10 of the Clayton Act prohibits a common carrier engaged in commerce from having "any dealings in securities" of more than $50,000, in the aggregate, in any one year, "with another corporation, . . . when the said common carrier shall have upon its board of directors . . . any person who is at the same time a director [of] such other corporation . . ., except such purchases [as] shall be made . . . by competitive bidding under regulations to be prescribed by [the] Commission." 38 Stat. 734, 15 U.S.C. 20. </s> Section 10 of the Clayton Act is, of course, an antitrust law, 12 and much of what we have just said relative to the problem of accommodation of 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act and the antitrust laws is equally applicable to this contention. The evident purpose of 10 of the Clayton Act was to prohibit a corporation from abusing a carrier by palming off upon it securities, supplies and other articles without competitive bidding and at excessive prices through overreaching by, or other misfeasance of, common directors, to the financial injury of the carrier and the consequent impairment of its ability to serve the public interest. 13 But, even if this purchase [361 U.S. 173, 191] of securities might, under other circumstances, violate 10 of the Clayton Act, Congress, by 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, has authorized the Commission to approve it if it finds that so doing is in the public interest. And Congress has expressly said that, upon such approval, the carrier shall be relieved "from the operation of the anti-trust laws . . . ." A contrary view would, in effect, permit the Commission to authorize only those stock purchases which would not, in the absence of 5 (11), offend the antitrust laws. "As has been said, this would render meaningless the exemption relieving the participants in a properly approved [acquisition] of the requirements of those laws . . . ." McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, supra, at 86. </s> Here, the Commission fully considered the contracts under which the Pennsylvania proposes to acquire a 50% interest in the Western stock and all other factors bearing on that matter and, after doing so, approved them. That action by the Commission did not exceed the statutory limits within which Congress has confined its discretion. </s> Minneapolis contends that 5 (11) operates only in futuro and confers "no authority to purge the taint of a transaction illegal at the time it was brought to the Commission." Whether there is merit in that contention, as a legal abstraction, we need not decide, for here the existing contractual arrangements through which Pennsylvania asks authority to acquire 50% of the Western stock look entirely to the future. Neither the stock sale and purchase contract between the trustees and the Santa Fe nor the one between the Santa Fe and the Pennsylvania [361 U.S. 173, 192] Company is a consummated transaction, but each is expressly subject to, and will become effective only upon, approval by the Commission. Apart from criminal prosecutions, with which we are not here concerned, it seems plain that approval of an acquisition by the Commission operates under 5 (11), as that section says, to relieve the acquiring carrier "from the operation of the antitrust laws . . . ." </s> Appellants next contend that the Commission violated 8 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to make findings which, they think, were compelled by the evidence. </s> There can be no doubt that the Administrative Procedure Act applies to proceedings before the Commission, Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 , and see Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 917 . </s> The last sentence of 8 (b) provides: </s> "All [administrative] decisions . . . shall become a part of the record and include a statement of (1) findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and (2) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof." 14 </s> Upon the basis of that language, appellants argue that the Commission should have found that the price which the Santa Fe agreed to pay for the Western stock of $135 per share was excessive. Though the Commission made no express finding upon that matter it did discuss it, pointing out that the certified value of Western's properties for ratemaking purposes was more than $13,500,000; that it has no outstanding preferred stock and is relatively free of debt; that it has a fine earning record; that the transaction was at arm's length; that Minneapolis had [361 U.S. 173, 193] offered $133 per share for the stock within a few days of the time when the Santa Fe contracted for its purchase at $135 per share; and that the Minneapolis sought authority in this proceeding to acquire the stock at the same price. The Commission concluded that if $135 per share was a fair price for the one it was also for the other. </s> Upon the same basis, appellants also argue that the Commission should have found that the Minneapolis application was in the public interest in that its acquisition of Western would greatly strengthen both Minneapolis and Western by eliminating many duplicating facilities and by reducing operating expenses by more than $1,770,000 annually. The Commission did not make a specific finding upon that matter, but it did give consideration to it and found that most of that saving - more than $1,300,000 annually - would be at the expense of Western's employees - a matter which, because of the express command of clause 4 of 5 (2) (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act (see note 1), it evidently thought was not consistent with the public interest. Appellants further argue that the Commission should have found that the Minneapolis plan afforded adequate protection to Western's employees by providing for their absorption into the Minneapolis as attrition among its own employees permitted. Again, although the Commission made no specific finding upon that contention it did consider and discuss it, and we think the law required no more. </s> Appellants challenge the Commission's failure to make a number of other subsidiary findings, all of which have been considered, but we find that they relate to contentions that are so collateral or immaterial that the law did not require specific findings upon them. By the express terms of 8 (b), the Commission is not required to make subordinate findings on every collateral contention advanced, but only upon those issues of fact, law, or [361 U.S. 173, 194] discretion which are "material." From a thorough examination of the record, we are persuaded that the Commission has made adequate subsidiary findings upon all material issues and has made the ultimate findings required by 5 (2), that they support the Commission's order, and are, in turn, supported by substantial evidence. </s> Finally, appellants contend that the District Court, because of inadequate subsidiary findings by the Commission, was unable to, or at least did not, afford them a proper judicial review, and merely "rubber stamped" the Commission's order. Whether or not we approve all of the reasons and legal conclusions of the District Court, it is clear that it fairly considered and decided all of the issues raised by appellants, accorded to them a full and fair judicial review, and reached a right result. Accordingly the judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act (24 Stat. 380, as amended, 54 Stat. 905, 49 U.S.C. 5 (2)) provides, in pertinent part, that: "(a) It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as provided in subdivision (b) of this paragraph - "(i) for . . . two or more carriers jointly, to acquire control of another through ownership of its stock or otherwise . . . . . . . . . "(b) Whenever a transaction is proposed under subdivision (a) of this paragraph, the carrier . . . seeking authority therefor shall present an application to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall notify . . . [designated parties], and shall afford reasonable opportunity for interested parties to be heard. If the Commission shall consider it necessary in order to determine whether the findings specified below may properly be made, it shall set said application for public hearing; and a public hearing shall be held in all cases where carriers by railroad are involved unless the Commission determines that a public hearing is not necessary in the public interest. If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed transaction is within the scope of subdivision (a) of this paragraph and will be consistent with the public interest, it shall enter an order approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable . . . . "(c) In passing upon any proposed transaction under the provisions of this paragraph, the Commission shall give weight to the [361 U.S. 173, 177] following considerations, among others: (1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the interest of the carrier employees affected. "(d) The Commission shall have authority in the case of a proposed transaction under this paragraph involving a railroad or railroads, as a prerequisite to its approval of the proposed transaction, to require, upon equitable terms, the inclusion of another railroad or other railroads in the territory involved, upon petition by such railroad or railroads requesting such inclusion, and upon a finding that such inclusion is consistent with the public interest. . . . . . "(f) As a condition of its approval, under this paragraph, of any transaction involving a carrier or carriers by railroad subject to the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected. . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 The term "bridge carrier" appears to mean a short-line carrier which transports through traffic from one long-line carrier to another. </s> [Footnote 3 During the negotiations, Minneapolis first offered $69.50, and later $80, per share for the stock. On April 15, 1955, the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania each obtained letter commitments from the trustees for the sale to each of them of 26% of the Western stock at a price of $100 per share. (Near the same time the Rock Island made a like offer to the trustees for 26% of the Western stock, but that offer was not accepted.) But a dispute arose - and apparently still exists between the trustees and Pennsylvania - with respect to the validity of those commitments. Thereupon, Minneapolis offered the trustees $133 per share for the Western stock, but that offer was not accepted, and on May 26, 1955, the Santa Fe, acting, as the Commission found, "on behalf of that carrier alone," agreed with the trustees for the sale by the latter and purchase by the former of all the Western stock held by the trustees at a price of $135 per share, and those parties on that date entered into a contract, accordingly, subject to approval of the Commission. </s> [Footnote 4 The contract of June 28, 1955, between the Santa Fe and the Pennsylvania Company provided that it was without prejudice to any claims, causes of action or rights which Pennsylvania may have against the trustees of the McNear estate with respect to the letter commitment of April 15, 1955, for the sale by the trustees to Pennsylvania of 26% of the Western stock; and that, in the event Pennsylvania should acquire from the trustees, under that letter commitment, all or any part of such shares, the obligation of the Santa Fe under the contract to sell Western shares to the Pennsylvania Company was to be reduced accordingly. It appears that litigation was then, and is yet, pending by Pennsylvania against the trustees for the enforcement of the letter commitment of April 15, 1955. The contract also contained a covenant which, in essence, provided that (1) Western "will continue to be operated as a separate and independent carrier with responsible management located along its lines in order to preserve to shippers and communities the present direct access to its officials," (2) that Western's properties will be maintained and improved, (3) that Western "will continue to maintain its own solicitation forces and will be entirely free to solicit traffic in such manner as best to serve the interests of" Western, (4) that all "existing routes and channels of trade via [Western] will be maintained and kept open without discrimination between connecting lines of railroad," and (5) that the Board of Directors of Western shall consist of 11 members, of whom one shall be the president of the company, two shall be officers of the Santa Fe, two shall be officers of the Pennsylvania Company, or Pennsylvania, or both, and the remaining six shall be prominent citizens not connected with either of the parties but selected by them through mutual agreement. </s> [Footnote 5 See note 1. </s> [Footnote 6 The New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company ("Nickel Plate") and the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company ("Rock Island") sought authority, under 5 (2) (d) of the Act (see note 1), to be included in the acquisition of Western's stock on an equal basis with the successful applicant or applicants. </s> [Footnote 7 The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company ("Burlington") and the Wabash Railroad Company ("Wabash") did not object to approval of the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application, provided the order required continuation of present routes and channels of trade via existing junctions and gateways and of all existing traffic and operating relations and arrangements, but they asked, in the event any railroad other than the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania be authorized to acquire an interest in Western's stock, that they, too, be authorized to participate therein to the same extent as any such other railroad. The Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central"), the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company ("Gulf") and the Chicago & North Western Railway Company ("North Western") asked that, [361 U.S. 173, 181] if either application be approved, the order be conditioned to require the maintenance of all routes and channels of trade via existing gateways. The Monon Railroad Company asked that if the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application be approved, the order contain a requirement that Pennsylvania shall grant to it certain trackage rights, and, if not done, that the Santa Fe-Pennsylvania application be denied. </s> [Footnote 8 See notes 6 and 7. </s> [Footnote 9 49 U.S.C., n. preceding 1, 54 Stat. 899. </s> [Footnote 10 15 U.S.C. 1, 26 Stat. 209. </s> [Footnote 11 15 U.S.C. 18, 38 Stat. 731. </s> [Footnote 12 It is clear that 10 of the Clayton Act is included in the "antitrust laws" referred to in 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) 12, provides that "`Anti-trust laws,' as used in sections 12, 13, 14-21, and 22-27 of this title, includes sections 1-27 of this title." Moreover, 5 (11) avoids any ambiguity by including "all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal." </s> [Footnote 13 The legislative history of 10 of the Clayton Act, though meager, supports the view stated in the text. In fact, the language of the several drafts of 10, together with the types of abuses cited in [361 U.S. 173, 191] support of its enactment, suggests strongly that the words "dealings in securities" were intended to cover only a carrier's dealings with related persons in its own securities. See H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; S. Rep. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 47-48; S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 8-9; 51 Cong. Rec. 15943. </s> [Footnote 14 60 Stat. 242, 5 U.S.C. 1007 (b). </s> [361 U.S. 173, 195]

United States Supreme Court CONNECTICUT v. MENILLO(1975) No. 74-1569 Argued: Decided: November 11, 1975 </s> Connecticut statute making criminal an attempted abortion by "any person" held to remain fully effective against performance of abortions by nonphysicians after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 . </s> Certiorari granted; 168 Conn. 266, 362 A. 2d 962, vacated and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> In 1971 a jury convicted Patrick Menillo of attempting to procure an abortion in violation of Connecticut's criminal abortion statute. Menillo is not a physician and has never had any medical training. The Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless overturned Menillo's conviction, holding that under the decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Connecticut statute was "null and void." As we think the Connecticut court misinterpreted Roe and Doe, we grant the State's petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment. </s> The statute under which Menillo was convicted makes criminal an attempted abortion by "any person." 1 The Connecticut Supreme Court felt compelled to hold this statute null and void, and thus incapable of constitutional [423 U.S. 9, 10] application even to someone not medically qualified to perform an abortion, because it read Roe to have done the same thing to the similar Texas statutes. But Roe did not go so far. </s> In Roe we held that Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1196, which permitted termination of pregnancy at any stage only to save the life of the expectant mother, unconstitutionally restricted a woman's right to an abortion. We went on to state that as a result of the unconstitutionality of Art. 1196 the Texas abortion statutes had to fall "as a unit," 410 U.S., at 166 , and it is that statement which the Connecticut Supreme Court and courts in some other States have read to require the invalidation of their own statutes even as applied to abortions performed by nonphysicians. 2 In context, however, our statement had no such effect. Jane Roe had sought to have an abortion "`performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions,'" id., at 120, and our opinion recognized only her right to an abortion under those circumstances. That the Texas statutes fell as a unit meant only that they could not be enforced, with or without Art. 1196, in contravention of a woman's right to a clinical abortion by medically competent personnel. We did not hold the Texas statutes unenforceable against a nonphysician abortionist, for the case did not present the issue. </s> Moreover, the rationale of our decision supports continued enforceability of criminal abortion statutes against nonphysicians. Roe teaches that a State cannot restrict [423 U.S. 9, 11] a decision by a woman, with the advice of her physician, to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester because neither its interest in maternal health nor its interest in the potential life of the fetus is sufficiently great at that stage. But the insufficiency of the State's interest in maternal health is predicated upon the first trimester abortion's being as safe for the woman as normal childbirth at term, and that predicate holds true only if the abortion is performed by medically competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum safety for the woman. See 410 U.S., at 149 -150, 163; cf. statement of DOUGLAS, J., in Cheaney v. Indiana, 410 U.S. 991 (1973), denying certiorari in 259 Ind. 138, 285 N. E. 2d 265 (1972). Even during the first trimester of pregnancy, therefore, prosecutions for abortions conducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy secured by the Constitution against state interference. And after the first trimester the ever-increasing state interest in maternal health provides additional justification for such prosecutions. </s> As far as this Court and the Federal Constitution are concerned, Connecticut's statute remains fully effective against performance of abortions by nonphysicians. We express no view, of course, as to whether the same is now true under Connecticut law. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for its further consideration in light of this opinion. </s> So ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in the result. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 53-29: "Any person who gives or administers to any woman, or advises or causes her to take or use anything, or uses any means, with intent to procure upon her a miscarriage or abortion, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life or that of her unborn child, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned in the State Prison not more than five years or both." </s> [Footnote 2 See, e. g., State v. Hultgren, 295 Minn. 299, 204 N. W. 2d 197 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 454 Pa. 429, 312 A. 2d 13 (1973). The highest courts of other States have held that their criminal abortion laws can continue to be applied to laymen following Roe and Doe. E. g., People v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524, 208 N. W. 2d 172 (1973); State v. Norflett, 67 N. J. 268, 237 A. 2d 609 (1975). </s> [423 U.S. 9, 12]

United States Supreme Court CHICAGO & N. W. R. CO. v. TRANSPORTATION UNION(1971) No. 189 Argued: January 18, 1971Decided: June 1, 1971 </s> Petitioner railroad brought this suit (after formal procedures of the Railway Labor Act had been exhausted) to enjoin a threatened strike by respondent Union, charging that the Union had failed to perform its obligations under 2 First of the Railway Labor Act "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." The Union answered that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to enjoin the strike and that in any event the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The District Court, declining to pass on whether either party had violated 2 First, concluded that the matter was one for administrative determination by the National Mediation Board and was not justiciable, and that 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the court of jurisdiction to enjoin the threatened strike. The Court of Appeals affirmed, construing 2 First as hortatory and not enforceable by the courts but only by the National Mediation Board. Held: </s> 1. Sec. 2 First was intended to be, not just a mere exhortation, but an enforceable legal obligation on carriers and employees alike. Pp. 574-578. </s> 2. The obligation imposed by 2 First, which is central to the effective working of the Railway Labor Act, is enforceable in the courts rather than by the Mediation Board, as is clear from the Act's legislative history. Pp. 578-581. </s> 3. Sec. 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prohibit the use of a strike injunction where that remedy is the only practical, effective means of enforcing the duty imposed by 2 First. Pp. 581-584. </s> 422 F.2d 979, reversed and remanded. </s> HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, [402 U.S. 570, 571] J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACK, DOUGLAS, and WHITE, JJ., joined, post, p. 584. </s> William H. Dempsey, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David Booth Beers and Richard M. Freeman. </s> John H. Haley, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John J. Naughton. </s> J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Chicago and North Western Railway Co., petitioner in this action, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin a threatened strike by the respondent, the United Transportation Union. The substance of the complaint was that in the negotiations between the parties over work rules, the Union had failed to perform its obligation under 2 First of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. 152 First, "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." 1 Jurisdiction was said to rest on 28 U.S.C. 1331 and [402 U.S. 570, 572] 1337. The Union in its answer contended that 4, 7, and 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, 72, 29 U.S.C. 104, 107, 108, 2 deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to issue a strike injunction and that in any event the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3 The District Judge, having heard evidence and argument, declined to pass on whether either party had violated 2 First. In an unreported opinion, he concluded that the question was a matter for administrative determination by the National Mediation Board and was nonjusticiable; he further ruled that 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the court of jurisdiction to issue an injunction against the Union's threatened strike. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 422 F.2d 979, construing 2 First as a statement of the purpose and policy of the subsequent provisions of the Act, and not as a specific requirement anticipating judicial enforcement. Rather, in that court's view, the enforcement of 2 First was solely a matter for the National Mediation Board. Id., at 985-988. We granted certiorari to consider this important question under the Railway Labor [402 U.S. 570, 573] Act, on which the lower courts had expressed divergent views. 4 For reasons that follow we reverse. </s> I </s> For at least the past decade, the Nation's railroads and the respondent Union or its predecessors have been engaged in an off-and-on struggle over the number of brakemen to be employed on each train. We find it unnecessary to describe this history in any great detail, either generally or with particular reference to petitioner. Accounts at earlier stages may be found in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 284, 285 -288 (1963); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 225 F. Supp. 11, 14-17 (DC), aff'd, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 100, 331 F.2d 1020 (1964); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R. Co., 128 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 66-70, 385 F.2d 581, 588-592 (1967); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 127 U.S. App. D.C. 298, 383 F.2d 225 (1967); and see the opinion of the court below, 422 F.2d, at 980-982, and n. 4. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that the parties have exhausted the formal procedures of the Railway Labor Act: notices, conferences, unsuccessful mediation, refusal by the Union to accept the National Mediation Board's proffer of arbitration, termination of mediation, and expiration of the 30-day cooling-off period of 5 First, [402 U.S. 570, 574] 45 U.S.C. 155 First. The Railroad's charge that the Union had violated 2 First was based principally on its contention that the Union had consistently refused to handle the dispute on a nationwide basis while maintaining an adamant determination that no agreement should be reached with the Chicago & North Western more favorable to the carrier than agreements which the Union had already reached with other railroads. The complaint also alleged that the Union had refused to bargain on the proposals in the Railroad's counternotices. </s> The narrow questions presented to us are whether 2 First imposes a legal obligation on carriers and employees or is a mere exhortation; whether the obligation is enforceable by the judiciary; and whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act strips the federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce the obligation by a strike injunction. The parties have not requested us to decide whether the allegations of the complaint or the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to show a violation of 2 First, and the lower courts, by their resolution of the threshold questions, did not reach the issue. Accordingly, we intimate no view on this matter. </s> II </s> This Court has previously observed that "[t]he heart of the Railway Labor Act is the duty, imposed by 2 First upon management and labor, `to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes . . . in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.'" Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377 -378 (1969). It is not surprising that such is the case. As one leading commentator has said, in connection with the duty under [402 U.S. 570, 575] the National Labor Relations Act to bargain in good faith, "[i]t was not enough for the law to compel the parties to meet and treat without passing judgment upon the quality of the negotiations. The bargaining status of a union can be destroyed by going through the motions of negotiating almost as easily as by bluntly withholding recognition." Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1412-1413 (1958). We recognized this to be true when we said in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, 361 U.S. 477, 484 -485 (1960), that "the duty of management to bargain in good faith is essentially a corollary of its duty to recognize the union." </s> Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), furnishes an early illustration of this principle in connection with the duty to "exert every reasonable effort" under the Railway Labor Act. In that case, the railroad refused to recognize a union certified by the National Mediation Board as the duly authorized representative of its shop workers, and instead sought to coerce these employees to join a company union. The employees sought and obtained an injunction requiring the railroad to perform its duty under 2 Ninth to "treat with" their certified representative; the injunction also compelled the railroad "to exert every reasonable effort" to make and maintain agreements with the union. This Court affirmed that decree, explicitly rejecting the argument that the duty to exert every reasonable effort was only a moral obligation. This conclusion has been repeatedly referred to without criticism in subsequent decisions. 5 </s> [402 U.S. 570, 576] </s> The conclusion that 2 First is more than merely hortatory finds support in the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act as well. As this Court has often noted, the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was, and was acknowledged to be, an agreement worked out between management and labor, and ratified by the Congress and the President. 6 Accordingly, the statements of the spokesmen for the two parties made in the hearings on the proposed Act are entitled to great weight in the construction of the Act. 7 </s> In the House hearings, Donald R. Richberg, counsel for the organized railway employees supporting the bill, was unequivocal on whether 2 First imposed a legal obligation on the parties. He stated, "it is [the parties'] duty to exert every reasonable effort . . . to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the abrogation of agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce. In other words, the legal obligation is imposed, and as I have previously stated, and I want to emphasize it, I believe that the deliberate violation of that legal obligation could be prevented by court compulsion." 8 Mr. Richberg went on to describe why the bill had been drafted in general language applicable equally to both parties, rather than in terms of specific [402 U.S. 570, 577] requirements or prohibitions accompanied by explicit sanctions: </s> "We believe, and this law has been written upon the theory, that in the development of the obligations in industrial relations and the law in regard thereto, there is more danger in attempting to write specific provisions and penalties into the law than there is in writing the general duties and obligations into the law and letting the enforcement of those duties and obligations develop through the courts in the way in which the common law has developed in England and America." 9 </s> Accordingly, we think it plain that 2 First was intended to be more than a mere statement of policy or exhortation to the parties; rather, it was designed to be a legal obligation, enforceable by whatever appropriate means might be developed on a case-by-case basis. </s> The Court of Appeals, in seemingly coming to the contrary conclusion, relied on this Court's decision in General Committee of Adjustment v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U.S. 323 (1943). In that case, the Court held that jurisdictional disputes between unions were not justiciable, but were left by the Act either to resolution by the National Mediation Board under 2 Ninth or to the economic muscle of the parties. Reliance had been placed on 2 Second, which requires that all disputes should be considered and if possible decided in conference of the authorized representatives of the parties. The Court held that this reliance was misplaced: "Nor does 2, Second make justiciable what otherwise is not. . . . 2, Second, like 2, First, merely states the policy which those other provisions buttress with more particularized commands." Id., at 334 (footnote omitted). [402 U.S. 570, 578] </s> In light of the place of 2 First in the scheme of the Railway Labor Act, the legislative history of that section, and the decisions interpreting it, the passing reference to it in the M-K-T case cannot bear the weight which the Court of Appeals sought to place upon it. </s> III </s> Given that 2 First imposes a legal obligation on the parties, the question remains whether it is an obligation enforceable by the judiciary. We have often been confronted with similar questions in connection with other duties under the Railway Labor Act. 10 Our cases reveal that where the statutory language and legislative history are unclear, the propriety of judicial enforcement turns on the importance of the duty in the scheme of the Act, the capacity of the courts to enforce it effectively, and the necessity for judicial enforcement if the right of the aggrieved party is not to prove illusory. </s> We have already observed that the obligation under 2 First is central to the effective working of the Railway Labor Act. The strictest compliance with the formal procedures of the Act is meaningless if one party goes through the motions with "a desire not to reach an agreement." NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (CA1 1953). While cases in which the union is the party with this attitude are perhaps rare, they are not unknown. See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 86 N. L. R. B. 1041 (1949), enforced sub nom. American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (CA7 1951), aff'd as to another issue, 345 U.S. 100 </s> [402 U.S. 570, 579] (1953). We think that at least to this extent the duty to exert every reasonable effort is of the essence. 11 </s> The capacity of the courts to enforce this duty was considered and affirmed in the Virginian case. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, noted that "whether action taken or omitted is in good faith or reasonable, are everyday subjects of inquiry by courts in framing and enforcing their decrees." 300 U.S., at 550 . Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act explicitly requires district courts to determine whether plaintiffs have "failed to make every reasonable effort" to settle the dispute out of which the request for the injunction grows. 12 We have no reason to believe that the district courts are less capable of making the inquiry in the one situation than in the other. </s> Finally, we must consider the Court of Appeals' position [402 U.S. 570, 580] that the question whether a party had exerted every reasonable effort was committed by the Railway Labor Act to the National Mediation Board rather than to the courts. We believe that the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act rather plainly disproves this contention. It is commonplace that the 1926 Railway Labor Act was enacted because of dissatisfaction with the 1920 Transportation Act, and particularly with the performance of the Railroad Labor Board. While there were many causes of this dissatisfaction, one of the most prominent was that because of its adjudicatory functions, the Board effectively lost any influence in attempting to settle disputes. Throughout the hearings on the bill which became the 1926 Act there are repeated expressions of concern that the National Mediation Board should retain no adjudicatory function, so that it might maintain the confidence of both parties. 13 And as the Court noted in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 303 (1943), when Congress in 1934 gave the Board power to resolve certain jurisdictional disputes, it authorized the Board to appoint a committee of neutrals to decide the dispute "so that the Board's [402 U.S. 570, 581] `own usefulness of settling disputes that might arise thereafter might not be impaired.' S. Rep. No. 1065, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3." Only last Term we referred to the fact that "the Mediation Board has no adjudicatory authority with regard to major disputes." Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 158 (1969). In light of these considerations, we think the conclusion inescapable that Congress intended the enforcement of 2 First to be overseen by appropriate judicial means rather than by the Mediation Board's retaining jurisdiction over the dispute or prematurely releasing the parties for resort to self-help if it feels such action called for. 14 </s> IV </s> We turn finally to the question whether 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 15 prohibits the use of a strike injunction in all cases of violation of 2 First. The fundamental principles in this area were epitomized in International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 772 -773 (1961): </s> "The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. 101-115, expresses a basic policy against the injunction of activities of labor unions. We have held that the Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of the Railway Labor Act. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, [402 U.S. 570, 582] 338 U.S. 232 . However, the policy of the Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right." </s> Similar statements may be found in many of our opinions. 16 We consider that these statements properly accommodate the conflicting policies of our labor laws, and we adhere to them. We find it quite impossible to say that no set of circumstances could arise where a strike injunction is the only practical, effective means of enforcing the command of 2 First. Accordingly, our prior decisions lead us to hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not forbid the District Court from even considering whether this is such a case. 17 If we have misinterpreted the congressional purpose, Congress can remedy the situation by speaking more clearly. In the meantime we have no choice but to trace out as best we may the uncertain line of appropriate accommodation of two statutes with purposes that lead in opposing directions. 18 </s> [402 U.S. 570, 583] </s> We recognize, of course, that our holding that strike injunctions may issue when such a remedy is the only practical, effective means of enforcing the duty to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements falls far short of that definiteness and clarity which businessmen and labor leaders undoubtedly desire. It creates a not insignificant danger that parties will structure their negotiating positions and tactics with an eye on the courts, rather than restricting their attention to the business at hand. Moreover, the party seeking to maintain the status quo may be less willing to compromise during the determinate processes of the Railway Labor Act if he believes that there is a chance of indefinitely postponing the other party's resort to self-help after those procedures have been exhausted. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S., at 380 -381; cf. Hearings, supra, n. 8, at 17, 50, 100 (Mr. Richberg); id., at 190 (Mr. Robertson). Finally, the vagueness of the obligation under 2 First could provide a cover for freewheeling judicial interference in labor relations of the sort that called forth the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place. 19 </s> These weighty considerations indeed counsel restraint in the issuance of strike injunctions based on violations of 2 First. See n. 11, supra. Nevertheless, the result reached today is unavoidable if we are to give effect to all our labor laws - enacted as they were by Congresses [402 U.S. 570, 584] of differing political makeup and differing views on labor relations - rather than restrict our examination to those pieces of legislation which are in accord with our personal views of sound labor policy. See Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970). </s> V </s> As we noted at the outset, we have not been requested to rule on whether the record shows a violation of 2 First in circumstances justifying a strike injunction, and we do not do so. Such a question should be examined by this Court, if at all, only after the facts have been marshaled and the issues clarified through the decisions of lower courts. </s> In view of the uncertainty heretofore existing on what constituted a violation of 2 First and what showing was necessary to make out a case for a strike injunction, we believe the appropriate course is to remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to return the case to the District Court for the taking of such further evidence as the parties may deem necessary and that court may find helpful in passing on the issues which the case presents in light of our opinion today. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The subsection provides: </s> "It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 4 reads in relevant part: </s> "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: </s> "(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 104. </s> Section 7 imposes strict procedural requirements on the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. Section 8 is set out in n. 12, infra. </s> [Footnote 3 The Union also averred that it had complied with the command of 2 First and that the Railroad had been derelict in its duty under that section. </s> [Footnote 4 See, besides the opinion below, Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 416 F.2d 633 (CA4 1969); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt R. Co., 128 U.S. App. D.C. 59, 385 F.2d 581 (1967), aff'g 253 F. Supp. 538 (1966); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 425 F.2d 1086 (CA2 1970); United Industrial Workers v. Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (CA5 1968). </s> [Footnote 5 E. g., Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721 -722, n. 12 (1945), adhered to on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1946); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 306 -307 (1944); Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 339 (1960); International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758 </s> [402 U.S. 570, 576] (1961); Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 658 (1965); Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 , 151 (1969). </s> [Footnote 6 E. g., International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758 (1961). </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142, 151 n. 18, 152 n. 19, 153 n. 20 (1969). </s> [Footnote 8 Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H. R. 7180) before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 (1926). See also id., at 40-41, 66, 84-85. </s> [Footnote 9 Id., at 91. See also id., at 66. </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). </s> [Footnote 11 While we have no occasion to determine whether 2 First requires more of the parties than avoidance of "bad faith" as defined by Judge Magruder in Reed & Prince, supra, we note two caveats. First, parallels between the duty to bargain in good faith and the duty to exert every reasonable effort, like all parallels between the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, should be drawn with the utmost care and with full awareness of the differences between the statutory schemes. Cf. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969). Second, great circumspection should be used in going beyond cases involving "desire not to reach an agreement," for doing so risks infringement of the strong federal labor policy against governmental interference with the substantive terms of collective-bargaining agreements. See n. 19, infra. </s> [Footnote 12 The section provides in full: </s> "No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." 29 U.S.C. 108. </s> [Footnote 13 E. g., Hearings, supra, n. 8, at 18 (Mr. Richberg): </s> "The board of mediation, to preserve its ability to mediate year after year between the parties, must not be given any duties to make public reports condemning one party or the other, even though the board may think one party is wrong. That is the fundamental cause of failure of the [Railroad] Labor Board. That is the reason why the Labor Board machinery never would work, because a board was constituted to sit and deliver opinions which must be opinions for or against one party, and as soon as that board began delivering opinions publicly against a party, that party was sure the board was unfair to it. That is human nature. The board, in other words, was created in a manner to destroy any confidence in itself. </s> "The board of mediators is not for that function. The board of mediators should never make any reports to the public condemning one party or the other. Their duty is that of remaining persuaders." </s> [Footnote 14 If such were the exclusive remedy for violations of 2 First, not only would it endanger the effectiveness of the Board's mediatory role and risk premature interruptions of transportation, but it would provide no remedy for cases where the violations of 2 First occurred or first became apparent after the Board had certified that its mediatory efforts had failed. </s> [Footnote 15 See n. 2, supra, for the text. </s> [Footnote 16 See Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S., at 562 -563; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237 (1949); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 41 -42 (1957); cf. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U.S., at 338 -339; id., at 360-364 (dissenting opinion); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957). </s> [Footnote 17 The congressional debates over the Norris-LaGuardia Act support a construction of that Act permitting federal courts to enjoin strikes in violation of the Railway Labor Act in appropriate cases. See 75 Cong. Rec. 4937-4938 (Sen. Blaine); id., at 5499, 5504 (Rep. LaGuardia). </s> [Footnote 18 Section 2 First was re-enacted in 1934, two years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Act of June 21, 1934, c. 691, 48 Stat. 1185. In the event of irreconcilable conflict between the policies of the earlier, general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and those of [402 U.S. 570, 583] the subsequent, more specific provisions of 2 First, the latter would prevail under familiar principles of statutory construction. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S., at 563 . </s> [Footnote 19 Section 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (d), was added precisely because of congressional concern that the NLRB had intruded too deeply into the collective-bargaining process under the guise of enforcing the duty to bargain in good faith. See NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting. </s> The instant dispute between the Chicago & North Western Railway Company (Railway) and the United Transportation Union (Union) reaches back to the decision of Arbitration Board No. 282, established pursuant to 77 Stat. 132 (1963). That board was established by Congress, after the failure of the dispute-settlement [402 U.S. 570, 585] machinery of the Railway Labor Act, to arbitrate disputes between various carriers and unions over the number of brakemen required on trains and the necessity of firemen on diesel locomotives. Insofar as is here pertinent, Board 282's award ultimately led to elimination of approximately 8,000 brakemen's jobs across the Nation. By its terms, however, the award expired January 25, 1966. Prior to expiration, the Union served upon the Railway notices under 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 156, 1 which called for re-establishing many of the brakemen's positions eliminated by Board 282 by changing the existing agreements to require not less than two brakemen on every freight and yard crew. The Railway reciprocated by serving upon the Union a 6 notice requesting an agreement that would make crew size a matter of managerial judgment. The parties held conferences under 6 without reaching agreement. The National Mediation Board attempted to mediate the dispute pursuant to 5, 45 U.S.C. 155, 2 failed, and proffered [402 U.S. 570, 586] arbitration pursuant to the same section. After the Union declined to accept arbitration, the National Mediation Board terminated its jurisdiction. Since no emergency board was appointed by the President under 10, 45 U.S.C. 160, 3 after the 30-day cooling-off period of 5 had run, 4 the Act's prohibition against resort to self-help measures lapsed. </s> Thereafter, the Railway brought this action in Federal District Court seeking an injunction against a threatened strike, alleging that the Union had not lived up to its obligation under 2 First, 45 U.S.C. 152 First, to "exert every reasonable effort" to make and maintain working agreements. Specifically, the Railway alleged [402 U.S. 570, 587] that the Union had violated its statutory duty in the following ways: </s> "First: Having insisted in the foregoing dispute upon bargaining separately with the plaintiff carrier instead of bargaining jointly with all the railroads upon which the BRT [Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen] had served like notices, nevertheless </s> "(a) The defendant has refused to bargain on the proposals in the carrier's counter-notices to reduce the size of main line road crews; </s> "(b) The defendant has insisted that any agreement on the C&NW be no more favorable to the C&NW than agreements reached on the other railroads upon which the BRT served like notices; </s> "(c) The defendant has entered negotiations with a fixed position and a determination not to deviate from the position regardless of what relevant consideration might be advanced by the C&NW; and </s> Second: Notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant has refused to engage in national handling of this dispute and to negotiate on a joint basis a national crew consist agreement with all the railroads on which the BRT served like notices." App. 7. </s> The District Judge denied the injunction, holding that "[w]hether there has been compliance with Section 2 First . . . is a matter for administrative determination . . . is not justiciable and this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider or adjudicate disputes with respect to compliance with such subsection . . . ." App. 204-205. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 422 F.2d 979 (CA7 1970). We granted certiorari, 400 U.S. 818 (1970), to resolve a conflict in the circuits. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 416 F.2d 633 (CA4 1969). I [402 U.S. 570, 588] believe that the Railway Labor Act evidences a clear intention to prohibit courts from weighing the relative merits of each party's attempts to reach a bargaining agreement, and that the decision of the Seventh Circuit should, therefore, be affirmed. </s> This case presents the question whether, in a major dispute, a District Court may enjoin self-help measures after the completion of the statutory procedures if it determines that a party has not made "every reasonable effort" to reach agreement as required by 2 First. Underlying this question is the corollary one, to what extent a District Court may inquire into collective negotiations in determining whether a party has complied with its statutory duty. </s> In answering these questions particular attention must be paid to the legislative history of the Act. Railway labor dispute-settlement law has undergone a long legislative evolution which this Court has previously explored. International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750 -760, and nn. 10-12 (1961); see also Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959); Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969). Much of the experimentation prior to passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 proved unsuccessful. Recognition that growing unrest in the railway industry had created a situation with potentially grave public consequences, led the President, in three messages to Congress between 1923 and 1925, and both the Republican and Democratic Parties, in 1924, to call for unprecedented cooperation between carriers and unions. H. R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1926); S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1926); Hearings on [402 U.S. 570, 589] Railroad Labor Disputes (H. R. 7180) before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 21-22, 90, 98, 197 (1926) (hereinafter Hearings). These basically antagonistic forces were urged to sit down and develop a workable solution for settling disputes in their industry in order to minimize the rupture of the public services that they provided. The legislative product devised by the parties themselves, which Congress enacted in 1926 as the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, was a unique blend of moral and legal duties looking toward settlement through conciliation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, presidential intervention, and finally, in case of ultimate failure of the statutory machinery, resort to traditional self-help measures. The cooperation involved was unparalleled in this country's labor history. It was felt significant to all involved that the parties themselves had worked out a solution and had presented it to Congress. 5 </s> [402 U.S. 570, 590] The significance lay in the fact that since the bill represented "the agreement of the parties . . . they will be under the moral obligation to see that their agreement accomplishes its purpose, and that if enacted into law they will desire to prove the law a success." Hearings 21. </s> The outstanding feature of the bill was that it was voluntary - Congress, the carriers, and the unions all recognized that there were very few enforceable provisions, and still fewer judicially enforceable ones. 6 In testimony before Congress, Mr. Richberg, the major spokesman for the unions, stated, "[O]ur thought has been in this law not to write a lot of statute law for the courts to enforce. . . . We expect that most of the provisions of this bill are to be enforced by the power of persuasion, either exercised by the parties themselves or by the Government [402 U.S. 570, 591] board of mediation representing the public interest." Hearings 65-66. Congress recognized the absence of coercive measures but chose not to add them, noting that "it is in the public interest to permit a fair trial of the method of amicable adjustment agreed upon by the parties . . . ." S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1926). Thus, the history of the Act reveals that in dealing with major disputes Congress was content to enact a machinery which dragged on, with cooling-off periods and various status quo restrictions, while the parties were required to "treat with" one another, 2 Ninth, 45 U.S.C. 152 Ninth, in the hope that ultimately they would voluntarily reach agreement. </s> In order to bring about settlement, it was made "the duty of all carriers . . . and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements . . . in order to avoid any interruption to commerce . . . ." 2 First, 45 U.S.C. 152 First. From the outset, Congress was interested in the meaning of this provision and whether this statutory duty was viewed by the drafters to be a judicially enforceable one. During the hearings on the House bill the following colloquy occurred: </s> "Mr. Huddleston. Now, referring to section 2 on page 3, [`]it shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees, to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements,' etc. Do you agree that that also is unenforceable by judicial proceeding? </s> "Mr. Richberg. Not always. I think any action involving an arbitrary refusal to comply with that duty might be subject to judicial compulsion. I am sure it would work both ways. </s> . . . . . </s> "In other words, I think it would not be exerting a reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements, [402 U.S. 570, 592] for a carrier or its appropriate officers to refuse to even meet a committee that sought to make an agreement. </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. Huddleston. You think, then, that this section is enforceable? </s> "Mr. Richberg. I think that a duty imposed by law is enforceable by judicial power, yes. Of course, this is not a duty which could be enforced in a very absolute way, because it is a duty to exert every reasonable effort. In other words, all that could be enforced by the court would be an order against an arbitrary refusal to even attempt to comply with that duty, but I believe that could be subject to judicial power." Hearings 84-85. </s> In response to an earlier question Mr. Richberg had testified: </s> ". . . In the first place, I think if either party showed a willful disregard of the fundamental requirements, that they should make every reasonable effort to make an agreement - in other words, if they refuse absolutely to confer, to meet or discuss or negotiate, I think there is a question as to whether there might not be invoked some judicial compulsion, but I would rather see that left to development rather than see it written into the law. But outside of that, if the parties do not make an agreement, I think you face this question, first, as to whether the Government board of mediation could bring them to see the error of their ways; and, second, if that effort was unsuccessful, whether they could bring them to refer that dispute to an arbitration, and then if it was of sufficient magnitude so that it actually affected commerce substantially, whether the emergency board could not itself bring about an adjustment." Hearings 66. [402 U.S. 570, 593] </s> Since the Act was the product of months of discussion between the carriers and unions and since Mr. Richberg's testimony was uncontradicted by the representatives of the carriers, 7 it seems fair to say that the above testimony evidences an understanding on the part of the unions, carriers, and Congress that the duty "to exert every reasonable effort" was judicially enforceable at least to the extent of requiring the parties to sit down at the bargaining table and talk to each other. This is exactly what this Court held in Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). That case was an equitable action brought by the Federation to force the Railway to bargain with it. The carrier, despite the Mediation Board's certification of the Federation as the bargaining agent of the employees, had continued to deal only with its company union. This Court held that the duty to exert every reasonable effort to reach agreement, which had been held to be without legal sanction in the context of the previous Act, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72 (1923), </s> "no longer stand[s] alone and unaided by mandatory provision . . . . The amendment of the Railway Labor Act added new provisions in 2, Ninth, which makes it the duty of the Mediation Board, when any dispute arises among the carrier's employees, `as to who are the representatives of such employees,' to investigate the dispute and to certify . . . the name of the organization authorized to represent the employees. It commands that `Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this Act.' [402 U.S. 570, 594] </s> "It is, we think, not open to doubt that Congress intended that this requirement be mandatory upon the railroad employer, and that its command, in a proper case, be enforced by the courts." 300 U.S., at 544 -545. </s> "[W]e cannot assume that its [ 2 Ninth's] addition to the statute was purposeless . . . . The statute does not undertake to compel agreement between the employer and employees, but it does command those preliminary steps without which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences - in short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as is contemplated by 2, First." Id., at 547-548. </s> Virginian R. Co. stands, then, for the proposition that, once the Board has certified a union as the bargaining agent of the employees, a court may require the employer to "treat with" that representative in order that the statutory machinery of the Railway Labor Act be given a chance to bring about a voluntary settlement. It is, in essence, an order for the parties to recognize one another and begin the long, drawn-out statutory bargaining process. </s> In the years since Virginian R. Co. this Court, in the context of a major dispute, has authorized the issuance of an injunction in only two other carefully limited classes of railway litigation - that seeking to prevent invidious discrimination on the part of a union as against employees and that seeking to prevent violation of the Act's status quo provisions during bargaining. In a series of cases beginning with Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., [402 U.S. 570, 595] 323 U.S. 192 (1944), 8 this Court has held that "the language of the Act to which we have referred [ 1 Sixth; 2 Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth], read in the light of the purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them." Id., at 202-203. Recently, in Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969), this Court held that the Act's status quo requirement, which "is central to its design," could be enforced by judicial authority. Id., at 150. While in each of these instances the Court found specific, positive statutory mandates for judicial interference, the underlying cohesiveness of the decisions lies in the fact that in each instance the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not begin to work without judicial involvement. That is, unless the unions fairly represented all of their employees; unless the employer bargained with the certified representative of the employees; unless the status quo was maintained during the entire range of bargaining, the statutory mechanism could not hope to induce a negotiated settlement. In each case the judicial involvement was minimal and in keeping with the central theme of the Act - to bring about voluntary settlement. In each case the "collective bargaining agents stepped outside their legal duties and violated the Act which called them into being . . . ." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 338 (1960). [402 U.S. 570, 596] </s> In the instant case, we have an entirely different situation. Here, all parties were fairly represented, the status quo was being maintained, and, most important, each bargaining representative met and conferred with his counterpart. The step-by-step procedures prescribed by the Railway Labor Act had been carried through. In essence, the Court holds that a district court has the duty under 2 First, to assess the bargaining tactics of each of the parties after the entire statutory scheme has run its course. If, then, the court determines that a party had not exerted sufficient effort to reach settlement, it should enjoin self-help measures, and, if such action is to make any sense within this statutory scheme, remand the parties to some unspecified point in the bargaining process. Such a notion is entirely contrary to the carefully constructed premise of the Railway Labor Act. </s> My summary of the legislative history of the Act clearly discloses that judicial involvement in the railway bargaining process was to be minuscule since the entire focus of the Act was toward achieving a voluntary settlement between the protagonists. "The Railway Labor Act, like the National Labor Relations Act, does not undertake governmental regulation of wages, hours, or working conditions. Instead it seeks to provide a means by which agreement may be reached with respect to them." Terminal Assn. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943) (footnote omitted). It is clear to me that the duty to exert every reasonable effort was agreed upon to make effective the duty of the carrier to recognize the union chosen by the employees - in other words, it is essentially a corollary of the duty. Such a duty does not contemplate that governmental power should, after failure of the parties to reach accord, be added to the scales in favor of either party and thus compel the other to agree upon the aided party's terms. Rather, at that point, impasse was to free both parties [402 U.S. 570, 597] to resort to self-help. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, 361 U.S. 477, 484 -486 (1960). As Mr. Richberg had testified, "I wish to stress that one point above all others. We are seeking an opportunity to preserve self-government in industry. . . . We are not asking the Government to use force against one or the other party. We are simply asking aid and cooperation." Hearings 22. </s> Even apart from what the drafters of the Act representing both sides specifically contemplated, the result reached today will destroy entirely the carefully planned scheme of the Act. The Act is built upon a step-by-step framework. Each step is carefully drawn to introduce slightly different pressures upon the parties to reach settlement from the preceding step. First, the parties confer jointly. Next, the National Mediation Board may add its pressure through mediation. Then, the President may call into effect both the great power of his office and that of informed public opinion through the creation of an emergency board. Underlying the entire statutory framework is the pressure born of the knowledge that in the final instance traditional self-help economic pressure may be brought to bear if the statutory mechanism does not produce agreement. The Act does not evidence an intention to return to any step once completed. The Court's decision will effectively destroy the scheme of gradually escalating pressures. Moreover, the Court provides absolutely no guidance as to where in the bargaining scheme the parties are to be remanded. Does the court send them back to the Mediation Board which has already terminated jurisdiction finding the parties to have reached impasse? Should the court remand to some other phase of the proceedings? If so, where? </s> More important, however, is the mortal wound today's holding inflicts on the critical role to be played by the [402 U.S. 570, 598] presence of economic weapons in reserve. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, supra, at 488-489. As the statutory machinery nears termination without achieving settlement, the threat of economic self-help and the pressures of informed public opinion create new impetus toward compromise and agreement. If self-help can now effectively be thwarted by injunction and by drawn-out court proceedings after the termination of the entire bargaining process, or worse yet, at each step thereof, the threat of its use becomes impotent, indeed. </s> Since there is no specific mandate for an injunction in the circumstances presented by this case, the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are applicable. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S., at 563 ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40 -41 (1957). </s> "The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. 101-115, expresses a basic policy against the injunction of activities of labor unions. We have held that the Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin compliance with various mandates of the Railway Labor Act. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 . However, the policy of the Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right." International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S., at 772 -773. </s> My conclusion, then, is that the Railway Labor Act as designed by its coframers and as enforced by this Court [402 U.S. 570, 599] excludes any role for the judiciary to oversee the relative efforts of the parties in their mutual attempt to reach settlement. A court may order the parties to recognize one another and sit down to bargain, but upon failure of the statutory machinery to induce settlement, the judiciary is denied power to enjoin resort to traditional self-help measures. If this scheme has proved ineffective, Congress, not this Court, must redress the deficiencies. </s> I would affirm. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 6 provides in part: </s> "Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 5 First, provides in part: </s> "The parties, or either party, to a dispute between an employee or group of employees and a carrier may invoke the services of the Mediation Board in any of the following cases: </s> "(a) A dispute concerning changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions not adjusted by the parties in conference. </s> . . . . . </s> "The Mediation Board may proffer its services in case any labor emergency is found by it to exist at any time. </s> "In either event the said Board shall promptly put itself in communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall use its best efforts, by mediation, to bring them to agreement. If such efforts . . . shall be unsuccessful, the said Board shall at once endeavor as its final required action . . . to induce the parties to [402 U.S. 570, 586] submit their controversy to arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." </s> [Footnote 3 Section 10 provides in part: </s> "If a dispute between a carrier and its employees be not adjusted under the foregoing provisions of this chapter and should, in the judgment of the Mediation Board, threaten substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board to investigate and report respecting such dispute. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "After the creation of such board and for thirty days after such board has made its report to the President, no change, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." </s> [Footnote 4 Section 5 First, provides in part: </s> "If arbitration at the request of the Board shall be refused by one or both parties, the Board shall at once notify both parties in writing that its mediatory efforts have failed and for thirty days thereafter, unless in the intervening period the parties agree to arbitration, or an emergency board shall be created under section 160 of this title, no change shall be made in the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in effect prior to the time the dispute arose." </s> [Footnote 5 "Mr. Richberg: . . . This bill which has been introduced in the House and in the Senate simultaneously represents the product of months of negotiations and conferences between the representatives of 20 railroad labor organizations and the Association of Railway Executives representatives, representing the great majority, practically all, of the carriers by railroad." Hearings 9. </s> "I want to emphasize again that this bill is the product of a negotiation between employers and employees which is unparalleled, I believe, in the history of American industrial relations. </s> "For the first time representatives of a great majority of all the employers and all the employees of one industry conferred for several months for the purpose of creating by agreement a machinery for the peaceful and prompt adjustment of both major and minor disagreements that might impair the efficiency of operations or interrupt the service they render to the community. They are now asking to have this agreement written into law, not for the purpose of having governmental power exerted to compel the parties to do right but in order to obtain Government aid in their cooperative efforts and in order to assure the public that their [402 U.S. 570, 590] interest in efficient continuous transportation service will be permanently protected. </s> . . . . . </s> "It is a remarkable fact that all parties concerned were able to lay aside the hostile feelings and suspicions that had too often characterized past negotiations and to act upon the belief that if an agreement were reached, it would be carried out in the same spirit of good faith and fair dealing that characterized the negotiations." Hearings 21-22. </s> [Footnote 6 Mr. Thom (carrier representative). "I wish you to bear that fact in mind - the moral obligation now resting upon each one of the proponents of this bill in respect to its effect upon the public interest. Suppose it is changed in any important particular, what effect will that have upon the moral obligation to which I have just alluded? . . . </s> "I personally attach most substantial importance to the view I am now asking you to consider. I think that when a measure is adopted, backed by the moral obligation of the parties that it will not be permitted in any degree to [a]ffect adversely the public interests, it would be a most unwise thing to insert measures of coercion, substitute principles, or anything that would have the effect of liberating these parties from the position they have voluntarily assumed before you, that this is a workable measure." Hearings 115. </s> [Footnote 7 Carrier representatives were present throughout the congressional testimony of Mr. Richberg. None contradicted Mr. Richberg's viewpoint in their testimony. </s> [Footnote 8 See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952). </s> [402 U.S. 570, 600]

United States Supreme Court MARSTON v. LEWIS(1973) No. 72-899 Argued: Decided: March 19, 1973 </s> Arizona's 50-day durational voter residency and registration requirements as applied to other than presidential elections held constitutionally permissible, in light of Arizona's special problems arising from the State's legitimate needs to correct registrations accomplished by volunteer personnel and to interrupt registration work to take care of activities occasioned by its fall primaries. </s> Reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Fourteen county recorders and other public officials of Arizona appeal from a judgment of a three-judge district court holding the State's 50-day durational voter residency requirement and its 50-day voter registration requirement unconstitutional under the decision in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 1 A permanent injunction was entered against enforcement of these or any other greater-than-30-day residency and registration requirements in any election held after November 1972. Appellants do not seek review of the District Court's judgment insofar as it enjoins application of the 50-day requirements in presidential elections. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1. 2 Appellants assert, however, that the requirements, [410 U.S. 679, 680] as applied to special, primary, or general elections involving state and local officials, are supported by sufficiently strong local interests to pass constitutional muster. We agree and reverse. </s> In Dunn v. Blumstein, we struck down Tennessee's durational voter residency requirement of one year in the State and three months in the county. We recognized that a person does not have a federal constitutional right to walk up to a voting place on election day and demand a ballot. States have valid and sufficient interests in providing for some period of time - prior to an election - in order to prepare adequate voter records and protect its electoral processes from possible frauds. A year, or even three months, was found too long, particularly in the context of "the judgment of the Tennessee lawmakers," who had set "the cutoff point for registration [at] 30 days before an election . . . ." 405 U.S., at 349 . The Arizona scheme, however, stands in a different light. The durational residency requirement is only 50 days, not a year or even three months. Moreover, unlike Tennessee's, the Arizona requirement is tied to the closing of the State's registration process at 50 days prior to elections and reflects a state legislative judgment that the period is necessary to achieve the State's legitimate goals. </s> We accept that judgment, particularly in light of the realities of Arizona's registration and voting procedures. Those procedures, apparently first adopted during the Populist Era, rely on a "massive" volunteer deputy registrar system. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-141. According to appellants' testimony, although these volunteers make registration convenient for voters, they average 1.13 mistakes per voter registration and the county recorder must correct those mistakes before certifying to [410 U.S. 679, 681] the "completeness and correctness" of each precinct register. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-155. The District Court itself noted that there were estimates that "in Maricopa County alone, some 4,400 registered voters might be denied the right to vote if the county voter list is in error by only one percent." </s> An additional complicating factor in Arizona registration procedures is the State's fall primary system. The uncontradicted testimony demonstrates that in the weeks preceding the deadline for registration in general elections - a period marked by a curve toward the "peak" in terms of the registration affidavits received - county recorders and their staffs are unable to process the incoming affidavits because of their work in the fall primaries. It is only after the primaries are over that the officials can return to the accumulated backlog of registration affidavits and undertake to process them in accordance with applicable statutory requirements. </s> On the basis of the evidence before the District Court, it is clear that the State has demonstrated that the 50-day voter registration cutoff (for election of state and local officials) is necessary to permit preparation of accurate voter lists. We said in Dunn v. Blumstein that "[f]ixing a constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of degree. It is sufficient to note here that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud - and a year, or three months, too much." 405 U.S., at 348 . In the present case, we are confronted with a recent and amply justifiable legislative judgment that 50 days rather than 30 is necessary to promote the State's important interest in accurate voter lists. The Constitution is not so rigid that that determination and others like it may not stand. [410 U.S. 679, 682] </s> The judgment of the District Court, insofar as it has been appealed from, is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The requirements appear, respectively, at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-101 (3) and 16-107. These provisions were enacted after our decision in Dunn v. Blumstein. </s> Appellees are a deputy registrar in Maricopa County and a resident of Maricopa County. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 1973aa-1 withstood constitutional attack in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concur, dissenting. </s> In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972), just last Term, we held that a 30-day residency requirement provided the State with "an ample period of time . . . to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud" in the process of voter registration. We made that judgment in light of the facts that Congress had made a similar judgment as to presidential and vice-presidential elections, 42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1 (a) (6), that roughly half the States had periods of similar length, 1972-1973 Book of the States 36-37 (as of time of decision), and that the evidence needed to determine residency was relatively easy to find. The District Court, after hearing evidence about the administrative burdens in Arizona, found that appellants needed no longer than 30 days to complete the same tasks. I find nothing in the record that leads me to conclude that this judgment was erroneous. </s> The Court relies on two factors to justify the longer period. First, Arizona's volunteer registrar system is said to result in so many errors that their correction requires 45 days. But these errors occur only because the deputy registrars are inadequately trained and the central supervision of the data-control process is not well organized. The District Court found that "under present conditions, at least forty-five days are required to make a voter list as free from error as possible" (emphasis added). This justified its refusal to enjoin the operation of the statute as to the election held in November 1972. But appellant Marston's testimony was directed almost exclusively to what can only be considered readily [410 U.S. 679, 683] solvable problems caused by untrained personnel in a relatively small office. Appellants presented no evidence that improvements in the administration of the deputy registrar system, including earlier recruitment and better training of deputy registrars and of dataprocessing personnel in the central offices, could not be adopted before the next election. If, as we held in Dunn, the State "cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity," and if the State must carry "a heavy burden of justification," 405 U.S., at 343 , surely it must show that it cannot, by better administration, eliminate the errors that justified a 50-day period in 1972. The District Court, in my view, correctly concluded that "the State has presented no facts demonstrating a compelling interest" in its 50-day requirement. </s> The second "complicating factor" is said to be the burden on county recorders caused by the need to interrupt the processing of affidavits filed by new registrants in order for them to work on the fall primaries. Here too the appellants showed no need to use small staffs. It is by no means obvious that the recorders' staffs could not be increased temporarily to deal with this "complication." Certainly that is a method of processing affidavits which less seriously burdens the right to vote. "And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference." Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 343. </s> In addition, appellants have established a system to register voters for presidential and vice-presidential elections, in compliance with the requirement of 42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1 (d), that no State may impose a residency requirement of greater than 30 days for such elections. In Arizona, those voters who qualify for presidential and vice-presidential elections, but not for state elections, [410 U.S. 679, 684] are given absentee ballots. This eliminates the necessity to prepare a separate list of registration lists. Any administrative problems caused by the inability to correct misspellings, to alphabetize the lists, and to determine in which precinct the voter lived - the only difficulties which appellants mentioned in their testimony * - could be eliminated by similar treatment of late registrants for all elections. And if these voters did not have to appear at the polls, the fears of deterring other voters by delays at the polling places would disappear. </s> Even if the evidence below established that the administrative burdens of a 30-day limitation on general registration could not possibly be removed, that would not itself justify the same limitation on registration of newly arrived voters. General registration requirements affect every voter in the State. Durational residency requirements affect a much smaller class of potential voters, and the burdens of registering the members of that class will therefore be significantly smaller. Further, general registration requirements, with which any otherwise eligible voter may comply if he acts with sufficient diligence, might be thought to impair less substantially [410 U.S. 679, 685] the right to vote than do durational residency requirements, which bar a newly arrived voter from any participation in the elections. Serious administrative problems might justify the less severe impairment, but a total bar to participation can be justified only by administrative problems of the highest order. </s> In short, the evidence produced below abundantly supports the District Court's conclusion that appellants had failed to carry the heavy burden of justifying the 50-day limitation period in light of reasonably available and less restrictive alternatives. If this Court has drawn a line beyond which reliance on administrative inconvenience is extremely questionable, as we did in Dunn, we can avoid an unprincipled numbers game only if we insist that any deviations from the line we have drawn, after mature consideration, be justified by far more substantial evidence than that produced in the District Court by appellants. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. </s> [Footnote * Appellant Marston testified that there would be difficulty in locating the proper precincts and school districts for each registrant. Again, this pertains exclusively to the election in 1972, because of several nonrecurring facts: the State had recently "cleansed" its voting lists, dropping everyone from the rolls and requiring reregistration of every voter; the State had just been redistricted; and a statute rescheduling school board elections caused transitional problems. Difficulties in determining the proper precinct for each voter could be eliminated by a simple reprograming of the computer used by the registrars. Now the computer simply indicates an error if the address and the precinct entered on the registration form by the registrars are inconsistent; it would not be difficult for a programer to have the computer itself find the proper precinct. And, as appellant Marston testified, his task would not be difficult at all if he used an "on-line" system of processing the cards through the computer rather than the present "batch" system. </s> [410 U.S. 679, 686]

United States Supreme Court LOUISIANA P. & L. CO. v. THIBODAUX CITY(1959) No. 398 Argued: April 2, 1959Decided: June 8, 1959 </s> The authority of respondent City of Thibodaux to expropriate the property of petitioner Power and Light Company was challenged in an eminent domain proceeding in the District Court, which had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Petitioner answered respondent's reliance upon a Louisiana statute by citing an opinion of the Louisiana Attorney General advising that a Louisiana city was without power to effect a similar expropriation. The District Judge, on his own motion, ordered that further proceedings be stayed until the Louisiana Supreme Court had been afforded an opportunity to interpret the theretofore judicially uninterpreted Act. Held: The District Court properly exercised the power it had in this case to stay proceedings pending a prompt state court construction of a state statute of dubious meaning. Pp. 25-31. </s> 255 F.2d 774, reversed. </s> J. Raburn Monroe argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were J. Blanc Monroe, Monte M. Lemann, Malcolm L. Monroe and Andrew P. Carter. </s> Louis Fenner Claiborne argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Remy Chiasson. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The City of Thibodaux, Louisiana, filed a petition for expropriation in one of the Louisiana District Courts, asserting a taking of the land, buildings, and equipment of petitioner Power and Light Company. Petitioner, a Florida corporation, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on the basis of diversity of citizenship. After a pre-trial conference in which various aspects of the case were discussed, [360 U.S. 25, 26] the district judge, on his own motion, ordered that "Further proceedings herein, therefore, will be stayed until the Supreme Court of Louisiana has been afforded an opportunity to interpret Act 111 of 1900," the authority on which the city's expropriation order was based. 153 F. Supp. 515, 517-518. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the procedure adopted by the district judge was not available in an expropriation proceeding, and that in any event no exceptional circumstances were present to justify the procedure even if available. 255 F.2d 774. We granted certiorari, 358 U.S. 893 , because of the importance of the question in the judicial enforcement of the power of eminent domain under diversity jurisdiction. 1 </s> In connection with the first decision in which a closely divided Court considered and upheld jurisdiction over an eminent domain proceeding removed to the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 , Mr. Justice Holmes made the following observation: </s> "The fundamental fact is that eminent domain is a prerogative of the State, which on the one hand may be exercised in any way that the State thinks fit, and on the other may not be exercised except by an authority which the State confers." </s> While this was said in the dissenting opinion, the distinction between expropriation proceedings and ordinary diversity cases, though found insufficient to restrict diversity jurisdiction, remains a relevant and important consideration in the appropriate judicial administration of such actions in the federal courts. [360 U.S. 25, 27] </s> We have increasingly recognized the wisdom of staying actions in the federal courts pending determination by a state court of decisive issues of state law. Thus in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 , it was said: </s> "Had we or they [the lower court judges] no choice in the matter but to decide what is the law of the state, we should hesitate long before rejecting their forecast of Texas law. But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination." </s> On the other hand, we have held that the mere difficulty of state law does not justify a federal court's relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court action. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 . 2 But [360 U.S. 25, 28] where the issue touched upon the relationship of City to State, Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 , or involved the scope of a previously uninterpreted state statute which, if applicable, was of questionable constitutionality, Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 229 , we have required District Courts, and not merely sanctioned an exercise of their discretionary power, to stay their proceedings pending the submission of the state law question to state determination. </s> These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism. We have drawn upon the judicial discretion of the chancellor to decline jurisdiction over a part or all of a case brought before him. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra. Although an eminent domain proceeding is deemed for certain purposes of legal classification a "suit at common law," Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 375 -376, it is of a special and peculiar nature. Mr. Justice Holmes set forth one differentiating characteristic of eminent domain: it is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative. And when, as here, a city's power to condemn is challenged, a further aspect of sovereignty is introduced. A determination of the nature and extent of delegation of the power of eminent domain concerns the apportionment of governmental powers between City and State. The issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation interpreted in local settings. The considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts of state government or needless friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a federal court. [360 U.S. 25, 29] </s> The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when his familiarity with the problems of local law so counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a disputed state statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively - the courts of the State under whose statute eminent domain is sought to be exercised - rather than himself make a dubious and tentative forecast. This course does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition. Eventually the District Court will award compensation if the taking is sustained. If for some reason a declaratory judgment is not promptly sought from the state courts and obtained within a reasonable time, the District Court, having retained complete control of the litigation, will doubtless assert it to decide also the question of the meaning of the state statute. The justification for this power, to be exercised within the indicated limits, lies in regard for the respective competence of the state and federal court systems and for the maintenance of harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State. </s> It would imply an unworthy conception of the federal judiciary to give weight to the suggestion that acknowledgment of this power will tempt some otiose or timid judge to shuffle off responsibility. "Such apprehension implies a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure." Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 . Procedures for effective judicial administration presuppose a federal judiciary composed of judges well-equipped and of sturdy character in whom may safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal. [360 U.S. 25, 30] </s> In light of these considerations, the immediate situation quickly falls into place. In providing on his own motion for a stay in this case, an experienced district judge was responding in a sensible way to a quandary about the power of the City of Thibodaux into which he was placed by an opinion of the Attorney General of Louisiana in which it was concluded that in a strikingly similar case a Louisiana city did not have the power here claimed by the City. A Louisiana statute apparently seems to grant such a power. But that statute apparently been interpreted, in respect to a situation like that before the judge, by the Louisiana courts and it would not be the first time that the authoritative tribunal has found in a statute less than meets the outsider's eye. Informed local courts may find meaning not discernible to the outsider. The consequence of allowing this to come to pass would be that this case would be the only case in which the Louisiana statute is construed as we would construe it, whereas the rights of all other litigants would be thereafter governed by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana quite different from ours. </s> Caught between the language of an old but uninterpreted statute and the pronouncement of the Attorney General of Louisiana, the district judge determined to solve his conscientious perplexity by directing utilization of the legal resources of Louisiana for a prompt ascertainment of meaning through the only tribunal whose interpretation could be controlling - the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The District Court was thus exercising a fair and well-considered judicial discretion in staying proceedings pending the institution of a declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the stay order of the District Court reinstated. We assume that both parties will cooperate in taking prompt [360 U.S. 25, 31] and effective steps to secure a declaratory judgment under the Louisiana Declaratory Judgment Act, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, Tit. 13, 4231-4246, and a review of that judgment by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. By retaining the case the District Court, of course, reserves power to take such steps as may be necessary for the just disposition of the litigation should anything prevent a prompt state court determination. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In the petition for certiorari there was also raised the question of the appealability of the District Court's order. In our grant of the writ we eliminated this question by limiting the scope of review. 358 U.S. 893 . </s> [Footnote 2 The issue in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 , is, of course, decisively different from the issue now before the Court. Here the issue is whether an experienced district judge, especially conversant with Louisiana law, who, when troubled with the construction which Louisiana courts may give to a Louisiana statute, himself initiates the taking of appropriate measures for securing construction of this doubtful and unsettled statute (and not at all in response to any alleged attempt by petitioner to delay a decision by that judge), should be jurisdictionally disabled from seeking the controlling light of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The issue in Winter Haven was not that. It was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court. At the very outset of his opinion Mr. Chief Justice Stone stated this issue: </s> "The question is whether the Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal from the judgment of the District Court, rightly declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that decision of the case on the merits turned on questions of Florida constitutional and statutory law which the decisions of the Florida courts had left in a state of uncertainty." 320 U.S., at 229 . </s> In Winter Haven the Court of Appeals directed the action to be dismissed. In this case the Court of Appeals denied a conscientious exercise by the federal district judge of his discretionary power merely to stay disposition of a retained case until he could get controlling light from the state court. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. </s> In a conscientious effort to do justice the District Court deferred immediate adjudication of this controversy pending authoritative clarification of a controlling state statute of highly doubtful meaning. Under the circumstances presented, I think the course pursued was clearly within the District Court's allowable discretion. For that reason I concur in the judgment. </s> This case is totally unlike County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co., decided today, post, p. 185, except for the coincidence that both cases involve eminent domain proceedings. In Mashuda the Court holds that it was error for the District Court to dismiss the complaint. The Court further holds in that case that, since the controlling state law is clear and only factual issues need be resolved, there is no occasion in the interest of justice to refrain from prompt adjudication. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. </s> Until today, the standards for testing this order of the District Court sending the parties to this diversity action to a state court for decision of a state law question might have been said to have been reasonably consistent with the imperative duty of a District Court, imposed by Congress under 28 U.S.C. 1332 and 1441, to render [360 U.S. 25, 32] prompt justice in cases between citizens of different States. To order these suitors out of the federal court and into a state court in the circumstances of this case passes beyond disrespect for the diversity jurisdiction to plain disregard of this imperative duty. The doctrine of abstention, in proper perspective, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to this duty, and abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve one of two important countervailing interests: either the avoidance of a premature and perhaps unnecessary decision of a serious federal constitutional question, or the avoidance of the hazard of unsettling some delicate balance in the area of federal-state relationships. </s> These exceptional circumstances provided until now a very narrow corridor through which a District Court could escape from its obligation to decide state law questions when federal jurisdiction was properly invoked. The doctrine of abstention originated in the area of the federal courts' duty to avoid, if possible, decision of a federal constitutional question. This was Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 . There this Court held that the District Court should have stayed its hand while state issues were resolved in a state court when an injunction was sought to restrain the enforcement of the order of a state administrative body on the ground that the order was not authorized by the state law and was violative of the Federal Constitution. The Court reasoned that if the state courts held that the order was not authorized under state law there could be avoided "the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication." 312 U.S., at 500 . Numerous decisions since then have sanctioned abstention from deciding cases involving a federal constitutional issue where a state court determination of state law might moot the issue or put the case in a [360 U.S. 25, 33] different posture. See, e. g., City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 ; Government Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 ; Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 ; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 ; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 ; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 ; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 ; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 ; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 . 1 Abstention has also been sanctioned on grounds of comity with the States - to avoid a result in "needless friction with state policies." Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 . Thus this Court has upheld an abstention when the exercise by the federal court of jurisdiction would disrupt a state administrative process, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 ; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 , interfere with the collection of state taxes, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 , or otherwise create needless friction by unnecessarily enjoining state officials from executing domestic policies, Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 ; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 . </s> But neither of the two recognized situations justifying abstention is present in the case before us. The suggestion that federal constitutional questions lurk in the background is so patently frivolous that neither the District Court, the Court of Appeals, nor this Court considers it to be worthy of even passing reference. The [360 U.S. 25, 34] Power and Light Company's only contention under the Federal Constitution is that the expropriation of its property would violate the Due Process and Impairment of the Obligation of Contract Clauses, even though just compensation is paid for it, because the property sought to be taken is operated by the company under a franchise granted by the Parish and confirmed by the City. This claim is utterly without substance. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 ; West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507. Certainly the avoidance of such a constitutional issue cannot justify a federal court's failure to exercise its jurisdiction. To hold the contrary would mean that a party could defeat his adversary's right to a federal adjudication simply by alleging a frivolous constitutional issue. Furthermore, no countervailing interest would be served by avoiding decision of such an issue. </s> The Court therefore turns the holding on the purported existence of the other situation justifying abstention, stating the bald conclusion that: "The considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts of state government or needless friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a federal court." But the fact of the matter is that this case does not involve the slightest hazard of friction with a State, the indispensable ingredient for upholding abstention on grounds of comity, and one which has been present in all of the prior cases in which abstention has been approved by this Court on that ground. First of all, unlike all prior cases in which abstention has been sanctioned on grounds of comity, the District Court has not been asked to grant injunctive relief which would prohibit state officials from acting. This case involves an [360 U.S. 25, 35] action at law, 2 initiated by the City and removed to the District Court under 28 U.S.C. 1441. Clearly decision of this case, in which the City itself is the party seeking an interpretation of its authority under state law, will not entail the friction in federal-state relations that would result from decision of a suit brought by another party to enjoin the City from acting. Secondly, this case does not involve the potential friction that results when a federal court applies paramount federal law to strike down state action. Aside from the patently frivolous constitutional question raised by the Power Company, the District Court in adjudicating this case would be applying state law precisely as would a state court. Far from disrupting state policy, the District Court would be applying state policy, as embodied in the state statute, to the facts of this case. There is no more possibility of conflict with the State in this situation than there is in the ordinary negligence or contract case in which a District Court applies state law under its diversity jurisdiction. A decision by the District Court in this case would not interfere with Louisiana administrative processes, prohibit the collection of state taxes, or otherwise frustrate the execution of state domestic policies. Quite the reverse, this action is part of the process which the City must follow in order to carry out the State's policy of expropriating private property for public uses. Finally, in this case the State of Louisiana, represented by its constituent organ the City of Thibodaux, urges the District Court to adjudicate the state law issue. How, conceivably, can the Court justify the abdication of responsibility to exercise jurisdiction on the ground of avoiding interference and conflict with the State when the State itself desires the federal court's adjudication? It is obvious that the abstention in this case was for the convenience of the District Court, not for [360 U.S. 25, 36] the State. The Court forgets, in upholding this abstention, that "The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience." Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 . </s> The Court of Appeals, in my view, correctly considered, in reversing the action of the District Court, that there is not shown a semblance of a countervailing interest which meets the standards permitting abstention. The standard utilized by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the District Court's order was not whether the district judge abused his discretion in staying the proceedings; rather it was whether he had any discretion to abstain from deciding this case in which the federal court's jurisdiction was properly invoked. This approach was correct in light of the teaching of all prior cases, which delimit the narrow area in which abstention is permissible and hold that jurisdiction must be exercised in all other situations. It would obviously wreak havoc with federal jurisdiction if the exercise of that jurisdiction was a matter for the ad hoc discretion of the District Court in each particular case. </s> Despite the complete absence of the necessary showing to justify abstention, the Court supports its holding simply by a reference to a dissenting opinion in which it was said "that eminent domain is a prerogative of the State." 3 Thus the Court attempts to carve out a new [360 U.S. 25, 37] area in which, even though an adjudication by the federal court would not require the decision of federal constitutional questions, nor create friction with the State, the federal courts are encouraged to abnegate their responsibilities in diversity cases. In doing so the Court very plainly has not made a responsible use of precedent. First of all, not only does the Court cite no cases where abstention has been approved in the absence of a showing of one of the only two countervailing interests heretofore required to justify abstention, but the Court ignores cases in which this Court has refused to refer state law questions to state courts even though that course required a federal constitutional decision which resulted in affirmative prohibitions against the State from carrying out sovereign activities. Surely eminent domain is no more mystically involved with "sovereign prerogative" than a city's power to license motor vehicles, Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 , a State's power to regulate fishing in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 , its power to regulate intrastate trucking rates, Public Utilities Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 , and a host of other governmental activities carried on by the States and their subdivisions which have been brought into question in the Federal District Courts without a prior state court determination of the relevant state law. Furthermore, the decision in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 , long recognized as a landmark in this field, is squarely contrary to today's holding. For there the petitioners sought in a Federal District Court an injunction prohibiting the City of Winter Haven from redeeming certain bonds without paying deferred interest charges on them. The only issues in the case were whether the City was authorized under the Florida Constitution and statutes to issue the bonds without a referendum, and, if the bonds were not validly issued, what recovery the bondholders were entitled to receive. Federal jurisdiction [360 U.S. 25, 38] was based solely on diversity of citizenship. Although there was present the obvious irritant to state-federal relations of a federal court injunction against City officials, which is not present in this case, this Court in Winter Haven held that it was incumbent on the Federal District Court to perform its duty and adjudicate the case. I am unable to see a distinction, so far as concerns non-interference with the exercise of state sovereignty, between decision as to the City of Winter Haven's authority under Florida's statutes and constitution to issue deferred-interest bonds without a referendum, and decision as to the City of Thibodaux's authority under Louisiana's statutes and constitution to expropriate the Power and Light Company's property. Since the Court suggests no adequate basis of distinction between the two cases, it should frankly announce that Meredith v. Winter Haven is overruled, for no other conclusion is reasonable. 4 </s> In the second place, the Court, in its opinion, omits mention of the host of cases, many in this Court, which [360 U.S. 25, 39] have approved the decision by a federal court of precisely the same kind of state eminent domain question which the District Court was asked by the City of Thibodaux to decide in this case. Years of experience in federal court adjudication of state eminent domain cases have conclusively demonstrated that this practice does not entail the hazard of friction in federal-state relations. See County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co., post, p. 185. The Court, despite the lesson taught by this experience and despite the fact that it is impossible to show any actual friction that might develop from a federal court adjudication in this case, rests its holding on a conclusive presumption that friction will develop because of "the special nature of eminent domain." This presumption is totally at war with the Court's holding today in County of Allegheny v. Mashuda Co., which orders a District Court to exercise its diversity jurisdiction even though such a course will require decision as to the power of a County under the state law of eminent domain to expropriate certain property. Thus the Court's decision is explicable to me for two other reasons, neither of which is articulated in the Court's opinion, probably because both are wholly untenable. </s> The first is that the only real issue of law in the case, the interpretation of Act 111, presents a difficult question of state law. It is true that there are no Louisiana decisions interpreting Act 111, and that there is a confusing opinion of the State's Attorney General on the question. But mere difficulty of construing the state statute is not justification for running away from the task. "Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404. Difficult questions of state law to which the federal courts cannot give definitive answers arise every day in federal courts [360 U.S. 25, 40] throughout the land. Chief Justice Stone, in his opinion for the Court in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 , settled that this difficulty can never justify a failure to exercise jurisdiction. The Chief Justice said: </s> "But we are of opinion that the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision. </s> "The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience. Its purpose was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity in such cases, at their option, to assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state courts. In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment. . . . When such exceptional circumstances are not present, denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act." 320 U.S., at 234 -235. </s> The cases are legion, since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , in which the federal courts have adjudicated diversity cases by deciding issues of state law, difficult and easy, without relevant state court decisions on the point in issue. And this Court has many times, often over dissents urging abstention, decided doubtful questions of state law when properly before us. Propper v. [360 U.S. 25, 41] Clark, 337 U.S. 472 ; Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 ; Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 ; Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 553 -554; Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 ; Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 270 U.S. 378 ; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 . </s> The second possible reason explaining the Court's holding is that it reflects a distaste for the diversity jurisdiction. But distaste for diversity jurisdiction certainly cannot be reason to license district judges to retreat from their responsibility. The roots of that jurisdiction are inextricably intertwined with the roots of our federal system. They stem from Art. III, 2 of the Constitution and the first Judiciary Act, the Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 5 I concede the liveliness of the controversy over the utility or desirability of diversity jurisdiction, but it has stubbornly outlasted the many and persistent attacks against it and the attempts in the Congress to curtail or eliminate it. 6 Until Congress speaks otherwise, the federal judiciary has no choice but conscientiously to render justice for litigants from different States entitled to have their controversies adjudicated in the federal courts. "Whether it is a sound theory, whether diversity jurisdiction is necessary or desirable in order to avoid possible unfairness by state courts, state judges and juries, against outsiders, whether the federal courts ought to be relieved of the burden of diversity litigation, - these are matters which are not my concern as a judge. They are the concern of those [360 U.S. 25, 42] whose business it is to legislate, not mine." Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 (dissenting opinion). </s> Not only has the Court departed from any precedential basis for its action, but the decision encourages inefficiency in administration of the federal courts and leads to unnecessary delay, waste and added expense for the parties. This is particularly the stark truth in the instant case. The City of Thibodaux brought this proceeding in a Louisiana court to expropriate lands of the Power and Light Company for public purposes. The Power and Light Company, a Florida corporation, removed the action to the District Court, as was its privilege under 28 U.S.C. 1441. The crucial issue in the case is whether Louisiana Act 111 of 1900 empowers the City to exercise the State's right of eminent domain. 7 Because the District Court rebuffed the City's plea to decide its authority under Act 111, and this Court sustains the District Court, the City must go back to the state court, not in the action originally [360 U.S. 25, 43] brought there by the City, but in a new action to be initiated under Louisiana's declaratory judgment law. The Power and Light Company, which escaped a state court decision by removing the City's action to the District Court, is now wholly content with the sua sponte action of the District Court. This is understandable since the longer decision is put off as to the City's power to expropriate its property, the longer the Power and Light Company will enjoy the possession of it. Resolution of the legal question of the City's authority, already delayed over two years due to no fault of the City, will be delayed, according to the City's estimate in its brief, a minimum of two additional years before a decision may be obtained from the State Supreme Court in the declaratory judgment action. Even if the City obtains a favorable decision, the City must suffer still further delay while the case comes back to the District Court for a decision upon the amount of damages to be paid the Power and Light Company. Thus at best the District Court will finally dispose of this case only after prolonged delay and considerable additional expense for the parties. Moreover, it is possible that the State Supreme Court will, for one reason or another, conclude that it will not render the parties this advisory opinion. All of this delay should have been avoided, and would have been, had the District Court performed what I think was its plain duty, and decided the question of the City's power when that question was ripe for decision a few months after the case was removed to the District Court. I think it is more than coincidence that both in this case and in Mashuda the party supporting abstention is the one presently in possession of the property in question. I cannot escape the conclusion in these cases that delay in the reaching of a decision is more important to those parties than the tribunal which ultimately renders the decision. The Court today upholds a procedure which encourages such delay [360 U.S. 25, 44] and prevents "that promptness of decision which in all judicial actions is one of the elements of justice." Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 513 . One must regret that this Court's departure from the long-settled criteria governing abstention should so richly fertilize the Power and Light Company's strategy of delay which now has succeeded, I dare say, past the fondest expectation of counsel who conceived it. It is especially unfortunate in that departure from these criteria fashions an opening wedge for District Courts to refer hard cases of state law to state courts in even the routine diversity negligence and contract actions. </s> I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 But when questions of state law are not cloudy the District Court should decide them, even though such a course necessitates decision of a federal constitutional issue. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 ; Public Utilities Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 ; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 . </s> [Footnote 2 Expropriation proceedings such as this one are recognized to be suits at law. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 376 . </s> [Footnote 3 Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 . The District Court did not rest its actions on this theory, but relied upon Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 , as authority for the stay order. That decision, which came down shortly before the District Court's order in this case, modified an order of the same district judge and provided for a reference to the Louisiana courts of a question of Louisiana law because the state court's interpretation of state law might well have mooted a federal constitutional issue or cast it in a different posture. The simple fact that there is no constitutional question of any substance to avoid in this case makes Leiter inapposite. </s> [Footnote 4 It is true that this Court in Meredith v. Winter Haven was reviewing an order dismissing federal jurisdiction, whereas the District Court order in this case retains jurisdiction pending the state court determination. However, it is significant that the Court in Winter Haven, rather than remanding the case with instructions that the District Court retain jurisdiction but abstain from deciding the state law issues, ordered the District Court to adjudicate those issues. It is perfectly clear that Winter Haven did not turn on any difference between an abstention and a dismissal, nor on the fact that it was a Court of Appeals rather than a District Court which initially decided to refrain from adjudicating the state issues. Neither did it turn on this Court's ideas about the competence or experience of the judges below. Meredith v. Winter Haven rested squarely on the Court's conclusion that, no matter how intimately related to a State's sovereignty a case is, the District Court must adjudicate it if jurisdiction is properly invoked and that adjudication would not entail decision of a serious constitutional question or disruption of state policy. </s> [Footnote 5 See, for a discussion of this subject, Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483; Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 869, 873-876; Frank, Historical Basis of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 22-28. </s> [Footnote 6 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 337 -338 (dissenting opinion); Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 893-894. </s> [Footnote 7 The Act, now 101 of Part III of Title 19 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, provides in pertinent part: </s> "Any municipal corporation of Louisiana may expropriate any electric light, gas, or waterworks plant or property whenever such a course is thought necessary for the public interest by the mayor and council of the municipality. When the municipal council cannot agree with the owner thereof for its purchase, the municipal corporation through the proper officers may petition the judge of the district court in which the property is situated, describing the property necessary for the municipal purpose, with a detailed statement of the buildings, machinery, appurtenances, fixtures, improvements, mains, pipes, sewers, wires, lights, poles and property of every kind, connected therewith, and praying that the property described be adjudged to the municipality upon payment to the owner of the value of the property plus all damages sustained in consequence of the expropriation. Where the same person is the owner of both gas, electric light, and water works plants, or of more than one of any one kind of plant, the municipal corporation may not expropriate any one of the plants without expropriating all of the plants owned by the same person." </s> [360 U.S. 25, 45]

United States Supreme Court GOOSBY v. OSSER(1973) No. 71-6316 Argued: Decided: January 17, 1973 </s> Philadelphia County prisoners unable to make bail or being held on nonbailable offenses brought this class action, asserting the unconstitutionality of Pennsylvania Election Code provisions denying them the right to vote. When the Commonwealth (but not the municipal) officials who were named as defendants conceded the Code provisions' unconstitutionality, the District Judge (deeming the Commonwealth officials the principal defendants) ruled the case nonjusticiable as not involving an Art. III case or controversy, and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, though differing as to justiciability, affirmed on the ground that petitioners' constitutional claims were wholly insubstantial under McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 , and ruled that a three-judge district court was therefore not required under 28 U.S.C. 2281. Held: </s> 1. The Commonwealth officials' concession did not foreclose the existence of an Art. III case or controversy since the municipal officials continue to assert the right to enforce the challenged Code provisions. Pp. 516-517. </s> 2. McDonald, supra, unlike the situation alleged here, did not deal with an absolute prohibition against voting by the prisoners there involved, and that decision does not "foreclose the subject" of petitioners' challenge to the Pennsylvania statutory scheme. The case may, if appropriate, therefore be heard by a three-judge district court. Pp. 518-523. </s> 452 F.2d 39, reversed and remanded. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Ann S. Torregrossa argued the cause for petitioners pro hac vice. With her on the briefs was Elliot B. Platt. </s> Peter W. Brown, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [409 U.S. 512, 513] et al. With him on the brief were J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Oravetz and Edward J. Weintraub, Deputy Attorneys General. John Mattioni argued the cause and filed a brief for municipal respondents. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jack Greenberg and Stanley A. Bass for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al., and by Samuel Rabinove, Michael von Moschzisker, Wilbur Bourne Ruthrauff, A. Harry Levitan, and Carolyn Temin for the American Jewish Committee et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question is whether 28 U.S.C. 2281 1 required the convening of a three-judge court in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to hear this case. It is a class action brought by and on behalf of persons awaiting trial and confined in Philadelphia County prisons because either unable to afford bail or because charged with nonbailable offenses. The complaint alleges that provisions of the Pennsylvania Election Code, in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, absolutely deny petitioners' class the right to vote in [409 U.S. 512, 514] that they neither permit members of the class to leave prison to register and vote, nor provide facilities for the purpose at the prisons, and in that they expressly prohibit persons "confined in penal institutions" from voting by absentee ballot. 2 The complaint names as defendants two Commonwealth officials, the Attorney General and Secretary of State of Pennsylvania, and certain municipal officials of the Country and City of Philadelphia: the City Commissioners of Philadelphia who constitute the Board of Elections and Registration Commission of the City and Country of Philadelphia, the Voting Registration Supervisor for the City and Country, and the Superintendent of Prisons for the Country. </s> On oral argument before a single judge on petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order, the Commonwealth officials appeared by a Deputy Attorney General, who conceded that the challenged provisions of the Election Code, as applied to petitioners' class, were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The municipal officials, on the other hand, vigorously defended the constitutionality of the provisions as so applied. The single judge deemed the contrary view of the municipal officials to be irrelevant, as he regarded the Commonwealth officials to be the "principal defendants." See [409 U.S. 512, 515] n. 3, infra. He therefore ruled that the concession on behalf of the Commonwealth officials meant there was no case or controversy before the court as required by Art. III of the Constitution, and dismissed the complaint. 3 On petitioners' appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 452 F.2d 39 (1971). We do not, however, read the per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals as resting the affirmance on agreement with the single judge that the concession of the Commonwealth officials meant there was no case or controversy before the court. Rather, we read the per curiam opinion as either implying disagreement with the single judge on that question, or as at least assuming that a case or controversy existed, for the opinion states that, in the view of the Court of Appeals, petitioners' constitutional claims were wholly insubstantial under McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), in which circumstance, [409 U.S. 512, 516] the Court of Appeals held, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), was authority that 28 U.S.C. 2281 did not require the assembly of a three-judge court and that dismissal by the single judge was therefore proper, 452 F.2d, at 40. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, three judges dissenting. We granted certiorari, 408 U.S. 922 (1972). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with direction to enter an appropriate order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281 for the convening of a three-judge court to hear this case. </s> I </s> The single judge clearly erred in holding that the concession of the Commonwealth officials foreclosed the existence of a case or controversy. All parties are in accord that Pennsylvania law did not oblige the municipal officials to defer to the concession of the Commonwealth officials, or otherwise give the Commonwealth officials a special status as "principal defendants." 4 Indeed, the brief filed in this Court by the Commonwealth officials forthrightly argues that "[t]he District Court made an egregious error. The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Commonwealth are not the only defendants in this case. The City Commissioners of Philadelphia, the Voting Registration Supervisor, the Registration Commission, and the Superintendent of Prisons for Philadelphia Country are also parties. These parties have contested vigorously the issues raised by petitioners both in the District Court and on appeal. [409 U.S. 512, 517] They have provided adversity of interest, and will sharply define the issues, to the extent they are not already clear." Brief for Respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. 4-5. 5 </s> Thus, there is satisfied the requisite of Art. III that "[t]he constitutional question . . . be presented in the context of a specific live grievance." Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110 (1969). As between petitioners and the municipal officials, the District Court was "called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies," Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885), and "the interests of [petitioners' class] require the use of . . . judicial authority for [petitioners'] protection against actual interference." United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947). Since the municipal officials persist in their asserted right to enforce the challenged provisions of the Election Code, there is a "real and substantial controversy" "touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests," Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 -241 (1937), in which circumstance the concession of the Commonwealth officials could not have the effect of dissipating the existence of a case or controversy. Cf. In re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U.S. 90, 107 -108 (1908). [409 U.S. 512, 518] </s> II </s> The Court of Appeals also erred. We disagree with its holding that McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, supra, rendered petitioners' constitutional claims wholly insubstantial. </s> Title 28 U.S.C. 2281 does not require the convening of a three-judge court when the constitutional attack upon the state statutes is insubstantial. "Constitutional insubstantiality" for this purpose has been equated with such concepts as "essentially fictitious," Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S., at 33 ; "wholly insubstantial," ibid.; "obviously frivolous," Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910); and "obviously without merit," Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933). The limiting words "wholly" and "obviously" have cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2281. A claim is insubstantial only if "`its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.'" Ex parte Poresky, supra, at 32, quoting from Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, supra, at 288; see also Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 -106 (1933); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70, 80 (1909). Under this test, it is clear that McDonald is not a prior decision of this Court that "foreclose[s] the subject" of petitioners' constitutional attack upon the Pennsylvania statutory scheme; it is demonstrably not a decision that [409 U.S. 512, 519] "leave[s] no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised [by petitioners] can be the subject of controversy." </s> In McDonald, appellants were a class of pretrial detainees in Cook Country, Illinois, already registered to vote, who sought to vote only by absentee ballot. Their timely applications to the Cook Country Board of Election Commissioners for absentee ballots were denied on the ground that pretrial detainees were not included among those persons specifically permitted by the Illinois Election Code to vote by absentee ballot. Appellants brought suit alleging that in that circumstance the Illinois Election Code denied them equal protection of the laws, particularly as the Code provided absentee ballots for those "medically incapacitated," and for pretrial detainees who were residents of Cook Country but incarcerated outside of Cook Country. 6 </s> The threshold question presented in McDonald was "how stringent a standard to use in evaluating the classifications made [by the Illinois absentee ballot provisions] and whether the distinctions must be justified by a compelling state interest . . . ." 394 U.S., at 806 . In resolving this question, the Court analyzed the Illinois scheme in light of our decisions that required the application of the more stringent compelling state interest test when either a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, was allegedly infringed, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, [409 U.S. 512, 520] 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), or when the statutory classifications were drawn on the basis of suspect criteria, such as wealth or race, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 394 U.S., at 807 . Our analysis led us to conclude that neither situation was presented by the Illinois absentee voting provisions. We held that "the distinctions made by Illinois' absentee provisions are not drawn on the basis of wealth or race," ibid., and, with respect to the alleged infringement of appellants' right to vote, that: </s> "[T]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote. It is thus not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive absentee ballots. Despite appellants' claim to the contrary, the absentee statutes, which are designed to make voting more available to some groups who cannot easily get to the polls, do not themselves deny appellants the exercise of the franchise; not, indeed, does Illinois' Election Code so operate as a whole, for the State's statutes specifically disenfranchise only those who have been convicted and sentenced, and not those similarly situated to appellants. [Citation omitted.] Faced as we are with a constitutional question, we cannot lightly assume, with nothing in the record to support such an assumption, that Illinois has in fact precluded appellants from voting." Id., at 807-808. (Emphasis supplied.) </s> For all that appeared, Illinois might make the franchise available by other means: </s> "Appellants agree that the record is barren of any indication that the State might not, for instance, [409 U.S. 512, 521] possibly furnish the jails with special polling booths or facilities on election day, or provide guarded transportation to the polls themselves for certain inmates, or entertain motions for temporary reductions in bail to allow some inmates to get to the polls on their own." Id., at 808 n. 6. </s> Thus, "[s]ince there is nothing in the record to show that appellants are in fact absolutely prohibited from voting by the State . . ." id., at 808 n. 7, we concluded that the Illinois absentee ballot provisions were to be tested by the "more traditional standards for evaluating . . . equal protection claims," id., at 808, and that under those standards the provisions could not be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable, particularly since "there is nothing to show that a judicially incapacitated, pretrial detainee is absolutely prohibited from exercising the franchise." Id., at 809. </s> Petitioners' constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania scheme are in sharp contrast. Petitioners allege 7 that, unlike the appellants in McDonald, the Pennsylvania statutory scheme absolutely prohibits them from voting, both because a specific provision affirmatively excludes "persons confined in a penal institution" from voting by absentee ballot, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, 2602 (w) [409 U.S. 512, 522] (12) (Supp. 1972-1973), and because requests by members of petitioners' class to register and to vote either by absentee ballot, or by personal or proxy appearance at polling places outside the prison, or at polling booths and registration facilities set up at the prisons, or generally by any means satisfactory to the election officials, had been denied. Thus, petitioners' complaint alleges a situation that McDonald itself suggested might make a different case. </s> This is not to say, of course, that petitioners are as a matter of law entitled to the relief sought. We neither decide nor intimate any view upon the merits. 8 It suffices that we hold that McDonald does not "foreclose the subject" of petitioners' challenge to the Pennsylvania statutory scheme. The significant differences between that scheme and the Illinois scheme leave ample "room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised [by petitioners] can be the subject of controversy." See supra, at 518, 519. </s> We therefore conclude that this case must be "heard and determined by a district court of three judges . . . ." 28 U.S.C. 2281. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed and the case is remanded with direction to enter an appropriate order pursuant to that section for the convening of a three-judge court to hear and determine the merits of petitioners' constitutional claims, see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 153 (1963); Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. [409 U.S. 512, 523] Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962); Borden Co. v. Liddy, 309 F.2d 871, 876 (CA8 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963); Riss & Co. v. Hoch, 99 F.2d 553, 555 (CA10 1938); see also C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 190-191 (2d ed. 1970), or, if deemed appropriate, to abstain from such determination pending state court proceedings. See Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 -513 (1972). </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Title 28 U.S.C. 2281 provides: </s> "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefore is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title." </s> [Footnote 2 Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 25, 623-1 et seq. (1963 and Supp. 1972-1973); 2602 (w) (12) (Supp. 1972-1973). Several elections, including the 1972 presidential election, have been held since this action was filed, but this does not render the case moot. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). Similarly, the case is not rendered moot because some of the named petitioners have lost their status as class members by being released on bail, discharged, acquitted, or convicted. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 803 n. 1 (1969); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 327 (MD Ala. 1966). </s> [Footnote 3 The unpublished transcript of the oral opinion of the single judge reads in pertinent part as follows: </s> "It has been stated that no Federal Court has jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of the State or of the United States void because irreconcilable with the Constitution except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. </s> "Now, in the instant case the Attorney General, as the chief legal officer of the Commonwealth, obviously represents, as Counsel have stated in their arguments this morning, the `principal' Defendant or Defendants. The position taken by the remaining Defendants seems to be the result of the fact that the Attorney General has not, in accordance with his past practice, rendered an opinion together with suggested procedures, plans, etc., covering the subject matter of the opinion. </s> "It is, therefore, our conclusion that in the posture of this case as it presently exists . . . there is no controversy in the sense in which that term is used by the Courts, and we find ourselves compelled to, therefore, dismiss the complaint. It is so ordered." App. 85. </s> [Footnote 4 Thus, this is not a situation in which a State confesses error and represents that the error will be corrected without need for further court action. See, e. g., Titmus v. Tinsley, 370 U.S. 964 (1962); McKissick v. Durham City Board of Education, 176 F. Supp. 3 (MDNC 1959); Jeffers v. Whitley, 197 F. Supp. 84 (MDNC 1961); Kelley v. Board of Education, 139 F. Supp. 578 (MD Tenn. 1956). </s> [Footnote 5 We also read respondents' brief as rejecting the view of the single judge that the municipal officials must defer to the commonwealth officials' concession pending the issuance of a formal opinion of the Attorney General on the question of the constitutionality of the statutes. </s> Insofar as the single judge may have rested his finding of the absence of a case or controversy on the alleged difficulty of formulating a remedy, he also erred. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). </s> [Footnote 6 The Illinois absentee voting statute, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46 19-1 to 19-3 (1971), made absentee voting available to four classes of persons: (1) those who were absent from their county of residence for any reason; (2) those who were "physically incapacitated"; (3) those whose observance of a religious holiday prevented attendance at the polls; and (4) those who served as poll watchers in precincts other than their own on election day. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, supra, at 803-804. </s> [Footnote 7 "The existence of a substantial question of constitutionality must be determined by the allegations of the bill of complaint." Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933). In the present procedural posture of petitioners' case, the allegations of their complaint must be deemed to be true. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 373 (1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). In addition to the allegations that they are absolutely prohibited from voting, petitioners allege that the Pennsylvania statute creates classifications based on wealth and race, that the denial of the right to vote is an impermissible consequence of pretrial detention in violation of due process of law, and that the Pennsylvania statute's specific exclusion of pretrial detainees from the definition of a "qualified absentee voter" is unconstitutional even under the less stringent rational relationship test applied in McDonald. </s> [Footnote 8 The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals states: "We have carefully considered each of the contentions raised by the [petitioners] and find them to be without merit." 452 F.2d 39, 41. In view of the result we reach, the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to render this holding insofar as it implies an adjudication of the merits of petitioners' constitutional contentions. Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 282 U.S. 10 (1930). C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 193 (2d ed. 1970). </s> [409 U.S. 512, 524]

United States Supreme Court SIPUEL V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF OKL.(1948) No. 369 Argued: Decided: January 12, 1948 </s> [ Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Okl. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) ] </s> [332 U.S. 631 , 632] </s> Messrs. Thurgood Marshall, of New York City, and Amos Hall, of Tulsa, Okl., for petitioner. Messrs. Fred Hansen, of Oklahoma City, Okl., and Maurice H. Merrill, of Norman, Okl., for respondents. </s> PER CURIAM. On January 14, 1946, the petitioner, a Negro, concededly qualified to receive the professional legal education offered by the State, applied for admission to the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma, the only institution for legal education supported and maintained by the taxpayers of the State of Oklahoma. Petitioner's application for admission was denied, solely because of her color. Petitioner then made application for a writ of mandamus in the District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma. The writ of mandamus was refused, and the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Okl. Sup., 180 P.2d 135. We brought the case here for review. The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution. To this time, it has been denied her although during the same period many </s> [332 U.S. 631 , 633] </s> white applicants have been afforded legal education by the State. The State must provide it for her in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938, 305 U.S. 337 . The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The mandate shall issue forthwith. Reversed. LEE v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

United States Supreme Court BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD.(1994) No. 92-1384 Argued: March 28, 1994Decided: June 20, 1994 </s> [Footnote * Page I Together with No. 92-1839, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> During the years at issue in these consolidated cases, California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine the corporate franchise tax owed by members of unitary multinational corporate groups doing business in California. California's method first looked to the worldwide income of the unitary business, and then taxed a percentage of that income equal to the average of the proportions of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located within California. In contrast, the Federal Government employs a "separate accounting" method, which treats each corporate entity discretely for the purpose of determining income tax liability. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 , this Court upheld the California scheme as applied to domestic-based multinationals, but did not address the constitutionality of the scheme as applied to domestic corporations with foreign parents or to foreign corporations with foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries. Both petitioner Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays) - a foreign multinational - and petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Colgate) - a domestic multinational - have operations in California. In separate cases, two members of the Barclays group and Colgate were denied refunds by the California authorities. </s> Held: </s> The Constitution does not impede application of California's tax to Barclays and Colgate. Pp. 10-33. Page II </s> (a) Absent congressional approval, a state tax on interstate or foreign commerce will not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax (1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly related to the services the State provides. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 . A tax affecting foreign commerce raises two additional concerns: one prompted by the "enhanced risk of multiple taxation," Container Corp., supra, at 185, and the other related to the Federal Government's capacity to "`speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments,'" Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 . California's tax easily meets all but the third of the Complete Auto criteria. As to the third, Barclays has not shown that the system in fact operates to impose inordinate compliance burdens on foreign enterprises, and its claim of unconstitutional discrimination against foreign commerce thus fails. Pp. 10-15. </s> (b) Nor has Barclays shown that California's "reasonable approximations" method of reducing the compliance burden is incompatible with due process. Barclays argues that California employs no standard to determine what approximations will be accepted, but Barclays has presented no example of an approximation California rejected as unreasonable. Furthermore, the state judiciary has construed California law to curtail the discretion of state tax officials, and the State has afforded Barclays the opportunity to seek clarification of the meaning of the relevant regulations. Rules governing international multijurisdictional income allocation have an inescapable imprecision given the subject matter's complexity, and rules against vagueness are not mechanically applied; rather, their application is tied to the nature of the enactment. Pp. 15-17. </s> (c) California's system does not expose foreign multinationals, such as Barclays, to constitutionally intolerable multiple taxation. In the face of a similar challenge, Container Corp. approved this very tax when applied to a domestic-based multinational. The considerations that informed the Container Corp. decision are not dispositively diminished when the tax is applied to a foreign-based enterprise. Multiple taxation is not the inevitable result of California's tax, and the alternative reasonably available to the State - separate accounting - cannot eliminate, and in some cases may even enhance, the risk of double taxation. Pp. 17-21. </s> (d) California's scheme also does not prevent the Federal Government from speaking with "one voice" in international trade. Page III Congress holds the control rein in this area. In the 11 years since Container Corp., Congress has not barred States from using the worldwide combined reporting method. In the past three decades, aware that foreign governments deplored use of the method, Congress nevertheless failed to enact any of numerous bills, or to ratify a treaty provision, that would have prohibited the practice. Executive Branch actions, statements, and amicus filings do not supply the requisite federal directive proscribing States' use of worldwide combined reporting, for the regulatory authority is Congress' to wield. Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned scheme. Pp. 21-32. </s> No. 92-1384, 10 Cal.App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, and No. 92-1839, 10 Cal.App. 4th 1768, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 761, affirmed. </s> GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and BLACKMUN, STEVENS, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV-B of which SCALIA, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Eleven years ago, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), this Court upheld California's income-based corporate franchise tax, as applied to a multinational enterprise, against a comprehensive challenge made under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Container Corp. involved a corporate taxpayer domiciled and headquartered in the United States; in addition to its stateside components, the taxpayer had a number of overseas subsidiaries incorporated in the countries in which they operated. The Court's decision in Container Corp. did not address the constitutionality of California's taxing scheme as applied to "domestic corporations with foreign parents or [to] foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." Id., at 189, n. 26. In the consolidated cases before us, we return to the taxing scheme earlier considered in Container Corp. and resolve matters left open in that case. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> The petitioner in No. 92-1384, Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays), is a United Kingdom corporation in the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. The petitioner in No. 92-1839, Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Colgate), is the United States-based parent of a multinational manufacturing and sales enterprise. Each enterprise has operations in California. During the years here at issue, California determined the state corporate franchise tax due for these operations under a method known as "worldwide combined reporting." California's scheme first looked to the worldwide income of the multinational enterprise, and then attributed a portion of that income (equal to the average of the proportions of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located in California) to the California operations. The State imposed its tax on the income thus attributed to Barclays' and Colgate's California business. </s> Barclays urges that California's tax system distinctively burdens foreign-based multinationals and results in double international taxation, in violation of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Both Barclays and Colgate contend that the scheme offends the Commerce Clause by frustrating the Federal Government's ability to "speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). We reject these arguments, and hold that the Constitution does not impede application of California's corporate franchise tax to Barclays and Colgate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the California Court of Appeal. </s> I </s> A </s> The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, this Court has held, prevent States that impose an income-based tax on nonresidents from </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> "tax[ing] value earned outside [the taxing State's] borders." ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). But when a business enterprise operates in more than one taxing jurisdiction, arriving at "precise territorial allocations of `value' is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice." Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 164 . Every method of allocation devised involves some degree of arbitrariness. See id., at 182. </s> One means of deriving locally taxable income, generally used by States that collect corporate income-based taxes, is the "unitary business" method. As explained in Container Corp., unitary taxation "rejects geographical or transactional accounting," which is "subject to manipulation" and does not fully capture "the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single enterprise." Id., at 164-165. The "unitary business/formula apportionment" method </s> "calculates the local tax base by first defining the scope of the "unitary business" of which the taxed enterprise's activities in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then apportioning the total income of that "unitary business" between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world on the basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the corporation's activities within and without the jurisdiction." Id., at 165. 1 </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> During the income years at issue in these cases - 1977 for Barclays, 1970-1973 for Colgate - California assessed its corporate franchise tax by employing a "worldwide combined reporting" method. California's scheme required the taxpayer to aggregate the income of all corporate entities composing the unitary business enterprise, including in the aggregation both affiliates operating abroad and those operating within the United States. Having defined the scope of the "unitary business" thus broadly, California used a long-accepted method of apportionment, commonly called the "three-factor" formula, to arrive at the amount of income attributable to the operations of the enterprise in California. Under the three-factor formula, California taxed a percentage of worldwide income equal to the arithmetic average of the proportions of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the State. Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. 25128 (West 1992). Thus, if a unitary business had 8% of its payroll, 3% of its property, and 4% of its sales in California, the State took the average - 5% - and imposed its tax on that percentage of the business' total income. 2 </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> B </s> The corporate income tax imposed by the United States employs a "separate accounting" method, a means of apportioning income among taxing sovereigns used by all major developed nations. In contrast to combined reporting, separate accounting treats each corporate entity discretely for the purpose of determining income tax liability. 3 </s> Separate accounting poses the risk that a conglomerate will manipulate transfers of value among its components to minimize its total tax liability. To guard against such manipulation, transactions between affiliated corporations must be scrutinized to ensure that they are reported on an "arm's length" basis, i.e., at a price reflecting their true market value. See 26 U.S.C. 482; Treas.Reg. 1.482-1T(b), 26 CFR 1.482-1T(b) (1993). 4 Assuming that all transactions are assigned their arm's length values in the corporate accounts, a jurisdiction using separate accounting taxes corporations that operate within its borders only on the income those corporations recognize on their own books. See Container Corp., supra, at 185. 5 </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> At one time, a number of States used worldwide combined reporting, as California did during the years at issue. In recent years, such States, including California, have modified their systems at least to allow corporate election of some variant of an approach that confines combined reporting to the United States' "water's edge." See 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra, n. 1, § 8.16, pp. 8-185 to 8-187. California's 1986 modification of its corporate franchise tax, effective in 1988, 1986 Cal. Stats., ch. 660, 6, made it nearly the last State to give way. 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra n. 1, § 8.16, p. 8-187. </s> California corporate taxpayers, under the State's water's edge alternative, may elect to limit their combined reporting group to corporations in the unitary business whose individual presence in the United States surpasses a certain threshold. Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. 25110 (West 1992); see Leegstra, Eager, & Stolte, The California Water's-Edge Election, 6 J. of St.Tax. 195 (1987) (explaining operation of California's water's edge system). The 1986 amendment conditioned a corporate group's water's edge election on payment of a substantial fee, and allowed the California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) to disregard a water's edge election under certain circumstances. In 1993, California again modified its corporate franchise tax statute, this time to allow domestic and foreign enterprises to elect water's edge treatment without payment of a fee and without the threat of disregard. 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 31, 53; 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 881, 22. See Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. 25110 (West Supp. 1994). The new amendments became effective in January, 1994. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> C </s> The first of these consolidated cases, No. 92-1384, is a tax refund suit brought by two members of the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. Based in the United Kingdom, the Barclays Group includes more than 220 corporations doing business in some 60 nations. The two refund-seeking members of the Barclays corporate family did business in California, and were therefore subject to California's franchise tax. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal), one of the two taxpayers, was a California banking corporation wholly owned by Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI), the second taxpayer. BBI, a United Kingdom corporation, did business in the United Kingdom and in more than 33 other nations and territories. </s> In computing its California franchise tax based on 1977 income, Barcal reported only the income from its own operations. BBI reported income on the assumption that it participated in a unitary business composed of itself and its subsidiaries, but not its parent corporation and the parent's other subsidiaries. After auditing BBI's and Barcal's 1977 income year franchise tax returns, the Tax Board, respondent here, determined that both were part of a worldwide unitary business, the Barclays Group. Ultimately, the Board assessed additional tax liability of $1,678 for BBI and $152,420 for Barcal. 6 </s> Barcal and BBI paid the assessments and sued for refunds. They prevailed in California's lower courts, but were unsuccessful in California's Supreme Court. The </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> California Supreme Court held that the tax did not impair the Federal Government's ability to "speak with one voice" in regulating foreign commerce, see Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S., at 449 , and therefore did not violate the Commerce Clause. Having so concluded, the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further development of Barclays' claim that the compliance burden on foreign-based multinationals imposed by California's tax violated both the Due Process Clause and the nondiscrimination requirement of the Commerce Clause. Barclay's Bank Int'l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal.4th 708, 829 P.2d 279, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___ (1992). On remand, the Court of Appeal decided the compliance burden issues against Barclays, 10 Cal.App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 537 (3d Dist. 1992), and the California Supreme Court denied further review. The case is therefore before us on writ of certiorari to the California Court of Appeal. 510 U.S. ___ (1993). Barclays has conceded, for purposes of this litigation, that the entire Barclays Group formed a worldwide unitary business in 1977. 7 </s> The petitioner in No. 93-1839, Colgate-Palmolive Co., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York. Colgate and its subsidiaries doing business in the United States engaged principally in the manufacture and distribution of household and personal hygiene products. In addition, Colgate owned some 75 corporations that operated entirely outside the United States; these foreign subsidiaries also engaged primarily in the manufacture and distribution of household and personal hygiene products. When Colgate filed California franchise </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> tax returns based on 1970-1973 income, it reported the income earned from its foreign operations on a separate accounting basis. Essentially, Colgate maintained that the Constitution compelled California to limit the reach of its unitary principle to the United States' water's edge. See supra, at 6. The Tax Board determined that Colgate's taxes should be computed on the basis of worldwide combined reporting, and assessed a 4-year deficiency of $604,765. 8 Colgate paid the tax and sued for a refund. </s> Colgate prevailed in the California Superior Court, which found that the Federal Government had condemned worldwide combined reporting as impermissibly intrusive upon the Nation's ability uniformly to regulate foreign commercial relations. No. 319715 (Super.Ct. Sacramento County, Apr. 19, 1989) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92-1839, pp. 88a-102a). The Court </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> of Appeal reversed, concluding that evidence of the federal Executive's opposition to the tax was insufficient. 4 Cal.App. 4th 1681, 1700-1712, 284 Cal.Rptr. 780, 792-800 (3d Dist. 1991). The California Supreme Court returned the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions "to vacate its decision and to refile the opinion after modification in light of" that Court's decision in Barclays. ___ Cal.4th ___, 831 P.2d 798 (1992). In its second decision, the Court of Appeal again ruled against Colgate. 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 761 (3d Dist. 1992). The California Supreme Court denied further review, and the case is before us on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal. 510 U.S. ___ (1993). Like Barclays, Colgate concedes, for purposes of this litigation, that during the years in question, its business, worldwide, was unitary. </s> II </s> The Commerce Clause expressly gives Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. It has long been understood, as well, to provide "protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not acted. . . ." Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945); see also South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938) (Commerce Clause, "by its own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce"). 9 The Clause does not shield interstate (or foreign) commerce from its "fair share of the state tax burden." Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978). Absent congressional approval, however, a state tax on such commerce will not survive Commerce Clause </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> scrutiny if the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax either (1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly related to the services provided by the State. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). </s> In "the unique context of foreign commerce," a State's power is further constrained because of "the special need for federal uniformity." Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). "`In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade, the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.'" Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979), quoting Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933). A tax affecting foreign commerce therefore raises two concerns in addition to the four delineated in Complete Auto. The first is prompted by "the enhanced risk of multiple taxation." Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 185 . The second relates to the Federal Government's capacity to "`speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.'" Japan Line, 441 U.S., at 449 , quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976). </s> California's worldwide combined reporting system easily meets three of the four Complete Auto criteria. The nexus requirement is met by the business all three taxpayers - Barcal, BBI, and Colgate - did in California during the years in question. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 436 -437 (1980). 10 The "fair apportionment" standard is also </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> satisfied. Neither Barclays nor Colgate has demonstrated the lack of a "rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise," Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 180 -181 (internal quotation marks omitted); nor have the petitioners shown that the income attributed to California is "out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the [taxpayers] in that State." Id., at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). We note in this regard that, "if applied by every jurisdiction," California's method "would result in no more than all of </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> the unitary business' income being taxed." Id., at 169. And surely California has afforded Colgate and the Barclays taxpayers "protection, opportunities and benefits" for which the State can exact a return. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); see ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S., at 315 . </s> Barclays (but not Colgate) vigorously contends, however, that California's worldwide combined reporting scheme violates the anti-discrimination component of the Complete Auto test. Barclays maintains that a foreign owner of a taxpayer filing a California tax return "is forced to convert its diverse financial and accounting records from around the world into the language, currency, and accounting principles of the United States" at "prohibitive" expense. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 44. 11 Domestic-owned taxpayers, by contrast, need not incur such expense, because they "already keep most of their records in English, in United States currency, and in accord with United States accounting principles." Id., at 45. Barclays urges that imposing this "prohibitive administrative burden," id., at 43, on foreign-owned enterprises gives a competitive advantage to their U.S.-owned counterparts and constitutes "economic protectionism" of the kind this Court has often condemned. Id., at 43-46. </s> Compliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on out-of-jurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be inconsonant </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> with the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 -351 (1977) (increased costs imposed by North Carolina statute on out-of-state apple producers "would tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of Washington apple growers," thereby discriminating against those growers). The factual predicate of Barclays' discrimination claim, however, is infirm. </s> Barclays points to provisions of California's implementing regulations setting out three discrete means for a taxpayer to fulfill its franchise tax reporting requirements. Each of these modes of compliance would require Barclays to gather and present much information not maintained by the unitary group in the ordinary course of business. 12 California's regulations, however, also provide that the Tax Board "shall consider the effort and expense required to obtain the necessary information" and, in "appropriate cases, such as when the necessary data cannot be developed from financial records maintained in the regular course of business," may accept "reasonable approximations." Cal.Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137-6(e)(1) (1985). As the Court of Appeal comprehended, in determining Barclays' 1977 worldwide income, Barclays and the Tax Board "used these [latter] provisions and [made] computations based on reasonable approximations," 10 Cal.App. 4th 1742, </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 15] </s> 1756, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 545 (3d Dist. 1992), thus allowing Barclays to avoid the large compliance costs of which it complains. 13 Barclays has not shown that California's provision for "reasonable approximations" systematically "overtaxes" foreign corporations generally or BBI or Barcal in particular. </s> In sum, Barclays has not demonstrated that California's tax system in fact operates to impose inordinate compliance burdens on foreign enterprises. Barclays' claim of unconstitutional discrimination against foreign commerce therefore fails. </s> III </s> Barclays additionally argues that California's "reasonable approximations" method of reducing the compliance burden is incompatible with due process. "Foreign multinationals," Barclays maintains, "remain at peril in filing their tax returns because there is no standard to determine what `approximations' will be accepted." Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 49. Barclays presents no substantive grievance concerning the treatment it has received, i.e., no example of an approximation rejected by the Tax Board as unreasonable. Barclays instead complains that "[t]he grant of standardless discretion itself violates due process," so that the taxpayer need not show "actual harm from arbitrary application." Ibid. </s> We note initially that "reasonableness" is a guide admitting effective judicial review in myriad settings, from encounters between the police and the citizenry, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (Fourth Amendment permits police officer's limited search for </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 16] </s> weapons in circumstances where "reasonably prudent man . . . would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger" based upon "reasonable inferences . . . draw[n] from the facts in light of [officer's] experience"), to the more closely analogous federal income tax context. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 162 (allowing deductions for ordinary business expenses, including a "reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation"); 26 U.S.C. 167 (permitting a "reasonable allowance" for wear and tear as a depreciation deduction); see also United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 522 (1942) (noting that determinations "by reference to a standard of `reasonableness' [are] not unusual under federal income tax laws"). </s> We next observe that California's judiciary has construed the California law to curtail the discretion of California tax officials. See 10 Cal.App. 4th at 1762, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d at 549 (the Tax Board must consider "regularly maintained or other readily accessibly corporate documents" in deciding whether the "cost and effort of producing [worldwide combined reporting] information" justifies submission of "reasonable approximations"). We note, furthermore, that California has afforded Barclays the opportunity "to clarify the meaning of the regulation[s] by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process." See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). Taxpayers, under the State's scheme, may seek "an advance determination" from the Tax Board regarding the tax consequences of a proposed course of action. Cal.Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137-6(e)(2) (1985). </s> Rules governing international multi-jurisdictional income allocation have an inescapable imprecision given the complexity of the subject matter. See Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 192 (allocation "bears some </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 17] </s> resemblance . . . to slicing a shadow"). 14 Mindful that rules against vagueness are not "mechanically applied" but depend, in their application, on "the nature of the enactment," Hoffman Estates, supra, at 498, we hold that California's scheme does not transgress constitutional limitations in this regard, and that Barclays' due process argument is no more weighty than its claim of discrimination first placed under a Commerce Clause heading. </s> IV </s> A </s> Satisfied that California's corporate franchise tax is "proper and fair" as tested under Complete Auto's guides, see Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 184 , we proceed to the "additional scrutiny" required when a State seeks to tax foreign commerce. Id., at 185. First of the two additional considerations is "the enhanced risk of multiple taxation." Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 185 . </s> In Container Corp., we upheld application of California's combined reporting obligation to "foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations," id., at 193 </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 18] </s> (emphasis added), against a charge that such application unconstitutionally exposed those subsidiaries to a risk of multiple international taxation. 15 Barclays contends that its situation compels a different outcome, because application of the combined reporting obligation to foreign multinationals creates a "`more aggravated' risk . . . of double taxation." Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 32, quoting Nos. 325059 and 325061 (Super.Ct. Sacramento County, Aug. 20, 1987) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92-1384, p. A-26). Barclays rests its argument on the observation that "foreign multinationals typically have more of their operations and entities outside of the United States [compared to] domestic multinationals, which typically have a smaller share of their operations and entities outside of the United States." Id., at 33. 16 As a result, a higher proportion of the income of a foreign multinational is subject to taxation by foreign sovereigns. This reality, Barclays concludes, means that for the foreign multinational, which must include all its foreign operations in the California combined reporting group, "the breadth of double taxation and the degree of burden on foreign commerce are greater than in the case of domestic multinationals." Ibid. </s> We do not question Barclays' assertion that multinational enterprises with a high proportion of income taxed by jurisdictions with wage rates, property values, and sales prices lower than California's face a correspondingly high risk of multiple international taxation. See </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 19] </s> Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 187 ; cf. id., at 199-200 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing how formulary apportionment leads to multiple taxation). Nor do we question that foreign-based multinationals have a higher proportion of such income, on average, than do their United States counterparts. But Container Corp.'s approval of this very tax, in the face of a multiple taxation challenge, did not rest on any insufficiency in the evidence that multiple taxation might occur; indeed, we accepted in that case the taxpayer's assertion that multiple taxation in fact had occurred. Id., at 187 ("[T]he tax imposed here, like the tax in Japan Line, has resulted in actual double taxation, in the sense that some of the income taxed without apportionment by foreign nations as attributable to appellant's foreign subsidiaries was also taxed by California as attributable to the State's share of the total income of the unitary business of which those subsidiaries are a part."); see also id., at 187, n. 22. </s> Container Corp.'s holding on multiple taxation relied on two considerations: first, that multiple taxation was not the "inevitable result" of the California tax; 17 and, second, that the "alternativ[e] reasonably available to the taxing State" (i.e., some version of the separate accounting/"arm's length" approach), id., at 188-189, "could not eliminate the risk of double taxation" and </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 20] </s> might in some cases enhance that risk. Id., at 191. 18 We underscored that, "even though most nations have adopted the arm's-length approach in its general outlines, the precise rules under which they reallocate income among affiliated corporations often differ substantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of double taxation also exists." Ibid. (emphasis added); see also id., at 192 ("California would have trouble avoiding multiple taxation even if it adopted the `arm's-length' approach. . . . "). </s> These considerations are not dispositively diminished when California's tax is applied to the components of foreign, as opposed to domestic, multinationals. Multiple taxation of such entities because of California's scheme is not "inevitable"; the existence vel non of actual multiple taxation of income remains, as in Container Corp., dependent "on the facts of the individual case." Id., at 188. And if, as we have held, adoption of a separate accounting system does not dispositively lessen the risk of multiple taxation of the income earned by foreign affiliates of domestic-owned corporations, we see no reason why it would do so in respect of the income earned by foreign affiliates of foreign-owned corporations. We refused in Container Corp. "to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 21] </s> taxation." Id., at 193. The foreign domicile of the taxpayer (or the taxpayer's parent) is a factor inadequate to warrant retraction of that position. </s> Recognizing that multiple taxation of international enterprise may occur whatever taxing scheme the State adopts, the dissent finds impermissible under "the [dormant] Foreign Commerce Clause" only double taxation that (1) burdens a foreign corporation, in need of protection for lack of access to the political process, and (2) occurs "because [the State] does not conform to international practice." Post, at 5. But the image of a politically impotent foreign transactor is surely belied by the battalion of foreign governments that has marched to Barclays' aid, deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation. See infra, at 26, n. 22; post, at 6. Indeed, California responded to this impressive political activity when it eliminated mandatory worldwide combined reporting. See supra, at 6. In view of this activity, and the control rein Congress holds, see infra, at 31-33, we cannot agree that "international practice" has such force as to dictate this Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. We therefore adhere to the precedent set in Container Corp. </s> B </s> We turn, finally, to the question ultimately and most energetically presented: did California's worldwide combined reporting requirement, as applied to Barcal, BBI, and Colgate, "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential," Japan Line, 441 U.S., at 448 ; in particular, did the State's taxing scheme "preven[t] the Federal Government from `speaking with one voice' in international trade"? Id., at 453, quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S., at 285 . </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 22] </s> 1 </s> Two decisions principally inform our judgment: first, this Court's 1983 determination in Container Corp.; and second, our decision three years later in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986). Container Corp. held that California's worldwide combined reporting requirement, as applied to domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries, did not violate the "one voice" standard. Container Corp. bears on Colgate's case, but not Barcal's or BBI's, to this extent: "[T]he tax [in Container Corp.] was imposed not on a foreign entity . . ., but on a domestic corporation." 463 U.S., at 195 . 19 Other factors emphasized in Container Corp., however, are relevant to the complaints of all three taxpayers in the consolidated cases now before us. 20 Most significantly, the Court found no "specific indications of congressional intent" to preempt California's tax: </s> "First, there is no claim here that the federal tax statutes themselves provide the necessary preemptive force. Second, although the United States is a party to a great number of tax treaties that require the Federal Government to adopt some form </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 23] </s> of "arm's-length" analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enterprises, that requirement is generally waived with respect to the taxes imposed by each of the contracting nations on its own domestic corporations. . . . Third, the tax treaties into which the United States has entered do not generally cover the taxing activities of subnational governmental units such as States, and in none of the treaties does the restriction on "non-arm's-length" methods of taxation apply to the States. Moreover, the Senate has on at least one occasion, in considering a proposed treaty, attached a reservation declining to give its consent to a provision in the treaty that would have extended that restriction to the States. Finally, . . . Congress has long debated, but has not enacted, legislation designed to regulate state taxation of income." Id., at 196-197 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). </s> The Court again confronted a "one voice" argument in Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986), and there rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to Florida's tax on the sale of fuel to common carriers, including airlines. Air carriers were taxed on all aviation fuel purchased in Florida, without regard to the amount the carrier consumed within the State or the amount of its in-state business. The carrier in Wardair, a Canadian airline that operated charter flights to and from the United States, conceded that the challenged tax satisfied the Complete Auto criteria and entailed no threat of multiple international taxation. Joined by the United States as amicus curiae, however, the carrier urged that Florida's tax "threaten[ed] the ability of the Federal Government to `speak with one voice.'" 477 U.S., at 9 . There is "a federal policy," the carrier asserted, "of reciprocal tax exemptions for aircraft, equipment, and supplies, including aviation fuel, </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 24] </s> that constitute the instrumentalities of international air traffic;" this policy, the carrier argued, "represents the statement that the `one voice' of the Federal Government wishes to make," a statement "threatened by [Florida's tax]." Ibid. </s> This Court disagreed, observing that the proffered evidence disclosed no federal policy of the kind described, and indeed demonstrated that the Federal Government intended to permit the States to impose sales taxes on aviation fuel. The international convention and resolution and more than 70 bilateral treaties on which the carrier relied to show a United States policy of tax exemption for the instrumentalities of international air traffic, the Court explained, in fact indicated far less: "[W]hile there appears to be an international aspiration on the one hand to eliminate all impediments to foreign air travel - including taxation of fuel - the law as it presently stands acquiesces in taxation of the sale of that fuel by political subdivisions of countries." Id., at 10 (emphasis in original). Most of the bilateral agreements prohibited the Federal Government from imposing national taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign carriers, but none prohibited the States or their subdivisions from taxing the sale of fuel to foreign airlines. The Court concluded that, "[b]y negative implication arising out of [these international accords,] the United States has at least acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international travel," and therefore upheld Florida's tax. Id., at 12. </s> In both Wardair and Container Corp., the Court considered the "one voice" argument only after determining that the challenged state action was otherwise constitutional. An important premise underlying both decisions 21 is this: Congress may more passively indicate </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 25] </s> that certain state practices do not "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential," Japan Line, 441 U.S., at 448 ; it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete Auto inspection. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (requiring an "unambiguous indication of congressional intent" to insulate "otherwise invalid state legislation" from judicial dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. ___, ___, and n. 19 (1994) (slip op., at 17, and n. 19) (same). </s> 2 </s> As in Container Corp. and Wardair, we discern no "specific indications of congressional intent" to bar the state action here challenged. Our decision upholding California's franchise tax in Container Corp. left the ball in Congress' court; had Congress, the branch responsible for the regulation of foreign commerce, see U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3, considered nationally uniform use of separate accounting "essential," Japan Line, supra, at 448, it could have enacted legislation prohibiting the States from taxing corporate income based on the world-wide combined reporting method. In the 11 years that have elapsed since our decision in Container Corp., Congress has failed to enact such legislation. </s> In the past three decades - both before and after Container Corp. - Congress, aware that foreign governments </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 26] </s> were displeased with States' worldwide combined reporting requirements, 22 has on many occasions studied state taxation of multinational enterprises. 23 The numerous </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 27] </s> bills introduced have varied, but all would have prohibited the California reporting requirement here challenged. One group of bills would have prohibited States using combined reporting from compelling inclusion, in the combined reporting group, of corporate affiliates whose income was derived substantially from sources outside the United States. 24 Another set would have barred the States from requiring taxpayers to report any income that was not subject to federal income tax; 25 thus, "foreign source income" of foreign </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 28] </s> corporations ordinarily would not be reported. See supra, at 5, n. 5. None of these bills, however, was enacted. </s> The history of Senate action on a United States/United Kingdom tax treaty, to which we referred in Container Corp., see 463 U.S., at 196 , reinforces our conclusion that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method. As originally negotiated by the President, this treaty - known as the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains - would have precluded States from requiring that United Kingdom-controlled corporate taxpayers use combined reporting to compute their state income. See Art. 9(4), 31 U.S.T. 5670, 5677, T.I.A.S. No. 9682. 26 The Senate rejected this version of the treaty, 124 Cong.Rec. 18670 (1978), and ultimately ratified the agreement, id., at 19076, "subject to the reservation that the provisions of [Article 9(4)] . . . shall not apply to any political subdivision or local authority of the United States." Id., at 18416. The final version of the treaty prohibited state tax discrimination against British nationals, Art. 2(4), 31 U.S.T. 5671; Art. 24, id., at 5687-5688, 27 but did not require </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 29] </s> States to use separate accounting or water's edge apportionment of income. Id., at 5709. </s> Given these indicia of Congress' willingness to tolerate States' worldwide combined reporting mandates, even when those mandates are applied to foreign corporations and domestic corporations with foreign parents, we cannot conclude that "the foreign policy of the United States - whose nuances . . . are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court - is [so] seriously threatened," Container Corp., supra, at 196, by California's practice as to warrant our intervention. 28 This Court has no constitutional authority to make the policy judgments essential to regulating foreign commerce and conducting foreign affairs. Matters relating "to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). For this reason, Barclays' and its amici's argument that California's worldwide combined reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it is likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign governments 29 is directed to the wrong forum. The judiciary </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 30] </s> is not vested with power to decide "how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please." Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 194 . </s> 3 </s> To support its argument that California's worldwide combined reporting method impermissibly interferes with the Federal Government's ability to "speak with one voice," and to distinguish Container Corp., Colgate points to a series of Executive Branch actions, statements, and amicus filings, made both before and after our decision in Container Corp. 30 Colgate contends that, taken together, these Executive pronouncements constitute a "clear federal directive" proscribing States' use of worldwide combined reporting. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1839, p. 36, quoting Container Corp., supra, at 194. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 31] </s> The Executive statements to which Colgate refers, however, cannot perform the service for which Colgate would enlist them. The Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. Const., Art. I., 8, cl. 3. As we have detailed, supra, at 25-29, and nn. 23-27, Congress has focused its attention on this issue, but has refrained from exercising its authority to prohibit state-mandated worldwide combined reporting. That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation practice, but encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence that the practice interfered with the Nation's ability to speak with one voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor to others. Cf. Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 4) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[The President] is better able to decide than we are which state regulatory interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that decision, but only the Congress."). </s> Congress may "delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the President," who "also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ in foreign affairs." Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948). We need not here consider the scope of the President's power to preempt state law pursuant to authority delegated by a statute or a ratified treaty; nor do we address whether the President may displace state law pursuant to legally binding executive </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 32] </s> agreements with foreign nations 31 made "in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, [where] he can only rely upon his own independent powers." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Executive Branch actions - press releases, letters, and amicus briefs - on which Colgate here relies are merely precatory. Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting. 32 </s> * * * </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 33] </s> The Constitution does "`not make the judiciary the overseer of our government.'" Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981), quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Having determined that the taxpayers before us had an adequate nexus with the State, that worldwide combined reporting led to taxation which was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services provided by the State, and that its imposition did not result inevitably in multiple taxation, we leave it to Congress - whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's - to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy. Accordingly, the judgments of the California Court of Appeal are </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 This Court first considered the "unitary business principle" in 1897, Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220-221; we revisited this "settled jurisprudence" most recently in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. ___, ___ -___ (1992) (slip op., at 6-13). See generally 1 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes § 8.03, pp. 8-29 (2d ed. 1993); id. § 8.05. On the determination whether a business is "unitary," see Allied-Signal, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 11) (business may be treated as unitary, </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> compatibly with constitutional limitations, if it exhibits functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale); Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472, 481, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (1947) ("If the operation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, the operations are unitary."); Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941) (A business is unitary if there is "(1) [u]nity of ownership; (2) [u]nity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use of its centralized executive force and general system of operation."), aff'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). </s> [Footnote 2 In 1993, California modified the formula to double the weight of the sales factor. Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. 25128 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 946, 1. </s> [Footnote 3 An affiliated group of domestic corporations may, however, elect to file a consolidated federal tax return in lieu of separate returns. 26 U.S.C. 1501. </s> [Footnote 4 Effective enforcement of arm's length standards requires exacting scrutiny by the taxing jurisdiction, and some commentators maintain that the results are arbitrary in any event. See 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra § 8.03 (describing "three inherent defects" of separate accounting: compliance expense, impracticability, and the difficulty of arriving at "arm's length" prices). </s> [Footnote 5 Under the Internal Revenue Code, a foreign corporation reports only income derived from a United States source or otherwise effectively connected with the corporation's conduct of a United States trade or business. 26 U.S.C. 881, 882, 884, 864(c). Domestic corporations must report all income, whether the source is domestic or foreign, 26 U.S.C. 11, though they receive a tax </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> credit for qualifying taxes paid to foreign sovereigns. 26 U.S.C. 901-908 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 6 The figures used by the Tax Board were: </s> Worldwide California Business Franchise Taxable Formula Income Tax Taxpayer Income Percentage </s> Barcal $401,566,973 .0139032% $5,583,066 $693,696 BBI 401,566,973 .0003232% 129,786 16,126 </s> App. in No. 92-1384, p. A-13 (Joint Stipulation of Facts, § 22). </s> [Footnote 7 The petitioner in No. 92-1384, Barclays Bank PLC, is the successor in interest to the tax refund claims of both Barcal and BBI. For convenience, this opinion uses "Barclays" to refer collectively to the taxpayers and the petitioner in No. 92-1384. </s> [Footnote 8 Colgate offered the following figures, using a water's edge approach: </s> Water's edge California Income Taxable Formula Business Franchise Year Income Percentage Income Tax </s> 1970 $25,652,055 9.31920% $2,390,566 $167,340 1971 27,520,141 9.01730% 2,481,574 173,710 1972 32,440,358 9.21640% 2,989,833 227,227 1973 36,554,060 8.88730% 3,248,669 269,640 </s> No. 319715 (Super.Ct. Sacramento County, Apr. 19, 1989) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92-1839, p. 85a). </s> Under California's worldwide combined reporting method, the computations were: </s> Worldwide California Income Taxable Formula Business Franchise Year Income Percentage Income Tax </s> 1970 $ 91,566,729 4.42075% $4,047,936 $283,356 1971 108,177,612 4.12017% 4,457,101 311,997 1972 123,779,352 4.03444% 4,993,803 379,529 1973 151,585,860 3.71812% 5,636,144 467,800 </s> Id., at 84a. </s> [Footnote 9 Our jurisprudence refers to the self-executing aspect of the Commerce Clause as the "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause. </s> [Footnote 10 Amicus curiae the Government of the United Kingdom points to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), which held that the Commerce Clause demands more of a connection than the </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> "minimum contacts" that suffice to satisfy the due process nexus requirement for assertion of judicial jurisdiction. Brief for Government of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae in No. 92-1384, pp. 24-25. Noting the absence of "any meaningful contact" between California and the activities of Barclays Group members operating exclusively outside the United States, id., at 25, the United Kingdom asserts that the trial court erred if it concluded that "California had the requisite nexus with every member of the Barclays group." Id., at 27 (emphasis added). </s> The trial court, however, did not reach the conclusion the United Kingdom suggests it did, nor was there cause for it so to do. As the United Kingdom recognizes, the theory underlying unitary taxation is that "certain intangible `flows of value' within the unitary group serve to link the various members together as if they were essentially a single entity." Id., at 26. Formulary apportionment of the income of a multi-jurisdictional (but unitary) business enterprise, if fairly done, taxes only the "income generated within a State." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S., at ___ (1992) (slip op., at 12) (upholding "unitary business principle" as "an appropriate means for distinguishing between income generated within a State and income generated without"). Quill held that the Commerce Clause requires a taxpayer's "physical presence" in the taxing jurisdiction before that jurisdiction can constitutionally impose a use tax. The California presence of the taxpayers before us is undisputed, and we find nothing in Quill to suggest that California may not reference the income of corporations worldwide with whom those taxpayers are closely intertwined in order to approximate the taxpayers' California income. </s> [Footnote 11 Barclays estimates, and the trial court found, that an accounting system capable of conveying the information Barclays thought California's worldwide reporting scheme required for all of the enterprise's foreign affiliates would cost more than $5 million to set up, and more than $2 million annually to maintain. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 44, n. 13; Nos. 325059 and 325061 (Super.Ct. Sacramento County, Aug. 20, 1987) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92-1384, pp. A-27 to A-28). </s> [Footnote 12 Under the regulations to which Barclays refers, a "unitary business with operations in foreign countries" may determine its worldwide income based upon either (1) "[a] profit and loss statement . . . for each foreign branch or corporation," Cal.Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137-6(b)(1) (1985); (2) the "consolidated profit and loss statement prepared for the related corporations of which the unitary business is a member which is prepared for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission," Cal.Code of Regs., Title 18, 25137-6(b)(2); or (3) "the consolidated profit and loss statement prepared for reporting to shareholders and subject to review by an independent auditor." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 13 The California Court of Appeal additionally found that Barclays' actual compliance costs were "relatively modest" during the years just prior to those here at issue, ranging from $900 to $1,250 per annum, for BBI. See 10 Cal.App. 4th at 1760, n. 9, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d at 548, n. 9. </s> [Footnote 14 As noted by the California Court of Appeal, even the federal separate accounting scheme preferred by Barclays entails recourse to a standard "akin to reasonable approximation." 10 Cal.App. 4th 1742, 1763, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 550 (1993). The Internal Revenue Code allows the Secretary of Treasury to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances" among a controlled group of businesses "if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of such businesses. 26 U.S.C. 482; see App. in No. 92-1384, p. A-829 (testimony of Barclays' expert witness that 482 requires "reasonable approximation[s]" of arm's-length prices); Peck v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 469, 472 (CA9 1985) (under 482, IRS determination of arm's-length prices will be sustained unless unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious). </s> [Footnote 15 We reserved judgment on whether an altered analysis would be required where the taxpayer was part of a foreign-based enterprise. See Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 189 , n. 26; id., at 195, n. 32. </s> [Footnote 16 To illustrate, Barclays points to its own operations: only three of the more than 220 entities in the Barclays Group did any business in the United States. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 33. </s> [Footnote 17 The Court stated: "[T]he double taxation in this case, although real, is not the "inevitabl[e]" result of the California taxing scheme. . . . [W]e are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the income of a multinational enterprise. The "arm's-length" approach divides the pie on the basis of formal accounting principles. The formula apportionment method divides the same pie on the basis of a mathematical generalization. Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual case." Container Corp., 463 U.S., at 188 (internal citation omitted). </s> [Footnote 18 The Court's decision in Container Corp. effectively modified, for purposes of income taxation, the Commerce Clause multiple taxation inquiry described in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (holding unconstitutional application of California's ad valorem property tax to cargo containers based in Japan and used exclusively in foreign commerce). In Japan Line, confronting a property tax on containers used as "instrumentalities of [foreign] commerce," not an income tax on companies, we said that a state tax is incompatible with the Commerce Clause if it "creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation." Id., at 451. </s> [Footnote 19 Container Corp. noted: </s> "We recognize that the fact that legal incidence of a tax falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less significant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter our analysis." 463 U.S., at 195 , n. 32. </s> [Footnote 20 Container Corp. observed that "the tax here does not create an automatic `asymmetry,' . . . in international taxation," id., at 194-195, quoting Japan Line, supra, at 453 - i.e., it does not inevitably lead to double taxation. See supra, at 19-20, and n. 17. Furthermore, Colgate, Barcal, and BBI are, "without a doubt, amenable to be taxed in California in one way or another," and "the amount of tax [they] pa[y] is much more the function of California's tax rate than of its allocation method." 463 U.S., at 195 . </s> [Footnote 21 See also Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___ </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 25] </s> (1993) (slip op., at 14) (upholding Tennessee's tax on lease of cargo containers used exclusively in international shipping; because tax in question was not among those proscribed by "various conventions, statutes and regulations[,] . . . the most rational inference to be drawn is that th[e] tax, one quite distinct from the general class of import duties, is permitted"). </s> [Footnote 22 The governments of many of our trading partners have expressed their strong disapproval of California's method of taxation, as demonstrated by the amici briefs in support of Barclays from the Government of the United Kingdom, and from the Member States of the European Communities (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and the Governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Barclays has also directed our attention to a series of diplomatic notes similarly protesting the tax. See, e.g., App. in No. 92-1384, pp. A-92 to A-123, A-127 to A-128, A-131 to A-138; see also p. A-603 (Letter from Secretary of State George Schultz to California Governor Deukmejian (Jan. 30, 1986)) ("The Department of State has received diplomatic notes complaining about state use of the worldwide unitary method of taxation from virtually every developed country in the world."). The British Parliament has gone further, enacting retaliatory legislation that would, if implemented, tax United States corporations on dividends they receive from their United Kingdom subsidiaries. See Finance Act, 1985, Pt. 2., ch. 1, 54, and Sch. 13, § 5 (Eng.), reenacted in Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, Pt. 18, ch. 3, 812 and Sch. 30, §§ 20, 21 (Eng.). </s> [Footnote 23 Pursuant to 201 of Pub. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 556, in which Congress undertook to "make full and complete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation . . . of interstate commerce . . . by the States," the House Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings on the (primarily domestic) implications of alternative tax apportionment schemes. See State Income Taxation of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Subcommittee's comprehensive final Report recommended, inter alia, that "formula apportionment be used as the sole method of dividing income among the States for tax purposes," State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Report of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R.Rep. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1144 (1965), and that States be required to refrain from taxing any foreign income exempt from federal taxation. Id., at 1135. Congress, however, enacted no </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 27] </s> legislation embodying these recommendations. </s> Congress continued to study and debate this matter over the next two decades. See Interstate Taxation Act, H.R. 11798 and Companion Bills: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Interstate Taxation, S. 1273: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1977-1978); Recommendations of the Task Force on Foreign Source Income, House Committee on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977); State Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1980: Hearings on H.R. 5076 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income, Hearings on S. 983 and S. 1688 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Unitary Taxation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). </s> [Footnote 24 See, e.g., S. 1245, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); H.R. 6146, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 4940, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 3061, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 1974, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 3980, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986); S. 1139, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1775, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). </s> [Footnote 25 See, e.g., H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 8277, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 1983, 97th Cong., 1st </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 28] </s> Sess. (1981); H.R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1113, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). </s> [Footnote 26 Article 9(4) would have provided: </s> "Except as specifically provided in this Article, in determining the tax liability of an enterprise doing business in a Contracting State, or in a political subdivision or local authority of a Contracting State, such Contracting State, political subdivision, or local authority shall not take into account the income, deductions, receipts, or outgoings of a related enterprise of the other Contracting State or of an enterprise of any third State related to any enterprise of the other Contracting State." (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 27 Article 2(4) provides: "For the purpose of Article 24 (Nondiscrimination), this Convention shall also apply to taxes of every kind </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 29] </s> and description imposed by each Contracting State, or by its political subdivisions or local authorities." </s> [Footnote 28 That "federal law has long embodied a preference for the arm's length method, in the sense that this method is used in computing the federal income tax liability of multinational corporations," does not render a State's use of a different method unconstitutional, as the Solicitor General points out. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 17-18 (emphasis in original), citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980) ("Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a well established norm. Absent some explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States."). </s> [Footnote 29 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, pp. 25-28; Brief for </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 30] </s> Government of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae in No. 92-1384, pp. 19-24; Brief for Member States of European Communities et al., as Amici Curiae in No. 92-1384, pp. 16-17. </s> [Footnote 30 Colgate cites, for example, President Reagan's decision to introduce legislation confining States to a water's edge method, State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 21 Weekly Comp. of Pres.Doc. 1368 (Nov. 8, 1985) (Statement of President Reagan); letters sent by members of the Reagan and Bush administrations to the Governor of California and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, expressing the Federal Government's opposition to worldwide combined reporting, App. in No. 92-1839, pp. 9-27; and Department of Justice amicus briefs filed in this Court, arguing that the worldwide combined reporting method violates the dormant Commerce Clause, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., O.T. 1982, No. 81-349, cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., O.T. 1992, No. 92-212, cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___ (1992). </s> [Footnote 31 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 -332 (1937). </s> [Footnote 32 The Solicitor General suggests that when a court analyzes "whether a state tax impairs the federal government's ability to speak with one voice . . . the statements of executive branch officials are entitled to substantial evidentiary weight," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 19, but he argues that the constitutionality of a State's taxing practice must be assessed according to the federal policy, if any, in effect at the time the challenged taxes were assessed. He asserts that federal officials had not articulated a policy opposing use by the States of worldwide combined reporting prior to the mid-1980's, and urges the Court to affirm the judgments below on the ground that California's use of worldwide combined reporting was not unconstitutional during the years here at issue, even if it became unconstitutional in later years (a question on which he takes no position, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-41). Colgate, on the other hand, suggests that the relevant timeframe is "when the tax is definitively enforced by the state taxing authority, through judicial proceedings if necessary, not when the tax technically accrues under state law," Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1839, p. 7, and argues, in the alternative, that a federal policy opposing combined worldwide reporting had been established as of 1970-1973, id., at 9. We need not resolve this dispute, because we have concluded that the Executive statements criticizing States' use of worldwide combined reporting do not, in light of Congress' acquiescence in the States' actions, authorize judicial intervention here. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. </s> Last Term, in Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (slip op. 4), I expressed my disagreement with the Court's willingness, in applying the "one voice" test, to "infe[r] permission for [a] tax from Congress' supposed failure to prohibit it." See also, Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). I accordingly would not rely in the present case on congressional inaction to conclude "that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method." Ante, at 27. Nevertheless, because today's holding largely is controlled by Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983), and because California's corporate franchise tax does not directly burden the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, see Itel, supra; Wardair, supra; and Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), I agree that the tax does not "impair federal uniformity in an </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> area where federal uniformity is essential," id., at 448. I therefore join the opinion of the Court. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I concur in the judgment of the Court and join all of its opinion except Part IV-B, which disposes of the petitioners' "negative" Foreign Commerce Clause argument by applying the "speak with one voice" test of Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). </s> As I stated last Term in Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), "I will enforce a self-executing, "negative" Commerce Clause in two circumstances: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against [interstate or foreign] commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court." Id., at ___ (footnote omitted). Absent one of these circumstances, I will permit the States to employ whatever means of taxation they choose insofar as the Commerce Clause is concerned. Neither </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> circumstance exists here, and the California tax therefore survives commerce clause attack. </s> I am not sure that the Court's opinion today, which requires no more than legislative inaction to establish that "Congress implicitly has permitted" the States to impose a particular restriction on foreign commerce, ante, at 28, will prove much different from my approach in its consequences. It is, moreover, an unquestionable improvement over Itel: whereas the "speak with one voice" analysis of that opinion gave the power to determine the constitutionality of a state law to the Executive Branch, see 507 U.S., at ___ (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), today's opinion restores the power to Congress - albeit in a form that strangely permits it to be exercised by silence. </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. </s> I joined Justice Powell in dissent in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983), and I continue to think the Court erred in upholding California's use of worldwide combined reporting in taxing the income of a domestic-based corporate group. But because the State and private parties have justifiably relied on the constitutionality of taxing such corporations, and Congress has not seen fit to override our decision, I agree with the Court that Container Corp. should not be overruled, cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitcamp, 504 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 18-19), and that it resolves the constitutional challenge raised by Colgate-Palmolive. I therefore concur in the judgment in No. 92-1839. Barclays Bank, on the other hand, is a foreign-based parent company of a multinational corporate group, and our holding in Container Corp. expressly does not extend </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> to this situation. See 463 U.S., at 189 , n. 26 and 195, n. 32. In my view, the California tax cannot constitutionally be applied to foreign corporations. I therefore respectfully dissent in No. 92-1384. </s> A state tax on interstate commerce must meet four requirements under our negative Commerce Clause precedents: the tax must be on an activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing State, it must be fairly apportioned, it must not discriminate against interstate commerce, and it must be fairly related to the services provided by the State. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). Substantially for the reasons explained by the Court, see ante, at 11-15, I agree that imposition of the California tax complies with the four Complete Auto factors. (I also agree that California's practice of accepting "reasonable approximations" of the statutorily required financial data does not violate due process. See ante, at 15-17.) A state tax on foreign commerce, however, must satisfy two additional inquiries: "first, whether the tax, notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from "speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." If a state tax contravenes either of these precepts, it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (emphasis added). </s> I am in general agreement with the Court, see ante, at 21-31, that the second Japan Line factor - the purported need for federal uniformity - does not prevent the use of worldwide combined reporting in taxing foreign corporations. The Congress, not the Executive or the Judiciary, has been given the power to regulate commerce. U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. The Legislature has neither approved nor disapproved the California tax. Although, in such circumstances, courts have the power </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> to scrutinize taxes for consistency with our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this determination should be made on the basis of the objective factors outlined in Complete Auto (and, in the foreign commerce context, the multiple taxation analysis discussed in Japan Line), not statements made and briefs filed by officials in the Executive Branch. Cf. Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 3-4) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Indeed, the inconsistent positions taken by the Solicitor General in the course of Barclays' challenge to the California tax illustrate the perils of resting constitutional determinations on such "evidence." Compare Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21-24 (arguing that the California tax was constitutionally applied to Barclays during the tax years in question), with Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, O.T. 1992, No. 92-212, pp. 9-16 (arguing that the imposition of the California tax on Barclays was unconstitutional). </s> But I cannot agree with the Court's resolution of the other Japan Line factor - the need to avoid international multiple taxation. See ante, at 17-21. Barclays does 98% of its business in countries other than the United States. California, through application of worldwide combined reporting, taxes some of that income. The trial court found as a fact that "[t]here is a definite risk of, as well as actual double taxation here." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-25. This double taxation occurs because California has adopted a taxing system that is inconsistent with the taxing method used by foreign taxing authorities. California's formula assigns a higher proportion of income to jurisdictions where wage rates, property values, and sales prices are higher; to the extent that California is such a jurisdiction (and it usually will be) the formula inherently leads to double taxation. And whenever the three factors are higher in </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> California, the State will tax income under its formula that already has been taxed by another country under accepted international practice. </s> In Container Corp., we recognized that the California tax "ha[d] resulted in actual double taxation . . . stem[ming] from a serious divergence in the taxing schemes adopted by California and the foreign taxing authorities," and that "the taxing method adopted by those foreign taxing authorities is consistent with accepted international practice." 463 U.S., at 187 . We nevertheless held that the tax did not violate the Japan Line principle. Two of the factors on which we relied - that the tax was on income rather than property, and that the multiple taxation was not "inevitable" - carry no more force today than they did 11 Terms ago, see 463 U.S., at 198 -201 (Powell, J., dissenting), but they are present here as well. </s> We also relied on a third ground to distinguish the tax upheld in Container Corp. from the tax invalidated in Japan Line: "[T]he tax here falls, not on the foreign owners of an instrumentality of foreign commerce, but on a corporation domiciled and headquartered in the United States. We specifically left open in Japan Line the application of that case to "domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce," and . . . this case falls clearly within that reservation." 463 U.S., at 188 -189, quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S., at 444 , n. 7. In a footnote, we continued: "We have no need to address in this opinion the constitutionality of [the California tax] with respect to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries." 463 U.S., at 189 , n. 26; see also id., at 195, and n. 32. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 18, and n. 15, Barclays' challenge to the California tax therefore presents the question we expressly left open in Container Corp.: does it make a constitutional difference </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> that the multiple taxation resulting from California's use of worldwide combined reporting falls on a foreign corporation rather than a domestic one? In my view, the answer is yes. </s> Japan Line teaches that where the instrumentality of commerce - and analogously, the corporate domicile - is foreign, the multiple taxation resulting from a state taxing scheme may violate the Commerce Clause even though the same tax would be constitutional as applied to a domestic corporation. 441 U.S., at 447 -448. When worldwide combined reporting is applied to American corporate groups with foreign affiliates, as in Container Corp., income attributable to those foreign companies will be taxed by California, even though they are also subject to tax in foreign countries. But in such cases, the incidence of the tax falls on the domestic parent corporation - a corporation subject to full taxation in the United States notwithstanding the source of its income. When the California tax is applied to a foreign corporate group with both domestic and foreign affiliates, some of the income of the foreign companies will also be taxed by California. The incidence of the tax in such cases falls on a foreign corporation, even though the United States (and its subnational governments) is entitled to tax only the income earned domestically. </s> In my view, the States are prohibited (absent express congressional authorization) by the Foreign Commerce Clause from adopting a system of taxation that, because it does not conform to international practice, results in multiple taxation of foreign corporations. It may be that such a rule "leave[s] California free to discriminate against a Delaware corporation in favor of an overseas corporation," Container Corp., supra, at 203 (Powell, J., dissenting), but the reason for this differential treatment is obvious. Domestic taxpayers have access to the political process at both the state and national levels, that foreign taxpayers simply do not enjoy. If California's </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> tax results in intolerable double taxation of domestic corporations, those companies can seek redress through the normal channels. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 , n. 17 (1981); Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 , n. 18 (1978). It is all too easy, however, for the state legislature to fill the State's coffers at the expense of outsiders. </s> Most of the United States' trading partners have objected to California's use of worldwide combined reporting. See Demarche from Danish Embassy, on behalf of Governments of European Community (Mar. 26, 1993) ("The views of the EC Member States on worldwide unitary taxation are well known to the United States Government. All Member States have expressed their strong opposition to [the California] tax in a number of diplomatic communiques to the United States Government from 1980 to the present date"); Demarche from Belgian Embassy, on behalf of Governments of Member States of European Community and of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (Sept. 23, 1993). At least one country has already enacted retaliatory legislation. See Brief of Government of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae 19-23. Moreover, the possibility of multiple taxation undoubtedly deters foreign investment in this country. See Brief of Member States of the European Communities et al. as Amici Curiae 14-16. These adverse consequences, which affect the Nation as a whole, result solely from California's refusal to conform its taxing practices to the internationally accepted standard. </s> Unlike the Court, see ante, at 20, I would not dismiss these difficulties solely by relying on our observation in Container Corp. that "it would be perverse, simply for the sake of avoiding double taxation, to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> method that also sometimes results in double taxation." 463 U.S., at 193 . In addition to being factually incorrect, see id., at 199, n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting), our discussion of alternatives in Container Corp. proceeded from the well established proposition that States need not conform their taxing practices to those of their neighbors at least so far as domestic commerce is concerned. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 277 -281 (1978). Multiple taxation of domestic companies is avoided, to the extent necessary, by the fair apportionment requirement. See Container Corp., supra, at 185; General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440 (1964). </s> But in Japan Line we squarely rejected the argument that the same principle applies to taxes imposed on foreign-owned instrumentalities: </s> "[N]either this Court nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign. If an instrumentality of commerce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may have the right, consistently with the custom of nations, to impose a tax on its full value. If a State should seek to tax the same instrumentality on an apportioned basis, multiple taxation inevitably results. . . . Due to the absence of an authoritative tribunal capable of ensuring that the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value, a state tax, even though "fairly apportioned" to reflect an instrumentality's presence within the State, may subject foreign commerce to the risk of a double tax burden to which [domestic] commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids." 441 U.S., at 447 -448 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). </s> In my view, the risk of multiple taxation created by California's use of worldwide combined reporting - a risk </s> [ BARCLAY'S BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BD., ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> that has materialized with respect to Barclays - is sufficient to render the California tax constitutionally infirm. I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion to the contrary. Page I

United States Supreme Court CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. P. & P.R. CO. V. ACME FAST FREIGHT(1949) No. 65 Argued: December 8, 1948Decided: April 4, 1949 </s> [ Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P.R. Co. v. Acme Fast Freight 336 U.S. 465 (1949) ] </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 466] </s> Messrs. Joseph Walker and Rowland L. Davis, Jr., both of New York City (Messrs. Willam Zearfaus, of Philadelphia, Pa., Bleakley, Platt, Gilchrist & Walker, Arthur C. Patterson, Dennis P. Donovan, Thomas L. Ennis, and Joseph Rosch, all of New York City, John H. English, of Albany, N.Y., and Pierce & Greer and H. Brua Campbell, both of New York City, of counsel), for petitioners. Mr. Paul A. Crouch, of New York City, for respondent. </s> Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1942, Congress enacted what is popularly known as the Freight Forwarder Act. This legislation, which appears as Part IV1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, was designed to define freight forwarders, to prescribe certain regulations governing forwarder operations, and to bring this essential transportation business within the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The legislative and judicial history culminating in the Act need not now be detailed. See United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 1940, 310 U.S. 344 ; Acme Fast Freight, Inc., v. United States, D.C., 30 F.Supp. 968, affirmed 1939, 309 U.S. 638 . </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 467] </s> Freight forwarders consolidate less than carload freight into carloads for shipment by rail, truck, or water. Their charges approximate rail less than carload rates; their expenses and profits are derived from the spread between the carload and 1. c. 1. rates. Forwarders are utilized by 1. c. 1. shippers because of the speed and efficiency with which they handle shipments, the unity of responsibility obtained, and certain services which forwarders make available. 2 </s> Forwarders are required by 1013 of the Act to issue bills of lading to their customers, covering the individual package shipment from time of receipt until delivery to the ultimate consignee. When the freight is consolidated into carloads, the railroad gives the forwarder its bill of lading in which the forwarder is designated as both consignor and consignee. The contents are noted as 'one carload of mixed merchandise' and usually move under an 'all-commodity' carload rate. The destination set out in the railroad bill of lading is the forwarder's break-bulk point. At that point the carload is broken up; some shipments may be distributed locally, some sent by truck to off-line destinations, and some consolidated into carloads for reshipment to further break-bulk points. The railroad has no knowledge of the contents of the car, the identity of the individual shippers, or the ultimate destinations of the consignments. The forwarder has an unqualified right to select the carrier and route for the transportation of the freight. The forwarder thus has some of the characteristics of both carrier and shipper. In its relations with its customers, a forwarder is subjected by the Act to many of the requirements and regulations applicable to common </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 468] </s> carriers under Parts I, II, and III of the Act, 49 U.S.C.A. 1 et seq., 301 et seq., 901 et seq. In its relations with these carriers, however, the status of the forwarder is still that of shipper. It is this duality of character that raises the question in this case. Section 1013 of the Act3 provides that the Carmack Amendment, 34 Stat. 593, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 20 (11)4 and </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 469] </s> (12),5 49 U.S.C.A. 20(11, 12), shall apply to freight forwarders 'in the case of service subject to this chapter' (Part IV), and that the freight forwarder shall be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company for the purposes of such 20(11) and (12). Incorporation of the Carmack Amendment requires, as has been noted, that the forwarder issue bills of lading to its shippers, covering transportation of the individual shipments to their ultimate destinations. There can be no question but that under 20(11), the forwarder is liable to its shipper for loss or damage to the freight exactly as if it were an initial carrier subject to Parts I, II, and III. We are now asked to decide whether the right-over given by 20(12) to an initial carrier against its connecting carriers applies in the case of forwarders who have paid loss and damage claims to their shippers and seek recompense from the carrier responsible for the loss. In this action, respondent freight forwarder sought a declaratory judgment that it is not bound by the nine-month limitation period provided in the railroad bill of lading for the filing of loss or damage claims. If 1013 of the Act, by its incorporation of 20(11) and (12), makes the forwarder an initial carrier with a right-over against </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 470] </s> the carrier responsible for the loss or damage, the nine-month period is not applicable. If, however, the forwarder is still a shipper vis-a-vis the railroads, it must file its claims within the period specified in the railroad bill of lading. 6 The District Court held, on an agreed statement of facts, that the forwarder must file its claims within the nine-month period. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that for the purposes of 1013 alone, forwarders are to be considered carriers and as such are entitled to the right-over given by 20(12). We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 335 U.S. 807 , to resolve this important question under Part IV of the Interstate Commerce Act. First. The railroads contend that Part IV of the Act was not intended to change the shipper-carrier relationship that had for many years existed between forwarder and railroad. Their position is that while the previously prevailing duties and responsibilities owed by the forwarder to the public were changed by the Act, the language of the Act and its legislative history negative the forwarder's claim to carrier status. They read the language of 1013, that 'The provisions of section 20(11) and ( 12) of this title * * * shall apply with respect to freight forwarders, in the case of service subject to this chapter * * *' to mean that, while the forwarder is liable to its shippers under 20(11) for loss or damage no matter whose the ultimate responsibility, its right-over under 20(12) is limited to losses or damage occurring </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 471] </s> in 'service subject to this chapter'-i.e., in the business of forwarding freight. Thus limited, the right-over would apply as against other freight forwarders with whom joint loading agreements authorized by 1004(d) were in effect, and against motor carriers who are permitted by 1013 to issue bills of lading on behalf of the forwarders. The right-over would not, however, apply against railroads, water carriers, and line-haul motor carriers. 'Service subject to this chapter' is defined in 1002 as 'any or all of the service in connection with the transportation in interstate commerce which any person undertakes to perform or provide as a freight forwarder * * *.' While use of the word, 'provide,' lends some support to respondent's thesis that the definition should be read broadly to include the service performed by common carriers for the forwarders, the House Committee report indicates the contrary. It defines 'service subject to this chapter' as: 'the term used throughout Part IV when referring to the business or operations of freight forwarders which it is proposed to regulate. The definition is intended to be broad enough to cover everything the freight forwarder does, in connection with the forwarding by surface facilities, in the course of carrying out his undertaking to the shipper whom he serves. On the other hand it is not broad enough, of course, to bring under regulation, under Part IV, the services performed by the carriers whose services the freight forwarder utilizes in performing his undertaking.'7 (Italics added.) </s> The emphasis supplied by the phrase is emphasis on the freight forwarder's activities, not upon the service performed by underlying carriers. Since the forwarder </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 472] </s> contracts with its shipper to deliver the shipment safely to its ultimate destination, its undertaking is obviously part of the 'service subject to this chapter'. But inclusion of that phrase in 1013 indicates a limitation of applicability of the right-over under 20(12) to the forwarder's business, which, we are told by the House Report, does not include 'the services performed by the carriers whose services the freight forwarder utilizes in performing his undertaking.' The importance of the phrase, 'service subject to this chapter,' in the Forwarder Act is accentuated by a contemporaneous amendment to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, which pertains to motor carriers. The MotorCarrier Act had made, 20(11) applicable to motor carriers but had omitted 20(12). As a part of the Freight Forwarder legislation, Congress amended 219 of the Interstate Commerce Act to make 20(12) applicable to motor carriers. It did so without including the qualifying phrase. The amendment reads simply: 'Sec. 219. The provisions of section 20(11) and (12) of this Act, together with such other provisions of such part (including penalties) as may be necessary for the enforcement of such provisions, shall apply with respect to common carriers by motor vehicle with like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically applicable.' </s> Unless we are to assume that Congress, in enacting 1013, included the phrase, 'in the case of service subject to this chapter,' for no purpose whatsoever, while at the same time approving a similar section which did not include the qualifying phrase, we must give it the effect contended for by petitioners. Respondent suggests no other. That meaning is supported by the explanation of 1013 given by Representative Wolverton, a member of the </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 473] </s> committee which drafted the section. However, doubt is cast upon the correctness of this interpretation by a contrary statement in the House Committee report. This report states flatly that 'in case the loss or damage to the property transported occurs on the line of a carrier whose service the freight forwarder utilizes, the freight forwarder will have the right of subrogation against the carrie under section 20(12).'8 We are warned, however, that the report is to be discounted in some particulars. Representative Wolverton prefaced his section-by-section analysis of the bill with this significant statement: 'In some respects the report which accompanies this bill is not as complete as it might be. Due to limitations of time, the report was not submitted to the members of the committee or subcommittee, and therefore it may not be out of place to include in these remarks some further explanations which may be helpful to the Members in their consideration of the measure. In a few instances, which will be mentioned later, the report may not be so phrased as to convey fully the sense of what was intended.'9 </s> That he had 1013 specifically in mind is clearly shown by his remarks explaining that section: 'In its explanation of section 413 ( 1013), the report which accompanied the bill is not strictly accurate in interpreting the intended legal effect of making section 20(11) and (12) of part I applicable to freight forwarders. It should be understood that, in so far as a given service to its shipper is covered by the published rate of a freight forwarder, the latter is the only person to which such shipper is entitled to look for recovery of damages, and it is </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 474] </s> in this sense that the forwarder is to 'be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company.' If damage to a shipment occurs on the line of a common carrier whose services are being utilized by the forwarder, the forwarder has no right of subrogation under section 20(12), since its own shipper never had any right of action against such carrier. The forwarder's recovery against the carrier would be upon the bill of lading issued to it by such carrier and under the provisions of law applicable thereto. The reference to paragraph (12) of section 20 was included in section 413 ( 1013) to cover a combination of services performed directly for the owner of the goods, such as would occur when two or more forwarders were involved.'10 </s> In weighing the relative importance of this statement and the committee report, a number of additional facts assume importance. The bill under consideration was reported unanimously by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 11 Congressman Wolverton, who was the ranking minority member of the committee, spoke in behalf of the bill and presented the only extended exposition of its provisions. His explanation of its meaning was not challenged or contradicted by any member of the committee. On the contrary, his part in its draft- </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 475] </s> ing was recognized by the chairman of the committee,12 and his remarks have been quoted as authority by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 13 </s> In this posture of events, the committee report can be given little weight. A report not previously submitted to members of the committee and expressly contradicted without challenge on the floor of the House by a ranking member of the committee can hardly be considered authoritative. The Committee of Conference, of which Representative Wolverton was a member, adopted 1013 exactly as it appeared in the House amendment. It bore, at that time, the gloss placed upon it on the floor of the House. 14 Under those circumstances, we cannot construe </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 476] </s> the statute to give forwarders the right-over against underlying carriers under 20(12). Second. Such a construction would, moreover, be out of harmony with the previously existing relationship between forwarders and carriers regulated by Parts I, II, and III of the Interstate Commerce Act, a relationship which Part IV unquestionably accepted and continued. Prior to the enactment of the Forwarder Act, this Court held in a number of cases that forwarders are shippers insofar as carriers are concerned, and that the latter cannot discriminate in favor of or against forwarders, nor enter into joint or proportional rates with them absent legislative authority. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 1911, 220 U.S. 235 ; Great Northern R. Co. v. O'Connor, 1914, 232 U.S. 508 ; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 1917, 243 U.S. 444 ; United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., supra; Acme Fast Freight, Inc., v. United States, supra. It is clear that this relationship was not altered by the enactment of Part IV. Nowhere in the Act are freight forwarders referred to as carriers. Congress defined the term, 'freight forwarder' in 1002(a)(5) to mean any person which 'otherwise than as a carrier subject to part I, II, or III of this title' consolidates goods for shipment, etc. In one section where, by inadvertence, forwarders were referred to as carriers, an amendment was passed less than two months later striking out 'carrier' and substituting 'freight forwarder.'15 The statements by </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 477] </s> committee members on the floor of the House16 leave no doubt that it was not the intent of Congress to alter the forwarders' status as shippers vis- a-vis carriers by rail, highway, and water. The fact that Congress studiously avoided characterizing forwarders as carriers, while at the same time subjecting them to many of the duties and responsibilities of such carriers, serves to emphasize the distinction drawn by the Act. The reason for this distinction has already been suggested. In their relations with shippers, forwarders unquestionably perform functions and have duties similar to the functions and duties of common carriers. Their activities are not essentially different from those of express companies, which are common carriers by definition, under 1(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1(3), 49 U.S.C.A. 1(3). Nevertheless, Congress recog- </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 478] </s> nized that forwarders occupy a different position in their dealings with the carriers whose services they utilize. 17 For that reason, they refused to sanction the joint rates that forwarders had established with certain motor carriers. See Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, supra. According to Representative Wolverton's statement on the floor of the House, 'it would be illogical and anomalous to permit the making of so- called joint rates in such a situation. The maintenance of a joint rate by a carrier and a shipper would be an absurdity. If nevertheless permitted, it would enable such shipper to receive rebates through the medium of divisions of the joint rate.'18 Carriers subject to Parts I, II, and III were permitted by 1008 of the Act to establish so-called 'assem- </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 479] </s> bling and distribution' rates, which were designed to give the forwarder the benefit of rates lower than those available to other shippers, because of savings to the carriers effected by some services performed by the forwarder. This was thought to be consistent with the position of the forwarder as shipper, however, and such rates could not be lowered beyond an amount which would reflect the savings. It is significant, too, that these rates were not applicable to line-haul or carload freight, but only to the services performed by carriers in bringing less than carload shipments from off-line points to the forwarder's concentration point and from break-bulk point to final destination. 19 It is therefore clear beyond argument that Congress intended to preserve the existing shipper-carrier relationship between forwarders and those carriers regulated by Parts, I, II, and III of the Act. Third. The Court of Appeals, while conceding that forwarders are still shippers vis-a-vis carriers under the Act, held that for the purposes of 1013 alone, they are to be regarded as initial carriers, while the railroads, motor vehicles, and boats whose services are utilized by forwarders are to be considered connecting carriers. Respondent goes farther. It contends not only that the liability provisions of the uniform rail bill of lading issued to the forwarder for his carload shipment may be disregarded, but that the railroad need not issue its bill of lading at all. In its view, Missouri, Kansas & Texas </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 480] </s> R. Co. of Texas v. Ward, 1917, 244 U.S. 383 , which struck down conditions in the bill of lading issued without consideration by a connecting carrier, is decisive of the invalidity of the conditions imposed by the rail bill of lading here in controversy. We do not agree, nor can we believe that the contention is seriously made. The underlying carrier's haul involves a different shipment, a different consideration, a different origin, a different destination, and a different consignor and consignee than are involved in the forwarder's undertaking. Furthermore, respondent's contention leads to the conclusion that railroads, whose bills of lading have long been prescribed by the I.C. C. and filed with rail tariffs, must transport freight on bills of lading subject to change at will by the forwarder and possibly different in many respects from the uniform rail bill. See e.g., Chain Deliveries Express, Inc., 260 I.C.C., 149, 151 (1943). That certainly has not been the position taken by the I.C.C. since enactment of Part IV,20 nor was the contention accepted by either of the courts below in this case. The real issue is whether, granting that both forwarder and underlying carrier must issue bills of lading, the liability provisions of bills issued by the latter are to be considered null and void when forwarder freight is being hauled. We think that the whole scheme of the Act, its language and history, negative that proposition. As has been noted, the forwarder remains a shipper in its relations with underlying carriers under the Act. It is a shipper to whom carriers are forbidden to give any undue or unreasonable preference in any respect whatsoever, under the specific provisions of the Act. 1004(c). </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 481] </s> On the other hand, forwarders, like other shippers, may discriminate as they choo e between carriers. 1004(b). If the liability provisions of the carrier bill of lading are inapplicable, other difficulties are presented. Since they are not bound to use the uniform bill of lading, forwarders may adopt a limitation period for the submission of claims longer than nine months, the minimum period permitted by 20(11). Since the rail bill of lading, which prescribes a nine-month period, would apply to all shippers other than shippers by freight forwarder, the former would thus be discriminated against contrary to 1004(c). Similarly, a shipper by freight forwarder might wish to contract for common-law liability by paying the higher tariff to the forwarder, as he must be permitted to do under 20(11). Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Rankin, 1916, 241 U.S. 319 , L.R.A.1917A, 265. The forwarder, on the other hand, pays the lower declared value rate to the railroad for the carload shipment. If the shipment were lost or damaged, the shipper could undoubtedly recover its actual value from the forwarder, but under ordinary circumstances the latter would be confined to recovery from the railroad of a proportional part of the declared value of the carload shipment. Section 20(12) provides, however, that the right- over is in the amount of the loss, damage, or injury as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof. Under respondent's theory, its bill of lading would be controlling, and the forwarder would be entitled to full recovery despite the fact that it had contracted with the carrier at the reduced rate. This result is clearly contrary to Great Northern R. Co. v. O'Connor, supra, which was relied on by the Court of Appeals in the present case. In addition, the factors which Congress felt made the original Carmack Amendment workable are totally absent </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 482] </s> in the case of freight forwarders. Congressman Richardson, in explaining its purpose to the House, said: 'The reasons for inducing us to (make the initial carrier liable for loss or damage) were the initial carrier has a through route connection with the secondary carrier on whose route the loss occurred, and the settlement between them will be an easy matter, while the shippper would be at a heavy expense in the institution of a suit. If a judgment is obtained against the initial carrier, no doubt exists but that the secondary carrier will pay it at once. Why? Because the arrangement, the concert, the cooperation, the through route courtesies between them would be broken up if prompt payment were not made. We have done that in Conference.'21 See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 1911, 219 U.S. 186, 201 , 168, 31 L.R.A.,N.S., 7. </s> The railroads have done exactly as was suggested. Elaborate freight- claim rules have been established covering the investigation, settlement, and defense of claims and the allocation of liability between carriers when, as is frequently the case, responsibility for loss or damage cannot be precisely ascertained. Arbitration boards settle disputes arising between carriers under the rules. As a practical matter, the right-over given by 20(12) is very little used by carriers, and indeed it is of no value when responsibility cannot definitely be placed upon any one carrier. The considerations that made 20(12) workable as applied to railroads are not, however, applicable to freight forwarders. They enter into no 'arrangements,' 'concerts,' 'cooperation,' or 'through route courtesies' with railroads. As shippers they are forbidden by law to do </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 483] </s> so. Furthermore, the forwarder will always be in the position of a receiving or delivering carrier seeking the right-over against 'connecting' carriers, never in the position of a carrier against whom the right-over is asserted. A railroad against which a claim has been filed as receiving or delivering carrier will ordinarily represent the connecting carrier as if no right-over existed, since it must depend in other cases upon similar representation by other roads. Details of such representation are, in fact, prescribed by the Freight Claim Rules, which are subscribed to by nearly all railroads. But the forwarder is always its own representative, and as between its customer, the shipper, and an underlying carrier allegedly responsible for loss or damage, the forwarder's tendency would naturally be to placate the former at the expense of the latter if the right-over existed and was applicable. These facts are, we feel, persuasive that Congress meant the right-over given in 1013 to extend no farther than to actions against those with whom forwarders are permitted to enter into cooperative arrangements-i.e., against those to whom the forwarder does not bear the relation of shipper. Fourth. Two arguments are made as to the inequity that will result from requiring forwarders to comply with the requirements of 20(11) without giving them the rights of initial carriers under 20(12). It is said that Congress could not have intended to make the forwarder an insurer of freight while requiring at the same time that it file and prove claims against carriers as if it were an ordinary shipper. Secondly, it is argued that the forwarder must, under 20(11), allow at least nine months for the filing of claims by shippers, and if the forwarder is subject to a similar limitation period, there will necessarily be some claims filed by shippers at the end of the period which the forwarder will not be able to refile against the carrier in time. </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 484] </s> The first contention is the result of a serious misconception as to the liability of freight forwarders prior to enactment of Part IV. This misconception is based on a failure to distinguish between two very different kinds of 'forwarders.'22 The term was originally applied to persons who arrange for the transportation by common carrier of the shipper's goods. The forwarder did not necessarily consolidate the individual consignments into carload lots, and its duties, as agent of the shipper, went no farther than procuring transportation by carrier and handling the details of shipment. Forwarders of this type charged fees for their services, which the shipper paid in addition to the freight charges of the carrier utilized for the actual transportation. Later, a different type of forwarding service was offered. This forwarder picked up the less than carload shipment at the shipper's place of business and engaged to deliver it safely at its ultimate destination. The freight forwarder charged a rate covering the entire transportation and made its profit by consolidating the shipment with others in carload quantities to take advantage of the spread between carload and 1. c. 1. rates. It held itself out not merely to arrange with common carriers for the transportation of the goods, but rather to deliver them safely to the consignee. The shipper seldom if ever knew which carrier would be utilized in the carriage of his shipment. This difference in function was recognized very early by the courts, and differing standards of liability were imposed. When goods handled by an agent-forwarder were lost or damaged, it was liable to the shipper only for its own negligence, including negligence in selecting </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 485] </s> a carrier. 23 If, on the other hand, the shipment had been entrusted to a forwarder of the second type-i.e., one who contracted to deliver the goods to the consignee at rates set by itself-the forwarder was subjected to common carrier liability for loss or damage whether it or an underlying carrier had been at fault. 24 The fact that the forwarder did not own the carriers whose services it utilized was held to be immaterial. Its undertaking was to deliver the shipment safely at the destination. Common carrier liability was the penalty for failure of fulfilment of that undertaking. The Freight Forwarder Act encompasses only the second type of forwarder described above. Section 1002(a)(5) defines 'freight forwarder' as 'Any person which * * * holds itself out to the general public to transport or provide transportation of property * * * and which, in the ordinary and usual </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 486] </s> course of its undertaking, (A) assembles and consolidates or provides for assembling and consolidating shipments of such property, and performs or provides for the performance of break-bulk and distributing operations with respect to such consolidated shipments, and (B) assumes responsibility for the transportation of such property from point of receipt to point of destination, and (C) utilizes, for the whole or any part of the transportation of such shipments, the services of a carrier or carriers subject to chapter 1, 8 or 12 of this title.'25 (Italics added.) </s> As to this group, as has been pointed out, the liability of common carrier to its shippers has always been the rule. By making 20(11) applicable to these forwarders, Congress did two things: (1) required forwarders to issue bills of lading;26 and (2) made a matter of federal law what had been uniformly adopted by the states as the rule of liability for loss or damage. As applied to railroads, the Carmack Amendment made a significant change, since it prevented the initial carrier from exercising the right given by decision is a majority of states to limit its liability to loss or damage occurring on its own lines. But that right had never been granted to forwarders of the type regulated by Part IV. Their liability has, from the beginning, been extended to loss or damage to the con- </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 487] </s> signment occurring at any time between pick-up at the point of origin and delivery at destination. As shippers, they have, of course, always had a right of action against the underlying carrier at fault. The defense that the goods are not those of the forwarder is not open to the carrier, since, as we have held, the carrier is not concerned with questions of ownership, but must treat the forwarder as shipper. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., supra. The Act thus leaves the freight forwarder in substantially the same position it had previously held with respect to its liability to shippers and its rights against underlying carriers. The hearings, committee reports and debates are bare of any suggestion that forwarders needed relief from the requirement that they file their claims against carriers like other shippers. They have done so for over a century. They have continued to do so since enactment of the Freight Forwarder Act. See, e.g., Merchant Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 1946, 28 Cal.2d 594, 170 P.2d 923; J. R. Kelly Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I.C.C. 315, 318 (1944); Hugh F. Gannon, Inc. Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I. C.C. 219, 220 (1944). We would require a much clearer showing than has been made to find that Congress intended, without increasing the liabilities of forwarders regulated by the Act, to give them a right-over against railroads, ship lines, and line-haul motor carriers as initial carriers under motor carriers as initial carriers under 20(12).27 </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 488] </s> It is true that under the provisions of 20(11), forwarders are now forbidden to limit the period within which claims must be filed by shippers to less than nine months. If forwarders must, in turn, file claims with </s> [336 U.S. 465 , 489] </s> carriers within nine months, respondent contends that in the case of claims filed against a forwarder during the last day or two of the period, it will not have enough time to refile the claim with the proper carrier and will thus have no recourse after having paid the claim. This objection obviously applies to an insignificant proportion of the total claims. Furthermore, if the Interstate Commerce Commission considers the matter to be of sufficient importance, it has the experience and authority to prescribe the proper corrective. In any event, this single inconsistency is hardly sufficient to justify the contention that Congress intended that 1013 be interpreted to make the forwarder an initial carrier with right- over against common carriers who must treat the forwarder as a shipper for all purposes. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Reversed. Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, and Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE would affirm the judgment for reasons stated by Judge Frank, writing for the Court of Appeals. See 166 F.2d 778. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 56 Stat. 284, 49 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 1001 et seq. </s> [Footnote 2 For a full description of freight forwarder practices, see United States v. Chicago Heights Truc ing Co., 1939, 310 U.S. 344 ; Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201; Bills of Lading of Freight Forwarders, 259 I.C.C. 277. </s> [Footnote 3 ' 1013. Bills of lading and delivery of property. The provisions of section 20(11) and (12) of this title, together with such other provisions of chapter 1 of this title, including penalties, as may be necessary for the enforcement of such provisions, shall apply with respect to freight forwarders, in the case of service subject to this chapter, with like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically applicable, and the freight forwarder shall be deemed both the receiving and delivering transportation company for the purposes of such section 20(11) and (12). * * * When the services of a common carrier by motor vehicle subject to chapter 8 of this title are utilized by a freight forwarder for the delivery of property to the consignee named in the freight forwarder's bill of lading, shipping receipt, or freight bill, the property may, with the consent of the freight forwarder, be delivered on the freight bill, and receipted for on the delivery receipt, of the freight forwarder.' [Footnote 4 So far as pertinent here, 20(11) provides: 'Liability of initial carrier for loss; limitation of liability; notice and filing of claim. Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company bject to the provisions of this chapter receiving property for transportation * * * shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading, * * * and any such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company so receiving property for transportation * * * shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not. * * * Provided further, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under the existing law * * *.' </s> [Footnote 5 Section 20(12) provides: 'Recovery by initial carrier from connecting carrier. The common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading, or delivering such property so received and transported, shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained, the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof'. </s> [Footnote 6 Petitioners also make the contention that even assuming the forwarder is an initial carrier with right-over under 20(12), the limitation period provided in 2(b) of the railroad bill of lading is effective to modify that right. They point to numerous modifications of the right-over in the Freight Claims Rules applicable to railroads inter se. And see Article I(a) of Principles and Practices for the Investigation and Disposition of Freight Claims. Under the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to reach that question. </s> [Footnote 7 H.R. Rep. No. 1172, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6. </s> [Footnote 8 Id. at p. 10. [Footnote 9 87 Cong.Rec. 8216. </s> [Footnote 10 87 Cong.Rec. 8220. [Footnote 11 It should be noted that although the debate technically concerned a bill already passed by the Senate (S. 210), the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce had struck everything following the enacting clause, so the measure actually under consideration was a House amendment. This amendment was made the basis of the bill reported by the conference, and 1013 was carried over intact from the House amendment. The conference report was adopted by both houses with little debate. </s> [Footnote 12 Mr. Lea. 'The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Wolverton), as the ranking minority member gave unstinted work to these problems and with an ability of which every member of the committee is well aware. I appreciate his good support of this measure today as well as the fine contributions he has made to other important measures we have brought to the House in recent years.' 87 Cong.Rec. 8227. Later, during debate on the bill reported by the conference, Chairman Lea said: 'I particularly commend the services of the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Wolverton) who has given much of his time, experience, and ability to this measure. It is fortunate for this country that this body has Members so well qualified by experience and ability to give such service to the nation.' 88 Cong.Rec. 4064. [Footnote 13 Pacific Coast Wholesalers' Association, Investigation of Status, 269 IC.C. 504, 513. [Footnote 14 In debate on the bill reported out of conference, Representative Wolverton gave a detailed explanation of the changes made by the Committee of Conference in the House amendment to S. 210. He did not comment specifically on the sections which had not been changed in conference, but said: 'In general, the balance of the bill now presented is substantially identical with that which was passed by the House on October 23, 1941. At that time I explained and commented on its principal provisions, and, to the extent that they are retained in the present measure, what I there said of them still remains applicable.' 88 Cong.Rec. 4068. </s> [Footnote 15 In explanation of this amendment (S. 2642) to 1017(b), Senator Reed said: 'When we passed the so-called freight forwarders' legislation there was some question as to whether or not a freight forwarder was a common carrier. The Senate bill offered no difficulty with that subject. We did not treat a freight forwarder as a common carrier. We passed Senate bill 210, which went to the House and was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. In the House there were a number of bills dealing with the subject. The House struck everything after the enacting clause and substituted one of its own bills. 'When the conference committee finished its work we thought we had a perfect bill. Later it was found that the drafting service had made a mistake as to one word, so Senate bill 2642 was introduc d for the purpose of correcting that error. At one place in the bill which was passed reference was made to a freight forwarder as a carrier. We desire to correct that reference.' 88 Cong.Rec. 6115. </s> [Footnote 16 Mr. Youngdahl: 'Close analysis developed that in many respects freight forwarders, as regards their relations with the actual carriers, are properly to be considered not as carriers but as shippers, and because of this essential difference in character it became necessary to recommend a form of legislation in keeping with that character. Only so, could gross discriminations against other shippers be avoided.' 87 Cong.Rec. 8223. Mr. Wolverton: 'Even though they may assume or incur the obligations of a common carrier toward their own shippers, forwarders nevertheless stand in the role of shippers with respect to the actual carriers whose service they utilize.' 88 Cong.Rec. 4065. See also, to the same effect, J. R. Kelly Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I.C.C. 315, 321. And see Freight Forwarding Investigation, 229 I.C.C. 201, 297Ä304. </s> [Footnote 17 That the relation between express companies and underlying carriers is much different than the relations between forwarders and such carriers is clearly indicated in a letter from the Interstate Commerce Commission to Chairman Lea of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which appears at p. 42 of the Hearings before that committee on H.R. 2764, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. The Commission there said: 'There is a vast distinction between the relations of forwarders and the Express Agency to the underlying carriers. The Express Agency has an identical contract with each rail oad, which would not be true of the forwarder. The profits, if any, accrue to the railroads, whereas under the forwarder arrangement the profits would accrue, as they do now under the joint rates, to the forwarders. The routing of express shipments, although in the control of the Express Agency, must of necessity depend primarily upon available train service rather than upon solicitation by, or concessions from, the transporting carrier, whereas concessions in the amount of compensation to the carrier would be the most important factor in the case of the forwarder. Thus, the considerations which led to the adoption of laws prohibiting unjust discrimination and undue prejudice and preference as between large and influential shippers on the one hand, and smaller shippers on the other, are practically absent in express service, but are highly prominent in forwarder service.' [Footnote 18 87 Cong.Rec. 8218. </s> [Footnote 19 Under 1009, forwarders were permitted to continue operation under joint rates previously established with motor carriers for eighteen months from the date of enactment of Part IV. This provision was thought necessary 'in order to provide a reasonable period of adjustment within which rates and charges may be established pursuant to the provisions of section (1008).' Section 1009 was amended by the Act of February 20, 1946, 60 Stat. 21, to permit the filing of joint rates between forwarders and motor carriers under certain circumstances. </s> [Footnote 20 See e.g., Twin City Shippers Association Freight Forwarder Application, 260 I.C.C. 307, 309. </s> [Footnote 21 40 Cong.Rec. 9580. </s> [Footnote 22 See 1 Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.) 71, 80Ä84; Bunge, Law of Draymen, Freight Forwarders and Warehousemen, p, 111. </s> [Footnote 23 Krender v. Woolcott, 1856, 1 Hilt., N.Y., 223; Heath v. Judson Freight Forwarding Co., 1920, 47 Cal.App. 426, 190 P. 839; Mansfield v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 7 Cir., 1912, 199 F. 95. [Footnote 24 The distinction is made in a number of cases, of which the following is typical: 'The defendants were not forwarders but carriers. A simple engagement to forward goods at New York, marked for a particular destination, is discharged by shipping the goods by the usual or most direct conveyance to the place designated; but an agreement to forward them from New York to the place of destination, the charge for freight for the whole distance being specified in the agreement, is very different. It is an agreement to carry them for that distance, or to be responsible for their safe carriage and delivery at the place designated in the agreement.' Krender v. Woolcott, 1856, 1 Hilt., N.Y., 223. See also, Christenson v. American Express Co., 1870, 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am.Rep. 122; Bare v. American Forwarding Co., 1909, 146 Ill.App. 388; Kettenhofen v. Globe Transfer & Storage Co., 1912, 70 Wash. 645, 127 P. 295, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 902, Ann.Cas. 1914B, 776; Highway Freight Forwarding Co. v. Public Service Commission, 1933, 108 Pa.Super. 178, 164 A. 835. </s> [Footnote 25 For discussion of the problem of assumption of responsibility for the through transportation of property by freight forwarders, see Judson- Sheldon Corp. Application, 260 I.C.C. 473; Universal Transcontinental Corp. Application, 260 I.C.C. 521; J. Nelson Kagarise Application, 260 I.C.C. 745. Cf. United States v. American Union Transport, 1945, 327 U.S. 437 . 90 L.Ed. 772. [Footnote 26 Section 20(11), of course, also includes the Cummins Amendments, 38 Stat. 1196 and 39 Stat. 441, which relate to limitation of liability to the declared value of the shipment. The section adds no new liability, however, to that previously borne by the orwarder. </s> [Footnote 27 The Court of Appeals rejected Representative Wolverton's analysis of 1013 as based on the erroneous premise that the shipper by freight forwarder never had any right of action against the carrier, and therefore the forwarder can have no right of subrogation under 20(12). The court felt that this rationale indicates a withdrawal of the shipper's common- law right of recovery against the responsible carrier, and consequently the placing of the forwarder in the position of an insurer with no right against the carrier responsible for loss or damage. We do not so read that analysis. Of course shippers by freight forwarder have for many years been permitted to sue underlying carriers for loss or damage occasioned by the latter. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 1848, 6 How. 344; Great Northern R. Co. v. O'Connor, 1914, 232 U.S. 508, 509 . The theory of these actions was that the shipper is the undisclosed principal of its agent, the forwarder, in the latter's contract with the carrier. The forwarder, as agent of an undisclosed principal, could, of course, sue on the contract. Merchant Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Drayage Co., 28 Cal.2d 594, 170 P.2d 923. See Bunge, Law of Draymen, Freight Forwarders and Warehousemen, p. 117. See also Restatement of Agency, 322, 364. On the other hand, when a shipper sued a connecting for loss of goods delivered to an initial carrier by railroad, it did so as a disclosed principal. The initial carrier, like the forwarder, acted as agent to contract with the connecting carrier for carriage of goods on the latter's lines, but since it acted for a disclosed principal, it was not a party to the contract. See Bichlmeir v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R. Co., 1915, 159 Wis. 404, 150 N.W. 508; 1 Roberts, Federal Liabilities of Carriers 386. See also Restatement of Agency 320. When the Carmack Amendment was passed, the theory of the liability imposed upon the initial carrier was that it became a principal and all its connecting carriers agents for the transportation of the goods. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Wall, 1916, 241 U.S. 87 ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 1911, 219 U.S. 186, 31 L.R.A.,N.S., 7. Since the initial carrier, unlike the forwarder, did not have a contract right of action against its connecting carriers (i.e. was not a shipper), 20(12) was passed to insure that the burden would fall on the carrier responsible for the loss. The forwarder, however, is a party to the contract with the carrier. It has no need for subrogation to the shipper's rights, as Representative Wolverton indicated. Its recovery against the carrier has always been upon 'the bill of lading issued to it by such carrier and under the provisions of law applicable thereto.' That right remains.

United States Supreme Court SWANN v. ADAMS(1964) No. 297 Argued: Decided: June 22, 1964 </s> Judgment reversed and case remanded. </s> Reported below: 214 F. Supp. 811. </s> Wm. Reece Smith, Jr. for appellant. </s> Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, C. Graham Carothers, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Edward S. Jaffry and Joseph C. Jacobs, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment below is reversed. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 . The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views stated in our opinions in Reynolds v. Sims and in the other cases relating to state legislative apportionment decided along with Reynolds. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK would reverse on the grounds stated in his opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 587 . </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART would remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in his dissenting opinion in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 744 . </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 . </s> [378 U.S. 553, 554]

United States Supreme Court ILLINOIS v. LAFAYETTE(1983) No. 81-1859 Argued: April 20, 1983Decided: June 20, 1983 </s> After respondent was arrested for disturbing the peace, he was taken to the police station. There, without obtaining a warrant and in the process of booking him and inventorying his possessions, the police removed the contents of a shoulder bag respondent had been carrying and found amphetamine pills. Respondent was subsequently charged with violating the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, and at a pretrial hearing the trial court ordered suppression of the pills. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the shoulder bag search did not constitute a valid search incident to a lawful arrest or a valid inventory search of respondent's belongings. </s> Held: </s> The search of respondent's shoulder bag was a valid inventory search. Pp. 643-648. </s> (a) Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police station incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search. Here, every consideration of orderly police administration - protection of a suspect's property, deterrence of false claims of theft against the police, security, and identification of the suspect - benefiting both the police and the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination of respondent's shoulder bag. Pp. 643-647. </s> (b) The fact that the protection of the public and of respondent's property might have been achieved by less intrusive means does not, in itself, render the search unreasonable. Even if some less intrusive means existed, it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be searched, and which must be sealed without examination as a unit. Pp. 647-648. </s> 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N. E. 2d 1383, reversed and remanded. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 649. [462 U.S. 640, 641] </s> Michael A. Ficaro, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, Tyrone C. Fahner, former Attorney General, Paul P. Biebel, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, and Steven F. Molo, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Peter A. Carusona argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Agostinelli and Frank W. Ralph. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Elliott Schulder for the United States; and by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Howard G. Berringer, Richard J. Brzeczek, David Crump, Courtney A. Evans, Daniel B. Hales, James A. Murphy, and Evelle J. Younger for the Chicago Police Department et al. </s> Quin Denvir and George L. Schraer filed a brief for the California State Public Defender as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented is whether, at the time an arrested person arrives at a police station, the police may, without obtaining a warrant, search a shoulder bag carried by that person. </s> I </s> On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p. m., Officer Maurice Mietzner of the Kankakee City Police arrived at the Town Cinema in Kankakee, Ill., in response to a call about a disturbance. There he found respondent involved in an altercation with the theater manager. He arrested respondent for disturbing the peace, handcuffed him, and took him to the police station. Respondent carried a purse-type shoulder bag on the trip to the station. </s> At the police station respondent was taken to the booking room; there, Officer Mietzner removed the handcuffs from respondent and ordered him to empty his pockets and place [462 U.S. 640, 642] the contents on the counter. After doing so, respondent took a package of cigarettes from his shoulder bag and placed the bag on the counter. Mietzner then removed the contents of the bag, and found 10 amphetamine pills inside the plastic wrap of a cigarette package. </s> Respondent was subsequently charged with violating 402(b) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 56 1/2, § 1402(b) (1981), on the basis of the controlled substances found in his shoulder bag. A pretrial suppression hearing was held at which the State argued that the search of the shoulder bag was a valid inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Officer Mietzner testified that he examined the bag's contents because it was standard procedure to inventory "everything" in the possession of an arrested person. App. 15, 16. He testified that he was not seeking and did not expect to find drugs or weapons when he searched the bag, and he conceded that the shoulder bag was small enough that it could have been placed and sealed in a bag, container, or locker for protective purposes. Id., at 15. After the hearing, but before any ruling, the State submitted a brief in which it argued for the first time that the search was valid as a delayed search incident to arrest. Thereafter, the trial court ordered the suppression of the amphetamine pills. Id., at 22. </s> On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N. E. 2d 1383 (3d Dist. 1981). It first held that the State had waived the argument that the search was incident to a valid arrest by failing to raise that argument at the suppression hearing. Id., at 832, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1385. However, the court went on to discuss and reject the State's argument: "[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the State has not waived this argument, the stationhouse search of the shoulder bag did not constitute a valid search incident to a lawful arrest." Id., at 833, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1385. </s> The state court also held that the search was not a valid inventory of respondent's belongings. It purported to distinguish [462 U.S. 640, 643] South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, on the basis that there is a greater privacy interest in a purse-type shoulder bag than in an automobile, and that the State's legitimate interests could have been met in a less intrusive manner, by "sealing [the shoulder bag] within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a secured locker." 99 Ill. App. 3d, at 834-835, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1386. The Illinois court concluded: </s> "Therefore, the postponed warrantless search of the [respondent's] shoulder bag was neither incident to his lawful arrest nor a valid inventory of his belongings, and thus, violated the fourth amendment." Id., at 835, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1386. </s> The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1b. We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 986 (1982), because of the frequency with which this question confronts police and courts, and we reverse. </s> II </s> The question here is whether, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search. Indeed, we have previously established that the inventory search constitutes a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, supra. The Illinois court and respondent rely on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); in the former, we noted that "probable cause to search is irrelevant" in inventory searches and went on to state: </s> "This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant simply have no application in that context; the constitutional [462 U.S. 640, 644] reasonableness of inventory searches must be determined on other bases." 433 U.S., at 10 , n. 5. 1 </s> A so-called inventory search is not an independent legal concept but rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration. To determine whether the search of respondent's shoulder bag was unreasonable we must "balanc[e] its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). </s> In order to see an inventory search in proper perspective, it is necessary to study the evolution of interests along the continuum from arrest to incarceration. We have held that immediately upon arrest an officer may lawfully search the person of an arrestee, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); he may also search the area within the arrestee's immediate control, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). We explained the basis for this doctrine in United States v. Robinson, supra, where we said: </s> "A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest [462 U.S. 640, 645] situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a `reasonable' search under that Amendment." 414 U.S., at 235 (emphasis added). </s> An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station, that is no more than a continuation of the custody inherent in the arrest status. Nonetheless, the factors justifying a search of the person and personal effects of an arrestee upon reaching a police station but prior to being placed in confinement are somewhat different from the factors justifying an immediate search at the time and place of arrest. </s> The governmental interests underlying a station-house search of the arrestee's person and possessions may in some circumstances be even greater than those supporting a search immediately following arrest. Consequently, the scope of a station-house search will often vary from that made at the time of arrest. Police conduct that would be impractical or unreasonable - or embarrassingly intrusive - on the street can more readily - and privately - be performed at the station. For example, the interests supporting a search incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on the street, but the practical necessities of routine jail administration may even justify taking a prisoner's clothes before confining him, although that step would be rare. This was made clear in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804 (1974): "With or without probable cause, the authorities were entitled [at the station house] not only to search [the [462 U.S. 640, 646] arrestee's] clothing but also to take it from him and keep it in official custody." 2 </s> At the station house, it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed. A range of governmental interests supports an inventory process. It is not unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal property taken from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons have been known to make false claims regarding what was taken from their possession at the station house. A standardized procedure for making a list or inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the station house not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested person. Arrested persons have also been known to injure themselves - or others - with belts, knives, drugs, or other items on their person while being detained. Dangerous instrumentalities - such as razor blades, bombs, or weapons - can be concealed in innocent-looking articles taken from the arrestee's possession. The bare recital of these mundane realities justifies reasonable measures by police to limit these risks - either while the items are in police possession or at the time they are returned to the arrestee upon his release. Examining all the items removed from the arrestee's person or possession and listing or inventorying them is an entirely reasonable administrative procedure. It is immaterial whether the police actually fear any particular package or container; the need to protect against such risks arises independently of a particular officer's subjective concerns. See United States v. Robinson, supra, at 235. Finally, inspection of an arrestee's personal property may assist the police in ascertaining or verifying his identity. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 5.3, pp. 306-307 (1978). In short, [462 U.S. 640, 647] every consideration of orderly police administration benefiting both police and the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination of respondent's shoulder bag prior to his incarceration. </s> Our prior cases amply support this conclusion. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), we upheld a search of the contents of the glove compartment of an abandoned automobile lawfully impounded by the police. We held that the search was reasonable because it served legitimate governmental interests that outweighed the individual's privacy interests in the contents of his car. Those measures protected the owner's property while it was in the custody of the police and protected police against possible false claims of theft. We found no need to consider the existence of less intrusive means of protecting the police and the property in their custody - such as locking the car and impounding it in safe storage under guard. Similarly, standardized inventory procedures are appropriate to serve legitimate governmental interests at stake here. </s> The Illinois court held that the search of respondent's shoulder bag was unreasonable because "preservation of the defendant's property and protection of police from claims of lost or stolen property, `could have been achieved in a less intrusive manner.' For example, . . . the defendant's shoulder bag could easily have been secured by sealing it within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a secured locker." 99 Ill. App. 3d, at 835, 425 N. E. 2d, at 1386 (citation omitted). Perhaps so, but the real question is not what "could have been achieved," but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps; it is not our function to write a manual on administering routine, neutral procedures of the station house. Our role is to assure against violations of the Constitution. </s> The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative "less intrusive" means. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), for example, we upheld the search of [462 U.S. 640, 648] the trunk of a car to find a revolver suspected of being there. We rejected the contention that the public could equally well have been protected by the posting of a guard over the automobile. In language equally applicable to this case, we held, "[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by `less intrusive' means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." Id., at 447. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 , n. 12 (1976). We are hardly in a position to second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees and preserve the security of the station house. It is evident that a station-house search of every item carried on or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by the police will amply serve the important and legitimate governmental interests involved. </s> Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit. Only recently in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), we stated that "`[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.'" Id., at 458, quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 -214 (1979). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982). </s> Applying these principles, we hold that it is not "unreasonable" for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures. 3 </s> [462 U.S. 640, 649] </s> The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). In that case we addressed Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), where the Court sustained a warrantless search of an automobile that occurred a week after its owner had been arrested. We explained Cooper in the following manner: "It was no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant, for the Court held the test to be, not whether it was reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search itself was reasonable, which it was." 415 U.S., at 807 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 2 We were not addressing in Edwards, and do not discuss here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate. </s> [Footnote 3 The record is unclear as to whether respondent was to have been incarcerated after being booked for disturbing the peace. That is an appropriate inquiry on remand. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree that the police do not need a warrant or probable cause to conduct an inventory search prior to incarcerating a suspect, and I therefore concur in the judgment. The practical necessities of securing persons and property in a jailhouse setting justify an inventory search as part of the standard procedure incident to incarceration. </s> A very different case would be presented if the State had relied solely on the fact of arrest to justify the search of respondent's shoulder bag. A warrantless search incident to arrest must be justified by a need to remove weapons or prevent the destruction of evidence. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Officer Mietzner did not in fact deem it necessary to search the bag when he arrested respondent, and I seriously doubt that such a search would have been lawful. A search at the time of respondent's arrest could not have been justified by a need to prevent the destruction of evidence, for there is no evidence or fruits of the offense - disturbing the peace - of which respondent was suspected. Moreover, although a concern about weapons might have justified seizure of the bag, such a concern could not have justified the further step of searching the bag following its seizure. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); id., at 17, and n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). </s> [462 U.S. 640, 650]

United States Supreme Court TENNESSEE v. LANE et al.(2004) No. 02-1667 Argued: January 13, 2004Decided: May 17, 2004 </s> Respondent paraplegics filed this action for damages and equitable relief, alleging that Tennessee and a number of its counties had denied them physical access to that State's courts in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which provides: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation or denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity," 42 U.S. C. §12132. After the District Court denied the State's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, the Sixth Circuit held the appeal in abeyance pending Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356. This Court later ruled in Garrett that the Eleventh Amendment bars private money damages actions for state violations of ADA Title I, which prohibits employment discrimination against the disabled. The en banc Sixth Circuit then issued its Popovich decision, in which it interpreted Garrett to bar private ADA suits against States based on equal protection principles, but not those relying on due process, and therefore permitted a Title II damages action to proceed despite the State's immunity claim. Thereafter, a Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal denial in this case, explaining that respondents' claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles. In response to a rehearing petition arguing that Popovich did not control because respondents' complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion, explaining that due process protects the right of access to the courts, and that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II established, inter alia, that physical barriers in courthouses and courtrooms have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity for such access. Held:As it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, Title II constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's substantive guarantees. Pp.4-23. (a)Determining whether Congress has constitutionally abrogated a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity requires resolution of two predicate questions: (1) whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate; and (2), if so, whether it acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73. The first question is easily answered here, since the ADA specifically provides for abrogation. See §12202. With regard to the second question, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456. That power is not, however, unlimited. While Congress must have a wide berth in devising appropriate remedial and preventative measures for unconstitutional actions, those measures may not work a "substantive change in the governing law." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519. In Boerne, the Court set forth the test for distinguishing between permissible remedial legislation and unconstitutional substantive redefinition: Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits "a congruence and proportionality" between an injury and the means adopted to prevent or remedy it. Id., at 520. Applying the Boerne test in Garrett, the Court concluded that ADA Title I was not a valid exercise of Congress' §5 power because the historical record and the statute's broad sweep suggested that Title I's true aim was not so much enforcement, but an attempt to "rewrite" this Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 531 U.S., at 372-374. In view of significant differences between Titles I and II, however, Garrett left open the question whether Title II is a valid exercise of Congress' §5 power, id., at 360, n.1. Pp.5-10. </s> (b)Title II is a valid exercise of Congress' §5 enforcement power. Pp.11-23. </s> (1)The Boerne inquiry's first step requires identification of the constitutional rights Congress sought to enforce when it enacted Title II. Garrett, 405 U.S. 330, 336-337. Whether Title II validly enforces such constitutional rights is a question that "must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects." E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308. Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment of persons with disabilities in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights. The historical experience that Title II reflects is also documented in the decisions of this and other courts, which have identified unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of public programs and services. With respect to the particular services at issue, Congress learned that many individuals, in many States, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities. A Civil Rights Commission report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by such persons. Congress also heard testimony from those persons describing the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses. And its appointed task force heard numerous examples of their exclusion from state judicial services and programs, including failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical disabilities. The sheer volume of such evidence far exceeds the record in last Term's Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-733, in which the Court approved the family-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 as valid §5 legislation. Congress' finding in the ADA that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ... access to public services," §12101(a)(3), together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes clear that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation. Pp.11-18. </s> (2)Title II is an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment. Unquestionably, it is valid §5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services. Congress' chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion and discrimination at issue, Title II's requirement of program accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts. The long history of unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has persisted despite several state and federal legislative efforts to remedy the problem. Faced with considerable evidence of the shortcomings of these previous efforts, Congress was justified in concluding that the difficult and intractable problem of disability discrimination warranted added prophylactic measures. Hibbs, 351 U.S. 12, and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, make clear that ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts. Judged against this backdrop, Title II's affirmative obligation to accommodate is a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end. Pp.18-23. 315 F. 3d 680, affirmed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed dissenting opinions. </s> TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [May 17, 2004] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 337, 42 U.S.C. §§12131-12165, provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." §12132. The question presented in this case is whether Title II exceeds Congress' power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I </s> In August 1998, respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones filed this action against the State of Tennessee and a number of Tennessee counties, alleging past and ongoing violations of Title II. Respondents, both of whom are paraplegics who use wheelchairs for mobility, claimed that they were denied access to, and the services of, the state court system by reason of their disabilities. Lane alleged that he was compelled to appear to answer a set of criminal charges on the second floor of a county courthouse that had no elevator. At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two flights of stairs to get to the courtroom. When Lane returned to the courthouse for a hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom; he consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she has not been able to gain access to a number of county courthouses, and, as a result, has lost both work and an opportunity to participate in the judicial process. Respondents sought damages and equitable relief. The State moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion without opinion, and the State appealed.1 The United States intervened to defend Title II's abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. On April 28, 2000, after the appeal had been briefed and argued, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered an order holding the case in abeyance pending our decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). </s> In Garrett, we concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of the ADA. We left open, however, the question whether the Eleventh Amendment permits suits for money damages under Title II. Id., at 360, n.1. Following the Garrett decision, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, heard argument in a Title II suit brought by a hearing-impaired litigant who sought money damages for the State's failure to accommodate his disability in a child custody proceeding. Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court, 276 F.3d 808 (CA6 2002). A divided court permitted the suit to proceed despite the State's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The majority interpreted Garrett to bar private ADA suits against States based on equal protection principles, but not those that rely on due process principles. 276 F.3d, at 811-816. The minority concluded that Congress had not validly abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity for any Title II claims, id., at 821, while the concurring opinion concluded that Title II validly abrogated state sovereign immunity with respect to both equal protection and due process claims, id., at 818. </s> Following the en banc decision in Popovich, a panel of the Court of Appeals entered an order affirming the District Court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss in this case. Judgt. order reported at 40 Fed. Appx. 911 (CA6 2002). The order explained that respondents' claims were not barred because they were based on due process principles. In response to a petition for rehearing arguing that Popovich was not controlling because the complaint did not allege due process violations, the panel filed an amended opinion. It explained that the Due Process Clause protects the right of access to the courts, and that the evidence before Congress when it enacted Title II "established that physical barriers in government buildings, including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause." 315 F.3d 680, 682 (CA6 2003). Moreover, that "record demonstrated that public entities' failure to accommodate the needs of qualified persons with disabilities may result directly from unconstitutional animus and impermissible stereotypes." Id., at 683. The panel did not, however, categorically reject the State's submission. It instead noted that the case presented difficult questions that "cannot be clarified absent a factual record," and remanded for further proceedings. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 539 U.S. 941 (2003), and now affirm. II </s> The ADA was passed by large majorities in both Houses of Congress after decades of deliberation and investigation into the need for comprehensive legislation to address discrimination against persons with disabilities. In the years immediately preceding the ADA's enactment, Congress held 13 hearings and created a special task force that gathered evidence from every State in the Union. The conclusions Congress drew from this evidence are set forth in the task force and Committee Reports, described in lengthy legislative hearings, and summarized in the preamble to the statute.2 Central among these conclusions was Congress' finding that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society." 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(7). </s> Invoking "the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce," the ADA is designed "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." §§12101(b)(1), (b)(4). It forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III. </s> Title II, §§12131-12134, prohibits any public entity from discriminating against "qualified" persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or activities. The Act defines the term "public entity" to include state and local governments, as well as their agencies and instrumentalities. §12131(1). Persons with disabilities are "qualified" if they, "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, mee[t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." §12131(2). Title II's enforcement provision incorporates by reference §505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, as added, 29 U.S.C. §794a, which authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money damages. 42 U.S.C. §12133. III </s> The Eleventh Amendment renders the States immune from "any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted ... by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Even though the Amendment "by its terms ... applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State," our cases have repeatedly held that this immunity also applies to unconsented suits brought by a State's own citizens. Garrett, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000). Our cases have also held that Congress may abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. To determine whether it has done so in any given case, we "must resolve two predicate questions: first, whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Id., at 73. The first question is easily answered in this case. The Act specifically provides: "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. §12202. As in Garrett, see 531 U.S., at 363-364, no party disputes the adequacy of that expression of Congress' intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The question, then, is whether Congress had the power to give effect to its intent. </s> In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), we held that Congress can abrogate a State's sovereign immunity when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive guarantees of that Amendment. Id., at 456. This enforcement power, as we have often acknowledged, is a "broad power indeed." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982), citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).3 It includes "the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." Kimel, 538 U.S. 721, 727-728 (2003). See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).4 The most recent affirmation of the breadth of Congress' §5 power came in Hibbs, in which we considered whether a male state employee could recover money damages against the State for its failure to comply with the family-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 107 Stat. 6, 29 U.S.C. §2601 et seq. We upheld the FMLA as a valid exercise of Congress' §5 power to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination, even though there was no suggestion that the State's leave policy was adopted or applied with a discriminatory purpose that would render it unconstitutional under the rule of Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination, §5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause. </s> Congress' §5 power is not, however, unlimited. While Congress must have a wide berth in devising appropriate remedial and preventative measures for unconstitutional actions, those measures may not work a "substantive change in the governing law." Boerne, 521 U.S., at 519. In Boerne, we recognized that the line between remedial legislation and substantive redefinition is "not easy to discern," and that "Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies." Id., at 519-520. But we also confirmed that "the distinction exists and must be observed," and set forth a test for so observing it: Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits "a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id., at 520. </s> In Boerne, we held that Congress had exceeded its §5 authority when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). We began by noting that Congress enacted RFRA "in direct response" to our decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), for the stated purpose of "restor[ing]" a constitutional rule that Smith had rejected. 521 U.S., at 512, 515 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though the respondent attempted to defend the statute as a reasonable means of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith, we concluded that RFRA was "so out of proportion" to that objective that it could be understood only as an attempt to work a "substantive change in constitutional protections." Id., at 529, 532. Indeed, that was the very purpose of the law. </s> This Court further defined the contours of Boerne's "congruence and proportionality" test in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). At issue in that case was the validity of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (hereinafter Patent Remedy Act), a statutory amendment Congress enacted in the wake of our decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), to clarify its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from patent infringement suits. Florida Prepaid, 528 U.S. 62 (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act exceeded Congress' §5 powers under Boerne); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act). </s> Applying the Boerne test in Garrett, we concluded that Title I of the ADA was not a valid exercise of Congress' §5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on unconstitutional disability discrimination in public employment. As in Florida Prepaid, we concluded Congress' exercise of its prophylactic §5 power was unsupported by a relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations. 531 U.S., at 368, 374. Although the dissent pointed out that Congress had before it a great deal of evidence of discrimination by the States against persons with disabilities, id., at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting), the Court's opinion noted that the "overwhelming majority" of that evidence related to "the provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III," rather than Title I, id., at 371, n.7. We also noted that neither the ADA's legislative findings nor its legislative history reflected a concern that the States had been engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination. We emphasized that the House and Senate Committee Reports on the ADA focused on "'discrimination [in] ... employment in the private sector,'" and made no mention of discrimination in public employment. Id., at 371-372 (quoting S.Rep. No. 101-116, p.6 (1989), and H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, p.28 (1990)) (emphasis in Garrett). Finally, we concluded that Title I's broad remedial scheme was insufficiently targeted to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination in public employment. Taken together, the historical record and the broad sweep of the statute suggested that Title I's true aim was not so much to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions against disability discrimination in public employment as it was to "rewrite" this Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 531 U.S., at 372-374. </s> In view of the significant differences between Titles I and II, however, Garrett left open the question whether Title II is a valid exercise of Congress' §5 enforcement power. It is to that question that we now turn. IV </s> The first step of the Boerne inquiry requires us to identify the constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted Title II. Garrett, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). As we observed, classifications based on disability violate that constitutional command if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Garrett, 531 U.S., at 366 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S., at 446). Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce this prohibition on irrational disability discrimination. But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial review. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-337 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). These rights include some, like the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, both guarantee to a criminal defendant such as respondent Lane the "right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n.15 (1975). The Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial proceedings. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). We have held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendants the right to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community, noting that the exclusion of "identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). And, finally, we have recognized that members of the public have a right of access to criminal proceedings secured by the First Amendment. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1986). </s> Whether Title II validly enforces these constitutional rights is a question that "must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). See also Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S., at 639-640; Boerne, 521 U.S., at 530. While §5 authorizes Congress to enact reasonably prophylactic remedial legislation, the appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of the harm it seeks to prevent. "Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies," Kimel, 528 U.S., at 88, but it is also true that "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one," Boerne, 521 U.S., at 530. It is not difficult to perceive the harm that Title II is designed to address. Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs, including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights. For example, "[a]s of 1979, most States ... categorically disqualified 'idiots' from voting, without regard to individual capacity."5 The majority of these laws remain on the books,6 and have been the subject of legal challenge as recently as 2001.7 Similarly, a number of States have prohibited and continue to prohibit persons with disabilities from engaging in activities such as marrying8 and serving as jurors.9 The historical experience that Title II reflects is also documented in this Court's cases, which have identified unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of settings, including unjustified commitment, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); the abuse and neglect of persons committed to state mental health hospitals, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982);10 and irrational discrimination in zoning decisions, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The decisions of other courts, too, document a pattern of unequal treatment in the adminis-tration of a wide range of public services, programs,and activities, including the penal system,11 publiceducation,12 and voting.13 Notably, these decisions also demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice.14 This pattern of disability discrimination persisted despite several federal and state legislative efforts to address it. In the deliberations that led up to the enactment of the ADA, Congress identified important shortcomings in existing laws that rendered them "inadequate to address the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing." S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 18. See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 47.15 It also uncovered further evidence of those shortcomings, in the form of hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions. See Garrett, 531 U.S., at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id., at 391 (App. C to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting). As the Court's opinion in Garrett observed, the "overwhelming majority" of these examples concerned discrimination in the administration of public programs and services. Id., at 371, n.7; Government's Lodging in Garrett, O.T. 2000, No. 99-1240 (available in Clerk of Court's case file). </s> With respect to the particular services at issue in this case, Congress learned that many individuals, in many States across the country, were being excluded from courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities. A report before Congress showed that some 76% of public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with disabilities, even taking into account the possibility that the services and programs might be restructured or relocated to other parts of the buildings. U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 39 (1983). Congress itself heard testimony from persons with disabilities who described the physical inaccessibility of local courthouses. Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4468 before the House Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 40-41, 48 (1988). And its appointed task force heard numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and programs, including exclusion of persons with visual impairments and hearing impairments from jury service, failure of state and local governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired, failure to permit the testimony of adults with developmental disabilities in abuse cases, and failure to make courtrooms accessible to witnesses with physical disabilities. Government's Lodging in Garrett, O.T. 2000, No. 99-1240. See also Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment (Oct. 12, 1990).16 Given the sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services, the dissent's contention that the record is insufficient to justify Congress' exercise of its prophylactic power is puzzling, to say the least. Just last Term in Hibbs, we approved the family-care leave provision of the FMLA as valid §5 legislation based primarily on evidence of disparate provision of parenting leave, little of which concerned unconstitutional state conduct. 538 U.S., at 728-733.17 We explained that because the FMLA was targeted at sex-based classifications, which are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, "it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations" than in Garrett or Kimel, both of which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to rational-basis review. 538 U.S., at 735-737. Title II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights, including the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, that call for a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based classifications. And in any event, the record of constitutional violations in this case--including judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the enjoyment of public services--far exceeds the record in Hibbs. </s> The conclusion that Congress drew from this body of evidence is set forth in the text of the ADA itself: "[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ... education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services." 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(3) (emphasis added). This finding, together with the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation. V </s> The only question that remains is whether Title II is an appropriate response to this history and pattern of unequal treatment. At the outset, we must determine the scope of that inquiry. Title II--unlike RFRA, the Patent Remedy Act, and the other statutes we have reviewed for validity under §5--reaches a wide array of official conduct in an effort to enforce an equally wide array of constitutional guarantees. Petitioner urges us both to examine the broad range of Title II's applications all at once, and to treat that breadth as a mark of the law's invalidity. According to petitioner, the fact that Title II applies not only to public education and voting-booth access but also to seating at state-owned hockey rinks indicates that Title II is not appropriately tailored to serve its objectives. But nothing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as an undifferentiated whole.18 Whatever might be said about Title II's other applications, the question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power under §5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts. Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid §5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services, we need go no further. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960).19 Congress' chosen remedy for the pattern of exclusion and discrimination described above, Title II's requirement of program accessibility, is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts. The unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability discrimination. Faced with considerable evidence of the shortcomings of previous legislative responses, Congress was justified in concluding that this "difficult and intractable proble[m]" warranted "added prophylactic measures in response." Hibbs, 538 U.S., at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted). </s> The remedy Congress chose is nevertheless a limited one. Recognizing that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility. 42 U.S.C. §12131(2). But Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs. It requires only "reasonable modifications" that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service. Ibid. As Title II's implementing regulations make clear, the reasonable modification requirement can be satisfied in a number of ways. In the case of facilities built or altered after 1992, the regulations require compliance with specific architectural accessibility standards. 28 CFR §35.151 (2003). But in the case of older facilities, for which structural change is likely to be more difficult, a public entity may comply with Title II by adopting a variety of less costly measures, including relocating services to alternative, accessible sites and assigning aides to assist persons with disabilities in accessing services. §35.150(b)(1). Only if these measures are ineffective in achieving accessibility is the public entity required to make reasonable structural changes. Ibid. And in no event is the entity required to undertake measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the service. §§35.150(a)(2), (a)(3). </s> This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, "within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard" in its courts. Boddie, 401 U.S., at 379 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).20 Our cases have recognized a number of affirmative obligations that flow from this principle: the duty to waive filing fees in certain family-law and criminal cases,21 the duty to provide transcripts to criminal defendants seeking review of their convictions,22 and the duty to provide counsel to certain criminal defendants.23 Each of these cases makes clear that ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts. Judged against this backdrop, Title II's affirmative obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the administration of justice cannot be said to be "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Boerne, 521 U.S., at 532; Kimel, 528 U.S., at 86.24 It is, rather, a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end. </s> For these reasons, we conclude that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' §5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. </s> TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [May 17, 2004] </s> Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion subject to the same caveats about the Court's recent cases on the Eleventh Amendment and §5 of the Fourteenth that I noted in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring). </s> Although I concur in the Court's approach applying the congruence-and-proportionality criteria to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as a guarantee of access to courts and related rights, I note that if the Court engaged in a more expansive enquiry as The Chief Justice suggests, post, at 15 (dissenting opinion), the evidence to be considered would underscore the appropriateness of action under §5 to address the situation of disabled individuals before the courts, for that evidence would show that the judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very discrimination subject to congressional remedy under §5. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927), was not grudging in sustaining the constitutionality of the once-pervasive practice of involuntarily sterilizing those with mental disabilities. See id., at 207 ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.... Three generations of imbeciles are enough"). Laws compelling sterilization were often accompanied by others indiscriminately requiring institutionalization, and prohibiting certain individuals with disabilities from marrying, from voting, from attending public schools, and even from appearing in public. One administrative action along these lines was judicially sustained in part as a justified precaution against the very sight of a child with cerebral palsy, lest he "produc[e] a depressing and nauseating effect" upon others. State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Ed. of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 232, 172 N.W. 153 (1919) (approving his exclusion from public school).1 </s> Many of these laws were enacted to implement the quondam science of eugenics, which peaked in the 1920's, yet the statutes and their judicial vindications sat on the books long after eugenics lapsed into discredit.2 See U. S. Civil Rights Commission, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 19-20 (1983). Quite apart from the fateful inspiration behind them, one pervasive fault of these provisions was their failure to reflect the "amount of flexibility and freedom" required to deal with "the wide variation in the abilities and needs" of people withdisabilities. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985). Instead, like other invidiousdiscrimination, they classified people without regard toindividual capacities, and by that lack of regard didgreat harm. In sustaining the application of Title II today, the Court takes a welcome step away from the judiciary's prior endorsement of blunt instruments imposing legal handicaps. </s> TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [May 17, 2004] </s> Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter andJustice Breyer join, concurring. </s> For the reasons stated by the Court, and mindful of Congress' objective in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act--the elimination or reduction of physical and social structures that impede people with some present, past, or perceived impairments from contributing, according to their talents, to our Nation's social, economic, and civic life--I join the Court's opinion. </s> The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213, is a measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with disabilities. See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 Va. L.Rev. 397, 471 (2000) (ADA aims both to "guarante[e] a baseline of equal citizenship by protecting against stigma and systematic exclusion from public and private opportunities, and [to] protec[t] society against the loss of valuable talents"). As the Court's opinion relates, see ante, at 5, the Act comprises three parts, prohibiting discrimination in employment (Title I), public services, programs, and activities (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III). This case concerns Title II, which controls the conduct of administrators of public undertakings. </s> Including individuals with disabilities among people who count in composing "We the People," Congress understood in shaping the ADA, would sometimes require not blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but accommodation. Central to the Act's primary objective, Congress extended the statute's range to reach all government activities, §12132 (Title II), and required "reasonable modifications to [public actors'] rules, policies, or practices," §§12131(2)-12132 (Title II). See also §12112(b)(5) (defining discrimination to include the failure to provide "reasonable accommodations") (Title I); §12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring "reasonable modifications in [public accommodations'] policies, practices, or procedures") (Title III); Bagenstos, supra, at 435 (ADA supporters sought "to eliminate the practices that combine with physical and mental conditions to create what we call 'disability.' The society-wide universal access rules serve this function on the macro level, and the requirements of individualized accommodation and modification fill in the gaps on the micro level." (footnote omitted)). </s> In Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), this Court responded with fidelity to the ADA's accommodation theme when it held a State accountable for failing to provide community residential placements for people with disabilities. The State argued in Olmstead that it had acted impartially, for it provided no community placements for individuals without disabilities. Id., at 598. Congress, the Court observed, advanced in the ADA "a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination," ibid., one that embraced failures to provide "reasonable accommodations," id., at 601. The Court today is similarly faithful to the Act's demand for reasonable accommodation to secure access and avoid exclusion. </s> Legislation calling upon all government actors to respect the dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our Constitution's commitment to federalism, properly conceived. It seems to me not conducive to a harmonious federal system to require Congress, before it exercises authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, essentially to indict each State for disregarding the equal-citizenship stature of persons with disabilities. But see post, at 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Congress may impose prophylactic §5 legislation only upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations."); Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (to be controlled by §5 legislation, State "can demand that it be shown to have been acting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment" (emphasis in original)). Members of Congress are understandably reluctant to condemn their own States as constitutional violators, complicit in maintaining the isolated and unequal status of persons with disabilities. I would not disarm a National Legislature for resisting an adversarial approach to lawmaking better suited to the courtroom. </s> As the Court's opinion documents, see ante, at 12-18, Congress considered a body of evidence showing that in diverse parts of our Nation, and at various levels of government, persons with disabilities encounter access barriers to public facilities and services. That record, the Court rightly holds, at least as it bears on access to courts, sufficed to warrant the barrier-lowering, dignity-respecting national solution the People's representatives in Congress elected to order. </s> TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [May 17, 2004] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. </s> In Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), we held that Congress did not validly abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12111-12117. Today, the Court concludes that Title II of that Act, §§12131-12165, does validly abrogate that immunity, at least insofar "as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts." Ante, at 19. Because today's decision is irreconcilable with Garrett and the well-established principles it embodies, I dissent. </s> The Eleventh Amendment bars private lawsuits in federal court against an unconsenting State. E.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003); Garrett, supra, at 363; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000). Congress may overcome States' sovereign immunity and authorize such suits only if it unmistakably expresses its intent to do so, and only if it "acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Hibbs, supra, at 726. While the Court correctly holds that Congress satisfied the first prerequisite, ante, at 6, I disagree with its conclusion that Title II is valid §5 enforcement legislation. </s> Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the familiar substantive guarantees contained in §1 of that Amendment. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). Congress' power to enact "appropriate" enforcement legislation is not limited to "mere legislative repetition" of this Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Garrett, supra, at 365. Congress may "remedy" and "deter" state violations of constitutional rights by "prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." Hibbs, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997) (enforcement power is "corrective or preventive, not definitional"). To ensure that Congress does not usurp this Court's responsibility to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, valid §5 legislation must exhibit "'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.'" Hibbs, supra, at 728 (quoting City of Boerne, supra, at 520). While the Court today pays lipservice to the "congruence and proportionality" test, see ante, at 8, it applies it in a manner inconsistent with our recent precedents. </s> In Garrett, we conducted the three-step inquiry first enunciated in City of Boerne to determine whether Title I of the ADA satisfied the congruence-and-proportionality test. A faithful application of that test to Title II reveals that it too "'substantively redefine[s],'" rather than permissibly enforces, the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hibbs, supra, at 728. </s> The first step is to "identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue." Garrett, supra, at 365. This task was easy in Garrett, Hibbs, Kimel, and City of Boerne because the statutes in those cases sought to enforce only one constitutional right. In Garrett, for example, the statute addressed the equal protection right of disabled persons to be free from unconstitutional employment discrimination. Garrett, supra, at 365. See also Hibbs, supra, at 728 ("The [Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA)] aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace"); Kimel, supra, at 83 (right to be free from unconstitutional age discrimination in employment); City of Boerne, supra, at 529 (right of free exercise of religion). The scope of that right, we explained, is quite limited; indeed, the Equal Protection Clause permits a State to classify on the basis of disability so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Garrett, supra, at 366-368 (discussing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)); see also ante, at 11. </s> In this case, the task of identifying the scope of the relevant constitutional protection is more difficult because Title II purports to enforce a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled persons: not only the equal protection right against irrational discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due Process Clause. Ante, at 11-12. However, because the Court ultimately upholds Title II "as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts," ante, at 19, the proper inquiry focuses on the scope of those due process rights. The Court cites four access-to-the-courts rights that Title II purportedly enforces: (1) the right of the criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of the trial, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975); (2) the right of litigants to have a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" in judicial proceedings, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); (3) the right of the criminal defendant to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the commun-ity, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); and (4) the public right of access to criminal proceedings, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1986). Ante, at 11-12. </s> Having traced the "metes and bounds" of the constitutional rights at issue, the next step in the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry requires us to examine whether Congress "identified a history and pattern" of violations of these constitutional rights by the States with respect to the disabled. Garrett, 531 U.S., at 368. This step is crucial to determining whether Title II is a legitimate attempt to remedy or prevent actual constitutional violations by the States or an illegitimate attempt to rewrite the constitutional provisions it purports to enforce. Indeed, "Congress' §5 power is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions." Ibid. (emphasis added). But the majority identifies nothing in the legislative record that shows Congress was responding to widespread violations of the due process rights of disabled persons. </s> Rather than limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due process rights on which it ultimately relies, the majority sets out on a wide-ranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled. Ante, at 12-15. This digression recounts historical discrimination against the disabled through institutionalization laws, restrictions on marriage, voting, and public education, conditions in mental hospitals, and various other forms of unequal treatment in the administration of public programs and services. Some of this evidence would be relevant if the Court were considering the constitutionality of the statute as a whole; but the Court rejects that approach in favor of a narrower "as-applied" inquiry.1 We discounted much the same type of outdated, generalized evidence in Garrett as unsupportive of Title I's ban on employment discrimination. 531 U.S., at 368-372; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 530 (noting that the "legislative record lacks ... modern instances of ... religious bigotry"). The evidence here is likewise irrelevant to Title II's purported enforcement of Due Process access-to-the-courts rights. </s> Even if it were proper to consider this broader category of evidence, much of it does not concern unconstitutional action by the States. The bulk of the Court's evidence concerns discrimination by nonstate governments, rather than the States themselves.2 We have repeatedly held that such evidence is irrelevant to the inquiry whether Congress has validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity, a privilege enjoyed only by the sovereign States. Garrett, supra, at 368-369; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999); Kimel, 531 U.S., at 370. Most of the brief anecdotes do not involve States at all, and those that do are not sufficiently detailed to determine whether the instances of "unequal treatment" were irrational, and thus unconstitutional under our decision in Cleburne. Garrett, supra, at 370-371. Therefore, even outside the "access to the courts" context, the Court identifies few, if any, constitutional violations perpetrated by the States against disabled persons.3 </s> With respect to the due process "access to the courts" rights on which the Court ultimately relies, Congress' failure to identify a pattern of actual constitutional violations by the States is even more striking. Indeed, there is nothing in the legislative record or statutory findings to indicate that disabled persons were systematically denied the right to be present at criminal trials, denied the meaningful opportunity to be heard in civil cases, unconstitutionally excluded from jury service, or denied the right to attend criminal trials.4 </s> The Court's attempt to disguise the lack of congressional documentation with a few citations to judicial decisions cannot retroactively provide support for Title II, and in any event, fails on its own terms. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S., at 368 ("[W]e examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern" of constitutional violations); ibid. ("[t]he legislative record ... fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern" of constitutional violations) (emphases added). Indeed, because this type of constitutional violation occurs in connection with litigation, it is particularly telling that the majority is able to identify only two reported cases finding that a disabled person's federal constitutional rights were violated.5 See ante, at 14, n.14 (citing Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1132-1133 (CA5), opinion withdrawn as moot, 573 F.2d 867 (1978); People v. Rivera, 125 Misc. 2d 516, 528, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984)).6 </s> Lacking any real evidence that Congress was responding to actual due process violations, the majority relies primarily on three items to justify its decision: (1) a 1983 U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report showing that 76% of "public services and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible" to persons with disabilities, ante, at 15-16; (2) testimony before a House subcommittee regarding the "physical inaccessibility" of local courthouses, ante, at 16; and (3) evidence submitted to Congress' designated ADA task force that purportedly contains "numerous examples of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and programs." Ibid. </s> On closer examination, however, the Civil Rights Commission's finding consists of a single conclusory sentence in its report, and it is far from clear that its finding even includes courthouses. The House subcommittee report, for its part, contains the testimony of two witnesses, neither of whom reported being denied the right to be present at constitutionally protected court proceedings.7 Indeed, the witnesses' testimony, like the U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report, concerns only physical barriers to access, and does not address whether States either provided means to overcome those barriers or alternative locations for proceedings involving disabled persons. Cf., n.4, supra (describing alternative means of access offered to respondent Lane). </s> Based on the majority's description, ante, at 16, the report of the ADA Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities sounds promising. But the report itself says nothing about any disabled person being denied access to court. The Court thus apparently relies solely on a general citation to the Government's Lodging in Garrett, O. T. 2000, No. 99-1240 which, amidst thousands of pages, contains only a few anecdotal handwritten reports of physically inaccessible courthouses, again with no mention of whether States provided alternate means of access. This evidence, moreover, was submitted not to Congress, but only to the task force, which itself made no findings regarding disabled persons' access to judicial proceedings. Cf. Garrett, 531 U.S., at 370-371 (rejecting anecdotal task force evidence for similar reasons). As we noted in Garrett, "had Congress truly understood this [task force] information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act's legislative findings." Id., at 371. Yet neither the legislative findings, nor even the Committee Reports, contain a single mention of the seemingly vital topic of access to the courts.8 Cf. ibid.; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S., at 641 (observing that Senate Report on Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) "contains no evidence that unremedied patent infringement by States had become a problem of national import"). To the contrary, the Senate Report on the ADA observed that "[a]ll states currently mandate accessibility in newly constructed state-owned public buildings." S.Rep. No. 101-116, p. 92 (1989). </s> Even if the anecdotal evidence and conclusory statements relied on by the majority could be properly considered, the mere existence of an architecturally "inaccessible" courthouse--i.e., one a disabled person cannot utilize without assistance--does not state a constitutional violation. A violation of due process occurs only when a person is actually denied the constitutional right to access a given judicial proceeding. We have never held that a person has a constitutional right to make his way into a courtroom without any external assistance. Indeed, the fact that the State may need to assist an individual to attend a hearing has no bearing on whether the individual successfully exercises his due process right to be present at the proceeding. Nor does an "inaccessible" courthouse violate the Equal Protection Clause, unless it is irrational for the State not to alter the courthouse to make it "accessible." But financial considerations almost always furnish a rational basis for a State to decline to make those alterations. See Garrett, 531 U.S., at 372 (noting that it would be constitutional for an employer to "conserve scarce financial resources" by hiring employees who can use existing facilities rather than making the facilities accessible to disabled employees). Thus, evidence regarding inaccessible courthouses, because it is not evidence of constitutional violations, provides no basis to abrogate States' sovereign immunity. </s> The near-total lack of actual constitutional violations in the congressional record is reminiscent of Garrett, wherein we found that the same type of minimal anecdotal evidence "f[e]ll far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional [state action] on which §5 legislation must be based." Id., at 370. See also Kimel, 521 U.S., at 526)). </s> The barren record here should likewise be fatal to the majority's holding that Title II is valid legislation enforcing due process rights that involve access to the courts. This conclusion gains even more support when Title II's nonexistent record of constitutional violations is compared with legislation that we have sustained as valid §5 enforcement legislation. See, e.g., Hibbs, 383 U.S. 301, 312-313 (1966) (same with respect to racial discrimination in voting rights). Accordingly, Title II can only be understood as a congressional attempt to "rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court," rather than a legitimate effort to remedy or prevent state violations of that Amendment. Garrett, supra, at 374.9 </s> The third step of our congruence-and-proportionality inquiry removes any doubt as to whether Title II is valid §5 legislation. At this stage, we ask whether the rights and remedies created by Title II are congruent and proportional to the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the record of constitutional violations adduced by Congress. Hibbs, supra, at 737-739; Garrett, supra, at 372-373. </s> Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. §12132. A disabled person is considered "qualified" if he "meets the essential eligibility requirements" for the receipt of the entity's services or participation in the entity's programs, "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services." §12131(2) (emphasis added). The ADA's findings make clear that Congress believed it was attacking "discrimination" in all areas of public services, as well as the "discriminatory effect" of "architectural, transportation, and communication barriers." §§12101(a)(3), (a)(5). In sum, Title II requires, on pain of money damages, special accommodations for disabled persons in virtually every interaction they have with the State. </s> "Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability," the broad terms of Title II "d[o] nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations." Florida Prepaid, 531 U.S., at 368; id., at 372-373 (contrasting Title I's reasonable accommodation and disparate impact provisions with the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements). Title II fails for the same reason. Like Title I, Title II may be laudable public policy, but it cannot be seriously disputed that it is also an attempt to legislatively "redefine the States' legal obligations" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel, 528 U.S., at 88. </s> The majority, however, claims that Title II also vindicates fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause--in addition to access to the courts--that are subject to heightened Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. Ante, at 11 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-337 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to move to a new jurisdiction); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and procreation)). But Title II is not tailored to provide prophylactic protection of these rights; instead, it applies to any service, program, or activity provided by any entity. Its provisions affect transportation, health, education, and recreation programs, among many others, all of which are accorded only rational-basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. A requirement of accommodation for the disabled at a state-owned amusement park or sports stadium, for example, bears no permissible prophylactic relationship to enabling disabled persons to exercise their fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, as with Title I in Garrett, the Patent Remedy Act in Florida Prepaid, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in Kimel, and the RFRA in City of Boerne, all of which we invalidated as attempts to substantively redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, it is unlikely "that many of the [state actions] affected by [Title II] ha[ve] any likelihood of being unconstitutional." City of Boerne, supra, at 532. Viewed as a whole, then, there is little doubt that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity.10 </s> The majority concludes that Title II's massive overbreadth can be cured by considering the statute only "as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services." Ante, at 20 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960)). I have grave doubts about importing an "as applied" approach into the §5 context. While the majority is of course correct that this Court normally only considers the application of a statute to a particular case, the proper inquiry under City of Boerne and its progeny is somewhat different. In applying the congruence-and-proportionality test, we ask whether Congress has attempted to statutorily redefine the constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This question can only be answered by measuring the breadth of a statute's coverage against the scope of the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and the record of violations it purports to remedy. </s> In conducting its as-applied analysis, however, the majority posits a hypothetical statute, never enacted by Congress, that applies only to courthouses. The effect is to rig the congruence-and-proportionality test by artificially constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a recognized constitutional right. But Title II is not susceptible of being carved up in this manner; it applies indiscriminately to all "services," "programs," or "activities" of any "public entity." Thus, the majority's approach is not really an assessment of whether Title II is "appropriate legislation" at all, U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §5 (emphasis added), but a test of whether the Court can conceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to constitute valid prophylactic legislation. </s> Our §5 precedents do not support this as-applied approach. In each case, we measured the full breadth of the statute or relevant provision that Congress enacted against the scope of the constitutional right it purported to enforce. If we had arbitrarily constricted the scope of the statutes to match the scope of a core constitutional right, those cases might have come out differently. In Garrett, for example, Title I might have been upheld "as applied" to irrational employment discrimination; or in Florida Prepaid, the Patent Remedy Act might have been upheld "as applied" to intentional, uncompensated patent infringements. It is thus not surprising that the only authority cited by the majority is Raines, supra, a case decided long before we enunciated the congruence-and-proportionality test.11 </s> I fear that the Court's adoption of an as-applied approach eliminates any incentive for Congress to craft §5 legislation for the purpose of remedying or deterring actual constitutional violations. Congress can now simply rely on the courts to sort out which hypothetical applications of an undifferentiated statute, such as Title II, may be enforced against the States. All the while, States will be subjected to substantial litigation in a piecemeal attempt to vindicate their Eleventh Amendment rights. The majority's as-applied approach simply cannot be squared with either our recent precedent or the proper role of the Judiciary. </s> Even in the limited courthouse-access context, Title II does not properly abrogate state sovereign immunity. As demonstrated in depth above, Congress utterly failed to identify any evidence that disabled persons were denied constitutionally protected access to judicial proceedings. Without this predicate showing, Title II, even if we were to hypothesize that it applies only to courthouses, cannot be viewed as a congruent and proportional response to state constitutional violations. Garrett, 531 U.S., at 368 ("Congress' §5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions"). </s> Moreover, even in the courthouse-access context, Title II requires substantially more than the Due Process Clause. Title II subjects States to private lawsuits if, inter alia, they fail to make "reasonable modifications" to fa-cilities, such as removing "architectural ... barriers." 42 U.S., C. §§12131(2), 12132. Yet the statute is not limited to occasions when the failure to modify results, or will likely result, in an actual due process violation--i.e., the inability of a disabled person to participate in a judicial proceeding. Indeed, liability is triggered if an inaccessible building results in a disabled person being "subjected to discrimination"--a term that presumably encompasses any sort of inconvenience in accessing the facility, for whatever purpose. §12132. </s> The majority's reliance on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and other cases in which we held that due process requires the State to waive filing fees for indigent litigants, is unavailing. While these cases support the principle that the State must remove financial requirements that in fact prevent an individual from exercising his constitutional rights, they certainly do not support a statute that subjects a State to liability for failing to make a vast array of special accommodations, without regard for whether the failure to accommodate results in a constitutional wrong. </s> In this respect, Title II is analogous to the Patent Remedy Act at issue in Florida Prepaid. That statute subjected States to monetary liability for any act of patent infringement. 527 U.S., at 646-647. Thus, "Congress did nothing to limit" the Act's coverage "to cases involving arguable [Due Process] violations," such as when the infringement was nonnegligent or uncompensated. Ibid. Similarly here, Congress has authorized private damages suits against a State for merely maintaining a courthouse that is not readily accessible to the disabled, without regard to whether a disabled person's due process rights are ever violated. Accordingly, even as applied to the "access to the courts" context, Title II's "indiscriminate scope offends [the congruence-and-proportionality] principle," particularly in light of the lack of record evidence showing that inaccessible courthouses cause actual Due Process violations. Id., at 647.12 </s> For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [May 17, 2004] </s> Justice Scalia, dissenting. </s> Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that Congress "shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of that Amendment--including, of course, the Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), we decided that Congress could, under this provision, forbid English literacy tests for Puerto Rican voters in New York State who met certain educational criteria. Though those tests were not themselves in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we held that §5 authorizes prophylactic legislation--that is, "legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct," Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003), when Congress determines such proscription is desirable "'to make the amendments fully effective,'" Morgan, supra, at 648 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)). We said that "the measure of what constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" is the flexible "necessary and proper" standard of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 342, 421 (1819). Morgan, 384 U.S., at 651. We described §5 as "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ibid. </s> The Morgan opinion followed close upon our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), which had upheld prophylactic application of the similarly worded "enforce" provision of the Fifteenth Amendment (§2) to challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike the Fifteenth, is not limited to denial of the franchise and not limited to the denial of other rights on the basis of race. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), we confronted Congress's inevitable expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Morgan, beyond the field of racial discrimination.1 There Congress had sought, in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb et seq., to impose upon the States an interpretation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause that this Court had explicitly rejected. To avoid placing in congressional hands effective power to rewrite the Bill of Rights through the medium of §5, we formulated the "congruence and proportionality" test for determining what legislation is "appropriate." When Congress enacts prophylactic legislation, we said, there must be "proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved." 521 U.S., at 533. </s> I joined the Court's opinion in Boerne with some misgiving. I have generally rejected tests based on such malleable standards as "proportionality," because they have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual judges' policy preferences. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31-32 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (declining to apply a "proportionality" test to the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954-956 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to apply the "undue burden" standard of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to apply a "reasonableness" test to punitive damages under the Due Process Clause). Even so, I signed on to the "congruence and proportionality" test in Boerne, and adhered to it in later cases: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), where we held that the provisions of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§271(h), 296(a), were "'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that [they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,'" 528 U.S. 62 (2000), where we held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), imposed on state and local governments requirements "disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act," 529 U.S. 598 (2000), where we held that a provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13981, lacked congruence and proportionality because it was "not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe," 531 U.S. 356 (2001), where we said that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 330, 42 U.S.C. §§12111-12117, raised "the same sort of concerns as to congruence and proportionality as were found in City of Boerne," 531 U.S., at 372. </s> But these cases were soon followed by Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, in which the Court held that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 9, 29 U.S.C. §2612 et seq., which required States to provide their employees up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave (for various purposes) annually, was "congruent and proportional to its remedial object [of preventing sex discrimination], and can be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 538 U.S., at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted). I joined Justice Kennedy's dissent, which established (conclusively, I thought) that Congress had identified no unconstitutional state action to which the statute could conceivably be a proportional response. And now we have today's decision, holding that Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the remediation of constitutional violations, in the face of what seems to me a compelling demonstration of the opposite by The Chief Justice's dissent. </s> I yield to the lessons of experience. The "congruence and proportionality" standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking. Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress's taskmaster. Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) must regularly check Congress's homework to make sure that it has identified sufficient constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent and proportional. As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal branch of Government. And when conflict is unavoidable, we should not come to do battle with the United States Congress armed only with a test ("congruence and proportionality") that has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be shown to have been met or failed. As I wrote for the Court in an earlier case, "low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995). </s> I would replace "congruence and proportionality" with another test--one that provides a clear, enforceable limitation supported by the text of §5. Section 5 grants Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const., Amdt. 14 (emphasis added). Morgan notwithstanding, one does not, within any normal meaning of the term, "enforce" a prohibition by issuing a still broader prohibition directed to the same end. One does not, for example, "enforce" a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit by imposing a 45-mile-per-hour speed limit--even though that is indeed directed to the same end of automotive safety and will undoubtedly result in many fewer violations of the 55-mile-per-hour limit. And one does not "enforce" the right of access to the courts at issue in this case, see ante, at 19, by requiring that disabled persons be provided access to all of the "services, programs, or activities" furnished or conducted by the State, 42 U.S.C. §12132. That is simply not what the power to enforce means--or ever meant. The 1860 edition of Noah Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language, current when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, defined "enforce" as: "To put in execution; to cause to take effect; as, to enforce the laws." Id., at 396. See also J. Worcester, Dictionary of the English Language 484 (1860) ("To put in force; to cause to be applied or executed; as, 'To enforce a law'"). Nothing in §5 allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or "remedy" conduct that does not itself violate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. So-called "prophylactic legislation" is reinforcement rather than enforcement. </s> Morgan asserted that this commonsense interpretation "would confine the legislative power . . . to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic generalities' of §1 of the Amendment." 384 U.S., at 648-649. That is not so. One must remember "that in 1866 the lower federal courts had no general jurisdiction of cases alleging a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution." R. Berger, Government By Judiciary 147 (2d ed. 1997). If, just after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, a State had enacted a law imposing racially discriminatory literacy tests (different questions for different races) a citizen prejudiced by such a test would have had no means of asserting his constitutional right to be free of it. Section 5 authorizes Congress to create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his Fourteenth Amendment rights. One of the first pieces of legislation passed under Congress's §5 power was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." Section 1 of that Act, later codified as Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, authorized a cause of action against "any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States." 17 Stat. 13. Section 5 would also authorize measures that do not restrict the States' substantive scope of action but impose requirements directly related to the facilitation of "enforcement"--for example, reporting requirements that would enable violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to be identified.2 But what §5 does not authorize is so-called "prophylactic" measures, prohibiting primary conduct that is itself not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> The major impediment to the approach I have suggested is stare decisis. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since Morgan, and many important and well-accepted measures, such as the Voting Rights Act, assume the validity of Morgan and South Carolina. As Prof. Archibald Cox put it in his Supreme Court Foreword: "The etymological meaning of section 5 may favor the narrower reading. Literally, 'to enforce' means to compel performance of the obligations imposed; but the linguistic argument lost much of its force once the South Carolina and Morgan cases decided that the power to enforce embraces any measure appropriate to effectuating the performance of the state's constitutional duty." Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 Harv. L.Rev. 91, 110-111 (1966). </s> However, South Carolina and Morgan, all of our later cases except Hibbs that give an expansive meaning to "enforce" in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all of our earlier cases that even suggest such an expansive meaning in dicta, involved congressional measures that were directed exclusively against, or were used in the particular case to remedy, racial discrimination. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (see discussion infra); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (dictum in a case involving a statute that imposed criminal penalties for officials' racial discrimination in jury selection); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 311-312 (1880) (dictum in a case involving a statute that permitted removal to federal court of a black man's claim that his jury had been selected in a racially discriminatory manner); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) (dictum in a racial discrimination case involving the same statute). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-178 (1980) (upholding as valid legislation under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment the most sweeping provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-441 (1968)(upholding a law, 42 U.S.C. §1982, banning public or private racial discrimination in the sale and rental of prop-erty as appropriate legislation under §2 of the Thirteenth Amendment). </s> Giving §5 more expansive scope with regard to measures directed against racial discrimination by the States accords to practices that are distinctively violative of the principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment a priority of attention that this Court envisioned from the beginning, and that has repeatedly been reflected in our opinions. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1873), the Court's first confrontation with the Fourteenth Amendment, we said the following with respect to the Equal Protection Clause: "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other." </s> Racial discrimination was the practice at issue in the early cases (cited in Morgan) that gave such an expansive description of the effects of §5. See 391 U.S. 145, 147-148 (1968)) and the doctrine of so-called "substantive due process" (which holds that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects unenumerated liberties, see generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the many guarantees that it now provides. In such a seemingly limited context, it did not appear to be a massive expansion of congressional power to interpret §5 broadly. Broad interpretation was particularly appropriate with regard to racial discrimination, since that was the principal evil against which the Equal Protection Clause was directed, and the principal constitutional prohibition that some of the States stubbornly ignored. The former is still true, and the latter remained true at least as late as Morgan. </s> When congressional regulation has not been targeted at racial discrimination, we have given narrower scope to §5. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court upheld, under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, that provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314, which barred literacy tests and similar voter-eligibility requirements--classic tools of the racial discrimination in voting that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids; but found to be beyond the §5 power of the Fourteenth Amendment the provision that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in state elections. See 400 U.S., at 124-130 (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 153-154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 293-296 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A third provision, which forbade States from disqualifying voters by reason of residency requirements, was also upheld--but only a minority of the Justices believed that §5 was adequate authority. Justice Black's opinion in that case described exactly the line I am drawing here, suggesting that Congress's enforcement power is broadest when directed "to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race." Id., at 130. And of course the results reached in Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett are consistent with the narrower compass afforded congressional regulation that does not protect against or prevent racial discrimination. </s> Thus, principally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States. I would not, however, abandon the requirement that Congress may impose prophylactic §5 legislation only upon those particular States in which there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations. See Hibbs, 538 U.S., at 741-743 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S., at 626-627; Morgan, 384 U.S., at 666-667, 669, 670-671 (Harlan, J., dissenting).4 I would also adhere to the requirement that the prophylactic remedy predicated upon such state violations must be directed against the States or state actors rather than the public at large. See Morrison, supra, at 625-626. And I would not, of course, permit any congressional measures that violate other provisions of the Constitution. When those requirements have been met, however, I shall leave it to Congress, under constraints no tighter than those of the Necessary and Proper Clause, to decide what measures are appropriate under §5 to prevent or remedy racial discrimination by the States. </s> I shall also not subject to "congruence and proportionality" analysis congressional action under §5 that is not directed to racial discrimination. Rather, I shall give full effect to that action when it consists of "enforcement" of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, within the broad but not unlimited meaning of that term I have described above. When it goes beyond enforcement to prophylaxis, however, I shall consider it ultra vires. The present legislation is plainly of the latter sort. * * * </s> Requiring access for disabled persons to all public buildings cannot remotely be considered a means of "enforcing" the Fourteenth Amendment. The considerations of long accepted practice and of policy that sanctioned such distortion of language where state racial discrimination is at issue do not apply in this field of social policy far removed from the principal object of the Civil War Amendments. "The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth 'logical' extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of gestative propensity calls for the 'line drawing' familiar in the judicial, as in the legislative process: 'thus far but not beyond.'" United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973) (Burger, C.J., for the Court) (footnote omitted). It is past time to draw a line limiting the uncontrolled spread of a well-intentioned textual distortion. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court. </s> TENNESSEE, PETITIONER v. GEORGE LANE etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [May 17, 2004] </s> Justice Thomas, dissenting. </s> I join the Chief Justice's dissent. I agree that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 cannot be a congruent and proportional remedy to the States' alleged practice of denying disabled persons access to the courts. Not only did Congress fail to identify any evidence of such a practice when it enacted the ADA, ante, at 6, 10, Title II regulates far more than the provision of access to the courts, ante, at 15-16. Because I joined the dissent in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and continue to believe that Hibbs was wrongly decided, I write separately only to disavow any reliance on Hibbs in reaching this conclusion. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1In Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993), we held that "States and state entities that claim to be 'arms of the State' may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id., at 147. Footnote 2See 42 U.S.C. §12101; Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, From ADA to Empowerment 16 (Oct. 12, 1990); S.Rep. No. 101-116 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (1990); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558 (1990); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-596 (1990); cf. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 389-390 (2001) (App. A to opinion of Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing congressional hearings). Footnote 3In Ex parte Virginia, we described the breadth of Congress' §5 power as follows: </s> "Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power." 521 U.S. 507, 517-518 (1997). Footnote 4In Boerne, we observed: </s> "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.' Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976). For example, the Court upheld a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements under Congress' parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, see U.S. Const., Amdt. 15, §2, as a measure to combat racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), despite the facial constitutionality of the tests under Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). We have also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, [384 U.S. 641 (1966)] (upholding ban on literacy tests that prohibited certain people schooled in Puerto Rico from voting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding 5-year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161 (1980) (upholding 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act's requirement that certain jurisdictions preclear any change to a '"standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting"'); see also James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924) (upholding ban on medical prescription of intoxicating malt liquors as appropriate to enforce Eighteenth Amendment ban on manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes)." Id., at 518. Footnote 5Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 464, and n.14 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 Yale L.J. 1644 (1979)). Footnote 6See Schriner, Ochs, & Shields, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 437, 456-472 tbl. II (2000) (listing state laws concerning the voting rights of persons with mental disabilities). Footnote 7See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F.Supp. 2d 35 (Me. 2001). Footnote 8E.g., D.C. Code §46-403 (West 2001) (declaring illegal and void the marriage of "an idiot or of a person adjudged to be a lunatic"); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §402.990(2) (West 1992 Cumulative Service) (criminalizing the marriage of persons with mental disabilities); Tenn. Code Ann. §36-3-109 (1996) (forbidding the issuance of a marriage license to "imbecile[s]"). Footnote 9E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §729.204 (West 2002) (persons selected for inclusion on jury list may not be "infirm or decrepit"); Tenn. Code Ann. §22-2-304(c) (1994) (authorizing judges to excuse "mentally and physically disabled" persons from jury service). Footnote 10The undisputed findings of fact in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), provide another example of such mistreatment. See id., at 7 ("Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded"). Footnote 11E.g., LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (CA4 1987) (paraplegic inmate unable to access toilet facilities); Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F.Supp. 2d 1014 (Kan. 1999) (double amputee forced to crawl around the floor of jail). See also, e.g., Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (CA6 1999) (deaf inmate denied access to sex offender therapy program allegedly required as precondition for parole). Footnote 12E.g., New York State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F.Supp. 487, 504 (EDNY 1979) (segregation of mentally retarded students with hepatitis B); Mills v. Board of Ed. of District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866 (DC 1972) (exclusion of mentally retarded students from public school system). See also, e.g., Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit School District No. 9, 684 F.Supp. 1002 (SD Ill. 1988) (elementary-school student with AIDS excluded from attending regular education classes or participating in extracurricular activities); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, 662 F.Supp. 376 (CD Cal. 1986) (kindergarten student with AIDS excluded from class). Footnote 13E.g., Doe v. Rowe, 156 F.Supp. 2d 35 (Me. 2001) (disenfranchisement of persons under guardianship by reason of mental illness). See also, e.g., New York ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F.Supp. 2d 12 (NDNY 2000) (mobility-impaired voters unable to access county polling places). Footnote 14E.g., Ferrell v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128, 1132-1133 (CA5) (deaf criminal defendant denied interpretive services), opinion withdrawn as moot, 573 F.2d 867 (1978); State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 64, 600 N.E. 2d 661, 672 (1992) (same); People v. Rivera, 125 Misc. 2d 516, 528, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 426, 434 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same). See also, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 470-472 (CA8 1998) (mobility-impaired litigant excluded from a county quorum court session held on the second floor of an inaccessible courthouse); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F.Supp. 2d 525, 533-534 (WD Ark. 1998) (wheelchair-bound litigant had to be carried to the second floor of an inaccessible courthouse, from which he was unable to leave to use restroom facilities or obtain a meal, and no arrangements were made to carry him downstairs at the end of the day); Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288, 1289 (CA9 1982) (blind persons categorically excluded from jury service); Galloway v. Superior Court of District of Columbia, 816 F.Supp. 12 (DC 1993) (same); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F.Supp. 399, 405 (WD Pa. 1989) (deaf individual excluded from jury service); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S. 2d 130, 133 (Cty. Ct. 1990) (prosecutor exercised peremptory strike against prospective juror solely because she was hearingimpaired). Footnote 15For a comprehensive discussion of the shortcomings of state disability discrimination statutes, see Colker & Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection against Disability Discrimination, 53 Ala. L.Rev. 1075 (2002). Footnote 16The Chief Justice dismisses as "irrelevant" the portions of this evidence that concern the conduct of nonstate governments. Post, at 5-6 (dissenting opinion). This argument rests on the mistaken premise that a valid exercise of Congress' §5 power must always be predicated solely on evidence of constitutional violations by the States themselves. To operate on that premise in this case would be particularly inappropriate because this case concerns the provision of judicial services, an area in which local governments are typically treated as "arm[s] of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes, Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), and thus enjoy precisely the same immunity from unconsented suit as the States. See, e.g., Callahan v. Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 670-674 (CA3 2000) (municipal court is an "arm of the State" entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Kelly v. Municipal Courts, 97 F.3d 902, 907-908 (CA7 1996) (same); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (CA9 1995) (same). Cf. Garrett, 531 U.S., at 368-369. </s> In any event, our cases have recognized that evidence of constitutional violations on the part of nonstate governmental actors is relevant to the §5 inquiry. To be sure, evidence of constitutional violations by the States themselves is particularly important when, as in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Garrett, the sole purpose of reliance on §5 is to place the States on equal footing with private actors with respect to their amenability to suit. But much of the evidence in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), post, at 11, in fact contained little specific evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on the part of the States. Indeed, the evidence before the Congress that enacted the FMLA related primarily to the practices of private-sector employers and the Federal Government. See Hibbs, 538 U.S., at 730-735. See also id., at 745-750 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Footnote 17Specifically, we relied on (1) a Senate Report citation to a Bureau of Labor Statistics survey revealing disparities in private-sector provision of parenting leave to men and women; (2) submissions from two sources at a hearing on the Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986, a predecessor bill to the FMLA, that public-sector parental leave polices "'diffe[r] little'" from private-sector policies; (3) evidence that 15 States provided women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only 4 States provided for similarly extended paternity leave; and (4) a House Report's quotation of a study that found that failure to implement uniform standards for parenting leave would "'leav[e] Federal employees open to discretionary and possibly unequal treatment,'" H.R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 2, p.11 (1993). Hibbs, 538 U.S., at 728-733. Footnote 18Contrary to The Chief Justice, post, at 15, neither Garrett nor Florida Prepaid lends support to the proposition that the Boerne test requires courts in all cases to "measur[e] the full breadth of the statute or relevant provision that Congress enacted against the scope of the constitutional right it purported to enforce." In fact, the decision in Garrett, which severed Title I of the ADA from Title II for purposes of the §5 inquiry, demonstrates that courts need not examine "the full breadth of the statute" all at once. Moreover, Garrett and Florida Prepaid, like all of our other recent §5 cases, concerned legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a single constitutional right; for that reason, neither speaks to the issue presented in this case. </s> Nor is The Chief Justice's approach compelled by the nature of the Boerne inquiry. The answer to the question Boerne asks--whether a piece of legislation attempts substantively to redefine a constitutional guarantee--logically focuses on the manner in which the legislation operates to enforce that particular guarantee. It is unclear what, if anything, examining Title II's application to hockey rinks or voting booths can tell us about whether Title II substantively redefines the right of access to the courts. Footnote 19In Raines, a State subject to suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 contended that the law exceeded Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment because it prohibited "any person," and not just state actors, from interfering with voting rights. We rejected that argument, concluding that "if the complaint here called for an application of the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should have been an end to the question of constitutionality." 362 U.S., at 24-25. Footnote 20Because this case implicates the right of access to the courts, we need not consider whether Title II's duty to accommodate exceeds what the Constitution requires in the class of cases that implicate only Cleburne's prohibition on irrational discrimination. See Garrett, 531 U.S., at 372. Footnote 21Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce filing fee); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (record fee in parental rights termination action); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for habeas petitions); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (filing fee for direct appeal in criminal case). Footnote 22Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Footnote 23Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (trial counsel for persons charged with felony offenses); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel for direct appeals as of right). Footnote 24The Chief Justice contends that Title II cannot be understood as remedial legislation because it "subjects a State to liability for failing to make a vast array of special accommodations, without regard for whether the failure to accommodate results in a constitutional wrong." Post, at 17 (emphasis in original). But as we have often acknowledged, Congress "is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment," and may prohibit "a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." Kimel, 538 U.S. 721 (upholding the FMLA as valid remedial legislation without regard to whether failure to provide the statutorily mandated 12 weeks' leave results in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1See generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 463-464 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment, 15 Santa Clara Law. 855 (1975); Brief for United States 17-19. Footnote 2As the majority opinion shows, some of them persist to this day, ante, at 12-14, to say nothing of their lingering effects on society. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1For further discussion of the propriety of this approach, see infra, at 14-15. Footnote 2E.g., ante, at 13 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (irrational discrimination by city zoning board)); ante, at 14, n.12 (citing New York ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware, 82 F.Supp. 2d 12 (NDNY 2000) (ADA lawsuit brought by State against a county)); ante, at 13-14, n. 11 (citing four cases concerning local school boards' unconstitutional actions); ante, at 14, n.13 (citing one case involving conditions in federal prison and another involving a county jail inmate); ante, at 15 (referring to "hundreds of examples of unequal treatment ... by States and their political subdivisions" (emphasis added)). Footnote 3The majority obscures this fact by repeatedly referring to congressional findings of "discrimination" and "unequal treatment." Of course, generic findings of discrimination and unequal treatment vel non are insufficient to show a pattern of constitutional violations where rational-basis scrutiny applies. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001). Footnote 4Certainly, respondents Lane and Jones were not denied these constitutional rights. The majority admits that Lane was able to attend the initial hearing of his criminal trial. Ante, at 1. Lane was arrested for failing to appear at his second hearing only after he refused assistance from officers dispatched by the court to help him to the courtroom. Ante, at 2. The court conducted a preliminary hearing in the first-floor library to accommodate Lane's disability, App. to Pet. for Cert. 16, and later offered to move all further proceedings in the case to a handicapped-accessible courthouse in a nearby town. In light of these facts, it can hardly be said that the State violated Lane's right to be present at his trial; indeed, it made affirmative attempts to secure that right. Respondent Jones, a disabled court reporter, does not seriously contend that she suffered a constitutional injury. Footnote 5As two Justices noted in Garrett, if the States were violating the Due Process rights of disabled ... persons, "one would have expected to find in decisions of the courts ... extensive litigation and discussion of the constitutional violations." 531 U. S., at 376 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring). Footnote 6The balance of the Court's citations refer to cases arising after enactment of the ADA or do not contain findings of federal constitutional violations. Ante, at 14-15, n.14 (citing Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469 (CA8 1998) (post-ADA case finding ADA violations only); Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F.Supp. 2d 525 (WD Ark. 1998) (same); Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F.Supp. 12 (DC 1993) (same); State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 600 N.E. 2d 661 (1992) (remanded for hearing on constitutional issue); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (County Ct. 1990) (finding violation of state constitution only); DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F.Supp. 399 (WD Pa. 1989) (statute upheld against facial constitutional challenge; Rehabilitation Act of 1973 violations only); Pomerantz v. Los Angeles County, 674 F.2d 1288 (CA9 1982) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973 claim; challenged jury-service statute later amended)). Accordingly, they offer no support whatsoever for the notion that Title II is a valid response to documented constitutional violations. Footnote 7Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4468 before the House Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 40-41 (1988) (statement of Emeka Nwojke) (explaining that he encountered difficulties appearing in court due to physical characteristics of the courthouse and courtroom and the rudeness of court employees); id., at 48 (statement of Ellen Telker) (blind attorney "know[s] of at least one courthouse in New Haven where the elevators do not have tactile markings"). Footnote 8The majority rather peculiarly points to Congress' finding that "'discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as access to public services'" as evidence that Congress sought to vindicate the Due Process rights of disabled persons. Ante, at 18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(3) (emphasis added by the Court)). However, one does not usually refer to the right to attend a judicial proceeding as "access to [a] public servic[e]." Given the lack of any concern over courthouse accessibility issues in the legislative history, it is highly unlikely that this legislative finding obliquely refers to state violations of the due process rights of disabled persons to attend judicial proceedings. Footnote 9The Court correctly explains that "'it [i]s easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations'" when it targets state action that triggers a higher level of constitutional scrutiny. Ante, at 18 (quoting Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)). However, this Court's precedents attest that Congress may not dispense with the required showing altogether simply because it purports to enforce due process rights. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-646 (1999) (invalidating Patent Remedy Act, which purported to enforce the Due Process Clause, because Congress failed to identify a record of constitutional violations); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-531 (1997) (same with respect to Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)). As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, that is precisely what the Court has sanctioned here. Because the record is utterly devoid of proof that Congress was responding to state violations of due process access-to-the-courts rights, this case is controlled by Florida Prepaid and City of Boerne, rather than Hibbs. Footnote 10Title II's all-encompassing approach to regulating public services contrasts starkly with the more closely tailored laws we have upheld as legitimate prophylactic §5 legislation. In Hibbs, for example, the FMLA was "narrowly targeted" to remedy widespread gender discrimination in the availability of family leave. 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and Garrett on this ground). Similarly, in cases involving enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, we upheld "limited remedial scheme[s]" that were narrowly tailored to address massive evidence of discrimination in voting. Garrett, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)). Unlike these statutes, Title II's "indiscriminate scope ... is particularly incongruous in light of the scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy." Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S., at 647. Footnote 11Raines is inapposite in any event. The Court there considered the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1957--a statute designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment--whose narrowly tailored substantive provisions could "unquestionably" be applied to state actors (like the respondents therein). 362 U.S., at 25, 26. The only question presented was whether the statute was facially invalid because it might be read to constrain nonstate actors as well. Id., at 20. The Court upheld the statute as applied to respondents and declined to entertain the facial challenge. Id., at 24-26. The situation in this case is much different: The very question presented is whether Title II's indiscriminate substantive provisions can constitutionally be applied to the petitioner State. Raines thus provides no support for avoiding this question by conjuring up an imaginary statute with substantive provisions that might pass the congruence-and-proportionality test. Footnote 12The majority's invocation of Hibbs to justify Title II's overbreadth is unpersuasive. See ante, at 22, n. 24. The Hibbs Court concluded that "in light of the evidence before Congress" the FMLA's 12-week family-leave provision was necessary to "achiev[e] Congress' remedial object." 538 U.S, at 748. The Court found that the legislative record included not only evidence of state constitutional violations, but evidence that a provision merely enforcing the Equal Protection Clause would actually perpetuate the gender stereotypes Congress sought to eradicate because employers could simply eliminate family leave entirely. Ibid. Without comparable evidence of constitutional violations and the necessity of prophylactic measures, the Court has no basis on which to uphold Title II's special-accommodation requirements. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Congress had previously attempted such an extension in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 318, which sought to lower the voting age in state elections from 21 to 18. This extension was rejected, but in three separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the Court. See infra, at 10. Footnote 2Professor Tribe's treatise gives some examples of such measures that facilitate enforcement in the context of the Fifteenth Amendment: </s> "The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctions against interference with the right to vote on racial grounds. The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86, permitted joinder of states as parties defendant, gave the Attorney General access to local voting records, and authorized courts to register voters in areas of systemic discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, expedited the hearing of voting cases before three-judge courts . . . ." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 931, n.5 (3d ed. 2000). Footnote 3A later case cited in Morgan, James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-563 (1924), applied the more flexible standard of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), to the Eighteenth Amendment, which, in §1, forbade the "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States . . . for beverage purposes" and provided, in §2, that "Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Congress had provided, in the Supplemental Prohibition Act of 1921, §2, 42 Stat. 222, that "only spirituous and vinous liquor may be prescribed for medicinal purposes." That was challenged as unconstitutional because it went beyond the regulation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and hence beyond "enforcement." In an opinion citing none of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment cases discussed in text, the Court held that the McCulloch v. Maryland test applied. Unlike what is at issue here, that case did not involve a power to control the States in respects not otherwise permitted by the Constitution. The only consequence of the Federal Government's going beyond "enforcement" narrowly defined was its arguable incursion upon powers left to the States--which is essentially the same issue that McCulloch addressed. Footnote 4Dicta in one of our earlier cases seemed to suggest that even nonprophylactic provisions could not be adopted under §5 except in response to a State's constitutional violations: </s> "When the State has been guilty of no violation of [the Fourteenth Amendment's] provisions; when it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when, on the contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments, recognize and protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon Congress." United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883). </s> I do not see the textual basis for this interpretation.

United States Supreme Court HARBISON v. BELL, WARDEN(2009) No. 07-8521 Argued: January 12, 2009Decided: April 1, 2009 </s> After the Tennessee state courts rejected petitioner Harbison's conviction and death sentence challenges, the Federal District Court appointed a federal public defender to represent him in filing a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254. That petition was denied. Harbison then sought appointment of counsel for state clemency proceedings. Because Tennessee law no longer authorizes the appointment of state public defenders as clemency counsel, his federal counsel moved to expand the scope of her representation to include the state proceedings. In denying the motion, the District Court relied on Circuit precedent construing 18 U.S.C. §3599, which provides for the appointment of federal counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Held: 1.A certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A) is not required to appeal an order denying a request for federally appointed counsel under §3599 because §2253(c)(1)(A) governs only final orders that dispose of a habeas corpus proceeding's merits. Pp.2-3. </s> 2.Section 3599 authorizes federally appointed counsel to represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and entitles them to compensation for that representation. Pp.3-14. </s> (a) Section 3599(a)(2), which refers to both §2254 and §2255 proceedings, triggers the appointment of counsel for both state and federal postconviction litigants, and §3599(e) governs the scope of appointed counsel's duties. Thus, federally funded counsel appointed to represent a state prisoner in §2254 proceedings "shall also represent the defendant in such ... proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant." §3599(e). Because state clemency proceedings are "available" to state petitioners who obtain subsection (a)(2) representation, the statute's plain language indicates that appointed counsel's authorized representation includes such proceedings. Moreover, subsection (e)'s reference to "proceedings for ... other clemency" refers to state proceedings, as federal clemency is exclusively executive, while States administer clemency in various ways. The Government is correct that appointed counsel is not expected to provide each service enumerated in subsection (e) for every client. Rather, counsel's representation includes only those judicial proceedings transpiring "subsequent" to her appointment, which under subsection (a)(2) begins with the §2254 or §2255 "post-conviction process." Pp.3-8. </s> (b)The Government's attempts to overcome §3599's plain language are not persuasive. First, our reading of the statute does not produce absurd results. Contrary to the Government's contention, a lawyer is not required to represent her client during a state retrial following postconviction relief because the retrial marks the commencement of new judicial proceedings, not a subsequent stage of existing proceedings; state postconviction proceedings are also not "subsequent" to federal habeas proceedings. Second, the legislative history does not support the Government's argument that Congress intended §3599 to apply only to federal defendants. Congress' decision to furnish counsel for state clemency proceedings reflects both clemency's role as the "'fail safe' of our criminal justice system," Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415, and the fact that federal habeas counsel are well positioned to represent their clients in clemency proceedings. Pp.8-14. 503 F.3d 566, reversed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C.J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Alito, J., joined. </s> EDWARD JEROME HARBISON, PETITIONER v.RICKY BELL, WARDEN on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner Edward Jerome Harbison was sentenced to death by a Tennessee court in 1983. In 1997, after the state courts rejected challenges to his conviction and sentence, the Federal District Court appointed the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee to represent him in filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254.1 During the course of that representation, counsel developed substantial evidence relating both to Harbison's culpability and to the appropriateness of his sentence. Although the courts did not order relief, the evidence proved persuasive to one Circuit Judge. See 408 F.3d 823, 837-846 (CA6 2005) (Clay, J., dissenting). </s> Shortly after his habeas corpus petition was denied, Harbison requested counsel for state clemency proceedings. In 2006, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that state law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as clemency counsel. State v. Johnson, No. M1987-00072-SC-DPE-DD (per curiam), 2006 Tenn. Lexis 1236, at *3 (2006). Thereafter, Harbison's federally appointed counsel moved to expand the authorized scope of her representation to include state clemency proceedings. Relying on Circuit precedent construing 18 U.S.C. §3599, which provides for the appointment of federal counsel, the District Court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 503 F.3d 566 (CA6 2007). </s> We granted certiorari, 554 U.S. ___ (2008), to decide two questions: (1) whether a certificate of appealability (COA) is required to appeal an order denying a request for federally appointed counsel pursuant to §3599, and (2) whether §3599(e)'s reference to "proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant" encompasses state clemency proceedings. We conclude that a COA is not necessary and that §3599 authorizes federally appointed counsel to represent clients in state clemency proceedings. I </s> We first consider whether Harbison was required to obtain a COA to appeal the District Court's order. The State of Tennessee and the United States as amicus curiae agree with Harbison that he was not. The District Court's denial of Harbison's motion to authorize his federal counsel to represent him in state clemency proceedings was clearly an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. §1291. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994) (reviewing the Court of Appeals' judgment denying a petition for the appointment of counsel pursuant to the statute now codified at 18 U.S.C. §3599). The question is whether Harbison's failure to obtain a COA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A) deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction over the appeal. </s> Section 2253(c)(1)(A) provides that unless a circuit justice or judge issues a COA, an appeal may not be taken from "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court." This provision governs final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding--a proceeding challenging the lawfulness of the petitioner's detention. See generally Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-485 (2000); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-83 (2005). An order that merely denies a motion to enlarge the authority of appointed counsel (or that denies a motion for appointment of counsel) is not such an order and is therefore not subject to the COA requirement. II </s> The central question presented by this case is whether 18 U.S.C. §3599 authorizes counsel appointed to represent a state petitioner in 28 U.S.C. §2254 proceedings to represent him in subsequent state clemency proceedings. Although Tennessee takes no position on this question, the Government defends the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the statute does not authorize such representation. We begin with the language of the statute. Section 3599, titled "Counsel for financially unable defendants," provides for the appointment of counsel for two classes of indigents, described, respectively, in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). The former states: "[I]n every criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death, a defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services at any time either-- </s> "(A) before judgment; or </s> "(B) after the entry of a judgment imposing a sentence of death but before the execution of that judgment; </s> "shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with subsections (b) through (f)." </s> Subsection (a)(2) states: "In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with subsections (b) through (f)." </s> The parties agree that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) make two different groups eligible for federally appointed counsel: (a)(1) describes federal capital defendants, while (a)(2) describes state and federal postconviction litigants, as indicated by its reference to both §2254 and §2255 proceedings.2 </s> After subsections (b) through (d) discuss counsel's necessary qualifications, subsection (e) sets forth counsel's responsibilities. It provides: "Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney's own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of execution and other appropriations motions and procedures, and shall also represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant." (Emphasis added.) </s> Focusing on the italicized clause of subsection (e), Harbison contends that the plain language of the statute dictates the outcome of this case. We are persuaded by his argument. </s> Under a straightforward reading of the statute, subsection (a)(2) triggers the appointment of counsel for habeas petitioners, and subsection (e) governs the scope of appointed counsel's duties. See §3599(a)(2) (stating that habeas petitioners challenging a death sentence shall be entitled to "the furnishing of ... services in accordance with subsections (b) through (f)"). Thus, once federally funded counsel is appointed to represent a state prisoner in §2254 proceedings, she "shall also represent the defendant in such ... proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant." §3599(e). Because state clemency proceedings are "available" to state petitioners who obtain representation pursuant to subsection (a)(2), the statutory language indicates that appointed counsel's authorized representation includes such proceedings. </s> The Government contends that, fairly read, the statute as a whole is intended to furnish representation only in federal proceedings and that all proceedings listed in subsection (e), including clemency proceedings, should be understood to be federal. The absence of the word "federal" in this subsection is not dispositive, it maintains, because subsection (a)(1) likewise does not use the word "federal" yet the parties agree that provision concerns only federal defendants. Just as "federal" is implied by context in subsection (a)(1), so too, the Government says, is it implied in subsection (e). According to the Government, the repeated use of the word "available" supports this reading: Congress contemplated that not all catalogued proceedings would be available to any given client, and clemency proceedings are simply not available to state petitioners because they are ineligible for federal clemency. </s> The Government's argument is not convincing. Subsection (a)(1) is properly understood as describing federal defendants because the statute is primarily concerned with federal criminal actions3 and (a)(1) includes no language suggesting that it applies more broadly. By contrast, subsection (a)(2) refers to state litigants, and it in turn provides that subsection (e) applies to such litigants. There is therefore no basis for assuming that Congress intended "proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant" in subsection (e) to indicate only federal clemency. </s> To the contrary, the reference to "proceedings for executive or other clemency," §3599(e) (emphasis added), reveals that Congress intended to include state clemency proceedings within the statute's reach.4 Federal clemency is exclusively executive: Only the President has the power to grant clemency for offenses under federal law. U.S. Const., Art.II, §2, cl.1.5 By contrast, the States administer clemency in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Ga. Const., Art. IV, §2 (independent board has clemency authority); Nev. Const., Art. 5, §14 (governor, supreme court justices, and attorney general share clemency power); Fla. Const., Art.IV, §8 (legislature has clemency authority for treasonous offenses); McLaughlin v. Bronson, 206 Conn. 267, 271, 537 A.2d 1004, 1006-1007 (1988) ("In Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the legislature, which has delegated its exercise to the board of pardons" (citation omitted)). Congress' reference to "other clemency" thus does not refer to federal clemency but instead encompasses the various forms of state clemency.6 </s> The Government's reliance on the word "available" is also misplaced. While it maintains that Congress' repeated use of the word shows that various §3599(e) procedures do not apply to particular indigents, the term instead indicates the breadth of the representation contemplated. The directive that counsel "shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including ... all available post-conviction process," for example, hardly suggests a limitation on the scope of representation. </s> The Government is correct that appointed counsel is not expected to provide each service enumerated in subsection (e) for every client. But that limitation does not follow from the word "available"; it follows from the word "subsequent" and the organization of subsection (e) to mirror the ordinary course of proceedings for capital defendants. Counsel's responsibilities commence at a different part of subsection (e) depending on whether she is appointed pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), or (a)(2). When she is appointed pursuant to (a)(1)(A), she is charged with representing her client in all listed proceedings. When she is appointed pursuant to (a)(1)(B) (i.e., after the entry of a federal death sentence), her representation begins with "appeals." And when she is appointed pursuant to (a)(2), her representation begins with the §2254 or §2255 "post-conviction process." Thus, counsel's representation includes only those judicial proceedings transpiring "subsequent" to her appointment. It is the sequential organization of the statute and the term "subsequent" that circumscribe counsel's representation, not a strict division between federal and state proceedings. III </s> In an attempt to overcome the plain language of §3599, the Government advances two additional arguments that merit discussion. First, it contends that a literal reading of subsection (e) would lead to unacceptable results: It would require a federal lawyer who obtained relief for her client in §2254 proceedings to continue to represent him during his state retrial; similarly, it would require federal counsel to represent her client in any state habeas proceeding following her appointment. Second, the Government claims that the statute's legislative history shows that Congress did not intend to include state clemency proceedings within §3599(e)'s coverage. Neither argument is persuasive. The Government suggests that reading §3599(e) to authorize federally funded counsel for state clemency proceedings would require a lawyer who succeeded in setting aside a state death sentence during postconviction proceedings to represent her client during an ensuing state retrial. We do not read subsection (e) to apply to state-court proceedings that follow the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. When a retrial occurs after postconviction relief, it is not properly understood as a "subsequent stage" of judicial proceedings but rather as the commencement of new judicial proceedings. Moreover, subsection (a)(2) provides for counsel only when a state petitioner is unable to obtain adequate representation. States are constitutionally required to provide trial counsel for indigent defendants. Thus, when a state prisoner is granted a new trial following §2254 proceedings, his state-furnished representation renders him ineligible for §3599 counsel until the commencement of new §2254 proceedings. </s> The Government likewise argues that our reading of §3599(e) would require federally funded counsel to represent her client in any state habeas proceeding occurring after her appointment because such proceedings are also "available post-conviction process." But as we have previously noted, subsection (e) authorizes counsel to represent her client in "subsequent" stages of available judicial proceedings. State habeas is not a stage "subsequent" to federal habeas. Just the opposite: Petitioners must exhaust their claims in state court before seeking federal habeas relief. See §2254(b)(1). That state postconviction litigation sometimes follows the initiation of federal habeas because a petitioner has failed to exhaust does not change the order of proceedings contemplated by the statute.7 </s> The Government also argues that §3599(e) should not be interpreted as including state-clemency proceedings because it was drafted to apply only to federal defendants. Section 3599 was originally enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §7001(b), 102 Stat. 4388 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§848(q)(4)-(10)), which created a federal capital offense of drug-related homicide. In 2006, the death penalty procedures specified in that Act were repealed and recodified without change at 18 U.S.C. §3599. Based on the 1988 legislative history, the Government argues that subsection (e) was not written to apply to state petitioners at all. In its telling, the subsection was drafted when the bill covered only federal defendants; state litigants were added, by means of what is now subsection (a)(2), just a few hours before the bill passed in rushed end-of-session proceedings; and Congress simply did not attend to the fact that this amendment applied what is now subsection (e) to state litigants. </s> While the legislative history is regrettably thin, the evidence that is available does not support the Government's argument. State petitioners were a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act from the first day the House of Representatives took up the bill. In the amendment authorizing the death penalty for drug-related homicides, Representative George Gekas included a provision that closely resembles the current §3599(a)(2): "In any post-conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, the court shall appoint counsel to represent any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation." 134 Cong. Rec. 22984 (1988) (emphasis added). </s> Following passage of the Gekas amendment, Representative John Conyers proposed replacing its provisions on appellate and collateral process (including the above-quoted provision) with language comprising the provisions now codified at §§3599(a)(1), (b), (c), and (e). Because his amendment introduced the §3599(e) language and did not refer specifically to §2254 proceedings, the Government and Justice Scalia argue that Representative Conyers drafted subsection (e) to apply only to federal defendants. But his floor statements evince his particular concern for state prisoners. He explained that his amendment filed a gap because "[w]hile State courts appoint lawyers for indigent defendants, there is no legal representation automatically provided once the case i[s] appealed to the Federal level." Id., at 22996.8 He then cited discussions by the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit and the NAACP devoted exclusively to errors found by federal courts during habeas corpus review of state capital cases. Ibid. </s> In the Senate, Representative Conyers' language was first replaced with Representative Gekas' provision for counsel for §2254 and §2255 petitioners, and then a subsequent amendment substituted the text of the Conyers amendment. See id., at 30401, 30746. Thereafter, the House amended the bill a final time to insert the language now codified at §3599(a)(2) while leaving the Conyers language in place. See id., at 33215. The Government argues that this late amendment marked the first occasion on which state prisoners were brought within the bill's compass. But Representative Gekas' initial amendment explicitly referenced §2254 petitioners, and Representative Conyers' proposal sought to provide additional protections for all capital defendants. The House's final amendment is therefore best understood not as altering the bill's scope, but as clarifying it. </s> The Government's arguments about §3599's history and purposes are laced with the suggestion that Congress simply would not have intended to fund clemency counsel for indigent state prisoners because clemency proceedings are a matter of grace entirely distinct from judicial proceedings.9 As this Court has recognized, however, "[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-412 (1993) (footnote omitted). Far from regarding clemency as a matter of mercy alone, we have called it "the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system." Id., at 415.10 </s> Congress' decision to furnish counsel for clemency proceedings demonstrates that it, too, recognized the importance of such process to death-sentenced prisoners, and its reference to "other clemency," §3599(e), shows that it was familiar with the availability of state as well as federal clemency proceedings. Moreover, Congress' sequential enumeration suggests an awareness that clemency proceedings are not as divorced from judicial proceedings as the Government submits. Subsection (e) emphasizes continuity of counsel, and Congress likely appreciated that federal habeas counsel are well positioned to represent their clients in the state clemency proceedings that typically follow the conclusion of §2254 litigation. </s> Indeed, as the history of this case demonstrates, the work of competent counsel during habeas corpus representation may provide the basis for a persuasive clemency application. Harbison's federally appointed counsel developed extensive information about his life history and cognitive impairments that was not presented during his trial or appeals. She also litigated a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), based on police records that had been suppressed for 14 years. One Court of Appeals judge concluded that the nondisclosure of these records "undermine[d] confidence in Harbison's guilty verdict" because the evidence contained therein could have supported a colorable defense that a third party murdered the victim and that Harbison's codefendant falsely implicated him. 408 F.3d, at 840 (Clay, J., dissenting). Although the Court of Appeals concluded that Harbison's Brady claim was procedurally defaulted, the information contained in the police records could be marshaled together with information about Harbison's background in a clemency application to the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole and the Governor. </s> Harbison's case underscores why it is "entirely plausible that Congress did not want condemned men and women to be abandoned by their counsel at the last moment and left to navigate the sometimes labyrinthine clemency process from their jail cells." Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168 (CA10 2006) (en banc). In authorizing federally funded counsel to represent their state clients in clemency proceedings, Congress ensured that no prisoner would be put to death without meaningful access to the "'fail-safe'" of our justice system. Herrera, 506 U.S., at 415. IV </s> We conclude that a COA is not required to appeal an order denying a motion for federally appointed counsel. We further hold that §3599 authorizes federally appointed counsel to represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and entitles them to compensation for that representation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. </s> EDWARD JEROME HARBISON, PETITIONER v. RICKY BELL, WARDEN on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree with much of the Court's opinion. 18 U.S.C. §3599(a)(2) entitles indigent federal habeas petitioners to appointed counsel "in accordance with" subsection (e). Subsection (e) specifies that the appointed counsel "shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings ... and shall also represent the defendant in such ... proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant." Nothing in the text of §3599(e) excludes proceedings for available state clemency, and, as the Court points out, there are good reasons to expect federal habeas counsel to carry on through state clemency proceedings. See ante, at 12-14. </s> At the same time, the "plain language of §3599," ante, at 8, does not fully resolve this case. The obligation in subsection (e) that the appointed counsel represent the defendant in "every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings" is not on its face limited to "federal" proceedings, just as there is no such limitation with respect to clemency. Yet it is highly unlikely that Congress intended federal habeas petitioners to keep their federal counsel during subsequent state judicial proceedings. See Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168, 1178 (CA10 2006) (Briscoe, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot seriously be suggested that Congress intended, in the event a state capital prisoner obtains federal habeas relief and is granted a new trial, to provide federally-funded counsel to represent that prisoner in the ensuing state trial, appellate, and post-conviction proceedings..."). Harbison concedes as much. Reply Brief for Petitioner 11-12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 15. </s> If there were no way to read the words of the statute to avoid this problematic result, I might be forced to accept the Government's invitation to insert the word "federal" into §3599(e)--a limitation that would have to apply to clemency as well. But fortunately the best reading of the statute avoids the problem: Section 3599(e)'s reference to "subsequent stage[s] of available judicial proceedings" does not include state judicial proceedings after federal habeas, because those are more properly regarded as new judicial proceedings. </s> The meaning of that phrase is not entirely plain, but it is plain that not every lawsuit involving an inmate that arises after the federal habeas proceeding is included. Surely "subsequent stage[s]" do not include, for example, a challenge to prison conditions or a suit for divorce in state court, even if these available judicial proceedings occur subsequent to federal habeas. That must be because these are new proceedings rather than "subsequent stage[s]" of the proceedings for which federal counsel is available. Once it is acknowledged that Congress has drawn a line at some point, this is the "best reading" of the statutory language. Post, at 3 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). </s> Justice Thomas does not disagree. Instead, he contends that it is not necessary to decide what the first part of the sentence means in deciding what the second part means. Post, at 4. We have said that "[w]e do not ... construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole." United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984). This certainly applies to reading sentences as a whole. </s> I entirely agree with Justice Thomas that "Congress' intent is found in the words it has chosen to use," and that "[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it," even if that produces "very bad policy." Post, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we need only apply the text of §3599 to conclude that federal counsel is available for state clemency, but not for subsequent state court litigation. I therefore concur in the result. </s> EDWARD JEROME HARBISON, PETITIONER v. RICKY BELL, WARDEN on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree that under 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A), a certificate of appealability was not required to seek appellate review of the issue in this case. See ante, at 2-3; see also post, at 1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I further agree with the Court that 18 U.S.C. §§3599(a)(2) and (e) entitle eligible state postconviction litigants to federally funded counsel in available state clemency proceedings. See ante, at 2, 5. As even Justice Scalia acknowledges in his dissenting opinion, the statute "contains no express language limiting its application to proceedings in a federal forum." Post, at 8; see also ante, at 1 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) ("Nothing in the text of §3599(e) excludes proceedings for available state clemency..."). By its express terms, the statute "entitle[s]" eligible litigants to appointed counsel who "shall represent the defendant ... in such ... proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant." §§3599(a)(2), (e). Because the statute applies to individuals challenging either state or federal convictions, see §3599(a)(2), and because state clemency is the only clemency available to those challenging state convictions, §§3599(a)(2) and (e) necessarily entitle eligible state postconviction litigants to federally funded counsel in state clemency proceedings. </s> I disagree, however, with the assumption that §3599 must be limited to "federal" proceedings in at least some respects. Ante, at 6; ante, at 1-2 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment); post, at 3-4. The majority and dissent read such a limitation into subsection (a)(1) of the statute. But that subsection, like subsection (a)(2), "contains no language limiting its application to federal capital defendants. It provides counsel to indigent defendants in 'every criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death.'" Post, at 3 (quoting §3599(a)(1)). The majority, then, compounds its error by attempting to discern some distinction between subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), to which it properly declines to add an extratextual "federal" limitation, see ante, at 5-6. The dissent seizes on this inconsistency between the majority's interpretation of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), but responds by incorrectly reading a parallel "federal" limitation into subsection (a)(2), see post, at 3-4. In the dissent's view, "it is perfectly reasonable to assume" that subsection (a)(2) is limited to federal postconviction proceedings--including clemency proceedings--"even where the statute contains no such express limitation." Post, at 3. </s> The Chief Justice, in contrast, finds a "federal" limitation in a clause of subsection (e) that is not before this Court in order to cabin the reach of today's decision. He observes that the text of subsection (e) includes no "federal" limitation with respect to any of the proceedings listed in that subsection. But The Chief Justice finds a way to avoid this "problematic result" by adding a different limitation to §3599. In his view, the "best" reading of the phrase "subsequent stage[s] of available judicial proceedings" is one that excludes "state judicial proceedings after federal habeas" proceedings because they are "new"--not "subsequent"--judicial proceedings. Ante, at 2. Without this limitation, The Chief Justice explains, "[he] might be forced to accept the Government's invitation to insert the word 'federal' into §3599(e)--a limitation that would have to apply to clemency as well"--because he finds it "highly unlikely that Congress intended" for there to be no federal limitation at all in subsection (e). Ante, at 1-2. </s> This Court is not tasked with interpreting §3599 in a way that it believes is consistent with the policy outcome intended by Congress. Nor should this Court's approach to statutory construction be influenced by the supposition that "it is highly unlikely that Congress intended" a given result. See ante, at 1 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment). Congress' intent is found in the words it has chosen to use. See West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("The best evidence of [Congress'] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President"). This Court's interpretive function requires it to identify and give effect to the best reading of the words in the provision at issue. Even if the proper interpretation of a statute upholds a "very bad policy," it "is not within our province to second-guess" the "wisdom of Congress' action" by picking and choosing our preferred interpretation from among a range of potentially plausible, but likely inaccurate, interpretations of a statute. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003); see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute"). "Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it." Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). </s> This statute's silence with respect to a "federal" limitation in no way authorizes us to assume that such a limitation must be read into subsections (a) and (e) in order to blunt the slippery-slope policy arguments of those opposed to a plain-meaning construction of the provisions under review, see ante, at 8-9. And Congress' silence certainly does not empower us to go even farther and incorporate such an assumption into the text of these provisions. Post, at 7-8. Moreover, the Court should not decide a question irrelevant to this case in order to pre-empt the "problematic" results that might arise from a plain-text reading of the statutory provision under review. See ante, at 2 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment). Whether or not The Chief Justice's construction of the "subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings" clause of subsection (e) is correct, it is irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the clemency clause of subsection (e). Even if the statute were to authorize federal postconviction counsel to appear in state proceedings other than state clemency proceedings, a question not resolved by today's decision, that conclusion would not provide a legitimate basis for adopting the dissent's atextual interpretation of the clemency clause of subsection (e). The "best" interpretation of the clemency clause does not turn on the unresolved breadth of the "subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings" clause. </s> Rather, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is most faithful to its text. Here, the absence of a "federal" limitation in the text of subsections (a) and (e) of §3599 most logically suggests that these provisions are not limited to federal clemency proceedings. "If Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to its intent. It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred result." Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. </s> EDWARD JEROME HARBISON, PETITIONER v. RICKY BELL, WARDEN on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Alito joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I agree with the Court that Harbison was not required to obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A) before appealing the District Court's denial of his motion to expand counsel's appointment. See ante, at 2-3. I do not agree, however, that 18 U.S.C. §3599 gives state prisoners federally funded counsel to pursue state clemency. While purporting to adopt a "straightforward reading of the statute," ante at 5, the Court in fact selectively amends the statute--inserting words in some places, twisting their meaning elsewhere. Because the statute is most naturally and coherently read to provide federally funded counsel to capital defendants appearing in a federal forum, I would affirm the decision of the Sixth Circuit and hold that Harbison was not entitled to federally funded counsel to pursue state clemency. I </s> Title 18 U.S.C. §3599(a)(2) provides for the appointment of counsel as follows: "In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with subsections (b) through (f). </s> Section 3599(e) defines the scope of appointed counsel's representation: "Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney's own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant." </s> As the Court notes, the first of these provisions entitled Harbison to counsel for §2254 proceedings. And the second of them, without any express qualification, provides for counsel's continued representation through "such . . . proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant," which in petitioner's case would include state clemency proceedings. The Court thus concludes that the statute's "plain language" provides Harbison federally funded counsel to represent him in state clemency proceedings. Ante, at 5. </s> But the Court quickly abandons its allegedly "plain" reading of the statute when it confronts the subsection that precedes these two, which provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in every criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death, a defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services at any time either- </s> "(A) before judgment; or </s> "(B) after the entry of a judgment imposing a sentence of death but before the execution of that judgment; </s> "shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with subsections (b) through (f)." §3599(a)(1). The Court states that "(a)(1) describes federal capital defendants." Ante, at 4. But according to the Court's mode of analysis, that is not so. Subsection (a)(1), like subsection (e), contains no language limiting its application to federal capital defendants. It provides counsel to indigent defendants in "every criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death." §3599(a)(1) (emphasis added). Why, then, is subsection (a)(1) limited to federal capital defendants? Because, as the Court notes, "the statute is primarily concerned with federal criminal actions and (a)(1) includes no language suggesting that it applies more broadly." Ante, at 6 (footnote omitted). Quite right. Section 3599 was enacted as part of a bill that created a new federal capital offense, see ibid., n.3, and it is perfectly reasonable to assume that a federal statute, providing federally funded counsel, applies in federal proceedings only, even where the statute contains no such express limitation. Cf. Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247-248 (1833). But there is no basis for adopting that reading with respect to only half the statute. If subsection (a)(1) is limited to federal proceedings, then subsection (e), which likewise contains no express federal limitation, is similarly limited. We cannot give the same silence (omission of the limiting word "federal") in adjacent and simultaneously enacted subsections of the same law (§3599) divergent meanings. </s> The Court advances two arguments for reading subsection (e) more broadly. First, it claims that unlike subsection (a)(1), "subsection (a)(2) refers to state litigants." Ante, at 6. It most certainly does not. It refers to proceedings under §2254 and §2255--proceedings under federal statutes providing federal causes of action in federal court. Read together, subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) provide federally funded counsel for persons convicted of capital crimes who are appearing in federal court. Subsection (a)(2) neither undermines the Court's earlier statement that "the statute's primary focus is federal" proceedings, nor gives the Court license to insert words selectively into the statutory text. </s> The Court next reasons that the phrase "executive or other clemency" suggests that subsection (e) includes state clemency proceedings. Since (the argument goes) federal clemency is exclusively executive, the word "other" must refer to state clemency, or else it would be superfluous. But the drafting history, which the Court thinks relevant, ante, at 10-11, defeats the inference the Court wishes to draw. The current text of subsection (e) first appeared in a version of the bill that included what is now subsection (a)(1) (which the Court concedes deals only with federal proceedings), but not subsection (a)(2) (which the Court would deem applicable to state proceedings). 134 Cong. Rec. 22995 (1988). In other words, at the time of its introduction, subsection (e) applied only to federal defendants, and the phrase "or other clemency" was unquestionably superfluous. </s> In any event, the Court's reading places a great deal of weight on avoiding superfluity in a statute that is already teeming with superfluity. Item: Subsection (a)(2) needlessly refers to §2255 proceedings even though subsections (a)(1) and (e) taken together would provide federal capital defendants with counsel in §2255 proceedings. Item: Subsection (a)(2) provides counsel "in accordance with subsections (b) through (f)" even though subsections (b) and (c) have no conceivable relevance to subsection (a)(2).** Item: Subsection (e) provides counsel "throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings," including "all available post-conviction process" (emphasis added). The first use of the term "available" is already of dubious value (is counsel expected to represent a defendant in unavailable proceedings?) but its needless repetition is inexplicable. In a statute that is such a paragon of shoddy draftsmanship, relying upon the superfluity of "or other" to extend the statute's application from federal to state proceedings is quite absurd--and doubly absurd when that extension is illogically limited to the subsection in which "or other" appears. II </s> The Court's reading of subsection (e) faces a second substantial difficulty. Subsection (e) provides that counsel, once appointed, "shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures." §3599(e). </s> In other words, once counsel is appointed under (a)(2), petitioner is entitled to federal counsel "throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings." The Government argues that, if subsection (e) is not limited to federal proceedings, then a §2254 petitioner who obtains federally funded counsel will retain that counsel, at federal expense, in all "subsequent" state-court proceedings, including the retrial that follows the grant of federal habeas relief. The Court disagrees, on the ground that a new trial represents the "commencement of new judicial proceedings." Ante, at 9. </s> I need not enter that controversy. What is clear, at least, is that (if subsection (e) includes state proceedings) federally funded counsel would have to represent petitioners in subsequent state habeas proceedings. The Court tries to split the baby here, conceding that "a district court may determine on a case-by-case basis that it is appropriate for federal counsel to exhaust [in state court] a claim in the course of her federal habeas representation." Ante, at 9-10, n.7. The Court tries to derive this discretionary authority from subsection (e)'s provision for representation by federal counsel in "other appropriate motions and procedures." §3599(e) (emphasis added). But that provision is in addition to, rather than in limitation of, subsection (e)'s unqualified statement that counsel "shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, including ... all available post-conviction process." The provision then continues: "together with applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures." (Emphasis added.) There is no way in which this can be read to limit the requirement that counsel represent the defendant in "every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings," which would include habeas proceedings in state court. </s> The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion by saying that "[s]tate habeas is not a stage 'subsequent' to federal habeas," because "[p]etitioners must exhaust their claims in state court before seeking federal habeas relief." Ante, at 9. This is a breathtaking denial of reality, confusing what should be with what is. It is rather like saying that murder does not exist because the law forbids it. To be sure, petitioners are supposed to complete state postconviction proceedings before pursuing relief in federal court. But they often do not do so, and when they do not our opinions permit them to seek stays or dismissals of their §2254 petitions in order that they may thereafter (subsequently) return to state court to exhaust their claims. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-278 (2005); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 228 (2004). Additionally, inmates may--as petitioner did in this case--file successive state habeas petitions after §2254 proceedings are complete. See Harbison v. State, No. E2004-00885-CCA-R28-PD, 2005 WL 1521910, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., June 27, 2005). These subsequent state proceedings are not rare but commonplace, and it is inconceivable (if state proceedings are covered) that subsection (e) does not refer to them. Indeed, one would think that subsection (e) refers especially to them. And what kind of an incoherent statute would it be that allows counsel for de-facto-subsequent federal habeas claims that should have been brought earlier (see §3599(a)(2)) but does not allow counsel for subsequent state habeas claims that have the same defect? </s> If §3599(e) includes state proceedings (as the Court holds), and if "subsequent" is given its proper scope (rather than the tortured one adopted by the Court)--then §3599(a)(2)'s limitation of federally provided counsel to only federal habeas proceedings would amount to a dead letter. A capital convict could file for federal habeas without first exhausting state postconviction remedies, obtain a stay or dismissal of that federal petition, and return to state court along with his federally funded lawyer. Indeed, under our decision in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994), he need not even file an unexhausted federal habeas petition; he can file a stand-alone "motion requesting the appointment of habeas counsel," id., at 859, and obtain federally funded counsel that he can then take back for the subsequent state proceedings. The question persists: Why would §3599(a)(2) provide counsel in only federal habeas proceedings, when §3599(e) makes it so easy to obtain federally funded counsel for state habeas proceedings as well? *  *  * </s> Concededly, §3599 contains no express language limiting its application to proceedings in a federal forum. And yet Harbison, the Government, and the Court all read part of that section to refer to federal proceedings only. The Court's refusal to extend that limitation to the entirety of §3599 is untenable. It lacks a textual basis and has the additional misfortune of producing absurd results, which the majority attempts to avoid by doing further violence to the statutory text. I would read the statute as providing federal counsel to capital convicts appearing in a federal forum, and I accordingly would affirm the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee is a nonprofit organization established pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §3006A(g)(2)(B). Footnote 2We note that §3599 uses the term "defendant" to describe postconviction litigants. Footnote 3As we discuss below, §3599 was originally enacted as part of a statute creating a new federal capital offense, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §7001(b), 102 Stat. 4388, and it is now codified in Title 18, which principally addresses federal criminal proceedings. Footnote 4Justice Scalia argues that subsection (e), including the reference to "other clemency," was drafted to apply only to federal defendants, but this is not correct, as we discuss infra, at10-12. Footnote 5The Government suggests that Congress might have referred to "other clemency" to encompass the Executive's use of other persons to assist him in reviewing clemency applications. But as the Government concedes, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 43--and as Members of Congress would have known--regardless of what assistance the President seeks, the federal proceeding is one for executive clemency under the Constitution. Footnote 6We also note that the Government's proposal to read the word "federal" into §3599(e) would lead to absurd results. It is clear, for example, that a state inmate faced with an imminent execution might be required to apply for a stay from a state court before seeking such relief in a federal court. On our reading of the statute, federally appointed counsel would be permitted to represent her client pursuant to subsection (e)'s reference to "applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures." But on the Government's reading, the inmate would have to secure new counsel to file the stay request because his federal counsel would not be authorized to represent him. Such a rigid limit on the authority of appointed federal counsel would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of the statute. Cf. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854-857 (1994). Footnote 7Pursuant to §3599(e)'s provision that counsel may represent her client in "other appropriate motions and procedures," a district court may determine on a case-by-case basis that it is appropriate for federal counsel to exhaust a claim in the course of her federal habeas representation. This is not the same as classifying state habeas proceedings as "available post-conviction process" within the meaning of the statute. Footnote 8Despite his reference to "defendants" and "appealed," Representative Conyers was clearly discussing state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief. Representative Gekas' amendment similarly referred to postconviction litigants as "defendants," and the relevant portion of his amendment was titled "Appeal in Capital Cases" even though it incorporated §2254 and §2255 proceedings. 134 Cong. Rec. 22984. As codified, §3599(a)(2) likewise uses the term "defendant" to refer to habeas petitioners. The Government is incorrect to suggest that the statute's use of this term illustrates that it was not written to apply to postconviction litigants. Footnote 9The Government also submits that providing federally funded counsel for state clemency proceedings would raise "unique federalism concerns." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31. But Tennessee's position belies that claim. Following other States that have litigated the question, Tennessee has expressed "no view" on the statute's scope because it "has no real stake in whether an inmate receives federal funding for clemency counsel." Brief for Respondent 7; see also Brief for Current and Former Governors as Amici Curiae 18 ("Contrary to the view of the Solicitor General ... , the fact that counsel is appointed by a federal court does not reflect an intrusion on state sovereignty"). Footnote 10See also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 193 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Reversal of an erroneous conviction on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through executive clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success. Those devices are part and parcel of the multiple assurances that are applied before a death sentence is carried out"); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 399 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Among its benign if too-often ignored objects, the clemency power can correct injustices that the ordinary criminal process seems unable or unwilling to consider"). FOOTNOTESFootnote **Subsection (b) details the requisite qualifications for a lawyer appointed "before judgment"; but appointments under subsection (a)(2) are made only after judgment. Subsection (c) requires that a lawyer appointed after judgment have been "admitted to practice in the court of appeals for not less than five years" (emphasis added); but the postconviction proceedings dealt with by subsection (a)(2) take place in federal district court.

United States Supreme Court PERMIAN BASIN AREA RATE CASES(1968) No. 90 Argued: Decided: May 1, 1968 </s> [Footnote * No. 90, Continental Oil Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission; No. 95, Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission; No. 98, New Mexico et al. v. Federal Power Commission; No. 99, Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al.; No. 100, California et al. v. Skelly Oil Co. et al; No. 101, Hunt Oil Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission; No. 102, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; No. 105, Bass et al. v. Federal Power Commission; No. 117, Federal Power Commission v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; No. 181, City of Los Angeles v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; No. 261, City and County of San Francisco v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; No. 262, City of San Diego v. Skelly Oil Co. et al.; No. 266, Standard Oil Co. of Texas, a Division of Chevron Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission; and No. 388, Mobil Oil Corp. et al. v. Federal Power Commission. </s> Following this Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 , holding that independent producers are "natural gas compan[ies]" within the meaning of 2 (6) of the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) struggled under a heavy administrative burden in attempting to determine whether producers' rates were just and reasonable under 4 (a) and 5 (a) by examining each producer's cost of service. In 1960 the FPC announced that it would begin a series of proceedings under 5 (a) in which it would determine maximum producers' rates for each major producing area. A Statement of General Policy was issued by the FPC, asserting its authority to determine and require application throughout a producing area of maximum rates for producers' interstate sales, tentatively designating certain areas as producing units for rate regulation (three of which areas were consolidated for this proceeding), and providing two series of area guideline prices, for initial filings and for increased rates. This first area proceeding was initiated in 1960, and in 1965 the FPC issued its decision, devising for the Permian Basin area a rate structure with two area maximum prices, one for natural gas produced from gas wells and dedicated to interstate commerce after January 1, 1961, and the other, and lower, price for all other natural gas produced in the area. The FPC found that price [390 U.S. 747, 748] could be an incentive for exploration and production of new gas-well gas, while supplies of associated and dissolved gas and previously committed reserves of gas-well gas were relatively unresponsive to price variations. The FPC did not use prevailing field prices in calculating rates, but utilized composite cost data from published sources and from producers' cost questionnaires, establishing the national costs in 1960 of finding and producing gas-well gas, and, for all other gas, deriving the just and reasonable rate from historical costs of gas-well gas produced in the Permian Basin in 1960, with a local and historical emphasis. The uncertainties of joint cost allocation made it difficult to compute the cost of gas produced in association with oil, but the FPC found that the costs of such gas were less than those incurred in producing flowing gas-well gas. Each maximum rate includes a return to the producer of 12% on average production investment based on the FPC's two series of cost computations. A system of quality and Btu adjustments was provided for. The following rates were determined: 16.5 per Mcf (including state production taxes) in Texas, and 15.5 (excluding state production taxes) in New Mexico, for gas-well gas dedicated to interstate commerce after January 1, 1961; 14.5 per Mcf (including taxes) in Texas, and 13.5 per Mcf (excluding taxes) in New Mexico, for flowing gas, including oil-well gas and gas-well gas dedicated to interstate commerce before 1961; 9 per Mcf minimum for all gas of pipeline quality. The FPC declared that it would provide special relief in hardship cases; that small producers (annual national sales not above 10,000,000 Mcf) need not adjust prices for quality and Btu deficiencies; that it would require a moratorium until January 1, 1968, for filing under 4 (d) for prices above the applicable area maximum; that the use of indefinite escalation clauses to increase prevailing contract prices above the area maximum was thereafter prohibited; and that refunds were required of the difference between amounts collected by producers in periods subject to refund and the amounts permitted under the area rate. The Court of Appeals held that the FPC had authority to impose maximum area rates, sustained (but stayed enforcement of) the moratorium on 4 (d) filings, approved the two-price system and the exemption for small producers, but concluded that the requirements of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 , were not satisfied. It held that the FPC had not properly calculated the financial consequences of the quality and Btu adjustments, had not made essential findings as to aggregate revenue, and had not precisely indicated the circumstances in which individual producers could [390 U.S. 747, 749] obtain relief from area rates. On rehearing, the court also held that refunds were permissible only if aggregate actual area revenues exceeded aggregate permissible area revenues, and only to the amount of the excess, apportioned on "some equitable contract-by-contract basis." Held: </s> 1. A presumption of validity attaches to each exercise of the FPC's expertise, and those who would overturn its judgment undertake "the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. Pp. 766-767. </s> 2. The FPC has constitutional and statutory authority to adopt a system of area regulation and to impose supplementary requirements. Pp. 768-790. </s> (a) Area maximum rates, determined in conformity with the Natural Gas Act, and intended to balance investor and consumer interests, are constitutionally permissible. Pp. 769-770. </s> (b) In these circumstances the FPC's broad guarantees of special relief were not inadequate or excessively imprecise. Pp. 771-772. </s> (c) The FPC did not abuse its discretion by its refusal to stay, pro tanto, enforcement of the area rates pending dispositions of producers' petitions for special relief. Pp. 773-774. </s> (d) Area regulation is consistent with the terms of the Act and is within the statutory authority granted the FPC to carry out its broad responsibilities. Pp. 774-777. </s> (e) The FPC may under 5 and 16 of the Act impose a moratorium on the filing under 4 (d) of proposed rates higher than those determined to be just and reasonable, and the relatively brief moratorium declared here did not exceed or abuse the FPC's authority. Pp. 777-781. </s> (f) Under the authority of 5 (a) the FPC permissibly restricted the application of indefinite escalation clauses. Pp. 781-784. </s> (g) The problems and public functions of small producers differ sufficiently to permit their separate classification, and the exemptions created for them by the FPC comport with the terms and purposes of its statutory responsibilities. Pp. 784-787. </s> (h) The regulatory area designated in this first area proceeding was both convenient and familiar, and the FPC was not obliged under these circumstances to include among the disputed [390 U.S. 747, 750] issues questions of the proper size and composition of the regulatory area. Pp. 787-789. </s> 3. The rate structure devised for natural gas produced in the Permian Basin did not exceed the FPC's authority; and the "heavy burden" of attacking the validity of that rate structure has not been satisfied. Pp. 790-813. </s> (a) The responsibilities of a reviewing court are to determine whether the FPC abused or exceeded its authority, whether each of the order's essential elements is supported by substantial evidence, and whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract needed capital, and fairly compensate investors for risks they have assumed, while appropriately protecting relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. Pp. 791-792. </s> (b) While field prices may have some relevance to the calculation of just and reasonable rates, the FPC was not compelled, on this record, to adopt field prices as the basis of its computations of area rates. Pp. 792-795. </s> (c) The two-price rate structure, which is permissible under the Act, will provide a useful incentive to exploration and prevent excessive producer profits, and thus protect both present and future consumer interests. Pp. 795-799. </s> (d) The FPC may employ "any formula or combination of formulas" it wishes and is free "to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances," as long as the consequences are not arbitrary or unreasonable. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 . P. 800. </s> (e) In calculating cost data for the two maximum rates by selections of differing geographical bases and time periods the FPC did not abuse its authority, as its selections comported with the logic of its system of incentive pricing. Pp. 800-803. </s> (f) The FPC's use of flowing gas-well gas cost data to calculate the rate for old gas, disregarding the costs of gas produced in association with oil, was essentially pragmatic, and its judgment was warranted under the circumstances. Pp. 803-805. </s> (g) The computation of the rate base by determining an average net production investment to which the FPC applied a constant rate of return, was within the FPC's discretion, and was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Pp. 805-806. </s> (h) The selection of 12% as the proper rate of return for gas of pipeline quality was supported by substantial evidence that [390 U.S. 747, 751] the rate will be likely to "maintain financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate investors for the risks assumed." Pp. 806-808. </s> (i) It was not impermissible for the FPC to treat quality adjustments as a risk of production, and its promulgation of quality standards was accompanied by adequate findings as to their revenue consequences. Pp. 808-812. </s> 4. The FPC's rate structure has not here been shown to deny producers revenues consonant with just and reasonable rates. Pp. 813-822. </s> (a) The FPC need not provide formal findings in absolute dollar amounts as to revenue and revenue requirements; it is enough if it proffers findings and conclusions sufficiently detailed to permit reasoned evaluation of the purposes and implications of its order. P. 814. </s> (b) The FPC permissibly discounted the producers' reliance upon the relationship between gas reserves and production to establish the inadequacy of the rate structure. Pp. 816-818. </s> (c) The contention that since the area maximum rates were derived from average costs they cannot, without further adjustment, provide aggregate revenue equal to the producers' aggregate requirements has not been sustained. Pp. 818-821. </s> (d) The FPC's authority to abrogate existing contract prices depends upon its conclusion that they "adversely affect the public interest," and it properly applied that authority in setting a minimum area price of 9 per Mcf and in declining to apply it to prices less than the two area maximum rates. Pp. 820-821. </s> 5. Since it has been almost eight years since these proceedings were commenced, and the remaining issues, which were not decided by the Court of Appeals, were briefed and argued at length in this Court, no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings in the Court of Appeals. Pp. 823-824. </s> 6. The FPC's orders requiring refunds of (1) amounts charged in excess of the applicable area rates for periods following the effective date of its order and (2) amounts collected in excess of area rates during previous periods in which producers' prices were subject to refund under 4 (e), were within its authority. It reasonably concluded that the adoption of a system of refunds conditioned on findings as to aggregate area revenues would prove inequitable to consumers and difficult to administer effectively. Pp. 825-828. </s> 375 F.2d 6 and 35, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. [390 U.S. 747, 752] </s> Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Posner, Peter H. Schiff, Leo E. Forquer, David J. Bardin and Alan J. Roth. </s> J. Calvin Simpson argued the cause for the Public Utilities Commission of California; Malcolm H. Furbush argued the cause for the Pacific Gas & Electric Co.; John Ormasa argued the cause for the Pacific Lighting Gas Supply Co. et al., and C. Hayden Ames argued the cause for the San Diego Gas & Electric Co., all in support of the order of the Federal Power Commission. With Mr. Simpson on the brief for the Public Utilities Commission of California was Mary Moran Pajalich. With Messrs. Furbush, Ormasa and Ames on the brief for Pacific Gas & Electric Co. et al. was Frederick T. Searls. Roger Arnebergh filed a brief for the City of Los Angeles, and Edward T. Butler and Thomas M. O'Connor filed a brief for the City of San Diego and the City and County of San Francisco, in support of the order of the Federal Power Commission. </s> Bruce R. Merrill argued the cause for the Continental Oil Co.; Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Texas; Boston E. Witt, Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of New Mexico; Herbert W. Varner argued the cause for the Superior Oil Co.; Robert W. Henderson argued the cause for the Hunt Oil Co. et al.; J. Evans Attwell argued the cause for Bass et al.; Justin R. Wolf argued the cause for the Standard Oil Co. of Texas; James L. Armour argued the cause for the Mobil Oil Corp.; Louis Flax argued the cause for the Sun Oil Co., and Carroll L. Gilliam and Oliver L. Stone argued the cause for the Amerada Petroleum Corp. et al., all in opposition to the order of the Federal Power Commission. [390 U.S. 747, 753] With Mr. Merrill on the brief for the Continental Oil Co. et al. were Thomas H. Burton, Cecil N. Cook, Neal Powers, Jr., and Lloyd F. Thanhouser. With Messrs. Martin and Witt on the brief for the State of Texas et al. were George M. Cowden, First Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Houghton Brownlee, Jr., Linward Shivers and C. Daniel Jones, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General of Texas, A. J. Carubbi, Jr., and William J. Cooley, Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico. With Mr. Varner on the brief for the Superior Oil Co. were Homer J. Penn and Murray Christian. With Mr. Henderson on the brief for the Hunt Oil Co. et al. were Paul W. Hicks and Donald K. Young. With Mr. Attwell on the brief for Bass et al. was W. H. Drushel, Jr. With Mr. Wolf on the brief for the Standard Oil Co. of Texas was Francis R. Kirkham. With Mr. Armour on the brief for Mobil Oil Corp. et al. were Thomas P. Hamill, Robert D. Haworth and William H. Tabb. With Mr. Flax on the brief for the Sun Oil Co. were Phillip D. Endom and Robert E. May. With Messrs. Gilliam and Stone on the brief for the Amerada Petroleum Corp. et al. were Joseph W. Morris, Edwin S. Nail, Edward J. Kremer, Jr., Robert E. Wade, Bernard A. Foster, Jr., Graydon D. Luthey, Warren M. Sparks, Martin E. Erck, Clayton L. Orn, Joseph F. Diver, H. Y. Rowe, W. W. Heard, J. P. Hammond, T. C. McCorkle, William H. Emerson, Kenneth Heady, John R. Rebman, Jerome M. Alper, Thomas G. Johnson, Charles E. McGee, Sherman S. Poland, Richard F. Remmers, Homer E. McEwen, Jr., William K. Tell, Jr., William R. Slye and John C. Snodgrass. John Davenport filed a brief for Texas Independent Producers & Royalty Owners Association et al., in opposition to the order of the Federal Power Commission. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Kent H. Brown and [390 U.S. 747, 754] Morton L. Simons for the Public Service Commission of the State of New York; by J. David Mann, Jr., John E. Holtzinger, Jr., Bertram D. Moll, William T. Coleman, Jr., Robert W. Maris, C. William Cooper, Edward S. Kirby, James R. Lacey, Edwin F. Russell, Jr., Barbara M. Suchow, John W. Glendening, Jr., John S. Schmid and Dale A. Wright for the Associated Gas Distributors Group, and by Vincent P. McDevitt and Samuel Graff Miller for the Philadelphia Electric Co. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases stem from proceedings commenced in 1960 by the Federal Power Commission under 5 (a) of the Natural Gas Act, 1 52 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. 717d (a), to determine maximum just and reasonable rates for sales in interstate commerce 2 of natural gas produced in the [390 U.S. 747, 755] Permian Basin. 3 24 F. P. C. 1121. The Commission conducted extended hearings, 4 and in 1965 issued a decision that both prescribed such rates and provided various ancillary requirements. 34 F. P. C. 159 and 1068. On petitions for review, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sustained in part and set aside in part the Commission's orders. 375 F.2d 6 and 35. Because these proceedings began a new era in the regulation of natural gas producers, we granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for briefing and extended oral argument. 387 U.S. 902, 388 U.S. 906, 389 U.S. 817 . For reasons that follow, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgments of the Court of Appeals, and sustain in their entirety the Commission's orders. </s> I. </s> The circumstances that led ultimately to these proceedings should first be recalled. The Commission's authority to regulate interstate sales of natural gas is derived entirely from the Natural Gas Act of 1938. 52 Stat. 821. The Act's provisions do not specifically extend to producers or to wellhead sales of natural gas, 5 and the Commission declined until 1954 to regulate sales by [390 U.S. 747, 756] independent producers 6 to interstate pipelines. 7 Its efforts to regulate such sales began only after this Court held in 1954 that independent producers are "natural-gas compan[ies]" within the meaning of 2 (6) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. 717a (6); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 . The Commission has since labored with obvious difficulty to regulate a diverse and growing industry under the terms of an ill-suited statute. </s> The Commission initially sought to determine whether producers' rates were just and reasonable within the meaning of 4 (a) 8 and 5 (a) by examination of each producer's costs of service. 9 Although this method has been widely employed in various rate-making situations, 10 it ultimately proved inappropriate for the regulation of independent producers. Producers of natural gas cannot usefully be classed as public utilities. 11 They enjoy [390 U.S. 747, 757] no franchises or guaranteed areas of service. They are intensely competitive vendors of a wasting commodity they have acquired only by costly and often unrewarded search. Their unit costs may rise or decline with the vagaries of fortune. The value to the public of the services they perform is measured by the quantity and character of the natural gas they produce, and not by the resources they have expended in its search; the Commission and the consumer alike are concerned principally with "what [the producer] gets out of the ground, not . . . what he puts into it . . . ." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649 (separate opinion). The exploration for and the production of natural gas are thus "more erratic and irregular and unpredictable in relation to investment than any phase of any other utility business." Id., at 647. Moreover, the number both of independent producers and of jurisdictional sales is large, 12 and the administrative burdens placed upon the Commission by an individual company costs-of-service standard were therefore extremely heavy. 13 </s> [390 U.S. 747, 758] </s> In consequence, the Commission's regulation of producers' sales became increasingly laborious, until, in 1960, it was described as the "outstanding example in the federal government of the breakdown of the administrative process." 14 The Commission in 1960 acknowledged the gravity of its difficulties, 15 and announced that it would commence a series of proceedings under 5 (a) in which it would determine maximum producers' rates for each of the major producing areas. 16 One member of the Commission has subsequently described these efforts as "admittedly . . . experimental . . . ." 17 These cases place in question the validity of the first such proceeding. 18 </s> The perimeter of this proceeding was drawn by the Commission in its second Phillips decision and in its Statement of General Policy No. 61-1. The Commission in Phillips asserted that it possesses statutory authority both to determine and to require the application throughout [390 U.S. 747, 759] a producing area of maximum rates for producers' interstate sales. 19 It averred that the adoption of area maximum rates would appreciably reduce its administrative difficulties, facilitate effective regulation, and ultimately prove better suited to the characteristics of the natural gas industry. Each of these conclusions was reaffirmed in the Commission's opinion in these proceedings. 20 Its Statement of General Policy tentatively designated various geographical areas as producing units for purposes of rate regulation; in addition, the Commission there provided two series of area guideline prices, 21 which were expected to help to determine "whether proposed initial rates should be certificated without a price condition and whether proposed rate changes should be accepted or suspended." 22 The Commission consolidated three of the producing areas listed in the Statement of General Policy for purposes of this proceeding. </s> The rate structure devised by the Commission for the Permian Basin includes two area maximum prices. The Commission provided one area maximum price for natural gas produced from gas wells and dedicated to interstate [390 U.S. 747, 760] commerce after January 1, 1961. 23 It created a second, and lower, area maximum price for all other natural gas produced in the Permian Basin. The Commission reasoned that it may employ price functionally, as a tool to encourage discovery and production of appropriate supplies of natural gas. It found that price could serve as a meaningful incentive to exploration and production only for gas-well gas committed to interstate commerce since 1960; the supplies of associated and dissolved gas, 24 and of previously committed reserves of gas-well gas, were, in contrast, found to be relatively unresponsive to variations in price. The Commission expected that its adoption of separate maximum prices would both provide a suitable incentive to exploration and prevent excessive producer profits. [390 U.S. 747, 761] </s> The Commission declined to calculate area rates from prevailing field prices. Instead, it derived the maximum just and reasonable rate for new gas-well gas from composite cost data, obtained from published sources and from producers through a series of cost questionnaires. This information was intended in combination to establish the national costs in 1960 of finding and producing gas-well gas; it was understood not to reflect any variations in cost peculiar either to the Permian Basin or to periods prior to 1960. The maximum just and reasonable rate for all other gas was derived chiefly from the historical costs of gas-well gas produced in the Permian Basin in 1960; the emphasis was here entirely local and historical. The Commission believed that the uncertainties of joint cost allocation made it difficult to compute accurately the cost of gas produced in association with oil. 25 It held, however, that the costs of such gas could not be greater, and must surely be smaller, than those incurred in the production of flowing gas-well gas. In addition, the Commission stated that the exigencies of administration demanded the smallest possible number of separate area rates. </s> Each of the area maximum rates adopted for the Permian Basin includes a return to the producer of 12% on average production investment, calculated from the [390 U.S. 747, 762] Commission's two series of cost computations. The Commission assumed for this purpose that production commences one year after investment, that gas wells deplete uniformly, and that they are totally depleted in 20 years. The rate of return was selected after study of the returns recently permitted to interstate pipelines, but, in addition, was intended to take fully into account the greater financial risks of exploration and production. The Commission recognized that producers are hostages to good fortune; they must expect that their programs of exploration will frequently prove unsuccessful, or that only gas of substandard quality will be found. </s> The allowances included in the return for the uncertainties of exploration were, however, paralleled by a system of quality and Btu adjustments. 26 The Commission held that gas of less than pipeline quality must be sold at reduced prices, and it provided for this purpose a system of quality standards. The price reduction appropriate in each sale is to be measured by the cost of the processing necessary to raise the gas to pipeline quality; these costs are to be determined by agreement between the parties to the sale, subject to review and approval by the Commission. The Commission ultimately indicated that it would accept any agreement which reflects "a good faith effort to approximate the processing costs involved . . . ." 34 F. P. C. 1068, 1071. In addition, the Commission prescribed that gas with a Btu content of less than 1,000 per cubic foot must be sold at a price proportionately lower than the applicable area maximum, and that gas with a Btu content greater than 1,050 per cubic foot may be sold at a price proportionately higher than the area maximum. The Commission acknowledged that the aggregate revenue consequences [390 U.S. 747, 763] of these adjustments could not be precisely calculated, although its opinion denying applications for rehearing provided estimates of the average price reductions that would be necessary. Id., at 1073. </s> The Commission derived from these calculations the following rates for the Permian Basin. 27 Gas-well gas, including its residue, and gas-cap gas, dedicated to interstate commerce after January 1, 1961, may be sold at 16.5 per Mcf (including state production taxes) in Texas, and 15.5 (excluding state production taxes) in New Mexico. 28 Flowing gas, including oil-well gas and gas-well gas dedicated to interstate commerce before January 1, 1961, may be sold at 14.5 per Mcf (including taxes) in Texas, and 13.5 per Mcf (excluding taxes) in New Mexico. Further, the Commission created a minimum just and reasonable rate of 9 per Mcf for all gas of pipeline quality sold under its jurisdiction within the Permian Basin. It found that existing contracts that included lower rates would "adversely affect the public interest." FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 . The Commission permitted producers to file under 4 (d), 15 U.S.C. 717c (d), 29 for the area minimum [390 U.S. 747, 764] rate despite existing contractual limitations, and without the consent of the purchaser. </s> The Commission acknowledged that area maximum rates derived from composite cost data might in individual cases produce hardship, and declared that it would, in such cases, provide special relief. It emphasized that exceptions to the area rates would not be readily or frequently permitted, but declined to indicate in detail in what circumstances relief would be given. </s> This rate structure is supplemented by a series of ancillary requirements. First, the Commission provided various special exemptions for producers whose annual jurisdictional sales throughout the United States do not exceed 10,000,000 Mcf. The prices in sales by these relatively small producers need not be adjusted for quality and Btu deficiencies. Moreover, the Commission by separate order commenced a rule-making proceeding to reduce the small producers' reporting and filing obligations under 4 and 7, 15 U.S.C. 717c, f. 34 F. P. C. 434. </s> Second, the Commission imposed a moratorium until January 1, 1968, upon filings under 4 (d) for prices in excess of the applicable area maximum rate. The Commission concluded that such a moratorium was imperative if the administrative benefits of an area proceeding were to be preserved. Further, it permanently prohibited the use of indefinite escalation clauses to increase prevailing contract prices above the applicable area maximum rate. 30 </s> [390 U.S. 747, 765] </s> Finally, the Commission announced that, by further order, it would require refunds of the difference between amounts that individual producers had actually collected in periods subject to refund, and the amounts that would have been permissible under the applicable area rate, including any necessary quality adjustments. 31 Small producers, although obliged to make refunds, are not required to take into account price reductions for quality deficiencies, unless they wish to take advantage of upward adjustments in price because of high Btu content. The Commission rejected the examiner's conclusion that refunds were appropriate only if the aggregate area revenue actually collected exceeds the aggregate area revenue permissible under the applicable area rates. It held that such a formula would prove both inequitable to purchasers and difficult for the Commission to administer effectively. </s> On petitions for review, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Commission had authority under the Natural Gas Act to impose maximum area rates upon producers' jurisdictional sales. It sustained, but stayed enforcement of, the Commission's moratorium upon filings under 4 (d) in excess of the applicable area maximum rate. It approved both the Commission's two-price system and its exemptions for small producers. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Commission failed to satisfy the requirements devised by this Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra. It held that the Commission had not properly calculated the financial consequences of the quality and Btu adjustments, had not made essential findings as to aggregate revenue, and [390 U.S. 747, 766] had not indicated with appropriate precision the circumstances in which relief from the area rates may be obtained by individual producers. 375 F.2d 6. On rehearing, the court also held that the Commission's treatment of refunds was erroneous; it concluded that refunds were permissible only if aggregate actual area revenues have exceeded aggregate permissible area revenues, and only to the amount of the excess, apportioned on "some equitable contract-by-contract basis." The Court of Appeals ordered the cases remanded to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with its opinions. 375 F.2d 35. </s> II. </s> The parties before this Court have together elected to place in question virtually every detail of the Commission's lengthy proceedings. 32 It must be said at the outset that, in assessing these disparate contentions, this Court's authority is essentially narrow and circumscribed. [390 U.S. 747, 767] </s> Section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act provides without qualification that the "finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." More important, we have heretofore emphasized that Congress has entrusted the regulation of the natural gas industry to the informed judgment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts. A presumption of validity therefore attaches to each exercise of the Commission's expertise, and those who would overturn the Commission's judgment undertake "the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. We are not obliged to examine each detail of the Commission's decision; if the "total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end." Ibid. </s> Moreover, this Court has often acknowledged that the Commission is not required by the Constitution or the Natural Gas Act to adopt as just and reasonable any particular rate level; rather, courts are without authority to set aside any rate selected by the Commission which is within a "zone of reasonableness." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 . No other rule would be consonant with the broad responsibilities given to the Commission by Congress; it must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests. It is on these premises that we proceed to assess the Commission's orders. </s> III. </s> The issues in controversy may conveniently be divided into four categories. In the first are questions of the Commission's statutory and constitutional authority to [390 U.S. 747, 768] employ area regulation and to impose various ancillary requirements. In the second are questions of the validity of the rate structure adopted by the Commission for natural gas produced in the Permian Basin. The third includes questions of the accuracy of the cost and other data from which the Commission derived the two area maximum prices. In the fourth are questions of the validity of the refund obligations imposed by the Commission. </s> We turn first to questions of the Commission's constitutional and statutory authority to adopt a system of area regulation and to impose various supplementary requirements. The most fundamental of these is whether the Commission may, consistently with the Constitution and the Natural Gas Act, regulate producers' interstate sales by the prescription of maximum area rates, rather than by proceedings conducted on an individual producer basis. This question was left unanswered in Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 . 33 Its solution requires consideration of a series of interrelated problems. </s> It is plain that the Constitution does not forbid the imposition, in appropriate circumstances, of maximum prices upon commercial and other activities. A legislative power to create price ceilings has, in "countries where the common law prevails," been "customary from time immemorial . . . ." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 . Its exercise has regularly been approved by this Court. See, e. g., Tagg Bros. v. United States, [390 U.S. 747, 769] 280 U.S. 420 ; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 . No more does the Constitution prohibit the determination of rates through group or class proceedings. This Court has repeatedly recognized that legislatures and administrative agencies may calculate rates for a regulated class without first evaluating the separate financial position of each member of the class; it has been thought to be sufficient if the agency has before it representative evidence, ample in quantity to measure with appropriate precision the financial and other requirements of the pertinent parties. See Tagg Bros. v. United States, supra; Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 ; United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 . Compare New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 196 -199; United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 290 -291; New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 ; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 326, 341 . </s> No constitutional objection arises from the imposition of maximum prices merely because "high cost operators may be more seriously affected . . . than others," Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 518, or because the value of regulated property is reduced as a consequence of regulation. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 601. Regulation may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return recovered on investment, for investors' interests provide only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 596 . </s> It is, however, plain that the "power to regulate is not a power to destroy," Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 ; Covington & Lexington Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, supra, at 593; and that maximum rates must be calculated for a regulated class in conformity with the pertinent constitutional limitations. Price control is "unconstitutional . . . if arbitrary, discriminatory, [390 U.S. 747, 770] or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt . . . ." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 . Nonetheless, the just and reasonable standard of the Natural Gas Act "coincides" with the applicable constitutional standards, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, at 586, and any rate selected by the Commission from the broad zone of reasonableness permitted by the Act cannot properly be attacked as confiscatory. Accordingly, there can be no constitutional objection if the Commission, in its calculation of rates, takes fully into account the various interests which Congress has required it to reconcile. We do not suggest that maximum rates computed for a group or geographical area can never be confiscatory; we hold only that any such rates, determined in conformity with the Natural Gas Act, and intended to "balanc[e] . . . the investor and the consumer interests," are constitutionally permissible. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 603. </s> One additional constitutional consideration remains. The producers have urged, and certain of this Court's decisions might be understood to have suggested, that if maximum rates are jointly determined for a group or area, the members of the regulated class must, under the Constitution, be proffered opportunities either to withdraw from the regulated activity or to seek special relief from the group rates. 34 We need not determine whether this is in every situation constitutionally imperative, for such arrangements have here been provided by the Commission, and we cannot now hold them inadequate. </s> The Commission declared that a producer should be permitted "appropriate relief" if it establishes that its "out-of-pocket expenses in connection with the operation of a particular well" exceed its revenue from the [390 U.S. 747, 771] well under the applicable area price. 34 F. P. C., at 226. It did not indicate which operating expenses would be pertinent for these calculations. 35 The Commission acknowledged that there might be other circumstances in which relief should be given, but declined to enumerate them. It emphasized, however, that a producer's inability to recover either its unsuccessful exploration costs or the full 12% return on its production investment would not, without more, warrant relief. It announced that in many situations it would authorize abandonment under 7 (b), 15 U.S.C. 717f (b), 36 rather than an exception to the area maximum price. Finally, the Commission held that the burden would be upon the producer to establish the propriety of an exception, and that it therefore would not stay enforcement of the area rates pending disposition of individual petitions for special relief. </s> The Court of Appeals held that these arrangements were inadequate. It found the Commission's description of its intentions vague. The Court would require the Commission to provide "guidelines which if followed by an aggrieved producer will permit it to be heard promptly and to have a stay of the general rate order until its claim for exemption is decided." 375 F.2d, at 30. We cannot agree. It would doubtless be desirable if the Commission [390 U.S. 747, 772] provided, as quickly as may be prudent, a more precise summary of its conditions for special relief, but it was not obliged to delay area regulation until such guidelines could be properly drawn. The Commission quite reasonably believed that the terms of any exceptional relief should be developed as its experience with area regulation lengthens. Moreover, area regulation of producer prices is avowedly still experimental in its terms and uncertain in its ultimate consequences; it is entirely possible that the Commission may later find that its area rate structure for the Permian Basin requires significant modification. 37 We cannot now hold that, in these circumstances, the Commission's broad guarantees of special relief were inadequate or excessively imprecise. </s> Nor is there reason now to suppose that petitions for relief will not be expeditiously evaluated; for the Commission has given assurance that they will be "disposed of as promptly as possible." 38 If it subsequently appears that the Commission's provisions for special relief are for any reason impermissibly dilatory, this question may then be reconsidered. </s> Furthermore, it is pertinent that the Commission may supplement its provisions for special relief by permitting abandonment of unprofitable activities. The producers [390 U.S. 747, 773] urge that this source of relief must be disregarded, since it is entirely conditional upon the Commission's assent. It is enough for present purposes that the Commission has in other circumstances allowed abandonment, 39 and that it has indicated that it will, in appropriate cases, authorize it here. Indeed, the Commission has already acknowledged that only in "exceptional situations" would the abandonment of unprofitable facilities prove detrimental to consumers, and thus impermissible under 7 (b). 34 F. P. C., at 226. </s> Finally, we cannot agree that the Commission abused its discretion by its refusal to stay, pro tanto, enforcement of the area rates pending disposition of producers' petitions for special relief. The Court of Appeals would evidently require the Commission automatically to issue such a stay each time a producer seeks relief. This is plainly inconsistent with the established rule that a party is not ordinarily granted a stay of an administrative order without an appropriate showing of irreparable injury. See, e. g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925. Moreover, the issuance of a stay of an administrative order pending disposition by the Commission of a motion to "modify or set aside, in whole or in part" the order is a matter committed by the Natural Gas Act to the Commission's discretion. 19 (a), (c), 15 U.S.C. 717r (a), (c). We have no reason now to believe that it would in all cases prove an abuse of discretion for the Commission to deny a stay of the area rate order. There might be many situations in which a stay would be inappropriate; at a minimum, the Commission is entitled to give careful consideration to the substantiality of the claim for relief, and to the consequences of any delay in the full administration of the area rate structure. We therefore decline to bind the Commission to any inflexible obligation; we shall assume [390 U.S. 747, 774] that it will, in situations in which stays prove appropriate, properly exercise its statutory authority. </s> For the reasons indicated, we find no constitutional infirmity in the Commission's adoption of an area maximum rate system for the Permian Basin. </s> We consider next the claims that the Commission has exceeded the authority given it by the Natural Gas Act. The first and most important of these questions is whether, despite the absence of any constitutional deficiency, area regulation is inconsistent with the terms of the Act. The producers that seek reversal of the judgments below offer three principal contentions on this question. First, they emphasize that the Act uniformly employs the singular to describe those subject to its requirements; 4 (a), for example, provides that rates received by "any natural-gas company" must be just and reasonable. It is urged that the draftsman's choice of number indicates that each producer's rates must be individually computed from evidence of its own financial position. We cannot infer so much from so little; we see no more in the draftsman's choice of phrase than that the Act's obligations are imposed severally upon each producer. </s> Reliance is next placed upon one sentence in the Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which in 1937 recommended passage of the Natural Gas Act. The Committee remarked that the "bill provides for regulation along recognized and more or less standardized lines." H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3. It added that the bill's provisions included nothing "novel." Ibid. We find these statements entirely inconclusive, particularly since, as the Committee doubtless was aware, regulation by group or class was a recognized administrative method even in 1937. Compare Tagg Bros. v. United States, supra; New [390 U.S. 747, 775] England Divisions Case, supra. See also H. R. Rep. No. 77, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11; H. R. Rep. No. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 29-30. </s> Finally, the producers urge that two opinions of this Court establish the inconsistency of area regulation with the Natural Gas Act. It is asserted that the failure of a majority of the Court to adopt the reasoning of Mr. Justice Jackson's separate opinion in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, impliedly rejected the system of regulation now selected by the Commission. We find this without force. The Court in Hope emphasized that we may not impose methods of regulation upon the discretion of the Commission; for purposes of judicial review, the validity of a rate order is determined by "the result reached not the method employed." 320 U.S., at 602 ; see also FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, at 586. The Court there did not reject area regulation; it repudiated instead the suggestion that courts may properly require the Commission to employ any particular regulatory formula or combination of formulae. </s> The producers next rely upon a dictum in the opinion of the Court in Bowles v. Willingham, supra. The Court remarked that "under other price-fixing statutes such as the Natural Gas Act of 1938 . . . Congress has provided for the fixing of rates which are just and reasonable in their application to particular persons or companies." 321 U.S., at 517 . The dictum is imprecise, but even if it were not, we could not agree that it can now be controlling. The construction of the Natural Gas Act was not even obliquely at issue in Bowles, and this Court does not decide important questions of law by cursory dicta inserted in unrelated cases. Whatever the dictum's meaning, we do not regard it as decisive here. Compare Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 310 . [390 U.S. 747, 776] </s> There are, moreover, other factors that indicate persuasively that the Natural Gas Act should be understood to permit area regulation. The Act was intended to create, through the exercise of the national power over interstate commerce, "an agency for regulating the wholesale distribution to public service companies of natural gas moving interstate"; Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498, 506 ; it was for this purpose expected to "balanc[e] . . . the investor and the consumer interests." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 603. This Court has repeatedly held that the width of administrative authority must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred; see, e. g., Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 299 ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 193 -194; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 ; American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 311 . Surely the Commission's broad responsibilities therefore demand a generous construction of its statutory authority. 40 </s> Such a construction is consistent with the view of administrative rate making uniformly taken by this Court. The Court has said that the "legislative discretion implied in the rate making power necessarily extends to the entire legislative process, embracing the method used in reaching the legislative determination as well as that determination itself." Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 304 . And see San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 446 . It follows that rate-making agencies are not bound [390 U.S. 747, 777] to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted, unless their statutory authority otherwise plainly indicates, "to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, at 586. </s> We are unwilling, in the circumstances now presented, to depart from these principles. The Commission has asserted, and the history of producer regulation has confirmed, that the ultimate achievement of the Commission's regulatory purposes may easily depend upon the contrivance of more expeditious administrative methods. The Commission believes that the elements of such methods may be found in area proceedings. "[C]onsiderations of feasibility and practicality are certainly germane" to the issues before us. Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 517. We cannot, in these circumstances, conclude that Congress has given authority inadequate to achieve with reasonable effectiveness the purposes for which it has acted. </s> We must now consider whether the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by the promulgation of various supplementary requirements. The first of these is its imposition of a moratorium until January 1, 1968, upon filings under 4 (d) for prices in excess of the applicable area maximum rate. Although the period for which the moratorium was to be effective has expired, the order is not without continuing effect. The Court of Appeals stayed enforcement of the moratorium until final disposition of the petitions for review, and a number of rate increases have therefore become effective subject to invalidation and refund if the moratorium order is now upheld. See Brief for the Federal Power Commission 69, n. 44. </s> The validity of the moratorium order turns principally upon construction of 4 and 5 of the Act. Section [390 U.S. 747, 778] 4 (d) 41 provides that no modification in existing rate schedules may be made by a natural gas company except after 30 days' notice to the Commission. When the Commission receives such notice, it is permitted by 4 (e), 42 upon complaint or on its own motion, to suspend the proposed rate schedule for a period not to exceed five months. The Commission is to employ the period of suspension to conduct hearings upon the lawfulness of the proposed rates. If at the end of the suspension period appropriate orders have not been issued, the proposed rate schedule becomes effective, subject only to a refund obligation. In contrast, 5 (a) 43 permits the Commission, upon complaint from a public agency or a gas distributing company, or on its own motion, to conduct proceedings to determine whether existing rates are just and reasonable, and to prescribe rates "to be thereafter observed and in [390 U.S. 747, 779] force . . . ." These investigatory powers are not conditional upon the filing by a natural gas company of any proposed change in existing rates. </s> Certain of the producers urge that 4 and 5 must in combination be understood to preclude moratoria upon filings under 4 (d). They assert that the period of effectiveness of a rate determination under 5 (a) is limited by 4 (e); they reason that 4 (d) creates an unrestricted right to file rate changes, and that such changes may, under 4 (e), be suspended for a period no longer than five months. If this construction were accepted, it would follow that area proceedings would terminate in rate limitations that could be disregarded by producers five months after their promulgation. The result, as the Commission observed, would be that "the conclusion of one area proceeding would only signal the beginning of the next, and just and reasonable rates for consumers would always be one area proceeding away." 34 F. P. C., at 228. </s> We cannot construe the Commission's statutory authority so restrictively. Nothing in 5 (a) imposes limitations of time upon the effectiveness of rate determinations issued under it; rather, the section provides that rates held to be just and reasonable are "to be there after observed . . . ." Moreover, this Court has already declined to find in 4 (d) or 4 (e) an "invincible right to raise prices subject only to a six-month delay and refund liability." United Gas v. Callery Properties, 382 U.S. 223, 232 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Section 4 (d) merely requires notice to the Commission as a condition of any modification of existing rates; it provides that a "change cannot be made without the proper notice to the Commission; it does not say under what circumstances a change can be made." United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 339 . (Emphasis in original.) Nor does 4 (e) restrict the [390 U.S. 747, 780] Commission's authority under 5 (a); it permits the Commission to preserve an existing situation pending consideration of a proposed change in rates, and thereafter to issue an order retroactively forbidding the change; but the "scope and purpose of the Commission's review [under 5 (a)] remain the same . . . ." Id., at 341. </s> The deficiencies of the producers' construction of 4 and 5 are illustrated by United Gas v. Callery Properties, supra. The Court held in Callery that permanent certifications issued under 7 may be conditioned, even upon remand, by a moratorium upon filings under 4 (d) for rates in excess of a specified ceiling. At issue were conditions imposed under 7 (e) prior to the determination of just and reasonable rates; but nothing in the pertinent statutory provisions suggests that the Commission's authority under 5 (a) is more narrow. Indeed, if the producers' construction of 4 and 5 were adopted, we should be forced to the uncomfortable result that filings under 4 (d) may be precluded by the Commission's relatively summary determination of a provisional in-line price, but not by its formal adjudication, after full deliberation, of a just and reasonable price. The consequences of such a construction would, as the Commission observed, be the enervation of 5 and the effective destruction of area regulation. We are, in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention, unwilling to prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes. We have found no such evidence here, and therefore hold that the Commission may under 5 and 16 restrict filings under 4 (d) of proposed rates higher than those determined by the Commission to be just and reasonable. </s> The question remains whether the imposition by the Commission of a moratorium until January 1, 1968, was [390 U.S. 747, 781] a permissible exercise of this authority. The Commission found that in 1960 the costs of gas production had recently been, and would foreseeably remain, "remarkably steady"; 44 it reasoned that in these circumstances a moratorium of 2 1/2 years, subject to "modification of its original decision after appropriate proceedings held in that docket," 45 would both facilitate orderly administration and satisfactorily assure the protection of producers' rights. Individual producers would not have been prevented by the moratorium from seeking relief from the maximum area rates; relief would have been possible both through the Commission's provisions for special exemptions and through motions for modification or termination of the moratorium. This is not a case in which the Commission has sought to bind producers, without recourse and in the face of changing circumstances, to an unchanging rate structure. </s> We cannot, given the apparent stability of production costs, the Commission's relative inexperience with area regulation, and the administrative burdens of concurrent area proceedings, hold that this arrangement was impermissible. We need not attempt to prescribe the limitations of the Commission's authority under 5 and 16 to impose moratoria upon 4 (d) filings; in particular, we intimate no views on the propriety of moratoria created in circumstances of changing costs. These and other difficult issues may more properly await both clarification of the Commission's intentions and the necessities of the particular circumstances. We hold only that this relatively brief moratorium did not, in the circumstances here presented, exceed or abuse the Commission's authority. </s> A collateral issue of statutory authority must be considered. The Commission supplemented its moratorium [390 U.S. 747, 782] by prohibiting price increases that exceed the area maximum rates, if the increases are the products of certain varieties of contractual price escalation clauses. Unlike the more general moratorium upon filings under 4 (d), this proscription is without limit of time. The Commission's order is applicable to the most-favored-nation, spiral escalation, and redetermination clauses 46 that in 1961 it entirely forbade in contracts executed on or after April 3, 1961; 47 the additional limitation provided here by the Commission was intended to restrict the use of clauses included in contracts executed before the date of effectiveness of the Commission's earlier orders. The Commission reasoned, as had the examiner, that to permit producers to breach the area maximum rates by implementation of such clauses would not be "in accordance with the principles upon which a rate structure should be based." 34 F. P. C., at 236. </s> Indefinite escalation clauses "cause price increases . . . to occur without reference to the circumstances or economics of the particular operation, but solely because [390 U.S. 747, 783] of what happens under another contract." 34 F. P. C., at 373. There is substantial evidence 48 that in design and function they are "incompatible with the public interest . . . ." Order No. 232, 25 F. P. C. 379, 380. Indeed, this Court has already entirely sustained the Commission's 1962 order. FPC v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33 . </s> The producers do not suggest that the Commission and Court were there mistaken; they urge instead that the Commission has acted inconsistently with its decision in Pure Oil Co., 25 F. P. C. 383, and that it has wrongly invalidated existing contracts. The Commission declined in Pure Oil to declare unenforceable escalation clauses included in previously executed contracts. It reasoned that since the contracts lacked severability provisions, to strike the escalation clauses would, under "familiar principles of law," destroy the contracts; it feared that this would prove "many times" more prejudicial to the public interest than would the escalation clauses. Id., at 388-389. The producers assert that the Commission has now committed the error that it avoided in Pure Oil. The Commission rejoins that it has not stricken the escalation clauses; it has merely limited their application to prices no higher than the area maximum rates. Alternatively, the Commission avers that even if the contracts have been frustrated, neither the public nor the producers can suffer, since producers' prices may be as high as, but not higher than, the area maximum. </s> We think that the Commission did not exceed or abuse its authority. Section 5 (a) provides without qualification [390 U.S. 747, 784] or exception that the Commission may determine whether "any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting . . . [any] rate . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential . . .," and prescribe the "rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed . . . ." Although the Natural Gas Act is premised upon a continuing system of private contracting, United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., supra, the Commission has plenary authority to limit or to proscribe contractual arrangements that contravene the relevant public interests. Compare FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 . Nor may its order properly be set aside merely because the Commission has on an earlier occasion reached another result; administrative authorities must be permitted, consistently with the obligations of due process, to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances. Compare American Trucking v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 . See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 18.09, at 610 (1958). We need not, for present purposes, calculate what collateral consequences, if any, the Commission's order may have for the terms or validity of the contracts it reaches; we hold only that the Commission has here permissibly restricted the application of indefinite escalation clauses. </s> The next supplementary order to be considered is the Commission's creation of various exemptions for the smaller producers. The difficulties of the smaller producers differ only in emphasis from those of the larger independent producers and the integrated producer-distributors; but these differences are not without relevant importance. 49 Although the resources of the small producers [390 U.S. 747, 785] are ordinarily more limited, their activities are characteristically financially more hazardous. 50 It appears that they drill a disproportionately large number of exploratory wells, and that these are frequently in areas in which relatively little exploration has previously occurred. 51 Their contribution to the search for new gas reserves is therefore significant, but it is made at correspondingly greater financial risks and at higher unit costs. The record before the Commission included evidence that, for this and other reasons, small producers have regularly suffered higher percentages of dry wells, and higher average costs per Mcf of production. 52 At the same time, the Commission found that small producers are the source of only a minor share of the total national gas production, and that the prices they have [390 U.S. 747, 786] received have followed closely those obtained by the larger producers. 53 </s> The Commission reasoned that, in these circumstances, carefully selected special arrangements for small producers would not improperly increase consumer prices. Moreover, it concluded that such exemptions might usefully both streamline the administrative process and strengthen the small producers' financial position. 54 The Commission provided two forms of special relief: first, it released small producers from the requirement that quality adjustments be made in price; 55 and second, it commenced a rule-making proceeding intended to relieve them from various filing and reporting obligations. See 34 F. P. C. 434. The Commission asserted that the consequences for consumer prices of the first would be de minimis; it expected that the second would measurably reduce the small producers' regulatory expenses. 56 </s> [390 U.S. 747, 787] </s> We conclude that these arrangements did not exceed the Commission's statutory authority. We recognize that the language of 5 and 7 is without exception or qualification, but it must also be noted that the Commission is empowered, for purposes of its rules and regulations, to "classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or matters." 16, 15 U.S.C. 717o. The problems and public functions of the small producers differ sufficiently to permit their separate classification, and the exemptions created by the Commission for them are fully consistent with the terms and purposes of its statutory responsibilities. It is not without relevance that this Court has previously expressed the belief that similar arrangements would ameliorate the Commission's administrative difficulties. See FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515, 527 . </s> Finally, we consider one additional question. Certain of the producers have urged that, having adopted a system of area regulation, the Commission improperly designated the Permian Basin as a regulatory area. It is contended that the Commission failed to provide appropriate opportunities for briefing and argument on questions of the size and composition of the area. We must, before considering the rate structure devised for the Permian Basin by the Commission, examine this contention. </s> The Commission's designation of the Permian Basin as a regulatory area stemmed from its Statement of General Policy, issued September 28, 1960. 24 F. P. C. [390 U.S. 747, 788] 818. The Commission there announced its intention to regulate producers' interstate sales through the imposition of maximum area prices; it provided, for this purpose, a provisional system of guideline prices for the principal producing areas. The Commission averred that these areas, although "not necessarily in complete accord with geographical and economic factors," are "convenient and well known." Id., at 819. It declared that, as "experience and changing factors" require, it was prepared to alter the areas to eliminate any inequities. Ibid. </s> On December 23, 1960, the Commission ordered the institution of this proceeding, for which it merged three of the producing areas separately listed by the Statement of General Policy. 24 F. P. C. 1121. It unequivocally announced that "no useful purpose would be served at this time by delaying the discharge of our primary responsibility . . . by entertaining issues . . . that the areas we have delineated . . . might be in appropriate for ratemaking purposes." Id., at 1122. It appears that no hearings were conducted, and no evidence taken, on the propriety of the areas thus designated by the Commission for inclusion in this proceeding. </s> We do not doubt that significant economic consequences may, in certain situations, result from the definition of boundaries among regulatory areas. The calculation of average costs might, for example, be influenced by the inclusion or omission of a given group of producers; and the loss or retention of a price differential between regulatory areas might prove decisive to the success of marginal producers. Nonetheless, we hold that the Commission did not abuse its statutory authority by its refusal to complicate still further its first area proceeding by inclusion of issues relating to the proper size and composition of the regulatory area. [390 U.S. 747, 789] </s> It must first be emphasized that the regulatory area designated by the Commission was evidently both convenient and familiar. There is no evidence before us, and the producers have not alleged, that the Permian Basin, as it was defined by the Commission, does not fit either with prevailing industry practice or with other programs of state or federal regulation. 57 Moreover, the Commission was already confronted by an extraordinary variety of difficult issues of first impression; it quite reasonably preferred to simplify, so far as possible, its proceedings. Finally, it is not amiss to note that the Commission evidently has more recently permitted consideration of similar questions in area proceedings. Compare Area Rate Proceeding (Hugoton-Anadarko Area), 31 F. P. C. 888, 891. We assume that, consistent with this practice and with the terms of its Statement of General Policy, the Commission now would, upon an adequate request, permit interested parties to offer evidence and argument on the propriety of modification of the Permian Basin regulatory area. We hold only that the Commission was not obliged, in the circumstances of this case, to include among the disputed issues questions of the proper size and composition of the regulatory area. </s> We therefore conclude that the Commission did not, in these proceedings, violate pertinent constitutional limitations, and that its adoption of a system of area [390 U.S. 747, 790] price regulation, supplemented by provisions for a moratorium upon certain price increases and for exceptions for smaller producers, did not abuse or exceed its authority. We accordingly turn to various questions that have been raised respecting the propriety of the rate structure devised by the Commission for the Permian Basin. </s> IV. </s> It is important first to delineate the criteria by which we shall assess the Commission's rate structure. 58 We must reiterate that the breadth and complexity of the Commission's responsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable opportunity to formulate methods of regulation appropriate for the solution of its intensely practical difficulties. This Court has therefore repeatedly stated that the Commission's orders may not be overturned if they produce "no arbitrary result." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, at 586; FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. Although neither law nor economics has yet devised generally accepted standards for the evaluation of rate-making orders, 59 it must, nonetheless, be obvious that reviewing courts will require criteria more discriminating than justice and arbitrariness if they are sensibly to appraise the Commission's orders. The Court in Hope found appropriate criteria by inquiring whether "the return to the equity owner [is] [390 U.S. 747, 791] commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks," and whether the return was "sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital." Id., at 603. And compare S. W. Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 262 U.S. 276, 290 -292 (dissenting opinion). But see Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate Making, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 516. These criteria, suitably modified to reflect the special circumstances of area regulation, remain pertinent, but they scarcely exhaust the relevant considerations. </s> The Commission cannot confine its inquires either to the computation of costs of service or to conjectures about the prospective responses of the capital market; it is instead obliged at each step of its regulatory process to assess the requirements of the broad public interests entrusted to its protection by Congress. Accordingly, the "end result" 60 of the Commission's orders must be measured as much by the success with which they protect those interests as by the effectiveness with which they "maintain . . . credit and . . . attract capital." </s> It follows that the responsibilities of a reviewing court are essentially three. First, it must determine whether the Commission's order, viewed in light of the relevant facts and of the Commission's broad regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. Second, the court [390 U.S. 747, 792] must examine the manner in which the Commission has employed the methods of regulation which it has itself selected, and must decide whether each of the order's essential elements is supported by substantial evidence. Third, the court must determine whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensative investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. The court's responsibility is not to supplant the Commission's balance of these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors. Judicial review of the Commission's orders will therefore function accurately and efficaciously only if the Commission indicates fully and carefully the methods by which, and the purposes for which, it has chosen to act, as well as its assessment of the consequences of its orders for the character and future development of the industry. We are, in addition, obliged at this juncture to give weight to the unusual difficulties of this first area proceeding; we must, however, emphasize that this weight must significantly lessen as the Commission's experience with area regulation lengthens. We shall examine the various issues presented by the rate structure in light of these interrelated criteria. </s> The first issue is whether the Commission properly rejected the producers' contention that area rates should be derived from field, or contract prices. The producers have urged that prevailing contract prices provide an accurate index of aggregate revenue requirements, and that they are an appropriate mechanism for the protection of consumer interests. The record before the Commission, however, supports its conclusion that competition cannot be expected to reduce field prices in the [390 U.S. 747, 793] Permian Basin to the "lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in the public interest." Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 . </s> The field price of natural gas produced in the Permian Basin has in recent years steadily and significantly increased. 61 These increases are in part the products of a relatively inelastic supply and steeply rising demand; but they are also symptomatic of the deficiencies of the market mechanism in the Permian Basin. Producers' contracts have in the past characteristically included indefinite escalation clauses. These clauses, in combination with the price leadership of a few large producers, 62 and with the inability or unwillingness of interstate pipelines to bargain vigorously for reduced prices, 63 have [390 U.S. 747, 794] created circumstances in which price increases unconnected with changes in cost may readily be obtained. These market imperfections, operative despite an "essentially monopsonistic environment," 64 have accentuated the consequences of inelastic supply and sharply rising demand. Once an increase has been obtained by the larger producers, the escalation clauses have guaranteed similar increases to others. 65 In contrast, consumers have been left without effective protection against steadily rising prices. Their alternative sources of energy are in practice few, and the demand for natural gas, particularly in California, is therefore relatively unresponsive to price increases. 66 The consumer is thus obliged to rely [390 U.S. 747, 795] upon the Commission to provide "a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra, at 388. </s> We do not now hold, and the Commission has not suggested, 67 that field prices are without relevance to the Commission's calculation of just and reasonable rates under 5 (a). The records in subsequent area proceedings may more clearly establish that the market mechanism will adequately protect consumer interests. 68 We hold only that, on this record, the Commission was not compelled to adopt field prices as the basis of its computations of area rates. </s> We next examine the Commission's decision to create two maximum area rates for the Permian Basin. Under the Commission's rate structure, the applicable maximum price for a producer's sale is determined both by the moment at which the gas was first dedicated to the interstate market, and by the method by which the gas was produced. It follows that two producers, simultaneously [390 U.S. 747, 796] offering gas of identical quality and Btu content, may be confronted by different maximum prices. </s> The premises of this arrangement are two. First, the Commission evidently believed that price should be employed functionally, as a tool to encourage the production of appropriate supplies of natural gas. A price is thus just and reasonable within the meaning of 4 (a) and 5 (a) not merely because it is "somebody's idea of return on a `rate base,'" 69 but because it results in satisfactory programs of exploration, development and production. </s> Second, the Commission concluded that price could usefully serve as an incentive to exploration and production only if it were computed according to the method by which gas is produced. Natural gas produced jointly with oil is necessarily a relatively unimportant by-product. The value of oil-well gas is on average only one-seventeenth that of the oil with which it is produced. See 34 F. P. C., at 322. It cannot be separately sought or independently produced; its production is effectively restricted by state regulations intended to encourage the conservation of oil. Accordingly, the supply of oil-well gas is, as the examiner observed, "almost perfectly inelastic." Id., at 323. </s> On the other hand, gas-well gas is produced independently of oil, and of state restrictions on oil production. More important, the Commission found that a separate search can now be conducted for gas reservoirs; cumulative drilling experience permits at least the larger producers to direct their programs of exploration and development to the search for gas. 70 The supply of gas-well [390 U.S. 747, 797] gas is therefore relatively elastic, and its price can meaningfully be employed by the Commission to encourage exploration and production. The Commission reasoned that a higher maximum rate for gas-well gas dedicated to interstate commerce after the approximate moment at which a separate search became widely possible would provide an effective incentive. 71 Correspondingly, the Commission adopted a relatively low price for all other natural gas produced in the Permian Basin, since price could not serve as an incentive, and since any price above average historical costs, plus an appropriate return, would merely confer windfalls. </s> We find no objection under the Natural Gas Act to this dual arrangement. We have emphasized that courts are without authority to set aside any rate adopted by the Commission which is within a "zone of reasonableness." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, at 585. The Commission may, within this zone, employ price functionally in order to achieve relevant regulatory purposes; it may, in particular, take fully into account the probable consequences of a given price level for future programs of exploration and production. Nothing in the purposes or history of the Act forbids the Commission to require different prices for different sales, even if the distinctions are unrelated to quality, if these arrangements are "necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act." 16, 15 U.S.C. 717o. We hold that the statutory [390 U.S. 747, 798] "just and reasonable" standard permits the Commission to require differences in price for simultaneous sales of gas of identical quality, if it has permissibly found that such differences will effectively serve the regulatory purposes contemplated by Congress. </s> The Commission's responsibilities include the protection of future, as well as present, consumer interests. It has here found, on the basis of substantial evidence, that a two-price rate structure will both provide a useful incentive to exploration and prevent excessive producer profits. In these circumstances, there is no objection under the Natural Gas Act to the price differentials required by the Commission. </s> The symmetry of the Commission's incentive program is, however, marred. The Commission held in 1965 that the higher maximum rate should be applicable to gas-well gas committed to interstate commerce since January 1, 1961. It is difficult to see how the higher rate could reasonably have been expected to encourage, retrospectively, exploration and production that had already occurred. There is thus force in Commissioner Ross' contention that this arrangement is not fully consistent with the logic of the two-price system. 72 </s> Nonetheless, we are constrained to hold that this was a permissible exercise of the Commission's discretion. The Commission believed that its Statement of General Policy, issued September 28, 1960, had created reasonable expectations among producers that higher rates would thereafter be permitted for initial filings under 7. 73 The Commission evidently concluded that fairness [390 U.S. 747, 799] obliged it to satisfy, at least in part, those expectations. We must also recognize that an unexpected downward revision of the guideline price for initial filings, with accompanying refunds, might have seriously diminished the producers' confidence in interstate prices, and perhaps threatened the future interstate supply of natural gas. 74 We can assume that the Commission gave attention to this possibility. Compare 34 F. P. C., at 188. These factors provide a permissible basis for this exercise of the Commission's authority. 75 </s> We must next examine the methods by which the Commission reached the two maximum rates it created for gas produced in the Permian Basin. The Commission justified its adoption of a two-price rate structure by reliance upon functional pricing; it suggested that two prices, with an appropriate differential, may be used so as both to provide an incentive to exploration and to restrict to reasonable levels producers' profits. In turn, it computed the two area maximum prices directly from costs of service, without allowances for noncost factors. The price differential which the Commission expects to serve as an incentive is the product of differences in the time periods and geographical areas for which costs were [390 U.S. 747, 800] computed, and not of noncost additives to cost components. Finally, the Commission, by its adoption of a moratorium until January 1, 1968, created a temporary price freeze in the Permian Basin. 76 </s> Although we would expect that the Commission will hereafter indicate more precisely the formulae by which it intends to proceed, we see no objection to its use of a variety of regulatory methods. Provided only that they do not together produce arbitrary or unreasonable consequences, the Commission may employ any "formula or combination of formulas" it wishes, and is free "to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra, at 586. We have already considered the Commission's adoption of a two-price system and of a moratorium, and have concluded that they are each reasonably calculated to achieve appropriate regulatory purposes. It remains now to examine its computation of the area maximum prices from the producers' costs of service. </s> The Commission derived the maximum rate for new gas-well gas from composite cost data intended to evidence the national costs in 1960 of finding and producing gas-well gas. It reasoned that these costs should be computed from national, and not area, data because, first, the larger producers conduct national programs of exploration, and, second, "much, if not most, of the relevant information" 77 was available only on a national [390 U.S. 747, 801] basis. It held, in addition, that costs in the Permian Basin did not "vary sufficiently from the national average to warrant a different treatment . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 191. The Commission found that 1960 cost data should be used, and historical data disregarded, because only relatively current cost data would adequately guarantee an effective incentive for future exploration and production. The Commission was obliged to obtain the relevant cost data from a variety of sources. Natural gas producers have not yet been required to adopt any uniform system of accounts, and no private or public agency had in 1965 collected all the pertinent information. Many of the data were taken from nationally published statistics; 78 the balance was derived from questionnaires completed by the producers. The Commission concluded that these sources "in combination provide an adequate basis for the costs we have found." Ibid. </s> The maximum just and reasonable rate for all other Permian Basin gas was calculated from cost data intended to reflect the historical costs of gas-well gas produced in 1960 in the Permian Basin. The examiner had computed this rate by essentially the same method he had used for new gas-well gas, with certain cost components adjusted by back-trending. The Commission's staff, on the other hand, offered a comprehensive study of historical costs of service. The Commission adopted both methods, using the examiner's back-trended cost [390 U.S. 747, 802] computations as a check upon the accuracy of the staff's presentation. </s> The Commission reasoned that excessive producer profits could be minimized only if the rate for flowing gas were derived from the most precise available evidence of actual historical costs. It therefore held that these costs should be taken from area, and not national, data. </s> The Commission's staff obtained the data necessary for its computation of historical costs from questionnaires completed by producers. The information used by the staff, and ultimately adopted by the Commission, was taken from questionnaires submitted by 42 major producers, which together account for 75% of all the gas produced in the Basin, and 85% of all the gas-well gas. Nonetheless, some two-thirds of all the gas produced in the Permian Basin is oil-well gas, and Sun Oil estimates that the staff's gas-well gas data were thus applicable only to some 15.3% of the total production of natural gas in the Basin in 1960. 79 </s> [390 U.S. 747, 803] </s> We hold that the Commission, in calculating cost data for the two maximum rates by differing geographical bases and time periods, did not abuse its authority. The Commission's use of separate sources of data for the two rates permitted the creation of a price differential between them without the inclusion of noncost components. Its selections of time periods and geographical bases were entirely consistent with the logic of its system of incentive pricing. In these circumstances, we can find no tenable objection to this aspect of the Commission's rate structure. </s> It is further contended that the Commission impermissibly used flowing gas-well gas cost data to calculate the maximum rate for old gas, thereby disregarding entirely the costs of gas produced in association with oil. The Commission's explanation was essentially pragmatic. It reasoned that the uncertainties of joint cost allocation preclude accurate computations of the cost of casinghead and residue gas. Further, the Commission averred that it is administratively imperative to simplify, so far as possible, the area rate structure. The Commission regarded its adoption of a single area maximum price for all gas, except new gas-well gas, its residue and gas-cap gas, as "an important step toward simplified and realistic area price regulation." 34 F. P. C., at 211. [390 U.S. 747, 804] </s> We cannot say that these arrangements are impermissible. There is ample support for the Commission's judgment that the apportionment of actual costs between two jointly produced commodities, only one of which is regulated by the Commission, is intrinsically unreliable. 80 It is true that certain of the costs of gas-well gas must also be apportioned, but the Commission reasonably concluded that these difficulties are relatively less severe. 81 The Commission was, in addition, entitled to give great weight to the administrative importance of a simplified rate structure. Finally, it is relevant that the Commission found that the cost of casinghead and residue gas could not be higher, and, if exploration and development costs are realistically discounted, must surely be lower than the costs of flowing gas-well gas. 82 These considerations in combination [390 U.S. 747, 805] warranted the Commission's judgment that a single area maximum price for all gas other than new gas-well gas should be imposed, and that this maximum rate should be derived entirely from the historic costs of flowing gas-well gas. </s> We turn now to the Commission's computation of the proper rate base. The Commission's method here differed significantly from that frequently preferred by regulatory authorities. It did not use a declining rate base and return, but instead computed an average net production investment, to which it applied a constant rate of return. The Commission assumed for this purpose that a gas well depletes at a uniform rate, and that it is, on average, totally depleted in 20 years. It found that the annual capital-recovery cost, including depletion, depreciation, and amortization, was 3.95 per Mcf. Allowing one year for a lag between investment and first production, the Commission obtained an average production investment of 43.45 per Mcf. The proper return per Mcf was then calculated by multiplying this figure by the rate of return. </s> The producers argue that this has the effect of postponing revenue, and thus discounting its present value; they suggest that the Commission should properly have [390 U.S. 747, 806] employed a declining investment base and return. This is a question peculiarly within the Commission's discretion, and, while the method adopted by the Commission was evidently less favorable to the producers than various other possible formulae, we cannot hold that it was arbitrary or unreasonable. </s> We next consider whether the rate of return adopted by the Commission was a permissible exercise of its regulatory authority. The Commission first asserted that rates of return must be assessed by a comparable-earnings standard. Under such a standard, earnings should be permitted that are "equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties." Bluefield Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U.S. 679, 692 ; FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 603. Although other standards might properly have been employed, 83 the Commission's decision to examine comparable earnings was fully consistent with prevailing administrative practice, and manifestly was not an abuse of its authority. </s> The Commission relied for purposes of comparison chiefly upon the rates of return that have recently been permitted to the interstate pipelines. It found that pipelines had been given returns of 6.0 to 6.5% on net investment, with a yield on equity of 10 to 12%. 84 The [390 U.S. 747, 807] Commission noted that producers characteristically have less long-term debt than pipelines, 85 and that the financial risks of production are somewhat greater than those of transmission. 86 It reasoned that these differences warranted a more generous rate of return for producers. In addition, the Commission stated that the risk of finding gas of less than pipeline quality, created by the Commission's promulgation of quality and Btu standards, should be reflected in the rate of return. Finally, the Commission sought to determine the rate of return recently earned by producers of natural gas. It found that accurate rates of return could not be calculated with assurance, although the Commission's staff offered evidence of an average return for nine companies over five years of 12.4% on net investment. 87 The Commission concluded that, despite its statistical deficiencies, [390 U.S. 747, 808] this and similar evidence must be given "heavy consideration in the decisional process." 34 F. P. C., at 203. </s> On balance, the Commission selected 12% as the proper rate of return for gas of pipeline quality. We think that this judgment was supported by substantial evidence, and that it did not exceed or abuse the Commission's authority. The evidence before the Commission fairly suggests that this rate will be likely to "maintain [the producers'] financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate [their] investors for the risks assumed . . . ." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 605. Further, the distributors and public agencies before the Court have not suggested, and we find no reason to believe, that this return will exceed the proper requirements of the industry. 88 Certainly, as we shall show below, this return is no more than comparable to that characteristically allowed interstate pipelines. </s> Nonetheless, there remains one further issue essential to an accurate appraisal of the return permitted by the Commission. The Commission's computation of the rate of return was specifically premised in part on the additional financial risks created for producers by the Commission's promulgation of quality and Btu standards. 89 Its opinion in these proceedings included a series of [390 U.S. 747, 809] specific quality standards. 90 The Commission ruled that gas that fails to satisfy these standards must be sold at prices lower than the applicable area maximum; the amount of the reduction necessary in each sale is to be initially determined by the parties, subject to review by the Commission. Further, natural gas with a Btu content of less than 1,000 per cubic foot must be sold at a price proportionately lower than the applicable area maximum, and gas with a Btu content of more than 1,050 per cubic foot may be sold at a price proportionately higher than the area maximum. 91 The [390 U.S. 747, 810] Commission conceded that it could not precisely determine the revenue consequences of these adjustments, although its opinion denying applications for rehearing provided various estimates. It appears to be conceded that the quality of gas produced in the Basin is characteristically lower than the Commission's standards, and that the standards are therefore likely to be more significant than they might be in other producing areas. </s> The producers urge, and the Court of Appeals held, that this arrangement is doubly erroneous. First, it treats as a risk what properly is a cost, and thus evades the necessity of appropriate findings on the revenue consequences of the quality adjustments. Second, it reduces the rate of return actually permitted individual producers to an unascertainable figure of less than 12%, and thus prevents an accurate appraisal of its sufficiency. We find both suggestions unpersuasive. </s> We cannot now hold that it was impermissible for the Commission to treat the quality adjustments as a risk of production. It must be recalled that the Commission [390 U.S. 747, 811] was in this first area rate case unable to determine with precision the average amount of the necessary price reductions, and that it thus would have been difficult to have included them as costs, as the Court of Appeals suggested. Further, we recognize that the Commission's method, premised on agreement between the parties to each sale, has at least the advantage of requiring discrete and accurate adjustments for each transaction. Finally, as we shall show below, treatment of these adjustments as risks of production did not in this case result in inadequate findings, and does not prevent proper appraisal of the rate of return permitted by the Commission. In any event, the Commission's discretion in such matters is necessarily broad, and its choice cannot be said to have abused its discretion. </s> The Commission estimated in its opinion denying applications for rehearing that the quality adjustments would result in average price reductions of from 0.7 to 1.5 per Mcf. In turn, the amount of these adjustments will be reduced by price increases for high Btu content, and by revenue from plant liquids. 92 We believe that, in the circumstances presented, these estimates were adequate. The Commission's information about existing contracts was evidently not sufficiently complete to permit precise calculations from previous experience. Moreover, since the adjustments are to be, in the first instance, the product of agreement between the parties, [390 U.S. 747, 812] a dimension of uncertainty is necessarily created. Despite these difficulties, the Commission provided reasonably specific estimates of the range of adjustments that it believed would result. We are entitled now to take notice that these are confirmed by subsequent events. 93 We hold that the Commission's promulgation of quality standards was accompanied by adequate findings as to their revenue consequences. </s> The Commission did not provide specific findings as to the effect of these revenue adjustments upon the producers' rate of return. This was an unfortunate omission, but it does not preclude evaluation of the Commission's conclusions. It would appear, and counsel for the Commission have estimated, that the rate of return "on average quality" natural gas sold in the Permian Basin might, after quality adjustments, yield "as little" as 10 to 12% on equity. 94 These figures presumably must be adjusted upward for sales of pipeline quality gas, sales of gas with a high Btu content, and revenue from plant liquids. Even as adjusted, however, the aggregate return permitted to producers will apparently exceed only slightly that customarily allowed pipelines, for the quantities of pipeline quality and high Btu content gas produced in the Permian Basin are evidently quite small. Nevertheless, the record before the Commission contained evidence sufficient to establish that these rates, as adjusted, will maintain the industry's credit and continue to attract capital. Although the Commission's position might at several places usefully [390 U.S. 747, 813] be clarified, 95 the producers have not satisfied the "heavy burden" placed upon those who would set aside its decisions. 96 </s> V. </s> We have concluded that the various segments of the Commission's rate structure do not separately exceed or abuse its authority. Nonetheless, certain of the producers have argued vigorously that the aggregate revenue permitted by the rate structure is, or might be, inadequate. They urge that the imposition of maximum prices computed from composite costs reduces contract prices to a maximum premised on a cost average; and they conclude that the Commission has therefore denied them the revenue necessary for appropriate programs of exploration and development. Related questions troubled the Court of Appeals. It held that the Commission must, under Hope, place in balance revenue and requirements, and that findings must be provided that will permit reviewing courts to assess the skill with which the Commission has employed its scales. Although we [390 U.S. 747, 814] sustain, for reasons stated above, the Commission's rate structure, we believe it proper to examine these additional contentions. </s> Three interrelated questions are pertinent. First, the adequacy of the Commission's aggregate revenue findings must be assessed. Second, we must consider the producers' contentions that the Commission has significantly underestimated the deficiencies of present programs of exploration. Finally, we must determine whether the Commission's use of averaged costs has created a rate structure that is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. </s> We turn initially to the adequacy of the Commission's revenue findings. It must be emphasized that we perceive no imperative obligation upon the Commission, under either the Natural Gas Act or the decisions of this Court, to provide an apparatus of formal findings, in terms of absolute dollar amounts, as to aggregate revenue and aggregate revenue requirements. It is enough if the Commission proffers findings and conclusions sufficiently detailed to permit reasoned evaluation of the purposes and implications of its order. Compare Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 326, 345 -347. As we shall show, the Commission's revenue findings were not, in the circumstances of these proceedings, unduly imprecise. The ambiguities about which the Court of Appeals expressed concern were two. First, the court faulted the Commission for the imprecision of its findings as to the revenue consequences of the quality and Btu adjustments. We have already found adequate the Commission's estimates of the necessary price reductions. Second, the court stated that the rate structure could not be accurately assessed, since the Commission has incorporated in its calculations both cost and noncost factors; it believed that "the Commission [390 U.S. 747, 815] decision rides two horses and we have no way of knowing the outcome of the race." 375 F.2d, at 34. </s> We find this unpersuasive. Although the Commission's exposition of these questions might have been more carefully drawn, it has quite appropriately incorporated in its calculations factors other than producers' costs. 97 Cost and noncost factors do not, as the Court of Appeals supposed, race one against the other; they must be, as they are here, harnessed side by side. The Commission's responsibilities necessarily oblige it to give continuing attention to values that may be reflected only imperfectly by producers' costs; a regulatory method that excluded as immaterial all but current or projected costs could not properly serve the consumer interests placed under the Commission's protection. We have already considered each of the points at which the Commission has given weight to noncost factors, and have found its judgments consistent with the terms and purposes of its statutory authority. 98 There is no reason now to [390 U.S. 747, 816] return these cases to the Commission for clarification of these issues. 99 </s> Nor can we hold that the Commission has under-estimated the deficiencies of current programs of exploration. The producers' argument has been uniformly premised upon the assertion that the ratio of proved recoverable reserves to current production is an accurate index of the industry's financial requirements. The producers urge that this ratio has dangerously declined, 100 and conclude that any reduction of prevailing field prices will jeopardize essential programs of exploration. There is, however, substantial evidence that additions to reserves have not been unsatisfactorily low, 101 and that [390 U.S. 747, 817] recent variations in the ratio of reserves to production are of quite limited significance. 102 Nothing in the record establishes as proper or even minimal any particular ratio. 103 We do not suggest, nor did the Commission, 104 that the Commission should not continuously assess the level and success of exploration, or that the relationship between reserves and production is not a useful benchmark of the industry's future. We hold only that the Commission here permissibly discounted the producers' [390 U.S. 747, 818] reliance upon this relationship to establish the inadequacy of its rate structure. </s> Finally, we turn to the contention that these area maximum rates were derived from averaged costs, and therefore cannot, without further adjustment, provide aggregate revenue equal to the producers' aggregate requirements. The producers that support the judgments below emphasize that revenue in 1960 from all jurisdictional sales in the Permian Basin averaged 12.72 per Mcf. 105 They contend that this revenue will, under the Commission's order, be reduced by the amount of any necessary quality deductions, by refunds, and by loss of revenue from abrogation of contract prices above the area maximum rates. The producers conclude that the Commission's rate structure will necessarily cause revenue deficiencies, measured by the difference between actual average revenue (12.72 less these adjustments) and 14.5 per Mcf, the rate assertedly found by the Commission to be just and reasonable for flowing gas. They urge that the Commission was properly obliged to balance revenue and costs either by increasing the area minimum rate, or by placing the area maximum rates above average costs. </s> The inadequacies of this reasoning are several. First, it neglects important characteristics of the rate structure. We understand the Commission, despite certain infelicities of its opinion, 106 to hold that the just and reasonable rate for old gas not of pipeline quality is 14.5 per Mcf, [390 U.S. 747, 819] less the cost of processing necessary to raise it to pipeline quality. The Commission's net just and reasonable rate for such gas is therefore 13.0 to 13.8, and not 14.5 per Mcf. 107 Further, average unit revenue will not be simultaneously reduced, as the producers have suggested, by refunds and by abrogation of above-ceiling field prices. As to the past, the two are in large part synonymous; as to the future, only the latter will be applicable. </s> Moreover, the Commission's computation of its area rates was not intended to reflect with complete fidelity either the producers' average costs or their sources of revenue. First, the actual average unit costs of casinghead and residue gas are substantially lower than the average unit costs of flowing gas-well gas; 108 yet the maximum rate for all associated and flowing gas was derived entirely from the latter. It follows that the producers' net revenues from sales of casinghead and residue gas will prove higher than the return formally permitted by the Commission. Second, producers receive significant payments for liquid hydrocarbons extracted by the pipelines during their processing of gas-well gas. 109 The maximum rate for new gas-well gas [390 U.S. 747, 820] evidently takes into account only part of these receipts, and that for old gas-well gas disregards altogether this source of additional revenue. 110 Third, some 20% of all the gas sold under the Commission's jurisdiction in the Permian Basin is controlled by Spraberry contracts, by which producers are paid for liquids processed by the pipelines from oil-well gas. 111 Much of the gas sold at prices below the applicable area maximum rate is governed by such contracts. 112 This source of revenue was not incorporated in the Commission's calculation of the maximum rate for oil-well gas. The Commission was unable to compute with precision the revenue obtained by producers from these disparate sources, but it estimated it to be "substantial." 34 F. P. C., at 1073. </s> Finally, the producers have ignored the limits of the Commission's statutory authority. This Court has held, under the Federal Power Act, that the Commission may not abrogate existing contractual arrangements unless the contract price is so "low as to adversely affect the public interest - as where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its [390 U.S. 747, 821] service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory." FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 . It is not enough, the Court there held, that the contract price permits less than a fair return; the Commission may not, absent evidence of injury to the public interest, relieve a regulated company of "its improvident bargain." Ibid. The pertinent provisions of the Federal Power Act "are in all material respects substantially identical to the equivalent provisions of the Natural Gas Act." Id., at 353. It follows that the Commission was here without authority to abrogate existing contract prices unless it first concluded that they "adversely affect the public interest." And see FPC v. Tennessee Gas Co., 371 U.S. 145, 153 . The Commission found that field prices of less than 9 per Mcf had such consequences, but it declined so to hold for all prices less than the two area maximum rates. 113 There was no evidence before the Commission that required a different result, or that would now permit this Court to set aside the Commission's judgment. </s> It does not, however, necessarily follow that the Commission was forbidden to consider, as it selected maximum [390 U.S. 747, 822] rates from within the zone of reasonableness, the aggregate revenue deficiencies that might result from improvident contractual limitations. Within this zone, the Commission is permitted to give weight to the consequences upon producers, and thereby upon supply, of such limitations. Nonetheless, the Commission permissibly declined to make adjustments in the area rates because of prevailing contract prices. It recognized that such adjustments would increase the cost of natural gas to some groups of consumers, in order simply to offset bargains previously obtained by others. </s> The regulatory system created by the Act is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public necessity. See United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. 332 . There was here no evidence of financial or other difficulties that required the Commission to relieve the producers, even obliquely, from the burdens of their contractual obligations. We do not suggest that the Commission need not continuously evaluate the revenue and other consequences of its area rate structures. A principal advantage of area regulation is that it centers attention upon the industry's aggregate problems, and we may expect that, as the Commission's experience with area regulation lengthens, it will treat these important questions more precisely and efficaciously. We hold only that, in the circumstances here presented, the Commission's rate structure has not been shown to deny producers revenues consonant with just and reasonable rates. 114 </s> [390 U.S. 747, 823] </s> VI. </s> There remain for consideration various additional objections by the producers to the Commission's cost determinations, and to the sources of information from which those determinations were derived. These questions were not decided by the Court of Appeals. Although this Court ordinarily does not review an administrative record in the first instance, United States v. Great Northern [390 U.S. 747, 824] R. Co., 343 U.S. 562, 578 ; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 154, 157 ; there are persuasive reasons now to reach and decide these remaining issues. Almost eight years have elapsed since the Commission commenced these proceedings; we are convinced that producers' rates may be fairly and effectively regulated only after this and the other area proceedings now before the Commission have been successfully terminated. These issues were briefed and argued at length before this Court; very extended additional proceedings would doubtless be necessary in order to review them yet again. </s> Moreover, the circumstances here parallel closely those in Chicago & N. W. R. Co., v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 326 . It was there said that the "presentation and discussion of evidence on cost issues constituted a dominant part of the lengthy administrative hearings, and the issues were thoroughly explored and contested before the Commission. Its factual findings and treatment of accounting problems concerned matters relating entirely to the special and complex peculiarities of the railroad industry. Our previous description of the Commission's disposition of these matters is sufficient to show that its conclusions had reasoned foundation and were within the area of its expert judgment." Id., at 356. This reasoning is entirely applicable to the circumstances presented here; we hold, as did the Court there, that no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings in the Court of Appeals, and that there is no legal infirmity in the Commission's findings. 115 </s> [390 U.S. 747, 825] </s> VII. </s> Lastly, we reach questions of the validity of the refund obligations imposed by the Commission's orders. Two categories of refunds were created. First, producers must return amounts charged in excess of the applicable area rates, including quality and Btu adjustments, for periods following September 1, 1965, the date of effectiveness of the Commission's order. 34 F. P. C., at 243. The Commission imposed interest of 7% upon these refunds. 116 Second, producers must refund amounts collected in excess of the applicable area rates, including quality and Btu adjustments, during previous periods in which their prices were subject [390 U.S. 747, 826] to refund under 4 (e). Such obligations ultimately arise from filings by the producers under 4 (d) for increases in existing price schedules. The appropriate interest on these refunds was held to be that specified in each 4 (e) proceeding. 117 Refunds in both categories were, under the Commission's order, to be measured by comparison of individual company price schedules with the applicable area rates. </s> The Court of Appeals initially sustained the Commission's refund orders. 375 F.2d, at 33. On petitions for rehearing, however, the court held that "no refund obligation may be imposed for a period in which there is a group revenue deficiency." Id., at 36. The court believed this to be an essential corollary of the Commission's asserted obligation to bring into balance group costs and group revenues; it would have permitted the Commission to order refunds only in periods in which aggregate revenue is found to exceed aggregate revenue requirements, and only as to the amount of the excess. The Commission was expected to apportion any refunds "on some equitable contract-by-contract basis." Ibid. </s> We find the court's reasoning unpersuasive. The Commission may, in the course of its examination of the producers' financial positions, consider the possible refund consequences of its rate-making orders; but its power to order refunds is not limited to situations in which group revenues exceed group revenue requirements. Area regulation offers a more expeditious method for the calculation of just and reasonable rates, and it will necessarily more rigorously focus the Commission's attention upon the producers' common problems. It does not, however, lessen the significance, or modify the [390 U.S. 747, 827] incidents, of findings that specific rate levels are or are not just and reasonable within the meaning of 4 (a) and 5 (a). A rate found to be unjust and unreasonable is declared by 4 (a) to be unlawful; if the rate has been the subject of a rate schedule modification under 4 (d), the Commission is empowered by 4 (e) to order its refund. We can see no warrant, either in the Act or in the terms of the Commission's orders, now to impose any additional limitations upon the Commission's authority; we hold that the Commission's discretion is not constricted in the fashion described by the Court of Appeals. </s> Wisconsin v. FPC, supra, does not require a different result. It did not, as the Court of Appeals evidently supposed, create any imperative procedure for the disposition of refunds from locked-in rates. 118 The Commission there held that, given its decision to begin a system of area regulation, it was not in the public interest "to reopen these proceedings, to determine a cost of service on the basis of completely new evidence and to attempt to determine rates on the basis of Phillips' individual cost of service." 24 F. P. C., at 1009. No just and reasonable rates had been, or could then have been, calculated for Phillips' sales in the relevant periods. The Commission did not urge, 119 and this Court did not hold, that Phillips' revenue deficiencies imposed a limitation upon the Commission's authority to require refunds; the Court merely sustained the Commission's refusal, in the [390 U.S. 747, 828] circumstances there presented, to pursue further a lengthy and burdensome series of 4 (e) proceedings. See also Hunt Oil Co., 28 F. P. C. 623; and Wisconsin v. FPC, supra, at 306, n. 15. </s> The Commission reasonably concluded that the adoption of a system of refunds conditioned on findings as to aggregate area revenues would prove both inequitable to consumers and difficult to administer effectively. Such arrangements would require consumers to accede to unjust and unreasonable prices merely because other prices, perhaps ultimately benefiting other consumers, had proved improvident. Nor would these arrangements necessarily serve the interests of the improvident producers; they might merely permit more prudent competitors to escape refunds on concededly unlawful prices. 120 We hold that the Commission's refund orders do not exceed or abuse its statutory authority. 121 </s> The motions for leave to adduce additional evidence are denied, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed in part and reversed in part, as herein indicated, and the cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 5 (a) provides in pertinent part that "Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 1 (b), 15 U.S.C. 717 (b), provides in part that the "provisions of this Chapter shall apply . . . to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use . . . ." We shall, for convenience, hereafter describe sales within the Commission's regulatory authority as "jurisdictional" or "interstate" sales. </s> [Footnote 3 The Permian Basin was defined by the Commission's order commencing these proceedings so as to include Texas Railroad Commission Districts Nos. 7-C and 8, and the New Mexico counties of Lea, Eddy, and Chaves. Area Rate Proceeding No. AR61-1, 24 F. P. C. 1121, 1125. </s> [Footnote 4 There were some 384 parties before the Commission, including 336 gas producers. Hearings began on October 11, 1961, and closed on September 10, 1963. The final transcript included more than 30,000 pages. The examiner's decision was issued on September 17, 1964. The Commission heard three days of oral argument, and issued its decision on August 5, 1965. A supplementary opinion denying applications for rehearing was issued on October 4, 1965. </s> [Footnote 5 Indeed, 1 (b), 15 U.S.C. 717 (b), provides in part that the "provisions of this Chapter . . . shall not apply to . . . the production or gathering of natural gas." </s> [Footnote 6 Independent producers are those that do "not engage in the interstate transmission of gas from the producing fields to consumer markets and [are] not affiliated with any interstate natural-gas pipeline company." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 675 . </s> [Footnote 7 This position was first adopted by the Commission in Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F. P. C. 200. See also Billings Gas Co., 2 F. P. C. 288; Fin-Ker Oil & Gas Production Co., 6 F. P. C. 92; Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., 6 F. P. C. 98. </s> [Footnote 8 Section 4 (a), 15 U.S.C. 717c (a), provides that "All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges, shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful." </s> [Footnote 9 See generally Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F. P. C. 537, 542. </s> [Footnote 10 It has been observed that costs-of-service standards are "most generally accepted in the regulation of the levels of rates" charged by both publicly and privately owned utilities. J. Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates 67 (1961). </s> [Footnote 11 It has been said that "the primary, even though not the sole, distinguishing feature of a public utility enterprise is to be found [390 U.S. 747, 757] in a technology of production and transmission which almost inevitably leads to a complete or partial monopoly of the market for the service." Bonbright, supra, at 10. See also Sunray Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 160 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 12 The Commission in its second Phillips opinion stated that there were then 3,372 independent producers with rates on file; these producers had on file 11,091 rate schedules and 33,231 supplements to those schedules. There were, at the moment of the Commission's opinion, 570 producers involved in 3,278 rate increase filings awaiting hearings and decisions. 24 F. P. C., at 545. See for listings by sales of natural gas producers, Federal Power Commission, Sales by Producers of Natural Gas to Natural Gas Pipeline Companies 1963, 1 (1965). </s> [Footnote 13 The Commission stated in its second Phillips opinion that "if our present staff were immediately tripled, and if all new employees would be as competent as those we now have, we would not reach a current status in our independent producer rate work until 2043 A. D. - [390 U.S. 747, 758] eighty-two and one half years from now." 24 F. P. C., at 546. It added that if "the plan of rate regulation we here announce is not lawful," it would follow that "as a practical matter, adequate regulation of producers appears to be impossible under existing law." Id., at 547. </s> [Footnote 14 Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, printed for use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 54. Contrast Landis, Theoretical and Practical Considerations with Reference to Price Regulation in Production and Transmission of Natural Gas, 13th Oil & Gas Inst. 401, 406 (1962). </s> [Footnote 15 Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at 542-548. </s> [Footnote 16 Id., at 547; Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F. P. C. 818. </s> [Footnote 17 Area Rate Proceeding (Hugoton-Anadarko Area) No. AR64-1, 30 F. P. C. 1354, 1359 (dissenting opinion of Commissioner Ross). </s> [Footnote 18 We are informed that four other area proceedings are pending in various stages before the Commission. These, in combination with the present proceeding, reach some 90% of the sales of natural gas subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Brief for the Federal Power Commission 14-15. </s> [Footnote 19 Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at 548. </s> [Footnote 20 It is proper to note that certain of the Commission's statements in Phillips concerning the difficulties of unit cost computations do not appear to have been entirely reaffirmed in its opinion in these proceedings. The two opinions are, however, broadly consistent, and the Commission is not, in any event, forbidden "to adapt [its] rules and practices to the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing economy." American Trucking v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 . </s> [Footnote 21 The Statement provided separate guideline prices for initial filings and for increased rates. The Commission said merely that "prices in new contracts are, and in many cases by virtue of economic factors, must be higher than the prices contained in old contracts." 24 F. P. C., at 819. The guideline prices applicable to the producing areas subsequently included in these proceedings were in each case 16 and 11 per Mcf, with the higher price for initial filings. </s> [Footnote 22 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, supra, at 818. </s> [Footnote 23 The Commission defined gas-well gas as "gas from dry gas reservoirs and gas condensate reservoirs, and gas from gas-cap wells." It added that gas-cap gas is "a special category of gas from an oil reservoir that can be produced free from the influence of oil production." 34 F. P. C. 159, 189 and n. 23. Residue gas derived from new gas-well gas is also to be subject to higher maximum rate. See id., at 211. </s> [Footnote 24 Natural gas is variously classified, and certain of the descriptive names that will be employed in this opinion should be briefly explained. Casinghead gas is "the common name for gas produced from oil wells in conjunction with the production of oil." 34 F. P. C., at 208. Residue gas is "the gas remaining after casinghead gas or gas-well gas has been processed to remove liquids present in the raw gas stream in the form of vapor or droplets." Id., at 210. Associated gas is "[f]ree natural gas in immediate contact, but not in solution, with crude oil in the field or reservoir." American Gas Association, 1966 Gas Facts 246 (1966). Dissolved gas is that "in solution with crude oil in the reservoir." Ibid. Oil-well gas encompasses associated, dissolved, and casinghead gas, together with residue derived from casinghead gas. In addition, we shall adopt the Commission's usage, and on occasion describe gas subject to the lower maximum rate as "old" or "flowing" gas. 34 F. P. C., at 212, n. 31. </s> [Footnote 25 Joint costs "are incurred when products cannot be separately produced . . . ." M. Adelman, The Supply and Price of Natural Gas 25 (1962). Compare the following: "Products are `truly joint' if they must be produced together and in constant proportions. Truly joint costs are variable costs. They vary (as a total) with the output of the entire set (fixed combination) of joint products." F. Machlup, The Economics of Sellers' Competition 21 (1952). And see Bonbright, supra, at 354-357. It appears to be conceded that even gas-well gas has costs jointly, as well as in common, with petroleum, but the Commission evidently, and permissibly, believed that the difficulties of allocation connected with gas-well gas were relatively uncomplicated. See 34 F. P. C., at 214-215, 339. </s> [Footnote 26 A Btu, or British thermal unit, is the amount of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water one degree Fahrenheit under stated conditions of pressure and temperature. </s> [Footnote 27 Tabular summaries of the cost components from which the distributors and the producers derived recommended rates for new gas-well gas may be found in the examiner's opinion. 34 F. P. C., at 343. Based on allowances for production investment costs, return, exploratory costs, royalty and production taxes, and other factors, the producers recommended a rate of 23.24 per Mcf; the distributors derived from the same factors a rate of 15.39 per Mcf. See also id., at 357. Similar tables summarizing the Commission's findings were included in its opinion. Id., at 192, 220. </s> [Footnote 28 The Commission excluded New Mexico state production taxes because they are not uniform throughout the three counties. See the Commission's opinion denying applications for rehearing, 34 F. P. C., at 1074. </s> [Footnote 29 Section 4 (d), 15 U.S.C. 717c (d), provides in part that "[u]nless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made [390 U.S. 747, 764] by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public." </s> [Footnote 30 The restricted contract provisions include most-favored-nation, spiral escalation and redetermination clauses. See Pure Oil Co., 25 F. P. C. 383, 388, n. 3. They were said by the examiner to "cause price increase . . . to occur without reference to the circumstances or economics . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 373 (initial decision of the presiding examiner). </s> [Footnote 31 Many of the refund obligations in question here stem from the consolidation of proceedings conducted in connection with filings for rate increases under 4 (d). For purposes of these filings and of the attendant refund obligations, these proceedings were conducted under 4 (e). Area Rate Proceeding No. AR61-1, 24 F. P. C. 1121. </s> [Footnote 32 The various parties before the Court have taken quite disparate positions. The distributing companies, with the exception of amici, and the public authorities, with the exceptions of the States of Texas and New Mexico, have all supported the Commission's orders in their entirety. They urge that "consumers . . . have waited long enough," and assert that "no good purpose can be served by further proceedings." See Joint Brief for the City of San Diego and the City and County of San Francisco 24. Certain of the producers support the judgment below; others challenge the validity of portions of the Commission's orders that were sustained below. We have, nonetheless, frequently not indicated which of the parties join, and which oppose, various contentions. This does not suggest that we do not recognize differences in position; we want merely to simplify, so far as possible, an already lengthy opinion. One further comment is pertinent. The organization and presentation of issues is, of course, a matter for the judgment of counsel. Nonetheless, it is proper to remark that the effectiveness and clarity with which issues are presented in cases of this complexity might be significantly increased if even greater efforts were made to focus and consolidate argumentation on behalf of parties with essentially similar views. </s> [Footnote 33 The opinion of the Court stated simply that "[w]e recognize the unusual difficulties inherent in regulating the price of a commodity such as natural gas. We respect the Commission's considered judgment, backed by sound and persuasive reasoning, that the individual company cost-of-service method is not a feasible or suitable one for regulating the rates of independent producers. We share the Commission's hopes that the area approach may prove to be the ultimate solution." 373 U.S., at 310 (note omitted). </s> [Footnote 34 Compare Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 517. </s> [Footnote 35 The Court of Appeals remarked that "[o]ut-of-pocket expenses are not defined and we do not know what they include." 375 F.2d ___, at 30. It is certainly true that the Commission proffered no definition, but we cannot regard this as a fatal omission. </s> [Footnote 36 Section 7 (b), 15 U.S.C. 717f (b), provides that "[n]o natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment." </s> [Footnote 37 Indeed, Commissioner Ross has already urged that the Commission modify its area proceedings so as to reflect the essentially national character of the relevant issues. Area Rate Proceeding (Hugoton-Anadarko Area) No. AR64-1, 30 F. P. C. 1354, 1359-1362 (dissenting opinion). Moreover, we note the "essential amalgamation" of the Hugoton-Anadarko and Texas Gulf Coast area proceedings before the Commission, where "identical issues were heard on a joint record." 1 Joint Initial Staff Brief in Area Rate Proceedings Nos. AR64-1 and AR64-2, 1. Finally, we must emphasize that we understand the present proceeding to be merely the first of many steps toward a more expeditious and effective system of regulation. </s> [Footnote 38 34 F. P. C., at 227. </s> [Footnote 39 See, e. g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 34 F. P. C. 584. </s> [Footnote 40 We obtain additional assistance from 16; it provides that the Commission "shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe . . . such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this" Act. 15 U.S.C. 717o. </s> [Footnote 41 Section 4 (d) is set out at n. 29, supra. </s> [Footnote 42 Section 4 (e), 15 U.S.C. 717c (e), provides in part that "[w]henever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority, either upon complaint . . . or upon its own initiative . . . to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission . . . may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate . . . but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and after full hearings, either completed before or after the rate, charge, classification, or service goes into effect, the Commission may make such orders with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. If the proceeding has not been concluded and an order made at the expiration of the suspension period . . . the proposed change of rate . . . shall go into effect. Where increased rates or charges are thus made effective, the Commission may, by order, require the natural-gas company to furnish a bond . . . and, upon completion of the hearing and decision, to order such natural-gas company to refund, with interest, the portion of such increased rates or charges by its decision found not justified." </s> [Footnote 43 See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 44 34 F. P. C., at 228. </s> [Footnote 45 Id., at 230. </s> [Footnote 46 The Commission has elsewhere provided brief definitions of the pertinent types of clauses. See generally Pure Oil Co., 25 F. P. C. 383. Two-party most-favored-nation clauses are those "activated by higher prices paid to any other supplier by the same purchaser." Three-party most-favored-nation clauses are "activated by higher prices paid to any other supplier by any purchaser." Spiral escalation clauses provide "that in the event the price which the buyer receives for the gas is increased, the price concurrently paid by the buyer to the supplier under the contract shall be increased in proportion to the buyer's increase." Redetermination clauses provide "that the price currently paid under the contract shall be subject to upward adjustment at certain specified times to reflect the average of the highest prices then paid by buyers to other suppliers for gas delivered under substantially similar terms and conditions." Id., at 388, n. 3. </s> [Footnote 47 Order No. 232, 25 F. P. C. 379. This was subsequently modified by Order No. 242, 27 F. P. C. 339. See 18 CFR 154.93. </s> [Footnote 48 The Commission stated in its Order No. 242 that indefinite escalation clauses "have created a significant portion of the administrative burdens under which this Commission is laboring," and that they produce a "flood of almost simultaneous filings" that "bear no apparent relationship to the economic requirements of the producers who file them." 27 F. P. C. 339, 340. See also 5 Joint Appendix 1858-1859. </s> [Footnote 49 The Commission defined a small producer as one "selling jurisdictionally less than 10,000,000 Mcf annually on a nationwide basis." 34 F. P. C., at 235. See further the testimony of producer witness Abel, 1 Joint Appendix 339-342. This would include some [390 U.S. 747, 785] 250 of the filing producers in the Permian Basin, leaving some 40 large producers. Under this definition, there are some 2,000 small producers in the United States, and 75 large producers. 34 F. P. C., at 235. See also Federal Power Commission, Sales by Producers of Natural Gas to Natural Gas Pipeline Companies 1963, 1-6 (1965). </s> [Footnote 50 The examiner observed that the "basic difference between the small and the large producer is that the risks of the business are materially different for each." 34 F. P. C., at 360. Compare 1 Joint Appendix 318-319, 328-332. </s> [Footnote 51 These questions were discussed at length in testimony before the examiner on behalf of the Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association, and others. See generally 5 Joint Appendix 1655-1714, 1773-1787; 1 id., at 224-232, 255. And see Supplement to Joint Appendix 3s-6s. </s> [Footnote 52 The examiner stated that small producers had "relatively larger dry hole expenses, a smaller proportion of geological and geophysical expenses, and a smaller proportion of lease acquisition expenditures"; he added that they had relatively larger depletion, depreciation, and amortization expenses. 34 F. P. C., at 361. The examiner also found that the "ratios of income available for income taxes, cash dividends, and working capital to net investment were 7.8, 2.5, and 7.4 for the large producers, small producers and for the weighted average." Ibid. See also testimony at 3 Joint Appendix 1114-1116. </s> [Footnote 53 The Commission found that they provide only about 15% of the total supply of natural gas moving in interstate commerce, and that "they usually cannot obtain more for their gas than the regulated price we fix for the major producers." 34 F. P. C., at 234. And see id., at 363. On the other hand, the Commission noted that in specific situations the small producers might have a very important portion of the relevant market. Id., at 235. The examiner indicated that "[f]ewer than 50" large producers sell 87% of the gas sold from the Permian Basin under the Commission's jurisdiction. Id., at 361. </s> [Footnote 54 It should be noted that the small producers did not at first wish any special exemptions; they evidently feared that any such exemptions might cause the Commission to ignore their difficulties, and ultimately perhaps to permit them to be priced out of the industry. These discussions may be traced at 5 Joint Appendix 1692-1714. </s> [Footnote 55 Correspondingly, the small producers need not take quality adjustments into account for purposes of refunds, unless they wish to take advantage of upward price adjustments because of high Btu content. 34 F. P. C., at 233. </s> [Footnote 56 It is pertinent that the Commission estimated regulatory expenses, for purposes of the calculation of area maximum rates, at 0.14 per Mcf. The Commission stated that "no participant disputes [390 U.S. 747, 787] its inclusion . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 197. In contrast, it has been estimated that the total costs to producers of the Commission's regulation are some 1.164 per Mcf. Of this total, 0.039 are said to arise from administration, 0.809 from delay, and 0.316 from contingencies. See Gerwig, Natural Gas Production: A Study of Costs of Regulation, 5 J. Law & Econ. 69, 85, 86, 88. </s> [Footnote 57 It is pertinent that much of the cost and other data upon which the Commission relied reflected national, and not area or local, circumstances. Further, the Commission found that production costs in the Permian Basin did not "vary sufficiently from the national average to warrant a different treatment . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 191. Moreover, no party offered a comprehensive cost study premised on a larger Permian Basin, although certain information relevant to adjacent areas was presented. See 1 Joint Appendix 37-41; 6 id., at 15e. But see 1 id., at 242-244. </s> [Footnote 58 The rate structure is summarized above, at 759-764. </s> [Footnote 59 Economists have frequently proved more candid about these difficulties. Social welfare and public interest standards have been described as "almost unique in the extreme vagueness of [their] ultimate verbal norm." Bonbright, supra, at 27. Similarly, it is said that no writer "whose views on public utility rates command respect purports to find a single yardstick by sole reference to which rates that are reasonable or socially desirable can be distinguished from rates that are unreasonable or adverse to the public interest." Id., at 67. But compare National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 . </s> [Footnote 60 This phrase was taken by the Court of Appeals as the substance of the opinion of the Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra. The court contrasted unfavorably the Commission's assertion that it had found a "fair relationship" between the consumer interests and the producers' costs. See 34 F. P. C., at 1074; 375 F.2d, at 34. We are unable to find in the verbal differences between these two phrases any objection to the Commission's orders. The Commission's exercise of its regulatory authority must be assessed in light of its purposes and consequences, and not by references to isolated phrases from previous cases. </s> [Footnote 61 The Commission found that the 2.8 per Mcf paid as an average price in 1947 had risen to 9.0 in 1954, and to 13.8 in 1960. In 1960, El Paso, the dominant pipeline company in the Basin, renegotiated its contracts and offered prices ranging from 13.5 to 17 per Mcf. 34 F. P. C., at 182. The examiner pointed out that between 1947 and 1960, the average price paid nationally by pipelines trebled, from 4.95 to 15.61 per Mfc. Id., at 312. And see 2 Joint Appendix 423-432. </s> [Footnote 62 It appears that five producers were responsible in 1960 for more than one-half of all the natural gas sold from the Basin under the Commission's regulation. Fifteen producers accounted for almost three-fourths of the sales. See Memorandum of the Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association, 5 Joint Appendix 1775, 1780. See also Analysis of Independent Producer Rate Schedules, 6 Joint Appendix 275e-293e. These questions are very usefully discussed by distributor witness Kahn at 2 Joint Appendix 410-432. He notes the significance of "a sharply rising demand operating on a sluggishly responding supply," id., at 423, but also emphasizes the importance of the escalation clauses and of various market imperfections. </s> [Footnote 63 The Commission stated that "the entire history of pipeline purchasing activity, since the end of the El Paso monopoly in the Permian Basin, has been characterized by the overriding needs of the pipelines to contract for the large blocks of uncommitted reserves [390 U.S. 747, 794] essential to maintain their competitive position in developing markets . . . and their inability to accomplish this objective except at ever increasing prices." 34 F. P. C., at 182. It is noteworthy that, despite the obvious importance of these proceedings, the pipeline companies did not take an active part here, in the Court of Appeals or before the Commission. See also 2 Joint Appendix 423-432. But see 4 id., at 1384-1388. </s> [Footnote 64 The phrase is Commissioner O'Connor's. 34 F. P. C., at 252 (opinion concurring and dissenting on limited issue). It is proper to note that he would have made much wider use of field prices for the calculation of the area rates. Monopsony is the term used to describe a situation in which the relevant market for a factor of production is dominated by a single purchaser. See J. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition 215 (1933). The relevant market here is that for uncommitted reserves. See 2 Joint Appendix 410. Finally, for a general examination of the usefulness of the competitive model for regulation, see Bonbright, supra, at 106-108. </s> [Footnote 65 It should be observed that the significance of the escalation clauses will presumably be diminished by the Commission's series of orders restricting their use. </s> [Footnote 66 Some 85% of the gas sold in interstate commerce from the Permian Basin is ultimately consumed in California. 34 F. P. C., at 174, 312. The demand for natural gas among residential and commercial consumers, once they have purchased the necessary equipment, is relatively inelastic. Id., at 313. The demand among [390 U.S. 747, 795] industrial consumers is more responsive to price, but restrictions in California on the use of various industrial fuels have left industrial demand less responsive to price there than in other parts of the country. Id., at 313-314. </s> [Footnote 67 Indeed, the Commission explicitly stated that "[w]e recognize that the history of negotiated prices in the area is an important element to be considered in reaching our decision." 34 F. P. C., at 181. </s> [Footnote 68 We note that economists have sometimes concluded that the market mechanism works satisfactorily in the natural gas industry. "There is . . . no question but that the field price of gas in the United States is competitively determined." Adelman, supra, at 39. See also E. Neuner, The Natural Gas Industry 125-134, 238-290 (1960). In contrast, Professor Kahn said of oil and gas that "few other industries in our entire economy . . . are so insulated . . . from the normal forces of the market." 2 Joint Appendix 607. But see 1 id., at 217-218, 280-281. And see R. Hooley, Financing the Natural Gas Industry 5-25 (1961). </s> [Footnote 69 Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 612 (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 70 The examiner found that the larger producers could now predict with high accuracy whether drilling in a particular area would be likely to produce associated or unassociated gas. 34 F. P. C., at 325-329. This appears primarily to be the consequence of [390 U.S. 747, 797] accumulated experience, and not of any improvement in technology. See also 2 Joint Appendix 558, 581; 1 id., at 56, 307-308. Useful statistical evidence of predictability may be found in producer testimony. See 3 id., at 952-955, 963, 965-967, 1079-1080. And see 7 id., at 572e-575e. It should be noted that the Commission's staff denied that gas could be separately sought. 3 id., at 933-934. </s> [Footnote 71 Estimates of the moment at which directional search became possible varied; one witness testified that Phillips regarded January 1, 1959, as an appropriate date of calculation. 1 Joint Appendix 56. </s> [Footnote 72 See 34 F. P. C., at 273. But contrast the testimony of distributor witness Kahn, who recognized that it would be "in some measure arbitrary" to give the lower price to gas wells that began production after 1960 but before the Commission's final decision in these proceedings. 2 Joint Appendix 635. </s> [Footnote 73 The Statement provided a guideline price of 16 per Mcf for initial filings, and 11 per Mcf for previously committed gas. 24 [390 U.S. 747, 799] F. P. C., at 820. The Commission indicated that this was in recognition of "economic factors." Id., at 819. </s> [Footnote 74 It is pertinent that Gerwig found that a premium of 1.16 per Mcf is necessary before producers rationally enter the interstate market. Gerwig, supra, at 85. See also Kitch, The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases and the Regulatory Determination of Price, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191, 207. Compare Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings: CATCO in Context, 62 Col. L. Rev. 773, 784, n. 61. Finally, see the testimony of producer witness Foster, 1 Joint Appendix 142-144. </s> [Footnote 75 We see no objection to the Commission's preference for January 1, 1961, instead of December 23, 1960, the date on which it issued the order commencing these proceedings. This choice was adequately justified by administrative convenience. </s> [Footnote 76 It should be observed that the witness chiefly responsible for the contrivance of the two-price system ultimately adopted by the Commission, see 2 Joint Appendix 510-513, 576-585, 601-611, has elsewhere described the need for close restraints on increases in the price for natural gas. Kahn, Economic Issues in Regulating the Field Price of Natural Gas, 50 Am. Econ. Rev. 506, 510-514. See also Kitch, supra, at 211-212. </s> [Footnote 77 34 F. P. C., at 191. And see id., at 339-340. </s> [Footnote 78 It should be noted that the parties proffered a list of sources of information, to which the examiner gave his approval. See 1 Joint Appendix 291-305, 309-310. These were said by the parties to be "recognized, published statistical data sources." Id., at 292. The Commission described them as "well-recognized and authoritative." 34 F. P. C., at 191. Nonetheless, careful efforts were made to determine whether these and other sources of evidence, including the producers' questionnaires, were, as to the various cost components, accurately representative of the relevant groups of producers. See, e. g., id., at 377, 378, 380, 381, 384, 387, 392, 393. </s> [Footnote 79 Three sets of questionnaires were used. Appendix A was applicable to all producers, and concerned chiefly drilling costs. Appendix B was required of large producers, and concerned costs, revenues and production. Appendix C was a simplified version of Appendix B, which small producers were permitted to use. The producers have argued vigorously that these questionnaires did not provide a sufficient basis for the Commission's findings. We cannot agree. The Commission reasonably concluded, as had the examiner, that the Appendix C questionnaires received from small producers were not necessarily representative. 34 F. P. C., at 214. And see 3 Joint Appendix 1117-1118. Moreover, the addition of the Appendix C data from the small producers would evidently not have produced a significant change in the ultimate cost components. See 34 F. P. C., at 214, 392-393, 400. Further, the Commission found that the responses to the Appendix B questionnaires received from 25 small producers would not have "change[d] the results." Id., at 214, n. 34. Of the 43 large producers that filed Appendix B questionnaires, the staff and Commission disregarded only one, which had not been properly completed. See generally 2 Joint Appendix 731-748; [390 U.S. 747, 803] 3 id., at 753-761. In these circumstances, the Commission concluded, we think reasonably, that "the data provided by the major producers with respect to their Permian production was fully representative of area costs . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 214. This Court has repeatedly held that administrative agencies may "proceed on a group basis . . . on `evidence which the Commission assumed was typical in character, and ample in quantity' to justify its findings . . . ." Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 326, 341 , quoting New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184, 196 -197. The Commission has here reasonably found that the evidence before it satisfied these requirements; we therefore find no objection. </s> [Footnote 80 See generally the examiner's discussion, 34 F. P. C., at 393-400. Economists have described these difficulties with repetitive pungency. "To make laborious computations purporting to divide [such] costs is `nonsense on stilts,' and has no more meaning than the famous example of predicting the banana crop by its correlation with expenditures on the Royal Navy." Adelman, supra, at 25. See also Machlup, supra, n. 25, at 21; Bonbright, supra, at 339-342. Compare Eckstein, Natural Gas and Patterns of Regulation, 36 Harv. Bus. Rev. 126, 129-133; and Kahn, supra, at 510-514. </s> [Footnote 81 By one estimate, the costs of nonassociated gas are 45% separate, 31% joint, and 24% common. See 34 F. P. C., at 339. All of the costs of associated gas are joint. Ibid. But see Kitch, supra, at 202. </s> [Footnote 82 34 F. P. C., at 1072. None of the distributors or public agencies before the Court, except amici, have argued that this permits excessively generous returns to producers. Indeed, representatives of the consumers who ultimately purchase most of the gas produced in the Permian Basin have urged us to avoid "long extensive delays" and to affirm the Commission's orders in their entirety. See, e. g., Brief for the City of Los Angeles 6; Joint Brief for the City of San Diego and the City and County of San Francisco 24; Brief for People of the State of California 63. These parties did not petition the Court of Appeals to review the Commission's orders, [390 U.S. 747, 805] and participated below only as intervenors in full support of the Commission's position. Even assuming arguendo that these questions are not now foreclosed by 19 (b), we can find no basis on which to set aside the area rates as excessive. As we shall show below, the rate of return permitted the producers does not substantially exceed that ordinarily allowed to pipelines. Further, it must be recalled that the area maximum rates were, even before adjustment for quality and Btu deficiencies, intended to approximate average unit costs. Finally, we note that the Commission's area rate for new gas-well gas, after adjustment for average quality deficiencies, very nearly equals that originally proposed by distributor and consumer representatives. Compare 34 F. P. C., at 343, and at 1073. We cannot say that the Commission's rates are above the "zone of reasonableness" permitted by the Natural Gas Act. </s> [Footnote 83 These questions are usefully discussed in Bonbright, supra, at 240-283. See also the Commission's discussion of the true yield method. 34 F. P. C., at 202. Compare 4 Joint Appendix 1267, 1406-1416. And see the Initial Decision of the Presiding Examiner in Area Rate Proceeding (Southern Louisiana Area), No. AR61-2, issued December 30, 1966, at 75-85. </s> [Footnote 84 34 F. P. C., at 201. Compare id., at 343-352. And see for estimates of more recent equity allowances, Brief for the Federal Power Commission 144, n. 16. </s> [Footnote 85 The examiner found that nonintegrated producers had an average debt of approximately 12%. The pipelines were found to have debts "sometimes as large as 70 percent of total capitalization . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 345. See also contrasting testimony at 1 Joint Appendix 173-177; and 2 id., at 614-626. It is proper to observe that it has sometimes been argued that the leverage of high borrowings itself creates certain financial risks. But see G. Stigler, Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries 64, n. 15 (1963). Finally, it should be noted that risk has on occasion been regarded as cause for a reduction of the rate of return. See C. Hardy, Risk and Risk-bearing 37-38 (1931). </s> [Footnote 86 As will appear below, we find the Commission's discussion of relative financial risks imprecise. There is, however, a plain statement in the Commission's opinion to the effect that exploration and production are financially more hazardous than transmission. See 34 F. P. C., at 201. The Commission did not indicate clearly whether it considered production taken in the aggregate as more hazardous than the affairs of an individual pipeline company, or indeed even whether it considered such aggregate calculations relevant. </s> [Footnote 87 See the discussion at 34 F. P. C., at 203-204. And see id., at 349-352. Finally, see 3 Joint Appendix 850-936. </s> [Footnote 88 But see Kitch, supra, at 201. See also Stigler, supra, at 62-64. </s> [Footnote 89 It has been argued with force that the producers were not given fair notice that the Commission might promulgate such standards. It appears that the Commission did not announce in terms that it might create quality standards, and that it tacitly denied a motion to consolidate this proceeding with a rule-making proceeding intended to devise national quality standards. We cannot say that the Commission impermissibly refused to complicate still further this proceeding by the addition of issues centering on national quality standards. Moreover, the general terms of the Commission's order commencing this proceeding reasonably encompassed questions of quality standards, 24 F. P. C. 1121, 1124, and we do not regard the Commission's denial of the consolidation motion as [390 U.S. 747, 809] foreclosing the ultimate adoption of such standards. The producers' motion was premised on the desirability of national standards, and explicitly recognized that prices and differences in quality "are so inextricably tied together that they cannot be meaningfully separated one from the other." 9 Joint Appendix 69d, 71d. We cannot hold that the Commission denied the producers fair notice that it might as a consequence of these hearings impose quality standards. </s> [Footnote 90 It is argued vigorously that the standards adopted by the Commission lack substantial basis in the record. Emphasis is placed chiefly on the examiner's statement that it would be "probably impossible on this record . . . to establish a complete set of differentials for the various value and quality characteristics of gas." 34 F. P. C., at 368. See also 1 Joint Appendix 123-136. We believe this statement to be inapposite to the issues before us. The Commission did not create such a set of differentials; it merely posited a series of pipeline standards, and placed the responsibility for reaching specific price differentials upon the parties to each sale. It indicated that it would accept any agreement that appeared to be a good-faith effort to determine the pertinent processing costs. It should be noted that at least one witness testified that negotiation among the relevant parties is the proper method for measurement of processing costs. See 3 Joint Appendix 983. Further, various estimates of quality adjustments were provided by witnesses before the examiner. See 5 id., at 1769-1771, 1867-1899, 1907-1908. We conclude that the Commission's findings on these questions are adequately supported by the record. </s> [Footnote 91 Commissioner O'Connor argued forcefully in a concurring and dissenting opinion that the Commission's adoption of high and low [390 U.S. 747, 810] Btu standards was unfair to producers. 34 F. P. C., at 267-268. The Court of Appeals indicated that it was unable to understand the reasons for the dual standard. 375 F.2d, at 31. We agree that the Commission might have dealt more clearly with these questions, but we have found no basis on which we can set aside its judgment. The Commission found that, by prevailing practice, the minimum Btu standard in the Permian Basin was 1,000 per cubic foot; the average Btu content is, however, in a range of 1,034 to 1,042 per cubic foot. 34 F. P. C., at 223, 267-268. It concluded that it would require downward price adjustments only where Btu content is less than 1,000, and permit upward adjustment only where it exceeds 1,050 per cubic foot. Although this is evidently less favorable to producers than other possible formulae, we have found no evidence that suggests that it is arbitrary, or an abuse of the Commission's authority. Compare Initial Decision, Area Rate Proceeding (Southern Louisiana Area), No. AR61-2, issued December 30, 1966, at 180-183. </s> [Footnote 92 The Commission pointed out that sellers of gas-well gas receive payments for "liquid hydrocarbons extracted from the gas by the pipelines." 34 F. P. C., at 1073. These payments may amount to 0.6 to 0.8 per Mcf in the Permian Basin. Ibid. An allowance of only 0.2 per Mcf was incorporated by stipulation in the new gas-well gas rate. Id., at 388. Moreover, producers receive "substantial payments" for liquids extracted from oil-well gas sold under Spraberry contracts. Id., at 1073. And see n. 111, infra. Compare 34 F. P. C., at 208-209. </s> [Footnote 93 The Commission's order accepting quality statements filed by producers in the Permian Basin indicates that the adjustments average 0.78 per Mcf for old gas-well gas, and 0.86 per Mcf for old residue gas. 37 F. P. C. 52, 53. </s> [Footnote 94 Brief for the Federal Power Commission 141. </s> [Footnote 95 The Commission emphasized that because exploration "is fraught with uncertainties foreign to its transmission," a "greater return" should be allowed. 34 F. P. C., at 201. Nonetheless, as we have found, the rate of return actually permitted by the Commission, after allowance for quality and other adjustments, does not substantially exceed that permitted to pipelines. We note, however, that the risks incidental to exploration have not always been thought to be greatly in excess of those incidental to transmission. See Kitch, supra, at 201. And see on the insurance principle, Nelson, Percentage Depletion and National Security, reprinted in Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, papers submitted to the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 463, 470 (Comm. Print 1955). See also Dirlam, Natural Gas: Cost, Conservation, and Pricing, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 491, 498. And compare 3 Joint Appendix 907. </s> [Footnote 96 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. </s> [Footnote 97 The Commission first emphasized that "we make clear that we do not confine ourselves to a cost calculation in determining just and reasonable rates." 34 F. P. C., at 190. It later said that "there is no justification in this area for any adjustment of a cost-determined ceiling price." It added that "no such [noncost] adjustments are required in the Permian Basin." Id., at 207. Yet it is quite plain that the Commission's rate structure is, and was intended to be, significantly influenced by "non-cost considerations." Unfortunately, the Commission never paused to reconcile these general observations with the specific terms of its rate structure. </s> [Footnote 98 We understand the principal points at which the Commission employed noncost factors to be four. It used the logic of functional pricing to justify both its two-price rate structure and its selections of sources of cost data. Second, it explained its imposition of a single maximum rate upon all old gas by, among other reasons, the importance of a relatively uncomplicated rate structure. Third, the Commission justified its adoption of a temporary period of price restriction by the exigencies of area regulation. Fourth, the Commission based its calculation of the rate of return upon risk factors that it did not directly reduce to cost components. </s> [Footnote 99 We are cognizant, as presumably is the Commission, of the forceful argument that the computation of rates from costs is ultimately circular. See Kitch, supra, at 195-196; compare Kahn, supra, at 510-514. See also Eckstein, supra, at 129-131. The Commission has not, however, relied simply upon cost computations, and we have found no basis on which we could now properly set aside the Commission's orders. We assume that the Commission will continue to examine both the premises of its regulatory methods and the consequences for the industry's future of its rate-making orders. Nothing under the Act or the cases of this Court compels the Commission to reduce its regulatory functions to self-fulfilling prophecies. Compare City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810, 818. </s> [Footnote 100 The ratio "has been as high as 32.5 to 1 in 1946 and it has steadily declined to about 18.7 to 1 in 1963 . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 183. At year end of 1965, proved recoverable reserves totaled 286.5 trillion cubic feet; withdrawals in 1965 were 16.25 trillion cubic feet. American Gas Association, 1966 Gas Facts 1 (1966). These questions may be traced in testimony at 1 Joint Appendix 20-34, 76-95, 97-111, 352-360; 2 id., at 459-471. See also Hooley, supra, 5-25. </s> [Footnote 101 In 1965, "[g]ross additions to reserves aggregated 21.3 trillion cubic feet, the third highest since the Natural Gas Reserves Committee initiated its reports in 1946." American Gas Association, supra, at 5. Further, "[o]ver the past twenty years, gross additions [390 U.S. 747, 817] have resulted in more than 343 trillion cubic feet being added to the nation's proved reserves of natural gas. During this same period, net production of natural gas totaled 207 trillion cubic feet." Ibid. See for similar evidence, American Gas Association, 1967 Gas Facts 5 (1967). It is, however, proper to recognize that the ratio of new discoveries to annual net production has generally declined since 1946, although the decline is neither steep nor consistent. See 34 F. P. C., at 319; 1 Joint Appendix 76-95, 97-111. And see generally Cram, Introduction to the Problem of Developing Adequate Supplies of Natural Gas, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Economics of the Gas Industry 1 (1962). </s> [Footnote 102 It is pertinent that the American Gas Association in 1957 observed of the reserves-to-production ratio that so "long as new additions exceed production there need be little cause for concern about such an hypothetical ratio." 1957 Gas Facts 6 (1957). See for similar evidence 34 F. P. C., at 309-317. </s> [Footnote 103 The producers have argued vigorously that 20 to 1 is the minimum reserves-to-production ratio. There is, however, ample evidence to support the commission's judgment that lower ratios are permissible. One intervenor witness forcefully described the concern for that ratio as a "neurotic preoccupation." 1 Joint Appendix 357. See also id., at 352-360; and 2 id., at 459-471. These questions are usefully discussed in Terry, Future Life of the Natural Gas Industry, Southwestern Legal Foundation, supra, at 275, 284-285; and in Netschert, Economic Aspects of Natural Gas Supply, id., at 27, 56-68. </s> [Footnote 104 Indeed, the Commission described the adequacy of reserves as "an important factor in our determination here," and said that it will "continue to be an important factor in reviewing area rates in the future . . . ." 34 F. P. C., at 185. </s> [Footnote 105 There appears to be some uncertainty about the appropriate figures. Compare Brief for the Federal Power Commission 96. The producers' use of 12.72 per Mcf is supported by 7 Joint Appendix 538e. </s> [Footnote 106 Certain of the producers urge that the Commission described 14.5 and 16.5, unadjusted for quality deficiencies, as the just and reasonable rates for the Permian Basin. This ellipsis may sometimes have entered the Commission's opinion, but on fair reading its intentions seem entirely clear. See 34 F. P. C., at 239. </s> [Footnote 107 It is pertinent to reiterate that the Commission has recently calculated the actual adjustments required by the quality statements filed by producers in the Permian Basin through August 31, 1966, as 0.78 per Mcf for old gas-well gas and 0.86 per Mcf for old residue gas. Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin Area), 37 F. P. C. 52, 53. </s> [Footnote 108 The Commission stated that "the evidence in the record makes clear that with respect to casinghead gas and residue gas derived therefrom (which together make up by far the largest share of the Permian gas subject to quality adjustments) the costs are substantially below the 14.5 cents per Mcf ceiling price." 34 F. P. C., at 1072. And see id., at 356-360. </s> [Footnote 109 The Commission pointed out that there was evidence that suggested that these payments average 0.6 to 0.8 per Mcf for gas-well gas in the Permian Basin. 34 F. P. C., at 1073. </s> [Footnote 110 The new gas-well gas rate includes a credit of 0.2 per Mcf for plant liquids. 34 F. P. C., at 197, 1073. This figure was determined by stipulation. Id., at 388. No such credit was included in the flowing gas rate. </s> [Footnote 111 The Spraberry, or El Paso, contract is one which provides "for the purchase of casinghead gas by a pipeline which processes the gas, pays the producer a percentage of the proceeds from the sale of the extracted liquids, plus a fixed price for the residue gas delivered to the pipeline." 34 F. P. C., at 208. The presiding examiner would have essentially prohibited such contracts in the Permian Basin, but the Commission declined to do so. Nonetheless, it asserted jurisdiction, we think properly, over the sale of casinghead gas under the contract. The Commission indicated that the producers' revenue from the contracts for the extracted liquids is "substantial." 34 F. P. C., at 1073. </s> [Footnote 112 Compare 34 F. P. C., at 209 and 1072. </s> [Footnote 113 The Commission's calculation of the minimum rate was, however, left largely unexplained. The Commission clearly found that "the establishment of minimum rates in this case is in the public interest and that the price impact on the consumer will be de minimis." 34 F. P. C., at 231. It failed to offer any explanation of its selection of 9 as the minimum rate, relying entirely on the examiner's preference for that figure. The examiner adopted two minimum rates: 9 per Mcf for residue and gas-well gas, and 7 per Mcf for casinghead gas. His calculations were evidently premised on his computation of the revenue standard for the various classes of natural gas. See id., at 369. The composite explanation for the choice of 9 as the area minimum rate is thus imprecise. Nonetheless, the Commission reasonably concluded that a minimum rate was imperative, and there is no evidence before us that permits the conclusion that its selection was unjust or unreasonable. </s> [Footnote 114 Two additional issues should properly be separately considered. First, the States of Texas and New Mexico have urged that we reconsider Hope, and require the Commission to give special weight to the probable effects of its orders on the economies of producing States. We have examined these contentions, but decline to modify the treatment of the similar question in Hope. See 320 U.S., at [390 U.S. 747, 823] 607-614. As we said there, we do not "suggest that Congress was unmindful of the interests of the producing states . . . when it drafted the Natural Gas Act." Id., at 612. But to go as far as Texas and New Mexico now ask "raises questions of policy which go beyond our province." Id., at 614. Second, the Commission indicated that it would apply these area rates to sales initiated during the pendency of these proceedings. 34 F. P. C., at 237. See order issuing certificates, id., at 418. The effect of this order is to impose these rates as the in-line rate for the Permian Basin for periods prior to the Commission's decision in these proceedings. See generally United Gas v. Callery Properties, 382 U.S. 223, 226 -228. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide the propriety of this arrangement. 375 F.2d, at 35-36. Nonetheless, we believe that in the circumstances here presented it is appropriate to resolve this issue without awaiting consideration by that court. Compare Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 326, 355 -356. We hold that the Commission was not forbidden to employ the area rates as the in-line rate for purposes of sales initiated after commencement of its proceedings, but before its final decision. The area rates were properly calculated as the just and reasonable rates for the Permian Basin for periods subsequent to the periods at issue, on the basis of cost factors believed to be stable throughout these periods. As the Commission observed, to prevent their use as the in-line rate "would require an unending succession of Section 5 area rate proceedings, each covering only the sales instituted prior to the institution of the proceeding." 34 F. P. C., at 237. We need not, however, determine for what further periods or in what other circumstances the Commission may use unadjusted area rates as in-line rates. Orders involving 7 proceedings commenced after the Commission's decision in these proceedings were not before the Commission, and are not now before the Court. </s> [Footnote 115 It is, however, proper to take special notice of various arguments that have been vigorously pressed by certain of the producers. First, it is urged that the Commission should have included an allowance for federal income taxes in the rate for new gas-well gas. It appears that the producers originally presented no evidence supporting such an allowance, and that producer witnesses did not include such costs in their computations. Further, there was evidence [390 U.S. 747, 825] that the computation of such an allowance would be difficult, see 3 Joint Appendix 992, and that, in any event, the producers will incur "no Federal income tax liability at any return up to 15 percent." 34 F. P. C., at 206. In these circumstances, we think that the Commission did not err in excluding such an allowance. Second, it is urged that the Commission failed to include an adequate allowance for exploration costs. We must emphasize that we perceive no obligation upon the Commission, under the Constitution or the Natural Gas Act, to permit recovery of all exploration costs, regardless of their amount and prudence. Although other methods of computing these costs might have been used by the Commission, see id., at 192-193, we have found nothing that would properly permit reversal of the Commission's judgment. Finally, Sun Oil asserts that it was at various points denied due process. It is enough to say that we have examined these contentions, and find them without substance. </s> [Footnote 116 We note that the terms of the stay entered by the Court of Appeals on January 20, 1966, would reduce this rate of interest to 4 1/2%. See 12 Transcript of Record 12, 13-14. The court offered no explanation of this modification of the Commission's orders. We perceive no basis for the court's order, particularly since the question was evidently not raised in the producers' applications to the Commission for rehearing. See 19 (b), 15 U.S.C. 717r (b). And see Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 307 . We hold that the Commission's order imposing interest of 7% must be restored. </s> [Footnote 117 We understand these interest rates to be in some cases 6% and in others 7%. Brief for the Federal Power Commission 169. </s> [Footnote 118 A locked-in rate is one in which an "increased rate is later superseded by a further increase . . . ." It is thus "effective only for the limited intervening period, called the `locked-in' period, and retains significance in 4 (e) proceedings only in respect of its refundability if found unlawful." Wisconsin v. FPC, supra, at 298, n. 5. </s> [Footnote 119 See Brief for the Federal Power Commission in Nos. 72, 73, 74, October Term, 1962, 48-53. </s> [Footnote 120 Compare FPC v. Tennessee Gas Co., 371 U.S. 145, 152 -153. </s> [Footnote 121 We note that Mobil and others have argued vigorously that the Commission's refund formulae would impose obligations to refund amounts below the "last clean rate." The latter is a rate established by a final permanent certificate unconditioned by a refund obligation under either 7 or 4 (e). The Commission concluded that it need not reach this question since "no such situation has been presented as resulting from our order herein." 34 F. P. C., at 1074-1075. And see Gulf Oil Corp., 35 F. P. C. 375. Given the Commission's postponement of the question, we intimate no views on the proper limitations of the Commission's authority in this regard. [390 U.S. 747, 829] </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> I. </s> What the Court does today cannot be reconciled with the construction given the Natural Gas Act by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 . In that case we said, in determining whether a rate had been properly found to be "just and reasonable" under the Act, that </s> (1) "it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling"; </s> (2) it is "not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts"; </s> (3) "If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end." </s> The area rate orders challenged here are based on averages. 1 No single producer's actual costs, actual risks, actual returns, are known. [390 U.S. 747, 830] </s> The "result reached" as to any producer is not known. </s> The "impact of the rate order" on any producer is not known. </s> The "total effect" of the rate order on a single producer is not known. </s> It is said, however, that if any producer is aggrieved, it may apply for relief and if it fails to obtain relief it can resort to the courts. But unless we know the standards which will govern in case it applies for relief, we are, with all respect, mouthing mere words when we say the [390 U.S. 747, 831] rate is "just and reasonable." In absence of knowledge, we cannot possibly perform our function of judicial review, limited though it be. </s> It was urged in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Hope that a system of regulation be authorized which would center not on the producer but on the product "which would be regulated with an eye to average or typical producing conditions in the field." 320 U.S., at 652 . But the Court rejected that approach, saying that 4 (a) and 5 (a) of the Natural Gas Act contained "only the conventional standards of rate-making for natural gas companies." Id., at 616. </s> Group regulation of rates is not, of course, novel. It has at times been authorized. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 1002 (e), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C. 1482 (e), permits it. And see General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 32 C. A. B. 291. Under the War Power, extensive price regulation on a group basis was sustained. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 -519. The Interstate Commerce Commission has undertaken it, as revealed by the Divisions of Revenue cases. New England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184 ; United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274 ; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U.S. 326 . See also 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 24 Stat. 384, 49 U.S.C. 15 (3). The requirement in the Divisions of Revenue cases is that the group evidence be "typical in character, and ample in quantity, to justify the finding made in respect to each division of each rate of every carrier." 261 U.S., at 196 -197. In other words, where the rates fixed will recover the typical group cost of service, the individual producer's right to a minimum of its operating expenses and capital charges is protected. Cost of service includes operating expenses and capital charges. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 607 (concurring opinion). With [390 U.S. 747, 832] that protection I can see no reason why group rates may not be sanctioned here. But more is required than the Commission undertook to do in these cases. </s> In the present cases the Commission found averages; but there are no findings as to the typicality and representative nature of those averages. 2 We certainly cannot [390 U.S. 747, 833] take judicial notice that the averages are typical. Mr. Justice Brandeis in the leading Divisions of Revenue case said that "averages are apt to be misleading" and they cannot be accepted "as a substitute for typical evidence." 265 U.S., at 291 . Cf. American Motors Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247, 251-259, 260-262 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1967). </s> The Commission found no median. Moreover, as we observed in another context, it did not find what was "the average cost" of groups made up of individual members who have "a close resemblance" when it comes to the "essential point or points which determine the [390 U.S. 747, 834] costs considered." United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 469 . </s> With respect to the cost of new gas-well gas, the Commission did not determine whether the average costs complied from the questionnaires or derived from industry-wide data were typical or representative. </s> In finding the cost of flowing gas, the Commission noted that the 1960 level of costs compiled by the staff in large part from the questionnaire responses was "fairly representative of the costs during the three year period ending in 1960" (34 F. P. C. 159, 213) and that "[t]he 1960 test year is . . . typical of current and future costs of the flowing gas . . . ." Ibid. This reference to "representative" and "typical" costs, however, dealt only with the question of time - i. e., the staff's use of 1960 data in developing its composite cost presentation was deemed permissible since 1960 was found to be a typical and representative year. </s> The Court professes to find that the Commission adequately determined that the averages it employed were "typical" and "representative." Ante, at 802-803, n. 79. But the statements plucked from the Commission's opinion do not support that interpretation. </s> The Commission also observed, with respect to the questionnaire data, that 42 of the major producers (representing all but one of the major producers in the Permian area) responded on the Appendix B questionnaires. The Commission agreed with the Examiner that "the data provided by the major producers with respect to their Permian production was fully representative of area costs," and that exclusion of the Appendix C returns from small producers would have only a de minimis effect. 34 F. P. C., at 214. But although the data submitted by the major producers were found to be typical data for the area, and I assume also for the major producers in the area, there are no findings whether the averages [390 U.S. 747, 835] compiled from the data were typical or representative of the costs of those major producers or of other producers in the area. </s> The Commission's statement that the sources used "in combination provide an adequate basis for the costs we have found" certainly cannot be read as a finding that those sources were "typical and representative." Nor does the fact that the sources were "recognized, published statistical data sources," or "well-recognized and authoritative," mean they also contained typical and representative averages. </s> An average cost is not only apt to be "misleading"; it may indeed not be representative of any producer. </s> The Commission allowed a 12% rate of return, the return being "on capital invested in finding new gas well gas." 34 F. P. C., at 306, 343. "Production investment costs" constituted this "capital invested" and were the bases to which the Commission applied the 12% rate to arrive at a return of 5.21 per Mcf to be included in the rate base for new gas-well gas. 34 F. P. C., at 197, 204. These "production investment costs" included successful well costs, lease acquisition costs, and the cost of other production facilities. But they were likewise determined on the basis of averages. See 34 F. P. C., at 197-198, 295, 377-382. </s> The average per capita income of a Middle East kingdom is said to be $1,800 a year. But since one man - or family - gets most of the money, $1,800 a year describes only a mythical resident of that country. </s> The 12% return allowed by the Commission and computed on an average-cost basis may likewise have no relation whatever to the reality of the actual costs of any producer. </s> One producer's cost, though varying from year to year, may average out at $1 per Mcf. Another's may average out at 5 per Mcf. Does that make 52.5 per Mcf representative [390 U.S. 747, 836] of either producer or typical of all producers, or, indeed, typical of any producer, even if the 52.5 per Mcf is stable over the entire period of years? </s> The Commission could follow the lead of the Interstate Commerce Commission and produce rates on a group basis. But it simply has not done so in any rational way. </s> Averages are apt to take us with Alice into Wonderland. That is one reason why the case should be remanded to the Commission for further findings. </s> The Commission will allow individual application for relief from these new rates. But it has not prescribed the terms and conditions on which relief will be granted. It has said, however, that an individual producer must show more than that its cost of service is greater than the averages on which the rate is based. 34 F. P. C., at 180. </s> In a regulated industry there is no constitutional guarantee that the most inefficient will survive. Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 170 -171. </s> That assumes, however, an ability to withdraw from the business. But a producer of natural gas may not abandon its existing facilities that supply the interstate market without Commission approval. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 385 U.S. 83 . </s> The Commission says that a producer will be able to obtain relief to cover its out-of-pocket expenses. 34 F. P. C., at 226. Do they include return, depreciation, depletion, exploration, development, and overhead? The Court of Appeals did not know (375 F.2d, at 30); and we certainly do not. The remand by the Court of Appeals for further definition was therefore clearly necessary. For even if we need not know the precise impact of the new group rate on each producer at the time of the group rate order, we certainly must know the conditions on which a producer can get relief before we can say that a rate as to it is "just and reasonable." [390 U.S. 747, 837] </s> Although we assume that the Act authorizes group rate-making, we cannot disregard the basic structure of the Act, patterned on the "conventional standards of rate-making" (FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 616) and providing in 4 (a) and 5 (a) that all rates of "any" natural gas company be "just and reasonable." Beyond the group is the single producer; beyond the community of producers is the individual. The ultimate thrust of the Act reaches the individual producer; and unless we know what the group rate in final analysis does to it or disables it from doing we cannot perform our duty of judicial review. </s> II. </s> If we move to the regulation of the group as such and consider the impact of these rate orders on it, we are likewise not able on the present record to perform our function of judicial review. </s> It is impossible to say whether the proper revenue requirements of the group can be satisfied under this rate order. For the costs represent averages; and there is no way for us to find from the record whether these averages are typical and what the impact of the rates on the group will be. </s> The error is compounded when the costs used are the purported costs of gas-well gas and do not include the costs of casinghead gas, residue gas derived therefrom, and gas-well gas from combination leases. The Commission concluded that the costs of casinghead gas and residue gas produced therefrom did not exceed the costs for gas-well gas. Yet at the same time it rejected proffered evidence of higher costs of processing gas to remove liquid hydrocarbons. Commission expertise should not be allowed to make its own "facts" to justify the desired result. [390 U.S. 747, 838] </s> Beyond that are the quality adjustments. Upward price adjustments are permitted for Btu content above 1,050 per cubic foot and downward adjustment for Btu content below 1,000. The Commission was concerned with the value of the "energy content of the gas, which in reality is what the consumer is purchasing." 34 F. P. C., at 223. </s> With that standard in mind it allowed price reductions </s> (1) where the gas contains more than 10 grains of hydrogen sulphide or 200 grains of total sulphur per Mcf; </s> (2) where it contains more than .009 pound per Mcf of water; </s> (3) where it contains more than 3% by volume of carbon dioxide; </s> (4) where the gas pressure is less than 500 pounds per square inch. </s> When any of these standards are not met, the applicable ceiling price is adjusted downward by the net cost of processing the gas to bring it up to standard. </s> Under the Commission's standards about 90% of the flowing gas moving interstate from the Permian Basin is not of the pipeline quality that the Commission has prescribed. 375 F.2d, at 30. What the costs will be to convert the gas to these new standards is not found in this record. Perhaps this deficiency is due to the fact that the Commission, almost as an afterthought and not with clear, advance notice, decided to deal with detailed quality standards. But without knowing these costs through competent evidence, neither we nor the Commission has any way even to guess at whether the new rates will satisfy the criteria of Hope. </s> III. </s> The Court approves the Commission's treatment of the quality adjustments as a risk of production. But [390 U.S. 747, 839] whether they be labeled a risk of production or a cost would seem to be irrelevant. That is a matter of semantics as far as the standards of Hope are concerned. For the question is whether we can reasonably determine the end result from the computations of the Commission, including both risk and cost factors. </s> Any unknown cost is a risk. But the Commission should not be permitted to excuse its failure to solicit or proffer appropriate evidence concerning the cost of converting gas into pipeline quality by labeling that cost a "risk." The Court of Appeals recognized this point. See 375 F.2d, at 31-32, 35. Commissioner O'Connor noted in his opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing that: "To bury the quality impact in our rate of return determination is to overlook the basis for the 12 per cent allowance: comparable return on equity of 10-12 per cent by the far less risky operations of transmission companies." 34 F. P. C., at 1081. And, as one commentator recently observed: </s> "The Commission stated that the rate of return also reflected the risk of finding gas of less than pipeline quality - a clever way of avoiding the quality discount problem. Since there was no evidence in the record as to what those discounts would be, one can only say that `risks' were involved. It is a novel doctrine, indeed, that the rate of return should be adjusted to reflect the risk that the regulatory cost computations are incorrect." 3 </s> The Court concedes that the lack of specific findings concerning the effect of the quality adjustments upon the rate of return was "an unfortunate omission." Ante, at 812. But it proceeds to scratch about for evidence [390 U.S. 747, 840] to support the Commission. With all respect, there is no competent evidence in the record to permit a meaningful determination of the impact of the quality deductions. 4 The Court of Appeals was clearly correct in [390 U.S. 747, 841] remanding to the Commission for proper findings on this point. </s> Behind the veneer of the Court's opinion may be an unstated premise that the complexity of the task of regulating the wellhead price of gas sold by producers is both so great and so novel that the Commission must be given great leeway. But the permissible bounds, so far as judicial review is concerned, are passed when guesswork is substituted for reasoned findings, when the Commission can avoid finding "costs" by the convenience of calling them "risks," when rates of return are computed for those mythical producers who happen to meet the "average" specifications. </s> If the task of regulating producer sales within the framework of the Natural Gas Act is as difficult as the present cases illustrate, perhaps the problem should be returned to Congress. But certainly we do little today to advance the cause of responsible administrative action. With all respect, we promote administrative irresponsibility by making an agency's fiat an adequate substitute for supported findings. </s> IV. </s> New Mexico and Texas, in which the Permian Basin is located, have comprehensive oil and gas conservation codes. 5 A substantial portion of their taxes on the production [390 U.S. 747, 842] of natural gas within their boundaries goes into school funds. They say that the "public interest" entrusted to the Commission by 15 U.S.C. 717 (a) includes the interest of the States where the gas is found. They claim that pricing can be disastrous to the producing States and urge the need for threefold findings by the Commission to ensure an adequate supply of natural gas for future use: </s> "First, the Commission must determine the quantity of gas needed to constitute an adequate future supply. Secondly, it must make a conclusion as to the level of exploration and development which will produce the needed gas supply. Finally, it must prescribe a rate which will elicit that level of exploration and development." </s> They argue that where Commission rates are lower than existing contract rates, continued operation is uneconomical in many so-called "stripper fields": </s> "Although daily per well production from these fields is relatively low, their combined remaining recoverable reserves nevertheless constitute a considerable percentage of the total reserves for the area which will be forever lost if it becomes necessary to plug and abandon these fields for economic reasons." </s> The Court of Appeals did not entertain these objections (375 F.2d, at 18) because it read the Hope case as foreclosing them. </s> Hope, however, did not involve regulation of producers of natural gas, only interstate pipelines. At that [390 U.S. 747, 843] time, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 , giving the Commission authority over these producers, had not been decided. In Hope we assumed that the Act meant what it said in 1 (b) when it did not extend federal control to the "production or gathering of natural gas." We were not then reviewing a federal order fixing wellhead gas prices for producers. Wellhead gas was not even involved in the Hope case. We were concerned there with abuses and overreaching by pipeline companies. We said: </s> "If the Commission is to be compelled to let the stockholders of natural gas companies have a feast so that the producing states may receive crumbs from that table, the present Act must be redesigned. Such a project raises questions of policy which go beyond our province." 320 U.S., at 614 . </s> Now that Phillips has put the prices of producers under federal control, the interests of the producing States must be considered, appraised, and weighed as an important ingredient of the "public interest." Regulation of wellhead prices by the Commission directly influences the level and feasibility of production, and can significantly affect the producing States' regulation of production. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, supra, at 689-690 (dissenting opinion). 6 </s> As the Court today says in another context, price in functional terms can be "a tool to encourage" the production of gas. Ante, at 760. The effect of price on the regulatory responsibilities of the several States must therefore be weighed, unless contrary to the mandate of the Act regulation of production is to pass into federal hands. </s> What the merits may be on this issue we do not know. The matter is complicated. For example, it seems [390 U.S. 747, 844] that the revenues of the processing plants are derived primarily (about 80%) from the liquids which they extract from the casinghead gas, rather than from the sale of the residue gas. We do not know how to appraise the chances that this gas would be flared rather than processed if the price were too low. For example, it might be that the processing plants would continue to purchase and process casinghead gas as long as the revenues from the liquids extracted plus those from the residue gas processed exceeded the cost of gathering, processing, and marketing the gas. As long as there is a market for the residue gas remaining after extraction of the liquids, it might be that the processor would sell it at almost any price rather than flare it, in order to recover at least part of his costs. This assumes, of course, that the processor has already made the investment in equipment necessary to purify the residue gas to make it salable, and that the operating costs of this process are not prohibitive. Conceivably, the price of the residue gas could influence the processing plants in deciding whether to maintain or install the equipment and procedures necessary to make salable quality residue gas as the liquids are being extracted. We do not know how many processors do not now have that necessary equipment or the cost of operating and maintaining that equipment. </s> If the processor is willing to gather and process the gas because of the value of the liquids extracted, it might be that a producer would be willing to sell its casinghead gas rather than flare it, in order to obtain some payment for the gas. On the other hand, the price of the casinghead gas might well be critical for marginal producers, whose revenues from the sale of casinghead gas justify keeping their oil wells in production. But we have no [390 U.S. 747, 845] evidence concerning how many oil producers in the Permian Basin area could be termed "marginal." </s> It may be that the posture of Hope was the reason why this phase of the case was not developed. Whatever the reason, it must be developed if the interest of the producing States is not by judicial fiat to be subjected entirely to complete federal supremacy, contrary to the promise in the Natural Gas Act. </s> [Footnote 1 In its effort to determine costs of production, the Commission sent out questionnaires (Appendices A, B, and C), to 458 producers in the Permian Basin area, 361 of which were named respondents in these proceedings. Appendices B and C inquired as to production costs; Appendix A covered drilling costs. Appendix B was a comprehensive questionnaire designed for major producers, while Appendix C was a simplified form for small producers (those with under 10,000,000 Mcf in nationwide jurisdictional sales in 1960). Small producers, however, could answer either Appendix B or C. The Commission received complete responses on Appendix B from 67 producers, of which 25 were small producers. Responses to Appendix C were filed by 105 small producers. (Some of the responses represented composite data for more than one company.) The Commission excluded the Appendix C replies from consideration. 34 F. P. C. 159, 213-214. The Commission's staff used these responses to develop a composite cost of service study. The staff arranged the Appendix B replies on various charts, arraying the data from high to low in respect to various categories (e. g., total unit costs and allowances, [390 U.S. 747, 830] cash expense unit costs). Then, weighted cost averages were computed - i. e., the replies on Appendix B were given a weight proportional to the volume Mcf covered by the responses. In establishing the rate for new gas-well gas, the Commission elected to proceed by determining costs on a national, rather than an area, basis. 34 F. P. C., at 191. It used the Permian questionnaire responses, however, as "a vital source of information," ibid., employing them in determining various components of the final national average cost. See id., at 191-200. The Commission also turned to various "well-recognized and authoritative industry data sources [which] were utilized by various witnesses in the proceeding." Id., at 191. These included such sources as the United States Census Bureau's Census of Mineral Industries for 1958 (wherever this source was used, the figures were trended to 1960 on the basis of the Permian questionnaire data), the 1961 Chase Manhattan Bank's Annual Analysis of the Petroleum Industry, and the 1958 Joint Association Survey (a survey made by three industry trade groups based on questionnaires mailed to all member companies). Various adjustments were made because of factors such as atypical years or the Permian questionnaire data being disproportionate to the national figures. See 34 F. P. C., at 194-196. The Commission's rate for flowing gas was based primarily on the questionnaire data which had been compiled by the staff into a composite cost of service study. The Commission in this instance based the ceiling price on Permian Basin area costs, although it used nationwide data in determining exploration and development costs. See 34 F. P. C., at 212-218. And, although the term "flowing gas" was defined to include casinghead gas, residue gas derived therefrom, and old gas-well gas, the Commission used only the costs of the old gas-well gas in determining the area rate. Id., at 208-212. </s> [Footnote 2 Nor did the Commission discuss the distribution of the data within the grouping being considered - that is, matters of the concentration, symmetry, and uniformity of the data. The Commission asserts in this Court that "while producer costs vary widely from year to year on an individual-company basis, in the long run the costs of most producers tend to approximate the industry average." In support of this assertion, it cites record testimony and refers to the existence of fairly stable industry averages for drilling costs of successful wells as compared with erratic figures for individual companies. Apart from the fact that not all of the testimony cited stands for the proposition stated by the Commission, but indicates at most only that there is less instability in individual producers' costs over time rather than that they tend to average out, there was conflicting testimony on the point of representativeness offered by a witness for the Sun Oil Company, who showed that certain averages were not representative of the basic data because the distribution of the data was so widely spread and skewed from the mean. The fact that there were no comprehensive cost data suitable for supplying all the necessary elements of a cost study (see 34 F. P. C., at 191) does not excuse the Commission from finding whether the data it chose to use were typical and representative. In fact, the necessity of making such a finding is accentuated, because of the number of different sources entering into the computation of virtually all of the individual cost components. See 34 F. P. C., at 191-207, 212-218. The Commission stated that it would use national rather than area data in arriving at a cost for new gas-well gas, noting: "It may be that in some areas production costs may vary sufficiently from the national average to warrant a different treatment but on the record in this case we agree that cost of new gas-well gas should be determined on the basis of nationwide data." 34 F. P. C., at 191. Since the Commission was discussing the use of area versus national costs, that statement at most suggests only that the Permian [390 U.S. 747, 833] Basin composite costs did not vary sufficiently from the national average costs to warrant not using the latter, rather than that the Commission was comparing the national average with individual producer costs in the Permian Basin. Perhaps for a group as large and diversified as that involved in this case, typical and representative averages cannot be computed. Hunt Oil Company presses this point strongly, contending that wide variations in unit costs are an inherent characteristic of gas and that a uniform ceiling rate fixed at the average composite cost level is unlawful per se because of the wide disparity in costs among different categories of gas as well as among different producers. The Commission itself noted this fact of wide variation in individual costs as part of its justification for basing costs on overall producer experience (see 34 F. P. C., at 179); but, as pointed out, it failed to go forward and determine whether the averages used to construct this overall producer experience were typical and representative. If they were not, then perhaps the Commission could have subdivided the group until it arrived at groupings whose members possessed essentially similar characteristics. Cf. United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 469 . This would not mean that the Commission would in effect be returning to an individual producer regulatory method; rather, the Commission could stop the subdivision at that point where group averages became typical and representative. But, as this case now stands, the Commission has not made the necessary findings; and, of course, this Court, lacking the required expertise, cannot undertake to supply those findings for the Commission, nor is it our function to do so. See, e. g., United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274 . </s> [Footnote 3 Kitch, The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases and the Regulatory Determination of Price, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191, 201 (1967) (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 4 Counsel for the Commission observe in their brief to this Court that "[n]o more precise determination was possible in the state of the record" than the 0.7 to 1.5 range for the average adjustment for quality predicted by the Commission in its opinion denying rehearing. See 34 F. P. C., at 1073. Counsel also cite to certain record testimony and exhibits to support the Commission's determination of this 0.7 to 1.5 range. It should be noted first that the 0.7 to 1.5 prediction is an average. I have already discussed the misleading nature of averages not found to be typical and representative, and those observations are equally pertinent here. Moreover, we have no idea whether the Commission relied in making its prediction on any of the sources cited by Commission counsel to this Court. In computing the 0.7 to 1.5 range in its opinion denying rehearing, the Commission apparently relied on Commissioner O'Connor's statement in his concurring opinion to the initial decision that the average adjustment would be between 1.0 and 1.7, and then adjusted those figures to allow for certain changes made with respect to quality standards in the decision denying rehearing. But at the time of the Commission's initial decision, Commissioner O'Connor did not and could not know the costs incurred by the pipelines in bringing gas up to pipeline quality, for the pipelines' processing costs were not in the record. Commissioner O'Connor based his estimate in large part on contract exhibits, as is evident from his opinion; and he noted that a precise adjustment for quality could not be ascertained from those exhibits. See 34 F. P. C., at 266. His view of the evidence on this point was clearly stated in his opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing, in which he observed that the record "does not permit a meaningful determination of the impact." 34 F. P. C., at 1081. Commission counsel also note the Examiner's finding that 1 represented a reasonable estimate for bringing new gas-well gas up to pipeline quality and 1 to 1.5 for old gas-well gas. But, as counsel admit, this finding was not made in conjunction with defining pipeline quality standards on which the costs of conforming the quality of the gas would be based. In fact, the Examiner concluded [390 U.S. 747, 841] that: "This record does not permit the determination of a complete set of quality and value differentials." 34 F. P. C., at 370. The percentage calculations translating the 0.7 to 1.5 range into terms of rate of return, which are relied upon by the Court, were presented by Commission counsel to this Court and do not appear in the Commission's opinion or in the record. </s> [Footnote 5 See N. M. Stat. Ann., c. 65 (1953); Tex. Stat. Ann., Art. 6004-6066d (1962). In 1935, Texas, New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma, Illinois, and Colorado agreed upon an interstate compact for the conservation of oil and gas. Congress subsequently gave its consent [390 U.S. 747, 842] to the compact on August 27, 1935, for a period of two years. Pub. Res. No. 64, 49 Stat. 939. The compact has been extended by the compacting States, with the consent of Congress, for successive periods without interruption, the latest extension being from September 1, 1967, to September 1, 1969. Pub. L. No. 90-185, 81 Stat. 560. </s> [Footnote 6 See also H. R. Doc. No. 342, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1956). </s> [390 U.S. 747, 1]

United States Supreme Court AGENCY HOLDING CORP. v. MALLEY-DUFF & ASSOCS.(1987) No. 86-497 Argued: April 21, 1987Decided: June 22, 1987 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 86-531, Crown Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> In February 1978, petitioner Crown Life Insurance Co. terminated its relationship with its agent, respondent Malley-Duff & Associates (Malley-Duff), for failure to satisfy a production quota. Alleging, inter alia, that the real reason for the termination was petitioners' desire to acquire its lucrative territory, Malley-Duff brought suit in March 1981 under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The Federal District Court granted petitioners' summary judgment motion, dismissing the RICO claims on the ground that they were barred by Pennsylvania's 2-year fraud statute of limitations. In the absence of a RICO statute of limitations, the court concluded that the 2-year statute was the best state law analogy. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the State's "catchall" 6-year residual statute of limitations contained the appropriate limitations period for all RICO claims arising in the State. </s> Held: </s> 1. The 4-year statute of limitations applicable to Clayton Act civil enforcement actions, 15 U.S.C. 15b, applies in RICO civil enforcement actions. Because the predicate acts that may establish a civil RICO violation are far ranging and cannot be reduced to a single generic classification, and because important RICO concepts were unknown to common law, there is a need for a uniform limitations period for civil RICO in order to avoid intolerable uncertainty for parties and time-consuming litigation. The Clayton Act offers the closest analogy to civil RICO, in light of similarities in purpose and structure between the statutes, and the clear legislative intent to pattern RICO's civil enforcement provision on the Clayton Act's. Moreover, the Clayton Act provides a far closer analogy to RICO than any state statute. It is unlikely that Congress intended state "catchall" statutes of limitations to apply or that such statutes would fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by RICO, and, in those States that do not have catchalls, any selection of a state statute would be at odds with RICO's sui generis nature. RICO cases [483 U.S. 143, 144] commonly involve interstate transactions, and the possibility of a multiplicity of applicable state limitations periods presents the dangers of forum shopping and of complex, expensive, and unnecessary litigation. Application of a uniform federal period also avoids the possibility that application of unduly short state periods would thwart the legislative purpose of providing an effective remedy. Section 15b is preferable to the "catchall" federal 5-year statute of limitations that applies in RICO criminal prosecutions, since that statute does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing equities unique to RICO civil enforcement actions. Pp. 146-156. </s> 2. Because this litigation was filed less than four years after Malley-Duff's termination as Crown Life's agent, which is the earliest time Malley-Duff's RICO action could have accrued, the litigation is timely. Pp. 156-157. </s> 792 F.2d 341, affirmed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 157. </s> Robert L. Frantz argued the cause for petitioners in No. 86-531. With him on the briefs were Alexander Black and Daniel E. Wille. John H. Bingler, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 86-497. With him on the briefs was Michael R. Bucci, Jr. </s> Harry Woodruff Turner argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were David A. Borkovic and Stephen H. Kaufman.Fn </s> Fn [483 U.S. 143, 144] David P. Bruton and Eric A. Schaffer filed a brief for Congress Financial Corporation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp. et al. by Michael D. Fishbein and Michael P. Malakoff; and for HMK Corporation by James G. Harrison, Lawrence D. Diehl, Robert A. Blackwood, and G. Robert Blakey. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At issue in these consolidated cases is the appropriate statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964 (1982 ed. and Supp. III). [483 U.S. 143, 145] </s> I </s> Petitioner Crown Life Insurance Company (Crown Life) is a Canadian corporation engaged in the business of selling life, health, and casualty insurance policies. Respondent Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. (Malley-Duff), was an agent of Crown Life for a territory in the Pittsburgh area. Crown Life terminated Malley-Duff's agency on February 13, 1978, after Malley-Duff failed to satisfy a production quota. This case is the second of two actions brought by Malley-Duff following that termination. </s> In April 1978, Malley-Duff filed its first suit (Malley-Duff I) against the petitioners in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and a state law claim for tortious interference with contract. See 734 F.2d 133 (CA3 1984). Before the antitrust action was brought to trial, however, on March 20, 1981, Malley-Duff brought this action (Malley-Duff II) in the same court, alleging causes of action under RICO, 42 U.S.C. 1985, and state civil conspiracy law. Initially, Malley-Duff II was consolidated with Malley-Duff I, but the two cases were severed before trial. Only the RICO claim of Malley-Duff II is at issue before this Court. </s> The RICO claim arose out of two alleged incidents. First, Malley-Duff alleges that Crown Life, together with several Crown Life employees and petitioner Agency Holding Corporation formed an enterprise whose purpose was to acquire by false and fraudulent means and pretenses various Crown Life agencies that had lucrative territories. This enterprise allegedly acquired Malley-Duff's agency by imposing an impossibly high annual production quota on Malley-Duff nine months into fiscal year 1977 and then terminating the agency when Malley-Duff failed to meet this quota. Malley-Duff further alleges that the petitioners used a similar scheme to acquire Crown Life agencies in other cities. Second, Malley-Duff alleges that the petitioners obstructed justice during the course of discovery in Malley-Duff I. [483 U.S. 143, 146] </s> On July 29, 1982, the petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted this motion and entered judgment for the petitioners on all counts. The District Court dismissed Malley-Duff's RICO claims on the ground that they were barred by Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of limitations period for fraud, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5524(7) (1982), concluding that this was the best state law analogy for Malley-Duff's claims. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. In its view, under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), Pennsylvania's "catchall" 6-year residual statute of limitations, 5527, was the appropriate statute of limitations for all RICO claims arising in Pennsylvania. 792 F.2d 341 (1986). We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 983 (1986), to resolve the important question of the appropriate statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions brought under RICO. </s> II </s> As is sometimes the case with federal statutes, RICO does not provide an express statute of limitations for actions brought under its civil enforcement provision. Although it has been suggested that federal courts always should apply the state statute of limitations most analogous to each individual case whenever a federal statute is silent on the proper limitations period, see Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 280 (dissent); DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 174 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting), a clear majority of the Court rejected such a single path. Instead, the Court has stated: </s> "In such situations we do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at all; rather, our task is to `borrow' the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other source. We have generally concluded that Congress intended that the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law. `The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning [483 U.S. 143, 147] remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of familiar legal principles.'" DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 158-159, quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). </s> The characterization of a federal claim for purposes of selecting the appropriate statute of limitations is generally a question of federal law, Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 269-270, and in determining the appropriate statute of limitations, the initial inquiry is whether all claims arising out of the federal statute "should be characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal theories presented in each individual case." 471 U.S., at 268 . Once this characterization is made, the next inquiry is whether a federal or state statute of limitations should be used. We have held that the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652, requires application of state statutes of limitations unless "a timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in federal law should be applied." DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 159 , n. 13; see also id., at 174, n. 1 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). Given our longstanding practice of borrowing state law, and the congressional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume that Congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law. In some limited circumstances, however, our characterization of a federal claim has led the Court to conclude that "state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. In those instances, it may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law." DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 161. While the mere fact that state law fails to provide a perfect analogy to the federal cause of action is never itself sufficient to justify the use of a federal statute of limitations, in some circumstances the Court has found it [483 U.S. 143, 148] more appropriate to borrow limitation periods found in other federal, rather than state, statutes: </s> "[A]s the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless, when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law." DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 171-172. </s> See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (adopting federal statute of limitations for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforcement actions); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (federal limitations period applied to unseaworthiness action under general admiralty law); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, supra (refusing to apply state limitations period to action to enforce federally created equitable right). </s> Federal courts have not adopted a consistent approach to the problem of selecting the most appropriate statute of limitations for civil RICO claims. Indeed, an American Bar Association task force described the current state of the law regarding the applicable statute of limitations for civil RICO claims as "confused, inconsistent, and unpredictable." Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 391 (1985) (hereinafter ABA Report). Some courts have simply used the state limitations period most similar to the predicate offenses alleged in the particular RICO claim. See, e. g., Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (CA6 1986); Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837 (Minn. 1984). Others, such as the Court of Appeals in this case, have chosen a uniform statute of limitations applicable to all [483 U.S. 143, 149] civil RICO actions brought within a given State. See, e. g., Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 805 F.2d 741 (CA7 1986); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (CA9 1984); Teltronics Services, Inc. v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 724 (EDNY 1984). The courts, however, have uniformly looked to state statutes of limitations rather than a federal uniform statute of limitations. See ABA Report 387. </s> We agree with the Court of Appeals that, for reasons similar to those expressed in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S., at 272 -275, a uniform statute of limitations should be selected in RICO cases. As Judge Sloviter aptly observed: </s> "RICO is similar to [42 U.S.C.] 1983 in that both `encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics.' [Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 273.] Many civil RICO actions have alleged wire and mail fraud as predicate acts, but 18 U.S.C. 1961 defines `racketeering activity' to include nine state law felonies and violations of over 25 federal statutes, including those prohibiting bribery, counterfeiting, embezzlement of pension funds, gambling offenses, obstruction of justice, interstate transportation of stolen property, and labor crimes." A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp., 792 F.2d 330, 337 (CA3 1986) (concurring in judgment). </s> Although the large majority of civil RICO complaints use mail fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud as the required predicate offenses, a not insignificant number of complaints allege criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals such as arson, bribery, theft and political corruption. ABA Report 56-57. As the Court of Appeals noted, "[e]ven RICO claims based on `garden variety' business disputes might be analogized to breach of contract, fraud, conversion, tortious interference with business relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, usury, disparagement, etc., with a multiplicity of applicable limitations periods." 792 F.2d, at 348. Moreover, RICO is designed to remedy injury caused by a pattern of racketeering, [483 U.S. 143, 150] and "[c]oncepts such as RICO `enterprise' and `pattern of racketeering activity' were simply unknown to common law." Ibid. </s> Under these circumstances, therefore, as with 1983, a uniform statute of limitations is required to avoid intolerable "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S., at 272 . This uncertainty has real-world consequences to both plaintiffs and defendants in RICO actions. "Plaintiffs may be denied their just remedy if they delay in filing their claims, having wrongly postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute. Defendants cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with confidence when their delicts lie in repose." Id., at 275, n. 34. It is not surprising, therefore, that the petitioners no less than the respondent support the adoption of a uniform statute of limitations. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 86-497, p. 17; Brief for Petitioners in No. 86-531, p. 12. </s> Unlike 1983, however, we believe that it is a federal statute that offers the closest analogy to civil RICO. The Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 15, offers a far closer analogy to RICO than any state law alternative. Even a cursory comparison of the two statutes reveals that the civil action provision of RICO was patterned after the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act provides: </s> "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. 15(a). </s> RICO's civil enforcement provision provides: </s> "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and [483 U.S. 143, 151] the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). </s> Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both statutes bring to bear the pressure of "private attorneys general" on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. Moreover, both statutes aim to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show injury "in his business or property by reason of" a violation. </s> The close similarity of the two provisions is no accident. The "clearest current" in the legislative history of RICO "is the reliance on the Clayton Act model." Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985). As early as 1967, Senator Hruska had proposed bills that would use "the novel approach of adapting antitrust concepts to thwart organized crime." ABA Report 78. As Senator Hruska explained: </s> "The antitrust laws now provide a well established vehicle for attacking anticompetitive activity of all kinds. They contain broad discovery provisions as well as civil and criminal sanctions. These extraordinarily broad and flexible remedies ought to be used more extensively against the `legitimate' business activities of organized crime." 113 Cong. Rec. 17999 (1967). </s> The American Bar Association's Antitrust Section agreed that "[t]he time tested machinery of the antitrust laws contains several useful and workable features which are appropriate for use against organized crime," including the use of treble-damages remedies. 115 Cong. Rec. 6995 (1969). </s> The use of an antitrust model for the development of remedies against organized crime was unquestionably at work when Congress later considered the bill that eventually became [483 U.S. 143, 152] RICO. That bill, introduced by Senators McClellan and Hruska in 1969, did not, in its initial form, include a private civil enforcement provision. Representative Steiger, however, proposed the addition of a private treble-damages action "similar to the private damage remedy found in the anti-trust laws." Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals, before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 520 (1970). During these same hearings, the American Bar Association proposed an amendment "to include the additional civil remedy of authorizing private damage suits based upon the concept of Section 4 of the Clayton Act" that would adopt a treble-damages civil remedy. Id., at 543-544. The Committee approved the amendment, and the full House approved a bill that included the civil enforcement remedy. During the House debates, the bill's sponsor described the civil enforcement remedy as "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality," 116 Cong. Rec. 35295 (1970), and Representative Steiger stated that he viewed the RICO civil enforcement remedy as a "parallel private . . . remed[y]" to the Clayton Act. Id., at 27739 (letter to House Judiciary Committee). </s> Together with the similarities in purpose and structure between RICO and the Clayton Act, the clear legislative intent to pattern RICO's civil enforcement provision on the Clayton Act strongly counsels in favor of application of the 4-year statute of limitations used for Clayton Act claims. 15 U.S.C. 15b. This is especially true given the lack of any satisfactory state law analogue to RICO. While "[t]he atrocities" that led Congress to enact 42 U.S.C. 1983 "plainly sounded in tort," Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S., at 277 , there is no comparable single state law analogue to RICO. As noted above, the predicate acts that may establish racketeering activity under RICO are far ranging, and unlike 1983, cannot be reduced to a single generic characterization. The Court of Appeals, therefore, selected Pennsylvania's "catchall" [483 U.S. 143, 153] statute of limitations. In Wilson v. Garcia, supra, at 278, we rejected the use of a "catchall" statute of limitations because we concluded that it was unlikely that Congress would have intended such a statute of limitations to apply. Furthermore, not all States have a "catchall" statute of limitations, see ABA Report 391, and the absence of such a statute in some States "distinguishes the RICO choice from the 1983 choice made in Wilson v. Garcia." A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp., 792 F.2d, at 339 (Sloviter, J., concurring in judgment). While we concluded in Wilson v. Garcia that characterization of all 1983 actions as personal injury claims minimized the risk that the choice of a state limitations period "would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by 1983," 471 U.S., at 279 , "a similar statement could not be made with confidence about RICO and state statutory `catch alls.'" A. J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Congress Financial Corp., 792 F.2d, at 339. Any selection of a state statute of limitations in those States without a catchall statute would be wholly at odds with the Court of Appeals' recognition of the sui generis nature of RICO. Ibid. </s> The federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation strongly suggest that the limitations period of the Clayton Act is a significantly more appropriate statute of limitations than any state limitations period. JUSTICE SCALIA recognizes that under his preferred approach to the question before us a federal statute "may be sufficient to pre-empt a state statute that discriminates against federal rights or is too short to permit the federal right to be vindicated." Post, at 162. In our view the practicalities of RICO litigation present equally compelling reasons for federal pre-emption of otherwise available state statutes of limitations even under JUSTICE SCALIA'S approach. As this case itself illustrates, RICO cases commonly involve interstate transactions, and conceivably the statute of limitations of several States could govern any given RICO claim. Indeed, some nexus to interstate [483 U.S. 143, 154] or foreign commerce is required as a jurisdictional element of a civil RICO claim, 18 U.S.C. 1962(b) and (c), and the heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering. Thus, predicate acts will often occur in several States. This is in marked contrast to the typical 1983 suit, in which there need not be any nexus to interstate commerce, and which most commonly involves a dispute wholly within one State. The multistate nature of RICO indicates the desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility of multiple state limitations, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shopping and, at the very least, would "virtually guarante[e] . . . complex and expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward matter." ABA Report 392. Moreover, application of a uniform federal limitations period avoids the possibility of the application of unduly short state statutes of limitations that would thwart the legislative purpose of creating an effective remedy. Ibid.; see also DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 166 , 167-168 (concluding that the federal statute of limitations was appropriate because state limitation periods were too short). </s> The petitioners, however, suggest that the legislative history reveals that Congress specifically considered and rejected a uniform federal limitations period. The petitioners note that Representative Steiger offered a comprehensive amendment that, together with six other provisions, included a proposed 5-year statute of limitations. 116 Cong. Rec. 35346 (1970). Congress did not "reject" this proposal, however. Instead, Representative Steiger voluntarily withdrew the proposed amendment immediately after it was introduced so that it could be referred to the House Judiciary Committee for study. Id., at 35346-35347. The reason for the reference to the House Judiciary Committee had absolutely nothing to do with the proposed statute of limitations. Instead, the amendment had included yet another civil remedy, and Representative Poff observed that "prudence would dictate [483 U.S. 143, 155] that the Judiciary Committee very carefully explore the potential consequences that this new remedy might have." Id., at 35346. Under these circumstances, we are unable to find any congressional intent opposing a uniform federal statute of limitations. The petitioners also point to the fact that a predecessor bill to RICO introduced by Senator Hruska, S. 1623, included a 4-year statute of limitations. 115 Cong. Rec. 6996 (1969). Senator Hruska, however, dropped his support for this bill in order to introduce with Senator McClellan the bill that eventually became RICO. See ABA Report 87. The reason that this new bill did not include a statute of limitations is simple, and in no way even remotely suggests the rejection of a uniform federal statute of limitations: the new bill included no private treble-damages remedy, and thus obviously had no need for a limitations period. Id., at 88. Finally, the petitioners cite the inclusion of a statute of limitations provision in S. 16, the Civil Remedies for Victims of Racketeering Activity and Theft Act of 1972, which would have amended 1964 of RICO but was not enacted. 118 Cong. Rec. 29368 (1972). This proposed bill, however, was not focused on the addition of a statute of limitations. Instead, the purpose of the bill was to broaden even further the remedies available under RICO. In particular, it would have authorized the United States itself to sue for damages and to intervene in private damages actions, and it would have further permitted private actions for injunctive relief. Congress' failure to enact this proposal, therefore, cannot be read as a rejection of a uniform federal statute of limitations. </s> We recognize that there is also available the 5-year statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. 3282. This statute of limitations, however, is the general "catchall" federal criminal statute of limitations. RICO itself includes no express statute of limitations for either civil or criminal remedies, and the 5-year statute of limitations applies to criminal RICO prosecutions only because [483 U.S. 143, 156] Congress has provided such a criminal limitations period when no other period is specified. Thus, the 5-year statute of limitations for criminal RICO actions does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing equities unique to civil RICO actions or, indeed, any other federal civil remedy. In our view, therefore, the Clayton Act offers the better federal law analogy. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA accepts our conclusion that state statutes of limitations are inappropriate for civil RICO claims, but concludes that if state codes fail to furnish an appropriate limitations period, there is none to apply. Post, at 170. As this Court observed in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S., at 271 , however: </s> "A federal cause of action `brought at any distance of time' would be `utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.' Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805). Just determinations of fact cannot be made when, because of the passage of time, the memories of witnesses have faded or evidence is lost. In compelling circumstances, even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten." </s> In sum, we conclude that there is a need for a uniform statute of limitations for civil RICO, that the Clayton Act clearly provides a far closer analogy than any available state statute, and that the federal policies that lie behind RICO and the practicalities of RICO litigation make the selection of the 4-year statute of limitations for Clayton Act actions, 15 U.S.C. 15b, the most appropriate limitations period for RICO actions. </s> This litigation was filed on March 20, 1981, less than four years after the earliest time Malley-Duff's RICO action could have accrued - i. e., the date of Malley-Duff's termination on February 13, 1978. Accordingly the litigation was timely brought. Because it is clear that Malley-Duff's RICO claims accrued within four years of the time the complaint was filed, [483 U.S. 143, 157] we have no occasion to decide the appropriate time of accrual for a RICO claim. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment. </s> The Court today continues on the course adopted in DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), and concludes that although Congress has enacted no federal limitations period for civil actions for damages brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964 (1982 ed. and Supp. III), it will supply one by "borrowing" the 4-year statute of limitations applicable to suits under the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. 15b. While at first glance it may seem a small step from the familiar practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations to today's decision to borrow a federal one, in my view it turns out to be a giant leap into the realm of legislative judgments. I therefore cannot join the Court's opinion. </s> I </s> The issue presented by this case cannot arise with respect to federal criminal statutes, as every federal offense is governed by an express limitations period. If no statute specifically defines a limitations period (or prescribes the absence of a limitations period, see 18 U.S.C. 3281) for a particular offense, a "catchall" statute operates to forbid prosecution, trial, or punishment "unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed." 3282. Congress has not provided that kind of a default limitations period, however, for federal civil suits; and since it has long been enacting civil statutes without express limitations periods, courts have long been wrestling with the problem of determining what, if any, limitations periods to apply. Prior to DelCostello, the virtually uniform practice was to look to applicable state statutes of limitations. Indeed, we departed [483 U.S. 143, 158] from that practice only when the applicable state limitations period would have frustrated the policy of the federal statute, concluding that in such a case no limitations period governs the suit. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 , 366-372 (1977). Until DelCostello, we never responded to legislative silence by applying a limitations period drawn from a different federal statute. </s> To understand why this new practice differs from - and is less legitimate than - the practice of borrowing state statutes, it is necessary to understand the two-phase history through which the earlier practice developed. It is in turn essential to that understanding to recognize that certain common conceptions about the borrowing of state limitations statutes are mistaken. As Part I-A explains in more detail, the very label used to describe that practice - "borrowing" - is misleading. In its original form, during what I term the "first phase" of the borrowing doctrine, our practice of applying state law in reality involved no borrowing at all; rather, we applied state limitations periods to federal causes of action because we believed that those state statutes applied of their own force, unless pre-empted by federal law. In the "second phase" of our development of the borrowing doctrine, we approached the issue rather differently. Whereas we had originally focused on the federal statute creating the cause of action only for purposes of our pre-emption inquiry - i. e., in order to ascertain whether the otherwise applicable state statute of limitations conflicted with the federal statute's terms or purposes - we later came to believe that the federal statute itself was the source of our obligation to apply state law. That is, instead of treating Congress' silence on the limitations question as a failure to pre-empt state law, we came to treat it as an affirmative directive to borrow state law. In my view, that deviation from the "first phase" approach was an analytical error. It has led in turn to the further error the Court commits (or compounds) today in deciding to treat congressional silence as a directive to borrow a [483 U.S. 143, 159] limitations period from a different federal statute. Today's error is by far the more serious of the two. As the history outlined above (and discussed in detail below) suggests, the borrowing of state statutes on the erroneous ground of congressional intent has a basis in, and to a reasonable degree approximates the results of, the approach that I think is correct as an original matter. The same cannot be said for the borrowing of federal statutes. </s> A </s> The analysis representing the "first phase" of the borrowing doctrine is exemplified by McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (1830), the first case presenting the question of what limitations period, if any, applies to a claim having its source in federal law when federal law does not specify the applicable time limit. Plaintiff-in-error McCluny had sought to purchase land under a federal statute providing for the sale of lands owned by the United States, but the register, a federal officer, had refused his tendered payment. McCluny then brought an action for trespass on the case in the Circuit Court for the District of Ohio, arguing that the register had wrongfully withheld the land, causing him $50,000 in damages. The register prevailed below on the ground that the Ohio statute of limitations governing actions for trespass on the case barred plaintiff's suit. McCluny argued that the Circuit Court had erred. The Ohio limitations statute, he contended, had no application in a suit brought in federal court against a federal officer for violation of a right conferred by an Act of Congress, not because Congress did not intend so (an issue raised by neither party to the dispute) but because the Ohio Legislature did not intend so. Id., at 270-274. We agreed with McCluny that the issue was whether the statute applied as a matter of Ohio law, see id., at 276 ("The decision in this cause depends upon the construction of the statute of Ohio"), but agreed with the register that under Ohio law, the statute applied. We reasoned that while it [483 U.S. 143, 160] was doubtless true that Ohio had not contemplated that its statute would govern such actions, by framing it to apply to all actions for trespass on the case the legislature had designed the statute to cover numerous torts not specifically within its contemplation. Id., at 277-278. At no point did we even question Ohio's power to enact statutes of limitations applicable to federal rights, so long as Congress had not provided otherwise. Rather, we simply noted that it was "well settled" that such statutes are "the law of the forum, and operat[e] upon all who submit themselves to its jurisdiction." Id., at 276-277. In the course of our opinion, we also mentioned the Rules of Decision Act, which provides: </s> "[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." 34, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. 1652. </s> But we discussed that statute not as the source of Ohio's power, but as confirmation of it where "no special provision had been made by congress," 3 Pet., at 277. </s> McCluny is an odd case to modern ears, because although a federal statute was clearly the source of McCluny's claim of right, it did not expressly create his cause of action. Yet neither the parties nor the Court raised the question we would certainly ask today: whether the federal statute gave him an "implied right" to sue. Instead McCluny simply brought an action seeking a common-law writ of trespass on the case. That feature of the case leaves open the argument that our acceptance of Ohio's power to pass limitations periods applicable to federal rights was based on the fact that the cause of action itself came from the common law rather than a federal statute. </s> That argument, however, was rejected in Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895), where we were faced with the [483 U.S. 143, 161] question whether to apply to a suit for patent infringement a Massachusetts statute of limitations requiring actions for tort to be brought within six years. In patent infringement suits, both the right and the cause of action were created by congressional legislation, and the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, it was argued that "the States, having no power to create the right or enforce the remedy, have no power to limit such remedy or to legislate in any manner with respect to the subject matter." Id., at 615. We replied that "this is rather to assert a distinction than to point out a difference," ibid., and that in the absence of congressional provision to the contrary, the States had the power to pass statutes of limitations that apply neutrally to federal rights, id., at 614-615, 618-620 (although they might not have the power to enact statutes that discriminated against federal rights or provided excessively short time periods for bringing suit, id., at 614-615). 1 </s> B </s> These early cases provide the foundation for a reasonably coherent theory about the application of state statutes of limitations to federal statutory causes of action. First, state statutes of limitations whose terms appear to cover federal statutory causes of action apply as a matter of state law to such claims, even though the state legislature that enacted the statutes did not have those claims in mind. McCluny, supra, at 277-278. Second, imposition of limitations periods on federal causes of action is within the States' powers, if not pre-empted by Congress. Campbell v. Haverhill, supra, at [483 U.S. 143, 162] 614-615, 618-620; McCluny, 3 Pet., at 276-277. Third, the obligation to apply state statutes of limitations does not spring from Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute; rather, that intent is relevant only to the question whether the state limitations period had been pre-empted by Congress' failure to provide one. Campbell v. Haverhill, supra, at 616. Fourth, congressional silence on the limitations issue is ordinarily insufficient to pre-empt state statutes; "special provision" by Congress is required to do that. Ibid.; McCluny, supra, at 277. Fifth, the federal statute - its substantive provisions rather than its mere silence - may be sufficient to pre-empt a state statute that discriminates against federal rights or is too short to permit the federal right to be vindicated. Campbell v. Haverhill, supra, at 614-615. </s> As to the role of the Rules of Decision Act: Although Campbell v. Haverhill in particular is not clear on the question, the Rules of Decision Act plays no role in deriving the first two principles stated above. It directs federal courts to follow state laws only "in cases where they apply," which federal courts would be required to do even in the absence of the Act. That is clear not only from the borrowing cases, but also from other early opinions of this Court displaying the clear understanding that the Act did not make state laws applicable to any new classes of cases. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 464 (1831) (the Rules of Decision Act "has been uniformly held to be no more than a declaration of what the law would have been without it: to wit, that the lex loci must be the governing rule of private right, under whatever jurisdiction private right comes to be examined"); Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 2 Pet. 492, 525-526 (1829) ("The laws of the states . . . would be . . . regarded [as rules of decision in the courts of the United States] independent of that special enactment"); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1026, 1035 (1953); see also Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 162 (1827) (holding that the Supreme Court would follow rules of property law settled [483 U.S. 143, 163] by state-court decisions without mentioning the Rules of Decision Act); Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 367 (1826) (holding that the Court was required to follow state statutes and their construction by state courts because of its duty to administer the laws of the respective States, without mentioning the Rules of Decision Act). In fact, because the Act required application of future state laws as well as those in effect at the time of its passage, it would have been considered open to serious constitutional challenge as an improper delegation of congressional legislative power to the States had it been anything other than declaratory on that point. See Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 47-48 (1825). </s> Thus, the Act changes the analysis of the question whether a federal court should look to state law only insofar as it provides the basis for the fourth principle. Its directive to federal courts to apply state law unless federal law otherwise "requires or provides" creates a presumption against implicit pre-emption which must be rebutted by affirmative congressional action, except for the implicit preclusion of state statutes that discriminate against federal claims or provide too short a limitations period to permit vindication of the federal right. </s> II </s> So understood, the borrowing doctrine involves no borrowing at all. Instead, it only requires us to engage in two everyday interpretive exercises: the determination of which state statute of limitations applies to a federal claim as a matter of state law, and the determination of whether the federal statute creating the cause of action pre-empts that state limitations period. We need not embark on a quest for an "appropriate" statute of limitations except to the limited extent that making those determinations may entail judgments as to which statute the State would believe "appropriate" and as to whether federal policy nevertheless makes that statute "inappropriate." Finally, if we determine that the state limitations period that would apply under state law is pre-empted [483 U.S. 143, 164] because it is inconsistent with the federal statute, that is the end of the matter, and there is no limitation on the federal cause of action. </s> In my view, that is the best approach to the question before us, and if a different historical practice had not intervened I would adhere to it. See also DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S., at 172 -174 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). For many years, however, we have used a different analysis. In the second phase of development of the borrowing doctrine, perhaps forgetting its origins, the Court adopted the view that we borrow the "appropriate" state statute of limitations when Congress fails to provide one because that is Congress' directive, implied by its silence on the subject. See Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). 2 As an original matter, that is not a very plausible interpretation of congressional silence. If one did not believe that state limitations periods applied of their own force, the most natural intention to impute to a Congress that enacted no limitations period would be that it wished none. However, after a century and a half of the Court's reacting to congressional silence by applying state statutes - first for the right [483 U.S. 143, 165] reason, then for the wrong one - by now at least it is reasonable to say that such a result is what Congress must expect, and hence intend, by its silence. The approach therefore has some legitimacy, and in any event generally produces the same results as the one I believe to be correct. 3 </s> III </s> As JUSTICE O'CONNOR pointed out in her dissent in DelCostello, however, if we are serious about this "congressional intent" justification for the borrowing doctrine, we should at least require some evidence of actual alternation of that intent before departing from it. See 462 U.S., at 174 -175 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). For if the basis of the rule is, in some form, that Congress knows that we will borrow state statutes of limitations unless it directs otherwise, it also knows that it [483 U.S. 143, 166] has to direct otherwise if it wants us to do something else. In addition, as under our former approach, should we discover that there is no appropriate state statute to borrow, because all the available ones run afoul of federal policy, we ought to conclude that there is no limitations period. </s> In the case before us, however, the Court does not require any showing of actual congressional intent at all before departing from our practice of borrowing state statutes, prowling hungrily through the Statutes at Large for an appetizing federal limitations period, and pouncing on the Clayton Act. Of course, a showing of actual congressional intent that we depart from tradition and borrow a federal statute is quite impossible. Under ordinary principles of construction, the very identity between the language and structure of the Clayton Act's and RICO's private civil-remedy provisions relied on by the Court as arguments for borrowing 15 U.S.C. 15b, would, when coupled with Congress' enactment of a limitations period for the former and failure to enact one for the latter, demonstrate - if any intent to depart from the state borrowing rule - a desire for no limitations period at all. The same is suggested by the legislative history discussed by the Court, showing that Congress has passed up several opportunities to impose a federal limitations period on civil RICO claims, ante, at 154-155. The Court avoids the troublesome requirement of finding a congressional intent to depart from state borrowing by the simple expedient of reformulating the rule, transforming it from a presumption that congressional silence means that we should apply the appropriate state limitations period into a presumption that congressional silence means we should apply the appropriate limitations period, state or federal. I cannot go along with this, for two reasons. </s> First, I can find no legitimate source for the new rule. Whereas our prior practice provides some basis for arguing that when Congress creates a civil cause of action without a limitations period, it expects and intends application of an [483 U.S. 143, 167] appropriate state statute, there is no basis whatsoever for arguing that its silence signifies that the most appropriate statute, state or federal, should be borrowed. To the contrary, all available evidence indicates that when Congress intends a federal limitations period for a civil cause of action, it enacts one - for example, 15 U.S.C. 15b itself. The possibility of borrowing a federal statute of limitations did not occur to any of the parties in this litigation until it was suggested by a concurring judge in the Court of Appeals, see 792 F.2d 341, 356 (CA3 1986), and all of the Federal Courts of Appeals that have passed on the issue of the appropriate RICO limitations period have applied state statutes. See 792 F.2d 341 (1986) (case below); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (CA2 1987); La Porte Construction Co. v. Bayshore National Bank, 805 F.2d 1254 (CA5 1986); Silverberg v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 787 F.2d 1079 (CA6 1986); Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 805 F.2d 741 (CA7 1986); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576 (CA8 1984); Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (CA9 1984); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011 (CA11 1986). It is extremely unlikely that Congress expected anything different. Moreover, had our prior rule been that a federal statute should be borrowed if appropriate, the considerations the Court advances as to why that is the right course here - that it will promote uniformity and avoid litigation, and that there are differences between the federal action and the actions covered by state statutes - would have been sufficient to warrant selection of a federal limitations period for almost any federal statute, a conclusion plainly inconsistent with the results of our cases. 4 </s> [483 U.S. 143, 168] </s> Second, as the case before us demonstrates, the new rule involves us in a very different kind of enterprise from that required when we borrow state law. In general, the type of decision we face in the latter context is how to choose among various statutes of limitations, each of which was intended by the state legislature to apply to a whole category of causes of action. Federal statutes of limitations, on the other hand, are almost invariably tied to specific causes of action. The first consequence of this distinction is that in practice the inquiry as to which state statute to select will be very close to the traditional kind of classification question courts deal with all the time. Thus, for example, if a federal statute creates a cause of action that has elements of tort and contract, we may frame the question of which statute to apply as whether it is more "appropriate" to apply the State's tort or contract limitations period. In reality, however, rather than examine whether the policies of the federal statute are better served by one limitations period than the other, we will generally answer [483 U.S. 143, 169] that question by determining whether the federal cause of action should be classified as sounding in tort or contract. See, e. g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987) (42 U.S.C. 1981 actions sound in tort); id., at 670 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ( 1981 actions sound in contract). In deciding whether to borrow a federal statute that clearly does not apply by its terms, however, we genuinely will have to determine whether, for example, the Clayton Act's limitations period will better serve the policies underlying civil actions under RICO than the limitations period covering criminal actions under RICO, or whether either will do the job better than state limitations upon actions for economic injury. That seems to me to be quintessentially the kind of judgment to be made by a legislature. See generally Wilcox v. Fitch, 20 Johns. *472, *475 (N. Y. 1823) (limitations are creatures of statute, and did not exist at common law); Wall v. Robson, 2 Nott & McCord 498, 499 (S. C. 1820) (same); 2 E. Coke, Institutes 95 (6th ed. 1680). </s> The second consequence of the generality of state statutes of limitations versus the particularity of federal ones is that in applying a state statute, we do not really have to make a new legislative judgment. The state legislature will already have made the judgment that, for example, in contract actions, a certain balance should be struck between "protecting valid claims . . . [and] prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). That judgment will have been made in the knowledge that it will apply to a broad range of contractual matters, some of which the legislature has not specifically contemplated. That is not true of a federal statute enacted with reference to a particular cause of action, such as the one for the Clayton Act. The Court is clearly aware of this difficulty. It declines to apply 18 U.S.C. 3282, the general 5-year criminal statute of limitations, on the ground that it "does not reflect any congressional balancing of the competing equities unique to civil RICO actions." Ante, at 156. [483 U.S. 143, 170] That objection should also, however, lead it to reject a 4-year limitations period, which clearly reflects only the balance of equities Congress deemed appropriate to the Clayton Act. </s> * * * </s> Thus, while I can accept the reasons the Court gives for refusing to apply state statutes of limitations to the civil RICO claim at issue here, ante, at 152-154, they lead me to a very different conclusion from that reached by the Court. I would hold that if state codes do not furnish an "appropriate" limitations period, there is none to apply. Such an approach would promote uniformity as effectively as the borrowing of a federal statute, and would do a better job of avoiding litigation over limitations issues than the Court's approach. That was the view we took in Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), as to Title VII civil enforcement actions, unmoved by the fear that that conclusion might prove "`"repugnant to the genius of our laws."'" Ante, at 156, quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985), in turn quoting Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch 336, 342 (1805). 5 See also 18 U.S.C. 3281 (no limitations period for federal capital offenses). Indeed, it might even prompt Congress to enact a limitations period that it believes "appropriate," a judgment far more within its competence than ours. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Although the opinion states that the Rules of Decision Act requires us to apply state statutes, 155 U.S., at 614 , and therefore appears to suggest that the Act rather than the state laws themselves was the source of our obligation to do so, a careful reading of the opinion belies that interpretation. Because the Act directs the federal courts to regard state laws as rules of decision only "in cases where they apply," the parties and the Court treated the questions of the applicability of the Act and the applicability of state law of its own force as interchangeable. </s> [Footnote 2 Thus, although we did not squarely reject our earlier approach until DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Court correctly argued in that case that our way of analyzing the issue had changed before then. Id., at 159-160, n. 13. Contrary to the DelCostello Court's claim, however, neither our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), nor the Rules of Decision Act scholarship underlying it in any way required that change. Neither remotely established that that statute applies only in diversity cases. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1033-1034 (1953); see also DelCostello v. Teamsters, supra, at 173, n. 1 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that "`the [Act] itself neither contains nor suggests . . . a distinction'" between diversity and federal-question cases, quoting Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616 (1895)); Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383, 408, n. 122 (1964) (characterizing the view that Erie requires application of state law only in diversity cases as an "oftencountered heresy"). </s> [Footnote 3 It need not always produce the same results, because the implicit directive attributed to Congress is not (as the old approach provided) that the courts apply the statute of limitations that the State deemed appropriate, but rather that the courts instead determine which state limitations period will best serve the policies of the federal statute. See, e. g., Automobile Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966); cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 -269 (1985). Imagine, for example, a federal statute with no limitations period creating a cause of action in favor of handicapped persons discriminated against in the making of contracts. If a State had two statutes of limitations, one covering tortious personal injury, and one covering tortious economic injury, under the old approach the question would have been whether the federal statutory cause of action was an action for personal or economic injury. Under the new approach the question, at least in theory, is whether application of the personal injury or economic injury statute best serves the policies of the federal Act. </s> Second, even before conducting pre-emption analysis, the old approach can lead to the conclusion that state law supplies no statute of limitations. For example, that would be true in the case of our hypothetical federal statute if a State had limitations periods only for assault and battery. The new approach, however, should never lead to that conclusion, because we have already made the determination that federal law directs us to borrow some limitations period, and the only question is which one. </s> In fact, however, our analysis under the new approach has not been ruthlessly faithful to its logic, so that it has turned out in practice to be almost indistinguishable from the old approach. See infra, at 168-169. </s> [Footnote 4 Even DelCostello does not fully support the Court's reformulation in the present opinion. It specifically noted that "our holding today should not be taken as a departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of action" and that it did "not mean to suggest that federal courts should eschew use of state limitations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect analogy." 462 U.S., at 171 . It also [483 U.S. 143, 168] involved borrowing a federal statute that was arguably applicable by its own terms. Id., at 170. In any event, to the extent our decision here rests on our interpretation of congressional intent, the Court's conclusion in that case that Congress intended 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(b), to be borrowed for suits claiming breach of the duty of fair representation tells us nothing as to what Congress intended in enacting RICO. </s> Because we claimed in DelCostello not to have abandoned our prior practice, that decision did not place Congress on notice that henceforth we would interpret its silence as a directive to borrow federal statutes of limitations. Any decision that the lower federal courts, whose regular task involves interpreting our opinions, did not understand to have worked a change in the law, see supra, at 167, is certainly not clear enough to form the basis for a presumption that Congress' expectations were transformed. In any event, even if that decision had announced a general change of approach, to which it could be expected that Congress would adapt, it would only be appropriate to make the assumption that it had done so with respect to statutes passed after the decision came down. RICO was passed in 1970, well before our opinion in DelCostello. Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 943, 18 U.S.C. 1963. </s> [Footnote 5 In Adams v. Woods, that argument was advanced not as a reason why the Court should apply a clearly inapplicable statute of limitations, but as a reason why it should interpret an arguably ambiguous one to apply to the claim at issue. 2 Cranch, at 341-342. </s> [483 U.S. 143, 171]

United States Supreme Court NLRB v. AMAX COAL CO.(1981) No. 80-692 Argued: April 28, 1981Decided: June 29, 1981 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 80-289, United Mine Workers of America, Local No. 1854, et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Amax Coal Co. owns several deep-shaft coal mines in the Midwest, with respect to which it is a member of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), a national multiemployer group that bargains with the union representing Amax's employees. Under a collective-bargaining contract with the union, Amax, along with other members of the BCOA, agreed to contribute to the union's national pension and welfare trust funds, which were established under 302 (c) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). In accord with 302 (c) (5) (B), the trust funds are administered by three trustees, one selected by the union, one by members of the BCOA, and one by the other two. When Amax opened a surface mine in Wyoming, with respect to which it did not join the BCOA, Amax and the union negotiated a separate collective-bargaining contract under which Amax contributed specified amounts of money to the national trust funds to benefit the employees at the surface mine. When this contract ended, the union struck the surface mine and others, in an attempt to compel the mine owners to establish a multiemployer bargaining unit and to agree to a new contract under which the members of the new employer unit would contribute to the national trust funds. When subsequent separate negotiations between the union and Amax came to an impasse and the strike continued at the surface mine, Amax filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) unfair labor practice charges against the union. Amax claimed that any management-appointed trustee of the 302 (c) (5) trust fund was a collective-bargaining "representative" of the employer within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act - which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain or coerce. . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances" - and that therefore, since the management trustee of the national trust funds had [453 U.S. 322, 323] already been selected by the BCOA, the union's insistence that it participate in the national trust funds with regard to the surface mine employees constituted illegal coercion under 8 (b) (1) (B). The NLRB held that the union had not violated 8 (b) (1) (B). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that management-appointed trustees of a 302 (c) (5) trust fund act as both fiduciaries of the employee beneficiaries and as agents of the appointing employers, and, insofar as is consistent with their fiduciary obligations, are expected to administer the trusts in such a way as to advance the employer's interests. The court accordingly concluded that the union had violated 8 (b) (1) (B) in exerting its economic power to induce Amax to participate in the national trust funds with respect to the surface mine employees. </s> Held: </s> Employer-selected trustees of a 302 (c) (5) trust fund are not "representatives" of the employer "for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances" within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B). Pp. 328-338. </s> (a) The duty of the management-appointed trustee of a 302 (c) (5) fund is inconsistent with that of an agent of the appointing party. Given the established rule of the law of trusts that a trustee has an unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary of a trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other parties, and the use in 302 (c) (5) of such terms as "held in trust" and "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and dependents," it must be inferred that Congress intended to incorporate the law of trusts, unless it has unequivocally expressed a contrary intent. Nothing in 302 (c) (5)'s language reveals any intent that a trustee should or may administer a trust fund in the interest of the party that appointed him, or that an employer may direct or supervise the decisions of the trustee he has appointed. And the LMRA's legislative history confirms that 302 (c) (5) was designed to reinforce, not to alter, a trustee's established duty. Pp. 328-332. </s> (b) Whatever may have been implicit in Congress' view of a trustee of a 302 (c) (5) fund became explicit when Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a 302 (c) (5) trustee must meet. And the ERISA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended to prevent such a trustee from being put in a position where he has dual loyalty. Pp 332-334. </s> (c) Section 8 (b) (1) (B) was primarily enacted to prevent unions from forcing employers to join multiemployer bargaining units, or to dictate the identity of those who would represent employers in collective-bargaining negotiations or settlement of employee grievances. A union's [453 U.S. 322, 324] power to strike or bargain to impasse to induce an employer to contribute to a multiemployer trust fund does not pose the danger Congress thereby sought to prevent. Moreover, union pressure to force an employer to contribute to an established trust fund does not amount to dictating to an employer who shall represent him in collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances, because the trustees of a 302 (c) (5) trust fund simply do not, as such, engage in these activities. Pp. 334-338. </s> 614 F.2d 872, reversed and remanded. </s> STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 339. </s> Harrison Combs argued the cause for petitioners in No. 80-289. With him on the briefs were J. Craig Kuhn, Melvin P. Stein, and James C. Kuhn III. </s> Harlon L. Dalton argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board in both cases. On the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Andrew J. Levander, Robert E. Allen, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and Richard B. Bader. </s> Daniel F. Gruender argued the cause for respondent Amax Coal Co., a Division of Amax, Inc., in both cases. With him on the brief was Raymond K. Denworth, Jr.Fn </s> Fn [453 U.S. 322, 324] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert J. Fenlon, Julia Penny Clark, J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and David R. Boyd, for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Charles P. O'Connor and Harry A. Rissetto for the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, Inc.; and by E. Calvin Golumbic for the Board of Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds. </s> JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This litigation concerns the relationship between two important provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA). 1 Section 8 (b) (1) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by 101 of the LMRA, 61 Stat. [453 U.S. 322, 325] 141, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union "to restrain or coerce . . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances . . . ." 2 Section 302 (c) (5) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 157, permits employers and unions to create employer-financed trust funds for the benefit of employees, so long as employees and employers are equally represented by the trustees of the funds. 3 The question at issue is whether the employer-selected trustees of a trust fund created under 302 (c) (5) are "representatives" of the employer "for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances" within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B). </s> I </s> The Amax Coal Co. owns several deep-shaft bituminous coal mines, most of them in the Midwestern United States. The United Mine Workers of America (the union) represents Amax's employees, and, with respect to the midwestern mines, Amax is a member of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), a national multiemployer group that bargains with the union. Through its collective-bargaining contract with the union, Amax, along with the other members of the BCOA, agreed to contribute to the union's national pension and welfare trust funds. These funds, established under 302 (c) (5) of the Act, provide comprehensive health and retirement benefits to coal miners and their families. In accord with 302 (c) (5) (B), the trust funds are administered by three trustees, one selected by the union, one by the members of BOCA, and one by the other two 4 . [453 U.S. 322, 326] </s> In 1972, Amax opened the Belle Ayr Mine in Wyoming, the company's first sub-bituminous surface mine. Although Amax did not join the BCOA with respect to that mine, Amax and the union negotiated a collective-bargaining contract for Belle Ayr which resembled the BCOA national contract, and under which Amax contributed specified amounts of money to the national trust funds to benefit the employees at Belle Ayr. In January 1975, when the collectively bargained contract covering the Belle Ayr Mine ended, the union struck Belle Ayr and other western mines, attempting to compel the mine owners to establish a multiemployer bargaining unit and to agree to a new collective contract proposed by the union, under which the members of the new employer unit would contribute to the national trust funds. Amax resisted, and the union, threatened with a complaint from the National Labor Relations Board Regional Counsel for illegally attempting to coerce the employer into a multiemployer bargaining unit, soon began separate negotiations with Amax. Those negotiations came to an impasse, and the union continued its strike at the Belle Ayr Mine. Amax then filed with the Board unfair labor practice charges against the union. </s> The matter of pension and welfare benefits had been a major barrier to agreement between Amax and the union, and formed an important part of Amax's charges before the Board. Amax had proposed its own benefit and pension trust plan, outside the purview of 302 (c) (5), but the union, claiming that such a plan would not be sufficiently portable to or reciprocal with the national trust funds, had rejected this proposal. Rather, the union had insisted that Amax, even as a separately bargaining employer, continue to contribute to the national trust funds for the Belle Ayr employees. [453 U.S. 322, 327] Amax, of course, as a member of BCOA, had participated in selecting the management-appointed trustee of the national trust funds, but it now wanted to appoint its own trustee for any trust fund covering the employees of the Belle Ayr Mine. Amax took the view that any management-appointed trustee of a 302 (c) (5) trust fund was a collective-bargaining "representative" of the employer within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B); therefore, since the management trustee of the national trust fund had already been selected by BCOA, Amax contended that the union's insistence that it participate in the national trust funds with regard to Belle Ayr employees constituted illegal coercion under 8 (b) (1) (B) of the Act. Amax also charged the union with refusing to bargain in good faith in violation of 8 (b) (3) of the Act. 5 </s> The National Labor Relations Board unanimously concluded that the union had acted legally in bargaining to impasse and striking to obtain Amax's participation in the national trust funds for the Belle Ayr employees. 6 The Board noted that the purpose of 8 (b) (1) (B) was to ensure that an employer can bargain through a freely chosen representative completely faithful to his interests under the principles of agency law, while the trustee of a joint trust fund, though he may appropriately consider the recommendations of the party who appoints him, is a fiduciary owing undivided loyalty to the interest of the beneficiaries in administering [453 U.S. 322, 328] the trust. 7 Accordingly, the Board concluded that the union had not violated 8 (b) (1) (B). </s> On cross-petitions by the parties, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, relying on its earlier decision in Associated Contractors of Essex County, Inc. v. Laborers International Union, 559 F.2d 222, 227-228, held that management-appointed trustees of a 302 (c) (5) trust fund act as both fiduciaries of the employee-beneficiaries and as agents of the appointing employers, and, insofar as is consistent with their fiduciary obligations, are expected to administer the trusts in such a way as to advance the employer's interests. 614 F.2d 872, 881-882. The court therefore concluded that the union had acted in violation of 8 (b) (1) (B) in exerting its economic power to induce Amax to participate in the national trust funds with respect to employees of the Belle Ayr Mine, and reversed the Board's ruling to the contrary. We granted certiorari to consider the important question of federal labor law these cases present. 449 U.S. 1110 . </s> II </s> Although 302 (a) of the Act 8 generally prohibits an employer from making payments to any representative of his employees, 302 (c) (5) allows an employer to contribute to an employee benefit trust fund that satisfies certain statutory requirements. To ensure that the funds in such a trust are not used as a union "war chest," Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 426 , the Act provides that the funds may be used only for specified benefits for employees and their dependents, and that the basis for these payments be laid out in a detailed written agreement between the union and the employer. 9 The fund must be subject to an annual audit, and [453 U.S. 322, 329] the results of the audit must be made available to all interested persons. 10 Furthermore, pension or annuity funds must be kept in a trust separate from other union welfare funds. 11 Finally, 302 (c) (5) (B) requires that "employees and employers [be] equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon . . . ." 12 </s> Congress directed that union welfare funds be established as written formal trusts, and that the assets of the funds be "held in trust," and be administered "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and dependents . . ." 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5). Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 -43. Under principles of equity, a trustee bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary of the trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other parties. Restatement (Second) of Trusts 170 (1) (1957); 2 A. Scott, Law of Trusts 170 (1967). To deter the trustee from all temptation and to prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary, the rule against [453 U.S. 322, 330] a trustee dividing his loyalties must be enforced with "uncompromising rigidity." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (Cardozo, C. J.). A fiduciary cannot contend "that although he had conflicting interests, he served his masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not weakened by the pull of his secondary one." Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269 . </s> Given this established rule against dual loyalties and Congress' use of terms long established in the courts of chancery, we must infer that Congress intended to impose on trustees traditional fiduciary duties unless Congress has unequivocally expressed an intent to the contrary. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 . However, although 302 (c) (5) (B) requires an equal balance between trustees appointed by the union and those appointed by the employer, nothing in the language of 302 (c) (5) reveals any congressional intent that a trustee should or may administer a trust fund in the interest of the party that appointed him, or that an employer may direct or supervise the decisions of a trustee he has appointed. 13 And the legislative history of the [453 U.S. 322, 331] LMRA confirms that 302 (c) (5) was designed to reinforce, not to alter, the long-established duties of a trustee. </s> As explained by Senator Ball, one of the two sponsors of the provision, the "sole purpose" of 302 (c) (5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds "are legitimate trust funds, used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers who contribute to them . . . ." 93 Cong. Rec. 4678 (1947). Senator Ball stated that "all we seek to do by [ 302 (c) (5)] is to make sure that the employees whose labor builds this fund and are really entitled to benefits under it shall receive the benefits; that it is a trust fund, and that, if necessary, they can go into court and obtain the benefits to which they are entitled." Id., at 4753; see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1947), 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 570 (1948) (Leg. Hist. LMRA). The debates on 302 (c) (5) further reveal Congress' intent to cast employee benefit plans in traditional trust form precisely because fiduciary standards long established in equity would best protect employee beneficiaries. For example, one opponent of the bill suggested that 305 (c) (5) was unnecessary because even without that provision, the "officials who administer [the fund] thereby become trustees, subject to all of the common law and State safeguards against misuse of funds by trustees." 93 Cong. Rec. 4751 (1947) (Sen. Morse). Senator Taft. the primary author of the entire Act, answered that many existing funds were not created expressly as trusts, and that 302 (c) (5)'s requirement that each fund be an express and enforceable trust would ensure that the future operations of all such funds would be subject to supervision by a court of chancery. 93 Cong. Rec. 4753 (1947). See also id., at 4678 (Sen. Ball); id., at 3564-3565 (Rep. Case, author of House bill on which 302 (c) (5) was patterned). In sum, the duty of the management-appointed trustee of an employee benefit fund under [453 U.S. 322, 332] 302 (c) (5) is directly antithetical to that of an agent of the appointing party. 14 </s> Whatever may have remained implicit in Congress' view of the employee benefit fund trustee under the Act became explicit when Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829. ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a 302 (c) (5) trustee must meet. See 29 U.S.C. 1002 (1) and (2); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, pp. 296, 307 (1974). Section 404 (a) (1) of ERISA requires a trustee to "discharge his duties . . . solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 1104 (a) (1). 15 Section [453 U.S. 322, 333] 406 (b) (2) declares that a trustee may not "act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. 1106 (b) (2). Section 405 (a) imposes on each trustee an affirmative duty to prevent every other trustee of the same fund from breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act solely on behalf of the beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. 1105 (a). </s> Moreover, the fiduciary requirements of ERISA specifically insulate the trust from the employer's interest. Except in circumstances involving excess contributions or termination of the trust, "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 403 (c) (1), 29 U.S.C. 1103 (c) (1). Finally, 406 (a) (1) (E) prohibits any transaction between the trust and a "party in interest," including an employer, and 407 carefully limits the amount and types of employer-owned property and securities that the trustees may obtain for the trust. 29 U.S.C. 1106 (a) (1) (E), 1107. 16 In sum, ERISA vests the "exclusive authority and discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan" in the trustees alone, and not the employer or the union. 29 U.S.C. 1103 (a). </s> The legislative history of ERISA confirms that Congress intended in particular to prevent trustees "from engaging in actions where there would be a conflict of interest with the [453 U.S. 322, 334] fund, such as representing any party dealing with the fund." S. Rep. No. 93-383, pp. 31, 32 (1973). In short, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA were designed to prevent a trustee "from being put into a position where he has dual loyalties, and, therefore, he cannot act exclusively for the benefit of a plan's participants and beneficiaries." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, supra, at 309. 17 </s> III </s> The language and legislative history of 302 (c) (5) and ERISA therefore demonstrate that an employee benefit fund trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome any loyalty to the interest of the party that appointed him. Thus, the statutes defining the duties of a management-appointed trustee make it virtually self-evident that welfare fund trustees are not "representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances" within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B). But close examination of the latter provision makes it even clearer that it does not limit the freedom of a union to try to induce an employer to select a particular 302 (c) (5) trustee. 18 </s> Congress enacted 8 (b) (1) (B) largely to prevent unions [453 U.S. 322, 335] from forcing employers to join multiemployer bargaining units, or to dictate the identity of those who would represent employers in collective-bargaining negotiations or the settlement of employee grievances. See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 422 -423, 429-431, 435-436; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 803 ; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 21, (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 427; 93 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1947) (Sen. Ellender). 19 The legislative history reveals the concern of some Senators that if unions could strike or bargain to impasse to compel employers to join industrywide bargaining units, the large unions might exercise monopoly power over wages or call strikes threatening large portions of the national economy. S. Rep. No. 105, pt. 1, supra, at 51, 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 457; 93 Cong. Rec. 4582-4588 (1947) (Sen. Taft). However, the power of a union to strike or bargain to impasse to induce an employer to contribute to a multiemployer trust fund does not pose the danger Congress sought to prevent. Congress treated the issues of multiemployer bargaining units and multiemployer trust funds quite distinctly. It is permissible under the law, and may be in the interest of the public, for an employer to bargain separately with a union, independently of any industrywide employer association, while the union exerts economic pressure to obtain protection for the employees through the medium of a multiemployer benefit fund. </s> Moreover, union pressure to force an employer to contribute to an established employee trust fund does not amount to dictating to an employer who shall represent him in collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances, because the trustees of a 302 (c) (5) trust fund simply do not, as [453 U.S. 322, 336] such, engage in these activities. The term "collective bargaining" in 8 (b) (1) (B) of the Act is defined by 8 (d): </s> "[T]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158 (d). </s> Under this definition, the collective-bargaining representatives of an employer and a union attempt to reach an agreement by negotiation, and, failing agreement, are free to settle their differences by resort to such economic weapons as strikes and lockouts, without any compulsion to reach agreement. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 219 ; NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 495 . </s> The atmosphere in which employee benefit trust fund fiduciaries must operate, as mandated by 302 (c) (5) and ERISA, is wholly inconsistent with this process of compromise and economic pressure. The management-appointed and union-appointed trustees do not bargain with each other to set the terms of the employer-employee contract; they can neither require employer contributions not required by the original collectively bargained contract, nor compromise the claims of the union or the employer with regard to the latter's contributions. Rather, the trustees operate under a detailed written agreement, 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5) (B), which is itself the product of bargaining between the representatives of the employees and those of the employer. 20 Indeed, [453 U.S. 322, 337] the trustees have an obligation to enforce the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement regarding employee fund contributions against the employer "for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries of the fund." United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 220 . Finally, disputes between benefit fund trustees over the administration of the trust cannot, as can disputes between parties in collective bargaining, lead to strikes, lockouts, or other exercises of economic power. Rather, whereas Congress has expressly rejected compulsory arbitration as a means of resolving collective-bargaining disputes, 302 (c) (5) explicitly provides for the compulsory resolution of any deadlocks among welfare fund trustees by a neutral umpire. Compare 29 U.S.C. 158 (d) with 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5); see. n. 12, supra. 21 </s> Like collective bargaining, the adjustment of grievances concerns the relationship between employer and employee. See 29 U.S.C. 159 (a). The trustees' concern, however, [453 U.S. 322, 338] is the relationship between the beneficiaries and the fund. The only "grievances" it may adjust are those concerning the eligibility of employees or their dependents for participation in the benefits of the fund. See Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 164 -171. And whereas Congress has adopted the principle of voluntary settlement, free of governmental compulsion, in the adjustment of employee grievances against the employer, 203 (d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 173 (d), a trustee deadlock over eligibility matters, like any other deadlock, must be submitted to the compulsory resolution procedure established by 302 (c) (5). </s> "Both the language and the legislative history of 8 (b) (1) (B) reflect a clearly focused congressional concern with the protection of employers in the selection of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities, namely collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S., at 803 . The duties of an employer-appointed trustee of an employee benefit trust fund, under 302 (c) (5) of the Act, under principles long ago developed in the courts of chancery, and under the specific provisions of ERISA, are totally alien to both of these activities. The Court of Appeals, therefore, was mistaken in believing that the conduct of the union in this case violated the provisions of 8 (b) (1) (B). 22 </s> [453 U.S. 322, 339] </s> For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq. </s> [Footnote 2 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (1) (B). </s> [Footnote 3 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5). </s> [Footnote 4 The trust agreement sets out the health and retirement benefits provided to employees and their dependents, defines the terms and the responsibilities of the trustees, describes the method of administration of the trust, and provides for periodic audits, reports, and notices. The [453 U.S. 322, 326] agreement also fixes the employers' contributions to the trust, requiring a specified number of cents per ton of coal produced, with the one exception that the trustees themselves retain the power to fix the rate for coal salvaged from slurry, sludge, or other refuse. </s> [Footnote 5 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (3). </s> [Footnote 6 On other claims by Amax, the Board found that the union had not bargained in bad faith in violation of 8 (b) (3), but that the union had acted illegally in attempting to coerce Amax to join the multiemployer bargaining unit for the western mines, in failing to notify the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of its dispute with Amax before striking, and by insisting to impasse on certain contract proposals that would have violated 8 (e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (e). The Court of Appeals affirmed all these rulings, and they are not before this Court. </s> [Footnote 7 The Board relied on its earlier resolution of this same issue in Sheet Metal Workers' International Assn, and Edward J. Carlough (Central Florida Sheetmetal Contractors Assn., Inc.), 234 N. L. R. B. 1238 (1978). </s> [Footnote 8 29 U.S.C. 186 (a). </s> [Footnote 9 Trust funds may pay only "for medical or hospital care, pensions on [453 U.S. 322, 329] retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance." 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5) (A). </s> [Footnote 10 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5) (B). </s> [Footnote 11 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5) (C). </s> [Footnote 12 If the trustees deadlock over a matter of trust administration, the statute further provides that the trustees may select a neutral arbiter, or "in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5) (B). </s> [Footnote 13 The use of the word "representatives" in 302 (c) (5) (B) in no way suggests that Congress did not intend to incorporate the equitable principles of fiduciary duty. The requirement that employer and employee be equally represented among the trustees of an employee benefit fund prevents any misuse of those funds by union officers who would otherwise have sole control of vast amounts of money contributed by the employer. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425 -426. The management-appointed trustee "represents" the employer only in the sense that he ensures that the union-appointed trustee does not abuse his trust with respect to the funds contributed by the employer. Nowhere in the debates over 302 (c) (5) did any Member of either House of Congress suggest that the employer "representative" as a trustee of a benefit fund created under this statute could or should advance the interest of the employer in administering the fund. In fact, some opponents of the provision objected that the requirement of equal management-union representation imposed onerous administrative duties on the employers. E. g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4749 (1947) (Sen. Murray). </s> [Footnote 14 The legislative history of 302 (c) (5) also bears directly on the actual question underlying the statutory issue in this litigation: whether Congress intended to prohibit union demands for employer participation in established multiemployer trust funds. One of the events that greatly influenced the legislative efforts culminating in the Act was the demand of John L. Lewis, then head of the United Mine Workers, that all mine owners contribute 10 cents per ton of coal produced into a central welfare fund established by the union itself. United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 304 -305; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 52 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 458. The debates and Reports reveal that despite considerable congressional opposition to Lewis' demands, ibid.; 93 Cong. Rec. 3423, 3516-3517, 3564-3565 (1947) (remarks of Reps. Hartley, Fisher, and Case); id., at 4678, 4746-4748 (Sens. Byrd and Taft), Congress specifically rejected proposals that would have rendered those demands illegal either by providing that union proposals concerning pension welfare benefits were not mandatory subjects of bargaining, or by prohibiting all such funds even indirectly established or managed by a union. See H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (11), 8 (a) (2) (C) (ii) (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 39-40, 51; H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 14-17 (1947), 2 Leg. Hist. LMRA, at 305-308. </s> [Footnote 15 A "participant" is "any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan . . ., or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." 29 U.S.C. 1002 (7). A "beneficiary" is "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. 1002 (8). </s> [Footnote 16 Although 408 (c) (3) of ERISA permits a trustee of an employee benefit fund to serve as an agent or representative of the union or employer, that provision in no way limits the duty of such a person to follow the law's fiduciary standards while he is performing his responsibilities as trustee. </s> [Footnote 17 In 1980, Congress amended ERISA to impose new responsibilities upon the trustees of multiemployer trust funds, passing the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1209, which reaffirmed that the trustees must act solely in the interest of the trust beneficiaries, see H. R. Rep. No. 96-869, pt. 1, p. 67 (1980). </s> [Footnote 18 Neither statutory provision refers to the other, and though the same congressional Committees considered the issues of employee benefit trust funds and multiemployer bargaining, the legislative history nowhere suggests that Congress intended that the restrictions on union activity created by 8 (b) (1) (B) were relevant to the selection of 302 (c) (5) trustees. Indeed, though faced with a United Mine Workers demand that owners contribute a fixed percentage of their coal receipts to a multiemployer trust fund created by the union, Congress rejected several proposals that would have denied the union the power to make such demands. See n. 14, supra. </s> [Footnote 19 Another concern of 8 (b) (1) (B), of no relevance here, was to prevent a union from striking to force an employer to fire a supervisor who, in the union's view, was too stern in his treatment of employees. 93 Cong. Rec. 3837-3838 (1947) (Sen. Taft). </s> [Footnote 20 The sole and minor exception under the agreement governing the national trust funds in this litigation is the authority of the trustees to fix [453 U.S. 322, 337] the number of cents per ton of salvage coal produced which a mine operator must contribute to the funds. See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 21 If the administration of 302 (c) (5) trust funds were "collective bargaining" within the meaning of federal labor law, as it would be under the Court of Appeals' view, the NLRB would have to review the discretionary actions of the trustees according to the statutory duty of good-faith bargaining. 29 U.S.C. 158 (a) (5), (b) (3), (d). The Board would thereby be thrust "into a new area of regulation which Congress [has] not committed to it," NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 499 . Moreover, under the Court of Appeals' view, a trustee would be subject to simultaneous regulation by the Board, the Secretary of Labor, and the courts, and might be torn between conflicting duties imposed by the National Labor Relations Act and ERISA. For example, ERISA requires a trustee to prevent any other trustee from breaching his fiduciary responsibilities to the trust beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. 1105 (a) (3), (b) (1) (A). On the other hand, 8 (b) (1) (B) bars a union representative from interfering with the employer's collective-bargaining agent's performance of his duties in accordance with the employer's instructions. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 436 . Therefore, if trust fund administration is collective bargaining, a trustee could be charged with an unfair labor practice by carrying out his duties under ERISA. </s> [Footnote 22 The view of the Court of Appeals that the union could not seek to compel the employer to join an established trust fund conflicts with recent legislation concerning multiemployer pension plans. In this litigation, Amax claimed complete power under 8 (b) (1) (B), unaffected by union economic pressure, to select the sole trustee, or all the trustees, of the trust fund benefiting the Belle Ayr Mine employees. Since, by definition, it is impossible for every employer participating in a multiemployer trust fund to exercise such power, the Court of Appeals' decision upholding Amax's claim would effectively preclude a union from resorting to economic pressure to cause an employer to participate in a multiemployer trust fund. Congress amended ERISA in 1980 to strengthen the funding requirements and enhance the financial stability of [453 U.S. 322, 339] multiemployer pension plans. In these amendments, Congress sought to foster "the maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans . . . [and] to provide reasonable protection for the interests of the participants and beneficiaries of financially distressed multiemployer pension plans." 3 (c) (2) and (c) (3) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1209-1210. Section 3 (a) (4) (A) of the 1980 Act states that "withdrawals of contributing employers from a multiemployer pension . . . adversely [affect] the plan, its participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management relations. . . ." 94 Stat. 1209. The Court of Appeals' decision therefore runs afoul of express congressional policy favoring multiemployer trusts. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> The key to this case, in my judgment, is the distinction between the process by which a person is appointed to office and the manner in which he performs that office after he has been appointed. Congress has provided that labor and management shall each appoint the same number of representatives to serve as trustees of jointly administered employee pension and welfare funds. 1 Giving each side of the bargaining [453 U.S. 322, 340] table exclusive control of the appointment of half of the trustees does not compromise in any way the fiduciary obligations of the trustees after they assume office. Conversely, the imposition of fiduciary responsibilities on the trustees after they have been appointed surely does not lend any support to the Court's quixotic notion that a union may interfere - by a strike if necessary - with management's selection of its representatives. </s> Three quite different theories might provide a basis for deciding this case in favor of the United Mine Workers (the union). First, the Court might conclude that the union was merely trying to induce Amax to agree to contribute to the national multiemployer trust funds and that it had no interest in the identity of the management trustees of those [453 U.S. 322, 341] funds. Second, the Court might conclude that because Amax, as a member of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, actually participated in the selection of the management trustees of the union's national trust funds, there is no basis for its claim that the union was interfering with that prerogative of management. Third, the Court might conclude that it is permissible for a union to restrain or to coerce an employer in the selection of its representatives for the purpose of administering joint employee pension and welfare funds. </s> If the Court relied on either of the first two rationales, or if its opinion could be read as resting on a blend of all three, this case would not be particularly significant. I believe, however, that the Court's opinion will be read as holding that it is not an unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to exercise an economic veto over an employer's selection of the management trustees of a jointly administered employee benefit fund. 2 In my opinion, that holding is foreclosed by rather plain statutory language and is flagrantly at odds with the intent of Congress. </s> I </s> The equal representation requirement of 302 (c) (5) is one of a number of restrictions employed by Congress to prevent the mismanagement or misuse of employee benefit funds by union officials. See, e. g., Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 426 ; Associated Contractors, Inc. v. Laborers International Union, 559 F.2d 222, 226 (CA3 1977). 3 Equal [453 U.S. 322, 342] representation was required, not to satisfy employer demands for a voice in benefit fund administration, 4 but to insure that money paid for the welfare of employees actually was used for that purpose. As Senator Taft explained: </s> "Certainly unless we impose some restrictions we shall find that the welfare fund will become merely a war chest for the particular union, and that the employees for whose benefit it is supposed to be established, for certain definite welfare purposes, will have no legal rights and will not receive the kind of benefits to which they are entitled after such deductions from their wages. </s> . . . . . </s> "This amendment is, in effect, a provision to prevent the abuse of the right to establish such funds by collective bargaining, pending further study of the whole problem. Otherwise I think we shall find that the welfare fund will become a racket. In many unions it is very easy for it to become a racket." 93 Cong. Rec. 4747 (1947). </s> The requirement of equal labor-management representation is a central factor in the congressional formula to prevent [453 U.S. 322, 343] such abuse. See, e. g., Associated Contractors, Inc., supra, at 227; Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191, 195 (ND Cal. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 69 (CA9 1975). </s> Although the Court repeatedly uses the word "trustee" to identify the persons who administer pension and welfare funds established in compliance with 302 (c) (5), Congress used the word "representative." See 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5). Congress' use of this term does not, of course, qualify the fiduciary responsibilities of those persons. 5 It is nevertheless important for two reasons. First, it is a remainder that one of the means selected by Congress for insuring neutrality in the administration of a trust fund was to give each side of the bargaining table an equal voice in the selection of trustees. Second, it is a recognition of the fact that the administration of a trust fund often gives rise to questions over which representatives of management and representatives of labor may have legitimate differences of opinion that are entirely consistent with their fiduciary duties. </s> The Court's extended discussion of the fiduciary responsibilities of employee benefit fund trustees has, in my judgment, little bearing on the question presented in this case. It is undisputed that such trustees are fiduciaries whose primary loyalty must be to the beneficiaries of the funds. The question with which we are confronted here is whether this fiduciary duty is necessarily wholly inconsistent with "representative" status. The Court answers this question in the affirmative by citing traditional principles of trust law and their federal statutory counterparts. This approach leads the Court into error because it ignores the purpose underlying [453 U.S. 322, 344] 302 (c) (5) and the carefully designed means chosen by Congress to achieve that purpose. </s> The trustees of employee benefit funds often exercise broad discretion on policy matters with respect to which management and labor representatives may reasonably have different views. Besides describing the trustees as "representatives," Congress expressly recognized in 302 (c) (5) that such differences would arise, for it provided a procedure to resolve such differences in the event of a deadlock between "the employer and employee groups." Nothing in the statute or the legislative history suggests that differences along labor-management lines are in any way inconsistent with the trustees' fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries. Indeed, it is precisely because management and the union can have legitimate differences with respect to matters of trust administration that the equal representation requirement serves as an effective safeguard. Although the Court seems to ignore this principle in its decision today, it has been recognized in the past by other federal courts 6 and by the commentators. 7 </s> [453 U.S. 322, 345] </s> The trust agreement at issue in this case allows ample room for such labor-management differences. For example, it authorizes the trustees to determine how much money each operator shall contribute to the fund on account of the production of salvaged coal. See App. 98k-98l. That kind of detail could be covered in the basic collective-bargaining agreement or left to the trustees for resolution in the light of changing circumstances. When the trustees resolve such an issue, one surely could not charge a management representative with a breach of trust merely for favoring a lower rate than the union representatives suggest. </s> The Court states that the trustees may never "compromise the claims of the union or the employer with regard to the [453 U.S. 322, 346] latter's contributions" to the fund. Ante, at 336. But what if one contributor to a multiemployer fund is unable to pay its bill currently? Do trustees have no power to enter into temporary arrangements or compromises? 8 In making decisions regarding the investment of the assets of the fund, legitimate differences among faithful trustees certainly may arise. Conceivably, management representatives may favor conservative investment policies that are best designed to guarantee the long-range solvency of the fund while labor representatives may favor investments with higher yields that will support a demand for more liberal benefits at the next bargaining session. No written trust agreement can entirely eliminate the need for discretionary decisions by trustees nor make it impermissible for the trustees to give consideration to the interests that they represent when confronting day-to-day administrative problems. </s> Some of the issues the trustees must resolve in processing applications for benefits are almost identical to those that arise in grievance proceedings. Rights to pension benefits and to seniority are measured, in part, by the employee's length of service. Either in the adjustment of a grievance over seniority or in the trustees' approval or disapproval of a claim for retirement benefits, it may be necessary to resolve a dispute over how to measure the period of employment. Bargaining units tend to develop an unwritten "law of the shop" to resolve such recurring minor disputes; it seems to me equally permissible for trustees to develop a similar common law of their own and for representatives of the two sides of the bargaining table to reflect different points of view as that law develops. The guarantee of impartiality in making [453 U.S. 322, 347] decisions of this kind is not a total divorce of every trustee from the interests that he represents; rather, neutrality is guaranteed by having an equal number of "representatives" of the two conflicting interests make the decisions, subject always to their basic obligation as fiduciaries. That this is the scheme of the statute is perfectly clear from its terms. 9 </s> It is equally clear that this scheme will be compromised if the employer's selection of his representatives is now to be a subject of collective bargaining. The danger to the legislative scheme is not mitigated by the fact that the employer need not agree with the union's demand that a particular person be named a management trustee. The employer may consider it less costly to give the union a veto over the selection of the management trustees than to grant a wage increase. 10 Any bargaining over the identity of a trustee inevitably [453 U.S. 322, 348] will destroy the precise balance that Congress intended by directing that each side shall select its own representatives. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN aptly stated while a member of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: </s> "[T]o permit the union in any degree to participate in the choice of employer representatives does violence to the statutory standard of equal representation." Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 72 (1965). 11 </s> In my opinion, the Court today "does violence to the statutory standard" because it misapprehends the safeguard established by Congress in 302 (c) (5), and instead applies to this case principles of trust law and statutory provisions that have little, if any, relevance to the precise question presented. </s> II </s> In addition to arguing that there is an inherent inconsistency between the duties of a "trustee" and the duties of a "representative" - and therefore that the trustees of an employee benefit fund cannot be representatives even though they are so named by Congress - the Court suggests that in any event these representatives are not selected "for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances" within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (1) (B). 12 The Court seems to read this provision as a narrow, precisely defined prohibition against interference with the selection of a relatively small number of representatives [453 U.S. 322, 349] whose primary function is to represent the employer in collective-bargaining negotiations or in the adjustment of grievances. Once again, the Court overlooks the distinction between interfering with the selection process and interfering with the performance of a supervisor's duties after he has been selected. I believe the Court's narrow construction was not intended by Congress, and that the statute prohibits union interference with management's selection of all personnel who have any, however minor, collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment responsibilities. When 8 (b) (1) (B) is read in light of its purpose and legislative history, it is plain that the prohibition applies to the selection of the employer's representatives in the administration of joint benefit funds. </s> The Court's narrow view of 8 (b) (1) (B) has its source in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790 - a case that did not involve any direct interference with the employer's selection of supervisors. In that case, we held that "a union's discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of 8 (b) (1) (B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer." Id., at 804-805. Thus, to make out a violation of the statute in such a case, it is not enough to show that the union disciplined a supervisor who had some collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment responsibilities; the discipline itself must relate directly to the supervisor's performance of those duties. See also American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 429 -430. This direct relationship is an appropriate element of a 8 (b) (1) (B) violation in a case involving union discipline of a supervisor because such discipline only indirectly affects the "selection" of management representatives, the primary focus of the statute. However, whenever the union conduct has a direct impact on the employer's selection of a representative, [453 U.S. 322, 350] it is not necessary that that conduct bear a direct relationship to the representative's collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment duties; it is sufficient that the union attempt to coerce or to restrain management in the selection of a representative who will have such duties, even if they will constitute only a small portion of his overall responsibilities. </s> The legislative history of 8 (b) (1) (B) supports a broad reading of the prohibition against union conduct aimed directly at the actual selection of employer representatives. Section 8 (b) (1) (B) was intended to protect the basic management prerogative of selecting foremen and more senior executives who exercise supervisory authority over employees and represent the company in its relationship with employees and their collective-bargaining agent. The sparse comments on the provision in the legislative history persuade me that Congress intended the description of "representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances" to refer to a category of employer representatives whose selection was exclusively a matter of management prerogative. </s> Thus, Senator Taft explained the provision by using the example of an unpopular foreman who may well have had no specific responsibility for either collective bargaining or adjusting grievances. He said: </s> "This unfair labor practice referred to is not perhaps of tremendous importance, but employees cannot say to their employer, `We do not like Mr. X, we will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us Mr. Y.' That has been done. It would prevent their saying to the employer, `You have to fire Foreman Jones. We do not like Foreman Jones, and therefore you have to fire him, or we will not go to work.'" 93 Cong. Rec. 3837 (1947). </s> A few days later, in a brief discussion of provisions in the bill intended to deal with "strikes invading the prerogatives [453 U.S. 322, 351] of management," Senator Ellender identified 8 (b) (1) as covering the coercion of an employer "either in the selection of his bargaining representative or in the selection of a personnel director or foreman, or other supervisory official." 93 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1947). His description of the provision surely supports a broad reading of the prohibition against strikes invading the prerogatives of management, rather than a narrowly restricted reference to a precisely defined category of representatives principally involved in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment. 13 </s> Therefore, to sustain its position in this case, it seems to me that the Court must establish that no part of the duties of an employee benefit fund trustee involve collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment activities. But even if one gives the narrowest literal reading to the term "collective bargaining," it is clear that employee benefit trust agreements generally, and the trust agreement involved in this case in particular, authorize the two groups of representatives to engage in collective-bargaining activity. The statute broadly defines collective bargaining to encompass any conference with respect to "the negotiation of an agreement, or any question [453 U.S. 322, 352] arising thereunder." 29 U.S.C. 158 (d). 14 Such negotiation is manifestly a part of a trustee's duties. 15 </s> In addition to the provision delegating to the trustees the power to fix the contribution rate for salvaged coal production, see supra, at 345, the agreement in this case provides that the trustee representing the union and the trustee representing the employers shall select the neutral trustee. 16 When the trustee representing the union and the trustee representing the employers select the neutral trustee, they surely are resolving a question arising under the agreement. It is therefore [453 U.S. 322, 353] perfectly clear that they are literally engaged in collective bargaining as that term is defined in the Act. Indeed, whenever they confer about various questions that arise in connection with the administration of the trust agreement, they inevitably are engaged in that activity as defined in the statute. The fact that differences between labor and management trustees in the administration of the fund are to be resolved through the neutral umpire procedure established in 302 (c) (5), rather than through strikes or lockouts, does not in any way change the character of the trustees' function. </s> In this case, there is no need to decide when, or indeed if ever, the refusal of one trustee to confer with another might constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith and therefore an unfair labor practice. It may well be true that the fiduciary obligations imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., or by other provisions of the LMRA, may make a different remedy appropriate for a violation of the trustee's statutory duties. In this case, however, we are merely confronted with the question whether the employer's right to designate its representative to the board of a jointly administered trust fund is a matter for negotiation with the union or is strictly a matter of management prerogative. The language of the statute, its structure, its purpose, and the history of administration of trust funds pursuant to the Act since it was passed, all support the conclusion that this is a matter of management prerogative over which the union has no right to strike. 17 In my opinion, [453 U.S. 322, 354] the Court of Appeals' judgment should be affirmed. I therefore respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 302 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, generally prohibits payments by employers to representatives of their employees. 29 U.S.C. 186 (a). Section 302 (c) (5) creates an exception to this general prohibition for payments to certain trust funds established for the sole benefit of employees. 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5). The statute contains detailed requirements that trust funds must satisfy to qualify for the exception: </s> "The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . . with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families [453 U.S. 322, 340] and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the District Court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5). </s> [Footnote 2 The Court states that "close examination of the latter provision [ 8 (b) (1) (B)] makes it even clearer that it does not limit the freedom of a union to try to induce an employer to select a particular 302 (c) (5) trustee." Ante, at 334. </s> [Footnote 3 In addition to containing numerous specific references to John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers central fund, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1947), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 458 (Leg. Hist. LMRA); 93 Cong. Rec. 3564-3569, A1910 (1947), id., at 4678, 4746-4748, 5015; the legislative history is replete with general expressions of concern about union [453 U.S. 322, 342] mismanagement and misuse of employee benefit funds. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA 458; 93 Cong. Rec. 3569 (1947); id., at 4678, 4746-4747, 4752-4753. The equal representation requirement was a direct response to these concerns. As Senator Ball explained: </s> "In other words, when the union has complete control of this fund, when there is no detailed provision in the agreement creating the fund respecting the benefits which are to go to employees, the union and its leadership will always come first in the administration of the fund, and the benefits to which the employees supposedly are entitled will come second." Id., at 4753. </s> See also S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1947), 1 Leg. Hist. LMRA 458; 93 Cong. Rec. 3564 (1947); id., at 4678, 4746. </s> [Footnote 4 Indeed, opponents of the bill that became 302 argued that many employers wanted absolutely nothing to do with the administration of employee benefit funds. See, e. g., id., at 4749, 4751-4752. </s> [Footnote 5 However, the fact that Congress used the term "representative" rather than "trustee" is significant in light of the Court's reliance on the principle that "[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms." Ante, at 329. </s> [Footnote 6 In Associated Contractors, Inc. v. Laborers International Union, 559 F.2d 222 (CA3 1977), the decision on which the Court of Appeals relied in this case, the court recognized that the inevitable conflict between the views of labor and the views of management with respect to the administration of employee benefit funds was an essential feature of the statutory protection designed by Congress: </s> "The starting point for analysis must be the candid recognition that the relationship between employer and employee trustees of an employee benefit trust fund is quasi-adversarial in nature. Naturally, the trustees of such a trust fund function as fiduciaries for the funds' beneficiaries but they also serve as representatives of the parties who appoint them. Insofar as it is consistent with their fiduciary obligations, employer trustees are expected to advance the interests of the employer while employee trustees are expected to further the concerns of the union in the ongoing collective bargaining process between them. . . . The trustees' efforts to improve the position of the parties they represent are completely legitimate - indeed, they are essential to the operation of section 302 (c) (5). [453 U.S. 322, 345] Congress envisioned the conflict of views of employer and employee as a distilling process which would provide safeguards against trust fund corruption." Id., at 227-228 (citations omitted). </s> See also Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303, 308 (CA10 1978); Lamb v. Carey, 162 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 251, 498 F.2d 789, 793 (1974), cert. denied sub nom. Carey v. Davis, 419 U.S. 869 ; Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191, 195 (ND Cal. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 69 (CA9 1975). </s> [Footnote 7 One commentator described the statutory scheme, as follows: </s> "The governing trust agreement separately entered into by the parties to the collective bargaining agreement may specify general categories of benefits, but it normally delegates to the trustees broad discretion to determine specific benefit levels and eligibility requirements, to modify the benefit plan, and to administer the plan. </s> "Exercise of this discretionary power may involve important questions of policy or judgment on which union and employer trustees may well differ. This potential divergence of interests was the underlying reason for the statutory requirement of equal representation. Employer representatives were intended to act as a check on the untrammeled discretion of the union. The possibility of adverse interests leading to dispute is recognized by the statutory provision for breaking deadlocks through appointment of an impartial umpire." Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 911, 922-923 (1970) (footnote omitted). </s> See also Goetz, Employee Benefit Trusts Under Section 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 59 Nw. U. L. Rev. 719, 748 (1965). </s> [Footnote 8 The trust agreement in this record suggests the contrary: </s> "The Trustees shall take such action as they deem appropriate to collect any such delinquencies, and shall advise the International Union and the appropriate Districts and Locals of the Union, on at least a monthly basis, of such delinquencies, as long as such delinquencies continue." App. 98p. </s> [Footnote 9 As noted above, the word "trustee" does not appear in 302 (c) of the LMRA. That section does require that "employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of the employee may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 186 (c) (5) (B). It seems to me that this statutory language is quite inconsistent with the Court's view that the trustees are essentially fungible once they have been appointed. </s> [Footnote 10 Because the equal representation requirement primarily benefits the fund's beneficiaries rather than the employer, it is unlikely that an employer would be willing to risk a strike or other economic pressure on the part of the union in order to preserve its right to choose its own representatives to the employee benefit fund. As the legislative history suggests, see n. 4, supra, many employers probably view the equal representation requirement as an unwelcome burden at best, rather than as an essential right worth defending at the risk of extended labor strife. Cf. Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 274, 290, 314 (1948) ("The provisions dealing with employer contributions to union trust funds set the employer up as watchdog, although it has no interest in the fund"). </s> [Footnote 11 See also Associated Contractors, Inc., 559 F.2d, at 227; Quad City Builders Assn. v. Tri City Bricklayers Union, 431 F.2d 999, 1003 (CA8 1970). </s> [Footnote 12 Section 8 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides, in pertinent part: </s> "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents - </s> "(1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (1) (B). </s> [Footnote 13 Senator Ellender's full statement on this point reads as follows: </s> "I shall now deal briefly with strikes invading the prerogatives of management. </s> "The bill prevents a union from dictating to an employer on the question of bargaining with union representatives through an employer association. The bill, in subsection 8 (b) (1) on page 14, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to coerce an employer either in the selection of his bargaining representative or in the selection of a personnel director or foreman, or other supervisory official. Senators who heard me discuss the issue early in the afternoon will recall that quite a few unions forced employers to change foremen. They have been taking it upon themselves to say that management should not appoint any representative who is too strict with the membership of the union. This amendment seeks to prescribe a remedy in order to prevent such interferences." 93 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1947). </s> [Footnote 14 In pertinent part, 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act reads: </s> "For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158 (d). </s> [Footnote 15 The wall between collective-bargaining activities and the duties of welfare fund trustees on which the Court's opinion is based simply does not exist. As one commentator has observed: </s> "[T]he subjects about which the trustees confer are within the scope of mandatory collective bargaining under the Act. </s> . . . . </s> "Despite the unusual setting, the deliberations of trustees of these funds may be looked upon as an extension of the collective bargaining process within contractual and statutory limits." Goetz, supra n. 7, 55 Cornell L. Rev., at 922, 923. </s> See also Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp., at 195-196. </s> [Footnote 16 The agreement provides: </s> "Section (e) Responsibilities and Duties of Trustees </s> "(1) Each Trust shall be administered by a Board of three Trustees, one of whom shall be appointed by the Employers; one of whom shall be appointed by the Union; and one of whom shall be a neutral party, selected by the other two." App. 98n (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 17 This conclusion is in no way inconsistent with the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 94 Stat. 1209, the Court's statement to the contrary notwithstanding. See ante, at 338-339, n. 22. While Congress sought, in that Act, to enhance the stability of multiemployer plans, it did not address the question presented in this case, nor did it prohibit the withdrawal of employers from such plans. Rather, Congress provided that withdrawing employers must fund a proportional share of a plan's unfunded vested benefits. MPPAA 104, 94 [453 U.S. 322, 354] Stat. 1217. Thus, the general expressions of concern in the legislative history of this Act must be read in light of the action Congress actually took to allay those concerns. </s> [453 U.S. 322, 355]

United States Supreme Court NORTH HAVEN BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BELL(1982) No. 80-986 Argued: December 9, 1981Decided: May 17, 1982 </s> Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that "no person," on the basis of sex, shall "be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Section 902 authorizes each agency awarding federal financial assistance to any education program to promulgate regulations ensuring that aid recipients adhere to 901(a), and as a sanction for noncompliance provides for termination of federal funds limited to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been found. Pursuant to 902, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), interpreting "person" in 901(a) to encompass employees as well as students, issued regulations (Subpart E) prohibiting federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of sex with respect to employment. Petitioners, federally funded public school boards, when threatened with enforcement proceedings for alleged violations of 901(a) with respect to board employees, brought separate suits challenging HEW's authority to issue the Subpart E regulations on the alleged ground that 901(a) was not intended to apply to employment practices, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court in each case granted the school board's motion for summary judgment. In a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 901(a) was intended to prohibit employment discrimination and that the Subpart E regulations were consistent with 902. </s> Held: </s> 1. Employment discrimination comes within Title IX's prohibition. Pp. 520-535. </s> (a) While 901(a) does not expressly include employees within its scope or expressly exclude them, its broad directive that "no person" may be discriminated against on the basis of gender, on its face, includes employees as well as students. Pp. 520-522. </s> (b) Title IX's legislative history corroborates the conclusion that employment discrimination was intended to come within its prohibition. Pp. 523-530. [456 U.S. 512, 513] </s> (c) Title IX's postenactment history provides additional evidence of Congress' desire to ban employment discrimination in federally financed education programs. Pp. 530-535. </s> 2. The Subpart E regulations are valid. Pp. 535-540. </s> (a) An agency's authority under Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limitation of 901(a) and 902. The Subpart E regulations are not inconsistent with this restriction. Pp. 535-539. </s> (b) But whether termination of petitioners' federal funds is permissible under Title IX is a question that must be answered by the District Court in the first instance. Pp. 539-540. </s> 629 F.2d 773, affirmed and remanded. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 540. </s> Susan K. Krell argued the cause for petitioner North Haven Board of Education. Paul E. Knag argued the cause for petitioner Trumbull Board of Education. With them on the briefs were Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., and Richard W. Rutherford. </s> Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Elinor Hadley Stillman, Brian K. Landsberg, and Marie E. Klimesz. Beverly J. Hodgson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Linda Potz. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; and by Gordon C. Coffman and John Michael Facciola for Hillsdale College. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Margaret A. Kohn for the American Association of University Women et al.; by Joseph Onek for Birch Bayh et al.; and by Barbara D. Underwood and Burke Marshall for the Yale Law Women's Association. [456 U.S. 512, 514] </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At issue here is the validity of regulations promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. These regulations prohibit federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to employment. </s> I </s> Title IX proscribes gender discrimination in education programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. Patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), Title IX, as amended, contains two core provisions. The first is a "program-specific" prohibition of gender discrimination: </s> "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 901(a), 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). </s> Nine statutory exceptions to 901(a)'s coverage follow. See 901(a)(1)-(9). 1 </s> The second core provision relates to enforcement. Section 902, 20 U.S.C. 1682, authorizes each agency awarding federal financial assistance to any education program to promulgate regulations ensuring that aid recipients adhere to 901(a)'s mandate. The ultimate sanction for noncompliance is termination of [456 U.S. 512, 515] federal funds or denial of future grants. 2 Like 901, 902 is program-specific: </s> "[S]uch termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding [of noncompliance] has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found . . . ." 3 </s> In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) invoked its 902 authority to issue regulations [456 U.S. 512, 516] governing the operation of federally funded education programs. 4 These regulations extend, for example, to policies involving admissions, textbooks, and athletics. See 34 CFR pt. 106 (1980). 5 Interpreting the term "person" in 901(a) to encompass employees as well as students, HEW included among the regulations a series entitled "Subpart E," which deals with employment practices, ranging from job classifications to pregnancy leave. See 34 CFR 106.51-106.61 (1980). Subpart E's general introductory section provides: </s> "No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, [456 U.S. 512, 517] consideration, or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance." 106.51(a)(1). 6 </s> II </s> Petitioners are two Connecticut public school boards that brought separate suits challenging HEW's authority to issue the Subpart E regulations. Petitioners contend that Title IX was not meant to reach the employment practices of educational institutions. </s> A. The North Haven case. The North Haven Board of Education (North Haven) receives federal funds for its education programs and activities and is therefore subject to Title IX's prohibition of gender discrimination. Since the 1975-1976 school year, North Haven has devoted between 46.8% and 66.9% of its federal assistance to the salaries of its employees; this practice is expected to continue. 7 </s> In January 1978, Elaine Dove, a tenured teacher in the North Haven public school system, filed a complaint with HEW, alleging that North Haven had violated Title IX by refusing to rehire her after a one-year maternity leave. In response to this complaint, HEW began to investigate the school board's employment practices and sought from petitioner information concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and tenure. Asserting that HEW lacked authority to regulate employment practices under Title IX, North Haven refused to comply with the request. [456 U.S. 512, 518] </s> When HEW then notified petitioner that it was considering administrative enforcement proceedings, North Haven brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Subpart E regulations exceeded the authority conferred on HEW by Title IX, and an injunction prohibiting HEW from attempting to terminate the school district's federal funds on the basis of those regulations. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on April 24, 1979, the District Court granted North Haven's motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51A. Agreeing with petitioner that Title IX was not intended to apply to employment practices, the court invalidated the employment regulations and permanently enjoined HEW from interfering with North Haven's federal funds because of noncompliance with those regulations. </s> B. The Trumbull case. The Trumbull Board of Education (Trumbull) likewise receives financial support from the Federal Government and must therefore adhere to the requirements of Title IX and appropriate implementing regulations. In October 1977, HEW began investigating a complaint filed by respondent Linda Potz, a former guidance counselor in the Trumbull school district. Potz alleged that Trumbull had discriminated against her on the basis of gender with respect to job assignments, working conditions, and the failure to renew her contract. In September 1978, HEW notified Trumbull that it had violated Title IX and warned that corrective action, including respondent's reinstatement, must be taken. </s> Trumbull then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, contending that HEW's Title IX employment regulations were invalid and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On the basis of its decision in North Haven, the District Court granted Trumbull's motion for summary judgment on May 24, 1979. App. to Pet. for [456 U.S. 512, 519] Cert. 76A. 8 The court subsequently amended the judgment, on Trumbull's request, to include injunctive and declaratory relief similar to that ordered in North Haven's case. Id., at 77A, 91A-92A. </s> C. The appeal. The two cases were consolidated on appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (1980). Finding the language of 901 inconclusive, the court examined the legislative history and concluded that the provision was intended to prohibit employment discrimination. The court also found the Subpart E regulations consistent with 902, which the court read as directing only that "any termination of funds be limited to the particular program or programs in which noncompliance with 901 is found . . . ." 629 F.2d, at 785 (emphasis added). Section 902, the Second Circuit held, does not circumscribe HEW's authority to issue regulations prohibiting gender discrimination in employment and does not require the Department "to specify prior to termination which particular programs receiving financial assistance are covered by its regulations." Ibid. Because HEW had not exercised its 902 authority to terminate federal assistance to either North Haven or Trumbull, the court declined to decide whether HEW could do so in these cases. The court remanded the cases to the District Court to determine whether petitioners had violated the HEW regulations and, if so, what remedies were appropriate. </s> Because other federal courts have invalidated the employment [456 U.S. 512, 520] regulations as unauthorized by Title IX, 9 we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 450 U.S. 909 (1981). </s> III </s> A </s> Our starting point in determining the scope of Title IX is, of course, the statutory language. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978). Section 901(a)'s broad directive that "no person" may be discriminated against on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as well as students. Under that provision, employees, like other "persons," may not be "excluded from participation in," "denied the benefits of," or "subjected to discrimination under" education programs receiving federal financial support. </s> Employees who directly participate in federal programs or who directly benefit from federal grants, loans, or contracts clearly fall within the first two protective categories described in 901(a). See Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (CA1), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 </s> [456 U.S. 512, 521] (1979). In addition, a female employee who works in a federally funded education program is "subjected to discrimination under" that program if she is paid a lower salary for like work, given less opportunity for promotion, or forced to work under more adverse conditions than are her male colleagues. See Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737-738 (CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No. 80-1023. </s> There is no doubt that "if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307 -308 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311 -312 (1932). Because 901(a) neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its reach, we should interpret the provision as covering and protecting these "persons" unless other considerations counsel to the contrary. After all, Congress easily could have substituted "student" or "beneficiary" for the word "person" if it had wished to restrict the scope of 901(a). 10 </s> Petitioners, however, point to the nine exceptions to 901(a)'s coverage set forth in 901(a)(1)-(9). See n. 1, supra. The exceptions, the school boards argue, are directed only at students, and thus indicate that 901(a) similarly applies only to students. But the exceptions are not concerned solely with students and student activities: two of them exempt an entire class of institutions - religious and military schools - and are not limited to student-related activities at such schools. See 901(a)(3), (4). Moreover, petitioners' argument rests on an inference that is by no means compelled; in fact, the absence of a specific exclusion for employment [456 U.S. 512, 522] among the list of exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Title IX's broad protection of "person[s]" does extend to employees of educational institutions. See Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616 -617 (1980). 11 </s> Although the statutory language thus seems to favor inclusion of employees, nevertheless, because Title IX does not expressly include or exclude employees from its scope, we turn to the Act's legislative history for evidence as to whether Congress meant somehow to limit the expansive language of 901. 12 </s> [456 U.S. 512, 523] </s> B </s> In the early 1970's, several attempts were made to enact legislation banning discrimination against women in the field of education. Although unsuccessful, these efforts included prohibitions against discriminatory employment practices. 13 </s> [456 U.S. 512, 524] </s> In 1972, the provisions ultimately enacted as Title IX were introduced in the Senate by Senator Bayh during debate on the Education Amendments of 1972. In addition to prohibiting gender discrimination in federally funded education programs and threatening termination of federal assistance for noncompliance, the amendment included provisions extending the coverage of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to educational institutions. Summarizing his proposal, Senator Bayh divided it into two parts - first, the forerunner of 901(a), and then the extensions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act: </s> "Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting from those programs. . . . [T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions. Enforcement powers include fund termination provisions - and appropriate safeguards - parallel to those found in title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Other important provisions in the amendment would extend the equal employment opportunities provisions of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and extend the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, administrative and professional women." 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added). </s> The Senator's description of 901(a), the "heart" of his amendment, indicates that it, as well as the Title VII and Equal Pay Act provisions, was aimed at discrimination in employment. 14 </s> [456 U.S. 512, 525] </s> Similarly, in a prepared statement summarizing the amendment, Senator Bayh discussed the general prohibition against gender discrimination: </s> "Central to my amendment are sections 1001-1005, which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas where abuse has been mentioned - employment practices for faculty and administrators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to programs within the institution such as vocational education classes, and so forth." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added). </s> Petitioners observe that the discussion of this portion of the amendment appears under the heading "A. Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Federally Funded Education Programs," while the provisions involving Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are summarized under the heading "B. Prohibition of Education-Related Employment Discrimination." But we are not willing to ascribe any particular significance to these headings. The Title VII and Equal Pay Act portions of the Bayh amendment are more narrowly focused on employment discrimination than is the general ban on gender discrimination, and the headings reflect that difference. Especially in light of the explicit reference to employment practices in the description of the amendment's general provision, however, the headings do not negate Senator Bayh's intent that employees as well as students be protected by the first portion of his amendment. 15 </s> [456 U.S. 512, 526] </s> The final piece of evidence from the Senate debate on the Bayh amendment appears during a colloquy between Senator Bayh and Senator Pell, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Education and floor manager of the education bill. In response to Senator Pell's inquiry about the scope of the sections that in large part became 901(a) and (b), Senator Bayh stated: </s> "As the Senator knows, we are dealing with three basically different types of discrimination here. We are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever. </s> "In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions." Id., at 5812 (emphasis added). 16 </s> Although the statements of one legislator made during debate may not be controlling, see, e. g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979), Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, [456 U.S. 512, 527] are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction. See, e. g., FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (such statements "deserv[e] to be accorded substantial weight . . ."); NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 -395 (1951). And, because 901 and 902 originated as a floor amendment, no committee report discusses the provisions; Senator Bayh's statements - which were made on the same day the amendment was passed, and some of which were prepared rather than spontaneous remarks - are the only authoritative indications of congressional intent regarding the scope of 901 and 902. </s> The legislative history in the House is even more sparse. H. R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), the Higher Education Act of 1971, contained, as part of its Title X, a general prohibition against gender discrimination in federally funded education programs that was identical to the corresponding section of the Bayh amendment and to 901(a) as ultimately enacted. But 1004 of Title X, like 604 of Title VI, see 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3, provided that nothing in Title X authorized action "by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice . . . except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." The debate on Title X included no discussion of this limitation. See 117 Cong. Rec. 39248-39263 (1971). 17 </s> When the House and Senate versions of Title IX were submitted [456 U.S. 512, 528] to the Conference Committee, 1004 was deleted. The Conference Reports simply explained: </s> "[T]he House amendment, but not the Senate amendment, provided that nothing in the title authorizes action by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment. The House recedes." S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-798, p. 221 (1972); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1085, p. 221 (1972). </s> Expressly a conscious choice, therefore, the omission of 1004 suggests that Congress intended that 901 prohibit gender discrimination in employment. </s> Petitioners and the dissent contend, however, that 1004 was deleted in order to avoid an inconsistency: Title IX included provisions relating to the Equal Pay Act, 18 which obviously concerned employment, and 1004 conflicted with those portions of the Act. See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 409 (1975) (1975 Hearings) (remarks of Rep. O'Hara) (arguing that Title IX was a "cut and paste job," using "a Xerox" of Title VI, and that 1004 "got in through a drafting error"). As the Court of Appeals observed, however, the Conference Committee could easily have altered the wording of 1004 to make clear that its limitation applied only to 901 19 or could have noted in the Conference [456 U.S. 512, 529] Reports that the omission was necessitated by the apparent inconsistency. Instead, by stating that "[t]he House recedes," the Reports suggest that the Senate version of Title IX, which was intended to ban discriminatory employment practices, prevailed for substantive reasons. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199 -200 (1974) (deletion of a provision by a Conference Committee "militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact"); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S., at 391 -392. Identical language - "The House recedes" or "The Senate recedes" - appears in the Conference Reports with respect to all other changes made in Title IX during the conference. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-798, pp. 221-222 (1972). See also 118 Cong. Rec. 18437 (1972) (letters printed in the record during the Senate debate on the Conference Report, which imply that employment discrimination is prohibited by 901). </s> Petitioners insist additionally that a specific exclusion for employment, such as that contained in 1004, was unnecessary to limit the scope of 901. Pointing out that Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the school boards contend that the addition of 604 to Title VI was not viewed by Congress as diminishing the scope of the Act; rather, petitioners argue, it was agreed that Title VI would not prohibit employment discrimination even before 604 made the exclusion explicit. </s> This focus on the history of Title VI - urged by petitioners and adopted by the dissent - is misplaced. It is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710 -711 (1979). The meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful guides in construing Title IX, therefore, only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX do not suggest a contrary interpretation. Moreover, [456 U.S. 512, 530] whether 604 clarified or altered the scope of Title VI, 20 it is apparent that 601 alone was not considered adequate to exclude employees from the statute's coverage. If Congress had intended that Title IX have the same reach as Title VI, therefore, we assume that it would have enacted counterparts to both 601 and 604. For although two statutes may be similar in language and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the differences between them. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 -585 (1978). </s> In our view, the legislative history thus corroborates our reading of the statutory language and verifies the Court of Appeals' conclusion that employment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX. 21 </s> C </s> The postenactment history of Title IX provides additional evidence of the intended scope of the Title and confirms Congress' [456 U.S. 512, 531] desire to ban employment discrimination in federally financed education programs. Following the passage of Title IX, Senator Bayh published in the Congressional Record a summary of the final version of the bill. That description expressly distinguishes Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to employment practices: </s> "Title VI . . . specifically excludes employment from coverage (except where the primary objective of the federal aid is to provide employment). There is no similar exemption for employment in the sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education programs." 118 Cong. Rec. 24684, n. 1 (1972) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). </s> See also 120 Cong. Rec. 39992 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). </s> Then, in June 1974, HEW published proposed Title IX regulations pursuant to 902. See 39 Fed. Reg. 22228 (1974). Included among these regulations was Subpart E, containing provisions prohibiting discriminatory employment practices in federally funded education programs. During the comment period, nearly 10,000 formal responses to the regulations were submitted, reputedly the most HEW had ever received on one of its proposals. See Salomone, Title IX and Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 9 J. Law & Ed. 433, 436 (1980). But not one suggested that 901 was not meant to prohibit discriminatory employment practices. See 1975 Hearings 479 (statement of Peter E. Holmes, Director of the Office for Civil Rights). </s> On June 4, 1975, HEW published its final Title IX regulations, see 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975), and, as required by 431(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232(d)(1), submitted the regulations to Congress for review. This "laying before" provision was designed to afford Congress an opportunity to examine a regulation and, if it found the regulation "inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority [456 U.S. 512, 532] . . .," to disapprove it in a concurrent resolution. If no such disapproval resolution was adopted within 45 days, the regulation would become effective. </s> Resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both Houses of Congress. The two Senate resolutions, which did not mention the employment regulations, were not acted upon. 22 In the House, the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor held six days of hearings to determine whether the HEW regulations were "consistent with the law and with the intent of the Congress in enacting the law." 1975 Hearings 1 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara). One witness expressed opposition to the employment regulations, interpreting the legislative history much as petitioners have. Id., at 406-408 (statement of Janet L. Kuhn); see also Kuhn, 65 Geo. L. J., at 49. Senator Bayh testified, however, that the regulations, "as the Congress mandated, call for equality in admissions . . . and in the case of teachers and other educational personnel, employment, pay and promotions." 1975 Hearings 169. 23 And HEW Secretary Weinberger stated that he did not see "any way you can find that employees do not participate in education programs and activities receiving Federal assistance, and, therefore, they are within the protected class . . . ." Id., at 478. See also id., at 140 (statement of Jean Simmons, [456 U.S. 512, 533] President, Federation of Organizations for Professional Women); 154-155 (statement of Rep. Carr); 164 (statement of Rep. Mink); 329 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler, Director, Project of the Status and Education of Women, Association of American Colleges). </s> Following the hearings, members of the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education introduced concurrent resolutions disapproving certain portions of the HEW regulations, but not referring specifically to the employment regulations. H. R. Con. Res. 329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H. R. Con. Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong. Rec. 21687 (1975). Representatives Quie and Erlenborn introduced an amendment to H. R. Con. Res. 330 that explicitly sought to disapprove the employment regulations as inconsistent with Title IX. See Unpublished Amendment to H. R. Con. Res. 330, quoted in 629 F.2d, at 783. 24 Neither resolution was passed, and HEW's regulations went into effect on July 21, 1975. </s> Admittedly, Congress' failure to disapprove the HEW regulations does not necessarily demonstrate that it considered [456 U.S. 512, 534] those regulations valid and consistent with the legislative intent. See 431(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act (as amended approximately four months after the Title IX regulations went into effect), 20 U.S.C. 1232(d) (1). But the postenactment history of Title IX does indicate that Congress was made aware of the Department's interpretation of the Act and of the controversy surrounding the regulations governing employment, and it lends weight to the argument that coverage of employment discrimination was intended. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 -16 (1941); Comment, 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev., at 153-157. And the relatively insubstantial interest given the resolutions of disapproval that were introduced seems particularly significant since Congress has proceeded to amend 901 when it has disagreed with HEW's interpretation of the statute. 25 While amending these other portions of 901, however, Congress has not seen fit to disturb the Subpart E regulations. </s> In fact, Congress has refused to pass bills that would have amended 901 to limit its coverage of employment discrimination. On the day the 45-day review period for the HEW regulations expired, Senator Helms introduced a bill that would have added a provision to Title IX stating that "[n]othing in [ 901] shall apply to employees of any educational institution subject to this title." S. 2146, 2(1), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong. Rec. 23845-23847 (1975). No action was taken on the bill. Similarly, Senator McClure [456 U.S. 512, 535] sponsored an amendment to S. 2657, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), the Education Amendments of 1976, which would have restricted the meaning of the term "educational program or activity" in 901(a) to the "curriculum or graduation requirements of the institutions . . ." receiving federal funds. 122 Cong. Rec. 28136 (1976). Senator Bayh successfully opposed the amendment, in part on the ground that it "would exempt those areas of traditional discrimination against women that are the reason for the congressional enactment of title IX[,]" including "employment and employment benefits . . . ." Id., at 28144. The McClure amendment was rejected. Id., at 28147. </s> Although postenactment developments cannot be accorded "the weight of contemporary legislative history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX . . . ." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 687 , n. 7. Where "an agency's statutory construction has been `fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 , n. 10 (1979), quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 702 -703; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); United States v. Bergh, 352 U.S. 40, 46 -47 (1956). These subsequent events therefore lend credence to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Title IX. 26 </s> IV </s> Although we agree with the Second Circuit's conclusion that Title IX proscribes employment discrimination in federally [456 U.S. 512, 536] funded education programs, we find that the Court of Appeals paid insufficient attention to the "program-specific" nature of the statute. The court acknowledged that, under 902, termination of funds "shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been . . . found," but implied that the Department's authority to issue regulations is considerably broader. See 629 F.2d, at 785-786. 27 We disagree. </s> It is not only Title IX's funding termination provision that [456 U.S. 512, 537] is program-specific. The portion of 902 authorizing the issuance of implementing regulations also provides: </s> "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken." (Emphasis added.) </s> Certainly, it makes little sense to interpret the statute, as respondents urge, to authorize an agency to promulgate rules that it cannot enforce. And 901(a) itself has a similar program-specific focus: it forbids gender discrimination "under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." </s> Title IX's legislative history corroborates its general program-specificity. Congress failed to adopt proposals that would have prohibited all discriminatory practices of an institution that receives federal funds. See 117 Cong. Rec. 30155-30157, 30408 (1971) (Sen. Bayh's 1971 amendment); H. R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1001(b) (1971) (administration proposal); 1970 Hearings 690-691 (Dept. of Justice's proposed alternative to 805 of H. R. 16098); cf. Title IX, 904 (proscribing discrimination against the blind by a recipient of federal assistance with no program-specific limitation). In contrast, Senator Bayh indicated that his 1972 amendment, which in large part was ultimately adopted, was program-specific. See 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (observing that the amendment "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs," and that "[t]he effect of termination of funds is limited to the particular entity and program in which such noncompliance has been found . . ."); cf. 117 Cong. Rec. 39256 (1971) (colloquies between [456 U.S. 512, 538] Reps. Green and Waggoner and between Reps. Green and Steiger). </s> Finally, we note that language in 601 and 602 of Title VI, virtually identical to that in 901 and 902 and on which Title IX was modeled, has been interpreted as being program-specific. See Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (CA5 1969). We conclude, then, that an agency's authority under Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limitation of 901 and 902. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 690 -693. </s> Examining the employment regulations with this restriction in mind, we nevertheless reject petitioners' contention that the regulations are facially invalid. Although their import is by no means unambiguous, we do not view them as inconsistent with Title IX's program-specific character. The employment regulations do speak in general terms of an educational institution's employment practices, but they are limited by the provision that states their general purpose: "to effectuate title IX . . . [,] which is designed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 34 CFR 106.1 (1980) (emphasis added). 28 </s> HEW's comments accompanying publication of its final Title IX regulations confirm our view that Subpart E is consistent with the Act's program-specificity. 29 The Department [456 U.S. 512, 539] recognized that 902 limited its authority to terminate funds to particular programs that were found to have violated Title IX, and it continued: </s> "Therefore, an education program or activity or part thereof operated by a recipient of Federal financial assistance administered by the Department will be subject to the requirements of this regulation if it 30 receives or benefits from such assistance. This interpretation is consistent with the only case specifically ruling on the language contained in title VI, which holds that Federal funds may be terminated under title VI upon a finding that they `are infected by a discriminatory environment . . .' Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969)." 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). </s> By expressly adopting the Fifth Circuit opinion construing Title VI as program-specific, HEW apparently indicated its intent that the Title IX regulations be interpreted in like fashion. So read, the regulations conform with the limitations Congress enacted in 901 and 902. </s> Whether termination of petitioners' federal funds is permissible [456 U.S. 512, 540] under Title IX is a question that must be answered by the District Court in the first instance. Similarly, we do not undertake to define "program" in this opinion. Neither of the cases before us advanced beyond a motion for summary judgment, and the record therefore does not reflect whether petitioners' employment practices actually discriminated on the basis of gender or whether any such discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX. Neither school board opposed HEW's investigation into its employment practices on the grounds that the complaining employees' salaries were not funded by federal money, that the employees did not work in an education program that received federal assistance, or that the discrimination they allegedly suffered did not affect a federally funded program. 31 Instead, petitioners disputed the Department's authority to regulate any employment practices whatsoever, and the District Court adopted that view, which we find to be error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals but remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 901(a)(1) provides that, with respect to admissions, 901(a) applies only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education. Specific exceptions are made for the admissions policies of schools that begin admitting students of both sexes for the first time, [456 U.S. 512, 515] 901(a)(2); religious schools, 901(a)(3); military schools, 901(a)(4); the admissions policies of public institutions of undergraduate higher education that traditionally and continually have admitted students of only one gender, 901(a)(5); social fraternities and sororities, and voluntary youth service organizations, 901(a)(6); Boys/Girls State/Nation conferences, 901(a)(7); father-son and mother-daughter activities at educational institutions, 901(a)(8); and scholarships awarded in "beauty" pageants by institutions of higher education, 901(a)(9). </s> [Footnote 2 Funding may not be terminated, however, until after the agency determines that noncompliance cannot be achieved by voluntary means; the recipient is given a hearing before an administrative law judge, who makes a recommendation subject to administrative and judicial review; and a report is filed with the appropriate House and Senate committees and no action is taken on that report for 30 days. See 902, 903; 34 CFR 106.71, 100.6-100.11, pt. 101 (1980). </s> [Footnote 3 Section 902 provides in full: </s> "Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an [456 U.S. 512, 516] express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report." 86 Stat. 374 (emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 4 HEW's functions under Title IX were transferred in 1979 to the Department of Education by 301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 678, 20 U.S.C. 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Because many of the relevant actions in this case were taken by HEW prior to reorganization, both agencies are referred to herein as HEW. </s> [Footnote 5 The regulations initially appeared at 34 CFR pt. 86 (1972), but were recodified in connection with the establishment of the Department of Education. 45 Fed. Reg. 30802 (1980). See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 6 The Department of Agriculture also has issued regulations implementing Title IX. These include employment practices provisions that track the regulations at issue here. See 7 CFR 15a.51-15a.61 (1980). In addition, the Small Business Administration has promulgated regulations prohibiting employment discrimination, which are based in part on Title IX. See 13 CFR 113.3 (1981). See generally Comment, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 417, 418, nn. 7 and 8 (1980). </s> [Footnote 7 See North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 774-775 (CA2 1980). </s> [Footnote 8 Because the court awarded summary judgment in petitioner's favor before respondent Potz had an opportunity to reply to Trumbull's motion, Potz filed a motion to set aside the judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment. On September 13, 1979, the court denied both motions, rejecting Potz' contention that the judgment was inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). App. to Pet. for Cert. 77A. </s> [Footnote 9 Four Courts of Appeals and several District Courts have so held. See Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (CA9), cert. granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U.S. 1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (CA1), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (WD Pa. 1980), appeal pending, Nos. 80-2383, 80-2384 (CA3); Kneeland v. Bloom Township High School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1280 (ND Ill. 1980); McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (Kan. 1978). </s> But see Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 781, n. 1 (ND Ohio 1976). Cf. Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No. 80-1023. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the Subpart E regulations on the ground that they do not apply only to specific programs that receive federal financial assistance, but ruled that Title IX permits the Secretary to regulate at least some employment practices. </s> [Footnote 10 According to the dissent, the ease with which any confusion "could have been avoided by the legislative draftsman . . ." suggests that "person" should be given its ordinary meaning. Post, at 551. </s> [Footnote 11 Nor does 901(b) qualify the broad language of 901(a). Section 901(b) repeats the language identifying certain of the categories of persons listed in 901(a); it provides no clearer indication of the intended scope of 901(a) than does that section itself. </s> [Footnote 12 In construing a statute, this Court normally accords great deference to the interpretation, particularly when it is longstanding, of the agency charged with the statute's administration. See, e. g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274 -275 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). But the administrative interpretation of Title IX has changed, and a split has occurred between the federal agencies responsible for promulgating Title IX regulations. On July 27, 1981, respondent Bell, Secretary of Education, wrote to the Attorney General expressing his dissatisfaction with the existing Subpart E regulations and his belief that they were ultra vires. The Secretary sought to amend the regulations to make them parallel with the Department of Education regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 34 CFR pt. 100 (1980). Specifically, Secretary Bell proposed to have the regulations cover employment practices "only when the complaint shows a clear nexus between the alleged employment discrimination and discrimination against the students, or when the complaint shows that the complainant is a beneficiary of a program in which a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." Letter from Terrel H. Bell to William French Smith, reprinted in Daily Labor Report, No. 150, p. A-5 (Aug. 5, 1981). Cf. 34 CFR 100.3(c) (1980). In response, the Attorney General, to whom the President has delegated the authority given him by 902 to approve regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX, refused to approve the Department's suggestion and continues to defend the existing regulations. See Brief for Federal Respondents 37, n. 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19. [456 U.S. 512, 523] The Department of Education has withdrawn its request to the Attorney General pending this Court's decision in this case. See id., at 17-18. Because the Subpart E regulations therefore are still in effect, respondent Bell's changed view does not moot the litigation. See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 505 , n. 25 (1981). It, however, does undercut the argument that the regulations are entitled to deference as the interpretation of the agency charged with Title IX's enforcement. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 , n. 11 (1979). </s> [Footnote 13 Title IX grew out of hearings on gender discrimination in education, held in 1970 by a special House Subcommittee on Education chaired by Representative Green. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H. R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (1970 Hearings). Much of the testimony focused on discrimination against women in employment. See generally, e. g., Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 Geo. L. J. 49, 59-60 (1976); Comment, 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 133, 140-141. The proposal on which the hearings were held, however, never emerged from committee. That provision, 805 of H. R. 16098, would have extended the prohibitions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to discrimination based on gender by adding the word "sex" to 601; would have made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to public school employees and education employees generally; would have amended the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to include gender discrimination within the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Commission; and would have extended the application of the Equal Pay Act to executive, administrative, and professional employees. </s> Then, in 1971, Senator Bayh introduced an amendment to S. 659, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), the Education Amendments of 1971, which would have prohibited recipients of federal education funds from discriminating against women. The amendment, which Senator Bayh characterized as identical to the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, plainly was meant to proscribe discrimination in employment. See 117 Cong. Rec. 30155, 30403 (1971); see also id., at 30411 (Sen. McGovern announces his intent to support Sen. Bayh's "similar amendment" rather than introducing his own, [456 U.S. 512, 524] which explicitly forbade gender discrimination in employment). The amendment never came to a vote on the floor of the Senate, however, because it was ruled nongermane. See id., at 30415. </s> [Footnote 14 Senator Bayh's 1971 proposal, see n. 13, supra, did not include provisions amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. His statements that the [456 U.S. 512, 525] 1971 amendment nevertheless would prohibit employment discrimination thus rebut petitioners' contention that the Senator's discussion of employment discrimination during debate on the 1972 version of his amendment referred solely to the provisions regarding Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. </s> [Footnote 15 The headings and corresponding divisions of Senator Bayh's summary of his amendment do suggest, however, that the Senator's reference to [456 U.S. 512, 526] "sections 1001-1005" in describing the prohibition of discrimination in federally funded education programs is of little significance. Although, as the dissent points out, post, at 548, 1005 of the amendment comprised the Title VII provisions, the detailed discussion of the Title VII amendments in part B of the summary, the absence of any further mention of those provisions in part A's description of Title IX, and the fact that the Title VII provisions were not limited to "federally funded education programs" indicate that the Senator's reference to 1005 in part A was inadvertent. </s> [Footnote 16 Moreover, in reply to Senator Pell's questions regarding Title IX's application to the faculty of religious and military schools, Senator Bayh made clear that such institutions were explicitly excepted from the reach of 901(a). See 118 Cong. Rec. 5813 (1972). His response makes no sense if Senator Bayh thought that the provision was not aimed at protecting any employees; in that event, he could have answered Senator Pell's questions simply by stating that employment discrimination was dealt with in the Title VII and Equal Pay Act portions of the amendment, rather than in 901. </s> [Footnote 17 Portions of that debate suggest, however, that, despite 1004, Members of the House thought that the ban on discrimination protected employees. In discussing a proposed amendment to 1001 of the bill, the section similar to 901(a) of Title IX, Representative Smith quoted 1001, described it as containing the "effective provisions" of Title X, and observed that the amendment "would exempt out of this title all undergraduate schools and would leave the prohibition against sex discrimination to apply to graduate education and faculty employment and salaries." 117 Cong. Rec. 39255 (1971); see also id., at 39260 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn); id., at 39262 (remarks of Rep. Quie). Despite the explicit exclusion of employment discrimination in 1004, then, there was at least some feeling on the [456 U.S. 512, 528] floor of the House that employment discrimination was nonetheless prohibited by the provision that would become 901(a). </s> [Footnote 18 The proposed amendments to Title VII had been deleted because identical provisions had already been enacted as part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(a). </s> [Footnote 19 The Court of Appeals suggested the following language: "`Nothing in 901 shall apply to any employees of any educational institution subject to [456 U.S. 512, 529] this title except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment.'" 629 F.2d, at 783. </s> [Footnote 20 Petitioners oversimplify the role of 604. Some Members of Congress did not find the language of 601 clearly limited to a certain class of beneficiaries. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2484 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Poff); Civil Rights: Hearings on H. R. 7152 before the House Committee on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 228 (1964) (colloquy between Rep. Avery and Rep. McCulloch); id., at 143 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 197-198 (colloquy between Rep. Avery and Rep. Celler); id., at 379-380 (remarks of Rep. Poff). Section 604 was thereafter added in the Senate, as part of the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute bill; although the provision has been viewed as merely clarifying the scope of Title VI, see 110 Cong. Rec. 12714, 12720 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Kuhn, 65 Geo. L. J., at 53, it has also been considered a substantive change, see 110 Cong. Rec. 14219-14220 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Holland); Comment, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 447 ("The employment exemption in title VI was amended onto the statute as part of a substitute written during informal bargaining between the Senate's Democratic and Republican leadership with the intention of providing a compromise that would garner enough votes to end the ongoing filibuster"). </s> [Footnote 21 Thus, we do not, as the dissent charges, "rel[y] on legislative history to add omitted words . . . ." Post, at 550. Rather, we use the legislative history as a guide to interpreting the "critical words" that Congress did include in Title IX. Ibid. It is the dissent that uses the legislative history - of a different statute - to rewrite Title IX so as to restrict its reach. </s> [Footnote 22 Senator Laxalt introduced a resolution disapproving the regulations governing athletic programs. S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong. Rec. 22940 (1975). Senator Helms' resolution was a blanket disapproval of the HEW regulations, S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong. Rec. 17300 (1975), but he did voice disapproval specifically of the employment regulations when he introduced the resolution. Id., at 17301. Senator Helms later explained that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare had met in executive session on his resolution but had decided not to report it to the full Senate. Id., at 23846. </s> [Footnote 23 Senator Bayh also stressed the similarity between Title IX and Title VI, see 1975 Hearings 169-171, thereby confirming that his references to Title VI during the debate on his amendment did not indicate an intent that employment discrimination be excluded from its coverage. </s> [Footnote 24 H. R. Con. Res. 330 was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor, which in turn submitted it to its Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities. That Subcommittee held a one-day hearing on the resolution, see Hearing on House concurrent Resolution 330 (Title IX Regulation) before the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (H. R. Con. Res. 330 Hearing), and then voted to recommend against passage of the resolution. Interestingly, Representative O'Hara testified at this hearing, but, despite his remarks during the hearings conducted by his own Subcommittee, see 1975 Hearings 408-409, he did not challenge the employment regulations. See H. R. Con. Res. 330 Hearing 2-21, 33-34, 38. </s> In addition to the two concurrent resolutions mentioned in the text, Representative Martin introduced two resolutions in the House - one broad resolution disapproving all the Title IX regulations, H. R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong. Rec. 19209 (1975), and one focusing on the sections governing athletic programs, H. R. Con. Res. 311, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong. Rec. 19209 (1975). Neither referred to the employment regulations. No action was taken on the Martin resolutions. </s> [Footnote 25 In 1974, Congress, by adding 901(a)(6), excepted social fraternities and sororities and voluntary youth service organizations from the reach of 901(a). Pub. L. 93-568, 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862. See 120 Cong. Rec. 41390-41391 (1974) (remarks of Reps. Green, Steiger, Perkins, Quie, and Ashbrook). The amendment was enacted prior to the period of regulations review, but after HEW had published for comment the Title IX regulations, including those pertaining to employment practices. Then, in 1976, Congress added three new exceptions, 901(a)(7)-(9). See 122 Cong. Rec. 27979-27987 (1976) (remarks of Sens. Fannin, Dole, Thurmond, Bayh, Humphrey, and Eagleton). </s> [Footnote 26 Petitioners' final two arguments rely on policy judgments: the school boards insist that the victims of employment discrimination have remedies other than those available under Title IX and that terminating all federal [456 U.S. 512, 536] funds to an education program because of discrimination suffered by one employee will injure numerous innocent students. These policy considerations were for Congress to weigh, and we are not free to ignore the language and history of Title IX even were we to disagree with the legislative choice. </s> Moreover, even if alternative remedies are available and their existence is relevant, but cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 711 ; Comment, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 442-446, this Court repeatedly has recognized that Congress has provided a variety of remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate employment discrimination. See, e. g., Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236 -239 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 -49 (1974). And petitioners do not dispute that all funds may be terminated for an education program that discriminates against only one student. </s> Similarly, the views of the dissent as to the competence of the drafters of Title IX, the need for the legislation, the type of procedural, remedial, and enforcement provisions that should have been included, and the language that should have been used, see post, at 551-555, may be interesting, and may be the sorts of considerations that Congress should take into account in enacting legislation; but they are not relevant to the inquiry we must undertake in ascertaining legislative intent. Rather, in order to avoid the oft-criticized practice of second-guessing Congress, we must rely on the legislative history, however "truncated," post, at 551, and not on our perceptions of the soundness of the legislative judgment. </s> [Footnote 27 To the extent that the Court of Appeals was suggesting only that regulations may be broadly worded and need not be directed at specific programs - as long as they are applied only to programs that receive federal funds - we do not dispute the court's conclusion. See 902 (referring to "rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability"). </s> [Footnote 28 Similarly, for example, the specific Title IX regulations governing student admissions policies - which are indisputably covered by the statute - are phrased generally, providing that "[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be denied admission, or be subjected to discrimination in admission, by any recipient . . . ." 34 CFR 106.21(a) (1980). The reach of those regulations is likewise limited by 106.1 to conform to Title IX's program-specific nature. See also 45 CFR 80.3(b)(1) (1980) (Title VI regulation providing that "[a] recipient under any program to which this part applies may not . . . [discriminate] on ground of race, color, or national origin . . ."). </s> [Footnote 29 In construing regulations, the Court normally defers to the agency's interpretation. See, e. g., INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); [456 U.S. 512, 539] Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 -17 (1965). Here, however, that interpretation has fluctuated from case to case, and even as this case has progressed. See Brief for Federal Respondents 46; compare 1975 Hearings 485 (testimony of HEW Secretary Weinberger), and Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d, at 737, with Brief for Federal Respondents 44-46. Accordingly, there is no consistent administrative interpretation of the Title IX regulations for us to evaluate. Cf. n. 12, supra. </s> [Footnote 30 Whether "it" refers to "recipient" or "education program or activity" is somewhat unclear, but we find the latter reading more plausible, especially given the approving citation to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (1969). Moreover, "a recipient of Federal financial assistance" by definition "receives or benefits from such assistance," whereas "an education program or activity . . . operated by a recipient" may not; the subordinate clause therefore adds nothing unless "it" means "program or activity." See also 34 CFR 106.51(a) (1980) (prohibiting gender discrimination "under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance" (emphasis added)). </s> [Footnote 31 Petitioner North Haven, for example, has conceded that it uses a substantial percentage of its federal funds to pay the salaries of its employees, including teachers. See App. 6, 18-20, 21-22, 24. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. </s> Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 1 promulgated regulations prohibiting [456 U.S. 512, 541] discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 CFR 106.51(a)(1). Today, the Court upholds the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several postenactment events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported by its legislative history, I dissent. 2 </s> I </s> Although the Court begins with the language of the statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in the statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 901(a)'s broad directive that `no person' may be discriminated against on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as well as students." Ante, at 520. This is not what the statutory language provides. </s> In relevant part, the statute states: </s> "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." Education Amendments of 1972, 901(a), 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). </s> A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiving federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied [456 U.S. 512, 542] participation in a program or activity; 3 (ii) denied the benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an education program or activity. Moreover, Congress made no reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explicit language in other statutes regulating employment practices. 4 </s> It is noteworthy that not one of the other five Courts of Appeals to consider the question before us reached the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), and that decision has been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider the question. There, the court concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies, i. e., either students attending institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded by the United States government." The court went on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees. 5 Ibid. [456 U.S. 512, 543] </s> In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, noting: "[A]s actually written, the statute is not nearly so broad. The words `no person' are modified by later language which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F.2d, at 584. The court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries. 6 Ibid. [456 U.S. 512, 544] </s> II </s> A </s> The Court acknowledges, as it must, that 901 of Title IX "does not expressly include . . . employees." But it finds a strong negative inference in the fact that 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope." Ante, at 522. The Court then turns to the legislative history for evidence as to whether or not 901 was meant to prohibit employment discrimination. Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute, the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously that Congress did intend what it failed to state. 7 The Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of this standard. </s> Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by Senator Bayh to Senate bill S. 659, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H. R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st [456 U.S. 512, 545] Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though generally barring employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not apply to discrimination "with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub. L. 88-352, Title VII, 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative, executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1) (1970 ed.) (no longer in force). Finally, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and activities. </s> The Bayh floor amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. Sections 1009-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And 1001-1003 created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational programs and activities, thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex discrimination in such programs. </s> Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include 1001-1003 of the Bayh amendment to proscribe such discrimination. Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded educational programs and activities. This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it was modeled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to [456 U.S. 512, 546] discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded programs, not general employment practices of fund recipients. 8 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3. 9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 -701 (1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had been its model. </s> B </s> The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 529 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 710-711). This point begs the question, however, since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a section, i. e., 604, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3, expressly stating that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, [456 U.S. 512, 547] Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Review of Regulations to Implement Title IX, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 409 (1975) (1975 Hearings). </s> Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh amendment originally contained a provision, 1004, equivalent to 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, at 527-528. A strong argument, however, can be made that there was a nonsubstantive reason for eliminating 1004 from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 1975 Hearings 409. Even without reference to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and the Senate's Bayh amendment, 1004 of the House bill was a drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill applied to employment, though sections of the House bill, as well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification, 10 the Court is on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use of the ritualistic words "the House recedes" reveals a substantive [456 U.S. 512, 548] change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process. </s> C </s> In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single Senator. 11 The first statement, ante, at 524 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did state that faculty employment would be covered by his amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to redress discrimination in employment. </s> Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 525 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972)). But 1005 of the Bayh amendment is the section amending Title VII and thus 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether Title IX does. 12 Moreover, the Court uses an ellipsis [456 U.S. 512, 549] rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement: </s> "Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipsis, ante, at 525). </s> Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI. </s> In the third Bayh statement, ante, at 526 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in Islesboro: </s> "A fair reading both of the colloquy . . ., as well as the discussion immediately preceding and following the above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were [456 U.S. 512, 550] specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), the third at employees (employment). While Senator Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell's question, we think HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and thus not as precise as a response in written form . . . ." 593 F.2d, at 427. </s> Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative history accords with the natural reading of the statute. Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally funded programs and activities, not all employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is modeled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited - and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous. 13 </s> As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "employment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal. [456 U.S. 512, 551] </s> III </s> As the sole issue before us is the meaning of 901(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language: </s> "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." </s> The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support for its position in this language, it must look to the legislative history for evidence as to whether or not 901 was meant to prohibit employment discrimination. Ante, at 522. Although the Court examines at length the truncated legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject; and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately proscribed, and provided remedies for, the conduct in question. When these factors are considered, there is no justification for reading sex employment discrimination language into 901. </s> If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative draftsman would have written 901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these other statutes had been enacted by an earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this [456 U.S. 512, 552] problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language ambiguous at best. </s> In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by the EEOC, federal-court remedies available within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimination and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within one of several exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund termination, apparently now available at the request of any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure. 14 </s> [456 U.S. 512, 553] Compare 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. (Title IX) with 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV) (Title VII). The Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was available under Title VII. 15 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. </s> Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX to the Department of HEW. In contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods. 16 The District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (ED Mich. 1977), aff'd, 600 F.2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), correctly observed: </s> "These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation [456 U.S. 512, 554] has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F. Supp., at 1034. </s> Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo court thought was self-evident: </s> "The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief for Federal Respondents 37, n. 26. </s> In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five perceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i) that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include language in 901 with respect to discrimination that would have made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to include in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv) that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce employment legislation; and finally (v) that in Title IX, it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employment, but did not make that remedy available to those discriminated against on the basis of race. </s> In response to this dissent, see ante, at 536, n. 26, the Court states that the factors considered in this Part III, summarized above, "are not relevant" to "ascertaining legislative [456 U.S. 512, 555] intent." If this were a "plain language" case, this statement probably would be unobjectionable. But the Court recognizes that its position cannot be sustained solely by the plain language of the statute, and it therefore relies heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on the floor of the Senate. In these circumstances, it defies reason to say that a court should not consider what reasonable legislators surely would have considered. Where ambiguity exists it is not "irrelevant," to the process of ascertaining the intention of Congress, to consider specifically other statutes on the same subject. Nor must a court shun common sense in resolving ambiguities. 17 </s> [Footnote 1 As noted by the Court, ante, at 516, n. 4, HEW's duties under Title IX were transferred to the Department of Education in 1979 by 301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 678, 20 U.S.C. 3441(a)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I follow the Court in referring to both agencies as HEW since many of the relevant acts in this case took place before the reorganization. See ante, at 516, n. 4. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court acknowledges that the postenactment events it discusses only "lend credence" to its interpretation of the statute. Ante, at 535. </s> [Footnote 3 I agree with the Court that employees who directly participate in a federal program, i. e., teachers who receive federal grants, are, of course, protected by Title IX. See ante, at 520-521. Respondents Elaine Dove and Linda Potz were not, however, participants in any grant program or in any other federally funded program or activity. Elaine Dove was a teacher and Linda Potz a guidance counselor. Both alleged only discrimination in employment. </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (Title VII: "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -"); 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1) (Equal Pay Act: "[n]o employer having employees . . ."). </s> [Footnote 5 The Court today not only finds this point unconvincing, but concludes that the "absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeals' conclusion" that Title IX does protect employees. Ante, at 521-522. I am unable to follow this reasoning. The absence of employment-related exceptions may not be [456 U.S. 512, 543] conclusive proof that employment is not within the scope of the statute. But I fail to see how that absence affirmatively indicates that the statute was intended to apply to employees. Indeed, if Congress did intend to cover employees, it is anomalous that it did not provide exceptions similar to those in Title VII. For example, Title VII does not proscribe bona fide seniority plans, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). </s> [Footnote 6 The question also has been presented to the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. In Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119, 121, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered HEW's arguments but "adopted" the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Islesboro. And in Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992, 993, cert. granted sub nom. United States Dept. of Ed. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U.S. 1009 (1980), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the three earlier Circuit decisions, nothing that each of those courts had held that the plain language of Title IX did not support HEW's position. Even in the decision below, in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the regulations, the court did not base its decision on the statutory language, and stated that the "language is more ambiguous than HEW suggests." 629 F.2d 773, 777. </s> The other appellate decision was entered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No. 80-1023. There, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the regulations invalid because they did not limit fund termination to the offending program or activity. In reaching this decision, the court noted that program-specific regulations might be sustainable in some instances, e. g., if they prohibited discrimination in pay against female teachers paid with federal funds relative to the amounts paid male teachers with federal funds. The court noted that an argument can be made that in such a case, [456 U.S. 512, 544] the woman teacher is "denied the benefits of" or "subject to discrimination under" the federal program. 622 F.2d, at 737-738. But there is no indication it would agree with this Court that the statutory language supports program-specific regulations prohibiting all kinds of discriminatory employment practices with respect to all types of employees, i. e., hourly employees, secretaries, and administrators as well as teachers. </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 , n. 29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent"). </s> [Footnote 8 The operative language in the two provisions is virtually identical. Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI) with 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (Title IX). </s> [Footnote 9 Title 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3 states: </s> "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 10076 (1964) (statement of Attorney General Kennedy); Civil Rights: Hearings on H. R. 7152 before the House Committee on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 198 (1964) (statement of Cong. Celler, House Floor Manager of Title VI). </s> [Footnote 11 The most dependable sources of legislative intent are the reports of the responsible committees. Because Title IX is the result of a floor amendment, there is no explanation of its meaning in reports from the relevant House and Senate Committees. </s> [Footnote 12 See description of various sections of the Bayh amendment, supra, at 545. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment). </s> The Court argues against the relevance of the portion of Senator Bayh's statement that is inconsistent with its position, characterizing that portion as "inadvertent." See ante, at 526, n. 15. This hardly gives one confidence that the Senator's statements, selectively relied upon by the Court, are not also inadvertent. Moreover, the Court's decision concededly is [456 U.S. 512, 549] based solely on discussion on the floor of the Senate. We note - as evidence of how little that discussion actually supports the Court - that the views of Courts of Appeals judges with respect to its import have ranged from viewing it as indicating no intention to include employment discrimination in Title IX to recognizing that, like most floor debates, the oral statements of Senators must be viewed with skepticism even when not ambiguous. See Seattle University v. HEW, 621 F.2d, at 995; Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 (CA1), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). </s> [Footnote 13 The Court devotes considerable time to describing postenactment actions or inaction on the part of subsequent Congresses. See ante, at 530-535. The fact that, in 1975, Congress considered, but failed to enact, resolutions disapproving HEW's regulations is essentially irrelevant in determining the intent of the enacting Congress in 1972. Similarly, the fact that a subsequent Congress considered, but failed to enact, bills limiting Title IX's coverage with respect to employment discrimination does not indicate that the 1972 Congress meant to include employment discrimination within Title IX. </s> [Footnote 14 It is interesting to note that, whereas Congress itself provided for administrative procedures to redress employment discrimination in Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), it enacted no comparable provisions in Title IX, see 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Such administrative procedures as are available under Title IX are part of the regulations promulgated by HEW, 45 CFR 80.7-80.10 (1980). </s> The administrative procedures enacted by Congress in the United States Code and promulgated by HEW in the Code of Federal Regulations are quite different, though addressing a single problem. The HEW regulations provide for Administrative Procedure Act hearings, followed by judicial review. See 45 CFR 80.9-80.11 (1980). In contrast, EEOC acts first as conciliator, attempting to settle employment disputes, and then, if it so desires, as counsel for the victims of discrimination in subsequent de novo judicial proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 15 An employee could presumably bring actions against the school district under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, seeking redress of his or her wrong in the form of backpay and injunctive relief, and, in addition, request that funds be terminated under Title IX. </s> [Footnote 16 The Court's decision will result in needless duplication of governmental bureaucracy. Although HEW would prefer to have no involvement in employment discrimination, see Brief for Federal Respondents 37, n. 26, it will be required to maintain a staff of employees to enforce the antidiscrimination in employment portion of Title IX. And these employees will duplicate the large staffs of the EEOC and the Department of Labor already devoted to employment discrimination. </s> From the viewpoint of educational institutions, there will now be two sets of federal regulations and regulators overseeing their employment practices. These different governmental departments may, or may not, have the same substantive standards and filing requirements at any given time. At the present time, the HEW and EEOC procedures in the event of noncompliance are quite different. See discussion in text supra, at 552. </s> [Footnote 17 See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (when statute is ambiguous, Court must "draw upon `those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining direction without a compass'") (citation omitted); Fairport R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 595 (1934) (the interpretation that a reasonable Congress would have intended is adopted by the Court); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 456.12, p. 38 (4th ed. 1973) (legislative bodies presumed to act reasonably). See also Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When `interpreting a statute, the court will look not merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law . . .'"). </s> [456 U.S. 512, 556]

United States Supreme Court HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES(1996) No. 94-818 Argued: October 30, 1995Decided: March 4, 1996 </s> Petitioner chemical manufacturers produced the defoliant Agent Orange under contracts with the Federal Government during the Vietnam era. After they incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, tort claims by veterans alleging physical injury from the use of Agent Orange, petitioners filed suits under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on alternative theories of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the Government. The Claims Court granted summary judgment against them and dismissed the complaints. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Petitioners may not recover on their warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. Pp. 5-13. </s> (a) The Tucker Act's grant of jurisdiction to the Claims Court to hear and determine claims against the Government that are founded upon any "express or implied" contract with the United States, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a), extends only to contracts either express or implied in fact, not to claims on contracts implied in law, see, e.g., Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581. Because the contracts at issue do not contain express warranty or indemnification provisions, petitioners must establish that, based on the circumstances at the time of contracting, there was an implied agreement between the parties to provide the undertakings that petitioners allege. Pp. 5-6. </s> (b) Neither an implied contractual warranty of specifications nor United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, the seminal case recognizing a cause of action for breach of such a warranty, extends so far as to render the United States responsible for costs incurred in defending and settling the veterans' tort claims. Where, as here, the Government provides specifications directing how a contract is to be Page II performed, it is logical to infer that the Government warrants that the contractor will be able to perform the contract satisfactorily if it follows the specifications. However, this inference does not support a further inference that would extend the warranty beyond performance to third-party claims against the contractor. Thus, the Spearin claims made by petitioners do not extend to postperformance third-party costs as a matter of law. Pp. 6-8. </s> (c) Although the Government required petitioner Thompson to produce Agent Orange under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) and threat of civil and criminal fines, imposed detailed specifications, had superior knowledge of the hazards, and, to a measurable extent, seized Thompson's processing facilities, these conditions do not give rise to an implied-in-fact agreement to indemnify Thompson for losses to third parties. The Anti-Deficiency Act, which bars federal employees from entering into contracts for future payment of money in advance of, or in excess of, an existing appropriation, 31 U.S.C. 1341, must be viewed as strong evidence that a contracting officer would not have provided, in fact, the contractual indemnification Thompson claims. And, the detailed statutes and regulations that enable such contracting officers to provide indemnity agreements to certain contractors show that implied agreements to indemnify should not be readily inferred. Also contrary to Thompson's argument, the DPA provision specifying that "[n]o person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a[n] . . . order issued pursuant to this Act," 50 U.S.C. App. 2157, does not reveal an intent to indemnify contractors. Likewise, since Thompson claims a breach of warranty by its customer rather than its seller and supplier, it misplaces its reliance on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 . Finally, petitioners' equitable appeal to "simple fairness" is considerably weakened by the fact that the injured veterans could not recover from the Government, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 , and, in any event, may not be entertained by this Court, see United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217-218. Pp. 8-13. </s> 24 F.3d 188, affirmed. </s> REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 1] </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioners in this case incurred substantial costs defending and then settling third-party tort claims arising out of their performance of Government contracts. In this action under the Tucker Act, they sought to recover these costs from the Government on alternate theories of contractual indemnification or warranty of specifications provided by the Government. We hold that they may not do so. </s> When the United States had armed forces stationed in Southeast Asia in the 1960's, it asked several chemical manufacturers, including petitioners Hercules Incorporated (Hercules) and Wm. T. Thompson Company (Thompson), to manufacture and sell it a specific phenoxy herbicide, code-named Agent Orange. The Department of Defense wanted to spray the defoliant in high concentrations on tree and plant life in order to both eliminate the enemy's hiding places and destroy its food supplies. From 1964 to 1968, the Government, pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), 64 Stat. 798, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), entered into a series of fixed-price production contracts with petitioners. The military prescribed the formula and detailed specifications for </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 2] </s> manufacture. The contracts also instructed the suppliers to mark the drums containing the herbicide with a 3-inch orange band with "[n]o further identification as to content." Lodging 30. Petitioners fully complied. </s> In the late 1970's, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against nine manufacturers of Agent Orange, including petitioners. The plaintiffs alleged that the veterans' exposure to dioxin, a toxic by-product found in Agent Orange and believed by many to be hazardous, had caused various health problems. The lawsuits were consolidated in the Eastern District of New York and a class action was certified. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 787-792 (1980). </s> District Judge Pratt awarded petitioners summary judgment on the basis of the Government contractor defense in May 1983. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 565 F. Supp. 1263 (EDNY 1983). Before the judgment was entered, however, the case was transferred to Chief Judge Weinstein, who withdrew Judge Pratt's opinion, ruled that the viability of the Government contractor defense could not be determined before trial, and reinstated petitioners as defendants. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 753 (EDNY 1984). </s> In May 1984, hours before the start of trial, the parties settled. The defendants agreed to create a $180 million settlement fund with each manufacturer contributing on a market-share basis. Hercules' share was $18,772,568, Thompson's was $3,096,597. Petitioners also incurred costs defending these suits exceeding $9 million combined. 1 </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 3] </s> Petitioners want the United States to reimburse them for the costs of defending and settling this litigation. They attempted to recover first in District Court under tort theories of contribution and noncontractual indemnification. Having failed there, 2 they each sued the Government in the United States Claims Court, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1491, and raising various claims sounding in contract. 3 On the Government's motions, the Claims Court granted summary judgment against petitioners and dismissed both complaints. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 616 (1992); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17 (1992). </s> The two cases were consolidated for appeal and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 24 F.3d 188 (1994). The court held that petitioners' claim of implied warranty of specifications </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 4] </s> failed because petitioners could not prove causation between the alleged breach and the damages. The court explained that, had petitioners pursued the class-action litigation to completion, the Government contractor defense would have barred the imposition of tort liability against them. The Government contractor defense, which many courts recognized before the Agent Orange settlement, but which this Court did not consider until afterward, shields contractors from tort liability for products manufactured for the Government in accordance with Government specifications, if the contractor warned the United States about any hazards known to the contractor but not to the Government. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). Because the Court of Appeals believed petitioners could have availed themselves of this defense, the court held that, by settling, petitioners voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible. It also rejected Thompson's claim of contractual indemnification. Thompson had argued that the Government, pursuant to 707 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. App. 2157 (1988 ed.), impliedly promised to indemnify Thompson for any liabilities incurred in performing under the DPA. Not persuaded, the court held that 707 did not create indemnification, but only provided a defense to a suit brought against the contractor by a disgruntled customer whose work order the DPA contract displaced. We granted certiorari, 514 U.S. ___ (1995), and now affirm the judgment below but on different grounds. 4 </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 5] </s> We begin by noting the limits of federal jurisdiction. "[T]he United States, as sovereign, `is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.'" United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). Congress created the Claims Court 5 to permit "a special and limited class of cases" to proceed against the United States, Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69, 75 (1878), and the court "can take cognizance only of those [claims] which by the terms of some act of Congress are committed to it," see Thurston v. United States, 232 U.S. 469, 476 (1914); United States v. Sherwood, supra, at 586-589. The Tucker Act confers upon the court jurisdiction to hear and determine, inter alia, claims against the United States founded upon any "express or implied" contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. 1491(a). </s> We have repeatedly held that this jurisdiction extends only to contracts either express or implied in fact, and not to claims on contracts implied in law. Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581 (1921); Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338, 341 (1925); United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983). Each material term or contractual obligation, as well as the contract as a whole, is subject to this jurisdictional </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 6] </s> limitation. See, e.g., Sutton, supra, at 580-581 (refusing to recognize an implied agreement to pay the fair value of work performed because the term was not "express or implied in fact" in the Government contract for dredging services); Lopez v. A. C. & S., Inc., 858 F.2d 712, 714-715, 716 (CA Fed. 1988) (a Spearin warranty within an asbestos contract must be implied in fact). </s> The distinction between "implied in fact" and "implied in law," and the consequent limitation, is well established in our cases. An agreement implied in fact is "founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923). See also Russell v. United States, 182 U.S. 516, 530 (1901) ("[T]o give the Court of Claims jurisdiction the demand sued on must be founded on a convention between the parties - `a coming together of minds'"). By contrast, an agreement implied in law is a "fiction of law" where "a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty, as to repay money obtained by fraud or duress." Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra, at 597. </s> Petitioners do not contend that their contracts contain express warranty or indemnification provisions. Therefore, for them to prevail, they must establish that, based on the circumstances at the time of contracting, there was an implied agreement between the parties to provide the undertakings that petitioners allege. We consider petitioners' warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims in turn. </s> The seminal case recognizing a cause of action for breach of contractual warranty of specifications is United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918). In that case, Spearin had contracted to build a dry dock in accordance with the Government's plans which called for the </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 7] </s> relocation of a storm sewer. After Spearin had moved the sewer, but before he had completed the dry dock, the sewer broke and caused the site to flood. The United States refused to pay for the damages and annulled the contract. Spearin filed suit to recover the balance due on his work and lost profits. This Court held that "if the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by [the Government], the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specification." Id., at 136. From this, petitioners contend the United States is responsible for costs incurred in defending and settling the third-party tort claims. </s> Neither the warranty nor Spearin extends that far. When the Government provides specifications directing how a contract is to be performed, the Government warrants that the contractor will be able to perform the contract satisfactorily if it follows the specifications. The specifications will not frustrate performance or make it impossible. It is quite logical to infer from the circumstance of one party providing specifications for performance that that party warrants the capability of performance. But this circumstance alone does not support a further inference that would extend the warranty beyond performance to third-party claims against the contractor. In this case, for example, it would be strange to conclude that the United States, understanding the herbicide's military use, actually contemplated a warranty that would extend to sums a manufacturer paid to a third party to settle claims such as are involved in the present action. It seems more likely that the Government would avoid such an obligation, because reimbursement through contract would provide a contractor with what is denied to it through tort law. See Stencel Aero Engineering Co. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 6 </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 8] </s> As an alternative basis for recovery, Thompson contends that the context in which the Government compelled it to manufacture Agent Orange constitutes an implied-in-fact agreement by the Government to indemnify for losses to third parties. 7 The Government required Thompson to produce under authority of the DPA and threat of civil and criminal fines, imposed detailed specifications, had superior knowledge of the hazards, and, to a measurable extent, seized Thompson's processing facilities. Under these conditions, petitioner contends, the contract must be read to include an implied agreement to protect the contractor and indemnify its losses. We cannot agree. </s> The circumstances surrounding the contracting are </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 9] </s> only relevant to the extent that they help us deduce what the parties to the contract agreed to in fact. These conditions here do not, we think, give rise to an implied-in-fact indemnity agreement. 8 There is also reason to think that a contracting officer would not agree to the open-ended indemnification alleged here. The Anti-Deficiency Act bars a federal employee or agency from entering into a contract for future payment of money in advance of, or in excess of, an existing appropriation. 31 U.S.C. 1341. 9 Ordinarily no federal appropriation covers contractors' payments to third-party </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 10] </s> tort claimants in these circumstances, and the Comptroller General has repeatedly ruled that Government procurement agencies may not enter into the type of open-ended indemnity for third-party liability that petitioner Thompson claims to have implicitly received under the Agent Orange contracts. 10 We view the Anti-Deficiency Act, and the contracting officer's presumed knowledge of its prohibition, as strong evidence that the officer would not have provided, in fact, the contractual indemnification Thompson claims. In an effort to avoid the Act's reach, Thompson argues that the Anti-Deficiency Act is not applicable to an implied-in-fact indemnity because such an indemnification is "judicially fashioned" and is "not an express contractual provision." Brief for Petitioners 41. However, "[t]he limitation upon the authority to impose contract obligations upon the United States is as applicable to contracts by implication as it is to those expressly made." Sutton, 256 U.S., at 580 (opinion of Brandeis, J.). </s> When Thompson contracted with the United States, statutory mechanisms existed under which a Government contracting officer could provide an indemnity </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 11] </s> agreement to specified classes of contractors under specified conditions. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. 1431 (1988 ed., Supp. V) (permitting the President, whenever he deems it necessary to facilitate national defense, to authorize Government contracting without regard to other provisions of law regulating the making of contracts; in 1958, the President, in Executive Order No. 10789, delegated this authority to the Department of Defense, provided that the contracts were "within the limits of the amounts appropriated and the contract authorization therefor" and "[p]roper records of all actions taken under the authority" were maintained; in 1971, the President amended the Order to specify the conditions under which indemnification could be provided to defense contractors); 10 U.S.C. 2354 (1956 statute authorizing indemnification provisions in contracts of a military department for research or development); 42 U.S.C. 2210 (indemnity scheme, first enacted in 1957, for liability arising out of a limited class of nuclear incidents, described in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 -67 (1978)). These statutes, set out in meticulous detail and each supported by a panoply of implementing regulations, 11 would be entirely unnecessary if an implied agreement to indemnify could arise from the circumstances of contracting. We will not interpret the DPA contracts so as to render these statutes and regulations superfluous. Cf. Astoria Federal Savings & Loan </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 12] </s> Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991). 12 </s> We find unpersuasive Thompson's argument that 707 of the DPA 13 reveals Congress' intent to hold harmless manufacturers for any liabilities which flow from compliance with an order issued under the DPA. Petitioner reads the provision too broadly. The statute plainly provides immunity, not indemnity. By expressly providing a defense to liability, Congress does not implicitly agree that, if liability is imposed notwithstanding that defense, the Government will reimburse the unlucky defendant. 14 We think petitioner's reliance on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), is likewise misplaced; there, in an action between private parties, we held that the stevedore was liable to the shipowner for the amount the latter paid </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 13] </s> in damages to an injured employee of the former. Here petitioner claims a breach of warranty by its customer, not by its seller and supplier. </s> Perhaps recognizing the weakness of their legal position, petitioners plead "simple fairness," Tr. of Oral Arg. 3, and ask us to "redress the unmistakable inequities," Brief for Petitioners 40. Fairness, of course, is in many respects a comparative concept, and the fact that the veterans who claimed physical injury from the use of Agent Orange could not recover against the Government, see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), considerably weakens petitioners' equitable appeal. But in any event we are constrained by our limited jurisdiction and may not entertain claims "based merely on equitable considerations." United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217-218 (1926). </s> For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Nearly 300 plaintiffs decided to "opt out" of the certified class and to proceed with their claims independent of the class action. After the class action settled, the defendant manufacturers sought and received summary judgment against these plaintiffs. The </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 3] </s> District Court found that the opt-out plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence of a causal connection between the veterans' exposure to Agent Orange and their alleged injuries and that the Government contractor defense barred liability. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (EDNY 1985). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but solely on the basis of the Government contractor defense. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 187, 189 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Krupkin v. Dow Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). </s> [Footnote 2 The District Court dismissed the claims, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, supra, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The appeals court found first that Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), precluded such recovery and second that "well-established principles of tort law" would not recognize contribution and indemnity where the underlying claims that settled "were without merit." In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, supra, at 207. </s> [Footnote 3 Thompson also raised in its amended complaint a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but subsequently abandoned that claim while still in the Claims Court. Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17, 22, n. 6 (1992). </s> [Footnote 4 JUSTICE BREYER dissent does not distinguish between, or separately address, the warranty-of-specifications and contractual-indemnification claims. The dissent further observes that petitioners "also set forth" a third "much more general fact-based claim." Post, at 6. This third claim, we believe, is indistinguishable from the contractual-indemnification </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 5] </s> claim that Thompson (but not Hercules) has raised, and which we address. To the extent that it differs from a claim for contractual indemnification, we decline to consider it; such a claim was neither presented to the Court of Appeals nor argued in the briefs to this Court. </s> [Footnote 5 Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, the newly created Claims Court inherited substantially all of the trial court jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. 96 Stat. 25. In 1992, Congress changed the title of the Claims Court and it is now the United States Court of Federal Claims. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 4506. Because the most recent change went into effect after that court rendered its decision in this case, we shall refer to it as the Claims Court throughout this opinion. </s> [Footnote 6 JUSTICE BREYER asserts, post, at 11, that "the majority . . . impl[ies] that a 1960's contracting officer would not have accepted an indemnification provision because of Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977)." The case is cited not for such an implication, but to provide added support for our decision not to extend the warranty-of-specification claim beyond performance. Although we decided Stencel after the formation of the Agent Orange contracts, we observed in that opinion that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1964 had adopted the position we would hold in Stencel, and that decisions inconsistent with that view began to arise in the Circuits only in 1972. Stencel, 431 U.S., at 669 , n. 6 (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (CA9 1964), and Barr v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464 F.2d 1141, 1143-1144 (CA10 1972)). Therefore, when the contracts at issue were drafted, Wiener at the very least suggested that the Government would not be liable under a tort theory. </s> [Footnote 7 Hercules did not plead contractual indemnification in its complaint or raise the claim in the Court of Appeals. Indeed, in the Claims Court, Hercules expressly disavowed having raised any contractual indemnification claim. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Government's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment 55 ("Hercules' claims for relief all are based on breaches of contractual duties; they are not claims that the Government has impliedly or expressly agreed to indemnify Hercules for open-ended liabilities"). </s> [Footnote 8 JUSTICE BREYER argues that the record before us does not permit us to find, as we do, that the conditions asserted do not support the inference that the contracting parties had a meeting of the minds and in fact agreed that the United States would indemnify. If JUSTICE BREYER is suggesting that the petitioners need further discovery to develop claims alleged in the complaints and not to some unarticulated third claim, see supra, n. 4; post, at 6-7), we believe his plea for further discovery must necessarily apply only to Thompson's contractual indemnification claim; we hold in this case that the Spearin claims made by both petitioners do not extend to postperformance third-party costs as a matter of law. See supra, at 7. In any event, JUSTICE BREYER fails to explain what facts are needed, or might be developed, which would place a court on remand in a better position than where we sit today. We take all factual allegations as true and still find them inadequate. In addition, we are skeptical that any material information regarding these 30-year-old transactions remains undisclosed, yet still discoverable. Hercules, and presumably Thompson, had access to all discovery materials (including thousands of documents and scores of depositions) produced during the Agent Orange class-action litigation. See Motion of United States for a Protective Order Staying Discovery in No. 90-496 (Cl. Ct.), pp. 1, 3-4, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 9 The Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341, provides: </s> "(a)(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the District of Columbia government may not - </s> "(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; </s> "(B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law." </s> [Footnote 10 With one peculiar exception that the Comptroller General expressly sanctioned, "the accounting officers of the Government have never issued a decision sanctioning the incurring of an obligation for an open-ended indemnity in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary." In re Assumption by Government of Contractor Liability to Third Persons - Reconsideration, 62 Comp. Gen. 361, 364-365 (1983). JUSTICE BREYER finds our reliance on the Comptroller General problematic because of a Comptroller General opinion that finds capped indemnity agreements not improper. Post, at 8-9. But the Anti-Deficiency Act applies equally to capped indemnification agreements. We do not suggest that all indemnification agreements would violate the Act, cf. supra, at 11 (citing statutes that expressly provide for the creation of indemnity agreements); the Act bars agreements for which there has been no appropriation. We consider open-ended indemnification in particular because that is the kind of agreement involved in this case. </s> [Footnote 11 See, e.g., 48 CFR 235.070 (1994) (specifying criteria for indemnification clauses in Department of Defense research and development contracts); 252.235-7000 to 252.235-7001 (contract language to be used for indemnification under 10 U.S.C. 2354); 32 CFR 7-303.62 (1983) (contract language to be used for indemnification under Pub. L. 85-804, 50 U.S.C. 1431-1435 (1988 ed. and Supp. V)). </s> [Footnote 12 JUSTICE BREYER asserts that, by citing these statutes and regulations, "the majority implies that a contracting officer, in all likelihood, would not have agreed to an implicit promise of indemnity, for doing so would amount to a bypass of" the provisions. Post, at 7. We view the statutes and regulations, which cover different fields of Government contracting, not as implying what a contracting officer might have done with regard to the Agent Orange contracts, but as showing that a promise to indemnify should not be readily inferred. </s> [Footnote 13 Section 707 provides, in relevant part: </s> "No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this Act . . . notwithstanding that any such rule, regulation, or order shall thereafter be declared by judicial or other competent authority to be invalid." 50 U.S.C. App. 2157 (1988 ed.). </s> [Footnote 14 The United States urges us to interpret 707 as only barring liability to customers whose orders are delayed or displaced on account of the priority accorded Government orders under 101 of the DPA, which authorizes the President to require contractors to give preferential treatment to contracts "necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense." 50 U.S.C. App. 2071(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V). We need not decide the scope of 707 in this case because it clearly functions only as an immunity, and provides no hint of a further agreement to indemnify. </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting. </s> The petitioners, two chemical companies, have brought this breach of contract action seeking reimbursement from the Government for their contribution to the settlement of lawsuits brought by Vietnam veterans exposed to their product Agent Orange. The companies argue that their contracts with the Government to produce Agent Orange contain certain promises or warranties that, in effect, hold them harmless. To win this case, as in the most elementary breach of contract case, the companies must show that the Government in fact made the warranties or promises, that the Government breached them, and that the Agent Orange settlement contribution was a consequent foreseeable harm. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 346, 347, 351 (1979); 5 A. Corbin, Contracts 997, 1001, 1002 (1964). </s> The companies concede that the promises, or warranties, are not written explicitly in their contracts; but, the companies intend to prove certain background facts and legal circumstances, which, they say, will show that these promises, or warranties, are an implicit part of the bargain that the parties struck. See 3 id., 538, 551 (common and trade usage, course of dealings, and existing statutes and rules of law are always probative </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 2] </s> as to the meaning of the parties). </s> The background facts alleged include the following: </s> * In the 1960's the Government, by exercising special statutory authority, required the companies to enter into the Agent Orange production contracts over the explicit objection of at least one of the companies. See Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), 50 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V); App. 8-9, 23-24. </s> * The Government required the companies to produce Agent Orange according to precise, detailed production specifications. Ibid. </s> * At that time the Government knew but did not reveal that Agent Orange was defective, or unsafe, to the point where its use might lead to plausible tort claims advanced by those who used it. Id., at 10-11, 25. </s> * The Government specified that the companies could not label Agent Orange in ways that might have promoted its safe use (with, say, dilution instructions), while, at the same time, the Government permitted its soldiers to use Agent Orange in unreasonably risky ways (such as using empty containers for showers or barbecues). Id., at 8-10. </s> The background (1960's) legal circumstances include the following: </s> * United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918), in which this Court approved the common judicial practice of reading Government contracts that provide detailed "plans and specifications," as containing an implied warranty that "the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications." Id., at 136. </s> * Lower court decisions reading Government contracts as containing an implied warranty that performance costs will not increase due to the Government's superior knowledge of undisclosed "vital information" that causes the cost increase. See Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 3] </s> United States, 312 F.2d 774, 777-778, and n. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (collecting cases). </s> * The broad language of the statute that authorized the President to enter into defense procurement contracts - language broad enough to authorize Government promises to indemnify. 50 U.S.C. 1431 (1988 ed., Supp. V); Exec. Order 10789, 3 CFR 426 (1954-1958 Comp.). See also Exec. Order 11610, 3 CFR 594 (1971- 1975 Comp.) (taking view that the statute grants authority to promise indemnification). </s> * The language of the DPA, which, while permitting the Government to place compulsory defense orders, also says that the compelled firms shall not "be held liable for damages . . . for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with" such an "order." 50 U.S.C. App. 2157 (1988 ed.). </s> These background facts and circumstances, say the companies, show that the Government knew far better than they that its Agent Orange contract specifications would force them to produce a risky product for risky use. They add that all parties knew of legal doctrines that made the Government responsible in analogous circumstances for analogous risks. They argue that the Government would not have wanted to force them (under the DPA) to enter into a contract subjecting them (through its specifications) to serious risks of damage, in respect to which (because of the Government's superior knowledge) they could not bargain for compensation. They conclude that the Government, in the contracts, took responsibility for those risks by implicitly promising to assume responsibility for the consequences of specification defects, including indemnification for the settlement of defect-related tort suits. </s> The Federal Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment against the companies. But, in doing so, it did not decide against the companies in respect to their claimed promises. Instead the Federal Circuit assumed </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 4] </s> (reluctantly and for argument's sake) that the companies would be able to prove the existence of the promises, but it went on to hold against them regardless. Even assuming the promises, the Circuit wrote, the companies will not be able to prove causation between promises and damages. The Circuit believed that, had the companies litigated the Agent Orange tort suits instead of settling them, they would have asserted a "government contractor defense," see Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), and thereby won the lawsuits. It concluded that, since the companies could readily have won the suits, the settlement amounts to a "voluntary payment" that cuts any causal link between a broken promise, or warranty, and resulting harm. </s> The companies, in their petition for certiorari and initial brief on the merits, primarily asked us to review, and to reverse, this "no causation" holding. The Court, in today's opinion, does not discuss that holding. Instead it holds that the companies will not be able to prove the existence of the implicit promises. In my view, however, the record before us now does not permit this latter holding. Rather, this Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' "no causation" holding and then remand this case for further proceedings. </s> I need mention only one fatal flaw in the Court of Appeals' "no causation" holding, that of hindsight. The Court of Appeals, in essence, found the companies' Agent Orange settlement so obviously unnecessary, so abnormal, so far removed from ordinary litigation behavior, that it could not have been "foreseeable," see Restatement (Second) of Contracts 351; 5 Corbin, Contracts 1002, or (if I recast the same point in the Court's tort-like "causation" language) that it cut the causal link between promise-breach and harm. But, viewed without the benefit of legal hindsight, the settlement was neither unforeseeable nor was it an intervening "cause" of the loss. </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 5] </s> In 1984, when the companies settled, the settlement was not notably different in terms of reasonableness or motivation from other settlements that terminate major litigation, for at that time the law that might have provided the companies with a defense was far less clear than it is today. I concede that even then some Circuits already had found in the law a "government contractor defense" that, in effect, immunized defense contractors from most suits by servicemen claiming injury from defective products. See McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448-451 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 249-254 (CA3 1982); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599-600 (CA7 1985). But, most of these Circuits had held that the existence of such a defense was a matter of state law, which might differ among the States. See Brown, supra; Tillett, supra; Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1044-1045 (CA5 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985). The Second Circuit, the home of the Agent Orange litigation, had not decided the issue. And, the two Agent Orange Second Circuit trial judges who (due to certain here irrelevant procedural considerations) both considered the companies' "government contractor" defense, decided the issue in opposite ways. Compare In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1274-1275 (EDNY 1983) with In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 847-850 (EDNY 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (CA2 1987), cert denied sub nom. Fraticelli v. Dow Chemical Co., 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). This Court did not authoritatively uphold the "government contractor" </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 6] </s> defense until 1988, four years after the settlement here at issue. Boyle, supra. And, it did so on a ground different from that upon which the Circuit Courts had previously relied. Compare McKay, supra, at 448-451; Tillett, supra, at 596-597 (finding the "government contractor defense" implicit in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)) with Boyle, supra, at 509-511 (explicitly rejecting Feres as the basis for a "government contractor defense"). </s> In light of this contemporaneous legal uncertainty, the settlement, viewed from the companies' perspective and without benefit of hindsight, seems a reasonable litigation strategy, through which the companies avoided added litigation costs and the threat of significant additional liability while helping to provide the veterans with at least some compensation. See In re "Agent Orange," supra, at 749 (explaining why Agent Orange district court approved the settlement). Nothing in the record here suggests the contrary. And, if reasonable at the time, the settlement must have been a "foreseeable" potential consequence of litigation and therefore within the scope of what the companies claim were implicit promises or warranties protecting them against the harms of litigation. See also 24 F.3d 188, 205-208 (CA Fed. 1994) (Plager, C.J., dissenting). For that reason, this Court simply should set aside the Court of Appeals' determination on the point. </s> The Court instead decides this case on an alternative basis, namely, that the companies cannot prove the existence of the implicit promises or warranties that they claim. But the existence of a contractual promise implied in fact is very much a creature of particular circumstance - the particular terms, the negotiating circumstances, and the background understandings of law or industry practice. See 3 Corbin, supra, 562, 566-570. Unlike the majority, which compartmentalizes the companies' claims into several separate doctrinal categories (a "Spearin" claim, an implied indemnification claim) - each rejected separately for doctrine-specific reasons - I believe the companies' submissions, fairly read, also set forth a much more general fact-based claim. In essence, the companies say that the parties, </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 7] </s> when specifying the details of this compulsory defense order, implicitly agreed to allocate to the Government certain risks of defective-government-specification-caused harm - namely those risks for which each company, because of its inferior knowledge, could not seek compensation in the contract price. And, the companies allege background facts that, if true and complete (as we must assume at this stage of the proceedings), make that implication plausible. </s> The legal considerations to which the majority points do not answer the companies' basic implied-in-fact contentions. To do so, the majority would have to argue that the five sets of legal circumstances to which it points, taken separately or together, show that no Government contracting officer would have agreed to a promise or warranty (of the sort claimed); hence, one cannot possibly imply the existence of such a promise "in fact." See 3 id., 561. The majority cannot argue that, because those five sets of circumstances suggest the contrary. </s> First, the majority implies that a contracting officer, in all likelihood, would not have agreed to an implicit promise of indemnity, for doing so would amount to a bypass of, and "render . . . superfluous," the statutes and "panoply of implementing regulations" that set forth specific procedures that contractors must follow to obtain a promise of indemnity. Ante, at ___ (slip op., at 11). My problem with this argument lies in the fact that, in 1964 the relevant statute, Executive Order, and regulations read very differently. At that time, their language was nonspecific or ambiguous on the procedures required for indemnification. The statute has always been phrased in general language, making no explicit reference to indemnification. See 50 U.S.C. 1431 (1988 ed., Supp. V); 50 U.S.C. 1431 (1964 ed.). The portion of the Executive Order that today treats indemnification as special, and sets out procedures for indemnification, </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 8] </s> did not exist in 1964, and the relevant regulations were also either silent or much more ambiguous than they are today. Compare Exec. Order 11610, 3 CFR 594 (1971-1975 Comp.) (indemnification) with Exec. Order 10789, 3 CFR 426 (1954-1958 Comp.) (no specific reference to indemnification); compare 32 CFR 17-301 et seq. (1975) (implementing today's indemnification procedures) with 32 CFR 17-301 et seq. (1964) (no reference to indemnification procedures) and 32 CFR 17.204-4 (1960) ("Informal commitments may be formalized under certain circumstances to permit payment to persons who have taken action without formal contract [e.g., where a person has furnished property or services to the military in good faith reliance on the apparent authority of a person giving an oral instruction]. Formalization of commitments under such circumstances normally will facilitate the national defense by assuring such persons that they will be treated fairly and paid expeditiously"); 32 CFR 17.206(i) (1964) (indemnification contracts must subject Government's obligation to availability of appropriated funds). </s> Second, the majority points to Comptroller General opinions that say that an "open-ended" agreement to indemnify would violate the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341 (1988 ed.). Ante, at ___, and n. 10 (slip op., at 9-10, and n. 10) (citing In re Assumption by Government of Contractor Liability to Third Persons - Reconsideration, 62 Comp. Gen. 361 (1983)). The problem with this argument is that other Comptroller General opinions say that an agreement to indemnify that is not open-ended, but is capped at an amount that a private insurer might have provided, is not improper. See Reimbursement of Costs in Connection with Liabilities to Third Parties for Employees' Negligence, 22 Comp. Gen. 892 (1943). A capped agreement, which, if reflected in the contract price, makes the Government a kind of self-insurer, is in effect within the appropriation </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 9] </s> (because the expenditure of assuming the risk of liability will roughly equal the cost of premiums that the Government saves by self-insuring), and may well prove sufficient for the plaintiffs' purposes. After all, on plaintiffs' factual allegations, a contractor who was as aware of the plaintiffs' alleged risks as was the Government, would have sensed trouble, wanted insurance, and likely have obtained a premium payment sufficient to buy it. The companies need argue only for a capped implicit warranty that would treat the unknowing contractor similarly. See also In re Government Indemnification of Public Utilities Against Loss Arising Out of Sale of Power to Government, 59 Comp. Gen. 705 (1980) (indemnification in contracts with a "sole source" of a good or service lawful under Anti-Deficiency Act). Whether an agreement to spend money beyond that which was appropriated is in writing or not is irrelevant to the Anti-Deficiency Act. </s> Third, the majority distinguishes United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918), on the ground that the implied warranty that Justice Brandeis there discussed protects a contractor from "specifications" that, in the majority's words, will "frustrate performance or make it impossible," but does not "extend . . . beyond performance to third-party claims against the contractor." Ante, at ___ (slip op., at 7). Spearin itself does not make this distinction. Nor have subsequent cases. See Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 551 F.2d 945 (CA5 1977) (allowing recovery against the Government of damages paid by a Government contractor to a third party to which the contractor caused damage by following Government specifications). See also 24 F.3d, at 197 (Spearin holds contractor harmless if the product proves defective). If the Government must pay, say, for the contractor's own machinery destroyed by a (defective-specification-caused) explosion when that destruction frustrates performance, see </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 10] </s> Ordnance Research, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.2d 462, 479 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (treating explosions causing increased costs as a breach of the warranty of specifications), why should the Government not also have to pay when the explosion takes place just after performance is complete? And, why should it not have to reimburse the contractor's payment for identical damage caused his next-door neighbor in the same explosion? In any event, whether or not there are good answers to these questions, they are unlikely to answer plaintiffs' further argument, namely that, even if Spearin does not compel a decision in their favor, it offers indirect support, as background, for implying a promise that would provide (in the particular circumstances) Spearin-like protection. </s> Fourth, the majority says that the Defense Production Act's "hold harmless" provision ("no person shall be held liable for damages . . . for any act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with an order") does not provide for indemnification. Ante, at ___ (slip op., at 12). The petitioners, however, do not claim the contrary. They state explicitly that they "do not attempt to interpret the DPA's hold harmless language as an affirmative indemnity." Reply Brief for Petitioners 2. They add that "an indemnity should be implied from all the circumstances of this case, including the circumstance that petitioners and the Government contracted against the backdrop of the sweeping hold harmless language contained in the DPA." Ibid. They argue simply that the DPA's stated objective - to relieve them of involuntarily created liability - would have led contracting officers in the 1960's (given the parties' uncertainty about future statutory interpretation) to have believed that a contractual "hold harmless" warranty was reasonable in the circumstances, not the contrary. See 3 Corbin, Contracts 551 (existing statutes and rules of law are always evidence of the meaning of the parties). The relevant point is not whether Congress </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 11] </s> intended to indemnify, but the likely effect of the DPA's language (before judicial interpretation limited it to an immunity provision) on what risks contracting officers at the time might have thought the Government was assuming in a forced production contract under the Act. </s> Fifth, both the Federal Circuit, 24 F.3d, at 198, n. 8, and the majority, ante, at ___ (slip op., at 7-8), imply that a 1960's contracting officer would not have accepted an indemnification provision because of Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). That case held (in light of the Feres doctrine providing the Government with immunity from armed services personnel tort suits) that Government contractors, whom armed services personnel had sued in tort, could not, in turn, sue the Government for indemnification. Otherwise a soldier, unable (given Feres) to sue the Government for injury caused, say, by a defective rifle, would sue the rifle manufacturer instead, and the rifle manufacturer would then sue the Government for indemnity, thereby, in a sense, circumventing the immunity that Feres promised the Government. </s> One problem with this argument is that Stencel postdates the formation of the contracts here at issue by about a decade. More importantly Stencel does not involve contractual promises to indemnify a contractor. Rather it concerns an indemnification provided by state tort law. Stencel, supra, at 667-668, nn. 2, 3. And, it nowhere says, or directly implies, that the law prohibits the Government from agreeing, explicitly or implicitly, to indemnify a contractor. Indeed, this Court has explicitly written that it "fail[s] to see how the Stencel holding . . . supports the conclusion that if the Tort Claims Act bars a tort remedy, neither is there a contractual remedy. The absence of Government tort liability has not been thought to bar contractual remedies on implied-in-fact contracts, even in those cases also having elements of a tort." Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. </s> [ HERCULES INC. v. UNITED STATES, ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </s> , 12] </s> United States, 444 U.S. 460, 465 (1980) (per curiam). I agree with the majority insofar as it warns against a court's too easily reading an implicit promise to indemnify a contractor's armed-services-related tort liability; but, then, its words would represent simply a wise caution and not an absolute prohibition. </s> In sum, the companies argue factual circumstances - compelled production, superior knowledge, detailed specifications, and significant defect - which, if true, suggest that a government, dealing in good faith with its contractors, would have agreed to the "implied" promise, particularly in light of legal authorities, known at the time, that offered somewhat similar guarantees to contractors in somewhat similar circumstances. The validity of their claim is likely to turn on the strength of the companies' factual case, as supported by evidence, and upon the details of Government contracting practices in the 1960's - matters not now before us and with which the lower courts are more familiar than are we. </s> The Court today unnecessarily restricts Spearin warranties, and, lacking particular facts at this stage of the proceeding, it relies on statutory circumstances that are common to many Government contracts. I fear that the practical effect of disposing of the companies' claim at this stage of the proceeding will be to make it more difficult, in other cases even if not here, for courts to interpret Government contracts with an eye towards achieving the fair allocation of risks that the parties likely intended. </s> For these reasons, I would remand this case for further proceedings. Page I

United States Supreme Court WOOD v. UNITED STATES(1967) No. 27 Argued: Decided: October 16, 1967 </s> Petitioner before trial filed an affidavit requesting the District Court to assign counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act but the court, without adequate inquiry into petitioner's financial ability to retain counsel, disapproved the request. The Court of Appeals, after granting leave to appeal in forma pauperis, affirmed. Held: The trial court should have explored the possibility that petitioner could afford only partial payment for the services of trial counsel and that counsel be appointed on that basis as permitted by the Act. </s> Certiorari granted; 373 F.2d 894, vacated and remanded. </s> Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack for the United States. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Petitioner was found guilty by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia of refusing to report for civilian employment, in violation of 12 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U.S.C. App. 462. Before trial he filed an affidavit with the court requesting assigned counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The court considered the affidavit, questioned petitioner and disapproved the request. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis, assigned counsel to assist petitioner in his appeal and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari. </s> Before this Court the Solicitor General has conceded that the record does not convincingly show that there [389 U.S. 20, 21] was adequate inquiry into the question of petitioner's financial ability to retain counsel, in that "the trial court should have explored the possibility that petitioner could afford only partial payment for the services of trial counsel and that counsel be appointed on that basis, as the Criminal Justice Act permits (see 18 U.S.C. 3006 (A) (c) and (f))." The Solicitor General urges, however, that there is no basis for believing that petitioner suffered prejudice from the District Court's error, an argument we find unpersuasive. </s> The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the Solicitor General's Memorandum and the relevant criteria of the Criminal Justice Act. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [389 U.S. 20, 22]

United States Supreme Court KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL ASSN. v. DeBENEDICTIS(1987) No. 85-1092 Argued: November 10, 1986Decided: March 9, 1987 </s> Section 4 of Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act) prohibits coal mining that causes subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries. Implementing regulations issued by Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources (DER) require 50% of the coal beneath 4-protected structures to be kept in place to provide surface support, and extend 4's protection to water courses. Section 6 of the Act authorizes the DER to revoke a mining permit if the removal of coal causes damage to a 4-protected structure or area and the operator has not within six months repaired the damage, satisfied any claim arising therefrom, or deposited the sum that repairs will reasonably cost as security. Petitioners, who own or control substantial coal reserves under Act-protected property, filed suit in Federal District Court seeking to enjoin the DER from enforcing the Act and regulations. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Pennsylvania recognizes a separate "support estate" in addition to the surface and mineral estates in land; that approximately 90% of the coal petitioners will mine was severed from surface estates between 1890 and 1920; that petitioners typically acquired waivers of any damages claims that might result from coal removal; that 4, as implemented by the 50% rule, and 6 violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause; and that 6 violates Article I's Contracts Clause. Because petitioners had not yet alleged or proved any specific injury caused by the enforcement of 4 and 6 or the regulations, the only question before the District Court was whether the mere enactment of 4 and 6 and the regulations constituted a taking. The District Court granted DER's motion for summary judgment on this facial challenge. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 , does not control; that the Act does not effect a taking; and that the impairment of private contracts effectuated by the Act was justified by the public interests protected by the Act. [480 U.S. 470, 471] </s> Held: </s> 1. Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of showing that 4 and 6 and the regulations' 50% rule constitute a taking of private property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case because the two factors there considered relevant - the Commonwealth's interest in enacting the law and the extent of the alleged taking - here support the Act's constitutionality. Pp. 481-502. </s> (a) Unlike the statute considered in Pennsylvania Coal, the Act is intended to serve genuine, substantial, and legitimate public interests in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area by minimizing damage to surface areas. None of the indicia of a statute enacted solely for the benefit of private parties identified in Pennsylvania Coal are present here. Petitioners' argument that 6's remedies are unnecessary to satisfy the Act's public purposes because of the Commonwealth's insurance program that reimburses repair costs is not persuasive, since the public purpose is served by deterring mine operators from causing damage in the first place by making them assume financial responsibility. Thus, the Commonwealth has merely exercised its police power to prevent activities that are tantamount to public nuisances. The character of this governmental action leans heavily against finding a taking. Pp. 485-493. </s> (b) The record in this case does not support a finding similar to the one in Pennsylvania Coal that the Act makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, or that there has been undue interference with their investment-backed expectations. Because this case involves only a facial constitutional challenge, such a finding is necessary to establish a taking. However, petitioners have never claimed that their mining operations, or even specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Act was passed; nor is there evidence that mining in any specific location affected by the 50% rule has been unprofitable. In fact, the only relevant evidence is testimony indicating that 4 requires petitioners to leave 27 million tons (less than 2%) of their coal in place. Petitioners' argument that the Commonwealth has effectively appropriated this coal since it has no other useful purpose if not mined fails because the 27 million tons do not constitute a separate segment of property for taking law purposes. The record indicates that only 75% of petitioners' underground coal can be profitably mined in any event, and there is no showing that their reasonable "investment-backed expectations" have been materially affected by the 4-imposed duty. Petitioners' argument that the Act constitutes a taking because it entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate also fails. As a practical matter, the support estate has value only insofar as it is used to exploit another [480 U.S. 470, 472] estate. Thus, the support estate is not a separate segment of property for takings law purposes since it constitutes just one part of the mine operators' bundle of property rights. Because petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking. Moreover, since there is no evidence as to what percentage of petitioners' support estates, either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate, has been affected by the Act, their Takings Clause facial challenge fails. Pp. 493-502. </s> 2. Section 6 does not impair petitioners' contractual agreements in violation of Article I, 10, of the Constitution by denying petitioners their right to hold surface owners to their contractual waivers of liability for surface damage. The Contracts Clause has not been read literally to obliterate valid exercises of the States' police power to protect the public health and welfare. Here, the Commonwealth has a significant and legitimate public interest in preventing subsidence damage to the 4-protected buildings, cemeteries, and water courses, and has determined that the imposition of liability on coal companies is necessary to protect that interest. This determination is entitled to deference because the Commonwealth is not a party to the contracts in question. Thus, the impairment of petitioners' right to enforce the generations-old damages waivers is amply justified by the public purposes served by the Act. Pp. 502-506. </s> 771 F.2d 707, affirmed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 506. </s> Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Michael A. Nemeroff, Carter G. Phillips, Henry McC. Ingram, and Thomas C. Reed. </s> Andrew S. Gordon, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation et al. by Richard B. McGlynn; for the National Coal Association et al. by Harold P. Quinn, Jr.; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robert K. Best, and Lucinda Low Swartz. [480 U.S. 470, 473] </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California ex rel. John K. Van de Kamp et al. by Mr. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, pro se, Richard C. Jacobs, N. Gregory Taylor, and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, Richard M. Frank, and Craig C. Thompson, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: John Steven Clark of Arkansas, Jim Smith of Florida, Corinne K. A. Watanabe of Hawaii, Linley E. Pearson, of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, Stephen H. Sachs of Maryland, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, James E. Tierney of Maine, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Edwin L. Pittman of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Robert Abrams of New York, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Michael Turpin of Oklahoma, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, W. J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, and Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, Beate Bloch, and Robert H. Freilich; and for the Pennsylvania State Grange et al. by K. W. James Rochow. [480 U.S. 470, 473] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that admittedly destroyed "previously existing rights of property and contract." Id., at 413. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes explained: </s> "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. [480 U.S. 470, 474] So the question depends upon the particular facts." Ibid. </s> In that case the "particular facts" led the Court to hold that the Pennsylvania Legislature had gone beyond its constitutional powers when it enacted a statute prohibiting the mining of anthracite coal in a manner that would cause the subsidence of land on which certain structures were located. </s> Now, 65 years later, we address a different set of "particular facts," involving the Pennsylvania Legislature's 1966 conclusion that the Commonwealth's existing mine subsidence legislation had failed to protect the public interest in safety, land conservation, preservation of affected municipalities' tax bases, and land development in the Commonwealth. Based on detailed findings, the legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Subsidence Act or Act), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 1406.1 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1986). Petitioners contend, relying heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania Coal, that 4 and 6 of the Subsidence Act and certain implementing regulations violate the Takings Clause, and that 6 of the Act violates the Contracts Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that Pennsylvania Coal does not control for several reasons and that our subsequent cases make it clear that neither 4 nor 6 is unconstitutional on its face. We agree. </s> I </s> Coal mine subsidence is the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine, including the land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal. This lowering of the strata can have devastating effects. 1 It often causes substantial damage [480 U.S. 470, 475] to foundations, walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and buildings. Subsidence frequently causes sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land difficult or impossible to develop. Its effect on farming has been well documented - many subsided areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause the loss of groundwater and surface ponds. 2 In short, it presents the type of environmental concern that has been the focus of so much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades. 3 </s> Despite what their name may suggest, neither of the "full extraction" mining methods currently used in western Pennsylvania 4 enables miners to extract all subsurface coal; considerable amounts need to be left in the ground to provide access, support, and ventilation to the mines. Additionally, mining companies have long been required by various Pennsylvania laws and regulations, the legitimacy of which is not challenged here, to leave coal in certain areas for public safety reasons. 5 Since 1966, Pennsylvania has placed an additional set of restrictions on the amount of coal that may be [480 U.S. 470, 476] extracted; these restrictions are designed to diminish subsidence and subsidence damage in the vicinity of certain structures and areas. </s> Pennsylvania's Subsidence Act authorizes the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to implement and enforce a comprehensive program to prevent or minimize subsidence and to regulate its consequences. Section 4 of the Subsidence Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1986), prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to three categories of structures that were in place on April 17, 1966: public buildings and noncommercial buildings generally used by the public; dwellings used for human habitation; and cemeteries. 6 Since 1966 the DER has applied [480 U.S. 470, 477] a formula that generally requires 50% of the coal beneath structures protected by 4 to be kept in place as a means of providing surface support. 7 Section 6 of the Subsidence Act, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 1406.6 (Purdon Supp. 1986), authorizes the DER to revoke a mining permit if the removal of coal causes damage to a structure or area protected by 4 and the operator has not within six months either repaired the damage, satisfied any claim arising therefrom, or deposited a sum equal to the reasonable cost of repair with the DER as security. 8 </s> [480 U.S. 470, 478] </s> II </s> In 1982, petitioners filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin officials of the DER from enforcing the Subsidence Act and its implementing regulations. Petitioners are an association of coal mine operators, and four corporations that are engaged, either directly or through affiliates, in underground mining of bituminous coal in western Pennsylvania. The members of the association and the corporate petitioners own, lease, or otherwise control substantial coal reserves beneath the surface of property affected by the Subsidence Act. The defendants in the action, respondents here, are the Secretary of the DER, the Chief of the DER's Division of Mine Subsidence, and the Chief of the DER's Section on Mine Subsidence Regulation. </s> The complaint alleges that Pennsylvania recognizes three separate estates in land: The mineral estate; the surface estate; and the "support estate." Beginning well over 100 years ago, landowners began severing title to underground coal and the right of surface support while retaining or conveying away ownership of the surface estate. It is stipulated that approximately 90% of the coal that is or will be mined by petitioners in western Pennsylvania was severed from the surface in the period between 1890 and 1920. When acquiring or retaining the mineral estate, petitioners or their predecessors typically acquired or retained certain additional rights that would enable them to extract and remove the coal. Thus, they acquired the right to deposit wastes, to provide for drainage and ventilation, and to erect facilities such as tipples, roads, or railroads, on the surface. Additionally, they typically acquired a waiver of any claims for damages that might result from the removal of the coal. </s> In the portions of the complaint that are relevant to us, petitioners alleged that both 4 of the Subsidence Act, as implemented [480 U.S. 470, 479] by the 50% rule, and 6 of the Subsidence Act, constitute a taking of their private property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also alleged that 6 impairs their contractual agreements in violation of Article I, 10, of the Constitution. 9 The parties entered into a stipulation of facts pertaining to petitioners' facial challenge, and filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the facial challenge. The District Court granted respondents' motion. </s> In rejecting petitioners' Takings Clause claim, the District Court first distinguished Pennsylvania Coal, primarily on the ground that the Subsidence Act served valid public purposes that the Court had found lacking in the earlier case. 581 F. Supp. 511, 516 (1984). The District Court found that the restriction on the use of petitioners' property was an exercise of the Commonwealth's police power, justified by Pennsylvania's interest in the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. In answer to petitioners' argument that the Subsidence Act effectuated a taking because a separate, recognized interest in realty - the support estate - had been entirely destroyed, the District Court concluded that under Pennsylvania law the support estate consists of a bundle of rights, including some that were not affected by the Act. That the right to cause damage to the surface may constitute the most valuable "strand" in the bundle of rights possessed by the owner of a support estate was not considered controlling under our decision in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). </s> In rejecting petitioners' Contracts Clause claim, the District Court noted that there was no contention that the Subsidence [480 U.S. 470, 480] Act or the DER regulations had impaired any contract to which the Commonwealth was a party. Since only private contractual obligations had been impaired, the court considered it appropriate to defer to the legislature's determinations concerning the public purposes served by the legislation. The court found that the adjustment of the rights of the contracting parties was tailored to those "significant and legitimate" public purposes. 581 F. Supp., at 514. At the parties' request, the District Court certified the facial challenge for appeal. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Pennsylvania Coal does not control because the Subsidence Act is a legitimate means of "protect[ing] the environment of the Commonwealth, its economic future, and its well-being." 771 F.2d 707, 715 (1985). The Court of Appeals' analysis of the Subsidence Act's effect on petitioners' property differed somewhat from the District Court's, however. In rejecting the argument that the support estate had been entirely destroyed, the Court of Appeals did not rely on the fact that the support estate itself constitutes a bundle of many rights, but rather considered the support estate as just one segment of a larger bundle of rights that invariably includes either the surface estate or the mineral estate. As Judge Adams explained: </s> "To focus upon the support estate separately when assessing the diminution of the value of plaintiffs' property caused by the Subsidence Act therefore would serve little purpose. The support estate is more properly viewed as only one `strand' in the plaintiff's `bundle' of property rights, which also includes the mineral estate. As the Court stated in Andrus, `[t]he destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.' 444 U.S. at 65. . . . The use to which the mine operators wish to put the support estate is forbidden. However, because the plaintiffs still possess valuable mineral rights that enable [480 U.S. 470, 481] them profitably to mine coal, subject only to the Subsidence Act's requirement that they prevent subsidence, their entire `bundle' of property rights has not been destroyed." Id., at 716. </s> With respect to the Contracts Clause claim, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a higher degree of deference should be afforded to legislative determinations respecting economic and social legislation affecting wholly private contracts than when the State impairs its own agreements. The court held that the impairment of private agreements effectuated by the Subsidence Act was justified by the legislative finding "that subsidence damage devastated many surface structures and thus endangered the health, safety, and economic welfare of the Commonwealth and its people." Id., at 718. We granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1080 (1986), and now affirm. </s> III </s> Petitioners assert that disposition of their takings claim 10 calls for no more than a straightforward application of the Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Although there are some obvious similarities between the cases, we agree with the Court of Appeals and the District Court that the similarities are far less significant than the differences, and that Pennsylvania Coal does not control this case. </s> In Pennsylvania Coal, the Pennsylvania Coal Company had served notice on Mr. and Mrs. Mahon that the company's mining operations beneath their premises would soon reach a point that would cause subsidence to the surface. The Mahons filed a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the coal company from removing any coal that would cause "the caving in, collapse [480 U.S. 470, 482] or subsidence" of their dwelling. The bill acknowledged that the Mahons owned only "the surface or right of soil" in the lot, and that the coal company had reserved the right to remove the coal without any liability to the owner of the surface estate. Nonetheless, the Mahons asserted that Pennsylvania's then recently enacted Kohler Act of 1921, P. L. 1198, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 661 et seq. (Purdon 1966), which prohibited mining that caused subsidence under certain structures, entitled them to an injunction. </s> After initially having entered a preliminary injunction pending a hearing on the merits, the Chancellor soon dissolved it, observing: </s> "[T]he plaintiffs' bill contains no averment on which to base by implication or otherwise any finding of fact that any interest public or private is involved in the defendant's proposal to mine the coal except the private interest of the plaintiffs in the prevention of private injury." Tr. of Record in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, O. T. 1922, No. 549, p. 23. </s> The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Kohler Act was a proper exercise of the police power. 274 Pa. 489, 118 A. 491 (1922). One Justice dissented. He concluded that the Kohler Act was not actually intended to protect lives and safety, but rather was special legislation enacted for the sole benefit of the surface owners who had released their right to support. Id., at 512-518, 118 A., at 499-501. </s> The company promptly appealed to this Court, asserting that the impact of the statute was so severe that "a serious shortage of domestic fuel is threatened." Motion to Advance for Argument in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, O. T. 1922, No. 549, p. 3. The company explained that until the Court ruled, "no anthracite coal which is likely to cause surface subsidence can be mined," and that strikes were threatened [480 U.S. 470, 483] throughout the anthracite coal fields. 11 In its argument in this Court, the company contended that the Kohler Act was not a bona fide exercise of the police power, but in reality was nothing more than "`robbery under the forms of law'" because its purpose was "not to protect the lives or safety of the public generally but merely to augment the property rights of a favored few." See 260 U.S., at 396 -398, quoting Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 664 (1875). </s> Over Justice Brandeis' dissent, this Court accepted the company's argument. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes first characteristically decided the specific case at hand in a single, terse paragraph: </s> "This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase and sale and in all that happens within the commonwealth. Some existing rights may be modified even in such a case. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368. But usually in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not warrant much of this kind of interference. A source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The damage is not common or public. Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95, 103. The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal. Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety. That could be provided for by notice. Indeed the very foundation of this bill is that the defendant gave timely notice of its intent to mine under the house. On the other hand the extent of the taking is great. It purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate [480 U.S. 470, 484] in land - a very valuable estate - and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract hitherto binding the plaintiffs. If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." 260 U.S., at 413 -414. </s> Then - uncharacteristically - Justice Holmes provided the parties with an advisory opinion discussing "the general validity of the Act." 12 In the advisory portion of the Court's opinion, Justice Holmes rested on two propositions, both critical to the Court's decision. First, because it served only private interests, not health or safety, the Kohler Act could not be "sustained as an exercise of the police power." Id., at 414. Second, the statute made it "commercially impracticable" to mine "certain coal" in the areas affected by the Kohler Act. 13 </s> The holdings and assumptions of the Court in Pennsylvania Coal provide obvious and necessary reasons for distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal from the case before us today. [480 U.S. 470, 485] The two factors that the Court considered relevant, have become integral parts of our takings analysis. We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Application of these tests to petitioners' challenge demonstrates that they have not satisfied their burden of showing that the Subsidence Act constitutes a taking. First, unlike the Kohler Act, the character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare. Second, there is no record in this case to support a finding, similar to the one the Court made in Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act makes it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business, or that there has been undue interference with their investment-backed expectations. </s> The Public Purpose </s> Unlike the Kohler Act, which was passed upon in Pennsylvania Coal, the Subsidence Act does not merely involve a balancing of the private economic interests of coal companies against the private interests of the surface owners. The Pennsylvania Legislature specifically found that important public interests are served by enforcing a policy that is designed to minimize subsidence in certain areas. Section 2 of the Subsidence Act provides: </s> "This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of surface land areas which may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal by methods other than `open pit' or [480 U.S. 470, 486] `strip' mining, to aid in the protection of the safety of the public, to enhance the value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface water drainage and public water supplies and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such lands and to maintain primary jurisdiction over surface coal mining in Pennsylvania." Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986). </s> The District Court and the Court of Appeals were both convinced that the legislative purposes 14 set forth in the statute were genuine, substantial, and legitimate, and we have no reason to conclude otherwise. 15 </s> None of the indicia of a statute enacted solely for the benefit of private parties identified in Justice Holmes' opinion are present here. First, Justice Holmes explained that the Kohler Act was a "private benefit" statute since it "ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal." 260 U.S., at 414 . The Subsidence Act, by contrast, has no such exception. The current surface owner may only waive the protection of the Act if the DER consents. See 25 Pa. Code 89.145(b) (1983). Moreover, the Court was forced to reject the Commonwealth's safety justification for the Kohler Act because it found that the Commonwealth's interest in safety could as easily have been accomplished through a notice requirement to landowners. The Subsidence Act, by contrast, is designed to accomplish a number of widely varying interests, with reference to which petitioners have not suggested alternative methods through which the Commonwealth could proceed. </s> Petitioners argue that at least 6, which requires coal companies to repair subsidence damage or pay damages to those [480 U.S. 470, 487] who suffer subsidence damage, is unnecessary because the Commonwealth administers an insurance program that adequately reimburses surface owners for the cost of repairing their property. But this argument rests on the mistaken premise that the statute was motivated by a desire to protect private parties. In fact, however, the public purpose that motivated the enactment of the legislation is served by preventing the damage from occurring in the first place - in the words of the statute - "by providing for the conservation of surface land areas." Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The requirement that the mine operator assume the financial responsibility for the repair of damaged structures deters the operator from causing the damage at all - the Commonwealth's main goal - whereas an insurance program would merely reimburse the surface owner after the damage occurs. 16 </s> Thus, the Subsidence Act differs from the Kohler Act in critical and dispositive respects. With regard to the Kohler Act, the Court believed that the Commonwealth had acted only to ensure against damage to some private landowners' homes. Justice Holmes stated that if the private individuals needed support for their structures, they should not have [480 U.S. 470, 488] "take[n] the risk of acquiring only surface rights." 260 U.S., at 416 . Here, by contrast, the Commonwealth is acting to protect the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. That private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nuisance. The Subsidence Act is a prime example that "circumstances may so change in time . . . as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at other times . . . would be a matter of purely private concern." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921). </s> In Pennsylvania Coal the Court recognized that the nature of the State's interest in the regulation is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred, and thus whether compensation is required. 17 The Court distinguished the case before it from a case it had decided eight years earlier, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914). There, "it was held competent for the legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left along the line of adjoining property." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S., at 415 . Justice Holmes explained that unlike the Kohler Act, the statute challenged in Plymouth Coal dealt with "a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of various laws." 260 U.S., at 415 . </s> Many cases before and since Pennsylvania Coal have recognized that the nature of the State's action is critical in takings analysis. 18 In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 </s> [480 U.S. 470, 489] (1887), for example, a Kansas distiller who had built a brewery while it was legal to do so challenged a Kansas constitutional amendment which prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. Although the Court recognized that the "buildings and machinery constituting these breweries are of little value" because of the Amendment, id., at 657, Justice Harlan explained that a </s> "prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or appropriation of property . . . . The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not - and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society cannot be - burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community." Id., at 668-669. [480 U.S. 470, 490] </s> See also Plymouth Coal Co., supra; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). </s> We reject petitioners' implicit assertion that Pennsylvania Coal overruled these cases which focused so heavily on the nature of the State's interest in the regulation. Just five years after the Pennsylvania Coal decision, Justice Holmes joined the Court's unanimous decision in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), holding that the Takings Clause did not require the State of Virginia to compensate the owners of cedar trees for the value of the trees that the State had ordered destroyed. The trees needed to be destroyed to prevent a disease from spreading to nearby apple orchards, which represented a far more valuable resource. In upholding the state action, the Court did not consider it necessary to "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute." Id., at 280. Rather, it was clear that the State's exercise of its police power to prevent the impending danger was justified, and did not require compensation. See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 509 (1923). Other subsequent cases reaffirm the important role that the nature of the state action plays in our takings analysis. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, appeal dism'd, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). As the Court explained in Goldblatt: "Although a comparison of values before and after" a regulatory action "is relevant, . . . it is by no means conclusive . . . ." 369 U.S., at 594 . 19 </s> [480 U.S. 470, 491] </s> The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the notion of "reciprocity of advantage" that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal. 20 Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others. 21 See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 144 -150 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); cf. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 322 (1905). These restrictions are "properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship." Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). Long ago it was recognized that "all property in [480 U.S. 470, 492] this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community," Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S., at 665 ; see also Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1878), and the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it. 22 See Mugler, 123 U.S., at 664 . </s> In Agins v. Tiburon, we explained that the "determination that governmental action constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest," and we recognized that this question "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests." 447 U.S., at 260 -261. As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the public interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a substantial one, which in many instances has not required compensation. The Subsidence Act, unlike the Kohler Act, plainly seeks to further such an interest. Nonetheless, we need not rest our decision on this factor alone, because petitioners have also failed to make a [480 U.S. 470, 493] showing of diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our other regulatory takings cases. </s> Diminution of Value and Investment-Backed Expectations </s> The second factor that distinguishes this case from Pennsylvania Coal is the finding in that case that the Kohler Act made mining of "certain coal" commercially impracticable. In this case, by contrast, petitioners have not shown any deprivation significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking. For this reason, their takings claim must fail. </s> In addressing petitioners' claim we must not disregard the posture in which this case comes before us. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents only on the facial challenge to the Subsidence Act. The court explained that "[b]ecause plaintiffs have not alleged any injury due to the enforcement of the statute, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific provisions and regulations. Thus, the only question before this court is whether the mere enactment of the statutes and regulations constitutes a taking." 581 F. Supp., at 513 (emphasis added). The next phase of the case was to be petitioners' presentation of evidence about the actual effects the Subsidence Act had and would have on them. Instead of proceeding in this manner, however, the parties filed a joint motion asking the court to certify the facial challenge for appeal. The parties explained that an assessment of the actual impact that the Act has on petitioners' operations "will involve complex and voluminous proofs," which neither party was currently in a position to present, App. 15-17, and stressed that if an appellate court were to reverse the District Court on the facial challenge, then all of their expenditures in adjudicating the as-applied challenge would be wasted. Based [480 U.S. 470, 494] on these considerations, the District Court certified three questions relating to the facial challenge. 23 </s> The posture of the case is critical because we have recognized an important distinction between a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that the particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property requires the payment of just compensation. This point is illustrated by our decision in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), in which we rejected a preenforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. We concluded that the District Court had been mistaken in its reliance on Pennsylvania Coal as support for a holding that two statutory provisions were unconstitutional because they deprived coal mine operators of the use of their land. The Court explained: </s> "[T]he court below ignored this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 -575, 584 (1947); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). Adherence to this rule is particularly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitutional taking of private property. Just last Term, we reaffirmed: [480 U.S. 470, 495] </s> "`[T]his Court has generally "been unable to develop any `set formula' for determining when `justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors - such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action - that have particular significance.' Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (citations omitted). </s> "These `ad hoc, factual inquiries' must be conducted with respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique circumstances. </s> "Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge, it presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to particular surface mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land. Thus, the only issue properly before the District Court and, in turn, this Court, is whether the `mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The test to be applied in considering this facial challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it `denies an owner economically viable use of his land . . . .' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260; see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)." 452 U.S., at 295 -296. </s> Petitioners thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on the Act as a taking. </s> The hill is made especially steep because petitioners have not claimed, at this stage, that the Act makes it commercially [480 U.S. 470, 496] impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania. Indeed, petitioners have not even pointed to a single mine that can no longer be mined for profit. The only evidence available on the effect that the Subsidence Act has had on petitioners' mining operations comes from petitioners' answers to respondents' interrogatories. Petitioners described the effect that the Subsidence Act had from 1966-1982 on 13 mines that the various companies operate, and claimed that they have been required to leave a bit less than 27 million tons of coal in place to support 4 areas. The total coal in those 13 mines amounts to over 1.46 billion tons. See App. 284. Thus 4 requires them to leave less than 2% of their coal in place. 24 But, as we have indicated, nowhere near all of the underground coal is extractable even aside from the Subsidence Act. The categories of coal that must be left for 4 purposes and other purposes are not necessarily distinct sets, and there is no information in the record as to how much coal is actually left in the ground solely because of 4. We do know, however, that petitioners have never claimed that their mining operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was passed. Nor is there evidence that mining in any specific location affected by the 50% rule has been unprofitable. </s> Instead, petitioners have sought to narrowly define certain segments of their property and assert that, when so defined, the Subsidence Act denies them economically viable use. They advance two alternative ways of carving their property in order to reach this conclusion. First, they focus on the specific tons of coal that they must leave in the ground under [480 U.S. 470, 497] the Subsidence Act, and argue that the Commonwealth has effectively appropriated this coal since it has no other useful purpose if not mined. Second, they contend that the Commonwealth has taken their separate legal interest in property - the "support estate." </s> Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property "whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction." Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967). 25 In Penn Central the Court explained: </s> "`Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole - here the city tax block designated as the `landmark site.'" 438 U.S., at 130 -131. </s> Similarly, in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), we held that "where an owner possesses a full `bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one `strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id., at 65-66. Although these verbal formulizations do not solve all of the definitional issues that may arise in defining the relevant mass of property, they do provide sufficient guidance to compel us to reject petitioners' arguments. [480 U.S. 470, 498] </s> The Coal in Place </s> The parties have stipulated that enforcement of the DER's 50% rule will require petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place. Because they own that coal but cannot mine it, they contend that Pennsylvania has appropriated it for the public purposes described in the Subsidence Act. </s> This argument fails for the reason explained in Penn Central and Andrus. The 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes. Many zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's right to make profitable use of some segments of his property. A requirement that a building occupy no more than a specified percentage of the lot on which it is located could be characterized as a taking of the vacant area as readily as the requirement that coal pillars be left in place. Similarly, under petitioners' theory one could always argue that a setback ordinance requiring that no structure be built within a certain distance from the property line constitutes a taking because the footage represents a distinct segment of property for takings law purposes. Cf. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding validity of setback ordinance) (Sutherland, J.). There is no basis for treating the less than 2% of petitioners' coal as a separate parcel of property. </s> We do not consider Justice Holmes' statement that the Kohler Act made mining of "certain coal" commercially impracticable as requiring us to focus on the individual pillars of coal that must be left in place. That statement is best understood as referring to the Pennsylvania Coal Company's assertion that it could not undertake profitable anthracite coal mining in light of the Kohler Act. There were strong assertions in the record to support that conclusion. For example, the coal company claimed that one company was "unable to operate six large collieries in the city of Scranton, employing more than five thousand men." Motion to Advance for Argument [480 U.S. 470, 499] in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, O. T. 1922, No. 549, p. 2. 26 As Judge Adams explained: </s> "At first blush, this language seems to suggest that the Court would have found a taking no matter how little of the defendants' coal was rendered unmineable - that because `certain' coal was no longer accessible, there had been a taking of that coal. However, when one reads the sentence in context, it becomes clear that the Court's concern was with whether the defendants' `right to mine coal . . . [could] be exercised with profit.' 260 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added). . . . Thus, the Court's holding in Mahon must be assumed to have been based on its understanding that the Kohler Act rendered the business of mining coal unprofitable." 771 F.2d, at 716, n. 6. </s> When the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in the context of any reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and financial-backed expectations, it is plain that petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden of proving that they have been denied the economically viable use of that property. The record indicates that only about 75% of petitioners' underground coal can be profitably mined in any event, and there is no showing that petitioners' reasonable "investment-backed expectations" have been materially affected by the additional duty to retain the small percentage that must be used to support the structures protected by 4. 27 </s> [480 U.S. 470, 500] </s> The Support Estate </s> Pennsylvania property law is apparently unique in regarding the support estate as a separate interest in land that can be conveyed apart from either the mineral estate or the surface estate. 28 Petitioners therefore argue that even if comparable legislation in another State would not constitute a taking, the Subsidence Act has that consequence because it entirely destroys the value of their unique support estate. It is clear, however, that our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property rights. For example, in Penn Central, the Court rejected the argument that the "air rights" above the terminal constituted a separate segment of property for Takings Clause purposes. 438 U.S., at 130 . Likewise, in Andrus v. Allard, we viewed the right to sell property as just one element of the owner's property interest. 444 U.S., at 65 -66. In neither case did the result turn on whether state law allowed the separate sale of the segment of property. </s> The Court of Appeals, which is more familiar with Pennsylvania law than we are, concluded that as a practical matter the support estate is always owned by either the owner of the surface or the owner of the minerals. It stated: </s> "The support estate consists of the right to remove the strata of coal and earth that undergird the surface or to leave those layers intact to support the surface and prevent subsidence. These two uses cannot co-exist and, depending upon the purposes of the owner of the support [480 U.S. 470, 501] estate, one use or the other must be chosen. If the owner is a mine operator, the support estate is used to exploit the mineral estate. When the right of support is held by the surface owner, its use is to support that surface and prevent subsidence. Thus, although Pennsylvania law does recognize the support estate as a `separate' property interest, id., it cannot be used profitably by one who does not also possess either the mineral estate or the surface estate. See Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and the `Third Estate in Pennsylvania,' 25 Temple L. Q. 1, 21 (1951)." 771 F.2d, at 715-716. </s> Thus, in practical terms, the support estate has value only insofar as it protects or enhances the value of the estate with which it is associated. Its value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface. Because petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all of the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking. Petitioners may continue to mine coal profitably even if they may not destroy or damage surface structures at will in the process. </s> But even if we were to accept petitioners' invitation to view the support estate as a distinct segment of property for "takings" purposes, they have not satisfied their heavy burden of sustaining a facial challenge to the Act. Petitioners have acquired or retained the support estate for a great deal of land, only part of which is protected under the Subsidence Act, which, of course, deals with subsidence in the immediate vicinity of certain structures, bodies of water, and cemeteries. See n. 6, supra. The record is devoid of any evidence on what percentage of the purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate, has been affected by the Act. Under these circumstances, petitioners' [480 U.S. 470, 502] facial attack under the Takings Clause must surely fail. 29 </s> IV </s> In addition to their challenge under the Takings Clause, petitioners assert that 6 of the Subsidence Act violates the Contracts Clause by not allowing them to hold the surface owners to their contractual waiver of liability for surface damage. Here too, we agree with the Court of Appeals and the District Court that the Commonwealth's strong public interests in the legislation are more than adequate to justify the impact of the statute on petitioners' contractual agreements. </s> Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was Article I, 10, that provided the primary constitutional check on state legislative power. The first sentence of that section provides: </s> "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold or silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. Const., Art. I, 10. </s> Unlike other provisions in the section, it is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not to be read literally. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934). The context in which the Contracts Clause is found, the historical setting in which it was [480 U.S. 470, 503] adopted, 30 and our cases construing the Clause, indicate that its primary focus was upon legislation that was designed to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships that obligors were unable to satisfy. See e. g., ibid.; Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Even in such cases, the Court has refused to give the Clause a literal reading. Thus, in the landmark case of Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, the Court upheld Minnesota's statutory moratorium against home foreclosures, in part, because the legislation was addressed to the "legitimate end" of protecting "a basic interest of society," and not just for the advantage of some favored group. Id., at 445. </s> As Justice Stewart explained: </s> "[I]t is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States. `It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.' Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 . As Mr. Justice [480 U.S. 470, 504] Holmes succinctly put the matter in his opinion for the Court in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 : `One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.'" Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 -242 (1978). </s> In assessing the validity of petitioners' Contracts Clause claim in this case, we begin by identifying the precise contractual right that has been impaired and the nature of the statutory impairment. Petitioners claim that they obtained damages waivers for a large percentage of the land surface protected by the Subsidence Act, but that the Act removes the surface owners' contractual obligations to waive damages. We agree that the statute operates as "a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship," id., at 244, and therefore proceed to the asserted justifications for the impairment. 31 </s> The record indicates that since 1966 petitioners have conducted mining operations under approximately 14,000 structures protected by the Subsidence Act. It is not clear whether that number includes the cemeteries and water courses under which mining has been conducted. In any event, it is petitioners' position that, because they contracted [480 U.S. 470, 505] with some previous owners of property generations ago, 32 they have a constitutionally protected legal right to conduct their mining operations in a way that would make a shambles of all those buildings and cemeteries. As we have discussed, the Commonwealth has a strong public interest in preventing this type of harm, the environmental effect of which transcends any private agreement between contracting parties. </s> Of course, the finding of a significant and legitimate public purpose is not, by itself, enough to justify the impairment of contractual obligations. A court must also satisfy itself that the legislature's "adjustment of `the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.'" Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983) (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). But, we have repeatedly held that unless the State is itself a contracting party, courts should "`properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.'" Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S., at 413 (quoting United States Trust Co., 431 U.S., at 23 ). [480 U.S. 470, 506] </s> As we explained more fully above, the Subsidence Act plainly survives scrutiny under our standards for evaluating impairments of private contracts. 33 The Commonwealth has determined that in order to deter mining practices that could have severe effects on the surface, it is not enough to set out guidelines and impose restrictions, but that imposition of liability is necessary. By requiring the coal companies either to repair the damage or to give the surface owner funds to repair the damage, the Commonwealth accomplishes both deterrence and restoration of the environment to its previous condition. We refuse to second-guess the Commonwealth's determinations that these are the most appropriate ways of dealing with the problem. We conclude, therefore, that the impairment of petitioners' right to enforce the damages waivers is amply justified by the public purposes served by the Subsidence Act. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See generally Department of the Interior, Lee & Abel, Subsidence from Underground Mining: Environmental Analysis and Planning Considerations, Geological Survey Circular 2-12, p. 876 (1983); P. Mavrolas & M. Schechtman, Coal Mine Subsidence 6-8 (1981); Blazey & Strain, Deep Mine Subsidence - State Law and the Federal Response, 1 Eastern Mineral Law Foundation 1.01, pp. 1-5 (1980); Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Moebs, Subsidence Over Four Room-and-Pillar Sections in South-western [480 U.S. 470, 475] Pennsylvania, R18645 (1982); H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, p. 126 (1977). </s> [Footnote 2 "Wherever [subsidence effects] extend, damage can occur to buildings, roads, pipelines, cables, streams, water impoundments, wells, and aquifers. Buildings can be cracked or tilted; roads can be lowered or cracked; streams, water impoundments, and aquifers can all be drained into the underground excavations. Oil and gas wells can be severed, causing their contents to migrate into underground mines, into aquifers, and even into residential basements. Sewage lines, gas lines, and water lines can all be severed, as can telephone and electric cables." Blazey & Strain, supra, 1.01 2.. </s> [Footnote 3 Indeed, in 1977, Congress passed the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq., which includes regulation of subsidence caused by underground coal mining. See 30 U.S.C. 1266. </s> [Footnote 4 The two "full extraction" coal mining methods in use in western Pennsylvania are the room and pillar method, and the longwall method. App. 90-91. </s> [Footnote 5 For example, Pennsylvania law requires that coal beneath and adjacent to certain large surface bodies of water be left in place. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 3101 et seq. (Purdon 1966). </s> [Footnote 6 Section 4 provides: </s> "Protection of surface structures against damage from cave-in, collapse, or subsidence </s> "In order to guard the health, safety and general welfare of the public, no owner, operator, lessor, lessee, or general manager, superintendent or other person in charge of or having supervision over any bituminous coal mine shall mine bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a result of the caving-in, collapse or subsidence of the following surface structures in place on April 27, 1966, overlying or in the proximity of the mine: </s> "(1) Any public building or any noncommercial structure customarily used by the public, including but not being limited to churches, schools, hospitals, and municipal utilities or municipal public service operations. </s> "(2) Any dwelling used for human habitation; and </s> "(3) Any cemetery or public burial ground; unless the current owner of the structure consents and the resulting damage is fully repaired or compensated." </s> In response to the enactment in 1977 of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 91 Stat. 445, 30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq., and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior in 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 14902, the Pennsylvania DER adopted new regulations extending the statutory protection to additional classes of buildings and surface features. Particularly: </s> "(a)(1) public buildings and non-commercial buildings customarily used by the public [after April 27, 1966], including churches, schools, hospitals, courthouses, and government offices; </s> . . . . . [480 U.S. 470, 477] </s> "(4) perennial streams and impoundments of water with the storage volume of 20 acre feet; </s> "(5) aquifers which serve as a significant source of water supply to any public water system; and </s> "(6) coal refuse disposa[l]" areas. 25 Pa. Code 89.145(a) and 89.146 (b) (1983). </s> [Footnote 7 The regulations define the zone for which the 50% rule applies: </s> "(2) The support area shall be rectangular in shape and determined by projecting a 15 degree angle of draw from the surface to the coal seam, beginning 15 feet from each side of the structure. For a structure on a surface slope of 5.0% or greater, the support area on the downslope side of the structure shall be extended an additional distance, determined by multiplying the depth of the overburden by the percentage of the surface slope." 89.146(b)(2). </s> However, this 50% requirement is neither an absolute floor nor ceiling. It may be waived by the Department upon a showing that alternative measures will prevent subsidence damage. 89.146(b)(5). Alternatively, more stringent measures may be imposed, or mining may be prohibited, if it appears that leaving 50% of the coal in place will not provide adequate support. 89.146(b)(4). </s> [Footnote 8 Although some subsidence eventually occurs over every underground mine, the extent and timing of the subsidence depends upon a number of factors, including the depth of the mining, the geology of the overlying strata, the topography of the surface, and the method of coal removal. The DER believes that the support provided by its 50% rule will last in almost all cases for the life of the structure being protected. Since 1966, petitioners have mined under approximately 14,000 structures or areas protected by 4; there have been subsidence damage claims with respect to only 300. Stipulations of Counsel 41 and 42, App. 90. </s> [Footnote 9 Petitioners also challenged various other portions of the Subsidence Act below, see 771 F.2d 707, 718-719 (1985); 581 F. Supp. 511, 513, 519-520 (1984), but have not pursued these claims in this Court. </s> [Footnote 10 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. This restriction is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). </s> [Footnote 11 The urgency with which the case was treated is evidenced by the fact that the Court issued its decision less than a month after oral argument; a little over a year after the test case had been commenced. </s> [Footnote 12 "But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the act should be discussed. The Attorney General of the State, the City of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests were allowed to take part in the argument below and have submitted their contentions here. It seems, therefore, to be our duty to go farther in the statement of our opinion, in order that it may be known at once, and that further suits should not be brought in vain." 260 U.S., at 414 . </s> [Footnote 13 "What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. This we think that we are warranted in assuming that the statute does." Id., at 414-415. </s> This assumption was not unreasonable in view of the fact that the Kohler Act may be read to prohibit mining that causes any subsidence - not just subsidence that results in damage to surface structures. The record in this case indicates that subsidence will almost always occur eventually. See n. 8, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 The legislature also set forth rather detailed findings about the dangers of subsidence and the need for legislation. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 52, 1406.3 (Purdon Supp. 1986). </s> [Footnote 15 "We are not disposed to displace the considered judgment of the Court of Appeals on an issue whose resolution is so contingent upon an analysis of state law." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 181 (1976). </s> [Footnote 16 We do not suggest that courts have "a license to judge the effectiveness of legislation," post, at 511, n. 3, or that courts are to undertake "least restrictive alternative" analysis in deciding whether a state regulatory scheme is designed to remedy a public harm or is instead intended to provide private benefits. That a land use regulation may be somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive is, of course, no justification for rejecting it. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 -389 (1926). But, on the other hand, Pennsylvania Coal instructs courts to examine the operative provisions of a statute, not just its stated purpose, in assessing its true nature. In Pennsylvania Coal, that inquiry led the Court to reject the Pennsylvania Legislature's stated purpose for the statute, because the "extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be limited." 260 U.S., at 413 -414. In this case, we, the Court of Appeals, and the District Court, have conducted the same type of inquiry the Court in Pennsylvania Coal conducted, and have determined that the details of the statute do not call the stated public purposes into question. </s> [Footnote 17 In his dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the State has an absolute right to prohibit land use that amounts to a public nuisance. Id., at 417. Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court did not contest that proposition, but instead took issue with Justice Brandeis' conclusion that the Kohler Act represented such a prohibition. Id., at 413-414. </s> [Footnote 18 Of course, the type of taking alleged is also an often critical factor. It is well settled that a "`taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, see, e. g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), than [480 U.S. 470, 489] when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central Tranportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). While the Court has almost invariably found that the permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a taking, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 -438 (1982), the Court has repeatedly upheld regulations that destroy or adversely affect real property interests. See, e. g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 125 ; Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 , n. 8 (1976); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 -593 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). This case, of course, involves land use regulation, not a physical appropriation of petitioners' property. </s> [Footnote 19 See also Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (the question whether a taking has occurred "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests"); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980) ("No police power justification is offered for the deprivation"). </s> [Footnote 20 The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the simple theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not "taken" anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity. Cf. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L. J. 149, 155-161 (1971); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1235-1237 (1967). </s> However, as the current CHIEF JUSTICE has explained: "The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power itself." Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S., at 145 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). This is certainly the case in light of our recent decisions holding that the "scope of the `public use' requirement of the Takings Clause is `coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.'" See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)). See generally R. Epstein, Takings 108-112 (1985). </s> [Footnote 21 The Takings Clause has never been read to require the States or the courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received. Not every individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits received. </s> [Footnote 22 Courts have consistently held that a State need not provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public nuisance. See Nassr v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 767, 477 N. E. 2d 987 (1985) (hazardous waste operation); Kuban v. McGimsey, 96 Nev. 105, 605 P.2d 623 (1980) (brothel); MacLeod v. Takoma Park, 257 Md. 477, 263 A. 2d 581 (1970) (unsafe building); Eno v. Burlington, 125 Vt. 8, 209 A. 2d 499 (1965) (fire and health hazard); Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bryan, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927) (gambling facility); People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 Ill. 256, 114 N. E. 31 (1916) ("bawdyhouse"). It is hard to imagine a different rule that would be consistent with the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (use your own property in such manner as not to injure that of another). See generally Empire State Insurance Co. v. Chafetz, 278 F.2d 41 (CA5 1960). As Professor Epstein has recently commented: "The issue of compensation cannot arise until the question of justification has been disposed of. In the typical nuisance prevention case, this question is resolved against the claimant." Epstein, supra, at 199. </s> [Footnote 23 The certified questions asked whether 4, 5, or 6 of the Subsidence Act, and various regulations: </s> "1. Violate the Rule of the Mahon Decision[,] </s> "2. Constitute Per Se Takings, </s> "3. Violate Article I, 10 of the Constitution of the United States." App. 12. </s> The Court of Appeals recognized the limited nature of its inquiry, pointing out that it was passing only on the facial challenge, and that the "as-applied challenge remains for disposition in the district court." 771 F.2d, at 710, n. 3. </s> [Footnote 24 The percentage of the total that must be left in place under 4 is not the same for every mine because of the wide variation in the extent of surface development in different areas. For 7 of the 13 mines identified in the record, 1% or less of the coal must remain in place; for 3 others, less than 3% must be left in place; for the other 3, the percentages are 4%, 7.8%, and 9.4%. See App. 284. </s> [Footnote 25 See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 60 (1964); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 566-567 (1984). </s> [Footnote 26 Of course, the company also argued that the Subsidence Act made it commercially impracticable to mine the very coal that had to be left in place. Although they could have constructed pillars for support in place of the coal, the cost of the artificial pillars would have far exceeded the value of the coal. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, O. T. 1922, No. 549, pp. 7-9. </s> [Footnote 27 We do not suggest that the State may physically appropriate relatively small amounts of private property for its own use without paying just compensation. The question here is whether there has been any taking at all when no coal has been physically appropriated, and the regulatory program [480 U.S. 470, 501] places a burden on the use of only a small fraction of the property that is subjected to regulation. See generally n. 18, supra. </s> [Footnote 28 See Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 A. 683 (1921); Penman v. Jones, 256 Pa. 416 (1917); Captline v. County of Allegheny, 74 Pa. Commw. 85, 459 A. 2d 1298 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); see generally Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 Temple L. Q. 1 (1951). </s> [Footnote 29 Another unanswered question about the level of diminution involves the District Court's observation that the support estate carries with it far more than the right to cause subsidence damage without liability. See 581 F. Supp., at 519. There is no record as to what value these other rights have and it is thus impossible to say whether the regulation of subsidence damage under certain structures, and the imposition of liability for damage to certain structures, denies petitioners the economically viable use of the support estate, even if viewed as a distinct segment of property. </s> [Footnote 30 "It was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular social evil - the state legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certain contracts - and thus was intended to prohibit States from adopting `as [their] policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them,' Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934)." Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 256 (1978) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 31 As we have mentioned above, we do not know what percentage of petitioners' acquired support estate is in fact restricted under the Subsidence Act. See supra, at 501-502. Moreover, we have no basis on which to conclude just how substantial a part of the support estate the waiver of liability is. See id., at n. 29. These inquiries are both essential to determine the "severity of the impairment," which in turn affects "the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be affected." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983). While these dearths in the record might be critical in some cases, they are not essential to our discussion here because the Subsidence Act withstands scrutiny even if it is assumed that it constitutes a total impairment. </s> [Footnote 32 Most of these waivers were obtained over 70 years ago as part of the support estate which was itself obtained or retained as an incident to the acquisition or retention of the right to mine large quantities of underground coal. No question of enforcement of such a waiver against the original covenantor is presented; rather, petitioners claim a right to enforce the waivers against subsequent owners of the surface. This claim is apparently supported by Pennsylvania precedent holding that these waivers run with the land. See Kormuth v. United States Steel Co., 379 Pa. 365, 108 A. 2d 907 (1954); Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15, 22 (1880). That the Pennsylvania courts might have had, or may in the future have, a valid basis for refusing to enforce these perpetual covenants against subsequent owners of the surface rights is not necessarily a sufficient reason for concluding that the legislative impairment of the contracts is permissible. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895) (distinguishing legislative and judicial action). </s> [Footnote 33 Because petitioners did not raise the issue before the District Court, the Court of Appeals rejected their attempt to argue on appeal that the Subsidence Act also affects contracts to which the Commonwealth is a party. See 771 F.2d, at 718, n. 8. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE POWELL, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting. </s> More than 50 years ago, this Court determined the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act as it affected the property interests of coal mine operators. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act approved today effects an interference with such interests in a strikingly similar manner. The Court finds at least two reasons why this case is different. First, we are told, "the character of the governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking." Ante, at 485. Second, the Court concludes that the Subsidence Act neither "makes it impossible for petitioners [480 U.S. 470, 507] to profitably engage in their business," nor involves "undue interference with [petitioners'] investment-backed expectations." Ibid. Neither of these conclusions persuades me that this case is different, and I believe that the Subsidence Act works a taking of petitioners' property interests. I therefore dissent. </s> I </s> In apparent recognition of the obstacles presented by Pennsylvania Coal to the decision it reaches, the Court attempts to undermine the authority of Justice Holmes' opinion as to the validity of the Kohler Act, labeling it "uncharacteristically . . . advisory." Ante, at 484. I would not so readily dismiss the precedential value of this opinion. There is, to be sure, some language in the case suggesting that it could have been decided simply by addressing the particular application of the Kohler Act at issue in the case. See, e. g., Pennsylvania Coal, supra, at 414 ("If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights"). The Court, however, found that the validity of the Act itself was properly drawn into question: "[T]he case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the [Kohler] act should be discussed." Ibid. 1 The coal company clearly had an interest in obtaining a determination that the Kohler Act was unenforceable if it worked a taking without providing for compensation. For [480 U.S. 470, 508] these reasons, I would not find the opinion of the Court in Pennsylvania Coal advisory in any respect. </s> The Court's implication to the contrary is particularly disturbing in this context, because the holding in Pennsylvania Coal today discounted by the Court has for 65 years been the foundation of our "regulatory takings" jurisprudence. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); D. Hagman & J. Juergensmeyer, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law 319 (2d ed. 1986) ("Pennsylvania Coal was a monumental decision which remains a vital element in contemporary taking law"). We have, for example, frequently relied on the admonition that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal, supra, at 415. See, e. g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). Thus, even were I willing to assume that the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal standing alone is reasonably subject to an interpretation that renders more than half the discussion "advisory," I would have no doubt that our repeated reliance on that opinion establishes it as a cornerstone of the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. </s> I accordingly approach this case with greater deference to the language as well as the holding of Pennsylvania Coal than does the Court. Admittedly, questions arising under the Just Compensation Clause rest on ad hoc factual inquiries, and must be decided on the facts and circumstances in each case. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra, at 124; United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., supra, at 168. Examination of the relevant factors presented here convinces me that the differences between [480 U.S. 470, 509] them and those in Pennsylvania Coal verge on the trivial. </s> II </s> The Court first determines that this case is different from Pennsylvania Coal because "the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare." Ante, at 485. In my view, reliance on this factor represents both a misreading of Pennsylvania Coal and a misunderstanding of our precedents. </s> A </s> The Court opines that the decision in Pennsylvania Coal rested on the fact that the Kohler Act was "enacted solely for the benefit of private parties," ante, at 486, and "served only private interests." Ante, at 484. A review of the Kohler Act shows that these statements are incorrect. The Pennsylvania Legislature passed the statute "as remedial legislation, designed to cure existing evils and abuses." Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 495, 118 A. 491, 492 (1922) (quoting the Act). These were public "evils and abuses," identified in the preamble as "wrecked and dangerous streets and highways, collapsed public buildings, churches, schools, factories, streets, and private dwellings, broken gas, water and sewer systems, the loss of human life . . . ." Id., at 496, 118 A., at 493. 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that these concerns were "such as to create an emergency, properly warranting the exercise of the police power . . . ." Id., at 497, 118 A., at 493. There can be [480 U.S. 470, 510] no doubt that the Kohler Act was intended to serve public interests. </s> Though several aspects of the Kohler Act limited its protection of these interests, see Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S., at 414 , this Court did not ignore the public interests served by the Act. When considering the protection of the "single private house" owned by the Mahons, the Court noted that "[n]o doubt there is a public interest even in this." Id., at 413 (emphasis added). It recognized that the Act "affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been reserved." Id., at 414. See also id., at 416 ("We assume . . . that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain"). The strong public interest in the stability of streets and cities, however, was insufficient "to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Ibid. Thus, the Court made clear that the mere existence of a public purpose was insufficient to release the government from the compensation requirement: "The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation." Id., at 415. </s> The Subsidence Act rests on similar public purposes. These purposes were clearly stated by the legislature: "[T]o aid in the protection of the safety of the public, to enhance the value of [surface area] lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface water drainage and public water supplies and generally to improve the use and enjoyment of such lands . . . ." Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 52, 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The Act's declaration of policy states that mine subsidence "has seriously impeded land development . . . has caused a very clear and present danger to the health, safety and welfare of the people of Pennsylvania [and] erodes the [480 U.S. 470, 511] tax base of the affected municipalities." 1406.3(2), (3), (4). The legislature determined that the prevention of subsidence would protect surface structures, advance the economic future and well-being of Pennsylvania, and ensure the safety and welfare of the Commonwealth's residents. Ibid. Thus, it is clear that the Court has severely understated the similarity of purpose between the Subsidence Act and the Kohler Act. The public purposes in this case are not sufficient to distinguish it from Pennsylvania Coal. 3 </s> B </s> The similarity of the public purpose of the present Act to that in Pennsylvania Coal does not resolve the question whether a taking has occurred; the existence of such a public purpose is merely a necessary prerequisite to the government's exercise of its taking power. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 -243, 245 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 -33 (1954). The nature of these purposes may be relevant, for we have recognized that a taking does not occur where the government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, [480 U.S. 470, 512] 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See generally Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 144 -146 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). The Court today indicates that this "nuisance exception" alone might support its conclusion that no taking has occurred. Despite the Court's implication to the contrary, see ante, at 485-486, and n. 15, the legitimacy of this purpose is a question of federal, rather than state, law, subject to independent scrutiny by this Court. This statute is not the type of regulation that our precedents have held to be within the "nuisance exception" to takings analysis. </s> The ease with which the Court moves from the recognition of public interests to the assertion that the activity here regulated is "akin to a public nuisance" suggests an exception far wider than recognized in our previous cases. "The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee," however, "is not coterminous with the police power itself," Penn Central Transportation, supra, at 145 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), but is a narrow exception allowing the government to prevent "a misuse or illegal use." Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911). It is not intended to allow "the prevention of a legal and essential use, an attribute of its ownership." Ibid. </s> The narrow nature of this exception is compelled by the concerns underlying the Fifth Amendment. Though, as the Court recognizes, ante, at 491-492, the Fifth Amendment does not prevent actions that secure a "reciprocity of advantage," Pennsylvania Coal, supra, at 415, it is designed to prevent "the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him." Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra, at 123-125; Armstrong v. [480 U.S. 470, 513] United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). A broad exception to the operation of the Just Compensation Clause based on the exercise of multifaceted health, welfare, and safety regulations would surely allow government much greater authority than we have recognized to impose societal burdens on individual landowners, for nearly every action the government takes is intended to secure for the public an extra measure of "health, safety, and welfare." </s> Thus, our cases applying the "nuisance" rationale have involved at least two narrowing principles. First, nuisance regulations exempted from the Fifth Amendment have rested on discrete and narrow purposes. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, supra; Mugler v. Kansas, supra. The Subsidence Act, however, is much more than a nuisance statute. The central purposes of the Act, though including public safety, reflect a concern for preservation of buildings, economic development, and maintenance of property values to sustain the Commonwealth's tax base. We should hesitate to allow a regulation based on essentially economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates of the Fifth Amendment by labeling it nuisance regulation. </s> Second, and more significantly, our cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property. Though nuisance regulations have been sustained despite a substantial reduction in value, we have not accepted the proposition that the State may completely extinguish a property interest or prohibit all use without providing compensation. Thus, in Mugler v. Kansas, supra, the prohibition on manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors made the distiller's brewery "of little value" but did not completely extinguish the value of the building. Similarly, in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the individual forced to cut down his cedar trees nevertheless was able "to use the felled trees." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra, at 126. The [480 U.S. 470, 514] restriction on surface mining upheld in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, may have prohibited "a beneficial use" of the property, but did not reduce the value of the lot in question. 369 U.S., at 593 , 594. In none of these cases did the regulation "destroy essential uses of private property." Curtin v. Benson, supra, at 86. </s> Here, petitioners' interests in particular coal deposits have been completely destroyed. By requiring that defined seams of coal remain in the ground, see ante, at 476-477, and n. 7, 4 of the Subsidence Act has extinguished any interest one might want to acquire in this property, for "`the right to coal consists in the right to mine it.'" Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S., at 414 , quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328, 331, 100 A. 820 (1917). Application of the nuisance exception in these circumstances would allow the State not merely to forbid one "particular use" of property with many uses but to extinguish all beneficial use of petitioners' property. 4 </s> Though suggesting that the purposes alone are sufficient to uphold the Act, the Court avoids reliance on the nuisance exception by finding that the Subsidence Act does not impair petitioners' investment-backed expectations or ability to profitably operate their businesses. This conclusion follows mainly from the Court's broad definition of the "relevant mass of property," ante, at 497, which allows it to ascribe to the Subsidence Act a less pernicious effect on the interests of the property owner. The need to consider the effect of regulation on some identifiable segment of property makes all important the admittedly difficult task of defining the relevant [480 U.S. 470, 515] parcel. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S., at 149 , n. 13 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). For the reasons explained below, I do not believe that the Court's opinion adequately performs this task. </s> III </s> The Pennsylvania Coal Court found it sufficient that the Kohler Act rendered it "commercially impracticable to mine certain coal." 260 U.S., at 414 . The Court, ante, at 498, observes that this language is best understood as a conclusion that certain coal mines could not be operated at a profit. Petitioners have not at this stage of the litigation rested their claim on similar proof; they have not "claimed that their mining operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was passed." Ante, at 496. The parties have, however, stipulated for purposes of this facial challenge that the Subsidence Act requires petitioners to leave in the ground 27 million tons of coal, without compensation therefor. Petitioners also claim that the Act extinguishes their purchased interests in support estates which allow them to mine the coal without liability for subsidence. We are thus asked to consider whether these restrictions are such as to constitute a taking. </s> A </s> The Court's conclusion that the restriction on particular coal does not work a taking is primarily the result of its view that the 27 million tons of coal in the ground "do not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes." Ante, at 498. This conclusion cannot be based on the view that the interests are too insignificant to warrant protection by the Fifth Amendment, for it is beyond cavil that government appropriation of "relatively small amounts of private property for its own use" requires just compensation. Ante, at 499, n. 27. Instead, the Court's refusal to recognize the coal in the ground as a separate segment of property for takings purposes is based on the fact that the [480 U.S. 470, 516] alleged taking is "regulatory," rather than a physical intrusion. See ante, at 488-489, n. 18. On the facts of this case, I cannot see how the label placed on the government's action is relevant to consideration of its impact on property rights. </s> Our decisions establish that governmental action short of physical invasion may constitute a taking because such regulatory action might result in "as complete [a loss] as if the [government] had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). Though the government's direct benefit may vary depending upon the nature of its action, the question is evaluated from the perspective of the property holder's loss rather than the government's gain. See ibid.; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). Our observation that "[a] `taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government," Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra, at 124, was not intended to alter this perspective merely because the claimed taking is by regulation. Instead, we have recognized that regulations - unlike physical invasions - do not typically extinguish the "full bundle" of rights in a particular piece of property. In Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979), for example, we found it crucial that a prohibition on the sale of avian artifacts destroyed only "one `strand' of the bundle" of property rights, "because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." This characteristic of regulations frequently makes unclear the breadth of their impact on identifiable segments of property, and has required that we evaluate the effects in light of the "several factors" enumerated in Penn Central Transportation Co.: "The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, . . . the extent to which the regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations, [and] the character of the governmental action." 438 U.S., at 124 . [480 U.S. 470, 517] </s> No one, however, would find any need to employ these analytical tools where the government has physically taken an identifiable segment of property. Physical appropriation by the government leaves no doubt that it has in fact deprived the owner of all uses of the land. Similarly, there is no need for further analysis where the government by regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable segment of property, for the effect of this action on the holder of the property is indistinguishable from the effect of a physical taking. 5 Thus, it is clear our decision in Andrus v. Allard, supra, would have been different if the Government had confiscated the avian artifacts. In my view, a different result would also follow if the Government simply prohibited every use of that property, for the owner would still have been "deprive[d] of all or most of his interest in the subject matter." United States v. General Motors Corp. supra, at 378. </s> In this case, enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its regulations will require petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place. There is no question that this coal is an identifiable and separable property interest. Unlike many property interests, the "bundle" of rights in this coal is sparse. "`For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it.'" Pennsylvania Coal, 260 Page 518 U.S., at 414 , quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Keater v. Clearview Coal Co., 256 Pa. at 331, 100 A. at 820. From the relevant perspective - that of the property owners - this interest has been destroyed every bit as much as if the government had proceeded to mine the coal for its own use. The regulation, then, does not merely inhibit one strand in the bundle, cf. Andrus v. Allard, supra, but instead destroys completely any interest in a segment of property. In these circumstances, I think it unnecessary to consider whether petitioners may operate individual mines or their overall mining operations profitably, for they have been denied all use of 27 million tons of coal. I would hold that 4 of the Subsidence Act works a taking of these property interests. </s> B </s> Petitioners also claim that the Subsidence Act effects a taking of their support estate. Under Pennsylvania law, the support estate, the surface estate, and the mineral estate are "three distinct estates in land which can be held in fee simple separate and distinct from each other . . . ." Captline v. County of Allegheny, 74 Pa. Commw. 85, 91, 459 A. 2d 1298, 1301 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984). In refusing to consider the effect of the Subsidence Act on this property interest alone, the Court dismisses this feature of Pennsylvania property law as simply a "legalistic distinctio[n] within a bundle of property rights." Ante, at 500. "Its value," the Court informs us, "is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface." Ante, at 501. See also 771 F.2d 707, 716 (1985) ("To focus upon the support estate separately . . . would serve little purpose"). This view of the support estate allows the Court to conclude that its destruction is merely the destruction of one "strand" in petitioners' bundle of property rights, not significant enough in the overall bundle to work a taking. </s> Contrary to the Court's approach today, we have evaluated takings claims by reference to the units of property defined [480 U.S. 470, 519] by state law. In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., for example, we determined that certain "health, safety, and environmental data" was "cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law," 467 U.S., at 1003 , and proceeded to evaluate the effects of governmental action on this state-defined property right. 6 Reliance on state law is necessitated by the fact that "`[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.'" Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In reality, the Court's decision today cannot reject this necessary reliance on state law. Rather, it simply rejects the support estate as the relevant segment of property and evaluates the impact of the Subsidence Act by reference to some broader, yet undefined, segment of property presumably recognized by state law. </s> I see no reason for refusing to evaluate the impact of the Subsidence Act on the support estate alone, for Pennsylvania has clearly defined it as a separate estate in property. The Court suggests that the practical significance of this estate is limited, because its value "is merely part of the bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface." Ante, at 501. Though this may accurately describe the usual state of affairs, I do not understand the Court to mean that one holding the support estate alone would find it worthless, for surely the owners of the mineral or surface estates [480 U.S. 470, 520] would be willing buyers of this interest. 7 Nor does the Court suggest that the owner of both the mineral and support estates finds his separate interest in support to be without value. In these circumstances, where the estate defined by state law is both severable and of value in its own right, it is appropriate to consider the effect of regulation on that particular property interest. </s> When held by owners of the mineral estate, the support estate "consists of the right to remove the strata of coal and earth that undergird the surface . . . ." 771 F.2d, at 715. Purchase of this right, therefore, shifts the risk of subsidence to the surface owner. Section 6 of the Subsidence Act, by making the coal mine operator strictly liable for any damage to surface structures caused by subsidence, purports to place this risk on the holder of the mineral estate regardless of whether the holder also owns the support estate. Operation of this provision extinguishes petitioners' interests in their support estates, making worthless what they purchased as a separate right under Pennsylvania law. Like the restriction on mining particular coal, this complete interference with a property right extinguishes its value, and must be accompanied by just compensation. 8 </s> IV </s> In sum, I would hold that Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act effects a taking of petitioners' property without providing just compensation. Specifically, the Act works to extinguish petitioners' interest [480 U.S. 470, 521] in at least 27 million tons of coal by requiring that coal to be left in the ground, and destroys their purchased support estates by returning to them financial liability for subsidence. I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to the contrary. 9 </s> [Footnote 1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the decision under review, had also determined that the case called for "consideration . . . of the constitutionality of the act itself." Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 494, 118 A. 491, 492 (1922). Before this Court, the coal company persisted in its claim that the Pennsylvania statute took its property without just compensation. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, O. T. 1922, No. 549, pp. 7-8, 16, 19-21, 28-33; Brief for Defendants in Error in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, O. T. 1922, No. 549, p. 73. </s> [Footnote 2 That these were public "evils and abuses" is further illustrated by the coverage of the Kohler Act, which regulated mining under "any public building or any structure customarily used by the public," including churches, schools, hospitals, theaters, hotels, and railroad stations. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal, supra, at 495, 118 A., at 492. Protected areas also included streets, roads, bridges, or "any other public passage-way, dedicated to public use or habitually used by the public," as well as public utility structures, private homes, workplaces, and cemeteries. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court notes that the particulars of the Subsidence Act better serve these public purposes than did the Kohler Act. Ante, at 486. This may well be true, but our inquiry into legislative purpose is not intended as a license to judge the effectiveness of legislation. When considering the Fifth Amendment issues presented by Hawaii's Land Reform Act, we noted that the Act, "like any other, may not be successful in achieving its intended goals. But `whether in fact the provisions will accomplish the objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is satisfied if . . . the . . . [State] Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.'" Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984), quoting Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671 -672 (1981). Conversely, our cases have never found it sufficient that legislation efficiently achieves its desired objectives to hold that the compensation required by the Fifth Amendment is unavailable. </s> [Footnote 4 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914), did not go this far. Though the Court in that case upheld a statute requiring mine operators to leave certain amounts of coal in their mines, examination of the opinion in Plymouth Coal reveals that the statute was not challenged as a taking for which compensation was due. Instead, the coal company complained that the statutory provisions for defining the width of required pillars of coal were constitutionally deficient as a matter of procedural due process. </s> [Footnote 5 There is admittedly some language in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 -131 (1978), that suggests a contrary analysis: "`Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole." The Court gave no guidance on how one is to distinguish a "discrete segment" from a "single parcel." It was not clear, moreover, that the air rights at issue in Penn Central were entirely eliminated by the operation of New York City's Landmark Preservation Law, for, as the Court noted, "it simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that appellants have been prohibited from occupying any portion of the airspace above the Terminal." Id., at 136. </s> [Footnote 6 Indeed, we rejected the claim that the Supremacy Clause allowed Congress to dictate that the effect of its regulation "not vary depending on the property law of the State in which the submitter [of trade-secret information is located. . . . If Congress can `pre-empt' state property law in the manner advocated . . ., then the Taking Clause has lost all vitality." Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S., at 1012 . </s> [Footnote 7 It is clear that under Pennsylvania law, "one person may own the coal, another the surface, and the third the right of support." Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa. 290, 304, 32 A. 2d 227, 234-235 (1943). </s> [Footnote 8 It is therefore irrelevant that petitioners have not presented evidence of "what percentage of the purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate, has been affected by the Act." Ante, at 501. There is no doubt that the Act extinguishes support estates. Because it fails to provide compensation for this taking, the Act violates the dictates of the Fifth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 9 Because I would find 6 of the Subsidence Act unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, I would not reach the Contracts Clause issue addressed by the Court, ante, at 502-506. </s> [480 U.S. 470, 522]

United States Supreme Court DEUTCH v. UNITED STATES(1961) No. 233 Argued: Decided: June 12, 1961 </s> Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, which was investigating Communist Party activities in the Albany, N. Y., area, petitioner, who had not attended the hearings in Albany and was questioned in Washington, D.C., freely answered questions about his own Communist activities at Cornell University and Ithaca, N. Y.; but he refused to name persons with whom he had been associated in such activities there. He was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C. 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness by a congressional committee to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry. At his trial, in an effort to prove the pertinency of the questions he refused to answer, the Government offered documentary evidence of statements made by the Chairman of the Subcommittee at the hearings in Albany, which tended to show that the subject of those hearings was Communist infiltration in the Albany area, particularly in the field of labor, and one witness testified that petitioner's hearing was a continuation of the Albany hearings, that the subject of those hearings was Communist infiltration in the Albany area and that the topic under inquiry was not Communism either at Cornell or in educational institutions generally. It also introduced transcripts of the testimony of two witnesses at the Albany hearings who, in addition to testifying about Communist infiltration into labor unions in the Albany area, had been led into some testimony about Communist activities by petitioner and others at Cornell. Held: On the record in this case, the Government failed to prove an essential element of the offense, that the questions which petitioner refused to answer were pertinent to the subject under inquiry, and his conviction must be set aside. Pp. 457-472. </s> 108 U.S. App. D.C. 143, 280 F.2d 691, reversed. </s> Henry W. Sawyer III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was George Herbert Goodrich. [367 U.S. 456, 457] </s> Kevin T. Maroney argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and Bruce J. Terris. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Once again we are called upon to review a criminal conviction for refusal to answer questions before a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. 1 See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 ; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 ; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 ; Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 . The petitioner was brought to trial in the District Court for the District of Columbia upon an indictment which charged that he had violated 2 U.S.C. 192 by refusing to answer five questions "which were pertinent to the question then under inquiry" by the subcommittee. He waived a jury and was convicted upon four of the five counts of the indictment. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 143, 280 F.2d 691, and we brought the case here because of doubt as to the validity of the conviction in the light of our previous [367 U.S. 456, 458] decisions. 2 </s> 364 U.S. 812 . A careful review of the trial record convinces us that the District Court should have ordered an acquittal. </s> At the trial the Government's case consisted largely of documentary evidence. That evidence showed that a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities conducted hearings in Albany, New York, in July of 1953, and again in early April of 1954. The petitioner was not present on either occasion. He was subpoenaed to appear before the subcommittee in Albany on April 9, 1954, but, at the request of his counsel, it was agreed that he should appear instead before the subcommittee three days later in the Old House Office Building in Washington, D.C. </s> He appeared there on the appointed day, accompanied by counsel, and without further ado his interrogation began. The petitioner freely answered all preliminary questions, revealing that he was then twenty-four years old and a graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania. He stated that his early education had been in the public schools of Brooklyn, New York, from where he had gone to Cornell University in 1947 for four years as an undergraduate and two additional years as a graduate student. </s> The subcommittee's counsel then made the following statement: </s> "Mr. Deutch, during hearings at Albany last week, the committee heard testimony regarding the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates at Cornell University, among certain graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca. [367 U.S. 456, 459] </s> "In connection with that testimony, the committee was informed that you were a member of one or more of those groups. If so, I would like to ask you certain matters relating to your activity there. </s> "Were you a member of a group of the Communist Party at Cornell?" </s> The petitioner answered, "under protest," that he had indeed been a member of the Communist Party while at Cornell. 3 He then testified freely and without further objection as to his own activities and associations. He stated that "from the age of 13 or 14 I had read many books on Marxism and at that time was very much impressed with trying to solve certain of the injustices we have nowadays." He said that when he got to college "I felt if I had ideas I shouldn't be half pregnant about them, so when I came to college I was approached and joined." He stated that the approach to join the Party had been made by a student. </s> As to the general nature of his Communist Party activities at Cornell, he said "about all that happened were bull sessions on Marxism, and some activities like giving out a leaflet or two. The people I met didn't advocate the overthrowing of the Government by force and violence, and if they had, I wouldn't have allowed it." He testified that he had known one faculty member at Cornell who was a Communist, but that this person had quit the Party. He stated that he had once received from "a personal friend," who was not connected with the Cornell faculty, a $100 contribution to give to the Party. He [367 U.S. 456, 460] stated that he had been the only graduate student at Cornell who was a Communist, and that, as the "head" (and lone member) of the "graduate group," he had attended meetings in a private house where a "maximum of 4 or 5" people were present. Many of his answers indicated a lack of awareness of the details of Communist activities at Cornell. 4 The petitioner testified that as of the time of the hearings he was no longer a member of the Communist Party, but he volunteered the information that "[t]o a great extent it is only fair to say I am a Marxist today - I don't want to deny that." </s> While the petitioner's answers to the many questions put to him about his own activities and conduct were thus [367 U.S. 456, 461] fully responsive, he refused to answer five questions he was asked concerning other people. He declined to give the names of the faculty member who had been a Communist, of the friend who had made the $100 contribution, of the student who had originally approached him about joining the Communist Party, and of the owners of the house where the meetings had been held. He also declined to say whether he was acquainted with one Homer Owen. For his refusal to answer these questions he was indicted, tried, and convicted. 5 </s> The reason which the petitioner gave the subcommittee for his refusal to answer these questions can best be put in his own words: </s> "Sir, I am perfectly willing to tell about my own activities, but do you feel I should trade my moral scruples by informing on someone else? . . . I can only say that whereas I do not want to be in [367 U.S. 456, 462] contempt of the committee, I do not believe I can answer questions about other people, but only about myself. . . . I happen to have been a graduate student - the only one there, and the organization is completely defunct, and the individual you are interested in wasn't even a professor. The magnitude of this is really beyond reason." </s> The chairman of the subcommittee ruled that it was the petitioner's duty nevertheless to answer the questions: </s> "That decision does not rest with you as to whether or not the scope of this inquiry - as to whether or not certain individuals are important now or not. That is the responsibility of we Representatives to determine. That determination cannot rest with you. It may be very true that the individual to whom you have referred is no longer a member of the Communist Party. However, that is a supposition on your part - and a supposition which the committee cannot accept. . . . I think that it is only fair to advise the witness - again advise the witness - that any scruples he may have due to a desire to protect friends and acquaintances, is not a legal reason for declining to answer the questions which are now being put to you, and which will be put to you by counsel." </s> In an effort to prove the pertinence of the questions which the petitioner had refused to answer, the Government offered at the trial the transcripts of the opening statements of Subcommittee Chairman Kearney at the Albany hearings in 1953 and 1954 and of Subcommittee Chairman Velde at a hearing in Chicago in 1954, as well as an additional portion of the transcript of the 1954 Albany hearing. One witness, the counsel for the Committee on Un-American Activities, testified. A review [367 U.S. 456, 463] of this evidence convinces us that the Government failed to prove the charge in the indictment that the questions which the petitioner refused to answer were "pertinent to the question then under inquiry" by the subcommittee before which he appeared. </s> The Chairman's opening statement at the Albany hearing in 1953 consisted largely of a paraphrase of the Committee's authorizing resolution and a general summary of the Committee's past activities. 6 The only statement of a specific purpose was as follows: </s> "The committee, in its course of investigation, came into possession of reliable information indicating [367 U.S. 456, 464] Communist Party activities within the Albany area. The committee decided that this information was of such a character as to merit an investigation to determine its nature, extent, character, and objects." [367 U.S. 456, 465] </s> At the opening of the Albany hearings in 1954 the Chairman stated that the subcommittee would "resume this morning the investigation of Communist Party activities within the capital area." He made clear that the hearings were "a continuation of the open hearings which were conducted in Albany" in 1953. He pointed out that testimony at the 1953 hearings had "related to the efforts of the Communist Party to infiltrate industry and other segments of society in the capital area." "This committee," he said, ". . . is investigating communism within the field of labor where it has substantial evidence that it exists." </s> The opening statement of the Chairman of the sub-committee which held hearings in Chicago in 1954 is the same statement that was before this Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 210 . As was pointed out in the Watkins opinion, Mr. Velde "did no more than paraphrase the authorizing resolution and give a very general sketch of the past efforts of the Committee." 7 Moreover, the statement indicated that that subcommittee hearing was directed primarily towards investigation of activities in the Chicago area: "We are here in Chicago, Ill., realizing that this is the center of the great Midwestern area of the United States. It cannot be said that subversive infiltration has had a greater, nor a lesser success in infiltrating this important area. The hearings today are the culmination of an investigation that has been conducted by the committee's competent staff and is a part of the committee's intention for holding hearings in various parts of the country." </s> The transcripts of part of the testimony of two witnesses at the 1954 Albany hearings, John Marqusee and Emmanuel Richardson, were also introduced at the petitioner's [367 U.S. 456, 466] trial. These transcripts showed that Marqusee's testimony had related primarily to Communist infiltration of a labor union in Schenectady for which he had worked during a summer vacation in 1948. 8 At that time he had been a student in the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, which, he had testified, was a part of Cornell University. He had told the subcommittee that he had never had any contact with the Communist Party before taking the labor union job. The transcripts showed that he had explained that he had taken the job in accordance with the school's requirement "that every student should put forth his efforts in securing a job during the summer, during the intervening summers of his 4-year program, 1 summer with a labor union, 1 with a management group, if possible, and 1 summer with a neutral agency, such as a mediation agency or arbitration service." There was no mention of the Cornell Graduate School, nor of the petitioner, in the transcript of Marqusee's testimony. </s> The transcript of Richardson's testimony showed that he had testified that as a student at the Cornell Law School in 1950 he had joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He had named several people he had known as Communists on the Cornell campus, including the petitioner and Homer Owen. He had stated that the petitioner had known a member of the Cornell faculty who was a Communist Party member, and that he had once received through the petitioner a contribution to the Party from someone else of "one hundred and some dollars." The transcript showed that Richardson had also testified at length concerning Communist infiltration into a labor union in a plant in Syracuse where he had worked during the summers of 1951 and 1952. [367 U.S. 456, 467] </s> After these transcripts had been introduced at the petitioner's trial, the Government called its only witness, Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., who had been the "interrogating attorney" at the Albany hearings and at the petitioner's hearing before the subcommittee in Washington. 9 Mr. Tavenner emphasized that the hearing in Washington was a continuation of the Albany hearings, which he characterized as "a general investigation of Communist Party activities in what was referred to as the `Capital Area.'" Under interrogation of government counsel, the witness expressly disclaimed that the purpose of the Washington hearing had been to investigate Communist activities in educational institutions. 10 He was asked what "connection was there between [the subject of the petitioner's testimony] and the investigations entitled `Albany, New York'?" This question was never answered. </s> On this record the District Court found the subject under inquiry to be "the infiltration of Communism into educational and labor fields." 147 F. Supp., at 91. The Court of Appeals never stated what it thought the subject under inquiry by the subcommittee was. </s> As our cases make clear, two quite different issues regarding pertinency may be involved in a prosecution under 2 U.S.C. 192. One issue reflects the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that the pertinency of the interrogation to the topic under the [367 U.S. 456, 468] congressional committee's inquiry must be brought home to the witness at the time the questions are put to him. "Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S., at 214 -215. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S., at 123 -124. The other and different pertinency issue stems from the prosecution's duty at the trial to prove that the questions propounded by the congressional committee were in fact "pertinent to the question under inquiry" by the committee. "Undeniably a conviction for contempt under 2 U.S.C. 192 cannot stand unless the questions asked are pertinent to the subject matter of the investigation." Barenblatt, supra, at 123. "[T]he statute defines the crime as refusal to answer `any question pertinent to the question under inquiry.' Part of the standard of criminality, therefore, is the pertinency of the questions propounded to the witness." Watkins, supra, at 208. See Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S., at 407 -409, 413; Braden v. United States, 365 U.S., at 433 , 435-436; Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 296 -297. These two basically different issues must not be blurred by treating them as a single question of "pertinency." </s> With regard to the first issue, it is evident that the petitioner was not made aware at the time he was questioned of the question then under inquiry nor of how the questions which were asked related to such a subject. The chairman made no opening statement, and the petitioner heard no other witnesses testify. The resolution creating the subcommittee revealed nothing. It was [367 U.S. 456, 469] merely a general resolution authorizing the creation of a subcommittee to act for the Committee. Committee counsel simply advised the petitioner that the committee had previously heard evidence regarding Communist activity at Cornell, and that he proposed to ask the petitioner "certain matters relating to your activity there." As to his own activity there the petitioner freely testified. When the petitioner declined to give the names of other people, no clear explanation of the topic under inquiry was forthcoming. </s> It is also evident, however, that the thoughts which the petitioner voiced in refusing to answer the questions about other people can hardly be considered as the equivalent of an objection upon the grounds of pertinency. Although he did indicate doubt as to the importance of the questions, the petitioner's main concern was clearly his own conscientious unwillingness to act as an informer. It can hardly be considered, therefore, that the objections which the petitioner made at the time were "adequate, within the meaning of what was said in Watkins, supra, at 214-215, to trigger what would have been the Subcommittee's reciprocal obligation had it been faced with a pertinency objection." Barenblatt, supra, at 124. </s> We need not pursue the matter, however, because, in any event, it is clear that the Government at the trial failed to carry its burden of proving the pertinence of the questions. See Bowers v. United States, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 79, 202 F.2d 447, 452. The first step in proving that component of the offense was to show the subject of the subcommittee's inquiry. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S., at 407 . As related above, the Government offered documentary evidence of statements made by the chairman of the subcommittees at two hearings in Albany which tended to show that those subcommittees were investigating Communist infiltration in the Albany or [367 U.S. 456, 470] "capital" area, particularly in the field of labor. 11 The Government presented one witness who testified that the petitioner's hearing was a continuation of the Albany hearings, and that the subject of those hearings was Communist infiltration in the Albany area. He disavowed any implication that the topic under inquiry was Communism either at Cornell or in educational institutions generally. </s> Yet the questions which the petitioner was convicted of refusing to answer obviously had nothing to do with the Albany area or with Communist infiltration into labor unions. It can hardly be seriously contended that Cornell University is in the Albany area. Indeed, we may take judicial notice of the fact that Ithaca is more than one hundred and sixty-five miles from Albany, and in an entirely different economic and geographic area of New York. The petitioner was asked nothing about Albany or the Albany area. So far as the record shows, he knew nothing about that subject. He was asked nothing about labor or labor unions. So far as the record shows, he knew nothing about them. He was asked nothing about any possible connection between Cornell or its graduate school and Communist infiltration in Albany. Yet the petitioner was basically a cooperative witness, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that, except for giving the names of others, he would not have freely answered any inquiry the subcommittee wished to pursue with respect to these subjects. It is true that the transcript of the testimony of two witnesses at the Albany hearings established that, in addition to testifying about Communist infiltration into labor unions in the Albany area, they had been willingly led into some testimony about Communist activities by the petitioner and others at Cornell. [367 U.S. 456, 471] But that excursion can hardly justify a disregard of the Government's careful proof at the petitioner's trial of what the subject under inquiry actually was. The pertinence of the interrogation of those two witnesses is not before us. The pertinence of the petitioner's interrogation is. </s> In enacting 2 U.S.C. 192, the Congress invoked the aid of the federal judicial system to protect itself from contumacious conduct. Watkins, supra, at 207. "In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal cases." Id., at 208. "One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the [prosecution] has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (concurring opinion). Among these is the presumption of the defendant's innocence. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S., at 296 -297; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S., at 151 . It was incumbent upon the prosecution in this case to prove that the petitioner had committed the offense for which he was indicted. One element of that offense was the pertinence to the subject matter under inquiry of the questions the petitioner refused to answer. 12 We hold, as a matter of law, that there was a failure of such proof in this case. Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 ; see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S., at 298 -299; Braden v. United States, 365 U.S., at 436 -437. </s> We do not decide today any question respecting the power or legislative purpose of this subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Nor do we reach the large issues stirred by the petitioner's First [367 U.S. 456, 472] Amendment claims. Our decision is made within the conventional framework of the federal criminal law, and in accord with its traditional concepts. In a word, we hold only that the Government failed to prove its case. 13 </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." 2 U.S.C. 192. </s> [Footnote 2 See, in addition to the cases cited in the text, supra: Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 ; United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 ; United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349 ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 ; Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 ; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 . See also McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 . </s> [Footnote 3 "I will answer that question, but only under protest. </s> "I wish to register a challenge as to the jurisdiction of this committee under Public Law 601, which is the committee's enabling legislation. This question, or any similar questions involving my associations, past or future, I am answering, but only under protest as to its constitutionality. But, under your jurisdiction as stated, I answer yes, I was a member of the Communist Party." </s> [Footnote 4 The following colloquies are typical: </s> "Mr. Doyle: Who published the leaflets? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I believe the Communist Party published them. </s> "Mr. Doyle: What Communist Party? Where did you get the leaflets? From the national headquarters? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I don't believe so. It was a local branch. </s> "Mr. Doyle: Where was the office of the local branch from which you got these leaflets? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I didn't know where it was. I was just asked to distribute them." </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. Tavenner: Were you ever a member of the Downtown Club of the Communist Party in Ithaca? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I don't believe so. </s> "Mr. Tavenner: Did you attend meetings of that group? </s> "Mr. Deutch: No. That is, I don't believe so. The reason I wonder is because that organization became defunct so that there was really no organization. Downtown was Uptown, and there were so few people that I just want to qualify that statement." </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. Scherer: Let me ask you this question. You knew where the meetings were held? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I don't believe I know exactly where they were. This is because - since Mr. Richardson drove me there." [Mr. Richardson was a law student at Cornell who had joined the Communist Party at the behest of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See p. 466, infra.] </s> [Footnote 5 The questions, as set out in the five counts of the indictment, were as follows: </s> "Count One </s> "The committee was advised that a witness by the name of Ross Richardson has stated that you acted as liaison between a Communist Party group on the campus and a member of the faculty at Cornell, and that you knew the name of the member of that faculty, who was a member of the Communist Party. Will you tell us who that member of the faculty was? </s> "Count Two </s> "Will you tell the committee, please, the source of that $100 contribution, if it was made? </s> "Count Three </s> "Where were these meetings held? </s> "Count Four </s> "Were you acquainted with Homer Owen? </s> "Count Five </s> "The witness is directed to give the name of the person by whom he was approached." </s> The petitioner was convicted on all but Count Three. </s> [Footnote 6 "The committee is charged by the Congress of the United States with the responsibility of investigating the extent, character and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries, or of a domestic origin, and attacks the principles of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution and all other questions in relation thereto that will aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. </s> "It has been fully established by testimony before this and other congressional committees and before the courts of our land that the Communist Party of the United States is part of an international conspiracy, which is being used as a tool or a weapon by a foreign power to promote its own foreign policy and which has for its objective the overthrow of the governments of all non-Communist countries, resorting to the use of force and violence if necessary. This organization cannot live and expand within the United States except by the promulgation and diffusion of subversive and un-American propaganda designed to win adherence to its cause. </s> "The first witness in this hearing will testify regarding certain aspects of the worldwide Communist conspiracy, which should demonstrate what a serious matter it is to permit individuals who are subject to the directives and discipline of the Communist Party to be placed in positions of leadership in any functional organization. </s> "The committee, in its course of investigation, came into possession of reliable information indicating Communist Party activities within the Albany area. The committee decided that this information was [367 U.S. 456, 464] of such a character as to merit an investigation to determine its nature, extent, character, and objects. </s> "Many witnesses have appeared before this committee, sitting in various places throughout the United States, and have revealed their experiences as former Communist Party members. Such testimony has added immeasurably to the sum total of the knowledge, character, extent, and objects of Communist activities in this country. </s> "Witnesses from Hollywood, labor unions, the legal profession, medical profession, and other groups have made a great contribution to the defense of our country by disclosing to this committee facts within their knowledge. </s> "In the view of this committee, such testimony should not be held against an individual where it has that character of trustworthiness which convinces one that the witness has completely and finally terminated Communist Party membership and that such testimony has been given in all good faith. </s> "The committee is not concerned with the political beliefs or opinions of any witness who has been called before it. It is concerned only with the facts showing the extent, character, and objects of the Communist Party activities. </s> "In keeping with the long-standing policy of this committee, any individual or organization whose name is mentioned during the course of the hearings in such a manner as to adversely affect them shall have an opportunity to appear before the committee for the purpose of making a denial or explanation of any adverse references. </s> "I would also like at this time, before the beginning of these hearings, to make this announcement to the public: We are here at the discretion of the Congress of the United States, trying to discharge a duty and obligation that has been placed upon us. The public is here by permission of the committee and not by any compulsion. Any attempt or effort on the part of anyone to make a demonstration or audible comment in this hearing room, either favorably or unfavorably, toward the committee's undertaking, or to what any witness may have to say, will not be countenanced by the committee. If such conduct should occur, the officers on duty will be requested to eject the offenders from the hearing room." </s> [Footnote 7 The entire statement of Mr. Velde is set out at 354 U.S. 210 -211. n. 49. </s> [Footnote 8 Schenectady is sixteen miles from Albany. </s> [Footnote 9 The subcommittee before which the petitioner appeared, "for the purpose of taking this testimony this morning," consisted of Representative Jackson, Acting Chairman, and Representatives Scherer and Doyle. The subcommittee which had conducted the hearings at Albany a few days earlier was composed of Representative Kearney, Chairman, and Representatives Scherer and Walter. </s> [Footnote 10 "Q. How does it happen that Mr. Deutch's testimony appears in `Education - 8' if it was a part actually of `Albany'? </s> "A. Well, the staff in the releasing of this testimony at a later date placed it for convenience under the heading of Education." </s> [Footnote 11 We disregard the evidence indicating that the subject under inquiry was Communist activities in the Chicago area. </s> [Footnote 12 This was hardly a matter within the peculiar knowledge of the petitioner. Cf. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 379 . </s> [Footnote 13 For a Court opinion specifically to join issue with what is written in dissent is a practice ordinarily to be avoided. One of the dissenting opinions in this case, however, is largely based upon what are asserted to be "the undisputed relevant facts in the record." Since every litigant is entitled to have his case reviewed on the facts in the record, it is appropriate to state explicitly that: </s> (1) The record affirmatively shows that neither Marqusee nor Richardson testified, directly or indirectly, to "passing out handbills at strike scenes" or to any "plan of using the prestige and innocent aid of the university's placement service in getting summer jobs with labor unions in upper New York," or anywhere else. </s> (2) The record affirmatively shows that at no time did the subcommittee, or anyone on its behalf, "advise" the petitioner, or anyone else, that the subcommittee was investigating the infiltration of communism into the "educational and labor fields." </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins, dissenting. </s> There is, of course, no doubt that a showing of "pertinency" is an essential part of the Government's burden in a prosecution under 2 U.S.C. 192. But the nature of this burden may differ, dependent upon what transpired at the Congressional inquiry giving rise to the prosecution. </s> In a case where the prosecution involves the defendant's refusal to answer a question whose pertinency was explained to him by the Congressional Committee before which he appeared as a witness - following his appropriate objection that the question was not pertinent to the matter "under inquiry," see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 123 -124 - the Government must stand or fall upon that explanation. For it would be obviously unfair to allow the Government at trial to prove pertinency [367 U.S. 456, 473] on a different theory than was given to the defendant at the time he testified, and on the basis of which he presumably determined that he need not answer the question put. </s> Where, however, the defendant made no "pertinency" objection as a witness before the Congressional Committee, the Government at trial is left free to satisfy the requirement of pertinency in any way it may choose. The present case is such a one, for, as the Court's opinion recognizes, the petitioner here made no adequate pertinency objection before the House Un-American Activities Subcommittee. </s> I dissent because in my opinion the Court's holding that the Government failed to establish "pertinency" rests on a too niggardly view of both the issue and the record. Pertinency, which in the context of an investigatory proceeding is of course a term of wider import than "relevancy" in the context of a trial, is to be judged not in terms of the immediate probative significance of a particular question to the matter under authorized inquiry, but in light of its tendency to elicit information which might be a useful link in the investigatory chain. See Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951, 953. An investigation must proceed "step by step." Ibid. </s> Pertinency is found lacking here because (1) inquiry as to affairs relating to petitioner's student days at Cornell University, situated at Ithaca, N. Y., it is said, was not germane to the Subcommittee's investigation as to Communist activities in "the Albany area"; and (2) in any event, such investigation, the Court finds, related only to alleged Communist infiltration into labor unions and not as well to infiltration "at Cornell or in educational institutions generally." I can agree with neither facet of this holding. </s> It is quite true, as the Court says, that Ithaca is some 165 miles away from Albany, but it seems to me much [367 U.S. 456, 474] too refined to say, as a matter of law, that the trial court could not reasonably determine that Ithaca was within the Subcommittee's terms of reference. Indeed, I think it fair to suggest that in common usage, at least among New Yorkers, "Albany area" would be regarded as aptly descriptive of "upstate" New York. In relation to "pertinency" the matter should not be judged as if it were one of technical jurisdiction or venue. </s> The other aspect of the Court's holding seems to me equally infirm. Accepting, as I shall, the Court's view that the trial record shows that the Subcommittee, at the relevant time, was investigating only alleged Communist "labor union," and not "educational," infiltration, it seems to me abundantly clear that the lower courts were justified in concluding that all of the questions with respect to which the petitioner was convicted * were pertinent to that matter. </s> Only shortly before it examined petitioner, the Subcommittee had interrogated two witnesses, Marqusee and Richardson, with respect to their Communist affiliations, their summer work with two labor unions in Schenectady and in Syracuse, and Communist infiltration into such unions, all while they were both students at Cornell. One of these witnesses, Richardson, had testified that during this period he had known the petitioner, and one Homer Owen (Count Four of the indictment), as Communists on the Cornell campus. I do not see why it should now be deemed either that the Subcommittee's interest in petitioner's testimony was confined to "educational infiltration," or that its preliminary questioning of him might not have led to developing information bearing on "labor union infiltration," possibly stemming from student Communist activity on the Cornell campus, had [367 U.S. 456, 475] further inquiry not been blocked by petitioner's refusal to answer. </s> I cannot agree that the decision of this case has been made "within the conventional framework of the federal criminal law." For surely in judging the pertinency of a question put in the course of an otherwise valid Congressional inquiry, as this one is recognized to have been, we should not insist that the inquiring committee follow stricter rules than the courts themselves apply in determining, for example, the sufficiency of a plea of self-incrimination under the "link in the chain" rule, see, e. g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 , or in judging "materiality" in a perjury case, see, e. g., Carroll v. United States, supra. In reversing this conviction, I think the Court has strayed from the even course of decision. </s> I would affirm. </s> [Footnote * Counts One, Two, Four, and Five of the indictment, set forth in note 5 of the Court's opinion. Ante, p. 461. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins, dissenting. </s> I must say, with all respect, that I think the Court has grossly misread this record. For, after studying and analyzing it, it seems entirely clear to me that not only did petitioner fail to complain of any uncertainty about the subject under inquiry, or object that the questions put to him were not pertinent to the inquiry, but, moreover, at least three of the questions he refused to answer were, on their face, clearly pertinent to the inquiry as a matter of law. Demonstration of these facts can be made only by carefully setting forth in detail the undisputed relevant facts in the record. I now turn to that task. </s> Acting under the statutory command of Congress to investigate and report to it on the extent, character and objects of "un-American propaganda activities," the "diffusion . . . of subversive . . . propaganda," and "all other questions in relation thereto that would aid [367 U.S. 456, 476] Congress in any necessary remedial legislation," 1 a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities conducted investigatory hearings at Albany, New York, on April 7, 8 and 9, 1954, relative to Communist subversive activities. At those hearings evidence was adduced, principally by the testimony of a former graduate student of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations of Cornell University, one Marqusee, and by one Richardson, a former student in the Cornell Law School, that a Communist cell existed in that University from 1947 through 1953. Those witnesses testified that they were members of that cell, and, in addition to holding frequent secret meetings and occasionally passing out handbills at strike scenes, the members of the cell formulated and carried out a plan of using the prestige and innocent aid of the university's placement service in getting summer jobs with labor unions in upper New York - particularly, Ithaca, Schenectady and Syracuse - where, by fellow Communists, they were put in contact with the leaders of Communist cells in the unions and there further carried on their Communist activities. Richardson - who was in fact an employee of, and regularly reported to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation - testified that there were at least six members of the Cornell cell and that one of the most active members of it was petitioner, Deutch, and that another was one Homer Owen. Richardson further testified that, in 1952 and 1953, Deutch was the liaison between an undisclosed member of the Cornell faculty and that cell; that, in that period, Deutch collected for and turned over to the cell various contributions, including one for $100, but declined to name the donor. [367 U.S. 456, 477] </s> Having this and other similar information, the Subcommittee determined to interrogate Deutch, and, locating him in the graduate school of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, it caused him to be subpoenaed to appear before the Subcommittee at Albany on Friday, April 9, 1954. But, at the request of petitioner's counsel, and for petitioner's convenience, the Subcommittee agreed to take petitioner's testimony in executive session at Washington, D.C., on Monday, April 12, instead of at Albany on Friday, April 9. </s> At the appointed time, petitioner, accompanied by his counsel, appeared before the Subcommittee in Washington and was sworn and interrogated. After asking and obtaining his name, place and date of birth, and his educational background, the committee advised petitioner that the particular aspect of Communist infiltration into the educational and labor fields to be inquired into in his interrogation was the existence and nature of ". . . a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates . . . [and] graduates at Cornell . . . ." Specifically, counsel for the committee stated: </s> "Mr. Deutch, during hearings at Albany last week, the committee heard testimony regarding the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates at Cornell University, among certain graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca. </s> "In connection with that testimony, the committee was informed that you were a member of one or more of those groups. If so, I would like to ask you [about] certain matters relating to your activity there." </s> The subject under inquiry, so stated, would appear to have been thus made quite plain. It appears to have been entirely plain to petitioner and his counsel, as neither of them then, or at any time during the hearing, manifested [367 U.S. 456, 478] any want of understanding of the subject or asked for any further explanation of it. </s> Thereupon the following immediately occurred: </s> "[Mr. Tavenner - counsel for the Committee]: </s> Were you a member of a group of the Communist Party at Cornell? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I will answer that question, but only under protest. </s> "I wish to register a challenge as to the jurisdiction of this committee under Public Law 601, which is the committee's enabling legislation. This question, or any similar questions involving my associations, past or future, I am answering, but only under protest as to its constitutionality. But, under your jurisdiction as stated, I answer yes, I was a member of the Communist Party. </s> "Mr. Tavenner: The committee was advised that a witness by the name of Ross Richardson has stated that you acted as liaison between a Communist Party group on the campus and a member of the faculty at Cornell, and that you knew the name of the member of that faculty, who was a member of the Communist Party. </s> "Will you tell us who that member of the faculty was? </s> "Mr. Deutch: Sir, I am perfectly willing to tell about my own activities, but do you feel I should trade my moral scruples by informing on someone else? </s> . . . . . </s> "Mr. Jackson [the acting chairman of the Subcommittee]: That is entirely beside the point. You have been asked a question and we must insist that you answer the question or decline to answer it, and [367 U.S. 456, 479] your declination must consist of something more than your moral scruples. </s> "Mr. Deutch: As to details of that, I think the whole question has been magnified more than it should have. </s> "Mr. Jackson: There is a question pending and the Chair must insist that you answer the question that has been asked. </s> "Mr. Deutch: I can only say that whereas I do not want to be in contempt of the committee, I do not believe I can answer questions about other people, but only about myself. </s> "Mr. Jackson: You therefore refuse to answer the question that is pending, is that correct? </s> "Mr. Deutch: Yes, sir . . . ." </s> Petitioner's refusal to answer that question resulted in Count One of his subsequent indictment. </s> A colloquy then ensued between petitioner and the acting chairman and another member of the Subcommittee, at the conclusion of which petitioner stated: "The only thing I am saying, sir, my challenge is, is it constitutional under Public Law 601?" </s> Thereupon the following occurred: </s> "Mr. Tavenner: The committee received testimony from Ross Richardson to the effect that you collected certain donations for the benefit of the Communist Party, and that on one occasion you delivered to him the sum of $100, without designating to him the source of it. Will you tell the committee, please, the source of that $100 contribution, if it was made? </s> "Mr. Deutch: No; this contribution was made - I believe I gave you the reason why I decline to answer regarding names, and this was from a personal friend." [367 U.S. 456, 480] </s> In reply to the acting chairman's direction to answer the question, petitioner stated: </s> "Mr. Deutch: I feel like I can't answer that question. I realize there are many problems facing me, and it wasn't an easy decision to make. </s> "Mr. Jackson: The Chair directs again that you answer. </s> "Mr. Deutch: I am unable to. </s> "Mr. Tavenner: . . . I want to know if you refuse to answer the question. </s> "Mr. Deutch: Yes, sir." </s> Petitioner's refusal to answer that question resulted in Count Two of his subsequent indictment. </s> The background of the question, and the question, that resulted in Count Three of the indictment are omitted, because the District Court dismissed that Count, and it is not before us. </s> Petitioner then refused, though directed by the acting chairman, to answer the question: "Were you acquainted with Homer Owen?" And that refusal resulted in Count Four of his subsequent indictment. </s> Then, after saying ". . . so when I came to college I was approached and joined [the Communist Party]," petitioner was asked and answered as follows: </s> "Mr. Tavenner: By whom were you approached? </s> "Mr. Deutch: I was approached by a student. I don't wish to give his name. </s> "Mr. Jackson: The witness is directed to give the name of the person by whom he was approached. </s> "Mr. Deutch: I decline to give the name." </s> Petitioner's refusal to answer that question resulted in Count Five of his indictment. </s> This, I submit, is a fair statement of the undisputed relevant facts, and it sets forth literally every contention, objection and reason given by petitioner at the hearing [367 U.S. 456, 481] for his refusal to answer these questions. Apart from the formal testimony of Mr. Tavenner and some documentary exhibits offered by the Government, this was the evidence that was offered and received at petitioner's contempt trial in the District Court. </s> I think this record provides an ample basis to support the District Court's finding that, in general, "The Committee was investigating the infiltration of Communism into educational and labor fields," 147 F. Supp., at 91, but whether or not that was the general and announced subject of the hearings is immaterial to this case, because here petitioner was told, near the beginning of his interrogation and before the relevant questions were propounded, that the subject about which the committee wished to interrogate him was "the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among [students] at Cornell University . . . [and] matters relating to [his] activity there." Like the Court of Appeals, I think these "quoted statements made to [petitioner] by the committee counsel and a committee member clearly indicated the object of the inquiry" of petitioner - i. e., the nature and extent of Communist infiltration at Cornell - "and the pertinency of the questions [to that subject]." 108 U.S. App. D.C., at 148, 280 F.2d, at 696. </s> Likewise, it seems entirely clear to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that not only did petitioner fail to object to any question on the ground of pertinency but "Never once did he indicate unawareness of the purpose of the hearing, or doubt as to the pertinency of the questions." 108 U.S. App. D.C., at 146, 280 F.2d, at 694. It also seems plain to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that petitioner "declined to answer the questions, not on the ground of pertinency [but rather on the ground] that it was against his `moral scruples' to answer questions about other people." 108 U.S. App. D.C., at 147, 280 F.2d, at 695. "Nor," as said by the Court of Appeals, "did he claim that he did not understand how the questions [367 U.S. 456, 482] related to the subject under inquiry, or what that subject was. On the contrary, it is quite obvious that he recognized that the questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry, and he based his refusal to answer solely and simply on the fact that he did not wish to give the names of other persons . . . [and] [n]to until the trial in the District Court, in what appears to be afterthought, did appellant raise the questions of pertinency and unawareness of the subject matter of the inquiry." 108 U.S. App. D.C., at 147-148, 280 F.2d, at 695-696. It thus seems clear to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that "the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject under inquiry and the pertinency of the questions were made to appear at the committee hearing with `indisputable clarity.'" 108 U.S. App. D.C., at 147, 280 F.2d, at 695. </s> Yet this Court now reverses the findings and judgments of the two courts below upon the sole ground "that the Government at the trial failed to carry its burden of proving the pertinence of the questions." I am compelled by the evidence, respectfully, to disagree. </s> Here, whether or not petitioner was told or knew that the general subject of the inquiry was "infiltration of Communism into educational and labor fields," he was specifically told that the committee had information that he had recently been a member of a Communist cell at Cornell, had acted as the liaison between an undisclosed member of the faculty and that cell, had collected and turned over to the cell monies from donors whom he refused to identify; and, then, coming specifically to the particular subject about which the committee desired to interrogate him, petitioner was told that the committee wished to interrogate him about "a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates . . . [and] . . . graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca" and "matters relating to [his] activity there." In the second place, the subject under inquiry, thus stated, was not only [367 U.S. 456, 483] crystal clear but appears to have been entirely plain to petitioner and his counsel, as neither of them then, or at any time during the hearing, manifested any want of understanding of the subject or asked for any further explanation of it. In the third place, neither petitioner nor his counsel made any objection, or even hinted any objection, to any question put to petitioner at the hearing on the ground of pertinency. Instead, petitioner said: "The only thing I am saying, sir, my challenge is, is it constitutional under Public Law 601?" And, finally, at the trial the Government proved this specific committee purpose by introducing into evidence not only the record made at the hearing but also the testimony of the Committee's counsel as to these matters. It is, therefore, passing strange that the Court is unable to find any proof of pertinency of the questions. </s> In Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 , the witness had expressly "objected to the questions on the grounds of lack of pertinency" (id., at 214), and the committee failed to clarify that matter. Hence, we said: "Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto." Id., at 214-215. (Emphasis added.) Here, as stated, not only was pertinency made to appear with "undisputable clarity," but moreover petitioner and his counsel gave every indication to the committee that they were aware of the subject under inquiry and made no objection whatever on the ground of pertinency. </s> In Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 , the witness had said at the hearing, "I might wish to . . . challenge the pertinency of the question to the investigation," and at another point, in a lengthy written statement, he quoted from this Court's opinion in Jones v. Securities & [367 U.S. 456, 484] Exchange Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1 , language relating to a witness' right to be informed of the pertinency of questions asked him by an administrative agency, and then contended in this Court that his conviction for contempt of Congress should be reversed because the subject of the inquiry and the relevancy of the questions thereto were not made clear. In rejecting that claim, and in contrasting that situation from the one existing in the Watkins case, we said: "These statements cannot, however, be accepted as the equivalent of a pertinency objection. At best they constituted but a contemplated objection to questions still unasked, and buried as they were in the context of petitioner's general challenge to the power of the Subcommittee they can hardly be considered adequate, within the meaning of what was said in Watkins, supra, at 214-215, to trigger what would have been the Subcommittee's reciprocal obligation had it been faced with a pertinency objection." 360 U.S., at 123 -124. </s> I also think that this Court's decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 , is highly relevant to this question. For it is as true here, as it was there, that if petitioner did not understand the subject under inquiry or believed that the questions put to him were not relevant to that subject, "a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority [he was being questioned], would have required that [he] state [his] reasons for [refusing answers to the questions]." Id., at 332. Such an objection would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by a further and even more detailed explanation of the subject under inquiry and the manner in which the propounded questions were pertinent thereto. "To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider [such an] objection or remedy it is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. See Bevan v. Kreiger, 289 U.S. 459, 464 -465 (1933)." 339 U.S., at 333 . Petitioner's failure to [367 U.S. 456, 485] make any such objection at the hearing, but raising it, for the first time, at his contempt trial, was patently an attempted "evasion of the duty of one summoned . . . before a congressional committee [, and] cannot be condoned." Id., at 333. And see McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 379 . </s> This alone should be, and is for me, a complete answer to petitioner's claim, and to the Court's holding, "that the Government at the trial failed to carry its burden of proving the pertinence of the questions." </s> But, in addition, at least the questions involved in Counts One, Two and Five of the indictment were, on their face, clearly pertinent to the inquiry as a matter of law. 2 Petitioner had been specifically told that the particular subject upon which he was to be interrogated was "the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates . . . [and] graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca," and "matters relating to [his] activity there." Surely the questions involved in Counts One, Two and Five of the Indictment were, on their face, clearly pertinent to that subject. One cannot profitably elaborate a truth so plain. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 123 -125. And see McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 -381. </s> For these reasons, I am bound to think that the two courts below were right, and that the judgment should be affirmed. </s> [Footnote 1 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, 828. Rule XI (1) (q) (2), Rules of the House of Representatives. H. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. 15. And see pp. 18, 24. </s> [Footnote 2 Inasmuch as a general sentence was imposed on the four counts of no more than the law allows to be imposed on any one count, it follows that if any one of the four counts was adequately proved by the Government the judgment must be affirmed. Barenblatt v. United States, supra, at 126, note 25. </s> [367 U.S. 456, 486]

United States Supreme Court CBS, INC. v. FCC(1981) No. 80-207 Argued: March 3, 1981Decided: July 1, 1981 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 80-213, American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., and No. 80-214, National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as added by Title I of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, authorizes the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to revoke any broadcasting station license "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." On October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (Committee) requested each of the three major television networks (petitioners) to provide time for a 30-minute program between 8 p. m. and 10:30 p. m. on any day from the 4th through the 7th of December 1979. The Committee intended to present, in conjunction with President Carter's formal announcement of his candidacy, a documentary outlining the record of his administration. The petitioners refused to make the requested time available. CBS emphasized the large number of candidates for the Presidential nominations and the potential disruption of regular programming to accommodate requests for equal treatment, but offered to sell a 5-minute segment at 10:55 p. m. on December 8 and a 5-minute segment in the daytime; American Broadcasting Cos. replied that it had not yet decided when it would begin selling political time for the 1980 Presidential campaign, but later indicated that it would allow such sales in January 1980; and National Broadcasting Co., noting the number of potential requests for time from Presidential candidates, stated that it was not prepared to sell time for political programs as early as December 1979. The Committee then filed a complaint with the FCC, charging that the networks had violated their obligation to provide "reasonable access" under 312 (a) (7). The FCC ruled that the networks had violated the statute, concluding that their reasons for refusing to sell the time requested were "deficient" under the FCC's standards [453 U.S. 367, 368] of reasonableness, and directing the networks to indicate by a specified date how they intended to fulfill their statutory obligations. On the networks' petition for review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC's orders, holding that the statute created a new, affirmative right of access to the broadcast media for individual candidates for federal elective office and that the FCC has the authority to independently evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute. The court approved the FCC's insistence that in responding to a candidate's request for time broadcasters must weigh certain factors, including the individual needs of the candidate (as expressed by the candidate); the amount of time previously provided to the candidate; potential disruption of regular programming; the number of other candidates likely to invoke equal opportunity rights if the broadcaster granted the request before it; and the timing of the request. The court determined that the record supported the FCC's conclusion that the networks failed to apply the proper standards and had thus violated the statute's "reasonable access" requirement. The court also rejected petitioners' First Amendment challenge to 312 (a) (7) as applied. </s> Held: </s> 1. Section 312 (a) (7) created an affirmative, promptly enforceable right of reasonable access to the use of broadcast stations for individual candidates seeking federal elective office. It went beyond merely codifying prior FCC policies developed under the public interest standard. Pp. 376-386. </s> (a) It is clear on the face of the statute that Congress did not prescribe simply a general duty to afford some measure of political programming, which the public interest obligation of broadcasters already provided for. Rather, 312 (a) (7) focuses on the individual "legally qualified candidate" seeking air time to advocate "his candidacy," and guarantees him "reasonable access" enforceable by specific governmental sanction. Further, the sanction may be imposed for either "willful or repeated" failure to afford reasonable access. Pp. 377-379. </s> (b) The legislative history confirms that 312 (a) (7) created a right of access that enlarged the political broadcasting responsibilities of licensees. Pp. 379-382. </s> (c) Since the enactment of 312 (a) (7), the FCC has consistently construed the statute as extending beyond the prior public interest policy and as imposing the additional requirement that reasonable access and purchase of reasonable amounts of time be afforded candidates for federal office. This repeated construction of the statute comports with its language and legislative history and has received congressional review, so that departure from that construction is unwarranted. Pp. 382-385. [453 U.S. 367, 369] </s> (d) The qualified observation in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 113 -114, n. 12, relied on by petitioners, that 312 (a) (7) "essentially codified" existing FCC practice was not a conclusion that the statute was in all respects coextensive with that practice and imposed no additional duties on broadcasters. That case did not purport to rule on the precise contours of the responsibilities created by 312 (a) (7) since that issue was not before the Court. Pp. 385-386. </s> 2. Contrary to petitioners' contentions, certain of the FCC's standards to effectuate the guarantees of 312 (a) (7) - which standards evolved principally on a case-by-case basis and are not embodied in formalized rules - do not contravene the statutory objectives or unduly intrude on petitioners' editorial discretion, and the statute was properly applied to petitioners in determining that they had failed to grant the "reasonable access" required by the statute. Pp. 386-394. </s> (a) The FCC's practice of independently determining - by examining objective evidence and considering the position of both the candidate and the networks as well as other factors - whether a campaign has begun and the obligations imposed by the statute have attached does not improperly involve the FCC in the electoral process or significantly impair broadcasters' editorial discretion. Nor is the FCC's standard requiring broadcasters to evaluate access requests on an individualized basis improper on the alleged ground that it attaches inordinate significance to candidates' needs, thereby precluding fair assessment of broadcasters' concerns. The FCC mandates careful consideration of, not blind assent to, candidates' desires for air time. Although the standard does proscribe blanket rules concerning access, such as broadcaster's rule of granting only time spots of a fixed duration to all candidates, the standard is consistent with 312 (a) (7)'s guarantee of reasonable access to individual candidates for federal elective office. The FCC's standards are not arbitrary and capricious, but represent a reasoned attempt to effectuate the statute's access requirement, giving broadcasters room to exercise their discretion but demanding that they act in good faith. Pp. 388-390. </s> (b) On the basis of prior FCC decisions and interpretations, petitioners had adequate notice that their conduct in responding to the Committee's request for access would contravene the statute. The FCC's conclusion about the status of the campaign accorded with its announced position on the vesting of 312 (a) (7) rights and was adequately supported by the objective factors on which it relied. And under the circumstances here, it cannot be concluded that the FCC abused its discretion in finding that petitioners failed to grant the "reasonable access" required by 312 (a) (7). Pp. 390-394. [453 U.S. 367, 370] </s> 3. The right of access to the media under 312 (a) (7), as defined by the FCC and applied here, does not violate the First Amendment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing their editorial discretion, but instead properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters. Although the broadcasting industry is entitled under the First Amendment to exercise "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public [duties]," Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 110, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 . Section 312 (a) (7), which creates only a limited right of access to the media, makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process. Pp. 394-397. </s> 202 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 629 F.2d 1, affirmed. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 397. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 418. </s> Floyd Abrams argued the cause for petitioners in all cases. On the briefs in No. 80-207 were J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, Ralph E. Goldberg, and Joseph DeFranco. On the briefs in No. 80-213 were James A. McKenna, Jr., Thomas N. Frohock, Carl R. Ramey, and Robert J. Kaufman. With Mr. Abrams on the briefs in No. 80-214 were Dean Ringel, Patricia A. Pickrel, Corydon B. Dunham, and Howard Monderer. Erwin G. Krasnow filed a brief for the National Association of Broadcasters, respondent under this Court's Rule 19.6, urging reversal. </s> Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for the federal respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Robert R. Bruce, and C. Grey Pash, Jr.Fn [453 U.S. 367, 371] </s> Fn [453 U.S. 367, 370] Heidi P. Sanchez and Andrew Jay Schwartzman filed a brief for the [453 U.S. 367, 371] National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari to consider whether the Federal Communications Commission properly construed 47 U.S.C. 312 (a) (7) and determined that petitioners failed to provide "reasonable access to . . . the use of a broadcasting station" as required by the statute. 449 U.S. 950 (1980). </s> I </s> A </s> On October 11, 1979, Gerald M. Rafshoon, President of the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, requested each of the three major television networks to provide time for a 30-minute program between 8 p. m. and 10:30 p. m. on either the 4th, 5th, 6th, or 7th of December 1979. 1 The Committee [453 U.S. 367, 372] intended to present, in conjunction with President Carter's formal announcement of his candidacy, a documentary outlining the record of his administration. </s> The networks declined to make the requested time available. Petitioner CBS emphasized the large number of candidates for the Republican and Democratic Presidential nominations and the potential disruption of regular programming to accommodate requests for equal treatment, but it offered to sell two 5-minute segments to the Committee, one at 10:55 p. m. on December 8 and one in the daytime. 2 Petitioner [453 U.S. 367, 373] American Broadcasting Cos. replied that it had not yet decided when it would begin selling political time for the 1980 Presidential campaign, 3 but subsequently indicated that it would allow such sales in January 1980. App. 58. Petitioner National Broadcasting Co., noting the number of potential requests for time from Presidential candidates, stated that it was not prepared to sell time for political programs as early as December 1979. 4 </s> On October 29, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission, charging that the networks had violated [453 U.S. 367, 374] their obligation to provide "reasonable access" under 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. Title 47 U.S.C. 312 (a) (7), as added to the Act, 86 Stat. 4, states: </s> "The Commission may revoke any station license or construction permit - </s> . . . . . </s> "(7) for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." </s> At an open meeting on November 20, 1979, the Commission, by a 4-to-3 vote, ruled that the networks had violated 312 (a) (7). In its memorandum opinion and order, the Commission concluded that the networks' reasons for refusing to sell the time requested were "deficient" under its standards of reasonableness, and directed the networks to indicate by November 26, 1979, how they intended to fulfill their statutory obligations. 74 F. C. C. 2d 631. </s> Petitioners sought reconsideration of the FCC's decision. The reconsideration petitions were denied by the same 4-to-3 vote, and, on November 28, 1979, the Commission issued a second memorandum opinion and order clarifying its previous decision. It rejected petitioners' arguments that 312 (a) (7) was not intended to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the Commission had improperly substituted its judgment for that of the networks in evaluating the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee's request for time. November 29, 1979, was set as the date for the networks to file their plans for compliance with the statute. 74 F. C. C. 2d 657. </s> The networks, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 402, then petitioned for review of the Commission's orders in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The [453 U.S. 367, 375] court allowed the Committee and the National Association of Broadcasters to intervene, and granted a stay of the Commission's orders pending review. </s> Following the seizure of American Embassy personnel in Iran, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee decided to postpone to early January 1980 the 30-minute program it had planned to broadcast during the period of December 4-7, 1979. However, believing that some time was needed in conjunction with the President's announcement of his candidacy, the Committee sought and subsequently obtained from CBS the purchase of five minutes of time on December 4. In addition, the Committee sought and obtained from ABC and NBC offers of time for a 30-minute program in January, and the ABC offer eventually was accepted. Throughout these negotiations, the Committee and the networks reserved all rights relating to the appeal. </s> B </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's orders, 202 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 629 F.2d 1 (1980), holding that the statute created a new, affirmative right of access to the broadcast media for individual candidates for federal elective office. As to the implementation of 312 (a) (7), the court concluded that the Commission has the authority to independently evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute, and approved the Commission's insistence that "broadcasters consider and address all non-frivolous matters in responding to a candidate's request for time." Id., at 386, 629 F.2d, at 18. For example, a broadcaster must weigh such factors as: "(a) the individual needs of the candidate (as expressed by the candidate); (b) the amount of time previously provided to the candidate; (c) potential disruption of regular programming; (d) the number of other candidates likely to invoke equal opportunity rights if the broadcaster grants the request before him; and. (e) the timing of the request." Id., at 387, 629 F.2d. at 19. And in reviewing a broadcaster's decision, the Commission will confine [453 U.S. 367, 376] itself to two questions: "(1) has the broadcaster adverted to the proper standards in deciding whether to grant a request for access, and (2) is the broadcaster's explanation for his decision reasonable in terms of those standards?" Id., at 386, 629 F.2d, at 18. </s> Applying these principles, the Court of Appeals sustained the Commission's determination that the Presidential campaign had begun by November 1979, and, accordingly, the obligations imposed by 312 (a) (7) had attached. Further, the court decided that "the record . . . adequately supports the Commission's conclusion that the networks failed to apply the proper standards." Id., at 389, 629 F.2d, at 21. In particular, the "across-the-board" policies of all three networks failed to address the specific needs asserted by the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee. Id., at 390, 629 F.2d, at 22. From this the court concluded that the Commission was correct in holding that the networks had violated the statute's "reasonable access" requirement. </s> Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' First Amendment challenge to 312 (a) (7) as applied, reasoning that the statute as construed by the Commission "is a constitutionally acceptable accommodation between, on the one hand, the public's right to be informed about elections and the right of candidates to speak and, on the other hand, the editorial rights of broadcasters." Id., at 389, 629 F.2d, at 25. In a concurring opinion adopted by the majority, id., at 389, n. 117, 629 F.2d, at 25, n. 117, Judge Tamm expressed the view that 312 (a) (7) is saved from constitutional infirmity "as long as the [Commission] . . . maintains a very limited `overseer' role consistent with its obligation of careful neutrality . . . ." Id., at 402, 629 F.2d, at 34. </s> II </s> We consider first the scope of 312 (a) (7). Petitioners CBS and NBC contend that the statute did not impose any [453 U.S. 367, 377] additional obligations on broadcasters, but merely codified prior policies developed by the Federal Communications Commission under the public interest standard. The Commission, however, argues that 312 (a) (7) created an affirmative, promptly enforceable right of reasonable access to the use of broadcast stations for individual candidates seeking federal elective office. </s> A </s> The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which Congress enacted in 1972, included as one of its four Titles the Campaign Communications Reform Act (Title I). Title I contained the provision that was codified as 47 U.S.C. 312 (a) (7). 5 </s> We have often observed that the starting point in every case involving statutory construction is "the language employed by Congress." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). In unambiguous language, 312 (a) (7) authorizes the Commission to revoke a broadcaster's license </s> "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." </s> It is clear on the face of the statute that Congress did not prescribe merely a general duty to afford some measure of political programming, which the public interest obligation [453 U.S. 367, 378] of broadcasters already provided for. Rather, 312 (a) (7) focuses on the individual "legally qualified candidate" seeking air time to advocate "his candidacy," and guarantees him "reasonable access" enforceable by specific governmental sanction. Further, the sanction may be imposed for "willful or repeated" failure to afford reasonable access. This suggests that, if a legally qualified candidate for federal office is denied a reasonable amount of broadcast time, license revocation may follow even a single instance of such denial so long as it is willful; where the denial is recurring, the penalty may be imposed in the absence of a showing of willfulness. </s> The command of 312 (a) (7) differs from the limited duty of broadcasters under the public interest standard. The practice preceding the adoption of 312 (a) (7) has been described by the Commission as follows: </s> "Prior to the enactment of the [statute], we recognized political broadcasting as one of the fourteen basic elements necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the community. No legally qualified candidate had, at that time, a specific right of access to a broadcasting station. However, stations were required to make reasonable, good faith judgments about the importance and interest of particular races. Based upon those judgments, licensees were to `determine how much time should be made available for candidates in each race on either a paid or unpaid basis.' There was no requirement that such time be made available for specific `uses' of a broadcasting station to which Section 315 `equal opportunities' would be applicable." (Footnotes omitted.) Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68 F. C. C. 2d 1079, 1087-1088 (1978) (1978 Report and Order). </s> Under the pre-1971 public interest requirement, compliance with which was necessary to assure license renewal, some time [453 U.S. 367, 379] had to be given to political issues, but an individual candidate could claim no personal right of access unless his opponent used the station and no distinction was drawn between federal, state, and local elections. 6 See Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 534 (1959). By its terms however, 312 (a) (7) singles out legally qualified candidates for federal elective office and grants them a special right of access on an individual basis, violation of which carries the serious consequence of license revocation. The conclusion is inescapable that the statute did more than simply codify the pre-existing public interest standard. </s> B </s> The legislative history confirms that 312 (a) (7) created a right of access that enlarged the political broadcasting responsibilities of licensees. When the subject of campaign reform was taken up by Congress in 1971, three bills were introduced in the Senate - S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956. All three measures, while differing in approach, were "intended to increase a candidate's accessibility to the media and to reduce the level of spending for its use." Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1. S. 382, and S. 956 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Pastore). The subsequent Report of the Senate Commerce Committee stated that one of the primary purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was to "give candidates for public office greater access to the media so that they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and completely inform the voters." S. Rep. No. 92-96, p. 20 (1971) (emphasis added). The Report contained [453 U.S. 367, 380] neither an explicit interpretation of the provision that became 312 (a) (7) nor a discussion of its intended impact, but simply noted: </s> "[The amendment] provide[s] that willful or repeated failure by a broadcast licensee to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of his station's facilities by a lagally [sic] qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy shall be grounds for adverse action by the FCC. </s> "The duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit the use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates for these public offices is inherent in the requirement that licensees serve the needs and interests of the [communities] of license. The Federal Communications Commission has recognized this obligation . . . ." Id., at 34. </s> While acknowledging the "general" public interest requirement, the Report treated it separately from the specific obligation prescribed by the proposed legislation. See also id., at 28. </s> As initially reported in the Senate, 312 (a) (7) applied broadly to "the use of a broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candidate on behalf of his candidacy." Id., at 3. The Conference Committee confined the provision to candidates seeking federal elective office. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, p. 22 (1971); H. Conf. Rep. No. 92-752, p. 22 (1971). During floor debate on the Conference Report in the House, attention was called to the substantial impact 312 (a) (7) would have on the broadcasting industry: </s> "[B]roadcasters [are required] to permit any legally qualified candidate [for federal office] to purchase a `reasonable amount of time' for his campaign advertising. Any broadcaster found in willful or repeated violation of this requirement could lose his license and be [453 U.S. 367, 381] thrown out of business, his total record of public service notwithstanding. </s> . . . . . </s> "[U]nder this provision, a broadcaster, whose license is obtained and retained on basis of performance in the public interest, may be charged with being unreasonable and, therefore, fall subject to revocation of his license." 118 Cong. Rec. 326 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Keith). </s> Such emphasis on the thrust of the statute would seem unnecessary if it did nothing more than reiterate the public interest standard. </s> Perhaps the most telling evidence of congressional intent, however, is the contemporaneous amendment of 315 (a) of the Communications Act. 7 That amendment was described by the Conference Committee as a "conforming amendment" necessitated by the enactment of 312 (a) (7). S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, supra, at 22; H. Conf. Rep. No. 92-752, supra, at 22. Prior to the "conforming amendment," the second sentence of 47 U.S.C. 315 (a) (1970 ed.) read: "No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." This language made clear that broadcasters were not common carriers as to affirmative, rather than responsive, requests for access. As a result of the amendment, the second sentence now contains an important qualification: "No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." 47 U.S.C. 315 (a) (emphasis added). Congress retreated from its statement that "no obligation" exists to afford individual access presumably because 312 (a) (7) compels such access in the context of federal elections. If 312 (a) (7) simply reaffirmed the pre-existing public interest [453 U.S. 367, 382] requirement with the added sanction of license revocation, no conforming amendment to 315 (a) would have been needed. </s> Thus, the legislative history supports the plain meaning of the statute that individual candidates for federal elective office have a right of reasonable access to the use of stations for paid political broadcasts on behalf of their candidacies, 8 without reference to whether an opponent has secured time. </s> C </s> We have held that "the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnotes omitted). Accord Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973). Such deference "is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency's interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979). </s> Since the enactment of 312 (a) (7), the Commission has consistently construed the statute as extending beyond the prior public interest policy. In 1972, the Commission made clear that 312 (a) (7) "now imposes on the overall obligation to operate in the public interest the additional specific requirement that reasonable access and purchase of reasonable amounts of time be afforded candidates for Federal office." Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F. C. C. 2d 510, 537-538 (1972) [453 U.S. 367, 383] (1972 Policy Statement) (emphasis added). Accord, Public Notice Concerning Licensee Responsibility Under Amendments to the Communications Act Made by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 47 F. C. C. 2d 516 (1974). In its 1978 Report and Order, the Commission stated: </s> "When Congress enacted Section 312 (a) (7), it imposed an additional obligation on the general mandate to operate in the public interest. Licensees were specifically required to afford reasonable access to or to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of broadcast time for the `use' of Federal candidates. </s> "We see no merit to the contention that Section 312 (a) (7) was meant merely as a codification of the Commission's already existing policy concerning political broadcasts. There was no reason to commit that policy to statute since it was already being enforced by the Commission. . . ." 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1088. </s> See also 1978 Primer, 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 2286-2289. The Commission has adhered to this view of the statute in its rulings on individual inquiries and complaints. See, e. g., The Labor Party, 67 F. C. C. 2d 589, 590 (1978); Ken Bauder, 62 F. C. C. 2d 849 (Broadcast Bureau 1976); Don C. Smith, 49 F. C. C. 2d 678, 679 (Broadcast Bureau 1974); Summa Corp., 43 F. C. C. 2d 602, 603-605 (1973); Robert H. Hauslein, 39 F. C. C. 2d 1064, 1065 (Broadcast Bureau 1973). </s> Congress has been made aware of the Commission's interpretation of 312 (a) (7). In 1973, hearings were conducted to review the operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 372 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Commission Chairman Dean Burch testified regarding the agency's experience with 312 (a) (7). Id., at 136-137. He noted that the Commission's 1972 Policy Statement was "widely distributed and represented our best judgment as to [453 U.S. 367, 384] the requirements of the law and the intent of Congress." Id., at 135. Chairman Burch discussed some of the difficult questions implicit in determining whether a station has afforded "reasonable access" to a candidate for federal office, and in conclusion stated: "We have brought our approach to these problems in the form of the 1972 Public Notice to the attention of Congress. If we have erred in some important construction, we would, of course, welcome congressional guidance." Id., at 137. Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Communications Subcommittee, replied: </s> "We didn't draw the provision any differently than we did because when you begin to legislate on guidelines, and on standards, and on criteria, you know what you run up against. I think what we did was reasonable enough, and I think what you did was reasonable enough as well. </s> . . . . . </s> "I would suppose that in cases of that kind, you would get some complaints. But, frankly, I think it has worked out pretty well." Id., at 137-138. </s> The issue was joined when CBS Vice Chairman Frank Stanton also testified at the hearings and objected to the fact that 312 (a) (7) "grants rights to all legally qualified candidates for Federal office . . . ." Id., at 190. He strongly urged "repeal" of the statute, but his plea was unsuccessful. Ibid. 9 </s> The Commission's repeated construction of 312 (a) (7) as affording an affirmative right of reasonable access to individual [453 U.S. 367, 385] candidates for federal elective office comports with the statute's language and legislative history and has received congressional review. Therefore, departure from that construction is unwarranted. "Congress' failure to repeal or revise [the statute] in the face of such administrative interpretation [is] persuasive evidence that that interpretation is the one intended by Congress." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965). </s> D </s> In support of their narrow reading of 312 (a) (7) as simply a restatement of the public interest obligation, petitioners cite our decision in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), which held that neither the First Amendment nor the Communications Act requires broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements from citizens at large. The Court in Democratic National Committee observed that "the Commission on several occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities," and that Congress has not altered that policy even though it has amended the Communications Act several times. Id., at 113. In a footnote, on which petitioners here rely, we referred to the then recently enacted 312 (a) (7) as one such amendment, stating that it had "essentially codified the Commission's prior interpretation of 315 (a) as requiring broadcasters to make time available to political candidates." Id., at 113-114, n. 12. </s> However, "the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S., at 341 . The qualified observation that 312 (a) (7) "essentially codified" existing Commission practice was not a conclusion that the statute was in all respects coextensive with that practice and imposed no additional duties on broadcasters. In Democratic National Committee, we did not purport to rule on the precise contours [453 U.S. 367, 386] of the responsibilities created by 312 (a) (7) since that issue was not before us. Like the general public interest standard and the equal opportunities provision of 315 (a), 312 (a) (7) reflects the importance attached to the use of the public airwaves by political candidates. Yet we now hold that 312 (a) (7) expanded on those predecessor requirements and granted a new right of access to persons seeking election to federal office. 10 </s> III </s> A </s> Although Congress provided in 312 (a) (7) for greater use of broadcasting stations by federal candidates, it did not give guidance on how the Commission should implement the statute's access requirement. Essentially, Congress adopted a "rule of reason" and charged the Commission with its enforcement. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 303 (r), which empowers the Commission to "[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Communications Act]," the agency has developed standards to effectuate the guarantees of 312 (a) (7). See also 47 U.S.C. 154 (i). The Commission has issued some general interpretative statements, but its standards implementing 312 (a) (7) have evolved principally on a case-by-case basis and are not embodied in formalized rules. The relevant criteria broadcasters must employ in evaluating access requests under the statute can be summarized from the Commission's 1978 Report and Order and the memorandum opinions and orders in these cases. </s> Broadcasters are free to deny the sale of air time prior to [453 U.S. 367, 387] the commencement of a campaign, but once a campaign has begun they must give reasonable and good-faith attention to access requests from "legally qualified" candidates 11 for federal elective office. Such requests must be considered on an individualized basis, and broadcasters are required to tailor their responses to accommodate, as much as reasonably possible, a candidate's stated purposes in seeking air time. In responding to access requests, however, broadcasters may also give weight to such factors as the amount of time previously sold to the candidate, the disruptive impact on regular programming, and the likelihood of requests for time by rival candidates under the equal opportunities provision of 315 (a). These considerations may not be invoked as pretexts for denying access; to justify a negative response, broadcasters must cite a realistic danger of substantial program disruption - perhaps caused by insufficient notice to allow adjustments in the schedule - or of an excessive number of equal time requests. Further, in order to facilitate review by the Commission, broadcasters must explain their reasons for refusing time or making a more limited counteroffer. If broadcasters take the appropriate factors into account and act reasonably and in good faith, their decisions will be entitled to deference even if the Commission's analysis would have differed in the first instance. But if broadcasters adopt "across-the-board policies" and do not attempt to respond to [453 U.S. 367, 388] the individualized situation of a particular candidate, the Commission is not compelled to sustain their denial of access. See 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 665-674; 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 642-651; 1978 Report and Order, 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1089-1092, 1094. Petitioners argue that certain of these standards are contrary to the statutory objectives of 312 (a) (7). </s> (1) </s> The Commission has concluded that, as a threshold matter, it will independently determine whether a campaign has begun and the obligations imposed by 312 (a) (7) have attached. 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 665-666. Petitioners assert that, in undertaking such a task, the Commission becomes improperly involved in the electoral process and seriously impairs broadcaster discretion. </s> However, petitioners fail to recognize that the Commission does not set the starting date for a campaign. Rather, on review of a complaint alleging denial of "reasonable access," it examines objective evidence to find whether the campaign has already commenced, "taking into account the position of the candidate and the networks as well as other factors." Id., at 665 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals noted, the "determination of when the statutory obligations attach does not control the electoral process. . . . the determination is controlled by the process." 202 U.S. App. D.C., at 384, 629 F.2d, at 16. Such a decision is not, and cannot be, purely one of editorial judgment. </s> Moreover, the Commission's approach serves to narrow 312 (a) (7), which might be read as vesting access rights in an individual candidate as soon as he becomes "legally qualified" without regard to the status of the campaign. See n. 11, supra. By confining the applicability of the statute to the period after a campaign commences, the Commission has limited its impact on broadcasters and given substance to its command of reasonable access. [453 U.S. 367, 389] </s> (2) </s> Petitioners also challenge the Commission's requirement that broadcasters evaluate and respond to access requests on an individualized basis. In petitioners' view, the agency has attached inordinate significance to candidates' needs, thereby precluding fair assessment of broadcasters' concerns and prohibiting the adoption of uniform policies regarding requests for access. </s> While admonishing broadcasters not to "`second guess' the `political' wisdom or . . . effectiveness" of the particular format sought by a candidate, the Commission has clearly acknowledged that "the candidate's . . . request is by no means conclusive of the question of how much time, if any, is appropriate. Other . . . factors, such as the disruption or displacement of regular programming (particularly as affected by a reasonable probability of requests by other candidates), must be considered in the balance." 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 667-668. Thus, the Commission mandates careful consideration of, not blind assent to, candidates' desires for air time. </s> Petitioners are correct that the Commission's standards proscribe blanket rules concerning access; each request must be examined on its own merits. While the adoption of uniform policies might well prove more convenient for broadcasters, such an approach would allow personal campaign strategies and the exigencies of the political process to be ignored. A broadcaster's "evenhanded" response of granting only time spots of a fixed duration to candidates may be "unreasonable" where a particular candidate desires less time for an advertisement or a longer format to discuss substantive issues. In essence, petitioners seek the unilateral right to determine in advance how much time to afford all candidates. Yet 312 (a) (7) assures a right of reasonable access to individual candidates for federal elective office, and the Commission's requirement that their requests be considered on an individualized basis is consistent with that guarantee. [453 U.S. 367, 390] </s> (3) </s> The Federal Communications Commission is the experienced administrative agency long entrusted by Congress with the regulation of broadcasting, and the Commission is responsible for implementing and enforcing 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act. Accordingly, its construction of the statute is entitled to judicial deference "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 381 . As we held in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S., at 120 , the Commission must be allowed to "remain in a posture of flexibility to chart a workable `middle course' in its quest to preserve a balance between the essential public accountability and the desired private control of the media." Like the Court of Appeals, we cannot say that the Commission's standards are arbitrary and capricious or at odds with the language and purposes of 312 (a) (7). See 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A). Indeed, we are satisfied that the Commission's action represents a reasoned attempt to effectuate the statute's access requirement, giving broadcasters room to exercise their discretion but demanding that they act in good faith. 12 </s> B </s> There can be no doubt that the Commission's standards have achieved greater clarity as a result of the orders in these cases. 13 However laudable that may be, it raises the question [453 U.S. 367, 391] whether 312 (a) (7) was properly applied to petitioners. 14 Based upon the Commission's prior decisions and 1978 Report and Order, however, we must conclude that petitioners had adequate notice that their conduct in responding to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee's request for access would contravene the statute. </s> In the 1978 Report and Order, the Commission stated that it could not establish a precise point at which 312 (a) (7) obligations would attach for all campaigns because each is unique: </s> "For instance, a presidential campaign may be in full swing almost a year before an election; other campaigns may be limited to a short concentrated period. . . . [W]e believe that, generally, a licensee would be unreasonable if it refused to afford access to Federal candidates at least during those time periods [when the `lowest unit charge' provision of 315 applied]. Moreover, it may be required to afford reasonable access before these periods; however, the determination of whether `reasonable access' must be afforded before these periods for particular races must be made in each case under all the facts and circumstances present. . . . [W]e expect licensees to afford access at a reasonable time prior to a convention or caucus. We will review a licensee's decisions in [453 U.S. 367, 392] this area on a case-by-case basis." 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1091-1092 (emphasis added). </s> In Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 67 F. C. C. 2d 743 (1978), the Commission observed: "[T]he licensee, and ultimately the Commission, must look to the circumstances of each particular case to determine when it is reasonable for a candidate's access to begin . . . ." Id., at 746, n. 4 (emphasis added). Further, the 1978 Report and Order made clear that "Federal candidates are the intended beneficiary of Section 312 (a) (7) and therefore a candidate's desires as to the method of conducting his or her media campaign should be considered by licensees in granting reasonable access." 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1089, n. 14. The agency also stated: </s> "[A]n arbitrary `blanket' ban on the use by a candidate of a particular class or length of time in a particular period cannot be considered reasonable. A Federal candidate's decisions as to the best method of pursuing his or her media campaign should be honored as much as possible under the `reasonable' limits imposed by the licensee." Id., at 1090. </s> Here, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee sought broadcast time approximately 11 months before the 1980 Presidential election and 8 months before the Democratic National Convention. In determining that a national campaign was underway at that point, the Commission stressed: (a) that 10 candidates formally had announced their intention to seek the Republican nomination, and 2 candidates had done so for the Democratic nomination; (b) that various states had started the delegate selection process; (c) that candidates were traveling across the country making speeches and attempting to raise funds; (d) that national campaign organizations were established and operating; (e) that the Iowa caucus would be held the following month; (f) that public officials and private groups were making endorsements; and (g) that the national print media had given campaign [453 U.S. 367, 393] activities prominent coverage for almost two months. 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 645-647. The Commission's conclusion about the status of the campaign accorded with its announced position on the vesting of 312 (a) (7) rights and was adequately supported by the objective factors on which it relied. </s> Nevertheless, petitioners ABC and NBC refused to sell the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee any time in December 1979 on the ground that it was "too early in the political season." App. 41-43, 52-74; nn. 3 and 4, supra. These petitioners made no counteroffers, but adopted "blanket" policies refusing access despite the admonition against such an approach in the 1978 Report and Order. Cf. Donald W. Riegle, 59 F. C. C. 2d 1314 (1976); WALB-TV, Inc., 59 F. C. C. 2d 1246 (1976). Likewise, petitioner CBS, while not barring access completely, had an across-the-board policy of selling only 5-minute spots to all candidates, notwithstanding the Commission's directive in the 1978 Report and Order that broadcasters consider "a candidate's desires as to the method of conducting his or her media campaign." 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1089, n. 14. See App. 44-45, 75-93; n. 2, supra. Petitioner CBS responded with its standard offer of separate 5-minute segments, even though the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee sought 30 minutes of air time to present a comprehensive statement launching President Carter's re-election campaign. Moreover, the Committee's request was made almost two months before the intended date of broadcast, was flexible in that it could be satisfied with any prime time slot during a 4-day period, was accompanied by an offer to pay the normal commercial rate, and was not preceded by other requests from President Carter for access. See App. 27-40; n. 1, supra. Although petitioners adverted to the disruption of regular programming and the potential equal time requests from rival candidates in their responses to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee's complaint, the Commission rejected these claims as "speculative and unsubstantiated at best." 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 674. [453 U.S. 367, 394] </s> Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Commission abused its discretion in finding that petitioners failed to grant the "reasonable access" required by 312 (a) (7). 15 See 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A). "[T]he fact that we might not have made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a substitution of judicial for administrative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to the latter." FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946). "[C]ourts should not overrule an administrative decision merely because they disagree with its wisdom." Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 420 (1951). </s> IV </s> Finally, petitioners assert that 312 (a) (7) as implemented by the Commission violates the First Amendment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing their editorial discretion. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S., at 117 , we stated: </s> "Th[e] role of the Government as an `overseer' and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest and the role of the license as a journalistic `free agent' call for a delicate balancing of competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years has called on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a `tight-rope' to preserve the First Amendment values written [453 U.S. 367, 395] into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act." </s> Petitioners argue that the Commission's interpretation of 312 (a) (7)'s access requirement disrupts the "delicate balanc[e]" that broadcast regulation must achieve. We disagree. </s> A licensed broadcaster is "granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations." Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 337, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966). This Court has noted the limits on a broadcast license: </s> "A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a . . . frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others . . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 389 . </s> See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 -800 (1978). Although the broadcasting industry is entitled under the First Amendment to exercise "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public [duties]," Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 110, the Court has made clear that: </s> "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Red [453 U.S. 367, 396] Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). </s> The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as well as broadcasters, are implicated by 312 (a) (7). We have recognized that "it is of particular importance that candidates have the . . . opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 -53 (1976). Indeed, "speech concerning public affairs is . . . the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 -75 (1964). The First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971). Section 312 (a) (7) thus makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process. </s> Petitioners are correct that the Court has never approved a general right of access to the media. See, e. g., FCC v. Midwest Vedio Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra. Nor do we do so today. Section 312 (a) (7) creates a limited right to "reasonable" access that pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates and may be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing their candidacies once a campaign has commenced. The Commission has stated that, in enforcing the statute, it will "provide leeway to broadcasters and not merely attempt de novo to determine the reasonableness of their judgments . . . ." 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 672. If broadcasters have considered the relevant factors in good faith, the Commission will uphold their decisions. See 202 U.S. App. D.C., at 393, 629 F.2d, at 25. Further, 312 [453 U.S. 367, 397] (a) (7) does not impair the discretion of broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming. </s> Section 312 (a) (7) represents an effort by Congress to assure that an important resource - the airwaves - will be used in the public interest. We hold that the statutory right of access, as defined by the Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeal is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The text of Mr. Rafshcon's letter to the three networks read as follows: </s> "On behalf of the Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc., I am requesting availabilities for a thirty (30) minute program on [ABC, CBS, or NBC] between 8:00 p. m. and 10:30 p. m. E. S. T. on December 4, December 5, December 6, or December 7, 1979. This program, to be run in conjunction with an announcement concerning his candidacy by President Carter for the Democratic nomination for President, consists of a documentary outlining the President's record and that of his administration. At the time this program is aired, it may be assumed that President Carter will be a legally qualified candidate under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and that the President would appear on the program. </s> "As you know, the first official contest to select delegates to the Democratic National Convention occurs January 21, 1980, in Iowa, which is 47 days after December 7, 1979, our last requested date for availabilities. </s> "Unlike all previous Presidential election years, the news media has chosen to focus enormous attention on the Florida Caucus (October 13, 1979) and Convention (November 16-18, 1979) as well as other aspects of the 1980 campaign. As illustration, I have noted that in the six-week period from September 1 through October 9, 1979, ABC devoted 51 minutes, 22 seconds to the 1980 campaign; CBS devoted 51 minutes, 17 seconds to this subject; and NBC devoted 70 minutes. Therefore, our request for the above [453 U.S. 367, 372] time seems eminently appropriate in view of the escalating political climate already generated by both print and broadcast media. </s> "I will expect to hear from one of your sales representatives within the next week regarding a selection of times in order that we may choose a mutually agreeable date." App. 35-40. </s> [Footnote 2 The letter (dated October 17, 1979) to Mr. Rafshoon from Raymond E. Dillon, Director of Political Sales at CBS, read in pertinent part: </s> "Because of the large number of present and potential candidates for the Republican and Democratic presidential nominations, we are at this time unable to accede to your request to purchase a half-hour program. We note that three Democrats and eleven Republicans have already announced, or may reasonably be expected shortly to announce, their presidential candidacies; indeed two candidates for the Republican presidential nomination have already requested to purchase half-hour programs on the CBS Television Network, and their requests have been declined on the same basis as indicated below. </s> "In light of the above circumstances, were we to provide the half-hour program you seek, accommodating potential requests for equal treatment from other candidates for presidential nomination would involve massive disruptions of the regular entertainment and information schedule of the CBS Television Network. Accordingly, we must respectfully reject your request. </s> "We are, however, prepared to make one 5-minute segment in prime time and one 5-minute daytime segment available for purchase by your committee. We note that this is the same offer made to the Republican candidates referred to above in response to their requests to purchase half-hour time periods. </s> "While we are unable to make available time on the dates you have specified, we are able to offer for your purchase a 5-minute period on [453 U.S. 367, 373] December 8 between approximately 10:55 and 11:00 PM. We will also provide a specific 5-minute daytime availability for your purchase on request." Id., at 44-45. </s> [Footnote 3 The letter (dated October 23, 1979) to Mr. Rafshoon from Charles C. Allen, Vice President for Sales Administration at ABC, read in pertinent part: </s> "[T]he ABC Television Network has not reached a decision as to when it will start selling political time for the 1980 Presidential campaign, and, accordingly, we are not in a position to comply with your request. As I mentioned on the telephone, I believe that later this year a decision will be made to make political time for the Presidential campaign available on ABC-TV early next year." Id., at 41. </s> [Footnote 4 The letter (dated October 23, 1979) to Mr. Rafshoon from Joseph J. Iaricci, Vice President for Sales and Administration at NBC, read in pertinent part: </s> "We have evaluated your request carefully. Based upon our experience with past campaigns, we believe it is too early in the political season for nationwide broadcast time to be made available for paid political purposes. In addition, we believe that honoring your request at this early stage of the Presidential campaign would require NBC to honor similar requests from a number of other Presidential aspirants. The impact of such an undertaking at this time is, of course, a significant factor in our decision. </s> "Insofar as the nomination process is now focused on political activities in individual states like Iowa, you may wish to contact stations serving those particular states. </s> "Please be assured that NBC News will continue to cover important and newsworthy aspects of President Carter's political activities." Id., at 42-43. </s> [Footnote 5 Title I also provided: (a) that during a specified period before a primary or general election, a broadcast station was not permitted to charge a legally qualified candidate for any public office a fee in excess of its "lowest unit charge . . . for the same class and amount of time for the same period," 47 U.S.C. 315 (b) (1); and (b) that in using the communications media, candidates for federal elective office were not allowed to exceed established spending limits, 47 U.S.C. 803 (1970 ed., Supp. II), repealed, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1278 (1974). </s> [Footnote 6 The public interest requirement still governs the obligations of broadcasters with respect to political races at the state and local levels. See Public Notice: The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F. C. C. 2d 2209, 2290 (1978) (1978 Primer). </s> [Footnote 7 Title 47 U.S.C. 315 (a) provides that, if a legally qualified candidate for public office is permitted to use a broadcasting station, the licensee must afford "equal opportunities to all other . . . candidates for that office in the use of [the] station." </s> [Footnote 8 No request for access must be honored under 312 (a) (7) unless the candidate is willing to pay for the time sought. See Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 174-178, 636 F.2d 432, 446-450 (1980); 1978 Primer, at 2288. </s> [Footnote 9 Broadcasters have continued to register their complaints about 312 (a) (7) with Congress. See First Amendment Clarification Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 22 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1978). And Congress has considered specific proposals to repeal the statute, but has declined to do so. See S. 22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1977); S. 1178, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1975). Indeed when the Federal Election Campaign Act was amended in 1974, 312 (a) (7) was left undisturbed. See Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1272. </s> [Footnote 10 See generally Note, The Right of "Reasonable Access" for Federal Political Candidates Under Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1287 (1978). </s> [Footnote 11 In order to be "legally qualified" under the Commission's rules, a candidate must: (a) be eligible under law to hold the office he seeks; (b) announce his candidacy; and (c) qualify for a place on the ballot or be eligible under law for election as a write-in candidate. Persons seeking nomination for the Presidency or Vice Presidency are "legally qualified" in: (a) those states in which they or their proposed delegates have qualified for the primary or Presidential preference ballot; or (b) those states in which they have made a substantial showing of being serious candidates for nomination. Such persons will be considered "legally qualified" in all states if they have qualified in 10 or more states. See 1978 Primer, 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 2216-2218. </s> [Footnote 12 The dissenters place great emphasis on the preservation of broadcaster discretion. However, endowing licensees with a "blank check" to determine what constitutes "reasonable access" would eviscerate 312 (a) (7). </s> [Footnote 13 In 1978, the Commission issued a Notice of Inquiry, which asked whether rulemaking proceedings should be commenced in order to clarify licensee obligations under 312 (a) (7). 43 Fed. Reg. 12938. Petitioners and others in the broadcasting industry expressed strong opposition to the promulgation of specific rules, and none were formulated. 1978 Report and Order, 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1079-1081. Petitioners, therefore, must share responsibility for any vagueness and confusion in the Commission's standards. </s> [Footnote 14 Section 312 (a) empowers the Commission to "revoke any station license or construction permit." (Emphasis added.) In the Court of Appeals, petitioners argued that the statute applies only to licensees, not to networks. However, the court rejected that contention, reasoning that the Commission's jurisdiction to "mandate reasonable network access . . . is `reasonably ancillary' to the effective enforcement of the individual licensee's Section 312 (a) (7) obligations . . . ." 202 U.S. App. D.C., at 393-395, 629 F.2d, at 25-27. Petitioners do not contest that holding in this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-17. In any event, as the Commission noted, each petitioner is "a multi-station licensee fully reachable [as to its licenses] by [the express] revocation authority" granted under 312 (a) (7). 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 640, n. 10. </s> [Footnote 15 As it did here, the Commission, with the approval of broadcasters, engages in case-by-case adjudication of 312 (a) (7) complaints rather than awaiting license renewal proceedings. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-16. Although the penalty provided by 312 (a) (7) is license revocation, petitioners simply were directed to inform the Commission of how they intended to meet their statutory obligations. See 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 651; 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 676-677. In essence, the Commission entered a declaratory order that petitioners' responses to the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee constituted a denial of "reasonable access." Such a ruling favors broadcasters by allowing an opportunity for curative action before their conduct is found to be "willful or repeated" and subject to the imposition of sanctions. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> The Court's opinion is disarmingly simple and seemingly straightforward: in 1972, Congress created a right of reasonable access for candidates for federal office; the Federal Communications Commission, charged with enforcing the statute, has defined that right; as long as the agency's action is within the zone of reasonableness, it should be accepted even though a court would have preferred a different course. This approach, however, conceals the fundamental issue in these cases, which is whether Congress intended not only to create a right of reasonable access but also to negate the longstanding statutory policy of deferring to editorial judgments that are not destructive of the goals of the Act. In these cases such a policy would require acceptance of network or station decisions on access as long as they are within the range of reasonableness, even if the Commission would have preferred different responses by the networks. It is demonstrable that Congress did not intend to set aside this traditional policy, and the Commission seriously misconstrued the statute when it assumed that it had been given authority to insist on its own views as to reasonable access even though this entailed rejection of media judgments representing different but nevertheless reasonable reactions to access requests. As this litigation [453 U.S. 367, 398] demonstrates, the result is an administratively created right of access which, in light of the pre-existing statutory policies concerning access, is far broader than Congress could have intended to allow. The Court unfortunately accepts this major departure from the underlying themes of the Communications Act and from the cases that have construed that statute. With all due respect, I dissent. </s> Section 312 (a) (7) provides that the Commission may revoke a broadcast license "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." It is untenable to suggest that the right of access the Commission has created is required or even suggested by the plain language of this section. What is "reasonable" access and what are "reasonable" amounts of time that must be sold are matters about which fair minds could easily differ. The Commission recognized as much in this litigation: "The statutory language," it said, "does not expressly define the scope of the Commission's responsibilities or the procedures by which it should enforce them." 74 F. C. C. 2d 631, 637. Furthermore, the Commission thought "[t]he legislative history of Section 312 (a) (7) does little to clarify those responsibilities and procedures." Ibid. It also found the floor debates to be "equally uninstructive." Ibid. It then announced that "[i]n the absence of further direction, we must also assume that Congress wanted to delegate to the Commission broad responsibility to define and implement the scope of Section 312 (a) (7)'s rights and duties." Id., at 638. Having conferred carte blanche on themselves, four of the seven members of the Commission proceeded to produce some 48 printed pages of guidelines, proscriptions, prescriptions, permissions, instructions on balancing, clarifications, summaries, conclusions, and orders, all purporting to define the "reasonable" access that broadcasters must provide federal candidates for office and to explain why the networks' [453 U.S. 367, 399] offers of access were not reasonable under the circumstances. The Commission issued an initial opinion covering 24 pages but felt compelled to write 24 more pages on reconsideration, purporting to clarify and explain what it had meant in the first place. I think the Commission fell into serious error and that its action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. 706 (2) (A). At the very least, its decision represents "a clear error of judgment." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). I regret particularly that the Court of Appeals and this Court have compounded the error by suggesting that the Commission understood its task and competently performed it in an understandable manner. There are several reasons for my position. </s> 1. The Commission seemed to approach this case as though Congress were legislating on a clean slate, without regard for other provisions of the Act and the manner in which those provisions had been construed and applied to avoid undue intrusions upon the editorial judgment of broadcasters and without regard for the longstanding statutory policies about access, including the recognized duty imposed on broadcasters to serve the public interest by keeping the citizenry reasonably informed about political candidates. </s> The history of the Federal Government's regulation of the broadcast media has been recounted by this Court on several occasions. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 103 -110 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 -386 (1969). That history evinces Congress' efforts to deal with the inevitable tension between the need to allocate scarce frequencies and the importance of giving licensees broad discretion in exercising editorial judgment in the use of those frequencies. These efforts have led to the creation of a general requirement that broadcast licensees operate in the public interest but that they be given considerable leeway in the fulfillment of that duty. As the Court stated in Columbia [453 U.S. 367, 400] Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 110: "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligation. Only when the interests of the public are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will government power be asserted within the framework of the Act." In particular, Congress has explicitly provided that broadcast licensees are not common carriers, 47 U.S.C. 153 (h), and that the Commission may not engage in censorship of radio communications. 47 U.S.C. 326. </s> The parties agree that prior to the adoption of 312 (a) (7) individuals or organizations had no specific right of access to broadcast facilities. This was the common view of the Commission, the courts, and Congress. As we said in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 122, Congress had "time and again rejected various legislative attempts that would have mandated a variety of forms of individual access." Broadcasters had obligations with respect to their programming, such as the fairness doctrine which obligated them to cover issues of public importance from opposing points of view, but this obligation was enforced with care so as not to unduly infringe on the "journalistic discretion in deciding how best to fulfill the Fairness Doctrine obligations." 412 U.S., at 111 . We also observed: "[I]n the area of discussion of public issues Congress chose to leave broad journalistic discretion with the licensee. Congress specifically dealt with - and firmly rejected - the argument that the broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues." Id., at 105. Similarly, in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), where we held that the Commission had erred in providing for a general system of access to cable television, we noted that the Commission's authority with respect to cable television was derived from the provisions of the Communications Act and [453 U.S. 367, 401] concluded that the Commission should not have ignored "Congress' stern disapproval - evidenced in 3 (h) - of negation of the editorial discretion otherwise enjoyed by broadcasters and cable operators alike." Id., at 708. We reaffirmed "the policy of the Act to preserve editorial control of programming in the licensee." Id., at 705. </s> Broadcasters, however, had certain statutory obligations with respect to political broadcasting: As the Commission has explained, it had "recognized political broadcasting as one of the fourteen basic elements necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the community." Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68 F. C. C. 2d 1079, 1087-1088 (1978). Prior to the enactment of 312 (a) (7): </s> "No legally qualified candidate had, at that time, a specific right of access to a broadcasting station. However, stations were required to make reasonable, goodfaith judgments about the importance and interests of particular races. Based upon those judgments, licensees were to `determine how much time should be made available for candidates in each race on either a paid or unpaid basis.' There was no requirement that such time be made available for specific `uses' of a broadcasting station to which Section 315 `equal opportunities' would be applicable." 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1088. </s> The Communications Act had thus long been construed to impose upon the broadcasters a duty to satisfy the public need for information about political campaigns. As this Court observed in Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 534 (1959), a broadcaster policy of "denying all candidates use of stations . . . would . . . effectively withdraw political discussion from the air," and such result would be quite contrary to congressional intent. Furthermore, 315 had long provided that should a station permit a political candidate to use its broadcasting facilities, it must "afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates [453 U.S. 367, 402] for that office . . . ." As that section expressly provided, however, the provision for equal time created no right of initial access. </s> It is therefore as clear as can be that the regulation of the broadcast media has been and is marked by a clearly defined "legislative desire to preserve values of private journalism." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 109. The corollary legislative policy has been not to recognize or attempt to require individual rights of access to the broadcast media. These policies have been so clear and are so obviously grounded in constitutional considerations that in the absence of unequivocal legislative intent to the contrary, it should not be assumed that 312 (a) (7) was designed to make the kind of substantial inroads in these basic considerations that the Commission has now mandated. Section 312 (a) (7) undoubtedly changed the law governing access in some respects, but the language of the section, as the Commission itself concedes, does not require the access rights the Commission has now created; and the legislative history, far from supporting the Commission's actions in these cases, has a contrary thrust. </s> 2. The legislative history, most of which the Commission ignored, shows that Congress was well aware of the statutory and regulatory background recounted above. It also shows that Congress had no intention of working the radical change in the roles of the broadcaster and the Commission that the Commission now insists is consistent with the statutory mandate. </s> The initial effort to incorporate the "reasonable access" concept into the Communications Act arose in 1970 as part of a floor amendment to S. 3637, a bill designed to repeal the equal time provisions of the Act with respect to Presidential and Vice Presidential elections and to require the sale of broadcast time to be made at the "lowest unit charge" available to commercial advertisers. S. 3637, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The amendment provided that "consistent with the other needs of the community broadcast licensees shall make [453 U.S. 367, 403] a reasonable amount of time available for legally qualified candidates for federal elective offices during [prime time]." It also limited expenditures by candidates on broadcast time. 116 Cong. Rec. 11593 (1970). Senator Pastore, sponsor of the amendment, explained that its purpose was "to avoid any misunderstanding as to the obligation of the licensee in making time available to candidates for a Federal elective office." Ibid. The amendment was adopted by the Senate, but not by the House. However, the House Committee Report made clear that "[t]he presentation of legally qualified candidates for public office is an essential part of any broadcast licensee's obligation to serve the public interest." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1347, p. 7 (1970). Senator Pastore's amendment would have codified that obligation with respect to federal elective office. The final bill was vetoed by President Nixon. </s> A second effort, this time by Senator Scott, to codify a "reasonable access" provision arose in the next session of Congress. That provision would have directed the Commission to promulgate regulations that would "insure that all licensees make available to legally qualified candidates for public office reasonable amounts of time for use of broadcasting stations." S. 956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 302 (c) (1971). The then Chairman of the Commission testified that he understood this proposal to codify the existing obligation of broadcasters to present political broadcasts under the public interest standard. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 189 (1971). This proposal also was not enacted. </s> The third effort to codify a reasonable access standard met with success in the form of 312 (a) (7) which the Senate Committee on Commerce added to Title I of what ultimately became the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The portions of this bill that addressed broadcast media included a repeal of the equal time provision of the Communications Act with respect to Presidential [453 U.S. 367, 404] and Vice Presidential elections, a requirement that broadcasters charge political candidates a "lowest unit charge" during certain periods of a campaign, and limitations on expenditures by candidates for federal office. 1 The Senate Committee indicated that these provisions should not result in the "diminution in the extent of such programming." S. Rep. No. 92-96, p. 28 (1971). And in this precise regard, 312 (a) (7) was included in the bill "[i]n order to emphasize the public interest obligation inherent in making broadcast time available to candidates covered by the spending limitation in the legislation . . . ." Ibid. Section 312 (a) (7) was primarily a device to insure that other provisions of the bill would not dilute the pre-existing public interest standard as applied to federal elections. Consistent with this approach, the Committee described the section and observed that </s> "[t]he duty of broadcast licensees generally to permit the use of their facilities by legally qualified candidates for these public offices is inherent in the requirement that licensees serve the needs and interests of the [communities] of license." Id., at 34. </s> The legislative history thus reveals that Congress sought to codify what it conceived to be the pre-existing duty of the broadcasters to serve the public interest by presenting political broadcasts. It also negates any suggestion that Congress believed it was creating the extensive, inflexible duty to provide access that the Commission has now fastened upon the broadcasters. This is not to say that 312 (a) (7) did not work important changes in the law, for it did put teeth in the obligation of the broadcasters' duty to serve the public interest by providing the remedy of license revocation for willful or repeated refusals to provide a candidate for federal elective [453 U.S. 367, 405] office with reasonable access to broadcast time. The need for this remedy arose out of the concern that other provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act could lead to a misunderstanding regarding the broadcasters' continuing duty to afford reasonable access to federal candidates. </s> The Commission almost totally ignored the legislative history as a possible limitation on the reach of the broadcasters' duty to provide reasonable access or upon the scope of its oversight responsibilities. The Commission did note that one of the purposes of the 1971 Act had been described as affording candidates a greater access to the broadcast media. But none of these statements indicated that this was the purpose of 312 (a) (7), the provision at issue here. That purpose was served by other provisions of the amendments, such as the provision requiring the sale of broadcast time at the lowest unit charged during specified periods; 312 (a) (7) itself aimed at preventing the charge limitation from reducing access that might otherwise be available. 2 </s> The Commission also noted, and the Court now heavily relies on, the so-called conforming amendment to 315 (a), the equal time provision, which then provided that "[n]o obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate." 47 U.S.C. 315 (a) (1970 ed.). But in its original form, 48 Stat. 1088, this portion of 315 had provided that "no obligation is hereby imposed" - the word "hereby" being omitted by the codifier of Title 47 of the United States Code. To the extent that 315 without [453 U.S. 367, 406] the conforming amendment, which returned the relevant provision to approximately its original form, suggested that the Act in no way required access to political candidates, it also called into the question the Commission's public interest policy of requiring stations to give reasonable access to political candidates. That the conforming amendment was made is understandable, but the Court gives it undue significance. </s> In any event, the Court relies on the conforming amendment for no more than an affirmative indication that Congress intended to give individual candidates a right of reasonable access, a right that did not exist prior to the enactment of 312 (a) (7). This much may be conceded, but nothing in this bit of legislative history, or in any other, furnishes any support for the Commission's sweeping decision in these cases. On the contrary, the legislative history negates the Commission's conclusion that it was free to so drastically limit the discretion of the broadcasters and to so radically expand its own oversight authority. </s> 3. The Court relies, as it must, on the authority of the Commission to interpret and apply the statute and on the deference that courts should accord to agency views with respect to the legislation it is charged with enforcing. As the Court has said, however, "[t]he amount of deference due an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute . . . `will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'" St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 783 , n. 13 (1981), quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). I find the Commission's current radical version not only quite inconsistent with its prior views but also singularly unpersuasive. </s> As for its past views, the Commission's policy statement issued in 1972, shortly after the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act, expressed the view that the section [453 U.S. 367, 407] had expressly imposed on the public interest obligation of broadcasters the "additional" specific requirement that candidates for federal public office be afforded reasonable access to broadcast time, but it also clearly eschewed anything approaching the negation of broadcaster discretion and the extensive agency oversight that the Commission's present decision inevitably involves: </s> "3. Q. How is a licensee to comply with the requirement of section 312 (a) (7) that he give reasonable access to his station to, or permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time by, candidates for Federal elective office? </s> "A. Each licensee, under the provisions of sections 307 and 309 of the Communications Act, is required to serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity. In its Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry (1960), the Commission stated that political broadcasts constitute one of the major elements in meeting that standard. (See Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division v. WDAY, Inc. 360 U.S. 525 (1959), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 -394 (1969).) The foregoing broad standard has been applied over the years to the overall programming of licensees. New section 312 (a) (7) adds to that broad standard specific language concerning reasonable access. </s> ". . . The test of whether a licensee has met the requirement of the new section is one of reasonableness. The Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of the licensee, but, rather, it will determine in any case that may arise whether the licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith in fulfilling his obligations under this section. </s> . . . . . </s> "8. Q. Some stations have in the past had the policy [453 U.S. 367, 408] of not selling short political spot announcements (e. g., 10 seconds, 1 minute) on the ground that they did not contribute to an informed electorate. In light of the enactment of section 312 (a) (7), may stations have such policies, or must they sell reasonable numbers of short spots to legally qualified candidates for Federal office if requested? </s> "A. We have, prior to the enactment of section 312 (a) (7), when stations were (under the provisions of section 315) not required to allow use of their facilities by particular candidates for public office, ruled that licensees may have such policies. In so ruling, we have cautioned that licensees have the public interest consideration of making their facilities available to candidates, but have left to the good-faith judgment of the licensee the determination of how the facilities were to be used to serve the public interest. As complaints arose, we looked to the reasonableness of that judgment in a particular fact pattern. (31 F. C. C. 2d 782) (1971)). Section 312 (a) (7) now imposes on the overall obligation to operate in the public interest the additional specific requirement that reasonable access and purchase of reasonable amounts of time be afforded candidates for Federal office. We shall, under this new section, apply the same test of reasonableness of the judgment of the licensee." Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F. C. C. 2d 510, 536-538 (emphasis supplied). </s> There was no suggestion in 1972 that the "needs" of the requesting candidate shall be paramount. Indeed, the Commission embraced its prior practice. Discretion was thought to remain with the broadcaster, not to be placed in the hands of the candidates or subjected to close and exacting oversight by the Commission. Clearly, the Commission's contemporaneous construction of 312 (a) (7) is inconsistent with the sweeping construction of the section it has now adopted. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). [453 U.S. 367, 409] </s> Subsequent interpretations of the scope of 312 (a) (7), including the comprehensive Report and Order: Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312 (a) (7) of the Communications Act, 68 F. C. C. 2d 1079 (1978), have consistently refrained from curtailing broadcaster discretion by refusing to impose stringent standards or to second-guess the broadcaster's good-faith judgments. In the Report and Order, the Commission explained: </s> "Since the passage of Section 312 (a) (7) as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Commission's policy has generally been to defer to the reasonable, good faith judgment of licensees as to what constitutes `reasonable access' under all the circumstances present in a particular case. The Commission desired, through its inquiry into this area, to learn whether that policy was proving manageable and equitable for candidates and licensees or whether additional rules or guidelines would be advisable." Id., at 1079-1080. </s> After a detailed examination of the question, the Commission concluded: </s> "We continue to believe that the best method for achieving a balance between the desires of candidates for air time and the commitments of licensees to the broadcast of other types of programming is to rely on the reasonable, good faith discretion of individual licensees. We are convinced that there are no formalized rules which would encompass all the various circumstances possible during an election campaign." Id., at 1089. </s> The Commission went on to suggest some very broad guidelines it considered essential in effectuating the intent of Congress under 312 (a) (7). For example, candidates generally were to be afforded some access to prime time, and access was to be flexible, including the possibility of program time and "spot" announcements. Candidates were not entitled, however, "to a particular placement of his or her political announcement [453 U.S. 367, 410] on a station's broadcast schedule. . . . It is best left to the discretion of a licensee when and on what date a candidate's spot announcement or program should be aired" 68 F. C. C. 2d, at 1091. The Commission specifically refused to arrogate to itself the power to determine when the reasonable access duty attached except on a case-by-case basis leaving the initial judgment in the hands of the broadcast licensee. Finally, there is no statement in this report that requires broadcasters to look to the needs of a candidate in the initial determination of reasonable access other than the admonition that broadcasters could not "follow a policy of flatly banning access by a Federal candidate to any of the classes and lengths of program or spot time in the same periods which the station offers to commercial advertisers." Id., at 1090. Like the initial policy statement issued in 1972, this report lends little credence to the new-found power of the Commission to oversee with an iron hand the implementation of 312 (a) (7). </s> In terms of the degree to which broadcaster editorial judgments should be subject to review and reversal by the Commission - the most important issue in this litigation - it is evident that the Commission has been quite inconsistent. Its present radical interpretation of 312 (a) (7) plainly rejects its earlier and more contemporaneous pronouncements as to the meaning and scope of the broadcasters' duties and of its own authority under 312 (a) (7). </s> 4. Equally, if not more fundamental, the Commission's opinions in this case are singularly unpersuasive. They contain a plethora of admonitions to the broadcast industry, some quite vague and others very specific but often inconsistent. Altogether, in operation and effect, they represent major departures from prior practice, from prior decisions, including those of this Court, and from congressionally recognized policies underlying the Federal Communications Act. As I have indicated, we should not endorse them without much clearer congressional direction than is apparent in the actions leading to the adoption of 312 (a) (7). I shall mention [453 U.S. 367, 411] my major difficulties with the Commission's opinion and judgment. </s> 4a. The Commission stated in a footnote that it should not differ with broadcaster decisions with respect to a candidate's access unless "`arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,'" an approach reflecting its traditional stance vis-a-vis the broadcasters. 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 642, n. 16. The Commission had already determined, however, that because 312 (a) (7) was not self-explanatory on its face and because it failed to find explicit guidance to the contrary in the legislative history, it would and should exercise wide discretion in interpreting and enforcing the Act. It is therefore not surprising that the Commission's assertions of deference to editorial judgment are palpably incredible. 3 </s> The Commission first confounds itself by announcing that the duty to provide access attaches when the campaign begins and that this threshold issue was to be "based on [an] independent evaluation of the status of the campaign taking into account the position of the candidate and the networks as well as other factors" 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 665. This effectively withdrew the issue of timing from the area of broadcaster judgment and transformed it into a question of law to be determined by the Commission de novo. It was also a major shift in the agency's position, for its Broadcast Bureau just two years before had ruled that the assessment of when a campaign is sufficiently underway to warrant the provision of access was to be left to broadcaster discretion: "A licensee's discretion in providing coverage of elections extends not only to the type and amount of time to be made available to candidates, [453 U.S. 367, 412] but to the date on which its campaign coverage will commence." Anthony R. Martin - Trigona, 66 F. C. C. 2d 968, 969 (Broadcast Bureau 1977), application for review denied, 67 F. C. C. 2d 33, reconsideration denied, 67 F. C. C. 2d 743 (1978). Although I have some difficulty in perceiving why the access obligation should begin when "the campaign" is underway, even if there is such a triggering event, reasonable men could differ as to when that moment has arrived. The Commission overstepped its authority in imposing its own answer on the industry and in rejecting the network's reasonable submissions. The Commission gave no explanation whatsoever for its action in this respect. In fact, it did not even acknowledge that it was making its own de novo determination until it issued its opinion on reconsideration. </s> 4b. The Commission ruled that in responding to its obligation to provide reasonable time, a broadcaster should place particular emphasis on the candidates' needs, weigh each request in its own specific context on a particularized basis, and tailor its response to the individual candidate. This approach expressly rejects the thesis of 315 that all candidates be treated equally. If the networks in this case had responded affirmatively to the candidate's request, 315 would require that equal time be extended to all other Democratic candidates and would forbid any kind of individualized consideration that would result in giving them less time than had been previously given to their competitor. There is no trace of support in the language of the Act or in the legislative history for this unrealistic approach to 312 (a) (7). Nor does the Commission offer any tenable explanation why a broadcaster's decision to provide equal time for all candidates is a violation of the obligation to provide reasonable time to each of them. The inference may be drawn from the Commission's position that reasonable access may require unequal access, but 315 requires equal time for all once it is [453 U.S. 367, 413] granted to anyone. The Commission's rejection of the equality approach as one of the possible ways of complying with 312 (a) (7) is a plain error. </s> Of course, the individualized-need approach requires a broadcaster to make an assessment with respect to each request for time, and each of these countless assessments will be subject to review by the Commission. If the degree of oversight to be exercised by the Commission is to be measured by its work in these cases, there will be very little deference paid to the judgment and discretion of the broadcaster. The demands of the candidate will be paramount. As Commissioner Lee said in this litigation: "I have listened carefully to my colleagues explain how this decision leaves broadcast discretion with the networks. However, the decision doesn't have this effect. By the time the majority finishes its analysis of the networks' reasons for not giving time, the networks do not have any choice other than to give the requested time. No other weighing of factors is reasonable in the view of the majority." 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 681 (footnote omitted). </s> 4c. Indicative also of the stringent degree of oversight that the Commission now intends to exercise is the manner in which it dealt with the networks' suggestions that in responding to the request for time involved here, they were entitled to take into account the fact that a total of 122 persons had filed notices of candidacy for the Presidency with the Federal Election Commission. The Commission conceded that it was a proper concern and that Republican candidates might have to be treated equally with Democrats. The Commission, however, in its political wisdom, concluded that it was "unlikely" that more than a tiny percentage of all candidates would request time, the net effect being that the networks' anticipations based on their professional experience were rejected. As petitioner CBS submits in its brief: "Broadcasters are not permitted to consider the likelihood of multiple future requests by similarly situated candidates unless [453 U.S. 367, 414] the imminence of such requests can be demonstrated to a near certainty. But the likelihood that there will be multiple demands from other candidates is not susceptible to proof in advance. Candidate needs are necessarily shifting in nature, and no candidate can supply a precise prediction of his future plans. Thus, under the Commission's approach, broadcasters can give only limited, if any, weight to potential disruption of normal program schedules, or their view that other material would better serve the interests of their audiences." Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-207, p. 38 (footnotes omitted). </s> 4d. The Court tells us: "If broadcasters take the appropriate factors into account and act reasonably and in good faith, their decisions will be entitled to deference even if the Commission's analysis would have differed in the first instance." Ante, at 387. But this language can be taken with a grain of salt, since the Commission, the Court of Appeals, and the majority give the networks no deference whatsoever. This is so because the "appropriate factors" are designed to eviscerate broadcaster discretion. The abrupt departure from accepted norms and the truly remarkable extent to which the Commission will seek to control the programming of political candidates in the future is best demonstrated by its rejection, as being unreasonable, of the submissions filed by the networks in response to the complaints, these submissions being summarized in the networks' briefs as follows: </s> CBS: </s> "On October 11, 1979, Gerald M. Rafshoon, President Carter's media adviser, asked CBS to offer the Carter/Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. (the `Carter Committee') a thirty-minute paid program on the CBS Television Network between 8:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. EST during the period December 4 to 7, 1979. The program, which was to be run following President Carter's anticipated announcement of his candidacy for reelection on [453 U.S. 367, 415] December 4, was described as `a documentary outlining the President's record and that of his administration.' J. A. 39. CBS declined to offer a half-hour period that early in the campaign, but did offer two five-minute periods, one in the prime evening hours and one in the daytime hours, as it had to two other presidential candidates. J. A. 44-45. </s> "On October 29, 1979, the Carter Committee filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that CBS, ABC and NBC had violated Section 312 (a) (7). In its response to the complaint and later pleadings, CBS asserted that its decision had been reasonable. CBS stated that it had traditionally sold half-hour periods during later campaign periods and that it intended to do so in the 1980 campaign. J. A. 80. It emphasized that its sales policies were designed to assure evenhanded treatment of candidates. J. A. 170-173. CBS pointed out that the Carter Committee request had been made even before the President had announced his candidacy and more than a year before the general election. It also pointed out that campaigns for the presidential nominations consisted not of one national contest, but of a series of state delegate contests extending over a long period of time; that the first of these contests was more than four months away; and that it was not reasonable to expect networks to sell half-hour periods nationally at such an early date. Moreover, CBS noted that there were a large number of actual and potential candidates for the Presidency; that two candidates for the Republican nomination had already requested half-hour periods; and that a substantial disruption of regular programming would occur if multiple requests were received and granted. J. A. 78-84. CBS further pointed out that an incumbent President has unparalleled opportunities to present his views to the public by means of the broadcast media. J. A. 170-71." [453 U.S. 367, 416] Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-207, pp. 4-5 (footnotes omitted). </s> NBC: </s> "NBC responded by letter of October 23, 1979 declining the request to purchase time (JA 42). In its letter NBC noted that it had carefully evaluated the request, but concluded that the earliness of the requested broadcast dates (eight months before the Democratic National Convention and 11 months before the national election), the multiplicity of federal candidates at that stage of the campaign (12 announced candidates had held national elective office or been Governor of a state), and NBC's obligation under Section 315 (a) of the Communications Act to provide equal half-hour time periods to all candidates requesting it should NBC honor the President's request, were all factors in its decision. NBC also noted that since the nomination process was focused at that time on political activities in individual states, such as the Iowa Caucus, the Committee might wish to contact individual local stations in those states." Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-214, pp. 3-4. </s> ABC: </s> "In a letter dated October 23, 1979, ABC advised Mr. Rafshoon that it could not comply with the Committee's request for time on one of the early December dates, but that it expected to make time available early in 1980. J. A. 41. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "In response, ABC explained the factors which had led it to conclude that political time sales could reasonably commence in early January, 1980 - instead of on the specific dates requested. Thus, the first of 36 Presidential primaries was, at that time, nearly four months away and the Democratic National Convention was more than [453 U.S. 367, 417] eight months away. J. A. 54-55. ABC also noted that the potential for program schedule disruption would be considerable if the Committee were sold time in early December, as multiple candidates would likely assert equal opportunities rights under Section 315 (a) of the Communications Act. J. A. 56. In this regard, ABC observed that at least nine Republicans had already declared their candidacy and that two Democratic leaders and a tenth prominent Republican were expected to announce within a short period of time. Finally, ABC emphasized that its continuing news coverage ensured that `the mixture of issues, developments (including candidate announcements) and personalities that dominate this early stage of the campaign are brought to the public's attention.' J. A. 57." Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-213, pp. 6-7. </s> None of these justifications is patently unreasonable. They become so only because of the Commission's conclusion, adopted by the majority, that the reasonableness of access is to be considered from the individual candidate's perspective, including that candidate's particular "needs." While both the Court and the Commission describe other factors considered relevant such as the number of candidates and disruption in programming, the overarching focus is directed to the perceived needs of the individual candidate. This highly skewed approach is required because, as the Court sees it, the networks "seek the unilateral right to determine in advance how much time to afford all candidates." Ante, at 389. But such a right, reasonably applied, would seem to fall squarely within the traditionally recognized discretion of the broadcaster. Instead of adhering to this traditional approach, the Court has laid the foundation for the unilateral right of candidates to demand and receive any "reasonable" amount of time a candidate determines to be necessary to execute a particular campaign strategy. The concomitant Commission involvement [453 U.S. 367, 418] is obvious. There is no basis in the statute for this very broad and unworkable scheme of access. 4 Commissioner Washburn's dissenting observation is surely correct: </s> "In addition, the document adopted by the majority today goes far beyond the proper limits of Commission responsibility in political broadcasting matters. In detail (see pages 12-13, paragraphs 13-35) it substitutes the Commission's judgment for the broadcaster's own good faith interpretation of candidate requests and his response thereto. Such governmental intrusion is unwarranted, is illegal and, I fear, will have far-reaching consequences that will come back to haunt the Commission and the public again and again." 74 F. C. C. 2d, at 682. </s> [Footnote 1 The bill as enacted did not include the proposed repeal of the equal time provisions with respect to Presidential and Vice Presidential elections. 86 Stat. 3. In addition, the expenditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 have been repealed. 88 Stat. 1278. </s> [Footnote 2 One of the major purposes of the Federal Election Campaign Act was to shorten the length of campaigns, thereby reducing campaign costs. See S. Rep. No. 92-96, pp. 20-21, 28 (1971). Television advertising was described as "unquestionably the most used media in political campaigns, and it has been the most significant contributor to the spiraling cost of these campaigns." Id., at 30. The majority's interpretation of 312 (a) (7) runs directly contrary to this broad goal. This decisions nothing more than an open invitation to start campaigning early, thus increasing the overall length of the campaign and the overall costs to all the candidates. </s> [Footnote 3 Of a similar tenor is the Court of Appeals' observation that "[t]he interference with editorial discretion" created by the rigid scheme of regulatory oversight it was endorsing "seems no more or less" than had existed under the broad public interest standard. 202 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 391, n. 102, 629 F.2d 1, 23, n. 102. </s> [Footnote 4 The statute permits revocation upon "willful or repeated" refusal to afford reasonable access. I think this language indicates that the Commission would intervene in only the most egregious of circumstances - such as an outright refusal to afford any time regardless of the circumstances. Consistent with this view, Senator Scott described 312 (a) (7) as directed at those few broadcasters who acted in "blatant disregard for the public interest." Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 103 (1971). The majority, however, reads this language as an open invitation for Commission intervention. A single "willful" violation is sufficient to trigger overview and immediate revocation. Ante, at 378. Since the Court has sustained the Commission's finding that the networks violated 312 (a) (7) and since a violation of 312 (a) (7) requires either willful or repeated refusal of reasonable access, it follows that the networks have been found to have acted willfully within the meaning of the statute and that their licenses are subject to immediate revocation. I doubt Congress intended to put the licenses of all broadcasters into a state of jeopardy on such tenuous grounds. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> In my judgment, the question whether a broadcast licensee has violated 47 U.S.C. 312 (a) (7) by denying a political candidate reasonable access to broadcast time must be answered [453 U.S. 367, 419] in the context of an entire political campaign, rather than by focusing upon the licensee's rejection of a single request for access. The licensee has a duty to act impartially and to make an adequate quantity of desirable time available. The performance of that duty cannot be evaluated adequately by focusing solely on particular requests or the particular needs of individual candidates. The approach the Federal Communications Commission has taken in this litigation, now adopted by the Court, creates an impermissible risk that the Commission's evaluation of a given refusal by a licensee will be biased - or will appear to be biased - by the character of the office held by the candidate making the request. * Indeed, anyone who listened to the campaign rhetoric that was broadcast during 1980 must wonder how an impartial administrator could conclude that any Presidential candidate was denied "reasonable access" to the electronic media. That wonderment is not dispelled by anything said in the opinions for the majority of the Commission in this litigation. </s> In sum, I find JUSTICE WHITE'S analysis of the issue compelling. I accordingly join his opinion. </s> [Footnote * The possibility that Commission decisions under 312 (a) (7) may appear to be biased is well illustrated by this litigation. In its initial decision and its decision on the networks' petitions for reconsideration, the Commission voted 4-3 in favor of the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee. See 74 F. C. C. 2d 631, 652, 653, 654 (1979). In both instances, the four Democratic Commissioners concluded that the networks had violated the statute by denying the Committee's request for access; the three Republican Commissioners disagreed. See Federal Communications Commission, 45th Annual Report/Fiscal Year 1979, pp. 1-2, 86-87 (1980). See also 202 U.S. App. D.C. 369, 400-401, and n. 16, 629 F.2d 1, 32-33, and n. 16 (1980) (Tamm, J., concurring). </s> [453 U.S. 367, 420]

United States Supreme Court DICKERSON v. UNITED STATES(2000) No. 99-5525 Argued: April 19, 2000Decided: June 26, 2000 </s> In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, in which the Court held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence, id., at 479, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §3501, which in essence makes the admissibility of such statements turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily. Petitioner, under indictment for bank robbery and related federal crimes, moved to suppress a statement he had made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the ground he had not received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings, but held that §3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. It concluded that Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and that, therefore, Congress could by statute have the final say on the admissibility question. </s> Held: Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Pp. 2-14. </s> (a) Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. Given §3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and its instruction for trial courts to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, this Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit that Congress intended §3501 to overrule Miranda. The law is clear as to whether Congress has constitutional authority to do so. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe binding rules of evidence and procedure. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426. While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-348, it may not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution, see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-521. That Miranda announced a constitutional rule is demonstrated, first and foremost, by the fact that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied its rule to proceedings in state courts, and that the Court has consistently done so ever since. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (per curiam). The Court does not hold supervisory power over the state courts, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, as to which its authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the Constitution, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422. The conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is also supported by the fact that that case is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule, see, e.g., 384 U.S., at 445. Although Miranda invited legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, it stated that any legislative alternative must be "at least as effective in appraising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Id., at 467. </s> A contrary conclusion is not required by the fact that the Court has subsequently made exceptions from the Miranda rule, see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649. No constitutional rule is immutable, and the sort of refinements made by such cases are merely a normal part of constitutional law. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306--in which the Court, in refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases, stated that Miranda's exclusionary rule serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than that Amendment itself--does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth. Finally, although the Court agrees with the court-appointed amicus curiae that there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than there were when Miranda was decided--e.g., a suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388--it does not agree that such additional measures supplement §3501's protections sufficiently to create an adequate substitute for the Miranda warnings. Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and assure him that the exercise of that right will be honored, see, e.g., 384 U.S., at 467, while §3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. Section 3501, therefore, cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law. Pp. 2-12. </s> (b) This Court declines to overrule Miranda. Whether or not this Court would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now. Even in constitutional cases, stare decisis carries such persuasive force that the Court has always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification. E.g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp, 517 U.S. 843, 856. There is no such justification here. Mirandahas become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-332. While the Court has overruled its precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, that has not happened to Miranda. If anything, subsequent cases have reduced Miranda's impact on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling. The rule's disadvantage is that it may result in a guilty defendant going free. But experience suggests that §3501's totality-of-the-circumstances test is more difficult than Miranda for officers to conform to, and for courts to apply consistently. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515. The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not dispense with the voluntariness inquiry, but cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was compelled despite officers' adherence to Miranda are rare. Pp. 12-14. </s> 166 F. 3d 667, reversed. </s> Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. </s> CHARLES THOMAS DICKERSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit </s> [June 26, 2000] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), we held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §3501, which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. </s> Petitioner Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit bank robbery, and using a firearm in the course of committing a crime of violence, all in violation of the applicable provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made at a Federal Bureau of Investigation field office, on the grounds that he had not received "Miranda warnings" before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress, and the Government took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That court, by a divided vote, reversed the District Court's suppression order. It agreed with the District Court's conclusion that petitioner had not received Miranda warnings before making his statement. But it went on to hold that §3501, which in effect makes the admissibility of statements such as Dickerson's turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily, was satisfied in this case. It then concluded that our decision in Miranda was not a constitutional holding, and that therefore Congress could by statute have the final say on the question of admissibility. 166 F.3d 667 (1999). </s> Because of the importance of the questions raised by the Court of Appeals' decision, we granted certiorari, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999), and now reverse. </s> We begin with a brief historical account of the law governing the admission of confessions. Prior to Miranda, we evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test. The roots of this test developed in the common law, as the courts of England and then the United States recognized that coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy. See, e.g., King v. Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 117-118, 122-123, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161, 164 (K. B. 1783) (Lord Mansfield, C. J.) (stating that the English courts excluded confessions obtained by threats and promises); King v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 262, 263-264, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K. B. 1783) ("A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt ... but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected"); King v. Parratt, 4 Car. & P. 570, 172 Eng. Rep. 829 (N. P. 1831); Queen v. Garner, 1 Den. 329, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848); Queen v. Baldry, 2 Den. 430, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852); Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355, 357 (1896). Over time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (stating that the voluntariness test "is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment ... commanding that no person `shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself '"); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (reversing a criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause because it was based on a confession obtained by physical coercion). </s> While Bram was decided before Brownand its progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the due process voluntariness test in "some 30 different cases decided during the era that intervened between Brownand Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [(1964)]." Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973). See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). Those cases refined the test into an inquiry that examines "whether a defendant's will was overborne" by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. Schneckcloth, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961) ("[A]ll the circumstances attendant upon the confession must be taken into account"); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945) ("If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced or compelled, it may not be used to convict a defendant"). The determination "depend[s] upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953). </s> We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily. But our decisions in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and Mirandachanged the focus of much of the inquiry in determining the admissibility of suspects' incriminating statements. In Malloy, we held that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to the States. Id., at 6-11. We decided Miranda on the heels of Malloy. </s> In Miranda, we noted that the advent of modern custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion.1 384 U.S., at 445-458. Because custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the individual, we stated that "[e]ven without employing brutality, the `third degree' or [other] specific stratagems, ... custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." Id., at 455. We concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be "accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment ... not to be compelled to incriminate himself." Id., at 439. Accordingly, we laid down "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Id., at 442. Those guidelines established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four warnings. These warnings (which have come to be known colloquially as "Miranda rights") are: a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id., at 479. </s> Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted §3501. That section provides, in relevant part: </s> "(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. </s> "(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. </s> "The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession." </s> Given §3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda. See also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that, prior to Miranda, "voluntariness vel non was the touchstone of admissibility of confessions"). Because of the obvious conflict between our decision in Miranda and §3501, we must address whether Congress has constitutional authority to thus supersede Miranda. If Congress has such authority, §3501's totality-of-the-circumstances approach must prevail over Miranda's requirement of warnings; if not, that section must yield to Miranda's more specific requirements. </s> The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional "rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress." Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353, n.11 (1959) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933), and Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. Palermo, supra, at 345-348; Carlisle, supra, at 426; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980). </s> But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-521 (1997). This case therefore turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction. Recognizing this point, the Court of Appeals surveyed Miranda and its progeny to determine the constitutional status of the Miranda decision. 166 F.3d, at 687-692. Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda's warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic," New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984), and "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution," Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974),2 the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally required. 166 F.3d, at 687-690. </s> We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court. But first and foremost of the factors on the other side--that Miranda is a constitutional decision--is that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts--to wit, Arizona, California, and New York. See 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-482 (1981). It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension"); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S 504, 508-509 (1958). With respect to proceedings in state courts, our "authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution." Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991). See also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-345 (1981) (per curiam) (stating that "[f]ederal judges may not require the observance of any special procedures" in state courts "except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution").3 </s> The Miranda opinion itself begins by stating that the Court granted certiorari "to explore some facets of the problems ... of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 384 U.S., at 441-442 (emphasis added). In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicating that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.4 Indeed, the Court's ultimate conclusion was that the unwarned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court in Miranda "were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege."5 Id., at 491. </s> Additional support for our conclusion that Miranda is constitutionally based is found in the MirandaCourt's invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination. After discussing the "compelling pressures" inherent in custodial police interrogation, the Miranda Court concluded that, "[i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored." Id., at 467. However, the Court emphasized that it could not foresee "the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States," and it accordingly opined that the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."6 Ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals also relied on the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule in cases such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See 166 F.3d, at 672, 689-691. But we have also broadened the application of the Miranda doctrine in cases such as Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). These decisions illustrate the principle--not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule--but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision. </s> The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), we stated that "`[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.'" 166 F.3d, at 690 (quoting Elstad, supra, at 306). Our decision in that case--refusing to apply the traditional "fruits" doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases--does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. </s> As an alternative argument for sustaining the Court of Appeals' decision, the court-invited amicus curiae7 contends that the section complies with the requirement that a legislative alternative to Miranda be equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions. See Brief for Paul G. Cassell as Amicus Curiae 28-39. We agree with the amicus' contention that there are more remedies available for abusive police conduct than there were at the time Miranda was decided, see, e.g., Wilkinsv. May, 872 F. 2d 190, 194 (CA7 1989) (applying Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to hold that a suspect may bring a federal cause of action under the Due Process Clause for police misconduct during custodial interrogation). But we do not agree that these additional measures supplement §3501's protections sufficiently to meet the constitutional minimum. Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. See, e.g., 384 U.S., at 467. As discussed above, §3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's confession. The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in our view, render them, together with §3501 an adequate substitute for the warnings required by Miranda. </s> The dissent argues that it is judicial overreaching for this Court to hold §3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that the Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements. Post, at 10-11, 22-23. But we need not go farther than Miranda to decide this case. In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, 384 U.S, at 457, a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that something more than the totality test was necessary. See ibid.; see also id., at 467, 490-491. As discussed above, §3501 reinstates the totality test as sufficient. Section 3501 therefore cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law. </s> Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment) ("The meaning of Mirandahas become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date"). While "`stare decisis is not an inexorable command,'" State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991)), particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997), "even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some `special justification.'" United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne, supra, at 842 (Souter, J., concurring) (in turn quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984))). </s> We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Mirandahas become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the fact that a rule has found "`wide acceptance in the legal culture'" is "adequate reason not to overrule" it). While we have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings, see, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), we do not believe that this has happened to the Mirandadecision. If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief. </s> The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his "rights," may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result. But experience suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances test which §3501 seeks to revive is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), "[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was `compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare." Id., at 433, n.20. </s> In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.8 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore </s> Reversed. </s> CHARLES THOMAS DICKERSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES </s> on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit </s> [June 26, 2000] </s> Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. </s> Those to whom judicial decisions are an unconnected series of judgments that produce either favored or disfavored results will doubtless greet today's decision as a paragon of moderation, since it declines to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Those who understand the judicial process will appreciate that today's decision is not a reaffirmation of Miranda, but a radical revision of the most significant element of Miranda (as of all cases): the rationale that gives it a permanent place in our jurisprudence. </s> Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), held that an Act of Congress will not be enforced by the courts if what it prescribes violates the Constitution of the United States. That was the basis on which Miranda was decided. One will search today's opinion in vain, however, for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that what 18 U.S.C. §3501 prescribes--the use at trial of a voluntary confession, even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has failed to be given--violates the Constitution. The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and perhaps not so much) that it would be absurd, inasmuch as §3501 excludes from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial, viz., compelled confessions; but also that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-458 (1994) (opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, J., joined); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, J., joined); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (opinion of the Court by O'Connor, J.); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist, J.). And so, to justify today's agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant new, if not entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law. As the Court chooses to describe that principle, statutes of Congress can be disregarded, not only when what they prescribe violates the Constitution, but when what they prescribe contradicts a decision of this Court that "announced a constitutional rule," ante, at 7. As I shall discuss in some detail, the only thing that can possibly mean in the context of this case is that this Court has the power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful "prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress and the States. That is an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist. </s> It takes only a small step to bring today's opinion out of the realm of power-judging and into the mainstream of legal reasoning: The Court need only go beyond its carefully couched iterations that "Miranda is a constitutional decision," ante, at 8, that "Miranda is constitutionally based," ante, at 10, that Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings," ante, at 10, n.5, and come out and say quite clearly: "We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States." It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court does not believe it. The Court therefore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of Congress. </s> I </s> Early in this Nation's history, this Court established the sound proposition that constitutional government in a system of separated powers requires judges to regard as inoperative any legislative act, even of Congress itself, that is "repugnant to the Constitution." </s> "So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case." Marbury, supra, at 178. </s> The power we recognized in Marbury will thus permit us, indeed require us, to "disregar[d]" §3501, a duly enacted statute governing the admissibility of evidence in the federal courts, only if it "be in opposition to the constitution"--here, assertedly, the dictates of the Fifth Amendment. </s> It was once possible to characterize the so-called Miranda rule as resting (however implausibly) upon the proposition that what the statute here before us permits--the admission at trial of un-Mirandized confessions--violates the Constitution. That is the fairest reading of the Miranda case itself. The Court began by announcing that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied in the context of extrajudicial custodial interrogation, see 384 U.S., at 460-467--itself a doubtful proposition as a matter both of history and precedent, see id., at, at 510-511 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court's conclusion that the FifthAmendment privilege, rather than the Due ProcessClause, governed stationhouse confessions as a "trompe l'oeil"). Having extended the privilege into the confines of the station house, the Court liberally sprinkled throughout its sprawling 60-page opinion suggestions that, because of the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, the privilege was violated by any statement thus obtained that did not conform to the rules set forth in Miranda, or some functional equivalent. See id., at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice") (emphases added); id., at 461 ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak"); id., at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation ... contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely"); id., 457, n.26 (noting the "absurdity of denying that a confession obtained under these circumstances is compelled"). </s> The dissenters, for their part, also understood Miranda's holding to be based on the "premise ... that pressure on the suspect must be eliminated though it be only the subtle influence of the atmosphere and surroundings." Id., at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id., at 535 (White, J., dissenting) ("[I]t has never been suggested, until today, that such questioning was so coercive and accused persons so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very first question following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed to be the product of an overborne will"). And at least one case decided shortly after Miranda explicitly confirmed </s> the view. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) ("[T]he use of these admissions obtained in the absence of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda"). </s> So understood, Miranda was objectionable for innumerable reasons, not least the fact that cases spanning more than 70 years had rejected its core premise that, absent the warnings and an effective waiver of the right to remain silent and of the (thitherto unknown) right to have an attorney present, a statement obtained pursuant to custodial interrogation was necessarily the product of compulsion. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (confession not involuntary despite denial of access to counsel); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) (same); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912) (lack of warnings and counsel did not render statement before United States Commisioner involuntary); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896) (same). Moreover, history and precedent aside, the decision in Miranda, if read as an explication of what the Constitution requires, is preposterous. There is, for example, simply no basis in reason for concluding that a response to the very first question asked, by a suspect who already knows all of the rights described in the Miranda warning, is anything other than a volitional act. See Miranda, supra, at 533-534 (White, J., dissenting). And even if one assumes that the elimination of compulsion absolutely requires informing even the most knowledgeable suspect of his right to remain silent, it cannot conceivably require the right to have counsel present. There is a world of difference, which the Court recognized under the traditional voluntariness test but ignored in Miranda, between compelling a suspect to incriminate himself and preventing him from foolishly doing so of his own accord. Only the latter (which is not required by the Constitution) could explain the Court's inclusion of a right to counsel and the requirement that it, too, be knowingly and intelligently waived. Counsel's presence is not required to tell the suspect that he need not speak; the interrogators can do that. The only good reason for having counsel there is that he can be counted on to advise the suspect that he should not speak. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncer-tain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances"). </s> Preventing foolish (rather than compelled) confessions is likewise the only conceivable basis for the rules (suggested in Miranda, see 423 U.S. 96, 105-106 (1975), or initiated by police after the suspect has expressed a desire to have counsel present, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981). Nonthreatening attempts to persuade the suspect to reconsider that initial decision are not, without more, enough to render a change of heart the product of anything other than the suspect's free will. Thus, what is most remarkable about the Miranda decision--and what made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward constitutional interpretation in the Marbury tradition--is its palpable hostility toward the act of confession per se, rather than toward what the Constitution abhors, compelled confession. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) ("[F]ar from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable"). The Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda majority, offended by a criminal's commendable qualm of conscience or fortunate fit of stupidity. Cf. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). </s> For these reasons, and others more than adequately developed in the Miranda dissents and in the subsequent works of the decision's many critics, any conclusionthat a violation of the Miranda rules necessarily amounts to a violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination can claim no support in history, precedent, or common sense, and as a result would at least presumptively be worth reconsidering even at this late date. But that is unnecessary, since the Court has (thankfully) long since abandoned the notion that failure to comply with Miranda's rules is itself a violation of the Constitution. </s> II </s> As the Court today acknowledges, since Miranda we have explicitly, and repeatedly, interpreted that decision as having announced, not the circumstances in which custodial interrogation runs afoul of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, but rather only "prophylactic" rules that go beyond the right against compelled self-incrimination. Of course the seeds of this "prophylactic" interpretation of Miranda were present in the decision itself. See Miranda, supra, at 439 (discussing the "necessity for procedures which assure that the [suspect] is accorded his privilege"); id., at 447 ("[u]nless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is achieved--such as these decisions will advance--there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated"); id., at 457 ("[i]n these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms"); ibid. (noting "concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights" and the "potentiality for compulsion" in Ernesto Miranda's interrogation). In subsequent cases, the seeds have sprouted and borne fruit: The Court has squarely concluded that it is possible--indeed not uncommon--for the police to violate Miranda without also violating the Constitution. </s> Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), an opinion for the Court written by then-Justice Rehnquist, rejected the true-to-Marbury, failure-to-warn-as-constitutional-violation interpretation of Miranda. It held that exclusion of the "fruits" of a Miranda violation--the statement of a witness whose identity the defendant had revealed while in custody--was not required. The opinion explained that the question whether the "police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination" was a "separate question" from "whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right." Id., at 439. The "procedural safeguards" adopted in Miranda, the Court said, "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected," and to "provide practical reinforcement for the right," id., at 444. Comparing the particular facts of the custodial interrogation with the "historical circumstances underlying the privilege," ibid., the Court concluded, unequivocally, that the defendant's statement could not be termed "involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court," id., at 445, and thus that there had been no constitutional violation, notwithstanding the clear violation of the "procedural rules later established in Miranda," ibid. Lest there be any confusion on the point, the Court reiterated that the "police conduct at issue here did not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege." Id., at 446. It is clear from our cases, of course, that if the statement in Tucker had been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the statement and its fruits would have been excluded. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984). </s> The next year, in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), the Court held that a defendant's statement taken in violation of Miranda that was nonetheless voluntary could be used at trial for impeachment purposes. This holding turned upon the recognition that violation of Miranda is not unconstitutional compulsion, since statements obtained in actual violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, "as opposed to ... taken in violation of Miranda," quite simply "may not be put to any testimonial use whatever against [the defendant] in a criminal trial," including as impeachment evidence. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-398 (1978) (holding that while statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment if otherwise trustworthy, the Constitution prohibits "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement"). </s> Nearly a decade later, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court relied upon the fact that "[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings ... are `not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,'" id., at 654 (quoting Tucker, supra, at 444), to create a "public safety" exception. In that case, police apprehended, after a chase in a grocery store, a rape suspect known to be carrying a gun. After handcuffing and searching him (and finding no gun)--but before reading him his Miranda warnings--the police demanded to know where the gun was. The defendant nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded that "the gun is over there." The Court held that both the unwarned statement--"the gun is over there"--and the recovered weapon were admissible in the prosecution's case in chief under a "public safety exception" to the "prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda." 467 U.S., at 653. It explicitly acknowledged that if the Miranda warnings were an imperative of the Fifth Amendment itself, such an exigency exception would be impossible, since the Fifth Amendment's bar on compelled self-incrimination is absolute, and its "`strictures, unlike the Fourth's are not removed by showing reasonableness,'" 467 U.S., at 653, n.3. (For the latter reason, the Court found it necessary to note that respondent did not "claim that [his] statements were actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist," id., at 654.) </s> The next year, the Court again declined to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to a Miranda violation, this time allowing the admission of a suspect's properly warned statement even though it had been preceded (and, arguably, induced) by an earlier inculpatory statement taken in violation of Miranda. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). As in Tucker, the Court distinguished the case from those holding that a confession obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search is inadmissible, on the ground that the violation of Miranda does not involve an "actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights," 470 U.S., at 308. Miranda, the Court explained, "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself," and "Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm." 470 U.S., at 307. "[E]rrors [that] are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures ... should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself." Id., at 308-309. </s> In light of these cases, and our statements to the same effect in others, see, e.g., Davis v. United States, 507 U.S. 680, 690-691 (1993); Eagan, 492 U.S., at 203, it is simply no longer possible for the Court to conclude, even if it wanted to, that a violation of Miranda's rules is a violation of the Constitution. But as I explained at the outset, that is what is required before the Court may disregard a law of Congress governing the admissibility of evidence in federal court. The Court today insists that the decision in Miranda is a "constitutional" one, ante, at 1, 8; that it has "constitutional underpinnings", ante, at 10, n.5; a "constitutional basis" and a "constitutional origin", ante, at 9, n.3; that it was "constitutionally based", ante, at 10; and that it announced a "constitutional rule," ante, at 7, 9, 11, 14. It is fine to play these word games; but what makes a decision "constitutional" in the only sense relevant here--in the sense that renders it impervious to supersession by congressional legislation such as §3501--is the determination that the Constitution requires the result that the decision announces and the statute ignores. By disregarding congressional action that concededly does not violate the Constitution, the Court flagrantly offends fundamental principles of separation of powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the representatives of the people. </s> The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion in two ways: First, by misdescribing these post-Miranda cases as mere dicta. The Court concedes only "that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view" that Miranda's protections are not "constitutionally required." Ante, at 8. It is not a matter of language; it is a matter of holdings. The proposition that failure to comply with Miranda's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central to the holdings of Tucker, Hass, Quarles, and Elstad. </s> The second way the Court seeks to avoid the impact of these cases is simply to disclaim responsibility for reasoned decisionmaking. It says: </s> "These decisions illustrate the principle--not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule--but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision." Ante, at 11. </s> The issue, however, is not whether court rules are "mutable"; they assuredly are. It is not whether, in the light of "various circumstances," they can be "modifi[ed]"; they assuredly can. The issue is whether, as mutated and modified, they must make sense. The requirement that they do so is the only thing that prevents this Court from being some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy. And if confessions procured in violation of Miranda are confessions "compelled" in violation of the Constitution, the post-Miranda decisions I have discussed do not make sense. The only reasoned basis for their outcome was that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution. If, for example, as the Court acknowledges was the holding of Elstad, "the traditional `fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases" (that the fruits of evidence obtained unconstitutionally must be excluded from trial) does not apply to the fruits of Miranda violations, ante, at 11; and if the reason for the difference is not that Miranda violations are not constitutional violations (which is plainly and flatly what Elstad said); then the Court must come up with some other explanation for the difference. (That will take quite a bit of doing, by the way, since it is not clear on the face of the Fourth Amendment that evidence obtained in violation of that guarantee must be excluded from trial, whereas it is clear on the face of the Fifth Amendment that unconstitutionally compelled confessions cannot be used.) To say simply that "unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment," ante, at 11-12, is true but supremely unhelpful. </s> Finally, the Court asserts that Miranda must be a "constitutional decision" announcing a "constitutional rule," and thus immune to congressional modification, because we have since its inception applied it to the States. If this argument is meant as an invocation of stare decisis, it fails because, though it is true that our cases applying Miranda against the States must be reconsidered if Miranda is not required by the Constitution, it is likewise true that our cases (discussed above) based on the principle that Miranda is not required by the Constitution will have to be reconsidered if it is. So the stare decisis argument is a wash. If, on the other hand, the argument is meant as an appeal to logic rather than stare decisis, it is a classic example of begging the question: Congress's attempt to set aside Miranda, since it represents an assertion that violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution, also represents an assertion that the Court has no power to impose Miranda on the States. To answer this assertion--not by showing why violation of Miranda is a violation of the Constitution--but by asserting that Miranda does apply against the States, is to assume precisely the point at issue. In my view, our continued application of the Miranda code to the States despite our consistent statements that running afoul of its dictates does not necessarily--or even usually--result in an actual constitutional violation, represents not the source of Miranda's salvation but rather evidence of its ultimate illegitimacy. See generally J. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 173-198 (1993); Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985). As Justice Stevens has elsewhere explained, "[t]his Court's power to require state courts to exclude probative self-incriminatory statements rests entirely on the premise that the use of such evidence violates the Federal Constitution. ... If the Court does not accept that premise, it must regard the holding in the Miranda case itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from that decision, as nothingmore than an illegitimate exercise of raw judicial power." Elstad, 470 U.S., at 370 (dissenting opinion). Quite so. </s> III </s> There was available to the Court a means of reconciling the established proposition that a violation of Miranda does not itself offend the Fifth Amendment with the Court's assertion of a right to ignore the present statute. That means of reconciliation was argued strenuously by both petitioner and the United States, who were evidently more concerned than the Court is with maintaining the coherence of our jurisprudence. It is not mentioned in the Court's opinion because, I assume, a majority of the Justices intent on reversing believes that incoherence is the lesser evil. They may be right. </s> Petitioner and the United States contend that there is nothing at all exceptional, much less unconstitutional, about the Court's adopting prophylactic rules to buttress constitutional rights, and enforcing them against Congress and the States. Indeed, the United States argues that "[p]rophylactic rules are now and have been for many years a feature of this Court's constitutional adjudication." Brief for United States 47. That statement is not wholly inaccurate, if by "many years" one means since the mid-1960's. However, in their zeal to validate what is in my view a lawless practice, the United States and petitioner greatly overstate the frequency with which we have engaged in it. For instance, petitioner cites several cases in which the Court quite simply exercised its traditional judicial power to define the scope of constitutional protections and, relatedly, the circumstances in which they are violated. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-437 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation constitutes a per se taking); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is actually "violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent"). </s> Similarly unsupportive of the supposed practice is Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), where we concluded that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment forbids the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's facially incriminating confession in a joint trial, even where the jury has been given a limiting instruction. That decision was based, not upon the theory that this was desirable protection "beyond" what the Confrontation Clause technically required; but rather upon the self-evident proposition that the inability to cross-examine an available witness whose damaging out-of-court testimony is introduced violates the Confrontation Clause, combined with the conclusion that in these circumstances a mere jury instruction can never be relied upon to prevent the testimony from being damaging, see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207-208 (1987). </s> The United States also relies on our cases involving the question whether a State's procedure for appointed counsel's withdrawal of representation on appeal satisfies the State's constitutional obligation to "`affor[d] adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.'" Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. ___, ___ (2000) (slip op., at 14) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), we concluded that California's procedure governing withdrawal fell short of the constitutional minimum, and we outlined a procedure that would meet that standard. But as we made clear earlier this Term in Smith, which upheld a procedure different from the one Anders suggested, the benchmark of constitutionality is the constitutional requirement of adequate representation, and not some excrescence upon that requirement decreed, for safety's sake, by this Court. </s> In a footnote, the United States directs our attention to certain overprotective First Amendment rules that we have adopted to ensure "breathing space" for expression. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 342 (1974) (recognizing that in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), we "extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood" of public officials); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (setting forth "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system" with respect to motion picture obscenity). In these cases, and others involving the First Amendment, the Court has acknowledged that in order to guarantee that protected speech is not "chilled" and thus forgone, it is in some instances necessary to incorporate in our substantive rules a "measure of strategic protection." But that is because the Court has viewed the importation of "chill" as itself a violation of the First Amendment--not because the Court thought it could go beyond what the First Amendment demanded in order to provide some prophylaxis. </s> Petitioner and the United States are right on target, however, in characterizing the Court's actions in a case decided within a few years of Miranda, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). There, the Court concluded that due process would be offended were a judge vindictively to resentence with added severity a defendant who had successfully appealed his original conviction. Rather than simply announce that vindictive sentencing violates the Due Process Clause, the Court went on to hold that "[i]n order to assure the absence of such a [vindictive] motivation, ... the reasons for [imposing the increased sentence] must affirmatively appear" and must "be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Id., at 726. The Court later explicitly acknowledged Pearce's prophylactic character, see Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973). It is true, therefore, that the case exhibits the same fundamental flaw as does Miranda when deprived (as it has been) of its original (implausible) pretension to announcement of what the Constitution itself required. That is, although the Due Process Clause may well prohibit punishment based on judicial vindictiveness, the Constitution by no means vests in the courts "any general power to prescribe particular devices `in order to assure the absence of such a motivation,'" 395 U.S., at 741 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black surely had the right idea when he derided the Court's requirement as "pure legislation if there ever was legislation," ibid., although in truth Pearce's rule pales as a legislative achievement when compared to the detailed code promulgated in Miranda.1 </s> The foregoing demonstrates that, petitioner's and the United States' suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, what the Court did in Miranda (assuming, as later cases hold, that Miranda went beyond what the Constitution actually requires) is in fact extraordinary. That the Court has, on rare and recent occasion, repeated the mistake does not transform error into truth, but illustrates the potential for future mischief that the error entails. Where the Constitution has wished to lodge in one of the branches of the Federal Government some limited power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so. See Amdt. 14, §5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"). The power with which the Court would endow itself under a "prophylactic" justification for Miranda goes far beyond what it has permitted Congress to do under authority of that text. Whereas we have insisted that congressional action under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be "congruent" with, and "proportional" to, a constitutional violation, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), the Miranda nontextual power to embellish confers authority to prescribe preventive measures against not only constitutionally prohibited compelled confessions, but also (as discussed earlier) foolhardy ones. </s> I applaud, therefore, the refusal of the Justices in the majority to enunciate this boundless doctrine of judicial empowerment as a means of rendering today's decision rational. In nonetheless joining the Court's judgment, however, they overlook two truisms: that actions speak louder than silence, and that (in judge-made law at least) logic will out. Since there is in fact no other principle that can reconcile today's judgment with the post-Miranda cases that the Court refuses to abandon, what today's decision will stand for, whether the Justices can bring themselves to say it or not, is the power of the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on Congress and the States. </s> IV </s> Thus, while I agree with the Court that §3501 cannot be upheld without also concluding that Miranda represents an illegitimate exercise of our authority to review state-court judgments, I do not share the Court's hesitation in reaching that conclusion. For while the Court is also correct that the doctrine of stare decisis demands some "special justification" for a departure from longstanding precedent--even precedent of the constitutional variety--that criterion is more than met here. To repeat Justice Stevens' cogent observation, it is "[o]bviou[s]" that "the Court's power to reverse Miranda's conviction rested entirely on the determination that a violation of the Federal Constitution had occurred." Elstad, 470 U.S., at 367, n.9 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added). Despite the Court's Orwellian assertion to the contrary, it is undeniable that later cases (discussed above) have "undermined [Miranda's] doctrinal underpinnings," ante, at 14, denying constitutional violation and thus stripping the holding of its only constitutionally legitimate support. Miranda's critics and supporters alike have long made this point. See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Attorney General on Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation 97 (Feb. 12, 1986) ("The current Court has repudiated the premises on which Miranda was based, but has drawn back from recognizing the full implications of its decisions"); id., at 78 ("Michigan v. Tucker accordingly repudiated the doctrinal basis of the Miranda decision"); Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 405, 407-408 (1982) ("Although the Burger Court has not overruled Miranda, the Court has consistently undermined the rationales, assumptions, and values which gave Miranda life"); id., at 425-426 ("Seemingly, the Court [in Michigan v. Tucker] utterly destroyed both Miranda's rationale and its holding"); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. 99, 118 ("Mr. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that there is a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a confession is involuntary ... is an outright rejection of the core premises of Miranda"). </s> The Court cites Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), as accurately reflecting our standard for overruling, see ante, at 14--which I am pleased to accept, even though Patterson was speaking of overruling statutory cases and the standard for constitutional decisions is somewhat more lenient. What is set forth there reads as though it was written precisely with the current status of Miranda in mind: </s> "In cases where statutory precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court's shift in position has been the intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress. Where such changes have removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, ... or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, ... the Court has not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision." 491 U.S., at 173. </s> Neither am I persuaded by the argument for retaining Miranda that touts its supposed workability as compared with the totality-of-the-circumstances test it purported to replace. Miranda's proponents cite ad nauseam the fact that the Court was called upon to make difficult and subtle distinctions in applying the "voluntariness" test in some 30-odd due process "coerced confessions" cases in the 30 years between Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and Miranda. It is not immediately apparent, however, that the judicial burden has been eased by the "bright-line" rules adopted in Miranda. In fact, in the 34 years since Miranda was decided, this Court has been called upon to decide nearly 60 cases involving a host of Miranda issues, most of them predicted with remarkable prescience by Justice White in his Miranda dissent. 384 U.S., at 545. </s> Moreover, it is not clear why the Court thinks that the "totality-of-the-circumstances test ... is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner." Ante,at 14. Indeed, I find myself persuaded by Justice O'Connor's rejection of this same argument in her opinion in Williams, 507 U.S., at 711-712 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): </s> "Miranda, for all its alleged brightness, is not without its difficulties; and voluntariness is not without its strengths.... Miranda creates as many close questions as it resolves. The task of determining whether a defendant is in `custody' has proved to be `a slippery one.' And the supposedly `bright' lines that separate interrogation from spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from waiver, and the adequate warning from the inadequate, likewise have turned out to be rather dim and ill defined. The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other hand, permits each fact to be taken into account without resort to formal and dispositive labels. By dispensing with the difficulty of producing a yes-or-no answer to questions that are often better answered in shades and degrees, the voluntariness inquiry often can make judicial decisionmaking easier rather than more onerous." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) </s> But even were I to agree that the old totality-of-the-circumstances test was more cumbersome, it is simply not true that Miranda has banished it from the law and replaced it with a new test. Under the current regime, which the Court today retains in its entirety, courts are frequently called upon to undertake both inquiries. That is because, as explained earlier, voluntariness remains the constitutional standard, and as such continues to govern the admissibility for impeachment purposes of statements taken in violation of Miranda, the admissibility of the "fruits" of such statements, and the admissibility of statements challenged as unconstitutionally obtained despite the interrogator's compliance with Miranda, see, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). </s> Finally, I am not convinced by petitioner's argument that Miranda should be preserved because the decision occupies a special place in the "public's consciousness." Brief for Petitioner 44. As far as I am aware, the public is not under the illusion that we are infallible. I see little harm in admitting that we made a mistake in taking away from the people the ability to decide for themselves what protections (beyond those required by the Constitution) are reasonably affordable in the criminal investigatory process. And I see much to be gained by reaffirming for the people the wonderful reality that they govern themselves--which means that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution" that the people adopted, "nor prohibited ... to the States" by that Constitution, "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," U.S. Const., Amdt. 10.2 </s> * * * </s> Today's judgment converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance. In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original opinion at least asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution. Today's decision does not pretend that it is--and yet still asserts the right to impose it against the will of the people's representatives in Congress. Far from believing that stare decisis compels this result, I believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated decision--especially a celebrated decision--that has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the States. This is not the system that was established by the Framers, or that would be established by any sane supporter of government by the people. </s> I dissent from today's decision, and, until §3501 is repealed, will continue to apply it in all cases where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was voluntary. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> While our cases have long interpreted the Due Process and Self-Incrimination Clauses to require that a suspect be accorded a fair trial free from coerced testimony, our application of those Clauses to the context of custodial police interrogation is relatively recent because the routine practice of such interrogation is itself a relatively new development. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S., at 445-458. </s> Footnote 2 </s> See also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S 452, 457-458 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-691 (1993) ("Miranda's safeguards are not constitutional in character"); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("[T]he Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights"); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result). </s> Footnote 3 </s> Our conclusion regarding Miranda's constitutional basis is further buttressed by the fact that we have allowed prisoners to bring alleged Miranda violations before the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Withrow, supra, at 690-695. Habeas corpus proceedings are available only for claims that a person "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). Since the Miranda rule is clearly not based on federal laws or treaties, our decision allowing habeas review for Miranda claims obviously assumes that Miranda is of constitutional origin. </s> Footnote 4 </s> See 384 U.S., at 445 ("The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody"), 457 (stating that the Miranda Court was concerned with "adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights"), 458 (examining the "history and precedent underlying the Self-Incrimination Clause to determine its applicability in this situation"), 476 ("The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is ... fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation"), 479 ("The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself"), 481, n. 52 (stating that the Court dealt with "constitutional standards in relation to statements made"), 490 ("[T]he issues presented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts"), 489 (stating that the Miranda Court was dealing "with rights grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution"). </s> Footnote 5 </s> Many of our subsequent cases have also referred to Miranda's constitutional underpinnings. See, e.g., Withrow, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (describing Miranda's warning requirement as resting on "the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination"); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 411 (1990) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a separate investigation"); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) ("The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations"); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986) (referring to Miranda as "our interpretation of the Federal Constitution"); Edwards, 451 U.S., at 481-482. </s> Footnote 6 </s> The Court of Appeals relied in part on our statement that the Miranda decision in no way "creates a `constitutional straightjacket.'" See 166 F. 3d, at 672 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S., at 467). However, a review of our opinion in Mirandaclarifies that this disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not require police to administer the particular Mirandawarnings, not that the Constitution does not require a procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights. </s> Footnote 7 </s> Because no party to the underlying litigation argued in favor of §3501's constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our deliberations by arguing in support of the judgment below. </s> Footnote 8 </s> Various other contentions and suggestions have been pressed by the numerous amici, but because of the procedural posture of this case we do not think it appropriate to consider them. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60, n.2 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 531-532, n.13 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960). </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> As for Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), upon which petitioner and the United States also rely, in that case we extended to the Sixth Amendment, postindictment, context the Miranda-based prophylactic rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), that the police cannot initiate interrogation after counsel has been requested. I think it less a separate instance of claimed judicial power to impose constitutional prophylaxis than a direct, logic-driven consequence of Miranda itself. </s> Footnote 2 </s> The Court cites my dissenting opinion in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-332 (1999), for the proposition that "the fact that a rule has found `wide acceptance in the legal culture' is `adequate reason not to overrule' it." Ante, at 13. But the legal culture is not the same as the "public's consciousness"; and unlike the rule at issue in Mitchell (prohibiting comment on a defendant's refusal to testify) Miranda has been continually criticized by lawyers, law enforcement officials, and scholars since its pronouncement (not to mention by Congress, as §3501 shows). In Mitchell, moreover, the constitutional underpinnings of the earlier rule had not been demolished by subsequent cases.

United States Supreme Court TIDEWATER OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES(1972) No. 71-366 Argued: October 11, 1972Decided: December 6, 1972 </s> The Expediting Act, providing that in a civil antitrust action brought by the United States in a federal district court an appeal from that court's final judgment will lie only to this court, lodged exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such actions in this Court and thus bars the courts of appeals from asserting jurisdiction over interlocutory orders covered by 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b), as well as over other interlocutory orders specified in 1292 (a). The legislative history of those provisions contains no indication of a congressional intent to impair the original exclusivity of this Court's jurisdiction under the Expediting Act. Pp. 154-174. </s> Affirmed. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 174. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 174. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, which REHNQUIST, J., joined, and DOUGLAS, J., joined in part, post, p. 178. </s> Moses Lasky argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was C. Lansing Hays, Jr. </s> A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., argued the cause for the United States pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Kauper. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On July 13, 1966, the United States filed a civil antitrust suit against Phillips Petroleum Co. (Phillips) and petitioner Tidewater Oil Co. (Tidewater). The complaint alleged that Phillips' acquisition of certain [409 U.S. 151, 152] assets and operations of Tidewater violated 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18. The District Court denied the United States' motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent consummation of the acquisition, 1 and its subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction to require either rescission of the acquisition or maintenance by Phillips of the going-concern value of the transferred assets and operations. </s> Petitioner continued as a party to the suit during some five years of pretrial discovery and preparation. 2 Then in April 1971, following the Government's announcement that it was ready for trial, petitioner moved to be dismissed as a party. 3 The District Court denied the motion, but found that it involved "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from [the] order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation." It therefore certified "its order denying defendant's motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal under Section 1292 (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code." As required by the statute, Tidewater then applied to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for leave to prosecute the appeal. That court, however, denied the application relying solely on its previous [409 U.S. 151, 153] decision in United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F.2d 534 (1963). There an attempt was made to appeal an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction in a Government civil antitrust case. Notwithstanding that 28 U.S.C. 1292 (a) (1) provides for an appeal of right to the courts of appeals from an order granting or denying preliminary injunctions, the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over such an appeal in a Government civil antitrust case because of 2 of the Expediting Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 29, which provides that "[i]n every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under any of [the Antitrust] Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court." In this case, then, the Court of Appeals extended its prior ruling to interlocutory orders within 1292 (b). Because this decision raises an important question of federal appellate jurisdiction and because a conflict among the circuits subsequently developed on this question, 4 we granted certiorari. 5 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. [409 U.S. 151, 154] </s> I </s> To determine the relevance of 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b) for Government civil antitrust cases, it is necessary first to consider the original purpose of 2 of the Expediting Act and the over half-century of experience with that section in the context of interlocutory appeals provisions that preceded the enactment of 1292 (b) in 1958. 6 </s> In an effort to "expedite [certain] litigation of great and general importance," 36 Cong. Rec. 1679 (remarks of Sen. Fairbanks), 7 Congress enacted 2 of the Expediting Act in 1903 8 to withdraw all intermediate appellate jurisdiction in Government civil antitrust [409 U.S. 151, 155] cases. At the time of the passage of the Expediting Act, the then recently established circuit courts of appeals 9 had jurisdiction under the Evarts Act over an appeal not only from a "final decision" 10 but also from "an interlocutory order or decree" granting or continuing an injunction or appointing a receiver "in a cause in which an appeal from a final decree may be taken . . . to the circuit court of appeals." 11 Hence, by lodging exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the "final judgment of the district court" in this Court, the Expediting Act necessarily eliminated court of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory, as well as final, decrees in Government civil antitrust cases. </s> Congress thus initially determined to speed appellate review by channeling appeals in Expediting Act cases directly to this Court and to avoid the delay inherent in piecemeal appeal by conditioning appeal upon the presence of a "final judgment." 12 But mere speed in [409 U.S. 151, 156] the disposition of Government civil antitrust cases was not Congress' only concern; that result might have been achieved simply by establishing procedures for the expeditious handling of such cases in the courts of appeals. Congress was also intent upon facilitating review by this Court "of a class of antitrust cases deemed particularly important." 13 Because of the importance of uniform interpretation of the antitrust law, 14 which was still in its infancy in 1903, it is understandable that Congress chose to establish this special appellate procedure for Government civil antitrust cases, which were thought generally to involve issues of wide importance. 15 </s> During the 25 years following the enactment of the Expediting Act, Congress amended the Evarts Act provision governing interlocutory appeals to the courts of [409 U.S. 151, 157] appeals on four separate occasions - in 1906, 16 1911, 17 1925, 18 and 1928. 19 It can be argued that on its face the very first of these amendments once again made interlocutory appeals available to the courts of appeals in Government civil antitrust cases and that the language of each successive amendment, where relevant, perpetuated that state of affairs. 20 But, while the clear meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored, "words are inexact tools at best," Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943), and hence it is essential that we place the words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the legislative history. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in this case. For we find it inconceivable [409 U.S. 151, 158] that Congress, having purposefully withdrawn the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals in certain antitrust cases in 1903, would re-establish it in the same cases - but only for interlocutory orders - just three years later in 1906, without making any reference to that purpose. Yet no mention of either the Expediting Act or Government civil antitrust cases is to be found in the legislative history of the 1906 amendment to the interlocutory appeals provision 21 - or, for that matter, in that of the successive amendments insofar as they are relevant; 22 rather, for each amendment some purpose wholly unrelated to Expediting Act cases is apparent from the relevant legislative materials. 23 In light of this, we find [409 U.S. 151, 159] it impossible to ascribe to Congress an intent to impair the original exclusivity of this Court's jurisdiction under 2 through any of these amendments to the interlocutory appeals provision. [409 U.S. 151, 160] </s> This clearly was the view of the seven members of the unanimous Court in United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929). There, in rejecting the argument that an appeal lay to the court of appeals from an order denying a motion to intervene in a Government civil antitrust case, the Court stated: 24 </s> "[The Evarts Act] provisions governing appeals in general were amended by the Expediting Act so that in suits in equity under the Anti-Trust Act `in which the United States is complainant,' the appeal should be direct to this Court from the final decree in the trial court. Thus, Congress limited the right of review to an appeal from the decree which disposed of all matters . . .; and it precluded the possibility of an appeal to either [this Court or the court of appeals] from an interlocutory decree." Id., at 558 (emphasis added). </s> And a decade and a half later, in Allen Calculators v. National Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 142 (1944), the Court reiterated "that jurisdiction to review District Court decrees was not vested in the Circuit Courts of Appeals but solely in this court, and [the Expediting Act] limited the right of appeal to final decrees." It is true that interlocutory orders in Government civil antitrust cases were subsequently held reviewable by way of extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651 (a), but application for the extraordinary writ must be made to this Court where "sole appellate jurisdiction lies" in such cases. United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 201 -203 (1945); [409 U.S. 151, 161] De Beers Consolidated Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945). 25 </s> The wording of the interlocutory appeals provision was again altered in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. 26 The result - after certain subsequent minor changes not here relevant 27 - was the present 28 U.S.C. 1292 (a) (1), which allows "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing [409 U.S. 151, 162] or dissolving injunctions . . ." 28 to be appealed to the courts of appeals "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." (Emphasis added.) This final clause is susceptible of two plausible constructions that yield opposite results in cases subject to the Expediting Act. A direct review of interlocutory orders in Government civil antitrust cases clearly may be had in this Court, thus barring resort to 1292 (a) (1) - or so it would seem. But direct review may not be had when the interlocutory order is entered since there is no "final judgment," the predicate of an appeal under the Expediting Act. Therefore, were the final clause construed as directed only at the present availability of review in this Court, it would not, on its face, bar an interlocutory appeal. However, the function of the Revisers of the 1948 Code was generally limited to that of consolidation and codification. 29 Consequently, a well-established principle governing the interpretation of provisions altered in the 1948 revision is that "no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed." Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957). We find no such clear expression here. To the contrary, the Revisers' Notes fail to reveal any intention to expand the scope of the pre-existing jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over interlocutory appeals; the new 1292 is described merely as a consolidation of a number of previously separate code provisions - including the general [409 U.S. 151, 163] interlocutory appeals provision - "with necessary changes in phraseology to effect the consolidation." 30 </s> In sum, then, our examination of the history and evolution of the present 1292 (a) (1) - the direct descendant of the original interlocutory appeals provision contained in the Evarts Act - has convinced us that at least up to the passage of 1292 (b) in 1958, Congress had not impaired the original exclusivity of this Court's jurisdiction under 2 of the Expediting Act. As is usually true of questions of statutory construction, the issue is not totally free from doubt. 31 Yet, in the last analysis, whatever ambiguity may exist in the lengthy history of the original interlocutory appeals provision relative to the Expediting Act, it results primarily from the absence of any consideration of Government civil antitrust cases in that history and thus emphasizes the extent to which appellate jurisdiction in such cases has long been viewed as a peculiarly distinct matter. Cf. United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U.S., at 202 -203. Certainly, this conclusion finds substantial support in our prior decisions in which we have consistently interpreted our appellate jurisdiction under 2 as exclusive. 32 </s> [409 U.S. 151, 164] </s> II </s> With this background, the question becomes what effect, if any, the enactment of 1292 (b) in 1958 had upon this Court's theretofore exclusive appellate jurisdiction in Government civil antitrust cases. Section 1292 (b) provides in relevant part: </s> "When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order . . . ." </s> At the outset petitioner contends that there is simply no conflict between this provision and 2 of the Expediting Act. It suggests that "civil action" must be read as an all-inclusive phrase that covers, inter alia, Government civil antitrust cases. At the same time, it points out that 1292 (b) is concerned only with interlocutory orders, while the Expediting Act deals only with final judgments. Thus, petitioner concludes that the enactment of 1292 (b) made discretionary interlocutory appeals available where none had previously existed, and that the two statutes are in complete harmony with one another. </s> Such a facile argument could also be made to support the contention that 1292 (a) (1) can be invoked in Expediting Act cases - were it not for the fact that, as we have already seen, 2 does not merely apply solely to a "final judgment" but also limits the right of appeal to a [409 U.S. 151, 165] "final judgment." Likewise, we can hardly accept petitioner's suggestion that when Congress enacted 1292 (b), it wrote upon a clean slate insofar as appeals from interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases are concerned. Nor do we find in 1292 (b) the "sharp break with the traditional policy" of limited availability of interlocutory appeal so apparent to the dissent. The new provision hardly created a general right of interlocutory appeal; rather, it only extended the availability of such appeals to a limited group of orders - not previously covered by 1292 (a) - that involve "a controlling question of law" the immediate appeal of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 33 In short, the consistent construction that had been accorded 2 prior to the enactment of 1292 (b) 34 cannot simply be ignored in determining the impact of that section on Government civil antitrust cases, cf. Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 393 U.S. 186, 191 -194 (1968). Acceptance of petitioner's contention would require us to conclude that 1292 (b) was intended to revise the policies underlying the Expediting Act for the first time - that it was intended as the first departure from the purposes of avoiding piecemeal appeal and of limiting review of important questions of antitrust law to this Court. We have been unable to discern any such intention. [409 U.S. 151, 166] </s> The legislative history associated with 1292 (b) contains no mention of cases within the Expediting Act. 35 Reference, to be sure, was made to antitrust cases, but it is clear on the face of these statements 36 that they refer only to private treble-damages actions. 37 In fact, rather than indicating that 1292 (b) was intended to apply to antitrust cases subject to final review in this Court under the Expediting Act, the legislative history strongly suggests an essentially contrary conclusion: the subsection was intended to apply only to interlocutory orders, "not otherwise appealable under" 1292 (a), in civil actions in which the courts of appeals would have jurisdiction over an appeal from the final judgment [409 U.S. 151, 167] under 28 U.S.C. 1291. For instance, in explaining the proposed statute, the Senate Report on 1292 (b) states: 38 </s> "The bill results from a growing awareness of the need for expedition of cases pending before the district courts. Many cases which are filed in the Federal district courts require the district judge to entertain motions at an early stage in the proceedings which, if determined, against the plaintiff, result in a final order which would then be appealable to the circuit courts of appeals of the United States. However, such motions, if determined in the plaintiff's favor, are interlocutory since they do not end the litigation and are not therefore, under existing provisions of law, appealable." </s> This is hardly supportive of petitioner's position, and yet throughout the legislative materials the focus similarly remains on interlocutory orders in civil cases that would be appealable to the courts of appeals upon final judgment. 39 </s> Petitioner's case is further weakened by the extraordinary result that acceptance of its position would yield. Section 1292 (a) provides for an appeal as a matter of right from a number of specified types of interlocutory orders - in particular, interlocutory orders granting or denying injunctions. Those interlocutory orders not within subsection (a), however, were made appealable in 1292 (b), subject to the judgment and discretion of the district court and the court of appeals. Greater importance obviously was attached to those [409 U.S. 151, 168] types of interlocutory orders specified in subsection (a) than to those covered by (b). 40 Nevertheless, petitioner would have us conclude that Congress intended to establish court of appeals jurisdiction for all interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases, except those orders for which an appeal of right is provided in 1292 (a) (1). 41 As the Government notes, such a result would effectively turn 1292 on its head. 42 Consistent with the evident thrust of the statute's legislative history, the much more sensible conclusion is that 1292 (b) was intended to establish jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review interlocutory orders, other than those specified in 1292 (a), in civil cases in which they would have jurisdiction were the judgments final. 43 </s> [409 U.S. 151, 169] </s> At the foundation of the petitioner's position in this case is the contention that 1292 (b) is the panacea for the special burdens imposed on this Court by 2 of the Expediting Act. Both the Court and various individual Members have on occasion commented that "[w]hatever may have been the wisdom of the Expediting Act in providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of its enactment in 1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory," for "[d]irect appeals not only place a great burden on the Court but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of Appeals." United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n. 1 (1963); see Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 595 n. 5 (1972) (BURGER, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 477 n. (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring); id., at 364-365 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Further, in light of the present size of our docket, direct review "seldom results in much expedition" since we normally must examine the entire record and resolve all questions however unsubstantial. Id., at 355 (Clark, J., concurring); see id., at 364 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); United States v. Borden Co., supra, at 477 n. (Harlan, J., dissenting). [409 U.S. 151, 170] Our action today should not be construed as a retreat from these previous remarks. On the contrary, we remain convinced that under present circumstances the Expediting Act fails to hasten substantially the final disposition of important antitrust actions while it unjustifiably burdens this Court with inadequately sifted records and with cases that could be disposed of by review in the courts of appeals. Uniformity in the interpretation and administration of the antitrust laws continues to be an important consideration. But such uniformity could be adequately ensured by the availability of review in this Court on certiorari of cases involving issues of general importance - together with the "[l]imited expediting of such cases, under the discretion of this Court," Ford Motor Co. v. United States, supra, at 595 n. 5 (BURGER, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where time is a factor. The simple fact is that "[t]he legal issues in most [Government] civil antitrust cases are no longer so novel or unsettled as to make them especially appropriate for initial appellate consideration by this Court, as compared with those in a variety of other areas of federal law," Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, at 364 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Yet, despite all of these criticisms, our personal views as to the wisdom of 2 are, of course, no basis for disregarding what we are bound to recognize as the plain and unaltered intent of Congress to require that appeals in Government civil antitrust cases be taken only from final judgments and only to this Court. </s> In any event, petitioner has failed to convince us that permitting appeals under 1292 (b) would provide a meaningful solution - if any solution at all - to the various problems created for the Court by the Expediting Act. In the first place, the availability of interlocutory appeals under 1292 (b) would not reduce the number of Government civil antitrust cases that could be brought [409 U.S. 151, 171] to this Court on direct appeal upon the entrance of a final judgment. Nor would it reduce the number of issues subject to review by this Court; any issue determined on interlocutory appeal would normally be open to consideration on final appeal, 44 and doubtless some party would raise an issue appealed under 1292 (b) since it must have involved "a controlling question of law." Also, there would be the added problem of applications for certiorari following a certified appeal in Expediting Act cases. By definition, the issue will be a substantial one and, where the appellate decision is questionable, it would be necessary to decide whether to grant certiorari, which might require the Court to consider a particular case, on two separate occasions, 45 or to deny certiorari, which might mean allowing the district court to proceed to final judgment on an erroneous basis. Given the potential waste of limited judicial resources - those either of this Court or of the district court - associated with each choice, neither can be considered attractive. Finally, in emphasizing the value of the screening function that court of appeals review would provide in Expediting Act cases, we have consistently focused upon the lengthy records and complex factual issues common to such cases. Yet, as is illustrated by this very case, in which the certified question relates to a motion to dismiss a party, questions that would be presented to the courts of appeals under 1292 (b) would often involve threshold procedural issues not [409 U.S. 151, 172] requiring extensive analysis of the record. 46 With respect to such issues the screening function performed by intermediate appellate review is of far less significance than it would be with respect to questions of, say, relevant market, competition, or agreement. But these latter questions can be properly decided only after full development of the evidence, and it is therefore doubtful at best that interlocutory appeals would aid this Court in dealing with them on final review. 47 </s> Nor are we even certain that the expeditious termination of litigation in the district courts - the express purpose of 1292 (b) 48 - would be materially advanced in the context of Government civil antitrust cases by acceptance of petitioner's contention. Permitting interlocutory appeals under 1292 (b) in Expediting Act [409 U.S. 151, 173] cases would result in an anomalous situation: the court of appeals would have jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders but not over the final judgment, which would be appealable only to this Court. An interlocutory appeal taken under 1292 (b) must, of course, involve "a controlling question of law" the immediate appeal of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." In the normal case, the decision of such a question on interlocutory appeal is final since the same court reviews the final judgment, and the likelihood of review in this Court on certiorari is very small. Here, however, the decision of the court of appeals on the interlocutory order would essentially be only an advisory opinion to the district court since the issue would usually be open to relitigation on appeal of the final judgment to this Court. 49 The net result would be added work for the courts of appeals, 50 with no assurance that there would ultimately be a saving of district court time. </s> III </s> Hence, we conclude that 1292 (b) did not establish jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases. The exclusive nature of [409 U.S. 151, 174] the jurisdiction created in 2 of the Expediting Act has consistently been recognized by this Court, and we hold today that that exclusivity remains unimpaired. Despite our interest in a restructuring of our jurisdiction under the Expediting Act, we are neither willing nor able to adopt the ungainly half measure offered by the petitioner in this case. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins the Court's opinion except for the advisory to Congress reflecting one view of the relative merits of the Expediting Act. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Tidewater then transferred title to its Western Marketing and Manufacturing Division to Phillips. </s> [Footnote 2 Tidewater merged with Getty Oil Co. on September 30, 1967. It has never been contended that that merger altered Tidewater's legal status in this case. </s> [Footnote 3 In its motion to be dismissed, Tidewater contended "that Section 7 of the Clayton Act is directed only against the acquiring corporation and not against the seller, that the sale of assets by defendant Tidewater Oil Company to Phillips Petroleum Company has long ago been consummated, that no relief is obtainable against Tidewater Oil Company, and that its presence in the suit is no longer necessary or appropriate." </s> [Footnote 4 Subsequent to the decision by the Ninth Circuit in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 1292 (b) could be used to take an interlocutory appeal in a Government civil antitrust case. See Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1244-1248, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972). The only other court of appeals to consider the question, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reached the same result as the Ninth Circuit in this case. See Farbenfabriken Bayer, A. G. v. United States, 1968 CCH Trade Cas. § 72,570, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 959 (1968); Glaxo Group, Ltd. v. United States, Misc. No. 3261 (June 25, 1968). </s> [Footnote 5 405 U.S. 986 (1972). We had originally denied certiorari, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). </s> [Footnote 6 Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770. </s> [Footnote 7 See also Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 375 U.S. 39, 40 (1963), modified, 375 U.S. 994 (1964). </s> Section 1 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. 28, requires that a three-judge district court be convened to hear any Government civil antitrust case that the Attorney General certifies to be of "general public importance." See also 49 U.S.C. 44. This three-judge court provision is also a reflection of the "great importance" attached to Government civil antitrust cases and was intended to provide a mechanism for full consideration of such cases by a panel of judges "before presentation to the Supreme Court as if heard by the United States circuit court of appeals." H. R. Rep. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1903). But this provision has been seldom used. </s> [Footnote 8 Act of Feb. 11, 1903, 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 291, 36 Stat. 1167; Act of June 9, 1944, c. 239, 58 Stat. 272; Act of June 25, 1948, 17, 62 Stat. 989. As originally enacted, the statute read in relevant part as follows: </s> "That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, . . . an appeal from the final decree of the circuit court will lie only to the Supreme Court and must be taken within sixty days from the entry thereof . . . ." </s> There is no contention here that the very minor changes in wording effected by the subsequent amendments and codifications of the statute in any way altered the original meaning of the Act. </s> [Footnote 9 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 2, 26 Stat. 826. </s> [Footnote 10 Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 6, 26 Stat. 828. </s> [Footnote 11 Act of June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 660, amending Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 7, 26 Stat. 828, as amended, Act of Feb. 18, 1895, 28 Stat. 666 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 12 In United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558 (1929), Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, detailed the causes of delay that prompted the Expediting Act: </s> "Congress sought by the Expediting Act to ensure speedy disposition of suits in equity brought by the United States under the Anti-Trust Act. Before the passage of the Expediting Act the opportunities for delay were many. From a final decree in the trial court under the Anti-Trust Act an appeal lay to the Circuit Court of Appeals; and six months were allowed for taking the appeal. From the judgment of the Court of Appeals an appeal lay to this Court; and one year was allowed for taking that appeal. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 6, 11, 26 Stat. 826, 828, 829. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 60 Fed. 306; 60 Fed. 934; 156 U.S. 1 ; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 53 Fed. 440; 58 Fed. 58; 166 U.S. 290 . Moreover, there might [409 U.S. 151, 156] be an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from a decree granting or denying an interlocutory injunction, Act of June 6, 1900, c. 803, 31 Stat. 660." </s> See also United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1945). </s> [Footnote 13 United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662, 664 (CA1 1969); see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 364 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); 36 Cong. Rec. 1679 (remarks of Sen. Fairbanks); cf. n. 7, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209. </s> [Footnote 15 In saying this, we are not to be understood as necessarily accepting today an important premise that underlies 2 - namely, that the courts of appeals, subject to review on certiorari in this Court, are incapable of providing the uniformity of interpretation necessary to the administration of the antitrust laws. See infra, at 170. In 1903, the courts of appeals had been in existence for only 12 years and various reservations about them had not yet been dispelled. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 258 (1927). Since that time, we have had over a half-century of experience with the courts of appeals - including experience in the field of private antitrust litigation - which has resolved any initial doubts. See ibid. </s> [Footnote 16 Act of Apr. 14, 1906, c. 1627, 34 Stat. 116. </s> [Footnote 17 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 129, 36 Stat. 1134. </s> [Footnote 18 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, amending 129, 43 Stat. 937. </s> [Footnote 19 Act of Apr. 11, 1928, c. 354, 45 Stat. 422. </s> [Footnote 20 The 1906 amendment removed the limitation on interlocutory appeal to causes "in which an appeal from a final decree may be taken . . . to the circuit court of appeals" and provided simply that such an appeal may be taken to the court of appeals "in any cause." Act of Apr. 14, 1906, c. 1627, 34 Stat. 116. In codifying the Evarts Act interlocutory appeals provision in 1911, "in any cause" was struck, and the provision was amended to allow the courts of appeals to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders "notwithstanding an appeal in such case might, upon final decree under the statutes regulating the same, be taken directly to the Supreme Court." Act of Mar. 3, 1911, 129, 36 Stat. 1134. Finally, the famous Judges' Bill of 1925, in turn struck the "notwithstanding" language, with the result that the codified provision, 129, simply allowed an appeal to be "taken from [an] interlocutory order or decree [granting or denying an injunction or appointing a receiver] to the circuit court of appeals . . . ." Act of Feb. 13, 1925, amending 129, 43 Stat. 937. </s> The 1928 amendment is completely without relevance here since it merely extended the applicability of the statute to interlocutory orders issued by the District Courts of Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. Act of Apr. 11, 1928, c. 354, 45 Stat. 422. </s> [Footnote 21 See S. Rep. No. 2192, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906): H. R. Rep. No. 542, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906); 40 Cong. Rec. 1723, 1742, 4429, 4856-4857, 5056. </s> [Footnote 22 As to the 1911 amendment, see S. Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 53 (1910); H. R. Doc. No. 783, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 57 (1910); H. R. Rep. No. 818, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910); S. Doc. No. 848, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1911); 45 Cong. Rec. 4001. As to the 1925 amendment, see S. Rep. No. 362, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924); H. R. Rep. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1925); Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1924). </s> [Footnote 23 Thus, the 1906 amendment, see n. 20, supra, was intended to render ineffective certain evasive pleading tactics that had theretofore been employed to take advantage of the fact that under the Evarts Act an interlocutory appeal could be taken where only a nonconstitutional issue was at stake but not where a constitutional issue was involved. See H. R. Rep. No. 542, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1906); 40 Cong. Rec. 1723 (remarks of Rep. Brantley); id., at 4856 (remarks of Sen. Bacon). </s> The legislative history concerning the 1911 amendment, see n. 20, supra, indicates that the "notwithstanding" language was designed to "remove any doubt" that the limitation - initially struck by the 1906 amendment - on interlocutory appeals to those cases in which an appeal might be taken to the court of appeals after a final decree had been eliminated. But this merely suggests an intent finally to resolve with even more specific language the problem of [409 U.S. 151, 159] evasive pleading which had motivated the 1906 amendment. See S. Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 53 (1910). Thus, in response to inquiry whether this amendment constituted "a change in the existing law," Senator Heyburn, a sponsor of the legislation, said on the Senate floor, "This is the existing law." 45 Cong. Rec. 4001. </s> As to the 1925 version of the interlocutory appeals provision, see n. 20, supra, the analysis prepared by the committee of this Court which drafted it explained that the "notwithstanding" language was "eliminated as having no further application in view of the repeal of" the provisions that had necessitated the initial 1906 amendment. Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1924). And if the addition of the "notwithstanding" language in 1911 did not establish court of appeals jurisdiction over interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases, we fail to see how dropping that language in 1925 did so. At the same time, elsewhere in the Judges' Bill, 2 of the Expediting Act was carried forward without alteration. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, amending 238 (1), 43 Stat. 938. In doing so, it was stated: "A direct review by the Supreme Court of an interlocutory or final judgment or decree of a district court may be had where it is so provided in the following Acts or parts of Acts, and not otherwise: (1) Section 2 of the Act of February 11, 1903, `to expedite the hearing and determination' of certain suits brought by the United States under the antitrust . . . laws. . . ." Ibid. (emphasis added). Section 2, of course, has never contained a provision allowing appeal of interlocutory orders. Moreover, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, a member of this Court's committee that prepared the bill, testified before the Senate Committee that the character of Expediting Act cases "suggest[s] that they should go directly to the Supreme Court rather than through the circuit courts of appeals" without any indication that an exception was being introduced for interlocutory appeals to the courts of appeals. Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 33 (1924). See also S. Rep. No. 362, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924). </s> [Footnote 24 Certainly the Court spoke fully cognizant of at least the amendment contained in the Judges' Bill of just four years before, see n. 20, supra, since all seven sitting Justices had been on the Court when its committee submitted the bill to Congress. </s> [Footnote 25 In Alkali Export Assn., the Court went on to say: </s> "[Extraordinary] writs may not be used as a substitute for an authorized appeal; and where, as here, the statutory scheme [the Expediting Act] permits appellate review of interlocutory orders only on appeal from the final judgment, review by certiorari or other extraordinary writ is not permissible in the face of the plain indication of the legislative purpose to avoid piecemeal reviews." 325 U.S., at 203 (emphasis added). </s> Nevertheless, the Court found that exigent circumstances associated with the District Court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the action justified immediate review by common-law certiorari in the particular case. Id., at 203-204. </s> The Court in De Beers, stating that "[w]hat is . . . said [in Alkali Export Assn.] applies in this instance," 325 U.S., at 217 , granted review under the All Writs Act of a preliminary injunction, although normally review would have been to the court of appeals under what is now 28 U.S.C. 1292 (a) (1). </s> Of course, nothing we say today signifies a retreat from our previous statements that appeals of interlocutory orders in Government civil antitrust cases cannot be taken even to this Court. </s> [Footnote 26 Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 929. </s> [Footnote 27 In 1951 reference to the District Court of Guam was inserted in the section, Act of Oct. 31, 1951, 49, 65 Stat. 726, and reference to the District Court for the Territory of Alaska was removed from the section effective upon the admission of Alaska into the Union in 1959, Act of July 7, 1958, 12 (e), 72 Stat. 348. Finally, when subsection (b) was added to the section, the former entire section was designated subsection (a). Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770. </s> [Footnote 28 The portion of the provision governing appeal of interlocutory orders appointing receivers and related matters became 28 U.S.C. 1292 (2) (1946 ed., Supp. II), now 28 U.S.C. 1292 (a) (2). </s> [Footnote 29 See S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1948) ("great care has been exercised to make no changes in the existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval"); H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-8 (1947). </s> [Footnote 30 H. R. Rep. No. 2646 of the Committee on Revision of the Laws of the House of Representatives to accompany H. R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., App. A107-108 (1946). See also H. R. Rep. No. 308 of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives to accompany H. R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., App. A110-111 (1947). </s> [Footnote 31 Compare n. 20, supra, with n. 23, supra. </s> [Footnote 32 See supra, at 160-161. Similarly, two of three courts of appeals which have considered the question have concluded that an interlocutory appeal does not lie under 1292 (a) (1) in Expediting Act cases. See United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662 (CA1 1969); United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F.2d 534 (CA9 1963). But see United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 511-517 (CA3 1963). </s> [Footnote 33 Cf. S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1958); H. R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958). </s> [Footnote 34 It was only subsequent to the enactment of 1292 (b) that a single Court of Appeals concluded - despite the unqualified statements by this Court since United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S., at 558 , to the contrary - that an interlocutory appeal would lie under 1292 (a) (1) in a Government civil antitrust case. See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d, at 511-517. See also Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d, at 1244-1248, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972) ( 1292 (b)). </s> [Footnote 35 See S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H. R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on H. R. 6238 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 104 Cong. Rec. 8002 (remarks of Rep. Keating). See also Report of the Proceedings of the Regular Annual Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States 32-33 (1951); Report of the Proceedings of a Special Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States 7 (1952); Report of the Proceedings of the Regular Annual Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States 27-28 (1953). </s> [Footnote 36 The Senate Report suggests the denial of a motion to dismiss an antitrust action as barred by the statute of limitations as one instance in which an interlocutory appeal might be desirable. But it goes on to state: </s> "Disposition of antitrust cases may take considerable time, yet upon appeal following final disposition of such cases, the court of appeals may well determine that the statute of limitations had run and for that reason the district court did not have jurisdiction." </s> S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1958) (emphasis added). The reference to antitrust cases in Chief Judge John J. Parker's testimony at the hearings on 1292 (b) was also clearly limited to private treble-damages actions. See Hearings on H. R. 6238 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1958). </s> [Footnote 37 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. 15. </s> [Footnote 38 S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 39 See id., at 2-3; H. R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1958); Hearings on H. R. 6238 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1958). </s> [Footnote 40 Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1958). </s> [Footnote 41 Petitioner suggests two avenues of escape from this anomalous situation: (1) that under 1292 (a) (1) an interlocutory appeal may in fact lie from an injunctive order in a Government civil antitrust case; (2) that if an appeal from such an order cannot be taken under 1292 (a), it may nevertheless be taken under 1292 (b) since, the argument goes, the latter applies to all orders not appealable under the former, "whatever the nature of the order and whatever the reason for its non-appealability." Reply Brief for Petitioner 7-8. Our discussion in Part I of this opinion is sufficient to dispose of petitioner's first contention. As to the second argument, while the language of 1292 (b) is unqualified on its face, the legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned only with orders of types other than those specified in 1292 (a); in other words, 1292 (b) was intended to supplement 1292 (a), not to provide a substitute for it. See n. 35, supra. Moreover, it would be, to say the least, extraordinary for Congress to have resorted to such a subtle method of establishing for the first time in Government civil antitrust cases interlocutory appeals for orders of the type specified in 1292 (a) without giving any hint whatsoever that this was its purpose. </s> [Footnote 42 Brief for United States 18. </s> [Footnote 43 Nor can it be ignored that subsequent to both the 1948 revision which resulted in 1292 (a) and the enactment of 1292 (b), we have reaffirmed that a final judgment is an essential prerequisite [409 U.S. 151, 169] to an appeal of an order issued in a government civil antitrust case since "Congress . . . limited the right of review in such cases to an appeal from a decree which disposed of all matters, and it precluded the possibility of an appeal either to this Court or to a Court of Appeals from an interlocutory decree." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S., at 305 n. 9. Section 1292 was not, to be sure, specifically at issue in Brown Shoe. But in holding, as it did, that the District Court's decree was appealable only because it was "final," id., at 306-309, the Court necessarily foreclosed the possibility of an interlocutory appeal to any court, and thus its remark concerning the preclusion of interlocutory appeals cannot be lightly dismissed. </s> [Footnote 44 The sole exception to this would be if the certified question had previously been considered by way of certiorari. </s> [Footnote 45 Only if we were to dispose of a controlling question in such a way as to end all proceedings would the possibility of a subsequent appeal be foreclosed. A threshold issue of jurisdiction might present such a controlling question; but even that type of issue will often not end an entire Government civil antitrust case which might involve a number of parties - as is true in this case where the certified question relates to only one of the two defendants. </s> [Footnote 46 See also Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241 (CA7), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972) (service of process); Farben-fabriken Bayer, A. G. v. United States, 1968 CCH Trade Cas. § 72,570 (CADC), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 959 (1968) (quasi in rem jurisdiction). </s> [Footnote 47 Other than threshold procedural issues, the question consistently sought to be raised on interlocutory appeal has been the propriety of orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions with respect to proposed acquisitions. See United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662 (CA1 1969); United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F.2d 534 (CA9 1963); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (CA3 1963). Although appeals of such orders would involve the merits of the antitrust actions, the fact is that permitting interlocutory appeal under 1292 (b) would not bring these orders and the related evidence before the courts of appeals since they come within 1292 (a) (1). Cf. n. 41, supra. Moreover, because of the need for speed if an acquisition is to be enjoined before accomplished, requests for such interlocutory orders must be determined after, at most, only an initial hearing and without full development of the record. Consequently, appeals from such orders would not necessarily bring before the courts of appeals the lengthy records and numerous documents with which we have often been forced to deal after final judgment. </s> [Footnote 48 See S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1958). </s> [Footnote 49 Of course, this problem would not exist if the interlocutory decision were reviewed immediately on certiorari in this Court; but, as we have already seen, this alternative entails serious problems of its own. </s> [Footnote 50 In this respect, it must be recalled that interlocutory appeal under 1292 (b) is subject to the decision of the court of appeals in the exercise of its discretion, to allow appeal of the question certified by the district court. Thus, the effectiveness of 1292 (b) in Government civil antitrust cases would be dependent upon the willingness of the courts of appeals to assume this new burden aware of the limited import of their decisions and of the fact that interlocutory appeals in such cases would represent only added work for them, since they would not otherwise consider any appeal. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> I agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART that the appeal of the interlocutory order in this case to the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b) was not barred by the Expediting Act. But I disagree with the intimations in both the majority opinion and the other dissenting opinion that because of our overwork the antitrust cases should first be routed to the courts of appeals and only then brought here. 1 </s> The case for our "overwork" is a myth. The total number of cases filed has increased from 1063 cases in the 1939 Term to 3643 in the 1971 Term. That increase has largely been in the in forma pauperis cases, 117 being filed in the 1939 Term and 1930 in the 1971 Term. But we grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction in very few cases. The signed opinions of the Court (which are only in argued cases) totaled 137 in the 1939 Term with [409 U.S. 151, 175] six per curiams 2 or a total of 143 Court opinions, while in the 1971 Term we had 129 signed opinions of the Court and 20 per curiams 3 or a total of 149 Court opinions. So in terms of petitions for certiorari granted and appeals noted and set for argument our load today is substantially what it was 33 years ago. </s> The load of work so far as processing cases is concerned has increased. That work is important; and in many ways it is the most important work we do. For the selection of cases across the broad spectrum of issues presented is the very heart of the judicial process. Once our jurisdiction was largely mandatory and the backlog of cases piled high. The 1925 Act 4 changed all that, leaving to the Court the selection of those certiorari cases which seem important to the public interest. The control of the docket was left to the minority, only four votes out of nine being necessary to grant a petition. The review or sifting of these petitions is in many respects the most important and, I think, the most interesting of all our functions. Across the screen each Term come the worries and concerns of the American people - high and low - presented in concrete, tangible form. Most of these cases have been before two or more courts already; and it is seldom important that a third or fourth review be granted. But we have national standards for many of our federal-state problems and it is important, where they control, that the national standards be uniform; and it is equally important where state law is supreme, that the States be allowed to experiment with various approaches and solutions. </s> Neither taking that jurisdiction from us nor the device of reducing our jurisdiction is necessary for the performance [409 U.S. 151, 176] of our duties. We are, if anything, underworked, not overworked. Our time is largely spent in the fascinating task of reading petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements. The number of cases taken or put down for oral argument has not materially increased in the last 30 years. </s> The Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. 28, 29, involved in the present case, does not contribute materially to our caseload. In the 1967 Term we had 12 such cases but only three of them were argued, the others being disposed of summarily. In the 1968 Term we had eight, but only three were argued. In the 1969 Term we had four; only two being argued. In the 1970 Term only two such cases reached us and each was argued. In the 1971 Term four such cases reached us, two of them being argued. 5 </s> If there are any courts that are surfeited, they are the courts of appeals. In my Circuit - the Ninth - it is not uncommon for a judge to write over 50 opinions for the court in one term. That Circuit has at the present time a 15-month backlog of civil cases, while we are current. The average number of signed opinions for the Court in [409 U.S. 151, 177] this Court is close to 12 per Justice; only occasionally does anyone write even as many as 18; and we have no backlog. </s> Separate opinions - including dissents and concurring opinions - multiply. If they are added to the total of 149 for the 1971 Term, the overall number would be 328. But the writing of concurrences, dissents, or separate opinions is wholly in the discretion of the Justice. It is not mandatory work; it is writing done in the vast leisure time we presently have. </s> The antitrust cases are only small fractions of our caseload. Yet they represent large issues of importance to the economy, to consumers, and to the maintenance of the free-enterprise system. Congress has expressed in the Sherman Act, 6 the Clayton Act, 7 the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 and the Celler-Kefauver Act 9 a clear policy to keep the avenues of business open, to bar monopolies, and to save the country from the cartel system which is the product of gargantuan growth. </s> It is of course for Congress and Congress alone to determine whether the Expediting Act 10 should bring the [409 U.S. 151, 178] antitrust cases directly here. While I join the statutory construction in MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S dissent, I do not join that part which expresses to me an inaccurate account of the "overwork" of the Court. We are vastly underworked. One interested in history will discover that once upon a time Hugo Black wrote over 30 opinions for the Court in a Term where only 135 opinions were written for the Court, a few more than we all wrote last Term. </s> [Footnote 1 It is true that several Justices over the years have expressed the desire that the antitrust cases come to us only by certiorari to the courts of appeals. So far as I am aware the only opinion speaking for the Court containing that suggestion is United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 . But there the idea was contained only in a footnote (id., at 175 n. 1); and as Mr. Chief Justice Hughes was wont to say, "Footnotes do not really count." </s> [Footnote 2 Not including orders of dismissal or affirmance. </s> [Footnote 3 Including orders of dismissal or affirmance. </s> [Footnote 4 Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936. </s> [Footnote 5 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 ; United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 . </s> The antitrust cases not argued in the 1967-1971 Terms were either reversed out of hand or affirmed out of hand (some of these being companion cases to those that were argued), or dismissed as moot, or dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There were three dismissed for want of jurisdiction. </s> Farbenfabriken Bayer A. G. v. United States, 393 U.S. 216 , involved an interlocutory order in which we ruled that we had no jurisdiction. Standard Fruit & S. S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 393 U.S. 406 , involved an effort of a corporation, not a party, to inspect the divestiture plans being submitted to the District Court pursuant to a consent judgment. Garrett Freightlines v. United States, 405 U.S. 1035 , involved an appeal from a defendant dismissed from the antitrust case because of the primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over the acquisition in question. </s> [Footnote 6 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. </s> [Footnote 7 Clayton Act of Oct. 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq., 44. </s> [Footnote 8 Robinson-Patman Act of June 19, 1936, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13, 13a, 13b, 21a, 1013. </s> [Footnote 9 Celler-Kefauver Act of Dec. 29, 1950, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. 18, 21. </s> [Footnote 10 For the legislative history of the Act see H. R. Rep. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. </s> Senator Fairbanks, leading exponent of the Act, said in reporting it to the Senate: "The far-reaching importance of the cases arising under antitrust laws now upon the statute books or hereafter to be enacted, and the general public interest therein, are such that every reasonable means should be provided for speeding the litigation. It is the purpose of the bill to expedite litigation of great and general importance. It has no other object." 36 Cong. Rec. 1679. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concurs, and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in part, dissenting. </s> The Expediting Act, enacted in 1903, provides that in civil antitrust actions brought by the United States "an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court." (Emphasis added.) Section 1292 (b), enacted in 1958, provides that when a district court, "in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section," shall appropriately certify the question involved, the court of appeals has discretionary jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from that order. Thus, the Expediting Act, by its terms, relates only to appeals from final judgments in a limited category of cases, while 1292 (b) applies to appeals from certain interlocutory orders in all civil actions. The Expediting Act does not prohibit court of appeals jurisdiction under 1292 (b), for the former applies only to final judgments, while the latter applies only to interlocutory orders. To find any inconsistency whatever between the two statutes thus requires rejection of the plain meaning of each of them - rejection, in short, of a most basic principle of statutory construction. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized in Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1972), "the language of each [can] be given full effect without limiting the scope of the other." [409 U.S. 151, 179] </s> Moreover, the purpose of 1292 (b) is wholly consistent with that of the Expediting Act. The 1903 statute was motivated by the view that Government antitrust actions are so important that they should be expedited. Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting v. ASCAP, 375 U.S. 39, 40 (1963). 1 So, too, the motivation behind 1292 (b), enacted 55 years later, was the contemporary view that interlocutory appeals involving important and controlling questions of law are a useful means of expediting litigation. Although 1292 (b) authorizes a departure from the general rule against interlocutory appeals, it does so only for the purpose of materially advancing the ultimate termination of the litigation. 2 Thus, the Expediting [409 U.S. 151, 180] Act and 1292 (b) are animated by precisely the same objectives and warranted by precisely the same circumstances, and they should be read together as supplementing one another, not as antagonistic. </s> The legislative history of 1292 (b) indicates that its primary benefit was expected to occur in the protracted or "big" cases, including civil antitrust litigation. 3 Yet, if no appeal can be taken to a court of appeals under 1292 (b) in a civil antitrust suit where the Government is plaintiff, then the purpose behind the statute cannot be served at all in these cases, for no statute provides for such an interlocutory appeal directly to this Court. It seems to me that if Congress had wanted to exclude cases like this one from the beneficent provisions of 1292 (b), it would have said so. 4 </s> [409 U.S. 151, 181] </s> The Expediting Act originally provided that Government antitrust cases would be heard by a panel of judges upon the certification of the Attorney General. That provision is now 15 U.S.C. 28, which provides for a panel of three. The purpose of the provision was to ensure that cases would receive full consideration by a panel of judges before presentation to this Court. 5 The Expediting Act, of course, has been criticized because it routes complex cases directly here without benefit of screening by the courts of appeals. As we stated in United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n. 1 (1963): </s> "Whatever may have been the wisdom of the Expediting Act in providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of its enactment in 1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory. . . . Direct appeals not only place a great burden on the Court but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of Appeals." </s> See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring); id., at 364-365 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460, 477 n. (1962) (Harlan, [409 U.S. 151, 182] J., dissenting); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 595 n. 5 (1972) (BURGER, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Interlocutory appeals under 1292 (b) in Government antitrust cases would provide screening of at least some issues in at least some cases by courts of appeals before those issues reach this Court; and this, as shown above, would be consistent with the original policy of the Expediting Act. The Court's decision today precludes, in cases like this, both the useful expediting effect of 1292 (b) and the equally desirable potential of intermediate review by the courts of appeals of important legal issues. </s> It is said that a ban on court of appeals jurisdiction under 1292 (b) in Government antitrust cases is to be derived from the provisions of 1292 (a) (1). The latter section provides that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of district courts granting or denying injunctions "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." The argument is that that language expressly excludes court of appeals jurisdiction in Expediting Act cases; and since there is nothing in the language of 1292 (b) that contradicts this express exclusion, interlocutory orders in Expediting Act cases are likewise not appealable under 1292 (b). If 1292 (b) did allow court of appeals jurisdiction in this case, it is said, the result would be that an interlocutory order in a Government antitrust case could be appealed to a court of appeals only if it did not involve an injunction; and that result would effectively turn 1292 on its head, because in non-Expediting Act cases, 1292 gives priority to injunctive orders, which may be appealed as of right. </s> There are several answers to this argument. At the outset, it is not clear that the major premise - that 1292 (a) (1) expressly excludes court of appeals jurisdiction in Expediting Act cases - is valid. On that question, the [409 U.S. 151, 183] Circuits are divided, the First and the Ninth denying their jurisdiction, 6 and the Third upholding appealability. 7 We have never before faced the question nor resolved the conflict. </s> But even if the Expediting Act does bar court of appeals jurisdiction to review interlocutory injunctive orders under 1292 (a) (1) in Government antitrust cases, it does not follow that there must be a similar bar to 1292 (b) jurisdiction. The very fact that 1292 (a) (1) contains express language which at least arguably creates an exception to court of appeals jurisdiction, while 1292 (b) contains no such language, is reason enough to treat the two differently. Beyond that, 1292 (a) (1) has a history dramatically different from 1292 (b). That history was thoroughly reviewed in United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662 (CA1 1969), in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (CA3 1963), and in the Court's opinion today, ante, at 155-163, and need not be discussed in detail here. Suffice it to say that the original version of 1292 (a) (1) was [409 U.S. 151, 184] enacted in 1891, and that the provision went through several changes in language in succeeding years, during which its relationship to the 1903 Expediting Act was often unclear. See United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d, at 666-669. The provision was finally codified in its present form in 1948, although, as the above-mentioned conflict among the circuits demonstrates, that codification did not make its relationship to the Expediting Act any clearer. Section 1292 (b), on the other hand, was an entirely new statute, written on a clean slate in 1958, and representing a sharp break with the traditional policy against appeals from noninjunctive interlocutory orders. At that time, there was already growing doubt about the wisdom of the Expediting Act; and the fact that Congress conferred 1292 (b) jurisdiction without making any express exception for cases where direct review may be had in this Court - such as had been in 1292 (a) (1) for some years - is surely some indication that Congress in 1958 was expressing the contemporary view that interlocutory appeals to the courts of appeals on controlling questions of law provide a desirable tool that should not be denied even in Expediting Act cases. </s> As to the point that this interpretation would "turn 1292 on its head," it is certainly arguable that if an appeal from an injunctive order in an Expediting Act case cannot be had under 1292 (a) (1), it may still be taken under 1292 (b). Section 1292 (b) relates to orders "not otherwise appealable under this section," whatever the nature of the order and whatever the reason for its nonappealability. Hence, if, in Government antitrust cases, courts of appeals have no jurisdiction under 1292 (a) (1), then an interlocutory injunctive order would be an order "not otherwise appealable," and 1292 (b)'s discretionary jurisdiction might well be held to apply. [409 U.S. 151, 185] </s> In short, there is no validity to the argument that the terms of 1292 (a) (1), whatever they may mean, have any bearing upon the proper interpretation of 1292 (b). </s> It is also argued that the basic policy of the Expediting Act was to remove all court of appeals jurisdiction in Government antitrust cases. According to this argument, although the Act speaks only of final judgments, it must be understood to include interlocutory appeals, since, at the time the Act was passed, the courts of appeals could review interlocutory orders only in cases where they could review final judgments. From United States v. California Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553, 558 (1929), to Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S., at 305 n. 9, the argument goes, this Court has consistently indicated that courts of appeals may not exercise jurisdiction in Expediting Act cases, regardless of whether the appeal is from a final or interlocutory order; and it should not be assumed that Congress in 1958 repealed this longstanding interpretation by legislation that is not addressed specifically to appeals in these cases. </s> I fail to see how we effect anything like a repealer of the Expediting Act by construing 1292 (b) to permit court of appeals jurisdiction thereunder in Expediting Act cases. As demonstrated above, there is no inconsistency whatever between this construction of 1292 (b) and the plain language of the Expediting Act. It is equally clear that the reason why in 1903, and indeed for 55 years thereafter, courts of appeals could not review noninjunctive interlocutory orders in cases where they could not review the final judgment is not that the Expediting Act forbade such review, but that there was no statutory authority for such review in any cases whatsoever. In 1958, however, Congress broke with the old policy against interlocutory appeals from noninjunctive orders and specifically provided that such appeals [409 U.S. 151, 186] may be taken to the courts of appeals in their discretion in all civil actions, where the question is properly certified. I see no reason, in the absence of some statutory prohibition, to refrain from applying that clear language, whether or not the court of appeals can review the final judgment. </s> The cases cited by the Government do not persuade me otherwise. California Canneries, of course, was decided 29 years before the enactment of 1292 (b); and whatever was said there was a judgment on what Congress had done, not on what it could do or on the meaning of what it was to do 29 years later. Brown Shoe does postdate the enactment of 1292 (b); but that case involved a direct appeal to this Court, and the only question about appealability was whether the appealed order was final. The issue of court of appeals jurisdiction under 1292 (b) was not involved there, nor was the 1958 Act even mentioned in the short footnote dictum so heavily relied on by the Government. That dictum did little more than quote the language of California Canneries, and it surely cannot be understood to decide the issue now before us. </s> Finally, it is said that it would be anomalous for a court of appeals that is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a final judgment to decide an interlocutory issue that could control the outcome of the case. But there is no case in which the judgment of a court of appeals is necessarily final. Whenever a court of appeals decides a controlling question of law in any litigation, its views are subject to review here. Far from being anomalous, interlocutory review of potentially dispositive questions by the courts of appeals in Government antitrust cases would be helpful to this Court, giving us the benefit of intermediate appellate consideration in these cases. We could then exercise our certiorari power informed by the reasoning of an appellate [409 U.S. 151, 187] court, and there might be no later direct appeal at all from the final judgment. And surely interlocutory appeals under 1292 (b) in Government antitrust cases would serve to lighten the burden on trial courts and litigants alike. </s> We cannot, of course, create an appellate jurisdiction not created by Congress, however desirable. But what Congress has conferred, we should not reject. </s> I would reverse the order of the Court of Appeals denying Tidewater's petition to appeal under 1292 (b) for lack of jurisdiction, and I would remand this case to that court with directions to consider the merits of the petition to appeal. </s> [Footnote 1 In reporting the bill that became the Expediting Act, Senator Fairbanks stated that: </s> "[E]very reasonable means should be provided for speeding the litigation. It is the purpose of the bill to expedite litigation of great and general importance. It has no other object." 36 Cong. Rec. 1679. </s> [Footnote 2 The Senate Report on the bill that became 1292 (b) stated: </s> "This legislation results from a considerable study by committees of the Judicial Conference. The legislation itself was introduced at the request of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States. . . . The bill results from a growing awareness of the need for expedition of cases pending before the district courts. Many cases which are filed in the Federal district courts require the district judge to entertain motions at an early stage in the proceedings which, if determined, against the plaintiff, result in a final order which would then be appealable to the circuit courts of appeals of the United States. However, such motions, if determined in the plaintiff's favor, are interlocutory since they do not end the litigation and are not therefore, under existing provisions of law, appealable. . . . </s> . . . . </s> "The committee believes that this legislation constitutes a desirable addition to the existing authority to appeal from interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States. . . . Any legislation, therefore, appropriately safeguarded, which might aid in the [409 U.S. 151, 180] disposition of cases before the district courts of the United States by saving useless expenditure of court time is such as to require the approbation of all those directly concerned with the administration of justice in the United States." S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 4 (1958). </s> [Footnote 3 The Senate Report stated: </s> "There are many civil actions from which similar illustrations could be furnished. For example, in an antitrust action a plea may be entered that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. If this motion is denied, under existing law the matter is not appealable and the case then goes forward to trial. Disposition of antitrust cases may take considerable time, yet upon appeal following final disposition of such cases, the court of appeals may well determine that the statute of limitations had run and for that reason the district court did not have jurisdiction." Id., at 3. </s> [Footnote 4 Although the antitrust cases referred to in the Senate Committee Report on 1292 (b) were apparently private cases, rather than Government litigation, the proposed legislation was introduced, after considerable study, at the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States (n. 2, supra), whose members - all eminent federal judges - were surely familiar with the appellate procedure in civil antitrust cases brought by the Government. </s> [Footnote 5 The House Report on the bill explains this provision by quoting a letter of the Attorney General as follows: </s> "There are a number of cases now provided by statute where appeals may be made directly to the Supreme Court from the district and circuit courts . . . . </s> "The class of cases that I suggest should be brought within this rule, it seems to me, is of as great importance as any of those referred to. The suggested provision requiring a full bench of the circuit judges would insure the cases receiving as full consideration before presentation to the Supreme Court as if heard by the United States circuit court of appeals." H. R. Rep. No. 3020, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1903). </s> [Footnote 6 United States v. Cities Service Co., 410 F.2d 662 (CA1 1969); United States v. FMC Corp., 321 F.2d 534 (CA9 1963). </s> [Footnote 7 United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (CA3 1963). The reasoning of the Third Circuit in this case was as follows: Section 1292 (a) (1) permits an appeal to a court of appeals of interlocutory injunctive orders "except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Since the Supreme Court has direct review in Expediting Act cases only from final judgments, it has none from interlocutory orders. Hence, the exception in 1292 (a) (1) does not bar court of appeals jurisdiction over interlocutory injunctive orders in Government antitrust cases. The court then concluded: </s> "In fact, it is extremely difficult and requires doing violence to the language of the statute to escape the conclusion that interlocutory orders, such as the one at bar, are reviewable by a court of appeals excepting and only excepting those types of cases in which an interlocutory order is directly reviewable by the Supreme Court." 320 F.2d, at 517. </s> [409 U.S. 151, 188]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. JIM(1972) No. 71-1509 Argued: Decided: November 20, 1972 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 71-1612, Utah et al. v. Jim et al., on appeal from the same court. </s> A statute enlarged the class of beneficiaries of certain royalties from oil and gas leases in the Aneth Extension of the Navajo Indian Reservation in Utah by providing that the funds be used to benefit all Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County rather than only those residing in the Aneth Extension, as provided in an earlier statute. Held: As the earlier statute did not create constitutionally protected property rights in the residents of the Aneth Extension, the statutory change did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation. </s> Reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motion of the Navajo Tribe of Indians for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in No. 71-1509, is granted. </s> These cases are here on appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the District of Utah that declared an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. Jurisdiction in this Court is conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1252 and 2101 (a). </s> In 1933, the Congress withdrew certain lands in Utah, known as the "Aneth Extension," from the public domain and added them to the Navajo Reservation. Though no oil or gas was believed to be located on these lands, it was provided that should such mineral resources be produced in commercial quantities, "37 1/2 per centum of the net royalties accruing therefrom derived from tribal leases shall be paid to the State of Utah: Provided, That said 37 1/2 per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the State of Utah in the tuition of Indian children [409 U.S. 80, 81] in white schools and/or in the building or maintenance of roads across the lands described in section 1 hereof, or for the benefit of the Indians residing therein." 47 Stat. 1418. The remaining 62 1/2% of the royalties generated by any such tribal mineral leases were, by implication, to go to the Navajo tribe. </s> After the passage of the Act, oil and gas were discovered on the Aneth Extension, and royalties were divided pursuant to the statute. The State of Utah created an Indian Affairs Commission to manage and expend the funds received by the State under the Act. As time went on, the language of the 1933 Act came to create administrative problems regarding the expenditure of the funds channeled through the State. A report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs noted in 1967 that the word "tuition" in the 1933 Act had created uncertainty as to the breadth of the educational program the State was authorized to finance from the royalty funds. The report also noted a difficulty in discerning precisely who was properly a beneficiary of the funds, since "many Navajo families do not live permanently within the lands set aside in 1933, but move back and forth between this area and other locations." S. Rep. No. 710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1967). </s> To make the administration of these funds more flexible and to spread the benefits of the royalties more broadly among the Navajo community, the Congress enacted a statute in 1968 that directed the State to expend the 37 1/2% of royalties "for the health, education, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County." 82 Stat. 121. This statutory change expanded the pool of beneficiaries substantially, and a class action was brought on behalf of the residents of the Aneth Extension, seeking inter alia a declaration that the statute was an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. The District Court concluded that the [409 U.S. 80, 82] 1933 Act vested certain property rights in the plaintiffs, and held the 1968 Act, with its changed pool of beneficiaries, to be unconstitutional. 1 </s> The judgment of the District Court is in error. Congress in 1933 did not create constitutionally protected property rights in the appellees. The Aneth Extension was added to a tribal reservation, and the leases which give rise to mineral royalties are tribal leases. It is settled that "[w]hatever title the Indians have is in the tribe, and not in the individuals, although held by the tribe for the common use and equal benefit of all the members." Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307 ; Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, 136 . To be sure, the 1933 Act established a pattern of distribution which benefited the appellees more than other Indians on the Navajo Reservation. 2 But it was well within the power of Congress to alter that distributional scheme. 3 In Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 , this Court approved a congressional enlargement of the pool of Indians who were to benefit from a distribution of tribal property. There, too, an earlier statute had established a more limited entitlement. </s> "But it is said that the act of 1902 contemplated that they [the beneficiaries under the first enactment] alone should receive allotments and be the participants in the distribution of the remaining lands, and also of the funds, of the tribe. No doubt [409 U.S. 80, 83] such was the purport of the act. But that, in our opinion, did not confer upon them any vested right such as would disable Congress from thereafter making provision for admitting newly born members of the tribe to the allotment and distribution. The difficulty with the appellants' contention is that it treats the act of 1902 as a contract, when `it is only an act of Congress and can have no greater effect.' . . . It was but an exertion of the administrative control of the Government over the tribal property of tribal Indians, and was subject to change by Congress . . . ." Id., at 648. </s> Congress has not deprived the Navajo of the benefits of mineral deposits on their tribal lands. It has merely chosen to re-allocate the 37 1/2% of royalties which flow through the State in a more efficient and equitable manner. This was well within the power of Congress to do. As no "property," in a Fifth Amendment sense, was conferred upon residents of the Aneth Extension by the 1933 Act, no violation of the Fifth Amendment was effected by the 1968 legislation. The judgment of the District Court is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The decision of the District Court is unreported. </s> [Footnote 2 While the 1933 Act remained in effect, the District Court properly insisted that the Utah State Indian Affairs Commission comply with the statutory formula for disbursements. See Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Comm'n, 198 F. Supp. 218 (declaratory judgment); 215 F. Supp. 12 (supplemental relief). </s> [Footnote 3 We intimate no view as to the rights a tribe might have if Congress were to deprive it of the value of mineral royalties generated by tribal lands. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> Plaintiffs below are a class of Indians with a membership of 1,500. They are a mixture of Navajo and Piute and live in an area of the Navajo Reservation called the Aneth Extension, made part of that reservation in a 1933 Act of Congress. 47 Stat. 1418. In 1968 Congress amended that Act, 82 Stat. 121, and the District Court for the District of Utah declared the amendment unconstitutional. </s> Prior to 1933 the Extension was part of the public lands of the United States. The area was occupied by the direct ancestors of the appellees. [409 U.S. 80, 84] </s> The Indians in the Aneth Extension number about 1,500 people who are primitive Navajos with some mixture of Piute blood. See Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Comm'n, 198 F. Supp. 218, 220. They live in a remote and relatively inaccessible area with an average annual income per family of $240. Ibid. The Aneth Extension is in San Juan County and the 1933 Act stated: "[N]o further allotments of lands to Indians on the public domain shall be made in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads be made in said county." </s> The white man was unconcerned about this domain until oil was discovered; and then he became quite active. By June 30, 1970, the royalties owing the Aneth Extension Indians had increased to $7,039,022.32. Of this, $78,000 was used to pipe water from the Aneth Extension to the adjoining lands of a white man, an "improvement" that only incidentally aided the resident Indians. Another $27,000 of Indian funds was spent for the construction of an airport and connecting road, which substantially benefited a white man's private dude ranch operation. Some $10,000 or more was expended for administrative purposes by Utah. 198 F. Supp., at 221. When this suit was started, additional expenditures were about to be made: $175,000 to a federal agency to locate isolated water springs on the Aneth Extension and $500,000 to build a hard-surfaced road outside the boundaries of the Extension. </s> These primitive Navajos wanted the money used to purchase high-elevation ranges where they might have summer grazing for the livestock and thus realize a round-the-year livestock operation. Judge Christensen found that members of the Aneth Extension were the sole beneficiaries of the fund and that it should be administered with their wishes in mind. [409 U.S. 80, 85] </s> But there are tensions and conflicts between these primitive Navajos who live on the Aneth Extension and other members of the tribe who live elsewhere. 198 F. Supp., at 221. </s> The State Commission did not comply with the District Court's order but sponsored legislation to extend the benefits of the fund to other Indians. 1 Judge Christensen ruled again that the fund was solely for the benefit of members of the Aneth Extension. Sakezzie v. Utah State Indian Affairs Comm'n, 215 F. Supp. 12. Neither opinion was appealed. But the State Commission promoted legislation to extend the benefits of the 1933 Act to other Indians. Id., at 20. </s> The problems the Commission had in administering the fund reached Congress and in 1968 the contested amendment was passed. 82 Stat. 121. This amendment indicates that money must be used by the State of Utah "for the health, education, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County" and that "Contribution may be made to projects and facilities within said area that are not exclusively for the benefits of the beneficiaries hereunder in proportion to the benefits to be received therefrom by said beneficiaries, as may be determined by the State of Utah . . . ." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) </s> The 1933 Act gave title to the land and right to the fund, not to the tribe of the Navajo, but to the Aneth [409 U.S. 80, 86] community. 2 I do not believe that under the circumstances of this case Congress had the power to expand the class of beneficiaries to include the whole tribe. </s> The occupants of the Extension have been a separate community for many generations. Their claim of right by continuous possession precedes the transfer of title by the United States Government. Congress made provision for the Secretary of the Interior to place other tribes on the land and, if he did, their claim would be based on territory, not membership. Since the rights were vested in those who lived on the Aneth Extension, I do not see how they can be extended to outsiders. </s> In Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 , the Court upheld the power of Congress to expand the beneficiaries of certain Indian land to the children of those who already enjoyed those rights. Here the expansion is not limited to those of the same blood line. But, more important, Congress had a different legal relation to the Cherokees than it does to the appellees. "[T]he members of this tribe were wards of the United States, which was fully empowered, whenever it seemed wise to do so, to assume full control [409 U.S. 80, 87] over them and their affairs, to determine who were such members, to allot and distribute the tribal lands and funds . . . ." Id., at 642. The 1933 Act states that the lands "are hereby, permanently withdrawn from all forms of entry or disposal for the benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon." 47 Stat. 1418. That would seem to freeze the existing legal rights in that area of the Aneth Extension to the inhabitants. The legal effect seems like a disclaimer on the part of the United States of any right in either the land or the minerals. It is difficult for me to see how Congress has power to change the scheme without payment of just compensation. After all, Indians are beneficiaries of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 ; Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 . They too are people, not sheep or cattle that can be given or denied whatever their overseer decrees. </s> Indians are also beneficiaries of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Chippewa Indians of Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 479 ; United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 ; Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 . When there is a taking of Indian lands, the compensation must take into account the mineral rights which are part of the lands. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 . What then constitutes a taking? The majority finds no taking because ownership already existed in the Navajo tribe. The 1933 Act states, however, that all lands are "permanently withdrawn from all forms of entry or disposal for the benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon," 47 Stat. 1418. That Act plainly indicates that only those residing on that tract, not the tribe as a whole, were the beneficiaries. [409 U.S. 80, 88] </s> If the royalty granted by the 1933 Act had been to the Standard Oil Co. or any other producer of oil, no one would dare say that the royalty could be assigned by a subsequent Congress to an oil consortium without payment of just compensation. Whenever we have made grants of public lands or interests therein to Indians the Court has held that the fact that Indians are wards and the United States a guardian does not make the Indian title defeasible. The Court in Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 , held that if the United States were allowed to take lands from Indians, "[t]hat would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of confiscation." </s> In United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S., at 109 -110, the Court said: </s> "The tribe was a dependent Indian community under the guardianship of the United States, and therefore its property and affairs were subject to the control and management of that government. But this power to control and manage was not absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it was subject to limitations inhering in such a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions. It did not enable the United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation for them . . . ." </s> The present cases are close to Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 , where Congress repeatedly put Arapahoes on Shoshone lands acquired under a treaty. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, allowed damages to the Shoshones: </s> "Confusion is likely to result from speaking of the wrong to the Shoshones as a destruction of their [409 U.S. 80, 89] title. Title in the strict sense was always in the United States, though the Shoshones had the treaty right of occupancy with all its beneficial incidents. . . . What those incidents are, it is needless to consider now . . . . The right of occupancy is the primary one to which the incidents attach, and division of the right with strangers is an appropriation of the land pro tanto, in substance, if not in form." Id., at 496. </s> And quoting from United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591, Mr. Justice Cardozo added, </s> "The right of the Indians to the occupancy of the lands pledged to them, may be one of occupancy only, but it is `as sacred as that of the United States to the fee.'" Id., at 497. </s> What power remains in Congress after the express purpose of the Act "permanently [to] withdraw" the lands from disposal? </s> Public lands are usually subject to disposition by patent and upon its issuance, control over the transaction ceases and the patent can only be set aside by judicial proceedings in the courts. Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589 ; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530 . Thus, when Congress passed legislation giving public lands to the railroads, it was considered a contract which could not be broken by Congress when it sought to use the lands as a water-power site, Payne v. Central Pacific R. Co., 255 U.S. 228 ; nor could the Secretary reclaim the property. United States v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 256 U.S. 51 ; Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197, 199 . An entryman on a homestead claim does not achieve title until certain time and work conditions are met. 43 U.S.C. 161-165. Yet, during this period he has the right to exclusive possession and use, unless the patent was secured by fraud. Patents [409 U.S. 80, 90] are not issued in oil and gas exploration but leases are. 30 U.S.C. 226. But that fact does not affect the power to cancel the leases. That can only be done by a failure of the lessee to comply with the lease, the statute, and regulations. 30 U.S.C. 188. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649. </s> Until lands are patented, title remains in the United States. Yet even before a patent issues the claims are "valid against the United States if there has been a discovery of mineral within the limits of the claim, if the lands are still mineral, and if other statutory requirements have been met." Best v. Humboldt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 . </s> The devices for doing the Indians in, when it comes to royalties in gas or oil lands, are numerous. See White v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 139 F.2d 103. But the owners of oil and gas interests (whether those interests be legal or equitable) normally have an interest separate and apart from the land where the oil and gas are discovered. See Lane v. Hughes, 228 S. W. 2d 986; 3 E. Kuntz, Oil and Gas, cc. 38 and 42 (1967); V. Kulp, Oil and Gas Rights 10.36 et seq. (1954). It is strange law, indeed, when the guardian (the United States) is allowed to do in the wards (the Indians) by depriving them of their equitable interest in the oil royalties which had been granted or by reducing their share of the royalties granted. </s> The problems of this case are typical of those that have plagued the Indians from the beginning. We should put the cases down for oral argument to make certain that these primitive Navajos receive the full benefit of the law. </s> [Footnote 1 The Act admitting Utah to the Union provided: </s> "That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States." 28 Stat. 108. </s> [Footnote 2 That Act (47 Stat. 1418), after describing the Aneth Extension by metes and bounds, provided that those public lands "be, and the same are hereby, permanently withdrawn from all forms of entry or disposal for the benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon: Provided, That no further allotments of lands to Indians on the public domain shall be made in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads be made in said county under the Act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. 96; U.S.C., title 43, sec. 190). Should oil or gas be produced in paying quantities within the lands hereby added to the Navajo Reservation, 37 1/2 per centum of the net royalties accruing therefrom derived from tribal leases shall be paid to the State of Utah: Provided, That said 37 1/2 per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the State of Utah in the tuition of Indian children in white schools and/or in the building or maintenance of roads across the lands described in section 1 hereof, or for the benefit of the Indians residing therein." </s> [409 U.S. 80, 91]

United States Supreme Court DUTTON v. EVANS(1970) No. 10 Argued: October 15, 1969Decided: December 15, 1970 </s> Appellee was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial in which one Shaw testified, over objection, concerning a statement Williams (an alleged accomplice) had made in the prison where both were incarcerated, after Williams' return there from his arraignment, that had it not been for appellee "we wouldn't be in this now." There were 19 other prosecution witnesses, one of whom (another alleged accomplice) gave detailed eyewitness testimony of the crime and the participation of the appellee and Williams therein. Shaw's testimony was admitted under a Georgia statute which, as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court, allows into evidence a coconspirator's out-of-court statement made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy. Following affirmance of the conviction by the Georgia Supreme Court, appellee brought this habeas corpus proceeding in federal court. The District Court denied the writ but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violated appellee's right to confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellee contends that the Georgia hearsay exception is unconstitutional since it differs from the hearsay exception applicable to conspiracy trials in the federal courts, which applies only if the out-of-court statement of a coconspirator was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 80-90; 93-100. </s> 400 F.2d 826, reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that: </s> 1. The coconspirator hearsay exception applied by Georgia is not invalid under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth, merely because it does not coincide with the narrower exception applicable in [400 U.S. 74, 75] federal conspiracy trials which results, not from the Sixth Amendment, but from the exercise of this Court's rule-making power respecting the federal law of evidence. Pp. 80-83. </s> 2. In the circumstances of this case the admission into evidence of Williams' statement did not result in any denial of appellee's confrontation right since the out-of-court statement bore indicia of reliability that fully warranted its being placed before the jury. Pp. 83-90. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concluded that exceptions to the rule against hearsay must be evaluated, not by the Confrontation Clause (which is not designed to cope with the many factors involved in passing on evidentiary rules), but by the due process standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus evaluated, the Georgia statute is constitutional as applied in this case since the out-of-court declaration against interest involved here evinces some likelihood of trustworthiness and its exclusion from evidence is therefore not essential to a fair trial. Pp. 93-100. </s> STEWART, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., joined, post, p. 90. HARLAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 93. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACK, DOUGLAS, and BRENNAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 100. </s> Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, reargued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, and Marion O. Gordon and Mathew Robins, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> Robert B. Thompson reargued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. </s> Solicitor General Griswold, by invitation of the Court, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae on the reargument. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Jerome M. Feit, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Roger A. Pauley. [400 U.S. 74, 76] </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join. </s> Early on an April morning in 1964, three police officers were brutally murdered in Gwinnett County, Georgia. Their bodies were found a few hours later, handcuffed together in a pine thicket, each with multiple gunshot wounds in the back of the head. After many months of investigation, Georgia authorities charged the appellee, Evans, and two other men, Wade Truett and Venson Williams, with the officers' murders. Evans and Williams were indicted by a grand jury; Truett was granted immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony. </s> Evans pleaded not guilty and exercised his right under Georgia law to be tried separately. After a jury trial, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. 1 The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, 2 and this Court denied certiorari. 3 Evans then brought the present habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district court, alleging, among other things, that he had been denied the constitutional right of confrontation at his trial. The District Court denied the writ, 4 but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Georgia had, indeed, denied Evans the right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, "to be confronted by the witnesses against him." 5 From that judgment an appeal was brought to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 6 The [400 U.S. 74, 77] case was originally argued last Term, but was set for reargument. 397 U.S. 1060 . </s> In order to understand the context of the constitutional question before us, a brief review of the proceedings at Evans' trial is necessary. The principal prosecution witness at the trial was Truett, the alleged accomplice who had been granted immunity. Truett described at length and in detail the circumstances surrounding the murder of the police officers. He testified that he, along with Evans and Williams, had been engaged in switching the license plates on a stolen car parked on a back road in Gwinnett County when they were accosted by the three police officers. As the youngest of the officers leaned in front of Evans to inspect the ignition switch on the car, Evans grabbed the officer's gun from its holster. Evans and Williams then disarmed the other officers at gunpoint, and handcuffed the three of them together. They then took the officers into the woods and killed them by firing several bullets into their bodies at extremely close range. In addition to Truett, 19 other witnesses testified for the prosecution. 7 Defense counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine each witness, and he exercised that opportunity with respect to most of them. </s> One of the 20 prosecution witnesses was a man named Shaw. He testified that he and Williams had been fellow prisoners in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, at the time Williams was brought to Gwinnett County to be arraigned on the charges of murdering the police officers. Shaw said that when Williams was returned to the penitentiary from the arraignment, he had asked Williams: "How did you make out in court?" and that Williams had responded, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." Defense counsel objected to the introduction [400 U.S. 74, 78] of this testimony upon the ground that it was hearsay and thus violative of Evans' right of confrontation. After the objection was overruled, counsel cross-examined Shaw at length. </s> The testimony of Shaw relating what he said Williams had told him was admitted by the Georgia trial court, and its admission upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court, upon the basis of a Georgia statute that provides: "After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all." 8 As the appellate court put it: </s> "`The rule is that so long as the conspiracy to conceal the fact that a crime has been committed or the identity of the perpetrators of the offense continues, the parties to such conspiracy are to be considered so much a unit that the declarations of either are admissible against the other.' The defendant, and his co-conspirator, Williams, at the time this statement was made, were still concealing their identity, keeping secret the fact that they had killed the deceased, if they had, and denying their guilt. There was evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy to steal the automobile and the killing of the deceased by the conspirators while carrying out the conspiracy, and the statement by Williams made after the actual commission of the crime, but while the conspiracy continued was admissible." 9 (Citations omitted.) </s> This holding was in accord with a consistent line of Georgia decisions construing the state statute. See, e. g., Chatterton v. State, 221 Ga. 424, 144 S. E. 2d 726, [400 U.S. 74, 79] cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 ; Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 73, 11 S. E. 2d 350, 358. </s> It was the admission of this testimony of the witness Shaw that formed the basis for the appellee's claim in the present habeas corpus proceeding that he had been denied the constitutional right of confrontation in the Georgia trial court. In upholding that claim, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarded its duty to be "not only to interpret the framers' original concept in light of historical developments, but also to translate into due-process terms the constitutional boundaries of the hearsay rule." 10 (Footnotes omitted.) The court upheld the appellee's constitutional claim because it could find no "salient and cogent reasons" for the exception to the hearsay rule Georgia applied in the present case, an exception that the court pointed out was broader than that applicable to conspiracy trials in the federal courts. 11 </s> The question before us, then, is whether in the circumstances of this case the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Evans' murder conviction had to be set aside because of the admission of Shaw's testimony. In considering this question, we start by recognizing that this Court has squarely held that "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is . . . a fundamental right . . . made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 . See also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 ; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 ; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 ; Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 ; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 ; California v. Green 399 U.S. 149 . But that is no more than the beginning of our inquiry. [400 U.S. 74, 80] </s> I </s> It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional right to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced. In the Pointer case itself, we referred to the decisions of this Court that have approved the admission of hearsay: </s> "This Court has recognized the admissibility against an accused of dying declarations, Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 , and of testimony of a deceased witness who has testified at a former trial, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 -244. See also Dowdell v. United States, supra, 221 U.S., at 330 ; Kirby v. United States, supra, 174 U.S., at 61 . . . . There are other analogous situations which might not fall within the scope of the constitutional rule requiring confrontation of witnesses." 12 </s> The argument seems to be, rather, that in any given case the Constitution requires a reappraisal of every exception to the hearsay rule, no matter how long established, in order to determine whether, in the words of the Court of Appeals, it is supported by "salient and cogent reasons." The logic of that position would seem to require a constitutional reassessment of every established hearsay exception, federal or state, but in the present case it is argued only that the hearsay exception applied by Georgia is constitutionally invalid because it does not identically conform to the hearsay exception applicable to conspiracy trials in the federal courts. Appellee does not challenge and we do not question the validity of the coconspirator exception applied in the federal courts. [400 U.S. 74, 81] </s> That the two evidentiary rules are not identical must be readily conceded. It is settled that in federal conspiracy trials the hearsay exception that allows evidence of an out-of-court statement of one conspirator to be admitted against his fellow conspirators applies only if the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and not during a subsequent period when the conspirators were engaged in nothing more than concealment of the criminal enterprise. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 ; Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 . The hearsay exception that Georgia applied in the present case, on the other hand, permits the introduction of evidence of such an out-of-court statement even though made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy. </s> But it does not follow that because the federal courts have declined to extend the hearsay exception to include out-of-court statements made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy, such an extension automatically violates the Confrontation Clause. Last Term in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , we said: </s> "Our task in this case is not to decide which of these positions, purely as a matter of the law of evidence, is the sounder. The issue before us is the considerably narrower one of whether a defendant's constitutional right `to be confronted with the witnesses against him' is necessarily inconsistent with a State's decision to change its hearsay rules . . . . While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established [400 U.S. 74, 82] such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied." Id., at 155-156 (citations and footnote omitted). </s> These observations have particular force in the present case. For this Court has never indicated that the limited contours of the hearsay exception in federal conspiracy trials are required by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. To the contrary, the limits of this hearsay exception have simply been defined by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making power in the area of the federal law of evidence. 13 It is clear that the limited scope of the hearsay exception in federal conspiracy trials is a product, not of the Sixth Amendment, but of the Court's "disfavor" of "attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404 . As Grunewald, Krulewitch, and other cases in this Court make clear, the evidentiary rule is intertwined, not only with the federal substantive law of conspiracy, but also with such related issues as the impact of the statute of limitations upon conspiracy prosecutions. [400 U.S. 74, 83] </s> In the case before us such policy questions are not present. Evans was not prosecuted for conspiracy in the Georgia court, but for the substantive offense of murder. 14 At his trial the State permitted the introduction of evidence under a long-established and well-recognized rule of state law. 15 We cannot say that the evidentiary rule applied by Georgia violates the Constitution merely because it does not exactly coincide with the hearsay exception applicable in the decidedly different context of a federal prosecution for the substantive offense of conspiracy. </s> II </s> It is argued, alternatively, that in any event Evans' conviction must be set aside under the impact of our recent decisions that have reversed state court convictions because of the denial of the constitutional right of confrontation. The cases upon which the appellee Evans primarily relies are Pointer v. Texas, supra; Douglas [400 U.S. 74, 84] v. Alabama, supra; Brookhart v. Janis, supra; Barber v. Page, supra; and Roberts v. Russell, supra. </s> In the Pointer case it appeared that a man named Phillips had been the victim of a robbery in Texas. At a preliminary hearing, Phillips "as chief witness for the State gave his version of the alleged robbery in detail, identifying petitioner as the man who had robbed him at gunpoint." 380 U.S., at 401 . Pointer had no lawyer at this hearing and did not try to cross-examine Phillips. At Pointer's subsequent trial the prosecution was permitted to introduce the transcript of Phillips' testimony given at the preliminary hearing. Thus, as this Court held, the State's "use of the transcript of that statement at the trial denied petitioner any opportunity to have the benefit of counsel's cross-examination of the principal witness against him." 380 U.S., at 403 . The Douglas case, decided the same day as Pointer, involved an even more flagrant violation of the defendant's right of confrontation. For at Douglas' trial the prosecutor himself was permitted to read an "entire document" purporting to be an accomplice's written confession after the accomplice had refused to testify in reliance upon his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. "The statements from the document as read by the Solicitor recited in considerable detail the circumstances leading to and surrounding the alleged crime; of crucial importance, they named the petitioner as the person who fired the shotgun blast which wounded the victim." 380 U.S., at 417 . In reversing Douglas' conviction, this Court pointed out that the accomplice's reliance upon the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination "created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true." 380 U.S., at 419 . Yet, since the prosecutor was "not a witness, the inference from his reading that [the accomplice] made the statement could not be [400 U.S. 74, 85] tested by cross-examination. Similarly, [the accomplice] could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him." Ibid. </s> Brookhart v. Janis and Barber v. Page are even further afield. In Brookhart it appeared that the petitioner had been "denied the right to cross-examine at all any witnesses who testified against him," and that, additionally, "there was introduced as evidence against him an alleged confession, made out of court by one of his co-defendants . . . who did not testify in court." 384 U.S., at 4 . The only issue in the case was one of waiver, since the State properly conceded that such a wholesale and complete "denial of cross-examination without waiver . . . would be constitutional error of the first magnitude . . . ." 384 U.S., at 3 . In Barber the "principal evidence" against the petitioner was a transcript of preliminary hearing testimony admitted by the trial judge under an exception to the hearsay rule that, by its terms, was applicable only if the witness was "unavailable." This hearsay exception "has been explained as arising from necessity . . . ." 390 U.S., at 722 , and we decided only that Oklahoma could not invoke that concept to use the preliminary hearing transcript in that case without showing "a good-faith effort" to obtain the witness' presence at the trial. Id., at 725. </s> In Roberts v. Russell we held that the doctrine of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , was applicable to the States and was to be given retroactive effect. But Bruton was a case far different from the one now before us. In that case there was a joint trial of the petitioner and a codefendant, coincidentally named Evans, upon a charge of armed postal robbery. A postal inspector testified that Evans had confessed to him that Evans and the petitioner had committed the robbery. This evidence was, concededly, wholly inadmissible against the petitioner. Evans did not testify. Although the trial judge [400 U.S. 74, 86] instructed the jury to disregard the evidence of Evans' confession in considering the question of the petitioner's guilt, we reversed the petitioner's conviction. The primary focus of the Court's opinion in Bruton was upon the issue of whether the jury in the circumstances presented could reasonably be expected to have followed the trial judge's instructions. The Court found that "[t]he risk of prejudice in petitioner's case was even more serious than in Douglas," because "the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial." 391 U.S., at 127 , 135-136. Accordingly, we held that "in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examination." 391 U.S., at 137 . There was not before us in Bruton "any recognized exception to the hearsay rule," and the Court was careful to emphasize that "we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause." 391 U.S., at 128 n. 3. </s> It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. 16 But this Court has never equated the two, 17 and we decline to do so now. We confine ourselves, instead, to deciding the case before us. [400 U.S. 74, 87] </s> This case does not involve evidence in any sense "crucial" or "devastating," as did all the cases just discussed. It does not involve the use, or misuse, of a confession made in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation, as did Douglas, Brookhart, Bruton, and Roberts. It does not involve any suggestion of prosecutorial misconduct or even negligence, as did Pointer, Douglas, and Barber. It does not involve the use by the prosecution of a paper transcript, as did Pointer, Brookhart, and Barber. It does not involve a joint trial, as did Bruton and Roberts. And it certainly does not involve the wholesale denial of cross-examination, as did Brookhart. </s> In the trial of this case no less than 20 witnesses appeared and testified for the prosecution. Evans' counsel was given full opportunity to cross-examine every one of them. The most important witness, by far, was the eyewitness who described all the details of the triple murder and who was cross-examined at great length. Of the 19 other witnesses, the testimony of but a single one is at issue here. That one witness testified to a brief conversation about Evans he had with a fellow prisoner in the Atlanta Penitentiary. The witness was vigorously and effectively cross-examined by defense counsel. 18 His testimony, which was of peripheral significance at most, was admitted in evidence under a co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule long established under state statutory law. The Georgia statute can [400 U.S. 74, 88] obviously have many applications consistent with the Confrontation Clause, and we conclude that its application in the circumstances of this case did not violate the Constitution. </s> Evans was not deprived of any right of confrontation on the issue of whether Williams actually made the statement related by Shaw. Neither a hearsay nor a confrontation question would arise had Shaw's testimony been used to prove merely that the statement had been made. The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying as to what he has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements. From the viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant not only as to what he has seen but also as to what he has heard. 19 </s> The confrontation issue arises because the jury was being invited to infer that Williams had implicitly identified Evans as the perpetrator of the murder when he blamed Evans for his predicament. But we conclude that there was no denial of the right of confrontation as to this question of identity. First, the statement contained no express assertion about past fact, and consequently it carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight. Second, Williams' personal knowledge of the identity and role of the other participants in the triple murder is abundantly established by Truett's testimony and by Williams' prior conviction. It is inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown that Williams was not in a position to know [400 U.S. 74, 89] whether or not Evans was involved in the murder. Third, the possibility that Williams' statement was founded on faulty recollection is remote in the extreme. Fourth, the circumstances under which Williams made the statement were such as to give reason to suppose that Williams did not misrepresent Evans' involvement in the crime. These circumstances go beyond a showing that Williams had no apparent reason to lie to Shaw. His statement was spontaneous, and it was against his penal interest to make it. These are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant. </s> The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 161 . Evans exercised, and exercised effectively, his right to confrontation on the factual question whether Shaw had actually heard Williams make the statement Shaw related. And the possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal. </s> Almost 40 years ago, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote an opinion for this Court refusing to set aside a state criminal conviction because of the claimed denial of the right of confrontation. The closing words of that opinion are worth repeating here: </s> "There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt - that discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment - if gossamer possibilities of prejudice [400 U.S. 74, 90] to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free." 291 U.S., at 122 . </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for consideration of the other issues presented in this habeas corpus proceeding. 20 </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The parties agree that this death sentence cannot be carried out. See n. 20, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S. E. 2d 240. </s> [Footnote 3 385 U.S. 953 . </s> [Footnote 4 The opinion of the District Court is unreported. </s> [Footnote 5 Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 827. </s> [Footnote 6 393 U.S. 1076 . Since, as will appear, the Court of Appeals held that a Georgia statute relied upon by the State at the trial was unconstitutional as applied, there can be no doubt of the right of appeal to this Court. 28 U.S.C. 1254 (2). </s> [Footnote 7 Three of these were rebuttal witnesses. There were four defense witnesses, and Evans himself made a lengthy unsworn statement. </s> [Footnote 8 Ga. Code Ann. 38-306 (1954). </s> [Footnote 9 Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 402, 150 S. E. 2d 240, 248. </s> [Footnote 10 400 F.2d, at 829. </s> [Footnote 11 400 F.2d, at 830, 831. </s> [Footnote 12 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S., at 407 . See also Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 . </s> [Footnote 13 </s> See 18 U.S.C. 3771. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 26 provides: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 . </s> [Footnote 14 We are advised that at the time of Evans' trial Georgia did not recognize conspiracy as a separate, substantive criminal offense. </s> [Footnote 15 The Georgia rule is hardly unique. See, e. g., Reed v. People, 156 Colo. 450, 402 P.2d 68; Dailey v. State, 233 Ala. 384,171 So. 729; State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280, 147 P. 828. See also 2 F. Wharton, Criminal Evidence 430 (12th ed. 1955): "The acts and declarations of a conspirator are admissible against a co-conspirator when they are made during the pendency of the wrongful act, and this includes not only the perpetration of the offense but also its subsequent concealment. . . . . . . . . "The theory for the admission of such evidence is that persons who conspire to commit a crime, and who do commit a crime, are as much concerned, after the crime, with their freedom from apprehension, as they were concerned, before the crime, with its commission: the conspiracy to commit the crime devolves after the commission thereof into a conspiracy to avoid arrest and implication." The existence of such a hearsay exception in the evidence law of many States was recognized in Krulewitch, supra. 336 U.S., at 444 . </s> [Footnote 16 It has been suggested that the constitutional provision is based on a common-law principle that had its origin in a reaction to abuses at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 104 (1951). </s> [Footnote 17 See Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale L. J. 1434: "Despite the superficial similarity between the evidentiary rule and the constitutional clause, the Court should not be eager to equate them. Present hearsay law does not merit a permanent niche in the Constitution; indeed, its ripeness for reform is a unifying theme of evidence literature. From Bentham to the authors of the Uniform [400 U.S. 74, 87] Rules of Evidence, authorities have agreed that present hearsay law keeps reliable evidence from the courtroom. If Pointer has read into the Constitution a hearsay rule of unknown proportions, reformers must grapple not only with centuries of inertia but with a constitutional prohibition as well." Id., at 1436. (Footnotes omitted.) </s> [Footnote 18 This cross-examination was such as to cast serious doubt on Shaw's credibility and, more particularly, on whether the conversation which Shaw related ever took place. </s> [Footnote 19 Of course Evans had the right to subpoena witnesses, including Williams, whose testimony might show that the statement had not been made. Counsel for Evans informed us at oral argument that he could have subpoenaed Williams but had concluded that this course would not be in the best interests of his client. </s> [Footnote 20 It was conceded at oral argument that the death penalty imposed in this case cannot be carried out, because the jury was qualified under standards violative of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 . The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has already set aside, under Witherspoon, the death sentence imposed upon Venson Williams, Evans' alleged accomplice. See Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 804-805. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring. </s> I join MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion. For me, however, there is an additional reason for the result. </s> The single sentence attributed in testimony by Shaw to Williams about Evans, and which has prolonged this litigation, was, in my view and in the light of the entire record, harmless error if it was error at all. Furthermore, the claimed circumstances of its utterance are so incredible that the testimony must have hurt, rather than helped, the prosecution's case. On this ground alone, I could be persuaded to reverse and remand. </s> Shaw testified that Williams made the remark at issue when Shaw "went to his room in the hospital" and asked Williams how he made out at a court hearing on the preceding day. On cross-examination, Shaw stated that he was then in custody at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta; that he worked as a clerk in the prison hospital; that Williams was lying on the bed in his [400 U.S. 74, 91] room and facing the wall; that he, Shaw, was in the hall and not in the room when he spoke with Williams; that the door to the room "was closed"; that he spoke through an opening about 10 inches square; that the opening "has a piece of plate glass, window glass, just ordinary window glass, and a piece of steel mesh"; that this does not impede talking through the door; and that one talks in a normal voice when he talks through that door. Shaw conceded that when he had testified at Williams' earlier trial, he made no reference to the glass in the opening in the door. </s> Carmen David Mabry, called by the State, testified that he was with the United States Public Health Service and stationed at the Atlanta Penitentiary. He described the opening in the door to Williams' room and said that it contained a glass "and over that is a wire mesh, heavy steel mesh"; that he has "never tried to talk through the door"; that, to his knowledge, he has never heard "other people talking through the door"; that, during his 11 years at the hospital, the glass has not been out of the door; and that the hospital records disclosed that it had not been out. </s> I am at a loss to understand how any normal jury, as we must assume this one to have been, could be led to believe, let alone be influenced by, this astonishing account by Shaw of his conversation with Williams in a normal voice through a closed hospital room door. I note, also, the Fifth Circuit's description of Shaw's testimony as "somewhat incredible" and as possessing "basic incredibility." 400 F.2d, at 828 n. 4. </s> In saying all this, I am fully aware that the Fifth Circuit panel went on to observe, in the footnote just cited, "[W]e are convinced that it cannot be called harmless." And Justice Quillian, in sole dissent on the direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, stated, "[I]t obviously was prejudicial to the defendant." 222 Ga. [400 U.S. 74, 92] 392, 408; 150 S. E. 2d 240, 251. However, neither the Georgia Superior Court judge who tried the case nor the Federal District Judge who held the hearing on Evans' petition for federal habeas concluded that prejudicial error was present. Also, we do not know the attitude of the Georgia Supreme Court majority, for they decided the issue strictly upon the pronounced limits of the long-established Georgia hearsay rule, 222 Ga., at 402; 150 S. E. 2d, at 248, and presumably had no occasion to touch upon any alternative ground such as harmlessness. I usually would refrain from passing upon an issue of this kind adversely to a federal court of appeals, but when the trial judges do not rule, I would suppose that we are as free to draw upon the cold record as is the appellate court. </s> I add an observation about corroboration. Marion Calvin Perry, another federal prisoner and one who admitted numerous past convictions, including "larceny of automobiles," testified without objection that he had known Williams and Evans for about 10 years, and Truett for about two years; that he spoke with Williams and Evans some 25 or 30 days prior to the murders of the three police officers; that Williams owed him money; that he and Williams talked by telephone "[a]bout me stealing some cars for him"; that Williams told him that "Alex [Evans] would know what kind of car he [Williams] would want"; that a few days later "me and Alex talked about cars and I told him I didn't want to mess with Venson [Williams]"; that Evans said, "if I got any, he said I could get them for him"; that seven or eight days before the murders Williams asked him by telephone whether he, Perry, "still had the Oldsmobile switch"; that the week of the murders he argued with Evans about how much he should receive for each stolen car; that six days after the murders he saw Evans at a filling station; that they talked about the murders; that "I said if I wanted to know who did it, I would see [400 U.S. 74, 93] mine and your friend"; and that Evans "got mad as hell" and "told me if I thought I knowed anything about it to keep my damn mouth shut." </s> Another witness, Lawrence H. Hartman, testified that his 1963 red Oldsmobile hardtop was stolen from his home in Atlanta the night of April 16, 1964 (the murders took place on the early morning of April 17). He went on to testify that the 1963 Oldsmobile found burning near the scene of the tragedy was his automobile. There is testimony in the record as to the earlier acquisition by Evans and Williams of another wrecked Oldsmobile of like model and color; as to the towing of that damaged car by a wrecker manned by Williams and Evans; and as to the replacement of good tires on a Chevrolet occupied by Williams, Evans, and Truett, with recapped tires then purchased by them. </s> This record testimony, it seems to me, bears directly and positively on the Williams-Evans-Truett car-stealing conspiracy and accomplishments and provides indisputable confirmation of Evans' role. The requirements of the Georgia corroboration rule were fully satisfied and Shaw's incredible remark fades into practical and legal insignificance. </s> The error here, if one exists, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 -25; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 . </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in the result. </s> Not surprisingly the difficult constitutional issue presented by this case has produced multiple opinions. MR. JUSTICE STEWART finds Shaw's testimony admissible because it is "wholly unreal" to suggest that cross-examination would have weakened the effect of Williams' statement on the jury's mind. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, while concurring in this view, finds admission of the statement to be harmless, seemingly because he deems Shaw's testimony so obviously fabricated that no normal jury [400 U.S. 74, 94] would have given it credence. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL answers both suggestions to my satisfaction, but he then adopts a position that I cannot accept. He apparently would prevent the prosecution from introducing any out-of-court statement of an accomplice unless there is an opportunity for cross-examination, and this regardless of the circumstances in which the statement was made and regardless of whether it is even hearsay. </s> The difficulty of this case arises from the assumption that the core purpose of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is to prevent overly broad exceptions to the hearsay rule. I believe this assumption to be wrong. Contrary to things as they appeared to me last Term when I wrote in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970). I have since become convinced that Wigmore states the correct view when he says: </s> "The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying declarations, or the like) shall be given infra-judicially, - this depends on the law of Evidence for the time being, - but only what mode of procedure shall be followed - i. e. a cross-examining procedure - in the case of such testimony as is required by the ordinary law of Evidence to be given infra-judicially." 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted). </s> The conversion of a clause intended to regulate trial procedure into a threat to much of the existing law of evidence and to future developments in that field is not an unnatural shift, for the paradigmatic evil the Confrontation Clause was aimed at - trial by affidavit 1 - can be [400 U.S. 74, 95] viewed almost equally well as a gross violation of the rule against hearsay and as the giving of evidence by the affiant out of the presence of the accused and not subject to cross-examination by him. But however natural the shift may be, once made it carries the seeds of great mischief for enlightened development in the law of evidence. </s> If one were to translate the Confrontation Clause into language in more common use today, it would read: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." Nothing in this language or in its 18th century equivalent would connote a purpose to control the scope of the rules of evidence. The language is particularly ill-chosen if what was intended was a prohibition on the use of any hearsay - the position toward which my Brother MARSHALL is being driven, although he does not quite yet embrace it. </s> Nor am I now content with the position I took in concurrence in California v. Green, supra, that the Confrontation Clause was designed to establish a preferential rule, requiring the prosecutor to avoid the use of hearsay where it is reasonably possible for him to do so - in other words, to produce available witnesses. Further consideration in the light of facts squarely presenting the issue, as Green did not, has led me to conclude that this is not a happy intent to be attributed to the Framers absent compelling linguistic or historical evidence pointing in that direction. It is common ground that the historical understanding of the clause furnishes no solid guide to adjudication. 2 </s> A rule requiring production of available witnesses would significantly curtail development of the law of [400 U.S. 74, 96] evidence to eliminate the necessity for production of declarants where production would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility to a defendant. Examples which come to mind are the Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. 1732-1733, and the exceptions to the hearsay rule for official statements, learned treatises, and trade reports. See, e. g., Uniform Rules of Evidence 63 (15), 63 (30), 63 (31); Gilstrap v. United States, 389 F.2d 6 (CA5 1968) (business records); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (CA4 1958) (laboratory analysis). If the hearsay exception involved in a given case is such as to commend itself to reasonable men, production of the declarant is likely to be difficult, unavailing, or pointless. In unusual cases, of which the case at hand may be an example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees federal defendants the right of compulsory process to obtain the presence of witnesses, and in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends the same protection to state defendants. 3 </s> Regardless of the interpretation one puts on the words of the Confrontation Clause, the clause is simply not well designed for taking into account the numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence. The failure of MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion to explain the standard by which it tests Shaw's statement, or how this standard can be squared with the seemingly absolute command of the clause, bears witness to the fact that the clause is being set a task for which it is not suited. The task is far more appropriately performed under the aegis of the Fifth and [400 U.S. 74, 97] Fourteenth Amendments' commands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due process of law. It is by this standard that I would test federal and state rules of evidence. 4 </s> It must be recognized that not everything which has been said in this Court's cases is consistent with this position. However, this approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the results that have been reached. Of the major "confrontation" decisions of this Court, seven involved the use of prior-recorded testimony. 5 In the absence of countervailing circumstances, introduction of such evidence would be an affront to the core meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The question in each case, therefore, was whether there had been adequate "confrontation" to satisfy the requirement of the clause. Regardless of the correctness of the results, the holding that the clause was applicable in those situations is consistent with the view of the clause I have taken. </s> Passing on to the other principal cases, Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911), held that the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the introduction of "[d]ocumentary evidence to establish collateral facts, [400 U.S. 74, 98] admissible under the common law." While this was characterized as an exception to the clause, rather than a problem to which the clause did not speak, the result would seem correct. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), and Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), involved restrictions on the right to cross-examination or the wholesale denial of that right. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), is perhaps most easily dealt with by viewing it as a case of prosecutorial misconduct. Alternatively, I would be prepared to hold as a matter of due process that a confession of an accomplice resulting from formal police interrogation cannot be introduced as evidence of the guilt of an accused, absent some circumstance indicating authorization or adoption. The exclusion of such evidence dates at least from Tong's Case, Kelyng 17, 18-19, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (K. B. 1663), and is universally accepted. This theory would be adequate to account for the results of both Douglas and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). </s> The remaining confrontation case of significance is Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). In that case a record of conviction of three men for theft was introduced at Kirby's trial. The judge instructed the jury that this judgment was prima facie evidence that the goods which Kirby was accused of receiving from the three men were in fact stolen. This Court reversed, holding that since the judgment was the sole evidence of the fact of theft, Kirby had been denied his right of confrontation. In my view this is not a confrontation case at all, but a matter of the substantive law of judgments. Accord, 4 Wigmore, supra, 1079, at 133. Indeed, the Kirby Court indicated that lack of confrontation was not at the heart of its objection when it said [400 U.S. 74, 99] that the record would have been competent evidence of the fact of conviction. The correctness of the result in Kirby can hardly be doubted, but it was, I think, based on the wrong legal theory. </s> Judging the Georgia statute here challenged by the standards of due process, I conclude that it must be sustained. Accomplishment of the main object of a conspiracy will seldom terminate the community of interest of the conspirators. Declarations against that interest evince some likelihood of trustworthiness. The jury, with the guidance of defense counsel, should be alert to the obvious dangers of crediting such testimony. As a practical matter, unless the out-of-court declaration can be proved by hearsay evidence, the facts it reveals are likely to remain hidden from the jury by the declarant's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 6 In light of such considerations, a person weighing the necessity for hearsay evidence of the type here involved against the danger that a jury will give it undue credit might reasonably conclude that admission of the evidence would increase the likelihood of just determinations of truth. Appellee has not suggested that Shaw's testimony possessed any peculiar characteristic that would lessen the force of these general considerations and require, as a constitutional matter, that the trial judge exercise residual discretion to exclude the evidence as unduly inflammatory. [400 U.S. 74, 100] Exclusion of such statements, as is done in the federal courts, commends itself to me, but I cannot say that it is essential to a fair trial. The Due Process Clause requires no more. </s> On the premises discussed in this opinion, I concur in the reversal of the judgment below. </s> [Footnote 1 See California v. Green, supra, at 179 (concurring opinion): historically, "the Confrontation Clause was meant to constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, trial by anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses." </s> [Footnote 2 See id., at 175-179, especially 176 n. 8 (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 3 Although the fact is not necessary to my conclusion, I note that counsel for Evans conceded at oral argument that he could have secured Williams' presence to testify, but decided against it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 51, 55. </s> [Footnote 4 Reliance on the Due Process Clauses would also have the virtue of subjecting rules of evidence to constitutional scrutiny in civil and criminal trials alike. It is exceedingly rare for the common law to make admissibility of evidence turn on whether the proceeding is civil or criminal in nature. See 1 Wigmore, supra, 4, at 16-17. This feature of our jurisprudence is a further indication that the Confrontation Clause, which applies only to criminal prosecutions, was never intended as a constitutional standard for testing rules of evidence. </s> [Footnote 5 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Motes v. United States 178 U.S. 458 (1900); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). </s> [Footnote 6 Quite apart from Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Georgia has long recognized the privilege. The Georgia Constitution of 1877, Art. I, 1, § VI, provided that: "No person shall be compelled to give testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself," and the same language appears in the present state constitution. Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. I, 1, § VI. The right had previously been recognized as a matter of common law, even in civil trials. See, e. g., Marshall v. Riley, 7 Ga. 367 (1849). </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting. </s> Appellee Evans was convicted of first-degree murder after a trial in which a witness named Shaw was allowed to testify, over counsel's strenuous objection, about a statement he claimed was made to him by Williams, an alleged accomplice who had already been convicted in a separate trial. 1 According to Shaw, the statement, which implicated both Williams and Evans in the crime, was made in a prison conversation immediately after Williams' arraignment. Williams did not testify nor was he called as a witness. Nevertheless, the Court today concludes that admission of the extrajudicial statement attributed to an alleged partner in crime did not deny Evans the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. In so doing, the majority reaches a result completely inconsistent with recent opinions of this Court, especially Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In my view, those cases fully apply here and establish a clear violation of Evans' constitutional rights. [400 U.S. 74, 101] </s> In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), this Court first held that "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is . . . a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 403. That decision held constitutionally inadmissible a statement offered against a defendant at a state trial where the statement was originally made at a preliminary hearing under circumstances not affording the defendant an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Indeed, we have since held that even cross-examination at a prior hearing does not satisfy the confrontation requirement, at least where the witness who made the statement is available to be called at trial. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness." Id., at 725. </s> In Douglas v. Alabama, supra, this Court applied the principles of Pointer to a case strikingly similar to this one. There, as here, the State charged two defendants with a crime and tried them in separate trials. There, as here, the State first prosecuted one defendant (Loyd) and then used a statement by him in the trial of the second defendant (Douglas). Although the State called Loyd as a witness, an appeal from his conviction was pending and he refused to testify on the ground that doing so would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. </s> Without reaching the question whether the privilege was properly invoked, 2 the Court held that the prosecutor's [400 U.S. 74, 102] reading of Loyd's statement in a purported attempt to refresh his memory denied Douglas' right to confrontation. "Loyd could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him." 380 U.S., at 419 . Of course, Douglas was provided the opportunity to cross-examine the officers who testified regarding Loyd's statement. "But since their evidence tended to show only that Loyd made the confession, cross-examination of them . . . could not substitute for cross-examination of Loyd to test the truth of the statement itself." 3 Id., at 420. Surely, the same reasoning compels the exclusion of Shaw's testimony here. Indeed, the only significant difference between Douglas and this case, insofar as the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine is concerned, is that here the State did not even attempt to call Williams to testify in Evans' trial. He was plainly available to the State, and for all we know he would have willingly testified, at least with regard to his alleged conversation with Shaw. 4 </s> Finally, we have applied the reasoning of Douglas to hold that, "despite instructions to the jury to disregard [400 U.S. 74, 103] the implicating statements in determining the codefendant's guilt or innocence, admission at a joint trial of a defendant's extrajudicial confession implicating a codefendant violated the codefendant's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment." Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), giving retroactive effect in both state and federal trials to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Thus Williams' alleged statement, an extrajudicial admission made to a fellow prisoner, could not even have been introduced against Williams if he had been tried in a joint trial with Evans. </s> The teaching of this line of cases seems clear: Absent the opportunity for cross-examination, testimony about the incriminating and implicating statement allegedly made by Williams was constitutionally inadmissible in the trial of Evans. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion for reversal characterizes as "wholly unreal" the possibility that cross-examination of Williams himself would change the picture presented by Shaw's account. A trial lawyer might well doubt, as an article of the skeptical faith of that profession, such a categorical prophecy about the likely results of careful cross-examination. Indeed, the facts of this case clearly demonstrate the necessity for fuller factual development which the corrective test of cross-examination makes possible. The plurality for reversal pigeonholes the out-of-court statement that was admitted in evidence as a "spontaneous" utterance, hence to be believed. As the Court of Appeals concluded, however, there is great doubt that Williams even made the statement attributed to him. 5 Moreover, [400 U.S. 74, 104] there remains the further question what, if anything, Williams might have meant by the remark that Shaw recounted. MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion concedes that the remark is ambiguous. Plainly it stands as an accusation of some sort: "If it hadn't been for . . . Evans," said Williams, according to Shaw, "we wouldn't be in this now." At his trial Evans himself gave unsworn testimony to the effect that the murder prosecution might have arisen from enmities that Evans' own law enforcement activities had stirred up in the locality. Did Williams' accusation relate to Evans as a man with powerful and unscrupulous enemies, or Evans as a murderer? MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion opts for the latter interpretation, for it concludes that Williams' remark was "against his penal interest" and hence to be believed. But at this great distance from events, no one can be certain. The point is that absent cross-examination of Williams himself, the jury was left with only the unelucidated, apparently damning, and patently damaging accusation as told by Shaw. </s> Thus we have a case with all the unanswered questions that the confrontation of witnesses through cross-examination is meant to aid in answering: What did the declarant say, and what did he mean, and was it the truth? If Williams had testified and been cross-examined, Evans' counsel could have fully explored these and other matters. The jury then could have evaluated the statement in the light of Williams' testimony and demeanor. As it was, however, the State was able to use Shaw to present the damaging evidence and thus to avoid confronting Evans with the person who allegedly gave witness against him. I had thought that this was precisely what the Confrontation Clause as applied to the States in Pointer and our other cases prevented. </s> Although MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion for reversal concludes that there was no violation of Evans' right of [400 U.S. 74, 105] confrontation, it does so in the complete absence of authority or reasoning to explain that result. For example, such facts as that Williams' alleged statement was not made during official interrogation, was not in transcript form, and was not introduced in a joint trial - though they differentiate some of the cases - are surely irrelevant. Other cases have presented each of these factors, 6 and no reason is offered why the right of confrontation could be so limited. </s> Nor can it be enough that the statement was admitted in evidence "under a long-established and well-recognized rule of state law." MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion surely does not mean that a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation must give way to a state evidentiary rule. That much is established by our decision in Barber v. Page, supra which held unconstitutional the admission of testimony in accordance with a rule similarly well recognized and long established. However, the plurality for reversal neither succeeds in distinguishing that case nor considers generally that there are inevitably conflicts between Pointer and state evidentiary rules. Rather, it attempts to buttress its conclusion merely by announcing a reluctance to equate evidentiary hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. 7 </s> [400 U.S. 74, 106] </s> The Court of Appeals, however, was not of the view that the Confrontation Clause implies unrelenting hostility to whatever evidence may be classified as hearsay. Nor did that court hold that States must conform their evidentiary rules to the hearsay exceptions applicable in federal conspiracy trials. While it did note that this case does not in reality even involve the traditional hearsay rule and its so-called coconspirators exception, 8 that was not the basis for its decision. Rather, the Court of Appeals found in the admission of an incriminatory and inculpating statement attributed to an alleged accomplice who was not made available for cross-examination what it termed an obvious abridgment of Evans' right of confrontation. Since the State presented no satisfactory justification for the denial of confrontation, cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S., at 407 , the Court of Appeals [400 U.S. 74, 107] held that under Douglas v. Alabama and this Court's other cases Evans was denied his constitutional rights. </s> Surely the Constitution requires at least that much when the State denies a defendant the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him in a criminal trial. In any case, that Shaw's testimony was admitted in accordance with an established rule of state law cannot aid my Brethren in reaching their conclusion. Carried to its logical end, justification of a denial of the right of confrontation on that basis would provide for the wholesale avoidance of this Court's decisions in Douglas and Burton, 9 decisions which MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion itself reaffirms. Indeed, if that opinion meant what it says, it would come very close to establishing in reverse the very equation it seeks to avoid - an equation that would give any exception to a state hearsay rule a "permanent niche in the Constitution" in the form of an exception to the Confrontation Clause as well. </s> Finally, the plurality for reversal apparently distinguishes the present case on the ground that it "does not involve evidence in any sense `crucial' or `devastating.'" [400 U.S. 74, 108] Despite the characterization of Shaw's testimony as "of peripheral significance at most," however, the possibility of its prejudice to Evans was very real. The outcome of Evans' trial rested, in essence, on whether the jury would believe the testimony of Truett with regard to Evans' role in the murder. Truett spoke as an admitted accomplice who had been immunized from prosecution. Relying on Georgia law, not federal constitutional law, the trial judge instructed the jury that "you cannot lawfully convict upon the testimony of an accomplice alone. . . . [T]he testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated . . . . [T]he corroboration . . . must be such as to connect the defendant with the criminal act." The State presented the testimony of a number of other witnesses, in addition to that of the alleged accomplice that tended to corroborate Evans' guilt. But Shaw's account of what Williams supposedly said to him was undoubtedly a part of that corroborating evidence. 10 </s> [400 U.S. 74, 109] </s> Indeed, MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion does not itself upset the Court of Appeals' finding that the admission of Shaw's testimony, if erroneous, could not be considered harmless. Beyond and apart from the question of harmless error, MR. JUSTICE STEWART undertakes an inquiry, the purpose of which I do not understand, into whether the evidence admitted is "crucial" or "devastating." The view is, apparently, that to require the exclusion of evidence falling short of that high standard of prejudice would bring a moment of clamor against the Bill of Rights. I would eschew such worries and confine the inquiry to the traditional questions: Was the defendant afforded the right to confront the witnesses against him? And, if not, was the denial of his constitutional right harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? </s> The fact is that Evans may well have been convicted in part by an incriminatory and implicating statement attributed to an alleged accomplice who did not testify and who consequently could not be questioned regarding the truth or meaning of that statement. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the Confrontation Clause prohibits such a result, whether the statement is introduced under the guise of refreshing a witness' recollection as in Douglas v. Alabama, against a codefendant with a limiting instruction as in Bruton v. United States, or in accordance with some other evidentiary rule as here. </s> I am troubled by the fact that the plurality for reversal, unable when all is said to place this case beyond the principled reach of our prior decisions, shifts its ground and begins a hunt for whatever "indicia of reliability" may cling to Williams' remark, as told by Shaw. Whether Williams made a "spontaneous" statement "against his penal interest" is the very question that should have been tested by cross-examination of Williams [400 U.S. 74, 110] himself. If "indicia of reliability" are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent vitality at all in protecting a criminal defendant against the use of extrajudicial statements not subject to cross-examination and not exposed to a jury assessment of the declarant's demeanor at trial. 11 I believe the Confrontation Clause has been sunk if any out-of-court statement bearing an indicium of a probative likelihood can come in, no matter how damaging the statement may be or how great the need for the truth-discovering test of cross-examination. Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 -162 (1970). Our decisions from Pointer and Douglas to Bruton and Roberts require more than this meager inquiry. Nor is the lame "indicia" approach necessary to avoid a rampaging Confrontation Clause that tramples all flexibility and innovation in a state's law of evidence. That specter is only a specter. 12 To decide this case I need not go beyond hitherto settled Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment law to consider generally what effect, if any, the Confrontation Clause has on the common-law hearsay rule and its exceptions, since no issue of such global dimension is presented. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S., at 128 n. 3. The incriminatory extrajudicial statement of an alleged accomplice is so inherently prejudicial that it cannot be introduced unless there is an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, whether or not his statement [400 U.S. 74, 111] falls within a genuine exception to the hearsay rule. </s> In my view, Evans is entitled to a trial in which he is fully accorded his constitutional guarantee of the right to confront and cross-examine all the witnesses against him. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and let this case go back to the Georgia courts to be tried without the use of this out-of-court statement attributed by Shaw to Williams. </s> [Footnote 1 Shaw had been a witness at Williams' trial; his testimony was fully anticipated and was objected to both before and after its admission. </s> [Footnote 2 This same question - which presents a fundamental conflict between a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and a witness' Fifth Amendment privilege - might have been present here had the State [400 U.S. 74, 102] called Williams to testify. Under a view that would make availability of a declarant the only concern of confrontation, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 -189 (1970) (HARLAN, J., concurring), the State's right or duty to compel a codefendant's testimony, by timing of trials and use of testimonial immunity, would seemingly have to be decided. See Comment, Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the Accused, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 151, 165 (1965). </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). </s> [Footnote 4 My Brother STEWART comments that Evans might have brought Williams to the courthouse by subpoena. Defense counsel did not do so, believing that Williams would stand on his right not to incriminate himself. Tr. of Oral Arg. 55. Be that as it may, it remains that the duty to confront a criminal defendant with the witnesses against him falls upon the State, and here the State was allowed to introduce damaging evidence without running the risks of trial confrontation. Cf. n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 After considering Shaw's testimony and other evidence submitted at the trial, the Court of Appeals concluded that Shaw's account of his conversation with Williams was notable for "its basic incredibility." 400 F.2d 826, 828 n. 4. </s> [Footnote 6 For example, Pointer involved only the second, and that one was not present in either Bruton or Roberts. </s> [Footnote 7 Constitutionalization of "all common-law hearsay rules and their exceptions," California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 174 (concurring opinion), would seem to be a prospect more frightening than real. Much of the complexity afflicting hearsay rules comes from the definition of hearsay as an out-of-court statement presented for the truth of the matter stated - a definition nowhere adopted by this Court for confrontation purposes. Rather, the decisions, while looking to availability of a declarant, Barber v. Page, supra recognize that "cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him," Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S., at 404 , and that admission in the absence of [400 U.S. 74, 106] cross-examination of certain types of suspect and highly damaging statements is one of the "threats to a fair trial" against which "the Confrontation Clause was directed," Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S., at 136 . </s> [Footnote 8 Evans was not charged with conspiracy nor could he have been under Georgia law. The "conspiracy" element came in as part of the State's evidentiary law, part of which goes far beyond the traditional hearsay exception even as it exists with regard to the "concealment phase" in some jurisdictions. Indeed, Williams' alleged statement itself negates the notion that Evans had authorized Williams to speak or had assumed the risk in order to achieve an unlawful aim through concert of effort. It is difficult to conceive how Williams could be part of a conspiracy to conceal the crime when all the alleged participants were in custody and he himself had already been arraigned. As this Court stated in Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946), an "admission by one co-conspirator after he has been apprehended is not in any sense a furtherance of the criminal enterprise. It is rather a frustration of it." One lower court in Georgia has adopted essentially this reasoning in reversing a conviction where testimony similar to that objected to in this case was admitted. See Green v. State, 115 Ga. App. 685, 155 S. E. 2d 655 (1967). But see n. 9, infra. </s> [Footnote 9 The Georgia rule involved here, which apparently makes admissible all pre-trial statements and admissions of an alleged accomplice or coconspirator, inevitably conflicts with this Court's decisions regarding the Confrontation Clause. See Darden v. State, 172 Ga. 590, 158 S. E. 414 (1931), and Mitchell v. State, 86 Ga. App. 292, 71 S. E. 2d 756 (1952), where confessions of codefendants not on trial were held admissible. Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court seems to have resolved this conflict in favor of the state rule by erroneously concluding that this Court's decisions are based on the federal hearsay rule concerning "a confession by one of the co-conspirators after he has been apprehended." Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36, 37, 165 S. E. 2d 708, 709-710 (1969). See also Park v. State, 225 Ga. 618,170 S. E. 2d 687 (1969), petition for cert. filed, November 4, 1969, No. 57, O. T. 1970 (renumbered). </s> [Footnote 10 The trial judge's instructions left no doubt that the statement attributed to Williams could provide the necessary corroboration. See Trial Record 412-413. Indeed, the prejudicial impact of Shaw's testimony is graphically revealed simply by juxtaposing two quotations. First, there is characterization in MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion of Shaw's testimony, a characterization that I find fair albeit studiedly mild: "[T]he jury was being invited to infer that Williams had implicitly identified Evans as the perpetrator of the murder. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Second, there is the trial judge's charge on corroboration of accomplice testimony: "Slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participator in the criminal act will be sufficient corroboration of an accomplice to support a verdict." (Emphasis added.) In the light of the charge and on consideration of the whole record of Evans' trial, it is impossible for me to believe "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 (1969). </s> [Footnote 11 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN answers this question with directness by adopting, to decide this case, his view of due process which apparently makes no distinction between civil and criminal trials, and which would prohibit only irrational or unreasonable evidentiary rulings. Needless to say, I cannot accept the view that Evans' constitutional rights should be measured by a standard concededly having nothing to do with the Confrontation Clause. </s> [Footnote 12 See n. 7, supra. </s> [400 U.S. 74, 112]

United States Supreme Court LYON v. SINGER(1950) No. 512 Argued: Decided: June 5, 1950 </s> 1. In these suits to collect from a statutory bank liquidator claims allegedly entitled to preference under New York Banking Law 606, arising from transactions with a Japanese corporation blocked under Executive Orders Nos. 8389 and 8832, this Court accepts the determination of the New York Court of Appeals that, under New York law, these claims arose from transactions in New York and were entitled to preference. Pp. 842-843. </s> 2. Since the New York court conditioned enforcement of the claims upon licensing by the Alien Property Custodian, federal control over alien property remains undiminished. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 , distinguished. P. 842. </s> 3. This Court agrees that, at the time the New York judgments were entered, no licenses had been issued to these claimants; and it affirms the judgments below. P. 843. </s> 299 N. Y. 113, 139, 85 N. E. 2d 894, 906, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 527, Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. et al.; No. 513, Lyon, Superintendent of Banks, v. Banque Mellie Iran; and No. 528, Banque Mellie Iran v. Lyon, Superintendent of Banks, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Edward Feldman argued the cause for Lyon, Superintendent of Banks. With him on the briefs was Daniel Gersen. </s> Albert R. Connelly argued the cause for Singer. With him on the brief was George S. Collins. </s> Allen T. Klots argued the cause for Banque Mellie Iran. With him on the brief were Peter H. Kaminer and Merrill E. Clark, Jr. </s> By special leave of Court, James L. Morrisson argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner in Nos. 512 and 513, urging reversal or [339 U.S. 841, 842] modification of the judgment in No. 512, and affirmance in No. 527. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Perlman and Harold I. Baynton. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Certiorari was granted in these cases to review federal issues respecting the administration of frozen alien property. 339 U.S. 902 . </s> The cases arose from suits brought by claimants Singer and Banque Mellie Iran to collect from a statutory bank liquidator claims allegedly entitled to a preference under New York Banking Law 606, arising from transactions with a Japanese corporation, blocked under Executive Orders Nos. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400; 8832, 6 Fed. Reg. 3715. The New York Court of Appeals held that the transactions gave rise to a preferred claim in the liquidation but that payment by the liquidator must await specific licensing by the Alien Property Custodian of the transactions underlying the claims. Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E. 2d 726, 299 N. Y. 113, 85 N. E. 2d 894; Banque Mellie Iran v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 299 N. Y. 139, 85 N. E. 2d 906. </s> Those opposed to the judgments urge that, as a matter of federal law, the freezing order prevented the creation of any claim recognizable under 606 of the New York Banking Law. </s> Oral argument and study of the record have convinced us that the judgments of the New York Court of Appeals are not inconsistent with the First War Powers Act of 1941, 301, 55 Stat. 839, or the above Executive Orders. We accept the New York court's determination that under New York law these claims arose from transactions in New York and were entitled to a preference. Since the New York court conditioned enforcement of the claims upon licensing by the Alien Property Custodian, federal control over alien property remains undiminished. Our [339 U.S. 841, 843] decision in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 , does not require a contrary conclusion. There the liquidator claimed title to frozen assets adversely to the Custodian, and sought to deny the Custodian's paramount power to vest the alien property in the United States. No such result follows from the New York court's judgments in the present cases. </s> Since we further agree that, at the time the New York judgments were entered, no licenses had been issued to these claimants, we affirm the judgments below. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER is of the opinion that since the federal question in Nos. 513 and 528 has been eliminated by the license granted by the Director, Office of Alien Property, no jurisdiction to review remains in this Court. Therefore, the writs of certiorari in these two cases should be dismissed. </s> [339 U.S. 841, 844]

United States Supreme Court GEORGIA v. McCOLLUM(1992) No. 91-372 Argued: February 26, 1992Decided: June 18, 1992 </s> Respondents, who are white, were charged with assaulting two African-Americans. Before jury selection began, the trial judge denied the prosecution's motion to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, distinguishing Edmonson v. Leesvlle Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 - in which this Court held that private litigant cannot exercise peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner - on the ground that it involved civil litigants, rather than criminal defendants. </s> Held: </s> The Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Pp. 3-16. </s> (a) The exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges offends the Equal Protection Clause when the offending challenges are made by the State, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 ; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 , and, in civil cases when they are made by private litigants, Edmonson, supra. Whether the prohibition should be extended to discriminatory challenges made by a criminal defendant turns upon the following four-factor analysis. Pp. 3-5. </s> (b) A criminal defendant's racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges inflicts the harms addressed by Batson. Regardless of whether it is the State or the defense who invokes them, discriminatory challenges harm the individual juror by subjecting him to open and public racial discrimination, and harm the community by undermining public confidence in this country's system of justice. Pp. 5-7. </s> (c) A criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause under the analytical framework summarized in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 . Respondents' argument that the adversarial relationship between the defendant and the prosecution negates a peremptory challenge's governmental character is rejected. Unlike other actions taken in support of a defendant's defense, the exercise of a peremptory challenge determines the composition of a governmental body. The fact that a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge to further his interest in acquittal does not conflict with a finding of state action, since [505 U.S. 42, 43] whenever a private actor's conduct is deemed fairly attributable to the government, it is likely that private motives will have animated the actor's decision. Pp. 7-12. </s> (d) The State has third-party standing to challenge a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, since it suffers a concrete injury when the fairness and the integrity of its own judicial process is undermined; since, as the representative of all its citizens, it has a close relation to potential jurors; and since the barriers to suit by an excluded juror are daunting. See Powers, 499 U.S., at 411 , 413, 414. Pp. 12-14. </s> (e) A prohibition against the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges does not violate a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. It is an affront to justice to argue that the right to a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race. Nor does the prohibition violate the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, since counsel can normally explain the reasons for peremptory challenges without revealing strategy or confidential communication, and since neither the Sixth Amendment nor the attorney-client privilege gives a defendant the right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of conduct. In addition, the prohibition does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a jury that is impartial with respect to both parties. Removing a juror whom the defendant believes harbors racial prejudice is different from exercising a peremptory challenge to discriminate invidiously against jurors on account of race. Pp. 14-16. </s> 261 Ga. 473, 405 S.E.2d 688, reversed and remanded. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 59. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 60. O'CONNOR, J., post, p. 62 and SCALIA, J., post, p. 69, filed dissenting opinions. </s> Harrison W. Kohler, Senior Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, and Charles M. Richards, Senior Assistant Attorney General. </s> Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson. [505 U.S. 42, 44] </s> Robert H. Revell, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Jesse W. Walters. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs on amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Julius L. Chambers, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Eric Schnapper. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Judy Clarke and Mario G. Conte; and for Charles J. Hynes, pro se, by Jay M. Cohen, Matthew S. Greenberg, Victor Barall, and Carol Teague Schwartzkopf. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> For more than a century, this Court consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Last Term, this Court held that racial discrimination in a civil litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges also violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). Today, we are asked to decide whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. </s> I </s> On August 10, 1990, a grand jury sitting in Dougherty County, Ga., returned a six-count indictment charging respondents with aggravated assault and simple battery. See App. 2. The indictment alleged that respondents beat and assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins. Respondents are white; the alleged victims are African-Americans. Shortly after the events, a leaflet was widely distributed in the local African-American community reporting the assault and urging community residents not to patronize respondents' business. </s> Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved to prohibit respondents from exercising peremptory challenges in [505 U.S. 42, 45] a racially discriminatory manner. The State explained that it expected to show that the victims' race was a factor in the alleged assault. According to the State, counsel for respondents had indicated a clear intention to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, arguing that the circumstances of their case gave them the right to exclude African-American citizens from participating as jurors in the trial. Observing that 43 percent of the county's population is African-American, the State contended that, if a statistically representative panel is assembled for jury selection, 18 of the potential 42 jurors would be African-American. 1 With 20 peremptory challenges, respondents therefore would be able to remove all the African-American potential jurors. 2 Relying on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Sixth Amendment, and the Georgia Constitution, the State sought an order providing that, if it succeeded in making out a prima facie case of racial discrimination by respondents, the latter would be required to articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges. </s> The trial judge denied the State's motion, holding that "[n]either Georgia nor federal law prohibits criminal defendants from exercising peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner." App. 14. The issue was certified for immediate appeal. Id., at 15 and 18. </s> The Supreme Court of Georgia, by a 4-to-3 vote, affirmed the trial court's ruling. 261 Ga. 473, 405 S. E. 2d 688 (1991). The court acknowledged that, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), this Court had found that the exercise of a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner "would constitute an impermissible injury" to the excluded juror. 261 Ga., at 473; 405 S.E.2d, at 689. [505 U.S. 42, 46] The court noted, however, that Edmonson involved private civil litigants, not criminal defendants. "Bearing in mind the long history of jury trials as an essential element of the protection of human rights," the court "decline[d] to diminish the free exercise of peremptory strikes by a criminal defendant." 261 Ga., at 473, 405 S. E. 2d, at 689. Three justices dissented, arguing that Edmonson and other decisions of this Court establish that racially based peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant violate the Constitution. 261 Ga., at 473, 405 S.E.2d at 689 (Hunt, J.); id., at 475, 405 S.E.2d, at 690 (Benham, J.); id., at 479, 405 S.E.2d, at 693 (Fletcher, J.). A motion for reconsideration was denied. App. 60. </s> We granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by our prior cases - whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 3 </s> 502 U.S. 937 (1991). </s> II </s> Over the last century, in an almost unbroken chain of decisions, this Court gradually has abolished race as a consideration for jury service. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court invalidated a state statute providing that only white men could serve as jurors. While stating that a defendant has no right to a "petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race," id., at 305, the Court held that a defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria. See also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 </s> [505 U.S. 42, 47] (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935) (State cannot exclude African-Americans from jury venire on false assumption that they, as a group, are not qualified to serve as jurors). </s> In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court was confronted with the question whether an African-American defendant was denied equal protection by the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury. Id., at 209-210. Although the Court rejected the defendant's attempt to establish an equal protection claim premised solely on the pattern of jury strikes in his own case, it acknowledged that proof of systematic exclusion of African-Americans through the use of peremptories over a period of time might establish such a violation. Id., at 224-228. </s> In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court discarded Swain's evidentiary formulation. The Batson Court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury based solely on the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. Id., at 87. "Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." Id., at 97. 4 </s> Last Term, this Court applied the Batson framework in two other contexts. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), it held that, in the trial of a white criminal defendant, a prosecutor is prohibited from excluding African-American jurors [505 U.S. 42, 48] on the basis of race. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court decided that, in a civil case, private litigants cannot exercise their peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. 5 </s> In deciding whether the Constitution prohibits criminal defendants from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, we must answer four questions. First, whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson. Second, whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant constitutes state action. Third, whether prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional challenge. And fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant nonetheless preclude the extension of our precedents to this case. </s> III </s> A </s> The majority in Powers recognized that "Batson `was designed "to serve multiple ends,'" only one of which was to protect individual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors." 499 U.S., at 406 . As in Powers and Edmonson, the extension of Batson in this context is designed to remedy the harm done to the "dignity of persons" and to the "integrity of the courts." Powers, 499 U.S., at 402 . </s> As long ago as Strauder, this Court recognized that denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror. 100 U.S., at 308 . See also Batson, 476 U.S., at 87 . While "[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, . . . he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race." Powers, [505 U.S. 42, 49] 499 U.S., at 409 . Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the harm is the same - in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination. </s> But "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community." Batson, 476 U.S., at 87 . One of the goals of our jury system is "to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair." Powers, 499 U.S., at 413 . Selection procedures that purposefully exclude African-Americans from juries undermine that public confidence - as well they should. "The overt wrong, often apparent to the entire jury panel, casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the cause." Id., at 412. See generally Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 Colum.L.Rev. 725, 748-750 (1992). </s> The need for public confidence is especially high in cases involving race-related crimes. In such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related crimes. See Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. 153, 195-196 (1989) (describing two trials in Miami, Fla., in which all African-American jurors were peremptorily struck by white defendants accused of racial beating, and the public outrage and riots that followed the defendants' acquittal). </s> "[B]e it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a court allows jurors to be excluded because of group bias, "[it] is [a] willing participant in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our system of justice - our citizens' [505 U.S. 42, 50] confidence in it." State v. Alvarado, 221 N.J. Super. 324, 328, 534 A.2d 440, 442 (1987). Just as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a conviction in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred in jury selection, so is public confidence undermined where a defendant, assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, obtains an acquittal. 6 </s> B </s> The fact that a defendant's use of discriminatory peremptory challenges harms the jurors and the community does not end our equal protection inquiry. Racial discrimination, although repugnant in all contexts, violates the Constitution only when it is attributable to state action. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). Thus, the second question that must be answered is whether a criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge constitutes state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. </s> Until Edmonson, the cases decided by this Court that presented the problem of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges involved assertions of discrimination by a prosecutor, a quintessential state actor. In Edmonson, by contrast, the contested peremptory challenges were exercised by a private defendant in a civil action. In order to determine whether state action was present in that setting, the [505 U.S. 42, 51] Court in Edmonson used the analytical framework summarized in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 7 </s> The first inquiry is "whether the claimed [constitutional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority." Id., at 939. "There can be no question" that peremptory challenges satisfy this first requirement, as they "are permitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury." Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 620 . As in Edmonson, a Georgia defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges and the scope of that right are established by a provision of state law. Ga.Code Ann. 15-12-165 (1990). </s> The second inquiry is whether the private party charged with the deprivation can be described as a state actor. See Lugar, 457 U.S., at 941 -94. In resolving that issue, the Court in Edmonson found it useful to apply three principles: (1) "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits"; (2) "whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function"; and (3) "whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority." 500 U.S., at 621 -622. </s> As to the first principle, the Edmonson Court found that the peremptory challenge system, as well as the jury system as a whole, "simply could not exist" without the "overt and significant participation of the government." Id., at 622. Georgia provides for the compilation of jury lists by the board of jury commissioners in each county and establishes the general criteria for service and the sources for creating a pool of qualified jurors representing a fair cross-section of the community. Ga.Code Ann. 15-12-40. State law further [505 U.S. 42, 52] provides that jurors are to be selected by a specified process, 15-12-42; they are to be summoned to court under the authority of the State, 15-12-120; and they are to be paid an expense allowance by the State whether or not they serve on a jury, 15-12-9. At court, potential jurors are placed in panels in order to facilitate examination by counsel, 15-12-131; they are administered an oath, 15-12-132; they are questioned on voir dire to determine whether they are impartial, 15-12-164; and they are subject to challenge for cause, 15-12-163. </s> In light of these procedures, the defendant in a Georgia criminal case relies on "governmental assistance and benefits" that are equivalent to those found in the civil context in Edmonson. "By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the Court `has . . . elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination.'" Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 624 (citation omitted). </s> In regard to the second principle, the Court in Edmonson found that peremptory challenges perform a traditional function of the government: "Their sole purpose is to permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact." Id., at 620. And, as the Edmonson Court recognized, the jury system in turn "performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of litigants and `ensur[ing] continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.'" Id., at 624 (citation omitted). These same conclusions apply with even greater force in the criminal context, because the selection of a jury in a criminal case fulfills a unique and constitutionally compelled governmental function. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (making Sixth Amendment applicable to States through Fourteenth Amendment), with Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (States do not have a constitutional obligation to provide a jury trial in civil cases). Cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 53 , n. 10 (1988) (private [505 U.S. 42, 53] physician hired by State to provide medical care to prisoners was state actor, because doctor was hired to fulfill State's constitutional obligation to attend to necessary medical care of prison inmates). The State cannot avoid its constitutional responsibilities by delegating a public function to private parties. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private political party's determination of qualifications for primary voters held to constitute state action). </s> Finally, the Edmonson Court indicated that the courtroom setting in which the peremptory challenge is exercised intensifies the harmful effects of the private litigant's discriminatory act, and contributes to its characterization as state action. These concerns are equally present in the context of a criminal trial. Regardless of who precipitated the jurors' removal, the perception and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court has excused juror based on race, an outcome that will be attributed to the State. 8 </s> Respondents nonetheless contend that the adversarial relationship between the defendant and the prosecution negates the governmental character of the peremptory challenge. Respondents rely on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), in which a defendant sued, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the public defender who represented him. The defendant claimed that the public defender had violated his constitutional rights in failing to provide adequate representation. This Court determined that a public defender does not qualify as a state actor when engaged in his general representation of a criminal defendant. 9 </s> [505 U.S. 42, 54] </s> Polk County did not hold that the adversarial relationship of a public defender with the State precludes a finding of state action - it held that this adversarial relationship prevented the attorney's public employment from alone being sufficient to support a finding of state action. Instead, the determination whether a public defender is a state actor for a particular purpose depends on the nature and context of the function he is performing. For example, in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), this Court held that a public defender, in making personnel decisions on behalf of the State, is a state actor who must comply with constitutional requirements. And the Polk County Court itself noted, without deciding, that a public defender may act under color of state law while performing certain administrative, and possibly investigative, functions. See 454 U.S., at 325 . </s> The exercise of a peremptory challenge differs significantly from other actions taken in support of a defendant's defense. In exercising a peremptory challenge, a criminal defendant is wielding the power to choose a quintessential governmental body - indeed, the institution of government on which our judicial system depends. Thus, as we held in Edmonson, when "a government confers on a private body the power to choose the government's employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race-neutrality." 500 U.S., at 625 . </s> Lastly, the fact that a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge to further his interest in acquittal does not conflict with a finding of state action. Whenever a private actor's conduct is deemed "fairly attributable" to the government, it is likely that private motives will have animated the actor's decision. Indeed, in Edmonson, the Court recognized that the private party's exercise of peremptory challenges [505 U.S. 42, 55] constituted state action, even though the motive underlying the exercise of the peremptory challenge may be to protect a private interest. See id., at 626. 10 </s> C </s> Having held that a defendant's discriminatory exercise of a peremptory challenge is a violation of equal protection, we move to the question whether the State has standing to challenge a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. In Powers, 499 U.S., at 416 , this Court held that a white criminal defendant has standing to raise the equal protection rights of black jurors wrongfully excluded from jury service. While third-party standing is a limited exception, the Powers Court recognized that a litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant can demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete injury, that he has a close relation to the third party, and that there exists some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its own interests. Id., at 411. In Edmonson, the Court applied the same analysis in deciding that civil litigants had standing to raise the equal protection rights of jurors excluded on the basis of their race. </s> In applying the first prong of its standing analysis, the Powers Court found that a criminal defendant suffered [505 U.S. 42, 56] cognizable injury "because racial discrimination in the selection of jurors "casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process," and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." 499 U.S., at 411 (citation omitted). In Edmonson, this Court found that these harms were not limited to the criminal sphere. 500 U.S., at 630 . Surely, a State suffers a similar injury when the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process is undermined. </s> In applying the second prong of its standing analysis, the Powers Court held that voir dire permits a defendant to "establish a relation, if not a bond of trust, with the jurors," a relation that "continues throughout the entire trial." 499 U.S., at 413 . "Exclusion of a juror on the basis of race severs that relation in an invidious way." Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 629 . </s> The State's relation to potential jurors in this case is closer than the relationships approved in Powers and Edmonson. As the representative of all its citizens, the State is the logical and proper party to assert the invasion of the constitutional rights of the excluded jurors in a criminal trial. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State from denying persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. </s> In applying the final prong of its standing analysis, the Powers Court recognized that, although individuals excluded from jury service on the basis of race have a right to bring suit on their own behalf, the "barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting." 499 U.S., at 414 . See also Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 629 . The barriers are no less formidable in this context. See Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 355, 367 (1988); Underwood, 92 Colum.L.Rev., at 757 (summarizing barriers to suit by excluded juror). Accordingly, we hold that the State has standing to assert the excluded jurors' rights. [505 U.S. 42, 57] </s> D </s> The final question is whether the interests served by Batson must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant. As a preliminary matter, it is important to recall that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial. This Court repeatedly has stated that the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial. See Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 , n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); see also Swain, 380 U.S., at 219 . </s> Yet in Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials," id., at 212, of the peremptory challenge, and noted the "long and widely held belief that the peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury," id., at 219; see id., at 212-219. This Court likewise has recognized that "the role of litigants in determining the jury's composition provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and of its verdicts." Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 630 . </s> We do not believe that this decision will undermine the contribution of the peremptory challenge to the administration of justice. Nonetheless, "if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair," we reaffirm today that such a "price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution." Id., at 630. Defense counsel is limited to "legitimate, lawful conduct." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (defense counsel does not render ineffective assistance when he informs his client that he would disclose the client's perjury to the court and move to withdraw from representation). It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race. [505 U.S. 42, 58] </s> Nor does a prohibition of the exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Counsel can ordinarily explain the reasons for peremptory challenges without revealing anything about trial strategy or any confidential client communications. In the rare case in which the explanation for a challenge would entail confidential communications or reveal trial strategy, an in camera discussion can be arranged. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); cf. Batson, 476 U.S., at 97 (expressing confidence that trial judges can develop procedures to implement the Court's holding). In any event, neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the attorney-client privilege gives a criminal defendant the right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of conduct. See Nix, 475 U.S., at 166 ; Zolin, 491 U.S., at 562 -563. See Swift, Defendants, Racism and the Peremptory Challenge, 22 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 177, 207-208 (1991). </s> Lastly, a prohibition of the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by an impartial jury. The goal of the Sixth Amendment is "jury impartiality with respect to both contestants." Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990). See also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887). </s> We recognize, of course, that a defendant has the right to an impartial jury that can view him without racial animus, which so long has distorted our system of criminal justice. We have, accordingly, held that there should be a mechanism for removing those on the venire whom the defendant has specific reason to believe would be incapable of confronting and suppressing their racism. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 -527 (1973); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 -190 (1981) (plurality opinion of WHITE, J.). Cf. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (exclusion of juror in capital trial is permissible upon showing that juror is incapable of considering sentences other than death). [505 U.S. 42, 59] </s> But there is a distinction between exercising a peremptory challenge to discriminate invidiously against jurors on account of race and exercising a peremptory challenge to remove an individual juror who harbors racial prejudice. This Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based on race provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror. As this Court stated just last Term in Powers, "[w]e may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the law condemns." 499 U.S., at 410 . "In our heterogeneous society, policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption - as a per se rule - that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion." Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 , n. 8 (1976). We therefore reaffirm today that the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party. </s> IV </s> We hold that the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Accordingly, if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the defendants, the defendants must articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Under Georgia law, the petit jury in a felony trial is selected from a panel of 42 persons. Ga.Code Ann. 15-12-160 (1990). </s> [Footnote 2 When a defendant is indicted for an offense carrying a penalty of four or more years, Georgia law provides that he may "peremptorily challenge 20 of the jurors impaneled to try him." 15-12-165. </s> [Footnote 3 The Ninth Circuit recently has prohibited criminal defendants from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. United States v. De Cross, 960 F.2d 1433 (1992) (en banc). Although the panel decision now has been vacated by the granting of rehearing en banc, a Fifth Circuit panel has held that criminal defendants may not exercise peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (CA5), rehearing granted, 948 F.2d 934 (1991). </s> [Footnote 4 The Batson majority specifically reserved the issue before us today. 476 U.S., at 89 , n. 12. The two Batson dissenters, however, argued that the "clear and inescapable import" was that Batson would similarly limit defendants. Id., at 125-126. Justice Marshall agreed, stating that "[o]ur criminal justice system "requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state, the scales are to be evenly held.' Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)." Id., at 107 (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 5 In his dissent in Edmonson, JUSTICE SCALIA stated that the effect of that decision logically must apply to defendants in criminal prosecutions. 500 U.S., at 644 . </s> [Footnote 6 The experience of many state jurisdictions has led to the recognition that a race-based peremptory challenge, regardless of who exercises it, harms not only the challenged juror, but the entire community. Acting pursuant to their state constitutions, state courts have ruled that criminal defendants have no greater license to violate the equal protection rights of prospective jurors than have prosecutors. See, e.g., State v. Levinson, 71 Haw. 492, 795 P.2d 845 (1990); People v. Kern, 149 App. Div. 2d 187, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1989), aff'd, 75 N. Y. 2d 638, 555 N. Y. S. 2d 647 (1990); State v. Alvarado, 221 N.J. Super. 324, 534 A.2d 440 (1987); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). </s> [Footnote 7 The Court in Lugar held that a private litigant is appropriately characterized as a state actor when he "jointly participates" with state officials in securing the seizure of property in which the private party claims to have rights. 457 U.S., at 932 -933, 941-942. </s> [Footnote 8 Indeed, it is common practice not to reveal the identity of the challenging party to the jurors and potential jurors, thus enhancing the perception that it is the court that has rejected them. See Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 Colum.L.Rev. 725, 751, n. 117 (1992). </s> [Footnote 9 Although Polk County determined whether or not the public defender's actions were under color of state law, as opposed to whether or not they constituted state action, this Court subsequently has held that [505 U.S. 42, 54] the two inquiries are the same, see, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982), and has specifically extended Polk County's reasoning to state action cases see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 , n. 20 (1982). </s> [Footnote 10 Numerous commentators similarly have concluded that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action. See generally Alschuler. The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 153, 197-198 (1989); Note, State Action and the Peremptory Challenge: Evolution of the Court's Treatment and Implications for Georgia v. McCollum, 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1049, 1061-1074 (1992); Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 355, 358-361 (1988); Comment, The Prosecutor's Right to Object to a Defendant's Abuse of Peremptory Challenges, 93 Dick.L.Rev. 143, 158-162 (1988); Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1015, 1027-1030 (1990); Underwood, 92 Colum.L.Rev., at 750-753. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring. </s> I was in dissent in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), and continue to believe that case to have been wrongly decided. But so long as it remains the law, I believe that it controls the disposition of this case on the [505 U.S. 42, 60] issue of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore join the opinion of the Court. </s> JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. </s> As a matter of first impression, I think that I would have shared the view of the dissenting opinions: a criminal defendant's use of peremptory strikes cannot violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because it does not involve state action. Yet, I agree with the Court and THE CHIEF JUSTICE that our decision last term in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), governs this case, and requires the opposite conclusion. Because the respondents do not question Edmonson, I believe that we must accept its consequences. I therefore concur in the judgment reversing the Georgia Supreme Court. </s> I write separately to express my general dissatisfaction with our continuing attempts to use the Constitution to regulate peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson, supra. In my view, by restricting a criminal defendant's use of such challenges, this case takes us further from the reasoning and the result of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). I doubt that this departure will produce favorable consequences. On the contrary, I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that this Court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory strikes. </s> In Strauder, as the Court notes, we invalidated a state law that prohibited blacks from serving on juries. In the course of the decision, we observed that the racial composition of a jury may affect the outcome of a criminal case. We explained: "It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy." Id., at 309. We thus recognized, [505 U.S. 42, 61] over a century ago, the precise point that JUSTICE O'CONNOR makes today. Simply stated, securing representation of the defendant's race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial. Post, at 68-69. </s> I do not think that this basic premise of Strauder has become obsolete. The public, in general, continues to believe that the makeup of juries can matter in certain instances. Consider, for example, how the press reports criminal trials. Major newspapers regularly note the number of whites and blacks that sit on juries in important cases. 1 Their editors and readers apparently recognize that conscious and unconscious prejudice persists in our society, and that it may influence some juries. Common experience and common sense confirm this understanding. </s> In Batson, however, this Court began to depart from Strauder by holding that, without some actual showing, suppositions about the possibility that jurors may harbor prejudice have no legitimacy. We said, in particular, that a prosecutor could not justify peremptory strikes "by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption - or his intuitive judgment - that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race." 476 U.S., at 97 . As noted, however, our decision in Strauder rested on precisely such an "assumption" or "intuition." We reasonably surmised, without direct evidence in any particular case, that all-white juries might judge black defendants unfairly. </s> Our departure from Strauder has two negative consequences. First, it produces a serious misordering of our priorities. In Strauder, we put the rights of defendants foremost. Today's decision, while protecting jurors, leaves defendants with less means of protecting themselves. [505 U.S. 42, 62] Unless jurors actually admit prejudice during voir dire, defendants generally must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will affect the verdict. Cf. Fed.Rule Evid. 606(b) (generally excluding juror testimony after trial to impeach the verdict). In effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death. At a minimum, I think that this inversion of priorities should give us pause. </s> Second, our departure from Strauder has taken us down a slope of inquiry that had no clear stopping point. Today, we decide only that white defendants may not strike black veniremen on the basis of race. Eventually, we will have to decide whether black defendants may strike white veniremen. 2 See, e.g., State v. Carr, 261 Ga. 845, 413 S.E.2d 192 (1992). Next will come the question whether defendants may exercise peremptories on the basis of sex. See, e.g., United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (CA9 1992). The consequences for defendants of our decision and of these future cases remain to be seen. But whatever the benefits were that this Court perceived in a criminal defendant's having members of his class on the jury, see Strauder, 100 U.S., at 309 -310, they have evaporated. </s> [Footnote 1 A computer search, for instance, reveals that the phrase "all-white jury" has appeared over 200 times in the past five years in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times. </s> [Footnote 2 The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., has submitted a brief arguing, in all sincerity, that "whether white defendants can use peremptory challenges to purge minority jurors presents quite different issues from whether a minority defendant can strike majority group jurors." Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 3-4. Although I suppose that this issue technically remains open, it is difficult to see how the result could be different if the defendants here were black. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. </s> The Court reaches the remarkable conclusion that criminal defendants being prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection. The Court purports merely to follow [505 U.S. 42, 63] precedents, but our cases do not compel this perverse result. To the contrary, our decisions specifically establish that criminal defendants and their lawyers are not government actors when they perform traditional trial functions. </s> I </s> It is well and properly settled that the Constitution's equal protection guarantee forbids prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991). The Constitution, however, affords no similar protection against private action. "Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendmen[t] . . ., and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be." National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (footnote omitted). This distinction appears on the face of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1 (emphasis added). The critical but straightforward question this case presents is whether criminal defendants and their lawyers, when exercising peremptory challenges as part of a defense, are state actors. </s> In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the Court developed a two-step approach to identifying state action in cases such as this. First, the Court will ask "whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority." Id., at 939. Next, it will decide whether, on the particular facts at issue, the parties who allegedly caused the deprivation of a federal right can "appropriately" and "in all fairness" be characterized as state actors. Ibid.; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). The [505 U.S. 42, 64] Court's determination in this case that the peremptory challenge is a creation of state authority, ante, at 51, breaks no new ground. See Edmonson, supra, at 620-621. But disposing of this threshold matter leaves the Court with the task of showing that criminal defendants who exercise peremptories should be deemed governmental actors. What our cases require, and what the Court neglects, is a realistic appraisal of the relationship between defendants and the government that has brought them to trial. </s> We discussed that relationship in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), which held that a public defender does not act "under color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983 "when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." 454 U.S., at 325 . We began our analysis by explaining that a public defender's obligations toward her client are no different than the obligations of any other defense attorney. Id., at 318. These obligations preclude attributing the acts of defense lawyers to the State: "[T]he duties of a defense lawyer are those of a personal counselor and advocate. It is often said that lawyers are `officers of the court." But the Courts of Appeals are agreed that a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor. . . ." Ibid. </s> We went on to stress the inconsistency between our adversarial system of justice and theories that would make defense lawyers state actors. "In our system," we said, "a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State." Ibid. This adversarial posture rests on the assumption that a defense lawyer best serves the public "not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing `the undivided interests of his client.'" Id., at 318-319 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)). Moreover, we pointed out that the independence of defense attorneys from state control has a constitutional dimension. Gideon v. Wainwright, [505 U.S. 42, 65] 372 U.S. 335 (1963), "established the right of state criminal defendants to the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against [them]." 454 U.S., at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). Implicit in this right "is the assumption that counsel will be free of state control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an effective and independent advocate." Ibid. Thus, the defense's freedom from state authority is not just empirically true, but is a constitutionally mandated attribute of our adversarial system. </s> Because this Court deems the "under color of state law" requirement that was not satisfied in Dodson identical to the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement, see Lugar, supra, at 929, the holding of Dodson simply cannot be squared with today's decision. In particular, Dodson cannot be explained away as a case concerned exclusively with the employment status of public defenders. See ante, at 54. The Dodson Court reasoned that public defenders performing traditional defense functions are not state actors, because they occupy the same position as other defense attorneys in relevant respects. 454 U.S., at 319 -325. This reasoning followed on the heels of a critical determination: Defending an accused "is essentially a private function," not state action. Id., at 319. The Court's refusal to acknowledge Dodson's initial holding, on which the entire opinion turned, will not make that holding go away. </s> The Court also seeks to evade Dodson's logic by spinning out a theory that defendants and their lawyers transmogrify from government adversaries into state actors when they exercise a peremptory challenge, and then change back to perform other defense functions. See ante, at 54. Dodson, however, established that, even though public defenders might act under color of state law when carrying out administrative or investigative functions outside a courtroom, they are not vested with state authority "when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a [505 U.S. 42, 66] criminal proceeding." 454 U.S., at 325 . Since making peremptory challenges plainly qualifies as a "traditional function" of criminal defense lawyers, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 -219 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892), Dodson forecloses the Court's functional analysis. </s> Even aside from our prior rejection of it, the Court's functional theory fails. "[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Thus, a private party's exercise of choice allowed by state law does not amount to state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as "the initiative comes from [the private party], and not from the State." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974). See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (State not responsible for a decision it "permits but does not compel"). The government in no way influences the defense's decision to use a peremptory challenge to strike a particular juror. Our adversarial system of criminal justice and the traditions of the peremptory challenge vest the decision to strike a juror entirely with the accused. A defendant "may, if he chooses, peremptorily challenge `on his own dislike, without showing any cause;" he may exercise that right without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously." Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (quoting 1 E. Coke, Institutes 156b (19th ed. 1832)). "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain, supra, at 220. See Dodson, supra, at 321-322; Lewis, supra, at 376, 378. </s> Certainly, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. did not render Dodson and its realistic approach to the state action inquiry dead letters. The Edmonson Court distinguished [505 U.S. 42, 67] Dodson by saying: "In the ordinary context of civil litigation in which the government is not a party, an adversarial relation does not exist between the government and a private litigant. In the jury selection process, the government and private litigants work for the same end." Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 627 . While the nonpartisan administrative interests of the State and the partisan interests of private litigants may not be at odds during civil jury selection, the same cannot be said of the partisan interests of the State and the defendant during jury selection in a criminal trial. A private civil litigant opposes a private counterpart, but a criminal defendant is, by design, in an adversarial relationship with the government. Simply put, the defendant seeks to strike jurors predisposed to convict, while the State seeks to strike jurors predisposed to acquit. The Edmonson Court clearly recognized this point when it limited the statement that "an adversarial relation does not exist between the government and a private litigant" to "the ordinary context of civil litigation in which the government is not a party." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> From arrest, to trial, to possible sentencing and punishment, the antagonistic relationship between government and the accused is clear for all to see. Rather than squarely facing this fact, the Court, as in Edmonson, rests its finding of governmental action on the points that defendants exercise peremptory challenges in a courtroom, and judges alter the composition of the jury in response to defendants' choices. I found this approach wanting in the context of civil controversies between private litigants, for reasons that need not be repeated here. See id., at 632 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). But even if I thought Edmonson was correctly decided, I could not accept today's simplistic extension of it. Dodson makes clear that the unique relationship between criminal defendants and the State precludes attributing defendants' actions to the State, whatever is the case in civil trials. How could it be otherwise when the underlying question [505 U.S. 42, 68] is whether the accused "c[an] be described in all fairness as a state actor?" 500 U.S., at 620 . As Dodson accords with our state action jurisprudence and with common sense, I would honor it. </s> II </s> What really seems to bother the Court is the prospect that leaving criminal defendants and their attorneys free to make racially motivated peremptory challenges will undermine the ideal of nondiscriminatory jury selection we espoused in Batson, 476 U.S., at 85 -88. The concept that the government alone must honor constitutional dictates, however, is a fundamental tenet of our legal order, not an obstacle to be circumvented. This is particularly so in the context of criminal trials, where we have held the prosecution to uniquely high standards of conduct. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done"). </s> Considered in purely pragmatic terms, moreover, the Court's holding may fail to advance nondiscriminatory criminal justice. It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence. See Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1472, 1559-1560 (1988); Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 Cornell L.Rev. 1, 110-112 (1990). Using peremptory challenges to secure minority representation on the jury may help to overcome such racial bias, for there is substantial reason to believe that the distorting influence of race is minimized on a racially mixed jury. See id., at 112-115; Developments in [505 U.S. 42, 69] the Law, supra, at 1559-1560. As amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund explained in this case: </s> "The ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race jurors may be crucial to empaneling a fair jury. In many cases, an African American, or other minority defendant, may be faced with a jury array in which his racial group is underrepresented to degree, but not sufficiently to permit challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. The only possible chance the defendant may have of having any minority jurors on the jury that actually tries him will be if he uses his peremptories to strike members of the majority race." Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 9-10 (footnote omitted). </s> See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 56-57; Edmonson, supra, at 644 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). In a world where the outcome of a minority defendant's trial may turn on the misconceptions or biases of white jurors, there is cause to question the implications of this Court's good intentions. </s> That the Constitution does not give federal judges the reach to wipe all marks of racism from every courtroom in the land is frustrating, to be sure. But such limitations are the necessary and intended consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. Because I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that government is responsible for decisions criminal defendants make while fighting state prosecution, I respectfully dissent. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting. </s> I agree with the Court that its judgment follows logically from Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). For the reasons given in the Edmonson dissents, however, I think that case was wrongly decided. Barely a year later, we witness its reduction to the terminally absurd: [505 U.S. 42, 70] a criminal defendant, in the process of defending himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of the state. JUSTICE O'CONNOR demonstrates the sheer inanity of this proposition (in case the mere statement of it does not suffice), and the contrived nature of the Court's justifications. I see no need to add to her discussion, and differ from her views only in that I do not consider Edmonson distinguishable ie in principle - except in the principle that a bad decision should not be followed logically to its illogical conclusion. </s> Today's decision gives the lie once again to the belief that an activist, "evolutionary" constitutional jurisprudence always evolves in the direction of greater individual rights. In the interest of promoting the supposedly greater good of race relations in the society as a whole (make no mistake that that is what underlies all of this), we use the Constitution to destroy the ages-old right of criminal defendants to exercise peremptory challenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they consider fair. I dissent. </s> [505 U.S. 42, 71]

United States Supreme Court FRAZIER v. CUPP(1969) No. 643 Argued: February 26, 1969Decided: April 22, 1969 </s> Petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding claims that his constitutional rights were violated in three respects in his trial in 1965 for murder for which he had been indicted jointly with one Rawls, who pleaded guilty. (1) The prosecutor, on the basis of previous information he had received that Rawls would testify, included in his opening statement a brief summary of Rawls' expected testimony. When Rawls was called to the stand he claimed his privilege against self-incrimination and was dismissed. Petitioner's motions for a mistrial were overruled. The trial court instructed the jury that the opening statements of counsel should not be considered as evidence. (2) After preliminary questioning shortly after his arrest petitioner was told that he could have an attorney if he wanted one and that anything he said could be used against him at trial. Thereafter the interrogating officer falsely told petitioner, who was reluctant to talk, that Rawls had confessed. Petitioner later began to spill his story, but again showed signs of reluctance and said he thought he better get a lawyer before he talked any more. Following the officer's reply that petitioner could not be in any more trouble than he was in, petitioner fully confessed and after further warnings signed a written confession, which was later admitted into evidence over petitioner's objection. (3) Also admitted into evidence was some clothing which officers had seized from petitioner's duffel bag which he and Rawls had used jointly and which the officers had found during a search conducted with Rawls' consent. Petitioner was convicted and the State Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, which granted the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed. Petitioner claims that the prosecutor's use of the summarized Rawls statement denied him his constitutional rights of confrontation as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; that his confession contravened the principles established by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and was involuntary; and that the clothing had been illegally seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Held: [394 U.S. 731, 732] </s> 1. On the facts here, where the evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to produce was objectively and briefly summarized and was not touted to the jury as crucial to the prosecution's case, the court's limiting instructions were sufficient to protect petitioner's constitutional rights. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), distinguished. Pp. 734-737. </s> 2. In the context of this case, where it is possible that the questioning officer took petitioner's remark about seeing an attorney not as a request that the interrogation cease but as a passing comment, there was no denial of the right to counsel such as existed in Escobedo; and Miranda, which was decided after petitioner's trial, is inapplicable under Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Pp. 738-739. </s> 3. On the facts of this case and in view of the "totality of the circumstances" the trial court did not err in holding that petitioner's confession was voluntary. P. 739. </s> 4. The clothing from petitioner's duffel bag was found in the course of a lawful search since Rawls, a joint user of the bag, had authority to consent to its search. P. 740. </s> 388 F.2d 777, affirmed. </s> Howard M. Feuerstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was R. A. Nahstoll. </s> Arlen Specter argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, and David H. Blunt, Assistant Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner was convicted in an Oregon state court of second-degree murder in connection with the September 22, 1964, slaying of one Russell Anton Marleau. After the Supreme Court of Oregon had affirmed his conviction, 245 Ore. 4, 418 P.2d 841 (1966), petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The District Court granted the writ, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 388 F.2d 777 (1968). We [394 U.S. 731, 733] granted certiorari to consider three contentions of error raised by petitioner. 393 U.S. 821 (1968). Although petitioner's case has been ably briefed and argued by appointed counsel, we find none of these allegations sufficient to warrant reversal. </s> I. </s> Petitioner's first argument centers on certain allegedly prejudicial remarks made during the prosecutor's opening statement. Petitioner had been indicted jointly with his cousin, Jerry Lee Rawls, who pleaded guilty to the same offense. Prior to petitioner's trial, petitioner's defense counsel told the prosecutor that Rawls would invoke his privilege against self-incrimination if he were called to the stand; defense counsel warned the prosecutor not to rely in his opening statement upon Rawls' expected testimony. The prosecutor replied that he would act on the basis of "all of the information I have concerning [Rawls'] testimony." Before trial, he consulted with a police officer who had spoken to Rawls and with Rawls' probation officer; each indicated his belief that Rawls would testify. Similar information came, through a sheriff's report, from some of Rawls' close relatives. Because of these reports, the prosecutor concluded that Rawls would testify if asked to do so. The court below felt that the prosecutor also relied on the fact that Rawls had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentence. This would give him reason, the court felt, to cooperate with the prosecutor. </s> In any case, after the trial began the prosecutor included in his opening statement a summary of the testimony he expected to receive from Rawls. The summary was not emphasized in any particular way; it took only a few minutes to recite and was sandwiched between a summary of petitioner's own confession and a description of the circumstantial evidence the State would introduce. [394 U.S. 731, 734] At one point the prosecutor referred to a paper he was holding in his hands to refresh his memory about something Rawls had said. Although the State admitted in argument here that the jury might fairly have believed that the prosecutor was referring to Rawls' statement, he did not explicitly tell the jury that this paper was Rawls' confession, nor did he purport to read directly from it. A motion for a mistrial was made at the close of the opening statement, but it was denied. Later, the prosecutor called Rawls to the stand. Rawls informed the court that he intended to assert his privilege against self-incrimination in regard to every question concerning his activities on the morning of September 22, 1964. The matter was not further pursued, and Rawls was dismissed from the stand. His appearance could not have lasted more than two or three minutes. The motion for mistrial was renewed and once again denied. </s> Petitioner argues that this series of events placed the substance of Rawls' statement before the jury in a way that "may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony," Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965), and that, as in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128 (1968), the statement "added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination . . . ." In this way, petitioner claims he was denied his constitutional right of confrontation, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Although the judge did caution the jurors that they "must not regard any statement made by counsel in your presence during the proceedings concerning the facts of this case as evidence," petitioner contends that Bruton v. United States, supra, disposes of the contention that limiting instructions of this sort can be relied upon to cure the error which occurred. Although the question thus posed is not an [394 U.S. 731, 735] easy one, we cannot agree with petitioner's conclusion. </s> First of all, it is clear that this case is quite different from either Douglas or Bruton. In Douglas, the prosecutor called the defendant's coconspirator to the stand and read his alleged confession to him; the coconspirator was required to assert his privilege against self-incrimination repeatedly as the prosecutor asked him to confirm or deny each statement. The Court found that this procedure placed powerfully incriminating evidence before the jury in a manner which effectively denied the right of cross-examination. Here, Rawls was on the stand for a very short time and only a paraphrase of the statement was placed before the jury. This was done not during the trial, while the person making the statement was on the stand, but in an opening statement. In addition, the jury was told that the opening statement should not be considered as evidence. Certainly the impact of the procedure used here was much less damaging than was the case in Douglas. And unlike the situation in Bruton, the jury was not being asked to perform the mental gymnastics of considering an incriminating statement against only one of two defendants in a joint trial. Moreover, unlike the situation in either Douglas or Bruton, Rawls' statement was not a vitally important part of the prosecution's case. </s> We believe that in these circumstances the limiting instructions given were sufficient to protect petitioner's constitutional rights. * As the Court said in Bruton, 391 U.S., at 135 , "Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently." See Hopt v. Utah, [394 U.S. 731, 736] 120 U.S. 430, 438 (1887). It may be that some remarks included in an opening or closing statement could be so prejudicial that a finding of error, or even constitutional error, would be unavoidable. But here we have no more than an objective summary of evidence which the prosecutor reasonably expected to produce. Many things might happen during the course of the trial which would prevent the presentation of all the evidence described in advance. Certainly not every variance between the advance description and the actual presentation constitutes reversible error, when a proper limiting instruction has been given. Even if it is unreasonable to assume that a jury can disregard a coconspirator's statement when introduced against one of two joint defendants, it does not seem at all remarkable to assume that the jury will ordinarily be able to limit its consideration to the evidence introduced during the trial. At least where the anticipated, and unproduced, evidence is not touted to the jury as a crucial part of the prosecution's case, "it is hard for us to imagine that the minds of the jurors would be so influenced by such incidental statements during this long trial that they would not appraise the evidence objectively and dispassionately." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239 (1940). </s> The Court of Appeals seemed to feel that this aspect of the case turned on whether or not the prosecutor acted "in a good faith expectation that Rawls would testify." 388 F.2d, at 780-781. While we do not believe that the prosecutor's good faith, or lack of it, is controlling in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, we agree with the Court of Appeals' factual determination in this case. The evidence presented in the record is sufficient to support the Oregon Supreme Court's conclusion that "the state could reasonably expect [Rawls] to testify in line with his [394 U.S. 731, 737] previous statements." 245 Ore., at 9, 418 P.2d, at 843. Accordingly, there is no need to decide whether the type of prosecutorial misconduct alleged to have occurred would have been sufficient to constitute reversible constitutional error. Cf. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). Therefore, because we find neither prosecutorial misconduct nor a deprivation of the right of confrontation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that nothing which occurred during the prosecution's opening statement would warrant federal habeas relief. </s> II. </s> Petitioner's second argument concerns the admission into evidence of his own confession. The circumstances under which the confession was obtained can be summarized briefly. Petitioner was arrested about 4:15 p. m. on September 24, 1964. He was taken to headquarters where questioning began at about 5 p. m. The interrogation, which was tape-recorded, ended slightly more than an hour later, and by 6:45 p. m. petitioner had signed a written version of his confession. </s> After the questioning had begun and after a few routine facts were ascertained, petitioner was questioned briefly about the location of his Marine uniform. He was next asked where he was on the night in question. Although he admitted that he was with his cousin Rawls, he denied being with any third person. Then petitioner was given a somewhat abbreviated description of his constitutional rights. He was told that he could have an attorney if he wanted one and that anything he said could be used against him at trial. Questioning thereafter became somewhat more vigorous, but petitioner continued to deny being with anyone but Rawls. At this point, the officer questioning petitioner told him, falsely, that Rawls had been brought in and that he had confessed. Petitioner still was reluctant to talk, but [394 U.S. 731, 738] after the officer sympathetically suggested that the victim had started a fight by making homosexual advances, petitioner began to spill out his story. Shortly after he began he again showed signs of reluctance and said, "I think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more. I am going to get into trouble more than I am in now." The officer replied simply, "You can't be in any more trouble than you are in now," and the questioning session proceeded. A full confession was obtained and, after further warnings, a written version was signed. </s> Since petitioner was tried after this Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), but before the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), only the rule of the former case is directly applicable. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Petitioner argues that his statement about getting a lawyer was sufficient to bring Escobedo into play and that the police should immediately have stopped the questioning and obtained counsel for him. We might agree were Miranda applicable to this case, for in Miranda this Court held that "[i]f . . . [a suspect] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S., at 444 -445. But Miranda does not apply to this case. This Court in Johnson v. New Jersey pointedly rejected the contention that the specific commands of Miranda should apply to all post-Escobedo cases. The Court recognized "[t]he disagreements among other courts concerning the implications of Escobedo," Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, at 734, and concluded that the States, although free to apply Miranda to post-Escobedo cases, id., at 733, were not required to do so. The Oregon Supreme Court, in affirming petitioner's conviction, concluded that the confession was properly introduced into evidence. Under Johnson, we would be [394 U.S. 731, 739] free to disagree with this conclusion only if we felt compelled to do so by the specific holding of Escobedo. </s> We do not believe that Escobedo covers this case. Petitioner's statement about seeing an attorney was neither as clear nor as unambiguous as the request Escobedo made. The police in Escobedo were unmistakably informed of their suspect's wishes; in fact Escobedo's attorney was present and repeatedly requested permission to see his client. Here, on the other hand, it is possible that the questioning officer took petitioner's remark not as a request that the interrogation cease but merely as a passing comment. Petitioner did not pursue the matter, but continued answering questions. In this context, we cannot find the denial of the right to counsel which was found so crucial in Escobedo. </s> Petitioner also presses the alternative argument that his confession was involuntary and that it should have been excluded for that reason. The trial judge, after an evidentiary hearing during which the tape recording was played, could not agree with this contention, and our reading of the record does not lead us to a contrary conclusion. Before petitioner made any incriminating statements, he received partial warnings of his constitutional rights; this is, of course, a circumstance quite relevant to a finding of voluntariness. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 -741 (1966). The questioning was of short duration, and petitioner was a mature individual of normal intelligence. The fact that the police misrepresented the statements that Rawls had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. These cases must be decided by viewing the "totality of the circumstances," see, e. g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 708 (1967), and on the facts of this case we can find no error in the admission of petitioner's confession. [394 U.S. 731, 740] </s> III. </s> Petitioner's final contention can be dismissed rather quickly. He argues that the trial judge erred in permitting some clothing seized from petitioner's duffel bag to be introduced into evidence. This duffel bag was being used jointly by petitioner and his cousin Rawls and it had been left in Rawls' home. The police, while arresting Rawls, asked him if they could have his clothing. They were directed to the duffel bag and both Rawls and his mother consented to its search. During this search, the officers came upon petitioner's clothing and it was seized as well. Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority to consent to its search. The officers therefore found evidence against petitioner while in the course of an otherwise lawful search. Under this Court's past decisions, they were clearly permitted to seize it. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Petitioner argues that Rawls only had actual permission to use one compartment of the bag and that he had no authority to consent to a search of the other compartments. We will not, however, engage in such metaphysical subtleties in judging the efficacy of Rawls' consent. Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside. We find no valid search and seizure claim in this case. </s> Because we find none of petitioner's contentions meritorious, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur in the result. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [Footnote * A more specific limiting instruction might have been desirable, but none was requested. </s> [394 U.S. 731, 741]

United States Supreme Court BODE v. BARRETT(1953) No. 187 Argued: Decided: February 9, 1953 </s> Appellants, most of whom are interstate carriers and all of whom are intrastate carriers in Illinois, challenged the constitutionality of an Illinois law which imposes a tax for the use of the public highways and measures the tax exclusively by the gross weight of each vehicle. None of the appellants showed that the tax bore no reasonable relation to the use he made of the highways in his intrastate operations or that the tax was increased by reason of his interstate operations. Held: </s> 1. Appellants have failed to carry the burden of showing that the tax deprives them of rights which the Commerce Clause protects. Pp. 584-585. </s> 2. The tax does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, though private carriers are taxed at the same rate as carriers for hire. Pp. 585-586. </s> 3. Since no showing is made that any of the appellants is the victim of an invidious classification, the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 586. </s> 4. The fact that the statute requires Illinois residents to pay the tax, whereas nonresidents are exempt if the states of their residence reciprocate and grant like exemptions to Illinois residents, does not violate the Compact Clause of Art. I, 10 of the Constitution. P. 586. </s> 412 Ill. 204, 106 N. E. 2d 521, and 412 Ill. 321, 106 N. E. 2d 510, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 274, Co-Ordinated Transport, Inc. et al. v. Barrett, Secretary of State, et al., argued January 5, 1953, on appeal from the same court. </s> The Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the constitutionality of a state tax on trucks. 412 Ill. 204, 321, 106 N. E. 2d 521, 510. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 586. </s> Scott W. Lucas, Charles A. Thomas and Hugh J. Graham, Jr. submitted on brief for appellants in No. 187. [344 U.S. 583, 584] </s> Frank R. Reid, Jr. argued the cause for appellants in No. 274. With him on the brief were Sam Alschuler, Ralph C. Putnam, Jr. and William C. Murphy. </s> Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General of Illinois, and John T. Chadwell, Frank M. Pfeifer and Richard M. Keck, Special Assistant Attorneys General, submitted on brief for appellees in No. 187. </s> Mr. Chadwell argued the cause for appellees in No. 274. With him on the brief were Mr. Elliott, Mr. Pfeifer and Mr. Keck. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases challenge the constitutionality of 9, 11, and 20 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law, as amended. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1951, c. 95 1/2. The statute imposes a tax for the use of the public highways and measures the tax exclusively by gross weight of the vehicle. Appellants, most of whom are interstate carriers, challenged the tax as violating the Commerce Clause (Art. I, 8) of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the statute. 412 Ill. 204, 321, 106 N. E. 2d 521, 510. The cases are here by appeal. 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). </s> The main emphasis of the argument is on the Commerce Clause. The argument starts from the premise found in our opinions that a state may levy a tax on an interstate motor vehicle that is "measured by or has some fair relationship to the use of the highways for which the charge is made." McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 181 . It is contended that the present tax is not so measured but has the same infirmities as the tax on motor vehicles which the Court invalidated in Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 . An elaborate argument is advanced to the effect that a large fraction of the costs of installing and maintaining highways has [344 U.S. 583, 585] no relation to the weight of the vehicles that pass over them. Therefore, a tax such as this one, which is determined solely with reference to weight, is a tax part of which is exacted for a purpose other than the use of the highways. </s> We do not stop to analyze the evidence tendered by appellants. For we do not reach the issue in this case. It is true that some of the appellants are interstate carriers. But it is also true that each of the interstate carriers does an intrastate business as well. The tax is required from any motor vehicle that moves on the highways. It is, indeed, a tax for the privilege of using the highways of Illinois. Clearly it is within the police power of Illinois to exact such a tax at least from intrastate operators. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 . No showing has been made by any of the appellants that the tax bears no reasonable relation to the use he makes of the highways in his intrastate operations. No effort is made to show that in that way or in some other manner the tax is increased by reason of the interstate operations of any appellant. In short appellants have failed to carry the burden of showing that the tax deprives them of rights which the Commerce Clause protects. Cf. Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 . The case is therefore to be distinguished from those situations where by nature of the tax or its incidence (Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 170 , 171; Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609 ) an issue of unreasonable burden on interstate commerce is presented. </s> The objections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are without substance. The power of a state to tax, basic to its sovereignty, is limited only if in substance and effect it is the exertion of a different and a forbidden power (Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 ), as for example the taxation of a privilege protected by the First Amendment. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 . No such problem is [344 U.S. 583, 586] even remotely involved here. Complaint is made that private carriers are taxed at the same rate as carriers for hire. Yet so far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, that objection is frivolous, since neither private nor public carriers have the right to use the highways without payment of a fee (see Hendrick v. Maryland, supra); and we cannot say that the exaction of the same fee from each is out of bounds. Appellants make other arguments to the effect that the statute is so inconsistent, vague, and uncertain in its classification as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But even if we assume that the vagaries of the law reach that dignity, no showing is made that any of the appellants is the victim of an invidious classification. Cf. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 277 . </s> We need notice only one other argument and that is that the statute requires Illinois residents to pay the tax, whereas nonresidents are exempted provided the states of their residence reciprocate and grant like exemptions to Illinois residents. That objection, so far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, was adequately answered in Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 57, 62 . And contrary to appellants' suggestions, that kind of reciprocal arrangement between states has never been thought to violate the Compact Clause of Art. I, 10 of the Constitution. See St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562 ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168 . </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON concurs in the result. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins, dissenting. </s> The problem of this case is not met by asserting that a tax ranging as high as $1,580 per truck does not present [344 U.S. 583, 587] an issue under the Commerce Clause because the carriers do intrastate as well as interstate business and the tax, therefore, does not as a matter of law affect commerce among the States. (The Court apparently deems the size of the tax immaterial since it does not mention the amounts involved.) It has been suggested in a cognate situation, though one involving a comparatively trifling exaction, that interstate commerce is unconstitutionally burdened solely because the taxpayer's interstate business increases the number of trucks on which the tax is levied and hence the total amount due from him. One does not have to embrace this suggestion to find the Court's position in this case unsupportable. For the Court declares appellants' claim under the Commerce Clause baseless although it does not "stop to analyze the evidence tendered by appellants." </s> The Court disposes of the contention that the judgments below offend the Commerce Clause, by concluding that it need not "reach the issue in this case." Its reasoning is as follows: all the interstate carriers here are engaged in intrastate commerce as well; were they not engaged in interstate commerce at all, they could be taxed on account of their intrastate operations; since none of the appellants thus pays an additional tax for its interstate operations, none is in a position to claim the protection of the Commerce Clause. Consideration of a challenge to a tax under the Due Process Clause, which the Court does undertake (reaching conclusions I agree with), does not, of course, bar appellants from challenging the tax under the Commerce Clause. Hence the Court's refusal, on the ground that it does "not reach the issue," "to analyze the evidence" on which the Commerce Clause contention rests can only mean that the Court finds that appellants had no standing to sue under the Commerce Clause, albeit the formal phrase is withheld. [344 U.S. 583, 588] </s> For this truly startling conclusion we are vouchsafed no authority except: "Cf. Southern R. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 534 ." On its facts the King case has nothing whatever to do with the problem before us. The passage to which the citation refers simply repeats the self-evident proposition that only one whose alleged constitutional rights are affected by a State statute can assail it. But whether appellants are so affected is the very question at the threshold of the constitutional issue: is the tax forbidden by the Commerce Clause. Being engaged in interstate commerce, appellants invoke the Commerce Clause against an Illinois statute which affects them because it taxes them. Whether or not the effect on them is unconstitutional is the question which, in compliance with settled procedural rules, they have brought here on appeal. </s> If it is indeed true, as the Court holds, that one who is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce has no standing to challenge a tax such as this under the Commerce Clause because the State might, perchance, extract the same dollars and cents from him even if he engaged in intrastate commerce alone, then this Court has long been entertaining, ignorantly and wastefully, cases which it had no power to hear. </s> The taxation and licensing by the States of commingled, though not necessarily inextricably commingled, intrastate and interstate business, or of the instrumentalities of such commingled business, have again and again been considered here to determine whether such an assertion of the taxing power by the States had, in its practical incidence, cast an inadmissible burden upon the interstate aspect of the joint enterprise. Can it be that all these cases could quickly and easily have been disposed of by suggesting that the taxpayer could in any event have been taxed on his intrastate operations? [344 U.S. 583, 589] </s> As far back as 1888, in Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 , the Court struck down because of the Commerce Clause a tax attacked by a taxpayer doing both intrastate and interstate business. In a hundred-odd cases since, a claim under the Commerce Clause in similar situations was considered. (This does not mean it always prevailed.) Can it be that all our predecessors bothered their heads needlessly? Indeed, ever since Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 , and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 , it has been settled that a State may not exclude a foreign corporation from doing merely local business if such exclusion would "unreasonably burden" the nonexcludable interstate business. (I am not now concerned with what is and what is not such an "unreasonable burden.") Under today's holding, was there standing in these cases? </s> A word on the merits. Of course a State may tax for the use of its roads by carriers engaged in interstate commerce, whether they carry local goods as well or do an exclusive interstate business. But this states the beginning of a problem in constitutional law; it does not give the answer. The real question is how the State makes the exaction - that is, what is the nature of the exaction, its basis and its practical operation. As the Court does not reach this question, it would serve no purpose for me to do so. </s> [344 U.S. 583, 590]

United States Supreme Court PILON v. BORDENKIRCHER(1979) No. 78-6932 Argued: Decided: October 9, 1979 </s> Held: </s> The requirement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that a criminal conviction be based upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can be effectuated only if a federal habeas corpus court, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a state-court conviction, inquires "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 . Thus, in the instant case the District Court and the Court of Appeals which, prior to the decision in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, had denied habeas corpus relief to petitioner from his state-court conviction, erred in applying the "no evidence" test that was held to be constitutionally inadequate in Jackson, and the case will be remanded to the District Court for reconsideration in the light of Jackson. </s> Certiorari granted; 593 F.2d 264, vacated and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petitioner was convicted in a Kentucky court on a charge of first-degree manslaughter, and the judgment of conviction was sustained on direct appeal. Pilon v. Common-wealth, [444 U.S. 1, 2] 544 S. W. 2d 228 (Ky. 1976). The petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in a Federal District Court, alleging that the Kentucky conviction was supported by evidence insufficient to afford him due process of law. The federal court denied relief. Applying the "no evidence" test of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), the court concluded that "[a]lthough this was a close case on the evidence, we believe that the case was not devoid of an evidentiary basis for petitioner's conviction." * The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, also relying on the "no evidence" test, affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. 593 F.2d 264. </s> Thereafter, this Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), held that the Thompson "no evidence" test is constitutionally inadequate in a case such as this. An earlier decision had made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court in Jackson held that this constitutional requirement can be effectuated only if a federal habeas corpus court, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a state-court conviction, inquires "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S., at 319 (emphasis omitted). </s> It is thus beyond dispute that the District Court and Court of Appeals applied an incorrect and inadequate constitutional test in resolving the petitioner's due process claim that his state-court conviction rested on insufficient evidence. Although it is quite possible that the evidence against the petitioner will survive a challenge under the correct constitutional standard, he is entitled to have his application for habeas corpus considered under that standard. [444 U.S. 1, 3] </s> The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky so that it may consider the petitioner's application for habeas corpus in the light of Jackson v. Virginia. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * The opinion of the District Court is unreported. </s> [444 U.S. 1, 4]

United States Supreme Court BOSTIC v. UNITED STATES(1971) No. 5250 Argued: April 21, 1971Decided: May 24, 1971 </s> Writ of certiorari, granted to review Court of Appeals' affirmance of petitioner's conviction of conspiracy to commit murder, dismissed as improvidently granted since, contrary to that court's opinion and Government's representation, it now appears that petitioner was not charged with or convicted of that offense. </s> 424 F.2d 951, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. </s> Thomas C. Binkley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Philip M. Carden. </s> Beatrice Rosenberg argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and Jerome M. Feit. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> We granted the writ of certiorari in this case 1 to consider whether the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had erred in holding that the petitioner had properly been convicted of conspiracy to commit murder in order to avoid apprehension for the robbery of a federally insured bank. The Court of Appeals purported to uphold a conviction for this offense, though there was no evidence that the petitioner knew of the plan to commit murder, and he had been confined in prison for several months prior to the date the murder was committed. 2 The [402 U.S. 547, 548] memorandum for the United States in opposition to the granting of the writ urged that the petitioner was "responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators in killing one member of the group," and as to this issue, relied on the opinion of the Court of Appeals. </s> It now appears that these statements in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and in the memorandum of the United States were erroneous, and that the facts are not as we believed them to be at the time we granted the writ. The record shows that the petitioner was neither charged with nor convicted of the offense of conspiracy to commit murder. The conspiracy count on which the petitioner was convicted did not include any charge of conspiracy to murder. Indeed, in his closing argument to the jury the prosecutor stated that the petitioner had left the conspiracy prior to the murder, when he was returned to the penitentiary. </s> Inasmuch as our grant of the writ of certiorari in this case was predicated on the mistaken representation that the petitioner had been convicted of the offense of conspiracy to commit murder, we now dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 400 U.S. 991 . </s> [Footnote 2 424 F.2d 951. The opinion recites that the conspiracy count on which the petitioner was convicted "alleged a conspiracy to rob federally insured banks with dangerous weapons and to commit murder to avoid apprehension for same." 424 F.2d, at 953. The [402 U.S. 547, 548] court went on to say, "As to Bostic, although he had been returned to the penitentiary sometime before Ferguson's murder, there is no evidence that he had renounced or withdrawn from the conspiracy." 424 F.2d, at 964. </s> [402 U.S. 547, 549]

United States Supreme Court FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. v. BRUCH(1989) No. 87-1054 Argued: November 30, 1988Decided: February 21, 1989 </s> Petitioner Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Firestone) maintained, and was the plan administrator and fiduciary of, a termination pay plan and two other unfunded employee benefit plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. After Firestone sold its Plastics Division to Occidental Petroleum Co. (Occidental), respondents, Plastics Division employees who were rehired by Occidental, sought severance benefits under the termination pay plan, but Firestone denied their requests on the ground that there had not been a "reduction in work force" that would authorize benefits under the plan's terms. Several respondents also sought information about their benefits under all three plans pursuant to 1024(b)(4)'s disclosure requirements, but Firestone denied those requests on the ground that respondents were no longer plan "participants" entitled to information under ERISA. Respondents then brought suit for severance benefits under 1132(a)(1)(B) and for damages under 1132(a)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B) based on Firestone's breach of its statutory disclosure obligation. The Federal District Court granted summary judgment for Firestone, holding that the company had satisfied its fiduciary duty as to the benefits requests because its decision not to pay was not arbitrary or capricious, and that it had no disclosure obligation to respondents because they were not plan "participants" within the meaning of 1002(7) at the time they requested the information. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that benefits denials should be subject to de novo judicial review rather than review under the arbitrary and capricious standard where the employer is itself the administrator and fiduciary of an unfunded plan, since deference is unwarranted in that situation given the lack of assurance of impartiality on the employer's part. The Court of Appeals also held that the right to disclosure of plan information extends both to people who are entitled to plan benefits and to those who claim to be, but are not, so entitled. </s> Held: </s> 1. De novo review is the appropriate standard for reviewing Firestone's denial of benefits to respondents. Pp. 108-115. [489 U.S. 101, 102] </s> (a) The arbitrary and capricious standard - which was developed under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) and adopted by some federal courts for 1132(a)(1)(B) actions in light of ERISA's failure to provide an appropriate standard of review for that section - should not be imported into ERISA on a wholesale basis. The raison d'etre for the LMRA standard - the need for a jurisdictional basis in benefits denial suits against joint labor-management pension plan trustees whose decisions are not expressly made reviewable by the LMRA - is not present in ERISA, which explicitly authorizes suits against fiduciaries and plan administrators to remedy statutory violations, including breaches of fiduciary duty and lack of compliance with plans. Without this jurisdictional analogy, LMRA principles offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard insofar as 1132 (a)(1)(B) is concerned. Pp. 108-110. </s> (b) Principles of the law of trusts - which must guide the present determination under ERISA's language and legislative history and this Court's decisions interpreting the statute - establish that a denial of benefits challenged under 1132(a)(1)(B) must be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the plan's terms, in which cases a deferential standard of review is appropriate. The latter exception cannot aid Firestone, since there is no evidence that under the termination pay plan the administrator has the power to construe uncertain plan terms or that eligibility determinations are to be given deference. Firestone's argument that plan interpretation is inherently discretionary is belied by other settled trust law principles whereby courts construe trust agreements without deferring to either party's interpretation. Moreover, ERISA provisions that define a fiduciary as one who "exercises any discretionary authority," give him control over the plan's operation and administration, and require that he provide a "full and fair review" of claim denials cannot be interpreted to empower him to exercise all his authority in a discretionary manner. Adopting Firestone's interpretation would afford employees and their beneficiaries less protection than they received under pre-ERISA cases, which applied a de novo standard in interpreting plans, a result that Congress could not have intended in light of ERISA's stated purpose of "promot[ing] the interest of employees and their beneficiaries." The fact that, after ERISA's passage, Congress failed to act upon a bill to amend 1132 to provide de novo review of benefits denial decisions does not indicate congressional approval of the arbitrary and capricious standard that had by then been adopted by most courts, since the bill's demise may have resulted from events having nothing to do with Congress' views on the relative merits of the two [489 U.S. 101, 103] standards, and since the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one. Firestone's assertion that the de novo standard would impose higher administrative and litigation costs on plans and thereby discourage employers from creating plans in contravention of ERISA's spirit is likewise unpersuasive, since there is nothing to foreclose parties from agreeing upon a narrower standard of review, and since the threat of increased litigation is not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a de novo standard. Those reasons have nothing to do with the concern for impartiality that guided the Court of Appeals, and the de novo standard applies regardless of whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded and whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a conflict of interest. If a plan gives discretion to such an official, however, the conflict must be weighed as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. Pp. 110-115. </s> 2. A "participant" entitled to disclosure under 1024(b)(4) and to damages for failure to disclose under 1132(c)(1)(B) does not include a person who merely claims to be, but is not, entitled to a plan benefit. The Court of Appeals' interpretation to the contrary strays far from the statutory language, which does not say that all "claimants" are entitled to disclosure; begs the question of who is a "participant"; and renders the 1002(7) definition of "participant" superfluous. Rather, that definition of a "participant" as "any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible" for benefits must be naturally read to mean either an employee in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment, or a former employee who has a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or a colorable claim to vested benefits. Moreover, a claimant must have a colorable claim that (1) he will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future in order to establish that he "may be eligible." This view attributes conventional meanings to the statutory language, since the "may become eligible" phrase clearly encompasses all employees in covered employment and former employees with a colorable claim to vested benefits, but simply does not apply to a former employee who has neither a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment nor a colorable claim to vested benefits. Congress' purpose in enacting the ERISA disclosure provisions - ensuring that the individual participant knows exactly where he stands - will not be thwarted by this natural reading of "participant," since a rational plan administrator or fiduciary faced with the possibility of $100-a-day penalties under 1132(c)(1)(B) for failure to disclose would likely opt to provide a claimant with the requested information if there were any doubt that he was a participant, especially since the claimant could be required to pay the reasonable [489 U.S. 101, 104] costs of producing the information under 1024(b)(4) and Department of Labor regulations. Since the Court of Appeals did not attempt to determine whether respondents were "participants" with respect to the plans about which they sought information, it must do so on remand. Pp. 115-118. </s> 828 F.2d 134, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 119. </s> Martin Wald argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James D. Crawford, Deena Jo Schneider, Steve D. Shadowen, and Thomas M. Forman. </s> David M. Silberman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Laurence Gold, Paula R. Markowitz, and Bruce R. Lerner. </s> Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, George R. Salem, Charles I. Hadden, and Jeffrey A. Hennemuth. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Council of Life Insurance et al. by Phillip E. Stano, Jack H. Blaine, and David J. Larkin, Jr.; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Rex E. Lee, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the ERISA Industry Committee by John M. Vine, Harris Weinstein, and Elliott Schulder; and for the Travelers Insurance Co. by Carol H. Jewett. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association by Paul H. Tobias; and for the Pension Rights Center by Karen W. Ferguson and Terisa E. Chaw. </s> Christopher G. Mackaronis and Cathy Ventrell-Monsees filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons as amicus curiae. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents two questions concerning the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. [489 U.S. 101, 105] 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. First, we address the appropriate standard of judicial review of benefit determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA. Second, we determine which persons are "participants" entitled to obtain information about benefit plans covered by ERISA. </s> I </s> Late in 1980, petitioner Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (Firestone) sold, as going concerns, the five plants composing its Plastics Division to Occidental Petroleum Company (Occidental). Most of the approximately 500 salaried employees at the five plants were rehired by Occidental and continued in their same positions without interruption and at the same rates of pay. At the time of the sale, Firestone maintained three pension and welfare benefit plans for its employees: a termination pay plan, a retirement plan, and a stock purchase plan. Firestone was the sole source of funding for the plans and had not established separate trust funds out of which to pay the benefits from the plans. All three of the plans were either "employee welfare benefit plans" or "employee pension benefit plans" governed (albeit in different ways) by ERISA. By operation of law, Firestone itself was the administrator, 29 U.S.C. 1002(16)(A)(ii), and fiduciary, 1002(21)(A), of each of these "unfunded" plans. At the time of the sale of its Plastics Division, Firestone was not aware that the termination pay plan was governed by ERISA, and therefore had not set up a claims procedure, 1133, nor complied with ERISA's reporting and disclosure obligations, 1021-1031, with respect to that plan. </s> Respondents, six Firestone employees who were rehired by Occidental, sought severance benefits from Firestone under the termination pay plan. In relevant part, that plan provides as follows: </s> "If your service is discontinued prior to the time you are eligible for pension benefits, you will be given termination pay if released because of a reduction in work [489 U.S. 101, 106] force or if you become physically or mentally unable to perform your job. </s> "The amount of termination pay you will receive will depend on your period of credited company service." </s> Several of the respondents also sought information from Firestone regarding their benefits under all three of the plans pursuant to certain ERISA disclosure provisions. See 1024(b)(4), 1025(a). Firestone denied respondents severance benefits on the ground that the sale of the Plastics Division to Occidental did not constitute a "reduction in work force" within the meaning of the termination pay plan. In addition, Firestone denied the requests for information concerning benefits under the three plans. Firestone concluded that respondents were not entitled to the information because they were no longer "participants" in the plans. </s> Respondents then filed a class action on behalf of "former, salaried, non-union employees who worked in the five plants that comprised the Plastics Division of Firestone." Complaint § 9, App. 94. The action was based on 1132(a)(1), which provides that a "civil action may be brought . . . by a participant or beneficiary [of a covered plan] . . . (A) for the relief provided for in [ 1132(c)], [and] (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan." In Count I of their complaint, respondents alleged that they were entitled to severance benefits because Firestone's sale of the Plastics Division to Occidental constituted a "reduction in work force" within the meaning of the termination pay plan. Complaint §§ 23-44, App. 98-104. In Count VII, respondents alleged that they were entitled to damages under 1132 (c) because Firestone had breached its reporting obligations under 1025(a). Complaint §§ 87-94, App. 104-106. </s> The District Court granted Firestone's motion for summary judgment. 640 F. Supp. 519 (ED Pa. 1986). With respect to Count I, the District Court held that Firestone had satisfied its fiduciary duty under ERISA because its decision not to pay severance benefits to respondents under the termination [489 U.S. 101, 107] pay plan was not arbitrary or capricious. Id., at 521-526. With respect to Count VII, the District Court held that, although 1024(b)(4) imposes a duty on a plan administrator to respond to written requests for information about the plan, that duty extends only to requests by plan participants and beneficiaries. Under ERISA a plan participant is "any employee or former employee . . . who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan." 1002(7). A beneficiary is "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." 1002(8). The District Court concluded that respondents were not entitled to damages under 1132(c) because they were not plan "participants" or "beneficiaries" at the time they requested information from Firestone. 640 F. Supp., at 534. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Counts I and VII. 828 F.2d 134 (CA3 1987). With respect to Count I, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that most federal courts have reviewed the denial of benefits by ERISA fiduciaries and administrators under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id., at 138 (citing cases). It noted, however, that the arbitrary and capricious standard had been softened in cases where fiduciaries and administrators had some bias or adverse interest. Id., at 138-140. See, e. g., Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-712 (CA9 1985) (where "the employer's denial of benefits to a class avoids a very considerable outlay [by the employer], the reviewing court should consider that fact in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review," and "[l]ess deference should be given to the trustee's decision"). The Court of Appeals held that where an employer is itself the fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded benefit plan, its decision to deny benefits should be subject to de novo judicial review. It reasoned that in such situations deference is unwarranted given the lack of assurance of impartiality on [489 U.S. 101, 108] the part of the employer. 828 F.2d, at 137-145. With respect to Count VII, the Court of Appeals held that the right to request and receive information about an employee benefit plan "most sensibly extend[s] both to people who are in fact entitled to a benefit under the plan and to those who claim to be but in fact are not." Id., at 153. Because the District Court had applied different legal standards in granting summary judgment in favor of Firestone on Counts I and VII, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. </s> We granted certiorari, 485 U.S. 986 (1988), to resolve the conflicts among the Courts of Appeals as to the appropriate standard of review in actions under 1132(a)(1)(B) and the interpretation of the term "participant" in 1002(7). We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. </s> II </s> ERISA provides "a panoply of remedial devices" for participants and beneficiaries of benefit plans. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985). Respondents' action asserting that they were entitled to benefits because the sale of Firestone's Plastics Division constituted a "reduction in work force" within the meaning of the termination pay plan was based on the authority of 1132(a) (1)(B). That provision allows a suit to recover benefits due under the plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, and to obtain a declaratory judgment of future entitlement to benefits under the provisions of the plan contract. The discussion which follows is limited to the appropriate standard of review in 1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan interpretations. We express no view as to the appropriate standard of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA. </s> A </s> Although it is a "comprehensive and reticulated statute," Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., [489 U.S. 101, 109] 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980), ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review for actions under 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations. To fill this gap, federal courts have adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard developed under 61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C. 186(c), a provision of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA). See, e. g., Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (CA3 1984); Bayles v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99-100, and n. 3 (CA5 1979). In light of Congress' general intent to incorporate much of LMRA fiduciary law into ERISA, see NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 332 (1981), and because ERISA, like the LMRA, imposes a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries and plan administrators, Firestone argues that the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard should apply to ERISA actions. See Brief for Petitioners 13-14. A comparison of the LMRA and ERISA, however, shows that the wholesale importation of the arbitrary and capricious standard into ERISA is unwarranted. </s> In relevant part, 29 U.S.C. 186(c) authorizes unions and employers to set up pension plans jointly and provides that contributions to such plans be made "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families and dependents." The LMRA does not provide for judicial review of the decisions of LMRA trustees. Federal courts adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard both as a standard of review and, more importantly, as a means of asserting jurisdiction over suits under 186(c) by beneficiaries of LMRA plans who were denied benefits by trustees. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (CA7 1987) ("[W]hen a plan provision as interpreted had the effect of denying an application for benefits unreasonably, or as it came to be said, arbitrarily and capriciously, courts would hold that the plan as `structured' was not for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees, so that the denial of [489 U.S. 101, 110] benefits violated [ 186(c)])." See also Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 Duquesne L. Rev. 1033, 1037-1039 (1985). Unlike the LMRA, ERISA explicitly authorizes suits against fiduciaries and plan administrators to remedy statutory violations, including breaches of fiduciary duty and lack of compliance with benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), 1132(f). See generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 -57 (1987) (describing scope of 1132(a)). Thus, the raison d'etre for the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard - the need for a jurisdictional basis in suits against trustees - is not present in ERISA. See Note, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 986, 994, n. 40 (1986). Without this jurisdictional analogy, LMRA principles offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard insofar as 1132(a)(1)(B) is concerned. </s> B </s> ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law. See, e. g., 29 U.S.C. 1002(7) ("participant"), 1002(8) ("beneficiary"), 1002(21)(A) ("fiduciary"), 1103(a) ("trustee"), 1104 ("fiduciary duties"). ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. 1101-1114, "codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts." H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 11 (1973). Given this language and history, we have held that courts are to develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, supra, at 56. See also Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 , n. 26 (1983) ("`[A] body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans'") (quoting 129 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)). [489 U.S. 101, 111] In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under 1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985). </s> Trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts 187 (1959) ("Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion"). See also G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees 560, pp. 193-208 (2d rev. ed. 1980). A trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful terms, and in such circumstances the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable. Id., 559, at 169-171. Whether "the exercise of a power is permissive or mandatory depends upon the terms of the trust." 3 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts 187, p. 14 (4th ed. 1988). Hence, over a century ago we remarked that "[w]hen trustees are in existence, and capable of acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in the exercise of a discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act." Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724 -725 (1875) (emphasis added). See also Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., supra, at 568 ("The trustees' determination that the trust documents authorize their access to records here in dispute has significant weight, for the trust agreement explicitly provides that `any construction [of the agreement's provisions] adopted by the Trustees in good faith shall be binding upon the Union, Employees, and Employers'"). Firestone can seek no shelter in these principles of trust law, however, for there is no evidence that under Firestone's termination pay plan the administrator has the power to construe uncertain terms or that eligibility determinations are to be given deference. See Brief for Respondents [489 U.S. 101, 112] 24-25; Reply Brief for Petitioners 7, n. 2; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-15, n. 11. </s> Finding no support in the language of its termination pay plan for the arbitrary and capricious standard, Firestone argues that as a matter of trust law the interpretation of the terms of a plan is an inherently discretionary function. But other settled principles of trust law, which point to de novo review of benefit eligibility determinations based on plan interpretations, belie this contention. As they do with contractual provisions, courts construe terms in trust agreements without deferring to either party's interpretation. "The extent of the duties and powers of a trustee is determined by the rules of law that are applicable to the situation, and not the rules that the trustee or his attorney believes to be applicable, and by the terms of the trust as the court may interpret them, and not as they may be interpreted by the trustee himself or by his attorney." 3 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts 201, at 221 (emphasis added). A trustee who is in doubt as to the interpretation of the instrument can protect himself by obtaining instructions from the court. Bogert & Bogert, supra, 559, at 162-168; Restatement (Second) of Trusts 201, Comment b (1959). See also United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399 (1973). The terms of trusts created by written instruments are "determined by the provisions of the instrument as interpreted in light of all the circumstances and such other evidence of the intention of the settlor with respect to the trust as is not inadmissible." Restatement (Second) of Trusts 4, Comment d (1959). </s> The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA. Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits before the enactment of ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If the plan did not give the employer or administrator discretionary or final authority to construe uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any other contract claim - [489 U.S. 101, 113] by looking to the terms of the plan and other manifestations of the parties' intent. See, e. g., Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A. 2d 866 (Del. 1969); Atlantic Steel Co. v. Kitchens, 228 Ga. 708, 187 S. E. 2d 824 (1972); Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N. E. 2d 878 (1937). </s> Despite these principles of trust law pointing to a de novo standard of review for claims like respondents', Firestone would have us read ERISA to require the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to such claims. ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of [a] plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets." 29 U.S.C. 1002(21) (A)(i). A fiduciary has "authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan," 1102(a)(1), and must provide a "full and fair review" of claim denials, 1133(2). From these provisions, Firestone concludes that an ERISA plan administrator, fiduciary, or trustee is empowered to exercise all his authority in a discretionary manner subject only to review for arbitrariness and capriciousness. But the provisions relied upon so heavily by Firestone do not characterize a fiduciary as one who exercises entirely discretionary authority or control. Rather, one is a fiduciary to the extent he exercises any discretionary authority or control. Cf. United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 573 -574 (1982) (common law of trusts did not alter nondiscretionary obligation of trustees to enforce eligibility requirements as required by LMRA trust agreement). </s> ERISA was enacted "to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans," Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983), and "to protect contractually defined benefits," Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S., at 148 . See generally 29 U.S.C. 1001 (setting forth congressional findings and declarations of policy regarding ERISA). Adopting Firestone's [489 U.S. 101, 114] reading of ERISA would require us to impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted. Nevertheless, Firestone maintains that congressional action after the passage of ERISA indicates that Congress intended ERISA claims to be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard. At a time when most federal courts had adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a bill was introduced in Congress to amend 1132 by providing de novo review of decisions denying benefits. See H. R. 6226, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in Pension Legislation: Hearings on H. R. 1614 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 60 (1983). Because the bill was never enacted, Firestone asserts that we should conclude that Congress was satisfied with the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Brief for Petitioners 19-20. We do not think that this bit of legislative inaction carries the day for Firestone. Though "instructive," failure to act on the proposed bill is not conclusive of Congress' views on the appropriate standard of review. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837 , n. 12 (1983). The bill's demise may have been the result of events that had nothing to do with Congress' view on the propriety of de novo review. Without more, we cannot ascribe to Congress any acquiescence in the arbitrary and capricious standard. "[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). </s> Firestone and its amici also assert that a de novo standard would contravene the spirit of ERISA because it would impose much higher administrative and litigation costs and therefore discourage employers from creating benefit plans. See, e. g., Brief for American Council of Life Insurance et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11. Because even under the arbitrary and capricious standard an employer's denial of benefits could [489 U.S. 101, 115] be subject to judicial review, the assumption seems to be that a de novo standard would encourage more litigation by employees, participants, and beneficiaries who wish to assert their right to benefits. Neither general principles of trust law nor a concern for impartial decisionmaking, however, forecloses parties from agreeing upon a narrower standard of review. Moreover, as to both funded and unfunded plans, the threat of increased litigation is not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a de novo standard that we have already explained. </s> As this case aptly demonstrates, the validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue. Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that a denial of benefits challenged under 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan. Because we do not rest our decision on the concern for impartiality that guided the Court of Appeals, see 828 F.2d, at 143-146, we need not distinguish between types of plans or focus on the motivations of plan administrators and fiduciaries. Thus, for purposes of actions under 1132(a)(1)(B), the de novo standard of review applies regardless of whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest. Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a "facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion." Restatement (Second) of Trusts 187, Comment d (1959). </s> III </s> Respondents unsuccessfully sought plan information from Firestone pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4), one of [489 U.S. 101, 116] ERISA's disclosure provisions. That provision reads as follows: </s> "The administrator shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary plan description, plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or operated. The administrator may make a reasonable charge to cover the cost of furnishing such complete copies. The Secretary [of Labor] may by regulation prescribe the maximum amount which will constitute a reasonable charge under the preceding sentence." </s> When Firestone did not comply with their request for information, respondents sought damages under 29 U.S.C. 1132 (c)(1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), which provides that "[a]ny administrator . . . who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary . . . may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day." </s> Respondents have not alleged that they are "beneficiaries" as defined in 1002(8). See Complaint §§ 87-95, App. 104-106. The dispute in this case therefore centers on the definition of the term "participant," which is found in 1002(7): </s> "The term `participant' means any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." </s> The Court of Appeals noted that 1132(a)(1) allows suits for benefits "by a participant or beneficiary." Finding that it would be illogical to say that a person could only bring a claim for benefits if he or she was entitled to benefits, the Court of [489 U.S. 101, 117] Appeals reasoned that 1132(a)(1) should be read to mean that "`a civil action may be brought by someone who claims to be a participant or beneficiary.'" 828 F.2d, at 152. It went on to conclude that the same interpretation should apply with respect to 1024(b)(4): "A provision such as that one, entitling people to information on the extent of their benefits, would most sensibly extend both to people who are in fact entitled to a benefit under the plan and to those who claim to be but in fact are not." Id., at 153. </s> The Court of Appeals "concede[d] that it is expensive and inefficient to provide people with information about benefits - and to permit them to obtain damages if information is withheld - if they are clearly not entitled to the benefits about which they are informed." Ibid. It tried to solve this dilemma by suggesting that courts use discretion and not award damages if the employee's claim for benefits was not colorable or if the employer did not act in bad faith. There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the term "participant": it strays far from the statutory language. Congress did not say that all "claimants" could receive information about benefit plans. To say that a "participant" is any person who claims to be one begs the question of who is a "participant" and renders the definition set forth in 1002(7) superfluous. Indeed, respondents admitted at oral argument that "the words point against [them]." Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. </s> In our view, the term "participant" is naturally read to mean either "employees in, or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment," Saladino v. I. L. G. W. U. National Retirement Fund, 754 F.2d 473, 476 (CA2 1985), or former employees who "have . . . a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment" or who have "a colorable claim" to vested benefits, Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 (CA9) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986). In order to establish that he or she "may become eligible" for benefits, a claimant must have a colorable claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) eligibility requirements [489 U.S. 101, 118] will be fulfilled in the future. "This view attributes conventional meanings to the statutory language since all employees in covered employment and former employees with a colorable claim to vested benefits `may become eligible.' A former employee who has neither a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment nor a colorable claim to vested benefits, however, simply does not fit within the [phrase] `may become eligible.'" Saladino v. I. L. G. W. U. National Retirement Fund, supra, at 476. </s> We do not think Congress' purpose in enacting the ERISA disclosure provisions - ensuring that "the individual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan," H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 11 (1973) - will be thwarted by a natural reading of the term "participant." Faced with the possibility of $100 a day in penalties under 1132(c)(1)(B), a rational plan administrator or fiduciary would likely opt to provide a claimant with the information requested if there is any doubt as to whether the claimant is a "participant," especially when the reasonable costs of producing the information can be recovered. See 29 CFR 2520.104b-30(b) (1987) (the "charge assessed by the plan administrator to cover the costs of furnishing documents is reasonable if it is equal to the actual cost per page to the plan for the least expensive means of acceptable reproduction, but in no event may such charge exceed 25 cents per page"). </s> The Court of Appeals did not attempt to determine whether respondents were "participants" under 1002(7). See 828 F.2d, at 152-153. We likewise express no views as to whether respondents were "participants" with respect to the benefit plans about which they sought information. Those questions are best left to the Court of Appeals on remand. </s> For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> So ordered. [489 U.S. 101, 119] </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I join the judgment of the Court and Parts I and II of its opinion. I agree with its disposition but not all of its reasoning regarding Part III. </s> The Court holds that a person with a colorable claim is one who "`may become eligible' for benefits" within the meaning of the statutory definition of "participant," because, it reasons, such a claim raises the possibility that "he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits." Ante, at 117. The relevant portion of the definition, however, refers to an employee "who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit." There is an obvious parallelism here: one "may become" eligible by acquiring, in the future, the same characteristic of eligibility that someone who "is" eligible now possesses. And I find it contrary to normal usage to think that the characteristic of "being" eligible consists of "having prevailed in a suit for benefits." Eligibility exists not merely during the brief period between formal judgment of entitlement and payment of benefits. Rather, one is eligible whether or not he has yet been adjudicated to be - and, similarly, one can become eligible before he is adjudicated to be. It follows that the phrase "may become eligible" has nothing to do with the probabilities of winning a suit. I think that, properly read, the definition of "participant" embraces those whose benefits have vested, and those who (by reason of current or former employment) have some potential to receive the vesting of benefits in the future, but not those who have a good argument that benefits have vested even though they have not. </s> Applying the definition in this fashion would mean, of course, that if the employer guesses right that a person with a colorable claim is in fact not entitled to benefits, he can deny that person the information required to be provided under 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) without paying the $100-a-day damages assessable for breach of that obligation, 29 U.S.C. 1132(c) (1)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). Since, however, no employer [489 U.S. 101, 120] sensible enough to consult the law would be senseless enough to take that risk, giving the term its defined meaning would produce precisely the same incentive for disclosure as the Court's opinion. </s> [489 U.S. 101, 121]

United States Supreme Court FLANAGAN v. UNITED STATES(1984) No. 82-374 Argued: November 30, 1983Decided: February 21, 1984 </s> Petitioners, four Philadelphia police officers, were indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiring to deprive citizens of their civil rights and for committing substantive civil rights offenses. Prior to the return of the indictment, petitioners had retained a certain law firm to act as joint counsel, and continued the joint representation after the indictment, even though the indictment did not make the same allegations against all petitioners. After three of the petitioners moved to sever their case from the fourth petitioner's and after petitioners moved to dismiss the conspiracy count, the District Court granted the Government's motion to disqualify the law firm from its multiple representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, because the disqualification order was appealable prior to trial as a collateral order. </s> Held: </s> The disqualification order was not immediately appealable under 1291, and hence the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review the order prior to entry of final judgment in the case. Pp. 263-270. </s> (a) The policy embodied in 1291, which limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to appeals from "final decisions of the district courts," is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions that do not terminate the litigation. This policy is at its strongest in the field of criminal law. Pp. 263-265. </s> (b) To come within the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule, a trial court order must (1) "conclusively determine the disputed question," (2) "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," and (3) "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 . A counsel disqualification order is not analogous to any of the three types of interlocutory orders - orders denying motions to reduce bail or to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds - that this Court has found immediately appealable in criminal cases as collateral-order exceptions. Nothing about a counsel disqualification order distinguishes it from the run of pretrial decisions that affect the rights of criminal defendants yet must await completion of trial court proceedings for review. Such an order fails to satisfy the [465 U.S. 259, 260] stringent Coopers & Lybrand conditions for qualification as an immediately appealable collateral order, and the overriding policies against interlocutory review in criminal cases apply in full. Pp. 265-270. </s> 679 F.2d 1072, reversed and remanded. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Edward H. Rubenstone argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Richard A. Sprague. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief was Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Richard G. Wilkins, and Peter D. Isakoff. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by James D. Crawford, Burt Neuborne, and Charles S. Sims; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Eugene G. Iredale and James M. Shellow. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), the Court held that a pretrial denial of a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable prior to trial under 28 U.S.C. 1291 as a final collateral order. The Court reserved the questions of the immediate appealability of pretrial denials of disqualification motions in criminal cases and of pretrial grants of disqualification motions in both criminal and civil cases. Id., at 372, n. 8. We decide today that a District Court's pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. </s> I </s> Petitioners are four police officers who formed a "grandpop" decoy squad in the Philadelphia Police Department. Petitioner Flanagan would pose as an aged derelict, a likely target for street criminals. When Flanagan gave the standard alarm, the other members of the decoy team would move in to make an arrest. [465 U.S. 259, 261] </s> A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted petitioners in September 1981. The indictment alleged that petitioners had conspired to make arrests without probable cause and had unlawfully arrested and abused eight people. One count of the indictment charged petitioners with conspiring to deprive citizens of their civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. 241. The remaining 12 counts charged petitioners, in various combinations, with committing substantive civil rights offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242. </s> Prior to the return of the indictment, petitioners had retained the law firm of Sprague and Rubenstone to act as joint counsel. Petitioners decided to continue the joint representation after the indictment was handed down, even though the indictment did not make the same allegations against all petitioners. Petitioners Keweshan, Landis, and McNamee, however, moved to sever their case from petitioner Flanagan's, arguing that the Government's evidence against Flanagan alone was so much greater than the evidence against them that severance was necessary to avoid prejudicial spillover. In addition, based on the asserted differences in their involvement in the activities alleged in the substantive counts of the indictment, petitioners moved to dismiss the conspiracy count. The Government responded by moving to disqualify Sprague and Rubenstone from its multiple representation of petitioners and by asking the court to inquire into the representation as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c). 1 </s> [465 U.S. 259, 262] </s> In early December 1981, following a hearing and briefing on the Government's motion, the District Court disqualified the law firm from participation in the case. The court found that no actual conflict of interest had yet developed but that there was a clear potential for conflict. Most notably, the severance motion and supporting papers showed that petitioner Flanagan's interests were likely to diverge from the other petitioners' interests. The District Court also found that petitioners had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived their right to conflict-free representation. The court concluded, however, that it had the authority and, indeed, the obligation under Rule 44(c) to disqualify counsel when "the likelihood is great that a potential conflict may escalate into an actual conflict." 527 F. Supp. 902, 909 (ED Pa. 1981). The court presumed that Sprague and Rubenstone had obtained privileged information from each of the petitioners and therefore disqualified the law firm from representing any of them. </s> Petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the District Court in June 1982. 679 F.2d 1072. Although jurisdiction was not challenged, the Court of Appeals noted that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the disqualification order was appealable prior to trial as a collateral order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The court went on to hold that the disqualification order was proper because an actual conflict of interest was very likely to arise. In July 1982 the court denied rehearing but stayed issuance of the mandate to permit filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. </s> Petitioners filed their petition in September 1982, one year after the grand jury had returned the indictment against them. They contended that disqualification of counsel of their choice after they had knowingly waived conflict-free representation deprived them of their Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and of their Fifth Amendment [465 U.S. 259, 263] due process right to present a common defense through joint counsel. We granted certiorari in January 1983. 459 U.S. 1101 . The parties briefed and argued both the merits and the jurisdictional question - whether the disqualification order was immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because we conclude that the court had no jurisdiction to review the disqualification order prior to entry of final judgment in the criminal case. 2 </s> II </s> "Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). Thus, the jurisdictional statute applicable to this case limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to appeals from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. 1291. This final judgment rule requires that "a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S., at 374 . In a criminal case the rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of sentence. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937). </s> The final judgment rule serves several important interests. It helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing [465 U.S. 259, 264] appellate-court interference with the numerous decisions they must make in the prejudgment stages of litigation. It reduces the ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals. It is crucial to the efficient administration of justice. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, supra, at 374. For these reasons, "[t]his Court has long held that the policy of Congress embodied in [ 1291] is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation . . . ." United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982). </s> The Court has also long held that "this policy is at its strongest in the field of criminal law." Ibid. More than 40 years ago the Court noted that the reasons for the final judgment rule are "especially compelling in the administration of criminal justice." Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 325. Promptness in bringing a criminal case to trial has become increasingly important as crime has increased, court dockets have swelled, and detention facilities have become overcrowded. </s> As the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial indicates, the accused may have a strong interest in speedy resolution of the charges against him. In addition, "there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). As time passes, the prosecution's ability to meet its burden of proof may greatly diminish: evidence and witnesses may disappear, and testimony becomes more easily impeachable as the events recounted become more remote. Delay increases the cost of pretrial detention and extends "the period during which defendants released on bail may commit other crimes." United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862 (1978). Delay between arrest and punishment prolongs public anxiety over community safety if a person accused of a serious crime is free on bail. It may also adversely affect the prospects for rehabilitation. See Barker v. Wingo, supra, at [465 U.S. 259, 265] 520. Finally, when a crime is committed against a community, the community has a strong collective psychological and moral interest in swiftly bringing the person responsible to justice. Prompt acquittal of a person wrongly accused, which forces prosecutorial investigation to continue, is as important as prompt conviction and sentence of a person rightly accused. Crime inflicts a wound on the community, and that wound may not begin to heal until criminal proceedings have come to an end. </s> The importance of the final judgment rule has led the Court to permit departures from the rule "only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all." Cobbledick v. United States, supra, at 324-325 (footnote omitted). The Court has allowed a departure only for the "limited category of cases falling within the `collateral order' exception delineated in Cohen . . . ." United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., supra, at 265. 3 To come within this "narrow exception," Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, supra, at 374, a trial court order must, at a minimum, meet three conditions. First, it "must conclusively determine the disputed question"; second, it must "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action"; third, it must "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted). </s> Because of the compelling interest in prompt trials, the Court has interpreted the requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases. The Court has found only three types of pretrial orders in criminal prosecutions to meet the [465 U.S. 259, 266] requirements. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S., at 265 . Each type involves "`an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.'" Id., at 266 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 860). </s> An order denying a motion to reduce bail may be reviewed before trial. The issue is finally resolved and is independent of the issues to be tried, and the order becomes moot if review awaits conviction and sentence. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). Orders denying motions to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds are likewise immediately appealable. Such orders finally resolve issues that are separate from guilt or innocence, and appellate review must occur before trial to be fully effective. The right guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause is more than the right not to be convicted in a second prosecution for an offense: it is the right not to be "placed in jeopardy" - that is, not to be tried for the offense. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). Similarly, the right guaranteed by the Speech or Debate Clause is more than the right not to be convicted for certain legislative activities: it is the right not to "be questioned" about them - that is, not to be tried for them. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979). Refusals to dismiss an indictment for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or of the Speech or Debate Clause, like denials of bail reduction, are truly final and collateral, and the asserted rights in all three cases would be irretrievably lost if review were postponed until trial is completed. </s> An order disqualifying counsel lacks the critical characteristics that make orders denying bail reduction or refusing to dismiss on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds immediately appealable. Unlike a request for bail reduction, a constitutional objection to counsel's disqualification is in no danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence. Moreover, it cannot be said that the right petitioners assert, whether based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth [465 U.S. 259, 267] Amendment or on the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, is a right not to be tried. Double jeopardy and speech or debate rights are sui generis in this regard. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S., at 860 , n. 7. Rather, just as the speedy trial right is merely a right not to be convicted at an excessively delayed trial, id., at 860-861, the asserted right not to have joint counsel disqualified is, like virtually all rights of criminal defendants, merely a right not to be convicted in certain circumstances. Unlike a double jeopardy or speech or debate claim, petitioners' claim "would be largely satisfied by an acquittal resulting from the prosecution's failure to carry its burden of proof." Id., at 859. See also United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., supra, at 268 (vindictive prosecution right fully protected by postconviction review). "Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S., at 325 . See also Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943). </s> A disqualification order thus is not analogous to any of the three types of interlocutory orders that this Court has found immediately appealable in criminal cases. Accordingly, Stack, Abney, and Helstoski provide no authority for petitioners' assertion that a disqualification order satisfies the three necessary conditions for coverage by the collateral-order exception. Nor does petitioners' jurisdictional assertion gain support from a direct inquiry into whether a disqualification order satisfies the three Coopers & Lybrand conditions. This is so regardless of the nature of the right to joint representation claimed by petitioners. 4 </s> Petitioners correctly concede that postconviction review of a disqualification order is fully effective to the extent that the asserted right to counsel of one's choice is like, for example, [465 U.S. 259, 268] the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Obtaining reversal for violation of such a right does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, ante, at 177-178, n. 8. Similarly, postconviction review is concededly effective to the extent that petitioners' asserted right is like the Sixth Amendment rights violated when a trial court denies appointment of counsel altogether, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), or denies counsel's request to be replaced because of a conflict of interest, see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). No showing of prejudice need be made to obtain reversal in these circumstances because prejudice to the defense is presumed. In sum, as petitioners concede, if establishing a violation of their asserted right requires no showing of prejudice to their defense, a pretrial order violating the right does not meet the third condition for coverage by the collateral-order exception: it is not "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." See supra, at 265. </s> If, on the other hand, petitioners' asserted right is one that is not violated absent some specifically demonstrated prejudice to the defense, a disqualification order still falls outside the coverage of the collateral-order exception. We need not consider, however, whether the third Coopers & Lybrand condition is satisfied - that is, whether postconviction review is plainly ineffective. It is sufficient to note that the second Coopers & Lybrand condition - that the order be truly collateral - is not satisfied if petitioners' asserted right is one requiring prejudice to the defense for its violation. </s> On this assumption, a disqualification order, though final, is not independent of the issues to be tried. Its validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is complete. The effect of the disqualification on the defense, and hence whether the asserted right has been violated, cannot be fairly assessed [465 U.S. 259, 269] until the substance of the prosecution's and defendant's cases is known. In this respect the right claimed by petitioners is analogous to the speedy trial right. In United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 859, 860, the Court concluded that because impairment of the defense is an important factor in judging whether a speedy trial violation has occurred, a denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is not separable from the issues at trial. The same conclusion applies to a disqualification order if prejudice to the defense is a necessary element of petitioners' claim. In these circumstances, the second Coopers & Lybrand condition for immediate appealability as a collateral order is not satisfied: the disqualification order does not resolve an "issue completely separate from the merits of the action." See supra, at 265. </s> In short, whether or not petitioners' claim requires a showing of prejudice, a disqualification order does not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order in a straight-forward application of the necessary conditions laid down in prior cases. Further, petitioners' claim does not justify expanding the small class of criminal case orders covered by the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule - either by eliminating any of the Coopers & Lybrand conditions or by interpreting them less strictly than the Court's cases have done. The costs of such expansion are great, and the potential rewards are small. </s> Unlike an appeal of a bail decision, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S., at 12 (opinion of Jackson, J.), an appeal of a disqualification order interrupts the trial. In criminal cases such interruption exacts a presumptively prohibitive price. See supra, at 264-265. Moreover, an appellate court's reversal of a disqualification order would not result in dismissal of the prosecution. The prosecution would continue, though only after long delay. The potential rewards of an immediate appeal are thus even smaller than they were in United States v. MacDonald, supra, and in United States v. Hollywood Motor [465 U.S. 259, 270] Car Co., supra, where the Court rejected claims of immediate appealability for orders denying motions to dismiss on speedy trial and vindictive prosecution grounds even though reversal of the orders would have led to dismissal of all or some charges. See also Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21 (1943) (no pretrial review of order denying motion to dismiss indictment for lack of jurisdiction); Heike v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 430 -431 (1910) (no pretrial review of order rejecting claim of statutory immunity from prosecution). Here, a delayed trial is a certain result of interlocutory appellate review. Allowing immediate appeal of a disqualification order thus would severely undermine the policies behind the final judgment rule. </s> III </s> "`[T]he final judgment rule is the dominant rule in federal appellate practice.' 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953), 113. Particularly is this true of criminal prosecutions." DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). Nothing about a disqualification order distinguishes it from the run of pretrial judicial decisions that affect the rights of criminal defendants yet must await completion of trial court proceedings for review. Such an order fails to satisfy the stringent conditions for qualification as an immediately appealable collateral order, and the overriding policies against interlocutory review in criminal cases apply in full. The exceptions to the final judgment rule in criminal cases are rare. An order disqualifying counsel is not one. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed. On remand the appeal should be dismissed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) provides: "Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged . . . or have been joined for trial . . ., and are represented by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant's right to counsel." </s> [Footnote 2 Among the Courts of Appeals, six Circuits in addition to the Third Circuit have allowed immediate appeal of pretrial disqualifications of criminal defense counsel. United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 19-20 (CA2 1982); United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126 (CA4 1981) (entertaining appeal without discussion of appealability question); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 275 (CA5 1975); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801 (CA6 1983); United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 968, n. 1 (CA8), cert. denied after remand and affirmance sub nom. Gustafson v. United States, 459 U.S. 834 (1982); United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 826 (CA11), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982). The Ninth Circuit has held that such orders are not immediately appealable. United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1110-1113 (1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). </s> [Footnote 3 Title 18 U.S.C. 3731 provides a statutory exception to the final judgment rule for certain orders suppressing or excluding evidence. That provision is not at issue in this case, which concerns only the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. 1291. This case likewise does not involve the finality problems that arise in appeals from state-court decisions to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1257. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). </s> [Footnote 4 We need not and do not express any view on the nature or existence of that right. </s> [465 U.S. 259, 271]

United States Supreme Court CARNLEY v. COCHRAN(1962) No. 158 Argued: Decided: April 30, 1962 </s> Petitioner, an illiterate, was tried in a Florida State Court without counsel and was convicted of serious noncapital offenses. The record was silent as to whether he had been offered and had waived counsel; but it clearly showed that he was incapable of conducting his own defense. Held: </s> 1. Petitioner's case was one in which the assistance of counsel, unless intelligently and understandingly waived by him, was a right guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 506-513. </s> 2. Presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible. To sustain a claim that counsel was waived, the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Pp. 513-517. </s> 123 So.2d 249, reversed and cause remanded. </s> By appointment of the Court, 368 U.S. 806 , Harold A. Ward III argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> James G. Mahorner, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent by special leave of Court, pro hac vice. With him on the brief was Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The petitioner, who was not afforded the assistance of counsel for his defense at his trial, claims that, for this reason, his conviction by a jury in the Court of Record for Escambia County, Florida, deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He obtained a provisional writ of habeas corpus from the Florida Supreme Court on his petition asserting that claim. [369 U.S. 506, 507] However, that court, on the petition, the respondent's return and the petitioner's reply - but without any hearing - discharged the writ. 123 So.2d 249. Since an important constitutional right is involved, we granted certiorari and appointed counsel to represent the petitioner in this Court. 366 U.S. 958, 368 U.S. 806. </s> The assistance of counsel might well have materially aided the petitioner in coping with several aspects of the case. He was charged with the noncapital offenses of incestuous sexual intercourse with his 13-year-old daughter and, in a separate count relating to the same acts, fondling a minor child, that is, assault in a lewd, lascivious, and indecent manner, upon a female child under the age of 14. At the time of trial two sets of Florida criminal statutes contained language reaching such behavior. Sections 741.22 and 800.04, Florida Statutes, 1959, were general criminal provisions separately defining the two offenses of incest and assault in a lewd, lascivious, and indecent manner. In addition, both offenses were included within the later enacted Chapter 801 of the Florida Statutes - Florida's so-called Child Molester Act - if the victim was 14 years of age or younger. 1 The Florida Supreme Court [369 U.S. 506, 508] plainly conceived the petitioner's prosecution for both offenses as having been under the Child Molester Act. 123 So.2d, at 250. While that is an obviously plausible view, a lawyer, but not a layman, might have perceived that because the Child Molester Act was invoked against the petitioner in respect of conduct elsewhere specifically defined as criminal, the 1954 decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Copeland v. State, 76 So.2d 137, raised doubts, under the Florida Constitution, of the validity of a prosecution based on the Act. 2 The picture is further complicated by the fact that the Child Molester Act had included no reference to incest prior to an amendment made subsequent to the petitioner's alleged offense. 3 </s> Establishing the basis of the petitioner's prosecution was vitally important for the protection of his rights. If the Child Molester Act was validly applied against the [369 U.S. 506, 509] petitioner, counsel could have materially assisted him by invoking on his behalf the special provisions of that law governing the disposition of defendants charged under it. Sections 741.22 and 800.04 authorize only jail sentences. In contrast, the Child Molester Act empowers the sentencing judge in a proper case to commit the convicted defendant to a Florida state hospital for treatment and rehabilitation. 4 That law also permits the accused to [369 U.S. 506, 510] petition for a psychiatric or psychological examination for the purpose of assisting the court in the trial of the case. 5 </s> There are thus present considerations of a sort often deemed sufficient to require the conclusion that a trial for crime without defense counsel did not measure up to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 446 -447; Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 531 -532; McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 114 -116; Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 -791. </s> Other aspects of this record also support petitioner's claim of the unfairness of trying him without affording him the help of a lawyer. As must generally be the case, the trial judge could not effectively discharge the roles of both judge and defense counsel. Here the record shows that the trial judge made efforts to assist the petitioner, but there were important omissions in the guidance he gave. He did not fully apprise the petitioner of vital [369 U.S. 506, 511] procedural rights of which laymen could not be expected to know but to which defense counsel doubtless would have called attention. The omissions are significant. See, e. g., Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 637 -638; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 776 -778; Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697, 702 -703. Despite the allegation in respondent's return that "the petitioners were carefully instructed by the trial court with regard to the rights guaranteed by both the Constitution of Florida and the Constitution of the United States 6 and with regard to the procedures to be followed during the course of the trial," it appears that, while petitioner was advised that he need not testify, he was not told what consequences might follow if he did testify. He chose to testify and his criminal record was brought out on his cross-examination. For defense lawyers, it is commonplace to weigh the risk to the accused of the revelation on cross-examination of a prior criminal record, when advising an accused whether to take the stand in his own behalf; for petitioner, the question had to be decided in ignorance of this important consideration. Nor does it appear that the trial judge advised the petitioner of his right to examine prospective jurors on voir dire, or of his right to submit proposed instructions to the jury, or of his right to object to the instructions that were given. </s> Other circumstances attending this case only serve to accentuate the unfairness of trial without counsel. Petitioner is illiterate. He did not interpose a single objection during the trial. The only two witnesses against him were his daughter and a 15-year-old son. Although both petitioner and his wife testified that they had experienced disciplinary problems with the children, and thus clearly revealed a possibly significant avenue for impeachment of [369 U.S. 506, 512] the children's testimony, there was no cross-examination worthy of the name. 7 </s> We hold that petitioner's case was one in which the assistance of counsel, unless intelligently and understandingly [369 U.S. 506, 513] waived by him, was a right guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> We must therefore consider whether the petitioner did intelligently and understandingly waive the assistance of counsel. The record does not show that the trial judge offered and the petitioner declined counsel. Cf. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160 -161. Nevertheless, the State Supreme Court imputed to petitioner the waiver of the benefit of counsel on a ground stated in the court's opinion as follows: "If the record shows that defendant did not have counsel . . ., it will be presumed that defendant waived the benefit of counsel . . . ." 123 So.2d ___, at 251. This might mean that the petitioner could have suffered no constitutional deprivation if he had not formally requested counsel, and that failure to make such a request is to be presumed unless the record shows the contrary. But it is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request. 8 In McNeal v. Culver, supra, the petitioner's allegation that he had requested counsel was countered by a denial in the return that "petitioner's constitutional rights were violated by the court's alleged refusal to appoint counsel in his behalf," and the State Supreme Court noted that the record was silent as to any request. We held that when the Constitution grants protection against criminal proceedings without the assistance of counsel, counsel must be furnished "whether or not the accused requested the appointment of counsel. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 ." 365 U.S., at 111 , n. 1. See Rice v. Olson, supra, at 788; Gibbs v. Burke, supra, at 780. [369 U.S. 506, 514] </s> However, the Florida Supreme Court may not have meant that the constitutional right to counsel depends upon a formal request. The court may have meant that from the very fact that no counsel was present, it would be assumed that the trial judge made an offer of counsel which the petitioner declined. 9 Or, it may have meant that it would assume simply that petitioner knew of his right to counsel and was willing to forego it. Of course, the validity of such presumptions is immediately called in question because the accused has no way of protecting against them during his trial except by requesting counsel - a formality upon which we have just said his right may not be made to depend. Nor is it an answer to say that he may counter such presumptions on collateral attack by showing - if he can - that he had not in fact agreed, or been willing, to be tried without counsel. To cast such a burden on the accused is wholly at war with the standard of proof of waiver of the right to counsel which we laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 -465: </s> "It has been pointed out that `courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we `do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' </s> . . . . . </s> "The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused - whose life or liberty is at stake - is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty [369 U.S. 506, 515] responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record." </s> We have held the principles declared in Johnson v. Zerbst equally applicable to asserted waivers of the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings. In Rice v. Olson, supra, the petitioner had pleaded guilty to a burglary charge. He did not claim that he had requested counsel, but alleged that he had not been advised of his right to the assistance of counsel and that he had not waived that right. In affirming the denial of relief, the State Supreme Court wrote that "`It is not necessary that there be a formal waiver; and a waiver will ordinarily be implied where accused appears without counsel and fails to request that counsel be assigned to him, particularly where accused voluntarily pleads guilty.'" We held that even when there had been a guilty plea such an implication, treated as a conclusive presumption, was "inconsistent with our interpretation of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that "A defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to the benefit of counsel, and a request for counsel is not necessary." 324 U.S., at 788 . However, we recognized in Rice v. Olson that, although the Fourteenth Amendment would not countenance any presumption of waiver from the appearance of the accused without counsel and the silence of the record as to a request, the entry of the guilty plea might have raised a fact issue as to whether the accused did not intelligently and understandingly waive his constitutional right. We held that a hearing was required since the facts were in [369 U.S. 506, 516] dispute. In the present case, however, there was no guilty plea, and the return to the writ does not allege an affirmative waiver. 10 Therefore, there is no disputed fact question requiring a hearing. Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver. </s> Neither Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 , nor Moore v. Michigan, supra, is in any way inconsistent with our holding and disposition here. In Bute, in which the petitioner pleaded guilty without having requested counsel, it was alleged that he had not been advised of his right to counsel. The Court held that there had been no denial of a constitutional right, but it expressly disclaimed a waiver rationale. It decided simply that the nature of the charge and the circumstances attending the reception of the guilty plea, as recited in that record, were not such as to call into play any constitutionally protected right to counsel. In Moore, the record showed clearly that the petitioner had expressly declined an offer of counsel by the trial judge, and we held that the accused had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his acquiescence was not sufficiently understanding and intelligent to amount to an effective waiver. But no such burden can be imposed upon an accused unless the record - or a hearing, [369 U.S. 506, 517] where required - reveals his affirmative acquiescence. Where, as in this case, the constitutional infirmity of trial without counsel is manifest, and there is not even an allegation, much less a showing, of affirmative waiver, the accused is entitled to relief from his unconstitutional conviction. </s> The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Fla. Stat., 1959, 741.22: </s> "Punishment for incest. - Persons within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited or declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry or commit adultery or fornication with each other, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding twenty years, or in the county jail not exceeding one year." </s> Fla. Stat., 1959, 800.04: </s> "Lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of child. - Any person who shall handle, fondle or make an assault upon any male or female child under the age of fourteen years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of such child, without intent to commit rape where such child is female, shall be deemed guilty of [369 U.S. 506, 508] a felony and punished by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail for not more than ten years." </s> Fla. Stat., 1959, 801.02: </s> "Definitions. - An offense under the provisions of this chapter shall include attempted rape, sodomy, attempted sodomy, crimes against nature, attempted crimes against nature, lewd and lascivious behavior, incest and attempted incest, assault (when a sexual act is completed or attempted) and assault and battery (when a sexual act is completed or attempted), when said acts are committed against, to or with a person fourteen years of age or under." </s> [Footnote 2 In the Copeland case, supra, the Florida Supreme Court held that the inclusion of rape in the Child Molester Act - with its attendant alteration in the consequences of that offense when committed against a child of 14 or younger - ran afoul of the State Constitution because the Act embraced 11 distinct crimes separately dealt with in other statutes, because the Act failed to set forth at length the general rape provisions which were pro tanto amended, and because the title of the Act failed to give notice that the consequences of rape had been changed. But see Buchanan v. State, 111 So.2d 51, in which the District Court of Appeal upheld the Child Molester Act as applied to lewd and lascivious conduct. </s> [Footnote 3 Florida Laws, E. S. 1957, c. 57-1990. </s> [Footnote 4 Fla. Stat., 1959, 801.03 (1): </s> "Powers and duties of judge after convictions. - </s> "(1) When any person has been convicted of an offense within the meaning of this chapter, it shall be within the power and jurisdiction of the trial judge to: </s> "(a) Sentence said person to a term of years not to exceed twenty five years in the state prison at Raiford. </s> "(b) Commit such person for treatment and rehabilitation to the Florida state hospital, or to the hospital or the state institution to which he would be sent as provided by law because of his age or color provided the hospital or institution possesses a maximum security facility as prescribed by the board of commissioners of state institutions. When, as provided for in this law, there shall have been created and established a Florida research and treatment center then the trial judge shall, instead of committing a person to the Florida state hospital, commit such person instead to the Florida research and treatment center. In any such case the court may, in its discretion, stay further criminal proceedings or defer the imposition of sentence pending the discharge of such person from further treatment in accordance with the procedure as outlined in this chapter." </s> Fla. Stat., 1959, 801.08: </s> "Execution of judgment may be suspended; probation; requirements. - </s> "(1) The trial judge under whose jurisdiction a conviction is obtained may suspend the execution of judgment and place the defendant upon probation. </s> "(2) The trial court placing a defendant on probation may at any time revoke the order placing such defendant on probation and impose such sentence or commitment as might have been imposed at the time of conviction. [369 U.S. 506, 510] </s> "(3) No defendant shall be placed on probation or continue on probation until the court is satisfied that the defendant will take regular psychiatric, psychotherapeutic or counseling help, and the individual helping the defendant shall make written reports at intervals of not more than six months to the court and the probation officer in charge of the case. The costs, fees and charges for treatment of a defendant on probation shall not be a charge of the county where the defendant was tried." </s> [Footnote 5 Fla. Stat., 1959, 801.10: </s> "Examination; petition for, court order. - When any person is charged with an offense within the purview of this chapter, said person may petition the court for a psychiatric and psychological examination as heretofore set out and the written report shall be filed with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the offense for the purpose of assisting the court in the trial of the case. The court may, of its own initiative, or upon petition of an interested person, order such examination and report as heretofore set out." </s> [Footnote 6 Emphasis in original. </s> [Footnote 7 The wife testified: "We tried to be firm with them, but it seemed like the more firm we got, these two older kids, they couldn't stand the pressure, so they would, every time that their Daddy would get after them or something or other about some of their doings, well, that oldest boy would say, `Well, Daddy, you will sure regret it. I will get even with you one way or the other,' and also the girl would get mad and flirtified and she would almost have the same opinion." </s> The entire cross-examination of both witnesses by petitioner and by his wife, who was a codefendant, is as follows: </s> "CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. WILLARD CARNLEY: </s> "Q. Carol Jean, you say your mother, she went and made arrangements to get the casket for your sister? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. You are right sure now that she did? </s> "A. I am sure. </s> "Q. Well, I will tell the Court, my wife was out at Mr. Joe Gayfer's house - </s> "THE COURT: Wait a minute, sir, you are testifying. You will have a chance to testify when the State rests. Any questions you wish to ask your daughter, you are welcome to do it. </s> "CROSS EXAMINATION BY MRS. PEARL CARNLEY: </s> "Q. Carol Jean, don't you recall after you got age of maturity that Mother tried to tell you right from wrong and always teach you right from wrong? </s> "A. Yes, you have taught me right from wrong. </s> "THEREUPON the witness was excused." </s> "CROSS EXAMINATION BY MRS. CARNLEY: </s> "Q. J. W., at this period of time, did you realize whenever we was up there at Century of your Dad's sickness from the time we moved up there until it was springtime, and after he was sick from his stomach that he taken a serious attack down by reason of his employment? </s> "A. Yes, I realize he said he was sick. He was supposed to be sick. I know that. </s> "THEREUPON the witness was excused." </s> [Footnote 8 For this reason, there is no occasion to hold a hearing in this case to settle the fact issue raised by the petition and return as to whether the petitioner requested counsel. </s> [Footnote 9 Or that the trial judge was justified in believing that the accused knew perfectly well of his right to counsel, and that it was unnecessary to make an explicit offer and to secure the accused's rejection of the offer. </s> [Footnote 10 Petitioner's allegation that he requested counsel is, obviously, tantamount to a denial of waiver. The return's denial of a request is not, however, for reasons already canvassed, the equivalent of an allegation of waiver. </s> The return alleged that the trial judge instructed petitioner as to his constitutional rights, but this allegation claimed support in the transcript, inspection of which reveals no instruction as to any constitutional right except the right not to testify. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring. </s> I concur in the Court's judgment of reversal and agree for the reasons stated in its opinion that petitioner was, even under the constitutional doctrine announced in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , entitled to be represented by counsel. That case, decided in 1942, held that an indigent defendant charged with crime in a state court did not have a right under the Federal Constitution to be provided with counsel unless this Court could say "by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case" that the refusal to provide counsel for the particular defendant constituted "a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice . . . ." Id., at 462. I dissented from the Court's denial of counsel and its announcement of what I considered to be such an impossibly vague and unpredictable standard. Among other [369 U.S. 506, 518] grounds I thought the defendant in that case entitled to counsel because of my belief that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." That is still my view. </s> Twenty years' experience in the state and federal courts with the Betts v. Brady rule has demonstrated its basic failure as a constitutional guide. Indeed, it has served not to guide but to confuse the courts as to when a person prosecuted by a State for crime is entitled to a lawyer. Little more could be expected, however, of a standard which imposes upon courts nothing more than the perplexing responsibility of appointing lawyers for an accused when a trial judge believes that a failure to do so would be "shocking to the universal sense of justice." To be sure, in recent years this Court has been fairly consistent in assuring indigent defendants the right to counsel. As the years have gone on we have been compelled even under the Betts rule to reverse more and more state convictions either for new trial or for hearing to determine whether counsel had been erroneously denied 1 - a result that in my judgment is due to a growing recognition of the fact that our Bill of Rights is correct in assuming that no layman should be compelled to defend himself in a criminal [369 U.S. 506, 519] prosecution. But all defendants who have been convicted of crime without the benefit of counsel cannot possibly bring their cases to us. And one need only look at the records of the right-to-counsel cases since Betts v. Brady in both state and federal courts to understand the capriciousness with which the "shocking to the universal sense of justice" standard bestows its protection upon persons accused of crime. 2 I think that now is the time to abandon this vague, fickle standard for determining the right to counsel of a person prosecuted for crime in a state court. We can do that by recognizing that defendants in state courts have by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment the same unequivocal right to counsel as defendants in federal courts have been held to have by virtue of the Sixth Amendment. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 . For these and many other reasons, including those set out in McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117 , by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and joined in by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, I would overrule Betts v. Brady in this case. In so doing we would simply return to the holding of this Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 -69, where it was stated with reference to prosecution for crime in the state courts that the ". . . right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." I am aware that this statement was made in a capital case, but the Fourteenth Amendment [369 U.S. 506, 520] protects life, liberty, and property and I would hold that defendants prosecuted for crime are entitled to counsel whether it is their life, their liberty, or their property which is at stake in a criminal prosecution. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, while joining the opinion of the Court, also join this opinion. </s> [Footnote 1 Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 ; McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 ; Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 ; Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 ; Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 ; Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 ; Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 ; Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 ; De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 ; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 . But cf. Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 ; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 . </s> [Footnote 2 Compare, e. g., Flansburg v. Kaiser, 55 F. Supp. 959, aff'd on other grounds, 144 F.2d 917, with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 ; Parker v. Ellis, 258 F.2d 937, with Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 ; Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, with United States ex rel. Savini v. Jackson, 250 F.2d 349. Numerous other examples could of course be cited including the contrast between the decisions cited in note 1 and the lower court decisions which they reversed which had held that the denial of counsel had not been erroneous under the Betts v. Brady rule. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring. </s> While I join the opinion of the Court and the separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, I wish to add a word to the reasons MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and I gave in McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117 -119, for overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 . </s> Petitioner, an admitted illiterate, * was forced to try his case to a six-man jury. There is no record of the proceedings at which the jury was impaneled. There is nothing to show that petitioner was told of his right to challenge individual veniremen, or the panel as a whole, or that he challenged anyone for cause or exercised any of the six peremptory challenges granted him by Florida law. Fla. Stat., 1959, 913.08. </s> It is certain that he could have made no challenge to the panel as a whole. Such challenge must be in writing, [369 U.S. 506, 521] Fla. Stat., 1959, 913.01, and the Florida Supreme Court tells us he could not write. But even if he could, it is doubtful that he would have been able to show an improper method of selection or even discrimination, because he was confined for a lengthy period prior to trial, five months of which were alleged to have been spent in solitary confinement. He did not have an opportunity, therefore, to gather the factual evidence necessary to sustain a possible challenge to the panel. The Florida statute, moreover, explicitly requires that the written challenge specify the facts on which it is based. Ibid. </s> Had petitioner been able to write, and had he access to the facts, he still would not, in all probability, have been able to build a legal argument sufficient to challenge the panel. He is a man of low intelligence. Some of the grounds for challenging the panel that might have been invoked by petitioner turn on difficult questions of state law, as where it is alleged that the legislature has passed a special, or local, law providing for the summoning and impaneling of grand and petit jurors. Article III, 20, of the Florida Constitution prohibits such "special" laws. It is not always clear, though, whether a particular law is "special" or "general." See, e. g., Hysler v. State, 132 Fla. 200, 181 So. 350; 132 Fla. 209, 181 So. 354; State v. Pearson, 153 Fla. 314, 14 So.2d 565. The sophisticated nature of the arguments necessary to attack a law as "special" would almost always be beyond the comprehension of one unlearned in the law. </s> In Florida, a plea of abatement is the usual manner of testing the legality of a jury list. In some cases, a proceeding in mandamus has been deemed a proper remedy, as where it is claimed that the county commissioners have erred in the manner in which they selected the panel. Jackson v. Jordan, 101 Fla. 616, 135 So. 138. Often a simple oral challenge to an individual juror can achieve just as much, as where an accused contends a venireman [369 U.S. 506, 522] does not have the "qualifications required by law." Fla. Stat., 1959, 913.03 (1). Yet obviously an illiterate cannot be expected to know these niceties of criminal procedure. </s> Assuming that an accused does decide to challenge prospective veniremen, either peremptorily or for cause, he must then decide how to secure the maximum benefit from his peremptory challenges. Florida statutes provide at least 12 independent grounds for a challenge for cause. Fla. Stat., 1959, 913.03. Ignorance of a ground for challenge is no defense. Denmark v. State, 43 Fla. 182, 31 So. 269; McNish v. State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 So. 176; Webster v. State, 47 Fla. 108, 36 So. 584. Objections to qualifications of jurors not raised at the trial will not be considered on appeal. McNish v. State, supra; Crosby v. State, 90 Fla. 381, 106 So. 741. </s> Where the trial court excuses a juror on its own motion, the accused has a right to object. The objection must be timely made, and the grounds therefor clearly stated. It is too late to object once the juror has been excused. Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768. On appeal, the accused must be able to show that the action of the court was prejudicial, or constituted an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 45 Fla. 128, 34 So. 279; Peadon v. State, 46 Fla. 124, 35 So. 204. </s> The special difficulties facing an accused in a jury trial do not end with challenges to the panel or individual jurors. Florida prohibits the trial judge from commenting on the weight of the evidence, Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232; Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897; Seward v. State, 59 So.2d 529, or from expressing an opinion that the accused should be convicted, Wood v. State, 31 Fla. 221, 12 So. 539, lest he influence the jury in its decision. But if he did make such comment, and the accused took no exception, the error will be deemed waived on appeal (Surrency v. State, 48 Fla. 59, 37 So. [369 U.S. 506, 523] 575; Smith v. State, 65 Fla. 56, 61 So. 120), except where the interests of justice would not be served. Kellum v. State, 104 So.2d 99 (Fla. Ct. App. 3d Dist.). </s> Hearsay evidence takes on added importance in jury trials. It is excluded if prejudicial. Owens v. State, 65 Fla. 483, 62 So. 651; Alvarez v. State, 75 Fla. 286, 78 So. 272. But if admitted without objection, it is generally regarded as having been received by consent. Sims v. State, 59 Fla. 38, 52 So. 198. An objection after a question has been answered is sometimes held to come too late. Schley v. State, 48 Fla. 53, 37 So. 518; Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 So. 749; Sims v. State, supra. Yet a motion to strike may achieve the same result. Dickens v. State, 50 Fla. 17, 38 So. 909. In a rapid-fire exchange of questions and answers by the prosecution and a witness, a defendant without the assistance of counsel will oftentime find himself helpless to object or even to conceive grounds on which an objection to hearsay will lie. Indeed, what constitutes hearsay is itself a difficult question, on which judges may not always agree. See, e. g., Royal v. State, 127 Fla. 320, 170 So. 450. </s> Once the evidence is in, an accused in Florida has the right to have the jury instructed on the law of the case before any final arguments are made. "The Judge's charge following immediately upon the conclusion of the evidence may enable the jury to obtain a clearer and more accurate conception of their duties in the particular case than if they were required to wait until after the argument of counsel to hear the law of the case from the judge." Smithie v. State, 88 Fla. 70, 76, 101 So. 276, 278. This right is waived by a failure to take exception to the procedure adopted by the court. Defects in the instructions of the court will likewise be deemed waived, where the accused fails to make timely objection. White v. State, 122 So.2d 340 (Fla. Ct. App. 2d Dist.); Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473. [369 U.S. 506, 524] </s> Intricate procedural rules are not restricted to criminal trials in Florida. Similar rules, equally as complex and confusing to the layman, may be found in the criminal statutes of the other States. I assume that they might not be applied with the same vigor against a layman defending himself, as they would against one represented by a lawyer. Yet even so, the rule of Betts v. Brady projected in a jury trial faces a layman with a labyrinth he can never understand nor negotiate. </s> As a result, the jury system - pride of the English-speaking world - becomes a trap for the layman because he is utterly without ability to make it serve the ends of justice. </s> [Footnote * The Florida Supreme Court denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing. With respect to the allegation that both petitioner and his wife were illiterate and unable to defend themselves, the court admitted that the record showed conclusively that they were in fact illiterate. It concluded, however, that illiteracy alone did not necessarily import ignorance of the ordinary things of life, such as how to get money from a bank. Apparently classifying the conduct of a defense to a felony charge as one of the "commonplace things of life," the court concluded there was no showing petitioner or his wife "suffered in the slightest from lack of intelligence." 123 So.2d 249, 251. (Petitioner's wife joined in the proceedings below, but is not a party to the petition for certiorari.) </s> [369 U.S. 506, 525]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. GAINEY(1965) No. 13 Argued: October 15, 1964Decided: March 1, 1965 </s> Respondent was convicted of illegal possession of a still and carrying on the business of a distiller without a bond, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5601 (a) (1) and (4). The trial judge's instructions informed the jury of statutory provisions authorizing it to infer guilt from respondent's unexplained presence at the still site. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions as violative of due process requirements. Held: </s> 1. The statutory presumption in 5601 (b) (2) is constitutionally permissible since there is a rational connection between a defendant's unexplained presence at a still and the comprehensive crime of the illegal distilling operation. Pp. 65-68. </s> 2. The statute deprives the trial judge of none of his normal powers with respect to submitting the case to the jury or granting a judgment notwithstanding a verdict. P. 68. </s> 3. The statute does not prevent the jury from being instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt and the jury here was instructed that the statutory inference was not conclusive. Pp. 68-70. </s> 322 F.2d 292, reversed. </s> Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit. </s> Joseph H. Davis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was J. Sewell Elliott. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, respondent Jackie Gainey was convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. 5601 [380 U.S. 63, 64] (a) (1) (possession, custody or control of a set up, unregistered still and distilling apparatus) and 26 U.S.C. 5601 (a) (4) (carrying on "the business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law"). 1 In the course of his instructions the trial judge informed the jury of two statutory provisions which authorize a jury to infer guilt of the substantive offenses from the fact of a defendant's unexplained presence at the site of an illegal still. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit [380 U.S. 63, 65] reversed the convictions on the ground that these statutory inferences are unconstitutional, 3 because it thought the connection between unexplained presence at an illegal still and the substantive offenses of "possession" and "carrying on" is insufficiently rational to satisfy the due process requirements formulated by this Court in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 . We granted certiorari, sub nom. United States v. Barrett, to review the exercise of the grave power of annulling an Act of Congress. 375 U.S. 962 . </s> If either statutory inference is valid, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, because concurrent sentences were imposed by the District Court. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 195 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929). We find the inference authorized by 5601 (b) (2) constitutionally permissible, and therefore reverse the judgment without reaching the validity of 5601 (b) (1). </s> The legislative record shows that Congress enacted these provisions because of "the practical impossibility of proving . . . actual participation in the illegal activities except by inference drawn from [the defendant's] presence when the illegal acts were committed . . . ." 4 The statutes were passed against a backdrop of varying formulations [380 U.S. 63, 66] among the Circuits of the standards which should shape a trial judge's instructions to a jury in telling it what weight to accord the fact of a defendant's unexplained presence at an illegal still site. Long before 1958, the year the statutes were enacted, trial judges had been instructing juries that a defendant's presence at a still could be considered by them in determining whether the defendant had participated in carrying on the illegal operation. Barton v. United States, 267 F. 174, 175-176 (C. A. 4th Cir.). Compare Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 . The Fourth Circuit had endorsed such a charge. Barton v. United States, supra. In the Third and Fifth Circuits the precedents were less clear. See Graceffo v. United States, 46 F.2d 852 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Fowler v. United States, 234 F.2d 697, 699 (C. A. 5th Cir.). </s> The variations among the courts of appeals concerned the reasonableness of inferring guilt of the substantive offense from the fact of unexplained presence at the site of the criminal enterprise. It is that question which Congress has now resolved in favor of the established practice of trial judges to include the inference in their charges. 5 And it is the same question of reasonableness which the petitioner asks this Court to determine in passing on the constitutionality of 5601 (b) (2). </s> As the Court of Appeals correctly stated in this case, the constitutionality of the legislation depends upon the rationality of the connection "between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed." Tot v. United States, [380 U.S. 63, 67] 319 U.S. 463, 466 . The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it. As the record in the Circuits shows, courts have differed in assessing the weight to be placed upon the fact of the defendant's unexplained presence at a still. See United States v. Freeman, 286 F.2d 262 (C. A. 4th Cir.). Yet it is precisely when courts have been unable to agree as to the exact relevance of a frequently occurring fact in an atmosphere pregnant with illegality that Congress' resolution is appropriate. </s> The rationality of the inference provided by 5601 (b) (2) must be viewed in the context of the broad substantive offense it supports. Section 5601 (a) (4) proscribes "carrying on" the enterprise of illegal distillation - an offense which is one of the most comprehensive of the criminal statutes designed to stop the production and sale of untaxed liquor. See Vukich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666, 669 (C. A. 9th Cir.). Those who aid and abet the enterpriser come within the statute's reach by virtue of 18 U.S.C. 2 (1958 ed.). United States v. Giuliano, 263 F.2d 582 (C. A. 3d Cir.). Suppliers, haulers, and a host of other functionaries have been convicted under the statute. See United States v. Pritchard, 55 F. Supp. 201 (D.C. W. D. S. C.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 240 (C. A. 4th Cir.). Congress was undoubtedly aware that manufacturers of illegal liquor are notorious for the deftness with which they locate arcane spots for plying their trade. Legislative recognition of the implications of seclusion only confirms what the folklore teaches - that strangers to the illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of [380 U.S. 63, 68] secrecy. 6 We therefore hold that 5601 (b) (2) satisfies the test of Tot v. United States, supra. </s> But it is said that this statute is unconstitutional upon a different ground - that it impinges upon the trial judge's powers over the judicial proceeding. We cannot agree. Our Constitution places in the hands of the trial judge the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the jury trial, including the right to have a case withheld from the jury when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction. The statute before us deprives the trial judge of none of his normal judicial powers. We do not interpret the provision in the statute that unexplained "presence . . . shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" as in any way invading the province of the judge's discretion. The language permits the judge to submit a case to the jury on the basis of the accused's presence alone, and to this extent it constitutes congressional recognition that the fact of presence does have probative worth in the determination of guilt. But where the only evidence is of presence the statute does not require the judge to submit the case to the jury, nor does it preclude the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. And the Court of Appeals may still review the trial judge's denial of motions for a directed verdict or for a judgment n. o. v. </s> The statute does not prevent the jury from being "properly instructed on the standards for reasonable [380 U.S. 63, 69] doubt." Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 . In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: </s> "There is one other matter which I should mention. I charge you that the presence of defendants at a still, if proved, with or without flight therefrom, or attempted flight therefrom, if proved, would be a circumstance for you to consider along with all the other testimony in the case. Of course, the bare presence at a distillery and flight therefrom of an innocent man is not in and of itself enough to make him guilty. It is possible under the law for an innocent man to be present at a distillery, and it is possible for him to run when about to be apprehended, and such an innocent man ought never to be convicted, but presence at a distillery, if you think these men were present, is a circumstance to be considered along with all the other circumstances in the case in determining whether they were connected with the distillery or not. Did they have any equipment with them that was necessary at the distillery? What was the hour of day that they were there? Did the officers see them do anything? Did they make any statements? </s> "It is your duty to explore this case, analyze the evidence pro and con fairly. Presence at a still, together with other circumstances in the case, if they are sufficient in your opinion to exclude every reasonable conclusion except that they were there connected with the distillery, in an illegal manner, . . . carrying on the business as charged . . . . if you believe those things, would authorize you in finding the defendants guilty. </s> "And under a statute enacted by Congress a few years back, when a person is on trial for . . . carrying on the business of a distiller without giving bond as required by law, as charged in this case, and the [380 U.S. 63, 70] defendant is shown to have been at the site of the place . . . where and at the time when the business of a distiller was engaged in or carried on without bond having been given, under the law such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant by the evidence in the case and by proven facts and circumstances explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury. </s> "Now this does not mean that the presence of the defendant at the site and place at the time referred to requires the jury to convict the defendant, if the defendant by the evidence in the case, facts and circumstances proved, fails to explain his presence to the satisfaction of the jury. It simply means that a jury may, if it sees fit, convict upon such evidence, as it shall be deemed in law sufficient to authorize a conviction, but does not require such a result." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> The jury was thus specifically told that the statutory inference was not conclusive. "Presence" was one circumstance to be considered among many. Even if it found that the defendant had been present at the still, and that his presence remained unexplained, the jury could nonetheless acquit him if it found that the Government had not proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Holland v. United States, supra. In the absence of the statute, such an instruction to the jury would surely have been permissible. Cf. Wilson v. United States, supra. Furthermore, in the context of the instructions as a whole, we do not consider that the single phrase "unless the defendant by the evidence in the case and by proven facts and circumstances explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury" can be fairly understood as a comment on the petitioner's failure to [380 U.S. 63, 71] testify. 7 Cf. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 . The judge's overall reference was carefully directed to the evidence as a whole, with neither allusion nor innuendo based on the defendant's decision not to take the stand. </s> In McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 525 , the Court approved a proceeding which did no more than "accord to the evidence, if unexplained, its natural probative force." That is all that Congress has done here. We cannot find that the law it enacted violates the Constitution. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The evidence for the prosecution showed that an old Dodge truck with darkened headlights drove up to the site of a secluded still, hidden in a swamp in Dooly County, Georgia. The respondent, Jackie Gainey, left the truck, turned on a flashlight, and walked toward the still. There he was confronted by state and federal revenue agents. The respondent attempted to flee, but after a short chase, he and his waiting colleagues were apprehended. Since the trial, one of Gainey's co-defendants, Roy Lee Barrett, has died; the other, Cleveland Johns, elected to serve and has completed his sentence. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 5601 (b) (1) provides: "(1) Unregistered stills. "Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (1) the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus was set up without having been registered, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)." Section 5601 (b) (2) provides: "(2) Failure or refusal of distiller or rectifier to give bond. "Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)." These sections were introduced into the Code in 1958. The statutory inferences are modeled after 18 U.S.C. 545 (1958 ed.), originally 4 of the Smuggling Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 178, 179. Similar [380 U.S. 63, 65] wording appears in 21 U.S.C. 174 (1958 ed.), the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 614, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 . </s> [Footnote 3 A third count charged a violation of 5602, which prohibits carrying on the business of a distiller with intent to defraud the United States. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on this count also, and the Government did not seek review of this reversal. A fourth count, charging that the defendants, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5180 (1958 ed.), worked in a distillery on which no sign was placed showing the name of the person engaged in the distilling, resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal. </s> [Footnote 4 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means on Excise Tax Technical and Administrative Problems, Part 3, p. 95, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. </s> [Footnote 5 Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 , contributed to congressional concern. See Hearings, note 4, supra. But that case did not deal with the problem of presence alone as insufficient evidence where the substantive offense is "carrying on" the enterprise of illegal distillation. Bozza's conviction for "carrying on" the enterprise of illegal distillation was affirmed by this Court. </s> [Footnote 6 "Very few of the illicit distillers allow any one, except their most intimate friends, to approach their distilleries. Such places, as a rule, are forbidden ground, for the reason that when the violators are arrested it is a difficult matter to prove them guilty, when so few persons have ever seen them operating their distilleries." Atkinson, After the Moonshiners, By One of the Raiders, at p. 23. "The first requisite for an illicit still is a good stream of cool water. . . . "The next requisite is seclusion. It must be placed where no one ever travels, or even thinks of traveling." Id., at p. 18. </s> [Footnote 7 Indeed the better practice would be to instruct the jurors that they may draw the inference unless the evidence in the case provides a satisfactory explanation for the defendant's presence at the still, omitting any explicit reference to the statute itself in the charge. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part. </s> The statute which the Court finds constitutional provides: </s> "Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) [making it an offense to carry on the business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law] the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)." 26 U.S.C. 5601 (b) (2). </s> It would be possible to interpret the statute as compelling judges to give the following instruction to juries: "If you find that the defendant was present at the still, then the law requires you to assume that he was there carrying on the business of a distiller within the meaning [380 U.S. 63, 72] of the statute; but you need not make this assumption if the defendant has given another explanation of his presence there and you are satisfied of the truth of that explanation." If the statute were read as compelling such an instruction, I would find it constitutionally intolerable, for the reasons so well stated by my Brother BLACK. </s> The Court, however, interprets the statute as merely allowing, not compelling, the jury to draw the inference of "carrying on" from the fact of "presence." The jury is left free to reject the inference if, in light of all the circumstances of the case, a reasonable doubt remains as to the defendant's guilt. That is the way the jury would normally function, apart from the statute. So, I have concluded that the statute, as construed, merely provides a rule of evidence and no more. </s> There are, to be sure, dangers inherent in any statutory presumption. Perhaps the jury will be overawed if it is told that some particular factual inference has been enshrined in an Act of Congress. Therefore the Court quite rightly suggests that the better practice would be to omit "any explicit reference to the statute itself in the charge." Ante, p. 71, n. 7. Or perhaps the judge may feel that the statute restricts his power to withhold an insufficient case from the jury or to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court reassures the trial judge that the statute does not thus invade the province of his discretion. Nor is the function of the appellate courts in any way circumscribed. </s> In my view, the acute danger in the statute as construed and applied lurks in its provision that the jury may draw the inference in question "unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) If this meant that the judge should instruct that the inference may be drawn unless the defendant himself becomes a witness and personally [380 U.S. 63, 73] explains his presence at the still, then, as my Brother BLACK says, the statute would clearly subject the defendant to an impermissible compulsion to testify. But more subtly compelling instructions than that are outlawed by the same policy. It has long been the rule in the federal courts that the defendant's failure to testify ought not to be even the subject of unfavorable comment: </s> "It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. . . . [C]ounsel is forbidden by the statute [now 18 U.S.C. 3481] * to make any comment which would create or tend to create a presumption against the defendant from his failure to testify." Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 -67. </s> Just as it is improper for counsel to argue from the defendant's silence, so is it improper for the trial judge to call attention to the fact of defendant's silence. Indeed, under 18 U.S.C. 3481 the defendant is entitled as a matter of right to have the trial judge expressly tell the jury that it must not attach any importance to the defendant's failure to testify; or, if the defendant sees fit, he may choose to have no mention made of his silence by anyone. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 . [380 U.S. 63, 74] </s> I have previously expressed my view that this rule against comment on the defendant's silence is mandated by the Fifth Amendment, because "[u]sing a defendant's silence as evidence against him is one way of having him testify against himself." Scott v. California, 364 U.S. 471, 472 (dissenting opinion). </s> The charge in the present case does not, in my view, satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The judge told the jury that the inference could be drawn "unless the defendant by the evidence in the case and by proven facts and circumstances explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury." I believe the charge in that form runs counter to the federal policy that forbids conviction on compelled testimony, not only because, as my Brother BLACK points out, it puts direct pressure on the defendant to come forward and testify, but also because it amounts in practical effect to an improper comment on the defendant's silence where, as here, he resists the pressure and does not take the stand in his own behalf. Unlike the Court, therefore, I would not interpret the statute before us as attempting a pro tanto repeal of 18 U.S.C. 3481 by authorizing such an instruction. </s> [Footnote * "In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United States and in all proceedings in courts martial and courts of inquiry in any State, District, Possession or Territory, the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him." </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> Respondent Gainey was tried and convicted of possession of an unregistered still 1 and of carrying on the [380 U.S. 63, 75] business of a distiller without having given bond 2 in violation of a federal statute. Other provisions of the statute, 3 entitled "Presumptions," declare that presence at the site of such a distillery "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury . . . ." At the trial federal and state officers testified, among other things, that they had seen Gainey at a still site. Gainey did not testify. The trial court, quite appropriately if the foregoing provisions are valid, instructed the jury [380 U.S. 63, 76] that Gainey's unexplained presence at the still was "deemed in law sufficient" to convict. I think that the statutory provisions which authorize such a charge deprived Gainey (1) of his constitutional right to trial by jury, guaranteed him both in Art. III, 2, and in the Sixth Amendment; (2) of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, which includes the right to be tried for a crime in a court according to the law of the land, without any interference with that court's judicial functions by the Congress; and (3) of his right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. </s> First of all, let me say that I am at a loss to understand the Court's puzzling statement that "where the only evidence is of presence the statute does not require the judge to submit the case to the jury, nor does it preclude the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The provisions in question both say unqualifiedly that "presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" unless the defendant explains his presence. The Court holds that this statutory command in 5601 (b) (2) is valid, 4 but then for some reason adds that judges are free to ignore it or, after telling juries that they may rely on it, are free to set aside the verdicts of those juries which do. In other words, under the Court's holding the judge is left free to take the extraordinary course of following a valid statute or not, as he chooses. Judges are not usually given such unlimited discretion to disregard valid statutes. And as the Court indicates elsewhere in its opinion, it was to prevent judges from setting aside jury verdicts based on presence alone that Congress passed this statute in the first place. Besides being almost self-contradictory, it amounts to an emasculation of [380 U.S. 63, 77] these statutory provisions, I think, to say that the judge was not required to tell the jury about them. But whether or not he was bound to do so, the fact is that here he did, and so this jury deliberated with the judge's solemn instruction that Congress had decided that proof of mere unexplained presence at a still was sufficient to convict Gainey of having illegally possessed it or carried on its business. Few jurors could have failed to believe that it was their duty to convict under this charge if presence was proved, and few judges could have failed to believe it was their duty to uphold such a conviction, even though all of them in a particular case might have felt that mere presence alone was not enough to show guilt. </s> It has always been recognized that the guaranty of trial by jury in criminal cases means that the jury is to be the factfinder. This is the only way in which a jury can perform its basic constitutional function of determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 -19; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 -10 (opinion announcing judgment). And of course this constitutionally established power of a jury to determine guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with crime cannot be taken away by Congress, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part. Obviously, a necessary part of this power, vested by the Constitution in juries (or in judges when juries are waived), is the exclusive right to decide whether evidence presented at trial is sufficient to convict. I think it flaunts the constitutional power of courts and juries for Congress to tell them what "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction." And if Congress could not thus directly encroach upon the judge's or jury's exclusive right to declare what evidence is sufficient to prove the facts necessary for conviction, it should not be allowed to do so merely by labeling its encroachment a "presumption." Neither Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 , relied [380 U.S. 63, 78] on by the Court as supporting this presumption, nor any case cited in Tot approved such an encroachment on the power of judges or juries. In fact, so far as I can tell, the problem of whether Congress can so restrict the power of court and jury in a criminal case in a federal court has never been squarely presented to or considered by this Court, perhaps because challenges to presumptions have arisen in many crucially different contexts but nevertheless have generally failed to distinguish between presumptions used in different ways, treating them as if they are either all valid or all invalid, regardless of the rights on which their use may impinge. Because the Court also fails to differentiate among the different circumstances in which presumptions may be utilized and the different consequences which will follow, I feel it necessary to say a few words on that subject before considering specifically the validity of the use of these presumptions in the light of the circumstances and consequences of their use. </s> In its simplest form a presumption is an inference permitted or required by law of the existence of one fact, which is unknown or which cannot be proved, from another fact which has been proved. The fact presumed may be based on a very strong probability, a weak supposition or an arbitrary assumption. The burden on the party seeking to prove the fact may be slight, as in a civil suit, or very heavy - proof beyond a reasonable doubt - as in a criminal prosecution. This points up the fact that statutes creating presumptions cannot be treated as fungible, that is, as interchangeable for all uses and all purposes. The validity of each presumption must be determined in the light of the particular consequences that flow from its use. When matters of trifling moment are involved, presumptions may be more freely accepted, but when consequences of vital importance to litigants and to the administration of justice are at stake, a more careful scrutiny is necessary. [380 U.S. 63, 79] </s> In judging the constitutionality of legislatively created presumptions this Court has evolved an initial criterion which applies alike to all kinds of presumptions: that before a presumption may be relied on, there must be a rational connection between the facts inferred and the facts which have been proved by competent evidence, that is, the facts proved must be evidence which is relevant, tending to prove (though not necessarily conclusively) the existence of the fact presumed. And courts have undoubtedly shown an inclination to be less strict about the logical strength of presumptive inferences they will permit in civil cases than about those which affect the trial of crimes. The stricter scrutiny in the latter situation follows from the fact that the burden of proof in a civil lawsuit is ordinarily merely a preponderance of the evidence, while in a criminal case where a man's life, liberty, or property is at stake, the prosecution must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 96 -97. The case of Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 , is a good illustration of this principle. There Bailey was accused of violating an Alabama statute which made it a crime to fail to perform personal services after obtaining money by contracting to perform them, with an intent to defraud the employer. The statute also provided that refusal or failure to perform the services, or to refund money paid for them, without just cause, constituted "prima facie evidence" (i. e., gave rise to a presumption) of the intent to injure or defraud. This Court, after calling attention to prior cases dealing with the requirement of rationality, passed over the test of rationality and held the statute invalid on another ground. Looking beyond the rational-relationship doctrine the Court held that the use of this presumption by Alabama against a man accused of crime would amount to a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids "involuntary [380 U.S. 63, 80] servitude, except as a punishment for crime." In so deciding the Court made it crystal clear that rationality is only the first hurdle which a legislatively created presumption must clear - that a presumption, even if rational, cannot be used to convict a man of crime if the effect of using the presumption is to deprive the accused of a constitutional right. In Bailey the constitutional right was given by the Thirteenth Amendment. In the case before us the accused, in my judgment, has been denied his right to the kind of trial by jury guaranteed by Art. III, 2, and the Sixth Amendment, as well as to due process of law and freedom from self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. And of course the principle announced in the Bailey case was not limited to rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court said in Bailey: </s> "It is apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions." 219 U.S., at 239 . </s> Thus the Court held that presumptions, while often valid (and some of which, I think, like the presumption of death based on long unexplained absence, may perhaps be even salutary in effect), must not be allowed to stand where they abridge or deny a specific constitutional guarantee. It is one thing to rely on a presumption to justify conditional administration of the estate of a person absent without explanation for seven years, see Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458 ; compare Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 ; it would be quite another to use the presumption of death from seven years' absence to convict a man of murder. I do not think it can be denied that use of the statutory presumptions in the case before [380 U.S. 63, 81] us at the very least seriously impaired Gainey's constitutional right to have a jury weigh the facts of his case without any congressional interference through predetermination of what evidence would be sufficient to prove the facts necessary to convict in a particular case. </s> The Bailey case also emphatically answers the Court's insistence that this encroachment on Gainey's constitutional rights was justified or neutralized by the trial court's instruction that while evidence of unexplained presence was sufficient under the statute to convict, the jury nonetheless was not compelled to convict. This same kind of contention was made to this Court and rejected in Bailey, where the Alabama Supreme Court had upheld that State's presumption on the ground that "with such evidence before them, the jury are still left free to find the accused guilty or not guilty, according as they may be satisfied of his guilt or not, by the whole evidence." Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 75, 78, 49 So. 886, 887. This Court answered that contention then, as I think it should now, saying: </s> "The point is that, in such a case, the statute authorizes the jury to convict. It is not enough to say that the jury may not accept that evidence as alone sufficient; for the jury may accept it, and they have the express warrant of the statute to accept [it] as a basis for their verdict." 219 U.S., at 235 . (Emphasis in original.) </s> And the Court added that "The normal assumption is that the jury will follow the statute and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as sufficient what the statute expressly so describes." Id., at 237. </s> Even if I could accept the doctrine that Congress after declaring that certain conduct shall be a crime has further power to tell judges and juries that certain evidence shall be sufficient to prove that conduct and convict [380 U.S. 63, 82] a defendant, I could not agree that these statutory presumptions are constitutional. They declare mere presence at a still site without more to be sufficient evidence to convict of the crimes of carrying on a distillery business and possessing a still. 5 While presence at a still is unquestionably a relevant circumstance to add to others to prove possession or operation of a still, I could not possibly agree that mere presence is sufficient in and of itself, without any supporting evidence, to permit a finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person present carried on a distillery business or possessed a still or even aided and abetted in committing those crimes. Indeed, with respect to the crime of possession, as the Court concedes, we held squarely to the contrary in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 , quite properly, I think. In setting aside the Bozza conviction for possession of a still, which had been based on mere presence at a still, this Court was acting in accordance with the historic principle that "independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have a most important place under our constitutional plan since they have power to set aside convictions." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 19 . This judicial responsibility to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence must be exercised in each case, no more to be controlled by a general congressional enactment than it could be by a special act directed to one case only. 6 This protective function of the court is amply demonstrated in the case before us: while Gainey was originally indicted on four counts. [380 U.S. 63, 83] the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on one 7 and the Court of Appeals ordered acquittal on another. 8 </s> It indeed is true, as the Court suggests, that it was to make convictions possible on no more evidence than presence that the presumption statute here under consideration was passed. Undoubtedly a presumption which can be used to produce convictions without the necessity of proving a crucial element of the crime charged - and a sometimes difficult-to-prove element at that 9 - is a boon to prosecutors and an incongruous snare for defendants in a country that claims to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Quite accurately such a use of a presumption has been described as "First Aid to the District Attorney." 10 Instead of supporting the constitutionality of such a use of statutory presumptions, however, I think this argument based on necessity and convenience points out its fatal defects. I suppose no one would deny that the Government's burden would also be made lighter if the defendant was not represented by counsel, compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , [380 U.S. 63, 84] or if the jury could receive and consider confessions extorted by torture, compare Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , or if evidence obtained from defendants through illegal searches and seizures could be used against them, compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , but this Court has not hesitated to strike down such encroachments on those constitutional rights. Yet here the Court sanctions a method less crude, but just as effective, to deny Gainey his constitutional right to a trial by jury. 11 </s> I cannot subscribe to the idea that any one of the constitutional grants of power to Congress enumerated in Art. I, 8, including the Necessary and Proper Clause, contains either an express or an implied power of Congress to instruct juries as to what evidence is sufficient to convict defendants in particular cases. 12 Congress can [380 U.S. 63, 85] undoubtedly create crimes, but it cannot constitutionally try them. The Constitution specifically prohibits bills of attainder. Congress can declare certain conduct a crime, unless barred by some constitutional provision, but it must, if true to our Constitution of divided powers and the Fifth Amendment's command that cases be tried according to due process of law, leave the trial of those crimes to the courts, in which judges or juries can decide the facts on their own judgment without legislative constraint and judges can set aside convictions which they believe are not justified by the evidence. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 473 (concurring opinion). "[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 . See Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 . Yet, viewed realistically, that is what the presumption which the Court today approves does in this case. I think that the presumption which should govern instead in criminal trials in the courts of this country is the time-honored presumption of innocence accorded to all criminal defendants until they are proved guilty by competent evidence. </s> Nor can a power of Congress to detract from the constitutional power of juries and judges to decide what facts are enough to convict be implied because of the power of Congress to make procedural rules or rules of evidence. See Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720 . It is not disputed that Congress has power to prescribe rules governing admissibility of evidence and purely procedural matters. The Congress unquestionably could declare the fact of presence to be admissible evidence, for certainly it is relevant when considered along with other circumstances. Yet this power to say what shall or shall not be admissible in no way empowers Congress to determine what facts, once admitted, suffice to prove guilt beyond a reasonable [380 U.S. 63, 86] doubt. 13 And I certainly cannot join the Court when it says: </s> "The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." </s> The implication of this statement is that somehow Congress is better qualified to decide what facts are sufficient to convict defendants than are courts and juries. I accept the proposition that Congress is the proper branch of our Government to decide legislative policies and enact general laws and that in so doing it must of necessity deal with facts to some extent. This is as the Constitution provides. But Congress is not authorized nor has it any special "expertise" with which I am familiar which entitles it to direct juries as to what conclusions they may or must draw from the unique facts of specific criminal cases tried in federal courts. Moreover, even were I to assume that Congress does have an expertise to assess facts in lawsuits which is superior to that of juries and judges, I still could not join the Court's opinion, for I think that the Founders of our Government decided for us that these are matters "within specialized" - and exclusive - "judicial [380 U.S. 63, 87] competence." As this Court has said with reference to jury trial of facts: </s> "whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence in federal courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 . </s> Besides impairing Gainey's right to trial by jury according to due process safeguards, the statutes in this case I think violated Gainey's constitutional rights in still another way. These statutory presumptions must tend, when incorporated into an instruction, as they were here, to influence the jury to reach an inference which the trier of fact might not otherwise have thought justified, to push some jurors to convict who might not otherwise have done so. Cf. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 15 . The undoubted practical effect of letting guilt rest on unexplained presence alone is to force a defendant to come forward and testify, however much he may think doing so may jeopardize his chances of acquittal, since if he does not he almost certainly destroys those chances. This is compulsion, which I think runs counter to the Fifth Amendment's purpose to forbid convictions on compelled testimony. The compulsion here is of course more subtle and less cruel physically than compulsion by torture, but it is nonetheless compulsion and it is nonetheless effective. I am aware that this Court in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 , held that use of a presumptive squeeze like this one did not amount to a form of compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. The Court's reasoning was contained in a single paragraph, the central argument of which was that despite a presumption like this a defendant is left "entirely free to testify or not as he chooses." That argument, it seems to me, would also justify admitting in evidence a confession [380 U.S. 63, 88] extorted by a policeman's pointing a gun at the head of an accused, on the theory that the man being threatened was entirely free to confess or not, as he chose. I think the holding in Yee Hem is completely out of harmony with the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, and I would overrule it. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (dissenting opinion); compare Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 . See also State v. Lapointe, 81 N. H. 227, 123 A. 692, quoted with approval in the opinion of the court below, 322 F.2d 292, 296 (C. A. 5th Cir.). </s> For all the foregoing reasons, I think that these two statutory presumptions by which Congress has tried to relieve the Government of its burden of proving a man guilty and to take away from courts and juries the function and duty of deciding guilt or innocence according to the evidence before them, unconstitutionally encroach on the functions of courts and deny persons accused of crime rights which our Constitution guarantees them. The most important and most crucial action the courts take in trying people for crime is to resolve facts. This is a judicial, not a legislative, function. I think that in passing these two sections Congress stepped over its constitutionally limited bounds and encroached on the constitutional power of courts to try cases. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court below and grant Gainey a new trial by judge and jury with all the protections accorded by the law of the land. </s> [Footnote 1 26 U.S.C. 5601 (a) (1) (1958 ed.) provides: "Offenses. "Any person who - "(1) Unregistered stills. "Has in his possession or custody, or under his control, any still or distilling apparatus set up which is not registered, as required by section 5179 (a) . . . . . . . . "shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for each such offense." </s> [Footnote 2 26 U.S.C. 5601 (a) (4) (1958 ed.) provides: "Offenses. "Any person who - . . . . . "(4) Failure or refusal of distiller or rectifier to give bond. "Carries on the business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required by law . . . . . . . . "shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, for each such offense." </s> [Footnote 3 Section 5601 (b) (1) provides: "(b) Presumptions. "(1) Unregistered stills. "Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (1) the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus was set up without having been registered, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)." Section 5601 (b) (2) provides: "(2) Failure or refusal of distiller or rectifier to give bond. "Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without jury)." </s> [Footnote 4 Although the Court does not consider the validity of 5601 (b) (1), its reasoning surely would seem to apply to that section as well. </s> [Footnote 5 I agree with the Court's holding that the language of 5601 (b) (2) "permits the judge to submit a case to the jury on the basis of the accused's presence alone." The Court does not suggest any reason why it would interpret the identical language in 5601 (b) (1) any differently. </s> [Footnote 6 Such an act obviously would be proscribed as a bill of attainder, forbidden by Art. I, 9. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 ; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. </s> [Footnote 7 The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on a count charging Gainey with working in a distillery which did not bear a sign showing the name of the person engaged in the distilling and denoting the business in which he was engaged, an offense made punishable by 26 U.S.C. 5180 (a), 5681 (c) (1958 ed.). </s> [Footnote 8 Count three of the indictment charged Gainey with carrying on the business of a distiller with intent to defraud the United States of taxes, a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5602 (1958 ed.). The Court of Appeals, holding that the record showed "no evidence whatever of intent to defraud," set aside the jury's verdict of conviction on that count. 322 F.2d 292, 300. </s> [Footnote 9 In this case, however, the record shows that there unquestionably was enough other evidence to submit the case to the jury without need for any artificial presumption. But the Court does not suggest that the use here of this presumption either should be or could be called harmless error. </s> [Footnote 10 Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A. B. A. J. 287. </s> [Footnote 11 "Once the thumbscrew and the following confession made conviction easy; but that method was crude and, I suppose, now would be declared unlawful upon some ground. Hereafter, presumption is to lighten the burden of the prosecutor. The victim will be spared the trouble of confessing and will go to his cell without mutilation or disquieting outcry." Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 420 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 12 It might be argued, although the Court does not so argue or hold, that Congress if it wished could make presence at a still a crime in itself, and so Congress should be free to create crimes which are called "possession" and "carrying on an illegal distillery business" but which are defined in such a way that unexplained presence is sufficient and indisputable evidence in all cases to support conviction for those offenses. See Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 . Assuming for the sake of argument that Congress could make unexplained presence a criminal act, and ignoring also the refusal of this Court in other cases to uphold a statutory presumption on such a theory, see Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 , there is no indication here that Congress intended to adopt such a misleading method of draftsmanship, nor in my judgment could the statutory provisions if so construed escape condemnation for vagueness, under the principles applied in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 , and many other cases. </s> [Footnote 13 "While it is within the province of the legislature to determine the sources of evidence, the modes of verification, who may or may not be competent witnesses, I am not prepared to say they may weigh and determine the quantity of evidence, which shall suffice to produce conviction in the mind of the judge or juror who tries a cause." Thomas, J., dissenting in Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray (72 Mass.) 1, 10, cited with approval in State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211, 219. </s> [380 U.S. 63, 89]

United States Supreme Court MASCIALE v. UNITED STATES(1958) No. 84 Argued: January 16, 1958Decided: May 19, 1958 </s> At the trial in a Federal District Court in which petitioner was convicted of the illegal sale of narcotics and conspiracy to make a sale, he did not deny the sale or his participation in it but claimed that he was entrapped by government agents. The testimony on the issue of entrapment was conflicting, and the judge submitted it to the jury under instructions to which no objection was made. Held: On the record in this case, the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury, and the conviction is sustained. Pp. 386-388. </s> 236 F.2d 601, affirmed. </s> Merrell E. Clark, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> James W. Knapp argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Warren Olney, III, then Assistant Attorney General, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the same issue as Sherman v. United States, ante, p. 369, decided this day: Should petitioner's conviction be set aside on the ground that as a matter of law the defense of entrapment was established? Cf. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 . Petitioner was convicted on three counts, two of which charged him with the illegal sale of narcotics and one with conspiracy to make a sale. 1 The issue of entrapment went to the jury, 2 </s> [356 U.S. 386, 387] and conviction followed. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 236 F.2d 601. We granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 1000 . </s> The evidence discloses the following events. On January 14, 1954, petitioner was introduced to government agent Marshall by a government informer, Kowel. Although petitioner had known Kowel for approximately four years, he was unaware of Kowel's undercover activities. Marshall was introduced as a big narcotics buyer. Both Marshall and petitioner testified concerning the ensuing conversation. Marshall testified that he immediately made it clear that he wanted to talk about buying large quantities of high-grade narcotics and that if petitioner were not interested, the conversation would end at once. Instead of leaving, petitioner questioned Marshall on his knowledge of the narcotics traffic and then boasted that while he was primarily a gambler, "he knew someone whom he considered high up in the narcotics traffic to whom he would introduce me [Marshall] and that I was able to get - and I can quote this - `88 per cent pure heroin' from this source." Marshall also stated that petitioner gave him a telephone number where he could be reached. In his testimony petitioner admitted that he was a gambler and had told Marshall that through his gambling contacts he knew about the narcotics traffic. He denied that he had then known any available source of narcotics or that he said he could obtain narcotics for Marshall at that time. Petitioner explained that he met Marshall only to help Kowel impress Marshall. Petitioner also said that it was Marshall who gave him the telephone number. It is noteworthy that nowhere in his testimony did petitioner state that during the conversation either Marshall or Kowel tried to persuade him to enter the narcotics traffic. In the six weeks following the conversation just related Marshall and petitioner met or spoke with each other at least ten times; petitioner kept [356 U.S. 386, 388] telling Marshall that he was trying to make his contact but was having trouble doing so. Finally, on March 1, 1954, petitioner introduced Marshall to Seifert, who sold some heroin to Marshall on the next day. Petitioner even loaned his sister's car to Seifert in order to get the narcotics. It was this sale for which petitioner was convicted. </s> In this case entrapment could have occurred in only one of two ways. Either Marshall induced petitioner, or Kowel did. As for Marshall, petitioner has conceded here that the jury could have found that when petitioner met Marshall he was ready and willing to search out a source of narcotics and to bring about a sale. 3 As for Kowel, petitioner testified that the informer engaged in a campaign to persuade him to sell narcotics by using the lure of easy income. Petitioner argues that this undisputed testimony 4 explained why he was willing to deal with Marshall and so established entrapment as a matter of law. However, his testimony alone could not have this effect. While petitioner presented enough evidence for the jury to consider, they were entitled to disbelieve him in regard to Kowel and so find for the Government on the issue of guilt. Therefore, the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury. 5 </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See 26 U.S.C. 2553 (a), 2554 (a); 21 U.S.C. 174, and 18 U.S.C. 2. </s> [Footnote 2 The charge to the jury was not in issue here. </s> [Footnote 3 Well might petitioner concede this, for despite petitioner's version of the meeting and his explanation for being there, the jury could have believed Marshall and have inferred from his narration that petitioner needed no persuasion to seek a narcotics buyer. </s> [Footnote 4 We conclude from the argument that neither party even attempted to subpoena Kowel. </s> [Footnote 5 For the reasons stated in Sherman v. United States, ante, p. 369, we decline to consider the contention that this case should be reversed and remanded to the District Court for a determination of the issue [356 U.S. 386, 389] of entrapment by the trial judge. This issue was never raised by the parties. The question of entrapment was submitted to the jury, and the charge to the jury was not put in issue by petitioner either here or in the Court of Appeals. [356 U.S. 386, 389] </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting. </s> The trial court in this case, according to the views expressed in my concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States, ante, p. 378, should itself have ruled on the issue of entrapment and not left it to determination by the jury. On a mere reading of the cold record the evidence for sustaining such a claim seems rather thin. But the judge who heard and saw the witnesses might give different weight to the evidence than the printed record reveals. Accordingly, I would remand the case to the District Court for determination of the issue of entrapment by the trial judge. If he should conclude, as the jury was allowed to conclude, that the claim of entrapment was not sustained, the conviction would stand. If he reached a different result, the indictment should be dismissed. This seems, on my view of the law, a better disposition than for this Court to decide that no harm was done in leaving the question to the jury because as a matter of law there was no entrapment. </s> [356 U.S. 386, 390]

United States Supreme Court RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSN. v. GIBBONS(1982) No. 80-415 Argued: December 2, 1981Decided: March 2, 1982 </s> In 1975, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. (Rock Island) petitioned the District Court for reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and thereafter continued operation under the protection of that Act until September 1979, when it ceased operation as a result of a labor strike. The District Court concluded that reorganization was not possible and directed appellee Trustee of Rock Island's estate (hereafter appellee) to liquidate the estate's assets. On June 2, 1980, the reorganization court ordered abandonment of the Rock Island system and concluded that no claim or arrangement "for employee labor protection payable out of the assets of the Debtor's estate is allowed or required by this Court." However, three days before the court's order, the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA) was signed into law. Under 106 and 110 of the statute, appellee must pay benefits of up to $75 million to those Rock Island employees who are not hired by other carriers, and the United States guarantees Rock Island's employee protection obligations. The statute also requires that such obligations must be considered administrative expenses of the Rock Island estate for purposes of determining the priority of the employees' claims to the estate's assets. On June 5, 1980, a complaint was filed in the reorganization court challenging the constitutionality of RITA and seeking injunctive relief. On June 9, the court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of 106 and 110, holding that those provisions constituted an uncompensated taking of private property (Rock Island's creditors' interests in the estate's assets) for a public purpose in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1252, the District Court's order was appealed to this Court (No. 80-415). Congress responded to the District Court's injunction by enacting 701 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which re-enacted 106 and 110 of RITA and added a provision seeking to avoid any implication that appellee and creditors had been deprived of any Tucker Act remedy otherwise available to pursue [455 U.S. 457, 458] their takings claim against the United States. Thereafter, the reorganization court denied a motion of appellant and the United States to vacate its June 9 injunction on the asserted ground that it was rendered moot by the passage of the Staggers Act, and issued a new order enjoining implementation of the labor protection provisions of RITA, as amended and re-enacted by the Staggers Act. This order was appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to 124(a)(1) of RITA, as added by the Staggers Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and an appeal was then taken to this Court (No. 80-1239). </s> Held: </s> 1. The June 9 injunction was rendered moot by the enactment of the Staggers Act, and accordingly the judgment of the District Court is vacated and it is ordered to vacate the injunction. P. 465. </s> 2. The Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed in No. 80-1239 because RITA, as amended by the Staggers Act, is repugnant to Art. I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, which empowers Congress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Pp. 465-473. </s> (a) The labor protection provisions of RITA are an exercise of Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause, rather than under the Commerce Clause. Although the subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition, "bankruptcy" has been defined as the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief." Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513 -514. By its terms, the subject matter of RITA is the relationship between a bankrupt railroad and its creditors; Congress did nothing less than to prescribe the manner in which Rock Island's property is to be distributed among its creditors. The events surrounding RITA's passage, as well as its legislative history, also indicate that Congress was exercising its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. Pp. 465-468. </s> (b) The Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity requirement does not prohibit Congress from distinguishing among classes of debtors, or from treating railroad bankruptcies as a distinctive problem. Nor does it deny Congress power to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems. However, RITA is not a response either to the particular problems of major railroad bankruptcies or to any geographically isolated problem. By its terms, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad; only Rock Island's creditors are affected by RITA's employee protection provisions and only Rock Island employees may take benefit of the arrangement. The language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself compels the conclusion that such a bankruptcy law is not within Congress' power to enact. Although meager, the debate in the Constitutional Convention regarding the Clause also supports the conclusion that the uniformity requirement prohibits [455 U.S. 457, 459] Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws that specifically apply to the affairs of only one named regional debtor. Pp. 468-473. </s> No. 80-415, vacated and remanded; No. 80-1239, 645 F.2d 74, affirmed. </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 473. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 80-1239, Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Gibbons, Trustee, et al., on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. </s> John O'B. Clarke, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was William G. Mahoney. </s> Elinor H. Stillman argued the cause for the federal parties as appellees under this Court's Rule 10.4 in support of appellant. On the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, former Solicitor General McCree, former Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Allen I. Horowitz, Richard A. Allen, and Henri F. Rush. </s> Daniel R. Murray argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs were Robert L. Stern, Milton L. Fisher, Harold L. Kaplan, Terry F. Moritz, Nicholas G. Manos, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., and Barbara S. Steiner. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion for the Court. </s> In March 1975, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. (Rock Island) petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for reorganization under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as added, 47 Stat. 1474, and amended, 11 U.S.C. 205. Under the protection of 77, the Rock Island continued to operate for approximately four and one-half years until it ceased all operations in September 1979 as a result of a labor strike that had depleted its cash reserves. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 11125 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) directed the Kansas City Terminal Railway Co. to provide rail service over the Rock Island lines. On January 25, 1980, the reorganization court concluded that reorganization was not possible. It then directed the Trustee of the Rock Island estate to prepare a plan for liquidation, and to continue planning for the cessation of rail operations upon the March 1980 [455 U.S. 457, 460] expiration of the ICC's directed service order. App. 239a-240a. Since the entry of the January 25, 1980, order, the Trustee has been liquidating the assets of the Rock Island estate. </s> On March 4, 1980, various railroads and labor organizations representing Rock Island employees reached an agreement as to Rock Island employees hired by carriers acquiring the Rock Island's trackage. The agreement covered such matters as hiring preferences, monetary protection, and seniority, but it did not cover those Rock Island employees who are not employed by acquiring carriers. </s> On April 14, 1980, the Rock Island Trustee petitioned the reorganization court to confirm the Rock Island's abandonment of all rail lines and operations. The reorganization court referred the petition to the ICC for its recommendation. On May 23, the ICC concluded that the Rock Island's abandonment and dissolution as an operating railroad was necessary. </s> On June 2, the reorganization court ordered the total abandonment of the Rock Island system and the discontinuance of its service. The court found that to order the Rock Island to continue its operations indefinitely at a loss for the public's benefit would violate the "Fifth Amendment rights of those who have a security interest in the enterprise. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.S. 396 (1920)." Id., at 270a. The reorganization court also concluded that "no claim or arrangement of any kind or nature for employee labor protection payable out of the assets of the Debtor's estate is allowed or required by this Court" pursuant to 17(a) of the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act (MRRA), Pub. L. 96-101, 93 Stat. 744, 45 U.S.C. 915(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 1 App. 271a. The court reasoned that 17(a) of the [455 U.S. 457, 461] MRRA does not apply to a total, systemwide abandonment of a railroad. App. 263a-264a. </s> Congress responded to the crisis resulting from this demise of the Rock Island by enacting the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA), Pub. L. 96-254, 94 Stat. 399, 45 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The President signed the Act into law on May 30, 1980, three days before the reorganization court's abandonment order. At issue in these cases are RITA's employee protections provisions. Sections 106 2 and 110 3 require [455 U.S. 457, 462] the Rock Island Trustee to provide economic benefits of up to $75 million to those Rock Island employees who are not hired by other carriers. 4 45 U.S.C. 1005, 1008 (1976 ed., [455 U.S. 457, 463] Supp. IV). Benefits must be paid from the estate's assets. The employee benefit obligations must be considered administrative expenses of the Rock Island estate for purposes of determining the priority of the employees' claims to the assets of the estate upon liquidation. </s> On June 5, 1980, appellees filed a complaint in the reorganization court seeking to declare RITA unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement. On June 9, the reorganization court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of 106 and 110 of RITA. Although it suggested that RITA might have other constitutional infirmities, the court concluded that RITA's employee protection provisions constituted an uncompensated taking of private property for a public purpose in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court reasoned: "[T]he Rock Island is a bankrupt corporation with no more operations, nothing left but assets and creditors and liquidation. Whatever obligations it may have to labor, it must arrive out of a contract that it had with labor, and any appropriate claims of labor under existing bankruptcy law is under the Railroad Retirement Act or any other statute which operates to fix the rights of labor. . . . But, these are all based upon existing law, existing rights, existing contracts, and that Congress believes it can legislate a $75 million labor protection burden on the assets of the Rock Island comes to me as a startling concept." App. 153a. Since it determined that the Rock Island is no longer subject to the obligations of an operating railroad, the court concluded that the Rock Island creditors' and bondholders' interests in the estate's remaining assets may not be taken to serve the public's interest in providing economic protection for displaced employees. Id., at 154a. Appellant appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1252 (No. 80-415). </s> Congress responded to the reorganization court's injunction by enacting 701 of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, [455 U.S. 457, 464] Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1959. With certain modifications, 5 701 of the Staggers Act re-enacted RITA 106 and 110. The Staggers Act also added 124 to RITA, 45 U.S.C. 1018 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), which sought to avoid any implication that it had deprived appellees of any Tucker Act remedy otherwise available for the Trustee and creditors to pursue their takings claim against the United States. 6 The Staggers Act was signed into law on October 14, 1980. </s> Six days previously, appellant and the United States had moved the reorganization court to vacate its June 9 injunction on the basis that the passage of the Staggers Act rendered the injunction moot. In addition, it was argued that no irreparable injury could be shown because the Staggers Act amendments provided that a remedy under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, would be available if the labor protection provisions were found to constitute a taking. On October 15, the reorganization court denied the motion to vacate and issued a new order enjoining implementation of the labor protection provisions of the "Rock Island Act, as amended and re-enacted by the Staggers Rail Act." App. to Juris. Statement in No. 80-1239, p. 6a. Pursuant to 124(a)(1) of RITA, as added by the Staggers Act, 45 U.S.C. 1018(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), 7 appellant and the United States appealed this order to the Court of Appeals for [455 U.S. 457, 465] the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion by an equally divided vote. In re Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 645 F.2d 74 (1980) (en banc). </s> This Court noted probable jurisdiction in No. 80-1239 and postponed the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-415 until our hearing the case on the merits. 451 U.S. 936 (1981). In No. 80-415 we order the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to vacate its injunction of June 9, 1980. 8 We affirm in No. 80-1239 because we conclude that RITA, as amended by the Staggers Act, is repugnant to Art. I, 8, cl. 4, the Bankruptcy Clause, of the Constitution. We therefore find it unnecessary to determine whether the employee protections provisions of RITA violate any other provision of the Constitution. 9 </s> Article I, 8, cl. 4, of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to "establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." It is necessary first to determine whether the labor protection provisions of amended RITA are an exercise of Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause, as contended by appellees, or under the Commerce Clause, as contended by appellant and the United States. Distinguishing a congressional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause from an exercise under the Bankruptcy Clause is admittedly not an easy task, for the two Clauses are closely related. As James Madison observed, "[t]he power of establishing [455 U.S. 457, 466] uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question." The Federalist No. 42, p. 285 (N. Y. Heritage Press 1945). See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 195 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.) ("The bankrupt law is said to grow out of the exigencies of commerce"). </s> Although we have noted that "[t]he subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition," we have previously defined "bankruptcy" as the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief." Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513 -514 (1938). See Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 673 (1935). Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause "contemplate[s] an adjustment of a failing debtor's obligations." Ibid. This power "extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed, the property of the debtor among his creditors." Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902). It "includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves the power to impair the obligation of contracts, and this the States were forbidden to do." Id., at 188. </s> An examination of the employee protection provisions of RITA, we think, demonstrates that RITA is an exercise of Congress' power under the Bankruptcy Clause. Section 106 authorizes the ICC to impose upon the Rock Island estate "a fair and equitable" employee protection arrangement. After such an employee protection arrangement is imposed, "the bankruptcy court shall immediately authorize and direct the Rock Island trustee to . . . immediately implement such arrangement." 106(c), 45 U.S.C. 1005(c) (1976 ed., [455 U.S. 457, 467] Supp. IV). Section 106(e)(2) provides that employee protection benefits shall be paid from Rock Island's assets and employee claims shall be treated as administrative expenses of the Rock Island estate. 45 U.S.C. 1005(e)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Section 108(a) provides that any employee who elects to receive benefits under 106 "shall be deemed to waive any employee protection benefits otherwise available to such employee" under the Bankruptcy Act, subtitle IV of Title 49 of the United States Code, or any applicable contract or agreement. 45 U.S.C. 1007(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Claims for "otherwise available" benefits are not accorded priority as an administrative expense of the estate. 1007(c). Under 110, the United States guarantees the Rock Island's employee protections obligations. 45 U.S.C. 1008(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As with the employee protection obligation itself, the guarantee is treated as an administrative expense of the Rock Island estate. 1008(b). </s> In sum, RITA imposes upon a bankrupt railroad the duty to pay large sums of money to its displaced employees, and then establishes a mechanism through which these "obligations" are to be satisfied. The Act provides that the claims of these employees are to be accorded priority over the claims of Rock Island's commercial creditors, bondholders, and shareholders. It follows that the subject matter of RITA is the relationship between a bankrupt railroad and its creditors. See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, at 513-514. The Act goes as far as to alter the relationship among the claimants to the Rock Island estate's remaining assets. In enacting RITA, Congress did nothing less than to prescribe the manner in which the property of the Rock Island estate is to be distributed among its creditors. </s> The events surrounding the passage of RITA, as well as its legislative history, indicate that Congress was exercising its powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. In RITA, Congress was responding to the crisis resulting from the demise of the [455 U.S. 457, 468] Rock Island as an operating entity. The Act was passed almost five years after the Rock Island had initiated reorganization proceedings under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, and approximately 10 months after a strike had rendered the Rock Island unable to pay its operating expenses. In addition to providing for the continuation of the Rock Island under a directed service order until its lines could be acquired by other carriers, Congress sought to provide displaced employees with economic protection. Congress wanted to make liquidation of a railroad costly for the estate. As the House Conference Report explains, "it is the intention of Congress that employee protection be imposed in bankruptcy proceedings involving major rail carriers, for to do otherwise would be to promote liquidations, to the detriment of the employees and the public interest." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, pp. 138-139 (1980). Moreover, Congress was attempting to eliminate the confusion that existed at the time as to whether the labor protection provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 11347 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), applied to railroads that were in liquidation proceedings and arguably had no remaining common carrier responsibilities. See 126 Cong. Rec. 4870 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum). In RITA, Congress intended that a labor protection arrangement be included as a part of the liquidation of the Rock Island estate. </s> We do not understand either appellant or the United States to argue that Congress may enact bankruptcy laws pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause. Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress' power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United States. Such uniformity in the applicability of legislation is not required by the Commerce Clause. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981); Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950) (distinguishing the Commerce Clause from Art. I, 8, cl. 4). Thus, if we [455 U.S. 457, 469] were to hold that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws. It is therefore necessary for us to determine the nature of the uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause. </s> Pursuant to Art. I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress has power to enact bankruptcy laws that are uniform throughout the United States. Prior to today, this Court has never invalidated a bankruptcy law for lack of uniformity. The uniformity requirement is not a straitjacket that forbids Congress to distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress from recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial transactions in a uniform manner. A bankruptcy law may be uniform and yet "may recognize the laws of the State in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to different results in different States." Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). Thus, uniformity does not require the elimination of any differences among the States in their laws governing commercial transactions. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S., at 189 -190, this Court held that Congress can give effect to the allowance of exemptions prescribed by state law without violating the uniformity requirement. The uniformity requirement, moreover, permits Congress to treat "railroad bankruptcies as a distinctive and special problem" and "does not deny Congress power to take into account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems." Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974) (3R Act Cases). In the 3R Act Cases, we upheld Congress' response to the existing rail transportation crisis in the Northeast. Since no railroad reorganization proceeding was then pending outside of the region defined by [455 U.S. 457, 470] the Regional Railroad Reorganization Act of 1973 (3R Act), 87 Stat. 985, 45 U.S.C. 701 et seq., the Act in fact operated uniformly upon all railroads then in bankruptcy proceedings. </s> But a quite different sort of "uniformity" question is presented in these cases. By its terms, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad. 10 Only Rock Island's creditors are affected by RITA's employee protection provisions and only employees of the Rock Island may take benefit of the arrangement. Unlike the situation in the 3R Act Cases, there are other railroads that are currently in reorganization proceedings, 11 but these railroads are not affected by the employee protection provisions of RITA. The conclusion is thus inevitable that RITA is not a response either to the particular problems of major railroad bankruptcies or to any geographically isolated problem: it is a response to the problems caused by the bankruptcy of one railroad. The employee protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class of debtors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular [455 U.S. 457, 471] problem of one bankrupt railroad. Albeit on a rather grand scale, RITA is nothing more than a private bill such as those Congress frequently enacts under its authority to spend money. 12 </s> The language of the Bankruptcy Clause itself compels us to hold that such a bankruptcy law is not within the power of Congress to enact. A law can hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country if it applies only to one debtor and can be enforced only by the one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over that debtor. In re Sink, 27 F.2d 361, 362 (WD Va. 1928), appeal dism'd per stipulation, 30 F.2d 1019 (CA4 1929). As the legislative history to the Staggers Act indicates, supra, at 468, Congress might deem it sound policy to impose labor protection obligations in all bankruptcy proceedings involving major railroads. By its specific terms, however, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad, and cannot be said to apply uniformly even to major railroads in bankruptcy proceedings throughout the United States. The employee protection provisions of RITA therefore cannot be said to "apply equally to all creditors and all debtors." 3R Act Cases, supra, at 160. </s> Although the debate in the Constitutional Convention regarding the Bankruptcy Clause was meager, we think it lends some support to our conclusion that the uniformity requirement of the Clause prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws that specifically apply to the affairs of only one named debtor. </s> The subject of bankruptcy was first introduced on August 29, 1787, by Charles Pinckney during discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Pinckney proposed the following grant of authority to Congress: "To establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages [455 U.S. 457, 472] arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 447 (1911). Two days later, John Rutledge recommended that the following be added to Congress' powers: "To establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." Id., at 483. The Bankruptcy Clause was adopted on September 3, 1787, with only Roger Sherman of Connecticut voting against. Id., at 489. 13 </s> Prior to the drafting of the Constitution, at least four States followed the practice of passing private Acts to relieve individual debtors. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 Am. J. Legal Hist. 215, 221-223 (1957). Given the sovereign status of the States, questions were raised as to whether one State had to recognize the relief given to a debtor by another State. See Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1788); James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1786). Uniformity among state debtor insolvency laws was an impossibility and the practice of passing private bankruptcy laws was subject to abuse if the legislators were less than honest. Thus, it is not surprising that the Bankruptcy Clause was introduced during discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Framers sought to provide Congress with the power to enact uniform laws on the subject enforceable among the States. See Nadelmann, supra, at 224-227. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity requirement was drafted in order to prohibit Congress from enacting private bankruptcy laws. See H. Black, Constitutional Prohibitions 6 (1887) (States had discriminated against British creditors). The States' practice of enacting private bills had rendered uniformity impossible. 14 </s> [455 U.S. 457, 473] </s> Our holding today does not impair Congress' ability under the Bankruptcy Clause to define classes of debtors and to structure relief accordingly. We have upheld bankruptcy laws that apply to a particular industry in a particular region. See 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). The uniformity requirement, however, prohibits Congress from enacting a bankruptcy law that, by definition, applies only to one regional debtor. To survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors. A bankruptcy law, such as RITA, confined as it is to the affairs of one named debtor can hardly be considered uniform. To hold otherwise would allow Congress to repeal the uniformity requirement from Art. I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution. </s> Since that result may be accomplished only by the process prescribed in that document for its amendment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 80-1239 is affirmed, and the judgment of the District Court in No. 80-415 is vacated with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 17(a) of MRRA provides in relevant part: "In authorizing any abandonment pursuant to this section, the court shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees as that required under section 11347 of title 49." 45 U.S.C. 915(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). [455 U.S. 457, 461] Title 49 U.S.C. 11347 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) provides in relevant part: "[T]he Interstate Commerce Commission shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees who are affected . . . as the terms imposed under this section before February 5, 1976, and the terms established under section 565 of title 45. . . . The arrangement and the order approving the transaction must require that the employees of the affected rail carrier will not be in a worse position related to their employment as a result of the transaction during the 4 years following the effective date of the final action of the Commission." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 106, as originally enacted, provided in relevant part: "(a) No later than 10 days after the date of enactment of this Act, in order to avoid disruption of rail service and undue displacement of employees, the Rock Island Railroad and labor organizations representing the employees of such railroad, with the assistance of the National Mediation Board, may enter into an agreement providing protection for employees of such railroad who are adversely affected as a result of a reduction in service by such railroad. Such employee protection may include, but need not be limited to, employee relocation incentive compensation, moving expenses, and separation allowances. "(b) If the Rock Island Railroad and the labor organizations representing the employees of such railroad are unable to enter into an employee protection agreement under subsection (a) of this section within 10 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the parties shall immediately submit the matter to the Commission. The Commission shall impose upon the parties by appropriate order a fair and equitable arrangement with respect to employee protection no later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, unless the Rock Island Railroad and the authorized representatives of its employees have by then entered into a labor protection agreement. For purposes of this subsection, the term `fair and equitable' means [455 U.S. 457, 462] no less protective of the interests of employees than protection afforded under section 9 of the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act (45 U.S.C. 908), subject to the limitations set forth in section 110 of this title. "(c) If an employee protection arrangement is imposed by the Commission under (b) of this section, the bankruptcy court shall immediately authorize and direct the Rock Island Railroad trustee to, and the Rock Island Railroad trustee and the labor organizations representing the employees of the railroad shall, immediately implement such arrangement. . . . . . "(e)(1) Any claim of an employee for benefits and allowances under an employee protection agreement or arrangement entered into under this section shall be filed with the [Railroad Retirement] Board . . . . "(2) Benefits and allowances under such agreement or arrangement entered into under this section shall be paid by the Rock Island Railroad from its own assets or in accordance with section 110 of this title, and claims of employees for such benefits and allowances shall be treated as administrative expenses of the estate of the Rock Island Railroad." 94 Stat. 401-402 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 3 Section 110, as originally enacted, provided in relevant part: "(a) The Secretary . . . shall guarantee obligations of the Rock Island Railroad for purposes of providing employee protection in accordance with the terms of any employee protection agreement or arrangement entered into under section 106 of this title. "(b) Any obligation guaranteed pursuant to this section shall be treated as an administrative expense of the estate of the Rock Island Railroad. "(c) The aggregate unpaid principal amount of obligations which may be guaranteed by the Secretary pursuant to this section shall not exceed $75,000,000. "(d) The total liability of the Rock Island Railroad in connection with benefits and allowances provided under any employee protection agreement or arrangement entered into under section 106 of this title shall not exceed $75,000,000. "(e) Except in connection with obligations guaranteed under this section, the United States shall incur no liability in connection with any employee protection agreement or arrangement entered into under section 106 of this title." 94 Stat. 403. </s> [Footnote 4 Those employees hired by other carriers are covered by the March 4, 1980, agreement. Supra, at 460. </s> [Footnote 5 In 106(a) and (b), the respective time limits were shortened to five days after the enactment of the Staggers Act. The judicial review provisions of 106(d) were modified substantially. In 110(e), Congress added the words "to employees" after "liability," apparently in reference to the Tucker Act remedy alluded to in new 124(c). </s> [Footnote 6 Section 124(c) provides that "[n]othing in this chapter or in the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act . . . shall limit the right of any person to commence an action in the United States Court of Claims under . . . the Tucker Act . . . ." 45 U.S.C. 1018(c) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 7 Section 124(a)(1), 45 U.S.C. 1018(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), provides that "any decision of the bankruptcy court with respect to the constitutionality of any provision of this chapter . . . shall be taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." </s> [Footnote 8 The injunction of June 9, 1980, was rendered moot by the enactment of the Staggers Act which re-enacted and amended the sections of RITA declared unconstitutional by the reorganization court. </s> [Footnote 9 In addition to the Bankruptcy Clause and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, appellees have challenged RITA pursuant to principles of separation of powers, the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We find it unnecessary to reach any of these additional contentions. </s> [Footnote 10 By contrast, the 3R Act applied to the reorganization proceedings of 8 major railroads and 15 lessors of leased lines of the Penn Central. 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S., at 108 -109, n. 3. </s> [Footnote 11 At the time RITA was enacted, the New York, Susquehanna and Western Railroad was in the process of liquidation under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In re New York, S. & W. R. Co., 504 F. Supp. 851 (NJ 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1301 (CA3 1981). Another bankrupt railroad is undergoing liquidation proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. 1161-1174 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). In re Auto-Train Corp., 11 B. R. 418 (Bkrtcy. DC 1981). The Milwaukee Road is in an income-based reorganization. That railroad is subject to its own employee protection requirements under 5 and 9 of the MRRA, 45 U.S.C. 904, 908 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As with the case of 106 and 108 of RITA, these sections of the MRRA apply only to one railroad. We have no occasion in these cases to consider the constitutionality of these provisions of the MRRA. Nevertheless, it is no argument that RITA is uniform because another statute imposes similar obligations upon another railroad, as the United States appears to contend. The issue is not whether Congress has discriminated against the Rock Island estate, but whether RITA's employee protection provisions are uniform bankruptcy laws. The uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause is not an Equal Protection Clause for bankrupts. </s> [Footnote 12 By its very terms, RITA applies only to the Rock Island. 45 U.S.C. 1001, 1005, 1007-1008 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Thus, we have no occasion to review a bankruptcy law which defines by identifying characteristics a particular class of debtors. Cf. 3R Act Cases, supra, at 156-160. </s> [Footnote 13 "Mr. Sherman observed that Bankruptcies were in some cases punishable with death by the laws of England - & He did not chuse to grant a power by which that might be done here." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 489 (1911). </s> [Footnote 14 The Framers' intent to achieve uniformity among the Nation's bankruptcy laws is also reflected in the Contract Clause. Apart from and independently of the Supremacy Clause, the Contract Clause prohibits the [455 U.S. 457, 473] States from enacting debtor relief laws which discharge the debtor from his obligations, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 197-199 (1819), unless the law operates prospectively. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (1827). </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree with the Court that the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act (RITA) violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. I write separately, however, because the Court accords a broader scope to that requirement than the Clause's language, its history, and the Court's cases justify. In particular, I am concerned that the Court's rationale may unduly restrict Congress' power to legislate with respect to the distinctive needs of a [455 U.S. 457, 474] particular railroad or its employees. I conclude that the Clause permits such legislation if Congress finds that the application of the law to a single debtor (or limited class of debtors) serves a national interest apart from the economic interests of that debtor or class, and if the identified national interest justifies Congress' failure to apply the law to other debtors. However, because RITA does not satisfy this more stringent test, I agree that RITA is unconstitutional. </s> The Court argues that the uniformity requirement forbids Congress to enact any bankruptcy law affecting a single debtor. But I do not believe that uniformity invariably requires that a bankruptcy law apply to a multiplicity of debtors. The term "uniform" does not necessarily imply either that the law must avoid specifying the debtors to which it applies or that the law must affect more than a single debtor. As we have noted in different contexts, a named individual may constitute a "legitimate class of one." Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (rejecting claim that statute applying, and referring by name, only to a single former President is a bill of attainder). Cf. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (invalidating a statute expressly exempting the American Express Co. by name), overruled in New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam). </s> In reviewing the scanty history of the Clause, the Court notes that one principal purpose was to avoid conflict between state laws concerning debtor insolvency. That concern, of course, is satisfied simply by uniform interstate application of federal bankruptcy laws under the Supremacy Clause. Another purpose, according to the Court, may have been to prevent the passage of private Acts to relieve individual debtors. However, the references to private Acts contained in the debates may have been intended only as examples of the first problem, in that other States failed to give credit to such Acts. To the extent that the Framers were concerned about the passage of private Acts, the question remains [455 U.S. 457, 475] whether they intended to prohibit all such Acts, and thus to disable Congress from enacting legislation applying to a specified debtor but promoting more general national policies than the simple economic interests of the debtor. </s> Our cases do not support the Court's view that any bankruptcy law applying to a single named debtor is unconstitutional. In the most relevant case, Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (3R Act Cases), this Court held that the Regional Rail Reorganization Act did not violate the Uniformity Clause even though it applied only to eight railroads in a specified geographic region. The Court squarely rejected the argument that the geographic nonuniformity of the Rail Act violated the Bankruptcy Clause. "The argument has a certain surface appeal but is without merit because it overlooks the flexibility inherent in the constitutional provision." Id., at 158. Reviewing earlier cases, the Court emphasized Congress' power to recognize geographic differences and "to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems." Id., at 159. The Court also noted that no other railroad was in reorganization during the time that the Act applied. The Court concluded that the Act satisfies the uniformity requirement because it is "designed to solve `the evil to be remedied.'" Id., at 161, quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884). </s> The Court's analysis in this case, too, "has a certain surface appeal." If a law applies to one debtor, it is invalid; if it applies to more than one debtor, it is valid if it satisfies the 3R Act Cases test, i. e., if it was designed to solve an identified evil. But there is nothing magical about a law that specifies only one object. I discern no principled ground for refusing to apply the same test without regard to the number of businesses regulated by the law. 1 </s> [455 U.S. 457, 476] </s> I would apply the 3R Act Cases test in every instance. Congress may specify what debtors, or (which is often the same thing) what portion of the country, will be subject to bankruptcy legislation. The constraint of uniformity, however, requires Congress to legislate uniformly with respect to an identified "evil." In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, Congress imposed certain requirements on all railroads in reorganization; all were deemed to present the same "evil." If Congress has legislated pursuant to its bankruptcy power, furthering federal bankruptcy policies, and if the specificity of the legislation is defensible in terms of those policies, then, but only then, has Congress satisfied the uniformity requirement. Where, as here, the law subjects one named debtor to special treatment, I would require especially clear findings to justify the narrowness of the law. </s> Although the question is close, I conclude that Congress did not justify the specificity of RITA in terms of national policy. Rather, the legislative history indicates an attempt simply to protect employees of a single railroad from the consequences of bankruptcy. No explanation for the specificity of the law is given that would justify such narrow application. In its statutory findings, Congress stated that "uninterrupted continuation of services over Rock Island lines is dependent on adequate employee protection provisions," and that a cessation of services would seriously affect certain state economies and the shipping public. 45 U.S.C. 1001 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The findings explicitly refer, however, only to the Rock Island Railroad. To be sure, in the legislative history Congress did recite more general purposes. Congressional Reports advert to the need for labor protection in "bankruptcy proceedings involving major rail carriers," H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1430, p. 139 (1980), and the need "to avoid disruption of rail service and undue displacement of employees." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1041, p. 26 (1980). See S. Rep. No. 96-614, p. 5 (1980). But recitation of a general purpose does not justify narrow application to a [455 U.S. 457, 477] single debtor where, as here, that purpose does not explain the nonuniform treatment of other comparable railroads that are now, or may be, in reorganization. See ante, at 470, n. 11. With respect to such railroads, reorganization will result in the same displacement of employees and disruption of service - the same "evil" - that Congress purported to address in RITA. Because Congress' findings fail to demonstrate that the narrowness of RITA is addressed to a particular kind of problem, the law does not satisfy the uniformity requirement. </s> I agree with the Court that "[t]he employee protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class of debtors nor a particular type of problem, but a particular problem of one bankrupt railroad." Ante, at 470-471. I do not agree that Congress may not legislate with respect to a single debtor, even if only that debtor presents "a particular type of problem." If, for example, Consolidated Rail Corp. were to fail, I cannot believe that Congress would be prohibited from enacting legislation addressed to the peculiar problems created by the bankruptcy of one of the Nation's principal freight carriers. 2 </s> For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result reached by the Court. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court implies that a law which is general in its terms but in operation applies only to a single debtor might satisfy the uniformity requirement. Again, such a formalistic requirement is not a principled reason for striking down congressional legislation. </s> [Footnote 2 It is indeed ironic that under the Court's approach, bankruptcy legislation respecting Conrail might be invalid. Conrail was created by the 3R Act, which reorganized eight bankrupt railroads into a single viable system operated by a private, for profit corporation. It is difficult to understand why legislation affecting the eight railroads passed constitutional muster in the 3R Act Cases, 419 U.S., at 156 -161, yet legislation affecting their successor might not. </s> [455 U.S. 457, 478]

United States Supreme Court KLEPPE v. NEW MEXICO(1976) No. 74-1488 Argued: March 23, 1976Decided: June 17, 1976 </s> The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act (Act) was enacted to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States" from "capture, branding, harassment, or death," to accomplish which "they are to be considered in the area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public lands." The Act provides that all such animals on the public lands administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or by the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service are committed to the jurisdiction of the respective Secretaries, who are "directed to protect and manage [the animals] as components of the public lands . . . in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands," and if the animals stray from those lands onto privately owned land, the private landowners may inform federal officials, who shall arrange to have the animals removed. Appellees, the State of New Mexico, its Livestock Board and director, and the purchaser of three unbranded burros seized by the Board (pursuant to the New Mexico Estray Law) on federal lands and sold at public auction, and whose return to public lands had been demanded by the BLM, brought this suit for injunctive relief and for a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional. A three-judge District Court held the Act unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Held: As applied to this case, the Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause of the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. Pp. 535-547. </s> (a) The Clause, in broad terms, empowers Congress to determine what are "needful" rules "respecting" the public lands, and there is no merit to appellees' narrow reading that the provision [426 U.S. 529, 530] grants Congress power only to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use of, and to protect federal property. The Clause must be given an expansive reading, for "[t]he power over the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations," United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 , and Congress' complete authority over the public lands includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there. Pp. 536-541. </s> (b) In arguing that the Act encroaches upon state sovereignty and that Congress can obtain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the public lands in a State only by state consent (absent which it may not act contrary to state law), appellees have confused Congress' derivative legislative power from a State pursuant to Art. I, 8, cl. 17, with Congress' powers under the Property Clause. Federal legislation under that Clause necessarily, under the Supremacy Clause, overrides conflicting state laws. And here, though the Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico, it overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as that statute attempts to regulate federally protected animals. Pp. 541-546. </s> (c) The question of the Act's permissible reach under the Property Clause over private lands to protect wild free-roaming horses and burros that have strayed from public land need not be, and is not, decided in the context of this case. Pp. 546-547. </s> 406 F. Supp. 1237, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Edmund B. Clark, and Dirk D. Snel. </s> George T. Harris, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Murdaugh Stuart Madden for the Humane Society of the United States; by Paul A. Lenzini for the International Association of Game, Fish, [426 U.S. 529, 531] and Conservation Commissioners; and by Thomas H. Wakefield for Hope Ryden. </s> Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by V. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General, and Sterling A. Case, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming et al.; by Robert List, Attorney General, for the Nevada State Board of Agriculture; by Jack E. Hull and John C. Miller for the Central Committee of Nevada State Grazing Boards et al.; and by David R. Belding and William I. Althen for Wild Horse Organized Assistance, Inc. [426 U.S. 529, 531] </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At issue in this case is whether Congress exceeded its powers under the Constitution in enacting the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. </s> I </s> The Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, 85 Stat. 649, 16 U.S.C. 1331-1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), was enacted in 1971 to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States," 2 (b) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 1332 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), from "capture, branding, harassment, or death." 1, 16 U.S.C. 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act provides that all such horses and burros on the public lands administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or by the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service are committed to the jurisdiction of the respective Secretaries, who are "directed to protect and manage [the animals] as components of the public lands . . . in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands." 3 (a), 16 U.S.C. 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). If protected horses or burros [426 U.S. 529, 532] "stray from public lands onto privately owned land, the owners of such land may inform the nearest federal marshal or agent of the Secretary, who shall arrange to have the animals removed." 1 4, 16 U.S.C. 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). </s> Section 6, 16 U.S.C. 1336 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Secretaries to promulgate regulations, see 36 CFR 231.11 (1975) (Agriculture); 43 CFR pt. 4710 (1975) (Interior), and to enter into cooperative agreements with other landowners and with state and local governmental agencies in furtherance of the Act's purposes. On August 7, 1973, the Secretaries executed such an agreement with the New Mexico Livestock Board, the agency charged with enforcing the New Mexico Estray Law, N. M. Stat. Ann. 47-14-1 et seq. (1966). 2 The agreement acknowledged the authority of the Secretaries to manage and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States within the State and established a procedure for evaluating the claims of private parties to ownership of such animals. [426 U.S. 529, 533] </s> The Livestock Board terminated the agreement three months later. Asserting that the Federal Government lacked power to control wild horses and burros on the public lands of the United States unless the animals were moving in interstate commerce or damaging the public lands and that neither of these bases of regulation was available here, the Board notified the Secretaries of its intent </s> "to exercise all regulatory, impoundment and sale powers which it derives from the New Mexico Estray Law, over all estray horses, mules or asses found running at large upon public or private lands within New Mexico . . . . This includes the right to go upon Federal or State lands to take possession of said horses or burros, should the Livestock Board so desire." App. 67, 72. </s> The differences between the Livestock Board and the Secretaries came to a head in February 1974. On February 1, 1974, a New Mexico rancher, Kelley Stephenson, was informed by the BLM that several unbranded burros had been seen near Taylor Well, where Stephenson watered his cattle. Taylor Well is on federal property, and Stephenson had access to it and some 8,000 surrounding acres only through a grazing permit issued pursuant to 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act, 48 Stat. 1270, as amended, 43 U.S.C. 315b. After the BLM made it clear to Stephenson that it would not remove the burros and after he personally inspected the Taylor Well area, Stephenson complained to the Livestock Board that the burros were interfering with his livestock operation by molesting his cattle and eating their feed. </s> Thereupon the Board rounded up and removed 19 unbranded and unclaimed burros pursuant to the New Mexico Estray Law. Each burro was seized on the public [426 U.S. 529, 534] lands of the United States 3 and, as the director of the Board conceded, each burro fit the definition of a wild free-roaming burro under 2 (b) of the Act. App. 43. On February 18, 1974, the Livestock Board, pursuant to its usual practice, sold the burros at a public auction. After the sale, the BLM asserted jurisdiction under the Act and demanded that the Board recover the animals and return them to the public lands. </s> On March 4, 1974, appellees 4 filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment that the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2282. </s> Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court held the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) from enforcing its provisions. 5 The court found that the Act "conflicts with . . . the traditional doctrines concerning wild animals," New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (1975), and is in excess of Congress' power under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. That Clause, the court found, enables Congress to regulate wild animals found on the public land only for the "protection of the public lands from damage of some kind." 406 F. Supp., at 1239 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, this power was exceeded in this [426 U.S. 529, 535] case because "[t]he statute is aimed at protecting the wild horses and burros, not at protecting the land they live on." Ibid. 6 We noted probable jurisdiction, 423 U.S. 818 (1975), and we now reverse. </s> II </s> The Property Clause of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. Const., Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. In passing the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, Congress deemed the regulated animals "an integral part of the natural system of the public lands" of the United States, 1, 16 U.S.C. 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), and found that their management was necessary "for achievement of an ecological balance on the public lands." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 5 (1971). According to Congress, these animals, if preserved in their native habitats, "contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives of the American people." 1, 16 U.S.C. 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 69, 122, 128, 138, 169, 183 (1971). Indeed, Congress concluded, the wild free-roaming horses and burros "are living symbols of the historic [426 U.S. 529, 536] and pioneer spirit of the West." 1, 16 U.S.C. 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Despite their importance, the Senate committee found: </s> "[These animals] have been cruelly captured and slain and their carcasses used in the production of pet food and fertilizer. They have been used for target practice and harassed for `sport' and profit. In spite of public outrage, this bloody traffic continues unabated, and it is the firm belief of the committee that this senseless slaughter must be brought to an end." S. Rep. No. 92-242, pp. 1-2 (1971). </s> For these reasons, Congress determined to preserve and protect the wild free-roaming horses and burros on the public lands of the United States. The question under the Property Clause is whether this determination can be sustained as a "needful" regulation "respecting" the public lands. In answering this question, we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 -30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840). </s> Appellees argue that the Act cannot be supported by the Property Clause. They contend that the Clause grants Congress essentially two kinds of power: (1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal property. According to appellees, the first power is not broad enough to support legislation protecting wild animals that live on federal property; and the second power is not implicated since the Act is designed to protect the animals, which are not themselves [426 U.S. 529, 537] federal property, and not the public lands. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Act was not passed in part to protect the public lands of the United States 7 or that Congress cannot assert a property interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the State. 8 But we need not consider whether the Act can be upheld on either of these grounds, for we reject appellees' narrow reading of the Property Clause. </s> Appellees ground their argument on a number of cases that, upon analysis, provide no support for their position. Like the District Court, appellees cite Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928), for the proposition that the Property Clause gives Congress only the limited power to regulate wild animals in order to protect the public lands from damage. But Hunt, which upheld the Government's right to kill deer that were damaging foliage in the national forests, only holds that damage to the land is a sufficient basis for regulation; it contains no suggestion that it is a necessary one. </s> Next, appellees refer to Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907). The referenced passage in that case states that the Property Clause "clearly . . . does not grant to Congress any legislative control over the States, and must, so far as they are concerned, be limited to authority over the property belonging to the United States within their limits." But this does no more than articulate the obvious: The Property Clause is a [426 U.S. 529, 538] grant of power only over federal property. It gives no indication of the kind of "authority" the Clause gives Congress over its property. </s> Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), is of even less help to appellees. Appellees rely upon the following language from Camfield: </s> "While we do not undertake to say that Congress has the unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a State, which it would have within a Territory, we do not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own protection." Id., at 525-526 (emphasis added). </s> Appellees mistakenly read this language to limit Congress' power to regulate activity on the public lands; in fact, the quoted passage refers to the scope of congressional power to regulate conduct on private land that affects the public lands. And Camfield holds that the Property Clause is broad enough to permit federal regulation of fences built on private land adjoining public land when the regulation is for the protection of the federal property. Camfield contains no suggestion of any limitation on Congress' power over conduct on its own property; its sole message is that the power granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach beyond territorial limits. </s> Lastly, appellees point to dicta in two cases to the effect that, unless the State has agreed to the exercise of federal jurisdiction, Congress' rights in its land are "only the rights of an ordinary proprietor . . . ." Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527 (1885). [426 U.S. 529, 539] See also Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963). In neither case was the power of Congress under the Property Clause at issue or considered and, as we shall see, these dicta fail to account for the raft of cases in which the Clause has been given a broader construction. 9 </s> In brief, beyond the Fort Leavenworth and Paul dicta, appellees have presented no support for their position that the Clause grants Congress only the power to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use of, and to protect federal property. This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are "needful" rules "respecting" the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S., at 29 -30; Light v. United States, 220 U.S., at 537 ; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that "[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations." United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 29. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294 -295 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947); Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99 (1872); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537. </s> The decided cases have supported this expansive reading. It is the Property Clause, for instance, that provides [426 U.S. 529, 540] the basis for governing the Territories of the United States. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 673 -674 (1945); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904); United States v. Gratiot, supra, at 537; Sere v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336-337 (1810). See also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948). And even over public land within the States, "[t]he general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case." Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. We have noted, for example, that the Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public lands "to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them . . . ." Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917). And we have approved legislation respecting the public lands "[i]f it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers [on the public lands]." Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain. Alabama v. Texas, supra, at 273; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 297 (1929); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). Although the Property Clause does not authorize "an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State," it does permit "an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it." United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 30 (footnote omitted). In our view, the "complete power" that [426 U.S. 529, 541] Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there. 10 </s> III </s> Appellees argue that if we approve the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Property Clause, then we have sanctioned an impermissible intrusion on the sovereignty, legislative authority, and police power of the State and have wrongly infringed upon the State's traditional trustee powers over wild animals. The argument appears to be that Congress could obtain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the public lands in the State only by state consent, and that in the absence of such consent Congress lacks the power to act contrary to state law. This argument is without merit. </s> Appellees' claim confuses Congress' derivative legislative [426 U.S. 529, 542] powers, which are not involved in this case, with its powers under the Property Clause. Congress may acquire derivative legislative power from a State pursuant to Art. I, 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution by consensual acquisition of land, or by nonconsensual acquisition followed by the State's subsequent cession of legislative authority over the land. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S., at 264 ; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S., at 541 -542. 11 In either case, the legislative jurisdiction acquired may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction with no residual state police power, e. g., Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U.S. 285 (1943), to concurrent, or partial, federal legislative jurisdiction, which may allow the State to exercise certain authority. E. g., Paul v. United States, supra, at 265; Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 -530 (1938); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 -149 (1937). </s> But while Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State's consent or cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress' powers under the [426 U.S. 529, 543] Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 197 (1937); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S., at 403 -405; Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899). And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S., at 100 ; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922). As we said in Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S., at 526 , in response to a somewhat different claim: "A different rule would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." </s> Thus, appellees' assertion that "[a]bsent state consent by complete cession of jurisdiction of lands to the United States, exclusive jurisdiction does not accrue to the federal landowner with regard to federal lands within the borders of the State," Brief for Appellees 24, is completely beside the point; and appellees' fear that the Secretary's position is that "the Property Clause totally exempts federal lands within state borders from state legislative powers, state police powers, and all rights and powers of local sovereignty and jurisdiction of the states," id., at 16, is totally unfounded. The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico, and the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands. But where those state laws conflict with the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act, or with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede. McKelvey v. United States, supra, at 359. [426 U.S. 529, 544] </s> Again, none of the cases relied upon by appellees are to the contrary. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650 (1930), merely states the rule outlined above that, "without more," federal ownership of lands within a State does not withdraw those lands from the jurisdiction of the State. Likewise, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 487 -488 (1946), holds only that, in the absence of consent or cession, the Federal Government did not acquire exclusive jurisdiction over certain federal forest reserve lands in Arkansas and the State retained legislative jurisdiction over those lands. No question was raised regarding Congress' power to regulate the forest reserves under the Property Clause. And in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230 -231 (1925), the Court found that Congress had not purported to assume jurisdiction over highways within the Rocky Mountain National Park, not that it lacked the power to do so under the Property Clause. 12 </s> [426 U.S. 529, 545] </s> In short, these cases do not support appellees' claim that upholding the Act would sanction an impermissible intrusion upon state sovereignty. The Act does not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over the public lands in New Mexico; it merely overrides the New Mexico Estray Law insofar as it attempts to regulate federally protected animals. And that is but the necessary consequence of valid legislation under the Property Clause. </s> Appellees' contention that the Act violates traditional state power over wild animals stands on no different footing. Unquestionably the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948); Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528 (1896). But, as Geer v. Connecticut cautions, those powers exist only "in so far as [their] exercise may be not incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution." Ibid. "No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of [wildlife], but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, 2, cl. 1, precludes a State from imposing prohibitory licensing fees on non-residents shrimping in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, supra; the Treaty Clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, 2, permits Congress to enter into and enforce a treaty to protect migratory birds despite state objections, Missouri v. Holland, supra; and the Property Clause gives Congress the power to thin overpopulated herds of deer on federal [426 U.S. 529, 546] lands contrary to state law. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). We hold today that the Property Clause also gives Congress the power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding. </s> IV </s> In this case, the New Mexico Livestock Board entered upon the public lands of the United States and removed wild burros. These actions were contrary to the provisions of the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act. We find that, as applied to this case, the Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. We need not, and do not, decide whether the Property Clause would sustain the Act in all of its conceivable applications. </s> Appellees are concerned that the Act's extension of protection to wild free-roaming horses and burros that stray from public land onto private land, 4, 16 U.S.C. 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), will be read to provide federal jurisdiction over every wild horse or burro that at any time sets foot upon federal land. While it is clear that regulations under the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal control, Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), we do not think it appropriate in this declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the extent, if any, to which the Property Clause empowers Congress to protect animals on private lands or the extent to which such regulation is attempted by the Act. We have often declined to decide important questions regarding "the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case," Longshoremen v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954), or in the absence of "an adequate and full-bodied record." Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 113 (1962). Cf. Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 </s> [426 U.S. 529, 547] (1948). We follow that course in this case and leave open the question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands under the Property Clause. </s> For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The landowner may elect to allow straying wild free-roaming horses and burros to remain on his property, in which case he must so notify the relevant Secretary. He may not destroy any such animals, however. 4 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 1334 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 2 Under the New Mexico law, an estray is defined as: </s> "Any bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at large upon public or private lands, either fenced or unfenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose owner is unknown in the section where found, or which shall be fifty (50) miles or more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that is branded with a brand which is not on record in the office of the cattle sanitary board of New Mexico . . . ." N. M. Stat. Ann. 47-14-1 (1966). </s> It is not disputed that the animals regulated by the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act are estrays within the meaning of this law. </s> [Footnote 3 The record is somewhat unclear on this point, but appellees conceded at oral argument that all the burros were seized on the public lands of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellees are the State of New Mexico, the New Mexico Livestock Board, the Board's director, and a purchaser of three of the burros seized at Taylor Well. </s> [Footnote 5 Since appellees did not file suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the District Court's injunction was limited to the Secretary of the Interior, who is the appellant in this Court. </s> [Footnote 6 The court also held that the Act could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause because "all the evidence establishes that the wild burros in question here do not migrate across state lines" and "Congress made no findings to indicate that it was in any way relying on the Commerce Clause in enacting this statute." 406 F. Supp., at 1239. While the Secretary argues in this Court that the Act is sustainable under the Commerce Clause, we have no occasion to address this contention since we find the Act, as applied, to be a permissible exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause. </s> [Footnote 7 Congress expressly ordered that the animals were to be managed and protected in order "to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands." 3 (a), 16 U.S.C. 1333 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Cf. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). </s> [Footnote 8 See infra, at 545-546. The Secretary makes no claim here, however, that the United States owns the wild free-roaming horses and burros found on public land. </s> [Footnote 9 Indeed, Hunt v. United States, supra, and Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), both relied upon by appellees, are inconsistent with the notion that the United States has only the rights of an ordinary proprietor with respect to its land. An ordinary proprietor may not, contrary to state law, kill game that is damaging his land, as the Government did in Hunt; nor may he prohibit the fencing in of his property without the assistance of state law, as the Government was able to do in Camfield. </s> [Footnote 10 Appellees ask us to declare that the Act is unconstitutional because the animals are not, as Congress found, "fast disappearing from the American scene." 1, 16 U.S.C. 1331 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). At the outset, no reason suggests itself why Congress' power under the Property Clause to enact legislation to protect wild free-roaming horses and burros "from capture, branding, harassment, or death," ibid., must depend on a finding that the animals are decreasing in number. But responding directly to appellees' contention, we note that the evidence before Congress on this question was conflicting and that Congress weighed the evidence and made a judgment. See Hearing on Protection of Wild Horses and Burros on Public Lands before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2, 7, 11-14, 17, 26-32, 80, 87-88, 101, 103, 134-136, 139-141 (1971). What appellees ask is that we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of Congress. This we must decline to do. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 -30 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 537-538 (1840). See also Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939). In any event, we note that Congress has provided for periodic review of the administration of the Act. 10, 16 U.S.C. 1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 11 Article I, 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power: </s> "To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . ." </s> The Clause has been broadly construed, and the acquisition by consent or cession of exclusive or partial jurisdiction over properties for any legitimate governmental purpose beyond those itemized is permissible. Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 -530 (1938). </s> [Footnote 12 Referring to the Act creating the National Park, the Court said: </s> "There is no attempt to give exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, but on the contrary the rights of the State over the roads are left unaffected in terms. Apart from those terms the State denies the power of Congress to curtail its jurisdiction or rights without an act of cession from it and an acceptance by the national government. The statute establishing the park would not be construed to attempt such a result. As the [park superintendent] is undertaking to assert exclusive control and to establish a monopoly in a matter as to which, if the allegations of the bill are maintained, the State has not surrendered its legislative power, a cause of action is disclosed if we do not look beyond the bill, and it was wrongly dismissed." 268 U.S., at 231 (citations omitted). </s> While Colorado thus asserted that, absent cession, the Federal Government lacked power to regulate the highways within the park, and the Court held that the State was entitled to attempt to prove that it had not surrendered legislative jurisdiction to the United States, at most the case stands for the proposition that where [426 U.S. 529, 545] Congress does not purport to override state power over public lands under the Property Clause and where there has been no cession, a federal official lacks power to regulate contrary to state law. </s> [426 U.S. 529, 548]

United States Supreme Court ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC., PETITIONER v. NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.(2001) No. 00-730 Argued: Decided: November 27, 2001 </s> Per Curiam. </s> We granted certiorari to review for a second time whether the Court of Appeals was correct when it concluded that the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program is consistent with the constitutional guaranty of equal protection. But upon full briefing and oral argument we find that the current posture of this case prevents review of that important question. To address it would require a threshold inquiry into issues decided by the Court of Appeals but not presented in the petition for certiorari. We therefore dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. </s> Six years ago in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Adarand I), we held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id., at 235 ("Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest"). We remanded for a determination whether the race-based components of the DOT's DBE program could survive this standard of review. </s> On remand, the District Court for the District of Colorado found that no such race-based component then in operation could so survive. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 965 F.Supp. 1556 (1997). The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgment, reasoning that petitioner's cause of action had been mooted because the Colorado Department of Transportation had recently certified petitioner as a DBE. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1296-1297 (CA10 1999). Finding it not at all clear that petitioner's certification was valid under DOT regulations, we again granted certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals, and remanded for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000) (per curiam). </s> Following the submission of supplemental briefs addressing statutory and regulatory changes that had occurred since the District Court's 1997 judgment favorable to petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 228 F.3d 1147 (CA10 2000). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the DOT's DBE program was unconstitutional as it was administered in 1997. It further agreed that the automatic use of financial incentives to encourage the award of subcontracts to DBEs, as originally contemplated by the DOT's Subcontractor Compensation Clause (SCC) program, was "unconstitutional under Adarand [I's] strict standard of scrutiny." Id., at 1187. The Secretary of Transportation never challenged these rulings and has since discontinued any and all use of the SCC program. Brief for Respondents 2, 10, 13, 20, n.3, 23. See also 228 F.3d, at 1194 ("The government maintains, and Adarand does not dispute, that the SCC, which spawned this litigation in 1989, is no longer in use"); Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 ("[SCCs] ha[ve been] abandoned in all respects, [they] have not been justified, and the United States Government is not employing [them]"). </s> The Court of Appeals next turned its attention to new regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. 105-178, Tit.I, §1101(b)(1), 112 Stat. 107. See 49 CFR pt. 26 (1999). These regulations pertain almost exclusively to procurement of federal funds for highway projects let by States and localities, which the Court of Appeals found to be the only "relevant" aspect of the DBE program under review. 228 F.3d, at 1160. The Court of Appeals further noted that petitioner either lacked standing or had waived its right to challenge any other race-conscious program. Ibid. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that, by virtue of the new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operates, that program passed constitutional muster under AdarandI. 228 F.3d, at 1176-1187. </s> We again granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in AdarandI. 532 U.S. 941 (2001). We anticipated that we would be able to review the same "relevant program" that was addressed by the Court of Appeals.1 But since certiorari was granted there has been a shift in the posture of the case that precludes such review. </s> Both parties agree that the Court of Appeals confined its opinion to the constitutionality of the DOT's DBE program as it pertains to procurement of federal funds for highway projects let by States and localities. See Brief for Petitioner 15-17; Brief for Respondents 19-23. It is clear from its opinion that the Court of Appeals considered no other programs; its strict scrutiny analysis relies almost exclusively on regulations designed to channel benefits, through States and localities, to firms owned by individuals who hold themselves out to be socially and economically disadvantaged. See 228 F.3d, at 1176-1188. These regulations clearly permit the award of contracts based on race-conscious measures in jurisdictions where petitioner operates, and, as the Government concedes, provide petitioner with a potential basis for prospective relief, at least to the extent petitioner challenges them. Brief for Respondents3. </s> It appeared at the certiorari stage that petitioner was indeed challenging these statutes and regulations. Nothing in the petition for certiorari contested the Court of Appeals' determination that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the statutes and regulations relating to any other race-conscious program. The petition for certiorari simply noted the Court of Appeals' determination on this ground as a matter of fact, without further comment. Pet. for Cert.4, nn.2, 3. </s> Petitioner now asserts, however, that it is not challenging any part of DOT's state and local procurement program. Instead, it claims to be challenging only the statutes and regulations that pertain to direct procurement of DOT funds for highway construction on federal lands. Brief for Petitioner 12-17. But the statutes and regulations relating to direct procurement are quite different than the statutes and regulations reviewed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, while procurement by States and localities is governed by the regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation under TEA-21, direct federal procurement is governed by the Small Business Act, including §§8(d)(4)-(6), as added by §211 of Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1768, and as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§637(d)(4)-(6) (1994 ed. and Supp.V), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 48 CFR pt.19 (1998). </s> This shift in posture requires dismissal of the writ for two reasons. First, the Court of Appeals has not considered whether the various race-based programs applicable to direct federal contracting could satisfy strict scrutiny. See 228 F.3d, at 1189, n.35 ("There is no indication from any of the parties in their briefs or elsewhere that the particular requirements of paragraphs (4)-(6) of §8(d) are at issue in the instant lawsuit") (citing 15 U.S.C. §§637(d)(4)-(6) (1994 ed. and Supp.IV)); see also 228 F.3d, at 1188-1189, n.32 ("The parties have not addressed paragraph (4) of §8(d) at all, and ... we do not address it in great detail"). The Government also has not addressed such programs in its brief on the merits. Brief for Respondents 38-50. Petitioner urges us to take on this task ourselves, and apply strict scrutiny in the first instance to a complex web of statutes and regulations without benefit of any lower court review. But in AdarandI, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999). See also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 205 (2001) ("In the ordinary course we do not decide questions neither raised nor resolved below"); Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 (1976) (per curiam) (same). </s> Second, to reach the merits of any challenge to statutes and regulations relating to direct procurement of DOT funds would require a threshold examination of whether petitioner has standing to challenge such statutes and regulations. Petitioner has sought to show that it does have such standing, but this showing was not made (and no argument was ever advanced) until three weeks before oral argument. It was made then in a reply brief submitted with a lodging of voluminous evidence that has never been presented to any lower court. Reply Brief for Petitioner 1-9. The Government has responded with a lodging of its own, contending that no race-conscious measures are used for direct procurement in any jurisdiction in which petitioner does business.2 Whatever the merits of these competing positions, the petition for certiorari nowhere disputed the Court of Appeals' explicit holding that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the very provisions petitioner now asks us to review. 228 F.3d, at 1160 ("Nor are we presented with any indication that Adarand has standing to challenge paragraphs (4)-(6) of 15 U.S.C. §637 (d)"). </s> We are obliged to examine standing suasponte where standing has erroneously been assumed below. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) ("'[I]f the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it'") (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936)). But we do not examine standing suasponte simply to reach an issue for which standing has been denied below--exactly what petitioner asks that we do here. See, e.g., Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1993) (per curiam) (discussing this Court's Rule 14.1(a) and the "heavy presumption" against reaching threshold questions not presented in the petition for certiorari) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). </s> "Mindful that this is a court of final review and not first view," Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 399 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part), we thus decline to reach the merits of petitioner's present challenge. Petitioner points out that this case presents questions of fundamental national importance calling for final resolution by this Court. But the importance of an issue should not distort the principles that control the exercise of our jurisdiction. To the contrary, "by adhering scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion regardless of the significance of the underlying issue, we promote respect ... for the Court's adjudicatory process." Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 92, n.6 (1997) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also "ensure that we are not tempted to engage in ill-considered decisions of questions not presented in the petition." Izumi Seimitsu, supra, at34. </s> For the foregoing reasons, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1We granted certiorari to review the following questions: </s> "1. Whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard in determining if Congress had a compelling interest to enact legislation designed to remedy the effects of racial discrimination? </s> "2. Whether the United States Department of Transportation's current Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest?" 532 U.S. 968 (2001). Footnote 2The Government states that a "Benchmark Study" completed by the Department of Commerce, see 64 Fed. Reg. 52806 (1999); 63 Fed. Reg. 35714 (1998), prohibits the use of race-conscious mechanisms for direct federal procurement of highway construction projects in any State other than Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas and Oklahoma, in none of which does petitioner conduct operations. Brief for Respondents 8-10, 22. At oral argument, the Government stated its view that the §§8(d)(4)-(6) programs in their current form would not meet the constitutional requirement of "narrow tailoring" if used in jurisdictions where the Benchmark Study has found no disparity suggesting discrimination or its continuing effects. Tr.of Oral Arg. 29-30.

United States Supreme Court ALABAMA G. S. R. CO. v. UNITED STATES(1951) No. 45 Argued: Decided: January 2, 1951 </s> An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, issued pursuant to 307 (d) of the Transportation Act of 1940, 49 U.S.C. 907 (d), required certain common carriers by railroad and certain interstate barge lines to establish joint through routes for the transportation of property, and to establish and apply to such through routes joint rates based on prescribed differentials from higher all-rail rates. The differentials were absorbed by the barge lines, but the Commission made no finding that barge-rail costs were lower than all-rail costs. Held: The order of the Commission is sustained. Pp. 218-229. </s> 1. A finding of lesser cost of barge service is not indispensable to the validity of the Commission's order. Pp. 223-225. </s> (a) The barge-rail rates based on the prescribed differentials were considered by the Commission to be compensatory with respect to the barge lines. P. 224. </s> (b) The judgment of the Commission that competition between barge and rail service was worth preserving was legitimately rested on relevant factors other than lesser cost of service. Pp. 224-225. </s> 2. The Commission's determination that its order is in accordance with general expressions of congressional policy is not the sole basis of the order, since the Commission gave careful consideration to other relevant factors. Pp. 225-226. </s> 3. The prescription of differentials in this proceeding does not deprive the appellant railroads of their inherent advantages contrary to the National Transportation Policy. I. C. C. v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 , distinguished. Pp. 226-227. [340 U.S. 216, 217] </s> 4. The basic findings essential to the statutory validity of the order are sufficiently disclosed in the written report of the Commission in this case. Pp. 227-228. </s> 5. The order of the Commission is not invalid as giving a preference to the port of New Orleans over certain ports of Georgia and Texas, in violation of Art. I, 9, cl. 6 of the Federal Constitution, since that clause does not forbid discriminations as between ports, and since whatever preference there is result from geography and not from any action of the Commission. Pp. 228-229. </s> 88 F. Supp. 982, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 46, Galveston Chamber of Commerce et al. v. United States et al.; No. 47, Railroad Commission of Texas v. United States et al.; and No. 48, Savannah Sugar Refining Corp. v. United States et al., also on appeals to the same court. </s> In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the District Court of three judges denied the injunction and dismissed the complaint. 88 F. Supp. 982. On direct appeals to this Court, affirmed, p. 229. </s> Harold E. Spencer argued the cause for appellants in No. 45. With him on the brief were Robert H. Bierma, Harry E. Boe, Charles Clark, Frank H. Cole, Jr., Leo P. Day, Roland J. Lehman, David O. Mathews, John E. McCullough and Toll R. Ware. </s> William A. Disque argued the cause for appellants in No. 46. Price Daniel, Attorney General of Texas, submitted on brief for appellant in No. 47. Mr. Daniel and Mr. Disque were on the brief for appellants in Nos. 46 and 47. </s> C. R. Hillyer argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant in No. 48. </s> Philip Elman argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Underhill, J. Roger Wollenberg, Daniel W. Knowlton and Edward M. Reidy. [340 U.S. 216, 218] </s> Nuel D. Belnap argued the cause for the American Barge Line Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were Samuel H. Moerman, Harry C. Ames, Robert N. Burchmore and John S. Burchmore. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In No. 45 appellant common carriers by railroad brought this suit against the United States in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued June 13, 1949, in a proceeding instituted by the Commission entitled Rail and Barge Joint Rates, No. 26712 on the Commission's docket. Appellee Interstate Commerce Commission intervened as a party defendant before the District Court, as did appellee common carriers by water, American Barge Line Company (American), Inland Waterways Corporation, doing business as Federal Barge Lines (Federal), and Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company (Valley). A statutory three-judge court heard the case and, upon findings of fact made and conclusions of law stated, denied the injunction and dismissed the complaint. 88 F. Supp. 982. This direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253 followed. </s> The Rail and Barge Joint Rates proceeding before the Commission was instituted in 1934 as an investigation ancillary to certain formal complaints before the Commission under 3 (e) of the Inland Waterways Corporation Act, as amended by the Denison Act, 45 Stat. 980, 1 and ancillary to other proceedings involving the same subject matter as the complaints. The investigation instituted concerned the reasonableness and lawfulness of existing through routes and joint rates, rules, regulations and practices for application by common carriers [340 U.S. 216, 219] by railroad and common carriers by water operating upon the Mississippi and Warrior Rivers and their tributaries; the reasonableness of existing minimum differentials between all-rail rates and corresponding rail-barge, barge-rail and rail-barge-rail rates; the necessity, if any, for the establishment by the railroad and water carriers of additional through routes and joint rates, rules, regulations and practices; and the necessity, if any, for fixing reasonable differentials between corresponding all-rail rates and joint rail and barge rates. Consolidated for disposition with the general investigation were the complaints and other proceedings involving the same general questions. </s> Hearings held pursuant to this investigation over a period of eight years resulted in a record of some 16,000 pages and 1,500 exhibits. An examiner submitted a report, to which exceptions and replies were filed. After argument before the full Commission, it rendered its written report and findings dated July 7, 1948, 270 I. C. C. 591, supplemented by report dated June 13, 1949, 274 I. C. C. 229, and promulgated the order under attack. The order, made pursuant to 307 (d) of the Transportation Act of 1940, 2 required the common carriers by railroad [340 U.S. 216, 220] and water to establish the joint through routes for the transportation of property prescribed in the reports, and to establish and thereafter to maintain and apply over the through routes the joint rates prescribed based upon certain differentials found in the reports to be justified. </s> Appellant common carriers by railroad represent the railroads required by the order to enter into differential joint rail-barge rates, while appellee common carriers by water are the principal barge lines affected by the order. Appellee Federal is a corporation created by act of Congress, and is supervised by the Department of Commerce. It operates between St. Paul, Chicago, Omaha, St. Louis, New Orleans, Port Birmingham, Alabama, and intermediate ports via waterways connecting the ports. Valley operates between Pittsburgh, points on the Monongahela River, Cincinnati, St. Louis and New Orleans. American operates principally between Pittsburgh and New Orleans. Valley and American are privately owned and their operations have been financially profitable while Federal has incurred an average net deficit from water-line operations of over $240,000 per year during the period from 1925 to 1947 inclusive. </s> Much evidence was introduced early in the investigation by both the railroads and the barge lines as to their costs of transportation. The cost section of the Commission made a study of relative costs for the period 1933-38 and concluded that rail-barge operating costs were greater than all-rail operating costs, due largely to the costs of added terminal handling operations. In its report the Commission stated that no useful purpose would be served by making a finding as to relative all-rail and rail-barge costs in the period covered by the study, because since that period there had been radical changes in the conditions affecting cost of transportation service by barge as well as by rail. And after reviewing other [340 U.S. 216, 221] factors bearing on costs of operation, the Commission concluded: </s> "In the face of these facts we cannot find that at the present time there are demonstrable economies in barge-rail transportation on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, including the Warrior, which from the standpoint of cost of service would justify differentials." 270 I. C. C. at 606. </s> Appellants' primary contention is that the Commission could not prescribe reasonable differentials between all-rail rates and joint rates in connection with the water carriers without proof of lower cost of the rail-barge service. Since the Commission had no valid proof as to the relative costs of the services, appellants insist that the Commission's order is arbitrary and capricious and its conclusions that the differentials are "justified as reasonable" and "necessary and desirable in the public interest" are not supported by substantial evidence and essential findings. This, it is contended by appellants, is apparent on the face of the Commission's report, so that it is not necessary for us to examine the evidence before the Commission. </s> The case will perhaps be better understood by an illustration of how the order operates. Assume </s> Illinois Central local rate New Orleans to Cairo, Ill. ........ $1.00 Big Four local rate, Cairo to Cleveland, Ohio ................. 1.00 Illinois Central-Big Four joint all-rail rate, New Orleans to Cleveland ................................................ 1.60 </s> The joint all-rail rate of $1.60 is divided as follows: </s> Illinois-Central, New Orleans to Cairo ........................ .80 Big Four, Cairo to Cleveland .................................. .80 </s> Assume a prescribed differential of ....................... .20 </s> Deduct the differential of $.20 from the $1.60 joint all-rail rate and the joint barge-rail rate is ................ 1.40 </s> The $1.40 barge-rail rate is divided between the rail and barge carriers as follows: </s> Big Four, Cairo to Cleveland ................................... .80 Barge, Cairo to New Orleans .................................... .60 [340 U.S. 216, 222] </s> The local situation, New Orleans to Cairo, then, is: </s> On Illinois Central: </s> Local all-rail rate ............................................ $1.00 Division of $1.60 joint all-rail rate .......................... .80 </s> On the barge line: </s> Local port-to-port rate ........................................ .80 Division of $1.40 barge-rail rate .............................. .60 </s> All-rail rates are not disturbed and no question of their being compensatory is raised. The differentials fixed by the Commission are applied to the presently-existing all-rail rates to compute the prescribed joint rail-barge rate. If an all-rail rate should be modified, the differential would not automatically attach to the new all-rail rate; the joint rail-barge rate would remain as now prescribed (subject to independent modification, of course). 3 It is apparent that the barge line absorbs all the differential. A railroad carrier always gets the same amount for its leg, e. g., Big Four, Cairo to Cleveland (see illustration, above), of a joint movement, whether the joint movement is all-rail or rail-barge. The railroad connecting with the barge carrier in a joint rail-barge movement is, as appellants admit, never hurt. "It is not the rail lines with which the barge lines connect which object to these unjustified differentials. It is the rail lines with which [340 U.S. 216, 223] the barge lines compete," say appellants. In short, the railroads complain of competition. </s> First. Appellants' attack upon the ground that the order gives a competitive advantage, not justified because not supported by a finding of lesser cost of barge service, is not persuasive. Admittedly, barge service is worth less than rail service. It is slower, requires more handling and entails more risk. A shipper will pay only what the service is worth to him. The shippers' evidence, the Commission found, indicated a fairly unanimous view that the principal worth to them of shipping by barge was the saving in transportation expense which it offered. The Commission is not bound to require a rate as high for the inferior as for the superior service. To do so would certainly destroy the principal worth of the inferior service and send all freight to the railroads; practically, there would be no competition between the different modes of transportation. </s> Neither the Commission nor this Court has held that lesser cost of service is a finding without which the Commission may not fix a charge, division of rate, or differential. 4 On the other hand, the considerations just discussed were rightly taken into account by the Commission. We must not lose sight of the fact that the Commission has the interests of shippers and consumers to safeguard as well as those of the carriers. Ayrshire Corp. v. United [340 U.S. 216, 224] States, 335 U.S. 573, 592 . The accommodation of the factors entering into rate structures, including competition, is a task peculiarly for the Commission. Id., at 593; United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 535 -536. </s> A carrier may, if it deems it advantageous, voluntarily accept a rate yielding a low return. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 379 . The Commission may permit it to do so if satisfied that the rate is compensatory, fair and reasonable, and in the public interest. Id., at 358. Appellants intimate that the rates fixed are not compensatory with respect to the barge lines, and that the Commission knew they were not compensatory. We disagree. The barge lines in the instant proceedings represented to the Commission that the differentials which they had proposed, and which were thoroughly examined and considered by the Commission in the light of the railroads' criticisms, were compensatory. From the Commission's report it appears that it substantially adopted the proposals of the barge lines. In any event, it is not apparent from the report that the Commission substantially exceeded these recommended differentials or was not warranted in adopting them. We conclude that the differentials fixed were considered by the Commission to be compensatory. 270 I. C. C. at 612, 613-617. If the rates obtained by the barge lines after applying the differentials are deemed to be less than relevant costs, a rate hearing is the proper proceeding to rectify prejudice flowing therefrom. </s> Here then, the barge lines, in order to protect the sole advantage of their service to the public, are willing to accept less for their inferior service than rail carriers receive for superior service. Competition was adjudged by the Commission to be worth preserving. That judgment was legitimately rested on relevant factors other than lesser cost of service. There is no provision in the [340 U.S. 216, 225] statute making relative costs of rail and water carriers the sole and controlling consideration in establishing joint rates. Indeed, the statute makes no mention of such costs at all. We do not say that relative costs when properly supported by evidence are not a matter to be considered, but we cannot say that the absence of that factor is fatal. </s> With respect to appellants' argument that the inferior barge service cannot be given at a lower rate than the superior without a finding that the inferior costs less than the superior, we note further that even if rail costs were no more than barge costs it would not follow that barge rates must be as great or greater than the rail rates. The rail rates may be too high. From their arguments, it appears to be the purpose of the railroads to eliminate the differentials, and thus, competition, not by reducing the all-rail rates but by increasing the rail-barge rates. The observation of Judge Lindley for the District Court is pertinent: "Of course, if the railroads were petitioning the Commission for a reduction in all-rail rates, proof of lower operating costs might well warrant such a reduction, but it is difficult to see how the lower costs of the railroads, if satisfactorily proven, would warrant an increase in the rates of a competitor." 88 F. Supp. 982, at 987. </s> Second. It has been contended by appellants that without a finding or any evidence to support a finding that barge costs are lower than rail costs, there is no basis for the Commission's order other than the Commission's determination that its order is in accordance with general expressions of congressional policy. It is apparent from the Commission's report that it gave careful consideration to numerous expressions of congressional policy. See particularly, 270 I. C. C. at 609-613. This it was in duty bound to do. But it is also apparent, as we have already indicated, that the Commission gave careful consideration to other factors - factors such as the tremendous [340 U.S. 216, 226] loss of traffic to the barge lines due to a loss of interchange traffic; the inferiority of the barge service; the shippers' testimony to the effect that they would not use barge service unless it were cheaper to do so; the compensatory character of the differentials adopted; the willingness of the barge lines to accept rates yielding low returns; as well as the fact that elimination of the differentials would curtail competition, and that this would negate support, financial and otherwise, which Congress had given Federal while it pioneered in the field of barge transportation. </s> Third. Appellants also contend that the prescription of differentials in this proceeding deprives them of their inherent advantages contrary to the National Transportation Policy. 5 They point to I. C. C. v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 , as having established the principle that the lower costs of the barge carrier there involved was an inherent advantage, and that the Commission had no discretion to approve a rate structure which would reduce such advantage. They argue that the "fair and impartial regulation" called for by the National Transportation Policy demands [340 U.S. 216, 227] that the rule of the Mechling case be applied impartially to protect the "inherent advantage" of the rail carriers here. </s> In the Mechling case, the Commission had fixed a rate for transportation of wheat east by rail from Chicago at a rate higher if it arrived in Chicago by barge than if by rail or lake. This was a plain case of discrimination. There were different rates provided for equal service without any showing that any additional service was rendered for the additional charge. Here the question is whether the barge lines may charge less than the railroads for the different service they render. There is no unlawful discrimination here as there was in the Mechling case. The differentials providing a lower rate for barge service do not constitute an "unjust discrimination" by express proviso of 305 (c) of the Act. 54 Stat. 935, 49 U.S.C. 905 (c). </s> The joint rail-barge rates prescribed neither ignore nor destroy the inherent advantage of rail traffic. The "inherent advantage" of rail carriers shown here is superiority of service. The joint rail-barge rates do not fail to reflect this "inherent advantage" for the same reason that a man who wishes to ride quickly and comfortably buys a Pullman ticket on a fast train instead of a coach seat on a "milk run" train. No one would contend that fixing a lower price on the "milk run" train seat fails to preserve the superior accommodations offered by a Pullman space. Each mode of transportation satisfies the needs and wants of some customers. It is for the customer to decide which mode satisfies his circumstances. </s> Fourth. As to the contention of appellants that the Commission's order is not supported by essential findings of fact, 14 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 14 (1), does not require the Commission to make detailed findings of fact except in a case where damages are awarded. Manufacturers R. Co. v. United [340 U.S. 216, 228] States, 246 U.S. 457, 487 , 489-490. The statute requires the Commission only to file a written report, stating its conclusions, together with its decision and order. This the Commission did, and the essential basis of its judgment is sufficiently disclosed in its report. Of course 14 (1) does not relieve the Commission of the duty to make the "basic" or "quasi-jurisdictional" findings essential to the statutory validity of an order. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 ; United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 464 -465. And the basic findings essential to the validity of a given order will vary with the statutory authority invoked and the context of the situation presented. E. g., United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515 ; North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507 ; Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685 ; United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475 . Here the Commission found, in conformity to the statute invoked, supra note 2, that the differentials prescribed are "justified as reasonable" and "necessary and desirable in the public interest." And "the report, read as a whole, sufficiently expresses the conclusion of the Commission, based upon supporting data . . . ." United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70, 80 . Enough has been "put of record to enable us to perform the limited task which is ours." Eastern-Central Assn. v. United States, 321 U.S. 194, 212 . </s> Appellants in Nos. 46, 47, and 48 were permitted to intervene in the District Court as parties plaintiff. They represent various commercial interests allegedly affected adversely by the order of the Commission. The only points urged by these appellants not answered in No. 45 are that the order gives a preference to the port of New Orleans over certain ports of Georgia and Texas, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act and of Art. I, 9, cl. 6 of the Federal Constitution. [340 U.S. 216, 229] </s> With respect to the constitutional argument, this Court in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 284 U.S. 125, 131 , stated: </s> "The clause of the Constitution invoked is: `No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; Nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.' The specified limitations on the power of Congress were set to prevent preference as between States in respect of their ports or the entry and clearance of vessels. It does not forbid such discriminations as between ports. Congress, acting under the commerce clause, causes many things to be done that greatly benefit particular ports and which incidentally result to the disadvantage of other ports in the same or neighboring States." </s> And we are clear that whatever preference there is to New Orleans is the result of geography and not of any action of the Commission. "The law does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunities or abilities." I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42, 46 . </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Repealed by Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, 950. </s> [Footnote 2 "(d) The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public interest, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own initiative without a complaint, establish through routes, joint classifications, and joint rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the transportation of passengers or property by common carriers by water, or by such carriers and carriers by railroad, or the maxima or minima, or maxima and minima, to be charged, and the divisions of such rates, fares, or charges as hereinafter provided, and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated. In the case of a through route, where one of the carriers is a common carrier by water, the Commission shall prescribe such reasonable differentials as it may find to be justified between all-rail rates and the joint rates in connection with such common carrier by water. . . ." 54 Stat. 898, 937, 49 U.S.C. 907 (d). </s> [Footnote 3 Counsel for the United States and the Commission have so interpreted the order. Finding 1 of the Commission reads: "We find that the amounts shown in appendix A and appendix B are justified as reasonable differentials to be deducted from the present first-class all-rail rates . . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] 270 I. C. C. at 619. The Commission's order, which incorporates the reports and findings by reference, requires the carriers to establish and thereafter to maintain and apply "the joint rates prescribed in the said reports based upon the differentials found in the said reports to be justified." [Emphasis supplied.] </s> This appears to require maintenance of the joint rail-barge rates prescribed, not a fixed difference between all-rail rates, no matter what they may be, and joint rail-barge rates, and we therefore accept the interpretation of counsel for appellees. </s> [Footnote 4 Both the Commission and this Court have consistently rejected any thought that costs should be the controlling factor in rate making. E. g., New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 331 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 359 ; Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 284 U.S. 125, 132 ; Charges for Protective Service to Perishable Freight, 241 I. C. C. 503, 510-511; Proposed Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal, 235 I. C. C. 753, 761; Lighterage Cases, 203 I. C. C. 481, 510; West Coast Lumbermen's Assn. v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 183 I. C. C. 191, 198-199; Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 159 I. C. C. 691, 696-697. </s> [Footnote 5 "It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions; - all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy." 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. (1946 ed.), p. 5443. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> I agree that the differentials established under 307 (d) of the Act need not be measured by the difference in cost between rail and barge transportation. Barge costs as compared with rail costs are, however, a relevant factor for consideration by the Commission under 307 (f) * when it determines what differentials are reasonable. [340 U.S. 216, 230] When the Commission proceeds to fix differentials without knowing what the relative barge and rail costs are, it is to my mind experimenting as a legislative body might do, not performing the infinitely more exacting task of the rate expert. </s> The Commission practically concedes that in this case it adopts a different standard than the statutory one. It is admitted that on this record there can be no adequate findings on costs. The evidence for an earlier period (1933-1938) shows that the cost for joint rail-barge routing is greater than for direct all-rail routing. The Commission refused to pursue the cost study into later years. The reason is apparent. One of the appellees is Inland Waterways Corp. which operates Federal Barge Lines. Inland is a federal corporation (43 Stat. 360, 49 U.S.C. 151) and it and Federal are subsidized by Congress. It is that program that the Commission is seeking to promote here. That may be important and desirable. But the standards which guide the Commission are still found in 307 (f). Costs have some relevance to the problem of differentials as 307 (f) makes clear. Congress is entitled to disregard costs completely. But I do not think the Commission is. </s> [Footnote * "In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates, fares, and charges of common carriers by water, and classifications, regulations, and practices relating thereto, the Commission shall give due consideration, among other factors, to the effect of rates upon the movement of traffic by the carrier or carriers for [340 U.S. 216, 230] which the rates are prescribed; to the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient water transportation service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service; and to the need of revenues sufficient to enable water carriers, under honest, economical, and efficient management, to provide such service." 54 Stat. 938. </s> [340 U.S. 216, 231]

United States Supreme Court RHODES v. STEWART(1988) No. 88-139 Argued: Decided: October 17, 1988 </s> While in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, respondent Stewart and one Reese filed a suit in the District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prison officials. After entering a judgment for the plaintiffs, the court entered an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. On appeal defendant argued that, because Reese had died and Stewart had been released, neither plaintiff had been in the State's custody on the day that the District Court had entered its underlying judgment. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the fees award, concluding that the claim's mootness when the judgment was issued did not undermine Stewart's status as a prevailing party since he had won a declaratory judgment. It distinguished this Court's holding in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 - that a plaintiff must receive some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to have prevailed within the meaning of 1988 - on the ground that the plaintiff in Hewitt, unlike Stewart, had not won such a judgment. </s> Held: </s> Stewart was not a prevailing party under the rule set forth in Hewitt v. Helms, supra, and therefore was not entitled to an award of fees pursuant to 1988. Nothing in Hewitt suggested that the entry of a declaratory judgment in a party's favor automatically renders that party prevailing. A declaratory judgment, like any other judgment, constitutes relief only if it affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. There was no such result in this case, since the lawsuit was [488 U.S. 1, 2] not brought as a class action, and since Stewart could not benefit from any changes in prison policies caused by his lawsuit. </s> Certiorari granted; 845 F.2d 327, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> After entry of a judgment for the plaintiffs in a suit by two prisoners under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. There is no entitlement to attorney's fees, however, unless the requesting party prevails; and by the time the District Court entered its judgment in the underlying suit one of the plaintiffs had died and the other was no longer in custody. In this posture, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties under the rule we set forth in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987), and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in affirming the award of fees by the District Court. </s> I </s> On January 17, 1978, while in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Albert Reese and Larry Stewart filed a complaint alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by officials who refused them permission to subscribe to a magazine. On April 2, 1981, the District Court issued an opinion and an order, later amended in respects no longer pertinent to the case. The court ruled that correctional officials had not applied the proper procedural and substantive standards in denying the inmates their request, and ordered compliance with those standards. </s> Two months later, the District Court entered an award of fees in favor of the attorneys for Reese and Stewart in the amount of $5,306.25. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 703 F.2d 566 (1982). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). Rhodes v. [488 U.S. 1, 3] Stewart, 461 U.S. 952 (1983). On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court confirmed its earlier award. </s> None of the opinions or orders cited thus far made reference to, or showed awareness of, two salient facts: Reese died on February 18, 1979; and Stewart, the sole respondent now before us, was paroled on March 15, 1978, and given a final release from parole on January 17, 1980. In consequence, when the District Court issued its original order on April 2, 1981, neither plaintiff was in the State's custody. For reasons that remain unexplained, petitioners here did not raise this matter until their appeal of the District Court's order after remand. </s> A divided Court of Appeals upheld the award of fees, concluding that the mootness of the claim when the judgment was issued did not undermine respondent's status as a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees. Affirmance order, 845 F.2d 327 (1988). In an unpublished opinion, the majority characterized the relief plaintiffs had received as declaratory relief. The panel majority noted our recent holding in Hewitt v. Helms, supra, that a plaintiff must receive some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to have prevailed within the meaning of 1988. It observed, however, that the plaintiff in Hewitt, unlike Stewart, had not won a declaratory judgment, and concluded that the declaratory judgment issued in this case justified the granting of attorney's fees. </s> II </s> The Court of Appeals misapprehended our holding in Hewitt. Although the plaintiff in Hewitt had not won a declaratory judgment, nothing in our opinion suggested that the entry of such a judgment in a party's favor automatically renders that party prevailing under 1988. Indeed, we confirmed the contrary proposition: </s> "In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the [488 U.S. 1, 4] defendant that the judgment produces - the payment of damages, or some specific specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. This is no less true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any other action. The real value of the judicial pronouncement - what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a `case or controversy' rather than an advisory opinion - is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff." 482 U.S., at 761 (emphasis in original). </s> A declaratory judgment, in this respect, is no different from any other judgment. It will constitute relief, for purposes of 1988, if, and only if, it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. In this case, there was no such result. The lawsuit was not brought as a class action, but by two plaintiffs. A modification of prison policies on magazine subscriptions could not in any way have benefited either plaintiff, one of whom was dead and the other released before the District Court entered its order. This case is thus controlled by our holding in Hewitt, where the fact that the respondent had "long since been released from prison" and "could not get redress" from any changes in prison policy caused by his lawsuit compelled the conclusion that he was ineligible for an award of fees. 482 U.S., at 763 . The case was moot before judgment issued, and the judgment therefore afforded the plaintiffs no relief whatsoever. In the absence of relief, a party cannot meet the threshold requirement of 1988 that he prevail, and in consequence he is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. </s> Certiorari is granted, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> I continue to believe that it is unfair to litigants and damaging to the integrity and accuracy of this Court's decisions [488 U.S. 1, 5] to reverse a decision summarily without the benefit of full briefing on the merits of the question decided. Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 269 -270 (1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 -8 (1987) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 405 -410 (1987) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). </s> The Rules of this Court urge litigants filing petitions for certiorari to focus on the exceptional need for this Court's review rather than on the merits of the underlying case. Summary disposition thus flies in the face of legitimate expectations of the parties seeking review by this Court and deprives them of the opportunity to argue the merits of their claim before judgment. Moreover, briefing on the merits leads to greater accuracy in our decisions and helps this Court to reduce as much as is humanly possible the inevitable incidence of error in our opinions. Finally, the practice of summary disposition demonstrates insufficient respect for lower court judges and for our own dissenting colleagues on this Court. </s> It is my view that when the Court is considering summary disposition of a case, it should, at the very least, so inform the litigants and invite them to submit supplemental briefs on the merits. I remain unconvinced that this slight modification of our practice would unduly burden the Court. The benefits of increasing the fairness and accuracy of our decisionmaking and the value of according greater respect to our colleagues on this and other courts more than outweigh any burden associated with such a modest accommodation. </s> I dissent. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> Because courts usually do not award remedies in cases that are moot, the novel legal issues presented here do not require this Court's plenary consideration, at least at this time. I therefore would just deny the petition for certiorari. Inasmuch, however, as the Court has chosen to grant the petition, [488 U.S. 1, 6] I would give the case plenary consideration with full briefing and argument. Because I believe that summary reversal is inappropriate, I dissent. </s> The Court summarily reverses the Court of Appeals' judgment for being contrary to "our holding in Hewitt [v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755 (1987)]," ante, at 3. That case clearly does not control here. In Hewitt, the plaintiff never obtained a "formal judgment in his favor," 482 U.S., at 761 , and the question there was whether he nonetheless could qualify as a "prevailing party," thereby making him eligible for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Court ruled that he could not because nothing about his lawsuit changed the defendants' behavior towards him. </s> Here, however, respondent did obtain a "formal judgment in his favor," although he no longer was incarcerated at the time. Thus, this case presents the question whether to be a "prevailing party" it is enough to win one's lawsuit. Hewitt did not decide this question, nor could it have, since it did not concern a plaintiff who had obtained "all or some of the relief he sought through a judgment." 482 U.S., at 760 . </s> The Court quotes a passage from Hewitt and construes it as stating that the entry of a declaratory judgment, without practical consequences, would not suffice for the purposes of 1988. Ante, at 3-4. In context, however, this passage simply bolsters the Court's point about when a nonfinal "statement of law" in a judicial opinion may be deemed the functional "equivalent of declaratory relief" under 1988. 482 U.S., at 761 . Indeed, it would be ironic if this passage purported to resolve a question not before the Court in Hewitt, as it extols the "judicial pronouncement" limited to resolving the particular "case or controversy" at hand rather than rendering an "advisory opinion" on a question not presented by the facts of the immediate dispute. Ibid. Thus, I believe that the Hewitt opinion was not meant to tell us, or the Court of Appeals, how to decide this case. But even if it did, I would not summarily reverse the Court of Appeals on [488 U.S. 1, 7] this basis for the very reason that our own pronouncements lose their controlling authority when they attempt to decide questions not before the Court at the time. 1 </s> Quite apart from the Court's interpretation of Hewitt, I have doubts about its interpretation of the term "prevailing party" in 1988. In ordinary usage, "prevailing" means winning. In the context of litigation, winning means obtaining a final judgment or other redress in one's favor. While the victory in this case may have been an empty one, it was a victory nonetheless. In the natural use of our language, we often speak of victories that are empty, hollow, or Pyrrhic. Thus, there is nothing anomalous about saying that respondent prevailed although he derived no tangible benefit from the judgment entered in his favor. Certainly the language of the statute does not so obviously compel a contrary conclusion as to warrant summary reversal. 2 </s> It is true that respondent here should not have obtained his judgment, since his case had become moot. But the fact that a party should not have "prevailed" ordinarily would not deprive him of attorney's fees. 3 Perhaps an exception should be made when the defect in the judgment goes to the court's jurisdiction, as mootness does, but the resolution of this issue [488 U.S. 1, 8] is not obvious. 4 It surely is not one that should be decided without benefit of briefing and oral argument. </s> I dissent from the Court's summary disposition of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 272 , 275 (1982) (dissenting opinion) (summary reversal is inappropriate when this Court's prior precedents do not "mandate" or "compel" reversal). See also EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19, 26 , n. 5 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (this Court customarily reserves summary dispositions for settled issues of law). </s> [Footnote 2 See Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337, 340 (CA4 1985) (plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees simply because judgment was entered in his favor). In addition, other Courts of Appeals have held that a judgment of nominal damages suffices for 1988. E. g., Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F.2d 1193 (CA7 1981); Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600 F.2d 1 (CA1 1979). </s> [Footnote 3 For example, if a defendant failed to raise a statute of limitations defense and the court entered a judgment for the plaintiff, and that judgment became final, I assume that the defendant later could not object to an award of attorney's fees on the ground that the plaintiff should not have prevailed because his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. </s> [Footnote 4 Cf. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 736, n. 8, 738 (CA1 1984) (an Eleventh Amendment issue not previously raised may not be used "to collaterally attack the court's judgment solely for the purpose of avoiding payment of the fees award") (footnote omitted). </s> [488 U.S. 1, 9]

United States Supreme Court RAILWAY CLERKS v. FLORIDA E. C. R. CO.(1966) No. 750 Argued: April 20, 1966Decided: May 23, 1966 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 782, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., and No. 783, Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Following union demands for a 25 hourly wage increase and a six months' notice requirement for layoffs and job abolitions made on behalf of nonoperating railroad employees of virtually all Class I railroads, including the Florida East Coast Railway Company (FEC), negotiations and mediation occurred under the Railway Labor Act. Section 2 Seventh provides in part that no carrier shall change employee pay rates, rules, or working conditions as embodied in agreements except as prescribed in such agreements or in 6, which, together with 5, requires negotiation and mediation. Thereafter following hearings a Presidential Emergency Board constituted under 10 recommended, and all the carriers but FEC accepted, a pay increase of about 10 an hour and a five days' notice before job abolition. Following further mediation under the Act, the parties' refusal voluntarily to arbitrate as suggested by the National Mediation Board; and further unsuccessful negotiations, the nonoperating unions struck, and most operating employees refused to cross the picket lines. After a brief shutdown, FEC resumed operations with a substantially different labor force consisting of supervisory personnel and replacements, with whom it made individual employment agreements which were substantially different from the existing collective bargaining agreements. FEC refused union-proposed mediation by the National Mediation Board. Then, although both sides had rejected arbitration prior to the strike, the unions changed their position and urged arbitration; again FEC refused. The Government brought this suit, in which the nonoperating unions intervened as plaintiffs, charging that FEC's unilateral departures [384 U.S. 238, 239] from the collective bargaining agreements violated the Act. In a parallel injunctive suit against FEC by an operating union, the Court of Appeals held that while FEC could not abrogate the existing collective bargaining agreements, it could make such changes in the agreements as the District Court found were "reasonably necessary" for it to operate under strike conditions. Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172. The District Court, in the Trainmen case and this case, enjoined FEC to adhere to the collective bargaining agreements except upon court authorization after a finding that such changes were "reasonably necessary" for continued operations under strike conditions. FEC applied to the District Court for permission to make numerous departures from the existing agreements, some of which that court sanctioned and some of which it disallowed. Both sides appealed, and, following the Trainmen case, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: </s> 1. All the procedures for settlement of the major dispute involved under 2 Seventh of the Act arising from the unions' demands having been exhausted, the unions were warranted in striking; at that point self-help was also available to the carrier. Pp. 243-244. </s> 2. A carrier, though not under an absolute duty to operate, must make reasonable efforts to maintain public service even during a strike. P. 245. </s> 3. After a strike occurs, the carrier, if its right of self-help and its duty to operate are to be meaningful, must be allowed to depart from the collective bargaining agreement without first following the Act's lengthy course for negotiation and mediation. P. 246. </s> 4. If, however, the spirit of the Act is to be honored, a carrier's power to make new terms governing its replacement labor force must be strictly confined to those truly necessary in light of the new labor force's inexperience or the lesser number of employees available for continued operation. Pp. 246-248. </s> 5. FEC, which did not refuse arbitration until after the strike had begun and its right of self-help had accrued, was not precluded from seeking the assistance of the federal court. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U.S. 50 , distinguished. Pp. 247-248. </s> 348 F.2d 682, affirmed. [384 U.S. 238, 240] </s> Neal Rutledge argued the cause for petitioners in No. 750. With him on the briefs were Lester P. Schoene and Allan Milledge. </s> Paul Bender argued the cause for the United States in Nos. 782 and 783, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas and David L. Rose. </s> William B. Devaney argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 750 and 782, and for petitioner in No. 783. With him on the briefs was George B. Mickum III. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Gregory S. Prince, Jonathan C. Gibson and C. George Niebank, Jr., for the Association of American Railroads, and by Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and James L. Highsaw, Jr., for the Railway Labor Executives' Association. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This controversy started with a union demand on behalf of the nonoperating employees for a general 25-cent-per-hour wage increase and a requirement of six months' advance notice of impending layoffs and abolition of job positions. The demand was made of virtually all Class I railroads, including Florida East Coast Railway Co. (hereinafter called FEC). The dispute underwent negotiations and mediation as required by the Railway Labor Act. 1 When those procedures proved unsuccessful, a Presidential Emergency Board was created [384 U.S. 238, 241] under 10 of the Act, 2 which after hearings recommended a general pay increase of about 10 cents per hour and a requirement of at least five days' notice before job abolition. In June 1962, this settlement was accepted by all the carriers except FEC. Thereupon, further mediation was invoked under the Act but again no settlement was reached. The Act makes no provision for compulsory arbitration. Section 5 First 3 does, however, provide for voluntary arbitration at the suggestion of the National Mediation Board. The suggestion was made but both the unions and FEC refused. Further negotiations were unsuccessful and on January 23, 1963, the nonoperating unions struck. When that happened, most operating employees refused to cross the picket lines. </s> FEC shut down for a short period; and then on February 3, 1963, resumed operations by employing supervisory personnel and replacements to fill the jobs of the strikers and of those operating employees who would not cross the picket lines. FEC made individual agreements with the replacements concerning their rates of pay, rules and working agreements on terms substantially different from those in the outstanding collective bargaining agreements with the various unions. Thereafter, FEC proposed formally to abolish all the existing collective bargaining agreements and to substitute another agreement that would make rather sweeping departures in numerous respects from the existing collective bargaining agreements. Negotiations between FEC and the unions broke down. The unions then invoked the mediation services of the National Mediation Board relative to the proposed changes, but the carrier refused. [384 U.S. 238, 242] The unions thereafter agreed to submit the underlying dispute - the one concerning wages and notice - to arbitration. But FEC refused arbitration and shortly thereafter established another new agreement by unilateral action and operated under it until the present action was instituted by the United States in 1964 - a suit charging that the unilateral promulgation of the new agreement violated the Act. 4 The nonoperating unions intervened as plaintiffs and hearings were held. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals decided Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, a parallel injunctive suit brought against FEC by an operating union and similarly complaining of FEC's unilateral promulgation of the new agreement. That court held that FEC had violated the Act by its unilateral abrogation of the existing collective bargaining agreements. It ruled, however, that FEC could unilaterally institute such changes in its existing agreements as the District Court found to be "reasonably necessary to effectuate its right to continue to run its railroad under the strike conditions." 336 F.2d, at 182. The District Court thereafter entered injunctions in the Trainmen case, and in the present case, requiring FEC to abide by all the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions specified in the existing collective bargaining agreements until the termination of the statutory mediation procedure "except upon specific authorization of this Court after a finding of reasonable necessity therefor upon application of the FEC to this Court." [384 U.S. 238, 243] </s> Thereupon FEC filed an application for approval of some departures from its existing agreements with its nonoperating unions. The District Court, after hearings, granted some requests and denied others. Thus it permitted FEC to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and age limitations established by the collective bargaining agreements, to contract out certain work, and to use supervisory personnel to perform certain specified jobs where it appeared that trained personnel were unavailable. The District Court denied FEC's request that it be permitted to disregard completely craft and seniority district restrictions, that it be allowed to use supervisors to perform craft work whenever it desired, that it be relieved of the duty to provide seniority rosters, that it be permitted to contract out work whenever trained personnel were unavailable, and that the union shop be declared void and unenforceable as to employees hired after January 23, 1963. Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of its decision in the Trainmen case. 348 F.2d 682. The unions, the United States, and FEC each petitioned for a writ of certiorari which we granted. 382 U.S. 1008 . </s> The controversy centers around 2 Seventh of the Act, 5 which provides: </s> "No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act." </s> The demand for a 25-cent-per-hour wage increase and for six months' advance notice of impending layoffs and job abolitions was a major dispute covered by 2 Seventh (Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 ) and it had proceeded through all the major dispute procedures [384 U.S. 238, 244] required by the Act without settlement. The unions, having made their demands and having exhausted all the procedures provided by Congress, were therefore warranted in striking. For the strike has been the ultimate sanction of the union, compulsory arbitration not being provided. </s> At that juncture self-help was also available to the carrier as we held in Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 284 ; 291: ". . . both parties, having exhausted all of the statutory procedures, are relegated to self-help in adjusting this dispute . . . ." </s> The carrier's right of self-help is underlined by the public service aspects of its business. "More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable consequences to the public." Virginian Ry. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 . The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, places a responsibility on common carriers by rail to provide transportation. 6 </s> [384 U.S. 238, 245] The duty runs not to shippers alone but to the public. In our complex society, metropolitan areas in particular might suffer a calamity if rail service for freight or for passengers were stopped. Food and other critical supplies might be dangerously curtailed; vital services might be impaired; whole metropolitan communities might be paralyzed. </s> We emphasize these aspects of the problem not to say that the carrier's duty to operate is absolute, but only to emphasize that it owes the public reasonable efforts to maintain the public service at all times, even when beset by labor-management controversies and that this duty continues even when all the mediation provisions of the Act have been exhausted and self-help becomes available to both sides of the labor-management controversy. </s> If all that were involved were the pay increase and the notice to be given on layoffs or job abolition, the problem would be simple. The complication arises because the carrier, having undertaken to keep its vital services going with a substantially different labor force, finds it necessary or desirable to make other changes in the collective bargaining agreements. Thus we find FEC in this case anxious to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and the age limitations in the collective bargaining agreements, to make changes in the contracting-out provisions, to disregard requirements for trained personnel, to discard craft and seniority restrictions, the union shop provision, and so on. Each of these technically is included in the words "rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements" within the meaning of 2 Seventh of the Act. It is, therefore, argued with force that each of these issues must run the same gantlet of negotiation and mediation, as did the pay and notice provisions that gave rise to this strike. [384 U.S. 238, 246] </s> The practical effect of that conclusion would be to bring the railroad operations to a grinding halt. For the procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute. If, therefore, 2 Seventh is applicable after a lawful strike has been called and after lawful self-help has been invoked by the carrier, the right of self-help might well become unilateral to the workers alone, and denied the carrier. For when a carrier improvises and employs an emergency labor force it may or may not be able to comply with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, drafted to meet the sophisticated requirements of a trained and professional labor force. The union remains the bargaining representative of all the employees in the designated craft, whether union members or not. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 . All these employees of the railroad are entitled to the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement, and the carrier may not supersede the agreement by individual contracts even though particular employees are willing to enter into them. See Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 347 . But when a strike occurs, both the carrier's right of self-help and its duty to operate, if reasonably possible, might well be academic if it could not depart from the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement without first following the lengthy course the Act otherwise prescribes. </s> At the same time, any power to change or revise the basic collective agreement must be closely confined and supervised. These collective bargaining agreements are the product of years of struggle and negotiation; they represent the rules governing the community of striking employees and the carrier. That community is not destroyed by the strike, as the strike represents only an [384 U.S. 238, 247] interruption in the continuity of the relation. 7 Were a strike to be the occasion for a carrier to tear up and annul, so to speak, the entire collective bargaining agreement, labor-management relations would revert to the jungle. A carrier could then use the occasion of a strike over a simple wage and hour dispute to make sweeping changes in its work-rules so as to permit operation on terms which could not conceivably have been obtained through negotiation. Having made such changes, a carrier might well have little incentive to reach a settlement of the dispute that led to the strike. It might indeed have a strong reason to prolong the strike and even break the union. The temptation might be strong to precipitate a strike in order to permit the carrier to abrogate the entire collective bargaining agreement on terms most favorable to it. The processes of bargaining and mediation called for by the Act would indeed become a sham if a carrier could unilaterally achieve what the Act requires be done by the other orderly procedures. </s> While the carrier has the duty to make all reasonable efforts to continue its operations during a strike, its power to make new terms and conditions governing the new labor force is strictly confined, if the spirit of the Railway Labor Act is to be honored. 8 The Court of Appeals used [384 U.S. 238, 248] the words "reasonably necessary." We do not disagree, provided that "reasonably necessary" is construed strictly. The carrier must respect the continuing status of the collective bargaining agreement and make only such changes as are truly necessary in light of the inexperience and lack of training of the new labor force or the lesser number of employees available for the continued operation. The collective bargaining agreement remains the norm; the burden is on the carrier to show the need for any alteration of it, as respects the new and different class of employees that it is required to employ in order to maintain that continuity of operation that the law requires of it. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 6, 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. 156 (1964 ed.); 5 First, 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195, 45 U.S.C. 155 First (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 2 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. 160 (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 3 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195, 45 U.S.C. 155 First (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 4 We have no doubt that the United States had standing to bring this action. Section 2 Tenth, 48 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. 152 Tenth (1964 ed.), makes it the duty of the United States attorney to "institute in the proper court and to prosecute . . . all necessary proceedings for the enforcement" of 2 (emphasis added) which FEC is here charged with violating. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 -492. </s> [Footnote 5 48 Stat. 1188, 45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 6 49 U.S.C. 1 (4) (1964 ed.) provides in part: </s> "It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable thereto; . . ." </s> 49 U.S.C. 1 (11) (1964 ed.) provides in part: </s> "It shall be the duty of every carrier by railroad subject to this chapter to furnish safe and adequate car service and to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service; . . ." </s> 49 U.S.C. 8 (1964 ed.) provides in part: </s> "In case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this chapter . . . ." </s> [Footnote 7 In this connection, it bears emphasis that the District Court's authorization to deviate in part from the collective bargaining agreement would, as FEC readily concedes, terminate at the conclusion of the strike. At that time, the terms of the earlier collective bargaining agreement, except as modified by any new agreement of the parties, would be fully in force. </s> [Footnote 8 If FEC had precipitated the strike by refusing to arbitrate, then it would be barred by Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U.S. 50 , from obtaining injunctive relief in the courts since it would have failed to make "every reasonable effort" to settle the dispute within the meaning of 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 72, 29 U.S.C. 108 (1964 ed.). And we assume that seeking relief from provisions of the collective bargaining agreements [384 U.S. 238, 248] would have fallen under the same ban. But in the instant case both FEC and the unions refused voluntary arbitration and the strike followed. Later the unions changed their mind and agreed to arbitration, FEC refusing. But by then the strike was on and the right to "self-help" had accrued. If an issue concerning the good faith of a party in refusing a pre-strike opportunity to arbitrate were presented, different considerations would apply. </s> Moreover, since the justification for permitting the carrier to depart from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement lies in its duty to continue to serve the public, a district court called upon to grant a carrier's relief from provisions of the collective bargaining agreement should satisfy itself that the carrier is engaged in a good-faith effort to restore service to the public and not, e. g., using the strike to curtail that service. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. </s> The Act provides that until bargaining procedures are exhausted there shall be neither strikes nor changes in the contract. Section 2 Seventh (45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh (1964 ed.)); 5 First (45 U.S.C. 155 First (1964 ed.)); 6 (45 U.S.C. 156 (1964 ed.)). Here, bargaining was exhausted only on wages and notice of [384 U.S. 238, 249] layoffs and job abolition. At that point the union was free to strike and the carrier to make such changes as had been bargained for. The carrier was free to operate, if it could, but in my view only under the terms of the existing collective bargaining contract as modified with respect to those subjects on which the Act's procedures had been followed. </s> The Court agrees that 2 Seventh forbids the carrier itself to make any changes in the contract other than those on which bargaining has taken place, regardless of how necessary these changes are to the successful operation of the railroad. But with the consent of a United States court, or a state court for that matter, the carrier may now make any change essential to its continued operation. 1 Although the union remains the bargaining agent for all employees, strikers and replacements alike, Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 , the carrier need not bargain with it, but with the court, if it wants to make changes which the Act forbids it to make alone. The union is free to strike and thereby to attempt to halt the operation of the railroad; but if it does, the court may - indeed, it must in some circumstances - permit the railroad to make any change in wages, hours and working conditions which is necessary to obviate the normal consequences of the strike. I fail to see how this exception can be read into the unequivocal language of 2 Seventh. [384 U.S. 238, 250] </s> This is very close to a judgment that there shall be no strikes in the transportation business, a judgment which Congress rejected in drafting the Railway Labor Act. True, the Act was designed to maximize settlements and minimize strikes, 2 but Congress stopped short of imposing compulsory arbitration, the most obvious technique to insure the settlement of disputes and to prevent strikes. 5, 45 U.S.C. 155 (1964 ed.). Certainly it was not anticipated that a struck railroad could invoke the aid of the court to make changes in a contract which Congress had forbidden it to make. Nor did Congress anticipate what is in effect a new type of railroad receivership designed to last as long as necessary to blunt the effectiveness of a strike which the Act left the union free to call. 3 Had Congress impressed upon the railroads an absolute duty to continue operating while struck, perhaps an implied exception to 2 Seventh might be warranted. But, as the majority recognizes, no such duty has been placed on the railroads. </s> Of course the railroad was free to operate, but the Congress specified in 2 Seventh the terms on which it might do so. To change those terms is a task for Congress, not for a federal or a state court. </s> [Footnote 1 Congress has generally entrusted the specialized and unique affairs of the railroad industry to a few expert boards and agencies. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 752 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Permitting the wholesale intervention of the courts in this manner seems inconsistent with these congressional policies of uniformity and expert supervision. Cf. Labor Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 299 (WHITE, J., dissenting); American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, 380 U.S. 300, 325 -327 (WHITE, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 2 It is certainly questionable whether the procedures approved by the majority will minimize strikes or maximize settlements. This particular strike is one of the longest in railroad history. There can be no doubt that the procedures followed in this case have helped prolong the strike. For example, in part because of these procedures, Florida East Coast enjoyed a substantial increase in its operating profits during the strike period. See Brief for Government, p. 8, n. 7. </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. 77 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 205 (n) (1964 ed.), which provides "No judge or trustee acting under this title shall change the wages or working conditions of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in the Railway Labor Act . . . ." Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572. </s> [384 U.S. 238, 251]

United States Supreme Court JACKSON v. TAYLOR(1957) No. 619 Argued: April 30, 1957Decided: June 3, 1957 </s> A general court-martial found a soldier guilty of the separate offenses of premeditated murder and attempted rape and, in accordance with the usual practice, gave him an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment for both offenses. The Army Board of Review set aside the conviction on the murder charge; but it sustained the conviction for attempted rape and reduced the sentence to 20 years' imprisonment, which is the maximum sentence for attempted rape. In a habeas corpus proceeding, the soldier challenged the validity of the reduced sentence. Held: The action of the Board of Review in modifying the sentence to 20 years' imprisonment was authorized by Article 66 (c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and it is sustained. Pp. 570-580. </s> (a) A different result is not required by the facts that the law officer of the court-martial advised the court-martial that, in view of the finding on the murder charge, it had only two alternatives, a death sentence of life imprisonment, and that he made no reference to punishment for attempted rape, the maximum for which is 20 years. Pp. 573-574. </s> (b) The Board of Review had authority under Article 66 (c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to modify the life sentence to 20 years after the murder conviction was set aside. Pp. 574-577. </s> (c) In view of the gross-sentence practice required in court-martial proceedings and the power vested by law in the Board of Review to correct such a sentence, the Board's action cannot be set aside on the conjecture that the court-martial might have imposed less than the maximum sentence for attempted rape had it considered that offense separately. Pp. 577-579. </s> (d) The case should not be remanded for a rehearing before the court-martial on the question of sentence, since there is no specific authority for doing so under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Congress intended that the Board of Review should exercise this power. P. 579. </s> (e) Nor should the case be remanded for rehearing before a new court-martial, since the function of reviewing such sentences is vested by law in the Board of Review. Pp. 579-580. [353 U.S. 569, 570] </s> (f) Since the sentence here involved was legally imposed by military authorities, its severity is not reviewable on habeas corpus in the civil courts. P. 578, note 10. </s> 234 F.2d 611, affirmed. </s> Urban P. Van Susteren argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and James W. Booth. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner, a soldier, attacks the validity of a sentence of 20 years he is now serving as the result of his conviction by an Army court-martial of the offense of attempted rape. While serving in the United States Army in Korea, he was found guilty by a general court-martial of the separate offenses of premeditated murder and attempted rape of a Korean woman. He was given an aggregate sentence 1 of life imprisonment for both offenses. The Army board of review found "incorrect in law and fact" the court-martial finding of guilty on the murder charge, but it approved the guilty finding for attempted rape. As to the sentence, the board found "that only so much of the approved sentence as provides for dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for 20 years is correct in law and fact." As so modified, [353 U.S. 569, 571] it approved the sentence. United States v. Fowler, 2 C. M. R. 336. The petitioner makes no attack on his original conviction on the attempted rape charge and its affirmance by the board. But he attacks the sentence of the board alleging that "the action of the Review Board in reserving twenty (20) years of the life sentence imposed by the Court-Martial for the crime of murder, even though it had reserved and set aside the conviction, was null and void." The District Court denied the writ and discharged the rule to show cause, Jackson v. Humphrey, 135 F. Supp. 776, holding that the board of review on reversing the murder conviction, properly modified the sentence and was not required to order a new trial or to remand the case for resentencing by the general court-martial. The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed. Jackson v. Taylor, 234 F.2d 611. It held that the board of review upon affirming the attempted rape conviction was authorized to "affirm . . . such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct," citing Article 66 (c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U.S.C. 653 (c). We believe the sentence must stand. </s> Petitioner was tried with two other soldiers and each was convicted of the same offenses, premeditated murder and attempted rape. Each was also sentenced to life imprisonment. The record of the trial was then forwarded to the convening authority where the convictions and sentences were approved. In accordance with military procedure, the record was then forwarded with the convening authority's approval to a board of review in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. That board, as already stated, found the murder convictions unsupported by the record and set them aside, but sustained the convictions for attempted rape and modified the sentences. The soldiers then sought further review by petition before the United States Court of Military [353 U.S. 569, 572] Appeals. No question regarding the authority of the review board to modify the sentences was raised and the petition was denied without opinion. United States v. Fowler, 1 U.S.C. M. A. 713. The soldiers, having started to serve their sentences, were held in different prisons. Each filed a writ of habeas corpus in the district in which he was imprisoned and each raised the same issue of the authority of the board of review to sentence in the manner described. A conflict between the Circuits has resulted 2 and we granted certiorari, limited to the gross sentence question, not only to resolve this conflict but to settle an important question in the administration of the Uniform Code. 352 U.S. 940 . </s> Petitioner claims no deprivation of constitutional rights. He argues only that under military law the board of review should have ordered either a rehearing or that he be released because it was without authority to impose the 20-year sentence. </s> The review board derives its power from Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U.S.C. 653. 3 We are concerned more particularly with subsection (c) of that section. It provides: </s> "(c) In a case referred to it, the board of review shall act only with respect to the findings and sentence [353 U.S. 569, 573] as approved by the convening authority. It shall affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. In considering the record it shall have authority to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses." </s> Here the board relied on its power to "affirm . . . such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct . . . ." Petitioner argues, however, that the 20-year sentence was not a "part or amount" of the sentence imposed by the court-martial. He supports this by reference to the action of the law officer of the court-martial who, after the findings of guilt were returned, advised its members in open court of the punishment it might impose. In view of the finding on the murder charge, he told the court-martial it had only two alternatives, a death sentence or life imprisonment. Art. of War 92, 62 Stat. 640. He made no reference to the punishment for attempted rape, the maximum for which is 20 years. Since the court-martial was required to impose a single sentence covering both of the guilty findings, 4 it entered a life sentence. Petitioner claims there was no sentence on the attempted rape conviction and, therefore, the entry of a 20-year sentence thereon by the board was an entirely new and independent imposition which was beyond its power. He bases this conclusion wholly on deduction. He contends that since the law officer advised the court-martial only as to the punishment for murder it follows that it did not sentence him on the attempted rape charge. But why should the officer go through the useless motion [353 U.S. 569, 574] of instructing on the attempted rape when the court-martial by law was required to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment? The sentence could have been no heavier unless it were death. What possible good would it have done for the court-martial, if it had been authorized, to add 20 or any other number of years onto a life sentence? In addition to the fact that the Uniform Code authorizes no such sentence we should not construe the Act of Congress to require the doing of a useless act. </s> But, the petitioner says, simple arithmetic shows that no sentence was imposed on the attempted rape finding. He reasons that the offense of premeditated murder carries a minimum punishment of life imprisonment, the exact sentence he received. The sentence therefore included no punishment covering the attempted rape finding he claims. It is true that the sentence was not broken down as to offenses. That is not permitted. However, the petitioner in his analysis overlooks entirely the requirement of military law that only the entry of a single gross sentence for both of the offenses is permitted. This Court has approved this practice. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 393 (1902). See also McDonald v. Lee, 217 F.2d 619, 622 (1954); Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1920), 404. The sentence here was a gross sentence. It covered both the convictions. What the petitioner would have us do is to strike down this long practice, not only approved over the years by the Congress but by our cases. This we cannot do. </s> The question remains whether the board had the authority to modify the life sentence to 20 years after the murder conviction was set aside. Reviewing authorities have broad powers under military law. 5 Unlike a [353 U.S. 569, 575] civilian trial in most jurisdictions, the initial sentence under military law is imposed by the members of the court-martial. Otherwise the court-martial performs functions more like those of a jury than a court. It is composed of laymen. See Art. 25 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 116, 50 U.S.C. 589. The powers of review, modification, and sentence-adjustment under the Uniform Code rest elsewhere than on this body of laymen. </s> Review of a court-martial conviction is first provided by the convening authority - the commanding officer who directed that the case be tried before a court-martial. He is empowered to reduce a sentence though he cannot increase it. He can weigh facts, determine credibility of witnesses, disapprove findings of guilt which he believes erroneous in law or fact, and determine sentence appropriateness without regard to what the court-martial might have done had it considered only the approved findings. Art. 64 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U.S.C. 651. He has other broad powers. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951), c. 17. Here the convening authority approved the action of the court-martial. </s> The next stage of review is that with which we are particularly concerned. It is conducted by the board of review composed of legally-trained officers. 6 Such boards first received statutory recognition in 1920. Art. of War 50 1/2, 41 Stat. 797-799. At that time Congress gave them power to review, with the Judge Advocate General, records for legal sufficiency. By 1949 this power [353 U.S. 569, 576] was increased to weigh facts, though, as petitioner argues, these boards still did not have power to determine sentence appropriateness. Art. of War 50 (g), 62 Stat. 637. Such power was, however, given to the Judge Advocate General and a Judicial Council. 7 </s> Against this background of broad powers of review under military law, Congress began the drafting of the new Uniform Code of Military Justice. Their work culminated, so far as we are here concerned, with Article 66 (c), supra. Petitioner finds the language of this section ambiguous and argues that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. That would be true if there were ambiguity in the section. But the words are clear. The board may "affirm . . . such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct . . . ." That is precisely what the review board did here. It affirmed such part, 20 years, of the sentence, life imprisonment, as it found correct in fact and law for the offense of attempted rape. Were the words themselves unclear, the teachings from the legislative history of the section would compel the same result. </s> The Uniform Code was drafted by a committee chairmanned by Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr. In testifying before the Senate Subcommittee which considered the bill, Professor Morgan stated with reference to the review board that it now </s> "has very extensive powers. It may review law, facts, and practically, sentences; because the provisions stipulate that the board of review shall affirm only so much of the sentence as it finds to be justified by the whole record. It gives the board of review . . . the power to review facts, law and sentence [353 U.S. 569, 577] . . . ." Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H. R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 42. </s> Military officials opposed giving the review boards power to alter sentences. Id., at 262, 285. The Subcommittee nevertheless decided the boards should have that power. Id., at 311. The Committee Report to the Senate augments the conclusion that the boards of review were to have the power to alter sentences. 8 A study of the legislative history of the Code in the House of Representatives leads to the same conclusion. See H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 31; 95 Cong. Rec. 5729. Article 66 was enacted in the language approved by the committees. It is manifest then that it was the intent of Congress that a board of review should exercise just such authority as was exercised here. 9 </s> Boards of review have been altering sentences from the inception of the Code provision. These alterations have been attacked but have found approval in the courts as [353 U.S. 569, 578] is shown by the list of cases collected in the opinion of Judge Hastie in the Court of Appeals. 234 F.2d, at 614, n. 3. Petitioner objects, however, that the board of review should not have imposed the maximum sentence for attempted rape because the court-martial might have imposed a lesser sentence had it considered the matter initially. But this is an objection that might properly be addressed to Congress. It has laid down the military law and it can take it away or restrict it. The Congress could have required a court-martial to enter a sentence on each separate offense just as is done in the civilian courts. The board of review would then know the attitude of the court-martial as to punishment on each of its findings of guilt. But this the Congress did not do. The argument, therefore, falls since it is based on pure conjecture. No one could say what sentence the court-martial would have imposed if it had found petitioner guilty only of attempted rape. But Congress avoided the necessity for conjecture and speculation by placing authority in the board of review to correct not only the findings as to guilt but the sentence as well. Likewise the apportionment of the sentence that the court-martial intended as between the offenses would be pure speculation. 10 But because of the gross sentence procedure in military law we need not concern ourselves with these problems. Military law [353 U.S. 569, 579] provides that one aggregate sentence must be imposed and the board of review may modify that sentence in the manner it finds appropriate. To say in this case that a gross sentence was not imposed is to shut one's eyes to the realities of military law and custom. </s> Finally the petitioner suggests that the case should be remanded for a rehearing before the court-martial on the question of the sentence. We find no authority in the Uniform Code for such a procedure and the petitioner points to none. 11 The reason is, of course, that the Congress intended that the board of review should exercise this power. This is true because the nature of a court-martial proceeding makes it impractical and unfeasible to remand for the purpose of sentencing alone. See United States v. Keith, 1 U.S.C. M. A. 442, 451, 4 C. M. R. 34, 43 (1952). Even petitioner admits that it would now, six years after the trial, be impractical to attempt to reconvene the court-martial that decided the case originally. A court-martial has neither continuity nor situs and often sits to hear only a single case. Because of the nature of military service, the members of a court-martial may be scattered throughout the world within a short time after a trial is concluded. Recognizing the [353 U.S. 569, 580] impossibility of remand to the same court-martial, petitioner suggests as an alternative that the case should be remanded for a rehearing before a new court-martial. 12 He admits that it would now be impractical for such a new court-martial to hear all of the evidence, and that the court would have to make its sentence determination on the basis of what it could learn from reading the record. Such a procedure would merely substitute one group of nonparticipants in the original trial for another. Congress thought the board of review could modify sentences when appropriate more expeditiously, more intelligently, and more fairly. Acting on a national basis the board of review can correct disparities in sentences and through its legally-trained personnel determine more appropriately the proper disposition to be made of the cases. Congress must have known of the problems inherent in rehearing and review proceedings for the procedures were adopted largely from prior law. It is not for us to question the judgment of the Congress in selecting the process it chose. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951), App. 8, at 521, specifically provides, inter alia: "The court will adjudge a single sentence for all the offenses of which the accused was found guilty." This sentence is known as an "aggregate" or "gross" sentence. A court-martial may not impose separate sentences for each finding of guilt, but may impose only a single, unitary sentence covering all of the guilty findings in their entirety, no matter how many such findings there may be. </s> [Footnote 2 Carl De Coster, one of the codefendants with petitioner, was released on an order of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See De Coster v. Madigan, 223 F.2d 906 (1955). The other codefendant, Harriel Fowler, was denied release by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Wilkinson v. Fowler, 234 F.2d 615 (1956). While no petition was filed in the De Coster case, we granted certiorari in both the petitioner's and Fowler's cases. </s> [Footnote 3 Since this action was filed this section has been revised and recodified as 70A Stat. 59, 10 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 866. The changes in language are not pertinent to this case. Other sections of the Uniform Code are cited in the form and source in which they appeared during the course of this litigation. The Uniform Code now appears in 70A Stat. 36-78, 10 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 801-934. </s> [Footnote 4 See note 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 For a detailed analysis and history of review powers under military law see Fratcher, Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. Rev. 15 (1949). </s> [Footnote 6 Art. 66 (a) of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 128, 50 U.S.C. 653 (a) provides: </s> "(a) The Judge Advocate General of each of the armed forces shall constitute in his office one or more boards of review, each composed of not less than three officers or civilians, each of whom shall be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State of the United States." </s> [Footnote 7 See Art. of War 51 (a), 62 Stat. 638, and Art. of War 49, 62 Stat. 635. </s> [Footnote 8 "The Board of Review shall affirm a finding of guilty of an offense or a lesser included offense . . . if it determines that the finding conforms to the weight of the evidence and that there has been no error of law which materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused. . . . The Board may set aside, on the basis of the record, any part of a sentence, either because it is illegal or because it is inappropriate. It is contemplated that this power will be exercised to establish uniformity of sentences throughout the armed forces." S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 28. </s> [Footnote 9 Commentators have recognized this power of sentence review since the enactment of the Code. See, e. g., Currier and Kent, The Boards of Review of the Armed Services, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 241 (1953). "The greatest single change brought about in the powers and duties of the boards of review by the Uniform Code of Military Justice is the power of the board to affirm only so much of the sentence in a given case as it finds appropriate." Id., at 242. See also 65 Yale L. J. 413. </s> [Footnote 10 Petitioner complains that the 20-year sentence for attempted rape was excessive. He argues that because the court-martial gave him the minimum sentence for premeditated murder, it would not have given the maximum sentence for attempted rape. We need not speculate on what the court-martial would have done, nor will we interfere with the discretion exercised by the board of review. It held that in the "vicious circumstances of this case," 20 years was an appropriate sentence. Furthermore, since the sentence was legally imposed, its severity is not reviewable on habeas corpus in the civil courts. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 401 (1902). </s> [Footnote 11 The United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Field, 5 U.S.C. M. A. 379, 18 C. M. R. 3 (1955), hesitatingly suggested in dictum that a convening authority might return a case to a court-martial solely for the purpose of a reassessment of sentence on the findings of guilt affirmed by him. The court indicated that such a practice would be unlikely for "obvious and compelling reasons of a practical character." Id., at 385, 18 C. M. R., at 9. It explicitly refused to express an opinion concerning the desirability of the practice. There, of course, was no suggestion that the practice was mandatory for the convening authority has, just as has the board of review, the power to modify a sentence to make it appropriate. See also United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C. M. A. 509, 543, 16 C. M. R. 83, 117 (1954). </s> [Footnote 12 It is well to point out that the Uniform Code permits the convening authority under limited circumstances to return a case for "reconsideration and revision" to a court-martial composed of "only . . . the members of the court who participated in the findings and sentence." See Art. 62 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 127, 50 U.S.C. 649, and Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1951), at 130. This would be impossible after the passage of time in nearly every case since the original court-martial could not be reassembled. On the other hand, if resentencing is a limited type of rehearing, the Uniform Code requires the rehearing to "take place before a court-martial composed of members not members of the court-martial which first heard the case." (Emphasis added.) Art. 63 of the Uniform Code, 64 Stat. 127, 50 U.S.C. 650. Such a court-martial would be no more capable - if as capable - as a board of review. [353 U.S. 569, 581] </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. </s> I am unable to see how the action of the Board of Review can fairly be characterized as other than an original imposition of sentence by the Board for the offense of attempted rape. The Uniform Code of Military Justice grants no power to the Board to impose original sentences. 64 Stat. 128, 50 U.S.C. 653. That power is reserved exclusively to the court-martial. There was, therefore, no valid gross sentence embracing attempted rape upon which the Board's power to remit an excessive portion could operate. I subscribe to what Judge Major said in the similar case of De Coster v. Madigan, 223 F.2d 906, 909-910 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1955), in which De Coster was allowed habeas corpus and ordered discharged: </s> ". . . While the court-martial obviously had jurisdiction of plaintiff and the offenses with which he was charged, it did not fully and fairly deal with him. The Law Officer instructed the court-martial that the minimum sentence which could be imposed on the murder charge was life imprisonment. But the Law Officer gave no instructions as to the punishment which could be imposed on the attempted rape charge. The court-martial found plaintiff guilty of both murder and attempted rape, but its sentence was life-imprisonment, the minimum sentence for the murder charge alone. Of course, any suggestion that the court-martial should have sentenced plaintiff for a term of life plus twenty years would be ridiculous, but equally so is the assertion that the court-martial did or intended to impose any part of its sentence for attempted rape. It lacked even the [353 U.S. 569, 582] necessary instructions upon which such award of punishment would have to be based. Imposition of sentence by the proper authority is an essential step in administration of criminal justice. Here, under the statute, only the court-martial was authorized to take this step; it failed to do so." </s> [353 U.S. 569, 583]

United States Supreme Court IN RE OLIVER(1948) No. 215 Argued: December 11, 1947Decided: March 8, 1948 </s> [ In re Oliver 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ] </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 258] </s> Messrs. William Henry Gallagher, of Detroit, Mich., and Osmond K. Fraenkel, for petitioner. Mr. Edumund E. Shepherd, of Detroit, Mich., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. A Michigan circuit judge summarily sent the petitioner to jail for contempt of court. We must determine whether he was denied the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In obedience to a subpoena the petitioner appeared as a witness before a Michigan circuit judge who was then conducting, in accordance with Michigan law, a 'one-man grand jury' investigation into alleged gambling and official corruption. The investigation presumably took place in the judge's chambers, though that is not certain. </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 259] </s> Two other circuit judges were present in an advisory capacity. 1 A prosecutor may have been present. A stenographer was most likely there. The record does not show what other members, if any, of the judge's investigatorial staff participated in the proceedings. It is certain, however, that the public was excluded-the questioning was secret in accordance with the traditional grand jury method. After petitioner had given certain testimony, the judge-grand jury, still in secret session, told petitioner that neither he nor his advisors believed petitioner's story-that it did not 'jell.' This belief of the judge-grand jury was not based entirely on what the petitioner had testified. As will later be seen, it rested in part on beliefs or suspicions of the judge-jury derived from the testimony of at least one other witness who had previously given evidence in secret. Petitioner had not been present when that witness testified and so far as appears was not even aware that he had testified. Based on its beliefs thus formed-that petitioner's story did not 'jell'-the judge-grand jury immediately charged him with contempt, immediately convicted him, and immediately sentenced him to sixty days in jail. Under these circumstances of haste and secrecy, petitioner, of course, had no chance to enjoy the benefits of counsel, no chance to prepare his defense, and no opportunity either to cross examine the other grand jury witness or to summon witnesses to refute the charge against him. Three days later a lawyer filed on petitioner's behalf in the Michigan Supreme Court the petition for habeas corpus now under consideration. It alleged among other </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 260] </s> things that the petitioner's attorney had not been allowed to confer with him and that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, the petitioner was not held in jail under any judgment, decree or execution, and was 'not confined by virtue of any legal commitment directed to the sheriff as required by law.' An order was then entered signed by the circuit judge that he had while 'sitting as a One-Man Grand Jury' convicted the petitioner of contempt of court because petitioner had testified 'evasively' and had given 'contradictory answers' to questions. The order directed that petitioner 'be confined in the county jail * * * for a period of sixty days * * * or until such time as he * * * shall appear and answer the questions heretofore propounded to him by this Court * * *.' The Supreme Court of Michigan, on grounds detailed in the companion case of Petition of Dohany (In re Hartley), 317 Mich. 441, 27 N.W.2d 48,2 rejected petitioner's contention that the summary manner in which he had been sentenced to jail in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had depi ved him of his liberty without affording him the kind of notice, opportunity to defend himself, and trial which the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 261] </s> requires. 3 Petition of Dohany (Ex Parte Oliver), 318 Mich. 7, 27 N.W.2d 323. We granted certiorari, 332 U.S. 755 , to consider these procedural due process questions. The case requires a brief explanation of Michigan's unique one-man grand jury system. 4 That state's first constitution (1835), like the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, required that most criminal prosecutions be begun by presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Art. I , 11. This compulsory provision was left out of the 1850 constitution and from the present constitution (1908). However, Michigan judges may still in their discretion summon grand juries, but we are told by the attorney general that this discretion is rarely exercised and that the 'One-Man Grand Jury' has taken the place of the old Michigan 16 to 23- member grand jury, particularly in probes of alleged misconduct of public officials. The one-man grand jury law was passed in 1917 following a recommendation of the State Bar Association that, in </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 262] </s> the interest of more rigorous law enforcement, greater emphasis should be put upon the 'investigative procedure' for 'probing' and for 'detecting' crime. 5 With this need uppermost in its thinking the Bar Association recommended a bill which provided that justices of the peace be vested with the inquisitorial powers traditionally conferred only on coroners and grand juries. The bill as passed imposed the recommended investigatory powers not only on justices of the peace, but on police judges and judges of courts of record as well. Mich.Laws 1917, Act 196. Whenever this judge-grand jury may summon a witness to appear, it is his duty to go and to answer all material questions that do not incriminate him. Should he fail to appear, fail to answer material questions, or should the judge-grand jury believe his evidence false and evasive, or deliberately contradit ory, he may be found guilty of contempt. This offense may be punishable by a fine of not more than $100, or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding sixty days, or both, at the discretion of the judge-grand jury. If after having been so sentenced he appears and satisfactorily answers the questions propounded by the judge- jury, his sentence may, within the judge-jury's discretion, be commuted or suspended. At the end of his first sentence he can be resummoned and subjected to the same inquiries. Should the judge-jury again believe his answers false and evasive, or contradictory, he can be sentenced to serve sixty days more unless he reappears before the judge-jury during the second 60-day period and satisfactorily answers the questions, and the judge-jury within </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 263] </s> its discretion then decides to commute or suspend his sentence. 6 </s> In carrying out this authority a judgegrand jury is authorized to appoint its own prosecutors, detectives and aides at public expense,7 all or any of whom may, at the discretion of the justice of the peace or judge, be admitted to the inquiry. Mich.Stat.Ann. 28.944 (Henderson 1938). Comp. Laws 1929, 17218. A witness may be asked questions on all subjects and need not be advised of his privilege against self-incrimination, even though the questioning is in secret. 8 And these secret interrogations can be carried on day or night, in a public place or a 'hideout,' a courthouse, an office building, a hotel room, a home, or a place of business; so well is this ambulatory power understood in Michigan that the one-man grand jury is also popularly referred to as the 'portable grand jury.'9 It was a circuit court judge-grand jury before which petitioner testified. That judge-jury filed in the State Supreme Court an answer to this petition for habeas corpus. The answer contained fragments of what was apparently a stenographic transcript of petitioner's testimony given before the grand jury. It was these fragments of testimony, so the answer stated, that the 'Grand </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 264] </s> Jury' had concluded to be 'false and evasive.' The petitioner then filed a verified motion with the State Supreme Court seeking to have the complete transcript of his testimony before the judge-jury produced for the habeas corpus hearing. He alleged that a full report of his testimony would disclose that he had freely, promptly, and to the best of his ability, answered all questions asked, and that the full transcript would refute the charge that he had testified evasively or falsely. In his answer to the motion the circuit judge did not deny these allegations. However, he asserted that the fragments contained in the original answer showed 'all of the Grand Jury testimony necessary to the present proceeding' and that 'the full disclosure of petitioner's testimony would seriously retard Grand Jury activities.' The State Supreme Court then denied the petitioner's motion. Thus when that Court later dismissed the petition for habeas corpus it had seen only a copy of a portion of the record of the testimony given by the petitioner. The petitioner does not here challenge the constitutional power of Michigan to grant traditional inquisitorial grand jury power to a single judge, and therefore we do not concern ourselves with that question. It has long been recognized in this country however that the traditionl 12 to 23-member grand juries may examine witnesses in secret sessions. Oaths of secrecy are ordinarily taken both by the members of such grand juries and by witnesses before them. Many reasons have been advanced to support grand jury secrecy. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 58 -66, 372-375; State v. Branch, 68 N.C. 186, 12 Am.Rep. 633. But those reasons have never been thought to justify secrecy in the trial of an accused charged with violation of law for which he may be fined or sent to jail. Grand juries investigate, and the usual end of their investigation is either a report, a 'no-bill' or an indictment. </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 265] </s> They do not try and they do not convict. They render no judgment. When their work is finished by the return of an indictment, it cannot be used as evidence against the person indicted. Nor may he be fined or sentenced to jail until he has been tried and convicted after having been afforded the procedural safeguards required by due process of law. Even when witnesses before grand juries refuse to answer proper questions, the grand juries do not adjudge the witnesses guilty of contempt of court in secret or in public or at all. 10 Witnesses who refuse to testify before grand juries are tried on contempt charges before judges sitting in open court. And though the powers of a judge even when acting as a one-man grand jury may be, as Michigan holds, judicial in their nature,11 the due process clause may apply with one effect on the judge's grand jury investigation, but with quite a different effect when the judge-grand jury suddenly makes a witness before it a defendant in a contempt case. Here we are concerned, not with petitioner's rights as a witness in a secret grand jury session, but with his rights as a defendant in a contempt proceeding. The powers of the judge-grand jury who tried and convicted him in secret and sentenced him to jail on a charge of false and evasive swearing must likewise be measured, not by the limitations applicable to grand jury proceedings, but by the constitutional standards applicable to court proceedings in which an accused may be sentenced to fine or imprisonment or both. Thus our first question is this: </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 266] </s> Can an accused be tried and convicted for contempt of court in grand jury secrecy? First. Counsel have not cited and we have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal,12 state, or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in dispute. Summary trials for alleged misconduct called contempt of court13 have not been regarded as an exception to this universal rule against secret trials, unless some other Michigan one-man grand jury case may represent such an exception. This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage. The exact date of its origin is obscure, but it likely evolved long before the settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. 14 In this country the guarantee to an accused of </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 267] </s> the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776. 15 Following the ratification in 1791 of the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which commands that 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial * * *' most of the original states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted similar constitutional provisions. 16 Today almost without exception17 every state by constitution18 </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 268] </s> statute,19 or judicial decision,20 requires that all criminal trials be open to the public. The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, 21 to the excesses of </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 269] </s> the English Court of Star Chamber,22 and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet. 23 All of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to liberty. In </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 270] </s> the hands of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial. Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society,24 the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. 25 One need not wholly agree with a statement made on the subject by </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 271] </s> Jeremy Bentham over 120 years ago to appreciate the fear of secret trials felt by him, his predecessors and contemporaries. Bentham said: '* * * suppose the proceedings to be completely secret, and the court, on the occasion, to consist of no more than a single judge,-that judge will be at once indolent and arbitrary: how corrupt soever his inclination may be, it will find no check, at any rate no tolerably efficient check, to oppose it. Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.' 26 In giving content to the constitutional and statutory commands that an accused be given a public trial, the state and e deral courts have differed over what groups of spectators, if any, could properly be excluded from a criminal trial. 27 But, unless in Michigan and in one-man grand jury contempt cases, no court in this country has ever before held, so far as we can find, that an accused can be tried, convicted, and sent to jail, when everybody else is denied entrance to the court, except the judge and his attaches. 28 And without exception all courts have held </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 272] </s> that an accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged. 29 In Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 85 , 86-470, this Court assumed that a criminal trial conducted in secret would violate the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, although its actual holding there was that no violation had in fact occurred, since the trial court's order barring the general public had not been enforced. Certain proceedings in a judge's chambers, including convictions for contempt of court, have occasionally been countenanced by state courts,30 but there has never been any intimation that all of the public, including the accused's relatives, friends, and counsel, were barred from the trial chamber. In the case before us, the petitioner was called as a witness to testify in secret before a one-man grand jury conducting a grand jury investigation. In the midst of petitioner's testimony the proceedings abruptly changed. The investigation became a 'trial,' the grand jury became a judge, and the witness became an accused charged with contempt of court-all in secret. Following a charge, conviction and sentence, the petitioner was led away to </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 273] </s> prison-still without any break in the secrecy. Even in jail, according to undenied allegations, his lawyer was denied an opportunity to see and confer with him. And that was not the end of secrecy. His lawyer filed in the State Supreme Court this habeas corpus proceeding. Even there, the mantle of secrecy enveloped the transaction and the State Supreme Court ordered him sent back to jail without ever having seen a record of his testimony, and without knowing all that took place in the secrecy of the judge's chambers. In viewo f this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and state governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison. Second. We further hold that failure to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law. A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel. 31 Michigan, not denying the existence of these rights in criminal cases generally, apparently concedes that the summary conviction here would have been a denial of procedural due process but for the nature of the charge, </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 274] </s> namely, a contempt of court, committed, the State urges, in the court's actual presence. It is true that courts have long exercised a power summarily to punish certain conduct committed in open court without notice, testimony or hearing. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 , was such a case. There Terry committed assault on the marshal who was at the moment removing a heckler from the courtroom. The 'violence and misconduct' of both the heckler and the marshal's assailant occurred within the 'personal view' of the judge, 'under his own eye,' and actually interrupted the trial of a cause then under way. This Court held that under such circumstances a judge has power to punish an offender at once, without notice and without hearing, although his conduct may also be punishable as a criminal offense. This Court reached its conclusion because it believed that a court's business could not be conducted unless it could suppress disturbances within the courtroom by immediate punishment. However, this Court recognized that such departure from the accepted standards of due process was capable of grave abuses, and for that reason gave no encouragement to its expansion beyond the suppression and punishment of the court-disrupting misconduct which alone justified its exercise. Indeed in the Terry case the Court cited with approval its decision in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, which had marked the limits of contempt authority in general as being 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' Id., at page 231 of 6 Wheat. And see In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 , 79. That the holding in the Terry case is not to be considered as an unlimited abandonment of the basic due process procedural safeguards, even in contempt cases, was spelled out with emphatic language in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 , a contempt case arising in a federal district court. There it was pointed out that for a </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 275] </s> court to exercise the extraordinary but narrowly limited power to punish for contempt without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, the court-disturbing misconduct must not only occur in the court's immediate presence, but that the judge must have personal knowledge of it acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous condut . This Court said that knowledge acquired from the testimony of others, or even from the confession of the accused, would not justify conviction without a trial in which there was an opportunity for defense. Furthermore, the Court explained the Terry rule as reaching only such conduct as created 'an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public' that, if 'not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court's authority will follow.' Id., at page 536 of 267 U.S., at pages 394, 395 of 45 S.Ct. Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation. The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the court's authority * * * before the public.' If some essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that the must depend upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires, according to the </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 276] </s> Cooke case, that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing as above set out. The facts shown by this record put this case outside the narrow category of cases that can be punished as contempt without notice, hearing and counsel. Since the petitioner's alleged misconduct all occurred in secret, there could be no possibility of a demoralization of the court's authority before the public. Furthermore, the answer of the judge-grand jury to the petition for habeas corpus showed that his conclusion that the petitioner had testified falsely was based, at least in part, upon the testimony given before him by one or more witnesses other than petitioner. Petitioner and one Hartley both testified the same day; both were pin-ball machine operators; both had bought or had in their possession certain so- called bonds purchased from one Mitchell; both were sent to jail for contempt the same day. Petition of Dohany (In re Hartley), 317 Mich. 441, 27 N.W.2d 48. The judge-grand jury pressed both petitioner and Hartley to state why they bought bonds which were patently worthless. The petitioner was also repeatedly asked what he had done with the worthless bonds. He answered every question asked him, according to the fragmentary portions of his testimony reported to the Michigan Supreme Court, most of which is included in that court's opinion. He steadfastly denied that he knew precisely what he had done with the worthless bonds, but made several different statements as to how he might have disposed of them, such as that he might have thrown them into the wastebasket, or trash can, or might have burned them. In upholding the judge-grand jury's conclusion that petitioner had testified falsely and evasively, the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court gave as one reason a statement in the judge-grand jury's answer 'That the Grand Jury, after investigation, is satisfied that the bonds </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 277] </s> sold by the said Carman A. Mitchell to the said William D. Oliver are the same as those sold by the said Carman A. Mitchell to Leo Thomas Hartley.' Nothing in the petitioner's testimony as reported could have remotely justified the judge-jury in drawing such a conclusion. The judge-jury was obviously appraising the truth of Oliver's testimony in light of testimony given the same day in petitioner's absence by Hartley and possibly by othe witnesses. The Terry case and others like it provide no support for sustaining petitioner's conviction of contempt of court upon testimony given in petitioner's absence. This case would be like the Terry case only if the judge there has not personally witnessed Terry's assault upon the marshal but had nevertheless sent him to jail for contempt of court after hearing the testimony of witnesses against Terry in Terry's absence. It may be conceivable, as is here urged, that a judge can under some circumstances correctly detect falsity and evasiveness from simply listening to a witness testify. But this is plainly not a case in which the finding of falsity rested on an exercise of this alleged power. For this reason we need not pass on the question argued in the briefs whether a judge can, consistently with procedural due process, convict a witness of testifying falsely and evasively solely on the judge's ability to detect it from merely observing a witness and hearing him testify. Nor is there any reason suggested why 'demoralization of the court's authority' would have resulted from giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to appear and offer a defense in open court to a charge of perjury or to the charge of contempt. The traditional grand juries have never punished contempts. 32 The practice that has always been followed with recalcitrant grand jury wit- </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 278] </s> nesses is to take them into open court, and that practice, consistent with due process, has not demoralized the authority of courts. Reported cases reveal no instances in which witnesses believed by grand juries on the basis of other testimony to be perjurers, have been convicted for contempt, or for perjury, without notice of the specific charges against them, and opportunity to prepare a defense, to obtain counsel, to cross-examine the witnesses against them and to offer evidence in their own defense. The right to be heard in open court before one is condemned is too valuable to be whittled away under the guise of 'demoralization of the court's authority.' It is 'the law of the land' that no man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as a punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal. See Chambers v Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 236, 237, 477. The petitioner was convicted without that kind of trial. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is reversed and the cause is remanded to it for disposition not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, concurring. I join in the Court's opinion and decision. But there is more which needs to be said. Michigan's one-man grand jury, as exemplified by this record, combines in a single official the historically separate powers of grand jury, committing magistrate, prosecutor, trial judge and petit jury. This aggregated authority denies to the accused not only the right to a public trial, but also those other basic protections secured by the Sixth Amendment, namely, the rights 'to be informed </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 279] </s> of the nature and cause of the accusation;1 to be confronted with the witnesses against him;2 to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.' It takes away the security against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense3 and denies the equal protection of the laws by leaving to the committing functionary's sole discretion the scope and contents of the record on appeal. 4 U.S.Const.Amends. V. and XIV. This aggregation of powers and inherently concomitant denial of historic freedoms were unknown to the common law at the time our institutions crystallized in the Constitution. They are altogether at variance with our tradition and system of government. They cannot stand the test of constitutionaliy for purposes of depriving any person of life, liberty or property. There is no semblance of due process of law in the scheme when it is used for those ends. 5 </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 280] </s> The case demonstrates how far this Court departed from our constitutional plan when, after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, it permitted selective departure by the states from the scheme of ordered personal liberty established by the Bill of Rights. 6 In the guise of permitting the states to experiment with improving the administration of justice, the Court left them free to substitute, 'in spite of the absolutism of continental governments,' their 'ideas and processes of civil justice' in place of the time-tried 'principles and institutions of the common law'7 perpetuated for us in the Bill of Rights. Only by an exercise of this freedom has Michigan been enabled to adopt and apply her scheme as was done in this case. It is the immediate offspring of Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , and later like cases. 8 </s> So long as they stand, so long as the Bill of Rights is regarded here as a strait jacket of Eighteenth Century procedures rather than a basic charter of personal liberty, like experimentations may be expected from the states. And the only check against their effectiveness will be the agreement of a majority of this Court that the experiment violates fundamental notions of justice in civilized society. I do not conceive that the Bill of Rights, apart from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, incorporates all such ideas. But as far as its provisions go, I know of no better substitutes. A few may be inconvenient. But restrictions upon authority for securing personal liberty, as well as fairness in trial to deprive </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 281] </s> one of it, are always inconvenient-to the authority so restricted. And in times like these I do not think substitutions imported from other systems, including continental ones, offer promise on the whole of more improvement than harm, either for the cause of perfecting the administration of justice or for that of securing and perpetuating individual freedom, which is the main end of our society as it is of our Constitution. One cannot attribute the collapse of liberty in Europe and elsewhere during recent years solely to the 'ideas and processes of civil justice' prevailing in the nations which have suffered that loss. Neither can one denyt he significance of the contrast between their success in maintaining systems of ordered liberty and that of other nations which in the main have adhered more closely to the scheme of personal freedoms the Bill of Rights secures. This experience demonstrates, I think, that it is both wiser and safer to put up with whatever inconveniences that charter creates than to run the risk of losing its hard-won guaranties by dubious, if also more convenient substitutions imported from alien traditions. 9 </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 282] </s> The states have survived with the nation through great vicissitudes, for the greater part of our history, without wide departures or numerous ones from the plan of the Bill of Rights. They accepted that plan for the nation when they ratified those amendments. They accepted it for themselves, in my opinion, when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 , dissenting opinions, at pages 68, 123, 1683, 1684, 171 A.L.R. 1223. It was good enough for our fathers. I think it should be good enough for this Court and for the states. Room enough there is beyond the specific limitations of the Bill of Rights for the states to experiment toward improving the administration of justice. Within those limitations there should be no laboratory excursions, unless or until the people have authorized them by the constitutionally provided method. This is no time to experiment with established liberties. That process carries the dangers of dilution and denial with the chances of enforcing and strengthening. It remains only to say that, in the face of so broad a departure from so many specific constitutional guaranties or, if the other view is to control, from their aggregate summarized in the concept of due process as representing fundamental ideas of fair play and justice in civilized society, such as the record in this case presents, this Court's eyes need not remain closed nor its hand idle until the case is returned to the state supreme court for reaffirmation of its position or confirmation of our views expressed in the Court's opinion. Neither Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 , nor Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 , presented a situation like the one tendered here, whether </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 283] </s> in relation to the disentanglement of constitutional issues from questions of state law or, consequently, in respect to the breadth and clarity of the state's departure from federal constitutional commands. Neither case therefore requires or justifies the disposition of this cause according to the procedure there followed. This case is neither unripe for decision nor wanting of sufficient basis in the record for exercise of that function. Mr. Justice FRAK FURTER: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may surely adopt as its own a procedure which was the established method for prosecuting crime in nearly half the States which ratified that amendment. And so, it may abolish the grand jury,1 or it may reduce the size of the grand </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 284] </s> jury, and even to a single member. A State has great leeway in devising its judicial instruments for probing into conduct as a basis for charging the commission of crime. It may, at the same time, surround such preliminary inquiry with safeguards, not only that crime may be detected and criminals punished, but also that charges may be sifted in secret so as not to injure or embarrass the innocent. Flouting of such a judicial investigatory system may be prevented by the hitherto constitutionally valid power to punish for contempt. There must, however, be such recalcitrance, where the basis of punishment is testimony given or withheld, that the administration of justice is actively blocked. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 11 A.L.R. 333. And the procedural safeguards of 'due process' must be observed. Due notice of the charge and a fair opportunity to meet it, are indispensable. This involves an opportunity to canvass the charge in the open and not behind closed doors. So long as a man has ample opportunity to demonstrate his innocence before he is hustled off to jail, he cannot complain that a State has seen fit to devise a new procedure for satisfying that opportunity. Just as it is not violative of due process for a State to take private property for public use and leave to a later stage the constitutional vindication of the right to compensation, it does not seem to me that it would be violative of due process to allow the judge-grand juror of Michigan to find criminal contempt for conduct in his proceedings without the familiar elements of an open trial, provided that the State furnishes the accused a public tribunal before which he has full opportunity to be quit of the finding. But an opportunity to meet a charge of criminal contempt must be a fair opportunity. It would not be fair, if in the court in which the accused can contest for the first time the validity of the charge against him, he comes </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 285] </s> handicapped with a finding against him which he did not have an adequate opportunity of resisting. We are here dealing with the attempt of a State having the seventh largest population in the Union to curb or mitigate the commission ofc rimes by effective prosecution. This procedure has been in operation for over thirty years. It was not heedlessly entered into nor has it been sporadically pursued. In a series of cases it has had the sanction of the highest court of Michigan. While there are indications in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan from which we could infer the constitutional inadequacy of the procedure pursued in this case, we should not decide constitutional issues and conclude that the Michigan system offends the Constitution of the United States, without a clearer formulation of what it is that actually happens under this system, or did happen here, than the case before us reveals. It is to me significant that the precise issues on which this Court decides this case have never been explicitly challenged before, or passed on, by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the series of cases in which that court had adjudicated controversies arising under the Michigan grand jury system. If a State has denied the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is more consonant with the delicate relations between the United States and the courts of the United States, and the States and the courts of the States, that the courts of the States be given the fullest opportunity, by proper presentation of the issues, to make such a finding of unconstitutionality. I do not think that we have had that in this case. For instance, while I could regard it inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment to have only a partial and mutilated record of the proceedings before the grand juror-judge when the contemnor for the first time has the opportunity to meet the accusation against him publicly, the petitioner himself in this case seems to repel the </s> [333 U.S. 257 , 286] </s> suggestion that that is his complaint. 2 Certainly, as Mr. Justice JACKSON points out, the first ground of the Court's opinion was not made the basis for inviting our review here. I agree with him in concluding that in the light of our decision the other day in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 , 68 S. Ct. 397, in conjunction with Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 , the cause should be returned to the Supreme Court of Michigan to enable that court to pass upon these issues. </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON, with whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER agrees, dissenting. The principal ground assigned for reversal of the judgment of conviction is the alleged secrecy of the contempt procedure. That ground was not assigned for review in the petition for certiorari to this Court. Nor was it raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state courts. Therefore, it has not been litigated and the record has not been made with reference to it. On the other hand, the principal question raised by the petition to this Court and argued by the State is not decided by the Court's opinion. When a case here from a state court involves a question not litigated below, not raised by petitioner here and which the state court has had no opportunity to pass upon, we should remand the case for its further consideration, as was just done in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 . Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 Under certain circumstances Michigan law permits circuit judges to sit with other circuit judges in an advisory capacity. Mich.Stat.Ann. 27. 188 (Henderson 1938), Mich.Comp.Laws 1929, 13666. </s> [Footnote 2 In giving reasons in its Hartley opinion for rejecting this petitioner's constitutional contentions, the State Supreme Court said it would have been an 'idle gesture to require such adjournment of the grand jury and its reconvening as a circuit court. The circuit judge, while acting as a one man grand jury may, in appropriate cases, summarily adjudge a witness testifying before him guilty of contempt and impose sentence forthwith. 'Plaintiff's contempt, if any, was committed in the face of the court and required no extraneous proofs as to its occurrence. It was direct and there was, therefore, no necessity for filing of charges, notice to accused and hearing as provided in 3 Comp.Laws of 1929, 13912, Stat.Ann . 27.513. It was properly dealt with summarily. 3 Comp.Laws 1929, 13910, 13911, Stat.Ann. 27.511, 27.512.' 317 Mich. at pages 444, 445, 27 N.W.2d at page 50. </s> [Footnote 3 By a four to four vote the court also held that there was 'evidence to support the finding' of the judge-grand jury that petitioner had testified falsely. Petitioner has argued here that there was not a shred of evidence which under any circumstances could have conceivably supported this finding and thus that he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law. In the view that we take of this case we find it unnecessary to consider this constitutional contention. [Footnote 4 The laws authorizing the system are found in Michigan Comp.Laws 1929, 17217 et seq., Mich.Stat.Ann. 28.943 et seq. (Henderson 1938). A summary of the ten states' statutes which have some similarities to Michigan's appears in Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J.Am. Jud.Soc. 137. See, e.g., Conn.Gen.Stat. 889f (Supp.1941); McCarthy v. Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 148 A. 551; Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 37, 83; tit. 21 951; Ex parte Ballew, 20 Okl.Cr. 105, 201 P. 525. </s> [Footnote 5 Proceedings of the Twenty-sixth Annual Meeting of the Michigan State Bar Association 101Ä105 (1916). </s> [Footnote 6 In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 747, 295 N.W. 483, 485. (First 60-day conviction May 31, 1940, followed by second 60-day conviction July 29, 1940. A $100 fine was also imposed in each instance.) [Footnote 7 In re Petition for Investigation of Recount, 270 Mich. 328, 331, 258 N.W. 776, 777; In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458, 479, 17 N.W.2d 251, 259. [Footnote 8 People v. Wolfson, 264 Mich. 409, 413, 250 N.W. 260, 262; In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 269, 291 N.W. 652, 655; People v. Butler, 221 Mich. 626, 631, 632, 192 N.W. 685, 687. [Footnote 9 Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 137, 143; Unprecedented Success in Criminal Courts, 26 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 42Ä43. </s> [Footnote 10 See cases collected in 8 A.L.R. 1579Ä1580; Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 161 (1947). [Footnote 11 In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458, 466Ä468, 17 N.W.2d 251, 254Ä255; Kloka v. Brake State Treasurer, 318 Mich. 87, 90, 27 N.W.2d 507, 508; cf. Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 284 , 891; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 481 , 489, 1134, 1137; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 44Ä 48. </s> [Footnote 12 Cases within the jurisdiction of courts martial may be regarded as an exception. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43 , 18; King v. Governor of Lewes Prison, 61 Sol.J. 294, 30 Harv.L.Rev. 771. Whatever may be the classification of juvenile court proceedings, they are often conducted without admitting all the public. But it has never been the practice wholly to exclude parents, relatives, and friends, or to refuse juveniles the benefit of counsel. [Footnote 13 Under Michigan law contempt proceedings against a witness before a one-man grand jury are criminal in nature. In re Wilkowski, 270 Mich. 687, 259 N.W. 658. But this characterization is not material in resolving this due process question. Cf. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 , 611, 695. [Footnote 14 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381Ä384. Early commentators mention that public trials were commonly held without attempting to trace their origin. Sir Thomas Smith in 1565 in his De Republica Anglorum bk. 2, pp. 79, 101 (Alston ed.1906); Sir Matthew Hale about 1670 in his History of The Common Law of England 343Ä345 (Runnington Ed.1820). In 1649, a few years after the Long Parliament abolished the Court of Star Chamber, an accused charged with high treason before a Special Commission of Oyer and Terminer claimed the right to public trial and apparently was given such a trial. Trial of John Lilburne, 4 How.St.Tr. 1270, 1274. 'By immemorial usage, wherever the common law prevails, all trials are in open court, to which spectators are admitted.' 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure 957 (2d Ed.1913). </s> [Footnote 15 Penn.Const., Declaration of Rights IX (1776); N.C.Const. Declaration of Rights IX (1776) (criminal convictions only by jury verdict in 'open court'). [Footnote 16 See, e.g., Vt.Const., ch. I, art. 11 (1787); Dela.Const. art. 1, 7 (1792); Ky.Const. art. XII, cl. 10 (1792); Tenn.Const. art. XI, 9 ( 1796); Miss.Const. art. I, 10 (1817); Mich.Const. art. I, 10 (1835); Tex.Const. art. I, 8 (1845). [Footnote 17 Four states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia and Wyoming, appear to have neither statutory nor constitutional provisions specifically requiring that criminal trials be held in public, although all have constitutions guaranteeing an accused the right to a jury trial. Mass.Const. Pt. I, art. XII; N.H.Const. Pt. I, arts. XV, XVI: Va.Const. art. I, 8; Wyo.Const. art. I, 10. Massachusetts by implication has recognized that an accused has a right to a public trial as well. A statute of that state permits the exclusion of spectators in only a limited category of cases. Mass.Gen.Laws c. 278, 16A (1932). In New Hampshire and Wyoming no statute or decision has been found in which the right of an accused to a public trial is mentioned. In Virginia, although no decision has been discovered, a statute provides: 'In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any or all persons whose presence is not deemed necessary.' Va.Code Ann. 4906 (1942). [Footnote 18 Forty-one states: Ala.Const. 6; Ariz.Const. art. II, 24; Ark. Const. art. II, 10; Cal.Const. art. I, 13; Colo.Const. art. II, 16; Conn.Const. art. I, 9; Del.Const. art. I, 7; Fla.Const. Declaration of Rights, 11, F.S.A.; Ga.Const. art. I, 1, par. 5, Code, 2-105; Idaho Const. art. I, 13; Ill.Const. art. 2, 9, Smith-Hurd States.; Ind.Const. art. I, 13; Iowa Const. art. I, 10; Kan.Const. Bill of Rights, 10; Ky.Const. 11; La.Const. art. I, 9; Me.Const. art. I, 6; Mich.Const. art. 2, 19; Minn.Const. art. I, 6, M.S.A.; Miss.Cons. 26; Mo.Const. art. I, 18 Mo.R.S.A.; Mont.Const. art. I, 16; Neb.Const. art. I, 11; N.J.Const. art. I, par. 8, N.J.S.A.; N.M.Const. art. II, 14; N.C.Const. art. I, 13 (no convictions for crime except by jury verdict in 'open court'); N.D.Const. art. I 13; Ohio Const. art. I, 10; Okl.Const. art. 2, 20, Okl.St.Ann.; Or.Const. art. I, 11; Pa.Const. art. I, 9, P.S.; R.I.Const. art. I, 10; S.C.Const. art. I, 18; S.D.Const. art. 6, 7; Tenn.Const. art. I, 9; Tex.Const. art. I, 10, Vernon's Ann.St.; Utah Const. art. I, 12; Vt.Const. ch. I, art. 10; Wash.Const. art. I, 22; W. Va.Const. art. III, 14; Wis.Const. art. I, 7. </s> [Footnote 19 Two states: Nev.Comp.Laws Ann. 10654 (1929); N.Y. Civil Rights Law, Consol.Laws, c. 6, 12. [Footnote 20 The Maryland Court of Appeals has apparently interpreted the state constitution as prohibiting secret trials. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 386Ä388, 91 A. 417, 422, 423, Ann.Cas.1916C, 89. [Footnote 21 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381, 389. The criminal procedure of the civil law countries long resembled that of the Inquisition in that the preliminary examination of the accused, the questioning of witnesses, and the trial of the accused were conducted in secret. Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure 183Ä382 (1913); Ploscowe, Development of Inquisitorial and Accusatorial Elements in French Procedure, 23 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 372Ä386. The ecclesiastical courts of Great Britain, which intermittently exercised a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction, adopted a procedure described as 'in name as well as in fact an Inquisition, differing from the Spanish Inquisition in the circumstances that it did not at any time as far as we are aware employ torture, and that the bulk of the business of the courts was of a comparatively unimportant kind * * *.' 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 402 (1883). The secrecy of the ecclesiastical courts and the civil law courts was often pointed out by commentators who praised the publicity of the common law courts. See e.g., 3 Blackstone, Commentaries * 373; 1 Bentham Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 594Ä595, 603 (1827. The English common law courts which succeeded to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts have renounced all claim to hold secret sessions in cases formerly within the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, even in civil suits. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, (1913) A.C. 417. </s> [Footnote 22 Davis v. United States, 8 Cir., 247 F. 394, 395, L.R.A.1918C, 1164; Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 459, 172 P. 273, L.R.A.1918D, 1093; Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 82, 83, 29 A. 943, 944, 25 L.R.A. 506; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 387, 91 A. 417, 422, Ann.Cas.1916C, 89; Jenks, The Book of English Law 91 (3d Ed.1932). Some authorities have said that trials in the Star Chamber were public, but that witnesses against the accused were examined privately with no opportunity for him to discredit them. Apparently all authorities agreed that the accused himself was grilled in secret, often tortured, in an effort to obtain a confession and that the most objectionable of the Star Chamber's practices was its asserted prerogative to disregard the common law rules of criminal procedure when the occasion demanded. 5 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 163, 165, 180Ä197 (2d Ed.1937); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381, 386Ä388; Washburn, The Court of Star Chamber, 12 Am.L.Rev. 21, 25Ä31. [Footnote 23 Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381, 388. The lettre de cachet was an order of the king that one of his subjects be forthwith imprisoned or exiled without a trial or an opportunity to defend himself. In the eighteenth century they were often issued in blank to local police. Louis XV is supposed to have issued more than 150,000 lettres de cachet during his reign. This device was the principal means employed to prosecute crimes of opinion, although it was also used by the royalty as a convenient method of preventing the public airing of intra- family scandals. Voltaire, Mirabeau and Montesquieu, among others denounced the use of the lettre de cachet, and it was abolished after the French Revolution, though later temporarily revived by Napoleon. 13 Encyc. Brit. 971; 3 Encyc. Soc. Sci, 137. </s> [Footnote 24 Other benefits attributed to publicity have been: (1) Public trials come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties. These witnesses may then voluntarily come forward and give important testimony. 6 Wigmore, Evidence 1834 (3d Ed.,1940); Tanksley v. United States, 9 Cir., 145 F.2d 58, 59, 156 A.L.R. 257. (2) The spectators learn about their government and acquire confidence in their judicial remedies. 6 Wigmore, Evidence 1834 (3d Ed. 1940); 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 525 (1827); State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 P. 1080, L.R.A.1916E, 472, Ann.Cas.1917E, 619; 20 Harv.L.Rev. 489. [Footnote 25 Jenks, The Book of English Law 91 (1932); Auld, Comparative Jurisprudence of Criminal Process, 1 U. of Toronto L.J. 82, 99; Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381; Criminal Procedure in Scotland and England, 108 Edinburgh Rev. 174, 181Ä182; Holmes, J. in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394, 50 Am.Rep. 318; State v. Osborne, 54 Or. 289, 295Ä297, 103 P. 62, 64Ä66, 20 Ann.Cas. 627. People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50 N.W. 995, 998, 14 L.R.A. 809, 28 Am.St.Rep. 294: 'It is for the protection of all persons accused of crimeÄthe innocently accused that they may not become the victim of an unjust prosecution, as well as the guilty, that they may be awarded a fair trialÄthat one rule (as to public trials) must be observed and applied to all.' Frequently quoted is the statement in 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.1927) at 647: 'The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions * * *' </s> [Footnote 26 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827). [Footnote 27 Compare People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 50 N.W. 995, 14 L.R.A. 809, 28 Am.St.Rep. 294, and People v. Yeager, 113 Mich. 228, 71 N.W. 491, with Reagan v. United States, 9 Cir., 202 F. 488, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 583. For collection and analysis of the cases, see 6 Wigmore, Evidence 1834 (3d Ed.1940); Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 385Ä387 (1947); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381, 389Ä391; Note, 35 Mich.L.Rev. 474; 8 U. of Det.L.J. 129; Tanksley v. United States, 9 Cir., 145 F.2d 58, 156 A.L.R. 265. [Footnote 28 'For the purposes contemplated by the provision of the constitution, the presence of the officers of the courtÄmen whom, it is safe to say, were under the influence of the courtÄmade the trial no more public than if they too had been excluded.' People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 244, 37 P. 153, 154, 42 Am.St.Rep. 108. </s> [Footnote 29 See, e.g., State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P.2d 461 (error to exclude friends and relatives of accused); Benedict v. People, 23 Colo. 126, 46 P. 637 (exclusion of all except witnesses, members of bar and law students upheld); People v. Hall, 51 App.Div. 57, 64 N.Y.S. 433 (exclusion of general public upheld where accused permitted to designate friends who remained). 'No court has gone so far as affirmatively to exclude the press.' Note, 35 Mich.L.Rev. 474, 476. Even those who deplore the sensationalism of criminal trials and advocate the exclusion of the general public from the courtroom would preserve the rights of the accused by requiring the admission of the press, friends of the accused, and selected members of the community. Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 Temp.L.Q. 381, 394Ä 395; 20 J.Am.Jud.Soc. 139. [Footnote 30 Cases are collected in 27 Ann.Cas. 35. </s> [Footnote 31 The following decisions of this Court involving various kinds of proceedings are among the multitude that support the above statement: Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 , 336, 90 A.L.R. 575; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 Ä70, 63, 64, 84 A.L.R. 527; Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 418 , 844; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390 , 391, 387; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 , 14, 15, 58 S. Ct. 773, 774, 775, and cases there cited. </s> [Footnote 32 See note 10 supra. </s> [Footnote 1 The requirement, of course, contemplates that the accused be so informed sufficiently in advance of trial or sentence to enable him to determine the nature of the plea to be entered and to prepare his defense if one is to be made. Cf. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 , 980; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 435, 84 A.L.R. 527. [Footnote 2 The only 'witness' in this case was the ga nd jury-judge who, so far as the record discloses, did not submit to cross-examination. [Footnote 3 As the Court's opinion notes, the state supreme court has held that the witness may be reexamined and recommitted for a further 60-day period after serving the first sentence of that length, unless he reappears and answers the same questions to the satisfaction of the one-man grand jury. In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 747, 295 N.W. 483. [Footnote 4 Cf. Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 . So far as appears, only persons committed or fined by a one-man grand jury are subjected in Michigan to this attenuated appellate procedure. Others convicted of crime, including criminal contempt, apparently are afforded rights to complete and non-discretionary records on appeal. [Footnote 5 The immediate shift of the proceeding from inquisitorial to punitive function converts it from a grand jury investigation to a proceeding in criminal contempt. </s> [Footnote 6 Cf. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 , at page 68, 1684, 171 A.L.R. 1223, dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black. [Footnote 7 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 , 118. [Footnote 8 E.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 , 171 A.L.R. 1223. </s> [Footnote 9 I do not think it can be demonstrated that state systems, free of the Bill of Rights' 'inconveniences,' have been more fair, just, or efficient than the federal system of administering criminal justice, which has never been clear of their restraints. Notwithstanding Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , and its progeny, I cannot imagine that state denial of the right to counsel beyond that permissible in the federal courts or indeed of any other guaranty of the Sixth Amendment could bring an improvement in the administration of justice. The guaranties seemingly considered most obstructive to that process are those of the Fifth Amendment requiring presentment or indictment of a grand jury and securing the privilege against self-incrimination; the rights to jury trial and to the assistance of counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment; and the requirements relating to suits at common law of the Seventh Amendment. Whatever inconveniences these or any of them may be thought to involve are far outweighed by the aggregate of security to the individual afforded by the Bill of Rights. That aggregate cannot be secured, indeed it may be largely defeated, so long as the states are left free to make broadly selective application of its protections. </s> [Footnote 1 In sustaining this power of the States, the Court enunciated a principle the force of which has not lessened with time: 'The constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the English law and history; but it was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a people gathered, and to be gathered, from many nations and of many tongues; and while we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the common law, we are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not unknown. Due process of law, in spite of the absolutism of continental governments, is not alien to that Code which survived the Roman empire as the foundation of modern civilization in Europe, and which has given us that fundamental maxim of distributive justice, suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mold and shape it into new and not less useful forms.' Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 , 531, 118. </s> [Footnote 2 'Neither in our brief nor in our argument before the court have we urged this court to reverse this conviction merely because the partial return of the witness's testimony to the Supreme Court constituted a denial of due process. * * * The questions we present are much more basic,Ä the denial of due process in the original commitment. * * * (To) us it is much more shocking that an accused charged with contempt not committed in open court be denied any trial in the lower court than that he be given a trial only upon an incomplete record in the appellate court.' Petitioner's 'Brief in Answer to Brief of State Bar of Michigan,' pp. 13, 14.

United States Supreme Court DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA(2008) No. 06-8273 Argued: October 31, 2007Decided: February 20, 2008 </s> After this Court announced a "new rule" for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, petitioner sought state postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because admitting the victim's taped interview at his trial violated Crawford's rule. The Minnesota trial and appeals courts concluded that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288. The State Supreme Court agreed, and also concluded that state courts are not free to give a decision of this Court announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court. Held:Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. Pp.4-27. (a)Crawford announced a "new rule"--as defined by Teague--because its result "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final," Teague, 489 U.S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule "of [this Court's] own devising" or the product of its own views about sound policy, Crawford, 541 U.S., at 67. Pp.4-6. </s> (b)The Court first adopted a "retroactivity" standard in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, but later rejected that standard for cases pending on direct review, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, and on federal habeas review, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288. Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas review unless they place certain primary individual conduct beyond the States' power to proscribe or are "watershed" rules of criminal procedure. Id., at 310 (plurality opinion). Pp.6-11. </s> (c)Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the States' authority to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. And Teague makes clear that its rule was tailored to the federal habeas context and thus had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings. Nothing in Justice O'Connor's general nonretroactivity rule discussion in Teague asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of a state agency or state court to extend a new rule's benefit to a broader class than she defined. Her opinion also clearly indicates that Teague's general nonretroactivity rule was an exercise of this Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. The opinion's text and reasoning also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. The federal interest in uniformity in the application of federal law does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The Teague rule was intended to limit federal courts' authority to overturn state convictions not to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for violations of new constitutional law rules when reviewing its own State's convictions. Subsequent cases confirm this view. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 412. Pp.11-18. </s> (d)Neither Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, nor American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, cast doubt on the state courts' authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. Pp.18-24. </s> (e)No federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, prohibits States from giving broader retroactive effect to new rules of criminal procedure. Pp. 24-26. 718 N.W. 2d 451, reversed and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ.,joined. Roberts, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined. </s> STEPHEN DANFORTH, PETITIONER v. MINNESOTA on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota [February 20, 2008] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> New constitutional rules announced by this Court that place certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond the power of the States to proscribe, as well as "watershed" rules of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trials, all cases pending on direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedings. All other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in future trials and in cases pending on direct review, but may not provide the basis for a federal collateral attack on a state-court conviction. This is the substance of the "Teague rule" described by Justice O'Connor in her plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).1 The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not. I </s> In 1996 a Minnesota jury found petitioner Stephen Danforth guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. See Minn. Stat. §609.342, subd. 1(a) (1994). The 6-year-old victim did not testify at trial, but the jury saw and heard a videotaped interview of the child. On appeal from his conviction, Danforth argued that the tape's admission violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Applying the rule of admissibility set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tape "was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence," and affirmed the conviction. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W. 2d 369, 375 (1997). The conviction became final in 1998 when the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review and petitioner's time for filing a writ of certiorari elapsed. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). After petitioner's conviction had become final, we announced a "new rule" for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004), we held that where testimonial statements are at issue, "the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." </s> Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a state postconviction petition, in which he argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the admission of the taped interview violated the rule announced in Crawford. Applying the standards set forth in Teague, the Minnesota trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Crawford did not apply to petitioner's case. The State Supreme Court granted review to consider two arguments: (1) that the lower courts erred in holding that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague; and (2) that the state court was "free to apply a broader retroactivity standard than that of Teague," and should apply the Crawford rule to petitioner's case even if federal law did not require it to do so. 718 N.W. 2d 451, 455 (2006). The court rejected both arguments. Ibid. </s> With respect to the second, the Minnesota court held that our decisions in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973), American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990), and Teague itself establish that state courts are not free to give a Supreme Court decision announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court.2 The Minnesota Court acknowledged that other state courts had held that Teague does not apply to state postconviction proceedings,3 but concluded that "we are not free to fashion our own standard of retroactivity for Crawford." 718 N.W. 2d, at 455-457. </s> Our recent decision in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. ___ (2007), makes clear that the Minnesota court correctly concluded that federal law does not require state courts to apply the holding in Crawford to cases that were final when that case was decided. Nevertheless, we granted certiorari, 550 U.S. ___ (2007), to consider whether Teague or any other federal rule of law prohibits them from doing so.4 II </s> We begin with a comment on the source of the "new rule" announced in Crawford. For much of our Nation's history, federal constitutional rights--such as the Sixth Amendment confrontation right at issue in Crawford--were not binding on the States. Federal law, in fact, imposed no constraints on the procedures that state courts could or should follow in imposing criminal sanctions on their citizens. Neither the Federal Constitution as originally ratified nor any of the Amendments added by the Bill of Rights in 1791 gave this Court or any other federal-court power to review the fairness of state criminal procedures. Moreover, before 1867 the statutory authority of federal district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus did not extend to convicted criminals in state custody. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment radically changed the federal courts' relationship with state courts. That Amendment, one of the post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments ratified in 1868, is the source of this Court's power to decide whether a defendant in a state proceeding received a fair trial--i.e., whether his deprivation of liberty was "without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). In construing that Amendment, we have held that it imposes minimum standards of fairness on the States, and requires state criminal trials to provide defendants with protections "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). </s> Slowly at first, and then at an accelerating pace in the 1950's and 1960's, the Court held that safeguards afforded by the Bill of Rights--including a defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him"--are incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are therefore binding upon the States. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that "the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment"). Our interpretation of that basic Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has evolved over the years. </s> In Crawford we accepted the petitioner's argument that the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation that we had previously endorsed in Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, needed reconsideration because it "stray[ed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause." 541 U.S., at 42. We "turn[ed] to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning," id., at 43, and relied primarily on legal developments that had occurred prior to the adoption of the Sixth Amendment to derive the correct interpretation. Id., at 43-50. We held that the "Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising." Id., at 67. </s> Thus, our opinion in Crawford announced a "new rule"--as that term is defined in Teague--because the result in that case "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final," Teague, 489 U.S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule "of our own devising" or the product of our own views about sound policy. III </s> Our decision today must also be understood against the backdrop of our somewhat confused and confusing "retroactivity" cases decided in the years between 1965 and 1987. Indeed, we note at the outset that the very word "retroactivity" is misleading because it speaks in temporal terms. "Retroactivity" suggests that when we declare that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure is "nonretroactive," we are implying that the right at issue was not in existence prior to the date the "new rule" was announced. But this is incorrect. As we have already explained, the source of a "new rule" is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule. What we are actually determining when we assess the "retroactivity" of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.5 Originally, criminal defendants whose convictions were final were entitled to federal habeas relief only if the court that rendered the judgment under which they were in custody lacked jurisdiction to do so. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176 (1874); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-377 (1880).6 In 1915, the realm of violations for which federal habeas relief would be available to state prisoners was expanded to include state proceedings that "deprive[d] the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915). In the early 1900's, however, such relief was only granted when the constitutional violation was so serious that it effectively rendered the conviction void for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of a trial); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (per curiam) (coerced guilty plea).7 </s> The serial incorporation of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights during the 1950's and 1960's imposed more constitutional obligations on the States and created more opportunity for claims that individuals were being convicted without due process and held in violation of the Constitution. Nevertheless, until 1965 the Court continued to construe every constitutional error, including newly announced ones, as entitling state prisoners to relief on federal habeas. "New" constitutional rules of criminal procedure were, without discussion or analysis, routinely applied to cases on habeas review. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335; Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam). </s> In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court expressly considered the issue of "retroactivity" for the first time. Adopting a practical approach, we held that the retroactive effect of each new rule should be determined on a case-by-case basis by examining the purpose of the rule, the reliance of the States on the prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the rule. Id., at 629. Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision.8 Linkletter, 381 U.S., at 636-640. </s> During the next four years, application of the Linkletter standard produced strikingly divergent results. As Justice Harlan pointed out in his classic dissent in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257 (1969), one new rule was applied to all cases subject to direct review, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); another to all cases in which trials had not yet commenced, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); another to all cases in which tainted evidence had not yet been introduced at trial, Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (per curiam); and still others only to the party involved in the case in which the new rule was announced and to all future cases in which the proscribed official conduct had not yet occurred, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam). He reasonably questioned whether such decisions "may properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the commands of a super-legislature." 394 U.S., at 259. </s> Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist, buttressed by his even more searching separate opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part), and scholarly criticism,9 laid the groundwork for the eventual demise of the Linkletter standard. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the Court rejected as "unprincipled and inequitable," the application of the Linkletter standard to cases pending on direct review. In Teague, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed Griffith's rejection of the Linkletter standard for determining the "retroactive" applicability of new rules to state convictions that were not yet final and rejected the Linkletter standard for cases pending on federal habeas review. She adopted (with a significant modification) the approach advocated by Justice Harlan for federal collateral review of final state judgments. </s> Justice O'Connor endorsed a general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review, stating that "[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." 489 U.S., at 310 (plurality opinion). The opinion defined two exceptions: rules that render types of primary conduct "'beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" id., at 311, and "watershed" rules that "implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial," id., at 311, 312, 313.10 </s> It is clear that Linkletter and then Teague considered what constitutional violations may be remedied on federal habeas.11 They did not define the scope of the "new" constitutional rights themselves. Nor, as we shall explain, did Linkletter or Teague (or any of the other cases relied upon by respondent and the Minnesota Supreme Court) speak to the entirely separate question whether States can provide remedies for violations of these rights in their own postconviction proceedings. IV </s> Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. Linkletter spoke in broad terms about the retroactive applicability of new rules to state convictions that had become final prior to our announcement of the rules. Although Linkletter arose on federal habeas, the opinion did not rely on that procedural posture as a factor in its holding or analysis. Arguably, therefore, the approach it established might have been applied with equal force to both federal and state courts reviewing final state convictions. But we did not state--and the state courts did not conclude--that Linkletter imposed such a limitation on the States.12 A year after deciding Linkletter, we granted certiorari in Johnson to address the retroactivity of the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Applying the standard announced in Linkletter, we held that those rules should be applied only to trials that began after the respective dates of those decisions; they were given no retroactive effect beyond the parties in Miranda and Escobedo themselves.13 </s> Notably, the Oregon Supreme Court decided to give retroactive effect to Escobedo despite our holding in Johnson. In State v. Fair, 263 Ore. 383, 502 P.2d 1150 (1972), the Oregon court noted that it was continuing to apply Escobedo retroactively and correctly stated that "we are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires." 263 Ore., at 387-388, 502 P.2d, at 1152. In so holding, the Oregon court cited our language in Johnson that "'States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision.'" 263 Ore., at 386, 502 P.2d, at 1151 (quoting Johnson, 384 U.S., at 733).14 </s> Like Linkletter, Teague arose on federal habeas. Unlike in Linkletter, however, this procedural posture was not merely a background fact in Teague. A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion. Because the case before us now does not involve either of the "Teague exceptions," it is Justice O'Connor's discussion of the general rule of nonretroactivity that merits the following three comments. </s> First, not a word in Justice O'Connor's discussion--or in either of the opinions of Justice Harlan that provided the blueprint for her entire analysis--asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of any state agency or state court to extend the benefit of a new rule to a broader class than she defined. </s> Second, Justice O'Connor's opinion clearly indicates that Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code gives federal courts the authority to grant "writs of habeas corpus," but leaves unresolved many important questions about the scope of available relief. This Court has interpreted that congressional silence--along with the statute's command to dispose of habeas petitions "as law and justice require," 28 U.S.C. §2243--as an authorization to adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (abuse-of-the-writ bar to relief); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (cognizability of Fourth Amendment claims). Teague is plainly grounded in this authority, as the opinion expressly situated the rule it announced in this line of cases adjusting the scope of federal habeas relief in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations. 489 U.S., at 308 (plurality opinion) (citing, inter alia, Wainwright and Stone).15 Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. </s> Third, the text and reasoning of Justice O'Connor's opinion also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. Justice O'Connor made numerous references to the "Great writ" and the "writ," and expressly stated that "[t]he relevant frame of reference" for determining the appropriate retroactivity rule is defined by "the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available." 489 U.S., at 306 (plurality opinion). Moreover, she justified the general rule of nonretroactivity in part by reference to comity and respect for the finality of state convictions. Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas review of state convictions. See, e.g., State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 475, 609 A.2d 1280, 1292 (1992) (explaining that comity and federalism concerns "simply do not apply when this Court reviews procedural rulings by our lower courts"). If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague. And while finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as federal habeas, finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts. </s> The dissent correctly points out that Teague was also grounded in concerns over uniformity and the inequity inherent in the Linkletter approach. There is, of course, a federal interest in "reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disuniformity in the application of federal law." Post, at 12. This interest in uniformity, however, does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The fundamental interest in federalism that allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of different ways--so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution--is not otherwise limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity. Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government. Any State could surely have adopted the rule of evidence defined in Crawford under state law even if that case had never been decided. It should be equally free to give its citizens the benefit of our rule in any fashion that does not offend federal law. </s> It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions--not to limit a state court's authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State's convictions.16 </s> Our subsequent cases, which characterize the Teague rule as a standard limiting only the scope of federal habeas relief, confirm that Teague speaks only to the context of federal habeas. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 412 (2004) ("Teague's nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners" (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)); Caspari, 510 U.S., at 389 ("The [Teague] nonretroactivity principle prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence became final"). </s> It is also noteworthy that for many years following Teague, state courts almost universally understood the Teague rule as binding only federal habeas courts, not state courts. See, e.g., Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W. 2d 514 (S. D. 1990); Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 609 A.2d 1280; State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 256-257, 548 N.W. 2d 45, 49 (1996) (choosing of its own volition to adopt the Teague rule); but see State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260 (1995).17 Commentators were similarly confident that Teague's "restrictions appl[ied] only to federal habeas cases," leaving States free to "determine whether to follow the federal courts' rulings on retroactivity or to fashion rules which respond to the unique concerns of that state." Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L.Rev. 421, 423-424, 422-423 (1993). </s> In sum, the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed "nonretroactive" under Teague. V </s> The State contends that two of our prior decisions--Michigan v. Payne and American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith--cast doubt on state courts' authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. We disagree. A </s> In Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, we considered the retroactivity of the rule prohibiting "vindictive" resentencing that had been announced in our opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-726 (1969).18 Relying on the approach set forth in Linkletter and Stovall, we held that the Pearce rule did not apply because Payne's resentencing had occurred prior to Pearce's date of decision.19 We therefore reversed the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, which had applied Pearce retroactively, and remanded for further proceedings. At first blush the fact that we reversed the judgment of the Michigan court appears to lend support to the view that state courts may not give greater retroactive effect to new rules announced by this Court than we expressly authorize. But, as our opinion in Payne noted, the Michigan Supreme Court had applied the Pearce rule retroactively "'pending clarification'" by this Court. 412 U.S., at 49. As the Michigan Court explained, it had applied the new rule in the case before it in order to give guidance to Michigan trial courts concerning what it regarded as an ambiguity in Pearce's new rule.20 The Michigan Court did not purport to make a definitive ruling on the retroactivity of Pearce; nor did it purport to apply a broader state rule of retroactivity than required by federal law. Our opinion in Payne did not require the Michigan Supreme Court to modify its disposition of the case; it simply remanded for further proceedings after providing the clarification that the Michigan Court sought. Most significantly, other than the fact that the case was remanded for further proceedings, not a word in our Payne opinion suggests that the Court intended to prohibit state courts from applying new constitutional standards in a broader range of cases than we require.21 </s> Notably, at least some state courts continued, after Payne, to adopt and apply broader standards of retroactivity than required by our decisions. In Pennsylvania v. McCormick, 359 Pa. Super. 461, 470, 519 A.2d 442, 447 (1986), for example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania chose not to follow this Court's nonretroactivity holding in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam). The Pennsylvania court correctly explained that our decision was "not binding authority [in part] because neither the federal nor the state constitution dictate which decisions must be given retroactive effect." 359 Pa. Super., at 470, 519 A.2d, at 447. B </s> In American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute enacted in 1983 that imposed a discriminatory burden on interstate truckers. While their suit was pending, this Court declared a virtually identical Pennsylvania tax unconstitutional. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987). Shortly thereafter, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the Arkansas tax at issue. The primary issue in Smith was whether petitioners were entitled to a refund of taxes that were assessed before the date of our decision in Scheiner. The Arkansas Court held that petitioners were not entitled to a refund because our decision in Scheiner did not apply retroactively. Four Members of this Court agreed. The plurality opinion concluded that federal law did not provide petitioners with a right to a refund of pre-Scheiner tax payments because Scheiner did not apply retroactively to invalidate the Arkansas tax prior to its date of decision. Four Members of this Court dissented. The dissenting opinion argued that the case actually raised both the substantive question whether the tax violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution and the remedial question whether, if so, the petitioners were entitled to a refund. The dissent concluded as a matter of federal law that the tax was invalid during the years before Scheiner, and that petitioners were entitled to a decision to that effect. Whether petitioners should get a refund, however, the dissent deemed a mixed question of state and federal law that should be decided by the state court in the first instance. </s> Justice Scalia concurred with the plurality's judgment because he disagreed with the substantive rule announced in Scheiner, but he did not agree with the plurality's reasoning. After stating that his views on retroactivity diverged from the plurality's "in a fundamental way," Justice Scalia explained: "I share [the dissent's] perception that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what [the law] shall be. The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide today--whether our decision in Scheiner shall 'apply' retroactively--presupposes a view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is. Such a view is contrary to that understanding of 'the judicial Power,' U.S. Const., Art.III, § 1, which is not only the common and traditional one, but which is the only one that can justify courts in denying force and effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures, see Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)--the very exercise of judicial power asserted in Scheiner. To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution forbids it; and when, as in this case, the constitutionality of a state statute is placed in issue, the question is not whether some decision of ours 'applies' in the way that a law applies; the question is whether the Constitution, as interpreted in that decision, invalidates the statute. Since the Constitution does not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form does not make sense. Either enforcement of the statute at issue in Scheiner (which occurred before our decision there) was unconstitutional, or it was not; if it was, then so is enforcement of all identical statutes in other States, whether occurring before or after our decision; and if it was not, then Scheiner was wrong, and the issue of whether to 'apply' that decision needs no further attention." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 201. </s> Because Justice Scalia's vote rested on his disagreement with the substantive rule announced in Scheiner--rather than with the retroactivity analysis in the dissenting opinion--there were actually five votes supporting the dissent's views on the retroactivity issue. Accordingly, it is the dissent rather than the plurality that should inform our analysis of the issue before us today.22 </s> Moreover, several years later, a majority of this Court explicitly adopted the Smith dissent's reasoning in Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). Harper, like Smith, involved a request for a refund of taxes paid before we declared a similar Michigan tax unconstitutional. We held that the Virginia tax at issue in Harper was in fact invalid--even before we declared the similar tax unconstitutional--but that this did not necessarily entitle the petitioners to a full refund. We explained that the Constitution required Virginia to "'provide relief consistent with federal due process principles,'" 509 U.S., at 100 (citing American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 181), but that "'a State found to have imposed an impermissibly discriminatory tax retains flexibility in responding to this determination'" under the due process clause, 509 U.S., at 100 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 39-40 (1990)). We left to the "Virginia courts this question of state law and the performance of other tasks pertaining to the crafting of any appropriate remedy." 509 U.S., at 102. And we specifically noted that Virginia "'is free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined.'" Ibid. (citing McKesson, 496 U.S., at 51-52); see also 509 U.S., at 102 ("State law may provide relief beyond the demands of federal due process, but under no circumstances may it confine petitioners to a lesser remedy" citations omitted)). </s> Thus, to the extent that these civil retroactivity decisions are relevant to the issue before us today,23 they support our conclusion that the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law. Federal law simply "sets certain minimum requirements that States must meet but may exceed in providing appropriate relief." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 178-179 (plurality opinion). They provide no support for the proposition that federal law places a limit on state authority to provide remedies for federal constitutional violations. VI </s> Finally, while the State acknowledges that it may grant its citizens broader protection than the Federal Constitution requires by enacting appropriate legislation or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution, it argues that it may not do so by judicial misconstruction of federal law. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)--like our early decisions in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (1859), and Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397 (1872)--provides solid support for that proposition. But the States that give broader retroactive effect to this Court's new rules of criminal procedure do not do so by misconstruing the federal Teague standard. Rather, they have developed state law to govern retroactivity in state postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W. 3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003) ("[A]s a matter of state law, this Court chooses not to adopt the Teague analysis . . ."). The issue in this case is whether there is a federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, that prohibits them from doing so. The absence of any precedent for the claim that Teague limits state collateral review courts' authority to provide remedies for federal constitutional violations is a sufficient reason for concluding that there is no such rule of federal law. That conclusion is confirmed by several additional considerations. First, if there is such a federal rule of law, presumably the Supremacy Clause in Article V of the Federal Constitution would require all state entities--not just state judges--to comply with it. We have held that States can waive a Teague defense, during the course of litigation, by expressly choosing not to rely on it, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990), or by failing to raise it in a timely manner, see Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-229 (1994). It would indeed be anomalous to hold that state legislatures and executives are not bound by Teague, but that state courts are. </s> Second, the State has not identified, and we cannot discern, the source of our authority to promulgate such a novel rule of federal law. While we have ample authority to control the administration of justice in the federal courts--particularly in their enforcement of federal legislation--we have no comparable supervisory authority over the work of state judges. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997). And while there are federal interests that occasionally justify this Court's development of common-law rules of federal law,24 our normal role is to interpret law created by others and "not to prescribe what it shall be." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Just as constitutional doubt may tip the scales in favor of one construction of a statute rather than another, so does uncertainty about the source of authority to impose a federal limit on the power of state judges to remedy wrongful state convictions outweigh any possible policy arguments favoring the rule that respondent espouses. </s> Finally, the dissent contends that the "end result [of this opinion] is startling" because "two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution" could obtain different results. Post, at 1. This assertion ignores the fact that the two hypothetical criminal defendants did not actually commit the "same crime." They violated different state laws, were tried in and by different state sovereigns, and may--for many reasons--be subject to different penalties. As previously noted, such nonuniformity is a necessary consequence of a federalist system of government. VII </s> It is important to keep in mind that our jurisprudence concerning the "retroactivity" of "new rules" of constitutional law is primarily concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies. The former is a "pure question of federal law, our resolution of which should be applied uniformly throughout the Nation, while the latter is a mixed question of state and federal law." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial--only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts. It is fully consistent with a government of laws to recognize that the finality of a judgment may bar relief. It would be quite wrong to assume, however, that the question whether constitutional violations occurred in trials conducted before a certain date depends on how much time was required to complete the appellate process. </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. As was true in Michigan v. Payne, the Minnesota Court is free to reinstate its judgment disposing of the petition for state postconviction relief. It is so ordered. </s> STEPHEN DANFORTH, PETITIONER v. MINNESOTA on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota [February 20, 2008] </s> Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting. </s> Some of our new rulings on the meaning of the United States Constitution apply retroactively--to cases already concluded--and some do not. This Court has held that the question whether a particular ruling is retroactive is itself a question of federal law. It is basic that when it comes to any such question of federal law, it is "the province and duty" of this Court "to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). State courts are the final arbiters of their own state law; this Court is the final arbiter of federal law. State courts are therefore bound by our rulings on whether our cases construing federal law are retroactive. </s> The majority contravenes these bedrock propositions. The end result is startling: Of two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution, one may be executed while the other is set free--the first despite being correct on his claim, and the second because of it. That result is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the Framers' decision to vest in "one supreme Court" the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniformity of federal law. Because the Constitution requires us to be more jealous of that responsibility and authority, I respectfully dissent. I </s> One year after Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)--our leading modern precedent on retroactivity--Teague's author explained: "The determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive ... is a matter of federal law. When questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the retroactivity of their own decisions. The retroactive applicability of a constitutional decision of this Court, however, 'is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied.'" American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177-178 (1990) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967); citation omitted)). </s> For that reason, "we have consistently required that state courts adhere to our retroactivity decisions." 496 U.S., at 178 (citing Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973), and Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam)). Even more recently, we held that the "Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law." Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993) (citation omitted). </s> Indeed, about the only point on which our retroactivity jurisprudence has been consistent is that the retroactivity of new federal rules is a question of federal law binding on States. The Court's contrary holding is based on a misreading of our precedent and a misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivity generally. A </s> As the Court correctly points out, before 1965 we took for granted the proposition that all federal constitutional rights, including rights that represented a break from earlier precedent, would be given full retroactive effect on both direct and collateral review. That all changed with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In that case, a Louisiana prisoner brought a federal habeas petition arguing that illegally seized evidence was introduced against him at trial in violation of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp, however, had been decided after his conviction became final. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Mapp rule "operates retrospectively upon cases finally decided in the period prior to Mapp." 381 U.S., at 619-620. In answering this question, we broke from our past practice of assuming full retroactivity, holding that "we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively." Id., at 629. Our analysis turned entirely on the nature and scope of the particular constitutional right at issue: "[W]e must ... weigh the merits and demerits [of retroactive application] in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Ibid. Under this framework, we held that Mapp would apply only prospectively. 381 U.S., at 639-640. The next year, we decided Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Johnson was a direct appeal from the New Jersey Supreme Court's denial of state collateral relief. The precise question in Johnson was whether the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), would apply to state prisoners whose convictions had become final before those cases were decided. In holding that Escobedo and Miranda should apply only prospectively, 384 U.S., at 732, we imported Linkletter's mode of retroactivity analysis into review of state postconviction proceedings, 384 U.S., at 726-727. Finally, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), we announced that, for purposes of retroactivity analysis, "no distinction is justified between convictions now final, as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review." Id., at 300. </s> Thus, by 1967, the Linkletter analysis was applied in review of criminal convictions, whether final or not. No matter at what stage of proceedings this Court considered a retroactivity question, the issue was decided with reference to the purposes and practical impact of the precise federal right in question: "Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine [to decide the retroactivity issue] must inevitably vary with the [constitutional] dictate involved." Johnson, supra, at 728. </s> Because the question of retroactivity was so tied up with the nature and purpose of the underlying federal constitutional right, it would have been surprising if any of our cases had suggested that States were free to apply new rules of federal constitutional law retroactively even when we would not. As one of the more thoughtful legal scholars put it in discussing the effect of the Linkletter analysis on state collateral review, "[i]f a state gave relief in such a case on the exclusive authority of Mapp, under the rationale of the Linkletter opinion it would presumably have been reversed." Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 91, n. 132 (1965). </s> Our precedents made clear that States could give greater substantive protection under their own laws than was available under federal law, and could give whatever retroactive effect to those laws they wished. As the Court explained in Johnson, "[o]f course, States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision." 384 U.S., at 733. The clear implication of this statement was that States could apply their own retroactivity rules only to new substantive rights "under their own law," not to new federal rules announced by this Court. </s> Thus, contrary to the Court's view, our early retroactivity cases nowhere suggested that the retroactivity of new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure was anything other than "a matter of federal law." Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32 (1975) (per curiam). It is no surprise, then, that when we held that a particular right would not apply retroactively, the language in our opinions did not indicate that our decisions were optional. See, e.g., Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (per curiam) (the rule announced in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), "is to be applied only to trials in which the evidence is sought to be introduced after the date of [that] decision" (emphasis added)). And, of course, when we found that a state court erred in holding that a particular right should not apply retroactively, the state court was bound to comply. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971) (per curiam); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4 (1968) (per curiam); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968) (per curiam). </s> Although nothing in our decisions suggested that state courts could determine the retroactivity of new federal rules according to their own lights, we had no opportunity to confront the issue head on until Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973).1 In Payne, the defendant had argued before the Michigan Supreme Court that his resentencing violated the rule we had announced in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In considering this question, the state court noted that this Court had "not yet decided whether Pearce is to be applied retroactively." People v. Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 90, n.3, 191 N.W. 2d 375, 378, n.2 (1971). Nevertheless, without so much as citing any federal retroactivity precedent, the court decided that it would "apply Pearce in the present case in order to instruct our trial courts as to the Michigan interpretation of an ambiguous portion of Pearce ..., pending clarification by the United States Supreme Court." Id., at 91, n.3, 191 N.W. 2d, at 378, n.2. </s> We granted certiorari in Payne only on the question of retroactivity, and decided that Pearce should not apply retroactively. In reversing the contrary decision of the state court, our language was not equivocal: "Since the resentencing hearing in this case took place approximately two years before Pearce was decided, we hold that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in applying its proscriptions here." 412 U.S., at 57. </s> The majority argues that Payne did not preclude States from applying retroactivity rules different from those we announced; rather, the argument goes, the Michigan Supreme Court simply elected to follow the federal retroactivity rule, "pending clarification." See ante, at 18-20. That is certainly a possible reading of Payne, but not the most plausible one. The Michigan Supreme Court did not purport to rest its decision to apply Pearce retroactively on the federal Linkletter analysis, and this Court's reversal is most reasonably read as requiring state courts to apply our federal retroactivity decisions. Notably, this is not the first time Members of this Court have debated the meaning of Payne, with Teague's author explaining that Payne supports the proposition that "we have consistently required that state courts adhere to our retroactivity decisions," American Trucking, 496 U.S., at 178 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.), and the author of today's opinion disagreeing in dissent, see id., at 210, n.4 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But whichever way Payne is read, it either offers no support for the majority's position, because the state court simply applied federal retroactivity rules, or flatly rejects the majority's position, because the state court failed to apply federal retroactivity rules, and was told by this Court that it must. </s> Meanwhile, Justice Harlan had begun dissenting in our retroactivity cases, pressing the view that new rules announced by the Court should be applied in all cases not yet final, without regard to the analysis set forth in Linkletter. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-269 (1969); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), we abandoned Linkletter as it applied to cases still on direct review and adopted Justice Harlan's view in such cases. Noting that nonretroactivity on direct appeal "violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and that "selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same," 479 U.S., at 322, 323, we held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final," id., at 328 (emphasis added). Just as in previous cases, Griffith by its terms bound state courts to apply our retroactivity decisions. </s> Two years after Griffith was decided, we granted certiorari in Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988). In that case, a South Carolina state habeas court had decided that our decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), should not be applied retroactively. If the authority of state courts to apply their own retroactivity rules were well established under our precedents--as the majority would have it, see ante, at 6-12--this case should have been easily decided on the ground that whatever the federal retroactivity rule, the State could adopt its own rule on the retroactivity of newly announced federal constitutional standards. </s> Instead, the State argued to this Court "that we should adopt Justice Harlan's theory that a newly announced constitutional rule should not be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review unless" the rule meets certain criteria--the flip side of Justice Harlan's view about cases on direct review that we had accepted in Griffith. 484 U.S., at 215. Under that approach, the State argued, Francis would not be applied retroactively on collateral review. 484 U.S., at 215. In response, we discussed Justice Harlan's "distinction between direct review and collateral review." Ibid. We found, however, that it was "not necessary to determine whether we should ... adopt Justice Harlan's reasoning as to the retroactivity of cases announcing new constitutional rules to cases pending on collateral review," id., at 215-216, because Francis did not announce a new rule. </s> This Court went on, however, to address South Carolina's alternative argument--that it "has the authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings," which would allow it in the case before the Court "to refuse to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law retroactively in such a proceeding." 484 U.S., at 217. This argument should sound familiar--whatever the federal retroactivity rule, a State may establish its own retroactivity rule for its own collateral proceedings. This Court rejected that proposition, not only because it did not regard Francis as a new rule, but also because the state court did not "plac[e] any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral proceedings." 484 U.S., at 218. As this Court explained, if the state court "consider[s] the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> Given all this, the present case should come out the way it does only if Teague changed the nature of retroactivity as a creature of federal law binding on the States, and adopted the argument rejected in Yates--that when it comes to retroactivity, a State "has the authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings." Teague did no such thing. B </s> In Teague, we completed the project of conforming our view on the retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure to those of Justice Harlan. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion posed the problem by noting, with more than a bit of understatement, that the "Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results." 489 U.S., at 302. In light of these concerns, and because of "'the important distinction between direct review and collateral review,'" id., at 307 (quoting Yates, supra, at 215), we generally adopted Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity on collateral review, 489 U.S., at 310, just as we had previously adopted his approach on direct review in Griffith. The Linkletter approach to retroactivity was thus overruled in favor of the Harlan approach in two steps: Griffith and Teague. There is no dispute that Griffith is fully binding on States; a new rule "is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final." 479 U.S., at 328 (emphasis added). Teague is simply the other side of the coin, and it too should be binding in "all cases, state or federal." The fact that Linkletter was overruled in two stages rather than one should not lead to a different result. </s> Indeed, Teague did not purport to distinguish between federal and state collateral review. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that "in Yates v. Aiken, we were asked to decide whether the rule announced in Francis v. Franklin, should be applied to a defendant on collateral review at the time that case was decided," but that we were able to decide the case on alternative grounds. 489 U.S., at 307 (citations omitted). This citation of Yates--a state habeas case--makes clear that Teague contemplated no difference between retroactivity of new federal rules in state and federal collateral proceedings. Thus, our unqualified holding--that "[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced," 489 U.S., at 310--is enough to decide this case. </s> Moreover, the reasons the Teague Court provided for adopting Justice Harlan's view apply to state as well as federal collateral review. The majority is quite right that Teague invoked the interest in comity between the state and federal sovereigns. Id., at 308. But contrary to the impression conveyed by the majority, there was more to Teague than that. Teague also relied on the interest in finality: "Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." Id., at 309. The Court responds by flatly stating that "finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one." Ante, at 15. But while it is certainly true that finality of state convictions is a state interest, that does mean it is not also a federal one. After all, our decision in Griffith made finality the touchstone for retroactivity of new federal rules, and bound States to that judgment. See 479 U.S., at 328 (new rules are "to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final" (emphasis added)). </s> It is quite a radical proposition to assert that this Court has nothing to say about an interest "essential to the operation of our criminal justice system," without which "the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect," when the question is whether this interest is being undermined by the very rules of federal constitutional procedure that we are charged with expounding. A State alone may "evaluate, and weigh the importance of" finality interests, ante, at 15, when it decides which substantive rules of criminal procedure state law affords; it is quite a leap to hold, as the Court does, that they alone can do so in the name of the Federal Constitution. </s> Teague was also based on the inequity of the Linkletter approach to retroactivity. After noting that the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants led us in Griffith to adopt Justice Harlan's view for cases on direct appeal, the Court then explained that the "Linkletter standard also led to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review." 489 U.S., at 305. See also id., at 316 (the Court's new approach to retroactivity "avoids the inequity resulting from the uneven application of new rules to similarly situated defendants"). </s> This interest in reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disuniformity in the application of federal law is quite plainly a predominantly federal interest. Indeed, it was one of the main reasons we cited in Griffith for imposing a uniform rule of retroactivity upon state courts for cases on direct appeal. And, more to the point, it is the very interest that animates the Supremacy Clause and our role as the "one supreme Court" charged with enforcing it. </s> Justice Story, writing for the Court, noted nearly two centuries ago that the Constitution requires "uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within [its] purview." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 347-348 (1816). Indeed, the "fundamental principle" of our Constitution, as Justice O'Connor once put it, is "that a single sovereign's law should be applied equally to all." Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 1, 4 (1985). States are free to announce their own state-law rules of criminal procedure, and to apply them retroactively in whatever manner they like. That is fully consistent with the principle that "a single sovereign's law should be applied equally to all." But the Court's opinion invites just the sort of disuniformity in federal law that the Supremacy Clause was meant to prevent. The same determination of a federal constitutional violation at the same stage in the criminal process can result in freedom in one State and loss of liberty or life in a neighboring State.2 The Court's opinion allows "a single sovereign's law"--the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by this Court--to be applied differently in every one of the several States. </s> Finally, from Linkletter through Johnson to Teague, we have always emphasized that determining whether a new federal right is retroactive turns on the nature of the substantive federal rule at issue. See Linkletter, 381 U.S., at 629 (in deciding retroactivity, we "loo[k] to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation"); Johnson, 384 U.S., at 728 ("Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine [to decide the retroactivity issue] must inevitably vary with the dictate involved"); Teague, supra, at 311-315 (deciding whether rule is applicable to cases on collateral review turns on whether the rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" and whether the rule is an "absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'"). That is how we determine retroactivity--by carefully examining the underlying federal right. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. ___, ___-___ (2007) (slip op., at 11-14); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353-354 (2004); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243-245 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318-319 (1989). </s> When this Court decides that a particular right shall not be applied retroactively, but a state court finds that it should, it is at least in part because of a different assessment by the state court of the nature of the underlying federal right--something on which the Constitution gives this Court the final say. The nature and scope of the new rules we announce directly determines whether they will be applied retroactively on collateral review. Today's opinion stands for the unfounded proposition that while we alone have the final say in expounding the former, we have no control over the latter. II </s> The Court's holding is not only based on a misreading of our retroactivity cases, but also on a misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivity generally. The majority's decision is grounded on the erroneous view that retroactivity is a remedial question. See ante, at 26-27 ("It is important to keep in mind that our jurisprudence concerning the 'retroactivity' of 'new rules' of constitutional law is primarily concerned, not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies"). But as explained in the lead opinion in American Trucking--penned by the author of the lead opinion in Teague--it is an "error" to "equat[e] a decision not to apply a rule retroactively with the judicial choice of a remedy." 496 U.S., at 194 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.). As Justice O'Connor went on to emphasize, "[n]or do this Court's retroactivity decisions, whether in the civil or criminal sphere, support the ... assertion that our retroactivity doctrine is a remedial principle." Ibid. "While application of the principles of retroactivity may have remedial effects, they are not themselves remedial principles.... A decision defining the operative conduct or events that will be adjudicated under old law does not, in itself, specify an appropriate remedy." Id., at 195. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199 (1973) (plurality opinion) (describing the question of retroactivity as "whether we will apply a new constitutional rule of criminal law in reviewing judgments of conviction obtained under a prior standard," and contrasting this with the question of the "appropriate scope of federal equitable remedies"). In other words, when we ask whether and to what extent a rule will be retroactively applied, we are asking what law--new or old--will apply. As we have expressly noted, "[t]he Teague doctrine ... does not involve a special 'remedial' limitation on the principle of 'retroactivity' as much as it reflects a limitation inherent in the principle itself." Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758 (1995). </s> The foregoing prompts a lengthy rejoinder from the Court, to the effect that it is wrong to view retroactivity as a federal choice-of-law question rather than a remedial one. That view, we are told, was rejected by five Justices in American Trucking and then by the Court in Harper. Ante, at 20-24. But the proposition on which five Members of the Court agreed in American Trucking, and that the Court adopted in Harper, was that the Griffith rule of retroactivity--that is, that newly announced constitutional decisions should apply to all cases on direct review--should apply to civil cases as well as criminal. See American Trucking, 496 U.S., at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("I share Justice Stevens' perception that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be"); id., at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Fundamental notions of fairness and legal process dictate that the same rules should be applied to all similar cases on direct review"); Harper, 509 U.S., at 97 ("When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review"). </s> Neither Justice Scalia's concurrence in American Trucking combined with the dissent, nor the Court's opinion in Harper, resolved that retroactivity was a remedial question. That is why, the year after American Trucking was decided, two of the Justices in today's majority could explain: "Since the question is whether the court should apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of law, 'a choice ... between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.' Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). Once a rule is found to apply 'backward,' there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one. Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, the remedial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least where the case originates in state court. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 210 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or otherwise. See Smith, supra, at 177-178 (plurality opinion)." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534-535 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (citation omitted; emphasis added). </s> And Harper certainly did not view the retroactivity of federal rules as a remedial question for state courts. Quite the contrary: Harper held that the "Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law," 509 U.S., at 100 (citation omitted), and expressly treated retroactivity and remedy as separate questions, id., at 100-102. </s> The majority explains that when we announce a new rule of law, we are not "'creating the law,'" but rather "'declaring what the law already is.'" Ante, at 21 (quoting American Trucking, supra, at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)). But this has nothing to do with the question before us. The point may lead to the conclusion that nonretroactivity of our decisions is improper--the position the Court has adopted in both criminal and civil cases on direct review--but everyone agrees that full retroactivity is not required on collateral review. It necessarily follows that we must choose whether "new" or "old" law applies to a particular category of cases. Suppose, for example, that a defendant, whose conviction became final before we announced our decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), argues (correctly) on collateral review that he was convicted in violation of both Crawford and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the case that Crawford overruled. Under our decision in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. ___ (2007), the "new" rule announced in Crawford would not apply retroactively to the defendant. But I take it to be uncontroversial that the defendant would nevertheless get the benefit of the "old" rule of Roberts, even under the view that the rule not only is but always has been an incorrect reading of the Constitution. See, e.g., Yates, 484 U.S., at 218. Thus, the question whether a particular federal rule will apply retroactively is, in a very real way, a choice between new and old law. The issue in this case is who should decide. </s> The proposition that the question of retroactivity--that is, the choice between new or old law in a particular case--is distinct from the question of remedies has several important implications for this case. To begin with, whatever intuitive appeal may lie in the majority's statement that "the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law," ante, at 24, the statement misses the mark. The relevant inquiry is not about remedy; it is about choice of law--new or old. There is no reason to believe, either legally or intuitively, that States should have any authority over this question when it comes to which federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure to apply.3 </s> Indeed, when the question is what federal rule of decision from this Court should apply to a particular case, no Court but this one--which has the ultimate authority "to say what the law is," Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177--should have final say over the answer. See Harper, supra, at 100 ("Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law" (citation omitted)). This is enough to rebut the proposition that there is no "source of [our] authority" to bind state courts to follow our retroactivity decisions. Ante, at 26. Retroactivity is a question of federal law, and our final authority to construe it cannot, at this point in the Nation's history, be reasonably doubted. </s> Principles of federalism protect the prerogative of States to extend greater rights under their own laws than are available under federal law. The question here, however, is the availability of protection under the Federal Constitution--specifically, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. It is no intrusion on the prerogatives of the States to recognize that it is for this Court to decide such a question of federal law, and that our decision is binding on the States under the Supremacy Clause. </s> Consider the flip side of the question before us today: If a State interprets its own constitution to provide protection beyond that available under the Federal Constitution, and has ruled that this interpretation is not retroactive, no one would suppose that a federal court could hold otherwise, and grant relief under state law that a state court would refuse to grant. The result should be the same when a state court is asked to give retroactive effect to a right under the Federal Constitution that this Court has held is not retroactive. </s> The distinction between retroactivity and available remedies highlights the fact that the majority's assertion "that Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute," ante, at 13--even if correct--is neither here nor there.4 While Congress has substantial control over federal courts' ability to grant relief for violations of the Federal Constitution, the Constitution gives us the responsibility to decide what its provisions mean. And with that responsibility necessarily comes the authority to determine the scope of those provisions--when they apply and when they do not. </s> This proposition--and the importance of the distinction between retroactivity and available remedies--were confirmed when we considered the availability of federal collateral review of state convictions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). Whatever control Congress has over federal courts' ability to grant postconviction remedies, the availability or scope of those remedies has no bearing on our decisions about whether new or old law should apply in a particular case. That is why, after AEDPA's passage, we view the Teague inquiry as distinct from that under AEDPA. See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam) ("While it is of course a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2254(d), ... none of our post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard, or that AEDPA relieves courts from the responsibility of addressing properly raised Teague arguments"). The majority today views the issue as simply one of what remedies a State chooses to apply; our cases confirm that the question whether a federal decision is retroactive is one of federal law distinct from the issue of available remedies. </s> Lurking behind today's decision is of course the question of just how free state courts are to define the retroactivity of our decisions interpreting the Federal Constitution. I do not see any basis in the majority's logic for concluding that States are free to hold our decisions retroactive when we have held they are not, but not free to hold that they are not when we have held they are. Under the majority's reasoning, in either case the availability of relief in state court is a question for those courts to evaluate independently. The majority carefully reserves that question, see ante, at 4, n.4, confirming that the majority regards it as open. </s> Nor is there anything in today's decision suggesting that States could not adopt more nuanced approaches to retroactivity. For example, suppose we hold that the Sixth Amendment right to be represented by particular counsel of choice, recently announced in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), is a new rule that does not apply retroactively. Under the majority's rationale, a state court could decide that it nonetheless will apply Gonzalez-Lopez retroactively, but only if the defendant could prove prejudice, or some other criterion we had rejected as irrelevant in defining the substantive right. Under the majority's logic, that would not be a misapplication of our decision in Gonzalez-Lopez--which specifically rejected any required showing of prejudice, id., at 147-148--but simply a state decision on the scope of available remedies in state court. The possible permutations--from State to State, and federal right to federal right--are endless. *  *  * </s> Perhaps all this will be dismissed as fine parsing of somewhat arcane precedents, over which reasonable judges may disagree. Fair enough; but I would hope that enough has been said at least to refute the majority's assertion that its conclusion is dictated by our prior cases. This dissent is compelled not simply by disagreement over how to read those cases, but by the fundamental issues at stake--our role under the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, both as to its meaning and its reach, and the accompanying duty to ensure the uniformity of that federal law. Stephen Danforth's conviction became final before the new rule in Crawford was announced. In Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. ___ (2007), we held that Crawford shall not be applied retroactively on collateral review. That should be the end of the matter. I respectfully dissent. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Although Teague was a plurality opinion that drew support from only four Members of the Court, the Teague rule was affirmed and applied by a majority of the Court shortly thereafter. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989) ("Because Penry is before us on collateral review, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether granting him the relief he seeks would create a new rule. Under Teague, new rules will not be applied or announced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Footnote 2The relevant passage in the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion states: </s> "Danforth argues that Teague dictates the limits of retroactive application of new rules only in federal habeas corpus proceedings and does not limit the retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings. Danforth is incorrect when he asserts that state courts are free to give a Supreme Court decision of federal constitutional criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by the Supreme Court. ... In light of Payne and American Trucking Associations, we cannot apply state retroactivity principles when determining the retroactivity of a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure if the Supreme Court has already provided relevant federal principles." 718 N.W. 2d 451, 456 (2006). Footnote 3See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 561 N.E. 2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So.2d 1292, 1296-1297 (La. 1992); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W. 3d 253, 266-268 (Mo. 2003); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 816-819, 59 P.3d 463, 470-471 (2002) (per curiam); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W. 2d 514, 517-518 (S.D. 1990). Footnote 4We note at the outset that this case does not present the questions whether States are required to apply "watershed" rules in state post-conviction proceedings, whether the Teague rule applies to cases brought under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (2000 ed., Supp. V), or whether Congress can alter the rules of retroactivity by statute. Accordingly, we express no opinion on these issues. Footnote 5It may, therefore, make more sense to speak in terms of the "redressability" of violations of new rules, rather than the "retroactivity" of such rules. Cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide today--whether our decision in [American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987),] shall 'apply' retroactively--presupposes [an incorrect] view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is"). Unfortunately, it would likely create, rather than alleviate, confusion to change our terminology at this point. Accordingly, we will continue to utilize the existing vocabulary, despite its shortcomings. Footnote 6Although our post-1867 cases reflected a "softening" of the concept of jurisdiction to embrace claims that the statute under which the petitioner had been convicted was unconstitutional or that the detention was based on an illegally imposed sentence, the Court adhered to the basic rule that habeas was unavailable to review claims of constitutional error that did not go to the trial court's jurisdiction. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L.Rev. 441, 471, 483-484 (1963); Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L.Rev. 84, 103-104 (1959). Footnote 7"[I]n Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), the Court openly discarded the concept of jurisdiction--by then more [of] a fiction than anything else--as a touchstone of the availability of federal habeas review, and acknowledged that such review is available for claims of disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused . . . ." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Footnote 8Linkletter arose in the context of a denial of federal habeas relief, so its holding was "necessarily limited to convictions which had become final by the time Mapp ... [was] rendered." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966). We noted in Linkletter that Mapp was being applied to cases that were still pending on direct review at the time it was decided, so the issue before us was expressly limited to "whether the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp applies to state court convictions which had become final before rendition of our opinion." 381 U.S., at 622 (footnote omitted). Shortly thereafter, however, we held that the three-pronged Linkletter analysis should be applied both to convictions that were final before rendition of our opinions and to cases that were still pending on direct review. See Johnson, 384 U.S., at 732; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Footnote 9See, e.g., Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 417 (1969). Footnote 10Rules of the former type "are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to [Teague's] bar." Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, n.4 (2004). Footnote 11Similarly, Johnson, and Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), defined the scope of constitutional violations that would be remedied on direct appeal. Footnote 12The dissent is correct that at least one "thoughtful legal scholar" believed that Linkletter did preclude States from applying new constitutional rules more broadly than our cases required. Post, at 4 (citing Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 91, n. 132 (1965)). Notably, this comment was made in the context of an attack on Linkletter's prospective approach as inconsistent with the idea that judges are "bound by a body of fixed, overriding law." Mishkin, 79 Harv. L.Rev., at 62. Moreover, the footnote cited by the dissent concludes with a statement that "the reservation to the states of the power to apply [new rules] to all convictions, ... is ... the preferable pattern." Id., at 91, n. 132. In all events, even if Linkletter and its progeny rested on the assumption that "new rules" of constitutional law did not exist until announced by this Court, that view of the law was rejected when we endorsed Justice Harlan's analysis of retroactivity. Footnote 13That same year, we similarly denied retroactive effect to the rule announced in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prohibiting prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). Shortly thereafter, in a case involving a Griffin error, we held for the first time that there are some constitutional errors that do not require the automatic reversal of a conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). Both Shott and Chapman protected the State of California from a potentially massive exodus of state prisoners because their prosecutors and judges had routinely commented on a defendant's failure to testify. Footnote 14Although the plain meaning of this language in Johnson is that a state creating its own substantive standards can be as generous with their retroactive effect as it wishes, courts and commentators both before and after Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), cited this language in support of the proposition that state courts "may apply new constitutional standards 'in a broader range of cases than is required' by th[is] Court's decision not to apply the standards retroactively." Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 818, 59 P.3d 463, 470-471 (2002) (per curiam); see also Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 Val. U. L.Rev. 421, 443 (2004). Thirty years after deciding State v. Fair, the Oregon Supreme Court "disavowed" this analysis based on our decisions in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167. Page v. Palmateer, 336 Ore. 379, 84 P.3d 133 (2004). As we explain infra, at 19, 20, its reliance on those cases was misplaced, and its decision to change course was therefore misguided. Footnote 15Subsequent decisions have characterized Teague in a similar fashion. See, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S., at 633, 634 (stating that "in defining the scope of the writ, we look first to the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence," and identifying Teague as an example). And individual Justices have been even more explicit. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 214 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing, inter alia, the Teague rule as having been "created by the habeas courts themselves, in the exercise of their traditional equitable discretion . . . because [it was] seen as necessary to protect the interests of comity and finality that federal collateral review of state criminal proceedings necessarily implicates"); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 699 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing Teague as one illustration of the principle that "federal courts exercising their habeas powers may refuse to grant relief on certain claims because of 'prudential concerns' such as equity and federalism"); 507 U.S., at 718 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Teague and other "gateways through which a habeas petitioner must pass before proceeding to the merits of a constitutional claim" are "grounded in the equitable discretion of habeas courts" (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); Teague, 489 U.S., at 317 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (characterizing Teague as a decision "construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes" and contrasting it with Griffith, which "appear[s] to have constitutional underpinnings"); 489 U.S., at 332-333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing Teague as an unwarranted change in "[this Court's] interpretation of the federal habeas statute"); see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 684 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (describing the problem of retroactivity as "a problem as to the scope of the habeas writ"). Footnote 16The lower federal courts have also applied the Teague rule to motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (2000 ed., Supp. V). Much of the reasoning applicable to applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to §2254 seems equally applicable in the context of §2255 motions. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (explaining that §2255 was enacted as a functional equivalent for habeas corpus to allow federal prisoners to bring a collateral attack in the court that imposed the sentence rather than a court that happened to be near the prison). Footnote 17Today, the majority of state courts still read Teague this way. As far as we can tell, only three States--Minnesota, Oregon, and Montana--have adopted a contrary view. See Page, 336 Ore. 379, 84 P.3d 133; Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260. Footnote 18In Pearce, we held: </s> "[W]henever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal." 395 U.S., at 726. </s> As the concurrence pointed out, some States already provided equivalent or broader protection against vindictive sentencing. See id., at 733-734, n.4 (opinion of Douglas, J.). Footnote 19Given the fact that Payne's appeal was still pending on that date, however, the result would have been different and the views of the dissenting Justices would have prevailed if the case had been decided after our decision in Teague. Footnote 20The relevant footnote in the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion explained: </s> "The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Pearce is to be applied retroactively. Although the Court twice granted certiorari to consider the question, in each case the writ was subsequently dismissed as improvidently granted. Moon v. Maryland, cert granted (1969), 395 US 975, writ dismissed (1970), 398 US 319; Odom v. United States, cert granted (1970), 399 US 904, writ dismissed (1970), 400 US 23. We decline to predict the high Court's answer to the question of Pearce's retroactive or prospective application, but we will apply Pearce in the present case in order to instruct our trial courts as to the Michigan interpretation of an ambiguous portion of Pearce, discussed Infra, pending clarification by the United States Supreme Court." People v. Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 90-91, n.3, 191 N.W. 2d 375, 378, n. 2 (1971) (citations omitted). See also Reply Brief for Petitioner in Michigan v. Payne, O. T. 1972, No. 71-1005, p. 4 ("People v Payne, 386 Mich 84, 191 NW2d 375 (1971) expressly withheld ruling on the retroactivity of Pearce but applied it to Payne to instruct the lower courts in Michigan"). Footnote 21See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S., at 210, n. 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Payne does not stand for the expansive proposition that federal law limits the relief a State may provide, but only for the more narrow proposition that a state court's decision that a particular remedy is constitutionally required is itself a federal question"). Footnote 22While the opinions discussed at great length our earlier cases raising retroactivity issues, none of them suggested that federal law would prohibit Arkansas from refunding the taxes at issue if it wanted to do so. Footnote 23The petitioners and the dissenters in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith relied heavily on separate opinions authored by Justice Harlan, and on the Court's then-recent opinion in Griffith, 479 U.S. 314, supporting the proposition that a new constitutional holding should be applied not only in cases that had not yet been tried, but also in all cases still pending on direct review. The plurality, however, declined to follow Griffith because of its view that "there are important distinctions between the retroactive application of civil and criminal decisions that make the Griffith rationale far less compelling in the civil sphere." 496 U.S., at 197. While Justice Harlan would probably disagree with the suggestion that the distinction between civil and criminal cases provided an acceptable basis for refusing to follow Griffith in the American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith litigation, see Mackey, 401 U.S., at 683, n. 2 (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part), if relevant, that same distinction would make it appropriate to disregard the plurality's opinion in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith in this case. Footnote 24See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) ("[W]e have held that a few areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests,' are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed ... by the courts--so-called 'federal common law'" (citation omitted)); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Payne came to us on direct appeal, but as noted, supra, at 4, we did not at the time distinguish between direct appeal and collateral review for purposes of retroactivity. Footnote 2The Court points out that the defendants in such a case are differently situated because they violated the laws of and were tried in different States. Ante, at 26. But disparate treatment under substantively different state laws is something we expect in our federal system; disparate treatment under the same Federal Constitution is quite a different matter. </s> The majority also points out that the rule announced in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)--that full retroactive application ends with the conclusion of direct appeal--creates its own disuniformity, because finality turns on how quickly a State brings its direct appeals to a close. Ante, at 27. The same point was raised by the Griffith dissenters, 479 U.S., at 331-332 (opinion of White, J.), and rejected as pertinent by the majority in that case, id., at 327-328. The disuniformity that the majority emphasizes today and the dissenters emphasized in Griffith is a necessary consequence of our having chosen a relatively clear rule--finality--to delineate the line between full retroactivity and presumptive nonretroactivity. The relevant point is that whatever inequity arises from the Griffith rule, it is based on a balancing of costs and benefits that this Court--not 50 different sovereigns--has performed. Footnote 3A federal court applying state law under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), follows state choice-of-law rules as well, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). It is not free to follow its own federal rule simply because the issue arises in federal court. By the same token, a state court considering a federal constitutional claim on collateral review should follow the federal rule on whether new or old law applies. It is not free to follow its own state-law view on the question simply because the issue arises in state court. Footnote 4The majority's assertion, however, is a bit of an overstatement. Teague would be an odd form of statutory interpretation; 28 U.S.C. §2254 is cited once in passing, 489 U.S., at 298, and §2243--the statute that the Court believes Teague was interpreting--is not cited at all. As support for its proposition, the Court cites several cases having nothing to do with retroactivity, and numerous concurring and dissenting opinions that did not command a majority. See ante, at 14-15, and n.15.

United States Supreme Court F. P. C. v. TUSCARORA INDIAN NATION(1960) No. 63 Argued: December 7, 1959Decided: March 7, 1960 </s> Under 21 of the Federal Power Act, certain lands purchased and owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and lying adjacent to a natural power site on the Niagara River may be taken for the storage reservoir of a hydroelectric power project, upon payment of just compensation, by the Power Authority of the State of New York under a license issued to it by the Federal Power Commission as directed by Congress in the Act of August 21, 1957, 71 Stat. 401. Pp. 100-124. </s> (1) Inasmuch as the lands here involved are owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and no "interest" in them is "owned by the United States," they are not within a "reservation," as that term is defined in 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act, and, therefore, a Commission finding under 4 (e) "that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired" is not necessary to the issuance of a license embracing the lands in question. Pp. 110-115. </s> (2) By the broad general terms of 21 of the Federal Power Act, Congress has authorized the Federal Power Commission's licensees to take lands owned by Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed for a licensed project, upon payment of just compensation; the lands in question are not subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscarora Indian Nation; and 25 U.S.C. 177, forbidding a transfer of lands from Indians unless made by a treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution, does not apply to the United States itself nor prohibit it or its licensees under the Federal Power Act from taking such lands in the manner provided by 21, upon payment of just compensation. Pp. 115-124. </s> 105 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 265 F.2d 338, reversed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 66, Power Authority of the State of New York v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, also on certiorari to the same Court. [362 U.S. 99, 100] </s> Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 63. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade, Lionel Kestenbaum, Willard W. Gatchell, John C. Mason, Leonard D. Eesley and Joseph B. Hobbs. </s> Thomas F. Moore Jr. argued the cause for petitioner in No. 66. With him on the brief were Samuel I. Rosenman, Frederic P. Lee and John R. Davison. </s> Arthur Lazarus, Jr. argued the causes for respondent. With him on the brief was Eugene Gressman. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The ultimate question presented by these cases is whether certain lands, purchased and owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and lying adjacent to a natural power site on the Niagara River near the town of Lewiston, New York, may be taken for the storage reservoir of a hydroelectric power project, upon the payment of just compensation, by the Power Authority of the State of New York under a license issued to it by the Federal Power Commission as directed by Congress in Public Law 85-159, approved August 21, 1957, 71 Stat. 401. </s> The Niagara River, an international boundary stream and a navigable waterway of the United States, flows from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario, a distance of 36 miles. Its mean flow is about 200,000 cubic feet per second. The river drops about 165 feet at Niagara Falls and an additional 140 feet in the rapids immediately above and below the falls. The "head" created by these great falls, combined with the large and steady flow of the river, makes the Lewiston power site, located below the rapids, an extremely favorable one for hydroelectric development. [362 U.S. 99, 101] </s> For the purpose of avoiding "continuing waste of a great natural resource and to make it possible for the United States of America and Canada to develop, for the benefit of their respective peoples, equal shares of the waters of the Niagara River available for power purposes," the United States and Canada entered into the Treaty of February 27, 1950, 1 providing for a flow of 100,000 cubic feet per second over Niagara Falls during certain specified daytime and evening hours of the tourist season (April 1 to October 31) and of 50,000 cubic feet per second at other times, and authorizing the equal division by the United States and Canada of all excess waters for power purposes. 2 </s> In consenting to the 1950 Treaty, the Senate imposed the condition that "no project for redevelopment of the United States' share of such waters shall be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of Congress." 1 U.S. T. 694, 699. To that end, a study was made and reported to Congress in 1951 by the United States Army Corps of Engineers respecting the most feasible plans for utilizing all of the waters available to the United States under the 1950 Treaty, and detailed plans embodying other studies were prepared and submitted to Congress prior to June 7, 1956, by the Bureau of Power of the Federal Power Commission, the Power Authority of New [362 U.S. 99, 102] York, and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. 3 To enable utilization of all of the United States' share of the Niagara waters by avoiding waste of the nighttime and week-end flow that would not be needed at those times for the generation of power, all of the studies and plans provided for a pumping-generating plant to lift those waters at those times into a reservoir, and for a storage reservoir to contain them until released for use - through the pumping-generating plant, when its motors (operating in reverse) would serve as generators - during the daytime hours when the demand for power would be highest and the diversion of waters from the river would be most restricted by the treaty. Estimates of dependable capacity of the several recommended projects varied from 1,240,000 to 1,723,000 kilowatts, and estimates of the needed reservoir capacity varied from 22,000 acre-feet covering 850 acres to 41,000 acre-feet covering 1,700 acres. The variations in these estimates were largely due to differing assumptions as to the length of the daily period of peak demand. </s> Although there was "no controversy as to the most desirable engineering plan of development," 4 there was serious disagreement in Congress over whether the project should be publicly or privately developed and over marketing preferences and other matters of policy. That disagreement continued through eight sessions of Committee Hearings, during which more than 30 proposed bills were considered, in the Eighty-first to Eighty-fifth Congresses, 5 and delayed congressional authorization of the project for seven years. [362 U.S. 99, 103] </s> On June 7, 1956, a rock slide destroyed the Schoellkopf plant. 6 This created a critical shortage of electric power in the Niagara community. It also required expansion of the plans for the Niagara project if the 20,000 cubic feet per second of water that had been reserved for the Schoellkopf plant was to be utilized. Accordingly, the Power Authority of New York prepared and submitted to Congress a major revision of the project plans. Those revised plans, designed to utilize all of the Niagara waters available to the United States under the 1950 Treaty, provided for an installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts, of which 1,800,000 kilowatts would be dependable power for 17 hours per day, necessitating a storage reservoir of 60,000 acre-feet capacity covering about 2,800 acres. 7 </s> [362 U.S. 99, 104] </s> Confronted with the destruction of the Schoellkopf plant and the consequent critical need for electric power in the Niagara community, Congress speedily composed its differences in the manner and terms prescribed in Public Law 85-159, approved August 21, 1957. 71 Stat. 401. By 1 (a) of that Act, Congress "expressly authorized and directed" the Federal Power Commission "to issue a license to the Power Authority of the State of New York for the construction and operation of a power project with capacity to utilize all of the United States share of the water of the Niagara River permitted to be used by international agreement." By 1 (b) of the Act, the Federal Power Commission was directed to "include among the licensing conditions, in addition to those deemed necessary and required under the terms of the Federal Power Act," seven conditions which are of only collateral importance here. 8 The concluding section of the Act, 2, provides: "The license issued under the terms [362 U.S. 99, 105] of this Act shall be granted in conformance with Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Power Commission, but in the event of any conflict, the provisions of this Act shall govern in respect of the project herein authorized." </s> Thereafter, the Power Authority of the State of New York, a municipal corporation created under the laws of that State to develop the St. Lawrence and Niagara power projects, applied to the Federal Power Commission for the project license which Congress had thus directed the Commission to issue to it. Its application embraced the project plans that it had submitted to the Eighty-fifth Congress shortly before its approval of Public Law 85-159. 9 The project was scheduled to be completed in 1963 at an estimated cost of $720,000,000. </s> Hearings were scheduled by the Commission, of which due notice was given to all interested parties, including the Tuscarora Indian Nation, inasmuch as the application contemplated the taking of some of its lands for the reservoir. The Tuscarora Indian Nation intervened and objected to the taking of any of its lands upon the ground "that the applicant lacks authority to acquire them." At the hearings, it was shown that the Tuscarora lands needed for the reservoir - then thought to be about 1,000 acres - are part of a separate tract of 4,329 acres purchased in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation, with the assistance of Henry Dearborn, then Secretary of War, from the Holland Land Company on November 21, 1804, with the [362 U.S. 99, 106] proceeds derived from the contemporaneous sale of their lands in North Carolina - from which they had removed in about the year 1775 to reside with the Oneidas in central New York. 10 </s> After concluding the hearings, the Commission, on January 30, 1958, issued its order granting the license. It found that a reservoir having a usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet "is required to properly utilize the water resources involved." Although the Commission found that the Indian lands "are almost entirely undeveloped [362 U.S. 99, 107] except for agricultural use," it did not pass upon the Tuscaroras' objection to the taking of their lands because it then assumed that "other lands are available for reservoir use if the Applicant is unable to acquire the Indian lands." But the Commission did direct the licensee to revise its exhibit covering the reservoir to more definitely show the area and acreage involved and to resubmit it to the Commission for approval within a stated time. </s> In its application for rehearing, the Tuscarora Indian Nation contended, among other things, that the portion of its lands sought to be taken for the reservoir was part of a "reservation," as defined in 3 (2), and as used in 4 (e), of the Federal Power Act, 11 and therefore could not lawfully be taken for reservoir purposes in the absence of a finding by the Commission "that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired." By its order of March 21, 1958, denying that application for rehearing, the Commission found that "[t]he best location of the reservoir would require approximately 1,000 acres of land owned by Intervener," and it held that the Indian lands involved "are not part of a `reservation' referred to in Section 4 (e) as defined in Section 3 (2) of the [Federal Power] Act and the finding suggested by Intervener is not required." On May 5, 1958, the Commission issued its order approving the licensee's revised exhibit which precisely delineated the location, area, and acreage to be embraced by the reservoir - which included 1,383 acres of the Tuscaroras' lands. </s> On May 16, 1958, the Tuscarora Indian Nation filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit challenging the license issued by the Commission on January 30, 1958, insofar as it [362 U.S. 99, 108] would authorize the taking of Tuscarora lands. 12 By its opinion and interim judgment of November 14, 1958, the Court of Appeals held that the Tuscarora lands sought to be taken for the reservoir constitute a part of a "reservation" [362 U.S. 99, 109] within the meaning of 3 (2) and 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, and that the Commission may not include those lands in the license in the absence of a 4 (e) finding that their taking "will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired," and the court remanded the case to the Commission that it might "explore the possibility of making that finding." 105 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 265 F.2d 338. </s> Upon remand, the Commission held extensive hearings, exploring not only the matter of the making of the finding held necessary by the Court of Appeals but also the possibility of locating the reservoir on other lands. In its order of February 2, 1959, the Commission found that the use of other lands for the reservoir would result in great delay, severe community disruption, and unreasonable expense; that a reservoir with usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet is required to utilize all of the United States' share of the water of the Niagara River, as required by Public Law 85-159; that removal of the reservoir from the Tuscarora lands by reducing the area of the reservoir would reduce the usable storage capacity from 60,000 acre-feet to 30,000 acre-feet and result in a loss of about 300,000 kilowatts of dependable capacity. But it concluded that, although other lands contiguous to their reservation might be acquired by the Tuscaroras, 13 </s> [362 U.S. 99, 110] the taking of the 1,383 acres of Tuscarora lands for the reservoir "would interfere and would be inconsistent with the purpose for which the reservation was created or acquired." That order was transmitted to the Court of Appeals which, on March 24, 1959, after considering various motions of the parties, entered its final judgment approving the license except insofar as it would authorize the taking of Tuscarora lands for the reservoir, and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to amend the license "to exclude specifically the power of the said Power Authority to condemn the said lands of the Tuscarora Indians for reservoir purposes." 105 U.S. App. D.C., at 152, 265 F.2d, at 344. </s> Because of conflict between the views of the court below and those of the Second Circuit, and of the general importance of the questions involved, we granted certiorari. 360 U.S. 915 . </s> The parties have urged upon us a number of contentions, but we think these cases turn upon the answers to two questions, namely, (1) whether the Tuscarora lands covered by the Commission's license are part of a "reservation" as defined and used in the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq., and, if not, (2) whether those lands may be condemned by the licensee, under the eminent domain powers conferred by 21 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 814. We now turn to a consideration of those questions in the order stated. </s> I. </s> A Commission finding that "the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired" is required by 4 (e) [362 U.S. 99, 111] of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 797 (e), only if the lands involved are within a "reservation" in the sense of that term as defined and used in that Act. That by generally accepted standards and common understanding these Tuscarora lands may be part of a "reservation" is not at all decisive of whether they are such within the meaning of the Federal Power Act. Congress was free and competent artificially to define the term "reservations" for the purposes it prescribed in that Act. And we are bound to give effect to its definition of that term, for it would be idle for Congress to define the sense in which it used it "if we were free in despite of it to choose a meaning for ourselves." Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 . By 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 796 (2), Congress has provided: </s> "SEC. 3. The words defined in this section shall have the following meanings for purposes of this Act, to wit: </s> . . . . . </s> "(2) `reservations' means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and held for any public purpose; but shall not include national monuments or national parks." (Emphasis added.) </s> The plain words of this definition seem rather clearly to show that Congress intended the term "reservations," wherever used in the Act, to embrace only "lands and interests in lands owned by the United States." </s> Turning to the definition's legislative history, we find that it, too, strongly indicates that such was the congressional intention. In the original draft bill of the Federal [362 U.S. 99, 112] Water Power Act of 1920, as proposed by the Administration and passed by the House in the Sixty-fifth and Sixty-sixth Congresses, the term was defined as follows: </s> "`Reservations' means lands and interest in lands owned by the United States and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public-land laws, and lands and interest in lands acquired and held for any public purpose." 14 </s> It is difficult to perceive how congressional intention could be more clearly and definitely expressed. However, after the bill reached the Senate it inserted the words "national monuments, national parks, national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other" (emphasis added) at the beginning of the definition. 15 When the bill was returned to the House it was explained that the Senate's "amendment recasts the House definition of `reservations.'" 16 The bill as enacted contained the definition as thus recast. It remains in that form, except for the deletion of the words "national monuments, national parks," which was occasioned by the Act of March 3, 1921 (41 Stat. 1353), negating Commission authority to license any project works within "national monuments or national parks," and those words were finally deleted from the definition by amendment in 1935. 49 Stat. 838. It seems entirely clear that no change in substance was intended or effected by the Senate's amendment, and that its "recasting" only specified, as illustrative, some of the "reservations" on "lands and interests in lands owned by the United States." </s> Further evidence that Congress intended to limit "reservations," for the "purposes of this Act" ( 3), to those [362 U.S. 99, 113] located on "lands owned by the United States" or in which it owns an interest is furnished by its use of the term in the context of 4 (e) of the Act. By that section Congress, after authorizing the Commission to license projects in streams or other bodies of water over which it has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, 8, cl. 3), authorized the Commission to license projects "upon any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States." Congress must be deemed to have known, as this Court held in Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 443 , that the licensing power, "in relation to public lands and reservations of the United States springs from the Property Clause" of the Constitution - namely, the ". . . Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . ." Art. IV, 3, cl. 2. In thus acting under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress must have intended to deal only with "the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." Ibid. </s> Moreover, the Federal Power Act's plan of compensating for lands taken or used for licensed projects is explicable only if the term "reservations" is confined, as Congress evidently intended, to those located on "lands owned by the United States" or in which it owns a proprietary interest. By 21, 16 U.S.C. 814, licensees are authorized to acquire "the lands or property of others necessary to the" licensed project "by the exercise of the right of eminent domain" in the federal or state courts, and, of course, upon the payment of just compensation. But, despite its general and all-inclusive terms, 21 does not apply to nor authorize condemnation of lands or interests in lands owned by the United States, because 10 (e) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 803 (e), expressly provides that "the licensee shall pay to the United States reasonable annual charges . . . for recompensating it for [362 U.S. 99, 114] the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of its lands or other property" (emphasis added) devoted to the licensed project. It therefore appears to be unmistakably clear that by the language of the first proviso of that section saying, in pertinent part, "That when licenses are issued involving the use of Government dams or other structures owned by the United States or tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations (these italicized words being lifted straight from the 3 (2) definition of `reservations') the Commission shall . . . fix a reasonable annual charge for the use thereof . . .," Congress intended to treat and treated only with structures, lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, for, as stated, the section expressly requires the "reasonable annual charges" to be paid to the United States for the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of "its lands or other property." (Emphasis added.) </s> This analysis of the plain words and legislative history of the Act's definition of "reservations" and of the plan and provisions of the Act leaves us with no doubt that Congress, "for purposes of this Act" ( 3 (2)), intended to and did confine "reservations," including "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations" ( 3 (2)), to those located on lands "owned by the United States" ( 3 (2)), or in which it owns a proprietary interest. </s> The Court of Appeals did not find to the contrary. Indeed, it found that the Act's definition of "reservations" includes only those located on lands in which the United States "has an interest." But it thought that the national paternal relationship to the Indians and the Government's concern to protect them against improper alienation of their lands gave the United States the requisite "interest" in the lands here involved, and that the result "must be the same as if the phrase `owned by the United States, [etc.]' were not construed as a limitation upon the term `tribal lands [etc.].'" 105 U.S. App. [362 U.S. 99, 115] D.C., at 150, 265 F.2d, at 342. We do not agree. The national "interest" in Indian welfare and protection "is not to be expressed in terms of property . . . ." Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 . The national "paternal interest" in the welfare and protection of Indians is not the "interests in lands owned by the United States" required, as an element of "reservations," by 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act. (Emphasis added.) </s> Inasmuch as the lands involved are owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and no "interest" in them is "owned by the United States," we hold that they are not within a "reservation" as that term is defined and used in the Federal Power Act, and that a Commission finding under 4 (e) of that Act "that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired" is not necessary to the issuance of a license embracing the Tuscarora lands needed for the project. </s> II. </s> We pass now to the question whether the portion of the Tuscarora lands here involved may be condemned by the licensee under the provisions and eminent domain powers of 21 of the Federal Power Act. Petitioners contend that 21 is a broad general statute authorizing condemnation of "the lands or property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any" licensed project, and that lands owned by Indians in fee simple, not being excluded, may be taken by the licensee under the federal eminent domain powers delegated to it by that section. Parrying this contention, the Tuscarora Indian Nation argues that 21, being only a general Act of Congress, does not apply to Indians or their lands. </s> The Tuscarora Indian Nation heavily relies upon Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 . It is true that in that case the [362 U.S. 99, 116] Court, dealing with the question whether a native-born American Indian was made a citizen of the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, said: "Under the Constitution of the United States, as originally established . . . General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them." 112 U.S., at 99 -100. However that may have been, it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests. In Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 , the funds of a restricted Creek Indian were held and invested for him by the Superintendent, and a question arose as to whether income from the investment was subject to federal income taxes. In an earlier case, Blackbird v. Commissioner, 38 F.2d 976, the Tenth Circuit had held such income to be exempt from federal income taxation. But in this case the Board of Tax Appeals sustained the tax, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, and the Superintendent brought the case here. This Court observed that in the Blackbird case the Tenth Circuit had said that to hold a general act of Congress to be applicable to restricted Indians "would be contrary to the almost unbroken policy of Congress in dealing with its Indian wards and their affairs. Whenever they and their interests have been the subject affected by legislation they have been named and their interests specifically dealt with." That is precisely the argument now made here by the Tuscarora Indian Nation. But this Court, in affirming the judgment, said: </s> "This does not harmonize with what we said in Choteau v. Burnet (1931), 283 U.S. 691, 696 : </s> "`The language of [the Internal Revenue Act of 1918] subjects the income of "every individual" to tax. Section 213 (a) includes income "from any [362 U.S. 99, 117] source whatever." The intent of Congress was to levy the tax with respect to all residents of the United States and upon all sorts of income. The Act does not expressly exempt the sort of income here involved, nor a person having petitioner's status respecting such income, and we are not referred to any other statute which does. . . . The intent to exclude must be definitely expressed, where, as here, the language of the Act laying the tax is broad enough to include the subject matter.' </s> "The court below properly declined to follow its quoted pronouncement in Blackbird's case. The terms of the 1928 Revenue Act are very broad, and nothing there indicates that Indians are to be excepted. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 ; Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U.S. 232 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84 ; Pitman v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 740. The purpose is sufficiently clear." 295 U.S., at 419 -420. </s> In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 , this Court, in holding that the estate of a restricted Oklahoma Indian was subject to state inheritance and estate taxes under general state statutes, said: </s> "The language of the statutes does not except either Indians or any other persons from their scope. [319 U.S., at 600 .] If Congress intends to prevent the State of Oklahoma from levying a general nondiscriminatory estate tax applying alike to all its citizens, it should say so in plain words. Such a conclusion cannot rest on dubious inferences." 319 U.S., at 607 . </s> See, e. g., Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corporation, 276 U.S. 575, 581 -582; United States v. Ransom, 263 U.S. 691 ; Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 563 -564; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 673 . [362 U.S. 99, 118] </s> The Federal Power Act constitutes a complete and comprehensive plan for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission and utilization of electric power in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its commerce powers, and upon the public lands and reservations of the United States under its property powers. See 4 (e). It neither overlooks nor excludes Indians or lands owned or occupied by them. Instead, as has been shown, the Act specifically defines and treats with lands occupied by Indians - "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations." See 3 (2) and 10 (e). The Act gives every indication that, within its comprehensive plan, Congress intended to include lands owned or occupied by any person or persons, including Indians. The Court of Appeals recognized that this is so. 105 U.S. App. D.C., at 151, 265 F.2d, at 343. Section 21 of the Act, by broad general terms, authorizes the licensee to condemn "the lands or property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any" licensed project. That section does not exclude lands or property owned by Indians, and, upon the authority of the cases cited, we must hold that it applies to these lands owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation. </s> The Tuscarora Indian Nation insists that even if its lands are embraced by the terms of 21 of the Federal Power Act, they still may not be taken for public use "without the express consent of Congress referring specifically to those lands," because of the provisions of 25 U.S.C. 177. 17 That section, in pertinent part, provides: </s> "No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any [362 U.S. 99, 119] Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution. . . ." </s> The obvious purpose of that statute is to prevent unfair, improvident or improper disposition by Indians of lands owned or possessed by them to other parties, except the United States, without the consent of Congress, and to enable the Government, acting as parens patriae for the Indians, to vacate any disposition of their lands made without its consent. See, e. g., United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363 ; United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441 -442; Henkel v. United States, 237 U.S. 43, 51 ; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 -48. But there is no such requirement with respect to conveyances to or condemnations by the United States or its licensees; "nor is it conceivable that it is necessary, for the Indians are subject only to the same rule of law as are others in the State . . . ." United States v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 318 U.S. 206, 211 . </s> As to the Tuscaroras' contention that 177 prohibits the taking of any of their lands for the reservoir "without the express and specific consent of Congress," one thing is certain. It is certain that if 177 is applicable to alienations effected by condemnation proceedings under 21 of the Federal Power Act, the mere "expressed consent" of Congress would be vain and idle. For 177 at the very least contemplates the assent of the Indian nation or tribe. And inasmuch as the Tuscarora Indian Nation withholds such consent and refuses to convey to the licensee any of its lands, it follows that the mere consent of Congress, however express and specific, would avail [362 U.S. 99, 120] nothing. Therefore, if 177 is applicable to alienations effected by condemnation under 21 of the Federal Power Act, the result would be that the Tuscarora lands, however imperative for the project, could not be taken at all. </s> But 177 is not applicable to the sovereign United States nor, hence, to its licensees to whom Congress has delegated federal eminent domain powers under 21 of the Federal Power Act. The law is now well settled that: </s> "A general statute imposing restrictions does not impose them upon the Government itself without a clear expression or implication to that effect." United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 358 -359. </s> In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 272 -273, the Court said: </s> "There is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect." </s> See, e. g., Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 224 -225; United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 449 ; United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190 ; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U.S. 548, 553 -555; Lewis v. United States, 92 U.S. 618, 622 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 263; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239. </s> This Court has several times applied, in combination, the rules (1) that general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary, and (2) that general statutes imposing restrictions do not apply to the Government itself without a clear expression to that effect. It did so in Henkel v. United States, 237 U.S. 43 (sustaining the right of the United States to take Indian lands for reservoir purposes under the general Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388), in Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. [362 U.S. 99, 121] 394 (sustaining the power of the Government to convey a strip of land through a tract owned by an Indian tribe to one Chandler for the use of the State of Michigan in constructing a canal, even though the conveyance was in derogation of a treaty with the Indian tribe), and in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U.S. 641 . There, this Court sustained the right of a licensee of the Government to take so much of the undescribed fee lands of an Indian tribe as was necessary for the licensed project, though in derogation of the terms of a treaty between the United States and the Indian tribe, 18 saying: </s> "It would be very strange if the national government, in the execution of its rightful authority, could exercise [362 U.S. 99, 122] the power of eminent domain in the several States, and could not exercise the same power in a Territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe, the members of which were wards of the United States, and directly subject to its political control. The lands in the Cherokee territory, like the lands held by private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States, are held subject to the authority of the general government to take them for such objects as are germane to the execution of the powers granted to it; provided only, that they are not taken without just compensation being made to the owner." 135 U.S., at 656 -657. [362 U.S. 99, 123] </s> See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 ; Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 117 -118; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 ; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 . </s> In the light of these authorities we must hold that Congress, by the broad general terms of 21 of the Federal Power Act, has authorized the Federal Power Commission's licensees to take lands owned by Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed for a licensed project, upon the payment of just compensation; that the lands in question are not subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras (see notes 10 and 18); and that 25 U.S.C. 177 does not apply to the United States itself nor prohibit it, or its licensees under the Federal Power Act, from taking such lands in [362 U.S. 99, 124] the manner provided by 21, upon the payment of just compensation. </s> All members of this Court - no one more than any other - adhere to the concept that agreements are made to be performed - no less by the Government than by others - but the federal eminent domain powers conferred by Congress upon the Commission's licensee, by 21 of the Federal Power Act, to take such of the lands of the Tuscaroras as are needed for the Niagara project do not breach the faith of the United States, or any treaty or other contractual agreement of the United States with the Tuscarora Indian Nation in respect to these lands for the conclusive reason that there is none. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concurs in the result. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 1 U.S. T. 694. </s> [Footnote 2 The excess flow of water available for power purposes under the 1950 Treaty was estimated to fluctuate between 44,000 and 210,000 cubic feet per second, depending on the flow, the time of year, and the time of day. S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. The 1950 Treaty superseded the Boundary Waters Treaty of January 11, 1909 (Treaty Series 548, 36 Stat. 2448) which limited diversions of water by Canada to 36,000, and by the United States to 20,000, cubic feet per second. Beginning in 1921, the waters available to the United States under that treaty were utilized by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in its Schoellkopf hydroelectric plant, under a federal license expiring in 1971. The rated capacity of that plant was 360,000 kilowatts. </s> [Footnote 3 S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-6. </s> [Footnote 4 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 5 Hearings were held before the Senate Committee on Public Works, or its Subcommittee, in the Eighty-second, Eighty-third and Eighty-fourth Congresses, and in the first session of the Eighty-fifth Congress; before the House Committee on Public Works in the first [362 U.S. 99, 103] sessions of the Eighty-first and Eighty-second Congresses, and in the first and second sessions of the Eighty-fourth Congress. Joint hearings were held by the House Committee and a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee in the Eighty-third Congress, first session. Reports on these bills were S. Rep. No. 2501, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 713, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1408, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 2635, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. The Committee Reports on the bill which was finally enacted were S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 862, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. </s> [Footnote 6 See note 2. </s> [Footnote 7 The Report of the Senate Committee on Public Works of June 27, 1957, reporting out the bill that was finally adopted, contained the following statement: "The proposals by the Power Authority of the State of New York at present contemplate a project with a total installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts. Of this 1,800,000 will constitute firm power on a 17-hour-day basis. They anticipate that in order to achieve this amount of firm capacity pump-storage and pumping-generating facilities will be required." S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. The Report of the House Committee on Public Works of July 23, 1957, contained the following statement: "As a result of the [Schoellkopf] disaster, the redevelopment project will be enlarged so as to develop the water formerly utilized in the destroyed plant. The proposal now contemplates a project [362 U.S. 99, 104] with a total installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts. Of this 1,800,000 will constitute firm power on a 17-hour-day basis. It is anticipated that in order to achieve this amount of firm capacity, pump-storage and pumping-generating facilities will be required." H. R. Rep. No. 862, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7. </s> [Footnote 8 Those seven conditions resolved the previously disputed issues which had so long delayed congressional authorization of the project. By those conditions, at least 50% of the project power must be made available to public bodies and nonprofit cooperatives "at the lowest rates reasonably possible," and 20% of that amount must be made available for use in neighboring States. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation was given the right to purchase 445,000 kilowatts for a designated period to supply, and "restore low power costs to," the customers of its Schoellkopf plant, in exchange for relinquishment of its federal license. The Power Authority of New York was authorized to construct independent transmission lines to reach its preference customers and to control the resale rates of distributors purchasing power from it. The project was required to bear the United States' share of the cost of remedial works in the river, and, within a designated maximum sum, the cost of a scenic drive and a park. </s> [Footnote 9 The plans embraced by the application for the license consisted, in general, of (1) the main generating plant on the east bank of the river, (2) a pumping-generating plant, located a short distance east of the main generating plant, (3) a storage reservoir, adjacent to the pumping-generating plant, having a usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet, and covering about 2,800 acres, (4) a water intake structure on the east bank of the river about three miles above the falls, and (5) a water conveyance system extending from the intake to a forebay at the pumping-generating plant, and from the latter to a forebay at the main generating plant. </s> [Footnote 10 Because the proceeds of the sale of the Tuscaroras' North Carolina lands ($15,000) were payable in three equal annual installments and were to be used, so far as necessary, for the payment of the purchase price of the New York lands ($13,752.80), which was also payable in three substantially equal annual installments, the latter lands were conveyed on November 21, 1804, by deed of the Holland Land Company (which acknowledged receipt of the first installment of the purchase price, and reserved a lien to secure the two unpaid installments of the purchase price) to Henry Dearborn "in Trust" for the "Tuscarora Nation of Indians and their Assigns forever . . . the said Henry Dearborn and his Heirs [to] grant and convey the same in Fee Simple or otherwise to such person or persons as the said Tuscarora Nation of Indians shall at any time hereafter direct and appoint." After collection of the remaining installments of the purchase price of the Tuscaroras' North Carolina lands and, in turn, remitting to the Holland Land Company so much thereof as was necessary to pay the balance of the purchase price for the New York lands, Henry Dearborn conveyed the New York lands to the "Tuscarora Nation of Indians and their Successors and Assigns for ever," in fee simple free and clear of encumbrances, on January 2, 1809. The Tuscarora Indian Nation has ever since continued to own those lands under that conveyance. In addition to the 4,329 acres purchased from the Holland Land Company in 1804, the Tuscaroras' reservation embraces two other contiguous tracts containing 1,920 acres. The first, a tract of 640 acres, was ceded to the Tuscaroras by the Holland Land Company in June 1798. The second, a tract of 1,280 acres, was ceded to them by the Holland Land Company in 1799. Those tracts are not involved in this case. </s> [Footnote 11 As amended, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U.S.C. 796 (2) and 797 (e). </s> [Footnote 12 Meanwhile, on April 15, 1958, the Power Authority of New York commenced so-called "appropriation" proceedings under 30 of the New York State Highway Law, McKinney's Consol Laws, c. 25, and also under Art. 5, Tit. 1, of the New York Public Authorities Law, McKinney's Consol. Laws, c. 43-A, to condemn the 1,383 acres of Tuscarora lands for reservoir use. On April 18, 1958, the Tuscarora Indian Nation filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Power Authority and the Superintendent of Public Works of New York, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Power Authority had no right or power to take any of its lands without the express and specific consent of the United States, and (2) a permanent injunction against the appropriation or condemnation of any of its lands. The court issued a temporary restraining order. The action, being a "local" one, was then transferred to the District Court for the Western District of New York. After hearing, that court on June 24, 1958, denied the relief prayed, dissolved the restraining order, and dismissed the complaint on the merits. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 164 F. Supp. 107. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the Power Authority was authorized under Public Law 58-159 and the Federal Power Act and by the Commission's license thereunder of January 30, 1958, to take the part of the Tuscarora lands needed for the reservoir, but that they could be taken only by a condemnation action in a state or federal court in the district where the property is located under and in the manner provided by 21 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 814), and not by "appropriation" proceedings under the New York laws referred to. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 257 F.2d 885. The Tuscarora Indian Nation's petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari was denied on October 13, 1958. 358 U.S. 841 . The Superintendent of Public Works of New York, a respondent in the Second Circuit proceedings, has appealed to this Court from so much of the judgment as denied a right to acquire the Tuscarora lands by appropriation proceedings under the New York laws, and that appeal is now pending here. (No. 4, Oct. Term, 1959.) </s> [Footnote 13 In making the statement referred to in the text the Commission was doubtless alluding to the fact that in May 1958, the Power Authority offered the Tuscaroras $1,500,000 for the 1,383 acres, or in excess of $1,000 per acre, plus payment for, or removal to or replacing on other lands, the 37 houses located on these 1,383 acres and offered to construct for them a community center building, involving a total expenditure of about $2,400,000, which offer, the Commission says, has never been withdrawn. The Tuscarora Indian Nation tells us in its brief that: "What the Government unfortunately fails to point out is that the Power Authority's `offer' was and still is an empty gesture since, as [362 U.S. 99, 110] the court below and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit both ruled, the Tuscarora Nation is prohibited by law from selling its lands without the consent of the United States expressed in an act of Congress. 25 U.S.C. 177, 233." </s> [Footnote 14 See H. R. Rep. No. 715, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22; S. Rep. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10. </s> [Footnote 15 See S. Rep. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10; 59 Cong. Rec. 1103. </s> [Footnote 16 See H. R. Rep. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7. </s> [Footnote 17 The Tuscaroras also rely upon 25 U.S.C. 233, which confers, subject to qualifications, jurisdiction upon the courts of New York over civil actions between Indians and also between them and other [362 U.S. 99, 119] persons, and contains a pertinent proviso "That nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing the alienation from any Indian nation, tribe, or band of Indians of any lands within any Indian reservation in the State of New York." </s> [Footnote 18 The Tuscarora Indian Nation argues that its lands in question should be regarded as subject to and protected from condemnation by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of October 22, 1784 (7 Stat. 15), the unratified Treaty of Fort Harmar of January 9, 1789 (7 Stat. 33), and the Treaty of Canandaigua of November 11, 1794 (7 Stat. 44). But the record shows that the first two of these treaties related to other lands and, principally at least, to other Indian nations, and that the last treaty mentioned, though covering the lands in question, was with another Indian nation (the Senecas) which, pursuant to the Treaty of Big Tree of September 15, 1797 (7 Stat. 601) and with the approbation of the United States, sold its interest in these lands to Robert Morris and thus freed them from the effects of the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794. Robert Morris, in turn, conveyed these lands to the Holland Land Company and it, in turn, conveyed the part in question to the Tuscarora Indian Nation, and its title rests upon that conveyance, free of any treaty. It appears from the record that, as earlier stated (see note 10), the Tuscaroras; save for a few of them who remained on their lands "on the Roanoke" in North Carolina, moved from their North Carolina lands to reside with the Oneidas in central New York - at a point about 200 miles east of the lands now owned by the Tuscaroras in Niagara County, New York - in 1775. The Tuscaroras had no proprietary interest in the Oneidas' lands in central New York but were there as "guests" of the Oneidas or as "tenants at will or by sufferance." [362 U.S. 99, 122] Hough, Census of the State of New York, 1857, p. 510; New York Senate Document No. 24, 1846, p. 68. They came to be recognized, however, as members of the Five Nations which thereafter became known as the Six Nations (the others being the Oneidas, the Mohawks, the Onondagas, the Cayugas and the Senecas). The Senecas occupied a vast area in western New York, including the lands here in question. A few Tuscaroras fought with the Senecas on the side of the British and after their defeat at the battle of Elmira in 1779, they went to reside with the Senecas in the vicinity of Fort Niagara in about 1780. Other Tuscaroras then moved to that place. Just when they did so is not known with certainty and it appears that the most that can be said is that they were there prior to 1797. The Tuscaroras had the same kind of tenure, i. e., guests or tenants at will or by sufferance, with the Senecas as they had earlier had with the Oneidas in central New York. One of their chiefs described their situation as "squatters upon the territory of another distinct nation." By the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784 (7 Stat. 15) and the unratified Treaty of Fort Harmar of 1789 (7 Stat. 33) with the Six Nations, the United States promised to hold the Oneidas and the Tuscaroras secure in the lands upon which they then lived - which were the lands in central New York about 200 miles east of the lands in question. By the same treaties the United States promised to secure to the Six Nations a tract of land in western New York in the vicinity of the Niagara River. By the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794 (7 Stat. 44) between the United States and the Six Nations, which superseded the prior treaties (except, by Article VI, the United States remained [362 U.S. 99, 123] bound to pay the Tuscaroras $4,500 per year for the purchase of clothing), it was recognized that the Senecas alone had possessory rights to the western New York area here involved and, as a result of that treaty, a large tract of western New York lands, including the lands now owned by the Tuscaroras, was secured to the Senecas. Under the 1786 Hartford Compact between New York and Massachusetts, New York was recognized to have sovereignty over those lands and Massachusetts to own the underlying fee to those lands and the right to purchase the Senecas' interest in them. In 1794, Massachusetts sold the fee and the right to purchase the Senecas' right to occupy these western New York lands, including the lands now owned by the Tuscaroras, to Robert Morris, who, in turn, sold those lands and rights to the Holland Land Company with the covenant that the would buy out the Senecas' rights of occupancy for and on behalf of the Holland Land Company. And at the Treaty of Big Tree of 1797 (7 Stat. 601), Morris, with the approbation of the United States, purchased the Senecas' rights of occupancy in the lands here in question for the Holland Land Company. Thus the lands in question were entirely freed from the effects of all then existing treaties with the Indians, and the Tuscaroras' title to their present lands derives, as earlier stated, from the Holland Land Company (see note 10 for further details) and has never since been subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. </s> The Court holds that the Federal Power Act 1 authorizes the taking of 22% (1,383 acres) of the single tract which the Tuscarora Indian Nation has owned and occupied as its homeland for 150 years. 2 Admittedly this [362 U.S. 99, 125] taking of so large a part of the lands will interfere with the purpose for which this Indian reservation was created - a permanent home for the Tuscaroras. I not only believe that the Federal Power Act does not authorize this taking, but that the Act positively prohibits it. Moreover, I think the taking also violates the Nation's long-established policy of recognizing and preserving Indian reservations for tribal use, and that it constitutes a breach of Indian treaties recognized by Congress since at least 1794. </s> Whether the Federal Power Act permits this condemnation depends, in part, upon whether the Tuscarora Reservation is a "reservation" within the meaning of the Act. For if it is, 4 (e) forbids the taking of any part of the lands except after a finding by the Federal Power Commission that the taking "will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired . . . ." 3 There is no such finding here. In fact, the Commission found that the inundation of so great a part of the Tuscarora Reservation by the waters [362 U.S. 99, 126] of the proposed reservoir "will interfere and will be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired." 21 F. P. C. 146, 148. If these Tuscarora homelands are "tribal lands embraced within" an Indian reservation as used in 3 (2) 4 they constitute a "reservation" for purposes of 4 (e), and therefore the taking here is unauthorized because the requisite finding could not be made. </s> I believe the plain meaning of the words used in the Act, taken alone, and their meaning in the light of the historical background against which they must be viewed, require the conclusion that these lands are a "reservation" entitled to the protections of 4 (e) of the Act. "Reservation," as used in 4 (e), is defined by 3 (2), which provides: </s> "`reservations' means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and held for any public purposes; but shall not include national monuments or national parks . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> The phrase "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations" surely includes these Tuscarora lands. They are tribal lands. They are embraced within the Tuscarora Indian Nation's reservation. The lands have been called a reservation for more than 150 years. They have been so described in treaties, Acts of Congress, court decisions, Indian agency reports, books, articles, [362 U.S. 99, 127] and maps. In fact, so far as I can ascertain, they have never been called anything else, anywhere or at any time - until today. Even the Court of Appeals and the Federal Power Commission, and the briefs and record in this Court, quite naturally refer to this 10-square-mile tract of land as an Indian reservation. The Court itself seems to accept the fact that the Tuscarora Nation lives on a reservation according to (in its words) the "generally accepted standards and common understanding" of that term. </s> The Court, however, decides that in the Federal Power Act Congress departed from the meaning universally given the phrase "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations" and defined the phrase, the Court says, "artificially." The Court believes that the words "other lands . . . owned by the United States," which follow, were intended by Congress to limit the phrase to include only those reservations to which the United States has technical legal title. By the Court's "artificial" interpretation, the phrase turns out to mean "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations - except when `the lands involved are owned in fee simple by the [Indians].'" 5 </s> Creating such a wholly artificial and limited definition, so new and disruptive, imposes a heavy burden of justification upon the one who asserts it. We are told that many tribes own their reservation lands. The well-known Pueblos of New Mexico own some 700,000 acres of land in fee. All such reservation lands are put in jeopardy by the Court's strained interpretation. The Court suggests no plausible reason, or any reason at all for that matter, why Congress should or would have sought artificially to place those Indians who hold legal title to their reservation [362 U.S. 99, 128] lands in such a less-favored position. 6 The fact that the Tuscarora Nation holds technical legal title is fortuitous and an accidental circumstance probably attributable to the Indian land policy prevailing at the early date this reservation was established. Their lands, like all other Indian tribal lands, can be sold, leased or subjected to easements only with the consent of the United States Government. Congress and government agencies have always treated the Tuscarora Reservation the same as all others, 7 and there is no reason even to suspect that Congress wanted to treat it differently when it passed the Federal Power Act. </s> It is necessary to add no more than a word about the legislative history of this section which the Court relies on. The Court points out that the House version of the 1920 Federal Water Power Act (now called the Federal Power Act) defined "reservations" as meaning only "lands and interests in lands owned by the United States." In this definition of "reservations" the Senate inserted new words which included the present phrase "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations." If the only [362 U.S. 99, 129] Indian lands Congress sought to cover by this section were those to which the United States had title, the Senate addition served no purpose. For the House bill covered all "lands . . . owned by the United States." The only reason for the Senate additions, it seems to me, was to cover lands, like those of the Tuscarora Nation here, title to which was not in the United States Government. </s> The Court also undertakes to support its "artificial" definition of "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations" by saying that the Congress knew, by a prior decision of this Court, that it was acting under Art. IV, 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution, which gives Congress power, as the Court says, "to deal only with `the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.'" In the first place I do not understand how the Court can say with such assurance that the Congress was acting only under that clause, as there is no evidence whatsoever that Congress expressed itself on this matter. Moreover, it seems far more likely to me that in this phrase regulating Indian tribes Congress was acting under Art. I, 8, cl. 3, which empowers Congress "To regulate Commerce with . . . the Indian Tribes." </s> Even accepting for a moment the Court's "artificial" definition, I think the United States owns a sufficient "interest" in these Tuscarora homelands to make them a "reservation" within the meaning of the Act. Section 3 (2) does not merely require a finding in order to take "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations"; the same finding is required in order to take "other . . . interests in lands owned by the United States" whether tribal or not. Or, again accepting the Court's conception, if the phrase "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations" must be modified by the words which follow, "lands . . . owned by the United States," it must also be modified by the words "interests in lands owned by the United States," which also follow. Read this way, the [362 U.S. 99, 130] section defines "reservations" as tribal lands in which the United States owns "interests." Thus again a finding under 4 (e) is required even under the Court's own technical approach if the United States owns "interests" in the lands. I think it does. </s> Certainly the words Congress used, "interests in lands," are not surplusage; they have some meaning and were intended to accomplish some purpose of their own. The United States undoubtedly controls (has "interests in") many lands in this country that it does not own in fee simple. This is surely true as to all Indian tribal lands, even though the Indians own the fee simple title. 8 Such lands cannot be sold or leased without the consent of the United States Government. The Secretary of the Interior took this position about this very reservation in 1912 when the Tuscaroras desired to lease a part of their lands to private individuals for limestone quarrying. 9 And, of course, the long-accepted concept of a guardian-ward relationship between the United States and its Indians, with all the requirements of fair dealing and protection that this involves, means that the Indians are not free to treat their lands as wholly their own. 10 Anyone doubting the [362 U.S. 99, 131] extent of ownership interest in these lands by the United States would have that doubt rapidly removed should he take a deed from the Tuscarora Nation without the consent of the Government. 11 I cannot agree, therefore, that this all but technical fee ownership which the United States has in these lands is inadequate to constitute the kind of "interests in lands owned by the United States" which requires a 4 (e) finding before condemnation. </s> After the Court concludes that because of its interpretation of the definition of "reservations" in 3 (2) a finding is not required by 4 (e) to take the Tuscarora lands, it goes on to find the necessary congressional authorization to take these lands in the general condemnation provisions of 21. 16 U.S.C. 814. I believe that this is an incorrect interpretation of the general power to condemn under 21, both because Congress specifically provided for the taking of all Indian reservation lands it wanted taken in other sections of the same Act, and because a taking under 21 is contrary to the manner in which Congress has traditionally gone about the taking of Indian lands - such as Congress here carefully prescribed in 4 (e). Congress has been consistent in generally exercising this power to take Indian lands only in accord with prior treaties, only when the Indians themselves consent to be moved, and only by Acts which either specifically refer to Indians or by their terms must include Indian lands. None of these conditions is satisfied here if 21 is to be relied upon. The specific and detailed provisions of 10 (e), 16 U.S.C. 803 (e), upon which the Court relies, only emphasize to me the kind of care [362 U.S. 99, 132] Congress always takes to protect the just claims of Indians to reservations like this one. </s> The cases which the Court cites in its opinion do not justify the broad meaning read into 21. Many of those cases deal with taxation - federal and state. The fact that Indians are sometimes taxed like other citizens does not even remotely indicate that Congress has weakened in any way its policy to preserve "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations." Moreover, cases dealing with individuals who are not Indians are not applicable to tribal reservations. For example, Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 , cited by the Court, did not involve tribal lands. That case only held that a State may tax the production of an oil company even though it was derived from oil company lands leased from an Indian. The owner there was an individual Indian, not a tribe, and the lands were not and never had been a part of an Indian reservation, but rather had been purchased for this single Indian with the royalties he obtained from his own original restricted allotted lands. In Henkel v. United States, 237 U.S. 43 , which involved the taking of Indian lands for the vast western reclamation project, the Court not only found that it had been "well known to Congress" that Indian lands would have to be taken, 237 U.S., at 50 , but the treaty with the Indians involved in that case contained a specific consent by the Indians to such a taking. 29 Stat. 356, quoted 237 U.S., at 48 -49. There was no provision even resembling this in the Treaty of 1794 with the Tuscaroras. Other cases relied on by the Court, such as Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394 , and Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U.S. 641 , all involved statutes that made it clear that Congress was well aware it was authorizing the taking of Indians' lands - unlike the history of 21 of the Federal Power Act and the 1957 Niagara Power Act, 71 Stat. 401, 16 U.S.C. 836-836a, involved here. [362 U.S. 99, 133] </s> All that I have said so far relates to what the Court calls the "plain words" of the statute. I interpret these "plain words" differently than the Court. But there are other more fundamental and decisive reasons why I disagree with the Court's interpretation of the Federal Power Act as it relates to Indians. The provisions in 4 (e) which protect Indian reservations against destruction by condemnation cannot be properly construed unless considered as a part of a body of Indian laws built up throughout this Nation's history, and extending back even to the Articles of Confederation. It is necessary to summarize briefly a part of that history. </s> The experience of the Tuscarora Nation illustrates this history as well as that of any Indian tribe. 12 When this country was discovered the Tuscaroras lived and owned their homelands in the area that later became North Carolina. Early settlers wanted their lands. The Tuscaroras did not want to give them up. Numerous conflicts arose because of this clash of desires. Finally, about 1710, there was a war between the Tuscaroras and the colonists in North and South Carolina. The Indians were routed. A majority of their warriors were killed. Hundreds of their men, women and children were captured and sold into slavery. Nearly all of the remainder [362 U.S. 99, 134] of the tribe fled. They found a home in distant New York with the Iroquois Confederation of Nations. With their acceptance into the Confederation about 1720 it became known as the Six Nations. Historical accounts indicate that about 1780 those Tuscaroras who had supported America in the Revolution were compelled to leave their first residence in New York because of the hostility of Indians who had fought with the British against the Colonies. 13 They migrated to the Village of Lewiston, New York, near Niagara Falls and settled in that area as their new home. They have remained there ever since - nearly 180 years. When their legal right to this land came into question about 1800 the Seneca Indians and the Holland Land Company both "thought their claim so just" 14 that they gave the Tuscarora Nation deeds to three square miles of the area they had been occupying for about 20 years. With the assistance of Presidents Washington and Jefferson and the Congress, the Tuscaroras were able, through the Secretary of War, to sell their vast North Carolina lands for $15,000. With this money, held by the Secretary of War as trustee, additional lands adjoining those received from the Seneca Indians and the Holland Land Company were obtained for the Tuscarora Nation and the title held in trust by the Secretary of War from 1804 to 1809. The Secretary supervised the payments to the Holland Land Company, from which the additional 4,329 acres were obtained, and when payments were completed he conveyed these lands to the Tuscarora Nation. 15 The 1,383 acres of the Tuscarora [362 U.S. 99, 135] Reservation involved today is a part of this purchase. Despite all this and the Government's continuing guardianship over these Indians and their lands throughout the years the Court attempts to justify this taking on the single ground that the Indians, not the United States Government now own the fee simple title to this property. </s> In 1838 the Government made a treaty with the Tuscaroras under which they were to be removed to other parts of the United States. 16 The removal was to be carried [362 U.S. 99, 136] out under the authority of a Congressional Act of 1830, 4 Stat. 411, which provided a program for removing the Indians from the Eastern United States to the West. Section 3 of that Act provided authority "for the President solemnly to assure the tribe or nation with which the exchange is made, that the United States will forever secure and guaranty to them, and their heirs or successors, the country so exchanged with them . . . ." The same Act also provided "That nothing in this act contained shall be construed as authorizing or directing the violation of any existing treaty between the United States and any of the Indian tribes." Id., 7. </s> The Tuscarora Nation then had such a treaty with the United States, which had been in existence since 1794 and is still recognized by Congress today. 17 The treaty [362 U.S. 99, 137] was made with all the Six Nations, at a time when the Tuscarora Nation had been a member for over 70 years, and one of their representatives signed the treaty. 18 In Article III of the Treaty the United States Government made this solemn promise: </s> "Now, the United States acknowledge all the land within the aforementioned boundaries, to be the property of the Seneka nation; and the United States will never claim the same, nor disturb the Seneka nation, nor any of the Six Nations, or of their Indian friends residing thereon and united with them, in the free use and enjoyment thereof: but it shall remain theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have the right to purchase." </s> This article of the 1794 Treaty substantially repeated the promise given the Tuscaroras in the prior 1784 Treaty, 7 Stat. 15, made before our Constitution was adopted, that "The Oneida and Tuscarora nations shall be secured in the possession of the lands on which they are settled." </s> Of course it is true that in 1794, when the Treaty was signed, the Tuscarora Nation did not yet have the technical legal title to that part of the reservation which the Government was later able to obtain for it. But the solemn pledge of the United States to its wards is not to be construed like a money-lender's mortgage. Up to this [362 U.S. 99, 138] time it has always been the established rule that this Court would give treaties with the Indians an enlarged interpretation; one that would assure them beyond all doubt that this Government does not engage in sharp practices with its wards. 19 This very principle of interpretation was applied in the case of The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761, 768, where the Court said, about this treaty: </s> "It has already been shown that the United States have acknowledged the reservations to be the property of the Seneca nation - that they will never claim them nor disturb this nation in their free use and enjoyment, and that they shall remain theirs until they choose to sell them. These are the guarantees given by the United States, and which her faith is pledged to uphold." </s> After the Treaty of 1838 was signed, in which the Tuscaroras agreed to go west, they decided not to do so, and the Government respected their objections and left them with their land. They have, since that time, held it as other Indians have throughout the Nation. This has been in accord with the settled general policy to preserve such reservations against any kind of taking, [362 U.S. 99, 139] whether by private citizens or government, that might result in depriving Indian tribes of their homelands against their will. 20 President Jackson, in 1835, explained the purpose of the removal and reservation program as [362 U.S. 99, 140] meaning that, "The pledge of the United States has been given by Congress that the country destined for the residence of this people shall be forever `secured and guaranteed to them.'" 21 This policy was so well settled that when the Missouri compromise bill was being discussed in Congress in 1854 Texas Senator Sam Houston used this picturesque language to describe the Government's promise to the Indians: </s> "As long as water flows, or grass grows upon the earth, or the sun rises to show your pathway, or you kindle your camp fires, so long shall you be protected by this Government, and never again removed from your present habitations." 22 </s> It was to carry out these sacred promises made to protect the security of Indian reservations that Congress adopted 4 (e) which forbids the taking of an Indian reservation for a power project if it will "interfere . . . with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired . . . ." But no such finding was made or could be made here. </s> There can be no doubt as to the importance of this power project. It will be one of the largest in this country and probably will have cost over $700,000,000 when it is completed. It is true that it will undoubtedly cost more to build a proper reservoir without the Tuscarora lands, and that there has already been some delay by reason of this controversy. The use of lands other than those of the tribe will cause the abandonment of more homes and the removal of more people. If the decision in this case depended exclusively upon cost and inconvenience, the Authority undoubtedly would have [362 U.S. 99, 141] been justified in using the Tuscarora lands. But the Federal Power Act requires far more than that to justify breaking up this Indian reservation. </s> These Indians have a way of life which this Government has seen fit to protect, if not actually to encourage. Cogent arguments can be made that it would be better for all concerned if Indians were to abandon their old customs and habits, and become incorporated in the communities where they reside. The fact remains, however, that they have not done this and that they have continued their tribal life with trust in a promise of security from this Government. </s> Of course, Congress has power to change this traditional policy when it sees fit. But when such changes have been made Congress has ordinarily been scrupulously careful to see that new conditions leave the Indians satisfied. Until Congress has a chance to express itself far more clearly than it has here the Tuscaroras are entitled to keep their reservation. It would be far better to let the Power Authority present the matter to Congress and request its consent to take these lands. It is not too late for it to do so now. If, as has been argued here, Congress has already impliedly authorized the taking, there can be no reason why it would not pass a measure at once confirming its authorization. It has been known to pass a Joint Resolution in one day where this Court interpreted an Act in a way it did not like. See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 639 -640. Such action would simply put this question of authorization back into the hands of the Legislative Department of the Government where the Constitution wisely reposed it. 23 </s> [362 U.S. 99, 142] </s> It may be hard for us to understand why these Indians cling so tenaciously to their lands and traditional tribal way of life. 24 The record does not leave the impression that the lands of their reservation are the most fertile, the landscape the most beautiful or their homes the most splendid specimens of architecture. But this is their home - their ancestral home. There, they, their children, and their forebears were born. They, too, have their memories and their loves. Some things are worth more than money and the costs of a new enterprise. </s> There may be instances in which Congress has broken faith with the Indians, although examples of such action have not been pointed out to us. Whether it has done so before now or not, however, I am not convinced that it has done so here. I regret that this Court is to be the governmental agency that breaks faith with this dependent people. Great nations, like great men, should keep their word. </s> [Footnote 1 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 791a-828c. </s> [Footnote 2 While the petitioners have argued that Congress authorized this taking in the 1957 Niagara Power Act, 71 Stat. 401, 16 U.S.C. 836-836a, the Court does not accept this argument. Neither do I. There is absolutely no evidence that Congress was in any way aware that these Tuscarora lands would be required by the Niagara Power Project. The petitioners have also argued that Congress impliedly authorized this taking in the 1957 Act because in fact the Tuscarora lands are indispensable to the Niagara Power Project. But the record shows that the reservation lands are not indispensable. The Federal Power Commission first found that "other lands are available." 19 F. P. C. 186, 188. And see 105 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 151, 265 F.2d 338, 343. On remand the Commission refused to find that the Indian lands were indispensable, although it did find that use of other [362 U.S. 99, 125] lands would be much more expensive. 21 F. P. C. 146. And see 21 F. P. C. 273, 275. That other lands are more expensive is hardly proof that the Tuscarora lands are indispensable to this $700,000,000 project. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 4 (e) contains the general grant of power for the Federal Power Commission to issue licenses for federal power projects. The part that is of crucial significance here reads: "[L]icenses shall be issued within any reservation only after a finding by the Commission that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired, and shall be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of the department under whose supervision such reservation falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and utilization of such reservation . . . ." Title 16 U.S.C. 797 (e), enacted as 4 (d) in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, was re-enacted in the 1935 amendments, 49 Stat. 838, as 4 (e) and is referred to as such throughout. </s> [Footnote 4 Section 3, 16 U.S.C. 796, is the general definitions section of the Federal Power Act, and was first enacted in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063. Section 3 (2) defines the term "reservations." </s> [Footnote 5 The Court's opinion states: "Inasmuch as the lands involved are owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation . . . we hold that they are not within a `reservation' . . . ." </s> [Footnote 6 In United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440 , and United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 , this Court has held that the Pueblos' fee simple ownership of their lands has no effect whatsoever on the United States' rights and responsibilities towards these Indians and their lands. See The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761, 767, for a similar holding as to Seneca Indian lands in New York governed by the same treaty under which the Tuscaroras assert their rights in this case. And see also United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363, 366 ("The governmental interest . . . is as clear as it would be if the fee were in the United States"); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 ; Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 . </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 1, Pt. 5, Vol. I, 45th Cong., 2d Sess. 397, 558-564 (1877). See also 64 Stat. 845, 25 U.S.C. 233, which specifically subjects all New York tribes to Rev. Stat. 2116 (1875), 25 U.S.C. 177, which bans alienation of their lands without the consent of Congress. And see generally notes 6, supra, 9, 11, 16, 17, 20, infra. </s> [Footnote 8 The Court of Appeals held the United States had an adequate 3 (2) "interest in" the Tuscarora Reservation to require a 4 (e) finding. 105 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 150, 265 F.2d 338, 342. See notes 6, supra. and 16, infra. </s> [Footnote 9 See 51 Cong. Rec. 11659-11660, 14561-14562. And see note 16, infra. </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 657 ; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 ; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 569 ; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17. See also United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 , where this Court pointed out that the same concept had applied under Spanish and Mexican law. And see also United States v. Kagama. 118 U.S. 375, 384 ("duty of protection"), and Chief Justice Marshall's leading opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 591 ("Indians [are] to be protected . . . in the possession of their lands"). </s> [Footnote 11 In United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 , for example, this Court held that the United States could set aside a deed from the Pueblos of lands to which the Indians had fee simple title, even though the issue in the case had been settled by otherwise applicable principles of res judicata in prior litigation to which the Indians, but not the United States, had been a party. See note 9, supra. </s> [Footnote 12 For general discussions of the Tuscaroras' history see Hodge (editor), Handbook of American Indians (1910), Pt. 2, 842-853, Smithsonian Institution Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 30, H. R. Doc. No. 926, Part 2, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.; Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1941), 423; Morgan, League of the Iroquois (1904), I, 23, 42, 93, II, 77, 187, 305: Cusick, Ancient History of the Six Nations (1848), 31-35; H. R. Doc. No. 1590, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 7, 11-15 (1915); H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 1, Pt. 5, Vol. I, 45th Cong., 2d Sess. 562-563 (1877). And see statements in New York Indians v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 413 (1895); Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority of New York, 164 F. Supp. 107 (D.C. W. D. N. Y. 1958); People ex rel. Cusick v. Daly, 212 N. Y. 183, 190, 105 N. E. 1048, 1050 (1914). </s> [Footnote 13 See Handbook of American Indians, op. cit., supra, note 12, at 848; Wilson, Apologies to the Iroquois (1960), 135. </s> [Footnote 14 Letter from Theophile Cazenove to Joseph Ellicott, May 10, 1798, 1 Bingham (editor), Holland Land Company's Papers: Reports of Joseph Ellicott (Buffalo Hist. Soc. Pub. Vol. 32, 1937) 21, 23. </s> [Footnote 15 In addition to the general histories cited, note 12 supra, this particular transaction is described in various letters and speeches [362 U.S. 99, 135] of the Tuscaroras and the Secretary of War. See Letters Sent by the Secretary of War Relating to Indian Affairs (National Archives, Record Group 75, Interior Branch), Vol. A, 18-19, 22-23, 113-114, 117-119, 147-148, 402, 425-426, 438-439, Vol. B, 29, 274, 421; 6 Buffalo Hist. Soc. Pub. 221; and letter from Erastus Granger to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, July 20, 1804, in Buffalo Hist. Soc. manuscript files. The deeds are recorded in the Niagara County Clerk's Office, Lockport, New York, Nov. 21, 1804, Liber B, pp. 2-7; Jan. 2, 1809, Liber A, p. 5. "[I]n 1804 Congress authorized the Secretary of War to purchase additional land for these Indians." From a Department of Interior letter, H. R. Doc. No. 1590, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 7. And see the Court's note 10, and Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366. </s> [Footnote 16 Treaty of January 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550, 554 (Article 14, "Special Provisions for the Tuscaroras"). The interest of the government in Indian lands was a part of the law of Spain, Mexico, Great Britain and other European powers during pre-Colonial days. United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 ; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 ; Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 551-552; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17-18. The original Articles of Confederation provided for congressional control of Indian affairs in Article 9. A similar provision is in the Commerce Clause of the present Constitution. One of the first Acts of the new Congress was the so-called Non-Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137, which provided, in 4, "That no sale of lands made by any Indians . . . shall be valid . . . unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States." The similar provision is presently found in 25 U.S.C. 177, as modified by Rev. Stat. 2079, 25 U.S.C. 71. </s> [Footnote 17 Treaty of November 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44. Article VI of that Treaty provides: "[B]ecause the United States desire, with humanity and kindness, to contribute to their comfortable support . . . the United States will add the sum of three thousand dollars to the one thousand five hundred dollars, heretofore allowed them by an article ratified by the President [April 23, 1792]; making in the whole, four thousand five hundred dollars; which shall be expended yearly forever, in purchasing cloathing, [etc.]. . . ." Every Congress until the 81st indicated that their $4,500 annual appropriation rested upon "article 6, treaty of November 11, 1794." E. g., 62 Stat. 1120, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. Subsequent Congresses simply appropriated a total amount for Indian treaty obligations including "treaties with Senecas and Six Nations of New York . . . ." E. g., 63 Stat. 774, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. In 1951 the 82d Cong., 1st Sess., appropriated simply "such amounts as may be necessary after June 30, 1951" for this purpose. 65 Stat. 254. At the hearings it was explained that this provision "would have the effect of being permanent law insofar as making the funds available without having to be included in each annual appropriation act. . . . [I]t is a treaty obligation and has always been paid by the Government in full. . . . These treaties have been in existence for many, many years." Director D. Otis Beasley, Division of Budget and Finance, Department [362 U.S. 99, 137] of the Interior, Hearings on Interior Department Appropriations for 1952 before the Subcommittee on Interior Department of the House Committee on Appropriations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, 1747, 1764. </s> [Footnote 18 "Kanatsoyh, alias Nicholas Kusik," signed the 1794 Treaty as a Tuscarora, but is not so identified there. However, he also signed the Treaties of December 2, 1794, 7 Stat. 47, and January 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550, for the Tuscarora Nation and is listed there as a "Tuscarora." It has never even been hinted, until the Court's note 18 today, that the Tuscarora Nation is for some reason not included in this November 11, 1794, Six Nations' Treaty. </s> [Footnote 19 The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737, 760 ("enlarged rules of construction are adopted in reference to Indian treaties"); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 582 ("The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. . . . How the words of the treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction") (concurring opinion); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 -685 ("in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people"). And see Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 405 ; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 ; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 ; United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567, 572. </s> [Footnote 20 The origins of this policy extend into pre-Colonial British history. As Chief Justice Marshall said in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 547, in speaking of the Indian land policy, "The king purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take, but never coerced a surrender of them." Chief Justice Marshall quoted at the same place similar language from a speech made to the American Indians by the British Superintendent of Indian affairs in 1763. This principle has been consistently recognized by this Government and this Court. Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 403 ; United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 ; The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761, 768; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17; Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543. And see 48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C. 476; 25 U.S.C. 311-328 and 25 CFR 161.3 (a). The age and scope of this doctrine of guardianship and fairness to the Indians is well illustrated in a statement made by President Washington, December 29, 1790, responding to an address by the chief and councilors of the Seneca Nation: "I am not uninformed, that the Six Nations have been led into some difficulties, with respect to the sale of their lands, since the peace. But I must inform you that these evils arose before the present Government of the United States was established, when the separate States, and individuals under their authority, undertook to treat with the Indian tribes respecting the sale of their lands. But the case is now entirely altered; the General Government, only, has the power to treat with the Indian nations, and any treaty formed, and held without its authority, will not be binding. "Here, then, is the security for the remainder of your lands. No State, nor person, can purchase your lands, unless at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States. The General Government will never consent to your being defrauded, but it will protect you in all your just rights." 4 American State Papers (Indian Affairs, Vol. I, 1832) 142; 31 Washington, Writings (United States George Washington Bicentennial Comm'n ed. 1939) 179, 180. </s> [Footnote 21 Seventh Annual Message, Dec. 7, 1835, 3 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897, 147, 172. </s> [Footnote 22 Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 202. See 1 Morison and Commager, The Growth of the American Republic (1950), 621. </s> [Footnote 23 See, e. g., United States v. Hellard, 322 U.S. 363, 367 ("the power of Congress over Indian affairs is plenary"); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 -46; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 ("It is for that body [Congress], and not the courts"); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 ("Plenary authority over [362 U.S. 99, 142] the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning . . . not . . . the judicial department of the government"); United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567, 572. </s> [Footnote 24 "As we understand the position of the tribe, they do not complain so much of a possible lease or license for the use of the lands as they complain of a possible permanent loss of part of their homelands." Letter from Under Secretary of the Interior Bennett to Federal Power Commission Chairman Kuykendall, December 19, 1958, relating to the taking of these Tuscarora lands for the Niagara Power Project. </s> [362 U.S. 99, 143]

United States Supreme Court SCHOOL DISTRICT OF OMAHA v. UNITED STATES(1977) No. 76-705 Argued: Decided: June 29, 1977 </s> Where neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court, in addressing itself to the remedial school desegregation plan for Omaha, Neb., mandated by an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals, addressed itself to the inquiry now required by Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, ante, p. 406, the Court of Appeals' judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration. </s> Certiorari granted; 541 F.2d 708, vacated and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This school desegregation case involves the School District of Omaha, Neb. The District Court in a comprehensive opinion extensively reviewed the evidence presented by the parties, and recognized that there was considerable racial imbalance in school attendance patterns. Applying a legal standard which placed the burden of proving intentional segregative actions on the respondents, and which regarded the natural and foreseeable consequences of petitioners' conduct as "neither determinative nor immaterial" but as "one additional factor to be weighed," the District Court concluded that the respondent had not carried the burden of proving a deliberate policy of racial segregation. 389 F. Supp. 293. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the legal standard applied by the District Court, 521 F.2d 530, stating that a "presumption of segregative intent" arises from actions or omissions whose natural and foreseeable result is to "bring about or maintain segregation." Id., at 535. Reviewing the facts found by the District Court concerning faculty assignment, student transfers, optional attendance zones, school construction, [433 U.S. 667, 668] and the deterioration of one high school in the district, the Court of Appeals generally accepted these factual findings. In each instance, however, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence under the legal standard it adopted to shift the burden of proof to the petitioners. Finding that in no instance had the petitioners carried their rebuttal burden, the Court of Appeals remanded for the formulation of a systemwide remedy. We denied certiorari. 423 U.S. 946 . </s> Following the explicit instruction of the Court of Appeals, the District Court promulgated an extensive plan involving, among other elements, the systemwide transportation of pupils. On petitioners' appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 541 F.2d 708. </s> In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), we said: </s> "[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." </s> We restated and amplified the implications of this holding in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). </s> Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court, in addressing itself to the remedial plan mandated by the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals, addressed itself to the inquiry required by our opinion in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, ante, p. 406, in which we said: </s> "If such violations are found, the District Court in the first instance, subject to review by the Court of Appeals, must determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations. The [433 U.S. 667, 669] remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy." Ante, at 420. </s> The petition for certiorari is accordingly granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration in the light of Arlington Heights and Dayton. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. </s> The Court's remand of this case for reconsideration in light of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, ante, p. 406, is inappropriate because wholly unnecessary. The Court of Appeals concluded that "segregation in the Omaha School District was intentionally created and maintained by the defendants." 521 F.2d 530, 532-533 (1975). The petitioners did not contest in the Court of Appeals the finding of the District Court that the Omaha public schools are segregated. Ibid. The Court of Appeals carefully reviewed the abundant evidence in the record bearing on segregative intent and concluded that the evidence justified a presumption that segregative intent permeated petitioners' policies concerning faculty assignment, student transfers, optional attendance zones, school construction, and the deterioration of the 96% black Tech High School. Id., at 537-546. Relying on Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 210 (1973), the Court of Appeals further found that the petitioners did not rebut this presumption because they "failed to carry their burden of establishing that segregative intent was not among the factors which motivated their actions." 521 F.2d, at 536, 537 (emphasis supplied). We denied certiorari. 423 U.S. 946 (1975). When the case came before the Court [433 U.S. 667, 670] of Appeals for the second time a year later, the court explicitly reviewed its prior holding in light of our intervening decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and found nothing in that case to cause it to revise its earlier opinion. 541 F.2d 708, 709 (1976). </s> Arlington Heights, supra, did not make new law, but only applied the holding of Washington v. Davis that discrimination must be purposeful to be unconstitutional. Arlington Heights interpreted Washington v. Davis to mean that an action in which an "invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" is unconstitutional, and that proof that a decision is "motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose" shifts the burden of proof to the alleged discriminator. 429 U.S., at 270 -271, n. 21. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the defendants "failed to carry their burden of establishing that segregative intent was not among the factors which motivated their actions" was based on language from our decision in Keyes, supra, but it so faithfully applies the Arlington Heights formulation that it reads as if the Court of Appeals had anticipated precisely what Arlington Heights would hold five months later. I cannot imagine that the Court of Appeals will do, or properly can do, anything on remand except reaffirm its judgment with a recitation of its gratification that Arlington Heights had been correctly anticipated. </s> Dayton, supra, reaffirmed the already well-established principle that the scope of the remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violation. Ante, at 420. In this case, the District Court ordered a comprehensive decree to remedy the effects of past discrimination, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. As is evident from a reading of the first Court of Appeals opinion describing the massive systemwide intentional segregation in the Omaha School District, a comprehensive order is entirely appropriate. A less comprehensive [433 U.S. 667, 671] order would simply not remedy fully the unconstitutional conditions that have been found to exist in the school system. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> For the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, I cannot join the Court's summary disposition of this case. I would deny certiorari. </s> [433 U.S. 667, 672]

United States Supreme Court GREEN v. BOCK LAUNDRY MACHINE CO.(1989) No. 87-1816 Argued: January 18, 1989Decided: May 22, 1989 </s> In petitioner Green's product liability action against respondent Bock, the manufacturer of a machine that injured Green, Bock impeached Green's testimony by eliciting admissions that he had previously been convicted of burglary and a related felony. After the jury returned a verdict for Bock, Green argued on appeal that the District Court had erred by denying his pretrial motion to exclude the impeaching evidence. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the District Court's ruling, following Circuit precedent established in Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577. Diggs held, inter alia, that Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence - which specifies that evidence that a witness has been convicted of a felony "shall" be admitted for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility "only if" the court determines that the probativeness of the evidence outweighs its prejudice "to the defendant" - mandates admission for impeachment purposes of a civil plaintiff's prior felony convictions, and that the Rule's specific command forecloses the judicial exercise of discretion under Rule 403, which authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. </s> Held: </s> Rule 609(a)(1) requires a judge to permit impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior felony convictions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the party offering the testimony. Thus, the District Court did not err in allowing the jury to learn through impeaching cross-examination that Green was a convicted felon. Pp. 509-527. </s> (a) The Rule's text is ambiguous with respect to its applicability in civil cases. By using the restrictive phrase "to the defendant," the Rule's plain language appears not only to command the weighing of prejudice to a civil defendant, but also to compel the automatic admissibility of prior felony conviction evidence detrimental to a civil plaintiff. An interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants a civil defendant is unacceptable; therefore, the Rule cannot mean what it says as far as civil trials are concerned. Pp. 509-511. </s> (b) The history leading to enactment of the Rule as law establishes that Congress intended that only the accused in a criminal case should be [490 U.S. 504, 505] protected from unfair prejudice by the balancing requirement set out in Rule 609(a)(1). Pp. 511-524. </s> (c) Rule 609(a)(1)'s exclusion of civil witnesses from its weighing language is a specific and mandatory command that impeachment of such witnesses be admitted into evidence, which command overrides a judge's general discretionary authority under Rule 403 to balance probative value against prejudice. Pp. 524-526. </s> 845 F.2d 1011, affirmed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 527. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 530. </s> Joseph M. Melillo argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Neil J. Rovner. </s> Thomas D. Caldwell, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard B. Swartz. * </s> [Footnote * A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al. by LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Gregory R. Neuhauser, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Robert Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Nicholas Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, Rosalie Simmonds Ballentine, Solicitor General of the Virgin Islands, Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a judge to let a civil litigant impeach an adversary's credibility with evidence of the adversary's prior felony convictions. Because the Courts of Appeals have answered that question in different ways, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 487 U.S. 1203 (1988). [490 U.S. 504, 506] </s> While in custody at a county prison, petitioner Paul Green obtained work-release employment at a car wash. On his sixth day at work, Green reached inside a large dryer to try to stop it. A heavy rotating drum caught and tore off his right arm. Green brought this product liability action against respondent Bock Laundry Co. (Bock), manufacturer of the machine. At trial Green testified that he had been instructed inadequately concerning the machine's operation and dangerous character. Bock impeached Green's testimony by eliciting admissions that he had been convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary, both felonies. The jury returned a verdict for Bock. On appeal Green argued that the District Court had erred by denying his pretrial motion to exclude the impeaching evidence. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the District Court's ruling. 845 F.2d 1011 (1988). </s> The Court of Appeals' disposition followed Circuit precedent established in Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577 (CA3 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1078 (1985). Writing for the panel majority, Judge Maris, who had headed the Advisory Committee that proposed a federal code of evidence to this Court, 1 concluded in Diggs that Rule 609 mandated admission for impeachment purposes of a civil plaintiff's prior felony convictions. He relied on the legislative history of Rule 609 as establishing that Congress intended Rule 609 to govern both criminal and civil proceedings. 741 F.2d, at 581. He also concluded that a judge may not balance prejudice and probativeness pursuant to Rule 403 2 in order to circumvent Rule [490 U.S. 504, 507] 609(a)(2)'s requirement that all convictions pertaining to dishonesty - often called crimen falsi evidence - be admitted. Ibid. Rule 609's specific command, he wrote, forecloses judicial exercise of Rule 403 discretion to exclude evidence of felony convictions. Id., at 582. The only situation in which Rule 609(a) allows the trial judge discretion to bar impeachment by prior felony convictions is when admission would unduly prejudice the defendant in a criminal case. 3 Ibid. Judge Maris concluded with this comment: </s> "[T]he scope of Rule 609 has been and is the subject of widespread controversy and strongly held divergent views. We have felt compelled to give the rule the effect which the plain meaning of its language and the legislative history require. We recognize that the mandatory admission of all felony convictions on the issue of credibility may in some cases produce unjust and even bizarre results. Evidence that a witness has in the past been convicted of manslaughter by automobile, for example, can have but little relevance to his credibility as a witness in a totally different matter. But if the rule is to be amended to eliminate these possibilities of injustice, it must be done by those who have the authority to amend the rules, the Supreme Court and the Congress . . . . It is not for us as enforcers of the rule to amend it under the guise of construing it." Ibid. </s> Dissenting, Judge Gibbons acknowledged that "snippets of legislative history" show that four Members of Congress anticipated that a court might interpret Rule 609(a) to require impeachment of a witness by prior felony convictions irrelevant to the civil context. Id., at 583. Yet he remained unpersuaded that Congress as a whole intended "so ridiculous a result." Ibid. Instead, he attributed the Rules' silence [490 U.S. 504, 508] regarding impeachment of civil plaintiffs to "legislative oversight." Ibid. And he noted that other Circuits had concluded, contrary to the panel majority, "that the mandatory admission feature of prior crimen falsi convictions does not apply to the admissibility of prior felony convictions in civil cases." Ibid. Placing the use of prior felony conviction evidence outside the reach of the judge's discretion, he declared, "makes no sense whatever." Ibid. </s> Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Diggs convey dissatisfaction with automatic admissibility of prior felony convictions to impeach civil witnesses, especially civil plaintiffs. Indeed, criticism of this result is longstanding and widespread. 4 Our task in deciding this case, however, is not to fashion the rule we deem desirable but to identify the rule that Congress fashioned. We begin by considering the extent to which the text of Rule 609 answers the question before us. Concluding that the text is ambiguous with respect [490 U.S. 504, 509] to civil cases, we then seek guidance from legislative history and from the Rules' overall structure. </s> I </s> Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides: </s> "General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment." </s> By its terms the Rule requires a judge to allow impeachment of any witness with prior convictions for felonies not involving dishonesty "only if" the probativeness of the evidence is greater than its prejudice "to the defendant." 5 Ibid. It follows that impeaching evidence detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case "shall be admitted" without any such balancing. Ibid. </s> The Rule's plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial as well as in a criminal trial. But that literal reading would compel an odd result in a case like this. Assuming that all impeaching evidence has at least minimal probative value, and given that the evidence of plaintiff Green's convictions had some prejudicial effect on his case - but surely none on defendant Bock's - balancing according to the strict language of Rule 609(a)(1) inevitably [490 U.S. 504, 510] leads to the conclusion that the evidence was admissible. In fact, under this construction of the Rule, impeachment detrimental to a civil plaintiff always would have to be admitted. </s> No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant. 6 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the prosecution, while the Fifth Amendment lets the accused choose not to testify at trial. In contrast, civil litigants in federal court share equally the protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Given liberal federal discovery rules, the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, and the need to prove their case, civil litigants almost always must testify in depositions or at trial. Denomination as a civil defendant or plaintiff, moreover, is often happenstance based on which party filed first or on the nature of the suit. 7 Evidence that a litigant or his witness is a convicted felon tends to shift a jury's focus from the worthiness of the litigant's position to the moral worth of the litigant himself. 8 It is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff - but not a civil defendant [490 U.S. 504, 511] - should be subjected to this risk. Thus we agree with the Seventh Circuit that as far as civil trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(1) "can't mean what it says." 9 Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (1987). </s> Out of this agreement flow divergent courses, each turning on the meaning of "defendant." The word might be interpreted to encompass all witnesses, civil and criminal, parties or not. See Green v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 382, 383 (ED Pa. 1985) (dictum). It might be read to connote any party offering a witness, in which event Rule 609(a)(1)'s balance would apply to civil, as well as criminal, cases. E. g., Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (CA5 1981). Finally, "defendant" may refer only to the defendant in a criminal case. See, e. g., Campbell, 831 F.2d, at 703. These choices spawn a corollary question: must a judge allow prior felony impeachment of all civil witnesses as well as all criminal prosecution witnesses, or is Rule 609(a)(1) inapplicable to civil cases, in which event Rule 403 would authorize a judge to balance in such cases? Because the plain text does not resolve these issues, we must examine the history leading to enactment of Rule 609 as law. </s> II </s> At common law a person who had been convicted of a felony was not competent to testify as a witness. "[T]he disqualification arose as part of the punishment for the crime, only later being rationalized on the basis that such a person was unworthy of belief." 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 60902., p. 609-58 (1988) (citing 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 519 (3d ed. 1940)). As the law evolved, this absolute bar gradually was replaced by a rule that allowed [490 U.S. 504, 512] such witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal cases, but also to be impeached by evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen falsi misdemeanor conviction. 10 In the face of scholarly criticism of automatic admission of such impeaching evidence, some courts moved toward a more flexible approach. 11 </s> [490 U.S. 504, 513] </s> In 1942, the American Law Institute proposed a rule that would have given the trial judge discretion in all cases 12 to exclude evidence of prior convictions of any witness if "its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . ." 13 Model Code of Evidence, Rule 303 (1942); see Rule 106. No such evidence could be admitted against a witness-accused unless he first introduced "evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility." Rule 106(3). </s> A decade later the American Bar Association endorsed a rule that further limited impairment of any witness' credibility to convictions for crimes "involving dishonesty or false statement." National Conference of Commissioners, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 21 (1953). As with Model Rule 106, this evidence would not be admitted against a witness-accused unless he adduced evidence supporting his credibility. Ibid. This code too afforded the judge discretion to exclude impeaching evidence in both criminal and civil trials if on balance he deemed it too prejudicial. See Rules 2, 45. </s> The only contemporaneous congressional enactment governing impeachment by prior convictions stated: </s> "No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or evidence aliunde . . . ." D.C. Code Ann. 14-305 (1961). [490 U.S. 504, 514] </s> This provision of the District of Columbia Code traditionally had been interpreted to require the admission of prior conviction evidence. McGowan, 1970 Law & Social Order 1. But in reviewing a defendant's challenge to admission of a grand larceny conviction to impeach his testimony at his trial on housebreaking and larceny charges, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the Rule said conviction evidence "may," not "shall," be admitted; therefore, a judge was not required to allow such impeachment. Luck v. United States, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 156, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (1965). In effect, the court conditioned admissibility on the kind of judicial balancing expressly provided in the Uniform Rules and Model Code. 14 Id., at 156, n. 8, 348 F.2d, at 768, n. 8. Far from welcoming this innovation, the Federal Department of Justice in 1969 proposed changing the code to overrule Luck, and in 1970 Congress amended the District of Columbia Code to provide that both prior felony and crimen falsi impeaching evidence "shall be admitted." 15 </s> [490 U.S. 504, 515] </s> Amid controversy over Luck, a distinguished Advisory Committee appointed at the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States submitted in March 1969 the first draft of evidence rules to be used in all federal civil and criminal proceedings. 16 Rule 6-09, forerunner of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, allowed all crimen falsi and felony convictions evidence without mention of judicial discretion. 17 The Committee reasoned that "[d]angers of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, waste of time, and surprise" inherent in the admission of evidence of witness misconduct "tend to disappear or diminish" when the evidence is based on a conviction. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F. R. D. 161, 297 (1969). Having considered five options - including the Luck doctrine - for further reducing risks to a witness-accused, the Committee found none acceptable, and so proposed a rule that "adheres to the traditional practice of allowing the witness-accused to be impeached by evidence of conviction of crime, like other witnesses." Id., at 299. </s> Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee embraced the Luck doctrine in its second draft. Issued in March 1971, this version of Rule 609(a) authorized the judge to exclude either felony or crimen falsi evidence upon determination that its probative value was "substantially outweighed by the danger [490 U.S. 504, 516] of unfair prejudice." 18 Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F. R. D. 315, 391 (1971). The Committee specified that its primary concern was prejudice to the witness-accused; the "risk of unfair prejudice to a party in the use of [convictions] to impeach the ordinary witness is so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment." Advisory Committee's Note, id., at 392. Yet the text of the proposal was broad enough to allow a judge to protect not only criminal defendants, but also civil litigants and nonparty witnesses, from unfair prejudice. Cf. ibid. (safeguards in Rule 609(b), (c), (d) apply to all witnesses). </s> As had Luck's interpretation of the District of Columbia Code, the Advisory Committee's revision of Rule 609(a) met resistance. The Department of Justice urged that the Committee supplant its proposal with the strict, amended version of the District Code. Moore 609.01[1. - 7], p. VI-111. Senator McClellan objected to the adoption of the Luck doctrine and urged reinstatement of the earlier draft. 19 </s> The Advisory Committee backed off. As Senator McClellan had requested, it submitted as its third and final draft the same strict version it had proposed in March 1969. Rules of [490 U.S. 504, 517] Evidence, 56 F. R. D. 183, 269-270 (1973). The Committee's Note explained: </s> "The weight of traditional authority has been to allow use of felonies generally, without regard to the nature of the particular offense, and of crimen falsi without regard to the grade of the offense. This is the view accepted by Congress in the 1970 amendment of 14-305 of the District of Columbia Code . . . . Whatever may be the merits of [other] views, this rule is drafted to accord with the Congressional policy manifested in the 1970 legislation." Id., at 270. </s> This Court forwarded the Advisory Committee's final draft to Congress on November 20, 1972. </s> The House of Representatives did not accept the Advisory Committee's final proposal. A Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee recommended an amended version similar to the text of the present Rule 609(a), except that it avoided the current Rule's ambiguous reference to prejudice to "the defendant." Rather, in prescribing weighing of admissibility of prior felony convictions, it used the same open-ended reference to "unfair prejudice" found in the Advisory Committee's second draft. 20 </s> The House Judiciary Committee departed even further from the Advisory Committee's final recommendation, preparing a draft that did not allow impeachment by evidence of prior conviction unless the crime involved dishonesty or false [490 U.S. 504, 518] statement. 21 Motivating the change were concerns about the deterrent effect upon an accused who might wish to testify and the danger of unfair prejudice, "even upon a witness who was not the accused," from allowing impeachment by prior felony convictions regardless of their relation to the witness' veracity. H. R. Rep. No. 93-650, p. 11 (1973). Although the Committee Report focused on criminal defendants and did not mention civil litigants, its express concerns encompassed all nonaccused witnesses. </s> Representatives who advocated the automatic admissibility approach of the Advisory Committee's draft and those who favored the intermediate approach proposed by the Subcommittee both opposed the Committee's bill on the House floor. Four Members pointed out that the Rule applied in civil, as well as criminal, cases. 22 The House voted to adopt the Rule as proposed by its Judiciary Committee. [490 U.S. 504, 519] </s> The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed an intermediate path. For criminal defendants, it would have allowed impeachment only by crimen falsi evidence; for other witnesses, it also would have permitted prior felony evidence only if the trial judge found that probative value outweighed "prejudicial effect against the party offering that witness." 23 This language thus required the exercise of discretion before prior felony convictions could be admitted in civil litigation. But the full Senate, prodded by Senator McClellan, reverted to the version that the Advisory Committee had submitted. See 120 Cong. Rec. 37076, 37083 (1974). </s> Conflict between the House bill, allowing impeachment only by crimen falsi evidence, and the Senate bill, embodying the Advisory Committee's automatic admissibility approach, was resolved by a Conference Committee. 24 The [490 U.S. 504, 520] conferees' compromise - enacted as Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) - authorizes impeachment by felony convictions, "but only if" the court determines that probative value outweighs "prejudicial effect to the defendant." The Conference Committee's Report makes it perfectly clear that the balance set forth in this draft, unlike the second Advisory Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee versions, does not protect all nonparty witnesses: </s> "The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant (such as injury to the witness' reputation in his community) was considered and rejected by the Conference as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility. It was the judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, pp. 9-10 (1974). </s> Accord, Linskey v. Hecker, 753 F.2d 199, 201 (CA1 1985). Equally clear is the conferees' intention that the rule shield the accused, but not the prosecution, 25 in a criminal case. Impeachment by convictions, the Committee Report stated, "should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, supra, at 10. </s> But this emphasis on the criminal context, in the Report's use of terms such as "defendant" and "to convict" and in individual [490 U.S. 504, 521] conferees' explanations of the compromise, 26 raises some doubt over the Rule's pertinence to civil litigants. The discussions suggest that only two kinds of witnesses risk prejudice - the defendant who elects to testify in a criminal case and witnesses other than the defendant in the same kind of case. Nowhere is it acknowledged that undue prejudice to a civil litigant also may improperly influence a trial's outcome. Although this omission lends support to Judge Gibbons' opinion that "legislative oversight" caused exclusion of civil parties from Rule 609(a)(1)'s balance, see Diggs, 741 F.2d, at 583, a number of considerations persuade us that the Rule was meant to authorize a judge to weigh prejudice against no one other than a criminal defendant. </s> A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change. Cf. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 502 (1986). The weight of authority before Rule 609's adoption accorded with the Advisory Committee's final draft, admitting all felonies without exercise of judicial discretion in [490 U.S. 504, 522] either civil or criminal cases. Departures from this general rule had occurred overtly by judicial interpretation, as in Luck v. United States, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965), or in evidence codes, such as the Model Code and the Uniform Rules. Rule 609 itself explicitly adds safeguards circumscribing the common-law rule. See Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F. R. D., at 270-271. The unsubstantiated assumption that legislative oversight produced Rule 609(a)(1)'s ambiguity respecting civil trials hardly demonstrates that Congress intended silently to overhaul the law of impeachment in the civil context. Cf. NLRB v. Plasterers, 404 U.S. 116, 129 -130 (1971). </s> To the extent various drafts of Rule 609 distinguished civil and criminal cases, moreover, they did so only to mitigate prejudice to criminal defendants. Any prejudice that convictions impeachment might cause witnesses other than the accused was deemed "so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment." Advisory Committee's Note, 51 F. R. D., at 392. Far from voicing concern lest such impeachment unjustly diminish a civil witness in the eyes of the jury, Representative Hogan declared that this evidence ought to be used to measure a witness' moral value. 27 Furthermore, Representative Dennis - who in advocating a Rule limiting [490 U.S. 504, 523] impeachment to crimen falsi convictions had recognized the impeachment Rule's applicability to civil trials - not only debated the issue on the House floor, but also took part in the conference out of which Rule 609 emerged. See 120 Cong. Rec. 2377-2380, 39942, 40894-40895 (1974). These factors indicate that Rule 609(a)(1)'s textual limitation of the prejudice balance to criminal defendants resulted from deliberation, not oversight. 28 </s> Had the conferees desired to protect other parties or witnesses, they could have done so easily. Presumably they had access to all of Rule 609's precursors, particularly the drafts prepared by the House Subcommittee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, both of which protected the civil litigant as well as the criminal defendant. Alternatively, the conferees could have amended their own draft to include other parties. 29 They did not for the simple reason that they [490 U.S. 504, 524] intended that only the accused in a criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1). </s> III </s> That conclusion does not end our inquiry. We next must decide whether Rule 609(a)(1) governs all prior felonies impeachment, so that no discretion may be exercised to benefit civil parties, or whether Rule 609(a)(1)'s specific reference to the criminal defendant leaves Rule 403 balancing available in the civil context. </s> Several courts, often with scant analysis of the interrelation between Rule 403 and Rule 609(a)(1), have turned to Rule 403 to weigh prejudice and probativeness of impeaching testimony in civil cases. 30 Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Diggs, 741 F.2d, at 583, labeled this a "sensible approach." Indeed it may be. Prodigious scholarship highlighting the irrationality and unfairness of impeaching credibility with evidence of felonies unrelated to veracity indicates that judicial exercise of discretion is in order. If Congress intended otherwise, however, judges must adhere to its decision. </s> A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule. See D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). Rule 403, the more general provision, thus comes into play only if Rule 609, though specific regarding criminal defendants, does not pertain to civil witnesses. See Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 403, 56 F. R. D., at 218. The legislative history [490 U.S. 504, 525] evinces some confusion about Rule 403's applicability to a version of Rule 609 that included no balancing language. 31 That confusion is not an obstacle because the structure of the Rules as enacted resolves the question. </s> Rule 609(a) states that impeaching convictions evidence "shall be admitted." 32 With regard to subpart (2), which governs impeachment by crimen falsi convictions, it is widely [490 U.S. 504, 526] agreed that this imperative, coupled with the absence of any balancing language, bars exercise of judicial discretion pursuant to Rule 403. 33 Subpart (1), concerning felonies, is subject to the same mandatory language; accordingly, Rule 403 balancing should not pertain to this subsection either. 34 </s> Any argument that Rule 403 overrides Rule 609 loses force when one considers that the Rule contains its own weighing language, not only in subsection (a)(1), but also in sections (b), pertaining to older convictions, and (d), to juvenile adjudications. These latter balances, like Rule 609 in general, apply to both civil and criminal witnesses. See Fed. Rule Evid. 1101(b). Earlier drafts of subsection (a)(1) also contained balancing provisions that comprehended both types of witnesses; these, as we have shown, deliberately were eliminated by advocates of an automatic admissibility rule. The absence of balances within only two aspects of the Rule - crimen falsi convictions and felony convictions of witnesses other than those whose impeachment would prejudice a criminal defendant - must be given its proper effect. Thus Rule 609(a)(1)'s exclusion of civil witnesses from its weighing language is a specific command that impeachment of such witnesses be admitted, which overrides a judge's general discretionary authority under Rule 403. Courts relying on Rule 403 to balance probative value against prejudice to civil witnesses depart from the mandatory language of Rule 609. 35 </s> [490 U.S. 504, 527] </s> In summary, we hold that Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) requires a judge to permit impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior felony convictions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the party offering the testimony. Thus no error occurred when the jury in this product liability suit learned through impeaching cross-examination that plaintiff Green was a convicted felon. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F. R. D. 161, 162 (1969). </s> [Footnote 2 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." </s> [Footnote 3 Although Rule 609(b) confers discretion upon the judge regarding the admission of convictions more than 10 years old, that factor was not present in Diggs or in this case. </s> [Footnote 4 More than a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., then a Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote in a civil case: "[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit." Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). Questions about the relevancy and fairness of such evidence did not abate, see n. 11, infra, and persisted even after enactment in 1975 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. E. g., Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118 (CA5 1983); 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice 609.02, pp. VI-134 to VI-135 (2d ed. 1988) (hereinafter Moore); 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 315, pp. 316-319 (1979) (hereinafter Louisell); Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 Ford. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Note, Prior Convictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil Trials: The Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 1063 (1986). </s> [Footnote 5 Thus the text of the Rule limits impeachment of not only a criminal defendant, but also any witness offered on the defendant's behalf. Cf. S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 364-365 (3d ed. 1982) (hereinafter Saltzburg) (suggesting Congress may not have intended this result). </s> [Footnote 6 Courts considering admissibility of impeachment harmful to a civil defendant occasionally have allowed balancing without questioning Rule 609(a)'s asymmetry when applied to the civil context. E. g., Murr v. Stinson, 752 F.2d 233 (CA6 1985) (per curiam); Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158 (CA6 1981). </s> [Footnote 7 Cf. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (CA7 1987). Declaratory judgment and interpleader actions, for instance, may invert expected designations of plaintiff and defendant. See 28 U.S.C. 2201 (1982 ed., Supp. V); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 22. </s> [Footnote 8 See Shows, 695 F.2d, at 118 (prior felony impeachment of plaintiff alleging injuries because of employer's negligence "presented the risk that a jury would not be fair to Shows' claim, not because it did not believe him, but because as a convict he was not deserving of their justice"). See also Foster, 57 Ford. L. Rev., at 5, 21-22; Note, 54 Ford. L. Rev., at 1067. </s> [Footnote 9 Accord, Moore 609.144., at VI-148 ("[S]ubsection (a)(1) is deficient, in that it cannot be sensibly applied in civil cases"); Louisell 316, at 324, n. 26 ("It would be incongruous to read the provision as allowing exclusion of convictions of defendants in civil cases, since no reason appears to distinguish among the parties in civil litigation"). </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., Moore 609.02, at VI-134; E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 43, p. 93 (3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter Cleary). While a Court of Appeals Judge, William Howard Taft, having determined that both common law and an Ohio statute permitted prior felonies impeachment in criminal cases, stated: "It is difficult to see any reason why the legislature should permit the credibility of a witness in a criminal case to be attacked by proof of former conviction, but should withhold such permission in civil cases." Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Rambo, 59 F. 75, 79 (CA6 1893). He concluded that evidence that a civil defendant's witness had been convicted of burglary could be admitted as impeachment, though not in the plaintiff's case in chief. See also Wounick v. Hysmith, 423 F.2d 873 (CA3 1970) (Circuit precedent permitted admission of all crimen falsi convictions); Oklahoma ex rel. Nesbitt v. Allied Materials Corp., 312 F. Supp. 130, 133 (WD Okla. 1968); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 33 F. R. D. 283, 285 (WD Mo. 1962). </s> [Footnote 11 In a seminal article, Dean Ladd questioned the traditional rule's "premise, that the doing of an act designated by organized society as a crime is itself an indication of testimonial unreliability," and advocated barring impeachment by evidence of convictions bearing no relation to a witness' truthfulness. Ladd, Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, 176, 191 (1940). See also McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Conviction, 1970 Law & Social Order 1 (hereafter McGowan); Comments following A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106, pp. 128-129 (1942). Among those who seemed to strain against the conventional rule was Judge Learned Hand, who, in allowing impeachment of a civil antitrust defendant by evidence of a nolo contendere plea, wrote: "[S]o far as we can see, the greater number of jurisdictions allow the conviction as evidence to impeach a witness. Where there is a doubt as to the competency of evidence, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 43(a) . . . admonishes us to admit it rather than to exclude it; and for that reason we think it should have been here admitted. In all such cases there is of course the danger that the jury will use the plea as an admission of the `operative' facts; but that is equally true of a conviction on a plea of guilty or on a verdict. Whether the attempt is ever practicable to limit its use to the witness's credibility, and whether, if not, its use is an injustice, are not [490 U.S. 504, 513] open questions for us." Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779, 785 (CA2 1947). See also Pasternak v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 417 F.2d 1292 (CA10 1969) (exercising discretion despite contrary state rule); Ruffalo's Trucking Service, Inc. v. National Ben-Franklin Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.2d 949 (CA2 1957) (holding state law permits discretion). </s> [Footnote 12 Model Code of Evidence, Rule 2 (1942). </s> [Footnote 13 This blending of Rules 106 and 303 is justified by the latter Rule's provision that "[a]ll Rules stating evidence to be admissible are subject to this Rule unless the contrary is expressly stated." See Rule 303(2). </s> [Footnote 14 Writing for the Court of Appeals' panel, Judge McGowan explained: "The trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The statute, in our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case. There may well be cases where the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story than by the defendant's foregoing [sic] that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction. There may well be other cases where the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. This last is, of course, a standard which trial judges apply every day in other contexts; and we think it has both utility and applicability in this field." Luck v. United States, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 151, 156, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (1965) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 15 Section 133(b) of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 551, D.C. Code Ann. 14-305(b) (1967 ed., Supp. IV 1971), provided in part that "for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if [490 U.S. 504, 515] offered, . . . but only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment)." </s> [Footnote 16 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F. R. D. 161 (1969); see Rule 11-01(b), id., at 417. </s> [Footnote 17 The first draft provided: "(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment." Id., at 295-296. </s> [Footnote 18 The second draft of Rule 609(a) provided: "General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3) in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F. R. D. 315, 391 (1971) (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 19 "If the 1970 Crime Act is to be overturned," McClellan wrote in a letter to Judge Maris, the Advisory Committee's chairman, "I suggest that this is a question for the Congress to decide." Supplement to Hearings on the Proposed Rules of Evidence before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 54 (1973). </s> [Footnote 20 The formulation of the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Judiciary Committee provided: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, unless the Court determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement." H. R. Rep. No. 93-650, p. 11 (1973). Compare ibid., with Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) and Proposed Rule of Evidence 609(a), 51 F. R. D., at 391. </s> [Footnote 21 The version sent to the full House by the Judiciary Committee simply provided: "(a) General Rule. - For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement." 120 Cong. Rec. 2374 (1974). </s> [Footnote 22 Seeking to substitute the Advisory Committee's final draft for the House Judiciary Committee version, Representative Hogan declared that his "amendment would benefit parties on all sides of litigation - the civil plaintiffs and civil defendants, the Government in prosecutions and the criminal defendant." 120 Cong. Rec. 2376 (1974). Representative Dennis, defending the version that he had shepherded through the House Judiciary Committee and onto the House floor, maintained that it too "does not apply only to a man who is a defendant in a criminal case, but it applies to any witness. Under the rule that the gentleman has in his amendment, if 20 years ago you were guilty of some misdemeanor and were called in as a witness in a civil case, then they could ask you about it, although that case had nothing to do with the case on trial before you." Id., at 2377. "The difficulty here," Representative Wiggins foresaw, "is we are dealing with a complex problem and are trying to fashion a single rule adequate to take care of the problem . . . . [F]urther draftsmanship is necessary to [490 U.S. 504, 519] spin off criminal cases from civil cases, to separate the nonparty witness problem from the party witness problem. As we deal with the total problem under a single rule, we create all this uncertainty and the possibility of inequity . . . ." Id., at 2379. Supporting Representative Hogan's rule of admissibility for all felonies, Representative Lott commented: "[I]t is essential to recognize that this is a rule that would have application in both civil and criminal cases, and which would apply not only to witnesses for the defense, but witnesses for the plaintiff or the prosecution as well. . . . [A] jury is entitled to all the evidence bearing on the witness's tendency to tell the truth." Id., at 2381. </s> [Footnote 23 S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 14 (1974). The Senate Judiciary Committee's actual draft was even less specific on this point, stating: "(a) General Rule. - For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime may be elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) involved dishonesty or false statement or (2) in the case of witnesses other than the accused, was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, but only if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." 120 Cong. Rec. 37076 (1974). </s> [Footnote 24 Cf. 120 Cong. Rec. 40894 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis) ("[I]n conference, we came up with a compromise which does not suit me 100 percent, [490 U.S. 504, 520] but which is a slight advance over the present law. It is the best we thought we could do . . ."). </s> [Footnote 25 As one Conference Committee Member explained: "[N]ow a defendant can cross examine a government witness about any of his previous felony convictions; he can always do it, because that will not prejudice him in anyway. . . . Only the government is going to be limited . . . ." Ibid. (remarks of Rep. Dennis). See also Cleary 43, at 94; Louisell 316, at 325. </s> [Footnote 26 Representative Dennis, who had stressed in earlier debates that the Rule would apply to both civil and criminal cases, see 120 Cong. Rec. 2377 (1974), explained the benefits of the Rule for criminal defendants and made no reference to benefits for civil litigants when he said: "[Y]ou can ask about all . . . felonies on cross examination, only if you can convince the court, and the burden is on the government, which is an important change in the law, that the probative value of the question is greater than the damage to the defendant; and that is damage or prejudice to the defendant alone." Id., at 40894 (emphases supplied). In the same debate Representative Hogan manifested awareness of the Rule's broad application. While supporting the compromise, he reiterated his preference for a rule "that, for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, even if the witness happens to be the defendant in a criminal case, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible and may be used to challenge that witness' credibility if the crime is a felony or is a misdemeanor involving dishonesty of [sic] false statement." Id., at 40895 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 27 "Suppose some governmental body instituted a civil action for damages, and the defendant called a witness who had been previously convicted of malicious destruction of public property. Under the committee's formulation, the convictions could not be used to impeach the witness' credibility since the crimes did not involve dishonesty or false statement. Yet, in the hypothetical case, as in any case in which the government was a party, justice would seem to me to require that the jury know that the witness had been carrying on some private war against society. Should a witness with an antisocial background be allowed to stand on the same basis of believability before juries as law-abiding citizens with unblemished records? I think not. . . . . . "Personally I am more concerned about the moral worth of individuals capable of engaging in such outrageous acts as adversely reflecting on a witness' character than I am of thieves . . . ." Id., at 2376. </s> [Footnote 28 Cf. Foster, 57 Ford. L. Rev., at 8 ("[T]his rule emerged in its present form as a deliberate, yet uneasy compromise between opposing positions in a sharply-divided Congress"). </s> [Footnote 29 For example, the current Uniform Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), promulgated in 1974, simply inserted "to a party or the witness" in place of "to the defendant" in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). See also Louisell 314, at 310-315; id., at 147-156 (Supp. 1988) (detailing States' revisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 609). Recently, two Advisory Committees proposed versions of Rule 609(a)(1) that expressly protect all witnesses. The preliminary draft of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States provides that a witness other than a criminal defendant may be impeached by a conviction for a felony unrelated to truthfulness only after balancing according to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Meanwhile, the Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence of the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section recommends deleting "to the defendant" from Rule 609(a)(1), thus requiring courts simply to "determin[e] that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." Federal Rules of Evidence: A Fresh Review and Evaluation 56 (1987). </s> [Footnote 30 The most extensive discussion reaching this result occurs in Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191 (CA6 1988). More frequently, courts employ Rule 403 without resolving the applicability of Rule 609(a)(1), as in Jones v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 844 F.2d 500 (CA8 1988), cert. pending, No. 88-5468; Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277 (CA4 1987); Radtke v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 707 F.2d 999 (CA8 1983); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317 (CA8 1983); and Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114 (CA5 1983). Accord, Hannah v. Overland, 795 F.2d 1385 (CA8 1986) (applying Rule 403 without mentioning Rule 609(a)(1)); Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968 (CA1 1986) (same). </s> [Footnote 31 Illustrative is this colloquy during the testimony before the House Subcommittee of Henry J. Friendly, then Chief Judge of the Second Circuit: "Judge FRIENDLY. . . . [O]f course, there is the overriding rule that the judge can always exclude testimony where probative value he thinks is outweighed by its prejudicial effect and perhaps in the case we are discussing he should do that. "Mr. HUNGATE. Would that be true with or without the rules? "Judge FRIENDLY. That is true today. "Mr. HUNGATE. Would it remain true if these rules became effective? "Judge FRIENDLY. I assume they have such a rule in here. I could easily check. "Mr. DENNIS. It seems to me if he has to follow this rule he does not have much discretion. Maybe he still could rule something out. I am not sure. . . . . . "Mr. HUNGATE. I believe section 403 is the rule to which you are referring. . . . "Judge FRIENDLY. I think . . . Congressman [Dennis'] point is a good one. You have the problem: Does that apply when there is a specific rule on the subject? This just says relevant evidence may be excluded if it has this effect. But then somebody is going to argue, this other rule dealt very specifically with the question and rule 403 is out. I don't know what the answer would be." Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 251-252 (1973). See also 120 Cong. Rec. 2381 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Lott) (suggesting that if automatic admissibility rule were adopted, Rule 403 balancing would be available). Cf. Campbell, 831 F.2d, at 705. </s> [Footnote 32 The process by which Congress changed the District of Columbia Code to provide that impeaching evidence "shall," not "may," be admitted, see supra, at 514, makes it evident that this mandatory language was intended. Contra, Saltzburg 366. </s> [Footnote 33 E. g., United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496 (CA7 1984); United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65 (CA3) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 842 (1983); Cleary 43, at 95; 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 416, p. 554 (1982); Saltzburg 366. </s> [Footnote 34 See Foster, 57 Ford. L. Rev., at 15 ("It strains logic to view Rule 403 as modifying one subsection of a specific rule containing its own balancing proviso, but not as modifying the other subsection, where neither the rule nor its legislative history reveals any intent to invoke Rule 403's residual discretion"); see also Campbell, 831 F.2d, at 705. </s> [Footnote 35 Accord, id., at 706 ("[W]here, as in Rule 609(a), Congress has taken pains to specify the conditions for both the admission and the exclusion of a [490 U.S. 504, 527] specific class of evidence (convictions), district courts may not use Rule 403 to set that specification at naught"). </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment. </s> We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result. Our task is to give some alternative meaning to the word "defendant" in Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) that avoids this consequence; and then to determine whether Rule 609(a)(1) excludes the operation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. </s> I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including the background of Rule 609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition (civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of weighing prejudice) was indeed unthought of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word "defendant" in the Rule. For that purpose, however, it would suffice to observe that counsel have not provided, nor have we discovered, a shred of evidence that anyone has ever proposed or assumed such a bizarre disposition. The Court's opinion, however, goes well beyond this. Approximately four-fifths of its substantive analysis is devoted to examining the evolution of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, from the 1942 Model Code of Evidence, to the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, to the 1965 Luck case and the 1970 statute overruling it, to the Subcommittee, [490 U.S. 504, 528] Committee, and Conference Committee Reports, and to the so-called floor debates on Rule 609 - all with the evident purpose, not merely of confirming that the word "defendant" cannot have been meant literally, but of determining what, precisely, the Rule does mean. </s> I find no reason to believe that any more than a handful of the Members of Congress who enacted Rule 609 were aware of its interesting evolution from the 1942 Model Code; or that any more than a handful of them (if any) voted, with respect to their understanding of the word "defendant" and the relationship between Rule 609 and Rule 403, on the basis of the referenced statements in the Subcommittee, Committee, or Conference Committee Reports, or floor debates - statements so marginally relevant, to such minute details, in such relatively inconsequential legislation. The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated - a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative material discussed by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these factors suggest. </s> I would analyze this case, in brief, as follows: </s> (1) The word "defendant" in Rule 609(a)(1) cannot rationally (or perhaps even constitutionally) mean to provide the benefit of prejudice-weighing to civil defendants and not civil plaintiffs. Since petitioner has not produced, and we have not ourselves discovered, even a snippet of support for this absurd result, we may confidently assume that the word was [490 U.S. 504, 529] not used (as it normally would be) to refer to all defendants and only all defendants. </s> (2) The available alternatives are to interpret "defendant" to mean (a) "civil plaintiff, civil defendant, prosecutor, and criminal defendant," (b) "civil plaintiff and defendant and criminal defendant," or (c) "criminal defendant." Quite obviously, the last does least violence to the text. It adds a qualification that the word "defendant" does not contain but, unlike the others, does not give the word a meaning ("plaintiff" or "prosecutor") it simply will not bear. The qualification it adds, moreover, is one that could understandably have been omitted by inadvertence - and sometimes is omitted in normal conversation ("I believe strongly in defendants' rights"). Finally, this last interpretation is consistent with the policy of the law in general and the Rules of Evidence in particular of providing special protection to defendants in criminal cases. * </s> (3) As well described by the Court, the "structure of the Rules," ante, at 525, makes it clear that Rule 403 is not to be applied in addition to Rule 609(a)(1). </s> I am frankly not sure that, despite its lengthy discussion of ideological evolution and legislative history, the Court's reasons for both aspects of its decision are much different from mine. I respectfully decline to join that discussion, however, because it is natural for the bar to believe that the juridical [490 U.S. 504, 530] importance of such material matches its prominence in our opinions - thus producing a legal culture in which, when counsel arguing before us assert that "Congress has said" something, they now frequently mean, by "Congress," a committee report; and in which it was not beyond the pale for a recent brief to say the following: "Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful. Thus, we turn to the other guidepost in this difficult area, statutory language." Brief for Petitioner in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, O. T. 1988, No. 87-2084, p. 21. </s> For the reasons stated, I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> [Footnote * Acknowledging the statutory ambiguity, the dissent would read "defendant" to mean "any party" because, it says, this interpretation "extend[s] the protection of judicial supervision to a larger class of litigants" than the interpretation the majority and I favor, which "takes protection away from litigants." Post, at 534-535. But neither side in this dispute can lay claim to generosity without begging the policy question whether judicial supervision is better than the automatic power to impeach. We could as well say - and with much more support in both prior law, see ante, at 511-512, and this Court's own recommendation, see ante, at 517 - that our reading "extend[s] the protection of [the right to impeach with prior felony convictions] to a larger class of litigants" than the dissent's interpretation, which "takes protection away from litigants." </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) has attracted much attention during its relatively short life. This is due in no small part to its poor and inartful drafting. See, e. g., 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice 609.144., p. V-148 (2d ed. 1988); Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 Ford. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988); Younger, Three Essays on Character and Credibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 Hofstra L. Rev. 7, 11-12 (1976); Savikas, New Concepts in Impeachment: Rule 609(a), Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 Chicago Bar Rec. 76 (1975). As noted by the majority, ante, at 510-511, the Rule's use of the word "defendant" creates inescapable ambiguity. The majority concludes that Rule 609(a)(1) cannot mean what it says on its face. Ante, at 511. I fully agree. </s> I fail to see, however, why we are required to solve this riddle of statutory interpretation by reading the inadvertent word "defendant" to mean "criminal defendant." I am persuaded that a better interpretation of the Rule would allow the trial court to consider the risk of prejudice faced by any party, not just a criminal defendant. Applying the balancing provisions of Rule 609(a)(1) to all parties would have prevented the admission of unnecessary and inflammatory [490 U.S. 504, 531] evidence in this case and would prevent other similar unjust results until Rule 609(a) is repaired, as it must be. The result the Court reaches today, in contrast, endorses "the irrationality and unfairness," ante, at 524, of denying the trial court the ability to weigh the risk of prejudice to any party before admitting evidence of a prior felony for purposes of impeachment. </s> A </s> The majority's lengthy recounting of the legislative history of Rule 609, ante, at 513-514, demonstrates why almost all that history is entitled to very little weight. Because the proposed rule changed so often - and finally was enacted as a compromise between the House and the Senate - much of the commentary cited by the majority concerns versions different from the Rule Congress finally enacted. </s> The only item of legislative history that focuses on the Rule as enacted is the Report of the Conference Committee, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597 (1974). Admittedly, language in the Report supports the majority's position: the Report mirrors the Rule in emphasizing the prejudicial effect on the defendant, and also uses the word "convict" to describe the potential outcome. Id., at 9-10. But the Report's draftsmanship is no better than the Rule's, and the Report's plain language is no more reliable an indicator of Congress' intent than is the plain language of the Rule itself. </s> Because the slipshod drafting of Rule 609(a)(1) demonstrates that clarity of language was not the Conference's forte, I prefer to rely on the underlying reasoning of the Report, rather than on its unfortunate choice of words, in ascertaining the Rule's proper scope. The Report's treatment of the Rule's discretionary standard consists of a single paragraph. After noting that the Conference was concerned with prejudice to a defendant, the Report, at 9-10, states: </s> "The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant (such as injury to the witness' reputation in his community) was considered and rejected by the Conference [490 U.S. 504, 532] as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility. It was the judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible. Such evidence should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record." </s> The Report indicates that the Conference determined that any felony conviction has sufficient relevance to a witness' credibility to be admitted, even if the felony had nothing directly to do with truthfulness or honesty. In dealing with the question of undue prejudice, however, the Conference drew a line: it distinguished between two types of prejudice, only one of which it permitted the trial court to consider. </s> As the Conference observed, admitting a prior conviction will always "prejudice" a witness, who, of course, would prefer that the conviction not be revealed to the public. The Report makes clear, however, that this kind of prejudice to the witness' life outside the courtroom is not to be considered in the judicial balancing required by Rule 609(a)(1). Rather, the kind of prejudice the court is instructed to be concerned with is prejudice which "presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial." Congress' solution to that kind of prejudice was to require judicial supervision: the conviction may be admitted only if "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant." Rule 609(a)(1). </s> Although the Conference expressed its concern in terms of the effect on a criminal defendant, the potential for prejudice to the outcome at trial exists in any type of litigation, whether criminal or civil, and threatens all parties to the litigation. The Report and the Rule are best read as expressing Congress' preference for judicial balancing whenever there is a chance that justice shall be denied a party because [490 U.S. 504, 533] of the unduly prejudicial nature of a witness' past conviction for a crime that has no direct bearing on the witness' truthfulness. In short, the reasoning of the Report suggests that by "prejudice to the defendant," Congress meant "prejudice to a party," as opposed to the prejudicial effect of the revelation of a prior conviction to the witness' own reputation. </s> B </s> It may be correct, as JUSTICE SCALIA notes in his opinion concurring in the judgment, that interpreting "prejudicial effect to the defendant" to include only "prejudicial effect to [a] criminal defendant," and not prejudicial effect to other categories of litigants as well, does the "least violence to the text," ante, at 529, if what we mean by "violence" is the interpolation of excess words or the deletion of existing words. But the reading endorsed by JUSTICE SCALIA and the majority does violence to the logic of the only rationale Members of Congress offered for the Rule they adopted. </s> Certainly the possibility that admission of a witness' past conviction will improperly determine the outcome at trial is troubling when the witness' testimony is in support of a criminal defendant. The potential, however, is no less real for other litigants. Unlike JUSTICE SCALIA, I do not approach the Rules of Evidence, which by their terms govern both civil and criminal proceedings, with the presumption that their general provisions should be read to "provid[e] special protection to defendants in criminal cases." Ibid. Rather, the Rules themselves specify that they "shall be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined" in all cases. Rule 102. The majority's result does not achieve that end. </s> C </s> The interpretation the majority adopts today, which limits the word "defendant" to mean less than it appears to mean on its face, creates an additional danger: the Rule as so interpreted [490 U.S. 504, 534] is a trap for the unwary. As noted by the majority, the "Rule's plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial as well as in a criminal trial." Ante, at 509. One of the primary purposes for enacting a set of evidentiary rules is to present precise answers to frequently posed questions. "A codification should be so wrought that it supplies answers to a lawyer's questions simpler, more comprehensible, and more easily found than those the lawyer could discover without the codification." Younger, Introduction, Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 251, 252 (1984). Relying on the plain language of Rule 609(a)(1), an attorney representing a civil defendant might well instruct his client's witness to take the stand, believing that a judge would pass upon the question whether "the probative value of admitting" the evidence of his prior conviction "outweighs its prejudicial effect." Yet under the majority's view, reliance on the plain language of the Rule would have been error on counsel's part. Now every lawyer who takes Rule 609(a) at face value will commit the same error, until the language of the Rule is changed. While in theory it is easy to presume that every busy practicing attorney keeps abreast of every single one of this Court's decisions, in the "real world" this obviously is not the case. The implications of the majority's opinion today require every lawyer who relies upon a Federal Rule of Evidence, or a Federal Rule of Criminal, Civil, or Appellate Procedure, to look beyond the plain language of the Rule in order to determine whether this Court, or some court controlling within the jurisdiction, has adopted an interpretation that takes away the protection the plain language of the Rule provides. </s> D </s> As I see it, therefore, our choice is between two interpretations of Rule 609(a)(1), neither of which is completely consistent with the Rule's plain language. The majority's interpretation takes protection away from litigants - i. e., civil [490 U.S. 504, 535] defendants - who would have every reason to believe themselves entitled to the judicial balancing offered by the Rule. The alternative interpretation - which I favor - also departs somewhat from the plain language, but does so by extending the protection of judicial supervision to a larger class of litigants - i. e., to all parties. Neither result is compelled by the statutory language or the legislative history, but for me the choice between them is an easy one. I find it proper, as a general matter and under the dictates of Rule 102, to construe the Rule so as to avoid "unnecessary hardship," see Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933), and to produce a sensible result. See, e. g., sources listed by the Court, ante, at 512-513, n. 11. </s> This case should have been decided on the basis of whether the Bock Laundry Machine Company designed and sold a dangerously defective machine without providing adequate warnings. The fact that Paul Green was a convicted felon, in a work-release program at a county prison, has little, if anything, to do with these issues. We cannot know precisely why the jury refused to compensate him for the sad and excruciating loss of his arm, but there is a very real possibility that it was influenced improperly by his criminal record. I believe that this is not a result Congress conceivably could have intended, and it is not a result this Court should endorse. </s> As the majority concludes otherwise, my hope is that Rule 609(a)(1) will be corrected without delay, preferably into a form that allows judicial oversight over, at the least, the use of any felony conviction that does not bear directly on a witness' honesty. It is encouraging that some efforts in this direction appear to be underway, see ante, at 523, n. 29, and that the damage Congress caused by its poor draftsmanship soon may be undone. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [490 U.S. 504, 536]

United States Supreme Court F. D. RICH CO., v. INDUSTRIAL LUMBER CO.(1974) No. 72-1382 Argued: January 9, 1974Decided: May 28, 1974 </s> Petitioner F. D. Rich Co., the prime contractor on a federal housing project in California, had two separate contracts for the project with Cerpac Co., one contract being for Cerpac to select, modify, detail, and install all custom millwork and the other being for Cerpac to supply all exterior plywood. Cerpac in turn ordered the lumber called for under the plywood contract from respondent. When Rich needed plywood for another project in South Carolina, one of the shipments called for by respondent's contract with Cerpac was diverted to South Carolina. When Cerpac defaulted on its payments to respondent for the plywood, including the South Carolina shipment, respondent gave notice to Rich and its surety of a Miller Act claim and thereafter brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California where the California project was located. Finding that Cerpac was a "subcontractor" within the meaning of the Miller Act, rather than merely a materialman, that hence respondent could assert a Miller Act claim against Rich, and that venue for suit on the South Carolina as well as the California shipments properly lay, under 40 U.S.C. 270b (b), in the Eastern District of California, the District Court granted judgment for respondent for the amount due on the unpaid invoices, but denied its claim for attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed in large part, but held that attorneys' fees should be awarded respondent. Held: </s> 1. Based on the substantiality and importance of its relationship with the prime contractor, MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102 , Cerpac was clearly a subcontractor for Miller Act purposes, considering not just its plywood contract but also its custom millwork contract on the California project. Moreover, Cerpac and Rich had closely interrelated management and financial structures, and their relationship on the California [417 U.S. 116, 117] project was the same as on many other similar projects; hence it would have been easy for Rich to secure itself from loss as a result of Cerpac's default. Pp. 121-124. </s> 2. Venue for suit on the South Carolina shipment properly lay in the Eastern District of California, since there was clearly a sufficient nexus for satisfaction of 270b (b)'s venue requirements. The contract between Cerpac and respondent was executed in California, all materials thereunder to be delivered to the California worksite. California remained the site for performance of the original contract despite the diversion of one shipment to South Carolina. There was no showing of prejudice resulting from the case's being heard in California and considerations of judicial economy and convenience supported venue in the court where all of respondent's claims could be adjudicated in a single proceeding. Pp. 124-126. </s> 3. Attorneys' fees were improperly awarded respondent. Pp. 126-131. </s> (a) The Court of Appeals erred in construing the Miller Act to require the award by reference to the "public policy" of the State in which suit was brought, since the Act provides a federal cause of action and there is no evidence of any congressional intent to incorporate state law to govern such an important element of Miller Act litigation as liability for attorneys' fees. Pp. 127-128. </s> (b) The provision of the Miller Act in 40 U.S.C. 270b (a) that claimants should recover the "sums justly due," does not require the award of attorneys' fees on the asserted ground that without such fee shifting, claimants would not be fully compensated. To hold otherwise would amount to judicial obviation of the "American Rule" that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable in federal litigation in the absence of a statute or contract providing therefor, in the context of everyday commercial litigation, where the policies which underlie the limited judicially created departures from the rule are inapplicable. Pp. 128-131. </s> 473 F.2d 720, affirmed in part and reversed in part. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 131. [417 U.S. 116, 118] </s> Lawrence Gochberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Otto Rohwer and Ronald N. Paul. </s> Dennis S. Harlowe argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was E. M. Murray. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793, as amended, 80 Stat. 1139, 40 U.S.C. 270a et seq., requires a Government contractor 1 to post a surety bond "for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work provided for" in the contract. The Act further provides that any person who has so furnished labor or material and who has not been paid in full within 90 days after the last labor was performed or material supplied may bring suit on the payment bond for the unpaid balance. 40 U.S.C. 270b (a). This case presents several unresolved issues of importance in the administration of the Act. </s> I </s> Between 1961 and 1968, petitioner F. D. Rich Co. was the prime contractor on numerous federal housing projects. During the years 1963-1966, much if not all of the plywood and millwork for these projects was supplied by Cerpac Co. The Cerpac organization was closely intertwined with Rich. The principals of Rich held a substantial voting interest in Cerpac stock, supplied a major share of its working capital, and were thoroughly familiar with its operations and financial condition. </s> On October 18, 1965, Rich contracted with the United States to build 337 family housing units at Beale Air [417 U.S. 116, 119] Force Base, California. Rich's Miller Act surety, petitioner Transamerica Insurance Co., posted the payment bond required by the Act. Rich then awarded Cerpac two contracts on the project, one to select, modify, detail, and install all custom millwork, and one merely to supply all standard exterior plywood, each contract incorporating by reference terms of the prime contract. A similar arrangement was employed by Rich and Cerpac on other projects during this period. </s> On February 22, 1966, Cerpac placed a single order with respondent Industrial Lumber Co. for all exterior plywood required under its plywood contract for the Beale project. Industrial is a broker, purchasing wood products and materials for resale. It acknowledged the complete Cerpac order, purchased the plywood from its own suppliers and arranged for deliveries at the Beale site to begin on March 10, 1966. Each shipment was receipted as it arrived on the site by a Rich representative. </s> Shortly after Industrial's shipments began, Rich informed Cerpac that more plywood was needed for another Government project being constructed in Charleston, South Carolina, for which Cerpac had also contracted to supply Rich with all exterior plywood. Rich and Cerpac decided to divert some of the Beale lumber to Charleston. Accordingly, Industrial was advised to supply a shipment of the plywood called for under its Beale contract with Cerpac to the South Carolina site. Industrial arranged for the wood to be shipped by one of its suppliers to a railhead near Charleston. The shipment diverted to South Carolina was one of 22 called for by Industrial's Beale Contract. 2 There were several subsequent shipments to the California site under that contract. [417 U.S. 116, 120] </s> During April and May 1966, Cerpac fell behind in its payments to Industrial, and on July 13, 1966, having not received payment on invoices for nine separate shipments, Industrial gave notice to Rich and its surety of a Miller Act claim and thereafter brought the instant action in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California. 3 The District Court recognized that under our decision in MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102 (1944), Rich's liability turned on whether Cerpac was a "subcontractor" within the meaning of the Act or merely a materialman. The District Court found that Cerpac was a subcontractor; hence Industrial, as its supplier, could assert a Miller Act claim against Rich, the prime contractor on the project. The District Court also rejected Rich's claim that venue for suit on the South Carolina shipment was improper in the Eastern District of California. Accordingly, the District Court granted judgment for Industrial, holding Cerpac 4 and Rich as primary obligees and Transamerica on its bond, jointly and severally liable for the amount of all nine unpaid invoices, $31,402.97, including the amount [417 U.S. 116, 121] due on the shipment diverted to South Carolina. The District Court, however, denied Industrial's claim for attorneys' fees. </s> Both Rich and Industrial appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Rich in large part. 5 On Industrial's cross-appeal, the court reversed, holding that attorneys' fees should have been awarded to Industrial as a successful plaintiff under the Miller Act, and remanded to the District Court for consideration of the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded. 473 F.2d 720 (CA9 1973). We granted certiorari. 6 </s> 414 U.S. 816 (1973). We affirm the judgment below to the extent it holds that Cerpac was a "subcontractor" for Miller Act purposes and that there was proper venue, but reverse as to the propriety of an award of attorneys' fees. </s> II </s> Section 270a (a) (2) of the Miller Act establishes the general requirement of a payment bond to protect those who supply labor or materials to a contractor on a federal [417 U.S. 116, 122] project. Ordinarily, a supplier of labor or materials on a private construction project can secure a mechanic's lien against the improved property under state law. But a lien cannot attach to Government property, see Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 (1917), so suppliers on Government projects are deprived of their usual security interest. The Miller Act was intended to provide an alternative remedy to protect the rights of these suppliers. </s> The rights afforded by the Act are limited, however, by the proviso of 270b (a). In MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Tomkins Co., supra, this Court construed 270b (a) to limit the protection of a Miller Act bond to those who had a contractual agreement with the prime contractor or with a "subcontractor." Those in more remote relationships, including persons supplying labor or material to a mere materialman, were found not to be protected. 322 U.S., at 109 -111. Industrial was a supplier of materials to Cerpac. Thus, if Cerpac were a subcontractor for purposes of the Act, Industrial, having given the required statutory notice, could assert a Miller Act claim against Rich, the prime contractor. But, if Cerpac were merely a materialman, Industrial could not assert its Miller Act claim since it would be merely a supplier of materials to a materialman, a relationship found too remote in MacEvoy to enjoy the protections of the Act. </s> Petitioners assert that the courts below erred in finding Cerpac a subcontractor. Cerpac's role under the plywood contract alone was that of a broker receiving standard lumber supplied by Industrial and, in turn, supplying it without modification to Rich. Petitioners argue that the court should not have looked beyond the plywood contract to determine Cerpac's status under the Act. [417 U.S. 116, 123] </s> In MacEvoy, supra, the Court adopted a functional rather than a technical definition for the term subcontractor, as used in the proviso. The Court noted that a subcontractor is "one who performs for and takes from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the original contract . . . ." 322 U.S., at 109 . The Court went on to explain the reason for the exclusion from the protections of the Act of suppliers of mere materialmen as opposed to those who supply subcontractors: </s> "The relatively few subcontractors who perform part of the original contract represent in a sense the prime contractor and are well known to him. It is easy for the prime contractor to secure himself against loss by requiring the subcontractors to give security by bond, or otherwise, for the payment of those who contract directly with the subcontractors. . . . But this method of protection is generally inadequate to cope with remote and undeterminable liabilities incurred by an ordinary materialman, who may be a manufacturer, a wholesaler or a retailer." Id., at 110. (Emphasis added.) </s> The Court of Appeals properly construed our holding in MacEvoy to establish as a test for whether one is a subcontractor, the substantiality and importance of his relationship with the prime contractor. 7 It is the substantiality of the relationship which will usually determine whether the prime contractor can protect himself, since he can easily require bond security or other protection from those few "subcontractors" with whom he has a [417 U.S. 116, 124] substantial relationship in the performance of the contract. </s> Measured against that test, Cerpac was clearly a subcontractor for the purposes of the Act. The Miller Act is "highly remedial [and] entitled to a liberal construction and application in order properly to effectuate the Congressional intent to protect those whose labor and materials go into public projects." MacEvoy, supra, at 107. It is consistent with that intent to look at the total relationship between Cerpac and Rich, not just the contract to supply exterior plywood, to determine whether Cerpac was a subcontractor. 8 Cerpac had not only agreed to supply standard plywood but also had a separate contract to select, modify, detail, and install all custom millwork for the Beale project. Cerpac, in effect, took over a substantial part of the prime contract itself. Moreover, the management and financial structures of the two companies were closely interrelated and their relationship on the Beale project was the same as on many other similar Government projects during the same period. Cerpac was, as the Court of Appeals observed, "in a special, integral, almost symbiotic relationship [with] Rich." 473 F.2d, at 724. It would have been easy for Rich to secure itself from loss as a result of a default by Cerpac. </s> III </s> We also agree with the courts below that venue under the Miller Act for suit on the shipment diverted to South Carolina properly lay in the Eastern District of California. The Act provides: </s> "Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in . . . the United States District Court for [417 U.S. 116, 125] any district in which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere . . . ." 40 U.S.C. 270b (b). </s> Petitioners argue that this provision bars a district court in California 9 from adjudicating respondent's claims arising from the shipments of plywood delivered in South Carolina. But 270b (b) is merely a venue requirement 10 and there was clearly a sufficient nexus for its satisfaction. The "Beale 647" contract between Cerpac and Industrial was executed in California, all of the materials described therein to be delivered to a worksite in that State. Although one of the 22 shipments made pursuant to the contract was later diverted to South Carolina for petitioner Rich's convenience, the site for performance of the original contract remained the same for Miller Act purposes. 11 Several shipments to the Beale site were made after the South Carolina shipment. Moreover, petitioners have pointed to no prejudice resulting from the case's being heard in the California court and considerations of judicial economy and convenience clearly support venue in the [417 U.S. 116, 126] District Court where all of respondent's claims arising from the "Beale 647" contract could be adjudicated in a single proceeding. </s> IV </s> We turn now to the question of whether attorneys' fees were properly awarded respondent as a successful Miller Act plaintiff. The so-called "American Rule" governing the award of attorneys' fees in litigation in the federal courts is that attorneys' fees "are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). There was no contractual provision concerning attorneys' fees in this case. Nor does the Miller Act explicitly provide for an award of attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff. But the Court of Appeals construed the Act to require an award of attorneys' fees where the "public policy" of the State in which suit was brought allows for the award of fees in similar contexts. The court reasoned that the Act provides remedies "`in lieu of the lien upon land and buildings customary where property is owned by private persons' . . . . The federal remedy was intended to substitute for the unavailable state remedy of the lien. Therefore, if state [law] allows a supplier on private projects to recover such fees, there is no reason for a different rule to apply to federal projects . . . ." 12 Looking to California law, the Court of Appeals found an award of attorneys' fees proper because Cal. Govt. Code 4207 (1966) allowed for the recovery of attorneys' [417 U.S. 116, 127] fees in state actions on the bonds of contractors for state and municipal public works projects. 13 </s> We think the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of the statute. The Miller Act provides a federal cause of action, and the scope of the remedy as well as the substance of the rights created thereby is a matter of federal not state law. Neither respondent nor the court below offers any evidence of congressional intent to incorporate state law to govern such an important element of Miller Act litigation as liability for attorneys' fees. Many federal contracts involve construction in more than one State, and often, as here, the parties to Miller Act litigation have little or no contact, other than the contract itself, with the State in which the federal project is located. The reasonable expectations of such potential litigants are better served by a rule of uniform national application. </s> A uniform rule also avoids many of the pitfalls which have already manifested themselves in using state law referents. For example, California law does not provide for awards of attorneys' fees in suits arising from private construction projects. And, a California court had held that the state statute providing for awards of attorneys' fees in suits on the bonds of state and municipal public works contractors is inapplicable to construction projects of the United States. 14 The Court of Appeals nonetheless [417 U.S. 116, 128] held that since federal law controls Miller Act recoveries, it was free to look to "state policy" rather than state law and proceeded to find an award of attorneys' fees appropriate. Although the court below premised its decision on the theory that a Miller Act remedy is afforded "`in lieu of the lien upon land and buildings customary where property is owned by private persons,'" it gave respondent more protection than California law affords litigants involved in disputes arising from private construction projects who are not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. We think it better to extricate the federal courts from the morass of trying to divine a "state policy" as to the award of attorneys' fees in suits on construction bonds. </s> Finally, the Court of Appeals intimates that in providing that Miller Act claimants should recover the "sums justly due," 40 U.S.C. 270b (a), Congress must have intended to provide for the award of attorneys' fees because without such fee shifting, Miller Act claimants would not be fully compensated - the claimant's recovery would always be diminished by the cost of his legal representation. This argument merely restates one of the oftrepeated criticisms of the American Rule. 15 Almost a half century ago, the Massachusetts Judicial Council pleaded for reform, asking, "On what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public highway recover [417 U.S. 116, 129] his doctor's bill but not his lawyer's bill?" 16 We recognize that there is some force to the argument that a party who must bear the costs of his attorney's fees out of his recovery is not made whole. But there are countervailing considerations as well. We have observed that "one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel." Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Moreover, "the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees," ibid., has given us pause, even though courts have regularly engaged in that endeavor in the many contexts where fee shifting is mandated by statute, policy, or contract. Finally, there is the possibility of a threat being posed to the principle of independent advocacy by having the earnings of the attorney flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues. </s> The American Rule has not served, however, as an absolute bar to the shifting of attorneys' fees even in the absence of statute or contract. The federal judiciary has recognized several exceptions to the general principle that each party should bear the costs of its own legal representation. We have long recognized that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, 17 or where a successful litigant [417 U.S. 116, 130] has conferred a substantial benefit on a class of persons and the court's shifting of fees operates to spread the cost proportionately among the members of the benefited class. 18 The lower courts have also applied a rationale for fee shifting based on the premise that the expense of litigation may often be a formidable if not insurmountable obstacle to the private litigation necessary to enforce important public policies. 19 This "private attorney general" rationale has not been squarely before this Court and it is not so now; nor do we intend to imply any view either on the validity or scope of that doctrine. It is sufficient for our purposes here to observe that this case clearly does not fall within any of these exceptions. </s> Miller Act suits are plain and simple commercial litigation. In effect then, we are being asked to go the last mile in this case, to judicially obviate the American Rule in the context of everyday commercial litigation, where [417 U.S. 116, 131] the policies which underlie the limited judicially created departures from the rule are inapplicable. This we are unprepared to do. The perspectives of the profession, the consumers of legal services, and other interested groups should be weighed in any decision to substantially undercut the application of the American Rule in such litigation. Congress is aware of the issue. 20 Thus whatever the merit of arguments for a further departure from the American Rule in Miller Act commercial litigation, those arguments are properly addressed to Congress. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as it holds that Cerpac is a subcontractor for Miller Act purposes and that there was proper venue for suit on the shipment diverted to South Carolina, but reversed insofar as it holds that an award of attorneys' fees to respondent Industrial is required by the Act. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Government contracts of less than $2,000 in value are excepted from the statute's coverage. </s> [Footnote 2 Shipments under the contract were invoiced by the truckload. The South Carolina shipment involved two such truckloads, while the other 21 shipments were each of only one truckload of lumber. </s> [Footnote 3 When Cerpac fell behind in its payments, Industrial indicated it would not deliver the final two truckloads of wood to the Beale project until it received satisfactory assurances of payment. Rich agreed to pay Industrial directly for the last two shipments, with Cerpac to receive its customary profit as a commission from Industrial. The last two shipments were made on May 18 and June 23, 1966, invoices being payable in full 30 days thereafter. The shipments were invoiced directly to Rich with copies to Cerpac, the invoices showing the shipments as being under the original "Beale 647" contract between Industrial and Cerpac. Rich nonetheless refused to pay the full invoice price of the two final shipments. Rich has since conceded its obligation to pay Industrial's claim for these two shipments, so there is no longer any controversy in regard to the amounts due on those invoices. </s> [Footnote 4 Cerpac subsequently filed for discharge in bankruptcy and is no longer a party. </s> [Footnote 5 All invoices under the Beale contract between Industrial and Cerpac were payable within 30 days with interest at an annual rate of eight percent after the due date. The District Court awarded Industrial seven percent interest on all "unliquidated claims." The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the amounts due under the terms of the contract were liquidated damages and should bear an interest rate of eight percent. </s> The District Court had also given judgment against Transamerica on its bond for the shipment which was sent to the South Carolina site. The Court of Appeals held that judgment should not have been rendered against Transamerica for material not delivered to the project for which it served as surety. </s> [Footnote 6 Petitioners also raise issues in their brief concerning the timeliness of the Miller Act notice and the amount of prejudgment interest awarded respondent. Those issues were not raised in the petition for certiorari, hence are not properly before the Court. See, e. g., Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 190 (1963); Rule 23.1 (c) of the Rules of this Court. </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson Steel Co., 382 F.2d 615, 617 (CA5 1967); Basich Bros. Construction Co. v. United States ex rel. Turner, 159 F.2d 182 (CA9 1946); cf. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Lembke Construction Co., 370 F.2d 293 (CA10 1966). </s> [Footnote 8 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States ex rel. Western Steel Co., 362 F.2d 896, 898 (CA9 1966); United States ex rel. Wellman Engineering Co. v. MSI Corp., 350 F.2d 285, 286 (CA2 1965). </s> [Footnote 9 Beale Air Force Base is located in the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California, hence respondent brought suit on the Beale contract in that court. </s> [Footnote 10 United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705 (CA2 1966); see cases collected, id., at 707. </s> [Footnote 11 The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment against Transamerica, on its bond, as to the shipment of wood diverted to South Carolina, because a Miller Act surety is liable only for material supplied for use on the bonded project. But, a decision on the ultimate question of the surety's liability involves different considerations from the questions of whether venue for suit on the bond is proper. Petitioner Rich's liability for the amount due on the South Carolina shipment was based on a pendent claim, the substance of which was not challenged in this Court or in the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 12 473 F.2d 720, 727 (1973). The same analysis has been accepted in several other cases; see Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Red Top Metal, Inc., 384 F.2d 752 (CA5 1967); United States ex rel. White Masonry, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Co., 434 F.2d 855, 859 (CA9 1970); Arnold v. United States ex rel. Bowman Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 470 F.2d 243, 245 (CA10 1972). </s> [Footnote 13 After the decision in the District Court, but prior to the Court of Appeals' opinion, Cal. Govt. Code 4207 (1966) was replaced, and the effective provisions transferred to Cal. Civ. Code 3250 (Supp. 1974), by an act of the California Legislature, dated August 31, 1969, that took effect on January 1, 1971. Given our reasoning, however, the revision in language of the applicable California law is of no relevance to the result reached herein. </s> [Footnote 14 B. C. Richter Contracting Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 491, 41 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1964) (construing the former law, see n. 13, supra). </s> [Footnote 15 The American Rule has come under repeated criticism over the years. See generally Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 Ford. L. Rev. 761 (1972); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1216 (1967). </s> [Footnote 16 Judicial Council of Massachusetts, First Report, 11 Mass. L. Q. 1, 64 (1925). </s> [Footnote 17 See, e. g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (CA1 1971); Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494 (CA4 1963); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (CA4 1951); 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 54.77 2., p. 1709 (2d ed. 1974). </s> [Footnote 18 See, e. g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (CA1 1973); Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (CA5 1972); Bright v. Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange, 327 F. Supp. 495, 506 (ED Pa. 1971); cf. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 301 (1973); Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 316 (1971). </s> [Footnote 19 See, e. g., Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (CA5 1972); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (CA1 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (CA5 1971); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F. R. D. 94 (ND Cal. 1972); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (Haw. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (MD Ala. 1972); cf. Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Education, 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Nussbaum, n. 18, supra; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 Hastings L. J. 733 (1973). </s> [Footnote 20 A congressional committee charged with making a broad-based inquiry about legal services is currently studying, inter alia, the general issue of attorneys' fees. Hearings on Legal Fees before the Sub-committee on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); cf. S. Rep. No. 93-146 (1973), accompanying S. Res. 101. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part. </s> The Court, dealing with the Miller Act's predecessor, held in Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376, 380 , that the Heard Act "must be construed liberally." That same principle applies to the Miller Act. Fleisher Co. v. United States ex rel. Hallenbeck, 311 U.S. 15, 17 -18. The Act is silent as to attorneys' fees, saying only that the payment bond shall allow the supplier "to prosecute said action to final execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due him." 40 U.S.C. 270b (a). [417 U.S. 116, 132] </s> The Miller Act is unlike the Lanham Act involved in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 . That Act itemized the components of the remedy which the Act afforded: injunctive relief, treble damages, and "costs" (which by federal statute did not include attorneys' fees). Id., at 719-720. Moreover, attempts to amend the Lanham Act to include attorneys' fees had never succeeded, id., at 721. Here there is no such legislative history; nor does the Miller Act itemize the components of the "sum or sums justly due." </s> The Court says that dependence on state law is inappropriate, for we deal with a federal standard that should be uniform. That takes great liberties with the Miller Act. Here the contract and law were made in California and were to be performed there. In Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., supra, the contract and law were made in Illinois and were to be performed there. "Questions of liability for interest must therefore be determined by the law of that State," said Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the Court, 244 U.S., at 381 . If state law would give the claimant interest, it should give him attorneys' fees based on the purpose of the Miller Act. Judge Carter writing for the Court of Appeals pointed out that the Miller Act is the federal equivalent of state lien laws. See 473 F.2d 720, 727. The remedy in a federal suit is therefore properly composed of the same elements as would be available to lien claimants in a state court collecting for labor and materials furnished on nonfederal projects. One of the elements of recovery permitted in a California court is attorneys' fees. The "sum or sums justly due" should as a matter of federal law be construed to be the same as that due a claimant whose remedy is based on a state statute, when the federal remedy was intended to be the equivalent of the state remedy. [417 U.S. 116, 133] </s> What Mr. Justice Brandeis said of interest is equally applicable to attorneys' fees under the Miller Act. * Under the circumstances present here it would seem quite unjust not to include in the sum that is due the cost of collecting that sum. </s> [Footnote * The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit awarded attorneys' fees under a Florida statute where suit was brought under the Miller Act, United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Construction Co., 430 F.2d 420, 425. And see United States ex rel. White Masonry, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Co., 434 F.2d 855, 859, where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed Alaska law. </s> [417 U.S. 116, 134]

United States Supreme Court LATHROP v. DONOHUE(1961) No. 200 Argued: January 18, 1961Decided: June 19, 1961 </s> Acting in accordance with an Act of the State Legislature, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin promulgated rules and bylaws creating an integrated State Bar and requiring all lawyers practicing in the State to be members thereof and to pay annual dues of $15. Appellant paid his dues under protest and sued for a refund, claiming that the State Bar engaged in political activities which he opposed, and that by coercing him to support it, such rules and bylaws violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court held that compulsory enrollment in the State Bar imposed only the duty to pay dues; sustained the constitutionality of the rules and bylaws; and affirmed a judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal to this Court, held: </s> 1. This appeal is cognizable by this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2), which authorizes it to review on appeal a final judgment rendered by the highest court of a State "where is drawn in question the validity of a [state] statute." Pp. 824-827. </s> 2. Insofar as the rules and bylaws merely require lawyers practicing in the State to become members of the integrated State Bar and to pay reasonable annual dues, they do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 . Pp. 827-843, 849-850, 865. </s> 3. The judgment is affirmed without passing on the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that appellant may constitutionally be compelled to contribute his financial support to political activities which he opposes. Pp. 843-848. </s> 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404, affirmed. </s> Trayton L. Lathrop and Leon E. Isaksen argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. </s> John W. Reynolds, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Gordon Sinykin argued the cause for appellee. With them on the brief was Warren H. Resh, Assistant Attorney General. [367 U.S. 820, 821] </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Herbert D. Sledd, William H. King and Edward R. Baird for the Kentucky State Bar Association and the Virginia State Bar; Albert E. Blashfield and J. Cameron Hall for the State Bar of Michigan; Herman F. Selvin, Eugene M. Prince and Burnham Enersen for the State Bar of California; John M. Dalton, Attorney General, for the State of Missouri; Charles B. Blackmar for the Missouri Bar; Clyde Atkins, Charles B. Fulton and J. Lewis Hall for the Florida Bar; Wade Church, Attorney General, for the State of Arizona; J. Blaine Anderson for the State of Idaho; Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and Dean F. Bryson for the State of Oregon; Walter L. Budge, Attorney General, and George S. Ballif for the State of Utah; Norman B. Gray, Attorney General, and John P. Ilsley for the State of Wyoming; W. W. Barron, Attorney General, Fred H. Caplan, Assistant Attorney General, Stanley E. Dadisman, C. E. Goodwin and Charles C. Wise, Jr. for the State of West Virginia; and Cecil E. Burney, Bernard G. Segal, James C. Dezendorf, Philip C. Ebeling, Erwin N. Griswold and Edward W. Kuhn for the American Judicature Society. </s> Leo Rattay and Edwin F. Woodle filed a brief for the Cuyahoga County Bar Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join. </s> The Wisconsin Supreme Court integrated the Wisconsin Bar by an order which created "The State Bar of Wisconsin" on January 1, 1957, under Rules and Bylaws promulgated by the court. In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281; id., p. vii; 77 N. W. 2d 602. The order originally was effective for a two-year trial period, but [367 U.S. 820, 822] in 1958 was continued indefinitely. In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N. W. 2d 601. Alleging that the "rules and by-laws required the plaintiff to enroll in the State Bar of Wisconsin and to pay dues to the treasurer of the State Bar of Wisconsin on the penalty of being deprived of his livelihood as a practicing lawyer, if he should fail to do so," the appellant, a Wisconsin lawyer, brought this action in the Circuit Court of Dane County for the refund of $15 annual dues for 1959 paid by him under protest to appellee, the Treasurer of the State Bar. He attached to his complaint a copy of the letter with which he had enclosed his check for the dues. He stated in the letter that he paid under protest because "I do not like to be coerced to support an organization which is authorized and directed to engage in political and propaganda activities. . . . A major portion of the activities of the State Bar as prescribed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin are of a political and propaganda nature." His, complaint alleges more specifically that the State Bar promotes "law reform" and "makes and opposes proposals for changes in . . . laws and constitutional provisions and argues to legislative bodies and their committees and to the lawyers and to the people with respect to the adoption of changes in . . . codes, laws and constitutional provisions." He alleges further that in the course of this activity "the State Bar of Wisconsin has used its employees, property and funds in active, unsolicited opposition to the adoption of legislation by the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, which was favored by the plaintiff, all contrary to plaintiff's convictions and beliefs." His complaint concludes: "The plaintiff bases this action on his claim that the defendant has unjustly received, held, and disposed of funds of the plaintiff in the amount of $15.00, which to the knowledge of the [367 U.S. 820, 823] defendant were paid to the defendant by the plaintiff unwillingly and under coercion, and that such coercion was and is entailed in the rules and by-laws of the State Bar of Wisconsin continued in effect by the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin . . .; and the said order insofar as it coerces the plaintiff to support the State Bar of Wisconsin, is unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States . . . ." </s> The appellee demurred to the complaint on the ground, among others, 1 that it failed to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and the complaint was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, on appeal, stated that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to determine the questions raised by the complaint. However, treating the case as if originally and properly brought in the Supreme Court, the court considered appellant's constitutional claims, not only on the allegations of the complaint, but also upon the facts, of which it took judicial notice, as to its own actions leading up to the challenged order, and as to all activities, including legislative activities, of the State Bar since its creation. 2 The judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing the complaint was affirmed. 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404. The Supreme Court held that the requirement that appellant be an enrolled dues-paying member of the State Bar did not abridge his rights of freedom of association, and also that his rights to free speech were not violated because the State Bar used his money to support legislation with which he disagreed. [367 U.S. 820, 824] </s> An appeal was brought here by appellant under 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2), which authorizes our review of a final judgment rendered by the highest court of a State "By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a [state] statute . . . ." We postponed to the hearing on the merits the question whether the order continuing the State Bar indefinitely under the Rules and Bylaws is a "statute" for the purposes of appeal under 1257 (2). 364 U.S. 810 . </s> We think that the order is a "statute" for the purposes of 1257 (2). Under that section, the legislative character of challenged state action, rather than the nature of the agency of the State performing the act, is decisive of the question of jurisdiction. It is not necessary that the state legislature itself should have taken the action drawn in question. In construing the similar jurisdictional provision in the Judiciary Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385, we said: "Any enactment, from whatever source originating, to which a State gives the force of law is a statute of the State, within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdiction of this court." Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183 . We likewise said of the provision of the Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936, which is the present 1257 (2): ". . . the jurisdictional provision uses the words `a statute of any State' in their larger sense and is not intended to make a distinction between acts of a state legislature and other exertions of the State's law-making power, but rather to include every act legislative in character to which the State gives its sanction." King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council, 277 U.S. 100, 104 -105. Thus this Court has upheld jurisdiction on appeal of challenges to municipal ordinances, e. g., King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council, supra; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 ; certain types of orders of state regulatory commissions, e. g., Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Comm'n, 249 U.S. 422 ; and some [367 U.S. 820, 825] orders of other state agencies, e. g., Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 257 -258. It is true that in these cases the state agency the action of which was called in question was exercising authority delegated to it by the legislature. However, this fact was not determinative, but was merely relevant to the character of the State's action. The absence of such a delegation does not preclude consideration of the exercise of authority as a statute. </s> We are satisfied that this appeal is from an act legislative in nature and within 1257 (2). Integration of the Bar was effected through an interplay of action by the legislature and the court directed to fashioning a policy for the organization of the legal profession. The Wisconsin Legislature initiated the movement for integration of the Bar in 1943 when it passed the statute, chapter 315 of the Wisconsin Laws for that year, now Wis. Rev. Stat. 256.31, providing: </s> "(1) There shall be an association to be known as the `State Bar of Wisconsin' composed of persons licensed to practice law in this state, and membership in such association shall be a condition precedent to the right to practice law in Wisconsin. </s> "(2) The supreme court by appropriate orders shall provide for the organization and government of the association and shall define the rights, obligations and conditions of membership therein, to the end that such association shall promote the public interest by maintaining high standards of conduct in the legal profession and by aiding in the efficient administration of justice." </s> The State Supreme Court held that this statute was not binding upon it because "[t]he power to integrate the bar is an incident to the exercise of the judicial power . . . ." Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 40, 11 N. W. 2d 604, 619. The court twice refused to order integration, 244 [367 U.S. 820, 826] Wis. 8, 11 N. W. 2d 604, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N. W. 2d 500, before taking the actions called in question on this appeal, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N. W. 2d 602, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N. W. 2d 601. Nevertheless, the court in rejecting the first petition, 244 Wis., at pp. 51-52, 11 N. W. 2d, at pp. 623-624, recognized that its exercise of the power to order integration of the Bar would not be adjudicatory, but an action in accord with and in implementation of the legislative declaration of public policy. 3 The court said: </s> "It is obvious that whether the general welfare requires that the bar be treated as a corporate body is a matter for the consideration of the legislature. . . . While the legislature has no constitutional power to compel the court to act or, if it acts, to act in a particular way in the discharge of the judicial function, it may nevertheless with propriety, and in the exercise of its power and the discharge of its duty, declare itself upon questions relating to the general welfare which includes the integration of the bar. The court, as has been exemplified during the entire history of the state, will respect such declarations [367 U.S. 820, 827] and, as already indicated, adopt them so far as they do not embarrass the court or impair its constitutional functions." </s> Integration of the Bar in Wisconsin bore no resemblance to adjudication. The State Supreme Court's action disposed of no litigation between parties. Rather the court sought to regulate the profession by applying its orders to all present members of the Bar and to all persons coming within the described class in the future. Cf. Hamilton v. Regents, supra, p. 258; King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council, supra, p. 104. As such, the action had the characteristics of legislation. We conclude that the appeal is cognizable under 1257 (2). We therefore proceed to the consideration of the merits. </s> The core of appellant's argument is that he cannot constitutionally be compelled to join and give support to an organization which has among its functions the expression of opinion on legislative matters and which utilizes its property, funds and employees for the purposes of influencing legislation and public opinion toward legislation. 4 But his compulsory enrollment imposes only [367 U.S. 820, 828] the duty to pay dues. 5 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin so interpreted its order and its interpretation is of course binding on us. The court said: "The rules and by-laws of the State Bar, as approved by this court, do not compel the plaintiff to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend its meetings or vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he has been subjected by the integration of the bar is the payment of the annual dues of $15 per year." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 237, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 408. 6 We therefore are confronted, as we were in Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 , only with a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not with involuntary membership in any other aspect. Cf. International Association of Machinists v. Street, decided today, ante, p. 740, at pp. 748-749. </s> A review of the activities of the State Bar authorized under the Rules and Bylaws is necessary to decision. The purposes of the organization are stated as follows in Rule 1, 2: "to aid the courts in carrying on and improving [367 U.S. 820, 829] the administration of justice; to foster and maintain on the part of those engaged in the practice of law high ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service and high standards of conduct; to safeguard the proper professional interests of the members of the bar; to encourage the formation and activities of local bar associations; to provide a forum for the discussion of subjects pertaining to the practice of law, the science of jurisprudence and law reform, and the relations of the bar to the public, and to publish information relating thereto; to the end that the public responsibilities of the legal profession may be more effectively discharged." To achieve these purposes standing committees and sections are established. 7 The Rules also assign the organization [367 U.S. 820, 830] a major role in the State's procedures for the discipline of members of the bar for unethical conduct. A Committee on Grievances is provided for each of the nine districts into which the State is divided. Each [367 U.S. 820, 831] committee receives and investigates complaints of alleged misconduct of lawyers within its district. Each committee also investigates and processes petitions for reinstatement of lawyers and petitions for late enrollment in the State Bar of lawyers who fail to enroll within a designated period after becoming eligible to enroll. </s> The State Legislature and the State Supreme Court have informed us of the public interest sought to be served by the integration of the bar. The statute states its desirability "to the end that such association shall promote the public interest by maintaining high standards [367 U.S. 820, 832] of conduct in the legal profession and by aiding in the efficient administration of justice." This theme is echoed in the several Supreme Court opinions. The first opinion after the passage of the statute noted the "widespread general recognition of the fact that the conduct of the bar is a matter of general public interest and concern." 244 Wis. 8, 16, 11 N. W. 2d 604, 608. But the court's examination at that time of existing procedures governing admission and discipline of lawyers and the prevention of the unauthorized practice of the law persuaded the court that the public interest was being adequately served without integration. The same conclusion was reached when the matter was reviewed again in 1946. At that time, in addition to reviewing the desirability of integration in the context of the problems of admission and discipline, the court considered its utility in other fields. The matter of post-law school or post-admission education of lawyers was one of these. The court believed, however, that while an educational program was a proper objective, the one proposed was "nebulous in outline and probably expensive in execution." 249 Wis. 523, 530, 25 N. W. 2d 500, 503. The court also observed, "There are doubtless many other useful activities for which dues might properly be used, but what they are does not occur to us and no particular one seems to press for action." 249 Wis. 523, 530, 25 N. W. 2d 500, 503. </s> The court concluded in 1956, however, that integration might serve the public interest and should be given a two-year trial. 8 It decided to "require the bar to act as [367 U.S. 820, 833] a unit to promote high standards of practice and the economical and speedy enforcement of legal rights," 273 Wis. 281, 283, 77 N. W. 2d 602, 603, because it had come to the conclusion that efforts to accomplish these ends in the public interest through voluntary association had not been effective. "[T]oo many lawyers have refrained or refused to join, . . . membership in the voluntary association has become static, and . . . a substantial minority of the lawyers in the state are not associated with the State Bar Association." 273 Wis. 281, 283, 77 N. W. 2d 602, 603. When the order was extended indefinitely in 1958 the action was expressly grounded on the finding that, "Members of the legal profession by their admission to the bar become an important part of [the] process [of administering justice] . . . . An independent, active, and intelligent bar is necessary to the efficient administration of justice by the courts." 5 Wis. 2d 618, 622, 93 N. W. 2d 601, 603. </s> The appellant attacks the power of the State to achieve these goals through integration on the ground that because of its legislative activities, the State Bar partakes of the character of a political party. But on their face the purposes and the designated activities of the State Bar hardly justify this characterization. The inclusion among its purposes that it be a forum for a "discussion of . . . law reform" and active in safeguarding the "proper professional interests of, the members of the bar," in unspecified ways, does not support it. Only two of the 12 committees, Administration of Justice, and Legislation, are expressly directed to concern themselves in a substantial way with legislation. Authority granted the other committees directs them to deal largely with matters [367 U.S. 820, 834] which appear to be wholly outside the political process and to concern the internal affairs of the profession. </s> We do not understand the appellant to contend that the State Bar is a sham organization deliberately designed to further a program of political action. Nor would such a contention find support in this record. Legislative activity is carried on under a statement of policy which followed the recommendations of a former president of the voluntary Wisconsin Bar Association, Alfred LaFrance. He recommended that the legislative activity of the State Bar should have two distinct aspects: (1) "the field of legislative reporting or the dissemination of information concerning legislative proposals. . . . This is a service-information function that is both useful to the general membership and to the local bar associations"; and (2) "promotional or positive legislative activity." As to the latter he advised that "the rule of substantial unanimity should be observed. Unless the lawyers of Wisconsin are substantially for or against a proposal, the State Bar should neither support nor oppose the proposal." Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1957, pp. 41-42. "We must remember that we are an integrated Bar, that the views of the minority must be given along with the views of the majority where unanimity does not appear. The State Bar represents all of the lawyers of this state and in that capacity we must safeguard the interests of all." Id., p. 44. The rules of policy and procedure for legislative activity follow these recommendations. 9 </s> [367 U.S. 820, 835] </s> Under its charter of legislative action, the State Bar has participated in political activities in these principal categories: </s> (1) its executive director is registered as a lobbyist in accordance with state law. For the legislative [367 U.S. 820, 836] session 1959-1960, the State Bar listed a $1,400 lobbying expense; this was a percentage of the salary of the executive director, based on an estimate of the time he spent in seeking to influence legislation, amounting to 5% of his salary for the two years. The registration statement signed by the then president of the State Bar added the explanatory note: "His activities as a lobbyist on behalf of the State Bar are incidental to his general work and occupy only a small portion of his time." </s> (2) The State Bar, through its Board of Governors or Executive Committee, has taken a formal [367 U.S. 820, 837] position with respect to a number of questions of legislative policy. These have included such subjects as an increase in the salaries of State Supreme Court justices; making attorneys notaries public; amending the Federal Career Compensation Act to apply to attorneys employed with the Armed Forces the same provisions for special pay and promotion available to members of other professions; improving pay scales of attorneys in state service; court reorganization; extending personal jurisdiction over nonresidents; allowing the recording of unwitnessed conveyances; use of deceased partners' names in firm names; revision of the law governing federal tax liens; law clerks for State Supreme Court justices; curtesy and dower; securities transfers by fiduciaries; jurisdiction of county courts over the administration of inter vivos trusts; special appropriations for research for the State Legislative Council. </s> (3) The standing committees, particularly the Committees on Legislation and Administration of Justice, and the sections have devoted considerable time to the study of legislation, the formulation of recommendations, and the support of various proposals. For example, the president reported in 1960 that the Committee on Legislation "has been extremely busy, and through its efforts in cooperation with other interested agencies has been instrumental in securing the passage of the Court Reorganization bill, the bill of the Judicial Council expanding personal jurisdiction, and at this recently resumed session a bill providing clerks for our Supreme Court, and other bills of importance to the administration of justice." Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 41. See also id., June 1959, pp. 64-65. A new subcommittee, on federal legislation, was set up by this committee following a study which found need for such a group [367 U.S. 820, 838] "to deal with federal legislation affecting the practice of law, or lawyers as a class, or the jurisdiction, procedure and practice of the Federal courts and other Federal tribunals, or creation of new Federal courts or judgeships affecting this state, and comparable subjects . . . ." Board of Governors Minutes, Dec. 11, 1959. Furthermore, legislative recommendations and activities have not been confined to those standing committees with the express function in the by-laws of considering legislative proposals. See, e. g., Report of the Committee on Legal Aid, Wis. Bar Bull., June 1960, p. 61; Report of the Committee on Legal Aid, id., June 1959, pp. 61-62. Many of the positions on legislation taken on behalf of the State Bar by the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee have also followed studies and recommendations by the sections. See, e. g., Report of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, Wis. Bar Bull., June 1960, p. 51; Report of the Corporation and Business Law Section, id., p. 56. </s> (4) A number of special committees have been constituted, either ad hoc to consider particular legislative proposals, or to perform continuing functions which may involve the consideration of legislation. Thus special committees have considered such subjects as extension of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents, law clerks for State Supreme Court justices, and revision of the federal tax lien laws. The Special Committee on World Peace through Law, which has encouraged the formation of similar committees on the local level, has sponsored debates on subjects such as the repeal of the Connally reservation, believing that "the general knowledge of laymen as well as of lawyers concerning the possibility of world peace through law is limited and requires a [367 U.S. 820, 839] constant program of education and discussion." Wis. Bar Bull., June 1960, p. 54. </s> (5) The Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, sent to each member, prints articles suggesting changes in state and federal law. And other publications of the State Bar deal with the progress of legislation. </s> But it seems plain that legislative activity is not the major activity of the State Bar. The activities without apparent political coloration are many. The Supreme Court provided in an appendix to the opinion below, "an analysis of [State Bar] . . . activities and the public purpose served thereby." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 246, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 412. The court found that "The most extensive activities of the State Bar are those directed toward postgraduate education of lawyers," and that "Postgraduate education of lawyers is in the public interest because it promotes the competency of lawyers to handle the legal matters entrusted to them by those of the general public who employ them." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 246, 102 N. W. 2d, at pp. 412-413. 10 It found that the State Bar's participation [367 U.S. 820, 840] in the handling of grievances improved the efficiency and effectiveness of this work. 11 It found that the public interest was furthered by the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law which was carrying on "a constant program since numerous trades and occupations keep expanding their services and frequently start offering services which constitute the practice of the law." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 248, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 413. 12 The court [367 U.S. 820, 841] also concluded that the Legal Aid Committee had "done effective and noteworthy work to encourage the local bar associations of the state to set up legal-aid systems in their local communities. . . . Such committee has also outlined recommended procedures for establishing and carrying through such systems of providing legal aid." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 249, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 414. 13 In the field of public relations the court found that the "chief activity" of the State Bar was the "preparation, publication, and distribution to the general public of pamphlets dealing with various transactions and happenings with which laymen are frequently confronted, which embody legal problems." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 247, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 413. 14 </s> [367 U.S. 820, 842] Moreover, a number of studies have been made of programs, not involving political action, to further the economic well-being of the profession. 15 </s> This examination of the purposes and functions of the State Bar shows its multifaceted character, in fact as well as in conception. In our view the case presents a claim of impingement upon freedom of association no different from that which we decided in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 . We there held that 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 152, Eleventh, did not on its face abridge protected rights of association in authorizing union-shop agreements between interstate railroads and unions of their employees conditioning the employees' continued employment on payment of union dues, initiation fees and assessments. [367 U.S. 820, 843] There too the record indicated that the organizations engaged in some activities similar to the legislative activities of which the appellant complains. See International Association of Machinists v. Street, ante, p. 748, note 5. In rejecting Hanson's claim of abridgment of his rights of freedom of association, we said, "On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar." 351 U.S., at 238 . Both in purport and in practice the bulk of State Bar activities serve the function, or at least so Wisconsin might reasonably believe, of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State, without any reference to the political process. It cannot be denied that this is a legitimate end of state policy. 16 We think that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in order to further the State's legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional services, may constitutionally require that the costs of improving the profession in this fashion should be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program, the lawyers, even though the organization created to attain the objective also engages in some legislative activity. Given the character of the integrated bar shown on this record, in the light of the limitation of the membership requirement to the compulsory payment of reasonable annual dues, we are unable to find any impingement upon protected rights of association. [367 U.S. 820, 844] </s> However, appellant would have us go farther and decide whether his constitutional rights of free speech are infringed if his dues money is used to support the political activities of the State Bar. The State Supreme Court treated the case as raising the question whether First Amendment rights were violated "because part of his dues money is used to support causes to which he is opposed." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 238, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 409. The Court in rejecting appellant's argument reasoned that "[t]he right to practice law is not a right but is a privilege subject to regulation. . . . The only limitation upon the state's power to regulate the privilege of the practice of law is that the regulations adopted do not impose an unconstitutional burden or deny due process." 10 Wis. 2d, at pp. 237-238, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 408. The Court found no such burden because ". . . the public welfare will be promoted by securing and publicizing the composite judgment of the members of the bar of the state on measures directly affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law. The general public and the legislature are entitled to know how the profession as a whole stands on such type of proposed legislation. . . . The only challenged interference with his liberty is the exaction of annual dues to the State Bar, in the nature of the imposition of an annual license fee, not unreasonable or unduly burdensome in amount, part of which is used to advocate causes to which he is opposed. However, this court, in which is vested the power of the state to regulate the practice of law, has determined that it promotes the public interest to have public expression of the views of a majority of the lawyers of the state, with respect to legislation affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law, the same to be voiced through their own democratically chosen representatives comprising the board of governors of the State Bar. The public interest so promoted far outweighs the slight inconvenience to the plaintiff resulting [367 U.S. 820, 845] from his required payment of the annual dues." 10 Wis. 2d, at pp. 239, 242, 102 N. W. 2d, at pp. 409, 411. 17 </s> We are persuaded that on this record we have no sound basis for deciding appellant's constitutional claim insofar as it rests on the assertion that his rights of free speech are violated by the use of his money for causes which he opposes. Even if the demurrer is taken as admitting all the factual allegations of the complaint, even if these allegations are construed most expansively, and even if, like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, we take judicial notice of the political activities of the State Bar, still we think that the issue of impingement upon rights of free speech through the use of exacted dues is no more concretely presented for adjudication than it was in Hanson. Compare International Association of Machinists v. Street, ante, p. 740, at pp. 747-749. Nowhere are we clearly [367 U.S. 820, 846] apprised as to the views of the appellant on any particular legislative issues on which the State Bar has taken a position, or as to the way in which and the degree to which funds compulsorily exacted from its members are used to support the organization's political activities. There is an allegation in the complaint that the State Bar had "used its employees, property and funds in active, unsolicited opposition to the adoption of legislation by the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, which was favored by the plaintiff, all contrary to the plaintiff's convictions and beliefs," but there is no indication of the nature of this legislation, nor of appellant's views on particular proposals, nor of whether any of his dues were used to support the State Bar's positions. There is an allegation that the State Bar's revenues amount to about $90,000 a year, of which $80,000 is derived from dues, but there is no indication in the record as to how political expenditures are financed and how much has been expended for political causes to which appellant objects. The facts of which the Supreme Court took judicial notice do not enlighten us on these gaps in the record. The minutes of the Board of Governors and Executive Committee of the State Bar show that the organization has taken one position or another on a wide variety of issues, but those minutes give no indication of appellant's views as to any of such issues or of what portions of the expenditure of funds to propagate the State Bar's views may be properly apportioned to his dues payments. Nor do the other publications of the State Bar. The Supreme Court assumed, as apparently the trial court did in passing on the demurrer, that the appellant was personally opposed to some of the legislation supported by the State Bar. But its opinion still gave no description of any specific measures he opposed, or the extent to which the State Bar actually utilized dues funds for specific purposes to which he had objected. Appellant's phrasing of the question presented on appeal in this [367 U.S. 820, 847] Court is not responsive to any of these inquiries as to facts which may be relevant to the determination of constitutional questions surrounding the political expenditures. It merely asks whether a requirement of financial support of an association which, "among other things, uses its property, funds and employees for the purpose of influencing a broad range of legislation and public opinion" can be constitutionally imposed on him. This statement of the question, just as does his complaint, appears more a claim of the right to be free from compelled financial support of the organization because of its political activities, than a challenge by appellant to the use of his dues money for particular political causes of which he disapproves. Moreover, although the court below purported to decide as against all Fourteenth Amendment claims that the appellant could be compelled to pay his annual dues, even though "part . . . is used to support causes to which he is opposed," on oral argument here appellant disclaimed any necessity to show that he had opposed the position of the State Bar on any particular issue and asserted that it was sufficient that he opposed the use of his money for any political purposes at all. In view of the state of the record and this disclaimer, we think that we would not be justified in passing on the constitutional question considered below. "[T]he questions involving the power of . . . [the State] come here not so shaped by the record and by the proceedings below as to bring those powers before this Court as leanly and as sharply as judicial judgment upon an exercise of . . . [state] power requires." United States v. C. I. O., 335 U.S. 106, 126 (concurring opinion). Cf. United States v. U. A. W. C. I. O., 352 U.S. 567, 589 -592. </s> We, therefore, intimate no view as to the correctness of the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the appellant may constitutionally be compelled to contribute his financial support to political activities which [367 U.S. 820, 848] he opposes. That issue is reserved, just as it was in Hanson, see International Association of Machinists v. Street, ante, p. 740, at 746-749. Upon this understanding we four vote to affirm. Since three of our colleagues are of the view that the claim which we do not decide is properly here and has no merit, and on that ground vote to affirm, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 He also demurred on grounds that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter because exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the Supreme Court and that there was a defect of parties because the State Bar was not made a defendant. </s> [Footnote 2 We also consider the case on this expanded record. Appellant raises no objection, and indeed urges us to do so. </s> [Footnote 3 The court's action was in response to a petition for "integration . . . in the manner described" in Wis. Rev. Stats. 256.31. Wis. Bar Bull., Apr. 1956, p. 21. The resolution of the House of Governors of the Wisconsin Bar Association leading to the filing of the petition referred to "integration . . . pursuant to the provisions of Section 256.31 of the Wisconsin Statutes." Id., p. 52. In many other States integration was initially accomplished either entirely by the legislature or by a combination of legislative and judicial action. See N. D. Laws 1921, c. 25; Ala. Laws 1923, No. 133; Idaho Laws 1923, c. 211; N. M. Laws 1925, c. 100; Cal. Stat. 1927, c. 34; Nev. Stat. 1928, c. 13; Okla. Laws 1929, c. 264; Utah Laws 1931, c. 48; S. D. Laws 1931, c. 84; Ariz. Laws 1933, c. 66; Wash. Laws 1933, c. 94; N.C. Laws 1933, c. 210; La. Acts 1934, 2d Extra Sess., No. 10; Ky. Acts 1934, c. 3; Ore. Laws 1935, c. 28; Mich. Acts 1935, No. 58; Va. Acts 1938, c. 410; Tex. Gen. Laws 1939, p. 64; W. Va. Acts 1945, c. 44; Alaska Laws 1955, c. 196. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellant's notice of appeal presents the following question for our review: </s> "Do the orders and rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin . . . and the rules and by-laws which were promulgated thereby deprive the appellant . . . of his rights of freedom of association, assembly, speech, press, conscience and thought, or of his liberty or property without due process of law or deny to him equal protection of the law or otherwise deprive him of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by compelling him, as a condition to his right to continue to practice law in the State of Wisconsin, to be a member of and financially support an association of attorneys known as the State Bar of Wisconsin, which association . . . among other things, uses its property, funds and employees for the purpose of influencing a broad range of legislation and public opinion; and, therefore, are said orders, [367 U.S. 820, 828] rules and by-laws, insofar as they coerce the appellant to be a member of and support said association, invalid on the ground that they are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States?" </s> [Footnote 5 The rules limit the maximum permissible dues to $20 a year. </s> [Footnote 6 A member suspended for nonpayment of dues may secure automatic reinstatement, so long as his dues are not in arrearage for three or more years, by making full payment of the amount and paying an additional $5 as a penalty. No other condition on acquiring or retaining membership is imposed by the rules or bylaws. Although the State Bar participates in the investigation of complaints of misconduct, see pp. 829-832, infra, final power to disbar or otherwise discipline any member resides in the Supreme Court. </s> The rules also make the canons of ethics of the American Bar Association, as modified or supplemented by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, "the standards governing the practice of law in this state." But appellant makes no claim that the State lacks power to impose on him a duty to abide by these canons. </s> [Footnote 7 The committees and their assigned functions are as follows: </s> "Legal education and bar admissions. - This committee shall make continuing studies of the curricula and teaching methods employed in law schools, and of standards and methods employed in determining the qualifications of applicants for admission to the bar; and whenever requested by the State Bar commissioners shall assist in the investigation of the qualifications of persons seeking admission to the bar. </s> "Post-graduate education. - This committee shall formulate and promote programs designed to afford to the members of the State Bar suitable opportunities for acquiring additional professional knowledge, training, and skill, through publications, lectures, and discussions at regional meetings of association members and law institutes, and through correspondence course study. </s> "Administration of justice. - This committee shall study the organization and operation of the Wisconsin judicial system and shall recommend from time to time appropriate changes in practice and procedure for improving the efficiency thereof; and in that connection shall examine all legislative proposals for changes in the judicial system. </s> "Judicial selection. - This committee shall study and collect information pertaining to judicial selection, tenure, and compensation, including retirement pensions, and shall report from time to time to the association with respect thereto. </s> "Professional ethics. - This committee shall formulate and recommend standards and methods for the effective enforcement of high [367 U.S. 820, 830] standards of ethics and conduct in the practice of law; shall consider the Canons of Ethics of the legal profession and the observance thereof, and shall make recommendations for appropriate amendments thereto. The committee shall have authority to express opinions regarding proper professional conduct, upon written request of any member or officer of the State Bar. </s> "Public services. - This committee shall prepare and present to the board of governors plans for advancing public acceptance of the objects and purposes of the association; and shall have responsibility for the execution of such plans as are approved by the board of governors. Such plans shall include arrangements for disseminating information of interest to the public in relation to the functions of the departments of government, the judicial system and the bar; and to that end the committee may operate a speakers' bureau and employ the facilities of the public press and other channels of public communications. </s> "Interprofessional and business relations. - It shall be the duty of this committee to serve as a liaison agency between the legal profession and other professions and groups with whom the bar is in contact in order to interpret to such professions and groups the proper scope of the practice of law. </s> "Legislation. - This committee shall study all proposals submitted to the Wisconsin legislature or the congress of the United States for changes in the statutes relating to the courts or the practice of law, and shall report thereon to the board of governors; and with the approval of the board of governors may represent the State Bar in supporting or opposing any such proposals. </s> "Legal aid. - This committee shall promote the establishment and efficient maintenance of legal aid organizations equipped to provide free legal services to those unable to pay for such service; shall study the administration of justice as it affects persons in the low income groups; and shall study and report on methods of making legal service more readily available to persons of moderate means, and shall encourage and assist local bar associations in accomplishing this purpose. </s> "Unauthorized practice of the law. - This committee shall keep itself and the association informed with respect to the unauthorized [367 U.S. 820, 831] practice of law by laymen and by agencies, and the participation of members of the bar in such activities, and concerning methods for the prevention thereof. The committee shall seek the elimination of such unauthorized practice and participation therein on the part of members of the bar, by such action and methods as may be appropriate for that purpose. </s> "State Bar Bulletin. - This committee shall assist and advise the officers of the association and the board of governors in matters pertaining to the production and publication of the Wisconsin State Bar Bulletin, the Wisbar Letter, the Supreme Court Calendar Service and such other periodical publications of the State Bar as may be authorized by the board of governors from time to time. </s> "State Grievance Committee. - This committee shall consist of the chairmen of the district grievance committees, who shall meet at least quarterly and whose duties shall be to exchange information as to problems arising under the grievance procedure, to discuss and adopt uniform procedures and standards under Rule 10 [relating to grievances] and to make recommendations to the Board of Governors for improvements in the procedures under Rule 10 and for other matters consistent with their organization." Article IV, Sections 2-13, 273 Wis. xxxiii-xxxv; Supplement, Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, pp. 21-23. </s> Sections have been created in the areas of corporation and business law, family law, role of house counsel, insurance, negligence and workmen's compensation law, labor relations law, military law, real property, probate and trust law, taxation, government law, protection of individual rights against misuse of powers of government, patent, trademark and copyright law, and criminal law. </s> [Footnote 8 The court said: "We feel . . . that integration of the bar should be tried. The results thereof will be what the bar and the court make of it. If integration does not work, this court can change the rules to meet any situation that arises or it can abandon the plan." In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 285, 77 N. W. 2d 602, 604. "[The rules and by-laws] cannot be taken as the last word, and . . . experience in operating under them may disclose imperfections, and [367 U.S. 820, 833] particulars in which they should be changed. The integrated bar itself is an experiment in Wisconsin, and like all new enterprises may be expected to need adaptation to conditions and circumstances not yet clearly foreseen." 273 Wis. ix. </s> [Footnote 9 The policy provides: </s> 1. "The State Bar, through action of its Board of Governors, will initiate legislation only on such matters as it believes to be of general professional interest. No legislation will be sponsored unless and until the Board is satisfied that the recommendation represents the consensus and the best composite judgment of the legal profession of this state, and that the proposed legislation is meritorious and in the public interest. The text of all proposed legislation shall be [367 U.S. 820, 835] carefully prepared and considered and the counsel of the experts in the field involved will be sought wherever possible." </s> 2. Power to make the final determination of the policy of the State Bar toward specific legislative proposals is lodged in the Board of Governors. </s> 3. "Where it is obvious that the membership of the Bar is of a substantially divided opinion, the Board of Governors shall take no definite position"; but in any such case the Board is empowered to report its vote to the Legislature as a reflection of the diverse views of the members. </s> 4. The Board may delegate its power to take a position on legislative matters to the Committee on Legislation, the president of the State Bar, or the legislative counsel. </s> 5. Between Board meetings, the Executive Committee may exercise all of the Board's powers with respect to legislation. </s> 6. The Board shall designate a legislative counsel, to be registered as a lobbyist in accordance with Wisconsin law. His task is to manage legislative activities, coordinating the work of sections and committees interested in legislative proposals with the activities of the Board, Executive Committee, and Committee on Legislation; he is also directed to screen all legislative proposals and refer those of special interest to the appropriate section or committee for study and recommendation. </s> 7. The Committee on Legislation is empowered to designate persons to appear before legislative committees and arrange for their appearance. </s> 8. When a section or committee sponsors legislation with the approval of the Board, section officers or the committee chairman may appear before the legislature in its name, or request the legislative counsel to appear. </s> 9. "During the session of the Legislature all sections and committees of the State Bar are expected to stand ready to: (a) Participate in explaining the bills recommended or opposed by the State Bar to the committees of the Legislature to whom they are referred; (b) Prepare explanatory material relative to any bill about which [367 U.S. 820, 836] a question has arisen since its introduction; (c) Examine all bills advocated by others that would affect the courts, the judiciary, the legal profession, or the administration of justice in any particular, or that would make any changes in the substantive law, and keep the Board of Governors and the Executive Committee fully informed so that ill-advised bills can be opposed and meritorious bills can be supported. Committees of the Legislature should be encouraged to request the State Bar to study and to report its recommendations concerning all bills of this category." </s> 10. The State Bar staff is directed to cooperate with all sections, committees, individual members, and local bar associations desiring to have bills drafted for introduction into the legislature. </s> 11. To facilitate widespread study of legislative proposals, the State Bar shall issue a weekly legislative bulletin to officers, members of the Board of Governors and the Executive Committee, section and committee chairmen, presidents and secretaries of all local bar associations, judges, and other persons as directed by the Executive Committee. </s> 12. Local bar associations are encouraged to take such action on legislation as they deem appropriate and forward their recommendations to the State Bar for consideration. Board of Governors Minutes, June 12, 1957. </s> By resolution in 1959 it was further provided that a committee or section may present its views on legislation without approval of the Board of Governors. But in so doing it must state that the position is that of the group or its officers, not that of the State Bar. Board of Governors Minutes, Feb. 18, 1959. </s> [Footnote 10 The statewide and regional meetings, the court found, are largely devoted "to the delivery of papers on technical legal subjects of an instructive nature." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 246, 102 N. W. 2d, at pp. 412-413. The sections are particularly active in this regard. As a former president of the State Bar described their role: "The sections provide a special place where members with interest in particular fields of law may serve on committees and receive assistance and training in such fields. Moreover, the sections provide their own programs at each Annual and Midwinter meeting largely of a very practical and educational nature." Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1958, p. 71. See, e. g., Report of Corporation and Business Law Section, id., June 1960, p. 56; Report of Labor Law Section, id., p. 60. For example, the Taxation Section has sponsored an annual tax institute for practicing lawyers. See Report of Taxation Section, Wis. Bar Bull., June 1959, pp. 53-54. Many of the papers delivered at such sessions are later given wider circulation to the Bar by publication in the Bar Bulletin. In addition, the State Bar has undertaken the sponsorship of numerous special [367 U.S. 820, 840] seminars and symposia, see, e. g., Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 41. And it has made funds available to the University of Wisconsin Law School to compensate students for assisting in the preparation of materials for post-graduate programs. See Board of Governors Minutes, Apr. 25, 1958; Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1958, pp. 69-70. </s> [Footnote 11 Prior to integration the Board of State Bar Commissioners conducted and paid for the investigation of grievances. Since then the grievance committees have performed most of that work, with a resulting diminution in the financial needs of the bar commissioners. A former president of the State Bar commented on these committees' performance of their functions: "The result is that a majority of complaints are adjusted or explained to the satisfaction of the complainant, and the State Bar Commissioners are saved considerable time and effort . . . ." Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1958, p. 68. See also id., Aug. 1960, p. 41. </s> [Footnote 12 Revenues from integration enabled the State Bar to employ a lawyer whose principal task is the investigation of complaints of unauthorized practice and the effort to achieve its discontinuance. A number of legal actions to prevent unauthorized practice have been instituted. See, e. g., Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 45; id., June 1960, pp. 49-50; id., June 1958, pp. 48-49. The Committee on Unauthorized Practice has also worked with the Committee on Interprofessional and Business Relations in conferring with other professional groups to establish demarcation lines between their activities and those of the bar. Thus an agreement was negotiated with the Association of Certified Public Accountants and a joint committee provided to police it. See Board of Governors Minutes, Dec. 9, 1960. The Committee on Interprofessional and Business Relations has also participated in projects for the formulation of agreements with the Association of Real Estate Brokers and the Association of Collection Agencies, and its program includes conferences with other professional [367 U.S. 820, 841] groups. See Executive Committee Minutes, July 22, 1960. Legal ethics is another concern of the State Bar. Its Committee on Professional Ethics has given opinions on a number of questions of ethical practice. See, e. g., Wis. Bar Bull., June 1960, pp. 46-49. </s> [Footnote 13 The number of lawyers in Wisconsin participating in legal aid has steadily increased. The committee reported in 1960 that it would "continue to vigorously carry on its program of rendering prompt and efficient legal aid services to all those who require the same; to continue to work diligently to the realization of the goal that every county bar association within our State have an effective legal aid bureau or legal aid society as soon as possible; to continue our policy of bringing into our open forum meetings on legal aid, the most outstanding authorities on the subject, to the end that we here in the State of Wisconsin will at all times have the fullest, up-to-date information on every phase of legal aid . . . ." Wis. Bar Bull., June 1960, p. 64. See also id., June 1959, p. 63. </s> [Footnote 14 The State Bar has also prepared articles on legal subjects for distribution to newspapers throughout the State. It has been concerned with the promotion of the annual Law Day. See, e. g., Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1958, p. 67. The Bar Bulletin, in addition to publishing articles on legal subjects, has issued special supplements explaining and annotating new laws and has printed checklists for attorneys suggesting how to proceed with various legal problems. Its avowed aim is to make the Bulletin "a very practical means for all practicing lawyers to keep posted on the ever-changing requirements in the practice. . . . We believe that one of the great justifications for integration is found [367 U.S. 820, 842] in the means of publication and communication from the Bar to the member through these vehicles." Wis. Bar Bull., June 1960, p. 67. </s> [Footnote 15 The stated functions of the Special Committee on Economics of the Bar are: "[t]he committee will engage itself in the general study of the economics of the Bar to determine a fair fee schedule from time to time; seek its uniform adoption and recognition throughout the state; study the encroachment of lay agencies on the fields of law; make suggestions for proper office management, and make such recommendations from time to time as it considers proper in the general field." Wis. Bar Bull., June 1959, p. 58. One of the principal products of such activity has been a recommended schedule of minimum fees for Wisconsin lawyers; this schedule was published and distributed at a cost of over $10,000 to the State Bar. See Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 40; also id., pp. 10-11. Another project authorized by the Board of Governors is a comprehensive statistical study of the economic status of Wisconsin lawyers. See Board of Governors Minutes, Sept. 23, 1960, Dec. 9, 1960. Other special committees have considered such matters as group insurance for State Bar members and creation of a client security plan to insure against attorneys' defalcations. See, e. g., Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 41; Board of Governors Minutes, Feb. 18, 1959; Executive Committee Minutes, Sept. 23, 1960. </s> [Footnote 16 On the subject of integration of the bar in the United States, see generally Glaser, The Organization of the Integrated Bar, The Debate Over the Integrated Bar, and Bibliography on the Integrated Bar (Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research). Comprehensive discussions of integration of the Bar in the various States are contained in briefs amici curiae filed with the Court in this case. </s> [Footnote 17 The Wisconsin Supreme Court originally declined to order integration partly because of misgivings whether possible political activities of the integrated Bar would be consistent with the public interest sought to be served. See In re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 N. W. 2d 500. It indicated that integration would "require it to censor the budgets and activities of the bar after integration" and said: "It requires a very short look at some of the possible activities of the bar to make it clear that this court would have to insist upon scrutinizing every activity for which it is proposed to expend funds derived from dues, and that a series of situations would arise that would be embarrassing to the relations of bench and bar." 249 Wis., at pp. 528, 529-530, 25 N. W. 2d, at pp. 502, 503. These reservations were expressly disclaimed when the court continued integration in 1958, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 626-627, 93 N. W. 2d 601, 605. The court said: "The integrated State Bar of Wisconsin is independent and free to conduct its activities within the framework of such rules and by-laws." 5 Wis. 2d, at p. 626, 93 N. W. 2d, at p. 605. The court reiterated this position in the present case: "In so far as it confines such activities to those authorized by the rules and by-laws, this court will not interfere or in any manner seek to control or censor the action taken, or to substitute its judgment for that of the membership of the State Bar." 10 Wis. 2d, at p. 240, 102 N. W. 2d, at p. 410. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins, concurring in the judgment. </s> I think it most unfortunate that the right of the Wisconsin Integrated Bar to use, in whole or in part, the dues of dissident members to carry on legislative and other programs of law reform - doubtless among the most useful and significant branches of its authorized activities - should be left in such disquieting Constitutional uncertainty. The effect of that uncertainty is compounded by the circumstance that it will doubtless also reach into the Integrated Bars of twenty-five other States. 1 </s> I must say, with all respect, that the reasons stated in the plurality opinion for avoiding decision of this Constitutional issue can hardly be regarded as anything but trivial. For, given the unquestioned fact that the Wisconsin Bar uses or threatens to use, over appellant's protest, some part of its receipts to further or oppose legislation on matters of law reform and the administration of [367 U.S. 820, 849] justice, I am at a loss to understand how it can be thought that this record affords "no sound basis" for adjudicating the issue simply because we are not "clearly apprised as to the views of the appellant on any particular legislative issues on which the State Bar has taken a position, or as to the way in which and the degree to which funds compulsorily exacted from its members are used to support the organization's political activities" (ante, pp. 845-846). I agree with my Brother BLACK that the Constitutional issue is inescapably before us. </s> Unless one is ready to fall prey to what are at best but alluring abstractions on rights of free speech and association, I think he will be hard put to it to find any solid basis for the Constitutional qualms which, though unexpressed, so obviously underlie the plurality opinion, or for the views of my two dissenting Brothers, one of whom finds unconstitutional the entire Integrated Bar concept (post, pp. 877-885), and the other of whom holds the operations of such a Bar unconstitutional to the extent that they involve talking "the money of protesting lawyers" and using "it to support causes they are against" (post, p. 871). </s> For me, there is a short and simple answer to all of this. The Hanson case, 351 U.S. 225 , decided by a unanimous Court, surely lays at rest all doubt that a State may Constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in an integrated bar association, a condition fully as justified by state needs as the union shop is by federal needs. Indeed the conclusion reached in Hanson with respect to compulsory union membership seems to me a fortiori true here, in light of the supervisory powers which the State, through its courts, has traditionally exercised over admission to the practice of law, see Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 ; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 , and over the conduct of lawyers after admission; see Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 . The Integrated Bar was in fact treated as such an a fortiori case in the [367 U.S. 820, 850] Hanson opinion itself. Supra, at 238. So much, indeed, is recognized by the plurality opinion which rejects the contention that Wisconsin could not Constitutionally require appellant, a lawyer, to become and remain a dues-paying member of the State Bar. </s> That being so, I do not understand why it should become unconstitutional for the State Bar to use appellant's dues to fulfill some of the very purposes for which it was established. I am wholly unable to follow the force of reasoning which, on the one hand, denies that compulsory dues-paying membership in an Integrated Bar infringes "freedom of association," and, on the other, in effect affirms that such membership, to the extent it entails the use of a dissident member's dues for legitimate Bar purposes, infringes "freedom of speech." This is a refinement between two aspects of what, in circumstances like these, is essentially but a single facet of the "liberty" assured by the Fourteenth Amendment, see N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 , that is too subtle for me to grasp. </s> Nevertheless, since a majority of the Court here, as in the Street case, ante, p. 740, has deemed the "free speech" issue to be distinct from that of "free association," I shall also treat the case on that basis. From a Constitutional standpoint, I think that there can be no doubt about Wisconsin's right to use appellant's dues in furtherance of any of the purposes now drawn in question. 2 Orderly analysis [367 U.S. 820, 851] requires that there be considered, first, the respects in which it may be thought that the use of a member's dues for causes he is against impinges on his right of free speech, and second, the nature of the state interest offered to justify such use of the dues exacted from him. I shall also add some further observations as to the over-all Constitutionality of the Integrated Bar concept. </s> I. </s> To avoid the pitfall of disarming, and usually obscuring, generalization which too often characterizes discussions in this Constitutional field, I see no alternative (even at the risk of being thought to labor the obvious) but to deal in turn with each of the various specific impingements on "free speech" which have been suggested or intimated to flow from the State Bar's use of an objecting member's dues for the purposes involved in this case. As I understand things, it is said that the operation of the Integrated Bar tends (1) to reduce a dissident member's "economic capacity" to espouse causes in which he believes; (2) to further governmental "establishment" of political views; (3) to threaten development of a "guild [367 U.S. 820, 852] system" of closed, self-regulating professions and businesses; (4) to "drown out" the voice of dissent by requiring all members of the Bar to lend financial support to the views of the majority; and (5) to interfere with freedom of belief by causing "compelled affirmation" of majority-held views. With deference, I am bound to say that, in my view, all of these arguments border on the chimerical. </s> 1. REDUCTION IN "ECONOMIC CAPACITY" TO ESPOUSE </s> VIEWS. </s> This argument which, if indeed suggested at all, is intimated only obliquely, is that the mere exaction of dues money works a Constitutionally cognizable inhibition of speech by reducing the resources otherwise available to a dissident member for the espousal of causes in which he believes. The untenability of such a proposition becomes immediately apparent when it is recognized that this rationale would make every governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the federal income tax would be suspect. And certainly this source of inhibition is as great if the Integrated Bar wastes its dues on dinners as if it spends them on recommendations to the legislature. Yet I suppose that no one would be willing to contend that every waste of money exacted by some form of compulsion is an abridgment of free speech. </s> 2. "ESTABLISHMENT" OF POLITICAL VIEWS. </s> The suggestion that a state-created Integrated Bar amounts to a governmental "establishment" of political belief is hardly worthy of more serious consideration. Even those who would treat the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing the identical protections afforded by the First would have to recognize the clear distinction in the wording of the First Amendment between the protections of speech and religion, only the latter providing a protection against "establishment." And as to the Fourteenth, [367 U.S. 820, 853] viewed independently of the First, one can surely agree that a State could not "create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups favored" by it "to elect their candidates or promote their controversial causes" (ante, p. 788), any more than could Congress do so, without agreeing that this is in any way analogous to what Wisconsin has done in creating its Integrated Bar, or to what Congress has provided in the Railway Labor Act, considered in the Street case, ante, p. 740. </s> In establishing the Integrated Bar Wisconsin has, I assume all would agree, shown no interest at all in favoring particular candidates for judicial or legal office or particular types of legislation. Even if Wisconsin had such an interest, the Integrated Bar does not provide a fixed, predictable conduit for governmental encouragement of particular views, for the Bar makes its own decisions on legislative recommendations and appears to take no action at all with regard to candidates. By the same token the weight lent to one side of a controversial issue by the prestige of government is wholly lacking here. </s> In short, it seems to me fanciful in the extreme to find in the limited functions of the Wisconsin State Bar those risks of governmental self-perpetuation that might justify the recognition of a Constitutional protection against the "establishment" of political beliefs. A contrary conclusion would, it seems to me, as well embrace within its rationale the operations of the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the legislative recommendations of independent agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Bureau of the Budget. </s> 3. DEVELOPMENT OF A "GUILD SYSTEM." </s> It is said that the Integrated Bar concept tends towards the development of some sort of a "guild system." But there are no requirements of action or inaction connected [367 U.S. 820, 854] with the Wisconsin Integrated Bar, as contrasted with any unintegrated bar, except for the requirement of payment of $15 annual dues. I would agree that the requirement of payment of dues could not be made the basis of limiting the profession of law to the comparatively wealthy. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 . Nor, doubtless, could admission to the profession be restricted to relatives of those already admitted. But there is no such "guild" threat presented in this situation. </s> True, the Wisconsin Bar makes recommendations to the State Supreme Court for regulatory canons of legal ethics, and it may be supposed that the Bar is not forbidden to address the State Legislature for measures regulating in some respects the conduct of lawyers. But neither activity is the kind of direct self-regulation that was stricken down in Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 . The Wisconsin Supreme Court has retained all of the traditional powers of a court to supervise the activities of practicing lawyers. It has delegated none of these to the Integrated Bar. As put by the State Supreme Court: </s> "The integrated bar has no power to discipline or to disbar any member. That power has been reserved to and not delegated by this court. The procedure under sec. 256.28, Stats., for filing complaints for discipline or disbarment in this court is unaffected by these rules. Rule 11 and Rule 7 provide an orderly and easy method by which proposals to amend or abrogate the rules of the State Bar may be brought before this court for hearing on petition. Rule 9 provides the rules of professional conduct set forth from time to time in the Canons of the Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association, as supplemented or modified by pronouncement of this court, shall be the standard governing the practice of law in this state. Prior to the adoption of the rules [367 U.S. 820, 855] this court has not expressly adopted such Canons of Professional Ethics in toto. </s> "The by-laws of the State Bar provide for the internal workings of the organization and by Rule 11, sec. 2, may be amended or abrogated by resolution adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the board of governors or by the members of the association themselves through the referendum procedure. As a further protection to the minority a petition for review of any change in the by-laws made by the board of governors will be entertained by the court if signed by 25 or more active members. </s> "Independently of the provisions in the rules for invoking our supervisory jurisdiction, this court has inherent power to take remedial action, on a sufficient showing that the activities or policies of the State Bar are not in harmony with the objectives for which integration was ordered or are otherwise contrary to the public interest." In re Integration of Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 624-625, 93 N. W. 2d 601, 604. </s> Moreover, it is by no means clear to me in what part of the Federal Constitution we are to find the prohibition of state-authorized self-regulation of and by an economic group that the Schechter case found in Article I as respects the Federal Government. Is state-authorized self-regulation of lawyers to be the occasion for judicial enforcement of Art. IV, 4, which provides that "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a Republican form of government . . ."? Cf. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 . </s> 4. "DROWNING OUT" THE VOICE OF DISSENT. </s> This objection can be stated in either of two ways. First: The requirement of dues payments to be spent to further views to which the payor is opposed tends to [367 U.S. 820, 856] increase the volume of the arguments he opposes and thereby to drown out his own voice in opposition, in violation of his Constitutional right to be heard. Second: The United States Constitution creates a scheme of federal and state governments each of which is to be elected on a one-man-one-vote basis and on a one-man-one-political-voice basis. Of course several persons may voluntarily cumulate their political voices, but no governmental force can require a single individual to contribute money to support views to be adopted by a democratically organized group even if the individual is also free to say what he pleases separately. </s> It seems to me these arguments have little force. In the first place, their supposition is that the voice of a dissenter is less effective if he speaks it first in an attempt to influence the action of a democratically organized group and then, if necessary, in dissent to the recommendations of that group. This is not at all convincing. The dissenter is not being made to contribute funds to the furtherance of views he opposes but is rather being made to contribute funds to a group expenditure about which he will have something to say. To the extent that his voice of dissent can convince his lawyer associates, it will later be heard by the State Legislature with a magnified voice. In short, I think it begs the question to approach the Constitutional issue with the assumption that the majority of the Bar has a permanently formulated position which the dissenting dues payor is being required to support, thus increasing the difficulty of effective opposition to it. </s> Moreover, I do not think it can be said with any assurance that being required to contribute to the dispersion of views one opposes has a substantial limiting effect on one's right to speak and be heard. Certainly these rights would be limited if state action substantially reduced one's ability to reach his audience. But are these rights substantially affected by increasing the opposition's ability [367 U.S. 820, 857] to reach the same audience? I can conceive of instances involving limited facilities, such as television time, which may go to the highest bidder, wherein increasing the resources of the opposition may tend to reduce a dissident's access to his audience. But before the Constitution comes into play, there should surely be some showing of a relationship between required financial support of the opposition and reduced ability to communicate, a showing I think hardly possible in the case of the legislative recommendations of the Wisconsin Bar. And, aside from the considerations of freedom from compelled affirmations of belief to be discussed later, I can find little basis for a right not to have one's opposition heard. </s> Beyond all this, the argument under discussion is contradicted in the everyday operation of our society. Of course it is disagreeable to see a group, to which one has been required to contribute, decide to spend its money for purposes the contributor opposes. But the Constitution does not protect against the mere play of personal emotions. We recognized in Hanson that an employee can be required to contribute to the propagation of personally repugnant views on working conditions or retirement benefits that are expressed on union picket signs or in union handbills. A federal taxpayer obtains no refund if he is offended by what is put out by the United States Information Agency. Such examples could be multiplied. </s> For me, this "drowning out" argument falls apart upon analysis. </s> 5. "COMPELLED AFFIRMATION" OF BELIEF. </s> It is argued that the requirement of Bar dues payments which may be spent for legislative recommendations which the payor opposes amounts to a compelled affirmation of belief of the sort this Court struck down in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 . While I agree that the rationale of Barnette is relevant, [367 U.S. 820, 858] I do not think that it is in any sense controlling in the present case. </s> Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Barnette, did not view the issue as turning merely "on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held." 319 U.S., at 634 . The holding of Barnette was that, no matter how strong or weak such beliefs might be, the Legislature of West Virginia was not free to require as concrete and intimate an expression of belief in any cause as that involved in a compulsory pledge of allegiance. It is in this light that one must assess the contention that, "Compelling a man by law to pay his money to elect candidates or advocate laws or doctrines he is against differs only in degree, if at all, from compelling him by law to speak for a candidate, a party, or a cause he is against" (ante, p. 788). One could as well say that the same mere difference in degree distinguishes the Barnette flag salute situation from a taxpayer's objections to the views a government agency presents, at public expense, to Congress. What seems to me obvious is the large difference in degree between, on the one hand, being compelled to raise one's hand and recite a belief as one's own, and, on the other, being compelled to contribute dues to a bar association fund which is to be used in part to promote the expression of views in the name of the organization (not in the name of the dues payor), which views when adopted may turn out to be contrary to the views of the dues payor. I think this is a situation where the difference in degree is so great as to amount to a difference in substance. </s> In Barnette there was a governmental purpose of requiring expression of a view in order to encourage adoption of that view, much the same as when a school teacher requires a student to write a message of self-correction on the blackboard one hundred times. In the present case there is no indication of a governmental purpose to further [367 U.S. 820, 859] the expression of any particular view. More than that, the State Bar's purpose of furthering expression of views is unconnected with any desire to induce belief or conviction by the device of forcing a person to identify himself with the expression of such views. True, purpose may not be controlling when the identification is intimate between the person who wishes to remain silent and the beliefs foisted upon him. But no such situation exists here where the connection between the payment of an individual's dues and the views to which he objects is factually so remote. Surely the Wisconsin Supreme Court is right when it says that petitioner can be expected to realize that "everyone understands or should understand" that the views expressed are those "of the State Bar as an entity separate and distinct from each individual." 5 Wis. 2d, at 623, 93 N. W. 2d, at 603. </s> Indeed, I think the extreme difficulty the Court encounters in the Street case (ante, p. 740) in finding a mechanism for reimbursing dissident union members for their share of "political" expenditures is wholly occasioned by, and is indicative of, the many steps of changed possession, ownership, and control of dues receipts and the multiple stages of decision making which separate the dues payor from the political expenditure of some part of his dues. I think these many steps and stages reflect as well upon whether there is an identification of dues payor and expenditure so intimate as to amount to a "compelled affirmation." Surely if this Court in Street can only with great difficulty - if at all - identify the contributions of particular union members with the union's political expenditures, we should pause before assuming that particular Bar members can sensibly hear their own voices when the State Bar speaks as an organization. </s> Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for himself, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone in Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265 , thought that the remoteness of the [367 U.S. 820, 860] connection between a conscientious objection to war and the study of military science was in itself sufficient to make untenable a claim that requiring this study in state universities amounted to a state establishment of religion. These Justices thought the case even clearer when all that was involved was a contribution of money: </s> "Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of a war . . . or in furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government." Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 268 . </s> Nor do I now believe that a state taxpayer could object on Fourteenth Amendment grounds to the use of his money for school textbooks or instruction which he finds intellectually repulsive, nor for the mere purchase of a flag for the school. In the present case appellant is simply required to pay dues into the general funds of the State Bar. I do not think a subsequent decision by the representatives of the majority of the bar members to devote some part of the organization's funds to the furtherance of a legislative proposal so identifies the individual payor of dues with the belief expressed that we are in the Barnette realm of "asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one. . . ." 319 U.S., at 634 . </s> It seems to me evident that the actual core of appellant's complaint as to "compelled affirmation" is not the identification with causes to which he objects that might arise from some conceivable tracing of the use of his dues in their support, but is his forced association with the [367 U.S. 820, 861] Integrated Bar. That, however, is a bridge which, beyond all doubt and any protestations now made to the contrary, we crossed in the Hanson case. I can see no way to uncross it without overruling Hanson. Certainly it cannot be done by declaring as a rule of law that lawyers feel more strongly about the identification of their names with proposals for law reform than union members feel about the identification of their names with collective bargaining demands declared on the radio, in picket signs, and on handbills. </s> II. </s> While I think that what has been said might well dispose of this case without more, in that Wisconsin lawyers retain "full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own minds, support their own causes and wholeheartedly fight whatever they are against" (post, p. 874), I shall pass on to consider the state interest involved in the establishment of the Integrated Bar, the other ingredient of adjudication which arises whenever incidental impingement upon such freedoms may fairly be said to draw in question governmental action. See, e. g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 ; Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra. </s> In this instance it can hardly be doubted that it was Constitutionally permissible for Wisconsin to regard the functions of an Integrated Bar as sufficiently important to justify whatever incursions on these individual freedoms may be thought to arise from the operations of the organization. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has described the fields of the State Bar's legislative activities and has asserted its readiness to restrict legislative recommendations to those fields: </s> "This court takes judicial notice of the activities of the State Bar in the legislative field since its creation by this court in 1956. In every instance the [367 U.S. 820, 862] legislative measures advocated or opposed have dealt with the administration of justice, court reform, and legal practice. Neither the above-quoted by-laws nor the stated purposes set forth in section 2 of Rule 1 for which the bar was integrated would permit the State Bar to be engaged in legislative activities unrelated to these three subjects. . . . However, as we pointed out in our opinion in the 1958 In re Integration of the Bar Case, this court will exercise its inherent power to take remedial action should the State Bar engage in an activity not authorized by the rules and by-laws and not in keeping with the stated objectives for which it was created. If the lawyers of the state wish by group action to engage in legislative activities not so authorized they will have to do so within the framework of some voluntary association, and not the State Bar." 10 Wis. 2d 230, 239-240, 102 N. W. 2d 404, 409-410. </s> Further, the same court has declared its belief that the lawyers of the State possess an expertise useful to the public interest within these fields: </s> "We are of the opinion that the public welfare will be promoted by securing and publicizing the composite judgment of the members of the bar of the state on measures directly affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law. The general public and the legislature are entitled to know how the profession as a whole stands on such type of proposed legislation. This is a function an integrated bar, which is as democratically governed and administered as the State Bar, can perform much more effectively than can a voluntary bar association." Ibid. </s> I do not think that the State Court's view in this respect can be considered in any way unreasonable. [367 U.S. 820, 863] </s> "[T]he composite judgment of the members of the bar of the state on measures directly affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law" may well be as helpful and informative to a state legislature as the work of individual legal scholars and of such organizations as the American Law Institute, for example, is to state and federal courts. State and federal courts are, of course, indifferent to the personal beliefs and predilections of any of such groups. The function such groups serve is a rationalizing one and their power flows from and is limited to their ability to convince by arguments from generally agreed upon premises. They are exercising the techniques and knowledge which lawyers are trained to possess in the task of solving problems with which the legal profession is most familiar. The numberless judicial citations to their work is proof enough of their usefulness in the judicial decision-making process. 3 </s> Legislatures too have found that they can benefit from a legal "expert's effort to improve the law in technical and non-controversial areas." Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 367. In the words of the Executive Secretary of the New York Law Revision Commission, there are areas in which "lawyers as lawyers have more to offer, to solve a given question, than other skilled persons or groups." 40 Cornell L. Q. 641, 644. See also Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113. The Acts recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have been adopted on over 1,300 occasions by the legislatures of the fifty States, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1960), at p. 207. There is no way of counting the number of occasions on which state legislatures have utilized the assistance of [367 U.S. 820, 864] legal advisory groups. Some indication may be obtained by noting that thirty-one jurisdictions have permanent legislative service agencies which recommend "substantive" legislative programs and forty-two jurisdictions utilize such permanent agencies in recommending statutory revision. 4 </s> In this light I can only regard as entirely gratuitous a contention that there is anything less than a most substantial state interest in Wisconsin having the views of the members of its Bar "on measures directly affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law." Nor can I take seriously a suggestion that the lawyers of Wisconsin are merely being polled on matters of their own personal belief or predilection, any more than Congress had in mind such a poll when it made it the duty of federal circuit judges summoned to attend the Judicial Conference of the United States "to advise . . . as to any matters in respect of which the administration of justice in the courts of the United States may be improved." 42 Stat. 837, 838. </s> III. </s> Beyond this conjunction of a highly significant state need and the chimerical nature of the claims of abridgment of individual freedom, there is still a further approach to the entire problem that combines both of these aspects and reinforces my belief in the Constitutionality of the Integrated Bar. </s> I had supposed it beyond doubt that a state legislature could set up a staff or commission to recommend changes in the more or less technical areas of the law into which no well-advised laymen would venture without the assistance of counsel. A state legislature could certainly appoint a commission to make recommendations to it on the desirability of passing or modifying any of the countless [367 U.S. 820, 865] uniform laws dealing with all kinds of legal subjects, running all the way from the Uniform Commercial Code to the Uniform Simultaneous Death Law. 5 It seems no less clear to me that a reasonable license tax can be imposed on the profession of being a lawyer, doctor, dentist, etc. See Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 572 . In these circumstances, wherein lies the unconstitutionality of what Wisconsin has done? Does the Constitution forbid the payment of some part of the Constitutional license fee directly to the equally Constitutional state law revision commission? Or is it that such a commission cannot be chosen by a majority vote of all the members of the state bar? Or could it be that the Federal Constitution requires a separation of state powers according to which a state legislature can tax and set up commissions but a state judiciary cannot do these things? </s> I end as I began. It is exceedingly regrettable that such specious contentions as appellant makes in this case should have resulted in putting the Integrated Bar under this cloud of partial unconstitutionality. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, concurring in result. </s> Believing that the State's requirement that a lawyer pay to its designee an annual fee of $15 as a condition of its grant, or of continuing its grant, to him of the special privilege (which is what it is) of practicing law in the State - which is really all that is involved here - does not violate any provision of the United States Constitution. I concur in the judgment. </s> [Footnote 1 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. See note 14, dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER in International Machinists v. Street, ante, p. 808. Arkansas has a Bar which is integrated only with respect to disciplinary matters. 207 Ark. xxxiv-xxxvii. </s> [Footnote 2 Among other things, the Integrated Bar of the State of Wisconsin is authorized by the State Supreme Court, acting under its inherent rule-making powers, to publish information relating to "the practice of law, the science of jurisprudence and law reform, and the relations of the bar to the public." Rule 1, 273 Wis. xi. Rule 4, 4, provides for standing committees including, inter alia, Committees on Administration of Justice and on Legislation. 273 Wis. xvi. The function of the former, as set out in Art. IV, 4, of the by-laws, 273 Wis. xxxiii, is to "study the organization and operation of the Wisconsin judicial [367 U.S. 820, 851] system and . . . recommend from time to time appropriate changes in practice and procedure for improving the efficiency thereof . . . ." The function of the Committee on Legislation is to study and, in certain circumstances, support or oppose "proposals submitted to the Wisconsin legislature or the congress of the United States for changes in the statutes relating to the courts or the practice of law . . . ." Art. IV, 9, 273 Wis. xxxiv. The enabling court rules indicate authorization for further study and comment on proposed legislation, for the board of governors is directed to establish sections on corporation and business law; family law; house counsel; insurance, negligence and workmen's compensation law; labor relations law; military law; real property, probate, and trust law; and taxation. 273 Wis. xvii. The plurality opinion of this Court sets out the nature and scope of the activities bearing on prospective legislation actually engaged in by this Integrated Bar. Ante, pp. 835-839. </s> [Footnote 3 The nine Restatements of the law alone have been cited well over 27,000 times. 36th Annual Meeting, The American Law Institute, at p. 63. </s> [Footnote 4 "Permanent Legislative Service Agencies," published by the Council of State Governments. </s> [Footnote 5 In thirty-three States the legislature appoints Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1960), at p. 211. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> I do not believe that either the bench, the bar or the litigants will know what has been decided in this case - certainly I do not. Two members of the Court, saying [367 U.S. 820, 866] that "the Constitutional issue is inescapably before us," vote to affirm the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a State can, without violating the Federal Constitution, compel lawyers over their protest to pay dues to be used in part for the support of legislation and causes they detest. Another member, apparently agreeing that the constitutional question is properly here, votes to affirm the holding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court because he believes that a State may constitutionally require a lawyer to pay a fee to its "designee" as a condition to granting him the "special privilege" of practicing law, even though that "designee," over the lawyer's protest, uses part of the fee to support causes the lawyer detests. Two other members of the Court vote to reverse the judgment of the Wisconsin court on the ground that the constitutional question is properly here and the powers conferred on the Wisconsin State Bar by the laws of that State violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, four members of the Court vote to affirm on the ground that the constitutional question is actually not here for decision at all. Thus the only proposition in this case for which there is a majority is that the constitutional question is properly here, and the five members of the Court who make up that majority express their views on this constitutional question. Yet a minority of four refuses to pass on the question and it is therefore left completely up in the air - the Court decides nothing. If ever there were two cases that should be set over for reargument in order for the Court to decide - or at least to make an orderly attempt to decide - the basic constitutional question involved in both of them, it is this case and the companion case of International Association of Machinists v. Street. 1 In this state of affairs, I find it necessary to set out my views on the questions which I think are properly presented and argued by the parties. [367 U.S. 820, 867] </s> In my judgment, this Court cannot properly avoid decision of the single, sharply defined constitutional issue which this case presents. The appellant filed a complaint in a Wisconsin Circuit Court, charging that he is being compelled by the State of Wisconsin, as a prerequisite to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of an association known as the State Bar of Wisconsin and to pay dues to that association; that he has paid these dues only under protest; that the State Bar of Wisconsin is using his money along with the moneys it has collected from other Wisconsin lawyers to engage in activities of a political and propagandistic nature in favor of objectives to which he is opposed and against objectives which he favors; and that, as a consequence of this compelled financial support of political views to which he is personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of rights guaranteed to him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Upon demurrer to this complaint, the Circuit Court held that it must be dismissed without leave to amend because, in the opinion of that court, "it would be impossible to frame a complaint so as to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against either the State Bar of Wisconsin or the defendant Donohue." 2 </s> On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, relying upon its powers of judicial notice, found as a fact that the State Bar does expend some of the moneys it collects as dues to further and oppose legislation 3 and that court [367 U.S. 820, 868] also accepted, at its full face value, the allegation of the complaint that many of these expenditures furthered views directly contrary to those held by the appellant. 4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the public interest in having "public expression of the views of a majority of the lawyers of the state, with respect to legislation affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law . . . far outweighs the slight inconvenience to," and hence any abridgment of the constitutional rights of, those who disagree with the views advocated by the State Bar. 5 </s> The plurality decision to affirm the judgment of the Wisconsin courts on the ground that the issue in the case is not "shaped . . . as leanly and as sharply as judicial judgment upon an exercise of . . . [state] power requires" is, in my judgment, wrong on at least two grounds. First of all, it completely denies the appellant an opportunity [367 U.S. 820, 869] to amend his complaint so as to "shape" the issue in a manner that would be acceptable to this Court. Appellant's complaint was dismissed by the Wisconsin courts, without giving him a chance to amend it and before he had an opportunity to bring out the facts in the case, solely because those courts believed that it would be impossible for him to allege any facts sufficient to entitle him to relief. The plurality now suggests, by implication, that the Wisconsin courts were wrong on this point and that appellant could possibly make out a case under his complaint. Why then is the case not remanded to the Wisconsin courts in order that the appellant will have at least one opportunity to meet this Court's fastidious pleading demands? The opinions of the Wisconsin courts in this case indicate that the laws of that State - as do the laws in most civilized jurisdictions - permit amendments and clarifications of complaints where defects exist in the original complaint which can be cured. And even if Wisconsin law were to the contrary, it is settled by the decisions of this Court that a federal right cannot be defeated merely on the ground that the original complaint contained a curable defect. 6 On this point, the judgment of the Court affirming the dismissal of appellant's suit, insofar as that judgment rests upon the plurality opinion, seems to me to be totally without justification, either in reason, in precedent or in justice. 7 </s> [367 U.S. 820, 870] </s> My second ground of disagreement with the plurality opinion is that I think we should consider and decide now the constitutional issue raised in this case. No one has suggested that this is a contrived or hypothetical lawsuit. Indeed, we have it on no less authority than that of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that the Wisconsin State Bar does in fact use money extracted from this appellant under color of law to engage in activities intended to influence legislation. The appellant has alleged, in a complaint sworn to under oath, that many of these activities are in opposition to the adoption of legislation which he favors. In such a situation, it seems to me to be nothing more than the emptiest formalism to suggest that the case cannot be decided because the appellant failed to allege, as precisely as four members of this Court think he should, what it is that the Bar does with which he disagrees. And it certainly seems unjust for the appellant to be thrown out of court completely without being given a chance to amend his complaint and for a judgment against him to be affirmed without consideration of the merits of his cause even though that judgment may later be held to constitute a complete bar to assertion of his First Amendment rights. Even if the complaint in this case had been drawn in rigid conformity to the meticulous requirements of the plurality, we would be presented with nothing but the very same question now before us: Can a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, force a person to support financially the activities of an organization in support of views to which he is opposed? Thus, the best, if not the only, reason I can think of for not resolving that question now is that a decision on the constitutional question in this case would make it impossible for the Court to rely upon the doctrine of avoidance with respect to that same constitutional [367 U.S. 820, 871] question to justify its strained interpretation of the Railway Labor Act in the Street case. 8 </s> On the merits, the question posed in this case is, in my judgment, identical to that posed to but avoided by the Court in the Street case. Thus, the same reasons that led me to conclude that it violates the First Amendment for a union to use dues compelled under a union-shop agreement to advocate views contrary to those advocated by the workers paying the dues under protest lead me to the conclusion that an integrated bar cannot take the money of protesting lawyers and use it to support causes they are against. What I have said in the Street case would be enough for me to dispose of the issues in this case were it not for the contention which has been urged by the appellee throughout this case that there are distinguishing features that would justify the affirmance of this case even if the statute in the Street case were struck down as unconstitutional. </s> The appellee's contention in this respect rests upon two different arguments. The first of these is that the use of compelled dues by an integrated bar to further legislative ends contrary to the wishes of some of its members can be upheld under the so-called "balancing test," which permits abridgment of First Amendment rights so long as that abridgment furthers some legitimate purpose of the State. 9 Under this theory, the appellee contends, [367 U.S. 820, 872] abridgments of speech "incidental" to an integrated bar must be upheld because the integrated bar performs many valuable services for the public. As pointed out above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court embraced this theory in express terms. And the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, though not purporting to distinguish the Street case, also adopts the case-by-case "balancing" approach under which such a distinction as, indeed, any desired distinction is possible. </s> The "balancing" argument here is identical to that which has recently produced a long line of liberty-stifling decisions in the name of "self-preservation." 10 The interest of the State in having "public expression of the views of a majority of the lawyers" by compelling dissenters to pay money against their will to advocate views they detest is magnified to the point where it assumes overpowering proportions and appears to become almost as necessary a part of the fabric of our society as the need for "self-preservation." On the other side of the "scales," the interest of lawyers in being free from such state compulsion is first fragmentized into abstract, imaginary parts, then minimized part by part almost to the point of extinction, and finally characterized as being of a purely "chimerical nature." As is too often the case, when the cherished freedoms of the First Amendment emerge from this process, they are too weightless to have any substantial effect upon the constitutional scales and must therefore be sacrificed in order not to disturb what are conceived to be the more important interests of society. </s> I cannot agree that a contention arising from the abridgment of First Amendment freedoms which results [367 U.S. 820, 873] from compelled support of detested views can properly be characterized as of a "chimerical nature" or, in the words of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as involving nothing more than a "slight inconvenience." 11 Quite the contrary, I can think of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the First Amendment than to compel persons to support candidates, parties, ideologies or causes that they are against. And, as stated many times before, I do not subscribe to the theory that abridgments of First Amendment freedoms can ever be permitted on a "balancing" basis. 12 I reiterate my belief that the unequivocal language of the First Amendment was intended to mean and does mean that the Framers of the Bill of Rights did all of the "balancing" that was to be done in this area. It is my firm belief that, in the long run, the continued existence of liberty in this country depends upon the abandonment of the constitutional doctrine that permits this Court to reweigh the values weighed by the Framers and thus to weaken the protections of the Bill of Rights. This case reaffirms that belief for it shows that the balancing test cannot be and will not be contained to apply only to those "hard" cases which at least some members of this Court have regarded as involving the question of the power of this country to [367 U.S. 820, 874] preserve itself. For I assume that no one would argue that the power at stake here is necessary to that end. </s> Moreover, if I felt that I had the power to reweigh the "competing" values involved. I would have no difficulty reaching the conclusion that the loss inflicted upon our free way of life by invasion of First Amendment freedoms brought about by the powers conferred upon the Wisconsin integrated bar far outweighs any state interest served by the exercise of those powers by that association. At stake here is the interest of the individual lawyers of Wisconsin in having full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own minds, support their own causes and wholeheartedly fight whatever they are against, as well as the interest of the people of Wisconsin and, to a lesser extent, the people of the entire country in maintaining the political independence of Wisconsin lawyers. 13 How is it possible that such formidable interests so vital to our free way of life can be said to be outweighed by any interest - much less the wholly imaginary interest urged here by the State which would have us believe that it will never know what its lawyers think about certain political questions if it cannot compel them to pay their money to support views they abhor? Certainly, I feel entirely confident in saying that the Framers of the First Amendment would never have struck the balance against freedom on the basis of such a demonstrably specious expediency. </s> In saying all this, I do not mean to suggest that the Wisconsin State Bar does not provide many useful and entirely lawful services. Quite the contrary, the record indicates that this integrated bar association, like other [367 U.S. 820, 875] bar associations both integrated and voluntary, does provide such services. But I think it clear that these aspects of the Wisconsin State Bar are quite beside the point so far as this case is concerned. For a State can certainly insure that the members of its bar will provide any useful and proper services it desires without creating an association with power to compel members of the bar to pay money to support views to which they are opposed or to fight views they favor. Thus, the power of a bar association to advocate legislation at the expense of those who oppose such legislation is wholly separable from any legitimate function of an involuntary bar association and, therefore, even for those who subscribe to the balancing test, there is nothing to balance against this invasion of constitutionally protected rights. </s> The second ground upon which the appellee would have us distinguish compelled support of hated views as practiced by an integrated bar from compelled support of such views as practiced by the unions involved in the Street case is that lawyers are somehow different from other people. This argument, though phrased in various ways, amounts to nothing more than the contention that the practice of law is a high office in our society which is conferred by the State as a privilege and that the State can, in return for this privilege, impose obligations upon lawyers that it could not impose upon those not given "so high a privilege." Were it not for this Court's recent decision in Cohen v. Hurley, 14 I would regard this [367 U.S. 820, 876] contention as utterly frivolous. But, it is true that the Court did hold in the Cohen case that lawyers could be treated differently from other people, at least insofar as a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is concerned. As I pointed out in my dissenting opinion in that case, it is a short step from that position to the position now urged in the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER - that lawyers must also give up their constitutional rights under the First Amendment in return for the "privilege" that the State has conferred upon them. 15 </s> I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government. What I said in the Cohen case is, in my judgment, equally applicable here: </s> ". . . [O]ne of the great purposes underlying the grant of those freedoms was to give independence to those who must discharge important public responsibilities. The legal profession, with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any group in our society, must have that independence. If it is denied them, they are likely to become nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment. Wherever that has happened in the world, the lawyer, as properly so called and respected, has ceased to perform the highest duty of [367 U.S. 820, 877] his calling and has lost the affection and even the respect of the people." 16 </s> As I see it, the single, sharply defined constitutional issue presented in this case does not raise a difficult problem. This appellant is not denying the power of the State of Wisconsin to provide that its bar shall engage in non-political and non-controversial activities or even the power of the State to provide that all lawyers shall pay a fee to support such activities. What he does argue, and properly I think, is that the State cannot compel him to pay his money to further the views of a majority or any other controlling percentage of the Wisconsin State Bar when that controlling group is trying to pass laws or advance political causes that he is against. If the "privilege" of being a lawyer renders that argument unsound, it is certainly one of the more burdensome privileges Government can confer upon one of its citizens. And lawyers might be well advised to reconsider the wisdom of encouraging the use of a slogan which, though high-sounding and noble in its outward appearance, apparently imposes heavy burdens upon their First Amendment freedoms. </s> I would reverse this case and direct the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to require refund of the dues exacted under protest from the appellant in order to permit the Wisconsin State Bar to advocate measures he is against and to oppose measures he favors. I think it plain that lawyers have at least as much protection from such compulsion under the Constitution as the Court is holding railroad workers have under the Railway Labor Act. </s> [Footnote 1 Ante, p. 740. </s> [Footnote 2 The Circuit Court also found jurisdictional difficulties with appellant's complaint but it expressly declined to rest its decision upon the jurisdictional defects alone. </s> [Footnote 3 "This court takes judicial notice of the activities of the State Bar in the legislative field since its creation by this court in 1956. In every instance the legislative measures advocated or opposed have dealt with the administration of justice, court reform, and legal practice." Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 239, 102 N. W. 2d 404, 409. The scope of this finding is shown by the court's further [367 U.S. 820, 868] statement in answer to appellant's contention that the State Bar also took positions on strictly substantive legislation: "We do not deem that the State Bar should be compelled to refrain from taking a stand on a measure which does substantially deal with legal practice and the administration of justice merely because it also makes some changes in substantive law." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 4 Thus, the Wisconsin court correctly stated the issue in this case: "The only challenged interference with his liberty is the exaction of annual dues to the State Bar . . . part of which is used to advocate causes to which he is opposed." 10 Wis. 2d 230, 242, 102 N. W. 2d 404, 411. </s> [Footnote 5 Ibid. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the Circuit Court that there were jurisdictional difficulties with the suit as it was brought. But the Supreme Court, like the Circuit Court, did not rest its decision on these jurisdictional grounds. Even though it agreed that the Circuit Court did not properly have jurisdiction, it expressly affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court which, as pointed out above, dismissed the complaint without leave to amend on the ground that no amendment would cure the defects in the merits of appellant's case. </s> [Footnote 6 See, e. g., Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 , especially at 296. </s> [Footnote 7 The authorities relied upon by the plurality opinion certainly do not support its position. The concurring opinion in United States v. C. I. O., 335 U.S. 106, 124 -129, does not suggest that a litigant who fails properly to "shape" constitutional issues should be thrown out of court completely for his failure. And the decision of the Court in United States v. International Union, U. A. W.-C. I. O., 352 U.S. 567 , plainly cannot be taken to justify such a disposition since that case was remanded for further proceedings. </s> [Footnote 8 As I have indicated in my dissenting opinion in that case, I also think the Court went to extravagant lengths to avoid the constitutional issue in that case. Ante, at 784-786. And I think it clear that the Court would have no choice but to meet and decide the constitutional issue in Street if a decision on that issue were made in this case. See id., at 785. </s> [Footnote 9 A complete statement of the arguments underlying the "balancing test" is set out in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 , in which this Court held that the freedoms of speech, press, [367 U.S. 820, 872] petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment are outweighed by the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. </s> [Footnote 10 See, e. g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 -511; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 -128; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 411 . </s> [Footnote 11 10 Wis. 2d, at 242, 102 N. W. 2d 404, 411. </s> [Footnote 12 See, e. g., Scales v. United States, ante, pp. 203, 259 (dissenting opinion); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, ante, pp. 1, 137 (dissenting opinion); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 110 -112 (dissenting opinion); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 62 -71 (dissenting opinion); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 441 -446 (dissenting opinion); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 422 -423 (dissenting opinion); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 392 -393 (dissenting opinion); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140 -144 (dissenting opinion); American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 -453 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 13 Cf. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 138 -150 (dissenting opinion); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 114 -116 (dissenting opinion); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 73 -74, 77-80 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 14 366 U.S. 117 . The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in that case was expressly rested in part upon the notion that the practice of law is a "special privilege." See id., at 132-133 (dissenting opinion). And I thought then, as I think now, that the decision of this Court upholding the judgment of the New York court placed "the stamp of approval upon a doctrine that, if permitted to grow, as doctrines have a habit of doing, can go far toward destroying the independence of the legal profession and thus toward rendering that [367 U.S. 820, 876] profession largely incapable of performing the very kinds of services for the public that most justify its existence." Id., at 135 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 15 Id., at 142-143 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 16 Id., at 138-139 (dissenting opinion). </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> The question in the present case concerns the power of a State to compel lawyers to belong to a statewide [367 U.S. 820, 878] bar association, the organization commonly referred to in this country as the "integrated bar." There can be no doubt that lawyers, like doctors and dentists, can be required to pass examinations that test their character and their fitness to practice the profession. No question of that nature is presented. There is also no doubt that a State for cause shown can deprive a lawyer of his license. No question of that kind is involved in the present case. 1 The sole question is the extent of the power of a State over a lawyer who rebels at becoming a member of the integrated bar and paying dues to support activities that are offensive to him. Thus the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, is brought into play. And for the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE BLACK, I think all issues in the case are ripe for decision. </s> If the State can compel all lawyers to join a guild, I see no reason why it cannot make the same requirement of doctors, dentists, and nurses. They too have responsibilities to the public; and they also have interests beyond making a living. The groups whose activities are or may be deemed affected with a public interest are indeed numerous. Teachers are an obvious example. Insurance agents, brokers, and pharmacists have long been under licensing requirements or supervisory regimes. As the interdependency of each person on the other increases with the complexities of modern society, the circle of people performing vital services increases. Precedents once established often gain momentum by the force of their existence. Doctrine has a habit of following the path of inexorable logic. [367 U.S. 820, 879] </s> We established no such precedent in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 . We dealt there only with a problem in collective bargaining, viz., is it beyond legislative competence to require all who benefit from the process of collective bargaining and enjoy its fruits to contribute to its costs? We held that the evil of those who are "free riders" may be so disruptive of labor relations and therefore so fraught with danger to the movement of commerce that Congress has the power to permit a union-shop agreement that exacts from each beneficiary his share of the cost of getting increased wages and improved working conditions. The power of a State to manage its internal affairs by requiring a union-shop agreement would seem to be as great. </s> In the Hanson case we said, to be sure, that if a lawyer could be required to join an integrated bar, an employee could be compelled to join a union shop. But on reflection the analogy fails. </s> Of course any group purports to serve a group cause. A medical association that fights socialized medicine protects the fees of the profession. Yet not even an immediate cause of that character is served by the integrated bar. Its contribution is in policing the members of the legal profession and in promoting what the majority of the Bar thinks is desirable legislation. </s> The Supreme Court of Wisconsin said that the integrated bar, unlike a voluntary bar association, was confined in its legislative activities. Though the Wisconsin Bar was active in the legislative field, it was restricted to administration of justice, court reform, and legal practice. The court however added: </s> "The plaintiff complains that certain proposed legislation, upon which the State Bar has taken a stand, embody changes in substantive law, and points to the recently enacted Family Code. Among other things, such measure made many changes in divorce [367 U.S. 820, 880] procedure, and, therefore, legal practice. We do not deem that the State Bar should be compelled to refrain from taking a stand on a measure which does substantially deal with legal practice and the administration of justice merely because it also makes some changes in substantive law." 10 Wis. 2d 230, 239, 102 N. W. 2d 404, 409. </s> It is difficult for me to see how the State can compel even that degree of subservience of the individual to the group. </s> It is true that one of the purposes of the State Bar Association is "to safeguard the proper professional interests of the members of the bar." State Bar of Wisconsin, Rule 1, 2. In this connection, the association has been active in exploiting the monopoly position given by the licensed character of the profession. Thus, the Bar has compiled and published a schedule of recommended minimum fees. See Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 40. Along the same line, the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, along with a Committee on Inter-professional and Business Relations, has been set up to police activities by nonprofessionals within "the proper scope of the practice of law." State Bar of Wisconsin, By-Laws, Art. IV, 8, 11. </s> Yet this is a far cry from the history which stood behind the decision of Congress to foster the well-established institution of collective bargaining as one of the means of preserving industrial peace. That history is partially crystallized in the language of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts: "Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce . . . by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees." [367 U.S. 820, 881] National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 137, 29 U.S.C. 151. It was with this history in mind that we spoke when we said that "One would have to be blind to history to assert that trade unionism did not enhance and strengthen the right to work." Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, supra, 235. </s> Nor can the present association be defended on grounds that it renders only public services. </s> If we had here a law which required lawyers to contribute to a fund out of which clients would be paid in case attorneys turned out to be embezzlers, 2 the present objection might not be relevant. In that case, one risk of the profession would be distributed among all members of the group. The fact that a dissident member did not feel he had within him the seeds of an embezzler might not bar a levy on the whole profession for one sad but notorious risk of the profession. We would also have a different case if lawyers were assessed to raise money to finance the defense of indigents. Cf. In re Florida Bar, 62 So.2d 20, 24. That would be an imposition of a duty on the calling which partook of service to the public. Here the objection strikes deeper. An attorney objects to a forced association with a group that demands his money for the promotion of causes with which he disagrees, from which he obtains no gain, and which is not part and parcel of service owing litigants or courts. </s> The right of association is an important incident of First Amendment rights. The right to belong - or not to [367 U.S. 820, 882] belong - is deep in the American tradition. Joining is one method of expression. This freedom of association is not an absolute. For as I have noted in my opinion in International Assn. of Machinists v. Street, ante. p. 775, decided this day, the necessities of life put us into relations with others that may be undesirable or even abhorrent, if individual standards were to obtain. Yet if this right is to be curtailed by law, if the individual is to be compelled to associate with others in a common cause, then I think exceptional circumstances should be shown. I would treat laws of this character like any that touch on First Amendment rights. Congestion of traffic, street fights, riots and such may justify curtailment of opportunities or occasions to speak freely. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 . But when those laws are sustained, we require them to be "narrowly drawn" (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 ) so as to be confined to the precise evil within the competence of the legislature. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 ; Louisiana v. N. A. A. C. P., 366 U.S. 293 . There is here no evil shown. It has the mark of "a lawyer class or caste" - the system of "a self-governing and self-disciplining bar" such as England has. 3 The pattern of this legislation is regimentation. The inroads of an integrated bar on the liberty and freedom of lawyers to espouse such causes as they choose was emphasized by William D. Guthrie 4 of the New York Bar: 5 </s> "The idea seems to be, contrary to all human experience, that if power be vested in this at present unknown and untried as well as indifferent outside body, holding themselves aloof from their profession, they will somehow become inspired with a high professional [367 U.S. 820, 883] sentiment or sense of duty and cooperation and will unselfishly exercise their majority power for the good of their profession and the public, that they can be trusted to choose as their officers and leaders lawyers of the type who are now leaders, that the responsibility of power will necessarily sober and elevate their minds, and finally that democracy calls for the rule of the majority. </s> "Thus, the traditions and ethics of our great profession would be left to the mercy of mere numbers officially authorized to speak for us! This would be adopting all the vices of democracy without the reasonable hope in common sense of securing any of its virtues. It would be forcing the democratic dogma of mass or majority rule to a dangerous and pernicious extreme. </s> "Although in political democracy the rule of the majority is necessary, the American system of democracy is based upon the recognition of the imperative necessity of limitations upon the will of the majority. In the proposed compulsory or involuntary incorporation of the bar, there would be no limitation whatever, and the best sentiments and traditions of the profession, of the public-spirited and high-minded lawyers who are now active in the voluntary bar associations of the state, could be wholly and wantonly disregarded and overruled." 6 </s> This regimentation appears in humble form today. Yet we know that the Bar and Bench do not move to a single [367 U.S. 820, 884] "nonpartisan" objective. The obvious fact that they are not so motivated is plain from Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 , which we decided only the other day. Once we approve this measure, we sanction a device where men and women in almost any profession or calling can be at least partially regimented behind causes which they oppose. I look on the Hanson case as a narrow exception to be closely confined. Unless we so treat it, we practically give carte blanche to any legislature to put at least professional people into goose-stepping brigades. 7 </s> [367 U.S. 820, 885] Those brigades are not compatible with the First Amendment. While the legislature has few limits where strictly social legislation is concerned (Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 ; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 ), the First Amendment applies strictures designed to keep our society from becoming moulded into patterns of conformity which satisfy the majority. </s> [Footnote 1 A self-policing provision whereby lawyers were given the power to investigate and disbar their associates would raise under most, if not all, state constitutions the type of problem presented in Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 . See 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 2.14. </s> [Footnote 2 See 84 Rep. Am. Bar Assn., pp. 365-367, 513-515, 604-606 (1959); Voorhees, A Progress Report: The Clients' Security Fund Program, 46 Am. Bar Assn. Jour., 496 (1960); Voorhees, Should The Bar Adopt Client Security Funds?, 28 Jour. Bar Assn. Kan. 5 (1959). As of May 1961, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington have such funds. </s> [Footnote 3 Guthrie, The Proposed Compulsory Incorporation of the Bar, 4 N. Y. L. Rev. 223, 231 (1926). </s> [Footnote 4 See Swaine, The Cravath Firm (1946), Vol. I, pp. 359, 518. </s> [Footnote 5 Guthrie, supra, note 3, 234-235. </s> [Footnote 6 Compare with this the language of the court below in this case: "[I]t promotes the public interest to have public expression of the views of a majority of the lawyers of the state, with respect to legislation affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law, the same to be voiced through their own democratically chosen representatives comprising the board of governors of the [Integrated] State Bar." 10 Wis. 2d 230, 242, 102 N. W. 2d 404. </s> [Footnote 7 A current observer has commented on the results of the regimented Bar in England: </s> "Britain is moving towards a dangerous dictatorship not only in journalism, wireless, and television, but in finance and law. The immense groups controlling financial operations are becoming more and more interlocked and have an increasing tendency to cover up each other's errors. </s> "The great firms of solicitors are less and less inclined to offend the powerful financial houses which place the biggest business; and if dishonesty is alleged they all too often refuse `to act' if this should involve one of the great interests upon which the big and profitable business of our times depends. </s> "Slowly, dangerously, and without the public fully realising what is happening, a nation of great power bottled up in a tiny geographical area is being brought within the grip of a minority of extremely powerful men whose genius is to deny the smallest pretension to power, but who, in fact, are wholly ruthless in a persistent search for power. </s> "In this search, although money is vital, they are ready to be Radical in many ways - particularly in the destruction of all rivalry for influence which might spring from a widespread continuity of wealth in the hands of proprietors of family businesses or land. </s> . . . . . </s> "To destroy this movement towards Press monopoly and financial `cover-up,' it will be necessary for individuals still preserved from `take-over' to support every form of independent journalism and finance. Unhappily, in the field of journalism the smaller groups are so afraid of worse than already threatens, that the tendency is towards surrender. This must be stopped." The Weekly Review, Feb. 3, 1961, pp. 1, 2. </s> [367 U.S. 820, 886]

United States Supreme Court BLUMENTHAL V. U.S.(1947) No. 54-to-57 Argued: October 23, 1947Decided: December 22, 1947 </s> Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1948. [ Blumenthal v. U.S. 332 U.S. 539 (1947) ] </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 541] </s> Mr. Arthur B. Dunne, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners Blumenthal, Goldsmith, and Feigenbaum. Mr. Samuel S. Weiss, pro se. Beatrice Rosenberg, of Washington, D.C., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court. The four petitioners and Abel, another defendant, were convicted of conspiring to sell whiskey at prices above the ceiling set by regulations of the Office of Price Administration, in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, 902(a), 904(a) and 925(b), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, 902(a), 904(a), 925(b). The charge was made pursuant to the general conspiracy statute, 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. 88. The convictions were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. 158 F.2d 883, dissenting opinion at 158 F.2d 762. Abel has not sought review in this Court. Certiorari was granted, 331 U.S. 799 , as to the other four defendants because we thought important questions were presented concerning the applicability of our recent decision in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 . We did not limit our grant of certiorari to that question, however, and on the record it is inseparably connected with the other issues, which relate to the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly we have considered all of petitioners' contentions. The com- </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 542] </s> petent proof was clearly sufficient to show that each petitioner had aided in the whiskey's illegal sale and had conspired with others to do so. The only phase of the case meriting further attention is whether, because of a difference in the state of the proof affecting two groups of defendants, the proof, in variance from the indictment, shows that there was more than one conspiracy. I. The indictment charges a single conspiracy in a single count. Ten overt acts are specified. The Government alleged and sought to establish that all of the defendants and other unidentified persons conspired together to dispose of two carloads, each consisting of about 2,000 cases, of Old Mr. Boston Rocking Chair Whiskey at over the ceiling wholesale prices. This whiskey was shipped by rail from the distiller or his agent to the Francisco Distributing Company, in San Francisco, in December, 1943. Goldsmith was the individual and sole owner of that business and held a wholesale liquor dealer's basic permit as required by federal law. Weiss, his former partner, was sales manager for the business. Feigenbaum operated the Sunset Drugstore in San Francisco. Blumenthal owned and operated the Sportorium, a sporting goods and pawn shop in the same city. Abel either owned or worked in a jewelry store in Vallejo, California. The evidence does not show that any of these last three was connected with Francisco in any way except that each had part in arranging sales and deliveries of portions of these two shipments to purchasers. These were tavern owners in San Francisco and near-by towns such as Vallejo, Santa Rosa, Livermore, Cottonwood and El Cerrito. Proof of the activities of Feigenbaum, Blumenthal and Abel was made largely by </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 543] </s> the testimony of the various tavernkeepers with whom they respectively dealt. The evidence showed that on arrival of the whiskey in San Francisco legal title was taken in Francisco's name, in which the shipping documents were made out; that it honored sight drafts for both shipments, upon Goldsmith's directions to Francisco's bank to pay them out of Francisco's account; that some of the whiskey was delivered ex car directly to tavernkeepers who previously had arranged for purchases in lots varying from 25 to 200 cases; that the remainder was placed in storage with the San Francisco Warehouse Company, pursuant to arrangements made by Weiss, and thereafter was delivered by the warehouse to various purchasers holding invoices issued by Francisco1 on orders given by Weiss. The ex car deliveries also were made pursuant to similar invoices and orders. If further appeared that the cost of the whiskey to Francisco was $21. 97 a case,2 the wholesale ceiling price was $25.27, and Francisco received, by check of the purchasing tavernkeepers, $24.50 for each case sold. There was thus left to it a margin above cost of $2.53 on each case, out of which were to come storage charges, if any, and legitimate net profit. Thus far no illegal act, transaction, intent or agreement appears. But by the testimony of purchasing tavernkeepers the Government proved that in connection with each sale the purchaser had paid to the selling intermediary, in addition to the $24.50 per case remitted </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 544] </s> by check to Francisco, an additional sum in cash amounting roughly to from $ 30 to $40 per case. Thus the actual cost to the retailer was from $55 to $ 65 per case. In some instances the identity of the person arranging the transaction for the seller and receiving the cash payment was not established or known to the witness testifying to the sale and its details. In others, however, Blumenthal, Feigenbaum or Abel was identified as the salesman or intermediary. It was not brought out with what person or persons Abel, Feigenbaum, Blumenthal or the other salesmen dealt in securing the whiskey from Francisco.3 In two sales, Figone, a tavernkeeper of El Cerrito, testified he arranged for the purchases in Francisco's offices, but could not identify the person with whom he dealt. In all instances, however, whether involving sales to San Francisco or to out-of-town dealers and whether through identified or unidentified selling intermediaries, the sales followed the general pattern described above. That is, once the understanding had been reached, the purchaser made out his check at the price of $24.50 per case, to the order of 'Francisco Distributing Co.,' at the direction of the selling intermediary, to whom the check was delivered; at the same time or later the purchaser </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 545] </s> also paid in cash to the intermediary the difference between the amount of the check and the agreed overceiling purchase price; then or later the purchaser received invoices in the name of Francisco for the number of cases of Old Mr. Boston Rocking Chair Whiskey bought showing only the legal price of $24.50 per case; and thereafter the purchaser received delivery of the whiskey from the warehouse company, by freight in the case of out-of-town buyers. Weiss gave the warehouse company instructions for shipments or local deliveries. Francisco collected the checks by endorsing and sending them through its bank for collection. Slight variations in detail of the pattern appear in some instances but they are insignificant for our purposes. The foregoing is substantially the evidence used, not only in part to show the conspiracy, but also to connect Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel with it. In addition to the evidence already related as it affects Goldsmith and Weiss, the court received as to them alone the testimony of Harkins, a special investigator for the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Treasury Department. He related conversations had with Goldsmith and Weiss, during which important admissions were made by one or the other or both. Those admissions give rise to the crucial problems in the case. At the initial conference 'early in January,' 1944, attended by both Goldsmith and Weiss, the latter 'did most of the talking.' Questioned concerning who purchased the two carloads and how they were handled, Weiss said 'that his firm received $2.00 a case for clearing it through their books.' Goldsmith concurred in this and both stated that they divided the $ 2.00, each taking a dollar. 'They both stated, agreed, that they did not sell any of the whiskey. It was sold by others, and they received </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 546] </s> the check generally for the payment for the whiskey in advance of the date that they had to take up the sight draft bills of lading. At that time they did not tell us who actually sold the whiskey.' Later conferences held separately with Goldsmith and Weiss simply confirmed the substance of the first to the effect that Francisco was not the actual owner, but that Goldsmith and Weiss were acting for an unidentified person in handling the shipments in Francisco's name. 4 The identity of the owner was not established. But Goldsmith added the admission that he wrote most of the invoices. Shortly after the trial began the court announced that it would save time and be fairer to all for the evidence to be received initially only as against the particular defendant or defendants to whom it appeared expressly related, reserving to the Government, however, the right to move for its admission as against any or all of the other defendants whenever in the Government's opinion </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 547] </s> sufficient facts had been introduced to show such defendants to have been connected with the conspiracy charged. This course was followed. At the close of the Government's case, the court granted its motion to admit all of the evidence as against all of the defendants, except that it declined to allow Harkins' testimony concerning his conversations with Goldsmith and Weiss to be admitted as against the defendants Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel. That testimony however was allowed to stand against both Goldsmith and Weiss insofar as it related the conversation had in the presence of both, and as to each of them respectively to the extent that the other interviews took place in his presence. The court overruled numerous objections to these rulings by each defendant. None offered evidence in his own behalf. Following its rulings on admissibility, the trial court concluded as against various objections that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the issues whether the conspiracy charged had been made out and concerning each defendant's connection with it. Accordingly, it overruled the defendants' motions for directed verdicts and submitted the case to the jury. In the instructions the court expressly stated, in accordance with the previous rulings on admissibility, that Harkins' testimony was to be considered only as against Goldsmith and Weiss, not as against the other three defendants. II. In the Kotteakos case, supra, the Government conceded that, under the charge of a single, all-inclusive conspiracy, the proof showed distinct and separate ones connected only by the fact that one man, Brown, was a participant and key figure in all. But it urged that </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 548] </s> under the ruling in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 , the variance was at the most harmless error, a contention we rejected. Here the situation is the reverse. The Government has conceded, in effect, that prejudice has resulted if more than one conspiracy has been proved. 5 But it insists that the evidence establishes a single conspiracy and no more, an issue not presented or determined in the Kotteakos case. The proof, in relation to whether one or more conspiracies were shown as well as relative to whether any was made out, requires somewhat different treatment concerning the two groups of defendants, Weiss and Goldsmith, on the one hand, and Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel, on the other. This is by reason of the court's exclusion of the admissions of Goldsmith and Weiss from consideration as to the other three defendants. The Government does not maintain that Francisco, or Goldsmith (or therefore Weiss), was the owner of the whiskey. It accepts the view that another or others unidentified, were the real owner or owners and that Francisco (and thus Goldsmith and Weiss) was merely a channel for distributing the liquor and giving that unlawful process a legal facade. Indeed the 'innocent appearing actions' of Weiss and Goldsmith in their use of Francisco, the brief asserts, 'were the crux of the conspiracy * * * since the color of legitimacy was an essential part of the plan to dispose of the liquor to tavern owners at over-ceiling prices.'6 </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 549] </s> The evidence including the admissions was clearly sufficient to establish that the owner devised a plan which contemplated the entire chain of events from the original purchase in Francisco's name to the ultimate black market sales and deliveries. This includes the obvious inference that he made the arrangements for clearance through Francisco's books. Since Goldsmith and Weiss were the owner and sales manager respectively of Francisco and had active parts personally in carrying out those arrangements, there hardly can be any question that they knew the owner, had part in making the arrangements with him and, by virtue of those facts and their parts in facilitating the sales and deliveries to the tavernkeepers, knew also of his intention to resell the whiskey and of his plan for doing so in every material respect except that he intended to sell at over-ceiling prices. The showing on that crucial question was entirely circumstantial. It was nonetheless substantial. Goldsmith and Weiss knew that there was a margin of only about 77õ between the legal price ceiling and the $24.50 per case they received by check in payment for the whiskey. 7 They knew that the invoices sent by Francisco to each purchaser gave no room for even that slender margin but </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 550] </s> represented only the owner's cost figure. They knew further that by using Francisco's name, services and facilities the owner was concealing his identity from the purchasers in the sales, making Francisco appear as the owner on the paper records; that sales were being made to numerous and widely scattered tavernkeepers; and that in every sale remittance was made to them uniformly not only by check, usually of the purchaser, but also in the exact amount of $24.50 per case. The inference that the unknown owner giving away the liquor is scarcely conceivable. The most likely inferences to be drawn were two, namely, that the owner was selling for a legal margin of not more than 77õ or that he was selling at overceiling prices. The first inference is hardly tenable, especially in view of the prevailing and widespread shortage and demand, with accompanying black market activity, of which the most meticulous wholesale liquor dealer hardly could have been ignorant. The inference was not only justified, it was almost inescapable, that Goldsmith and Weiss knew of the owner's intent and purpose to sell above the lawful price, as well as most of the detail of his plan for doing so. With that knowledge their active aid toward executing his design made them co-conspirators with him, and he with them, toward accomplishing it. III. It remains however to consider whether, without the admissions, Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel have been shown to have conspired together and with Goldsmith and Weiss in the scheme proved against the latter two. The admissions alone disclosed the unknown owner's existence; that Goldsmith and Weiss were aci ng for him, not for themselves; received from the transactions, and divided equally, the $2 per case; and gave the use of </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 551] </s> Francisco's name to cover up the unknown owner's existence, identity and part in the scheme. Whether or not the evidence stripped of those facts was sufficient to sustain the charge, a preliminary question arises upon the trial court's disposition of the admissions. They supplied strong confirmatory or supplementing proof to show, not only the connections of Goldsmith and Weiss with the scheme, but also its existence and illegal character. If therefore it were shown, or even were doubtful, that the admissions had been improperly received as against Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel, reversal would be required as to them. 8 </s> But the trial court's rulings, both upon admissibility9 and in the instructions,10 leave no room for doubt that the </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 552] </s> admissions were adequately excluded, insofar as this could be done in a joint trial, from consideration on the question of their guilt. The rulings told the jury plainly to disregard the admissions entirely, in every phase of the case, in determining that question. 11 The </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 553] </s> direction was a total exclusion, not simply a partial one as the Government's argument seems to imply. 12 The court might have been more emphatic. But we cannot say its unambiguous direction was inadequate. Nor can we assume that the jury misunderstood or disobeyed it. With the admissions thus entirely excluded, we think nevertheless that the remaining evidence was sufficient to show, in accordance with the charge, that the five defendants joined in a single conspiracy to sell the whiskey at over-ceiling prices in the guise of legal sales. We set forth in the margin the remaining evidence, in part, which justifies this conclusion both as to Goldsmith and Weiss13 and as to the other three defendants. 14 </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 554] </s> The main difference comes with the climination of the unknown owner from view, and Francisco's consequent appearance as both actual and legal owner. This changes the detail of the facade, but does not remove either the </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 555] </s> facade itself or the essence of the unlawful scheme. That still was to sell the whiskey illegally in the guise of legal sales,15 to the knowledge of each defendant. 16 The gist of the conspiracy lay not in who actually owned the </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 556] </s> whiskey, but in the agreement to sell it in this unlawful fashion, regardless of who might own it. With the case thus posited, it is true the salesmen did not know of the unknown owner's existence or part in the plan. And in a hypertechnical aspect the case as a whole might be regarded as showing in one phase an agreement among Goldsmith, Weiss and the unknown owner, X, and in the other an agreement among the five defendants to which X was not a party. Thus in the most meticulous sense it might be regarded as disclosing two agreements, with Goldsmith and Weiss as figures common to both. Indeed that may be what took place chronologically, for conspiracies involving such elaborate arrangements generally are not born full grown. Rather they mature by successive stages which are necessary to bring in the essential parties. And not all of those joining in the earlier ones make known their participation to others later coming in. The law does not demand proof of so much. For it is most often true, especially in broad schemes calling for the aid of many persons, that after discovery of enough </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 557] </s> to show clearly the essence of the scheme and the identity of a number participating, the identity and the fact of participation of others remain undiscovered and undiscoverable. Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the law rightly gives room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the participation of others. 17 Otherwise the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in proof and of correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and conspirators would go free by their very ingenuity. Here, apart from the weight which the proof of the unknown owner's existence and participation added to the convictions of Weiss and Goldsmith, it added no essential feature to the charge against the five defendants. The whiskey was the same. The agreements related alike to its disposition. They comprehended illegal sales in the guise of legal ones. Who owned the whiskey was irrelevant to the basic plan and its essential illegality. It was a matter of indifferent detail to the salesmen, as by the same token was the fact that Goldsmith and Weiss were receiving and splitting only the $2 per case. It mattered nothing to the others whether those two received only that amount or the larger illegal sums. We think that in the special circumstances of this case the two agreements were merely step in the formation of the larger and ultimate more general conspiracy. In </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 558] </s> that view it would be a perversion of justice to regard the salesmen's ignorance of the unknown owner's participation as furnishing adequate ground for reversal of their convictions. Nor does anything in the Kotteakos decision require this. The scheme was in fact the same scheme; the salesmen knew or must have known that others unknown to them were sharing in so large a project; and it hardly can be sufficient to relieve them that they did not know, when they joined the scheme, who those people were or exactly the parts they were playing in carrying out the common design and object of all. By their separate agreements, if such they were, they became parties to the larger common plan, joined together by their knowledge of its essential features and broad scope, though not of its exact limits, and by their common single goal. The case therefore is very different from the facts admitted to exist in the Kotteakos case. Apart from the much larger number of agreements there involved, no two of those agreements were tied together as stages in the formation of a large all-inclusive combination, all directed to achieving a single unlawful end or result. On the contrary each separate agreement had its own distinct, illegal end. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through. And none aided in any way, by agreement or otherwise, in procuring another's loan. The conspiracies therefore were distinct and disconnected, not parts of a larger general scheme, both in the phase of agreement with Brown and also in the absence of any aid given to others as well as in specific object and result. There was no drawing of all together in a single, over-all, comprehensive plan. </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 559] </s> Here the contrary is true. All knew of and joined in the overriding scheme. All intended to aid the owner, whether Francisco or another, to sell the whiskey unlawfully, though the two groups of defendants differed on the proof in knowledge and belief concerning the owner's identity. All by reason of their knowledge of the plan's general scope, if not its exact limits, sought a common end, to aid in disposing of the whiskey. True, each salesman aided in selling only his part. But he knew the lot to be sold was larger and thus that he was aiding in a larger plan. He thus became a party to it and not merely to the integrating agreement with Weiss and Goldsmith. We think therefore that in every practical sense the unique facts of this case reveal a single conspiracy of which the several agreements were essential and integral steps, and accordingly that the judgments should be affirmed. The grave danger in this case, if any, arose not from the trial court's rulings upon admissibility or from its instructions to the jury. As we have said, these were as adequate as might reasonably be required in a joint trial. The danger rested rather in the risk that the jury, in disregard of the court's direction, would transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the effect of the excluded admissions from the case as made againt Goldsmith and Weiss across the barrier of the exclusion to the other three defendants. That danger was real. It is one likely to arise in any conspiracy trial and more likely to occur as the number of persons charged together increases. Perhaps even at best the safeguards provided by clear rulings on admissibility, limitations of the bearing of evidence as against particular individuals, and adequate instructions, are insufficient to ward off the danger entirely. It is therefore extremely important that those safeguards be made as </s> [332 U.S. 539 , 560] </s> impregnable as possible. Here, however, the case as presented involved none of the risks common to mass trials. And, in view of the trial court's caution, the risk of transference of gul t over the border of admissibility was reduced to the minimum. So great was the court's concern that it expressly told the jury, in addition to the instructions set forth above, '* * * the guilt or innocence of each defendant must be determined by the jury separately. Each defendant has the same right to that kind of consideration on your part as if he were being tried alone.' We have considered petitioners' remaining contentions and find them without merit. 18 </s> The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs in the result. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 Of the more than 4,000 cases received by Francisco, proof concerning disposition at over-ceiling prices related to less than half, or some 1,500-plus cases. [Footnote 2 Consisting of $19.24 per case to the distiller, 81õ for freight, and $1.92 for state taxes. </s> [Footnote 3 The witnesses identifying Feigenbaum testified they sought him out at the Sunset Drugstore in San Francisco and made the arrangements with him for their purchasers there. Similar testimony was given by those identifying Blumenthal with the arrangements taking place in the Sportorium. In some instances the out-of-town purchasing witnesses testified that they went to San Francisco in search of whiskey to buy and by one means or another, usually through inquiry of persons frequentig bars where the witnesses stopped, were directed to the selling agent. In other instances the intermediary sought out the tavernkeeper as a prospective purchaser at his place of business. </s> [Footnote 4 At an interview with Goldsmith 'early in September,' Goldsmith was asked 'who actually bought him the whiskey, who owned it.' In reply 'he said that Blumenthal brought it in, and when asked if he knew of his own knowledge, he said, 'No." He again stated that Francisco received $2 per case, of which he gave Weiss half. A still further questioning of Goldsmith took place on September 13. Harkins showed Goldsmith several invoices given to purchasers in the name of Francisco. Goldsmith admitted that he wrote most of the invoices and identified his own handwriting, stating however that a few were written by his bookkeeper. Harkins testified also regarding a conversation with Weiss on May 14, 1944. In this Weiss stated 'it was true that he received half of the $2 commission paid to the Francisco Distributing Company for clearing this whiskey through their books, and he finally refused to answer who actually owned the whiskey. He said 'I don't want to involve myself." Weiss also admitted knowing Blumenthal, but 'refused to state, to the best of my (the witness') recollection, positively, whether Mr. Blumenthal was the owner of the whiskey or not.' </s> [Footnote 5 The brief states: 'The Government does not contend that if the proof showed several conspiracies, as the dissenting judge thought, the variance would not be prejudicial.' [Footnote 6 The brief also declares that 'the gist of the conspiracy * * * was the scheme to sell liquor to tavern owners at over-ceiling prices in an apparently legitimate fashion through the medium of Francisco.' The plan, it is said, 'was not merely to sell liquor at over-ceiling prices; it was a plan to sell liquor at over-ceiling prices in an apparently legitimate fashion' and 'the core of the scheme was the arrangement by which the whiskey would clear to tavern owners through Francisco, a legitimate wholesaler.' </s> [Footnote 7 The $24.50 price was at the most 53õ above the actual cost of the whiskey, see note 2, plus the $2.00 fee paid Francisco for the use of its books. There is no evidence that the unknown owner received any portion of this 53õ margin. Since the record shows that Francisco was billed by the warehouse company for the storage of the liquor, the inference was fully justified that the 53õ margin was largely dissipated by the storage charges and other overhead costs attributable to the sale of the whiskey and that the remaining sum, if any, was retained by Francisco. </s> [Footnote 8 Even if the evidence were sufficient with the admissions excluded, they were of such importance that if admitted improperly the jury might have drawn entirely different inferences from the whole evidence including them than from it without them. [Footnote 9 Before sending the case to the jury the court stated in its presence and for its benefit that it had granted the Government's motion to admit all the evidence against all the defendants except: 'That the testimony of the last witness, Mr. Harkins, is admitted in evidence as against the defendant Goldsmith as to the conversation had by the witness with the defendant Goldsmith; that his testimony is admitted as to the defendant Weiss with respect to conversations with the defendant Weiss; and as to both defendants, Goldsmith and Weiss, as to all conversations at which both defendants, Goldsmith and Weiss, were present, and exceptions are noted as to this ruling on behalf of all the defendants separately.' The court then added, on inquiry, that counsel was right in taking this to mean that the Harkins testimony 'does not affect the defendants Blumenthal and the other two or three.' [Footnote 10 At three distinct places the court made references either generally and abstractly or expressly applicable to the admissions. In the first, after stating that the testimony of an accomplice or co- conspirator and oral admissions of a defendant must be received with caution, the court said: 'In this case * * * proof of the conspiracy charged * * * must be made independent of admissions of any defendant made after the termination of the alleged conspiracy.' At a later point the jury was told: '* * * you must disregard entirely any testimony stricken out by the Court, or any testimony to which an objection has been sustained * * *. Testimony which has been admitted only to apply as to a specified defendant may only be considered by you as to that defendant and none other.' (Emphasis added.) And finally near the end of the instructions, expressly referring to the admissions of Goldsmith and Weiss, the court said: 'Where the existence of a criminal conspiracy has been shown, every act or declaration of each member of such conspiracy, done or made thereafter pursuant to the concerted plan and in furtherance of the common object, is considered the act and declaration of all the conspirators, and is evidence against each of them. On the other hand, after a conspiracy has come to an end, either by the accomplishment of the common design, or by the parties abandoning the same, evidence of acts or del arations thereafter made by any of the conspirators can be considered only as against the person doing such acts or making such statements. 'In that connection, you will recall that I advised you during the trial of the case that the statements made by the defendants Goldsmith and Weiss to the witness Harkins could only be considered by you as against those two named defendants.' (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 11 It is not entirely clear whether the words 'In that connection,' italicized in the last paragraph of note 10, refer only to the last or to both of the preceding sentences, in the specific context of the two paragraphs last quoted. But when those statements are taken in conjunction with the earlier ones and with the court's rulings on admissibility made in the jury's presence, we think the total effect of the instructions was to tell the jury plainly to disregard the admissions entirely in considering the guilt of Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and Abel. This view, though apparently differing from the Government's, see note 12, is reinforced by the further instruction, immediately following the one last quoted in note 10, to the effect that admissions of a conspirator not made in execution of the common design are not evidence against any of the parties other than the one making them. The admissions here fell clearly in that category, some of them because made after termination of the conspiracy, others because they had no effect to forward its object. None were made in furtherance of the conspiracy's object. Cf. Fiswick v. united States, 329 U.S. 211 . </s> [Footnote 12 Although we are not sure the argument goes so far, it seems to urge, see note 6 and text, that the admissions, as well as the other evidence expressly affecting only one or some of the defendants, were admissible and were received, not merely as against Weiss and Goldsmith on the whole case but also in part as against the other three, that is, to show even as to them the existence and illegal character of the scheme, though not to establish their connections with it. We do not read the record as showing this was the effect of the trial court's ruling. [Footnote 13 The evidence as to the unknown owner no longer being in the picture, the inference is almost irresistible that Francisco was the owner. On arrival of the whiskey, title was taken in Francisco's name, in which the shipping documents were made out; sight drafts for the two carloads were paid, at Goldsmith's direction, from Francisco's bank account; and the whiskey was stored and delivered by the warehouse company in accordance with Weiss' directions. At a time when wholesale liquor distributors were hard put to supply even long-established customers, Francisco sold its liquor, through the medium of salesmen who had no previous connection with the firm and were not regularly engaged in the business of selling liquor, to various tavern owners who had not previously had dealings with Francisco. Moreover, the sales were billed at a price 77õ per case below the OPA ceiling, despite the fact that tavern owners and other retail distributors considered themselves fortunate to secure whiskey at the full ceiling price. Also of interest are tavern owner Figone's over-ceiling purchases, which followed the pattern of the other sales, except in the important respect that they were made at the Francisco office, but with a person Figone could not identify. See text supra following note 3. We are not prepared to say that the jury was not justified in inferring from this evidence that Goldsmith and Weiss, the guiding hands of Francisco, were willig to make the sales only because of an illegal agreement with the salesmen to receive over-ceiling prices. The case would stand little better for Goldsmith and Weiss upon an inference that they sold to some other person, who in turn resold to the tavernkeepers through the salesmen. For then the 77õ legal margin would remain, now for the intervening purchaser, together with the use of Francisco's books and records to conceal his existence and part in the transactions and the allowable inferences from those facts. [Footnote 14 Acting almost simultaneously in early December before the first carload arrived in San Francisco, Blumenthal and Feigenbaum, as well as Abel and other unidentified salesmen, made it known that they could obtain whiskey for tavernkeepers. There are compelling indications that these salesmen were kept informed of the status of the whiskey. Thus, on the 8th or 9th of December, Feigenbaum told one purchaser that the whiskey would arrive in San Francisco in 'about a week or ten days,' that it would come in by railroad, and that there would be 'a carload of it.' The first of the two carloads of liquor actually arrived on December 17. Similarly, on the 3d or 4th of December, Blumenthal told tavernkeeper Fingerhut that the whiskey would arrive in the latter part of the month. The whiskey did so arrive and the purchaser received delivery. Then, late in December, Fingerhut received a telephone call, which he said was from Blumenthal, asking whether he needed more whiskey. As a result, Fingerhut made an additional purchase on January 3 or 4, 1944. The second carload was received by the warehouse company on or about January 3d. In addition to being well informed as to the progress of the whiskey in its journey westward, the salesmen followed a singularly set pattern in making their respective sales. All knew and so told the prospective customer that he would receive Francisco's invoice for the whiskey at the same below-ceiling price, which invoice was of great importance because it enabled the tavernkeepers to comply with the record-keeping requirements imposed by the California law. See note 15. All made arrangements for the payment of the identical price of $24.50 per case to Francisco by check. All received the checks, which were delivered to Francisco and collected by it. Of some significance, in connection with the other evidence, is the testimony of tavernkeeper Reinburg that on two occasions, at Abel's direction, he drove Abel to San Francisco, dropped him at the Sportorium, Blumenthal's place of business, and picked him up there about a half hour later. The inference was justified that Blumenthal, Feigenbaum and the other salesmen were aware that their individual sales were part of a larger common enterprise, dependent on the carefully evolved arrangements to give the sales the guise of legitimacy, to dispose of a larger store of liquor. Where a salesman knew, as did Feigenbaum, that at least a carload of whiskey was involved, it was an entirely reasonable inference that he knew that other salesmen, paralleling his efforts, were making sales similar to his. On the basis of the evidence, the jury was well warranted in deciding that the facts dovetailed too neatly to be the result of mere chance. </s> [Footnote 15 The evidence showed that some of the purchasers were unwilling to buy liquor without receiving a document to show purchase from a lawfully authorized source as reqi red by state law. With Francisco appearing as actual owner the scheme took on the aspect of one to sell its own whiskey illegally in the guise of lawful sales. [Footnote 16 Each salesman knew that he was receiving $30 to $40 above the ceiling; that Francisco was supplying the whiskey; that the elaborate arrangements were made not merely for his sales, but also for others, see note 14; and that he had to have the cash, as well as the check, before delivery from Francisco was completed. The basis for imputing such knowledge to Goldsmith and Weiss becomes not so compelling as with the admissions included, but nevertheless remains adequate. However the case is viewed, apart from the admissions, they knew the margin of legal profit left, whether for themselves or for others, after deducting the $24.50 per case, was only 77õ. If they actually owned and sold the whiskey, why sell below the ceiling in the face of the shortage and demand, when selling costs including the salesmen's compensation still were to be paid? If they did not own or sell at the $24.50 figure, then why the checks and false invoices in that amount? The inference is justified that either they or someone else to their knowledge was receiving more than the lawful price. </s> [Footnote 17 Marino v. United States, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 691; Lefco v. United States, 3 Cir., 74 F.2d 66; Jezewski v. United States, 6 Cir., 13 F.2d 599; Allen v. United States, 6 Cir., 4 F.2d 688. </s> [Footnote 18 These include the argument that petitioners were prosecuted under the wrong statute. Section 4(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act makes it unlawful, as a misdemeanor, 205(b), for any person to sell or deliver any commodity in violation of price regulations, 'or to offer, solicit, attempt, or agree to do any of the foregoing.' (Emphasis added.) Petitioners regard the prohibitory words 'or agree,' etc., as repeal by implication of the general conspiracy statute, 37 of the Criminal Code, insofar as otherwise it might apply to the acts forbidden by 4(a). There was no 'implied repeal.' Conviction under the general conspiracy statute requires more than mere agreement, namely, the commission of an overt act. See also Taub v. Bowles, Em.App., 149 F.2d 817; H.Rep. No. 827, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 8.

United States Supreme Court PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS CO. v. U.S.(1959) No. 489 Argued: April 28, 1959Decided: June 22, 1959 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 491, Galax Mirror Co., Inc., et al. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Court, argued April 29, 1959. </s> Petitioners were convicted in a Federal District Court of conspiring to fix prices of plain plate glass mirrors in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. After a key government witness had testified at their trial and had admitted that he had testified on the same general subject matter before the grand jury which indicted petitioners, their counsel moved for production of the grand jury minutes, not attempting to show any particularized need for them but claiming an absolute right to their production under Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 . This motion was denied by the trial judge. Held: Under Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the question whether the grand jury minutes should be produced was committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge; no abuse of his discretion has been shown; and petitioners' conviction is sustained. Pp. 396-401. </s> (a) Neither Jencks v. United States, supra, nor 18 U.S.C. 3500, which superseded its doctrine, has any bearing on this case, since neither of them relates to grand jury minutes. P. 398. </s> (b) Under Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the question whether grand jury minutes should be disclosed is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Pp. 398-399. </s> (c) No particularized need for production of the grand jury's minutes having been shown, the trial judge did not err in denying their production. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 . Pp. 399-401. </s> 260 F.2d 397, affirmed. </s> Leland Hazard argued the cause for petitioner in No. 489. With him on the brief were Cyrus v. Anderson and James B. Henry, Jr. [360 U.S. 395, 396] </s> H. Graham Morison argued the cause for petitioners in No. 491. With him on the brief were Samuel K. Abrams and Robert M. Lichtman. </s> Philip Elman argued the causes for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Daniel M. Friedman, Richard A. Solomon, Samuel Karp and Ernest L. Folk III. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioners stand convicted on a single-count indictment charging a conspiracy under 1 of the Sherman Act. They contend that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit them to inspect the grand jury minutes covering the testimony before that body of a key government witness at the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, 260 F.2d 397. With reference to the present claim, it held that Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 committed the inspection or not of grand jury minutes to the sound discretion of the trial judge, [360 U.S. 395, 397] and that in this instance, no abuse of that discretion had been shown. We granted certiorari limited to the question posed by this ruling. 358 U.S. 917, 918 . We conclude that in the circumstances of this case the trial court did not err in refusing to make Jonas' grand jury testimony available to petitioners for use in cross-examination. </s> The indictment returned in the case named as defendants seven corporations, all manufacturers of mirrors, and three of their officers. However, only three of the corporations are petitioners here, along with one individual, J. A. Messer, Sr. The indictment charged a conspiracy to fix the price of plain plate glass mirrors sold in interstate commerce. It is not necessary for our purposes to detail the facts of this long trial, the record of which covers 860 pages. It is sufficient to say that the Government proved its case through 10 witnesses, the last of whom was Jonas. He was President of a large North Carolina mirror manufacturing company and had a reputation for independence in the industry. Although neither he nor his corporation was indicted, the latter was made a co-conspirator. The evidence indicates that the conspiracy was consummated at two meetings held on successive days during the week of the annual meeting of the Mirror Manufacturers Association in 1954 at Asheville, North Carolina. Jonas, not being a member of the Association, did not attend the convention. Talk at the convention regarding prices culminated in telephone calls by several representatives of mirror manufacturers to Jonas concerning his attitude on raising prices. On the day following these calls Jonas and three of the participants in the conspiracy met at an inn away from the convention headquarters and discussed "prices." Within three days thereafter each of the manufacturers announced an identical price increase, which was approximately 10 percent. Jonas' testimony, of course, was confined to the telephone calls and the meeting at the inn [360 U.S. 395, 398] where the understanding was finalized. The Government admits that he was an "important" witness. However, proof of the conspiracy was overwhelming aside from Jonas' testimony. While he was the only witness who characterized the outcome of the meetings as an "agreement" on prices, no witness negatived this conclusion and the identical price lists that followed the meeting at the inn were little less than proof positive. </s> After the conclusion of Jonas' testimony, defense counsel interrogated him as to the number of times he appeared and the subject of his testimony before the grand jury. Upon ascertaining that Jonas had testified three times on "the same general subject matter," counsel moved for the delivery of the grand jury minutes. He stated that the petitioners had "a right . . . to inspect the Grand Jury record of the testimony of this witness after he has completed his direct examination" relating to "the same general subject matter" as his trial testimony. 2 As authority for "the automatic delivery of Grand Jury transcripts" under such circumstances counsel cited Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). As previously indicated, the motion was denied. </s> It appears to us clear that Jencks v. United States, supra, is in nowise controlling here. It had nothing to do with grand jury proceedings and its language was not intended to encompass grand jury minutes. Likewise, it is equally clear that Congress intended to exclude those minutes from the operation of the so-called Jencks Act, 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) 3500. 3 </s> Petitioners concede, as they must, that any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered by Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 6 (e) promulgated by this Court in 1946 after the [360 U.S. 395, 399] approval of Congress. In fact, the federal trial courts as well as the Courts of Appeals have been nearly unanimous in regarding disclosure as committed to the discretion of the trial judge. 4 Our cases announce the same principle, 5 and Rule 6 (e) is but declaratory of it. 6 As recently as last Term we characterized cases where grand jury minutes are used "to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility and the like" as instances of "particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly." United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). </s> Petitioners argue, however, that the trial judge's discretion under Rule 6 (e) must be exercised in accordance with the rationale of Jencks; namely, upon a showing on cross-examination that a trial witness testified before the grand jury - and nothing more - the defense has a "right" to the delivery to it of the witness' grand jury testimony. </s> This conclusion, however, runs counter to "a long-established policy" of secrecy, United States v. Procter & Gamble, supra, at 681, older than our Nation itself. The reasons therefor are manifold, id., at 682, and are compelling when viewed in the light of the history and modus operandi of the grand jury. Its establishment in the Constitution "as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases" indeed "shows the high place it [holds] as an instrument of justice." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). Ever since this action [360 U.S. 395, 400] by the Fathers, the American grand jury, like that of England, "has convened as a body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor." Ibid. Indeed, indictments may be returned on hearsay, or for that matter, even on the knowledge of the grand jurors themselves. Id., at 362, 363. To make public any part of its proceedings would inevitably detract from its efficacy. Grand jurors would not act with that independence required of an accusatory and inquisitorial body. Moreover, not only would the participation of the jurors be curtailed, but testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew that his testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused. Especially is this true in antitrust proceedings where fear of business reprisal might haunt both the grand juror and the witness. And this "go slow" sign would continue as realistically at the time of trial as theretofore. </s> It does not follow, however, that grand jury minutes should never be made available to the defense. This Court has long held that there are occasions, see United States v. Procter & Gamble, supra, at 683, when the trial judge may in the exercise of his discretion order the minutes of a grand jury witness produced for use on his cross-examination at trial. Certainly "disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, at 234. </s> The burden, however, is on the defense to show that "a particularized need" exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy. We have no such showing here. As we read the record the petitioners failed to show any need whatever for the testimony of the witness Jonas. They contended only that they had a "right" to the transcript because it dealt with subject matter generally covered at the trial. Petitioners indicate that the trial judge required a showing of contradiction [360 U.S. 395, 401] between Jonas' trial and grand jury testimony. Such a preliminary showing would not, of course, be necessary. While in a colloquy with counsel the judge did refer to such a requirement, we read his denial as being based on the breadth of petitioners' claim. Petitioners also claim error because the trial judge failed to examine the transcript himself for any inconsistencies. But we need not consider that problem because petitioners made no such request of the trial judge. The Court of Appeals apparently was of the view that even if the trial judge had been requested to examine the transcript he would not have been absolutely required to do so. It is contended here that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has reached a contrary conclusion. United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338. Be that as it may, resolution of that question must await a case where the issue is presented by the record. The short of it is that in the present case the petitioners did not invoke the discretion of the trial judge, but asserted a supposed absolute right, a right which we hold they did not have. The judgment is therefore. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Rule 6. The Grand Jury. </s> . . . . . </s> "(e) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons." </s> [Footnote 2 The fact that the trial testimony and that before the grand jury included the same "subjects" or related to "the same general subject matter" is not contested. </s> [Footnote 3 See S. Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.; 103 Cong. Rec. 15933. </s> [Footnote 4 E. g., United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338; United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d 383; United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 629; Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394; United States v. American Medical Assn., 26 F. Supp. 429. </s> [Footnote 5 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). And see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). </s> [Footnote 6 See Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, following Rule 6, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. </s> In the words of the Court of Appeals, Jonas was the Government's "principal prosecuting witness." 1 He was President of Lenoir Mirror Company, which company was [360 U.S. 395, 402] a participant in the alleged price-fixing conspiracy, but was not indicted. After Jonas testified on direct examination defense counsel asked for the production of his relevant grand jury testimony. The trial judge immediately made clear his intention not to grant the motion: "Unless you can show some sound basis that contradicts between what happened in the Grand Jury room and his testimony before the Grand Jury and his testimony in this trial, I am not going to require the production of the Grand Jury records. It would be easy for any attorney to get access to the records of the Grand Jury by just such a motion as you are making here." Defense counsel protested, "we are not attempting that. We want just a transcript of his testimony before the Grand Jury regarding the subjects to which he has testified on direct examination." (Emphasis supplied.) This request thus encompassed all of Jonas' grand jury testimony only if all of that testimony covered the subject matter of Jonas' trial testimony. The court replied, "You have stated what you want to ask him and I am denying your right to do it." Plainly defense counsel were not asking to see the minutes of the entire grand jury proceedings, nor even of all of Jonas' testimony before the grand jury unless all of it was on the same subject matter as his trial testimony. Their motion was carefully limited to a request for so much of Jonas' grand jury testimony as "covered the substance of his testimony on direct examination." This request that secrecy be "lifted discretely and limitedly," United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 , necessarily implied a request that the trial judge inspect the grand jury minutes and turn over to the defense only those parts dealing with Jonas' testimony on the same subject matter as his trial testimony. In this posture, then, the question for our decision is the narrow one whether the trial judge erred in denying the defense request for inspection of the grand jury testimony of a [360 U.S. 395, 403] key government witness which covered the subject matter of that witness' trial testimony. 2 I dissent from the Court's affirmance of the trial judge's ruling denying this carefully circumscribed request. </s> Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy is maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends or when the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing interest in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted, for to do so in such a circumstance would further the fair administration of criminal justice. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 . It is true that secrecy is not to be lifted without a showing of good reason, but it is too late in the day to say, as the Court as a practical matter does here, that the Government may insist upon grand jury secrecy even when the possible prejudice to the accused in a criminal case is crystal clear and none of the reasons justifying secrecy is present. "[A]fter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 . Thus grand jury minutes have been made available to a defendant accused of committing perjury before the grand jury so that he could adequately prepare his defense, United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246; United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, and to a defendant who can show an inconsistency between the trial testimony and grand jury testimony of a government witness, United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222; Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960; Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561; United States v. H. J. K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502. On occasion the Government itself has recognized the fairness of permitting the defense access to the grand jury testimony of [360 U.S. 395, 404] government witnesses even though it considered that it was not bound to do so, United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621. This Court has implied that grand jury minutes would be discoverable by a defendant in a civil antitrust suit instituted by the Government on a showing of "particularized need," United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 . 3 Nor can we overlook that the Government uses grand jury minutes to further its own interests in litigation. It is apparently standard practice for government attorneys to use grand jury minutes in preparing a case for trial, see United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 678 , in refreshing the recollection of government witnesses at trial, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 , and, when the need arises, in impeaching witnesses at trial, see United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689. Of course, when the Government uses grand jury minutes at trial the defense is ordinarily entitled to inspect the relevant testimony in those minutes. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 ; United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689. Indeed, Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal [360 U.S. 395, 405] Procedure itself recognizes that grand jury testimony is discoverable under appropriate circumstances. 4 </s> The Court apparently agrees with the conclusion compelled by these precedents, for its opinion states that grand jury minutes are discoverable when "`a particularized need' exists for the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy." But the Court pays only lip service to the principle in view of the result in this case. It is clear beyond question, I think, that the application of that principle to this case requires a holding that Jonas' grand jury testimony is discoverable to the limited extent sought. Since there are no valid considerations which militate in favor of grand jury secrecy in this case, simple justice requires that the petitioners be given access to the relevant portions of Jonas' grand jury testimony so that they have a fair opportunity to refute the Government's case. </s> Essentially four reasons have been advanced as justification for grand jury secrecy. 5 (1) To prevent the accused from escaping before he is indicted and arrested or from tampering with the witnesses against him. (2) To prevent disclosure of derogatory information presented to the grand jury against an accused who has not been indicted. (3) To encourage complainants and witnesses to come before the grand jury and speak freely without fear that their testimony will be made public thereby subjecting them to possible discomfort or retaliation. (4) To encourage the grand jurors to engage in uninhibited investigation and deliberation by barring disclosure of their votes and comments during the proceedings. [360 U.S. 395, 406] </s> None of these reasons dictates that Jonas' grand jury testimony, to the limited extent it is sought, should be kept secret. The Court, while making obeisance to "a long-established policy" of secrecy, makes no showing whatever how denial of Jonas' grand jury testimony serves any of the purposes justifying secrecy. Certainly disclosure at this stage of the proceedings would not enable the defendants to escape from custody or to tamper with the witness who has already testified against them on direct examination. Certainly, also, protection of an innocent accused who has not been indicted has no bearing on this case. Discovery has been sought only of Jonas' grand jury testimony on the same subject matter as his testimony at trial. This testimony will have condemned someone to whom he did not refer at trial only if he has concealed information at the trial, and this creates the very situation in which it is imperative that the defense have access to the grand jury testimony if we are to adhere to the standards we have set for ourselves to assure the fair administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. Similarly, disclosure of Jonas' relevant grand jury testimony could not produce the apprehended results of retaliation or discomfort which might induce a reluctance in others to testify before grand juries. Jonas has already taken the stand and testified freely in open court against the defendants. His testimony has been extremely damaging. Disclosure of his testimony before the grand jury is hardly likely to result in any embarrassment that his trial testimony has not already produced. "If he tells the truth, and the truth is the same as he testified before the grand jury, the disclosure of the former testimony cannot possibly bring to him any harm . . . which his testimony on the open trial does not equally tend to produce." 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 2362, at 725. Witnesses before a grand jury necessarily know that once called by the Government to testify at trial they cannot [360 U.S. 395, 407] remain secret informants quite apart from whether their grand jury testimony is discoverable. Finally, the defense seeks nothing which would disclose the votes or opinions of any of the grand jurors involved in these proceedings. All that is sought is the relevant testimony of Jonas. If there are questions by grand jurors intertwined with Jonas' testimony disclosure of which would indicate the jurors' opinions or be embarrassing to them, the names of the grand jurors asking the questions can be excised. Cf. United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621. </s> Plainly, then, no reason justifying secrecy of Jonas' relevant grand jury testimony appears. The Court's insistence on secrecy exalts the principle of secrecy for secrecy's sake in the face of obvious possible prejudice to the petitioners' defense against Jonas' seriously damaging testimony on the trial. Surely "Justice requires no less," Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 , than that the defense be permitted every reasonable opportunity to impeach a government witness, and that a criminal conviction not be based on the testimony of untruthful or inaccurate witnesses. The interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution, it must be emphasized, "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 . </s> Obviously the impeachment of the Government's key witness on the basis of prior inconsistent or contradictory statements made under oath before a grand jury would have an important effect on a trial. Thus it has long been held that a defendant may have access to inconsistent grand jury testimony for use in cross-examination if he can somehow show that an inconsistency between the trial and grand jury testimony exists. United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222; Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960; Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561; United States v. H. J. K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502. But in an analogous situation we have pointed [360 U.S. 395, 408] out the folly of requiring the defense to show inconsistency between the witness' trial testimony and his previous statements on the same subject matter before it can obtain access to those very statements. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 , we said that it offers no protection to permit a defendant to obtain inconsistent statements to impeach a witness unless he may inspect statements to determine if in fact they are inconsistent with the trial testimony. We said in Jencks: </s> "Requiring the accused first to show conflict between the reports and the testimony is actually to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense. The occasion for determining a conflict cannot arise until after the witness has testified, and unless he admits conflict, as in Gordon, [Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 the accused is helpless to know or discover conflict without inspecting the reports. A requirement of a showing of conflict would be clearly incompatible with our standards for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and must therefore be rejected." 353 U.S., at 667 -668. </s> The considerations which moved us to lay down this principle as to prior statements of government witnesses made to government agents obviously apply with equal force to the grand jury testimony of a government witness. For the defense will rarely be able to lay a foundation for obtaining grand jury testimony by showing it is inconsistent with trial testimony unless it can inspect the grand jury testimony, and, apparently in recognition of this fact, the Court holds today that a preliminary showing of inconsistency by the defense would not be necessary in order for it to obtain access to relevant grand jury minutes. It is suggested by the Government, however, that rather than permit the defense to inspect the [360 U.S. 395, 409] relevant grand jury minutes for possible use on cross-examination, the trial judge should inspect them and turn over to the defense only those portions, if any, that the judge considers would be useful for purposes of impeachment. This procedure has sometimes been utilized in the past as a way to limit discovery of grand jury minutes. See United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222; United States v. Consolidated Laundries, 159 F. Supp. 860. But we pointed out in Jencks the serious disadvantages of such a procedure and expressly disapproved of it. We said: </s> "Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony. </s> . . . . . </s> ". . . We hold . . . that the petitioner is entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether to use them in his defense. Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less." 353 U.S., at 667 -669. </s> From Jonas' own admission it appears that his grand jury testimony covered the subject matter of his trial testimony. The reasons for permitting the defense counsel rather than the trial judge to decide what parts of that testimony can effectively be used on cross-examination are certainly not less compelling than in regard to the FBI reports involved in Jencks. For grand jury [360 U.S. 395, 410] testimony is often lengthy and involved, and it will be extremely difficult for even the most able and experienced trial judge under the pressures of conducting a trial to pick out all of the grand jury testimony that would be useful in impeaching a witness. See United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338. His task should be completed when he has satisfied himself what part of the grand jury testimony covers the subject matter of the witness' testimony on the trial, and when he has given that part to the defense. Then the defense may utilize the grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes as it may deem advisable in its best interests, subject of course to the applicable rules of evidence. </s> I would reverse the Court of Appeals and order a new trial for failure of the trial judge to order the production of Jonas' relevant grand jury testimony. </s> [Footnote 1 Jonas was the only witness to testify that the defendants had actually agreed to a uniform price increase. Furthermore, his testimony was necessary to refute other testimony that the President of petitioner Galax Mirror Co., Inc., had stated that he would follow his pricing policy regardless of what the other manufacturers did. Jonas' testimony was also instrumental in connecting petitioner Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. to the price-fixing agreement. </s> [Footnote 2 As the Court points out, discovery of grand jury minutes is not affected by the Jencks statute, 18 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 3500. </s> [Footnote 3 United States v. Procter & Gamble, upon which the Court relies, actually is authority for permitting discovery in this case. The Court in that case recognized that grand jury minutes were discoverable where the need outweighed the advantages of secrecy, but held that such was not the case in the circumstances because, unlike this case, Procter & Gamble concerned a demand for a transcript of the entire grand jury proceedings to be used in pretrial preparation of a civil suit. This case, of course, concerns a demand for discovery of a particular witness' relevant testimony for use on cross-examination at trial in a criminal prosecution. The Court specifically stated in Procter & Gamble: "We do not reach in this case problems concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility and the like. Those are cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly." 356 U.S., at 683 . </s> [Footnote 4 See United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222, 226; In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639. </s> [Footnote 5 See United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-629; United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 2360. </s> [360 U.S. 395, 411]

United States Supreme Court WOODARD v. HUTCHINS(1984) No. A-557 Argued: Decided: January 13, 1984 </s> Held: </s> An application to vacate an order of a Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit staying respondent's execution is granted. </s> Application to vacate stay granted. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This matter comes to the Court on the application of the State of North Carolina to vacate an order of a single Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, granting, at 12:05 a. m. today, respondent's application for a stay of execution. Circuit Judge Phillips had jurisdiction to consider respondent's application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1651; accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the State's application. A transcript of Judge Phillips' opinion is before the Court. The application to vacate the stay of execution entered today, January 13, 1984, by Circuit Judge Phillips, was presented to the Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court. </s> The application to vacate said stay is granted. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. </s> Unlike JUSTICES WHITE and STEVENS, I do not believe that under the circumstances of this case the District Court was obligated to rule on this successive petition for writ of habeas corpus. </s> This is another capital case in which a last-minute application for a stay of execution and a new petition for habeas corpus [464 U.S. 377, 378] relief have been filed with no explanation as to why the claims were not raised earlier or why they were not all raised in one petition. It is another example of abuse of the writ. 1 </s> On September 21, 1979, a jury convicted James Hutchins of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of murder in the second degree. He was sentenced to death. It is not denied that he deliberately murdered three policemen. After exhausting his state remedies, on September 24, 1982, Hutchins filed his first petition for federal habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. This was denied after an evidentiary hearing, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a full opinion. Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425 (1983). On January 4, 1984, Hutchins filed a petition for certiorari with this Court seeking review of that decision. </s> Hutchins raised three claims in this habeas petition: (i) that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been denied because of a breakdown in communications with his court-appointed counsel; (ii) that the state trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion for a continuance; and (iii) that imposition of the death penalty in his case was unconstitutional because the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment of a person who is "mentally or emotionally distressed" at the time of the crime. This Court, after careful consideration, denied certiorari on January 11, 1984. Post, p. 1065. That same day Hutchins began anew his quest for postconviction relief, raising claims previously not raised. </s> After both the North Carolina trial court and the North Carolina Supreme Court denied Hutchins' new claims for postconviction relief, he filed a second petition in District [464 U.S. 377, 379] Court on January 12, 1984. 2 This raised three new claims: that he had new evidence of his alleged insanity at the time of the crime; that he had evidence that he currently is insane; and that the jury selection process was unconstitutional. Hutchins offers no explanation for having failed to raise these claims in his first petition for habeas corpus, and I see none. Successive petitions for habeas corpus that raise claims deliberately withheld from prior petitions constitute an abuse of the writ. 3 </s> Title 28 U.S.C. 2244 makes clear the power of the federal courts to eliminate the unnecessary burden placed on them by successive habeas applications by state prisoners. It provides: </s> "(b) When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits . . . [a federal court or federal judge has denied a petition for federal habeas corpus], a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States . . . unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ." </s> See also 28 U.S.C. 2254 Rule 9(b). </s> This case is a clear example of the abuse of the writ that 2244(b) was intended to eliminate. All three of Hutchins' claims could and should have been raised in his first petition for federal habeas corpus. The new evidence that Hutchins offers to support his claim that he was insane at the time of the crime is the report of a forensic psychiatrist prepared [464 U.S. 377, 380] after a January 2, 1984, psychiatric examination. Hutchins, convicted some four years ago, and frequently before courts during the intervening years, does not explain why this examination was not conducted earlier. 4 He does not claim that his alleged insanity is a recent development. In light of his claim that he also was insane at the time of the crime, such an assertion would be implausible. Finally, Hutchins does not explain why he failed to include his challenge to the jury selection in his prior habeas petition. </s> A pattern seems to be developing in capital cases of multiple review in which claims that could have been presented years ago are brought forward - often in a piecemeal fashion - only after the execution date is set or becomes imminent. Federal courts should not continue to tolerate - even in capital cases - this type of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 It would have been preferable had the District Court stated expressly that it would not entertain this successive petition because it constituted an abuse of the writ. Nevertheless, it is clear that the petition in this case was an abuse. </s> [Footnote 2 See the per curiam opinion of this Court, ante, p. 377, vacating the stay entered by Judge Phillips for the procedural posture of the case here. </s> [Footnote 3 There is no affirmative evidence that the claims were deliberately withheld. But Hutchins has had counsel through the various phases of this case, and no explanation has been made as to why they were not raised until the very eve of the execution date. </s> [Footnote 4 Hutchins' case has been reviewed by at least seven courts, including this Court, and more than 25 judges. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, concurring. </s> Unlike our Brothers WHITE and STEVENS, we believe that the District Court is not obligated to rule on every 11th-hour petition for habeas corpus before it denies a stay. But assuming that the merits of the Witherspoon aspect of Judge Phillips' order granting the stay are necessarily before us, we find that nothing in the material presented by respondent would show that the particular jurors who sat in his case were "less than neutral with respect to guilt." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 , n. 18 (1968). Absent such a showing, there can be no claim that respondent was denied this aspect of his right to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, or that he would be subject to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. [464 U.S. 377, 381] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. </s> I find the Court's decision to vacate the stay of execution in this case simply incomprehensible. The stay was granted early this morning, at 12:05, by Judge James Dickson Phillips of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Phillips correctly decided that a stay was necessary in order to preserve a substantial issue raised by the condemned prisoner, James Hutchins. That issue - whether the exclusion for cause of potential jurors unequivocally opposed to the death penalty resulted in a biased jury during the guilt phase of the trial proceedings against Hutchins - is currently the subject of a conflict between judges of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina and remains undecided by this Court. </s> As the Court recognizes, Judge Phillips had jurisdiction over this case. * Late yesterday, Hutchins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an application for a stay of execution in the court of District Judge Woodrow W. Jones. Chief Judge Jones, however, acted only to deny the application, leaving in limbo Hutchins' petition for habeas corpus. After taking this action, Chief Judge Jones apparently went home. As a result, when Hutchins approached Judge Phillips for relief, Judge Phillips was faced with an application to stay the execution scheduled to take place within a matter of hours, appended to which was a copy of Hutchins' petition for habeas corpus that had been left undecided by the District Court. [464 U.S. 377, 382] </s> Judge Phillips, knowing that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was then pending in the District Court, and would not be decided before Hutchins' execution, correctly issued the stay to preserve the issue noted above. As JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE STEVENS note, the stay was properly issued to allow the District Court to act on the habeas petition. In addition, under 28 U.S.C. 2241, it was appropriate for Judge Phillips to treat the papers filed with him as an independent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, refer that petition to the District Court, and grant a stay under 28 U.S.C. 2251 pending decision by the District Court. See also All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. </s> Despite its holding that Judge Phillips had jurisdiction to issue the stay, the Court has inexplicably concluded that Judge Phillips improperly exercised that jurisdiction. A stay issued by a lower court, however, should be vacated only upon a showing that issuance of the stay was an abuse of discretion. Far from being an abuse of discretion, the action of Judge Phillips was eminently reasonable and correct. Not only is there at least one other federal judge in Judge Phillips' own Circuit who has ruled favorably on the merits of this question, see Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164 (WDNC 1984), and at least one District Court in Arkansas that has reached a similar conclusion, see Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (ED Ark. 1983), appeal pending, No. 83-2113 (CA8, filed Aug. 8, 1983), but also this Court itself has recognized the potential validity of the claim. See, e. g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516 -518 (1968); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 , and nn. 5, 6 (1968). See also Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1982). </s> Finally, the State argues that Hutchins should pursue state-court remedies in light of yesterday's Keeten decision. While this obviously is not the basis of the Court's vacation of the stay, this in any event is a literal impossibility given the 6 p. m. [464 U.S. 377, 383] deadline for execution. Indeed, in light of the constraints imposed on our deliberations by that deadline, the most disturbing aspect of the Court's decision is its indefensible - and unexplained - rush to judgment. When a life is at stake, the process that produces this result is surely insensitive, if not ghoulish. </s> I dissent. </s> [Footnote * As JUSTICE MARSHALL points out, the Court's zealous efforts to reimpose Hutchins' execution at the last minute may therefore be futile. North Carolina's death penalty statute requires that a new date of execution be set once a stay of execution, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, is terminated. N.C. Gen. Stat. 15-194 (1983). As we have noted, the Court holds that Judge Phillips had jurisdiction to issue his stay. It thus appears that the North Carolina statute is applicable and will require that Hutchins' execution be postponed. </s> JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> We would not vacate the stay because the District Court did not pass on the merits of the habeas corpus petition and the stay was entered by a Court of Appeals Judge until the District Court performs its duty and acts on the habeas petition. Until the merits of the petition are addressed below or it is there held that there has been abuse of the writ, we would leave the stay in effect. That is the orderly procedure it seems to us. It also seems to us that the Court's opaque per curiam opinion vacating the stay comes very close to a holding that a second petition for habeas corpus should be considered as an abuse of the writ and for that reason need not be otherwise addressed on the merits. We are not now prepared to accept such a per se rule. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> At 12:05 a. m. today, Judge James Dickson Phillips of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted respondent Hutchins' application for a stay of execution. Less than an hour after the stay was issued, attorneys from the North Carolina Attorney General's Office filed in this Court a 3 1/2-page, handwritten application to vacate Judge Phillips' stay. Without taking time to consider the basis of Judge Phillips' stay - indeed without waiting to receive the final draft of Judge Phillips' memorandum opinion - the Court has granted the application, apparently so that North Carolina can proceed with Hutchins' execution before his death warrant expires at 6 o'clock this evening. Given the posture [464 U.S. 377, 384] of this application and the dire consequences of error, I find the Court's haste outrageous. </s> Without any explanation, the Court takes the position that Judge Phillips somehow erred in granting a stay of Hutchins' execution. 1 As JUSTICE BRENNAN has shown, ante, at 382, Judge Phillips' decision to grant the stay was a prudent exercise of authority taken by a federal judge under serious time constraints and dealing with considerable uncertainty. What is incredible about this Court's decision is that five Members of the Court have voted to vacate Judge Phillips' stay without even reading his opinion 2 or fully considering respondent's defense of the stay. Indeed, at the present time, the Court does not even have before it a full record of the case. 3 In all candor, if there is abuse of federal power in this matter, it is to be found in our own Chambers. </s> Ironically, the Court's zealous efforts to authorize Hutchins' execution at the last minute may be futile. The North Carolina death penalty statute apparently requires that a new date of execution must be set whenever a stay of execution is issued and then vacated. 4 N.C. Gen. Stat. 15-194 [464 U.S. 377, 385] (1983). Since Judge Phillips indisputably issued a stay of execution and the Court now vacates the stay, North Carolina law would seem to require that a new date of execution now be set. 5 Of course, the meaning of this provision is a question of North Carolina law, and is therefore to be decided by North Carolina courts. I trust, however, that the responsible North Carolina officials will consider whether Hutchins has a valid claim under this provision before the State proceeds with Hutchins' execution. </s> I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Much of the State's application involves a challenge to Judge Phillips' jurisdiction and an argument that Hutchins is procedurally barred from raising his juror-bias claim in federal court. The majority apparently agrees with respondent that these threshold claims are insubstantial. </s> [Footnote 2 Early this morning, the Court received over the telephone a short summary of Judge Phillips' decision, which the Clerk's Office transcribed. That brief, preliminary draft concluded with the statement, "I will say roughly the foregoing in a very short memorandum opinion that I will file tomorrow." </s> [Footnote 3 In addition to the State's handwritten application, the Court has received over the course of the day Hutchins' response to the State's application and supplemental handwritten papers from both parties. Although respondent has filed various briefs that he presented to other courts in this litigation, neither party has filed a complete transcript of the trial court voir dire, at which the deprivation of Hutchins' constitutional rights allegedly took place. </s> [Footnote 4 The relevant statute reads: "Whenever . . . a stay of execution granted by any competent judicial tribunal . . . has expired or been terminated, . . . a hearing shall be held in a superior court . . . to fix a new date for the [464 U.S. 377, 385] execution of the original sentence. . . . The judge shall set the date of execution for not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days from the date of the hearing." N.C. Gen. Stat. 15-194 (1983) (emphasis added). The majority's per curiam clearly concludes that Judge Phillips was a competent judicial tribunal with jurisdiction to issue a stay. See n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 Common decency demands such a postponement, especially since, under North Carolina law, Hutchins must already have been notified of his reprieve by Judge Phillips. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 15-193 (1983). </s> [464 U.S. 377, 386]

United States Supreme Court ORING v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA(1989) No. 87-1224 Argued: January 10, 1988Decided: January 23, 1989 </s> Appeal dismissed. </s> Theodore A. Cohen argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Scott Spolin. </s> Diane C. Yu argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Truitt A. Richey, Jr., and Erica Tabachnick. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question. </s> [488 U.S. 590, 1]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON(1982) No. 80-1608 Argued: February 24, 1982Decided: June 21, 1982 </s> Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 , held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest. Before Payton was decided, respondent was arrested on a federal charge by Secret Service agents who had entered his home without an arrest warrant. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied respondent's pretrial motion to suppress incriminating statements he made after his arrest. This evidence was admitted at his trial and he was convicted. While his case was still pending on direct appeal, Payton was decided. On the strength of Payton, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Payton applied retroactively. </s> Held: </s> A decision of this Court construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered, except where a case would be clearly controlled by existing retroactivity precedents. Hence, Payton is to be applied retroactively to respondent's case. Pp. 542-563. </s> (a) Respondent's case does not present a retrospectivity problem clearly controlled by existing precedent. Where a decision of this Court merely has applied settled principles to a new set of facts, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases. Conversely, where the Court has declared a rule of criminal procedure to be "a clear break with the past," it almost invariably has found the new principle nonretroactive. Also, this Court has recognized full retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish the defendant in the first place. Respondent's case does not fit any of these categories, as Payton did not apply settled precedent to a new set of facts, did not announce an entirely new and unanticipated principle of law, and did not hold either that the trial court lacked authority to convict Payton or that the Fourth Amendment immunized his conduct from punishment. Pp. 548-554. </s> (b) The retroactivity question presented here is fairly resolved by applying the Payton rule to all cases still pending on direct appeal at the time Payton was decided. To do so (1) provides a principle of decision-making consonant with this Court's original understanding in Linkletter v. Walker, [457 U.S. 537, 538] 381 U.S. 618 , and Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 , that all newly declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to convictions not yet final when the rule was established; (2) comports with this Court's judicial responsibility "to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and to "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles," Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); and (3) furthers the goal of treating similarly situated defendants similarly. Pp. 554-556. </s> (c) There is no merit to the Government's arguments, based on United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 , against adoption of the above approach to the retroactivity question in this case. Pp. 557-562. </s> 626 F.2d 753, affirmed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ. joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 563. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 564. </s> Elliott Schulder argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Patty Merkamp Stemler. </s> John F. Walter, by appointment of the Court, 454 U.S. 1028 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), this Court held that the Fourth Amendment 1 prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's [457 U.S. 537, 539] home to make a routine felony arrest. The question before us in the present case is whether the rule announced in Payton applies to an arrest that took place before Payton was decided. </s> I </s> Special Agents Hemenway and Pickering of the United States Secret Service suspected respondent Raymond Eugene Johnson and his codefendant, Oscar Joseph Dodd, of attempting to negotiate a misdelivered United States Treasury check. 2 Proceeding without an arrest warrant, on May 5, 1977, the two agents went to respondent's Los Angeles home and waited outside. Shortly thereafter, respondent and his wife arrived and entered the house. </s> The agents drew their weapons, approached the doorway and knocked, identifying themselves by fictitious names. When respondent opened the door, he saw the two agents with their guns drawn and their badges raised. Respondent permitted the agents to enter the house. While one agent stood with respondent in the living room, the other searched the premises. The agents then advised respondent of his constitutional rights and interrogated him. When respondent revealed his involvement in the taking of the misdelivered check, the agents formally arrested him. Respondent later signed a written statement admitting his involvement with the check. </s> Before trial, respondent sought to suppress his oral and written statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest not supported [457 U.S. 537, 540] by probable cause. The United States District Court for the Central District of California found respondent's arrest to be proper and admitted the evidence. App. 7. A jury then convicted respondent of aiding and abetting obstruction of correspondence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2 and 1702. 3 The imposition of respondent's sentence was suspended in favor of five years' probation. </s> By an unreported opinion filed December 19, 1978, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction. Acknowledging that "[i]t certainly would have been preferable had the agents obtained a warrant" for respondent's arrest before entering his residence, the court nonetheless ruled that "if probable cause exists for the arrest, [respondent's] constitutional rights were not violated by the warrantless arrest, even though there may have been time [for the agents] to have obtained a warrant for his arrest." App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a. </s> On April 15, 1980, while respondent's petition for rehearing was still pending before the Ninth Circuit, this Court decided Payton v. New York, supra. 4 On September 2, [457 U.S. 537, 541] 1980, the Ninth Circuit granted respondent's petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and on the strength of Payton, now reversed the judgment of conviction. 626 F.2d 753. "In light of the strong language by the Court in Payton emphasizing the special protection the Constitution affords to individuals within their homes," the Court of Appeals held that "the warrantless arrest of Johnson, while he stood within his home, after having opened the door in response to false identification by the agents, constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights." Id., at 757. The Government petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the principles of Payton should not apply retroactively to an arrest that had occurred before Payton was decided. The Court of Appeals disagreed, denied the petition for rehearing, and amended its opinion to clarify that Payton did apply retroactively. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. 5 </s> The Government sought review in this Court. We granted certiorari to consider the retrospective effect, if any, of the Fourth Amendment rule announced in Payton. 454 U.S. 814 (1981). 6 </s> [457 U.S. 537, 542] </s> II </s> "[T]he federal constitution has no voice upon the subject" of retrospectivity. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). Before 1965, when this Court decided Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , "both the common law and our own decisions recognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court . . . subject to [certain] limited exceptions." Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973), citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886), and Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). 7 </s> In Linkletter, however, the Court concluded "that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires [that] retrospective effect" be given to any "new" constitutional rule. 381 U.S., at 629 . Since Linkletter, the Court's announcement of a constitutional rule in the realm of criminal procedure has frequently been followed by a separate decision explaining whether, and to what extent, that rule applies to past, pending, and future cases. See generally Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1557 (1975). </s> Linkletter itself addressed the question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), should apply to state convictions that had become final before Mapp was decided. 8 At the outset, the Linkletter Court noted that cases still pending on direct review when Mapp was handed down had already received the [457 U.S. 537, 543] benefit of Mapp's rule. See 381 U.S., at 622 , n. 4, citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); and Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). This limited retrospective application of Mapp was consistent with the common-law rule, recognized in both civil and criminal litigation, "that a change in law will be given effect while a case is on direct review." 381 U.S., at 627 , citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801). </s> To determine whether a particular ruling should also extend to cases that were already final, Linkletter directed courts to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." 381 U.S., at 629 . Employing that test, the Court concluded that the Mapp rule should not apply to convictions that had become final before Mapp was decided. </s> The following Term, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court applied Linkletter's analysis to hold the Fifth Amendment rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (barring comment on a state defendant's failure to testify), nonretroactive to judgments of conviction made final before Griffin was decided. The Court again found no "question of the applicability of the Griffin rule to cases still pending on direct review at the time it was announced." 382 U.S., at 409 , n. 3, citing O'Connor v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 286 (1965). Thus, after Linkletter and Shott, it appeared that all newly declared constitutional rules of criminal procedure would apply retrospectively at least to judgments of conviction not yet final when the rule was established. </s> In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), however, the Court departed from that basic principle. Those cases held that, in the interest of justice, the Court may balance three factors to determine whether a "new" constitutional rule should be retrospectively [457 U.S. 537, 544] or prospectively applied: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id., at 297. See also Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 728 . Because the outcome of that balancing process might call for different degrees of retroactivity in different cases, the Court concluded that "no distinction is justified between convictions now final . . . and convictions at various stages of trial and direct review." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S., at 300 . See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 732 . </s> Because the balance of the three Stovall factors inevitably has shifted from case to case, it is hardly surprising that, for some, "the subsequent course of Linkletter became almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its intended victim." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). At one extreme, the Court has regularly given complete retroactive effect to new constitutional rules whose major purpose "is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also id., at 653, n. 6; Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 328 -330 (1980) (plurality opinion); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 679 (1973) (plurality opinion); Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 205 (1972). </s> At the other extreme, the Court has applied some standards only to future cases, denying the benefit of the new rule even to the parties before the Court. See, e. g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972) (establishing basic requirements applicable only to "future revocations of parole"). Cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 733 , citing England [457 U.S. 537, 545] v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), and James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). As an intermediate position, the Court has applied a change in the law to all future litigants, but retroactively only to the parties at bar. See, e. g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S., at 301 ; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 284 -285 (1972) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973). </s> In a consistent stream of separate opinions since Linkletter, Members of this Court have argued against selective awards of retroactivity. Those opinions uniformly have asserted that, at a minimum, all defendants whose cases were still pending on direct appeal at the time of the law-changing decision should be entitled to invoke the new rule. 9 </s> [457 U.S. 537, 546] In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (dissenting opinion), and Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S., at 675 (separate opinion), Justice Harlan presented a comprehensive analysis in support of that principle. In his view, failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule at least to cases pending on direct review at the time of the decision violated three norms of constitutional adjudication. </s> First, Justice Harlan argued, the Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine," id., at 681, conflicts with the norm of principled decisionmaking. "Some members of the Court, and I have come to regret that I was among them, initially grasped this doctrine as a way of limiting the reach of decisions that seemed to them fundamentally unsound. Others rationalized this resort to prospectivity as a `technique' that provided an `impetus . . . for the implementation of long overdue reforms, which otherwise could not be practicably effected.'" Id., at 676, citing Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 218 (1969). "The upshot of this confluence of viewpoints," 401 U.S., at 676 , was that the coalitions favoring nonretroactivity had realigned from case to case, inevitably generating a welter of "incompatible rules and inconsistent principles," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 258 . See also Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S., at 61 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("principled adjudication requires the Court to abandon the charade of carefully balancing countervailing considerations when deciding the question of retroactivity"). </s> Second, Justice Harlan found it difficult to accept the notion that the Court, as a judicial body, could apply a "`new' constitutional rule entirely prospectively, while making an exception only for the particular litigant whose case was chosen as the vehicle for establishing that rule." Desist v. [457 U.S. 537, 547] United States, 394 U.S., at 258 (dissenting opinion). A legislature makes its new rules "wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it deems wise." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This Court, however, </s> "announce[s] new constitutional rules . . . only as a correlative of our dual duty to decide those cases over which we have jurisdiction and to apply the Federal Constitution as one source of the matrix of governing legal rules. . . . Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this model of judicial review." Id., at 678-679. </s> Third, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court's selective application of new constitutional rules departed from the principle of treating similarly situated defendants similarly: 10 </s> "[W]hen another similarly situated defendant comes before us, we must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting differently. We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those who [457 U.S. 537, 548] alone will receive the benefit of a `new' rule of constitutional law." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 258 -259 (dissenting opinion). </s> Justice Harlan suggested one simple rule to satisfy all three of his concerns. "I have concluded that Linkletter was right in insisting that all `new' rules of constitutional law must, at a minimum, be applied to all those cases which are still subject to direct review by this Court at the time the `new' decision is handed down." Id., at 258. "[A] proper perception of our duties as a court of law, charged with applying the Constitution to resolve every legal dispute within our jurisdiction on direct review, mandates that we apply the law as it is at the time, not as it once was." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S., at 681 (separate opinion). </s> We now agree with Justice Harlan that "[r]etroactivity' must be rethought," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 258 (dissenting opinion). We therefore examine the circumstances of this case to determine whether it presents a retroactivity question clearly controlled by past precedents, and if not, whether application of the Harlan approach would resolve the retroactivity issue presented in a principled and equitable manner. </s> III </s> A </s> At the outset, we must first ask whether respondent's case presents a retrospectivity problem clearly controlled by existing precedent. Re-examination of the post-Linkletter decisions convinces us that in three narrow categories of cases, the answer to the retroactivity question has been effectively determined, not by application of the Stovall factors, but rather, through application of a threshold test. 11 </s> [457 U.S. 537, 549] </s> First, when a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that rule in any material way. See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206 (1979) (reviewing application of the rule in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412 (1969) ("further explicat[ing]" the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 263 (Harlan, J., dissenting). </s> Conversely, where the Court has expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be "a clear break with the past," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 248 , it almost invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted principle nonretroactive. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 547 , n. 5 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). In this second type of case, the traits of the particular constitutional rule have been less critical than the Court's express threshold determination that the "`new' constitutional interpretatio[n] . . . so change[s] the law that prospectivity is arguably the proper course," Williams v. United States, 401 U.S., at 659 (plurality opinion). Once the Court has found that the new rule was unanticipated, the second and third Stovall factors - reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule - have virtually [457 U.S. 537, 550] compelled a finding of nonretroactivity. See, e. g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S., at 672 -673, 682-685 (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S., at 55 -57. 12 </s> Third, the Court has recognized full retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place. The Court has invalidated inconsistent prior judgments where its reading of a particular constitutional guarantee immunizes a defendant's conduct from punishment, see, e. g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971) (penalty against assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination), or serves "to prevent [his] trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of [that] trial," Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S., at 509 (double jeopardy). In such cases, the Court has relied less on the technique of retroactive application than on the notion that the prior inconsistent judgments or sentences were void ab initio. See, e. g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972) (retroactive application of Eighth Amendment ruling in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 , n. 1 (1970) (retroactive application of double jeopardy ruling in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). See also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S., at 693 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S., at 61 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (rulings are fully retroactive when the "Court [457 U.S. 537, 551] has held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the traditional sense"). </s> Respondent's case neatly fits none of these three categories. First, Payton v. New York did not simply apply settled precedent to a new set of facts. In Payton, the Court acknowledged that the "important constitutional question presented" there had been "expressly left open in a number of our prior opinions." 445 U.S., at 574 and 575, n. 1, citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 , n. 6 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 , n. 13 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 -481 (1971); and Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 -500 (1958). </s> By the same token, however, Payton also did not announce an entirely new and unanticipated principle of law. In general, the Court has not subsequently read a decision to work a "sharp break in the web of the law," Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381 , n. 2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting), unless that ruling caused "such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an older one," Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 498 (1968). Such a break has been recognized only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court, see, e. g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases, see, e. g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S., at 673 (plurality opinion); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 283 ; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S., at 731 , or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved. See, e. g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S., at 673 (plurality opinion) (applying nonretroactively a decision that "effected a decisional change in attitude that had prevailed for many decades"); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S., at 299 -300. See also Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); Cipriano [457 U.S. 537, 552] v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S., at 381 -382, n. 2 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("sharp break" occurs when "decision overrules clear past precedent . . . or disrupts a practice long accepted and widely relied upon"). </s> Payton did none of these. Payton expressly overruled no clear past precedent of this Court on which litigants may have relied. Nor did Payton disapprove an established practice that the Court had previously sanctioned. To the extent that the Court earlier had spoken to the conduct engaged in by the police officers in Payton, it had deemed it of doubtful constitutionality. 13 The Court's own analysis in Payton makes it clear that its ruling rested on both long-recognized principles of Fourth Amendment law and the weight of historical authority as it had appeared to the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. 14 Finally, Payton overturned no longstanding [457 U.S. 537, 553] practice approved by a near-unanimous body of lower court authority. 15 Payton therefore does not fall into that narrow class of decisions whose nonretroactivity is effectively [457 U.S. 537, 554] preordained because they unmistakably signal "a clear break with the past," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 248 . </s> It is equally plain that Payton does not fall into the third category of cases that do not pose difficult retroactivity questions. Payton did not hold that the trial court lacked authority to convict or sentence Theodore Payton, nor did Payton's reading of the Fourth Amendment immunize Payton's conduct from punishment. The holding in Payton did not prevent the defendant's trial from taking place; rather, it reversed the New York Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded for a new trial to be conducted without unconstitutionally obtained evidence. </s> B </s> Having determined that the retroactivity question here is not clearly controlled by our prior precedents, we next must ask whether that question would be fairly resolved by applying the rule in Payton to all cases still pending on direct appeal at the time when Payton was decided. Answering that question affirmatively would satisfy each of the three concerns stated in Justice Harlan's opinions in Desist and Mackey. </s> First, retroactive application of Payton to all previously nonfinal convictions would provide a principle of decisionmaking consonant with our original understanding of retroactivity in Linkletter and Shott. Moreover, such a principle would be one capable of general applicability, satisfying Justice Harlan's central concern: "Refusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising on direct review . . . tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing us [457 U.S. 537, 555] to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis . . . a force which ought properly to bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S., at 680 -681 (separate opinion). </s> Second, application of Payton to cases pending on direct review would comport with our judicial responsibilities "to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case," Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and to "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S., at 679 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court of Appeals held that the circumstances of respondent's arrest violated Payton, and the Government does not dispute that contention. See n. 6, supra. It would be ironic indeed were we now to reverse a judgment applying Payton's rule, when in Payton itself, we reversed a directly contrary judgment of the New York Court of Appeals. As Justice Harlan noted in Desist: "If a `new' constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced." 394 U.S., at 259 . </s> Third, application of the Harlan approach to respondent's case would further the goal of treating similarly situated defendants similarly. The Government contends that respondent may not invoke Payton because he was arrested before Payton was decided. Yet it goes without saying that Theodore Payton also was arrested before Payton was decided, and he received the benefit of the rule in his case. Furthermore, at least one other defendant whose conviction was not final when Payton issued benefited from Payton's rule, although he, too, was arrested before Payton was decided. 16 </s> [457 U.S. 537, 556] An approach that resolved all nonfinal convictions under the same rule of law would lessen the possibility that this Court might mete out different constitutional protection to defendants simultaneously subjected to identical police conduct. 17 </s> [457 U.S. 537, 557] </s> IV </s> Against adoption of this approach, the Government raises four arguments based on United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). None is persuasive. </s> The Government first cites Peltier's holding: that the Fourth Amendment rule announced in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), should not apply retroactively to a case pending on appeal when Almeida-Sanchez was announced. By so holding, the Government suggests, [457 U.S. 537, 558] Peltier declared a principle that controls the issue of retroactivity for all Fourth Amendment rulings. 18 </s> Upon examination, however, the retroactivity question posed here differs from that presented in Peltier. As the Government concedes, Payton overturned neither a statute nor any consistent judicial history approving nonconsensual, warrantless home entries. See Brief for United States 30, n. 18. Thus, its nonretroactivity is not preordained under the "clear break" principles stated above. In Peltier, in contrast, the Court noted that Almeida-Sanchez had invalidated a form of search previously sanctioned by "a validly enacted statute, supported by longstanding administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval." 422 U.S., at 541 . See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S., at 278 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("While the question is one of first impression in this Court," the practice disapproved had "been consistently approved by the judiciary"); id., at 298-299, n. 10 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (35 of 36 judges in 20 Court of Appeals cases had approved the invalidated practice). </s> Because Almeida-Sanchez had overturned a longstanding practice to which this Court had not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority had approved, it represented a "clear break" with the past. For that reason alone, under controlling retroactivity precedents, the nonretroactive application of Almeida-Sanchez would have been appropriate even if the case had involved no Fourth Amendment question. In that respect, Peltier resembles several earlier decisions that held "new" Fourth Amendment [457 U.S. 537, 559] doctrine nonretroactive, not on the ground that all Fourth Amendment rulings apply only prospectively, but because the particular decisions being applied "so change[d] the law that prospectivity [was] arguably the proper course." Williams v. United States, 401 U.S., at 659 (plurality opinion) (refusing to apply retroactively Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which overruled United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)). See also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (refusing to apply retroactively Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which overruled Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). </s> The Government bases its second argument on Peltier's broad language: "If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment" (emphasis added). 422 U.S., at 542 . The Government reads this language to require that new Fourth Amendment rules must be denied retroactive effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in good-faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms. </s> The Government does not seriously suggest that the retroactivity of a given Fourth Amendment ruling should turn solely on the subjective state of a particular arresting officer's mind. Instead, it offers an "objective" test: that law enforcement officers "may properly be charged with knowledge" of all "settled" Fourth Amendment law. Under the Government's theory, because the state of Fourth Amendment law regarding warrantless home arrests was "unsettled" before Payton, that ruling should not apply retroactively even to cases pending on direct appeal when Payton was decided. See Brief for United States 14-19, 34-38. [457 U.S. 537, 560] </s> Yet the Government's reading of Peltier would reduce its own "retroactivity test" to an absurdity. Under this view, the only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive application are those in which the arresting officers violated pre-existing guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen above, cases involving simple application of clear, pre-existing Fourth Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of retroactivity at all. Literally read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate all Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application. </s> The Government's third claim is that Peltier's logic suggests that retroactive application of Fourth Amendment decisions like Payton - even to cases pending on direct review - would not serve the policies underlying the exclusionary rule. Cf. 422 U.S., at 536 -542. Yet viewed in the light of Peltier's holding, this assertion also fails. Peltier suggested only that retroactive application of a Fourth Amendment ruling that worked a "sharp break" in the law, like Almeida-Sanchez, would have little deterrent effect, because law enforcement officers would rarely be deterred from engaging in a practice they never expected to be invalidated. See 422 U.S., at 541 -542. </s> This logic does not apply to a ruling like Payton, that resolved a previously unsettled point of Fourth Amendment law. Because this Court cannot rule on every unsettled Fourth Amendment question, years may pass before the Court finally invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality. See, e. g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 275 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "physical-trespass" wiretap rule of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), had been moribund for 17 years before it was formally overruled). Long before Payton, for example, this Court had questioned the constitutionality of warrantless home arrests. See n. 13, supra. Furthermore, the Court's [457 U.S. 537, 561] opinions consistently had emphasized that, in light of the constitutional protection traditionally accorded to the privacy of the home, police officers should resolve any doubts regarding the validity of a home arrest in favor of obtaining a warrant. See, e. g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers"). </s> If, as the Government argues, all rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, in close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior. 19 Official awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled question. Failure to accord any retroactive effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would "encourage police or other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 277 (Fortas, J., dissenting). </s> The Government finally argues that retroactive application of Payton, even to a case pending on direct appeal, would accomplish nothing but the discharge of a wrongdoer. Justice Harlan gave the answer to this assertion. "We do not release a criminal from jail because we like to do so, or because we think it wise to do so, but only because the government has offended constitutional principle in the conduct of his case. And when another similarly situated defendant comes [457 U.S. 537, 562] before us, we must grant the same relief or give a principled reason for acting differently." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 258 (dissenting opinion). Applying Payton to convictions that were not yet final when Payton issued would accomplish the first step toward "turning our backs on the ad hoc approach that has so far characterized our decisions in the retroactivity field and proceeding to administer the doctrine on principle." Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S., at 224 (Harlan, J., dissenting). </s> V </s> To the extent necessary to decide today's case, we embrace Justice Harlan's views in Desist and Mackey. We therefore hold that, subject to the exceptions stated below, a decision of this Court construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered. </s> By so holding, however, we leave undisturbed our precedents in other areas. First, our decision today does not affect those cases that would be clearly controlled by our existing retroactivity precedents. Second, because respondent's case arises on direct review, we need not address the retroactive reach of our Fourth Amendment decisions to those cases that still may raise Fourth Amendment issues on collateral attack. 20 Cf. n. 10, supra. Third, we express no view on the retroactive application of decisions construing any constitutional provision other than the Fourth Amendment. 21 </s> [457 U.S. 537, 563] Finally, all questions of civil retroactivity continue to be governed by the standard enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S., at 106 -107. See n. 12, supra. </s> Respondent's case was pending on direct appeal when Payton v. New York was decided. Because the Court of Appeals correctly held that the rule in Payton should apply to respondent's case, its judgment is affirmed. 22 </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Fourth Amendment reads: </s> "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." </s> [Footnote 2 On March 30, 1977, the United States Postal Service mistakenly delivered to Lena Kearney a Treasury check for $4,681.41, payable to Elihu Peterson. Kearney and her sister-in-law sought Dodd's assistance in cashing the check. Accompanied by respondent Johnson and another man, Dodd went to Kearney's residence to discuss methods of cashing the check. The three men eventually departed, taking the check with them. </s> After Kearney and her sister-in-law related the foregoing events to Special Agent Hemenway, he obtained a warrant for Dodd's arrest. He, however, did not obtain a warrant to arrest respondent. See 626 F.2d 753, 754-755 (CA9 1980). </s> [Footnote 3 The jury acquitted respondent on a separate count of aiding and abetting the receipt of stolen Government property. See 18 U.S.C. 2,641. Respondent's codefendant Dodd was convicted on both counts. In an unreported decision, Dodd's conviction was affirmed summarily on appeal, and is not before us. See United States v. Dodd, No. 79-1030 (CA9 Feb. 4, 1980), rehearing denied, Mar. 5, 1980. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court noted probable jurisdiction in Payton on December 11, 1978. 439 U.S. 1044 . On March 5, 1979, the Ninth Circuit deferred decision on respondent's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending this Court's decision in Payton. App. 8. The Court heard argument in Payton on March 26, 1979, but restored the case to the calendar for reargument. See 441 U.S. 930 (1979). </s> On August 20, 1979, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed respondent's conviction, in the process amending its initial opinion and denying respondent's petition for rehearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. Respondent timely filed a second petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, which was still pending in the Court of Appeals when Payton was decided. </s> [Footnote 5 In a decision issued three months before its initial ruling here, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit had anticipated Payton, holding that "absent exigent circumstances, police who have probable cause to arrest a felony suspect must obtain a warrant before entering a dwelling to carry out the arrest." United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (1978). Upon denial of the Government's petition for rehearing in respondent's case, the Court of Appeals made clear that its postPayton reversal of respondent's conviction "rests chiefly upon basic principles common to our decision in Prescott and that of the Supreme Court in Payton." App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. The court also noted that it had already held that its ruling in Prescott should apply retroactively. See United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d 731 (1980). </s> [Footnote 6 For the purposes of this case, the Government assumes the correctness of the Court of Appeals' ruling that, if applied to these facts, Payton would require exclusion of respondent's statements. Brief for United States 12-13, n. 6. We therefore need not examine the Court of Appeals' conclusion on that issue. </s> [Footnote 7 The pre-1965 requirement that all constitutional rules receive full retroactive application derived from the Blackstonian notion "that the duty of the court was not to `pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.'" Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 -623 (1965), citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (15th ed. 1809). </s> [Footnote 8 "By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed [or a petition for certiorari finally denied, all] before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S., at 622 , n. 5. See also Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 409 , n. 3 (1966). </s> [Footnote 9 See, e. g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 337 (1980) (POWELL, J., with whom STEVENS, J., joined, concurring in judgment); Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459, 460 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring in judgments); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 245 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 246 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 543 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 33 , and n. (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 461 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 58 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 59 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., with whom MARSHALL, J., concurred, dissenting); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 713 (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., concurred, dissenting); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 665 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 19 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 817 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in result); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 256 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id., at 269 (Fortas, J., dissenting); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 82 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968) (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J., joined, dissenting); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 303 (Black, J., dissenting); Johnson [457 U.S. 537, 546] v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 736 (1966) (Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting); Whisman v. Georgia, 384 U.S. 895 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S., at 419 (Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S., at 640 (Black, J., with whom Douglas, J., joined, dissenting). </s> [Footnote 10 Evenhanded justice for similarly situated litigants was the principal theme sounded by the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas. See cases cited in n. 9, supra. The views of these Justices diverged from those of Justice Harlan, however, on the question whether equal treatment also requires retroactive application of newly announced constitutional rules to all cases arising on collateral attack. Compare Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 255 (Douglas, J., dissenting), with id., at 260-269 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 287 , and n. 4 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Members of the Court continue to offer views on this troublesome question. Compare Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S., at 246 , and n. (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment), with id., at 248 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). </s> [Footnote 11 These cases therefore have not proved "readily susceptible of analysis under the Linkletter line of cases." Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 508 (1973). The dissent's accusation that these categories exclude the "most obvious" line of cases - those announcing rules relating to the truth-finding [457 U.S. 537, 549] function, post, at 567 - misses our point. In those cases, the retroactivity decision has in fact turned on a traditional application of the Stovall factors, with the central issue in dispute often being the major purpose to be served by the new standard. Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (plurality opinion), with id., at 337 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (disagreeing over the "major purpose" of the unanimous six-person jury rule of Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979)). </s> [Footnote 12 In the civil context, in contrast, the "clear break" principle has usually been stated as the threshold test for determining whether or not a decision should be applied nonretroactively. See, e. g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). Once it has been determined that a decision has "establish[ed] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed," the Court has gone on to examine the history, purpose, and effect of the new rule, as well as the inequity that would be imposed by its retroactive application. Id., at 106-107. See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 499 (1968). </s> [Footnote 13 At least since Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), the Court had acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment accords special protection to the home. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948), stated that "the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home." See also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 -15 (1948). While ultimately declining to decide whether a warrant is necessary to effect a home arrest, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 -475 (1971) (footnote omitted), had declared that "a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of `exigent circumstances.'" See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) ("the sanctity of private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection"). </s> [Footnote 14 The Payton Court relied on the "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 445 U.S., at 586 , citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S., at 477 . The Court further recognized that the express [457 U.S. 537, 553] language of the Fourth Amendment "has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house" in "terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons." 445 U.S., at 590 . After examining the common-law understanding of an officer's authority to arrest a suspect in his own home, id., at 591-598, the Court concluded that "the weight of authority as it appeared to the Framers [of the Fourth Amendment] was to the effect that a warrant was required [before a home arrest], or at the minimum that there were substantial risks in proceeding without one." Id., at 596. </s> [Footnote 15 While the practice invalidated in Payton had found support in some state courts, those decisions evinced "by no means the kind of virtual unanimity," id., at 600, required to make Payton a clear break with the past. In Payton, the Court noted that at the time of its decision, "`[o]nly 24 of the 50 States currently sanction warrantless entries into the home to arrest, . . . and there is an obvious declining trend." Ibid. In California, where the present respondent's case arose, the State Supreme Court had held more than a year before respondent's arrest that, under the Fourth Amendment and its state constitutional counterpart, warrantless arrests within the home were per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 275-276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340-1341, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976). </s> Of the seven United States Courts of Appeals that had considered the question before Payton, five had expressed the view that warrantless home arrests were unconstitutional. 445 U.S., at 575 , and n. 4. Three other Circuits had assumed, without expressly deciding, that such searches were unlawful. Ibid. After one of those decisions, in 1978, the Department of Justice instructed federal law enforcement agencies to follow the practice of procuring arrest warrants before entering a suspect's home to arrest him without exigent circumstances. Brief for United States 33, n. 20. </s> In the Ninth Circuit, where respondent was arrested, it has been said that "law enforcement officials knew that th[e] circuit's law was unsettled but that there was some drift toward a warrant requirement." United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d, at 736. United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131, 1135 (CA9 1974), had suggested in dictum that warrants are required before officers may enter a private dwelling to effect an arrest. In United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (CA9 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Stephenson v. United States, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977), it was observed that [457 U.S. 537, 554] the Government had agreed that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home would be illegal. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d, at 1350, then squarely held such arrests unconstitutional. See n. 5, supra. </s> [Footnote 16 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Payton's conviction along with that of Obie Riddick. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S., at [457 U.S. 537, 556] 578-579. This Court noted probable jurisdiction in Riddick's appeal, consolidated it with Payton's, then reversed both convictions. Id., at 603. </s> In theory, the Court could have held Riddick's jurisdictional statement pending the disposition in Payton's case, then vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Payton. Such a course was taken in seven other nonfinal cases. See Gonzalez v. New York, 446 U.S. 902 (1980); Brown v. Florida, 446 U.S. 902 (1980); Busch v. Florida, 446 U.S. 902 (1980); Vidal v. New York, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Gordon v. New York, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Gayle v. New York, 446 U.S. 905 (1980); and Dunagan v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 905 (1980). Alternatively, the Court could have given all these cases plenary review. </s> Potential for unequal treatment is inherent in this process. As Justice Douglas "recalled," when the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): </s> "[S]ome 80 cases were presented raising the same question. We took four of them and held the rest and then disposed of each of the four, applying the new procedural rule retroactively. But as respects the rest of the pending cases we denied any relief. . . . Yet it was sheer coincidence that those precise four were chosen. Any other single case in the group or any other four would have been sufficient for our purposes." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S., at 255 (dissenting opinion). </s> The dissent argues that "we long ago resolved the problem of the appearance of inequity that arises whenever we limit the retroactive reach of a new principle of law." Post, at 566. But the dissent mischaracterizes both the problem and this Court's treatment of it. The problem is not merely the appearance of inequity, but the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary of a retroactively applied rule. As the persistently voiced dissatisfaction with the Court's "ambulatory retroactivity doctrine" has revealed, see n. 9, supra, until now this Court has not "resolved" this problem so much as it has chosen to tolerate it. The time for toleration has come to an end. </s> [Footnote 17 We are aware, of course, that many considerations affect a defendant's progress through the judicial system, and that the speed of appellate review will differ from State to State, Circuit to Circuit, and case to case. Even under our approach, it may be unavoidable that some similarly [457 U.S. 537, 557] situated defendants will be treated differently. Cf. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S., at 657 , and n. 9 (plurality opinion). </s> The Government suggests an approach, however, that virtually ensures that such anomalies will occur. The Government concedes that the Payton rule should apply to any pre-Payton case arising in a Circuit where the United States Court of Appeals already had held authoritatively that Payton-type searches were unlawful. Brief for United States 22-26. When respondent was arrested, two Courts of Appeals had invalidated warrantless home arrests conducted in the absence of exigent circumstances. See Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (CA6 1974). Thus, under the Government's theory, the statements of a suspect arrested in the District of Columbia, on the same day as respondent was arrested in Los Angeles and under identical circumstances, should be excluded while respondent's statements should not. Moreover, under the Government's reasoning, this Court would be obliged to reverse a ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit excluding those statements, but not an identical ruling from the District of Columbia Circuit in a parallel case. </s> The dissent takes a different tack. Arguing that "inherent arbitrariness" arises whenever lines are drawn in this area, the dissent suggests that the "best way to deal with this problem" is to continue to make retroactivity decisions by picking and choosing from among similarly situated defendants. See post, at 568. By clinging to this view, the dissent, and not the Court, "is fooling itself." Ibid. This Court has no power to speed up or slow down the appellate process in the many tribunals throughout the country to ensure similar treatment of similarly situated defendants. The Court does, however, have the power to eliminate the obvious unfairness that results when it gives only the most conveniently situated defendant the retrospective benefit of a newly declared rule. </s> [Footnote 18 The dissent shares this mistaken impression. In support of its claim, the dissent cites Peltier's suggestion that every decision by this Court involving the exclusionary rule has been "accorded only prospective application." Post, at 564, citing 422 U.S., at 535 . As Peltier recognized with discomfort, however, Linkletter itself - the first of the modern retroactivity cases - acknowledged the application of the Mapp exclusionary rule to cases that were pending on direct review at the time that Mapp was decided. See 422 U.S., at 535 , n. 5. </s> [Footnote 19 The record in this case, for example, does not explain why respondent's arresting officers failed to obtain a warrant for his arrest, when they did obtain warrant to arrest his codefendant. See n. 2. supra. </s> [Footnote 20 After Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the only cases raising Fourth Amendment challenges on collateral attack are those federal habeas corpus cases in which the State has failed to provide a state prisoner with an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim, analogous federal cases under 28 U.S.C. 2255, and collateral challenges by state prisoners to their state convictions under postconviction relief statutes that continue to recognize Fourth Amendment claims. </s> [Footnote 21 The logic of our ruling, however, is not inconsistent with our precedents giving complete retroactive effect to constitutional rules whose purpose is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function. See, e. g., Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972). [457 U.S. 537, 563] Depending on the constitutional provision involved, additional factors may warrant giving a particular ruling retroactive effect beyond those cases pending on direct review. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S., at 248 , n. 2 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). </s> Curiously, the dissent faults us not only for limiting our ruling to the only context properly presented by this case - the Fourth Amendment - but also for preserving, rather than overruling, clearly controlling retroactivity precedents. See post, at 568. The dissent then recasts those precedents in its own simplistic way, arguing that rules related to truth-finding automatically receive full retroactive effect, while implying that all other rules - including Fourth Amendment rules - should receive none. </s> There are, however, two problems with this. First, the Court's decisions regularly giving complete retroactive effect to truth-finding rules have in no way required that newly declared Fourth Amendment rulings be denied all retroactive effect. For the reasons already stated, retroactive application of Fourth Amendment rules at least to cases pending on direct review furthers the policies underlying the exclusionary rule. Second, and more important, the Fourth Amendment "rule" urged by the dissent is far from a "perfectly good" one. Ibid. As we already have shown, that "rule" condones obviously inequitable treatment of similarly situated litigants and judicial injustice to individual litigants. </s> [Footnote 22 The question on which we granted certiorari encompassed one other issue: whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that its own decision in United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (1978), applies retroactively to respondent's arrest. See n. 5, supra. Because we hold that the principles of our decision in Payton apply retroactively to respondent's case, we need not disturb the Court of Appeals' ruling regarding the retroactive application of its own prior decision. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that the decision leaves undisturbed our retroactivity precedents as applied [457 U.S. 537, 564] to convictions final at the time of decision. See, e. g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. </s> In my view, this case is controlled by United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). Peltier established two propositions. First, retroactive application of a new constitutional doctrine is appropriate when that doctrine's major purpose is "`to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.'" Id., at 535, quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). Second, new extensions of the exclusionary rule do not serve this purpose and, therefore, will not generally be applied retroactively. There was surely nothing extraordinary about our ruling in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), that would justify an exception to this general rule. </s> Peltier was only the latest of a number of cases involving the question of whether rulings extending the reach of the exclusionary rule should be given retroactive effect. We noted there that "in every case in which the Court has addressed the retroactivity problem in the context of the exclusionary rule . . . the Court has concluded that any such new constitutional principle would be accorded only prospective application." 422 U.S., at 535 . We suggested that there were two reasons for this consistent pattern of decisions and that these two reasons were directly related to the justifications for the exclusionary rule. </s> That rule has traditionally been understood to serve two purposes: first, it preserves "judicial integrity"; second, it acts as a deterrent to unconstitutional police conduct. Neither of these purposes, however, is furthered by retroactive application of new extensions of the rule. First, "if the law enforcement officers reasonably believed in good faith that evidence they had seized was admissible at trial, the `imperative [457 U.S. 537, 565] of judicial integrity' is not offended by the introduction into evidence of that material." Id., at 537. Second, a deterrence purpose can only be served when the evidence to be suppressed is derived from a search which the law enforcement officers knew or should have known was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 542. </s> In focusing on the purpose of the exclusionary rule in order to decide the question of retroactivity, the Court was following settled principles. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), which the majority agrees is the first of the modern retroactivity cases, the Court set forth a three-pronged model for analysis of the retroactivity question presented there: </s> "[W]e must look to the purpose of the Mapp rule; the reliance placed upon the Wolf doctrine; and the effect on the administration of justice of a retrospective application of Mapp." Id., at 636. </s> This three-prong analysis was consistently applied in the cases which followed, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). Indeed, in Stovall, the Court specifically announced that these three considerations - purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect on the administration of justice - were generally to guide resolution of all retroactivity problems relating to constitutional rules of criminal procedure. In each of these cases, the purpose of the new rule was the first consideration. That this was not accidental was made absolutely clear in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969): "Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be served by the new constitutional rule." * And as we went on [457 U.S. 537, 566] to say there, "[t]his criterion strongly supports prospectivity for a decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary rule." Ibid. </s> Moreover, up until today's decision it was clear that these same principles governed the question of whether a new decision should retroactively apply to cases pending on appeal at the time of its announcement. Peltier itself was just this sort of a case: Peltier's case was on appeal at the time of the announcement of the decision in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Indeed, we reversed the Court of Appeals' holding in that case that the "rule announced . . . in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States . . . should be applied to similar cases pending on appeal on the date the Supreme Court's decision was announced." United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985, 986 (CA9 1974) (footnote omitted). I had thought that we long ago resolved the problem of the appearance of inequity that arises whenever we limit the retroactive reach of a new principle of law. As JUSTICE BRENNAN stated for the Court in Stovall, supra, at 301: </s> "Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making." </s> All of these principles are well settled and require reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The majority, in an intricate and confusing opinion disagrees. Two reasons for its disagreement seem to be presented. </s> First, the majority discerns no consistent reading of our precedents that would control this case. Ante, at 554 ("Having determined that the retroactivity question here is not clearly controlled by our prior precedents . . ."). Given the clarity with which we have previously set out the applicable [457 U.S. 537, 567] principles and the consistent application of those principles in cases involving extensions of the exclusionary rule, this is surely a strange conclusion. Eschewing the straight-forward reading of the cases set forth above, which looks primarily to the substantive purpose of the relevant rule of law, the majority replaces it with an exceedingly formal set of three categories. Ante, at 549-551. Because these categories turn out to be dicta only, they merit little comment. Suffice it to say that their inadequacy is obvious from even a moment's reflection: That category to which the majority agrees "the Court has regularly given complete retroactive effect" is nowhere included in this formal scheme - cases announcing new constitutional rules whose major purpose "`is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials.'" Ante, at 544, quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S., at 653 (plurality opinion). It is little wonder that the majority finds this case difficult, when it has failed to learn the most obvious lessons of the previous cases. </s> Second, the majority seems to think that the problems of principle that Justice Harlan struggled with in his dissent in Desist v. United States, supra, are unanswerable under any rule that fails to give the benefits of a new constitutional ruling to all criminal defendants whose cases are pending on appeal at the time of the announcement. These problems are not new and were, I believe, adequately answered by JUSTICE BRENNAN in Stovall. The majority's approach, however, does not resolve these theoretical problems; it simply draws what is necessarily an arbitrary line in a somewhat different place than the Court had previously settled upon. Anything less than full retroactivity will necessarily appear unjust in some instances; it will provide different treatment to similarly situated individuals. The majority recognizes that the vagaries of the appellate process will cause this same problem to reappear under its proposed rule: "Even under [457 U.S. 537, 568] our approach, it may be unavoidable that some similarly situated defendants will be treated differently." Ante, at 556-557, n. 17. We had previously held that the best way to deal with this problem of inherent arbitrariness was to abide by the substantive principles outlined in Stovall. The majority makes no better suggestion today and is fooling itself if it believes that its proposal is a reasoned response to this problem of arbitrariness, rather than an exercise in line-drawing. </s> The insubstantiality of the majority's analysis and proposal is well illustrated by its conclusion. Despite the appearance of having resolved the difficult problem of the apparent injustice of any rule of partial retroactivity, the Court announces at the end that its decision today applies only to decisions "construing the Fourth Amendment" and asserts that it is not disturbing any of our retroactivity precedents. Ante, at 562. That is, it returns from its abstract procedural approach to the substantive rule of law at issue. There are two problems with this, however. First, there is no connection between the analysis and the conclusion. Second, and more important, we already had a perfectly good rule for resolving retroactivity problems involving the Fourth Amendment. </s> Accordingly, I dissent. </s> [Footnote * See also 394 U.S., at 251 : "It is to be noted also that we have relied heavily on the factors of the extent of reliance and consequent burden on the administration of justice only when the purpose of the rule in question did not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity." </s> [457 U.S. 537, 569]

United States Supreme Court BONE v. UNITED STATES(1963) No. 716 Argued: Decided: June 17, 1963 </s> Certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded. </s> Reported below: 305 F.2d 772. </s> Petitioner pro se. </s> Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Richard W. Schmude for the United States. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 . </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN would deny certiorari on the basis of their dissent in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S., at 23 . </s> [374 U.S. 503, 504]

United States Supreme Court FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION V. CEMENT INSTITUTE(1948) No. 23-34 Argued: Decided: April 26, 1948 </s> Rehearing Denied June 7, 1948.[ Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ] </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 686] </s> Charles H. Weston and Walter B. Wooden, both of Washington, D.C ., for petitioner. William J. Donovan, of New York City, for respondents Cement Institute and others. Edward A. Zimmerman, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. Charles Wright, Jr., of Detroit, Mich., for respondent Huron Portland Cement Co. Herbert S. Little, of Seattle, Wash., for respondents Superior Portland Cement, Inc. S. Harold Shefelman, of Seattle, Wash., for respondent Northwestern Portland Cement Co. Herbert W. Clark of San Francisco, Cal., for respondents Calaveras Cement Co. and another. Pierce Works, of Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent Riverside Cement Co. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 687] </s> Nathan L. Miller, of New York City, for respondent Universal Atlas cement co. Alex W. Davis, of Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent California Portland Cement Co. No appearance for Monolith Portland Cement Co. and others. </s> Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to review the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which, with one judge dissenting, vacated and set aside a cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Commission against the respondents. 7 Cir., 157 F.2d 533. Those respondents are: The Cement Institute, an unincorporated trade association composed of 74 corporations 1 which manufacture, sell and distribute cement; the 74 corporate members of the Institute;2 and 21 individuals who are associated with the Institute. It took three years for a trial examiner to hear the evidence which consists of about 49,000 pages of oral testimony and 50,000 pages of exhibits. Even the findings and conclusions of the Commission cover 176 pages. The briefs with accompanying p pendixes submitted by the parties contain more than 4,000 pages. The legal questions raised by the Commission and by the different re- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 688] </s> spondents are many and varied. Some contentions are urged by all respondents and can be jointly considered. Others require separate treatment. In order to keep our opinion within reasonable limits, we must restrict our record references to the minimum consistent with an adequate consideration of the legal questions we discuss. The proceedings were begun by a Commission complaint of two counts. The first charged that certain alleged conduct set out at length constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 38 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. 45, 15 U.S.C.A. 45. The core of the charge was that the respondents had restrained and hindered competition in the sale and distribution of cement by means of a combination among themselves made effective through mutual understanding or agreement to employ a multiple basing point system of pricing. It was alleged that this system resulted in the quotation of identical terms of sale and identical prices for cement by the respondents at any given point in the United States. This system had worked so successfully, it was further charged, that for many years prior to the filing of the complaint, all cement buyers throughout the nation, with rare exceptions, had been unable to purchase cement for delivery in any given locality from any one of the respondents at a lower price or on more favorable terms than from any of the other respondents. The second count of the complaint, resting chiefly on the same allegations of fact set out in Count I, charged that the multiple basing point system of sales resulted in systematic price discriminations between the customers of each respondent. These discriminations were made, it was alleged, with the purpose of destroying competition in price between the various respondents in violation of 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526. That section, with </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 689] </s> certain conditions which need not here be set out, makes it 'unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, * * * either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. * * *' 15 U.S.C. 13, 15 U.S.C.A. 13. Resting upon its findings, the Commission ordered that respondents cease and desist from 'carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy' to do a number of things, 37 F.T.C. 97, 258-262, all of which things, the Commission argues, had to be restrained in order effectively to restore individual freedom of action among the separate units in the cement industry. Certain contentions with reference to the order will later require a more detailed discussion of its terms. For the present it is sufficient to say that, if the order stands, its terms are broad enough to bar respondents from acting in concert to sell cement on a basing point delivered price plan which so eliminates competition that respondents' prices are always identical at any given point in the United States. We shall not now detail the numerous contentions urged against the order's validity. A statement of these contentions can best await the separate consideration we give them. Jurisdiction.-At the very beginning we are met with a challenge to the Commission's jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and to act on it. This contention is pressed by respondent Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. and is relied upon by other respondents. Count I of the complaint is drawn under the provision in 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which declares that 'Unfair methods of competii on * * * are hereby declared unlawful.' Marquette contends that the facts alleged in Count I do not constitute an 'unfair method of competition' within the meaning of *s 5. Its argument runs this way: Count I in reality charges a combination to restrain trade. Such </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 690] </s> a combination constitutes an offense under 1 of the Sherman Act which outlaws 'Every * * * combination * * * in restraint of trade.' 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1, 15 U.S.C.A. 1. Section 4 of the Sherman Act provides that the attorney general shall institute suits under the Act on behalf of the United States, and that the federal district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such suits. Hence, continue respondents, the Commission, whose jurisdiction is limited to 'unfair methods of competition,' is without power to institute proceedings or to issue an order with regard to the combination in restraint of trade charged in Count I. Marquette then argues that since the fact allegations of Count I are the chief reliance for the charge in Count II, this latter count also must be interpreted as charging a violation of the Sherman Act. Assuming, without deciding, that the conduct charged in each count constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act, we hold that the Commission does have jurisdiction to conclude that such conduct may also be an unfair method of competition and hence constitute a violation of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. As early as 1920 this Court considered it an 'unfair method of competition' to engage in practices 'against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.' Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 , 575. In 1921, the Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 19 A.L.R. 882, sustained a cease and desist order against a resale price maintenance plan because such a plan 'necessarily constitutes a scheme which restrains the natural flow of commerce and the freedom of competition in the channels of interstate trade which it has been the purpose of all the Anti-Trust Acts to maintain.' Id., 257 U.S. at page 454, 42 S.Ct. at page 154, 19 A.L.R. 882. The Court, in holding that the scheme before it constituted an unfair method of competition, noted that </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 691] </s> the conduct in question was practically identical with that previously declared unlawful in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 , and United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 , the latter a suit brought under 1 of the Sherman Act. Again in 1926 this Court sustained a Commission unfair-method-of-competition order against defendants who had engaged in a price-fixing combination, a plain violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 . In 1941 we reiterated that certain conduct of a combination found to conflict with the policy of the Sherman Act could be suppressed by the Commission as an unfair method of competition. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 465 , 707. The Commission's order was sustained in the Fashion Originators' case not only because the prohibited conduct violated the Clayton Act but also because the Commission's findings brought the 'combination in its entirety well within the inhibition of the policies declared by the Sherman Act itself.' In other cases this Court has pointed out many reasons which support interpretation of the language 'unfair methods of competition' in 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as including violations of the Sherman Act. 3 Thus it appears that soon after its creation the Commission began to interpret the prohibitions of 5 as including those restraints of trade which also were outlawed by the Sherman Act,4 and </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 692] </s> that this Court has consistently approved that interpretatin of the Act. Despite this long and consistent administrative and judicial construction of 5, we are urged to hold that these prior interpretations were wrong and that the term 'unfair methods of competition' should not be construed as embracing any conduct within the ambit of the Sherman Act. In support of this contention, Marquette chiefly relies upon its reading of the legislative history of the Commission Act. We have given careful consideration to this contention because of the earnestness with which it is pressed. Marquette points to particular statements of some of the Act's sponsors which, taken out of their context, might lend faint support to its contention that Congress did not intend the Commission to concern itself with conduct then punishable under the Sherman Act. But on the whole the Act's legislative history shows a strong congressional purpose not only to continue enforcement of the Sherman Act by the Department of Justice and the Federal District Courts but also to supplement that enforcement through the administrative process of the new Trade Commission. Far from being regarded as a rival of the Justice Department and the District Courts in dissolving combinations in restraint of trade, the new Commission was envisioned as an aid to them and was specifically authorized to assist them in the drafting of </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 693] </s> appropriate decrees in antitrust litigation. 5 All of the committee reports and the statements of those in charge of the Trade Commission Act reveal an abiding purpose to vest both the Commission and the courts with adequate powers to hit at every trade practice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained competition or might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its incipient stages. These congressional purposes are revealed in the legislative history cited below, most of which is referred to in respondents' briefs. 6 We can conceive of no greater obstacle this Court could create to the fulfillment of these congressional purposes than to inject into every Trade Commission proceeding brought under 5 and into every Sherman Act suit brought by the Justice Department a possible jurisdictional question. We adhere to our former rulings. The Commission has jurisdiction to declare that conduct tending to restrain trade is an unfair method of competition even though the selfsame conduct may also violate the Sherman Act. There is a related jurisdictional argument pressed by Marquette which may be disposed of at this time. While review of the Commission's order was pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Attorney General filed a civil action in the Federal District Court for Denver, Colorado, </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 694] </s> to restrain the Cement Institute, Marquette and 88 other cement companies, including all of the present respondents, from violating 1 of the Sherman Act. Much of the evidence before the Commission in this proceeding might also be relevant in that case, which, we are informed, has not thus far been brought to trial. Marquette urges that the Commission proceeding should now be dismissed because it is contrary to the public interest to force respondents to defend both a Commission proceeding and a Sherman Act suit based largely on the same alleged misconduct. We find nothing to justify a holding that the filing of a Sherman Act suit by the Attorney General requires the termination of these Federal Trade Commission proceedings. In the first place, although all conduct violative of the Sherman Act may likewise come within the unfair trade practice prohibitions of the Trade Commission Act, the converse is not necessarily true. It has long been recognized that there are many unfair methods of competition that do not assume the proportions of Sherman Act violations. Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 ; Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 , 574. Hence a conclusion that respondents' conduct constituted an unfair method of competition does not necessarily mean that their same activities would also be found to violate 1 of the Sherman Act. In the second place, the fact that the same conduct may constitute a violation of both acts in nowise requires us to dismiss this Commission proceeding. Just as the Sherman Act itself permits the Attorney General to bring simultaneous civil and criminal suits against a defendant based on the same misconduct, so the Sherman Act and the Trade Commission Act provide the Government with cumulative remedies against activity detrimental to competition. Both the legislative history of the Trade Commission Act and its specific language indicate a congres- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 695] </s> sional purpose, not to confine each of these proceedings within narrow, mutually exclusive limits, but rather to permit the simultaneous use of both types of proceedings. Marquette's objections to the Commission's jurisdiction are overruled. Ojections to Commission's Jurisdiction by Certain Respondents on Ground That They Were Not Engaged in Interstate Commerce.-One other challenge to the Commission's jurisdiction is specially raised by Northwestern Portland and Superior Portland. The Commission found that 'Northwestern Portland makes no sales or shipments outside the State of Washington,' and that 'Superior Portland, with few exceptions, makes sales and shipments outside the State of Washington only to Alaska.' These two respondents contend that since they did not engage in interstate commerce, and since 5 of the Trade Commission Act applies only to unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce, the Commission was without jurisdiction to enter an order against them under Count I of the complaint. For this contention they chiefly rely on Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 . They also argue that for the same reason the Commission lacked jurisdiction to enforce against them the price discrimination charge in Count II of the complaint. We cannot sustain this contention. The charge against thee respondents was not that they, apart from the other respondents, had engaged in unfair methods of competition and price discriminations simply by making intrastate sales. Instead, the charge was, as supported by the Commission's findings, that these respondents in combination with others agreed to maintain a delivered price system in order to eliminate price competition in the sale of cement in interstate commerce. The combination, as found, includes the Institute and cement companies located in many different states. The Commission has further found that 'In general, said corporate respondents </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 696] </s> have maintained, and now maintain, a constant course of trade and commerce in cement among and between the several States of the United States.' The fact that one or two of the numerous participants in the combination happen to be selling only within the borders of a single state is not controlling in determining the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction. The important factor is that the concerted action of all of the parties to the combination is essential in order to make wholly effective the restraint of commerce among the states. 7 The Commission would be rendered helpless to stop unfair methods of competition in the form of interstate combinations and conspiracies if its jurisdiction could be defeated on a mere showing that each conspirator had carefully confined his illegal activities within the borders of a single state. We hold that the Commission did have jurisdiction to make an order against Superior Portland and Northwestern Portland. The Multiple Basing Point Delivered Price System.-Since the multiple basing point delivered price system of fixing prices and terms of cement sales is the nub of this controversy, it will be helpful at this preliminary stage to point out in general what it is and how it works. A brief reference to the distinctive characteristics of 'factory' or 'mill prices' and 'delivered prices' is of importance to an understanding of the basing point delivered price system here involved. Goods may be sold and delivered to customers at the seller's mill or warehouse door or may be sold free on board (f.o.b.) trucks or railroad cars immediately adjacent to the seller's mill or warehouse. In either event the actual cost of the goods to the purchaser is, broadly speaking, the seller's 'mill price' plus the purchaser's cost of </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 697] </s> transportation. However, if the seller fixes a price at which he undertakes to deliver goods to the purchaser where they are to be used, the cost to the purchaser is the 'delivered price.' A seller who makes the 'mill price' identical for all purchasers of like amount and quality simply delivers his goods at the same place (his mill) and for the same price (price at the mill). He thus receives for all f.o.b. mill sales an identical net amount of money for like goods from all customers. But a 'delivered price' system creates complications which may result in a seller's receiving different net returns from the sale of like goods. The cost of transporting 500 miles is almost always more than the cost of transporting 100 miles. Consequently if customers 100 and 500 miles away pay the same 'delivered price,' the seller's net return is less from the more distant customer. This difference in the producer's net return from sales to customers in different localities under a 'delivered price' system is an important element in the charge under Count I of the complaint and is the crux of Count II. The best known early example of a basing point price system was called 'Pittsburgh plus.' It related to the price of steel. The Pittsburgh price was the base price, Pittsburgh being therefore called a price basing point. In order for the system to work, sales a d to be made only at delivered prices. Under this system the delivered price of steel from anywhere in the United States to a point of delivery anywhere in the United States was in general the Pittsburgh price plus the railroad freight rate from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery. 8 Take Chicago, Illinois, as an illustration of the operation and consequences </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 698] </s> of the system. A Chicago steel producer was not free to sell his steel at cost plus a reasonable profit. He must sell it at the Pittsburgh price plus the railroad freight rate from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery. Chicago steel customers were by this pricing plan thus arbitrarily required to pay for Chicago produced steel the Pittsburgh base price plus what it would have cost to ship the steel by rail from Pittsburgh to Chicago had it been shipped. The theoretical cost of this fictitious shipment became known as 'phantom freight.' But had it been economically possible under this plan for a Chicago producer to ship his steel to Pittsburgh, his 'delivered price' would have been merely the Pittsburgh price, although he actually would have been required to pay the freight from Chicago to Pittsburgh. Thus the 'delivered price' under these latter circumstances required a Chicago (non-basing point) producer to 'absorb' freight costs. That is, such a seller's net returns became smaller and smaller as his deliveries approached closer and closer to the basing point. Several results obviously flow from use of a single basing point system such as 'Pittsburgh plus' originally was. One is that the 'delivered prices' of all producers in every locality where deliveries are made are always the same regardless of the producers' different freight costs. Another is that sales made by a non-base mill for delivery at different localities result in net receipts to the seller which vary in amounts equivalent to the 'phantom freight' included in, or the 'freight absorption' taken from the 'delivered price.' As commonly employed by respondents, the basing point system is not single but multiple. That is, instead of one basing point, like that in 'Pittsburgh plus,' a number of basing point localities are used. In the multiple basing point system, just as in the single basing point system, freight absorption or phantom freight is an ele- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 699] </s> ment of the delivered price on all sales not governed by a basing point actually located at the seller's mill. 9 And all sellers quote identical delivered prices in any given locality regardless of their different costs of production and their different freight expenses. Thus the multiple and single systems function in the same general manner and produce the same consequences-identity of prices and diversity of net returns. 10 Such differences </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 700] </s> as there are in matters here pertinent are therefore differences of degree only. Alleged Bias of the Commission.-One year after the taking of testimony had been concluded and while these proceedings were still pending before the Commission, the respondent Marquette asked the Commission to disqualify itself from passing upon the issues involved. Marquette charged that the Commission had previously prejudged the issues, was 'prejudiced and biased against the Portland cement industry generally,' and that the industry and Marquette in particular could not receive a fair hearing from the Commission. After hearing oral argument the Commission refused to disqualify itself. This contention, repeated here, was also urged and rejected in the Circuit Court of Appeals one year before that court reviewed the merits of the Commission's order. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 147 F.2d 589. Marquette introduced numerous exhibits intended to support its charges. In the main these exhibits were copies of the Commission's reports made to Congress or to the President, as required by 6 of the Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. 46, 15 U.S.C.A. 46. These reports, as well as the testimony given by members of the Commission before congressional committees, make it clear that long before the filing of this complaint the members of the Commission at that time, or at least some of them, were of the opinion that the operation of the multiple basing point system as they had studied it was the equivalent of a price fixing restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. We therefore decide this contention, as did the Circuit Court of Appeals, on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result of its prior official investigations. But we also agree with that court's holding that this belief did not disqualify the Commission. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 701] </s> In the first place, the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents' basing point practices. Here, in contrast to the Commission's investigations, members of the cement industry were legally authorized participants in the hearings. They produced evidence- volumes of it. They were free to point out to the Commission by testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and by arguments, conditions of the trade practices under attack which they thought kept these practices within the range of legally permissible business activities. Moreover, Marquette's position, if sustained, would to a large extent defeat the congressional purposes which prompted passage of the Trade Commission Act. Had the entire membership of the Commission disqualified in the proceedings against these e spondents, this complaint could not have been acted upon by the Commission or by any other government agency. Congress has provided for no such contingency. It has not directed that the Commission disqualify itself under any circumstances, has not provided for substitute commissioners should any of its members disqualify, and has not authorized any other government agency to hold hearings, make findings, and issue cease and desist orders in proceedings against unfair trade practices. 11 Yet if Marquette is right, the Commission, by making studies and filing reports in obedience to congressional command, completely immunized the practices investigated, even though they are 'unfair,' from any cease and desist order by the Commission or any other governmental agency. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 702] </s> There is no warrant in the Act for reaching a conclusion which would thus frustrate its purposes. If the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally required reports would bar its members from acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would appear that opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them from ever passing on another. See Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409, 421 , 1004. Thus experience acquired from their work as commissioners would be a handicap instead of an advantage. Such was not the intendment of Congress. For Congress acted on a committee report stating: 'It is manifestly desirable that the terms of the commissioners shall be long enough to give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience.' Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce, No. 597, June 13, 1914, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11. Marquette also seems to argue that it was a denial of due process for the Commission to act in these proceedings after having expressed the view that industry-wide use of the basing point system was illegal. A number of cases are cited as giving support to this contention. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 50 A.L.R. 1243, is among them. But it provides no support for the contention. In that case Tumey had been convicted of a criminal offense, fined, and committed to jail by a judge who had a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching his conclusion to convict. A criminal conviction by such a tribunal was held to violate procedural due process. But the Court there pointed out that most matters relating to judicial disqualification did not rise to a constitutional level. Id., at page 523 of 273 U.S., at page 441 of L.Ed. 749, 50 A.L.R. 1243. Neither the Tumey decision nor any other decision of this Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 703] </s> a case after he had expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try the same case more than once and decide identical issues each time, although these issues involved questions both of law and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court. 12 </s> The Commission properly refused to disqualify itself. We thus need notr eview the additional holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals that Marquette's objection on the ground of the alleged bias of the Commission was filed too late in the proceedings before that agency to warrant consideration. Alleged Errors in re Introduction of Evidence.-The complaint before the Commission, filed July 2, 1937, alleged that respondents had maintained an illegal combination for 'more than eight yearts last past.' In the Circuit Court of Appeals and in this Court the Government treated its case on the basis that the combination began in August, 1929, when the respondent Cement Institute was organized. The Government introduced much evidence over respondents' objections, however, which showed the activities of the cement industry for many years prior to 1929, some of it as far back as 1902. It also introduced evidence as to respondents' activities from 1933 to May 27, 1935, much of which related to the preparation and administration of the NRA Code for the cement industry pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, held invalid by this Court </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 704] </s> May 27, 1935, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 97 A.L.R. 947. All of the testimony to which objection was made related to the initiation, development, and carrying on of the basing point practices. Respondents contend that the pre-1929 evidence, especially that prior to 1919, is patently inadmissible with reference to a 1929 combination, many of whose alleged members were non-existent in 1919. They also urge that evidence of activities during the NRA period was improperly admitted because 5 of Title I of the NRA provided that any action taken in compliance with the code provisions of an industry should be 'exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States.' And some of the NRA period testimony relating to basing point practices did involve references to code provisions. The Government contends that evidence of both the pre-1929 and the NRA period activities of members of the cement industry tends to show a continuous course of concerted efforts on the part of the industry, or at least most of it, to utilize the basing point system as a means to fix uniform terms and prices at which cement would be sold, and that the Commission had properly so regarded this evidence. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that the Commission had erroneously considered both the NRA period evidence and the pre-1929 evidence in making its findings of the existence of a combination among respondents. We conclude that both types of evidence were admissible for the purpose of showing the existence of a continuing combination among respondents to utilize the basing poing pricing system. 13 </s> The Commission did not make its findings of post-1929 combination, in whole or in part, on the premise that </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 705] </s> any of respondents' pre-1929 or NRA code activities were illegal. The consideration given these activities by the Commission was well within the established judicial rule of evidence that testimony of prior or subsequent transactions, which for some reason are barred from forming the basis for a suit, may nevertheless be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 46 , 47, 510, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 834, Ann.Cas.1912D, 734; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 43 , 44, 427, 428. Here the trade practices of an entire industry were under consideration. Respondents, on the one hand, insisted that the multiple basin point delivered price system represented a natural evolution of business practices adopted by the different cement companies, not in concert, but separately in response to customers' needs and demands. That the separately adopted business practices produced uniform terms and conditions of sale in all localities was, so the respondents contended, nothing but an inevitable result of long-continued competition. On the other hand, the Government contended that, despite shifts in ownership of individual cement companies, what had taken place from 1902 to the date the complaint was filed showed continued concerted action on the part of all cement producers to develop and improve the basing point system so that it would automatically eliminate competition. In the Government's view the Institute when formed in 1929 simply took up the old practices for the old purpose and aided its member companies to carry it straight on through and beyond the NRA period. See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 156 F.2d 899, 906. Furthermore, administrative agencies like the Federal Trade Commission have never been restricted by the </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 706] </s> rigid rules of evidence. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44 , 568, 569. And of course rules which bar certain types of evidence in criminal or quasi-criminal cases are not controlling in proceedings like this, where the effect of the Commission's order is not to punish or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the future in accordance with the general mandate of Congress. The foregoing likewise largely answers respondents' contention that there was error in the admission of a letter written by one Treanor in 1934 to the chairman of the NRA code authority for the cement industry. Treanor, who died prior to the filing of the complaint, was at the time president of one of the respondent companies and also an active trustee of the Institute. In the letter he stated among other things that the cement industry was one 'above all others that cannot stand free competition, that must systematically restrain competition or be ruined.' This statement was made as part of his criticism of the cement industry's publicity campaign in defense of the basing point system. The relevance of this statement indicating this Institute official's informed judgment is obvious. That is might be only his conclusion does not render the statement inadmissible in this administrative proceeding. All contentions in regard to the introduction of testimony have been considered. None of them justify refusal to enforce this order. The Old Cement Case.-This Court's opinion in Cement Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 592 , known as the Old Cement case, is relied on by the respondents in almost every contention they present. We think it has little relevance, if any at all, to the issues in this case. In that case the United States brought an action in the District Court to enjoin an alleged combination to violate </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 707] </s> s 1 of the Sherman Act. The respondents were the Cement Manufacturers Protective Association, four of its officers, and nineteen cement manufacturers. The District Court held hearings, made findings of fact, and issued an injunction against those respondents. This Court, with three justices dissenting, reversed upon a review of the evidence. It did so because the Government did not charge and the record did not show 'any agreement or understanding between the defendants placing limitations on either prices or production,' or any agreement to utilize the basing point system as a means of fixing prices. The Court said 'But here the government does not rely upon agreement or understanding, and this record wholly fails to establish, either directly or by inference, any concerted action other than that involved in the gathering and dissemination of pertinent information with respect to the sale and distribution of cement to whc h we have referred, and it fails to show any effect on price and production except such as would naturally flow from the dissemination of that information in the trade and its natural influence on individual action.' Id., at page 606, of 268 U.S., at page 592 of 45 S.Ct.. In the Old Cement case and in Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 , decided the same day, the Court's attention was focused on the rights of a trade association, despite the Sherman Act, openly to gather and disseminate statistics and information as to production costs, output, past prices, merchandise on hand, specific job contracts, freight rates, etc., so long as the Association did these things without attempts to foster agreements or concerted action with reference to prices, production, or terms of sale. Such associations were declared guiltless of violating the Sherman Act, because 'in fact, no prohibited concert of action was found.' Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726, 735 , 65 S. Ct. 961, 966. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 708] </s> The Court's holding in the Old Cement case would not have been inconsistent with a judgment sustaining the Commission's order here, even had the two cases been before this Court the same day. The issues in the present Commission proceedings are quite different from those in the Old Cement case, although many of the trade practices shown here were also shown there. In the first place, unlike the Old Cement case the Commission does here specifically charge a combination to utilize the basing point system as a means to bring about uniform prices and terms of sale. And here the Commission has focused attention on this issue, having introduced evidence on the issue which covers thousands of pages. Furthermore, unlike the trial court in the Old Cement case, the Commission has specifically found the existence of a combination among respondents to employ the basing point system for the purpose of selling at identical prices. In the second place, individual conduct, or concerted conduct, which falls short of being a Sherman Act violation may as a matter of law constitute an 'unfair method of competition' prohibited by the Trade Commission Act. A major purpose of that Act, as we have frequently said, was to enable the Commission to restrain practices as 'unfair' which, although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions would, most likely do so if left unrestrained. The Commission and the courts were to determine what conduct, even though it might then be short of a Sherman Act violation, was an 'unfair method of competition.' This general language was deliberately left to the 'Commission and the courts' for definition because it was thought that 'There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field'; that consequently, a definition that fitted practices known to lead towards an unlawful restraint of trade today would not fit tomorrow's new inventions in the field; and that for Congress to try to keep its precise definitions abreast of this course of conduct </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 709] </s> would be an 'endless task.' See Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 -312, 426, and congressional committee reports there quoted. These marked differences between what a court must decide in a Sherman Act proceeding and the duty of the Commission in determining whether conduct is to be classified as an unfair method of competition are enough in and of themselves to make the Old Cement decision wholly inapplicable to our problem in reviewing the findings in this case. That basic problem is whether the Commission made findings of concerted action, whether those findings are supported by evidence, and if so whether the findings are adequate as a matter of law to sustain the Commission's conclusion that the multiple basing point system as practiced constitutes an 'unfair method of competition,' because it either restrains free competition or is an incipient menace to it. Findings and Ei dence.-It is strongly urged that the Commission failed to find, as charged in both counts of the complaint, that the respondents had by combination, agreements, or understandings among themselves utilized the multiple basing point delivered price system as a restraint to accomplish uniform prices and terms of sale. A subsidiary contention is that assuming the Commission did so find, there is no substantial evidence to support such a finding. We think that adequate findings of combination were made and that the findings have support in the evidence. The Commission's findings of fact set out at great length and with painstaking detail numerous concerted activities carried on in order to make the multiple basing point system work in such way that competition in quality, price and terms of sale of cement would be nonexistent, and that uniform prices, job contracts, discounts, and terms of sale would be continuously maintained. The Commission found that many of these activities </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 710] </s> were carried on by the Cement Institute, the industry's unincorporated trade association, and that in other instances the activities were under the immediate control of groups of respondents. Among the collective methods used to accomplish these purposes, according to the findings, were boycotts; discharge of uncooperative employees; organized opposition to the erection of new cement plants; selling cement in a recalcitrant price cutter's sales territory at a price so low that the recalcitrant was forced to adhere to the established basing point prices; discouraging the shipment of cement by truck or barge; and preparing and distributing freight rate books which provided respondents with similar figures to use as actual or 'phantom' freight factors, thus guaranteeing that their delivered prices (base prices plus freight factors) would be identical on all sales whether made to individual purchasers under open bids or to governmental agencies under sealed bids. These are but a few of the many activities of respondents which the Commission found to have been done in combination to reduce or destroy price competition in cement. After having made these detailed findings of concerted action, the Commission followed them by a general finding that 'the capacity, tendency, and effect of the combination maintained by the respondents herein in the manner aforesaid is to * * * promote and maintain their multiple basing point delivered- price system and obstruct and defeat any form of competition which threatens or tends to threaten the continued use and maintenance of said system and the uniformity of prices created and maintained by its use.'14 The Commission then concluded </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 711] </s> that 'The aforesaid combination and acts and practices of respondents pursuant thereto and in connection therewith, as hereinabove found, under the conditions and circumstances set forth, constitute unfair methods of competition in commerce within the intent and meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' And the Commission's cease and desist order prohibited respondents 'from entering into, continuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy between and among any two or more of said respondents * * *' to do certain things there enumerated. Thus we have a complaint which charged collective action by respondents designed to maintain a sales tech- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 712] </s> nique that restrained competition, detailed findings of collective activities by groups of respondents to achieve that end, then a general finding that respondents maintained the combination, and finally an order prohibiting the continuance of the combination. It seems impossible to conceive that anyone reading these findings in their entirety could doubt that the Commission found that respondents, collectively maintained a multiple basing point delivered price system for the purpose of suppressing competition in cement sales. The findings are sufficient. The contention that they were not is without substance. Disposition of this question brings us to the related contention that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings. We might well dispose of the contention as this Court dismissed a like one with reference to evidence and findings in a civil suit brought under the Sherman Act in Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 601 , 56 S. Ct. 629, 643: 'After a hearing of extraordinary length, in which no pertinent fact was permitted to escape consideration, the trial court subjected the evidence to a thorough and acute analysis which has left but slight room for debate over matters of fact. Our examination of the record discloses no reason for overruling the court's findings in any matter essential to our decision.' In this case, which involves the evidence and findings of the Federal Trade Commission, we likewise see no reason for upsetting the essential findings of the Commission. Neither do we find it necessary to refer to all the voluminous testimony in this record which tends to support the Commission's findings. Although there is much more evidence to which reference could be made, we think that the following facts shown by evidence in the record, some of which are in dispute, are sufficient to warrant the Commission's finding of concerted action. When the Commission rendered its decision there were about 80 cement manufacturing companies in the United </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 713] </s> States operating about 150 mills. Ten companies controlled more than half of the mills and there were substantial corporate affiliations among many of the others. This concentration of productive capacity made concerted action far less difficult than it would otherwise have been. The belief is prevalent in the industry that because of the standardized nature of cement, among other reasons, price competition is wholly unsuited to it. That belief is historic. It has resulted in concerted activities to devise means and measures to do away with competition in the industy . Out of those activities came the multiple basing point delivered price system. Evidence shows it to be a handy instrument to bring about elimination of any kind of price competition. The use of the multiple basing point delivered price system by the cement producers has been coincident with a situation whereby for many years, with rare exceptions, cement has been offered for sale in every given locality at identical prices and terms by all producers. Thousands of secret sealed bids have been received by public agencies which corresponded in prices of cement down to a fractional part of a penny. 15 </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 714] </s> Occasionally foreign cement has been imported, and cement dealers have sold it below the delivered price of the domestic product. Dealers who persisted in selling foreign cement were boycotted by the domestic producers. Officers of the Institute took the lead in securing pledges by producers not to permit sales f.o.b. mill to purchasers who furnished their own trucks, a practice regarded as seriously disruptive of the entire delivered price structure of the industry. During the depression in the 1930's, slow business prompted some producers to deviate from the prices fixed by the delivered price system. Meetings were held by other producers; an effective plan was devised to punish the recalcitrants and bring them into line. The plan was simple but successful. Other producers made the recalcitrant's plant an involuntary base point. The base price was driven down with relatively insignificant losses to the producers who imposed the punitive basing point, but with heavy losses to the recalcitrant who had to make all its sales on this basis. In one instance, where a producer had made a low public bid, a punitive base point price was put on its plant and cement was reduced 10 per barrel; further reductions quickly followed until the base price at which this recalcitrant had to sell its cement dropped to 75 per barrel, scarcely one-half of its former base price of $1.45. Within six weeks after the base price hit 75 capitulation occurred and the recalcitrant joined a Portland cement association. Cement in that locality then bounced back to $1.15, later to $1.35, and finally to $1.75. The foregoing are but illustrations of the practices shown to have been utilized to maintain the basing point price system. Respondents offered testimony that cement is a standardized product, that 'cement is cement,' that no differences existed in quality or usefulness, and that purchasers demanded delivered price quotations be- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 715] </s> cause of the high cost of transportation from mill to dealer. There was evidence, however, that the Institute and its members had, in the interest of eliminating competition, suppressed information as to the variations in quality that sometimes exist in different cements. 16 Respondents introduced the testimony of economists to the effect that competition alone could lead to the evolution of a multiple basing point system of uniform delivered prices and terms of sale for an industry with a standardized product and with relatively high freight costs. These economists testified that for the above reasons no inferences of collusion, agreement, or understanding could be drawn from the admitted fc t that cement prices of all United States producers had for many years almost invariably been the same in every given locality in the country. There was also considerable testimony by other economic experts that the multiple basing point system of delivered prices as employed by respondents contravened accepted economic principles and could only have been maintained through collusion. The Commission did not adopt the views of the economists produced by the respondents. It decided that even though competition might tend to drive the price of standardized products to a uniform level, such a tendency alone could not account for the almost perfect identity in prices, discounts, and cement containers which had prevailed for so long a time in the cement industry. The Commission held that the uniformity and absence of competition in the industry were the results of understandings or agreements entered into or carried out by concert of the Institute and the other respondents. It </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 716] </s> may possibly be true, as respondents' economists testified, that cement producers will, without agreement express or implied and without understanding explicit or tacit, always and at all times (for such has been substantially the case here) charge for their cement precisely, to the fractional part of a penny, the price their competitors charge. Certainly it runs counter to what many people have believed, namely, that without agreement, prices will vary-that the desire to sell will sometimes be so strong that a seller will be willing to lower his prices and take his chances. We therefore hold that the Commission was not compelled to accept the views of respondents' economist-witnesses that active competition was bound to produce uniform cement prices. The Commission was authorized to find understanding, express or implied, from evidence that the industry's Institute actively worked, in cooperation with various of its members, to maintain the multiple basing point delivered price system; that this pricing system is calculated to produce, and has produced, uniform prices and terms of sale throughout the country; and that all of the respondents have sold their cement substantially in accord with the pattern required by the multiple basing point system. 17 </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 717] </s> Some of the respondn ts contend that particularly as to them crucial findings of participation by them in collective action to eliminate price competition and to bring about uniformity of cement prices are without testimonial support. On this ground they seek to have the proceedings dismissed as to them even though there may be adequate evidence to sustain the Commission's findings and order as to other respondents. The Commission rejected their contentions; the Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider them in its opinion. Those respondents whose individual contentions in this respect deserve special mention are central and southern California cement companies; Superior Portland Cement Company and Northwestern Portland Cement Company, both of the State of Washington; Huron Portland Cement Company, which does business in the Great Lakes region; and Marquette Cement Manufacturing Company with plants in Illinois and Missouri. These companies support their separate contentions for particularized consideration by pointing out among other things that there was record evidence which showed differences between many of their sales methods and those practiced by other respondents. Each says that there was no direct evidence to connect it with all of the practices found to have been used by the Institute and other respondents to achieve delivered price uniformity. The record does show such differences as those suggested. It is correct to say, therefore, that the sales practices of these particular respondents, and perhaps </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 718] </s> of other respondents as well, were not at all times precisely like the sales practices of all or any of the others. For example, the Commission found that in 1929 all of the central California mills became basing points. There was evidence that the Institute's rate books did not extend to the states in which some of the California companies did business. The Commission found that 'In Southern California the basing point system of pricing is modified by an elaborate system of zone prices applicable in certain areas,' that the California system does not require separate calculations to determine the delivered price at each destination, but that complete price lists were published by the companies showing delivered prices at substantially all delivery points. Northwestern and Superior assert that among other distinctive practices of theirs, they were willing to and did bid for government contracts on a mill price rather than a delivered price basis. Huron points out that it permitted the use of trucks to deliver cement, which practice, far from being consistent with the plan of others to maintain the basing point delivered price formulas, was frowned on by the Institute and others as endangering the success of the plan. Marquette emphasizes that it did not follow all the practices used to carry out the anticompetition plan, and urges that although the Commission rightly found that it had upon occasion undercut its competitors, it erroneously found that its admitted abandonment of price cutting was due to the combined pressure of other respondents, including the Institute. What these particular respondents emphasize does serve to underscore certain findings which show that some respondents were more active and influential in the combination than were others,18 and that some companies </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 719] </s> probably unwillingly abandoned competitive practices and entered into the combination. But none of the distinctions mentioned, or any other differences relied on by these particular respondents, justifies a holding that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings that they cooperated with all the others to achieve the ultimate objective of all-the elimination of price competition in the sale of cement. These respondents' special contentions only illustrate that the Commission was called upon to resolve factual issues as to each of them in the light of whatever relevant differences in their practices were shown by the evidence. For aside from the testimony indicating the differencs in their individual sales practices, there was abundant evidence as to common practices of these respondents and the others on the basis of which the Commission was justified in finding cooperative conduct among all to achieve delivered price uniformity. The evidence commonly applicable to these and the other respondents showed that all were members of the Institute and that the officers of some of these particular respondents were or had been officers of the Institute. We have already sustained findings that the Institute was organized to maintain the multiple basing point system as one of the 'customs and usages' of the industry and that it participated in numerous activities intended to eliminate price competition through the collective efforts of the respondents. Evidence before the Commission also showed that the delivered prices of these respondents, like those of all the other respondents, were, with rare exceptions, identical with the delivered prices of all their competitors. Furthermore, there was evi- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 720] </s> dence that all of these respondents, including those who sold cement on a zone basis in sections of southern California, employed the mutiple basing point delivered price system on a portion of their sales. Our conclusion is that there was evidence to support the Commission's findings that all of the respondents, including the California companies, Northwestern Portland and Superior Portland, Huron and Marquette, cooperated in carrying out the objectives of the basing point delivered price system. Unfair Methods of Competition.-We sustain the Commission's holding that concerted maintenance of the basing point delivered price system is an unfair method of competition prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. In so doing we give great weight to the Commission's conclusion, as this Court has done in other cases. Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 , 427; Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 63 , 258. In the Keppel case the Court called attention to the express intention of Congress to create an agency whose membership would at all times be experienced, so that its conclusions would be the result of an expertness coming from experience. We are persuaded that the Commission's long and close examination of the questions it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of its statutory duty. The kind of specialized knowledge Congress wanted its agency to have was an expertness that would fit it to stop at the threshold every unfair trade practice- that kind of practice, which if left alone, 'destroys competition and establishes monopoly.' Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 , 650, 591, 79 A.L.R. 1191. And see Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 , 968. We cannot say that the Commission is wrong in concluding that the delivered-price system as here used pro- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 721] </s> vides an effective instrument which, if left free for use of the respondents, would result in complete destruction of competition and the establishment of monopoly in the cement industry. That the basing point price system may lend itself to industry-wide anti-competitive practices is illustrated in the following among other cases: United States v. United States Gypsum Co. et al., 333 U.S. 364 , Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 . We uphold the Commission's conclusio that the basing point delivered price system employed by respondents is an unfair trade practice which the Trade Commission may suppress. 19 </s> The Price Discrimination Charge in Count Two.-The Commission found that respondents' combination to use the multiple basing point delivered price system had effected systematic price discrimination in violation of 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13, 15 U.S.C.A. 13. Section 2(a) of that Act declares it to 'be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce * * * either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality * * * where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them * * *' Section 2(b) provides that proof of discrimination in price ( selling the same kind of goods cheaper to one purchaser than to another), makes out a prima facie case of violation, but permits the seller to </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 722] </s> rebut 'the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price * * * was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor * * *.' The Commission held that the varying mill nets received by respondents on sales between customers in different localities constituted a 'discrimination in price between different purchasers' within the prohibition of 2(a), and that the effect of this discrimination was the substantial lessening of competition between respondents. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Commission on this count. It agreed that respondents' prices were unlawful insofar as they involved the collection of phantom freight, but it held that prices involving only freight absorption came within the 'good faith' proviso of 2(b). The respondents contend that the differences in their net returns from sales in different localities which result from use of the multiple basing point delivered price system are not price discriminations within the meaning of 2(a). If held that these net return differences are price discriminations prohibited by 2(a), they contend that the discriminations were justified under 2(b) because 'made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.' Practically all the arguments presented by respondents in support of their contentions were considered by this Court and rejected in 1945 in Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726 , and in the related case of Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 . As stated in the Corn Products opinion at page 730, of 324 U.S., at page 963 of 65 S.Ct., certiorari was granted in those two cases because the 'questions involved' were 'of importance in the administration of the Clayton Act in view of the widespread use of basing point price systems.' For this reason the questions there raised were given thorough consideration. Consequently, we see no reason for again reviewing the questions that were there decided. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 723] </s> In the Corn Products case the Court, in holding illegal a single basing point system, specifically reserved decision upon the legality under the Clayton Act of a multiple basing point price system, but only in view of the 'good faith' proviso of 2(b), and referred at that point to the companion Staley opinion. 324 U.S. at page 735, 65 S.Ct. at page 966. The latter case held thata seller could not justify the adoption of a competitor's basing point price system under 2(b) as a good faith attempt to meet the latter's equally low price. Thus the combined effect of the two cases was to forbid the adoption for sales purposes of any basing point pricing system. It is true that the Commission's complaint in the Corn Products and Staley cases simply charged the individual respondents with discrimination in price through use of a basing point price system, and did not, as here, allege a conspiracy or combination to use that system. But the holdings in those two cases that 2 forbids a basing point price system are equally controlling here, where the use of such a system is found to have been the result of a combination. Respondents deny, however, that the Corn Products and Staley cases passed on the questions they here urge. Corn Products Co. was engaged in the manufacture and sale of glucose. It had two plants, one in Chicago, one in Kansas City. Both plants sold 'only at delivered prices, computed by adding to a base price at Chicago the published freight tariff from Chicago to the several points of delivery, even though deliveries are in fact made from their factory at Kansas City as well as from their Chicago factory.' 324 U.S. at page 729, 65 S.Ct. at page 963. This price system we held resulted in Corn Products Co. receiving from different purchasers different net amounts corresponding to differences in the amounts of phantom freight collected or of actual freight charges absorbed. We further held that 'price discriminations are necessarily involved where </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 724] </s> the price basing point is distant from the point of production,' because in such situations prices 'usually include an item of unearned of phantom freight or require the absorption of freight with the consequent variations in the seller's net factory prices. Since such freight differentials bear no relation to the actual cost of delivery, they are systematic discriminations prohibited by 2(a), whenever they have the defined effect upon competition.' Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., supra, at pages 750, 751 of 324 U.S., at page 973 of 65 S.Ct.. This was a direct holding that a pricing system involving both phantom freight and freight absorption violates 2(a) if under that system prices are computed for products actually shipped from one locality on the fiction that they were shipped from another. This Court made the holding despite arguments, which are now repeated here, that in passing the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress manifested its purpose to sanction such pricing systems; that this Court had approved the system in Maple Flooring Mfrs' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 , and in Cement Mfrs' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 S. Ct. 592; and that there was no discrimination under this system between buyers at the same point of delivery. Respondents attempt to distinguish their multiple basing point pricing system from those previously held unlawful by pointing out that in some situations their system involves neither phantom freight nor freight absorption, and that is correct; for example, sales by a base mill at its base price plus actual freight from the mill to the point of delivery involve neither phantom freight nor freight absorption. But the Corn Products pricing system which was condemned by this Court related to a base mill, that at Chicago, as well as to a non-base mill, at Kansas City. The Court did not permit this fact to relieve the pricing system from application of 2, or to require any modification of the Commission's order. So here, we could </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 725] </s> not require the Commission to attempt to distinguish between sales made by a base mill involving actual freight costs and all other sales made by both base and non-base mills, when all mills adhere to a common pricing system. Section 2(b) permits a single company to sell one customer at a lower price than it sells to another i the price is 'made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.' But this does not mean that 2(b) permits a seller to use a sales system which constantly results in his getting more money for like goods from some customers than he does from others. We held to the contrary in the Staley case. There we said that the Act 'speaks only of the seller's 'lower' price and of that only to the extent that it is made 'in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.' The Act thus places emphasis on individual competitive situations, rather than upon a general system of competition.' Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., supra, at page 753 of 324 U.S., at page 975 of 65 S.Ct.. Each of the respondents, whether all its mills were basing points or not, sold some cement at prices determined by the basing point formula and governed by other base mills. Thus, all respondents to this extent adopted a discriminatory pricing system condemned by 2. As this in itself was evidence of the employment of the multiple basing point system by the respondents as a practice rather than as a good faith effort to meet 'individual competitive situations,' we think the Federal Trade Commission correctly concluded that the use of this cement basing point system violated the Act. Nor can we discern under these circumstances any distinction between the 'good faith' proviso as applied to a situation involving only phantom freight and one involving only freight absorption. Neither comes within its terms. We hold that the Commission properly concluded that respondents' pricing system results in price discrimina- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 726] </s> tions. Its findings that the discriminations substantially lessened competition between respondents and that they were not made in good faith to meet a competitor's price are supported by evidence. Accordingly, the Commission was justified in issuing a cease and desist order against a continuation of the unlawful discriminatory pricing system. The Order.-There are several objections to the Commission's cease and desist order. We consider the objections, having in mind that the language of its prohibitions should be clear and precise in order that they may be understood by those against whom they are directed. See Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thomson, 318 U.S. 675, 685 , 839. But we also have in mind that the Commission has a wide discretion generally in the choice of remedies to cope with trade problems entrusted to it by the Commission Act. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608 , 611-613, 759, 760. There is a special reason, however, why courts should not lightly modify the Commission's orders made in efforts to safeguard a competitive economy. Congress when it passed the Trade Commission Act felt that courts needed the assistance of men trained to combat monopolistic practices in the framing of judicial decrees in antitrust litigation. Congress envisioned a commission trained in this type of work by experience in carrying out the functions imposed upon it. 20 To this end it provided in 7 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 47, 15 U.S.C.A. 47, that courts might, if it should be concluded that the Government was entitled to </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 727] </s> a decree in an antitrust case, refer that case 'to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree therein.' The Court could then adopt or reject such a report. In the present proceeding the Commission has exhibited the familiarity with the competitive problems before it which Congress originally anticipated the Commission would achieve from its experience. The order it has prepared is we think clear and comprehensive. At the same time the prohibitions in the order forbid no activities except those which if continued would directly aid in perpetuating the same old unlawful practices. Nor do we find merit to the charges of surplusage in the order's terms. Most of the objections to the order appear to rest on the premise that its terms will bar an individual cement producer from selling cement at delivered prices such that its net return from one customer will be less than from another, even if the particular sale be made in good faith to meet the lower price of a competitor. The Commission disclaims that the order can possibly be so understood. Nor do we so understand it. As we read the order, all of its separate prohibiting paragraphs and sub- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 728] </s> paragraphs, which need not here be set out, are modified and limited by a preamble. This preamble directs that all of the respondents 'do forthwith cease and desist from entering into, continuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding or agreement, combination or conspiracy, between and among any two or more of said respondents, or between any one or more of said respondents and others not parties hereto, to do or perform any of the following things . * * *' Then follow the prohibitory sentences. It is thus apparent that the order by its terms is directed solely at concerted, not individual activity on the part of the respondents. Respondents have objected to the phrase 'planned common course of action' in the preamble. The objection is two-fold; first, that it adds nothing to the words that immediately follow it; and second, that if it does add anything, 'the Commission should be required to state what this novel phrase means in this order and what it adds to the four words.' It seems quite clear to us what the phrase means. It is merely an emphatic statement that the Commission is prohibiting concerted action-planned concerted action. The Commission chose a phrase perhaps more readily understood by businessmen than the accompanying legal words of like import. Then there is objection to that phrase in the preamble which would prevent respondents, or any of them, from doing the prohibited things with 'others not parties hereto.' We see no merit in this objection. The Commission has found that the cement producers have from time to time secured the aid of others outside the industry who are not parties to this proceeding in carrying out their program for preserving the basing point pricing system as an instrument to suppress competition. Moreover, there will very likely be changes in the present </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 729] </s> ownership of cement mills, and the construction of new mills in the future may be reasonably anticipated. In view of these facts, the Commission was authorized to make its order broad enough effectively to restrain respondents from combining with others as well as among themselves. One other specific objection to the order will be noted. Paragraph 1 prohibits respondents from 'quoting or selling cement pursuant to or in accordance with any other plan or system which results in identical price u otations or prices for cement at points of quotation or sale or to particular purchasers by respondents using such plan or system, or which prevents purchasers from finding any advantage in price in dealing with one or more of the respondents against any of the other respondents.' This paragraph like all the others in the order is limited by the preamble which refers to concerted conduct in accordance with agreement or planned common course of action. The paragraph is merely designed to forbid respondents from acting in harmony to bring about national uniformity in whatever fashion they may seek by collective action to achieve that result. We think that no one would find ambiguity in this language who concluded in good faith to abandon the old practices. There is little difference in effect between paragraph 1 to which objection is here raised and paragraph 5 which was sustained as proper in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 1922, 257 U.S. 441, 456 , 19 A.L.R. 882, one of the first Trade Commission cases to come before this Court. Paragraph 5 in the Beech-Nut case read: '* * * by utilizing any other equivalent co-operative means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company.' Many other arguments have been presented by respondents. All have been examined, but we find them without merit. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 730] </s> The Commission's order should not have been set aside by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Its judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enforce the order. It is so ordered. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Mr. Justice BURTON, dissenting. While this dissent is written with special reference to case No. 23 against The Cement Institute, et al., its conclusions apply to cases Nos. 23-34, all of which were considered together. It is important to note that this Court has disagreed with the conclusions of the court below as to the material facts constituting the premise on which that court and this have based their respective conclusions. Accordingly, this Court has neither reversed nor directly passed upon the principal conclusion of law reached by the court below. The court below concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding by the Federal Trade Commission of the existence of that combination among the respondents to restrain the competition in price that was charged in both counts of the complaint. 1 </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 731] </s> The court below even doubted that the Commission had clearly stated that it found such a combination existed. However, rather than send the case back to the Commission for clarification of the Commission's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals assumed that those findings did state that such a combination existed. The court then concluded that, even if the Commission had so found, there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding. 2 Accordingly, the court below applied the law of the case to a set of facts that did not include such a combination. On that basis, it held that the Commission's order to cease and desist should be set aside. I agree with the court below in both of these conclusions. 3 On the other hand, this Court today has held not only </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 732] </s> that the Commission found the existence of the combination as charged, but that such finding is sufficiently supported by evidence in the record. This Court accordingly has applied the law of the case to a set of facts which includes a combination among the respondents to restrain competition in price as alleged in the complaint. The resulting effect is that, while the court below has held that without such a combination there was not the alleged violation either of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act4 or of 2 of the amended Clayton Act,5 yet on the other hand, this Court has held that, in- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 733] </s> cluding such a combination, there was a violation of each of those Sections to h e extent charged in the several cases. This Court, therefore, has not here determined the relation, if any, of either of the foregoing statutes to the absorption of freight charges by individuals when not participating in a combination of the kind charged by the Commission. 6 </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 734] </s> The Commission based its conclusion upon its finding of the existence of the combination charged in its com- </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 735] </s> plaint. 7 The court below was in a position to, and did, judicially examine the record at length, hear extended argument upon it and pass upon the many inferences to be drawn from the evidence it contained. In the light of that court's recent experience with many cases in this particular field of the law, and of what it has described as its 'long and careful study of the situation,' it concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of the combination charged. Its opinion reviewed the evidence and pointed out many weaknesses in the inferences upon which the Commission had based its </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 736] </s> finding of the existence of the alleged unlawful combination. 8 </s> The absence of sufficient evidence to support the conclusions of the Commission was especially impressive in the cases concerning the central California group, the southern California group, the Washington-Oregon group9 and the Huron Portland Cement Company. The </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 737] </s> decision of the Commission and of this Court even in those cases was made dependent upon the conclusion of the existence of a combination, however attenuated the basis for that conclusion might be. 10 The cease and desist orders in all of these cases are therefore to be regarded as based upon the unique and extended record presented in this case, including what this Court refers to as 'abundant evidence as to common practices of these respondents and the others on the basis of which the Commission was justified in finding cooperative conduct among all to achieve delivered price uniformity.' On the view of the evidence taken by the court below and by me, that evidence does not support the Commission's finding of the combination as charged. Unlike the Commission and the majority of this Court, the lower court and I, therefore, have faced the further issue presented by the Commission's charges unsupported by a finding of the alleged combination. This has led us to consider an issue quite different from that decided by this Court today. That issue lies within the long-established and widespread practice by individuals of bona fide competition by freight absorption with which practice Congress has declined to interfere, although asked </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 738] </s> to do so.11 This is the field where a producer, for his own purposes and without collusion, often ships his product to a customer who, in terms of freight charges, is </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 739] </s> located nearer to one or more of the producer's competitors than to the producer himself. In selling to such a customer, this producer is at an obvious freight disadvantage. To meet the lower delivered-price of his competitor, the producer, therefore, reduces his delivered-price in that area by a sum sufficient to absorb his freight disadvantage. He might do this for many reasons. For example, this customer might be such a large customer that the volume of his orders would yield such a return to the producer that the producer, by distributing his fixedc harges over the resultingly increased volume of business, could absorb the freight differential without loss of profit to his business as a whole and without raising any charges to his other customers. The securing of this particular business might even enable the producer to reduce his own basic factory price to all his customers. It might make the difference between a profitable and a losing business, resulting in the producer's solvency or bankruptcy. If the advantage to be derived from this customer's business were not sufficient, in itself, thus completely to absorb the freight differential, the producer might absorb all or part of such differential by a reduction in his net earnings without affecting his other customers. Whether or not he would be justified in absorbing any or all of this freight differential by increasing his charges to other customers, in his own freight-advantage area, raises a separate question as to the validity of such an increase. The Commission and the majority of this Court did not reach the question of individual and independent absorptions of freight charges by one or more producers to meet lower prices of competitors in such competitors' respective areas of freight advantage. </s> [333 U.S. 683 , 740] </s> I conclude, therefore, that the judgment f the Court of Appeals setting aside the order of the Federal Trade Commission should have been affirmed, but I emphasize what I regard as equally important-that this Court, in sustaining the order of the Commission, has done so on such a different premise that it has not passed upon the validity of freight absorptions made in sales by one or more producers in the course of bona fide competition, where such producers have not acted as part of a combination to hinder, lessen, restrain or suppress competition in the sale or distribution of the products so sold. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The Commission dismissed the proceedings without prejudice against respondent Castalia Portland Cement Co., which went into bankruptcy. [Footnote 2 Respondent Valley Forge Cement Co. is associated with the Institute only by reason of its affiliation with a member company. </s> [Footnote 3 Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310 , 425; Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 , 650, 590, 591, 79 A.L.R. 1191; see also United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 and see Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 142 F.2d 321, 326, 327, and cases there cited, among the numerous Circuit Courts of Appeals cases on the same subject. [Footnote 4 'The Commission had issued up to October 1939, a total of 267 orders to cease and desist in cases involving cooperation, conspiracy, or combination.' Beer, Federal Trade Law and Practice, 94 (1942). Other writers have also commented on the recognition by the Commission and courts that unfair methods of competition include violations of the Sherman Act. Handler, Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission, 8 G.W.L.Rev., 399, 416, 417, 419. Montague, The Commission's Jurisdiction Over Practices in Restraint of Trade: A Large-scale Method of Mass Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 8 G.W.L.Rev. 365; Miller, Unfair Competition, Chapter XI (1941); Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission, a Study in Administrative Law and Procedure, 22Ä28 (1924); Beer, Federal Trade Law and Practice, 93 et seq. (1942). </s> [Footnote 5 Section 7 of the Act empowered the Commission, upon the request of the district courts, to serve as a master in chancery in framing appropriate decrees in antitrust suits brought by the attorney general. Section 6(c) authorized the Commission to investigate compliance with antitrust decrees upon application of the Attorney General and to report its findings and recommendations to him. 38 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. 47, 46( c), 15 U.S.C.A. 47, 46(c). [Footnote 6 51 Cong.Rec. 11083, 11104, 11528Ä11533, 12146, 12622Ä12623, 12733Ä 12734, 12787, 13311Ä131 2, 14251, 14460, 14926, 14929; H.R.Rep.No.533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 6 (1914); H.R.Rep.No.1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 18Ä19 ( 1914); Sen.Rep.No.597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 12Ä13 (1914). </s> [Footnote 7 See Ramsay Co. v. Bill Posters Ass'n, 260 U.S. 501, 511 , 168; Stevens Co. v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 311 U.S. 255 , 260, 261, 212, 213; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 , 297, 298, 663, 664. </s> [Footnote 8 This was not true as to steel produced and shipped from Birmingham, Alabama. Under the system Birmingham steel had to be sold at the Pittsburgh price plus an arbitrary addition of $5 per ton. There were also other minor variations from the system as here described. See United States Steel Corp. et al., 8 F.T.C. 1. </s> [Footnote 9 A base mill selling cement for delivery at a point outside the area in which its base price governs, and inside the area where another base mill's lower delivered price governs, adopts the latter's lower delivered price. The first base mill thus absorbs freight and becomes as to such sales a non-base mill. [Footnote 10 The Commission in its findings explained how the multiple basing point system affects a seller's net return on sales in different localities and how the delivered price is determined at any particular point. 'Substantially all sales of cement by the corporate respondents are made on the basis of a delivered price; that is, at a price determined by the location at which actual delivery of the cement is made to the purchaser. In determining the delivered price which will be charged for cement at any given location, respondents use a mut iple basing-point system. The formula used to make this system operative is that the delivered price at any location shall be the lowest combination of base price plus all-rail freight. Thus, if Mill A has a base price of $1.50 per barrel, its delivered price at each location where it sells cement will be $ 1.50 per barrel plus the all-rail freight from its mill to the point of delivery, except that when a sale is made for delivery at a location at which the combination of the base price plus all-rail freight from another mill is a lower figure, Mill A uses this lower combination so that its delivered price at such location will be the same as the delivered price of the other mill. At all locations where the base price of Mill A plus freight is the lowest combination, Mill A recovers $1.50 net at the mill, and at locations where the combination of base price plus freight of another mill is lower, Mill A shrinks its mill net sufficiently to equal that price. Under these conditions it is obvious that the highest mill net which can be recovered by Mill A is $1.50 per barrel, and on sales where it has been necessary to shrink its mill net in order to match the delivered price of another mill, its net recovery at the mill is less than $ 1.50.' 37 F.T.C. at 147Ä148. </s> [Footnote 11 Marquette in support of its motion to disqualify the Commission urged that the Department of Justice and the Commission had concurrent power or jurisdiction to enforce the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 147 F.2d at page 593. </s> [Footnote 12 'Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs.' The Commission is not a court. It can render no judgment, civil or criminal. Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 , 3, 68 A.L.R. 838; and see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 , 874; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 307 , 51. </s> [Footnote 13 We need not here determine what protection was afforded respondents by the exemption from the antitrust laws conferred by the Act later held unconstitutional. Nor need we decide whether this provision also exempted respondents from the unfair methods of competition provisions of the Trade Commission Act. The Government does not press either contention here. </s> [Footnote 14 Paragraph 26 of the Findings is as follows: 'The Commission concludes from the evidence of record and therefore finds that the capacity, tendency, and effect of the combination maintained by the respondents herein in the manner aforesaid and the acts and practices performed thereunder and in connection therewith by said respondents, as set out herein, has been and is to hinder, lessen, restrain, and suppress competition in the sale and distribution of cement in, among, and between the several States of the United States; to deprive purchasers of cement, both private and governmental of the benefits of competition in price; to systematically maintain artificial and monopolistic methods and prices in the sale and distributo n of cement, including common rate factors used and useful in the pricing of cement; to prevent purchasers from utilizing motor trucks or water carriers for the transportation of cement and from obtaining benefits which might accrue from the use of such transportation agencies; to require that purchases of cement be made on a delivered price basis, and to prevent and defeat efforts of purchasers to avoid this requirement; frequently to deprive agencies of the Federal Government of the benefits of all or a part of the lower landgrant rates available to such purchasers; to require certain agencies of the Federal Government to purchase their requirements of cement through dealers at higher prices than are available in direct purchases from manufacturers; to establish and maintain an agreed classification of customers who may purchase cement from manufacturers thereof; to maintain uniform terms and conditions of sale; to hinder and obstruct the sale of imported cement through restraints upon those who deal in such cement; and otherwise to promote and maintain their multiple basing-point delivered-price system and obstruct and defeat any form of competition which threatens or tends to threaten the continued use and maintenance of said system and the uniformity of prices created and maintained by its use.' 37 F.T.C. 257Ä258. </s> [Footnote 15 The following is one among many of the Commission's findings as to the identity of sealed bids: An abstract of the bids for 6,000 barrels of cement to the United States Engineer Office at Tucumcari, New Mexico, opened April 23, 1936, shows the following: Name of Price Name of Price Bidder per Bbl. Bidder per Bbl. Monarch $3.286854 Oklahoma $3.286854 Ash Grove 3.286854 Consolidated 3.286854 Lehigh 3.286854 Trinity 3.286854 Southwestern 3.286854 Lone Star 3.286854 U. S. Portland Cement Co. 3.286854 Universal 3.286854 Colorado 3.286854 All bids subject to 10 per barrel discount for payment in 15 days. ( Com.Ex. 175-A.) See 157 F.2d at page 576. </s> [Footnote 16 See Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 , 643: 'The fact that because sugar is a standardized commodity, there is a strong tendency to uniformity of price, makes it the more important that such opportunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired.' </s> [Footnote 17 It is enough to warrant a finding of a 'combination' within the meaning of the Sherman Act, if there is evidence that persons, with knowledge that concerted action was contemplated and invited, give adherence to and then participate in a scheme. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 , 226, 227, 474; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 , 1076; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707 , 722, 723, 813; United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393 , 394; . See United States Maltsters Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 152 F.2d 161, 164: 'We are of the view that the Commission's findings that a price fixing agreement existed must be accepted. Any other conclusion would do violence to common sense and the realities of the situation. The fact that petitioners utilized a system which enabled them to deliver malt at every point of destination at exactly the same price is a persuasive circumstance in itself. Especially is this so when it is considered that petitioners' plants are located in four different states and that the barley from which the malt is manufactured is procured from eight or nine different states.' See also Milk & Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 152 F. 2d 478, 481; Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 156 F.2d 899, 907. </s> [Footnote 18 For example, there was evidence which showed that Huron's officials participated in meetings held in connection with another respondent's practices deemed inimical to the policy of non-competition. As a result of that meeting the offending company agreed that it would 'play the game 100%'; that it would not countenance 'chiseling'; that it would not knowingly invade territory of its competitors, or 'tear down the price structure.' </s> [Footnote 19 While we hold that the Commission's findings of combination were supported by evidence, that does not mean that existence of a 'combination' is an indispensable ingredient of an 'unfair method of competition' under the Trade Commission Act. See Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 , 155, 19 A.L.R. 882. </s> [Footnote 20 In speaking of the authority granted the Commission to aid the courts in drafting antitrust decrees, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce said: 'These powers, partly administrative and partly quasi judicial, are of great importance and will bring both to the Attorney General and to the court the aid of special expert experience and training in matters regarding which neither the Department of Justice nor the courts can be expected to be proficient. </s> 'With the exception of the Knight case (United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 ), the Supreme Court has never failed to condemn and to break up any organization formed in violation of the Sherman law which has been brought to its attention; but the decrees of the court, while declaring the law satisfactorily as to the dissolution of the combinations, have apparently failed in many instances in their accomplishment simply because the courts and the Department of Justice have lacked the expert knowledge and experience necessary to be applied to the dissolution of the combinations and the reassembling of the divided elements in harmony with the spirit of the law.' Sen.Rep.No.597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1914). </s> [Footnote 1 '* * * For more than eight years last past, respondents have maintained and now have in effect a combination among themselves to hinder, lessen, restrict and restrain competition in price, among producing respondents in the course of their aforesaid commerce among the states. The said combination is made effective by mutual understanding or agreement to employ, and by the actual employment of, the methods and practices set forth in Paragraphs Five to Seven inclusive, of this Count.' Count I, Paragraph Four, of complaint. '* * * As Paragraphs One to Five, inclusive, of Count II of this complaint the Commission hereby incorporates Paragraphs One to Five, inclusive, of Count I to precisely the same extent as if each and all of them were set forth in full and repeated verbatim in this Count.' Count II, Paragraphs One to Five, inclusive, of complaint. 37 F.T.C. at pp. 102, 117. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals considered it a 'highly controverted issue' as to whether the findings as made by the Commission, even if supported by sufficient evidence in the record, would 'sustain the charge of combination alleged in the complaint.' 157 F.2d 533, 543. That court then said that ifÄ'this were an ordinary proceeding we would return it to the Commission for the purpose of revising its findings if it could and so desired in the light of what we have said. However, we are confronted with what might be termed an extraordinary situation. As already observed, it will soon be ten years since this proceeding was initiated. * * * We think the case should be on its way up and not down. For this reason we shall not return it to the Commission but shall proceed to decide the legal issues involved.' Id., 157 F.2d at page 553. [Footnote 3 The law of the case represents a development of the law in relation to delivered-price systems. See especially, Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 ; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726 ; Sugar Institute, Inc., v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 ; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 52 A.L.R. 163; Cement Mfrs' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 ; Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 ; Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 157 F.2d 533 (this case below); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 156 F.2d 899; United States Maltsters Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 152 F.2d 161. </s> [Footnote 4 'Sec. 5. (a) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 'The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, * * * from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. </s> '(b) Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed * * *. If upon such hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by this Act, it shall make a e port in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts and shall issue and cause to be served on such person, partnership, or corporation an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or practice. * * *' </s> [Footnote 52 Stat. 111, 112, 15 U.S.C. 45, 15 U.S.C.A. 45. [Footnote 5 Sec. 2. (a) * * * It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, * * * where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing contained shall prevent diferentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered: * * * '(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.' </s> [Footnote 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13, 15 U.S.C.A. 13. </s> [Footnote 6 The final section of the opinion of the Court makes appropriate disclaimers as to the breadth of the Commission's order and of its own decision sustaining that order. Among these is the statement that 'the order by its terms is directed solely at concerted, not individual activity on the part of the respondents.' These disclaimers are further supported by such statements as the following in the brief filed for the Commission in this Court: 'It is plain that under this order there is a violation of its provisions only in the event that there is a 'planned common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy' to which a respondent is a party to do something specified in the numbered paragraphs of the order. This is an essential qualification of the prohibitions of these paragraphs. The order therefore leaves each respondent freeÄprovided he acts individually and with that variability in action respecting particular competitive situations which is characteristic of genuine competitive endeavor and a free marketÄto absorb freight in order to meet a competitor's low price or to sell at a delivered price. </s> 'What the order does is to bar acting in concert in adopting, continuing, or implementing the multiple basing-point delivered-price system or any similar system which necessarily operates to suppress price competition. The order is aimed at uprooting the pricing system which has flourished by virtue of the agreement among respondents, charged and found, to stifle price competition by selling cement at identical prices. </s> 'The error of the court below is epitomized in its statement that 'this court is now urged to hold that the (multiple basing-point delivered- priced) system is illegal per se, and to require that cement be sold on an f.o.b. plant basis' * * *. The system as such was not attacked; what was attacked was agreement to maintain and implement the system and to eliminate price competition. </s> '* * * Had the Commission inferred agreement from the system alone, it might loosely be said h at the system itself was attacked as illegal per se. But this is not what the Commission did. Its searching inquiry disclosed in specific detail the collective action which had been taken to implement and continue the system. And from all these facts, as well as the existence of the system, itself, the Commission found combination among respondents to suppress price competition.' </s> The statement by this Court, in its note 19, to the effect that the Court does not hold 'that existence of a 'combination' is an indispensable ingredient of an 'unfair method of competition' under the Trade Commission Act' is accompanied by a citation which shows that that statement is one of general application and that it is not intended as a denial that the combination found by the Commission in this case is not a highly material and possibly decisive factor in this particular case. </s> [Footnote 7 See Paragraph Twenty-six of the Commission's 'Findings as to Facts and Conclusion': '* * * The Commission concludes from the evidence of record and therefore finds that the capacity, tendency, and effect of the combination maintained by the respondents herein in the manner aforesaid and the acts and practices performed thereunder and in connection therewith by said respondents, as set out herein, has been and is to hinder, lessen, restrain, and suppress competition in the sale and distribution of cement in, among, and between the several States of the United States; to deprive purchasers of cement, both private and governmental, of the benefits of competition in price; to systematically maintain artificial and monopolistic methods and prices in the sale and distribution of cement, including common rate factors used and useful in the pricing of cement; * * *.' 37 F.T.C. p. 257. The Commission followed this Paragraph Twenty-six immediately with the following conclusion of law: 'The aforesaid combination and acts and practices of respondents pursuant thereto and in connection therewith, as hereinabove found, under the conditions and circumstances set forth, constitute unfair methods of competition in commerce within the intent and meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and the discriminations in price by respondents, as hereinabove set out, constitute violations of subsection (a) of Section 2 of an Act of Congress entitled 'An Act To supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes,' approved October 15, 1914 (the Clayton Act), as amended by Act approved June 19, 1936 (the Robinson- Patman Act).' Id., at p. 258. </s> [Footnote 8 A further review of the insufficiently supported inferences would be of little value here. By way of illustration, however, it may be noted that the Commission and this Court, in its note 15, have emphasized the fact that secret sealed bids for 6,000 barrels of cement were received by a public agency from ten or more of the respondent companies and that the bid of each company was precisely $3.286854 a barrel. Such a fractional identity of price would, on its face, create an inference of collusion. However, the Commission failed to explain, as has the court below, that the highly fractional figure merely reflected the freight charge. The bid, apart from the freight chag e, was $2.10 per barrel while 'the land grant freight rate to which the government was entitled from the nearest mill of the eleven bidders was $1.1865854 ($1.186854) per barrel.' Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 157 F.2d 533, 567. [Footnote 9 The central California group refers to the following respondents: Calaveras Cement Company, Pacific Portland Cement Company, Santa Cruz Portland Cement Company, Yosemite Portland Cement Corporation, The southern California group to: California Portland Cement Company, Monolith Portland Cement Company, Riverside Cement Company, Southwestern Portland Cement Company (Victorville, California, plant). The Washington-Oregon group to: Beaver Portland Cement Company, Lehigh Portland Cement Company (Metaline Falls, Washington, plant), Northwestern Portland Cement Company. Oregon Portland Cement Company, Spokane Portland Cement Company, Superior Portland Cement, Inc. </s> [Footnote 10 In a general finding the Commission indicated that the evidence concerning certain of the respondent companies was less conclusive than that relating to some of the other respondents. 'Some of the respondents have been parties to substantially all of these activities; other respondents have participated in a lesser degree, or fully or partially for shorter periods of time; other respondents have been mere followers, adopting and supporting the practices of their more active associates; and a few respondents have from time to time, for various reasons, participated only reluctantly in some of the practices, and have occasionally opposed for a time particular instances of group action.' Commission's 'Findings as to Facts and Conclusion.' Paragraph Six ( a). 37 F.T.C. at p. 144. </s> [Footnote 11 'Furthermore, the basing point price system has been in use by industry for almost a half century. There has been and is a marked diversity of opinion among economists, lawmakers and people generally as to whether it is good or bad. Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to outlaw its use. Countless time has been spent in hearings by Congressional committees, before whom it has been assailed and defended. The pages of the Congressional Record bear mute but indisputable proof of the fact that Congress has repeatedly refused to declare its use illegal. There is no occasion to relate this Congressional history. It is a matter of common and general knowledge. In the Corn Products case, the court in commenting upon some of this legislative history stated (324 U.S. at page 737, 65 S.Ct. at page 967): 'We think this legislative history indicates only that Congress was unwilling to require f.o.b. factory pricing, and thus to make all uniform delivered price systems and all basing point systems illegal per se.' Notwithstanding this Congressional attitude as recognized by the Supreme Court, this court is now urged to hold that the system is illegal per se, and to require that cement be sold on an f.o.b. plant basis. 'In our judgment, the question as to whether the basing point price system should be declared illegal rests clearly within the legislative domain. We know of no criticism so often and so forcibly directed at courts, particularly Federal courts, as their propensity for usurping the functions of Congress. If this pricing system which Congress has over the years steadfastly refused to declare illegal, although vigorously urged to do so is now to be outlawed by the courts, it will mark the high tide in judicial usurpation.' Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra, at page 573. </s> See 1 and 2, Sherman Antitrust Act, approved July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, 2; 5, Federal Trade Commission Act, approved September 26, 1914, 38 Stat. 719; 2, Clayton Act, approved October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730; 2, Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, approved June 19, 1936, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S. C. 13, 15 U.S.C.A. 13; 5, Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, March 21, 1938, 52 Stat. 111, 15 U.S.C. 45, 15 U.S.C.A. 45. See Bill 'To Prevent Unnecessary and Wasteful Cross-Hauling' introduced by Senator Wheeler in 1936 banning basing-point systems by statute, but not reported out of Committee. Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 4055, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), and see p. 325. See also, H.R.Rep. No.2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1936), and debates upon the Robinson- Patman Bill, 80 Cong.Rec. 8102, 8118, 8140, 8223Ä8224 (1936).

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. HEALY(1964) No. 64 Argued: January 6, 1964Decided: February 17, 1964 </s> 1. An indictment was dismissed by the District Court before trial based upon the construction of the statute upon which the indictment was founded. The Government filed notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of the petition for rehearing, but more than 30 days after the entry of the original judgment. Under Rule 11 (2) of this Court, a criminal appeal from a district court to this Court must be filed within 30 days after entry of "the judgment or order" appealed from, and appellees contended that the filing of a petition for rehearing without authorization by statute or rule cannot extend the time for appeal. Held: The timely filing of a petition for a rehearing in a criminal case, no less than in a civil case, renders the judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal until the court disposes of the petition, and in such an instance the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 11 (2) begins to run from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing. Pp. 77-80. </s> 2. Appellees were indicted under two counts for forcing at gunpoint the pilot of a private airplane to transport them from Florida to Cuba. One count, under 18 U.S.C. 1201, for kidnaping, was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the kidnaping was not "for ransom or reward or otherwise" unless committed for the pecuniary benefit of the defendant. Held: The statute, as Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 , plainly held, is not confined to kidnapings for pecuniary gain; nor need the underlying purpose for which the kidnaping is done be an illegal one in order for the statute to apply. Pp. 81-82. </s> 3. The other count, under 902 (i) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended in 1961, for "aircraft piracy," was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that a private airplane is not "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" within the meaning of the statute. Held: Both the language of the statute and its legislative history manifest congressional intent to include private aircraft within the scope of 902 (i). Pp. 83-85. </s> Reversed and remanded. [376 U.S. 75, 76] </s> Stephen J. Pollak argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Robert G. Maysack. </s> Robert L. Shevin argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were R. E. Kunkel and Alvin Goodman. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> A federal grand jury alleged in an indictment, returned in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, that on April 13, 1962, the appellees had kidnaped at gunpoint the pilot of a private Cessna 172 airplane and compelled him to transport them from Florida to Cuba. Count 1 of the indictment charged appellees with having violated 18 U.S.C. 1201, 1 the Federal Kidnaping Act. Under Count 2, appellees were charged with the commission of "aircraft piracy" in contravention of a 1961 amendment to 902 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 75 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1472 (i). 2 </s> The District Court dismissed the indictment on September 17, 1962, before trial. It held that a kidnaping is not "for ransom or reward or otherwise," as required by 1201 (a), unless committed for the pecuniary benefit of [376 U.S. 75, 77] the defendant and that a private airplane is not "an aircraft in flight in air commerce" within the meaning of the aircraft piracy provision, which it read as limited to commercial airliners. The Government's petition for rehearing, filed October 17, was denied on November 8. On December 5, the Government filed a notice of appeal to this Court under 18 U.S.C. 3731, permitting direct appeal when the dismissal of an indictment is based on construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. We noted probable jurisdiction, 372 U.S. 963 . We conclude that the judgment of dismissal must be reversed. </s> I. </s> Appellees contend that this Court is without jurisdiction and is thereby precluded from considering the case on its merits. They argue that, absent authorization by statute or rule, the filing of a petition for rehearing by the Government in a criminal case cannot extend the time for appeal. Rule 11 (2) of this Court provides: </s> "An appeal permitted by law from a district court to this court in a criminal case shall be in time when the notice of appeal prescribed by Rule 10 is filed with the clerk of the district court within thirty days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." </s> It is undisputed that the notice of appeal was filed by the United States within 30 days from the denial of the petition for rehearing, although not within 30 days of the original entry of judgment. Since the petition for rehearing was filed within 30 days of the judgment, we are not faced with an attempt to rejuvenate an extinguished right to appeal. Cf. Allegrucci v. United States, 372 U.S. 954 . The question, therefore, is simply whether in a criminal case a timely petition for rehearing by the Government filed within the permissible time for appeal [376 U.S. 75, 78] renders the judgment not final for purposes of appeal until the court disposes of the petition - in other words whether in such circumstances the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 11 (2) begins to run from the date of entry of judgment or the denial of the petition for rehearing. </s> The latter is the well-established rule in civil cases, whether brought here by appeal or certiorari, e. g., United States, v. Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524, 539 ; Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151, 153 -154; Bowman v. Loperena, 311 U.S. 262, 264 -266. That a rehearing petition, at least when filed within the original period for review, may also extend the time for filing a petition for certiorari by a criminal defendant is the unarticulated premise on which the Court has consistently proceeded. See, e. g., Panico v. United States, 375 U.S. 29 (order extending time for filing entered 19 days after denial of petition for rehearing en banc, 45 days after original judgment of Court of Appeals); Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 (petition for certiorari filed 30 days after denial of rehearing, 45 days after original judgment of Court of Appeals); Genovese v. United States, decided with Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (order extending time for filing entered 16 days after denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, 49 days after entry of original judgment). In Craig v. United States, 298 U.S. 637 , this Court dismissed an application for a writ of certiorari as premature, "without prejudice to a renewal of the application within thirty days after action by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the petition for rehearing." This summary disposition plainly reflects an advertent decision that criminal judgments are nonfinal for purposes of appeal so long as timely rehearing petitions are pending. </s> We have recently recognized the appropriateness of petitions for rehearing by the United States in criminal cases, Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 425 -426. [376 U.S. 75, 79] The practice of the Court has been to treat such petitions as having the same effect on the permissible time for seeking review as do similar petitions in civil cases and in criminal cases in which the Government has won below. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (appeal from dismissal of indictment by District Court; notice of appeal filed 29 days after denial of motion for rehearing, 44 days after entry of original order); United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 (appeal from dismissal of indictment by District Court; notice of appeal filed 28 days after denial of petition for rehearing, 109 days after entry of original order); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (petition for certiorari from Court of Appeals; order extending time for filing entered 28 days after denial of rehearing, 88 days after entry of original judgment). </s> Appellees place great reliance on the absence of any statute or rule governing the effect of rehearing petitions of the Government, but both the civil and criminal procedural doctrines lack such a foundation. The wording of Rule 11 (2) of this Court, as unilluminating on this issue as it may be standing alone, is virtually identical to that of Rule 22 (2), which encompasses petitions for certiorari both by criminal defendants and the Government. The inference is compelling that no difference in treatment is intended between appealable judgments and those reviewable by certiorari, or between criminal defendants and the United States. We are constrained to read these rules as consistent with a traditional and virtually unquestioned practice. </s> Rule 37 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 does not alter this conclusion, since it sheds no [376 U.S. 75, 80] light on the relevance of a petition for rehearing. Nor can the principle of strict construction of statutes permitting governmental appeals in criminal cases, Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 , be utilized to undermine a well-established procedural rule for criminal, as well as civil, litigation. No persuasive considerations of policy dictate a deviant standard for government appeals. </s> Of course speedy disposition of criminal cases is desirable, but to deprive the Government of the opportunity to petition a lower court for the correction of errors might, in some circumstances, actually prolong the process of litigation - since plenary consideration of a question of law here ordinarily consumes more time than disposition of a petition for rehearing - and could, in some cases, impose an added and unnecessary burden of adjudication upon this Court. 4 It would be senseless for this Court to pass on an issue while a motion for rehearing is pending below, and no significant saving of time would be achieved by altering the ordinary rule to the extent of compelling a notice of appeal to be filed while the petition for rehearing is under consideration. </s> We conclude that this appeal was timely filed and that the Court has jurisdiction to determine the case on its merits. [376 U.S. 75, 81] </s> II. </s> By interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1201 to require a motive of pecuniary profit, the District Court disregarded the plain holding of Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 , in which the defendant, who had seized and carried away a state peace officer attempting to effectuate his arrest, was held subject to prosecution under the statute. Prior to a 1934 amendment, the Federal Kidnaping Act had been applicable only if the person transported was held for ransom or reward. The wording was then changed to encompass persons held "for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof," 48 Stat. 781. (Emphasis added.) The Court in Gooch, noting the ambiguity of the word "reward," found convincing evidence in the amendment's legislative history that the addition of "otherwise" was intended to make clear that a nonpecuniary motive did not preclude prosecution under the statute. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which quoted from a memorandum of the Justice Department, and the House Judiciary Committee both had reported that the bill was designed to extend federal jurisdiction under the Act to cases of persons kidnaped and held "not only for reward, but for any other reason." 5 The Court's conclusion that the amended statute covered the facts before it was clearly in accord with the congressional purpose. </s> The Courts of Appeals have consistently followed Gooch, e. g., United States v. Parker, 103 F.2d 857; Brooks v. United States, 199 F.2d 336; Hayes v. United States, 296 F.2d 657, and appellees do not challenge the authority of that case. While recognizing that the [376 U.S. 75, 82] statute is not limited to kidnapings for pecuniary gain, they assert that it is restricted to kidnapings for an otherwise illegal purpose. This contention is without support in the language of the provision, its legislative history, judicial decisions, or reason. The wording certainly suggests no distinction based on the ultimate purpose of a kidnaping; were one intended, the exclusion of parent-child kidnapings would have been largely superfluous, since such conduct is rarely the result of an intrinsically illegal purpose. Nothing in the reports or debates supports appellees' position. In two cases, Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599, 600; Bearden v. United States, 304 F.2d 532 (judgment vacated on another ground, 372 U.S. 252 ), Courts of Appeals have assumed that the applicability of the statute does not turn on the illegality of the ultimate purpose of the kidnaper. No policy considerations support appellees' strained reading of 18 U.S.C. 1201. A murder committed to accelerate the accrual of one's rightful inheritance is hardly less heinous than one committed to facilitate a theft; by the same token, we find no compelling correlation between the propriety of the ultimate purpose sought to be furthered by a kidnaping and the undesirability of the act of kidnaping itself. Appellees rely on the principle of strict construction of penal statutes, 6 but that maxim is hardly a directive to this Court to invent distinctions neither reflective of the policy behind congressional enactments nor intimated by the words used to implement the legislative goal. 7 </s> [376 U.S. 75, 83] </s> We hold that the District Court improperly dismissed the first count of the indictment. </s> III. </s> The 1961 "aircraft piracy" amendment to the Federal Aviation Act makes it a federal crime, inter alia, to exercise control, by threat of force with wrongful intent, of "an aircraft in flight in air commerce," 902 (i), 75 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1472 (i). Examination of the provision itself and its relation to the rest of the statute, apart from reference to the legislative history, stands against the conclusion of the court below. The Cessna 172 was "an aircraft"; it was "in flight"; it was in flight "in air commerce." Appellees assert that had Congress intended to include private airplanes it could have referred to "any aircraft," but, standing alone, the phrase "an aircraft" is on its face an all-inclusive term. Appellees' contention that the statutory language refers only to commercial airlines is contradicted by the definition of air commerce in the original act, 101 of the Federal [376 U.S. 75, 84] Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1301: </s> "(4) `Air commerce' means interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any Federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce." </s> Without question, this definition covers the facts alleged in the indictment in this case. That the relation between the language of the "aircraft piracy" amendment and the above definition was not overlooked by the drafters is indicated by the different phraseology used in a contemporaneous amendment concerning concealed weapons. Section 902 (l) of the amended act, 75 Stat. 466, 49 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1472 (l), makes it a crime to carry such a weapon "while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air transportation." Thus Congress knew how to choose words to refer solely to commercial airliners when it wished to do so. </s> The conclusions drawn from the statute itself are confirmed by the legislative history. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce reported, H. R. Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., that the term "air commerce" was used by design because of its broad scope as defined in existing law, p. 8. It specifically cited "the urgent need for stronger Federal laws applicable to criminal acts committed aboard commercial and private aircraft," p. 3, and noted that the subsection regarding weapons "would be limited to aircraft being used in air carrier commercial operations, whereas these other subsections [including that relating to aircraft piracy] would apply also in the case of private aircraft," p. 15. [376 U.S. 75, 85] </s> Comments during House debate accord with the Committee's understanding, see remarks of Congressman Harris (107 Cong. Rec. 16545) and Congressman Williams (107 Cong. Rec. 16547-16548). The remarks of Senator Engle, the sponsor of the aircraft piracy provisions in the Senate, during debate are explicit: "Yes; it applies to all airplanes in air commerce, which includes, of course, not only commercial aircraft, but private airplanes as well." (107 Cong. Rec. 15243). The statements of members of Congress evincing a concern for the protection of passengers aboard commercial airlines, see, e. g., remarks of Congressman Rostenkowski (107 Cong. Rec. 16552), do not reflect any intent to put private aircraft beyond the scope of the provision. Indeed, since one of the often-expressed purposes of the aircraft piracy amendment was to provide a solution to the jurisdictional problems involved in fixing a locus for a crime committed in transit and in arresting a deplaning passenger who may have engaged in criminal activity over the territory of a different State, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3-5, one would suppose, absent any other evidence, a design to include private aircraft; these problems are as pertinent to acts committed aboard them as to those done on commercial airliners. Finding that the plainly expressed intent of Congress, as manifested both in the statutory language and legislative history, was to include private aircraft within the scope of 902 (i), we conclude that dismissal of the second count of the indictment was also incorrect. </s> The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to reinstate both counts of the indictment. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 "(1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as herein defined, shall be punished . . . . "(2) As used in this subsection, the term `aircraft piracy' means any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in air commerce." </s> [Footnote 3 "Time for Taking Appeal. An appeal by a defendant may be taken within 10 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from, but if a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment has been made within the 10-day period an appeal from a judgment of conviction may be taken within 10 days after entry of the order denying [376 U.S. 75, 80] the motion. When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant. An appeal by the government when authorized by statute may be taken within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." </s> [Footnote 4 In this case, the record and legal issues plainly indicate the good faith of the Government in petitioning for rehearing. We would, of course, not countenance the United States' using such petitions simply as a delaying tactic in criminal litigation; there is, however, not the slightest basis for believing that it would try to do so. </s> [Footnote 5 S. Rep. No. 534, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 20, 1934; H. R. Rep. No. 1457, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., May 3, 1934, p. 2. </s> [Footnote 6 Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 , which involved the transporting of a girl to maintain a "celestial" marriage, is inapposite. There the element of coercion or deception, central to the crime of kidnaping, was absent. </s> [Footnote 7 Our disposition of this issue relieves us from considering whether appellees' ultimate purpose was unlawful and, if so, whether illegality of purpose, if not obvious, is a necessary element in the [376 U.S. 75, 83] indictment. However, it may be observed that a trip to Cuba would have been lawful only if appellees had had passports specifically endorsed for travel to Cuba. See Presidential Proclamations No. 2914, Dec. 16, 1950 (64 Stat. A454); and No. 3004, Jan. 17, 1953 (67 Stat. C31); 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 190, 8 U.S.C. 1185; Department of State Public Notice 179, 26 Fed. Reg. 492, Jan. 16, 1961. Appellees, without claiming lawfulness of purpose, argue that the burden of showing that they had not complied with the regulations governing travel to Cuba rests with the United States and that noncompliance has to be specifically alleged in an indictment. The discussion concerning the legality of travel to Cuba points up how untenable is appellees' basic position. It would surely be anomalous were application of the Kidnaping Act made to turn on whether existing regulations permit travel to the point of destination without a passport, with an ordinary passport, or only with a passport specially endorsed. </s> [376 U.S. 75, 86]

United States Supreme Court COLAUTTI v. FRANKLIN(1979) No. 77-891 Argued: October 3, 1978Decided: January 9, 1979 </s> Section 5 (a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act requires every person who performs an abortion to make a determination, "based on his experience, judgment or professional competence," that the fetus is not viable. If such person determines that the fetus "is viable," or "if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," then he must exercise the same care to preserve the fetus' life and health as would be required in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive, and must use the abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive, so long as a different technique is not necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. The Act, in 5 (d), also imposes a penal sanction for a violation of 5 (a). Appellees brought suit claiming, inter alia, that 5 (a) is unconstitutionally vague, and a three-judge District Court upheld their claim. Held: </s> 1. The viability-determination requirement of 5 (a) is void for vagueness. Pp. 390-397. </s> (a) Though apparently the determination of whether the fetus "is viable" is to rest upon the basis of the attending physician's "experience, judgment or professional competence," it is ambiguous whether that subjective language applies to the second condition that activates the duty to the fetus, viz., "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable." Pp. 391-392. </s> (b) The intended distinction between "is viable" and "may be viable" is elusive. Apparently those phrases refer to distinct conditions, one of which indeterminately differs from the definition of viability set forth in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , and Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 . Pp. 392-394. </s> (c) The vagueness of the viability-determination requirement is compounded by the fact that 5 (d) subjects the physician to potential criminal liability without regard to fault. Because of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be viable, the Act is little more than "a trap for those who act in good faith," United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , and the perils of strict criminal liability are particularly [439 U.S. 379, 380] acute here because of the uncertainty of the viability determination itself. Pp. 394-397. </s> 2. The standard-of-care provision is likewise impermissibly vague. It is uncertain whether the statute permits the physician to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the fetus, or whether it requires the physician to make a "trade-off" between the patient's health and increased chances of fetal survival. Where conflicting duties of such magnitude are involved, there must be greater statutory precision before a physician may be subjected to possible criminal sanctions. Pp. 397-401. </s> Affirmed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 401. </s> Carol Los Mansmann, Special Assistant Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the brief was J. Jerome Mansmann, Special Assistant Attorney General. </s> Roland Morris argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. * </s> [Footnote * Burt Neuborne and Sylvia Law filed a brief for the American Public Health Assn. et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by George E. Reed and Patrick F. Geary for the United States Catholic Conference; and by Dennis J. Horan, John D. Gorby, Victor G. Rosenblum, and Dolores V. Horan for Americans United for Life, Inc. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At issue here is the constitutionality of subsection (a) of 5 1 of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 1974 Pa. Laws, [439 U.S. 379, 381] Act No. 209, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6605 (a) (Purdon 1977). This statute subjects a physician who performs an abortion to potential criminal liability if he fails to utilize a statutorily prescribed technique when the fetus "is viable" or when there is "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable." A three-judge Federal District Court 2 declared 5 (a) unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and enjoined its enforcement. App. 239a-244a. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Beal v. Franklin, 435 U.S. 913 (1978). </s> I </s> The Abortion Control Act was passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature, over the Governor's veto, in the year following this Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). It was a comprehensive statute. </s> Section 1 gave the Act its title. Section 2 defined, among other terms, "informed consent" and "viable." The latter was specified to mean "the capability of a fetus to live outside the [439 U.S. 379, 382] mother's womb albeit with artificial aid." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., at 160 . </s> Section 3 (a) proscribed the performance of an abortion "upon any person in the absence of informed consent thereto by such person." Section 3 (b) (i) prohibited the performance of an abortion in the absence of the written consent of the woman's spouse, provided that the spouse could be located and notified, and the abortion was not certified by a licensed physician "to be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother." Section 3 (b) (ii), applicable if the woman was unmarried and under the age of 18, forbade the performance of an abortion in the absence of the written consent of "one parent or person in loco parentis" of the woman, unless the abortion was certified by a licensed physician "as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother." Section 3 (e) provided that whoever performed an abortion without such consent was guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. </s> Section 4 provided that whoever, intentionally and willfully, took the life of a premature infant aborted alive, was guilty of murder of the second degree. Section 5 (a), set forth in n. 1, supra, provided that if the fetus was determined to be viable, or if there was sufficient reason to believe that the fetus might be viable, the person performing the abortion was required to exercise the same care to preserve the life and health of the fetus as would be required in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive, and was required to adopt the abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive, so long as a different technique was not necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. Section 5 (d), also set forth in n. 1, imposed a penal sanction for a violation of 5 (a). </s> Section 6 specified abortion controls. It prohibited abortion during the stage of pregnancy subsequent to viability, except where necessary, in the judgment of a licensed physician, to preserve the life or health of the mother. No abortion [439 U.S. 379, 383] was to be performed except by a licensed physician and in an approved facility. It required that appropriate records be kept, and that quarterly reports be filed with the Commonwealth's Department of Health. And it prohibited solicitation or advertising with respect to abortions. A violation of 6 was a misdemeanor of the first or third degrees, as specified. </s> Section 7 prohibited the use of public funds for an abortion in the absence of a certificate of a physician stating that the abortion was necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. Finally, 8 authorized the Department of Health to make rules and regulations with respect to performance of abortions and the facilities in which abortions were performed. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6601-6608 (Purdon 1977). </s> Prior to the Act's effective date, October 10, 1974, the present suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging, on federal constitutional grounds, nearly all of the Act's provisions. 3 </s> [439 U.S. 379, 384] The three-judge court on October 10 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of a number of those provisions. 4 Each side sought a class-action determination; the plaintiffs', but not the defendants', motion to this effect was granted. 5 </s> The case went to trial in January 1975. The court received extensive testimony from expert witnesses on all aspects of abortion procedures. The resulting judgment declared the Act to be severable, upheld certain of its provisions, and held other provisions unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (1975). 6 The court sustained the definition of "informed consent" in 2; the facility-approval requirement and certain of the reporting requirements of 6; 8's authorization of rules and regulations; and, by a divided vote, the informed consent requirement of 3 (a). It overturned 3 (b) (i)'s spousal-consent requirement [439 U.S. 379, 385] and, again by a divided vote, 3 (b) (ii)'s parental-consent requirement; 6's reporting requirements relating to spousal and parental consent; 6's prohibition of advertising; and 7's restriction on abortion funding. The definition of "viable" in 2 was declared void for vagueness and, because of the incorporation of this definition, 6's proscription of abortions after viability, except to preserve the life or health of the woman, was struck down. Finally, in part because of the incorporation of the definition of "viable," and in part because of the perceived overbreadth of the phrase "may be viable," the court invalidated the viability-determination and standard-of-care provisions of 5 (a). 401 F. Supp., at 594. </s> Both sides appealed to this Court. While the appeals were pending, the Court decided Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). Virginia State Board shed light on the prohibition of advertising for abortion services. Planned Parenthood had direct bearing on the patient-, spousal-, and parental-consent issues and was instructive on the definition-of-viability issue. Singleton concerned the issue of standing to challenge abortion regulations. Accordingly, that portion of the three-judge court's judgment which was the subject of the plaintiffs' appeal was summarily affirmed. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). And that portion of the judgment which was the subject of the defendants' appeal was vacated and remanded for further consideration in the light of Planned Parenthood, Singleton, and Virginia State Board. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). </s> On remand, the parties entered into a stipulation which disposed of all issues except the constitutionality of 5 (a) and 7. Relying on this Court's supervening decisions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the District Court found, contrary to its original view, [439 U.S. 379, 386] see 401 F. Supp., at 594, that 7 did not violate either Tit. XIX of the Social Security Act, as added, 79 Stat. 343, and amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 241a. The court, however, declared: "After reconsideration of section 5 (a) in light of the most recent Supreme Court decisions, we adhere to our original view and decision that section 5 (a) is unconstitutional." Id., at 240a-214a. Since the plaintiffs-appellees have not appealed from the ruling with respect to 7, the only issue remaining in this protracted litigation is the validity of 5 (a). </s> II </s> Three cases in the sensitive and earnestly contested abortion area provide essential background for the present controversy. </s> In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), this Court concluded that there is a right of privacy, implicit in the liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, that "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id., at 153. This right, we said, although fundamental, is not absolute or unqualified, and must be considered against important state interests in the health of the pregnant woman and in the potential life of the fetus. "These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes `compelling.'" Id., at 162-163. For both logical and biological reasons, we indicated that the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus reaches the compelling point at the stage of viability. Hence, prior to viability, the State may not seek to further this interest by directly restricting a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 7 But after viability, the [439 U.S. 379, 387] State, if it chooses, may regulate or even prohibit abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman. Id., at 163-164. </s> We did not undertake in Roe to examine the various factors that may enter into the determination of viability. We simply observed that, in the medical and scientific communities, a fetus is considered viable if it is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id., at 160. We added that there must be a potentiality of "meaningful life," id., at 163, not merely momentary survival. And we noted that viability "is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id., at 160. We thus left the point flexible for anticipated advancements in medical skill. </s> Roe stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried out. We indicated that up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention, "the abortion decision in all its aspects in inherently, and primarily, a medical decision," id., at 166, and we added that if this privilege were abused, "the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are available." Ibid. </s> Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), underscored the importance of affording the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment. After the Court there reiterated that "a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand," id., at 189, the Court discussed, in a vagueness-attack context, the Georgia statute's requirement that a physician's decision to perform an abortion must rest upon "his best clinical judgment." The Court found it critical that that [439 U.S. 379, 388] judgment "may be exercised in the light of all factors - physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age - relevant to the well-being of the patient." Id., at 192. </s> The third case, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), stressed similar themes. There a Missouri statute that defined viability was challenged on the ground that it conflicted with the discussion of viability in Roe and that it was, in reality, an attempt to advance the point of viability to an earlier stage in gestation. The Court rejected that argument, repeated the Roe definition of viability, 428 U.S., at 63 , and observed again that viability is "a matter of medical judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we preserved [in Roe] the flexibility of the term." Id., at 64. The Court also rejected a contention that "a specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the point of viability." Id., at 65. It said: </s> "In any event, we agree with the District Court that it is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician." Id., at 64. </s> In these three cases, then, this Court has stressed viability, has declared its determination to be a matter for medical judgment, and has recognized that differing legal consequences ensue upon the near and far sides of that point in the human gestation period. We reaffirm these principles. Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support. Because this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering [439 U.S. 379, 389] into the ascertainment of viability - be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor - as the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical point. And we have recognized no attempt to stretch the point of viability one way or the other. </s> With these principles in mind, we turn to the issues presented by the instant controversy. </s> III </s> The attack mounted by the plaintiffs-appellees upon 5 (a) centers on both the viability-determination requirement and the stated standard of care. The former provision, requiring the physician to observe the care standard when he determines that the fetus is viable, or when "there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," is asserted to be unconstitutionally vague because it fails to inform the physician when his duty to the fetus arises, and because it does not make the physician's good-faith determination of viability conclusive. This provision is also said to be unconstitutionally overbroad, because it carves out a new time period prior to the stage of viability, and could have a restrictive effect on a couple who wants to abort a fetus determined by genetic testing to be defective. 8 The standard of care, and in particular the requirement that the physician employ the abortion technique "which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother," is said to be void for vagueness and to be unconstitutionally restrictive in failing to afford [439 U.S. 379, 390] the physician sufficient professional discretion in determining which abortion technique is appropriate. </s> The defendants-appellants, in opposition, assert that the Pennsylvania statute is concerned only with post-viability abortions and with prescribing a standard of care for those abortions. They assert that the terminology "may be viable" correctly describes the statistical probability of fetal survival associated with viability; that the viability-determination requirement is otherwise sufficiently definite to be interpreted by the medical community; and that it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine whether a viable but genetically defective fetus has a right to life. They contend that the standard-of-care provision preserves the flexibility required for sound medical practice, and that it simply requires that when a physician has a choice of procedures of equal risk to the woman, he must select the procedure least likely to be fatal to the fetus. </s> IV </s> We agree with plaintiffs-appellees that the viability-determination requirement of 5 (a) is ambiguous, and that its uncertainty is aggravated by the absence of a scienter requirement with respect to the finding of viability. Because we conclude that this portion of the statute is void for vagueness, we find it unnecessary to consider appellees' alternative arguments based on the alleged overbreadth of 5 (a). </s> A </s> It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), is void for vagueness. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 -109 (1972). [439 U.S. 379, 391] This appears to be especially true where the uncertainty induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Id., at 109; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 -604 (1967). </s> Section 5 (a) requires every person who performs or induces an abortion to make a determination, "based on his experience, judgment or professional competence," that the fetus is not viable. If such person determines that the fetus is viable, or if "there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," then he must adhere to the prescribed standard of care. See n. 1, supra. This requirement contains a double ambiguity. First, it is unclear whether the statute imports a purely subjective standard, or whether it imposes a mixed subjective and objective standard. Second, it is uncertain whether the phrase "may be viable" simply refers to viability, as that term has been defined in Roe and in Planned Parenthood, or whether it refers to an undefined penumbral or "gray" area prior to the stage of viability. </s> The statute requires the physician to conform to the prescribed standard of care if one of two conditions is satisfied: if he determines that the fetus "is viable," or "if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable." Apparently, the determination of whether the fetus "is viable" is to be based on the attending physician's "experience, judgment or professional competence," a subjective point of reference. But it is unclear whether the same phrase applies to the second triggering condition, that is, to "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable." In other words, it is ambiguous whether there must be "sufficient reason" from the perspective of the judgment, skill, and training of the attending physician, or "sufficient reason" from the perspective of a cross section of the medical community or a panel of experts. The latter, obviously, portends not an inconsequential hazard for the typical private practitioner who may not [439 U.S. 379, 392] have the skills and technology that are readily available at a teaching hospital or large medical center. </s> The intended distinction between the phrases "is viable" and "may be viable" is even more elusive. Appellants argue that no difference is intended, and that the use of the "may be viable" words "simply incorporates the acknowledged medical fact that a fetus is `viable' if it has that statistical `chance' of survival recognized by the medical community." Brief for Appellants 28. The statute, however, does not support the contention that "may be viable" is synonymous with, or merely intended to explicate the meaning of, "viable." 9 </s> Section 5 (a) requires the physician to observe the prescribed standard of care if he determines "that the fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable" (emphasis supplied). The syntax clearly implies that there are two distinct conditions under which the physician must conform to the standard of care. Appellants' argument that "may be viable" is synonymous with "viable" would make either the first or the second condition redundant or largely superfluous, in violation of the elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 -539 (1955). </s> Furthermore, the suggestion that "may be viable" is an explication of the meaning of "viable" flies in the face of the fact that the statute, in 2, already defines "viable." This, presumably, was intended to be the exclusive definition of "viable" throughout the Act. 10 In this respect, it is significant [439 U.S. 379, 393] that 6 (b) of the Act speaks only of the limited availability of abortion during the stage of a pregnancy "subsequent to viability." The concept of viability is just as important in 6 (b) as it is in 5 (a). Yet in 6 (b) the legislature found it unnecessary to explain that a "viable" fetus includes one that "may be viable." </s> Since we must reject appellants' theory that "may be viable" means "viable," a second serious ambiguity appears in the statute. On the one hand, as appellees urge and as the District Court found, see 401 F. Supp., at 572, it may be that "may be viable" carves out a new time period during pregnancy when there is a remote possibility of fetal survival outside the womb, but the fetus has not yet attained the reasonable likelihood of survival that physicians associate with viability. On the other hand, although appellants do not argue this, it may be that "may be viable" refers to viability as physicians understand it, and "viable" refers to some undetermined stage later in pregnancy. We need not resolve this question. The crucial point is that "viable" and "may be viable" apparently refer to distinct conditions, and that one of these conditions differs in some indeterminate way from the definition of viability as set forth in Roe and in Planned Parenthood. 11 </s> Because of the double ambiguity in the viability-determination requirement, this portion of the Pennsylvania statute is readily distinguishable from the requirement that an abortion must be "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health," upheld against a vagueness challenge in United [439 U.S. 379, 394] States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69 -72 (1971), and the requirement that a physician determine, on the basis of his "best clinical judgment," that an abortion is "necessary," upheld against a vagueness attack in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S., at 191 -192. The contested provisions in those cases had been interpreted to allow the physician to make his determination in the light of all attendant circumstances - psychological and emotional as well as physical - that might be relevant to the well-being of the patient. The present statute does not afford broad discretion to the physician. Instead, it conditions potential criminal liability on confusing and ambiguous criteria. It therefore presents serious problems of notice, discriminatory application, and chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights. </s> B </s> The vagueness of the viability-determination requirement of 5 (a) is compounded by the fact that the Act subjects the physician to potential criminal liability without regard to fault. Under 5 (d), see n. 1, supra, a physician who fails to abide by the standard of care when there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus "may be viable" is subject "to such civil or criminal liability as would pertain to him had the fetus been a child who was intended to be born and not aborted." To be sure, the Pennsylvania law of criminal homicide, made applicable to the physician by 5 (d), conditions guilt upon a finding of scienter. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 2501-2504 (Purdon 1973 and Supp. 1978). The required mental state, however, is that of "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently caus[ing] the death of another human being." 2501 (1973). Thus, the Pennsylvania law of criminal homicide requires scienter with respect to whether the physician's actions will result in the death of the fetus. But neither the Pennsylvania law of criminal homicide, nor the Abortion Control Act, requires that the [439 U.S. 379, 395] physician be culpable in failing to find sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable. 12 </s> This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea. See, for example, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434 -446 (1978); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S., at 163 ; Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952). 13 Because of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be viable, the statute is little more than "a trap for those who act in good faith." United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942). </s> The perils of strict criminal liability are particularly acute here because of the uncertainty of the viability determination itself. As the record in this case indicates, a physician determines whether or not a fetus is viable after considering a number of variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived from the reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; the woman's general health and nutrition; the [439 U.S. 379, 396] quality of the available medical facilities; and other factors. 14 Because of the number and the imprecision of these variables, the probability of any particular fetus' obtaining meaningful life outside the womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the record indicates that even if agreement may be reached on the probability of survival, different physicians equate viability with different probabilities of survival, and some physicians refuse to equate viability with any numerical probability at all. 15 In the face of these uncertainties, it is not unlikely that experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in the second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability. The prospect of such disagreement, in conjunction with a statute imposing strict civil and criminal liability for an erroneous determination of viability, could have a profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical judgment. </s> Because we hold that the viability-determination provision of 5 (a) is void on its face, we need not now decide whether, under a properly drafted statute, a finding of bad faith or some other type of scienter would be required before a physician could be held criminally responsible for an erroneous determination of viability. We reaffirm, however, that "the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. [439 U.S. 379, 397] Danforth, 428 U.S., at 64 . State regulation that impinges upon this determination, if it is to be constitutional, must allow the attending physician "the room he needs to make his best medical judgment." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S., at 192 . </s> V </s> We also conclude that the standard-of-care provision of 5 (a) is impermissibly vague. 16 The standard-of-care provision, when it applies, requires the physician to </s> "exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother." </s> Plaintiffs-appellees focus their attack on the second part of the standard, requiring the physician to employ the abortion technique offering the greatest possibility of fetal survival, provided some other technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. 17 </s> [439 U.S. 379, 398] </s> The District Court took extensive testimony from various physicians about their understanding of this requirement. That testimony is illuminating. When asked what method of abortion they would prefer to use in the second trimester in the absence of 5 (a), the plaintiffs' experts said that they thought saline amnio-infusion was the method of choice. 18 This was described as a method involving removal of amniotic fluid and injection of a saline or other solution into the amniotic sac. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S., at 75 -79. All physicians agreed, however, that saline amnio-infusion nearly always is fatal to the fetus, 19 and it was commonly assumed that this method would be prohibited by the statute. </s> When the plaintiffs' and defendants' physician-experts respectively were asked what would be the method of choice under 5 (a), opinions differed widely. Preferences ranged from no abortion, to prostaglandin infusion, to hysterotomy, to oxytocin induction. 20 Each method, it was generally conceded, involved disadvantages from the perspective of the woman. Hysterotomy, a type of Caesarean section procedure, generally was considered to have the highest incidence of fetal survival of any of the abortifacients. Hysterotomy, however, is associated with the risks attendant upon any operative procedure involving anesthesia and incision of [439 U.S. 379, 399] tissue. 21 And all physicians agreed that future children born to a woman having a hysterotomy would have to be delivered by Caesarean section because of the likelihood of rupture of the scar. 22 </s> Few of the testifying physicians had had any direct experience with prostaglandins, described as drugs that stimulate uterine contractibility, inducing premature expulsion of the fetus. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S., at 77 -78. It was generally agreed that the incidence of fetal survival with prostaglandins would be significantly greater than with saline amnio-infusion. 23 Several physicians testified, however, that prostaglandins have undesirable side effects, such as nausea, vomiting, headache, and diarrhea, and indicated that they are unsafe with patients having a history of asthma, glaucoma, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, or epilepsy. 24 See Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1326 (ND Ill. 1978). One physician recommended oxytocin induction. He doubted, however, whether the procedure would be fully effective in all cases, and he indicated that the procedure was prolonged and expensive. 25 </s> The parties acknowledge that there is disagreement among medical authorities about the relative merits and the safety of different abortion procedures that may be used during the second trimester. See Brief for Appellants 24. The appellants submit, however, that the only legally relevant considerations are that alternatives exist among abortifacients, [439 U.S. 379, 400] "and that the physician, mindful of the state's interest in protecting viable life, must make a competent and good faith medical judgment on the feasibility of protecting the fetus' chance of survival in a manner consistent with the life and health of the pregnant woman." Id., at 25. We read 5 (a), however, to be much more problematical. </s> The statute does not clearly specify, as appellants imply, that the woman's life and health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict. The woman's life and health are not mentioned in the first part of the stated standard of care, which sets forth the general duty to the viable fetus; they are mentioned only in the second part which deals with the choice of abortion procedures. Moreover, the second part of the standard directs the physician to employ the abortion technique best suited to fetal survival "so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother" (emphasis supplied). In this context, the word "necessary" suggests that a particular technique must be indispensable to the woman's life or health - not merely desirable - before it may be adopted. And "the life or health of the mother," as used in 5 (a), has not been construed by the courts of the Commonwealth to mean, nor does it necessarily imply, that all factors relevant to the welfare of the woman may be taken into account by the physician in making his decision. Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S., at 71 -72; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S., at 191 . </s> Consequently, it is uncertain whether the statute permits the physician to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the fetus, or whether it requires the physician to make a "trade-off" between the woman's health and additional percentage points of fetal survival. Serious ethical and constitutional difficulties, that we do not address, lurk behind this ambiguity. We hold only that where conflicting duties of this magnitude are involved, the [439 U.S. 379, 401] State, at the least, must proceed with greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible criminal sanctions. </s> Appellants' further suggestion that 5 (a) requires only that the physician make a good-faith selection of the proper abortion procedure finds no support in either the language or an authoritative interpretation of the statute. 26 Certainly, there is nothing to suggest a mens rea requirement with respect to a decision whether a particular abortion method is necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the woman. The choice of an appropriate abortion technique, as the record in this case so amply demonstrates, is a complex medical judgment about which experts can - and do - disagree. The lack of any scienter requirement exacerbates the uncertainty of the statute. We conclude that the standard-of-care provision, like the viability-determination requirement, is void for vagueness. </s> The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 5 reads in pertinent part: </s> "(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior thereto have made a determination based on his experience, judgment or professional competence that the fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that degree of [439 U.S. 379, 381] professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. </s> . . . . . </s> "(d) Any person who fails to make the determination provided for in subsection (a) of this section, or who fails to exercise the degree of professional skill, care and diligence or to provide the abortion technique as provided for in subsection (a) of this section . . . shall be subject to such civil or criminal liability as would pertain to him had the fetus been a child who was intended to be born and not aborted." </s> [Footnote 2 The three-judge court was designated in September 1974 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281 (1970 ed.). This statute was repealed by Pub. L. 94-381, 1, 90 Stat. 1119, but the repeal did not apply to any action commenced on or before August 12, 1976. 7. </s> [Footnote 3 The plaintiffs named in the complaint, as amended, were Planned Parenthood Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Inc., a nonprofit corporation; appellee John Franklin, M. D., a licensed and board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist and medical director of Planned Parenthood; Concern for Health Options: Information, Care and Education, Inc. (CHOICE), a nonprofit corporation; and Clergy Consultation Service of Northeastern Pennsylvania, a voluntary organization. Later, appellee Obstetrical Society of Philadelphia intervened as a party plaintiff. Named as original defendants were F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., District Attorney of Philadelphia County, and Helene Wohlgemuth, the then Secretary of Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Subsequently, the Commonwealth's Attorney General and the Commonwealth itself intervened as parties defendant. </s> The District Court, in a ruling not under challenge here, eventually dismissed Planned Parenthood, CHOICE, and Clergy Consultation as plaintiffs. Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 562, 593-594 (1975). </s> The present posture of the case, as a consequence, is a suit between Dr. Franklin and the Obstetrical Society, as plaintiffs-appellees, and Aldo [439 U.S. 379, 384] Colautti, the present Secretary of Welfare, the Attorney General, the Commonwealth, and the District Attorney, as defendants-appellants. </s> We agree with the District Court's ruling in the cited 1975 opinion, 401 F. Supp., at 561-562, 594, that under Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973), the plaintiff physicians have standing to challenge 5 (a), and that their claims present a justiciable controversy. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976). </s> [Footnote 4 The court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the spousal- and parental-consent requirements, 3 (b); the penal provisions of 3 (e); the requirements of 5 (a) and (d); the restriction on abortions subsequent to viability, 6 (b); the facility-approval requirement, 6 (c); the reporting provisions, 6 (d); most of the penal provisions of 6 (i); the restrictions on funding of abortions, 7; and the definitions of "viable" and "informed consent" in 2. Record, Doc. No. 16; see Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp., at 559. </s> [Footnote 5 The court ruled that "the present action is determined to be a class action on behalf of the class of Pennsylvania physicians who perform abortions and/or counsel their female patients with regard to family planning and pregnancy including the option of abortion, and the sub-class of members of the Obstetrical Society of Philadelphia who practice in Pennsylvania." Record, Doc. No. 57. </s> [Footnote 6 See also Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (MD Pa. 1975). </s> [Footnote 7 In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 -477 (1977), the Court ruled that a State may withhold funding to indigent women even though such withholding influences the abortion decision prior to viability. The Court, however, reaffirmed that a State during this period may not impose direct [439 U.S. 379, 387] obstacles - such as criminal penalties - to further its interest in the potential life of the fetus. </s> [Footnote 8 The plaintiffs-appellees introduced evidence that modern medical technology makes it possible to detect whether a fetus is afflicted with such disorders as Tay-Sachs disease and Down's syndrome (mongolism). Such testing, however, often cannot be completed until after 18-20 weeks' gestation. App. 53a-56a (testimony of Hope Punnett, Ph. D.). </s> [Footnote 9 Appellants do not argue that federal-court abstention is required on this issue, nor is it appropriate, given the extent of the vagueness that afflicts 5 (a), for this Court to abstain sua sponte. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10 (1976). </s> [Footnote 10 The statute says that viable "means," not "includes," the capability of a fetus "to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aid." As a rule, "[a] definition which declares what a term `means' . . . excludes [439 U.S. 379, 393] any meaning that is not stated." 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978). </s> [Footnote 11 Since our ruling today is confined to the conclusion that the viability-determination requirement of 5 (a) is impermissibly vague, there is no merit in the dissenting opinion's suggestion, post, at 406, that the Court has "tacitly disown[ed]" the definition of viability as set forth in Roe and Planned Parenthood. On the contrary, as noted above, supra, at 388, we reaffirm what was said in those decisions about this critical concept. </s> [Footnote 12 Section 5 (a) does provide that the determination of viability is to be based on the physician's "experience, judgment or professional competence." A subjective standard keyed to the physician's individual skill and abilities, however, is different from a requirement that the physician be culpable or blameworthy for his performance under such a standard. Moreover, as noted above, it is ambiguous whether this subjective language applies to the second condition that activates the duty to the fetus, namely, "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable." </s> [Footnote 13 "[T]he requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid. . . . The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain. But it does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 -102 (1945) (plurality opinion). </s> [Footnote 14 See App. 5a-6a, 10a, 17a (testimony of Louis Gerstley III, M. D.); id., at 77a-78a, 81a (testimony of Thomas W. Hilgers, M. D.); id., at 93a-101a, 109a, 112a (testimony of William J. Keenan, M. D.). </s> [Footnote 15 See id., at 8a (testimony of Dr. Gerstley) (viability means 5% chance of survival, "certainly at least two to three percent"); id., at 104a (testimony of Dr. Keenan) (10% chance of survival would be viable); id., at 144a (deposition of John Franklin, M. D.) (viability means "ten percent or better" probability of survival); id., at 132a (testimony of Arturo Hervada, M. D.) (it is misleading to be obsessed with a particular percentage figure). </s> [Footnote 16 The dissenting opinion questions whether the alleged vagueness of the standard-of-care provision is properly before us, since it is said that this issue was not reached by the District Court. That court, however, declared 5 (a) unconstitutional in its entirety, including both the viability-determination requirement and the standard-of-care provision. App. 243a. Appellees, as the prevailing parties, may of course assert any ground in support of that judgment, "whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6 (1970). </s> [Footnote 17 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 -84 (1976), the Court struck down a provision similar to the first part of the standard-of-care provision of 5 (a), on the ground that it applied at all stages of gestation and not just to the period subsequent to [439 U.S. 379, 398] viability. Except to the extent that 5 (a) is also alleged to apply prior to the point of viability, a contention we do not reach, see supra, at 390, appellees do not challenge the standard-of-care provision on overbreadth grounds. </s> [Footnote 18 App. 11a (testimony of Dr. Gerstley); id., at 28a (testimony of Dr. Franklin). </s> [Footnote 19 See, e. g., id., at 28a (testimony of Dr. Franklin); id., at 36a (testimony of Fred Mecklenburg, M. D.). </s> [Footnote 20 There was testimony that dilation and curettage and dilation and suction, two of the more common methods of abortion in the first trimester, normally are not used in the second trimester. Id., at 39a-40a (testimony of Dr. Mecklenburg). </s> [Footnote 21 Id., at 23a (testimony of Dr. Franklin); id., at 43a (testimony of Dr. Mecklenburg); id., at 73a (testimony of Dr. Hilgers). </s> [Footnote 22 See, e. g., id., at 13a (testimony of Dr. Gerstley); id., at 28a (testimony of Dr. Franklin). </s> [Footnote 23 See, e. g., id., at 11a-12a (testimony of Dr. Gerstley); id., at 28a (testimony of Dr. Franklin). </s> [Footnote 24 See id., at 11a (testimony of Dr. Gerstley); id., at 37a-38a (testimony of Dr. Mecklenburg); id., at 72a (testimony of Dr. Hilgers). </s> [Footnote 25 Id., at 12a (testimony of Dr. Gerstley). </s> [Footnote 26 Appellants, again, do not argue or suggest that we should abstain from passing on this issue. See n. 9, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. </s> Because the Court now withdraws from the States a substantial measure of the power to protect fetal life that was reserved to them in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), I file this dissent. </s> I </s> In Roe v. Wade, the Court defined the term "viability" to signify the stage at which a fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." This is the point at which the State's interest in protecting fetal [439 U.S. 379, 402] life becomes sufficiently strong to permit it to "go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." 410 U.S., at 163 -164. </s> The Court obviously crafted its definition of viability with some care, and it chose to define that term not as that stage of development at which the fetus actually is able or actually has the ability to survive outside the mother's womb, with or without artificial aid, but as that point at which the fetus is potentially able to survive. In the ordinary usage of these words, being able and being potentially able do not mean the same thing. Potential ability is not actual ability. It is ability "[e]xisting in possibility, not in actuality." Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1958). The Court's definition of viability in Roe v. Wade reaches an earlier point in the development of the fetus than that stage at which a doctor could say with assurance that the fetus would survive outside the womb. </s> It was against this background that the Pennsylvania statute at issue here was adopted and the District Court's judgment was entered. Insofar as Roe v. Wade was concerned, Pennsylvania could have defined viability in the language of that case - "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb" - and could have forbidden all abortions after this stage of any pregnancy. The Pennsylvania Act, however, did not go so far. It forbade entirely only those abortions where the fetus had attained viability as defined in 2 of the Act, that is, where the fetus had "the capability . . . to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aid." Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, 6602 (Purdon 1977) (emphasis added). But the State, understanding that it also had the power under Roe v. Wade to regulate where the fetus was only "potentially able" to exist outside the womb, also sought to regulate, but not forbid, abortions where there was sufficient reason to believe that the fetus "may be viable"; this language was reasonably [439 U.S. 379, 403] believed by the State to be equivalent to what the Court meant in 1973 by the term "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb." Under 5 (a), abortionists must not only determine whether the fetus is viable but also whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable. If either condition exists, the method of abortion is regulated and a standard of care imposed. Under 5 (d), breach of these regulations exposes the abortionist to the civil and criminal penalties that would be applicable if a live birth rather than an abortion had been intended. </s> In the original opinion and judgment of the three-judge court, Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (ED Pa. 1975), 5 (a) was invalidated on two grounds: first, because it required a determination of viability and because that term, as defined in 2, was held to be unenforceably vague; and second, because the section required a determination of when a fetus may be viable, it was thought to regulate a period of time prior to viability and was therefore considered to be invalid under this Court's cases. The District Court was not disturbed by the fact that its opinion declared the term "viability" as used in this Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade to be hopelessly vague since it understood that opinion also to have given specific content to that term and to have held that a State could not consider any fetus to be viable prior to the 24th week of pregnancy. This was concrete guidance to the States, and because the "may be viable" provision of 5 (a) "tend[ed] to carve out a . . . period of time of potential viability [which might cover a period of] 20 to 26 weeks gestation," 401 F. Supp., at 572, the State was unlawfully regulating the second trimester. Because it sought to enforce 5 (a), 5 (d) was also invalidated. Section 6 (b), which forbade all abortions after viability, also fell to the challenge of vagueness. </s> The District Court's judgment was pending on appeal here when Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, [439 U.S. 379, 404] supra, was argued and decided. There, the state Act defined viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." 428 U.S., at 63 . This definition was attacked as impermissibly expanding the Roe v. Wade definition of viability; the "mere possibility of momentary survival," it was argued, was not the proper standard under the Court's cases. 428 U.S., at 63 . It was also argued in this Court that the "may be" language of the Missouri statute was vulnerable for the same reasons that the "may be" provision of the Pennsylvania statute had been invalidated by the District Court in the case now before us. Brief for Appellants, O. T. 1975, No. 74-1151, pp. 65-66, quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, supra, at 571-572. This Court, however, rejected these arguments and sustained the Missouri definition as consistent with Roe, "even when read in conjunction with" another section of the Act that proscribed all abortions not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother "unless the attending physician first certifies with reasonable medical certainty that the fetus is not viable," that is, that it has not reached that stage at which it may exist indefinitely outside the mother's womb. 428 U.S., at 63 -64. The Court noted that one of the appellant doctors "had no particular difficulty with the statutory definition" and added that the Missouri definition might well be considered more favorable to the complainants than the Roe definition since the "point when life can be `continued indefinitely outside the womb' may well occur later in pregnancy than the point where the fetus is `potentially able to live outside the mother's womb.'" 428 U.S., at 64 . The Court went on to make clear that it was not the proper function of the legislature or of the courts to place viability at a specific point in the gestation period. The "flexibility of the term," which was essentially a medical concept, was to be preserved. Ibid. The Court plainly reaffirmed what it had held [439 U.S. 379, 405] in Roe v. Wade: Viability refers not only to that stage of development when the fetus actually has the capability of existing outside the womb but also to that stage when the fetus may have the ability to do so. The Court also reaffirmed that at any time after viability, as so understood, the State has the power to prohibit abortions except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. </s> In light of Danforth, several aspects of the District Court's judgment in the Fitzpatrick case were highly questionable, and that judgment was accordingly vacated and remanded to the District Court for reconsideration. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). A drastically modified judgment eventuated. The term "viability" could not be deemed vague in itself, and hence the definition of that term in 2 and the proscription of 6 (b) against post-viability abortions were sustained. The District Court, however, in a conclusory opinion adhered to its prior view that 5 (a) was unconstitutional, as was 5 (d) insofar as it related to 5 (a). </s> Affirmance of the District Court's judgment is untenable. The District Court originally thought 5 (a) was vague because the term "viability" was itself vague. The Court scotched that notion in Danforth, and the District Court then sustained the Pennsylvania definition of viability. In doing so, it necessarily nullified the major reason for its prior invalidation of 5 (a), which was that it incorporated the supposedly vague standard of 2. But the District Court had also said that the "may be viable" standard was invalid as an impermissible effort to regulate a period of "potential" viability. This was the sole remaining articulated ground for invalidating 5 (a). But this is the very ground that was urged and rejected in Danforth, where this Court sustained the Missouri provision defining viability as the stage at which the fetus "may" have the ability to survive outside the womb and reaffirmed the flexible concept of viability announced in Roe. [439 U.S. 379, 406] </s> In affirming the District Court, the Court does not in so many words agree with the District Court but argues that it is too difficult to know whether the Pennsylvania Act simply intended, as the State urges, to go no further than Roe permitted in protecting a fetus that is potentially able to survive or whether it intended to carve out a protected period prior to viability as defined in Roe. The District Court, although otherwise seriously in error, had no such trouble with the Act. It understood the "may be viable" provision as an attempt to protect a period of potential life, precisely the kind of interest that Roe protected but which the District Court erroneously thought the State was not entitled to protect. 1 Danforth, as I have said, reaffirmed Roe in this respect. Only those with unalterable determination to invalidate the Pennsylvania Act can draw any measurable difference insofar as vagueness is concerned between "viability" defined as the ability to survive and "viability" defined as that stage at which the fetus may have the ability to survive. It seems to me that, in affirming, the Court is tacitly disowning the "may be" standard of the Missouri law as well as the "potential ability" [439 U.S. 379, 407] component of viability as that concept was described in Roe. This is a further constitutionally unwarranted intrusion upon the police powers of the States. </s> II </s> Apparently uneasy with its work, the Court has searched for and seized upon two additional reasons to support affirmance, neither of which was relied upon by the District Court. The Court first notes that under 5 (d), failure to make the determinations required by 5 (a), or otherwise to comply with its provisions, subjects the abortionist to criminal prosecution under those laws that "would pertain to him had the fetus been a child who was intended to be born and not aborted." Although concededly the Pennsylvania law of criminal homicide conditions guilt upon a finding that the defendant intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently caused the death of another human being, the Court nevertheless goes on to declare that the abortionist could be successfully prosecuted for criminal homicide without any such fault or omission in determining whether or not the fetus is viable or may be viable. This alleged lack of a scienter requirement, the Court says, fortifies its holding that 5 (a) is void for vagueness. </s> This seems to me an incredible construction of the Pennsylvania statutes. The District Court suggested nothing of the sort, and appellees focus entirely on 5 (a), ignoring the homicide statutes. The latter not only define the specified degrees of scienter that are required for the various homicides, but also provide that ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is a reasonable explanation, is a defense to a homicide charge if it negatives the mental state necessary for conviction. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, 304 (Purdon 1973). Given this background, I do not see how it can be seriously argued that a doctor who makes a good-faith mistake about whether a fetus is or is not viable could be successfully prosecuted [439 U.S. 379, 408] for criminal homicide. This is the State's submission in this Court; the court below did not address the matter; and at the very least this is something the Court should not decide without hearing from the Pennsylvania courts. </s> Secondly, the Court proceeds to find the standard-of-care provision in 5 (a) to be impermissibly vague, particularly because of an asserted lack of a mens rea requirement. I am unable to agree. In the first place, the District Court found fault with 5 (a) only because of its viability and "may be viable" provisions. It neither considered nor invalidated the standard-of-care provision. Furthermore, the complaint did not expressly attack 5 (a) on this ground, and plaintiffs' request for findings and conclusions challenged the section only on the grounds of the overbreadth and vagueness of the viability and the "may be viable" provisions. There was no request to invalidate the standard-of-care provision. Also, the plaintiffs' post-trial brief dealt with the matter in only the most tangential way. Appellees took no cross-appeal; and although they argue the matter in their brief on the merits in this Court, I question whether they are entitled to have still another provision of the Pennsylvania Act declared unconstitutional in this Court in the first instance, thereby and to that extent expanding the relief they obtained in the court below. 2 United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166 n. 8 (1977). </s> In any event, I cannot join the Court in its determined attack on the Pennsylvania statute. As in the case with a mistaken viability determination under 5 (a), there is no basis for asserting the lack of a scienter requirement in a prosecution for violating the standard-of-care provision. I agree with the State that there is not the remotest chance that any abortionist will be prosecuted on the basis of a goodfaith [439 U.S. 379, 409] mistake regarding whether to abort, and if he does, with respect to which abortion technique is to be used. If there is substantial doubt about this, the Court should not complain of a lack of an authoritative state construction, as it does, but should direct abstention and permit the state courts to address the issues in the light of the Pennsylvania homicide laws with which those courts are so much more familiar than are we or any other federal court. </s> III </s> Although it seems to me that the Court has considerably narrowed the scope of the power to forbid and regulate abortions that the States could reasonably have expected to enjoy under Roe and Danforth, the Court has not yet invalidated a statute simply requiring abortionists to determine whether a fetus is viable and forbidding the abortion of a viable fetus except where necessary to save the life or health of the mother. Nor has it yet ruled that the abortionist's determination of viability under such a standard must be final and is immune to civil or criminal attack. Sections 2 and 6 (b) of the Pennsylvania law, for example, remain undisturbed by the District Court's judgment or by the judgment of this Court. </s> What the Court has done is to issue a warning to the States, in the name of vagueness, that they should not attempt to forbid or regulate abortions when there is a chance for the survival of the fetus, but it is not sufficiently large that the abortionist considers the fetus to be viable. This edict has no constitutional warrant, and I cannot join it. </s> [Footnote 1 The District Court observed: </s> "Roe makes it abundantly clear that the compelling point at which a state in the interest of fetal life may regulate, or even prohibit, abortion is not before the 24th week of gestation of the fetus, at which point the Supreme Court recognized the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. Consequently, Roe recognizes only two periods concerning fetuses. The period prior to viability, when the state may not regulate in the interest of fetal life, and the period after viability, when it may prohibit altogether or regulate as it sees fit. The `may be viable' provision of Section 5 (a) tends to carve out a third period of time of potential viability." Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 572 (ED Pa. 1975) (emphasis added). </s> Thus, the court interpreted the term "viability" more restrictively than Roe, read in its entirety, permitted but coextensively with the definition in 2. Based on its misapprehension of Roe, the court condemned 5 (a) essentially for reaching the period when the fetus has the potential "capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 2 Unquestionably, rehabilitating 5 (a) to satisfy this Court's opinion will be a far more extensive and more difficult task than that which the State faced under the District Court's ruling. </s> [439 U.S. 379, 410]

United States Supreme Court THORPE v. HOUSING AUTHORITY(1969) No. 20 Argued: October 23, 1968Decided: January 13, 1969 </s> Petitioner had a month-to-month tenancy in a federally assisted public housing project operated by respondent, the lease providing for termination by either party on 15 days' notice. She received a lease cancellation notice, with no reasons being given, the day after being elected president of a tenants' organization. Petitioner, who fruitlessly tried to determine why she was being evicted, refused to vacate. Respondent brought an eviction action, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's eviction order which held that the reasons for cancellation were immaterial, notwithstanding petitioner's contention that she was being evicted because of her organizational activities in violation of her First Amendment rights. This Court granted certiorari. Thereafter, on February 7, 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular requiring local housing authorities to give tenants the reasons for eviction and to afford them an opportunity for explanation or reply. Following this Court's remand for further proceedings in the light of the HUD circular ( 386 U.S. 670 ), the State Supreme Court upheld petitioner's eviction on the ground that the parties' rights had "matured" before issuance of the circular, which the court held applied only prospectively. The court stayed execution of its judgment pending this Court's decision. Respondent urges that the circular (1) is only advisory; (2) if mandatory, constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of respondent's contract with HUD and its lease agreement with petitioner; and (3) if constitutional, does not apply to eviction proceedings commenced before its issuance. Held: </s> 1. Housing authorities of federally assisted public housing projects must follow the requirements of the February 7, 1967, HUD circular before evicting any tenant residing in such projects on the date of this Court's decision herein. Pp. 274-284. </s> (a) The circular, which originally supplemented and later became incorporated in HUD's Low-Rent Management Manual issued under the agency's general rule-making powers pursuant to 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, was intended by HUD to be mandatory. Pp. 274-276. [393 U.S. 268, 269] </s> (b) The simple notification procedure required by the circular, which has only nominal effect on respondent's administration of the housing project, does not violate the congressional policy set forth in the Act for local control of federally financed housing projects. Pp. 277-278. </s> (c) The respective obligations of HUD and respondent under the annual contributions contract between them, and the lease agreement between petitioner and respondent, remain unchanged by the circular, which therefore does not involve any impairment of contractual obligations in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 278-280. </s> (d) The circular furthers the Act's remedial purpose. Pp. 280-281. </s> (e) The circular applies to eviction proceedings commenced before its issuance under the general rule that a court must apply the law (here that of an administrative agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization) in effect at the time it renders decision; and that rule is particularly applicable here where ascertainment of the reason for eviction is essential to enable a tenant to defend against eviction for activity claimed to be constitutionally protected. Pp. 281-283. </s> 2. It would be premature to decide, as petitioner urges, that this Court must establish guidelines to insure that she is given not only the reasons for her eviction but also a hearing comporting with due process requirements. Pp. 283-284. </s> 271 N.C. 468, 157 S. E. 2d 147, reversed and remanded. </s> James M. Nabrit III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, Charles Stephen Ralston, Charles H. Jones, Jr., Anthony G. Amsterdam, and William Bennett Turner. </s> Daniel K. Edwards argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was William Y. Manson. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case raises the question whether a tenant of a federally assisted housing project can be evicted prior to notification of the reasons for the eviction and without an opportunity to reply to those reasons, when such a [393 U.S. 268, 270] procedure is provided for in a Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter HUD) circular issued after eviction proceedings have been initiated. </s> On November 11, 1964, petitioner and her children commenced a month-to-month tenancy in McDougald Terrace, a federally assisted, low-rent housing project owned and operated by the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, North Carolina. Under the lease, petitioner is entitled to an automatic renewal for successive one-month terms, provided that her family composition and income remain unchanged and that she does not violate the terms of the lease. 1 The lease also provides, however, that either the tenant or the Authority may terminate the tenancy by giving notice at least 15 days before the end of any monthly term. 2 </s> [393 U.S. 268, 271] </s> On August 10, 1965, petitioner was elected president of a McDougald Terrace tenants' organization called the Parents' Club. On the very next day, without any explanation, the executive director of the Housing Authority notified petitioner that her lease would be canceled as of August 31. 3 After receiving notice, petitioner attempted through her attorneys, by phone and by letter, to find out the reasons for her eviction. 4 Her inquiries went unanswered, and she refused to vacate. </s> On September 17, 1965, the Housing Authority brought an action for summary eviction in the Durham Justice of the Peace Court, which, three days later, ordered petitioner removed from her apartment. On appeal to the Superior Court of Durham County, petitioner alleged that she was being evicted because of her organizational activities in violation of her First Amendment rights. After a trial de novo, 5 the Superior Court affirmed the [393 U.S. 268, 272] eviction, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina also affirmed. 6 Both appellate courts held that under the lease the Authority's reasons for terminating petitioner's tenancy were immaterial. On December 5, 1966, we granted certiorari 7 to consider whether petitioner was denied due process by the Housing Authority's refusal to state the reasons for her eviction and to afford her a hearing at which she could contest the sufficiency of those reasons. </s> On February 7, 1967, while petitioner's case was pending in this Court, HUD issued a circular directing that before instituting an eviction proceeding local housing authorities operating all federally assisted projects should inform the tenant "in a private conference or other appropriate manner" of the reasons for the eviction and give him "an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish." 8 Since the application of [393 U.S. 268, 273] this directive to petitioner would render a decision on the constitutional issues she raised unnecessary, we vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and remanded the case "for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in the light of the February 7 circular of the Department of Housing and Urban Development." 9 </s> On remand, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to apply the February 7 HUD circular and reaffirmed its prior decision upholding petitioner's eviction. Analogizing [393 U.S. 268, 274] to the North Carolina rule that statutes are presumed to act prospectively only, the court held that since "[a]ll critical events" 10 had occurred prior to the date on which the circular was issued "[t]he rights of the parties had matured and had been determined before . . ." that date. 11 We again granted certiorari. 12 We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and hold that housing authorities of federally assisted public housing projects must apply the February 7, 1967, HUD circular before evicting any tenant still residing in such projects on the date of this decision. 13 </s> In support of the North Carolina judgment, the Housing Authority makes three arguments: (1) the HUD circular was intended to be advisory, not mandatory; (2) if the circular is mandatory, it is an unauthorized and unconstitutional impairment of both the Authority's annual contributions contract with HUD 14 and the lease agreement between the Authority and petitioner; and (3) even if the circular is mandatory, within HUD's power, and constitutional, it does not apply to eviction proceedings commenced prior to the date the circular was issued. We reject each of these contentions. </s> I. </s> Pursuant to its general rule-making power under 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 15 HUD has [393 U.S. 268, 275] issued a Low-Rent Management Manual, 16 which contains requirements that supplement the provisions of the annual contributions contract applicable to project management. 17 According to HUD, these requirements "are the minimum considered consistent with fulfilling Federal responsibilities" under the Act. 18 Changes in the manual are initially promulgated as circulars. These circulars, which have not yet been physically incorporated into the manual, are temporary additions or modifications of the manual's requirements and "have the same effect." 19 In contrast, the various "handbooks" and "booklets" issued by HUD contain mere "instructions," "technical suggestions," and "items for consideration." 20 </s> Despite the incorporation of the February 7 circular into the Management Manual in October 1967, the Housing Authority contends that on its face the circular purports to be only advisory. The Authority places particular emphasis on the circular's precatory statement that HUD "believes" that its notification procedure should be followed. In addition to overlooking the significance of the subsequent incorporation of the circular into the Management Manual, the Authority's argument is based upon a simple misconstruction of the language actually used. The import of that language, which characterizes the new notification procedure as "essential," becomes apparent when the February 7 circular is contrasted with the one it superseded. The earlier circular, issued on May 31, 1966, stated: "[W]e strongly urge, as a matter of good social policy, that Local Authorities in a [393 U.S. 268, 276] private conference inform any tenants who are given . . . [termination] notices of the reasons for this action." 21 (Emphasis added.) This circular was not incorporated into the Management Manual. </s> That HUD intended the February 7 circular to be mandatory has been confirmed unequivocally in letters written by HUD's Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance 22 and by its Chief Counsel. 23 As we stated in Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), when construing an administrative regulation, "a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . . [T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 24 Thus, when the language and HUD's treatment of the February 7 circular are contrasted with the language and treatment of the superseded circular, there can be no doubt that the more recent circular was intended to be mandatory, not merely advisory as contended by the Authority. [393 U.S. 268, 277] </s> II. </s> Finding that the circular was intended to be mandatory does not, of course, determine the validity of the requirements it imposes. 25 In our opinion remanding this case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina to consider the HUD circular's applicability, we pointed out that the circular was issued pursuant to HUD's rule-making power under 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 26 which authorizes HUD 27 "from time to time [to] make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." 28 The Housing Authority argues that this authorization is limited by the Act's express policy of "vest[ing] in the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent housing program, including responsibility for the establishment of rents and eligibility requirements (subject to the approval of . . . [HUD]), with due consideration to accomplishing the objectives of this Act while effecting economies." 29 But the HUD circular is not inconsistent with this policy. Its minimal effect upon [393 U.S. 268, 278] the Authority's "responsibility in the administration" of McDougald Terrace is aptly attested to by the Authority's own description of what the circular does not require: </s> "It does not . . . purport to change the terms of the lease provisions used by Housing Authorities, nor does it purport to take away from the Housing Authority its legal ability to evict by complying with the terms of the lease and the pertinent provisions of the State law relating to evictions. It does not deal with what reasons are acceptable to HUD . . . . Moreover, the Circular clearly does not say that a Housing Authority cannot terminate at the end of any term without cause as is provided in the lease." 30 </s> The circular imposes only one requirement: that the Authority comply with a very simple notification procedure before evicting its tenants. Given the admittedly insubstantial effect this requirement has upon the basic lease agreement under which the Authority discharges its management responsibilities, the contention that the circular violates the congressional policy of allowing local authorities to retain maximum control over the administration of federally financed housing projects is untenable. </s> The Authority also argues that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment HUD is powerless to impose any obligations except those mutually agreed upon in the annual contributions contract. 31 If HUD's [393 U.S. 268, 279] power is not so limited, the Authority argues, HUD would be free to impair its contractual obligations to the Authority through unilateral action. Moreover, in this particular case, the Authority contends that HUD has not only impaired its own contract with the Authority, but it has also impaired the contract between petitioner and the Authority. The obligations of each of these contracts, however, can be impaired only "by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them . . . [or by a law] which without destroying [the] contracts derogate[s] from substantial contractual rights." 32 The HUD circular does neither. </s> The respective obligations of both HUD and the Authority under the annual contributions contract remain unchanged. Each provision of that contract is as enforceable now as it was prior to the issuance of the circular. 33 Although the circular supplements the contract in the sense that it imposes upon the Authority an additional obligation not contained in the contract, that obligation is imposed under HUD's wholly independent rule-making power. </s> Likewise, the lease agreement between the Authority and petitioner remains inviolate. Petitioner must still pay her rent and comply with the other terms of the lease; and, as the Authority itself acknowledges, she is still subject to eviction. 34 HUD has merely provided for a particular type of notification that must precede [393 U.S. 268, 280] eviction; and "[i]n modes of proceeding and forms to enforce the contract the legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not deny a remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right." 35 </s> Since the Authority does not argue that the circular is proscribed by any constitutional provision other than the Due Process Clause, the only remaining inquiry is whether it is reasonably related to the purposes of the [393 U.S. 268, 281] enabling legislation under which it was promulgated. 36 One of the specific purposes of the federal housing acts is to provide "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family" 37 that lacks the financial means of providing such a home without governmental aid. A procedure requiring housing authorities to explain why they are evicting a tenant who is apparently among those people in need of such assistance certainly furthers this goal. We therefore cannot hold that the circular's requirements bear no reasonable relationship to the purposes for which HUD's rule-making power was authorized. </s> III. </s> The Housing Authority also urges that petitioner's eviction should be upheld on the theory relied upon by the Supreme Court of North Carolina: the circular does not apply to eviction proceedings commenced prior to its issuance. The general rule, however, is that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision. 38 Since the law we are concerned with in this case is embodied in a federal administrative regulation, the applicability of this general rule is necessarily [393 U.S. 268, 282] governed by federal law. Chief Justice Marshall explained the rule over 150 years ago as follows: </s> "[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If the law be constitutional, . . . I know of no court which can contest its obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns . . . the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside." 39 </s> This same reasoning has been applied where the change was constitutional, 40 statutory, 41 or judicial. 42 Surely it applies with equal force where the change is made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization. Exceptions have been made to prevent manifest injustice, 43 but this is not such a case. </s> To the contrary, the general rule is particularly applicable here. The Housing Authority concedes that its power to evict is limited at least to the extent that it may not evict a tenant for engaging in constitutionally [393 U.S. 268, 283] protected activity; 44 but a tenant would have considerable difficulty effectively defending against such an admittedly illegal eviction if the Authority were under no obligation to disclose its reasons. 45 On the other hand, requiring the Authority to apply the circular before evicting petitioner not only does not infringe upon any of its rights, but also does not even constitute an imposition. The Authority admitted during oral argument that it has already begun complying with the circular. 46 It refuses to apply it to petitioner simply because it decided to evict her before the circular was issued. Since petitioner has not yet vacated, we fail to see the significance of this distinction. We conclude, therefore, that the circular should be applied to all tenants still residing in McDougald Terrace, including petitioner, not only because it is designed to insure a fairer eviction procedure in general, but also because the prescribed notification is essential to remove a serious impediment to the successful protection of constitutional rights. </s> IV. </s> Petitioner argues that in addition to holding the HUD circular applicable to her case, we must also establish guidelines to insure that she is provided with not only [393 U.S. 268, 284] the reasons for her eviction but also a hearing that comports with the requirements of due process. We do not sit, however, "to decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions . . . or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its decision . . . ." 47 The Authority may be able to provide petitioner with reasons that justify eviction under the express terms of the lease. In that event, she may decide to vacate voluntarily without contesting the Authority's right to have her removed. And if she challenges the reasons offered, the Authority may well decide to afford her the full hearing she insists is essential. 48 Moreover, even if the Authority does not provide such a hearing, we have no reason to believe that once petitioner is told the reasons for her eviction she cannot effectively challenge their legal sufficiency in whatever eviction proceedings may be brought in the North Carolina courts. Thus, with the case in this posture, a decision on petitioner's constitutional claims would be premature. 49 </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "This lease shall be automatically renewed for successive terms of one month each at the rental last entered and acknowledged below . . . . Provided, there is no change in the income or composition of the family of the tenant and no violation of the terms hereof. In the event of any change in the composition or income of the family of the tenant, rent for the premises shall automatically conform to the rental rates established in the approved current rent schedule which has been adopted by the Management for the operation of this Project . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 "This lease may be terminated by the Tenant by giving to Management notice in writing of such termination 15 days prior to the last day of the term. The Management may terminate this lease by giving to the Tenant notice in writing of such termination fifteen (15) days prior to the last day of the term. Provided, however, that this paragraph shall not be construed to prevent the termination of this lease by Management in any other method or for any other cause set forth in this lease." </s> The Housing Authority construes this provision to authorize termination upon the giving of the required notice even if the tenant has not violated the terms of the lease and his income and family composition have not changed. Petitioner, however, insists that since the Authority is a government agency, it may not constitutionally evict "for no reason at all, or for an unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious reason . . . ." Brief for Petitioner 27. We do not, however, reach that issue in this case. See n. 49, infra. </s> [Footnote 3 The text of the notice is as follows: </s> "Your Dwelling Lease provides that the Lease may be cancelled upon fifteen (15) days written notice. This is to notify you that your Dwelling Lease will be cancelled effective August 31, 1965, at which time you will be required to vacate the premises you now occupy." </s> [Footnote 4 One of those attempts was made on September 1. In an affidavit filed with the Superior Court of Durham County, petitioner alleged that on that day members of the Housing Authority met with a Durham police detective who had been investigating petitioner's conduct. Although petitioner's attorney met with Housing Authority representatives on this same day to request a hearing, the attorney was not informed what information had been uncovered by the police investigation or whether it had any bearing on petitioner's eviction. </s> [Footnote 5 All of the essential facts were stipulated in the Superior Court, including: </s> "that if Mr. C. S. Oldham, the Executive Director of the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, were present and duly sworn and were testifying, he would testify that whatever reason there may have been, if any, for giving notice to Joyce C. Thorpe of the termination of her lease, it was not for the reason that she was elected [393 U.S. 268, 272] president of any group organized in McDougald Terrace, and specifically it was not for the reason that she was elected president of any group organized in McDougald Terrace on August 10, 1965 . . . ." </s> [Footnote 6 267 N.C. 431, 148 S. E. 2d 290 (1966). </s> [Footnote 7 385 U.S. 967 . </s> [Footnote 8 The full text of that circular is as follows: </s> DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Washington, D.C. 20410 </s> Circular 2-7-67 </s> Office of the Assistant Secretary For Renewal and Housing Assistance </s> TO: Local Housing Authorities Assistant Regional Administrators for Housing Assistance HAA Division and Branch Heads </s> FROM: Don Hummel </s> SUBJECT: Terminations of Tenancy in Low-Rent Projects </s> Within the past year increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed with eviction practices in public low-rent housing projects. During [393 U.S. 268, 273] that period a number of suits have been filed throughout the United States generally challenging the right of a Local Authority to evict a tenant without advising him of the reasons for such eviction. </s> Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish. </s> In addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any proposed eviction action, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain a written record of every eviction from its federally assisted public housing. Such records are to be available for review from time to time by HUD representatives and shall contain the following information: </s> 1. Name of tenant and identification of unit occupied. </s> 2. Date of notice to vacate. </s> 3. Specific reason(s) for notice to vacate. For example, if a tenant is being evicted because of undesirable actions, the record should detail the actions which resulted in the determination that eviction should be instituted. </s> 4. Date and method of notifying tenant with summary of any conferences with tenant, including names of conference participants. </s> 5. Date and description of final action taken. </s> The Circular on the above subject from the PHA Commissioner, dated May 31, 1966, is superseded by this Circular. </s> s/ Don Hummel Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance </s> [Footnote 9 386 U.S. 670, 673 -674 (1967). </s> [Footnote 10 271 N.C. 468, 471, 157 S. E. 2d 147, 150 (1967). </s> [Footnote 11 271 N.C., at 470, 157 S. E. 2d, at 149. </s> [Footnote 12 390 U.S. 942 (1968). </s> [Footnote 13 The Supreme Court of North Carolina stayed the execution of its judgment pending our decision. As a result, petitioner has not yet vacated her apartment. </s> [Footnote 14 Under 10 (a) of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 891, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1410 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. III), HUD is required to enter into an annual contributions contract with the local housing authorities. In that contract, HUD guarantees to provide a certain amount of money over a certain number of years. </s> [Footnote 15 50 Stat. 891, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1408 (1964 ed., Supp. III). </s> [Footnote 16 Housing Assistance Administration, HUD, Low-Rent Management Manual. </s> [Footnote 17 Id., 0 (preface) (April 1962). </s> [Footnote 18 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 19 Housing Assistance Administration, HUD, Low-Rent Housing Manual 100.2, at 2 (Sept. 1963). </s> [Footnote 20 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 21 Circular from Commissioner Marie C. McGuire to Local Authorities, Regional Directors, and Central Office Division and Branch Heads, May 31, 1966. </s> [Footnote 22 "[W]e intended it to be followed. . . . The circular is as binding in its present form as it will be after incorporation in the manual. . . . HUD intends to enforce the circular to the fullest extent of its ability. . . ." </s> Letter from Assistant Secretary Don Hummel to Mr. Charles S. Ralston of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., July 25, 1967. </s> [Footnote 23 HUD's Chief Counsel stated that his "views are the same as those expressed" by Assistant Secretary Hummel. Letter from Mr. Joseph Burstein to Mr. Charles S. Ralston, Aug. 7, 1967. </s> [Footnote 24 Accord, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). </s> [Footnote 25 See Udall v. Tallman, supra. </s> [Footnote 26 386 U.S. 670, 673 , n. 4 (1967). </s> [Footnote 27 This rule-making power was transferred from the Public Housing Administration to HUD by 5 (a) of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, 79 Stat. 669, 42 U.S.C. 3534 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. III). </s> [Footnote 28 50 Stat. 891, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1408 (1964 ed., Supp. III). Such broad rule-making powers have been granted to numerous other federal administrative bodies in substantially the same language. See, e. g., 72 Stat. 743, 49 U.S.C. 1324 (a) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 49 Stat. 647, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1302 (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); 52 Stat. 830, 15 U.S.C. 717o (Federal Power Commission). </s> [Footnote 29 Section 1 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 888, as amended by 501 of the Housing Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 679, 42 U.S.C. 1401. </s> [Footnote 30 Brief for Respondent 21, 23. </s> [Footnote 31 Although the constitutional prohibition of the impairment of contracts, U.S. Const. Art. I, 10, applies only to the States, we have held that "[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a State or the United States. Rights against the United States arising out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment." Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). </s> [Footnote 32 Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 431 (1934). The statute challenged in Lynch v. United States, supra, fell into the first of these two categories. It repealed "all laws granting or pertaining to yearly renewable [War Risk term] insurance . . . ." 292 U.S., at 575 . </s> [Footnote 33 A far different case would be presented if HUD were a party to this suit arguing that it could repudiate its obligations under the annual contributions contract because the Authority had failed to apply the circular. Cf. Lynch v. United States, supra. </s> [Footnote 34 Cf. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra, at 425. </s> [Footnote 35 Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714, 720 (1881). See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 , at 508 (1965); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra. </s> We have consistently upheld legislation that affects contract rights far more substantially than does the HUD circular. E. g., El Paso v. Simmons, supra, upheld a state statute that placed a time limit on the right to reinstate a claim in previously forfeited public lands; East N. Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945), upheld a New York statute suspending mortgage foreclosures for the 10th year in succession; and Blaisdell upheld a statute that extended mortgagors' redemption time. </s> There is no reason why the principles that control legislation that affects contractual rights should not also control administrative rule making that affects contractual rights. Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 779 -780 (1968), which upheld a Federal Power Commission order limiting the application of "escalation clauses" in contracts for the sale of natural gas; and 24 CFR 1.1-1.12 (1968), which proscribe a wide range of racially discriminatory practices by both governmental and private interests that receive any federal financial assistance whether or not pursuant to a pre-existing contract. This regulation was promulgated under 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1, which directs each federal agency that administers federal financial assistance "by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty . . . to effectuate the provisions of section 601 [which prohibits racial discrimination in the administration of any program receiving federal financial assistance] . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken." </s> [Footnote 36 See, e. g., FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289 -294 (1965); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953). </s> [Footnote 37 Section 2 of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413, 42 U.S.C. 1441. That section further directs all agencies of the Federal Government "having powers, functions, or duties with respect to housing . . . [to] exercise their powers, functions, and duties under this or any other law, consistently with the national housing policy declared by this Act . . . ." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 38 "A change in the law between a nisi prius and an appellate decision requires the appellate court to apply the changed law." Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943). Accord, e. g., Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934). </s> [Footnote 39 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801). </s> [Footnote 40 See, e. g., United States v. Chambers, supra. </s> [Footnote 41 See, e. g., Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U.S. 23 (1940). </s> [Footnote 42 See, e. g., Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., supra. </s> [Footnote 43 See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964), in which we held that the petitioner's right to recover lost pay for a wrongful discharge was "vested" as a result of our earlier decision in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), which we construed to have made a "final" and "favorable" determination, 376 U.S., at 159 , that petitioner had been wrongfully deprived of his employment. </s> [Footnote 44 "We do not contend that, in the case of Housing Authority leases if the purpose of the notice of termination of the lease is to proscribe the exercise of a constitutional right by the tenant the notice would be effective; the notice would be invalid, and the term of the lease and its automatic renewal would not thereby be affected." Brief for Respondent 11. </s> [Footnote 45 See generally Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 674 -681 (1967) (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 46 Transcript of Argument 28. Despite this admission, counsel for the Authority insisted throughout his oral argument that HUD has no power to require compliance with the circular. See id., at 26-27, 28, 30-32, 48-49. He even expressly suggested that the Authority could depart from its requirements "without violating any kind of Federal law." Id., at 48. </s> [Footnote 47 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, supra, at 18-20; United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961). </s> [Footnote 48 Moreover, if the procedure followed by the Authority proves inadequate, HUD may well decide to provide for an appropriate hearing. Cf. 24 CFR 1.1-1.12 (1968), which establish a detailed procedure to dispose of complaints of racial discrimination in any federally assisted program. </s> [Footnote 49 These same considerations lead us to conclude that it would be equally premature for us to reach a decision on petitioner's contention that it would violate due process for the Authority to evict her arbitrarily. That issue can be more appropriately considered if petitioner is in fact evicted arbitrarily. See Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring. </s> The Court here uses a cannon to dispose of a case that calls for no more than a popgun. The Durham Housing [393 U.S. 268, 285] Authority has clearly stated, both in its brief and at oral argument, that it is fully complying with the directive of the Department of Housing and Urban Development concerning notice to tenants of reasons for their eviction. The only possible issue therefore is whether the directive should apply to Mrs. Thorpe, against whom eviction proceedings were started prior to the effective date of the HUD memorandum but who is still residing in public housing, as a result of judicial stays. I agree, of course, that the directive should apply to her eviction. Nothing else need be decided. </s> [393 U.S. 268, 286]

United States Supreme Court REYNOLDS v. COCHRAN(1961) No. 115 Argued: March 2, 1961Decided: March 20, 1961 </s> In his petition for habeas corpus, filed in a State Supreme Court, petitioner alleged that, after he had finished serving his terms for two separate felonies of which he had been convicted and after he had been released, he was arrested by state authorities, taken to another county, and there brought to trial two days after his arrest on a charge of being a "second offender" in violation of a state statute. He further alleged that he told the trial court that he had already retained counsel for his own defense, that his counsel was on the way and was due to arrive on the day of the trial, and that he asked that his trial be postponed until his counsel arrived; but that the court denied a continuance and proceeded to convict him on the record of his two previous convictions and his admission that he had been guilty of those offenses, and he was sentenced to imprisonment. The State Supreme Court dismissed his petition without a hearing. Held: The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 526-533. </s> (a) Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to prove his claim that he had been deprived of due process by the refusal of the trial judge to grant his motion for a continuance in order that he might have the assistance of the counsel he had retained in the proceedings against him. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 . Pp. 527-531. </s> (b) If the trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion for a continuance, that error was not harmless under the facts of this case. Pp. 531-533. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Claude Pepper, acting under appointment by the Court, 363 U.S. 824 , argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> George R. Georgieff, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General. [365 U.S. 525, 526] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1956 petitioner was convicted of grand larceny in the Criminal Court of Polk County, Florida, and sentenced to serve two years in prison. In December 1957, with time for good behavior, petitioner was released from prison and discharged from custody as an absolutely free man. Some two months after his release and discharge, the Polk County prosecutor filed an information against petitioner charging that he "has been convicted of two (2) felonies under the laws of the State of Florida, contrary to Section 775.09, Florida Statutes, 1957 1 . . . and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida." The two convictions referred to were the 1956 conviction for grand larceny and a 1934 conviction for robbery for which petitioner had also completely served his sentence. Upon the filing of this information, petitioner was promptly arrested, arraigned and, according to the judgment of the trial court, "did then and there freely and voluntarily plead guilty to the Information filed." The court then proceeded to find petitioner "guilty of the offense of Second Offender" and ordered that for "said offense, [he] be confined in the State Prison of Florida at hard labor for a term of Ten (10) Years." 2 Petitioner later brought this [365 U.S. 525, 527] original petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida challenging his confinement under this judgment on the ground that it was not authorized by the Florida second-offender statute and that it violated both the State and the Federal Constitutions in several different respects. Despite the fact that none of the charges made by petitioner were denied by the State, the Florida court dismissed his petition without a hearing. 3 We granted certiorari to consider the correctness of this peremptory denial of the petition in view of the serious nature of the charges made. 4 </s> Since it is conceded by the State that the federal questions presented here were properly raised and passed on below, and since it is clear that for the purposes of this proceeding the facts set forth by petitioner must be accepted as true, 5 we go directly to the charges made in [365 U.S. 525, 528] the petition. Those charges were clearly stated by petitioner himself in the following excerpt from his rather crudely drawn application for habeas corpus: </s> "Your petitioner would show this Honorable Court that at the time of his arrest he was living in Valusia County, DeLand Florida, that he was arrested without a warrant, that he was arrested on strength of a pick up order from Sheriff Office, Bartow, Polk County, Florida, that the arresting officer, a deputy sheriff of Volusia County did not know why he was arresting your petitioner and did not have a warrant to make a legal arrest, further that your petitioner was taken against his will across five (5) county lines. The said county lines being Volusia, Seminole, Orange, Osceala, into Polk County all of State of Florida, without his knowing why he was arrested or the arresting officer knowing why or what charge he was making arrest for; Your petitioner, was taken across the afore said counties by the arresting officer, a deputy sheriff of Volusia County, Florida. </s> "Your petitioner contends that once he was in the clutches of the Criminal Court of Record in and for Polk County Florida; he was a convicted person before he was ever tried. </s> "To support the above statement your petitioner would show that he was forced to go before the court against his will; that once before the court your petitioner informed the court that he then had legal counsel on the way to represent him in what ever charge may be; a better description of afore said known by Mrs. Sadie M. Bradley, 317 West Minncasata Avenue, DeLand Volusia County, Florida, and, D.C. Laird; attorney at Law, Lakeland Polk Florida. That petitioner had been arrested on the 18th day of February 1958 in Valusia County, and [365 U.S. 525, 529] his attorney was to arrive this morning this date being the 20th day of February 1958, that after being so informed `the trial court so stated to your petitioner `you do not need counsel in this case.' Counsel would not be of any assistance you your petitioner, `No point in calling a Doctor to a man already dead.' </s> "The trial court then proceeded to read off two (2) convictions from your petitioners record and then asked, You are guilty of these two convictions, are you not? Petitioner saying yes your Honor, but the court, I find, you guilty of being a `second offender' and sentence you Stephen Franklin Reynolds to ten (10) years in State Prison . . . ." </s> On the basis of these facts, petitioner contends, among other things, that his confinement is not authorized by the Florida second-offender statute because he had already served the sentences imposed upon each of his prior convictions, 6 and that such confinement violates the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws and against double jeopardy. It would, of course, be entirely inappropriate under the circumstances of this case for this Court to consider the [365 U.S. 525, 530] questions posed under state law. Nor do we find it necessary to consider these particular questions raised under the Federal Constitution beyond the observation that they certainly cannot fairly be characterized as frivolous. 7 For we think it clear that this case must be reversed for a hearing in order to afford petitioner an opportunity to prove his allegations with regard to another constitutional claim - that he was deprived of due process by the refusal of the trial judge to grant his motion for a continuance in order that he might have the assistance of the counsel he had retained in the proceeding against him. 8 </s> In Chandler v. Fretag, 9 we made it emphatically clear that a person proceeded against as a multiple offender has a constitutional right to the assistance of his own counsel in that proceeding. Under the facts of this case, as alleged in the petition filed before the Florida Supreme Court, the decision in Chandler is squarely in point and controlling. Under those facts, the statement of this Court in Powell v. Alabama, 10 which provided the basis of our holding in Chandler, 11 is wholly applicable: "If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be [365 U.S. 525, 531] doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense." </s> The State seeks to avoid the application of the holding in Chandler on the basis of a contention that even if it was error for the trial judge to deny petitioner's motion for a continuance, that error was harmless under the facts of this case. The argument offered in support of this contention is that since petitioner admitted the only fact at issue in the proceeding - that he had been convicted of a previous felony in 1934 as charged in the information - a lawyer would have been of no use to him. We find this argument totally inadequate to meet the decision in Chandler. Even assuming, which we do not, that the deprivation to an accused of the assistance of counsel when that counsel has been privately employed could ever be termed "harmless error," 12 it is clear that such deprivation was not harmless under the facts as presented in this case. In the first place, petitioner asked for a continuance to enable him to consult with counsel before he admitted the truth of the charge of prior felony conviction. Thus, if petitioner had been allowed the assistance of his counsel when he first asked for it, we cannot know that counsel could not have found defects in the 1934 conviction that would have precluded its admission in a multiple-offender proceeding. 13 </s> Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, the State's contention that this factual issue was the only [365 U.S. 525, 532] issue in the proceeding seems to constitute an oversimplification of the matter. For, in addition to the constitutional issues mentioned above, able counsel appointed to represent petitioner in this Court has also pointed out that the proceeding involved a difficult question of statutory construction under Florida law. Counsel has pointed out, for example, that the Florida Supreme Court has never had occasion to pass upon the question whether the second-offender statute may be applied to reimprison a person who has completely satisfied the sentence imposed upon his second conviction and has been discharged from custody. In one case in which that question was argued, the Florida court found that it was not properly presented by the facts of the case before it and then went on to say: "On this question there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Court but, as it is not ripe for determination under the record here, no useful purpose could be served by discussing it." 14 Moreover, another decision of that court has indicated that the statute permitting the filing of an information against a second offender "at any time" 15 would not necessarily be interpreted so mechanically as to allow the second-offender statute to hang over a defendant's head to the end of his natural life. 16 </s> We of course express no opinion as to how this question of statutory construction should eventually be decided by the Florida courts. But its mere existence dramatically illustrates that even in the most routine-appearing proceedings the assistance of able counsel may be of [365 U.S. 525, 533] inestimable value. Plainly, such assistance might have been of great value to petitioner here. The allegations of his petition for habeas corpus indicated, if true, that he had been denied the assistance of counsel he had retained. He is entitled to a hearing to establish the truth of those allegations. The case must therefore be and is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "A person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, or under the laws of any other state, government or country, of a crime which, if committed within this state would be a felony, commits any felony within this state is punishable upon conviction of such second offense as follows: If the subsequent felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term no less than the longest term nor more than twice the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction. . . ." Fla. Stat., 1957, 775.09. </s> [Footnote 2 The theory used by the State in its proceedings against petitioner, as disclosed by the quoted recitals of the information and judgment, seems to be completely at variance with that upon which multiple-offender [365 U.S. 525, 527] proceedings are normally based. For normally the punishment provided for in a multiple-offender statute is viewed as increased punishment for the last offense in the sequence. Here, on the other hand, the theory seems to have been that petitioner, by virtue of his convictions for two previous offenses, has committed a third and entirely separate offense - to quote the judgment, "the offense of Second Offender." Because of the disposition we make of this case on other grounds, however, we need not reach the questions posed as to the constitutionality of confinement based upon such a theory. In any event, prior opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida indicate that there might be room for considerable doubt whether 775.09 authorizes confinement on such a theory. See Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 119 So. 380; Washington v. Mayo, 91 So.2d 621. </s> [Footnote 3 The Supreme Court of Florida issued no opinion, the case being disposed of with the following order: "The above-named petitioner has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to be issued to the respondent in the above entitled cause, and upon consideration thereof, it is ordered that said petition be and the same is hereby denied." </s> [Footnote 4 363 U.S. 801 . </s> [Footnote 5 Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633, 634 ; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 273 . </s> [Footnote 6 Section 775.09, set forth in n. 1, supra, is supplemented by a provision which, on its face at least, appears to condone imposition of second-offender penalties even at such a late date: "If at any time after sentence or conviction it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of crimes as set forth either in 775.09 or 775.10 the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such conviction was had, shall file an information accusing said person of such previous convictions, whereupon the court in which such conviction was had shall cause said person, whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought before it and shall inform him of the allegations contained in such information and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof, according to law, and shall require such offender to say whether he is the same person as charged in such information or not." Fla. Stat., 1957, 775.11. (Emphasis supplied.) </s> [Footnote 7 The problem presented by these questions is rather dramatically stated by petitioner himself in his petition for habeas corpus: "In the instant case how can your petitioner know when in his life he is no longer subject to have his liberty translated to imprisonment, even after expiration of the present sentence, can he again be imprisoned without committing another crime as in the instant case?? Surely this Honorable Court will not condone this practice . . . ." </s> [Footnote 8 As in Chandler v. Fretag, n. 9, infra, the petitioner here also alleged a denial of due process in that he was not given pretrial notice of the charge against him. But as in Chandler, we find it unnecessary to pass upon this contention. See 348 U.S. 3, 5 -6, n. 4. </s> [Footnote 9 348 U.S. 3 . </s> [Footnote 10 287 U.S. 45, 69 . </s> [Footnote 11 348 U.S., at 9 -10. </s> [Footnote 12 It is significant that in Chandler we did not require any showing that the defendant there would have derived any particular benefit from the assistance of counsel. </s> [Footnote 13 The proof of prior convictions in a second-offender proceeding may raise difficult evidentiary problems. See, e. g., Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 809. Moreover, it can be presumed that if an accused second offender were able to make a successful collateral attack upon his first conviction, 775.09 would not be applied. Cf. Fields v. State, 85 So.2d 609. </s> [Footnote 14 Milan v. State, 102 So.2d 595, 596. </s> [Footnote 15 See n. 6, supra. </s> [Footnote 16 In Ard v. State, 91 So.2d 166, the Florida Supreme Court held that the second-offender statute did not apply to a person who had concededly committed two felonies but who had been on probation for five years between the date of his conviction of the second felony and the filing of the second-offender information. </s> [365 U.S. 525, 534]

United States Supreme Court MULLANEY v. WILBUR(1975) No. 74-13 Argued: January 15, 1975Decided: June 9, 1975 </s> The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder, which upon conviction carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, in which case the punishment is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding 20 years. Held: The Maine rule does not comport with the requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 . To satisfy that requirement the prosecution in a homicide case in Maine must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented. Pp. 691-704. </s> 496 F.2d 1303, affirmed. </s> POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., joined, post, p. 704. </s> Vernon I. Arey, Assistant Attorney General of Maine, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Jon A. Lund, Attorney General, Richard S. Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, and Charles K. Leadbetter, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Peter J. Rubin, by appointment of the Court, 419 U.S. 1017 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The State of Maine requires a defendant charged with murder to prove that he acted "in the heat of passion on sudden provocation" in order to reduce the homicide to [421 U.S. 684, 685] manslaughter. We must decide whether this rule comports with the due process requirement, as defined in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. </s> I </s> In June 1966 a jury found respondent Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr., guilty of murder. The case against him rested on his own pretrial statement and on circumstantial evidence showing that he fatally assaulted Claude Hebert in the latter's hotel room. Respondent's statement, introduced by the prosecution, claimed that he had attacked Hebert in a frenzy provoked by Hebert's homosexual advance. The defense offered no evidence, but argued that the homicide was not unlawful since respondent lacked criminal intent. Alternatively, Wilbur's counsel asserted that at most the homicide was manslaughter rather than murder, since it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault. </s> The trial court instructed the jury that Maine law recognizes two kinds of homicide, murder and manslaughter, and that these offenses are not subdivided into different degrees. The common elements of both are that the homicide be unlawful - i. e., neither justifiable nor excusable 1 - and that it be intentional. 2 The prosecution is required to prove these elements by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and only if they are [421 U.S. 684, 686] so proved is the jury to consider the distinction between murder and manslaughter. </s> In view of the evidence the trial court drew particular attention to the difference between murder and manslaughter. After reading the statutory definitions of both offenses, 3 the court charged that "malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder," App. 40, without which the homicide would be manslaughter. The jury was further instructed, however, that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. 4 The court emphasized that "malice aforethought [421 U.S. 684, 687] and heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things," id., at 62; thus, by proving the latter the defendant would negate the former and reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The court then concluded its charge with elaborate definitions of "heat of passion" 5 and "sudden provocation." 6 </s> After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury twice returned to request further instruction. It first sought reinstruction on the doctrine of implied malice aforethought, and later on the definition of "heat of passion." Shortly after the second reinstruction, the jury found respondent guilty of murder. </s> Respondent appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, arguing that he had been denied due process because he was required to negate the element of malice aforethought by proving that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. He claimed that under Maine law malice aforethought was an essential element of the crime of murder - indeed that it was the sole element distinguishing murder from manslaughter. Respondent contended, therefore, that this Court's decision in Winship requires the prosecution to prove the existence of that element beyond a reasonable doubt. [421 U.S. 684, 688] </s> The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, 7 holding that in Maine murder and manslaughter are not distinct crimes but, rather, different degrees of the single generic offense of felonious homicide. State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d 139 (1971). The court further stated that for more than a century it repeatedly had held that the prosecution could rest on a presumption of implied malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. With respect to Winship, which was decided after respondent's trial, 8 the court noted that it did not anticipate the application of the Winship principle to a factor such as the heat of passion on sudden provocation. </s> Respondent next successfully petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (Me. 1972). The District Court ruled that under the Maine statutes murder and manslaughter are distinct offenses, not different degrees of a single offense. The court further held that "[m]alice aforethought is made the distinguishing element of the offense of murder, and it is expressly excluded as an element of the offense of manslaughter." Id., at 153. Thus, the District Court concluded, Winship requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt; it cannot rely on a presumption of implied malice, which requires the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. [421 U.S. 684, 689] </s> The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, subscribing in general to the District Court's analysis and construction of Maine law. 473 F.2d 943 (1973). Although recognizing that "within broad limits a state court must be the one to interpret its own laws," the court nevertheless ruled that "a totally unsupportable construction which leads to an invasion of constitutional due process is a federal matter." Id., at 945. The Court of Appeals equated malice aforethought with "premeditation," id., at 947, and concluded that Winship requires the prosecution to prove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. </s> Following this decision, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court decided the case of State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 (1973), in which it sharply disputed the First Circuit's view that it was entitled to make an independent determination of Maine law. The Maine court also reaffirmed its earlier opinion that murder and manslaughter are punishment categories of the single offense of felonious homicide. Accordingly, if the prosecution proves a felonious homicide the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to receive the lesser penalty prescribed for manslaughter. 9 </s> In view of the Lafferty decision we granted certiorari in this case and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). On [421 U.S. 684, 690] remand, that court again applied Winship, this time to the Maine law as construed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. 496 F.2d 1303 (1974). Looking to the "substance" of that law, the court found that the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation results in significant differences in the penalties and stigma attaching to conviction. For these reasons the Court of Appeals held that the principles enunciated in Winship control, and that to establish murder the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. </s> Because of the importance of the issues presented, we again granted certiorari. 419 U.S. 823 (1974). We now affirm. </s> II </s> We reject at the outset respondent's position that we follow the analysis of the District Court and the initial opinion of the First Circuit, both of which held that murder and manslaughter are distinct crimes in Maine, and that malice aforethought is a fact essential to the former and absent in the latter. Respondent argues that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state law should not be deemed binding on this Court since it marks a radical departure from prior law, 10 leads to internally [421 U.S. 684, 691] inconsistent results, and is a transparent effort to circumvent Winship. This Court, however, repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law, see, e. g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and that we are bound by their constructions except in extreme circumstances not present here. 11 Accordingly, we accept as binding the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state homicide law. </s> III </s> The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case, can be stated succinctly: Absent justification or excuse, all intentional or criminally reckless killings are felonious homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murder - i. e., by life imprisonment - unless the defendant proves [421 U.S. 684, 692] by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, in which case it is punished as manslaughter - i. e., by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment not to exceed 20 years. The issue is whether the Maine rule requiring the defendant to prove that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation accords with due process. </s> A </s> Our analysis may be illuminated if this issue is placed in historical context. 12 At early common law only those homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were considered justifiable; all others were deemed unlawful and were punished by death. Gradually, however, the severity of the common-law punishment for homicide abated. Between the 13th and 16th centuries the class of justifiable homicides expanded to include, for example, accidental homicides and those committed in self-defense. Concurrently, the widespread use of capital punishment was ameliorated further by extension of the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligible for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that effected a transfer from the secular to the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. And under ecclesiastic law a person who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he received a one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and was required to forfeit his goods. At the turn of the 16th century, English rulers, concerned with the accretion of ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, enacted a series of statutes eliminating the benefit of [421 U.S. 684, 693] clergy in all cases of "murder of malice prepensed." 13 Unlawful homicides that were committed without such malice were designated "manslaughter," and their perpetrators remained eligible for the benefit of clergy. </s> Even after ecclesiastic jurisdiction was eliminated for all secular offenses the distinction between murder and manslaughter persisted. It was said that "manslaughter, when voluntary, 14 arises from the sudden heat of the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *190. Malice aforethought was designated as the element that distinguished the two crimes, but it was recognized that such malice could be implied by law as well as proved by evidence. Absent proof that an unlawful homicide resulted from "sudden and sufficiently violent provocation," the homicide was "presumed to be malicious." 15 Id., at *201. In view of this presumption, the early English authorities, relying on the case of The King v. Oneby, 92 Eng. Rep. 465 (K. B. 1727), held that once the prosecution proved that the accused had committed the homicide, it was "incumbent upon the prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction of the court and jury" "all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries [421 U.S. 684, 694] *201. See M. Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762). Thus, at common law the burden of proving heat of passion on sudden provocation appears to have rested on the defendant. 16 </s> In this country the concept of malice aforethought took on two distinct meanings: in some jurisdictions it came to signify a substantive element of intent, requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; in other jurisdictions it remained a policy presumption, indicating only that absent proof to the contrary a homicide was presumed not to have occurred in the heat of passion. See State v. Rollins, 295 A. 2d 914, 918-919 (Me. 1972). See generally Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale L. J. 537, 548-549, 566-568 (1934). 17 In a landmark case, Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93 (1845), Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was required to negate malice aforethought by proving by a preponderance [421 U.S. 684, 695] of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion. 18 Initially, York was adopted in Maine 19 as well as in several other jurisdictions. 20 In 1895, however, in [421 U.S. 684, 696] the context of deciding a question of federal criminal procedure, this Court explicitly considered and unanimously rejected the general approach articulated in York. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 . 21 And, in the past half century, the large majority of States have abandoned York and now require the prosecution to prove the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 539-540 (1972). 22 </s> This historical review establishes two important points. First, the fact at issue here - the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation - has been, almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide. And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving this fact. See generally Fletcher, supra, n. 16; H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 137-139 (1968). </s> B </s> Petitioners, the warden of the Maine Prison and the State of Maine, argue that despite these considerations [421 U.S. 684, 697] Winship should not be extended to the present case. They note that as a formal matter the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a "fact necessary to constitute the crime" of felonious homicide in Maine. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 364 (emphasis supplied). This distinction is relevant, according to petitioners, because in Winship the facts at issue were essential to establish criminality in the first instance, whereas the fact in question here does not come into play until the jury already has determined that the defendant is guilty and may be punished at least for manslaughter. In this situation, petitioners maintain, the defendant's critical interests in liberty and reputation are no longer of paramount concern since, irrespective of the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation, he is likely to lose his liberty and certain to be stigmatized. 23 In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those facts which, if not proved, would wholly exonerate the defendant. </s> This analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law of Maine, like that of other jurisdictions, is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also [421 U.S. 684, 698] with the degree of criminal culpability. Maine has chosen to distinguish those who kill in the heat of passion from those who kill in the absence of this factor. Because the former are less "blameworth[y]," State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d, at 671, 673 (concurring opinion), they are subject to substantially less severe penalties. By drawing this distinction, while refusing to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests found critical in Winship. </s> The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty. The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when viewed in terms of the potential difference in restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the distinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes. </s> Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. An extreme example of this approach can be fashioned from the law challenged in this case. Maine divides the single generic offense of felonious homicide into three distinct punishment categories - murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. Only the first two of these categories require that the homicidal act either be [421 U.S. 684, 699] intentional or the result of criminally reckless conduct. See State v. Lafferty, supra, at 670-672 (concurring opinion). But under Maine law these facts of intent are not general elements of the crime of felonious homicide. See Brief for Petitioners 10 n. 5. Instead, they bear only on the appropriate punishment category. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a life sentence for any felonious homicide - even one that traditionally might be considered involuntary manslaughter - unless the defendant was able to prove that his act was neither intentional nor criminally reckless. 24 </s> Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism. 25 The rationale of that case requires an analysis that looks to the "operation and effect of the law as applied and enforced by the State," St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914), and to the interests of both the State and the defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of proof. </s> In Winship the Court emphasized the societal interests in the reliability of jury verdicts: 26 </s> "The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal [421 U.S. 684, 700] prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. . . . </s> "Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned." 397 U.S., at 363 , 364. </s> These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this case than they were in Winship itself. Petitioner there faced an 18-month sentence, with a maximum possible extension of an additional four and one-half years, id., at 360, whereas respondent here faces a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant and the community's confidence in the administration of the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this case, 27 since the adjudication of delinquency involved in Winship was "benevolent" in intention, seeking to provide "a generously conceived program of compassionate treatment." Id., at 376 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting). </s> Not only are the interests underlying Winship implicated to a greater degree in this case, but in one respect the protection afforded those interests is less here. In Winship the ultimate burden of persuasion remained with the prosecution, although the standard had been reduced to proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. [421 U.S. 684, 701] In this case, by contrast, the State has affirmatively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. The result, in a case such as this one where the defendant is required to prove the critical fact in dispute, is to increase further the likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction. Such a result directly contravenes the principle articulated in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 -526 (1958): </s> "[W]here one party has at stake an interest of transcending value - as a criminal defendant his liberty - th[e] margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the [prosecution] the burden . . . of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial . . . ." </s> See also In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 370 -372 (Harlan, J., concurring). </s> C </s> It has been suggested, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 145, that because of the difficulties in negating an argument that the homicide was committed in the heat of passion the burden of proving this fact should rest on the defendant. No doubt this is often a heavy burden for the prosecution to satisfy. The same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts in a criminal trial. But this is the traditional burden which our system of criminal justice deems essential. </s> Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court itself acknowledged that most States require the prosecution to prove the absence of passion beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 146. 28 Moreover, the difficulty of meeting such an [421 U.S. 684, 702] exacting burden is mitigated in Maine where the fact at issue is largely an "objective, rather than a subjective, behavioral criterion." State v. Rollins, 295 A. 2d, at 920. In this respect, proving that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation is similar to proving any other element of intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the homicide. And although intent is typically considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, this does not, as the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 45 (1969). </s> Nor is the requirement of proving a negative unique in our system of criminal jurisprudence. 29 Maine itself requires the prosecution to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Millett, 273 A. 2d 504 (1971). 30 Satisfying this burden imposes an obligation that, in all practical effect, is identical to the burden involved in negating the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Thus, we discern no unique hardship on the prosecution that would justify requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proving a fact so critical to criminal culpability. 31 </s> [421 U.S. 684, 703] </s> IV </s> Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable result in a society where, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, it is far worse to sentence one guilty only of manslaughter as a murderer than to sentence a murderer for the lesser [421 U.S. 684, 704] crime of manslaughter. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 372 (concurring opinion). We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. Accordingly, the judgment below is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 As examples of justifiable or excusable homicides, the court mentioned a soldier in battle, a policeman in certain circumstances, and an individual acting in self-defense. App. 38. </s> [Footnote 2 The court elaborated that an intentional homicide required the jury to find "either that the defendant intended death, or that he intended an act which was calculated and should have been understood by [a] person of reason to be one likely to do great bodily harm and that death resulted." Id., at 37. </s> [Footnote 3 The Maine murder statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, 2651 (1964), provides: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." The manslaughter statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, 2551 (1964), in relevant part provides: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice afore-thought . . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years . . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 The trial court also explained the concept of express malice aforethought, which required a "premeditated design to kill" thereby manifesting a "general malignancy and disregard for human life which proceeds from a heart void of social duty and fatally bent on mischief." App. 40-42. Despite this instruction, the court repeatedly made clear that express malice need not be established since malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that he acted in the heat of passion. Hence, the instruction on express malice appears to have been wholly unnecessary, as the Maine Supreme Judicial Court subsequently held. State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 (1973). See also n. 10, infra. </s> [Footnote 5 "Heat of passion . . . means that at the time of the act the reason is disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might [make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to act irrationally without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than judgment." App. 47. </s> [Footnote 6 "[H]eat of passion will not avail unless upon sudden provocation. Sudden means happening without previous notice or with very brief notice; coming unexpectedly, precipitated, or unlooked for. . . . It is not every provocation, it is not every rage of passion that will reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter. The provocation must be of such a character and so close upon the act of killing, that for a moment a person could be - that for a moment the defendant could be considered as not being the master of his own understanding." Id., at 47-48. </s> [Footnote 7 Respondent did not object to the relevant instructions at trial. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless found the issue cognizable on appeal because it had "constitutional implications." State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d 139, 144 (1971). </s> [Footnote 8 The Maine court concluded that Winship should not be applied retroactively. We subsequently decided, however, that Winship should be given complete retroactive effect. Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972). </s> [Footnote 9 The Maine court emphasized that, contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, malice aforethought connotes no substantive fact (such as premeditation), but rather is solely a policy presumption. Under its interpretation of state law, the Maine court would require proof of the same element of intent for both murder and manslaughter, the distinction being that in the latter case the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the defendant to act in the heat of passion. 309 A. 2d, at 670-671 (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 10 Respondent relies on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). In that case a State Supreme Court's reinterpretation of a criminal statute was so novel as to be "unforeseeable" and therefore deprived the defendants of fair notice of the possible criminality of their acts at the time they were committed. Thus, the retroactive application of the new interpretation was itself a denial of due process. See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). In this case, as respondent apparently concedes, Brief for Respondent 12, there was no comparable prejudice to respondent since in Maine the burden of proving heat of passion has rested on the defendant for more than a century. See, [421 U.S. 684, 691] e. g., State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 137-138 (1857). To be sure, the trial court instructed the jury on the concept of express malice aforethought, see n. 4, supra, a concept that was subsequently stripped of its vitality by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. But the trial court explicitly stated that express malice aforethought need not be shown since malice would be implied from the unlawful homicide. In considering these instructions as a whole, see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973), we discern no prejudice to respondent. </s> [Footnote 11 On rare occasions the Court has re-examined a state-court interpretation of state law when it appears to be an "obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue." Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945). See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. Ketcham, 194 U.S. 579 (1904). In this case the Maine court's interpretation of state law, even assuming it to be novel, does not frustrate consideration of the due process issue, as the Maine court itself recognized, State v. Wilbur, 278 A. 2d, at 146, and as the remainder of this opinion makes clear. See generally Comment, Due Process and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism After Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974). </s> [Footnote 12 Much of this history was set out in the Court's opinion in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 -198 (1971). See also 3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 1-107 (1883); 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 478-487 (2d ed. 1909). </s> [Footnote 13 12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496); 4 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1512); 23 Hen. 8, c. 1, 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, 10 (1547). </s> [Footnote 14 Blackstone also referred to a class of homicides called involuntary manslaughter. Such homicides were committed by accident in the course of perpetrating another unlawful, although not felonious, act. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *192-193. This offense, with some modification and elaboration, generally has been recognized in this country. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 70-77 (2d ed. 1969). </s> [Footnote 15 Thus it appears that the concept of express malice aforethought was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden provocation it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder. In this respect, Maine law appears to follow the old common law. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B. U. L. Rev. 973, 986-999 (1974). </s> [Footnote 16 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 880, 904-907 (1968), disputes this conclusion, arguing that the reliance on Oneby's case was misplaced. In Oneby the jury returned a special verdict making specific findings of fact. No finding was made with respect to provocation. Absent such a finding the court held that the homicide was murder. Fletcher maintains that in the context of a special verdict it is impossible to determine whether the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of going forward with "some evidence" or the ultimate burden of persuading the jury. See also n. 20, infra. </s> [Footnote 17 Several jurisdictions also divided murder into different degrees, typically limiting capital punishment to first-degree murder and requiring the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation in order to establish that offense. See Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 759 (1949); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 703-707 (1937). </s> [Footnote 18 Justice Wilde dissented, arguing that the Commonwealth was required to prove all facts necessary to establish murder, including malice aforethought, which in turn required it to negate the suggestion that the killing occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. He also rejected the doctrine of implied malice on the ground that "[n]o malice can be inferred from the mere act of killing. Such a presumption, therefore, is arbitrary and unfounded." 50 Mass., at 128. </s> [Footnote 19 State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857). </s> [Footnote 20 See cases cited in Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 903 nn. 77-79. Some confusion developed, however, as to precisely what York required. Contemporary writers divide the general notion of "burden of proof" into a burden of producing some probative evidence on a particular issue and a burden of persuading the factfinder with respect to that issue by a standard such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a fair preponderance of the evidence. See, e. g., E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 336 (2d ed. 1972). This distinction apparently was not well recognized at the time York was decided, and thus in some jurisdictions it was unclear whether the defendant was required to bear the production burden or the persuasion burden on the issue of heat of passion. See, e. g., cases discussed in People v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 315-323, 187 N. W. 2d 434, 441-446 (1971). Indeed, 10 years after the decision in York, Chief Justice Shaw explained that "the doctrine of York's case was that where the killing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing further is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of murder." Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 69 Mass. 463, 465 (1855) (emphasis in original). He further noted that this presumption did not govern when there was evidence indicating that the defendant might have acted in the heat of passion. In that situation, "if the jury, upon all the circumstances, are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the homicide] was done with malice, they will return a verdict of murder; otherwise, they will find the defendant guilty of manslaughter." Id., at 466. Thus, even the author of York quickly limited its scope to require only that the accused produce some evidence on the issue of passion; that is, that he satisfy the production but not the persuasion burden. Other [421 U.S. 684, 696] jurisdictions blurred the distinction between these two burdens by requiring the defendant to prove "to the satisfaction of the jury" that he acted in the heat of passion. See, e. g., State v. Willis, 63 N.C. 26 (1868). </s> [Footnote 21 In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Court declined to apply the specific holding of Davis - that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt - to the States. </s> [Footnote 22 See also State v. Cuevas, 488 P.2d 322 (Haw. 1971) (Winship requires the prosecution to prove malice aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt). England also now requires the prosecution to negate heat of passion on sudden provocation by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1942. A. C. 1; see Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935. A. C. 462. </s> [Footnote 23 Relying on Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), and McGautha v. California, 402 U.S., at 196 , petitioners seek to buttress this contention by arguing that since the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation affects only the extent of punishment it should be considered a matter within the traditional discretion of the sentencing body and therefore not subject to rigorous due process demands. But cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). There is no incompatibility between our decision today and the traditional discretion afforded sentencing bodies. Under Maine law the jury is given no discretion as to the sentence to be imposed on one found guilty of felonious homicide. If the defendant is found to be a murderer, a mandatory life sentence results. On the other hand, if the jury finds him guilty only of manslaughter it remains for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion to impose a sentence within the statutorily defined limits. </s> [Footnote 24 Many States impose different statutory sentences on different degrees of assault. If Winship were limited to a State's definition of the elements of a crime, these States could define all assaults as a single offense and then require the defendant to disprove the elements of aggravation - e. g., intent to kill or intent to rob. But see State v. Ferris, 249 A. 2d 523 (Me. 1969) (prosecution must prove elements of aggravation in criminal assault case by proof beyond a reasonable doubt). </s> [Footnote 25 Indeed, in Winship itself the Court invalidated the burden of proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding even though delinquency was not formally considered a "crime" under state law. 397 U.S., at 365 -366; id., at 373-374 (Harlan, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 26 See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972). </s> [Footnote 27 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968): "The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken `as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.'" Quoting from District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937). </s> [Footnote 28 See supra, at 696. See also 38 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1973). Many States do require the defendant to show that there is "some evidence" indicating that he acted in the heat of passion before requiring the prosecution to negate this element by proving the absence of [421 U.S. 684, 702] passion beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 539 (1972); Perkins, supra, n. 14, at 50-51. See also nn. 16 & 20, supra. Nothing in this opinion is intended to affect that requirement. See also n. 30, infra. </s> [Footnote 29 See generally F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 320 (9th ed. 1884); Model Penal Code 1.13, Comment, p. 110 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, supra, n. 16, at 883, and n. 14. </s> [Footnote 30 In Millet the Maine Supreme Judicial Court adopted the "majority rule" regarding proof of self-defense. The burden of producing "some evidence" on this issue rests with the defendant, but the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the prosecution. </s> [Footnote 31 This conclusion is supported by consideration of a related line of [421 U.S. 684, 703] cases. Generally in a criminal case the prosecution bears both the production burden and the persuasion burden. In some instances, however, it is aided by a presumption, see Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (presumption of sanity), or a permissible inference, see United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (inference of knowledge from presence at an illegal still). These procedural devices require (in the case of a presumption) or permit (in the case of an inference) the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of proof with respect to the presumed or inferred fact by having satisfactorily established other facts. Thus, in effect they require the defendant to present some evidence contesting the otherwise presumed or inferred fact. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n. 11 (1973). Since they shift the production burden to the defendant, these devices must satisfy certain due process requirements. See e. g., Barnes v. United States, supra; Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). In each of these cases, however, the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remained on the prosecution. See, e. g., Barnes v. United States, supra, at 845 n. 9; Davis v. United States, supra, at 484-488. Shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant obviously places an even greater strain upon him since he no longer need only present some evidence with respect to the fact at issue; he must affirmatively establish that fact. Accordingly, the Due Process Clause demands more exacting standards before the State may require a defendant to bear this ultimate burden of persuasion. See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L. J. 165 (1969). </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring. </s> While I join in the Court's opinion, the somewhat peculiar posture of the case as it comes to us leads me to add these observations. </s> Respondent made no objection to the trial court's instruction respecting the burden of proof on the issue of whether he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Nonetheless, on his appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, that court considered his objection to the charge on its merits and held the charge to be a correct statement of Maine law. It neither made any point of respondent's failure to object to the instruction in the trial court, * nor did it give any consideration to the doctrine long approved by this Court that the [421 U.S. 684, 705] instructions to the jury are not to be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). It likewise expressed no view on whether, even though the instruction might have amounted to constitutional error, that error could have been harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Its reason for not treating the possibility that the error was harmless may have been because, as this Court's opinion points out, ante, at 687, the jury came back in the midst of its deliberations and requested further instructions on the doctrine of implied malice aforethought and the definition of "heat of passion." </s> The case which has now reached us through the route of federal habeas corpus, therefore, is a highly unusual one which does present the abstract question of law isolated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine and now decided here. </s> I agree with the Court that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), does require that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element which constitutes the crime charged against a defendant. I see no inconsistency between that holding and the holding of Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). In the latter case this Court held that there was no constitutional requirement that the State shoulder the burden of proving the sanity of the defendant. </s> The Court noted in Leland that the issue of insanity as a defense to a criminal charge was considered by the jury only after it had found that all elements of the offense, including the mens rea, if any, required by state law, had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 792, 795. Although as the state court's instructions in Leland recognized, id., at 794-795, evidence relevant [421 U.S. 684, 706] to insanity as defined by state law may also be relevant to whether the required mens rea was present, the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime. For this reason, Oregon's placement of the burden of proof of insanity on Leland, unlike Maine's redefinition of homicide in the instant case, did not effect an unconstitutional shift in the State's traditional burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all necessary elements of the offense. Id., at 795. Both the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in In re Winship, supra, stress the importance of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as "bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 397 U.S., at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). Having once met that rigorous burden of proof that, for example, in a case such as this, the defendant not only killed a fellow human being, but did it with malice aforethought, the State could quite consistently with such a constitutional principle conclude that a defendant who sought to establish the defense of insanity, and thereby escape any punishment whatever for a heinous crime, should bear the laboring oar on such an issue. </s> [Footnote * While Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), holds that a failure to appeal through the state-court system from a constitutionally infirm judgment of conviction does not bar subsequent relief in federal habeas corpus, failure to object to a proposed instruction should stand on a different footing. It is one thing to fail to utilize the appeal process to cure a defect which already inheres in a judgment of conviction, but it is quite another to forgo making an objection or exception which might prevent the error from ever occurring. Cf. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). Here, however, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless affirmatively ruled that the issue was cognizable despite respondent's failure to object at trial. See majority opinion, ante, at 688 n. 7. And the State did not contest the propriety of consideration of the issue in federal habeas. </s> [421 U.S. 684, 707]

United States Supreme Court BAY RIDGE OPERATING CO. V. AARON(1948) No. 366 Argued: January 12, 1948Decided: June 7, 1948 </s> 334 U.S. 446 (1948) ] </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 448] </s> Messrs. Peyton Ford and Marvin C. Taylor, both of Washington, D.C., for petitioners. Mr. Monroe Goldwater, of New York City, for respondents. </s> Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present another aspect of the perplexing problem of what constitutes the regular rate of pay which the Fair Labor Standards Act requires to be used in computing the proper payment for work in excess of forty hours. The applicable provisions read as follows: 'Sec. 7. (a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 449] </s> employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce- </s> (3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.' 1 The problem posed is the method of computing the regular rate of pay for longshoremen who work in foreign and interstate commerce varying and irregular hours throughout the workweek under a collective bargaining agreement for handling cargo which provides contract straight time hourly rates for work done within a prescribed 44-hour time schedule and contract overtime rates for all work done outside the straight time hours. 2 </s> These two suits were brought as class actions on behalf of all longshoremen employed by two stevedoring companies, Bay Ridge Operating Co ., and Huron Stevedoring </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 450] </s> Corp., to recover unpaid statutory excess compensation3 in accordance with 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 4 By stipulation the claims of ten specific longshoremen in each case were severed and the two suits were consolidated for trial, leaving the claims of the other plaintiffs pending on the docket. The claims of the plaintiffs here are for the period October 1, 1943, to September 30, 1945. </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 451] </s> The terms of employment for the respondents, longshoremen working in the Port of New York, were fixed for the period in question by the collective bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremens Association and the New York Shipping Association together with certain steamship and stevedore companies. It was applicable to the two petitioners. The agreement established a 'basic working day' of eight hours and a 'basic working week,' that is, workweek, of forty-four hours; hourly rates for different types of cargo were specified for work between 8 a.m. and 12 noon and between 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. during five working days of the week, Monday through Friday, and from 8 a.m. to 12 noon on Saturday, and a different schedule of rates for work during all other hours in the workweek. The first schedule was called 'straight time' rates, and the second schedule was entitled 'overtime' rates. This opinion designates these rates as contract straight time and contract overtime. For four types of cargo the overtime rates were exactly one and a half times the straight time rates; for four other types the overtime rates were slightly less than one and a half times the straight time rates. The contract straight time rates ranged from $1.25 to $2.50 an hour. The contract overtime rates were paid for all work on Sundays and legal holidays. The contract provided for no differential for work in excess of forty hours in a week. 5 </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 452] </s> Respondents claim that their regular rate of pay under the contract for any workweek within the meaning of </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 453] </s> s 7(a), is the average hourly rate computed by dividing the total number of hours worked in any workweek for any single employer into the total compensation received from that employer during that week; and that in those workweeks in which they worked more than forty hours for any one employer they were entitled by 7(a) to statutory excess compensation for all such excess hours computed on the basis of that rate. The petitioners claim that the straight time rates are the regular rates, and that they have, therefore, with minor exceptions not presented by this review, complied with the requirements of 7(a). That is, no rates except straight time rates are to be taken into consideration in computing the regular rate. The petitioners contend that the contract overtime rates were intended to cover any earned statutory excess compensation and did cover it because they were substantially in an amount of one and one-half times the straight time rates. The District Court held that the contract straight time rates were the regular rates but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held otherwise. 6 </s> Throughout all these proceedings the petitioners have been represented by the Department of Justice, since the United States under its cost-plus contracts with the petitioners is the real party in interest. Substantially all stevedoring during the war years was performed for the account of the United States. The Solicitor General notes that prior to the decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 118 suits had been instituted on behalf of longshoremen, and since that time approximately 100 new complaints have been filed. Contracts of the same general type are said to have been in effect in all our maritime areas. Witnesses testifying before the Wages and Hours </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 454] </s> Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor stated that liability of the Government under such suits would be large. 7 The Wage and Hour Administrator has not filed a brief in the proceedings, but the Solicitor General has advised us that the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor 'believes that proper consideration was given by the court below to his interpretation of Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and that the decision below is correct.' The Administrator and the Solicitor of the Department of Labor testified at length before the House committee as to their views on the issues presented by these cases. 8 Amicus briefs have been filed by the International Longshoremens Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Waterfront Employers </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 455] </s> Association of the Pacific Coast, all urging that the decision below be reversed. In order to fix the legal issues in their factual setting, we summarize the findings of fact made by the District Court which were accepted by the Circuit Court of Appeals and are not challenged here. Most of these findings referred to in this opinion will be found in the Appendix at 162 F.2d 670. Employment in the longshore industry has always been casual in nature. The amount of work available depends on the number of ships in port and their length of stay and is consequently highly variable and unpredictable, from day to day, week to week, and season to season. Longshoremen are hired for a specific job at the 'shape,'9 which is normally held three times a day at each pier where work is available. The hiring stevedore selects the men he desires from the longshoremen who are present at the 'shape'; in some instances a group of longshoremen are hired together as a gang. The work may last only for a few hours or for as long as a week. Although some work is carried on at all hours, the stevedoring companies, since operations are then carried on at less cost, attempt to do as much work as possible during the straight time hours. </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 456] </s> The court further found that the rate for night work and holiday work had been higher than the rate for day work since at least as far back as 1887, and that since 1916, when the first agreement was made with the International Longshoremens Association, the differential had been approximately 50%. Joseph B. Ryan, President of the Association, testified that the differential was designed to shorten the total number of hours worked and to confine the work as far as possible within the scheduled forty-four hours. Despite the differential, many longshoremen were unwilling to work at night. Although some longshore work was required at all hours, except Saturday night, the District Court found that the differential had been responsible for the high degree of concentration of longshore work to the contract straight time hours. The government introduced elaborate statistical studies to show the distribution of work as between the contract straight time and contract overtime hours. From 1932 to 1937, 80% of the total hours worked were within the contract straight time hours and only 2 1/2% of the total manhours were performed by men working between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m. ( exclusive of Sundays and holidays) who had worked no straight time hours earlier that day. During the war, the proportion of work in contract overtime hours was considerably higher because of the greater volume of cargo had led; 55% of the total hours fell within the contract straight time hours, and the ratio of work in contract overtime hours by men who had not previously worked in the contract straight time hours was correspondingly higher. The respondents' employment was highly irregular; in many weeks the respondents did not work at all, and in weeks in which they did work their hours of employment varied over a wide range. The trial court concluded that </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 457] </s> the 'basic working day' and 'basic working week,' 10 meaning by these phrases the contract straight time hours, were not the periods 'normally, regularly, or usually' worked by the respondents. Finding 45. In giving judgment for the petitioners, the trial court placed emphasis on the fact that the rates in question were arrived at through bona fide collective bargaining, and were more favorable to the longshoremen than the statutory mandate required. That is, that rates as high as contract straight time rates plus statutory excess compensation were paid to all workers for all work in contract overtime hours whether required by 7(a) or not. The District Court opinion referred to Joseph B. Ryan's statement that the International Longshoremens Association was opposed to the suit 'as it might wipe out all of the gains we had made for our men over a period of 25 years,'11 It rejected respondents' alternative contentions </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 458] </s> that the regular rate was to be determined by the average rate during the first forty hours or by the average rate for all hours worked. It noted that shift differentials were usually five or ten cents an hour and seldom exceeded fifteen cents and were not designed to deter the employer from working employees during the period for which the differential was paid; in the present case the trial judge found that the 50% differential was designed to deter and actually did deter work outside contract straight time hours. Accordingly the trial court concluded that the 'collectively bargained agreement established a regular rate' under the Fair Labor Standards Act-the contract straight time rate. 69 F.Supp. 956, 958. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regular rate must be determined as an 'actual fact' and could not be arranged through a collective bargaining agreement, citing 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 , 67 S.t . 1178, 169 A.L.R. 1293. That court therefore concluded that on the basis of the findings below the regular rate must be computed by dividing the total number of hours worked into the total compensation received. The court rejected the contention that the regular rate was the average rate for the first forty hours of work, citing Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U.S. 17 . The judgment of the District Court was reversed with directions to determine the amounts due plaintiffs in the light of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84. No determination of the scope or validity of that act was attempted as those matters had not been argued. 162 F.2d 673. </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 459] </s> On account of the importance of the method of computing the regular rate of pay in employment contracts providing for extra pay, we granted certiorari. 12 332 U.S. 814 . The government adopts the view of the District Court that the contract straight time rates constituted the regular rates within the meaning of 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The government accepts, too, the reasoning of the District Court that the contract overtime rates, as they were coercive in the sense that they were intended to exert pressure on employers to carry on their activities in the straight time hours, were not regular rates and could be credited against required statutory excess compensation in the amount that the contract overtime rates exceeded the contract straight time rates. The government argues in the alternative that the 'normal, non-overtime workweek,' said to be the hours controlling the regular rate of pay, is to be determined by reference to peacetime conditions, rather than the abnormal war-time conditions, and that the statistical studies show that the work of longshoremen is sufficiently concentrated within the scheduled hours to compel the finding that the contract straight time hours are the regular working hours. The government urges also that the contract, as thus interpreted, accords with congressional purposes in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is said to reduce working hours and spread employment and to preserve the integrity of collective bargaining. We agree with the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Later in this opinion, 334 U.S. 464, 469 , 1199, we set out our reasons for concluding that the extra pay for contract overtime hours is not an overtime premium. Where there are no overtime premium payments the rule </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 460] </s> for determining the regular rate of pay is to divide the wages actually paid by the hours actually worked in any workweek and adjudge additional payment to each individual on that basis for time in excess of forty hours worked for a single employer. Any statutory excess compensation so found is of course subject to enlargement under the provisions of 16(b). Compare 11 of Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. This determination, we think, accords with the statute and the terms of the contract. (1) The statute, 7(a), expresses the intention of Congress 'to require extra pay for overtime work by those covered by the Act even though their hourly wages exceeded the statutory minimum.' The purpose was to compensate those who labored in excess of the statutory maximum number of hours for the wear and tear of extra work and to spread employment through inducing employers to shorten hours because of the pressure of extra cost. 13 The statute by its terms protects the group of employees by protecting each individual employee from overly long hours. So although only one of a thousand works more than forty hours, that one is entitled to statutory excess compensation. That excess compensation is fixed by 7( a) at 'one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.' The regular rate of pay of the respondents under this contract must therefore be found. The statute contains no definition of regular rate of pay and no rule for its determination. Contracts for pay take many forms. The rate of pay may be by the hour, by piecework, by the week, month or year, and with or without a guarantee that earnings for a period of time shall be at least a stated sum. The regular rate may vary from week to week. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 461] </s> 316 U.S. 572, 580 , 1221; Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 632 , 1227. The employee's hours may be regular or irregular. From all such wages the regular hourly rate must be extracted. As no authority was given any agency to establish regulations, courts must apply the statute to this situation without the benefit of binding interpretations within the scope of the Act by an administrative agency. 14 </s> Every contract of employment, written or oral, explicitly or implicitly includes a regular rate of pay for the person employed. Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., supra, 316 U.S. 631 ; Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., supra. We have said that 'the words 'regular rate' * * * obviously mean the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime workweek.' Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 40 , 13. See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 , 296. 'Wage divided by hours equals regular rate.' Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, supra, 316 U.S. 580 . 'The regular rate by its very nature must reflect all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received regularly during the workweek, exclusive of overtime payments. It is not an arbitrary label chosen by the parties; it is an actual fact. Once the parties have decided upon the amount of wages and the mode of payment the determination of the regular rate becomes a matter of mathematical computation, the result of which is unaffected by any designation of a contrary 'regular rate' in the wage contracts.' Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 , 424, 425, 1245. The result is an 'actual fact.' 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, supra, 331 U.S. at page 204, 67 S.Ct. at page 1181. In dealing with such a complex situation as wages throughout national industry, Congress necessarily had to </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 462] </s> rely upon judicial or administrative application of its standards in applying sanctions to individual situations. These standards had to be expressed in words of generality. The possible contract variations were unforeseeable. In Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., supra, 316 U.S. at page 634, 62 S.Ct. at page 1228, this Court refrained from rigidly defining 'regular rate' in a guaranteed weekly wage contract that met the statutory requirements of 7(a) for minimum compensation. In the Belo case the contract called for a regular or basic rate of pay above the statutory minimum and a guaranteed weekly wage of 60 times that amount. As the hourly rate was kept low in relation to the guaranteed wage, statutory overtime plus the contract hourly rate did not amount to the guaranteed weekly wage until after 54 1/2 hours were worked. 316 U.S. at page 628, 62 S.Ct. at page 1225. We refused to require division of the weekly wage actually paid by the hours actually worked to find the 'regular rate' of pay and left its determination to agreement of the parties. Where the same type of guaranteed weekly wages were involved, we have reaffirmed that decision as a narrow precedent principally because of publc reliance upon and congressional acceptance of the rule there announced. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., supra. Aside from this limitation of Belo, the case itself is not a precedent for these cases as in Belo the statutory requirements of minimum wages and statutory excess compensation were provided by the Belo contract. In these present cases no provision has been made for any statutory excess compensation and none can be earned by any respondent based on the contract overtime pay. Our assent to the Belo decision, moreover, does not imply that mere words in a contract can fix the regular rate. 15 That </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 463] </s> would not be the maintenance of a flexible definition of regular rate but a refusal to apply a statutory requirement for protecting workers against excessive hours. The results on the individual of the operations under the contract must be tested by the statute. 16 As Congress left the regular rate of pay undefined, we feel sure the purpose was to require judicial determination as to whether in fact an employee receives the full statutory excess compensation, rather than to impose a rule that in the absence of fraud or clear evasion employers and employees might fix a regular rate without regard to hours worked or sums actually received as pay. Further, we reject the argument that under the statute, an agreement reached or administered through collective bargaining is more persuasive in defining regular rate than individual contracts. Although our public policy recognizes the effectiveness of collective bargaining and encourages its use,17 nothing to our knowledge in any act authorizes us to give decisive weight to contract declarations as to the regular rate because they are the result of collective bargaining. 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, supra, 331 U.S. 202 and 204, 1181; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 432 , 1249.18 A vigorous argument is presented for petitioners by the International Longshoremens Association that a collectively obtained and administered agree- </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 464] </s> ment should be effective in determining the regular rate of pay19 but we think the words of and practices under the contract are the determinative factors in finding the regular rate for each individual. As the regular rate of pay cannot be left to a declaration by the parties as to what is to be treated as the regular rate for an employee, it must be drawn from what happens under the employment contract. We think the most reasonable conclusion is that Congress intended the regular rate of pay to be found by dividing the weekly compensation by the hours worked unless the compensation by the hours employee contains some amount that represents an overtime premium. If such overtime premium is included in the weekly pay check that must be deducted before the division. This deduction of overtime premium from the pay for the workweek results from the language of the statute. When the statute says that the employee shall receive for his excess hours one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed, it is clear to us that Congress intended to exclude overtime premium payments from the computation of the regular rate of pay. To permit overtime premium to enter into the computation of the regular rate would be to allow overtime premium on overtime premium-a pyramiding that Congress could not have intended. In order to avoid a similar double payment, we think that any overtime premium paid, even if for work during the first forty hours of the workweek, may be credited against any obligation to pay </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 465] </s> statutory excess compensation. These conclusions accord with those of the Administrator. 20 </s> The definition of overtime premium thus becomes crucial in determining the regular rate of pay. We need not pause to differentiate the situations that have been described by the word 'overtime.'21 Sometimes it is used to denote work after regular hours, sometimes work after hours fixed by contract at less than the statutory maximum hours and sometimes hours outside of a specified clock pattern without regard to whether previous work has been done, e.g., work on Sundays or holidays. It is not a word of art. See Premium Pay Provisions in Union Agreements, Monthly Labor Review, United States Department of Labor, October 1947, Vol. 65, No. 4. Overtime premium has been used in this opinion as defined in note 3. It is that extra pay for work because of previous work for a specified number of hours in the workweek or workday. It is extra pay of that kind which we think that Congress intended should be excluded from computation of regular pay. Otherwise the purpose of the statute to require payment to an employee for excess hours is expanded extravagantly by computing regular rate of pay upon a payment already made for the same purpose for which 7(a) requires extra pay, to wit, extra pay because of excess working hours. Accordingly, statutory excess compensation paid for work in excess of forty hours should not be used to figure the regular rate. Neither should similar contract excess compensation for work </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 466] </s> because of prior work be used in such a calculation. Extra pay by contract because of longer hours than the standard fixed by the contract for the day or week has the same purpose as statutory excess compensation and must likewise be excluded. 22 Under the definition, a mere higher rate paid as a job differential or as a shift differential, or for Sunday or holiday work, is not an overtime premium. It is immaterial in determining the character of the extra pay that an employee actually has worked at a lower rate earlier in the workweek prior to the receipt of the higher rate. The higher rate must be paid because of the hours previously worked for the extra pay to be an overtime premium. </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 467] </s> The trial court refused to accept the respondents' contention that the contract overtime rate was a shift differential, partly because it was felt that such a holding would have a disruptive effect on national economy. 69 F.Supp. 958, 959. We use as examples three illustrations employed by the District Court to illustrate its understanding of the effect of respondents' contentions to employment situations. That court thought these illustrations indicated additional liability from the employer under 7(a).23 We do not agree. Our conclusions as to the trial court's illustrations vary from those of the trial court because that court did not deduct overtime premiums, as we have defined them, actually paid from the weekly wage before dividing by the hours worked. See quotation from Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., supra, at page 461, this opinion. (1) The employment contract calls for an overtime premium for work beyond thirty-six hours. Such extra pay should not be included as weekly wages in any computation of the regular rate at which a man works. 24 (2) A contract </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 468] </s> provides for payment of time and a half for work in excess of eight hours in a single workday. An employee who works five ten-hour days would have no claim for statutory excess compensation if paid the amount due by the contract. 25 Or (3) a contract provides for a rate of $1 an hour for the first 40 hours and $1.50 for all excess hours; an employee works 48 hours and receives $52. To find his regular rate of employment, the overtime premium of $4 should be deducted and the resulting sum divided by 48 hours. 26 On the other hand, a man might be employed as a night watchman on an eight-hour shift at time and a half the wage rate of day watchmen. This would be extra pay for undesirable hours. It is a shift differential. It would not be overtime premium pay but would be included in the computation for determining overtime premium for any excess hours. 27 </s> Where an employee receives a higher wage or rate because of undesirable hours or disagreeable work, such </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 469] </s> wage represents a shift differential or higher wages because of the character of work done or the time at which he is required to labor rather than an overtime premium. 28 Such payments enter into the determination of the regular rate of pay. See Cabunac v. National Terminals Corp., 7 Cir., 139 F.2d 853. The trial court seemed to assume that if the contract overtime rate were a shift differential, the employee who worked on a higher paid shift would be entitled to have his higher shift rates enter into the computation of regular rate of pay. One of the reasons for not allowing the contract overtime rates in the computation of regular rate of pay was that it thought the great difference between the contract straight time and contract overtime rates showed that the premium paid by contract was not a shift differential but a true overtime premium. In this we think the trial court erred. The size of the shift differential cannot change the fact that large wages were paid for work in undesirable hours. It i like a differential for dangerous work. This contract called for $2.50 straight time hourly rate for handling explosives. The statutory excess compensation would, of course, be $3.75 per hour. If an employee receives from his employer a </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 470] </s> high hourly rate of pay for hard or disagreeable duty, he is entitled to the statutory excess compensation figured on his actual pay. Nor do we find the District Court's reliance upon the fact that the overtime rates were employed in order to concentrate the work of the longshoremen in the straight time hours relevant to a determination of the respondents' rate of pay. The District Court thought the concentration was significant. It did not test whether the contract overtime rates contained overtime premium payments by considering whether the employee actually received extra compensation for excess hours. We accept the District Court's holding that this concentration was an intended effect of the overtime rates and that the higher rates did contribute to the concentration of the work in the straight time hours as set out in a preceding paragraph of this opinion. supra. Such a concentration tends, in some respects, to the employment of more men, as there is pressure for more work to be done in the straight time hours. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, supra, 316 U.S. 578 . However, the pressure of the contract overtime wages is not solely toward a spread of employment. Since work is in fact done outside straight time hours, the employer can use men who have previously worked in straight time hours in contract overtime hours without additional cost. But spread of employment is not the sole purpose of the forty-hour maximum provision of 7(a). Its purpose is also to compensate an employee in a specific manner for the strain of working longer than forty hours. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, supra, 316 U.S. 578 . The statute commands that an employee receive time and one-half his regular rate of pay for statutory excess compensation. The contract here in question fails to give that compensation to an employee who works all or part of his time in the less desirable contract overtime hours. Looked at </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 471] </s> from the individual standpoint of respondents, the concentration of work does not have any effect upon their regular rate of pay. Because of this defect, the concentration of work brought about by the contract has no effect in the determination of the regular rate of pay. As we indicated at the beginning of this subdivision (1) a major purpose of the statute was to compensate an employee by extra pay for work done in excess of the statutory maximum hours. Thus the burdens of overly long hours are balanced by the pay of time and a half for the excess hours. We therefore hold that overtime premium, deductible from extra pay to find the regular rate of pay, is any additional sum received by an employee for work because of previous work for a specified number of hours in the workweek or workday whether the hours are specified by contract or statute. 29 </s> (2) Since under Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, 69, the Administrator refers to regular working hours as important in calculating the regular rate of pay under </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 472] </s> s 7(a) of the Act, a word must be said as to regular working hours in this case. 30 'Regular working hours' apparently has not been defined by the Administrator. He could hardly have intended in 69 to employ the statutory maximum hours as synonymous with regular working hours as there is no prohibition on regular working hours that are longer than the statutory maximum. His illustrations, numbers 2 and 3, show that overtime premiums may be earned within the first 40 hours of a workweek. The statutory maximum hours are significant only as requiring overtime premium pay. An employer may increase pay or decrease hours free as to those steps from statutory regulation. See article in Monthly Labor Review, supra. The trial court pointed out that 'The identifying mark of the case at bar is the absence of any norm, any regularity. Both parties have emphasized the casual, irregular character of the employment.' 69 F.Supp. 959, 960. The trial court, as we have heretofore stated, 334 U.S. 455 , also found that the 'basic working day,' defined by 2(a) of the agreement set forth in note 5, supra, was not the day normally, regularly or usually worked by respondents. Indeed the contract, 1, required these round-the-clock irregular hours from some </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 473] </s> individuals. We call attention to the problem only to lay it aside as inapplicable in this case. However, the government contends in this case that regular working hours are important, that the contract fixed regular working hours as the straight time hours and that as an actual fact as shown by the statistics of concentration of work in straight time hours, 334 U.S. 456 supra, the straight time hours were the regular working hours of all longshoremen. The government concludes from this that the contract straight time pay is the regular rate of pay and the contract overtime pay includes a true overtime premium. We may be mistaken in thus limiting the government's argument on this point. If the government means that any extra pay to an employee for work outside regular working hours of the group of employees is to be excluded from the computation of the regular rate, we do not think that contention sound. The defect in this argument, however the government's position is construed, is that it treats of the entire group of longshoremen instead of the individual workmen, respondents here. The straight time hours can be the regular working hours only to those who work in those hours. The work schedule of other individuals in the same general employment is of no importance in determining regular working hours of a single individual. As a matter of fact, rg ular working hours under a contract, even for an individual, has no significance in determining the rate of pay under the statute. It is not important whether pay is earned for work outside of regular working hours. The time when work is done does not control whether or not all or a part of the pay for that work is to be considered as a part of the regular pay. We think, therefore, that this case presents no problems that involve determination of the regular hours of work. As an employment contract for irregular hours </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 474] </s> the rule of dividing the weekly wage by the number of hours worked to find the regular rate of pay would apply. Cf. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, supra, 316 U.S. at page 580, 62 S.Ct. at page 1221. (3) The contract was interpreted by the Shipping Association and the Longshoremens Association as providing that the contract straight time was the regular rate. The parties to the contract indicated by their conduct that the contract overtime was the statutory excess compensation or an overtime premium. Finding 43, 162 F.2d at page 672; see note 33 infra. 31 Apparently no dispute or controversy arose over this interpretation although the contract, 19, made provision for the resolution of such disagreements. The trial court determined that the straight time hourly rate was the regular rate at which respondents were employed. 32 This construction by the parties and the court's conclusion, supported by evidence, leads us to consider this agreement as though there was a paragraph which read to the effect that the straight time rate is the regular rate of pay. We should also consider that the contract provided that the contract overtime rates were intended to provide any statutory excess compensation, when men worked more than forty hours except in those situations where the entire time, including the excess, was in the straight time hours. 33 This of course </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 475] </s> does not mean that respondents here were familiar with these purposes of the agreement. So far as the record shows, they worked for the pay promised under the words of the contract. It shows nothing more on this point. Under the contract we are examining, the respondents' work in overtime hours was performed without any relation as to whether they had or had not worked before. Under our view of 7(a)'s requirements their high pay was not because they had previously worked but because of the disagreeable hours they were called to labor or because the contracting parties wished to compress the regular working days into the straight time hours as much as possible. As heretofore pointed out, we need not determine what were the regular working hours of these respondents. If it were important, the trial court determined that their regular working hours were not the straight time hours. They worked at irregular times. Finding 45, 162 F.2d at page 672. The record shows that all respondents worked 5,201 straightt ime hours and 20,771 overtime hours. Four of the twenty respondents worked no straight time hours. Five others worked less than 100 straight time hours. Three worked more straight time than overtime. The record does not show the hours these respondents worked for other employers. That fact is immaterial in this case as respondents seek recovery only from petitioner employers. These round-the-clock hours were in strict accordance with the contract which allowed the Longshoremens Association to furnish all men needed and called for the men to 'work any night of the week, or on Sundays, holidays or Saturday afternoons when required.' 1 and 2; see note 5. Men who worked contract overtime hours were entitled to contract overtime pay. They were given no overtime premium pay because </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 476] </s> of long hours. It is immaterial that his regular rate may greatly exceed the statutory minimum rate. This contract overtime rate, therefore, did not meet the excess pay requirements of 7. In finding the statutory excess compensation due respondents, the trial court must determine the method of computation. Each respondent is entitled to receive compensation for his hours worked in excess of forty at one and a half times his regular rate, computed as the weighted average of the rates worked during the week. In computing the amount to be paid, the petitioners may credit against the obligation to pay statutory excess compensation the amount already paid to each respondent which is allocable to work in those excess hours. The precise method for computing this credit presents the difficulty. According to the Administrator's interpretation, an employer may credit himself with an amount equal to the number of hours worked in excess of forty multiplied by the regular rate of pay for the entire week rather than an amount equal to the number of hours worked in excess of forty multiplied by the average rate of pay for those excess hours. 34 Under that formula each respond- </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 477] </s> ent is entitled, as statutory excess compensation, to an additional sum equal to the number of hours worked for one employer in a workweek in excess of forty, multiplied by one-half the regular rate of pay. On the record before us, that interpretation seems to be a reasonable one; we leave a final determination of the point to the District Court on further proceedings. The Circuit Court ordered the case remanded to the District Court for determination of the amounts due respondents in accordance with its opinion. Bya further order, it allowed the District Court to consider any matters presented to it by petitioners as a defense in whole or in part under the Portal to Portal Act. We modify these orders so as to permit the District Court to allow any amendments to the complaint or answer or any further evidence that the District Court may consider just. As so modified the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed. Modified and affirmed. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, with whom Mr. Justice JACKSON and Mr. Justice BURTON concur, dissenting. No time is a good time needlessly to sap the principle of collective bargaining or to disturb harmonious and fruitful relations between employers and employees </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 478] </s> brought about by collective bargaining. The judgment of Congress upon another doctrinaire construction by this Court of the Fair Labor Standards Act ought to admonish against an application of that Act in disregard of industrial realities. Promptly after the Eightieth Congress convened, Congress proceeded to undo the disastrous decisions of this Court in the so-called portal-to-portal cases. Within less than a year of the decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 , both Houses, by overwhelming votes that cut across party lines, passed and the President signed, the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. What is most pertinent to the immediate problem before us is the fact that because the Fair Labor Standards Act had been 'interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees,' Congress had to undo such judicial misconstruction because it found that 'voluntary collective bargaining would be interfered with and industrial disputes between employees and employers and between employees and employees would be created.' 1 Because the present decision is heedless of a long-standing and socially desirable collective agreement and is calculated to foster disputes in an industry which has been happily at peace for more than thirty years. I deem it necessary to set forth the grounds of my dissent. The Court's opinion is written quite in the abstract. It treats the words of the Fair Labor Standards Act as though they were parts of a cross- word puzzle. They are, of course, the means by which Congress sought to eliminate specific industrial abuses. The Court deals with these words of Congress as though they were unrelated to the facts of industrial life, particularly the facts pertaining to the longshoremen's industry in New York. The </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 479] </s> Court's opinion could equally well have been written had the history of that industry up to 1916 not been an anarchic exploitation of the necessities of casual labor for want of a strong union to secure through equality of bargaining power fair terms of employment. See, e.g., Barnes, The Longshoremen (1915), passim. Through such bargaining power the agreement was secured which the Court now upsets. Through this agreement, the rights and duties of the industry-the members of the union on the one hand and the employers on the other hand-were defined, and the interests of the men, the employers, and, not least, the community were to be adjusted in a rational and civilized way. On behalf of a few dissident members of the union, but against the protests of the union and of the employers and of the Government, the Court dislocates this arrangement and it does so by what it conceives to be the compulsions of 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 2 This is to attribute destructive potency to two simple English words-'regular rate'-far beyond what they deserve. Employment of longshoremen has traditionally been precarious because dependent on weather, trade conditions, and other unpredictables. Decasualization of their work has been their prime objective for at least sixty years. They have sought to achieve this result by inducing concentration of work during weekday daytime hours. One of the strongest influences to this end is to make it economically desirable. And so the union has sought and achieved an addition to the basic-the regular-rate sufficiently high to deter employers from assigning work </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 480] </s> outside of defined periods, except in emergencies. Since 1916, when the International Longshoremens Association made its first collective agreement with waterfront employers in New York, a 50% premium on night and weekend work has generally prevailed. In the industry, this has been colloquially called 'overtime' pay. Longshoremen do not usually work continuously for one employer, but shift from one to another, wherever employment can be found. The Fair Labor Standards Act does not entitle an employee who works a total of over forty hours per week for several employers, but not more than forty hours for any one of them, to any overtime pay. In view of the peculiarities of this industry, therefore, the only effective way of promoting the aim of the Fair Labor Standards Act, to deter a long workweek, is that devised by the collective agreement, namely, to limit to approximately the statutory maximum of hours the total length of the periods in the week for which additional pay amounting to overtime rates need not be paid, regardless of the employer for whom the work is done. During the period (1943-45) in controversy, the wage rates were governed by the 1943 General Cargo Agreement between the International Longshoremens Association and the employers at the Port of New York. Under its terms, the 'basic working week,' for which 'straight time' hourly rates were paid, included the hours of 8 a.m. to noon, and 1 p.m. to 5 p.m ., Monday through Friday. and 8 a.m. to noon on Saturday. 3 'Overtime' rates, for </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 481] </s> 'all other time,' were in almost all instances4 150% of the 'straight time' rates. The 1943 Agreement embodied the practice of the industry since 1916, whereby approximately 150% of 'straight time' rates was paid for night and weekend work. Through the years, with successive renewals of agreements between the International Longshoremens Association and the employers, the rates of pay have risen and the length of the 'basic working week' has decreased. The respondents, members of the International Longshoremens Association, did a large part of their work for the petitioners outside of the enumerated 'straight time' hours. In accordance with the collective agreement, they received, for whatever work they did during the 'basic working week,' 'straight time' pay, and for work at all other times, 'overtime' pay, drawing such 'overtime' pay regardless of whether such work was or was not part of their first forty hours of work in the week. 5 They instituted this action, for double damages under 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), 29 U.S.C.A. 216(b), assert- </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 482] </s> ing that night and weekend work had been so frequent an incident of their employment that the contractual 'straight time' pay could not be deemed their 'regular rate' of pay, under 7(a), but that their 'regular rate' was the average of what they received for all their work for any one employer, 'straight time' and 'overtime' together. On this theory, rejected by the union, the employers, and the Government, but now accepted by the Court, all work beyond forty hours per week for any one employer should have been paid for at one and one-half times this average. The statutory phrase 'regular rate' is not a technical term. Thirteen expressions used in the Fair Labor Standards Act were defined by Congress in 3. 'Regular rate' was left undefined. The legislative history of the phrase reveals only that it replaced 'agreed wage' in an earlier draft, but there is no indication that this modification had significance. Nor is there any indication that in the field of labor relations, 'regular rate' was a technical term meaning the arithmetic average of wages in any one week. If ordinary English words are not legislatively defined, they may rightly be used by the parties to whom they are addressed to mean what the parties through long usage have understood them to mean, when the words can bear such meaning without doing violence to English speech. The 'regular rate' can therefore be established by the parties to a labor agreement, provided only that the rate so established truly reflects the nature of the agreement and is not a subterfuge to circumvent the policy of the statute. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 , 1244. Thus the problem before us is whether the designation of 'straight time rates' for the 'basic working week' in the longshoremen's collective agreement was an honest reflection of the distinctive conditions of this industry. We are not concerned with an abstract 'regular rate' of pay, for industry is not. The 'regular rate' in a given </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 483] </s> industry must be interpreted in the light of the customs and practices of that industry. The distinctive conditions of the longshoremen's trade, where employees frequently work during one week for several different employers, are reflected in the provisions which the industry has made in determining rates of compensation. These provisions were designed to secure for longshoremen protection not only from harmful practices common to many industries and dealt with specifically by the statute, but also from those peculiar to the longshoremen's industry, requiring special treatment. The respondents' wages, as part of a comprehensive arrangement for the betterment of the longshoremen's trade-also covering health and sanitary provisions, minimum number of men in a gang doing specified types of work, 'shaping time,' minimum hours of employment for those chosen at a 'shape,' arbitration, etc.-were determined by a collective agreement entered into between the union and the employers. The Fair Labor Standards Act was 'intended to aid and not supplant the efforts of American wr kers to improve their own position by self-organization and collective bargaining.' H.Rep.No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9. 'The right of individual or collective employees to bargain with their employers concerning wages and hours is recognized and encouraged by this bill. It is not intended that this law shall invade the right of employer and employee to fix their own contracts of employment, wherever there can be any real, genuine bargaining between them. It is only those low-wage and long-working-hour industrial workers, who are the helpless victims of their own bargaining weakness, that this bill seeks to assist to obtain a minimum wage.' Sen.Rep.No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3-4.6 Such as- </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 484] </s> surances were necessary to allay the traditional hostility of organized labor to legislative wage-fixing. The Court now holds unlawful a collective agreement entered into by a strong union, governing the wide range of the longshoremen's employment relationships, and especially designed to restrict the hours of work and to require the same premium as that given by the statute for work done outside of normal hours but within the statutory limit. The Court substitutes an arrangement rejected both by the union and the employers as inimical to the needs of their industry and subversive of the process of collective bargaining under which the industry has been carried on. But, we are told, these untoward consequences are compelled by a mere reading of what Congress has written. On the question you ask depends the answer you get. If the problem is conceived of merely as a matter of arithmetic you get an arithmetical answer. If the problem is put in the context of the industry to which it relates, and meaning is derived from an understanding of the problems of the industrial community of which this is just one aspect, a totally different set of considerations must be respected. The defendants derived their rights from the entire agreement and not from a part mutilated by isolation. If the parties had written out with unambiguous explicitness that the extra wage in the scheduled periods is to be deemed a deterrent against work during those periods and is not to be deemed a basis for calculating time and a half after the forty hours, I cannot believe that this Court would say that such an agreement, </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 485] </s> made in palpable good faith, is outlawed by the Fair Labor Standards Act. How is compensation for services above the limits set by the Act to be reckoned? The standard for compensation could be determined (1) by specific statutory terms; (2) by collective agreement; or (3) by judicial construction in default of either. Congress could have laid down a hard and fast rule, could have expressed a purely arithmetic formula. It could have said that the rate on which time and a half is to be reckoned is to be found by dividing the total wage by the hours worked. It would not even have been necessary to spell all this out. Congress could have conveyed its thought by using the phrase 'average' instead of 'regular.' And where we have nothing else to go on, except the total wage and the hours, it is reasonable enough thus to ascertain the regular rate. But when parties to a complicated industrial agreement, with full understanding of details not peculiarly within the competence of judges, indicate what the regular rt e is for purposes of contingencies and adjustments satisfied otherwise than by a purely arithmetic determination of the rate of wages, nothing in the history of the law or its language precludes such desirable consensual arrangements, provided, of course, that the parties deal at arms length, and that the defined 'regular' rate is not an artifice for circumventing the plain commands of the law. Such an artifice would obviously not be used in a contract made by workers in their own interests represented by a union strong enough to pursue those interests. Regularity in this context implies of course a controlling norm for determining wages which, though agreed upon between the parties, is consistent with, and not hostile to, the underlying aims of the overtime provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Discouragement of overwork and of under- </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 486] </s> employment are the aims. The longshoremen's collective agreement serves the same purpose as does the statute. The Fair Labor Standards Act is not a legislative code for the government of industry. It sets a few minimum standards, leaving the main features in the employment relation for voluntary arrangement between the parties. Where strong unions exist relatively little of the employment relation was to be enforced by law. Most of it was left to be regulated by free choice and usage as expressed and understood by the unions and employers. Congress did not provide for increase in basic rates except to the limited extent of establishing minimum wages. The inclusion of such minimum wages is in itself a recognition by Congress of the distinction between what it sought to change and what it sought to use only as the basis for the computation of an overtime percentage. The claim of the few members in opposition to the union is predicated upon an amount superadded for reasons peculiar to the stevedoring industry to the wage which the parties to the agreement in perfect good faith established as the regular rate. The union members secured this extra wage as part of the entire scheme of the collective agreement. 7 This premium is not to be detached from the scheme as though it were a rate fixed by law as a basis for calculating the statute's narrowly limited overtime provision. So long as its minimum wage provisions were complied with, the statute did not seek to change the true basic or 'regular' rate of pay in any industry, from which rate all statutory overtime is to be computed. There is no justification for interpreting the statutory term as including elements clearly understood </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 487] </s> in the industry to be as foreign to the 'regular rate' as any strictly overtime rates. Here the extra wage is the industry's overtime rate for work which might not be within the overtime period of the Fair Labor Standards Act, but was within the schedule of the collective agreement for extra wages, not because the work was overtime in the ordinary industrial sense but because it was at periods during which all work was sought to be discouraged by making it costly. Because the union secured for its men an extra wage even for not more than forty working hours, the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act as to overtime is not enlarged. Only for a work- week longer than forty hours is an employee to be paid one and a half times 'the regular rate,' and nothing in the Act precludes agreement between the parties as to what the regular rate should be, provided such agreement is reached in good faith and as a fair bargain. The presupposition of the Act was that voluntary arrangements through collective bargaining should cover an area much wider, and economically more advantageous, than the minimum standards fixed by the Act. The traditional process of collective bargaining was not to be disturbed where it existed. It was to be extended by advancing the economic position of workers in non-unionized industries and in industries where unions were weak, by furthering equality in bargaining power It certainly was not the purpose of the Act to permit te weakening of a strong union by eviscerating judicial construction of the terms of a collective agreement contrary to the meaning under which the industry had long been operating and for which the union is earnestly contending. There can be no quarrel with the generality that merely because the conditions of employment are arrived at through collective bargaining an arrangement which violates the statute need not be upheld. But this does not </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 488] </s> mean that in determining whether the contractual designation of certain hours as 'basic' is honest and fair, we cannot consider the fact that the contract was one entered into by a powerful union, familiar with the needs of its members and the peculiar conditions of the industry, and fully equipped to safeguard its membership. To view such a contract with a hostile eye is scarcely to carry out the purpose of Congress in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court has sustained the power of 'employer and employee * * * to establish (the) regular rate at any point and in any manner they see fit,' Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 , 1245, provided that the regular rate is not computed 'in a wholly unrealistic and artificial manner so as to negate the statutory purposes.' Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 42 . If we were confronted with an agreement which did not reflect the true practice in the industry, if despite the designation of certain hours as 'basic' and others as 'overtime,' the distinction was not actually observed, but work was done at all times indiscriminately, so that what the contract designated as 'overtime' pay was in reality a 'shift differential,' designed to induce employees to work at less pleasant hours, rather than to deter employers from carrying on at such hours, the labels attached by the parties to the various periods of work would not be allowed to conceal the true facts. We have again and again pierced through such deceptive forms. See, e.g., Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37 ; Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 ; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 . 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 , 169 A.L.R. 1293. But here there is no suggestion that the agreement mislabeled the true circumstances of the employment relationship. And it is significant that in no case in which we found </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 489] </s> that the terms used had distorted the true facts did a union which had made the contract appear to defend it. The fact that some work was done at odd hours does not misrepresent the regular situation, provided that such work was exceptional and was restricted in frequency by the overtime provisions of the agreement, so that what the agreement treated as regular and what as exceptional were truly just that. We turn then to the actual experience, in representative periods, of the Port of New York longshoremen. The stipulations, exhibits, and findings of the District Court, all demonstrate the exceptional nature of 'overtime' work. 8 It is also apparent that such night work as was done was usually done in addition to, rather than instead of, daytime work. The increased compensation for such work therefore served principally to achieve the same result as did the statute-namely, to afford a higher rate of compensation for long hours. In peacetime, night work was extremely rate for any one as a recurring experience, and even during the exigencies of war only a small minority was principally so occupied. The accuracy of the designation of one period or [] Oct. 24, 1938 1932-37 (effective date Apr. 1, 1944- average of FLSA) to Mar. 31, 1945 Aug. 31, 1939 (height of (eve of war) wartime activity) [] Work performed during straight time hours 79.93% 75.03% 54.5% Night work 15.13% 17.89% 20.5% Weekend work 4.94% 7.08% 25.0% Total night work by men who had worked during same day 13. 2% 23.29% 44.5% Ditto by those who had not 86. 8% 76.71% 55.5% Total man-hours, consisting of night work by those who had not worked during same day 2.57% 4.17% 11.1% Concentration of man-hours straight time over overtime 11.22 8.47 3.38 [] </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 490] </s> amount of work as 'basic' is not contradicted by the fact that some work may have been done at other times as well. They very reference in any collective agreement to overtime pay for unusual hours implies that some such work is anticipated. A protective tariff need not be so high as to exclude every last item. The statistics in the margin amply justify the trial judge's conclusion that the designations in the collective agreement were not unreal or artificial when the agreement was entered into, and did not become so even at the height of the abnormal wartime effort. Of course, even if most of the work of longshoremen was performed during 'straight time' hours, if the 50% increment for work at other times was not a true overtime payment, but a shift differential, this higher rate of pay would have to be taken into account in establishing the 'regular rate' of the respondents. But the District Court found that this premium constituted true overtime. As that court stated (Finding 28), a shift differential 'is an amount added to the normal rate of compensation, which is large enough to attract workers to work during what are regarded as less desirable hours of the day, and yet not so large as to inhibit an employer from the use of multiple shifts,' while a true overtime premium 'is an addition to the normal rate of compensation, designed to inhibit or discourage an employer from using his employees beyond a specified number of hours during the week of during certain specified hours of the day. A safe guide for distinguishing between the shift differential and the overtime premium is by the degree of spread between the normal rate and the penalty rate. Whereas a shift differential is usually 5 or 10 cents per hour, the overtime premium is generally 50% of the normal rate.' </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 491] </s> These findings of the District Court are amply supported by the testimony and by industrial statistics. See 65 Monthly Labor Review 183-85; Wage Structure; Machinery (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1945) p. 21; id. ( 1946) p. 38; Wage Structure: Foundries (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1945) Tables 32, 33; id. (1946) pp. 44-45. And compare the Directives of the Economic Stabilization Director dated March 8, 1945, and April 24, 1945, limiting the shift differentials which the National War Labor Board could approve to four cents per hour for the second shift and six or eight cents per hour for the third. CCH Labor Law Service, vol. 1A, 10,034.11, 10,462. Applying the test based on Finding 28, and finding also that the differential had in fact served to deter night and week-end work, the District Court held that the fifty per cent increment was true overtime and not a shift differential. The Court purports to accept the findings of the District Court, and yet it concludes that the District Court erred in finding that the fifty per cent was by way of overtime and not a shift differential. The District Court, to be sure, and not explicitly state that the premium was not a shift differential in one of its formal Findings of Fact. It did so state, however, in its opinion and this conclusion depended on the statements quoted above from Finding 28 as to the characteristics indicativeo f true overtime and shift differentials. I fail to see how this Court can accept Finding 28 and reject the conclusion that the contractual 'overtime' was not a shift differential. Findings of lower courts are to be disregarded only if not substantiated by the evidence. Here, the evidence supporting the finding was impressive, and yet the Court strains to overturn it to reach a result not urged as socially desirable but only as demanded by legal dialectic. 9 </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 492] </s> The Court holds that even if the collective agreement accurately designated that regular and overtime work of the generality of longshoremen, it cannot apply to the respondents, because of their particular working hours for a stretch of the wartime period here in controversy. This contention expresses an attitude toward the process of collective bargaining which, if accepted, would undermine its efficacy. It subjects the collective agreement to the hazards of self-serving individualism, which must inevitably weaken the force of such agreements for improving the conditions of labor and forwarding industrial peace. Here, the very increased rates of pay which the respondents received for exceptional right and weekend work was the result of the contract which they now seek to disavow. Collective bargaining between powerful combinations of employers and employees in an entire industry, each group conscious of what it seeks and having not merely responsibility for its membership but resourceful experience in discharging it, is a form of industrial government whereby self-imposed law supplants force. Cf. Feis, The Settlement of Wage Disputes (1921) c. II. This is an accurate description of the process by which the stevedoring industry has served the greatest port in the United States. Yet the Court rejects the meaning which the parties to the agreement have given it and says it means what the parties reject. Often, too often, industrial strife is engendered by conflicting views between employers and employees as to the meaning of a collective agree- </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 493] </s> ment. Here the industry as an entirety-the union and the employers' association-is in complete accord on the meaning of the terms under which the industry has lived for thirty years and under which alone, the parties to the agreement insist, they can continue to live peacefully. But a few members of the union assert an interest different from that of their fellows-some thirty thousand-and urge their private meaning even though this carries potential dislocation to the very agreement to which they appeal for their rights. Unless it be judicially established that union officers do not know their responsibility or have betrayed it, so that what appears to be a contract on behalf of their men is mere pretense in that it does not express the true interests of the union as an entirely, this Court had better let the union speak for its members and represent their welfare, instead of reconstructing, and thereby jeopardizing, arrangements under which the union has lived and thrived and by which it wishes to abide. 10 </s> Collective agreements play too valuable a part in the government of industrial relationships to be cast aside at the whim of a few union members who seek to retain their benefits but wish to disavow what they regard as their burdens. Unless the collective agreement is held to determine the incidents of the employment of the entirety for whom it was secured, it ceases to play its great role as </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 494] </s> an instrument of industrial democracy. Cf. Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 572; Wolf, The Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements: A proposal, 5 Law & Contemp.Prob. 273; Hamilton, Collective Bargaining, 3 Encyc.Soc.Sci. 628, 630. But furthermore, as I read the Court's opinion, it is not limited in application to those employees most or all of whose work was done at night, but extends equally to those work worked chiefly during the 'basic working week,' but also did a few hours of work at other times. Even where a longshoreman worked precisely forty hours of 'straight time,' followed by a few hours of 'overtime' in the same week, payment of the appropriate wages as determined by the collectibe agreement would not satisfy the Court's test that only such extra pay as is given 'for work because of previous work for a specified number of hours in the workday or workweek' 11 can be regarded as true overtime pay. To require specification in an industry where the only thing certain is uncertainty is to command the impossible. There is no justification for such a test in the statute, its history, industrial practice, judicial decision, or administrative interpretations. 12 </s> In short, this is not a decision that where the predominant work of an employee is paid for at 'overtime' rates, such rates enter into computation of the 'regular rate,' but rather that where the conditions in an industry are such that the number of 'straight time' hours cannot be precisely predicted in advance, an arrangement for time and a half for all other hours cannot be legal, regardless of how unusual work outside of the 'straight time' hours may be. </s> [334 U.S. 446 , 495] </s> But whether or not the Court means to go as fas as it seems to go, and even if its holding is later limited to the narrow situation now before us, I cannot agree with its conclusion. It seems to me that the 'regular rate' of pay for Port of New York longshoremen was the 'straight time' scale provided for by the union contract, and that this was true for the whole union, including the individual respondents. Far from receiving less overtime than the statute required, the respondents were, through the agreement, the recipients of much more. To call their demand one for 'overtime pyramided on overtime' is not to use a clever catchphrase, but to describe fairly the true nature of their claim. I would reinstate the judgments of the District Court. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 52 Stat. 1060, 1063, approved June 25, 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.; 7(a) took effect 120 days later, 7(d). No problem as to the length of time any employee worked is presented. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 , 152 A.L.R. 1014; Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 , 66 S. Ct. 1187. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S. C.A. 251 et seq. [Footnote 2 The use of the word 'overtime' in the contract does not decide this case. The problem for solution is whether rates described as 'overtime' by the contract actually are such rates as 7(a) provides for statutory excess hours. As will hereafter appear, we consider the contract as intending to provide statutory excess compensation and overtime premium. Consequently, we accept the word 'overtime' used in the contract to describe one wage scale as having been intended by the parties to the contract to satisfy fully the requirements of 7(a). </s> [Footnote 3 The following phrases are used in this opinion with the following meaning. These definitions do not apply to quotations. Extra pay.ÄAny increased differential from a lower pay scale for work after a certain number of hours in a workday or workweek or for work at specified hours. Overtime premium.ÄExtra pay for work because of previous work for a specified number of hours in the workweek or workday whether the hours are specified by contract or statute. Statutory excess compensation.ÄAdditional compensation required to be paid by 7(a), F.L.S.A. Regular rate of pay.ÄTotal compensation for hours worked during any workweek less overtime premium divided by total number of hours worked. The following definitions apply to the circumstances of this conr act only: Contract straight time.ÄCompensation paid under the longshoring contract for work during the hours defined in par. 3(a) of the contract, as follows: 8 a.m. to 12 noon and from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m., Monday to Friday, inclusive, and from 8 a.m. to 12 noon Saturday. Contract overtime.ÄAdditional compensation which the contract requires shall be paid for work on legal holidays and for work at hours other than those specified in par. 3(a). [Footnote 4 52 Stat. 1069, 16, 29 U.S.C.A. 216: '(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. * * * The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.' </s> [Footnote 5 The Agreement contains the following provisions with respect to the hours of work and scale of wages: I. General Cargo Agreement. '1. Members of the party of the second part shall have all of the work pertaining to the rigging up of ships and the coaling of same, and the discharging and loading of all cargoes including mail, ships' stores and baggage. When the party of the second part cannot furnish a sufficient number of men to perform the work in a satisfactory manner, then the party of the first part may employ such other men as are available. </s> '2. (a) The basic working day shall consist of 8 hours, and the basic working week shall consist of 44 hours. Men shall work any night of the week, or on Sundays, Holidays, or Saturday afternoons, when required. On Saturday night, work shall be performed only to finish a ship for sailing on Sunday, or to handle mail or baggage. '(b) Meal hours shall be form 6 A.M. to 7 A.M., from 12 Noon to 1 P.M ., from 6 P.M. to 7 P.M., and from 12 midnight to 1 A.M. '(c) Legal Holidays shall be: New Year's Day, Lincoln's Birthday, Washington's Birthday, Good Friday on the New Jersey Shore, Decoration Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Election Day, Armistice Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and such other National or State Holidays as may be proclaimed by Executive authority. </s> '3. (a) Straight time rate shall be paid for any work performed from 8 A.M. to 12 Noon and from 1 P.M. to 5 P.M., Monday to Friday, inclusive, and from 8 A.M. to 12 Noon Saturday. '(b) All other time, including meal hours and the Legal Holidays specified herein, shall be coni dered overtime and shall be paid for at the overtime rate. '(c) The full meal hour rate shall be paid if any part of the meal hour is worked and shall continue to apply until the men are relieved. </s> '4. Wage Scale: The wage scale shall be as follows: </s> [Footnote 6 Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 69 F.Supp. 956; Aaron v. Bay Ridge Operating Co., 162 F.2d 665. </s> [Footnote 7 Mr. Walter E. Maloney, representing the National Federation of American Shipping, testified that liability to the Government on stevedoring contracts might run as high as $260,000,000, although he admitted that the amount of liability was 'almost impossible to calculate.' Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1198Ä1205. Committee members referred to the amounts in question as $236,000,000, $340,000,000, and $300,000,000. Hearings, supra, pp. 1203, 2283, 2469. The basis for such figures does not appear. Nor is it made clear whether the Portal-to-Portal Act was in mind. 61 Stat. 84, Pt. IV, 9 and 11, 29 U.S.C.A. 258, 260. The International Longshoremens Association claims to have approi mately 80,000 members in United States and Canada. Thirty thousand are said to work in the Port of New York, and the terms adopted in the New York contract are generally followed in other ports. The Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast states that 20,000 stevedores are covered by 21 collective bargaining contracts, of which 3 are with the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. The current New York contract with the I.L.A. and the 21 agreements between the Pacific Association and the I.L.A. and I.L.W.U. are said to contain clauses permitting cancellation if the courts sustain the claims of plaintiffs in this suit. [Footnote 8 Hearings, supra, note 7, 2467Ä2471; 2474Ä2482; 2736Ä2762. </s> [Footnote 9 The trial court gave the following explanation of the 'shape,' Finding 16: 'At three stated hours during the day, namely at 7.55 a.m., 12. 55 p.m., and 6.55 p.m., men seeking employment gather in a group or semicircle, constituting the 'shape,' at the head of a pier where work is available. The foreman stevedore then selects from the 'shape' such men as he desires to hire, to work until 'knocked off', that is, told to quit. The selection of a man from the shape carries with it no obligation on the part of the employer concerning any specified length of employment, except for work requirements of the Collective Agreement relating to minimum hours under specified conditions. The duration of employment depends entirely upon the determination of the stevedore or the steamship company.' </s> [Footnote 10 The trial court found, Finding 13, that 'The work week commenced on Monday at 7 a.m. and ended the following Monday at 7 a.m.' The 44-hour week had been in the contracts between the Shipping Association and the Longshoremens Association prior to the Fair Labor Standards Act. No adjustment of the basic workweek was made in the contract when the 42- and 40-hour provisions of 7(a) became effective. [Footnote 11 Mr. Ryan explained the Association objective as follows: 'Our objective was to de-casualize longshore work as much as possible, to have the work done in the daytime as much as possible, and make it as expensive for the employers as possible on Sunday. Before there was any union we had double time for Sunday. We wanted to work in the daytime. We figured we only live once. We want the daytime when every man who wants to work wants it done in the daytime and not during overtime. The employers would say it cannot be done in the steamship industry. I think we have proven for them that after 30 years of negotiating many of the things they said could not be done in the industry, when they found it too expensive to do it in any other way, have been done. 'Q. Do the men object to working outside of a normal day?ÄA. Absolutely.' </s> Furthermore, as the Longshoremens Association's primary interest is as stated above by Mr. Ryan, it fears the effect on their employment contract of a holding that the contract overtime rate must be used in the determination of statutory excess compensation. The Shipping Association might insist on a reduction of the contract overtime rate, if payment of that rate were not to be treated as a satisfaction of the statutory requirements. </s> [Footnote 12 See note 7, supra. </s> [Footnote 13 Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 , 577, 578,6 , 1219, 1220; Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 40 , 13; Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 , 902; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 167 , 1066. </s> [Footnote 14 Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 , 1120; see 9, Part IV, Portal-to-Portal Act, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S. C.A. 258. </s> [Footnote 15 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, supra, 331 U.S. at page 204, 67 S.Ct. at page 1181: 'The crucial questions in this case, however, are whether the hourly rate derived from the formula here presented was, in fact, the 'regular rate' of pay within the statutory meaning and whether the wage agreement under consideration, in fact, made adequate provision for overtime compensation.' Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 432 . </s> [Footnote 16 Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., supra, 325 U.S. 424 ; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., supra, 325 U.S. 430 , 65 S. Ct. at page 1248. [Footnote 17 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.; Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. 141 et seq.; Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 2, 29 U.S.C.A. 102; Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 1, 29 U.S.C.A. 251. [Footnote 18 The contention, however, found favor with the District Court: 'Such catastrophic results are inevitable once we accept plaintiffs' underlying premiseÄthat in determining the 'regular rate' intended by Congress, we must close our eyes to the contract in good faith negotiated between employer and employees and look only to the actual work pattern. Upon such a premise, genuine collective bargaining cannot live.' 69 F.Supp. 956, 959. </s> [Footnote 19 'Collective bargaining, to be effective, must necessarily deal with large groupsÄwith all the workers in the industry, or its subdivision, on whose behalf the bargaining is being conducted. And when, as in the I.L. A., such collective agreements are submitted to a vote of the membership affected, and that approval of the bargain thus arrived at is voted, it would make ofc ollective bargaining a mockery if some of them could seek special terms, because, for a short period of time, their work experience has varied in some degree from that of their fellow workers.' </s> [Footnote 20 See note 30 and Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., supra, 325 U.S. 424, 425 , 1245. [Footnote 21 Cf. Finding 28(a): 'Prior to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the word overtime had a generally accepted meaning in American industry, a mely, excess time, to which a penalty rate of compensation was applied to discourage such work. The idea of excessivity, however, was not an indispensable element of the concept of overtime as understood. Overtime was also understood to cover hours outside of a specified clock pattern.' </s> [Footnote 22 The holding in Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, supra, is not to the contrary of this position. The facts of that case indicated a palpable evasion of the statutory purposes. See 69 F.Supp. at page 958, note 1. Nor is the decision in 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, supra, opposed to this position. In that case weekly wage contracts calling for a workweek of 46 and 54 hours provided the following formula for determining the regular hourly rate of pay: 'The hourly rates for those regularly employed more than forty (40) hours per week shall be determined by dividing their weekly earnings by the number of hours employed plus one- half the number of hours actually employed in excess of forty (40) hours.' 331 U.S. at page 202, 67 S.Ct. at page 1180. Under that method of computation an employee who worked 46 hours received a sum equal to what he would have received if he had been paid for 40 hours' work at the formula hourly rate and 6 hours of work at one and a half times the formula rate. As so construed, the extra pay for work in excess of 40 hours would be an overtime premium which could be excluded from the computation of the regular rate, and the regular rate would be the formula rate. The Court did not reach the question of the legality of that method of computation as it held that since the formula rate was not consistently employed in determining compensation, the formula rate could not be considered the regular rate for those who worked more that 40 hours. Accordingly the regular rate was held to be the average of all wages actually paid during the entire week. See Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave. Corp ., 2 Cir., 156 F.2d 139, 141. </s> [Footnote 23 The opinion stated: 'This controversy requires for its resolution a delicate adjustment to accommodate the harmonious application of three national policies. A heavy handed meshing of these three policies with the industrial machine which fails to minimize the friction at their points of contact can generate enough heat to impair one or more of the policies or severely injure the machine itself. </s> 'In chronological order we have (1) the National Labor Relations Act, July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, * * * to encourage the practice of collective bargaining; (2) the Fair Labor Standards Act, June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 , * * * to correct and eliminate the labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well being of workers; (3) the national need during the war for the maximum of production as illustrated by Executive Order 9301, February 9, 1943 (29 U.S.C.A. 207 note), 8 Fed.Reg. 1825, establishing the 48 hour week for the duration of the war.' 69 F.Supp. 956, 958. </s> [Footnote 24 36 hours $1 14 hours $1.50=total wages $57. Regular rate=$57, less overtime premium of $7, 50 hours=$1 per hour. </s> [Footnote 25 5 days 8 hours at $1 per hour 5 days 2 hours at $1.50 per hour=$55 total wage. Regular rate=$55Ä$5 50=$1 per hour. [Footnote 26 Executive Order 9301, issued February 9, 1943, 8 F.R. 1825, provided that all government contractors should work their employees at least 48 hours per week. The Order provided that it should not be construed as superseding the provisions of any individual or collective bargaining agreement with respect to rates of pay for hours worked in excess of the agreed or customary workweek, nor as suspending or modifying any provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act or any other law relating to the payment of wages or overtime. [Footnote 27 For example, daytime watchman's pay, $.60 per hour. Nighttime watchman's pay $.90 per hour, eight-hour, seven-day shift. Sixteen hours would be compensated for at excess time rates. The watchman's pay would be 56 $.90=$50.40. His statutory excess pay 16 $.45=$7.20; total $57.60. His regular rate is ($57.60Ä$7.20) 56 or $.90 per hour. Compare Legal Field Letter 109, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor, July 31, 1946, 1947 Wage-Hour Man. 66, in which the Chief of the Wage-Hour Section characterizes a particular 50% differential as a shift differential. </s> [Footnote 28 This is well brought out by a case similar in character to this litigation. Ferrer v. Waterman S.S. Corp., D.C., 70 F.Supp. 1. There the wage schedule was as follows, 70 F.Supp. at page 3: GENERAL CARGO From To Work Days Holidays [Footnote 7 A.M. 12 M.D. $0.55 $0.77 [Footnote 12 M.D. 1 P.M. 0.90 1.00 [Footnote 1 P.M. 4 P.M. 0.55 0.77 [Footnote 4 P.M. 6 P.M. 0.77 0.84 [Footnote 6 P.M. 7 P.M. 0.90 1.20 [Footnote 7 P.M. 11 P.M. 0.77 0.84 [Footnote 11 P.M. 12 M.N. 0.90 1.25 [Footnote 12 M.N. 6 A.M. 0.84 1.02 [Footnote 6 A.M. 7 A.M. 1.30 1.40 </s> [Footnote 29 We avoid any extended discussion of respondents' suggestion that the proper way to determine the regular rate is to divide the wages received during the first forty hours of work in a week by 40. The quotient, it is suggested, would be the regular rate. One fault of that method, we think, is that such wages might contain overtime premium payments; for example, a contract which fixed a rate for 36 hours and a higher rate for subsequent hours. Another objection is that such a method of computation would give an improperly weighted average for the rate of pay for the entire week; an employee who performed more highly skilled or unpleasant work after 40 hours of work would not receive the proper amount of statutory excess compensation if the regular rate were computed only on the basis of the first 40 hours. The statement as to statutory excess hours in Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 , 43 , 1245, was made as to a situation where this Court concluded the dual pay plan of the case was 'wholly unrealistic and artificial * * * so as to negate the statutory purposes.' The problem we are here considering was not at issue. </s> [Footnote 30 The question is sufficiently shown by this excerpt: 'Extra compensation paid for overtime work, even if required to be paid by a union agreement or other agreement between the employer and his employees need not be included in determining the employee's regular hourly rate of pay (see par. 13 of this bulletin). Furthermore, in determining whether he has met the overtime requirements of section 7 the employer may properly consider as overtime compensation paid by him for the purpose of satisfying these requirements, only the extra amount of compensationÄover and above straight timeÄpaid by him as compensation for overtime workÄthat is, for hours worked outside the normal or regular working hoursÄ regardless of whether he is required to pay such compensation by a union or other agreement.' Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Office of the Administrator, revised November 1940. </s> [Footnote 31 As a matter of fact in half of the cargo classifications, the overtime rate was a few cents less per hour than time and a half the straight time rates. [Footnote 32 Conclusion of Law No. 3: 'The 'straight time hourly rate' set forth in each subdivision of Paragraph 4 of the Collective Agreement, as stated in Finding of Fact No. 9, constituted the regular rate at which plaintiffs were employed when handling the stated kind of cargo.' [Footnote 33 It is clear under the applicable section of the agreement, 2(a), note 5 above, that a man could work all his time wholly in contract overtime hours. An employee received overtime premium for work done in what the trial court considered to be the basic workweek. Finding 43(a): 'If, and only if, a longshoreman worked more than 40 hours between 8 a.m. and 12 noon, and 1 p.m. and 5 p.m. on Mondays to Fridays, inclusive, and between 8 a.m. and 12 noon on Saturday of that workweek, none of these days being a holiday, he was paid an additional sum for work on Saturday morning in excess of 40 hoursÄnamely 62 1/2 cents per hour, * * *' </s> [Footnote 34 See Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, 14. The Administrator illustrates his position with the following example: an employee works 30 hours a week at an occupation paying 40 cents an hour and 20 hours in the same week at an occupation paying 50 cents an hour. The employee's regular rate of pay is 44 cents an hour (30 hours 40 cents 20 hours 50 cents 50 hours), and he is entitled to receive $2.20 in addition to the $22 he has already received, equal to the number of overtime hours (10) multiplied by one-half the regular rate of pay (22 cents). If it were held that an employer, under the contract we are here considering, could credit himself only with the wages actually paid during the hours following the first 40, an employee who performed 40 hours of contract overtime work early in the week and 10 hours of straight time after the first 40 hours would receive a larger award than an employee who first worked 10 straight time hours and then worked 40 contract overtime hours. Such a variation in the amount of statutory excess compensation would not be in accord with the statutory purpose. Compare, however, Releases 1913 and 1913(a) issued by the Administrator on December 1, 1942 and January 5, 1943, which provide that an employer may if he so elects compute the regular rate on the basis of the number of hours worked in excess of 40. If that method of computation of the regular rate is followed, an employer could credit himself with the wages actually paid during the hours in excess of 40. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 1(a), Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.C. 251(a), 29 U.S.C.A. 251(a). </s> [Footnote 2 'No employer shall * * * employ any of his employees * * * for a workweek longer than forty hours * * * unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of (fory hours) at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.' 52 Stat. 1060, 1063, 29 U.S.C. 207(a), 29 U.S.C.A. 207(a). </s> [Footnote 3 '2(a) The basic working day shall consist of 8 hours, and te basic working week shall consist of 44 hours. Men shall work any night of the week, or on Sundays, Holidays, or Saturday afternoons, when required. On Saturday night, work shall be performed only to finish a ship for sailing on Sunday, or to handle mail or baggage. '(b) Meal hours shall be from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m., from 12 Noon to 1 p.m ., from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m., and from 12 Midnight to 1 a.m. </s> '3(a) Straight time rate shall be paid for any work performed from 8 a.m. to 12 Noon and from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m., Monday to Friday, inclusive, and from 8 a.m. to 12 Noon Saturday. </s> '(b) All other time, including meal hours and the Legal Holidays specified herein, shall be considered overtime and shall be paid for at the overtime rate. </s> '(c) The full meal hour rate shall be paid if any part of the meal hour is worked and shall continue to apply until the men are relieved. * * * ' </s> [Footnote 4 For purposes of this case, the 'overtime' rate may be regarded as 150% of 'straight time' in all instances, since the District Court allowed the respondents to recover for those few instances where the 'overtime' was slightly less, and this portion of its judgment was not appealed. [Footnote 5 On the other hand, although the contract did not so specify, in the unusual situation of a longshoreman working over forty hours of 'straight time' for one employer in one week, he was paid time and a half for the excess. Where this had not been done, the District Court allowed appropriate recovery, and this was not appealed. </s> [Footnote 6 Similar intentions were expressed again and again in the Committee Hearings and on the floor of both Houses of Congress by the spokesmen of the Administration and Congressional Committee members. See the Joint Hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Education and the House Committee on Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 46Ä47 (Asst. Atty. Gen. Jackson); id. pp. 181Ä83 (Secy. Perkins and Sen. Walsh); 81 Cong.Rec. 7650, 7651, 7808 (Sen. Black); 7652, 7799, 7800, 7885Ä86, 7937 (Sen. Walsh); 7813 (Sen. Pepper); 82 Cong.Rec. 1390 (Rep. Norton); 1395 (Rep. Randolph); 83 Cong.Rec. 7291 (Rep. Allen); 7310 (Rep. Fitzgerald); 9258 (Rep. Randolph). </s> [Footnote 7 Cf. Lord Stowell, in The Neptune, 1 Hagg.Adm. 227, 232: '* * * the natural and legal parents of wages are the mariner's contract, and the performance of the service covenanted therein; they in fact generate the title to wages.' </s> [Footnote 8 The following figures were either stipulated by the parties, found as facts by the District Court and concurred in the Circuit Court of Appeals andt his Court, or computed from such statistics: </s> [Footnote 9 That the hours designated by the agreement as 'overtime' were regarded by the union as excessive hours, rather than merely as unpleasant hours, may also be deduced from the fact that they included much weekday time in which there was ample daylight during a large part of the year, and were not confined to nights and weekends. Another indication of the same thing is the fact that the history of the union agreements for New York longshoremen reveals a succession of reductions of the total number of 'straight time' hours parallel to the reduction of the usual weekly working hours during the same period throughout American industry. </s> [Footnote 10 Of course, if it can be shown that particular employeesÄfor reasons of color, lack of seniority, or anything elseÄwere not fairly or properly represented in the collective bargaining agreement, and were discriminated against and forced into a less desirable class of work, not because of accident or their on desire but because of the deliberate policy of the employers, the union, or both, we cannot treat the agreement made for the generality of longshoremen as binding upon them as well. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 . The respondents' claim was not based upon any such allegation. </s> [Footnote 11 Italics supplied. [Footnote 12 The Interpretations of the Wage-Hour Administrator pertinent to this case are conflicting and inconclusive. Citation of the most relevant should suffice. Cf. 69, 70, Interpretative Bulletin No. 4, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor.

United States Supreme Court HONEYCUTT v. WABASH RAILWAY CO.(1958) No. 639 Argued: Decided: January 27, 1958 </s> In this case arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, held: The proofs justified the conclusion that employer negligence played a part in producing petitioner's injury. Therefore, certiorari is granted, the judgment reversing a judgment for petitioner is reversed and the case is remanded. </s> 303 S. W. 2d 153, reversed and remanded. </s> Charles E. Gray for petitioner. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the St. Louis Court of Appeals of the State of Missouri is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We hold that the proofs justified with reason the jury's conclusion that employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's injury. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521 ; Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 . </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER joins, concurs in the result for the reasons given in his memorandum in Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18 . </s> For the reasons set forth in his opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 524 , MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER is of the view that the writ of certiorari is improvidently granted. </s> [355 U.S. 424, 425]

United States Supreme Court FONG FOO v. UNITED STATES(1962) No. 64 Argued: January 16, 1962Decided: March 19, 1962 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 65, Standard Coil Products Co., Inc., v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Court. </s> Petitioners were brought to trial under a valid indictment in a Federal District Court which had jurisdiction over them and over the subject matter. After the Government had introduced part, but not all, of its evidence, the District Judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal, and a formal judgment of acquittal was entered. The Government petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus, praying that the judgment of acquittal be vacated and the case reassigned for trial. The Court of Appeals granted the petition on the ground that, under the circumstances revealed by the record, the District Court was without power to direct the judgment of acquittal. Held: The judgment of the Court of Appeals was contrary to the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment against double jeopardy. Pp. 141-143. </s> 286 F.2d 556, reversed. </s> Arthur Richenthal argued the causes for petitioners and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 65. David E. Feller filed briefs for petitioners in No. 64. </s> Solicitor General Cox argued the causes for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Miller, Stephen J. Pollak, Beatrice Rosenberg, Philip R. Monahan and J. F. Bishop. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petitioners, a corporation and two of its employees, were brought to trial before a jury in a federal district court upon an indictment charging a conspiracy and the substantive offense of concealing material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1001. After seven [369 U.S. 141, 142] days of what promised to be a long and complicated trial, three government witnesses had appeared and a fourth was in the process of testifying. At that point the district judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal as to all the defendants, and a formal judgment of acquittal was subsequently entered. </s> The record shows that the district judge's action was based upon one or both of two grounds: supposed improper conduct on the part of the Assistant United States Attorney who was prosecuting the case, and a supposed lack of credibility in the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution who had testified up to that point. </s> The Government filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, praying that the judgment of acquittal be vacated and the case reassigned for trial. The court granted the petition, upon the ground that under the circumstances revealed by the record the trial court was without power to direct the judgment in question. Judge Aldrich concurred separately, finding that the directed judgment of acquittal had been based solely on the supposed improper conduct of the prosecutor, and agreeing with his colleagues that the district judge was without power to direct an acquittal on that ground. 286 F.2d 556. We granted certiorari to consider a question of importance in the administration of justice in the federal courts. 366 U.S. 959 . </s> In holding that the District Court was without power to direct acquittals under the circumstances disclosed by the record, the Court of Appeals relied primarily upon two decisions of this Court, Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 , and Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 . In the first of these cases it was held that a district judge had no power to suspend a mandatory prison sentence, and that a writ of mandamus would lie to require the judge to vacate his erroneous order of suspension. In the second case the Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering a district [369 U.S. 141, 143] judge to issue a bench warrant which he had refused to do, in the purported exercise of his discretion, for a person under an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury. </s> Neither of those decisions involved the guaranty of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." That constitutional provision is at the very root of the present case, and we cannot but conclude that the guaranty was violated when the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of acquittal and directed that the petitioners be tried again for the same offense. </s> The petitioners were tried under a valid indictment in a federal court which had jurisdiction over them and over the subject matter. The trial did not terminate prior to the entry of judgment, as in Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 . It terminated with the entry of a final judgment of acquittal as to each petitioner. The Court of Appeals thought, not without reason, that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. Nevertheless, "[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution." United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 . </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring. </s> Were I able to find, as Judge Aldrich did, that the District Court's judgment of acquittal was based solely on the Assistant United States Attorney's alleged misconduct, I would think that a retrial of the petitioners would not be prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the [369 U.S. 141, 144] Fifth Amendment. Even assuming that a trial court may have power, in extreme circumstances, to direct a judgment of acquittal, instead of declaring a mistrial, because of a prosecutor's misconduct - a proposition which I seriously doubt - I do not think that such power existed in the circumstances of this case. But since an examination of the record leaves me unable, as it did the majority of the Court of Appeals, to attribute the action of the District Court to this factor alone, I concur in the judgment of reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting. </s> The Court speaks with such expanse that I am obliged to dissent. It says that because "a final judgment of acquittal" was entered pursuant to a directed verdict the propriety of such "acquittal" cannot be reviewed even though the Government had not concluded its main case at the time the verdict was directed. The District Court under the circumstances here clearly had no power to direct a verdict of acquittal or to enter a judgment thereon. In my view when a trial court has no power to direct such a verdict, the judgment based thereon is a nullity. The word "acquittal" in this context is no magic open sesame freeing in this case two persons and absolving a corporation from serious grand jury charges of fraud upon the Government. </s> On the record before us it matters not whether the so-called acquittal was pursuant to the trial court's conclusion that the Government's witnesses up to that point lacked credibility or was based on the alleged misconduct of the prosecution. </s> On the first point, the Government had only examined three of its witnesses and was in the process of examining a fourth when the acquittal was entered. The first and third witnesses were merely preliminary, offered to identify [369 U.S. 141, 145] documents and explain the functions performed by the individual defendants for the corporate defendant. The second was offered to give the jury an explanation of radiosondes, devices for gathering weather data, which petitioners were furnishing the Government under contracts totaling several million dollars. It was during the latter's testimony - entirely explanatory - that the court called a recess for the stated purpose of requiring the United States Attorney to "consider whether the public interest is served by a further prosecution of this case." Upon the vigorous insistence of the United States Attorney himself, the trial was resumed and the Government called its third and fourth witnesses. The fourth witness was the first to testify as to the fraud upon the Government which related to a deliberate scheme to conceal from government inspectors defects in the devices. During direct examination the fourth witness was "not sure" as to the date of a certain conference at which representatives of the corporate defendant were present. Thereafter at a recess period his memory was refreshed during a conversation with one of the Assistant United States Attorneys. Upon resuming the stand he corrected his previous testimony as to the date, placing it a few months earlier. On cross-examination he admitted that the error had been called to his attention by the Assistant. The court then excused the jury and after excoriating the Assistant called the jury back into session and directed the verdict of acquittal. </s> It is fundamental in our criminal jurisprudence that the public has a right to have a person who stands legally indicted by a grand jury publicly tried on the charge. No judge has the power before hearing the testimony proffered by the Government or at least canvassing the same to enter a judgment of acquittal and thus frustrate the Government in the performance of its duty to prosecute those who violate its law. [369 U.S. 141, 146] </s> Here, as the United States Attorney advised the court, only three witnesses of the "many . . . to be heard from . . ." had testified. The court had only begun to hear what promised to be a protracted conspiracy case involving many witnesses. The Government had not rested. As the majority of the Court of Appeals observed, the District Court: </s> "abruptly terminated the Government's case . . . long before the Government had had an opportunity to show whether or not it had a case; and, moreover, he did so in ignorance of either the exact nature or the cogency of the specific evidence of guilt which Government's counsel said he had available and was ready to present." 286 F.2d, at 562-563. </s> At such a stage of the case the District Court had no power to prejudge the Government's proof - find it insufficient or unconvincing - and set the petitioners free. </s> On the second point, even if there were misconduct, the court still had no power to punish the Government because of the indiscretion of its lawyer. As this Court said in McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927), "A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not played according to rule." At most, if there had been misconduct, the remedy would have been to declare a mistrial and impose appropriate punishment upon the Assistant United States Attorney, rather than upon the public. In my view the judgment of the Court of Appeals should, therefore, be affirmed. </s> [369 U.S. 141, 147]

United States Supreme Court LABOR BOARD v. COCA-COLA BOT. CO.(1956) No. 79 Argued: January 17, 1956Decided: February 27, 1956 </s> A labor union instituted proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board charging an employer with unfair labor practices in violation of 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. A complaint based on these charges was issued. At the hearing, the employer challenged the Board's jurisdiction on the ground that the union had not satisfied the requirements of 9 (h), which requires the filing of non-Communist affidavits by all "officers" of the union and of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate, and offered to prove that the Regional Director of the CIO for Kentucky, who had not filed such an affidavit, was an "officer" within the meaning of 9 (h). Held: </s> 1. The Board erred in ruling that, during the course of the unfair labor practice hearing, the employer could not show that the labor organization had not complied with 9 (h) and thereby establish the Board's want of jurisdiction. Labor Board v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co., 341 U.S. 322 . Pp. 266-268. </s> 2. The Board's construction of the word "officer" in 9 (h) as meaning "any person occupying a position identified as an office in the constitution of the labor organization," and its finding that the Regional Director of the CIO for Kentucky is not such an "officer," are sustained. Pp. 268-269. </s> 219 F.2d 441, reversed and remanded. </s> David P. Findling argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Theophil C. Kammholz, Dominick L. Manoli and Samuel M. Singer. </s> John K. Skaggs, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James E. Fahey. [350 U.S. 264, 265] </s> Arthur J. Goldberg argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were J. Albert Woll and Thomas E. Harris. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Charging respondent with coercion of its employees and discrimination against pro-union employees, Local 20 of the United Brewery Workers, CIO, instituted proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board for violation of 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 140, 65 Stat. 601, 602, which outlaw such unfair labor practices. Pursuant to this charge, a complaint was issued; at the hearing which followed, respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Board upon the ground that the union had not satisfied the requirements of 9 (h) of the Act. Section 9 (h) provides that "no complaint shall be issued pursuant to [an unfair labor practice] charge made by a labor organization . . . unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods." Respondent offered to prove, by evidence of his duties and functions, that Taylor, the Regional Director of the CIO for Kentucky, who admittedly had not filed a non-Communist affidavit, was an "officer" within the meaning of 9 (h). [350 U.S. 264, 266] The Board rejected this contention on two grounds: First, "the compliance status of a union . . . is a matter for administrative determination, and not one to be litigated in complaint or representation proceedings." 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 491. Second, "had the Respondent established in a collateral proceeding what it had offered to prove at the hearing herein, we are satisfied, and find, that under the Board's present `constitutional' test, such proof would fall short of substantiating the Respondent's contention that Taylor was an officer of the CIO." 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 492-493. </s> On the merits, the Board found that respondent had committed the unfair practices charged. When the Board sought enforcement of its decree, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, without passing upon the unfair practices, remanded the case to the Board for determination of the issue tendered by respondent in its claim that Taylor's functions constituted him an "officer." 219 F.2d 441. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the questions raised in the administration of the statute. 350 U.S. 819 . </s> These questions are two in number: (1) May an employer, during the course of an unfair labor practice hearing, show that a labor organization has not complied with 9 (h) and thereby establish the Board's want of jurisdiction? (2) Assuming the answer to this question is "yes," is the Board's construction of "officer" in 9 (h) - viz., "any person occupying a position identified as an office in the constitution of the labor organization" - proper? 29 CFR, 1955 Supp., 102.13. * </s> [350 U.S. 264, 267] </s> The Court of Appeals answered the first question in the affirmative upon the authority of Labor Board v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co., 341 U.S. 322 . In that case an employer, defendant in an unfair labor practice suit, challenged the Board's interpretation of "national or international labor organization" in 9 (h). The agency had read this language as not including labor federations, i. e., the AFL or CIO. Therefore, it had not required affidavits from officers of these federations. Highland Park's challenge was rejected by the Board under its then settled policy that the employer could not raise noncompliance with 9 (h) as a bar to a proceeding on an unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals held to the contrary, 184 F.2d 98, and we affirmed its decision. </s> The Board distinguishes Highland Park by suggesting that here the "employer seeks to question only the fact of compliance, as distinguished from the necessity of compliance." The genesis of this distinction comes from the following in Highland Park: "If there were dispute as to whether the C. I. O. had filed the required affidavits or whether documents filed met the statutory requirements and the Board had resolved that question in favor of the labor organizations, a different question would be presented." 341 U.S. 322, 325 . The Board misconceives the significance of the passage. Both Highland Park and this case involve the scope of 9 (h), the meaning to [350 U.S. 264, 268] be derived from its language; neither case involves an inquiry into disputed facts, the situation referred to in Highland Park. Acceptance of a differentiation between these cases upon any such theory as that suggested by the Board would make of law too thin a dialectic enterprise. </s> But if the Board's distinction is overly subtle, its reason for attempting a distinction has force, namely, a concern with "the need to expedite the hearing of cases and the resolution of issues on their merits . . . ." 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 491. Much may be said for the claim that an employer should not be permitted to disrupt or delay complaint or representation cases by raising questions respecting 9 (h). But after Highland Park the argument comes too late. </s> In any event, whether the impediment to the effectiveness of the administrative process in determining the merits of a charge of unfair labor practice may be serious or negligible by injecting into it the subsidiary issue of compliance with 9 (h), depends upon the scope of the inquiry opened up by the latter issue. This brings us to that question. Our concern specifically is with the appropriate construction of "officers" in 9 (h). The Court of Appeals rejected the Board's "constitutional" rule for determining who is a union "officer" in favor of a so-called "functional" test. Presumably this test would require those members of a union who are effective instruments of its policies to file affidavits as "officers," regardless of the fact that they do not fill the offices designated by their organization's constitution. </s> Neither 9 (h) itself nor its legislative history attempts a definition of "officers." "Officers" is a word of familiar usage and "[a]fter all, legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him." Addison v. [350 U.S. 264, 269] Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618 . "Officers" normally means those who hold defined offices. It does not mean the boys in the back room or other agencies of invisible government, whether in politics or in the trade-union movement. A definition of officer as "any person occupying a position identified as an office in the constitution of the labor organization" accords with this lay understanding. 29 CFR, 1955 Supp., 102.13. </s> But if the word be deemed to have a peculiar connotation for those intimate with trade-union affairs, it is incumbent upon us to give the word its technical meaning, Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 , for 9 (h) is an integral part of a statute whose sponsors were familiar with labor organization and labor problems and which was doubtless drawn by specialists in labor relations. If such be the case, then of course the Board's expertness comes into play. We should affirm its definition if that definition does not appear too farfetched, Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 . The statute provides some evidence to support the Board, for 9 (f), which requires unions to report specific information to the Secretary of Labor, differentiates between "officers" and "agents" of labor organizations. </s> We conclude that the Board's criterion for determining who are officers both accords with the lay definition of the word and is a reasonable, if indeed not a compelling, construction of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [Footnote * The only qualification to this practically automatic definition of who is or is not an officer is the following provision of 102.13 (b) (3) of the Board's Rules and Regulations: </s> ". . . where the Board has reasonable cause to believe that a labor organization has omitted from its constitution the designation of any position as an office for the purpose of evading or circumventing [350 U.S. 264, 267] the filing requirements of section 9 (h) of the act, the Board may, upon appropriate notice, conduct an investigation to determine the facts in that regard, and where the facts appear to warrant such action the Board may require affidavits from persons other than incumbents of positions identified by the constitution as offices before the labor organization will be recognized as having complied with section 9 (h) of the act." 29 CFR, 1955 Supp., 102.13 (b) (3). </s> We interpret this to mean that the application of this exception is wholly within the Board's control and cannot be litigated in an unfair labor practice proceeding. </s> [350 U.S. 264, 270]

United States Supreme Court FPC v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.(1972) No. 71-1016 Argued: April 19, 1972Decided: June 7, 1972 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 71-1040, United Gas Pipe Line Co. et al. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. et al., on certiorari to the same court. </s> When United Gas Pipe Line Co. (United), a jurisdictional pipeline, experienced temporary shortages of natural gas supply forcing it to reduce deliveries to its contract customers, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) asserted its jurisdiction to effect a reasonable curtailment plan covering deliveries to both direct-sales customers and purchasers for resale. While curtailment proceedings were pending before the FPC, Louisiana Power & Light Co. (LP&L), a direct-sales customer of United, brought this action in the District Court against United, seeking to enjoin curtailment of deliveries to LP&L's plants pursuant to any FPC-promulgated plans, including any under FPC Order No. 431. LP&L also sought to enjoin United from seeking FPC certification of United's previously intrastate deliveries through its Green System. The FPC intervened, asserting that both matters were pending before it and any decision by the District Court would therefore invade its primary jurisdiction. The District Court dismissed the action, holding that the FPC had jurisdiction of both proceedings and that LP&L had to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the FPC lacked jurisdiction to curtail deliveries to direct-sales customers, since Section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act makes the Act applicable only to sales for resale. The Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court's decision on the Green System, holding that the system was wholly intrastate. Held: </s> 1. The FPC has power to regulate curtailment of direct interstate sales of natural gas under the head of its "transportation" jurisdiction in 1 (b), and the prohibition in the proviso clause of that provision withheld from FPC only rate-setting authority with respect to such sales. Pp. 631-647. </s> 2. The FPC had primary jurisdiction to determine whether the Green System was subject to its authority, and the Court of Appeals [406 U.S. 621, 622] erred in deciding that question. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 . Pp. 647-648. </s> 456 F.2d 326, reversed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except STEWART, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases, and POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. </s> Gordon Gooch argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-1016. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Samuel Huntington, Leo E. Forquer, J. Richard Tiano, and George W. McHenry. William C. Harvin argued the cause for petitioners in No. 71-1040. With him on the briefs were William R. Choate, Perry O. Barber, Jr., Jeron Stevens, W. DeVier Pierson, and William B. Cassin. </s> Andrew P. Carter argued the cause for respondent Louisiana Power & Light Co. With him on the brief was Thomas W. Leigh. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by J. Lee Rankin, Stanley Buchsbaum, and Francis I. Howley for the City of New York; by Peter H. Schiff for the Public Service Commission for the State of New York; by J. Evans Attwell, Christopher T. Boland, Robert O. Koch, John J. Mullally, and William W. Brackett for the Pipeline Intervenors; by Howard E. Wahrenbrock and John M. Kuykendall, Jr., for Mobile Gas Service Corp. et al.; by Barbara M. Gunther for Brooklyn Union Gas Co.; and by Richard A. Rosan and Daniel L. Bell, Jr., for Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by John J. McKeithen, Governor, Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General, Fred G. Benton, Sr., and Arnold D. Berkeley for the State of Louisiana; by Pat Moran for the Arkansas Public Service Commission; by Martin N. [406 U.S. 621, 623] Erck, John R. Rebman, Kirby Ellis, Sherman S. Poland, and Daniel F. Collins for Humble Oil & Refining Co.; by Thomas G. Johnson for Shell Oil Co.; and by J. Donald Annett, Kirk W. Weinert, and John M. Young for Texaco Inc. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Albert G. Norman, Jr., John W. Hinchey, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, John E. Holtzinger, Jr., and Allen E. Lockerman for Atlanta Gas Light Co. et al., and by John T. Miller, Jr., for Monsanto Co. et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In April 1971 the Federal Power Commission (FPC) promulgated its Order No. 431 requiring every jurisdictional pipeline to report to the FPC whether curtailment of its deliveries to customers would be necessary because of inadequate supply of natural gas. A pipeline anticipating the necessity for curtailment was required to file a revised tariff to control deliveries to all customers - industrial "direct sales" customers, purchasing gas for their own consumption, and "resale" customers, purchasing gas for distribution to ultimate consumers. </s> The principal question here is whether the proviso to 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. 717, prohibits the FPC from applying its Order No. 431 to curtail direct-sales deliveries in times of natural gas shortage. Section 1 (b) provides: </s> "The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation [406 U.S. 621, 624] or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> A subsidiary question presented is whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction obliged the federal courts in this case to defer to the FPC for an initial determination of FPC jurisdiction to certificate a particular pipeline delivery when a certification proceeding to determine that question was pending before the Commission. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the proviso of 1 (b) prohibited application of FPC curtailment regulations to direct sales deliveries, and held, further, that neither that court nor the District Court was obliged to defer to the FPC's pending certification proceeding. 456 F.2d 326 (CA5 1972). We granted certiorari, 405 U.S. 973 (1972). We reverse. </s> I </s> Respondent Louisiana Power & Light Co. (LP&L) generates electricity at Sterlington-Electric Generating Station in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, and at Nine-Mile Point Generating Station in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The natural gas burned under LP&L's boilers at both stations is purchased from United Gas Pipe Line Co. (United), a petitioner in No. 71-1040, under direct-sales contracts of long standing. The sales to Sterlington Station are sales of interstate gas, initially certificated by the FPC. Sales to Nine-Mile Point Station had been wholly intrastate gas delivered from United's intrastate "Green System" when, in 1970, United diverted 2.6% of the gas from its interstate "Black System" into the intrastate "Green System" after which United sought FPC certification of the "Green System." In 1970 also, United, from concern that its gas supply [406 U.S. 621, 625] during the 1970-1971 heating season would fall short of demand, sought a declaratory order from the FPC to approve a proposed program of curtailment of natural gas deliveries to both its direct and resale customers. This proceeding culminated in agreement among affected customers under which FPC allowed United to carry out its program for the 1970-1971 winter. </s> When, however, United made a supplemental filing in February 1971, for a proposed curtailment program for the 1971 summer season, LP&L, in March 1971, filed this diversity action in the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that the program was a breach of its contracts with United and asking injunctive relief against its implementation. LP&L also asked for a judgment declaring that the "Green System" was an intrastate system, deliveries from which did not require FPC certification. The FPC and United sought dismissal of the action on the ground that a prior decision by the District Court would be destructive of the FPC's primary jurisdiction since the FPC was, in fact, asserting its jurisdiction over both issues at that time and was promulgating its Order No. 431, and United, in response to Order No. 431, was filing its third curtailment plan. </s> In opposition to the motions to dismiss in the District Court, LP&L argued that the FPC was without jurisdiction to authorize or approve curtailment programs affecting direct-sales deliveries and was also without jurisdiction to curtail deliveries to Nine-Mile Point Station because they were local and not interstate deliveries. On June 30, 1971, the District Court dismissed the action, holding that the FPC had jurisdiction of both curtailment and certification proceedings and that LP&L had to exhaust its administrative remedies in both, 332 F. Supp. 692 (1971). The Court of Appeals decision reversed this dismissal. [406 U.S. 621, 626] </s> II </s> United is a "jurisdictional" pipeline 1 purchasing gas from producers in Texas and Louisiana and supplying wholesalers, direct-sales customers, and other pipelines. United supplies ultimate consumers throughout the eastern half of the United States from Texas to Massachusetts with a peak-day commitment in the winter heating months totaling about 6,000,000 thousand cubic feet (Mcf). </s> In 1970, as part of a pattern of temporary and chronic natural gas shortages throughout the Nation, 2 United found itself unable to meet all of its contract commitments during peak demand periods. 3 Indeed, on [406 U.S. 621, 627] days of greatest use, United expected to fall short by as much as 20% or more. 4 In October 1970 United first promulgated a proposed delivery curtailment plan and sought a declaratory order from the FPC that the plan was consistent with United's obligations under its tariff and direct-sales contracts. 5 Many of United's contracts with its customers made some provision for curtailment in times of temporary shortage, but these terms were complex and were not identical in all contracts or in United's tariff filings with the Commission. 6 United's proposed curtailment plan established a priority system of three groups, curtailed on the basis of end use. These three groups were, in order of the lowest priority and curtailed first, gas used for industrial purposes, including gas to generate electricity for industrial purposes; gas used to generate electricity consumed by domestic consumers; and gas used by domestic consumers. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., F. P. C. Op. No. 606, Oct. 5, 1971. The plan made no distinction between direct-sales customers and resale customers. [406 U.S. 621, 628] </s> This plan was opposed by LP&L and others, primarily on the ground that the FPC had no jurisdiction to curtail deliveries under direct-sales contracts. While preserving their objections, all but one of United's customers 7 agreed to a modified plan to go into effect for the 1970-1971 winter season while the proceedings continued. </s> During this same season, many other pipelines reported serious shortages and applied to the FPC for assistance in effecting curtailment plans. In response, the FPC promulgated several emergency provisions for temporary measures to avoid major disruptions of power supplies. Orders Nos. 402, 35 Fed. Reg. 7511, and 402A. 35 Fed. Reg. 8927, authorized short-term purchases by pipelines facing shortages from other jurisdictional pipelines to ensure that storage fields were filled. Order No. 418, 35 Fed. Reg. 19173, authorized similar emergency purchases from producers without following usual procedures. </s> It was because these measures were found to be insufficient that the FPC promulgated Order No. 431, 36 Fed. Reg. 7505. The Order recommended that in filing the required tariff revisions, "[c]onsideration should be given to the curtailment of volumes equivalent to all interruptible sales and to the curtailment of large boiler fuel sales where alternate fuels are available." Finally, Order No. 431 provided: </s> "Jurisdictional pipelines have the responsibility in the first instance to adopt a curtailment program by filing appropriate tariffs. Such tariffs, if approved by the Commission, will control in all respects notwithstanding inconsistent provisions in sales contracts, jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional, entered into prior to the date of the approval of the tariff." [406 U.S. 621, 629] United's revised tariff program filed in compliance with this order immediately became subject to the pending hearing for a declaratory order. On October 5, 1971, the FPC announced its interim decision, Op. No. 606, finding jurisdiction to effect a curtailment program for all customers, revising United's latest filing slightly, and remanding other issues in the plan to a hearing examiner. On November 2, 1971, United's plan, as modified, went into full effect. The appeal of LP&L and others from the FPC decision, Op. No. 606, is pending in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 8 </s> Also, in October 1970, based on the introduction of the interstate gas from its Black System, United sought certification under 7 (c) 9 for the continued operation of the portion of its pipeline facilities in Louisiana (the Green System) used to supply LP&L's Nine-Mile Point generating station. LP&L opposed the application, alleging that the pipeline was constructed and operated to be wholly intrastate, and that United's "illegal" introduction of a very small quantity of interstate gas did not cause the whole system to come under Commission jurisdiction. </s> On February 9, 1972, the Commission found in Op. No. 610 that the Green System was within its jurisdiction and thus required certification; it remanded the [406 U.S. 621, 630] proceedings to a trial examiner to determine if the certificate should be granted under the "public convenience and necessity" standard of 7. </s> The Court of Appeals' reversal of the District Court 10 on the curtailment, issue rested on its view that under the Natural Gas Act ". . . FPC has no form of continuing certificate jurisdiction over direct sales to customers of interstate pipeline companies. It has the initial right to issue or veto a certificate of public convenience and necessity and it must give its approval to the abandonment of the use of the certificated facilities, but between the two functions the express exemption [in the proviso of 1 (b)] of regulatory power over such consumptive sales bars agency intervention." 456 F.2d, at 338. </s> The Court of Appeals' holding that United's injection of interstate gas from its Black System into the theretofore intrastate Green System did not establish FPC jurisdiction to certificate the Green System, rested on its finding that the record showed that "the flow of gas from the Black system into the Green System in the case at bar is occasional and irregular, as well as minimal. The Green system, as an entire and separate unit, is physically located and functions entirely in Louisiana. Therefore, the undisputed facts show that the channel of constant flow is an intrastate and not an interstate channel. The regulation of the Green system is substantially and essentially a localized matter committed to Louisiana's jurisdiction." 456 F.2d, at 339-340. [406 U.S. 621, 631] </s> III </s> The Natural Gas Act of 1938 granted FPC broad powers "to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944). See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19 (1961); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 147 (1960). To that end, Congress "meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme," Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 520 (1947), of dual state and federal authority. Although federal jurisdiction was not to be exclusive, FPC regulation was to be broadly complementary to that reserved to the States, so that there would be no "gaps" for private interests to subvert the public welfare. This congressional blueprint has guided judicial interpretation of the broad language defining FPC jurisdiction, and </s> "when a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to approach the problem negatively, thus raising the possibility that a `no man's land' will be created. Compare Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 . That is to say, in a borderline case where congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs." FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., supra, at 19-20. </s> This litigation poses the question whether FPC has authority to effect orderly curtailment plans involving both direct sales and sales for resale. LP&L insists that [406 U.S. 621, 632] the FPC has no power to include direct sales in these plans. Transcontinental counsels inquiry into the necessary consequences of that contention in terms of the scope of federal and state regulatory authority in the premises. </s> Thirty-seven percent of United's total sales in 1970 were direct industrial sales. Under LP&L's argument, this volume would be wholly exempt from any curtailment plan approved by the FPC and thus United's resale customers would be forced to accept the entire burden of sharply reduced volumes while direct-sales customers received full contract service. The ultimate consumers thus affected include schools, hospitals, and homes completely dependent on a continued natural gas supply for heating and other domestic uses. These resale consumers could be curtailed by as much as 560,000 Mcf on cold days without dire consequences, but burdening them with the full curtailment volume would deprive them of up to 1,500,000 Mcf. </s> From a practical point of view, LP&L's position may thus produce a seriously inequitable system of gas distribution. Many direct industrial users of gas require only "interruptible services," which by the terms of their contracts are recognized to be of such minimal importance to the user that, upon the happening of certain events, the supply can be shut off on little or no notice. Nevertheless, the need for curtailment may not be sufficient to trigger these provisions of the contract and interruptible service customers may be able to demand full contract gas while resale consumers are being drastically curtailed. Many other direct industrial sales customers have alternative means available at little or no additional cost, yet under LP&L's contention will be able to demand their contract volumes while homes, hospitals, and schools suffer from lack of adequate service. </s> Can state authority practicably regulate in this area to prevent this inequity and hardship? Insofar as state [406 U.S. 621, 633] plans purport to curtail deliveries of interstate gas, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), is authority that such plans, when they operate to withdraw a large volume of gas from an established interstate current whereby it is supplied to customers in other States, would constitute a prohibited interference with interstate commerce. But even to the extent the States may constitutionally promulgate curtailment plans, the inevitable result would be varied regulatory programs of state courts and agencies, interpreting a countless number of different contracts and applying a variety of state agency rules. The conflicting results would necessarily produce allocations determined simply by the ability of each customer to pump its desired volume from a pipeline. Moreover, in some States, Louisiana for example, the state regulatory agency is forbidden to regulate direct-sales contracts. 11 Besides, a state agency empowered to regulate these contracts would be obliged to regulate in the State, not the national interest. 12 Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, supra. The unavoidable conflict between producing [406 U.S. 621, 634] States and consuming States will create contradictory regulations that cannot possibly be equitably resolved by the courts. With these problems in mind, the desirability [406 U.S. 621, 635] of uniform federal regulation is abundantly clear. Nevertheless, as the Court of Appeals emphasized, 456 F.2d, at 335, a need for federal regulation [406 U.S. 621, 636] does not establish FPC jurisdiction that Congress has not granted. We turn then to analysis of the statute to determine whether Congress withheld, as LP&L argues, authority from the FPC to apply its curtailment regulations to direct sales. </s> IV </s> In 1 (b) of the Act, "[t]hree things and three only Congress drew within its own regulatory power, delegated by the Act to its agent, the Federal Power Commission. These were: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale." Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S., at 516 . Each of these is an independent grant of jurisdiction and, though the Act's application to "sales" is limited to sales of interstate gas for resale, the Act applies to interstate "transportation" regardless of whether the gas transported is ultimately sold retail or wholesale. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 468 (1950). 13 </s> [406 U.S. 621, 637] </s> LP&L argues that the proviso in 1 (b) creates a complete exemption of direct sales from curtailment regulations. 14 The answer is that the prohibition of [406 U.S. 621, 638] the proviso of 1 (b) withheld from FPC only rate-setting authority with respect to direct sales. Curtailment regulations are not rate-setting regulations but regulations of the "transportation" of natural gas and thus within FPC jurisdiction under the opening sentence of 1 (b) that "[t]he provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce . . . ." The Court of Appeals rejected that construction on the ground that under it the "transportation" jurisdiction would swallow up the proviso's exemption for direct sales. We disagree. </s> The major impetus for the congressional grant of sales jurisdiction to the FPC was furnished by a Federal Trade Commission study of the pipeline industry in 1935-1936. 15 The study showed that increasing concentration in the industry was producing vast economic power for the pipelines and a serious threat of unreasonably high prices for consumers. This threat was most acute in the case of sales for resale because wholesale distributors and their customers had little economic clout with which to obtain equitable prices from the pipelines. State power to regulate rates charged for interstate service to a customer in another State for resale was also thought, within this Court's decisions, constitutionally to be outside the regulatory power of the [406 U.S. 621, 639] States. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924). </s> In response to this report and pressures from state regulatory agencies, Congress enacted a federal "sales" jurisdiction in the Natural Gas Act, by which Congress granted rate-setting authority to the Commission over all interstate sales for resale. But as this Court, in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920), had sustained state authority to regulate rates for "direct" sales, and, moreover, the need for federal authority here was not deemed acute, Congress withheld rate-setting jurisdiction over direct sales. That rate setting was the only subject matter covered by "sales" jurisdiction and the "direct sales" exception is clear from the legislative history of the proviso. The original phrasing of the proviso was: </s> "Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Commission to fix rates or charges for the sale of natural gas distributed locally in low-pressure mains or for the sale of natural gas for industrial use only." Hearing on H. R. 11662 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1936) (emphasis supplied). </s> The phrasing was changed and the words "to fix rates or charges" were subsequently deleted, but the House committee report confirms that the proviso as finally phrased was nevertheless meant to be restricted to rate setting. H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1937), states: </s> "It was urged in connection with earlier bills that there should be inserted at the end of this subsection a proviso as follows: </s> "`Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Commission to fix the rates [406 U.S. 621, 640] or charges to the public for the sale of natural gas distributed locally.' </s> "In order to avoid misunderstanding the committee thought it necessary to omit this proviso from the present bill for the following reasons, even though there is entire agreement with the intended policy which would have prompted its inclusion: First, it would have been surplusage if interpreted as it was intended to be interpreted, and, second, it would have been, in all likelihood, a source of confusion if interpreted in any other way. For example, it was felt that in the effort to find a reason for its inclusion it might have been argued that it exempted sales to a publicly owned distributing company, and such an exemption is not, of course, intended. It is believed that the purposes of this proviso, assuming the need for any such provision, are fully covered in the present provision by the language - `but shall not apply to any other . . . sales of natural gas.'" (Emphasis supplied.) </s> The author of the changed version, the General Solicitor of the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, confirmed this interpretation. Hearing on H. R. 4008, before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 143. </s> Thus, Congress' grant of sales jurisdiction as to sales for resale and the prohibition as to direct sales were meant to apply exclusively to rate setting, and in no wise limited the broad base of "transportation" jurisdiction granted the FPC. That head of jurisdiction plainly embraces regulation of the quantities of gas that pipelines may transport, for in that respect Congress created "a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme," Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S., at 520 , to "afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection . . . ." Atlantic [406 U.S. 621, 641] Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959). </s> "Therefore, when we are presented with an attempt by the federal authority to control a problem that is not, by its very nature, one with which state regulatory commissions can be expected to deal, the conclusion is irresistible that Congress desired regulation by federal authority rather than nonregulation." FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S., at 28 . </s> Comprehensive and equitable curtailment plans for gas transported in interstate commerce, as already mentioned, are practically beyond the competence of state regulatory agencies. Congress was also aware that Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), casts serious doubt upon the constitutionality of state regulation of such plans. That decision was considered in the deliberations on the Natural Gas Act and was cited to the House Committee as a reason for federal regulation. Hearing on H. R. 11662 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1936). </s> Finally, this Court has already stated its view that curtailment plans are aspects of FPC's "transportation" and not its "sales" jurisdiction. In Panhandle Eastern, 332 U.S., at 523 , we said: </s> "[T]he matter of interrupting service is one largely related . . . to transportation and thus within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to control, in accommodation of any conflicting interests among various states." 16 </s> [406 U.S. 621, 642] </s> V </s> Since curtailment programs fall within the FPC's responsibilities under the head of its "transportation" jurisdiction, the Commission must possess broad powers to devise effective means to meet these responsibilities. FPC and other agencies created to protect the public interest must be free, "within the ambit of their statutory authority, to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances." FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942). Section 16 of the Act assures the FPC the necessary degree of flexibility in providing that: </s> "The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act. . . ." 15 U.S.C. 717o. </s> In applying this section, we have held that "the width of administrative authority must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred . . . . Surely the Commission's broad responsibilities therefore demand a generous construction of its statutory authority." Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968); see United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 385 U.S. 83, 89 -90 (1966). </s> The substantive standard governing FPC evaluation of curtailment plans is found in 4 (b) of the Act: </s> "No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or [406 U.S. 621, 643] grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service." 15 U.S.C. 717c (b). </s> Two procedural mechanisms are available to enforce this antidiscriminatory provision of 4 (b). As to a tariff already on file and in effect, the FPC may proceed under 5 (a). 17 The 5 (a) procedure has substantial disadvantages, however, rendering it unsuitable for the evaluation of curtailment plans. The FPC must afford interested parties a full hearing on the reasonableness of the tariff before taking any remedial action, and, as we have observed, "the delay incident to determination in 5 proceedings through which initial certificated rates [as well as "practices" and "contracts"] are reviewable appears nigh interminable." Atlantic Refining Co. v. [406 U.S. 621, 644] Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S., at 389 . 18 In addition a prescribed remedial order can have only prospective application. FPC has therefore chosen to process curtailment plans under 4 (c), (d), and (e). 19 </s> [406 U.S. 621, 645] Under these provisions, a pipeline's tariff amendments filed with the FPC go into effect in 30 days unless suspended by the Commission. If a filing is challenged or the FPC of its own motion deems it appropriate, it may suspend the amended tariff for up to five months, at the end of which time the amended tariff becomes effective pending the completion of hearings. In these hearings, the pipeline has the burden of proving that its plan is reasonable and fair. </s> Order No. 431 makes full use of the 4 procedures. All pipelines facing shortages necessitating curtailment are required to file reasonable allocation schemes as amendments to their existing tariffs, or to state that the existing tariffs are adequate. When emergency or other conditions arise and it appears desirable in the public interest to place a plan into effect, the FPC may accept the filing, implement it immediately or suspend it, and employ the plan as a working guideline while hearings continue. In addition to the flexibility of this arrangement, the requirement that pipelines submit plans enables the FPC to utilize each pipeline's unique knowledge of its customers' needs, ability to substitute other fuel sources, and other relevant considerations. </s> The Court of Appeals held that, under our decision in FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S., at 17 , FPC authority over direct-sales contracts is limited to a "veto power" to be exercised only in certification proceedings under 7 (c) and abandonment [406 U.S. 621, 646] proceedings under 7 (b). We reject this argument on two grounds. First, Transcontinental dealt with FPC's authority to consider direct-sales rates in certification proceedings. We there noted that under 1 (b) FPC jurisdiction over rates was limited. The litigation here, unlike Transcontinental, does not involve rates and therefore the provision of 1 (b) is wholly inapplicable. Secondly, Transcontinental dealt only with FPC "veto power" under 7, and in no way limited FPC authority under 4 (b) to prevent discrimination among a pipeline's customers. Since 4 (b) deals with "service," the FPC may invoke it to deal with curtailment programs, whether or not it could also invoke 7 for that purpose. </s> Amici have argued that permitting the pipeline's tariff amendments to take effect despite contrary terms in existing contracts is inconsistent with our decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956). In that case, however, we dealt with an attempt by a pipeline unilaterally to effect a change in its contract terms by making a filing under 4. In the present cause, the issue is whether the FPC, acting under the head of its transportation jurisdiction and its broad mandate under 16, may order pipelines facing shortages to develop and submit rational curtailment arrangements. Our holding in Mobile Gas Service Corp. does not govern the decision of this issue since, as we observed in that case: </s> "[D]enying to natural gas companies the power unilaterally to change their contracts in no way impairs the regulatory powers of the Commission, for the contracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest." 350 U.S., at 344. [406 U.S. 621, 647] </s> We conclude therefore that the FPC has the jurisdiction asserted here and that the Natural Gas Act fully authorizes the method chosen by the FPC for its exercise. </s> VI </s> In addition to holding that the proviso to 1 (b) prohibited curtailment of gas delivered to the Nine-Mile Point Station, the Court of Appeals held that those deliveries were not regulable by the FPC because "the flow of gas from the Black system into the Green system . . . is occasional and irregular, as well as minimal," and that "[t]he Green system, as an entire and separate unit, is physically located and functions entirely in Louisiana"; the court concluded that, for these reasons, "[t]he regulation of the Green system is substantially and essentially a localized matter committed to Louisiana's jurisdiction." 456 F.2d, at 339-340. The Court of Appeals erred in deciding this question. The FPC had exercised its primary jurisdiction and was conducting proceedings to determine whether the Green System was subject to its jurisdiction. In that circumstance, the District Court and the Court of Appeals were obliged to defer to the FPC for the initial determination of its jurisdiction. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). The need to protect the primary authority of an agency to determine its own jurisdiction "is obviously greatest when the precise issue brought before a court is in the process of litigation through procedures originating in the [agency]. While the [agency's] decision is not the last word, it must assuredly be the first." Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Interlake S. S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 185 (1962). Review of the FPC decision may proceed in due course pursuant to 19 (b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 717r (b). We see no need to make the same disposition as to the [406 U.S. 621, 648] curtailment question since the Court of Appeals had Op. No. 606 before it and acted upon the opinion in reaching its decision. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the decision of these cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 A "jurisdictional" pipeline transports natural gas in interstate commerce and for that reason is subject to FPC certification jurisdiction. The "jurisdictional" label is also sometimes used to apply to sales, in which case it refers to interstate sales for resale, which are subject to Commission rate regulation. </s> [Footnote 2 FPC Staff Report No. 2, National Gas Supply and Demand 1971-1990 (1972): "The emergence of a natural gas shortage during the past two years marks a historic turning point - the end of natural gas industry growth uninhibited by supply considerations. Not only has the Nation's proven gas reserve inventory for the lower 48 states been shrinking for the past three years, but major pipeline companies and distributors in most parts of the country have been forced to refuse requests for additional gas service from large industrial customers and from many new customers. For practical short-term purposes we are confronted with the fact that current proven reserves in the lower 48 states, as reported by the American Gas Association, have dropped from 289.3 trillion cubic feet in 1967 to 259.6 in 1970, a 10.3 percent drop within a three-year period. Furthermore, approximately 95 percent of this proven reserve inventory is already committed to gas sales contracts and is therefore unavailable for sales to new customers or for increased volumes to old customers." Id., at xi. </s> [Footnote 3 Demand for natural gas fluctuates sharply from season to season and from day to day. Nationally, peak days occur in winter heating [406 U.S. 621, 627] months. For LP&L, however, the need for gas is greatest in the summer months, when air conditioning increases electricity consumption. </s> [Footnote 4 Many of the facts are taken from the recitals in the petitions for certiorari, which draw upon evidence presented before the FPC in the curtailment proceedings. LP&L has not challenged their accuracy except to argue that no significant gas shortage actually exists. Our decision in this case in no way limits LP&L's freedom to argue its position as to the facts on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 5 The Commission has authority to issue declaratory orders under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554 (e). </s> [Footnote 6 The record in these cases does not contain all the contract terms dealing with curtailment of deliveries. United's two contracts with LP&L under consideration in this litigation, however, indicate that the terms vary from year to year and customer to customer since these two contracts themselves establish slightly different priority systems. Moreover, LP&L informs us that its contracts had terms slightly different from those in most other direct-sales contracts. </s> [Footnote 7 The objecting party appealed the decision of the FPC and that case is now pending in the District of Columbia. </s> [Footnote 8 The petitions of the Solicitor General and United for review here of the FPC decision prior to judgment of the Court of Appeals were denied. 405 U.S. 973 (1972). </s> [Footnote 9 Section 7 (c) provides: "No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . . ." 15 U.S.C. 717f (c). </s> [Footnote 10 Argument was heard in the Fifth Circuit in November 1971, one month after the FPC decision in No. 606. The Court of Appeals decision was announced in January 1972, one month before the FPC decision in No. 610. </s> [Footnote 11 La. Const., Art. 6, 4. </s> [Footnote 12 The conflict between producing and consuming States over state or federal regulatory authority is highlighted in the contrast between Louisiana's amicus brief in this litigation and the statement of the Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission in another case. Louisiana, a producing State, submits: "Historically, gas producing states have certain advantages over states which do not have their own gas supply. Their very proximity to the source of production attracts industries which use gas as the raw material without which their plants could not operate. The lower transportation costs of delivering gas to other industrial and commercial users within the state makes its use particularly attractive for such applications. It is not surprising, therefore, that producing states have a higher proportion of industrial-commercial consumption of total gas consumed and of firm gas than consuming states. Louisiana utilizes 84% of the total quantity of firm gas sold [406 U.S. 621, 634] in the state for industrial and power plant generation purposes, in comparison to a national average of only 37%. "Louisiana's economy is heavily dependent upon the availability of a firm, reliable and uninterrupted supply of natural gas. State-wide investment by industrial category clearly reflects the predominance of petroleum, refineries and chemicals which represented $465,297,370 or 76% of a total industrial investment of $609,578,850 in 1970. Apart from these industries which use natural gas as process gas without which their plants cannot function, the state's electric utilities are completely dependent upon natural gas as fuel for electric generators. "Thus, the economic welfare of the state hinges upon the continued delivery of the volumes of gas it received and used prior to United's curtailment and upon the ability to draw upon greater volumes. Otherwise, its economy will be frozen at or below its present level. This is not true of other states in which natural gas plays a subsidiary rather than a dominant role in the overall economy of the state and in which the electrical utilities have alternate power sources such as coal, imported liquefied natural gas and inexpensive hydro-electric power." Brief of State of Louisiana Amicus Curiae 2-3. As observed in FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961), consuming States prefer federal regulation. The Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission summed up this position in In re Cabot Gas Corp., 16 P. U. R. (N. S.) 443 (1936): "There can be but one opinion among those who believe in the conservation of natural resources. They should be developed not to benefit a few individuals but in the interests of public welfare present and future. Our natural gas resources ought to be conserved and there is probably no field where the Federal government acting in the interests of the entire country and to protect the welfare of the future could accomplish more than in the natural gas industry. From a conservation viewpoint, I thoroughly agree with Commissioner Burritt, and if I could see how a denial of the present petition would work to this end, I would vote to refuse the application; but will such denial produce the desired results? "The field from which gas is to be taken by the petitioner is in [406 U.S. 621, 635] northern Pennsylvania and southern New York. Apparently, far more of the gas will come from Pennsylvania than from New York and over the extraction of gas in the state of Pennsylvania, this Commission has practically no control. It is possible for Pennsylvania companies to take all of the gas from this field unless the New York companies remove the gas before the field is exhausted. "Further, the Public Service Commission has been given no adequate authority to determine how the natural gas resources of this state, to say nothing of the resources of Pennsylvania, shall be developed. We have no powers directly to control the amount of gas that is taken from any field and our indirect powers are so limited that it is doubtful if much could be accomplished. The state of New York receives far more gas from sources located beyond its boundaries than it exports to any adjoining state and the conservation of natural gas resources in the various states cannot be properly brought about except through voluntary action of the states or by the Federal government. Neither one is yet operative and while attention has been given to electric interstate commerce, no effective steps have been taken to conserve or regulate the distribution of natural gas, where it is so urgently needed. "In view of the lack of authority conferred upon this Commission to conserve natural resources, the question becomes primarily what will be gained to consumers in the state of New York if the petition is denied. It is stated that about 80 or 90 per cent of the gas furnished by the petitioner will be used for industrial purposes and that only from 10 to 20 per cent will go to the general public, the inference being that the saving to the companies purchasing the gas will go to enrich a few stockholders. Let us assume such are the facts. Who will gain if those benefited by the petition are deprived of their profits or advantages by a denial of the petition? This Commission does not control the use that will be made of the gas from the field tapped by the petitioner. There are many other companies tapping the supply and we have no means of determining where, when, or to whom the gas will be sold. If restriction is imposed on the use of it in New York, it may go to Pennsylvania; and if the petitioner is not allowed to supply the areas which it is proposed to serve, the gas will go to other areas and there is no assurance that it [406 U.S. 621, 636] will be used any more beneficially from a public viewpoint than it will be if the petition is granted. "As stated, I am heartily in favor of the conservation of natural gas as well as other natural resources; but in this specific case, will the granting or the denial of the petition work to the benefit of the people of New York? The benefit to the area to be supplied by the petitioner is definite, it is known, it is sure. But if the petition is denied, who will be benefited? There is no assurance upon this point. The answer is speculative and uncertain. There is nothing to assure us that the denial of the petition would conserve the gas supply. Is it not likely that the benefits would merely be diverted from one group or one locality to another?" </s> [Footnote 13 East Ohio dealt with the grant of FPC jurisdiction over natural gas companies engaged in interstate transportation or sale. What we said there has relevance to the issue in this case: "Respondents contend, however, that the word `transportation' [406 U.S. 621, 637] in 1 (b) must be construed as applying only to companies engaged in the business of transporting gas in interstate commerce for hire or for sales to be followed by resales, whereas East Ohio does neither. The short answer is that the Act's language did not express any such limitation. Despite the unqualified language of 1 (b) making the Act apply to `transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,' respondents ask us to qualify that language by applying it only to businesses which both transport and sell natural gas for resale. They rely on a sentence in the declaration of policy, 1 (a), referring to `the business of transporting and selling natural gas.' But their contention that the word `and' in the policy provision creates an unseverable bond is completely refuted by the clearly disjunctive phrasing of 1 (b) itself. As we pointed out in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 516 , 1 (b) made the Natural Gas Act applicable to three separate things: `(1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale.' And throughout the Act `transportation' and `sale' are viewed as separate subjects of regulation. They have independent and equally important places in the Act. Thus, to adopt respondents' construction would unduly restrict the Commission's power to carry out one of the major policies of the Act. Moreover, the initial interest of Congress in regulation of transportation facilities was reemphasized in 1942 by passage of an amendment to 7 (c) of the Act broadening the Commission's powers over the construction or extension of pipe lines. 56 Stat. 83. This amendment followed a report of the Commission to Congress pointing out that without amendment the Act vested the Commission with inadequate power to make `any serious effort to control the unplanned construction of natural-gas pipe lines with a view to conserving one of the country's valuable but exhaustible energy resources.' We hold that the word `transportation' like the phrase `interstate commerce' aptly describes the movements of gas in East Ohio's high-pressure pipe lines." 338 U.S. 464, 468 -469 (1950). (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 14 It is well established that the proviso was added to the Act merely for clarification and was not intended to deprive FPC of any jurisdiction otherwise granted by 1 (b). FPC v. Transcontinental [406 U.S. 621, 638] Gas Pipe Line Co., 365 U.S. 1 (1961); FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950). The House report on the bill described this second sentence of 1 (b) as follows: "The quoted words are not actually necessary, as the matters specified therein could not be said fairly to be covered by the language affirmatively stating the jurisdiction of the Commission, but similar language was in previous bills, and, rather than invite the contention, however unfounded, that the elimination of the negative language would broaden the scope of the act, the committee has included it in this bill." H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). </s> [Footnote 15 S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 84-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., submitted Dec. 31, 1935. </s> [Footnote 16 In Panhandle, the Court was asked to hold that direct industrial sales customers receiving gas in interstate commerce could not be subjected to state regulatory control consistently with FPC jurisdiction in the area. In support of this position, the customers [406 U.S. 621, 642] argued that state control of certain matters affecting the sales could not practically be managed by state regulation. Not surprisingly, the problem of curtailment was used as a prime example of a matter presenting these difficulties. </s> [Footnote 17 Section 5 (a) provides: "Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates." 15 U.S.C. 717d (a). </s> [Footnote 18 Of course, even when conducting a 5 hearing, the Commission would have emergency authority to issue interim orders effecting a curtailment plan. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). </s> [Footnote 19 These sections provide, "(c) Under such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe, every natural-gas company shall file with the Commission, within such time (not less than sixty days from the date this Act takes effect) and in such form as the Commission may designate, and shall keep open in convenient form and place for public inspection, schedules showing all rates and charges for any transportation or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and services. "(d) Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days' notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published. "(e) Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and [406 U.S. 621, 645] the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect." 15 U.S.C. 717c (c), (d), and (e). </s> [406 U.S. 621, 649]

United States Supreme Court BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS v. FLRA(1983) No. 82-799 Argued: October 11, 1983Decided: November 29, 1983 </s> The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act) in 5 U.S.C. 7131(a) (1982 ed.) requires federal agencies to grant to employees representing their union in collective bargaining with the agencies "official time . . . during the time the employee otherwise would be in a duty status." This allows the employee negotiators to be paid as if they were at work, whenever they bargain during hours when they would otherwise be on duty. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), in an "Interpretation and Guidance" of general applicability, construed 7131(a)'s grant of official time as also entitling employee negotiators to a per diem allowance and reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in connection with collective bargaining. In this case, the Court of Appeals enforced an FLRA order requiring petitioner federal agency to pay an employee union representative per diem and travel expenses in addition to his salary, finding the FLRA's interpretation of the statute "reasonably defensible." </s> Held: </s> The FLRA's interpretation of 7131(a) constitutes an "unauthorized assumption by [the] agency of [a] major policy decisio[n] properly made by Congress," American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 . Pp. 96-108. </s> (a) While reviewing courts should uphold an agency's reasonable and defensible constructions of its enabling statute, they must not "rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute," NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 -292. Pp. 96-98. </s> (b) Here, there are no indications in the Act or its legislative history that Congress intended employee negotiators to be allowed per diem and travel expenses on the theory that they are engaged in Government business. The Act's declaration that collective bargaining contributes to efficient government and therefore serves the public interest does not reflect a dramatic departure from the principles which applied prior to passage of the Act pursuant to a program established by an Executive Order and under which employee negotiators had not been regarded as working for the Government. Nor do the specific provisions of the Act aimed at equalizing the positions of management and labor suggest that [464 U.S. 89, 90] Congress intended employee negotiators to be treated as though they were "on the job" for all purposes. The qualifying language of 7131(a) under which the right to a salary is conferred only when "the employee otherwise would be in a duty status" strongly suggests that the employee negotiator is not considered in a duty status while engaged in collective bargaining and thereby entitled to all of the normal forms of compensation. Pp. 102-106. </s> (c) The FLRA's interpretation of 7131(a) is not supported by the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S.C. 5702(a) (1982 ed.), which authorizes a per diem allowance for a federal employee "traveling on official business away from his designated post of duty." Neither Congress' declaration that collective bargaining is in the public interest nor its use of the term "official time" warrants the conclusion that employee negotiators are on "official business" of the Government. Pp. 106-107. </s> 672 F.2d 732, reversed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Carolyn F. Corwin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, William Kanter, and Douglas Letter. </s> Ruth E. Peters argued the cause for respondents. Steven H. Svartz and William E. Persina filed a brief for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority. Robert M. Tobias, Lois G. Williams, and Kerry L. Adams filed a brief for respondent National Treasury Employees Union. * </s> [Footnote * Edwin Vieira, Jr., filed a brief for the Public Service Research Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, by Mark D. Roth and James R. Rosa; and for the National Federation of Federal Employees by Catherine Waelder. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act), Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1214, 5 U.S.C. 7131(a) (1982 ed.), requires federal agencies to grant "official time" to employees [464 U.S. 89, 91] representing their union in collective bargaining with the agencies. The grant of official time allows the employee negotiators to be paid as if they were at work, whenever they bargain during hours when they would otherwise be on duty. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) concluded that the grant of official time also entitles employee union representatives to a per diem allowance and reimbursement for travel expenses incurred in connection with collective bargaining. 2 F. L. R. A. 265 (1979). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced an FLRA order requiring an agency to pay a union negotiator travel expenses and a per diem, finding the Authority's interpretation of the statute "reasonably defensible." 672 F.2d 732, 733 (1982). Three other Courts of Appeals have rejected the FLRA's construction of the Act. 1 We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 459 U.S. 1145 (1983), and now reverse. </s> I </s> A </s> Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act, part of a comprehensive revision of the laws governing the rights and obligations of civil servants, contains the first statutory scheme governing labor relations between federal agencies and their employees. Prior to enactment of Title VII, labor-management relations in the federal sector were governed by a program established in a 1962 Executive Order. 2 The Executive Order regime, under which federal employees had [464 U.S. 89, 92] limited rights to engage in concerted activity, was most recently administered by the Federal Labor Relations Council, a body composed of three Executive Branch management officials whose decisions were not subject to judicial review. 3 </s> The new Act, declaring that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest," 5 U.S.C. 7101(a) (1982 ed.), significantly strengthened the position of public employee unions while carefully preserving the ability of federal managers to maintain "an effective and efficient Government," 7101(b). 4 Title VII expressly protects the rights of federal employees "to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity," 7102, and imposes on federal agencies and labor organizations a duty to bargain collectively in good faith, 7116(a)(5) and (b)(5). The Act excludes certain management prerogatives from the scope of negotiations, although an agency must bargain over the procedures by which these management rights are exercised. See 7106. In general, unions and federal agencies must negotiate over terms and conditions of employment, unless a bargaining proposal is inconsistent with existing federal law, rule, or regulation. See 7103(a), 7114, 7116, and 7117(a). Strikes and certain other forms of concerted activities by federal employees are illegal and constitute unfair labor practices under the Act, 7116(b)(7)(A). </s> The Act replaced the management-controlled Federal Labor Relations Council with the FLRA, a three-member independent and bipartisan body within the Executive Branch with responsibility for supervising the collective-bargaining process and administering other aspects of federal labor relations established by Title VII. 7104. The Authority, the role of which in the public sector is analogous [464 U.S. 89, 93] to that of the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector, see H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 41 (1978), adjudicates negotiability disputes, unfair labor practice complaints, bargaining unit issues, arbitration exceptions, and conflicts over the conduct of representational elections. See 7105(a)(2) (A)-(I). In addition to its adjudicatory functions, the Authority may engage in formal rulemaking, 7134, and is specifically required to "provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters" arising under the Act, 7105(a)(1). The FLRA may seek enforcement of its adjudicatory orders in the United States courts of appeals, 7123(b), and persons, including federal agencies, aggrieved by any final FLRA decision may also seek judicial review in those courts, 7123(a). </s> B </s> Petitioner, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF or Bureau), an agency within the Department of the Treasury, maintained a regional office in Lodi, California. Respondent National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU or Union) was the exclusive representative of BATF employees stationed in the Lodi office. In November 1978, the Bureau notified NTEU that it intended to move the Lodi office to Sacramento and to establish a reduced duty post at a new location in Lodi. The Union informed BATF that it wished to negotiate aspects of the move's impact on employees in the bargaining unit. As its agent for these negotiations, the Union designated Donald Pruett, a BATF employee and NTEU steward who lived in Madera, California, and was stationed in Fresno. Bureau officials agreed to meet with Pruett at the new offices and discuss the planned move. Pruett asked that his participation in the discussions be classified as "official time" so that he could receive his regular salary while attending the meetings. The Bureau denied the request and directed Pruett to take either annual leave or leave without pay for the day of the meeting. </s> On February 23, 1979, Bureau officials met with Pruett at the proposed new Sacramento offices and inspected the physical [464 U.S. 89, 94] amenities, including the restrooms, dining facilities, and parking areas. Pruett and the BATF officials then drove to Lodi where they conducted a similar inspection of the new reduced duty post. Finally, the group repaired to the existing Lodi office where they discussed the planned move. After Pruett expressed his general satisfaction with the new facilities, he negotiated with the agency officials about such matters as parking arrangements, employee assignments, and the possibility of excusing employee tardiness for the first week of operations in the Sacramento office. Once the parties reached an agreement on the move, Pruett drove back to his home in Madera. </s> Pruett had spent 11 1/2 hours traveling to and attending the meetings, and had driven more than 300 miles in his own car. When he renewed his request to have his participation at the meetings classified as official time, the Bureau informed him that it did not reimburse employees for expenses incurred in negotiations and that it granted official time only for quarterly collective-bargaining sessions and not for midterm discussions like those involved here. In June 1979, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA, claiming that BATF had improperly compelled Pruett to take annual leave for the February 23 sessions. </s> While the charge was pending, the FLRA issued an "Interpretation and Guidance" of general applicability which required federal agencies to pay salaries, travel expenses, and per diem allowances to union representatives engaged in collective bargaining with the agencies. 5 2 F. L. R. A. 265 (1979). The Interpretation relied on 5 U.S.C. 7131(a) [464 U.S. 89, 95] (1982 ed.), which provides that "[a]ny employee representing an exclusive representative in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement . . . shall be authorized official time for such purposes . . . ." The Authority concluded that an employee's entitlement to official time under this provision extends to "all negotiations between an exclusive representative and an agency, regardless of whether such negotiations pertain to the negotiation or renegotiation of a basic collective bargaining agreement." 2 F. L. R. A., at 268. The Authority further determined that 7131(a) requires agencies to pay a per diem allowance and travel expenses to employees representing their union in such negotiations. Id., at 270. </s> Based on the NTEU's pending charge against the Bureau, the General Counsel of the Authority issued a complaint and notice of hearing, alleging that the BATF had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to grant Pruett official time for the February 23 meetings. 6 During the course of a subsequent hearing on the charge before an Administrative Law Judge, the complaint was amended to add a claim that, in addition to paying Pruett's salary for the day of the meetings, the BATF should have paid his travel expenses and a per diem allowance. Following the hearing, the ALJ determined [464 U.S. 89, 96] that negotiations had in fact taken place between Pruett and BATF officials at the February 23 meetings. Bound to follow the recent FLRA Interpretation and Guidance, the ALJ concluded that the Bureau had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to comply with 7131(a). Accordingly, he ordered the Bureau to pay Pruett his regular salary for the day in question, as well as his travel costs and a per diem allowance. The ALJ also required the BATF to post a notice stating that the agency would do the same for all employee union representatives in future negotiations. The Bureau filed exceptions to the decision with the Authority, which, in September 1980, affirmed the decision of the ALJ, adopting his findings, conclusions, and recommended relief. 4 F. L. R. A. 288 (1980). </s> The Bureau sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Union intervened as a party in that appeal. The Bureau challenged both the FLRA's conclusion that 7131(a) applies to midterm negotiations and its determination that the section requires payment of travel expenses and a per diem allowance. After deciding that the Authority's construction of its enabling Act was entitled to deference if it was "reasoned and supportable," 672 F.2d, at 735-736, the Court of Appeals enforced the Authority's order on both issues. Id., at 737, 738. On certiorari to this Court, petitioner does not seek review of the holding with respect to midterm negotiations. Only that aspect of the Court of Appeals' decision regarding travel expenses and per diem allowances is at issue here. </s> II </s> The FLRA order enforced by the Court of Appeals in this case was, as noted, premised on the Authority's earlier construction of 7131(a) in its Interpretation and Guidance. Although we have not previously had occasion to consider an interpretation of the Civil Service Reform Act by the FLRA, we have often described the appropriate standard of judicial [464 U.S. 89, 97] review in similar contexts. 7 Like the National Labor Relations Board, see, e. g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963), the FLRA was intended to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the Act. See 7105; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 41 (1978). Consequently, the Authority is entitled to considerable deference when it exercises its "special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities" of federal labor relations. Cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 236. See also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979); NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). </s> On the other hand, the "deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965). Accordingly, while reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency's enabling Act, NLRB v. Iron Workers, supra, at 350, they must not "rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute." NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 -292 (1965). See Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 , [464 U.S. 89, 98] 166 (1971). 8 Guided by these principles, we turn to a consideration of the FLRA's construction of 7131(a). </s> III </s> Title 5 U.S.C. 7131(a) (1982 ed.) provides in full: </s> "Any employee representing an exclusive representative in the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement [464 U.S. 89, 99] under this chapter shall be authorized official time for such purposes, including attendance at impasse proceeding, during the time the employee otherwise would be in a duty status. The number of employees for whom official time is authorized under this subsection shall not exceed the number of individuals designated as representing the agency for such purposes." </s> According to the House Committee that reported the bill containing 7131, Congress used the term "official time" to mean "paid time." See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 58 (1978). In light of this clear expression of congressional intent, the parties agree that employee union negotiators are entitled to their usual pay during collective-bargaining sessions that occur when the employee "otherwise would be in a duty status." Both the Authority, 2 F. L. R. A., at 269, and the Court of Appeals, 672 F.2d, at 737, recognized that there is no corresponding expression, either in the statute or the extensive legislative history, of a congressional intent to pay employee negotiators travel expenses and per diem allowances as well. </s> Despite this congressional silence, respondents advance several reasons why the FLRA's determination that such payments are required is consistent with the policies underlying the Act. Each of these arguments proceeds from the assumption that, by providing employee negotiators with official time for bargaining, Congress rejected the model of federal labor relations that had shaped prior administrative practice. In its place, according to respondents, Congress substituted a new vision of collective bargaining under which employee negotiators, like management representatives, are considered "on the job" while bargaining and are therefore entitled to all customary forms of compensation, including travel expenses and per diem allowances. 9 In order to evaluate this claim, it is necessary briefly to review the rights of [464 U.S. 89, 100] employee negotiators to compensation prior to adoption of the Act. </s> A </s> Under the 1962 Executive Order establishing the first federal labor relations program, the decision whether to pay union representatives for the time spent in collective bargaining was left within the discretion of their employing agency, 10 apparently on the ground that, without some control by management, the length of such sessions could impose too great a burden on Government business. See Report of the President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Service, reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, pp. 1177, 1203 (Comm. Print 1979) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.). Under this early scheme, employee negotiators were not entitled to per diem allowances and travel expenses, on the view that they were engaged, not in official business of the Government, but rather in activities "primarily in the interest of the employee organization." 44 Comp. Gen. 617, 618 (1965). 11 </s> [464 U.S. 89, 101] </s> Executive Order No. 11491, which became effective in 1970, cut back on the previous Order by providing that employees engaged in negotiations with their agencies could not receive official time, even at the agencies' discretion. See 3 CFR 861-862, 873-874 (1966-1970 Comp.). Again, the prohibition was based on the view that employee representatives work for their union, not for the Government, when negotiating an agreement with their employers. See Leg. Hist., at 1167. In 1971, however, at the recommendation of the Federal Labor Relations Council, an amending Executive Order allowed unions to negotiate with agencies to obtain official time for employee representatives, up to a maximum of either 40 hours, or 50% of the total time spent in bargaining. Exec. Order No. 11616, 3 CFR 605 (1971-1975 Comp.). The Council made clear that this limited authorization, which was intended "to maintain a reasonable policy with respect to union self-support and an incentive to economical and businesslike bargaining practices," Leg. Hist., at 1169, did not permit "[o]vertime, premium pay, or travel expenditures." Id., at 1264. </s> The Senate version of the bill that became the Civil Service Reform Act would have retained the last Executive Order's restrictions on the authorization of official time. S. Rep. [464 U.S. 89, 102] No. 95-969, p. 112 (1978). Congress instead adopted the section in its present form, concluding, in the words of one Congressman, that union negotiators "should be allowed official time to carry out their statutory representational activities just as management uses official time to carry out its responsibilities." 124 Cong. Rec. 29188 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay). See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, p. 111 (1978). </s> B </s> Respondents suggest that, by rejecting earlier limitations on official time, Congress repudiated the view that employee negotiators work only for their union and not for the Government. Under the new vision of federal labor relations postulated by respondents, civil servants on both sides of the bargaining table are engaged in official business of the Government and must be compensated equally. Because federal employees representing the views of management receive travel expenses and per diem allowances, federal employees representing the views of labor are entitled to such payments as well. In support of this view, respondents rely on the Act's declaration that public sector collective bargaining is in "the public interest" and "contributes to the effective conduct of public business," 7101(a), as well as on a number of specific provisions in the Act intended to equalize the position of management and labor. For instance, the Act requires agencies to deduct union dues from employees' paychecks and to transfer the funds to the union at no cost, 7115(a); 12 in addition, agencies must furnish a variety of date useful to unions in the collective-bargaining process, 7114(b)(4). Respondents also contend that Congress employed the term "official time" in 7131 specifically to indicate that employee negotiators are engaged in Government business and therefore entitled to all of their usual forms of compensation. [464 U.S. 89, 103] </s> Although Congress certainly could have adopted the model of collective bargaining advanced by respondents, we find no indications in the Act or its legislative history that it intended to do so. The Act's declaration that collective bargaining contributes to efficient government and therefore serves the public interest does not reflect a dramatic departure from the principles of the Executive Order regime under which employee negotiators had not been regarded as working for the Government. To the contrary, the declaration constitutes a strong congressional endorsement of the policy on which the federal labor relations program had been based since its creation in 1962. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 CFR 521 (1959-1963 Comp.) ("participation of employees in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies affecting them contributes to effective conduct of public business"); Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 CFR 861 (1966-1970 Comp.) ("public interest requires . . . modern and progressive work practices to facilitate improved employee performance and efficiency" and efficient government is "benefited by providing employees an opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of their employment"). See also S. Rep. No. 95-969, p. 12 (1978); 124 Cong. Rec. 29182 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall) ("What we really do is to codify the 1962 action of President Kennedy in setting up a basic framework of collective bargaining for Federal employees"). 13 </s> [464 U.S. 89, 104] </s> Nor do the specific provisions of the Act aimed at equalizing the positions of management and labor suggest that Congress intended employee representatives to be treated as though they were "on the job" for all purposes. Indeed, the Act's provision of a number of specific subsidies for union activities supports precisely the opposite conclusion. As noted above, Congress expressly considered and ultimately rejected the approach to paid time that had prevailed under the Executive Order regime. See supra, at 101-102. In contrast, there is no reference in the statute or the legislative history to travel expenses and per diem allowances, despite the fact that these kinds of payments had also received administrative attention prior to passage of the Act, see supra, at 100, and n. 11. There is, of course, nothing inconsistent in paying the salaries, but not the expenses, of union negotiators. Congress might well have concluded that, although union representatives should not be penalized by a loss in salary while engaged in collective bargaining, they need not be further subsidized with travel and per diem allowances. The provisions of the Act intended to facilitate the collection of union dues, see 7115, certainly suggest that Congress contemplated that unions would ordinarily pay their own expenses. </s> Respondents also find their understanding of the role of union representatives supported by Congress' use of the phrase "official time" in 7131(a). For respondents, the use of this term indicates an intent to treat employee negotiators "as doing the government's work for all the usual purposes," and therefore entitled to "all attributes of employment," including travel expenses and a per diem allowance. Brief for Respondent NTEU 24-28. They suggest that, if Congress intended to maintain only the employees' salaries, it would have granted them "leave without loss of pay," a term it has used in other statutes. See, e. g., 5 U.S.C. 6321 (absence of veterans to attend funeral services), 6322(a) (jury or witness duty), and 6323 (military reserve duty) (1982 ed.). In contrast, Congress uses the terms "official [464 U.S. 89, 105] capacity" and "duty status" to indicate that an employee is "on the job" and entitled to all the usual liabilities and privileges of employment. See, e. g., 5751, 6322(b) (employee summoned to testify in "official capacity" entitled to travel expenses). 14 </s> The difficulty with respondents' argument is that Congress did not provide that employees engaged in collective bargaining are acting in their "official capacity," "on the job," or in a "duty status." Instead, the right to a salary conferred by 7131(a) obtains only when "the employee otherwise would be in a duty status" (emphasis supplied). This qualifying language strongly suggests that union negotiators engaged in collective bargaining are not considered in a duty status and thereby entitled to all of their normal forms of compensation. Nor does the phrase "official time," borrowed from prior administrative practice, have the same meaning as "official capacity." 15 As noted above, employees on "official time" under the Executive Order regime were not generally entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance. See supra, at 100-101. Moreover, as respondents' own examples demonstrate, Congress does not rely on the mere use of the word "official" when it intends to allow travel expenses and per diems. Even as to those employees acting in an "official capacity," Congress generally provides explicit authorization for such payments. See, e. g., 5702, 5751(b), 6322(b). In the Civil Service Reform Act itself, for instance, Congress expressly provided that members of the Federal Service [464 U.S. 89, 106] Impasses Panel are entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance, in addition to a salary. See 5703, 7119(c)(4). 16 </s> Perhaps recognizing that authority for travel expenses and per diem allowances cannot be found within the four corners of 7131(a), respondents alternatively contend that the Authority's decision is supported by the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S.C. 5702(a) (1982 ed.), which provides that a federal employee "traveling on official business away from his designated post of duty . . . is entitled to . . . a per diem allowance." The Travel Expense Act is administered by the Comptroller General who has concluded that agencies may authorize per diem allowances for travel that is "sufficiently in the interest of the United States so as to be regarded as official business." 44 Comp. Gen. 188, 189 (1964). Under the Executive Order regime, the Comptroller General authorized per diem payments to employee negotiators pursuant to this statute upon a certification that the employees' travel served the convenience of the employing agency. See n. 11, supra. </s> Based on its view that employee negotiators are "on the job," the Authority determined that union representatives engaged in collective bargaining are on "official business" and therefore entitled to a per diem allowance under the Travel Expense Act. 2 F. L. R. A., at 269. In support of this reasoning, the Authority notes that 5702(a) has been construed broadly to authorize reimbursement in connection with a variety [464 U.S. 89, 107] of "quasi-official" activities, such as employees' attendance at their own personnel hearings and at privately sponsored conferences. See, e. g., Comptroller General of the United States, Travel in the Management and Operation of Federal Programs 1, App. I, p. 5 (Rpt. No. FPCD-77-11, Mar. 17, 1977); 31 Comp. Gen. 346 (1952). In each of these instances, however, the travel in question was presumably for the convenience of the agency and therefore clearly constituted "official business" of the Government. As we have explained, neither Congress' declaration that collective bargaining is in the public interest nor its use of the term of art "official time" warrants the conclusion that employee negotiators are on "official business" of the Government. 17 </s> IV </s> In passing the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress unquestionably intended to strengthen the position of federal unions and to make the collective-bargaining process a more effective instrument of the public interest than it had been under the Executive Order regime. See supra, at 91-93. There is no evidence, however, that the Act departed from the basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public [464 U.S. 89, 108] and the private sector that the parties "proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest." NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 394 (1982). Nor did the Act confer on the FLRA an unconstrained authority to equalize the economic positions of union and management. See American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S., at 316 -318. We conclude, therefore, that the FLRA's interpretation of 7131(a) constitutes an "unauthorized assumption by [the] agency of [a] major policy decisio[n] properly made by Congress." Id., at 318. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Florida National Guard v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1082 (CA11 1983), cert. pending, No. 82-1970; United States Dept. of Agriculture v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 1242 (CA8 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-979; Division of Military & Naval Affairs v. FLRA, 683 F.2d 45 (CA2 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-1021. </s> [Footnote 2 Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 CFR 521 (1959-1963 Comp.). The Executive Order program was revised and continued by Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 CFR 861 (1966-1970 Comp.), as amended by Exec. Orders Nos. 11616, 11636, and 11838, 3 CFR 605, 634, 957 (1971-1975 Comp.). </s> [Footnote 3 The Council was established by Executive Order No. 11491 in 1970. </s> [Footnote 4 Certain federal employees, including members of the military and the Foreign Service, and certain federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, are excluded from the coverage of Title VII. 5 U.S.C. 7102(a)(2) [î] and (3) (1982 ed.). [î] ERRATA: "7102" should be "7103". </s> [Footnote 5 Although the Authority invited interested persons to express their views prior to adoption of the Interpretation, see Notice Relating to Official Time, 44 Fed. Reg. 42788 (1979), the decision apparently was issued not under the FLRA's statutory power to promulgate regulations, 7134, but rather under 7105(a)(1), which requires the Authority to provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to federal labor-management relations. See Brief for Respondent FLRA 11, n. 10. </s> [Footnote 6 Title 5 U.S.C. 7118 (1982 ed.) provides in part: </s> "(a)(1) If any agency or labor organization is charged by any person with having engaged in or engaging in an unfair labor practice, the General Counsel shall investigate the charge and may issue and cause to be served upon the agency or labor organization a complaint. . . ." </s> The complaint issued by the General Counsel in this case relied on 7116, which provides in part: </s> "(a) For the purposes of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency - </s> "(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right under this chapter; </s> . . . . . </s> "(8) to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter." </s> [Footnote 7 The decisions of the FLRA are subject to judicial review in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. See 5 U.S.C. 7123(c) (1982 ed.). The APA requires a reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 706. The court must set aside agency actions and conclusions found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right." 706(2)(A) and (C). </s> [Footnote 8 Petitioner suggests that we should accord little deference to the Authority's decision in this case for two reasons. First, petitioner contends that the FLRA's conclusion that employee negotiators are entitled to travel expenses and a per diem allowance was based largely on the Authority's reading of the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S.C. 5702 (1982 ed.), a statute the FLRA does not administer. As we understand the FLRA's decision, however, the Authority's view that the Travel Expense Act supported its conclusion derived primarily from its interpretation of 7131(a). See infra, at 106. </s> Second, petitioner argues that the Interpretation and Guidance is entitled to less weight since it was apparently an "interpretative rule" rather than an "administrative regulation." See n. 5, supra. Congress did, however, afford the FLRA broad authority to establish policies consistent with the Act, see 7105 and 7134, and the Interpretation and Guidance was attended by at least some of the procedural characteristics of a rulemaking. See n. 5, supra. See 5 U.S.C. 553. Compare FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981), with General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 -142 (1976). In any event, we find it unnecessary to rest our decision on a precise classification of the FLRA's action. As we explain in the text, an agency acting within its authority to make policy choices consistent with the congressional mandate should receive considerable deference from courts, provided, of course, that its actions conform to applicable procedural requirements and are not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). See, e. g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 -426 (1977); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 -138 (1940). When an agency's decision is premised on its understanding of a specific congressional intent, however, it engages in the quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute means. In that case, the agency's interpretation, particularly to the extent it rests on factual premises within its expertise, may be influential, but it cannot bind a court. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, supra; Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 -193 (1969); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the FLRA's decision in this case neither rests on specific congressional intent nor is consistent with the policies underlying the Act. </s> [Footnote 9 In the Interpretation and Guidance, the FLRA also noted that it had previously construed 7131(c), which authorizes "official time" for [464 U.S. 89, 100] employee representatives appearing before the Authority, to require the payment of travel expenses and a per diem allowance. 2 F. L. R. A. 265, 270 (1979). See 5 CFR 2429.13 (1983). The fact that the Authority interpreted two similar provisions of the Act consistently does not, however, demonstrate that either interpretation is correct. We, of course, express no view as to whether different considerations uniquely applicable to proceedings before the Authority might justify the FLRA's interpretation of 7131(c). </s> [Footnote 10 Section 9 of Executive Order No. 10988 encouraged agencies to conduct general consultations with labor representatives on official time, but left them free to conduct collective-bargaining sessions "during the non-duty hours of the employee organization representatives involved in such negotiations." 3 CFR 521, 524-525 (1959-1963 Comp.). </s> [Footnote 11 The 1962 Executive Order contained no reference to travel expenses or per diem allowances. The decision that such payments were not available was made in 1965 by the Comptroller General, 44 Comp. Gen. 617, who is authorized to give agencies guidance concerning such disbursements. [464 U.S. 89, 101] See 31 U.S.C. 3529 (1982 ed.). The following year, the Comptroller General modified his position and approved new guidelines issued by the Civil Service Commission. 46 Comp. Gen. 21, 21-22. The guidelines provided that, while employees should not generally be allowed travel expenses to attend negotiations, such expenses would be approved if an agency head certified that the employee representatives' travel would be in the "primary interest of the Government." Ibid. An agency might make such a certification when, for example, it would be more convenient for management to meet at a particular site and more economical to pay the employees' costs of traveling there than to pay the cost for agency representatives to travel to a different site. Ibid. This exception to the earlier prohibition on travel expenses was, by its terms, consistent with the Comptroller General's view that employee negotiators act principally in the interest of their union and not on official business for the United States. </s> [Footnote 12 Under the Executive Order regime, unions had to negotiate for dues deductions and were generally charged a fee for the service. See Information Announcement, 1 F. L. R. C. 676, 677 (1973). </s> [Footnote 13 We do not read Representative Udall's remarks to suggest that the Authority is bound by administrative decisions made under the Executive Order regime. The Act explicitly encourages the Authority to establish policies and provide guidance in the federal labor relations field, 7105(a)(1), and there are undoubtedly areas in which the FLRA, like the National Labor Relations Board, enjoys considerable freedom to apply its expertise to new problems, provided it remains faithful to the fundamental policy choices made by Congress. See supra, at 96-98, and n. 8. See also 7135(b) (decisions under Executive Order regime remain in effect unless revised by President or superseded by Act or regulations or decisions thereunder). </s> [Footnote 14 The Authority seemed to rely on this distinction between "duty status" and "leave" in its Interpretation when it stated that an employee negotiator "is on paid time entitled to his or her usual compensation and is not in leave status." 2 F. L. R. A., at 269. </s> [Footnote 15 Similarly, the statement of Representative Clay that employee representatives "should be allowed official time to carry out their statutory representational activities just as management uses official time to carry out its responsibilities," 124 Cong. Rec. 29188 (1978), does not indicate that Congress intended union representatives to be treated as if they are "at work" for all purposes. </s> [Footnote 16 As further support for their reading of "official time," respondents contend that union representatives engaged in collective bargaining may be entitled to benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. 8101 et seq. (1982 ed.), and may create Government liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The fact that other federal statutes, with different purposes, may be construed to apply to employee negotiators, however, does not demonstrate that, in enacting the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress intended to treat union negotiators as engaged in official business of the Government. </s> [Footnote 17 Our conclusion that federal agencies may not be required under 7131(a) to pay the travel expenses and per diem allowances of union negotiators does not, of course, preclude an agency from making such payments upon a determination that they serve the convenience of the agency or are otherwise in the primary interest of the Government, as was the practice prior to passage of the Act. See n. 11, supra. Furthermore, unions may presumably negotiate for such payments in collective bargaining as they do in the private sector. See Midstate Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 401, 405 (CA2 1983); Axelson, Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 91, 93-95 (CA5 1979). Indeed, we are informed that many agencies presently pay the travel expenses of employee representatives pursuant to collective-bargaining agreements. Letter from Ruth E. Peters, Counsel for Respondent FLRA, Nov. 9, 1983. See also J. P. Stevens & Co., 239 N. L. R. B. 738, 739 (1978) (employer required to pay travel expenses as remedy for failing to bargain in good faith). </s> [464 U.S. 89, 109]

United States Supreme Court LITTLE v. STREATER(1981) No. 79-6779 Argued: January 13, 1981Decided: June 1, 1981 </s> After appellee, while unmarried, gave birth to a female child, she identified appellant as the father to the Connecticut Department of Social Services, a requirement stemming from the child's receipt of public assistance. The Department then provided an attorney for appellee to bring a paternity suit against appellant in a Connecticut state court. Appellant moved the trial court to order blood grouping tests on appellee and her child pursuant to a Connecticut statute ( 46b-168), which includes the provision that the cost of such tests shall be chargeable against the party requesting them. Asserting that he was indigent, appellant asked that the State be ordered to pay for the tests. The trial court granted the motion insofar as it sought the tests but denied the request that they be furnished at the State's expense, with the result that no tests were performed. After a trial, the court found that appellant was the child's father, entered a damages judgment against him, and ordered him to pay child support directly to the State. The Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that 46b-168 does not violate the due process rights of an indigent defendant in a paternity proceeding. </s> Held: </s> In the circumstances of this case, application of 46b-168 to deny appellant blood grouping tests because of his lack of financial resources violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 5-17. </s> (a) Appellant's due process claim is premised on the unique quality [452 U.S. 1, 2] of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evidence, the State's prominent role in the litigation, and the character of paternity suits under Connecticut law. In evaluating that claim, the following factors must be considered: the private interests at stake; the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the governmental interests affected. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 . Pp. 5-12. </s> (b) Assessment of these factors indicates that appellant did not receive the process he was constitutionally due. The private interests implicated are substantial. Given the usual absence of witnesses in a paternity suit, the self-interest coloring the litigants' testimony, Connecticut's onerous evidentiary rule that the reputed father's testimony alone is insufficient to overcome the mother's prima facie case, and the State's refusal to pay for blood grouping tests, the risk is not inconsiderable that an indigent defendant will be erroneously adjudged the father. Furthermore, because of its recognized capacity to definitively exclude a high percentage of falsely accused putative father, the availability of scientific blood test evidence clearly would be a valuable procedural safeguard in such cases. And the State's financial interest in avoiding the expenses of blood grouping tests is not significant enough to overcome the substantial private interests involved, particularly where federal funds are available to help defray such expenses and the State could advance such expenses and then tax them as costs to the parties. Thus, without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a paternity case, an indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adversary when the child is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the evidentiary burden Connecticut imposes, lacks "a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Pp. 13-16. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Jon C. Blue, by appointment of the Court, 449 U.S. 948 , argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. </s> Stephen J. McGovern, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General. * </s> [452 U.S. 1, 3] </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This appeal presents the question whether a Connecticut statute, which provides that in paternity actions the cost of blood grouping tests is to be borne by the party requesting them, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to deny such tests to indigent defendants. </s> I </s> On May 21, 1975, appellee Gloria Streater, while unmarried, gave birth to a female child, Kenyatta Chantel Streater. As a requirement stemming from her child's receipt of public assistance, appellee identified appellant Walter Little as the child's father to the Connecticut Department of Social Services. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-169 (1981). The Department then provided an attorney for appellee to bring a paternity suit against appellant in the Court of Common Pleas at New Haven to establish his liability for the child's support. 1 </s> At the time the paternity action was commenced, appellant was incarcerated in the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Enfield. Through his counsel, who was provided by a legal aid organization, appellant moved the trial court to order blood grouping tests on appellee and her child pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-184 (1977), which later became Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-168 (1981) and includes the provision that "[t]he costs of making such tests shall be chargeable against the party making the motion." 2 Appellant [452 U.S. 1, 4] asserted that he was indigent 3 and asked that the State be ordered to pay for the tests. The trial court granted the motion insofar as it sought blood grouping tests but denied the request that they be furnished at the State's expense. App. 8. </s> For "financial reasons," no blood grouping tests were performed even though they had been authorized. Id., at 12. The paternity action was tried to the court on September 28, 1978. Both appellee and appellant, who was still a state prisoner, testified at trial. Id., at 14-19. 4 After listening to the testimony, the court found that appellant was the child's father. Id., at 2, 20. Following a subsequent hearing on damages, the court entered judgment against appellant in the amount of $6,974.48, which included the "lying-in" expenses of appellee and the child, "accrued maintenance" through October 31, 1978, and the "costs of suit plus reasonable attorney's fees." Ibid. In addition, appellant was ordered to pay child support at the rate of $2 per month - $1 toward the arrearage amount of $6,974.48 and $1 toward a current monthly award of $163.58 - directly to Connecticut's Department of Finance and Control. Id., at 20-21. 5 </s> [452 U.S. 1, 5] </s> The Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in a per curiam opinion that is not officially reported. Relying on its prior decision in Ferro v. Morgan, 35 Conn. Supp. 679, 406 A. 2d 873, cert. denied, 177 Conn. 753, 399 A. 2d 526 (1979), the Appellate Session held that Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-168 (1981) does not violate the due process and equal protection rights of an indigent defendant in a paternity proceeding. The Appellate Session thus found no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's motion that the cost of blood grouping tests be paid by the State. App. 25-26. </s> Thereafter, appellant's petition for certification was denied by the Connecticut Supreme Court, 180 Conn. 756, 414 A. 2d 199 (1980); and we noted probable jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 817 (1980). </s> II </s> The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." Appellant argues that his right to due process was abridged by the refusal, under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-168 (1981), to grant his request based on indigency for state-subsidized blood grouping tests. </s> Due process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (concurring opinion). Rather, it is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971), the Court held that "due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced [452 U.S. 1, 6] to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Accord, Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). And in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), we explained: </s> "[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." </s> These standards govern appellant's due process claim, which is premised on the unique quality of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evidence, the State's prominent role in the litigation, and the character of paternity actions under Connecticut law. </s> A </s> The discovery of human blood groups by Dr. Karl Landsteiner in Vienna at the beginning of this century, and subsequent understanding of their hereditary aspects, made possible the eventual use of blood tests to scientifically evaluate allegations of paternity. P. Speiser & F. Smekal, Karl Landsteiner 89-93 (1975). Like their European counterparts, American courts gradually recognized the evidentiary value of blood grouping tests in paternity cases, and the modern status of such tests has been described by one commentator as follows: </s> "As far as the accuracy, reliability, dependability - even infallibility - of the test are concerned, there is no [452 U.S. 1, 7] longer any controversy. The result of the test is universally accepted by distinguished scientific and medical authority. There is, in fact, no living authority of repute, medical or legal, who may be cited adversely. . . . [T]here is now . . . practically universal and unanimous judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of paternity." S. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings 9.13 (1975). </s> The application of blood tests to the issue of paternity results from certain properties of the human blood groups and types: (a) the blood group and type of any individual can be determined at birth or shortly thereafter; (b) the blood group and type of every individual remain constant throughout life; and (c) the blood groups and types are inherited in accordance with Mendel's laws. Id., 5.03. If the blood groups and types of the mother and child are known, the possible and impossible blood groups and types of the true father can be determined under the rules of inheritance. For example, a group AB child cannot have a group O parent, but can have a group A, B, or AB parent. Similarly, a child cannot be type M unless one or both parents are type M, and the factor rh' cannot appear in the blood of a child unless present in the blood of one or both parents. Id., 5.03 and 6.02. Since millions of men belong to the possible groups and types, a blood grouping test cannot conclusively establish paternity. However, it can demonstrate nonpaternity, such as where the alleged father belongs to group O and the child is group AB. It is a negative rather than an affirmative test with the potential to scientifically exclude the paternity of a falsely accused putative father. </s> The ability of blood grouping tests to exonerate innocent putative fathers was confirmed by a 1976 report developed jointly by the American Bar Association and the American [452 U.S. 1, 8] Medical Association. Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Family L. Q. 247 (Fall 1976). The joint report recommended the use of seven blood test "systems" - ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy, Kidd, and HLA - when investigating questions of paternity. Id., at 257-258. These systems were found to be "reasonable" in cost and to provide a 91% cumulative probability of negating paternity for erroneously accused Negro men and 93% for white men. Id., at 254, 257-258. </s> The effectiveness of the seven systems attests the probative value of blood test evidence in paternity cases. The importance of that scientific evidence is heightened because "[t]here are seldom accurate or reliable eyewitnesses since the sexual activities usually take place in intimate and private surroundings, and the self-serving testimony of a party is of questionable reliability." Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13 J. Fam. L. 713 (1973-1974). AS JUSTICE BRENNAN wrote while a member of the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court: </s> "[I]n the field of contested paternity . . . the truth is so often obscured because social pressures create a conspiracy of silence or, worse, induce deliberate falsity. </s> "The value of blood tests as a wholesome aid in the quest for truth in the administration of justice in these matters cannot be gainsaid in this day. Their reliability as an indicator of the truth has been fully established. The substantial weight of medical and legal authority attests their accuracy, not to prove paternity, and not always to disprove it, but 'they can disprove it conclusively in a great many cases provided they are administered by specially qualified experts' . . . ." Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 156, 76 A. 2d 717, 719 (1950). [452 U.S. 1, 9] </s> B </s> Appellant emphasizes that, unlike a common dispute between private parties, the State's involvement in this paternity proceeding was considerable and manifest, giving rise to a constitutional duty. Because appellee's child was a recipient of public assistance, Connecticut law compelled her, upon penalty of fine and imprisonment for contempt, "to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said child." Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-169 (1981). See Maher v. Doe, 432 U.S. 526 (1977); Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975). 6 The State's Attorney General automatically became a party to the action, and any settlement agreement required his approval or that of the Commissioner of Human Resources or Commissioner of Income Maintenance. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-160 and 46b-170 (1981). The State referred this mandatory paternity suit to appellee's lawyer "for prosecution" and paid his fee as well as all costs of the litigation. App. 10, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 34, 40. 7 In addition, the State will be the recipient of the monthly support payments to be made by appellant pursuant to the trial court's judgment. App. 21. "State action" has undeniably pervaded this case. Accordingly, appellant need not, and does not, contend that Connecticut has a constitutional obligation to [452 U.S. 1, 10] fund blood tests for an indigent's defense in ordinary civil litigation between private parties. </s> The nature of paternity proceedings in Connecticut also bears heavily on appellant's due process claim. Although the State characterizes such proceedings as "civil," see Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367, 372-373, 365 A. 2d 824, 827-828, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976), they have "quasicriminal" overtones. Connecticut Gen. Stat. 46b-171 (1981) provides that if a putative father "is found guilty, the court shall order him to stand charged with the support and maintenance of such child" (emphasis added); and his subsequent failure to comply with the court's support order is punishable by imprisonment under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-171, 46b-215, and 53-304 (1981). Cf. Walker v. Stokes, 45 Ohio App. 2d 275, 278, 344 N. E. 2d 159, 161 (1975); People v. Doherty, 261 App. Div. 86, 87, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 821, 823 (1941). </s> Moreover, the defendant in a Connecticut paternity action faces an unusual evidentiary obstacle. Connecticut's original "bastardy" statute was enacted in 1672, see The Book of the General Laws for the People Within the Jurisdiction of Connecticut 6 (1673), and from 1702 until 1902 it stated in pertinent part: "And if such woman shall continue constant in her accusation, being put to the discovery in the time of her travail, and also examined on the trial of the cause, it shall be prima facie evidence that such accused person is the father of such child." Mosher v. Bennett, 108 Conn. 671, 672, 144 A. 297 (1929). In Booth v. Hart, 43 Conn. 480 (1876), the Connecticut Supreme Court construed this statutory language as follows: </s> "[For 146 years], parties to suits with but one exception could not testify in their own behalf. But in cases of illegitimate children, . . . an exception was made of suits brought by [a mother] for the maintenance of [her] child, and she was allowed to testify who was its father [452 U.S. 1, 11] under certain safeguards provided by the statute. And the statute went on to provide that if she should continue constant in her accusation, being examined on oath and put to the discovery in the time of her travail, the person whom she declared to be the father of her child should be adjudged to be so, unless from the evidence introduced by him the triers should be of the opinion that he was innocent of the charge. The existence of these few facts were all that was necessary to maintain the suit in the first instance, and the burden of proof then changed to the defendant, and he was required to prove himself innocent of the accusation by other evidence than his own." Id., at 485. </s> In 1848, the Connecticut Legislature enacted a statute providing that "[n]o person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise." Id., at 486. Since the defendant in a paternity action was no longer precluded from testifying in his own behalf, the 1848 statute removed the need for the safeguard of putting the complainant "to the discovery in the time of her travail." Ibid. In its modern form, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-160 (1981) simply states that "if such mother or expectant mother continues constant in her accusation, it shall be evidence that the respondent is the father of such child." Nevertheless, in Mosher v. Bennett, supra, at 674, 144 A., at 298, the Connecticut Supreme Court held: </s> "The mother still has the right to rely upon the prima facie case made out by constancy in her accusation. She is no longer required under oath to make such discovery at the time of her travail. The prima facie case so made out places upon the reputed father the burden of showing his innocence of the charge, and under our practice he must do this by other evidence than his own." (Emphasis added.) [452 U.S. 1, 12] </s> Accord, Kelsaw v. Green, 6 Conn. Cir. 516, 519-520, 276 A. 2d 909, 911-912 (1971). 8 </s> Under Connecticut law, therefore, the defendant in a paternity suit is placed at a distinct disadvantage in that his testimony alone is insufficient to overcome the plaintiff's prima facie case. Among the most probative additional evidence the defendant might offer are the results of blood grouping tests, but if he is indigent, the State essentially denies him that reliable scientific proof by requiring that he bear its cost. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-168 (1981). In substance, the State has created an adverse presumption regarding the defendant's testimony by elevating the weight to be accorded the mother's imputation of him. If the plaintiff has been "constant" in her accusation of paternity, the defendant carries the burden of proof and faces severe penalties if he does not meet that burden and fails to comply with the judgment entered against him. Yet not only is the State inextricably involved in paternity litigation such as this and responsible for an imbalance between the parties, it in effect forecloses what is potentially a conclusive means for an indigent defendant to surmount that disparity and exonerate himself. Such a practice is irreconcilable with the command of the Due Process Clause. [452 U.S. 1, 13] </s> C </s> Our holding in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 335 , set forth three elements to be evaluated in determining what process is constitutionally due: the private interests at stake; the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results and the probable value of the suggested procedural safeguard; and the governmental interests affected. Analysis of those considerations weighs in appellant's favor. </s> The private interests implicated here are substantial. Apart from the putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 -652 (1972). Just as the termination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, p. 18, so too does their imposition. Through the judicial process, the State properly endeavors to identify the father of a child born out of wedlock and to make him responsible for the child's maintenance. Obviously, both the child and the defendant in a paternity action have a compelling interest in the accuracy of such a determination. 9 </s> [452 U.S. 1, 14] </s> Given the usual absence of witnesses, the self-interest coloring the testimony of the litigants, and the State's onerous evidentiary rule and refusal to pay for blood grouping tests, the risk is not inconsiderable that an indigent defendant in a Connecticut paternity proceeding will be erroneously adjudged the father of the child in question. See generally H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 106-108 (1971). Further, because of its recognized capacity to definitively exclude a high percentage of falsely accused putative fathers, the availability of scientific blood test evidence clearly would be a valuable procedural safeguard in such cases. See id., at 123-137; Part II-A, supra. Connecticut has acknowledged as much in 46b-168 of its statutes by providing for the ordering of blood tests and the admissibility of negative findings. See n. 2, supra. Unlike other evidence that may be susceptible to varying interpretation or disparagement, blood test results, if obtained under proper conditions by qualified experts, are difficult to refute. Thus, access to blood grouping tests for indigent defendants such as appellant would help to insure the correctness of paternity decisions in Connecticut. </s> The State admittedly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child born out of wedlock who is receiving public assistance, as well as in securing support for the child from those legally responsible. In addition, it shares the interest of the child and the defendant in an accurate and just determination of paternity. See Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies 17-82e-4 (1979). Nevertheless, the State also has financial concerns; it wishes to have the paternity actions in which it is involved proceed as economically as possible and, hence, seeks to avoid the expense of blood grouping tests. 10 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 655 (a) (1) (1976 ed. and [452 U.S. 1, 15] Supp. III), however, the states are entitled to reimbursement of 75% of the funds they expend on operation of their approved child support plans, and regulations promulgated under authority of 42 U.S.C. 1302 make clear that such federal financial participation is available for the development of evidence regarding paternity, "including the use of . . . blood tests." 45 CFR 304.20 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1980). Moreover, following the example of other states, the expense of blood grouping tests for an indigent defendant in a Connecticut paternity suit could be advanced by the State and then taxed as costs to the parties. See Ark. Stat. Ann. 34.705.1 (1962); Kan. Stat. Ann. 23-132 (1974); La. Rev. Stat. 9:397.1 (West Supp. 1981); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 522:3 (1974); Ore. Rev. Stat. 109.256 (1) (1979); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 6135 (Purdon Supp. 1981); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 13.03 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). 11 We must conclude [452 U.S. 1, 16] that the State's monetary interest "is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here." Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, at 28. </s> Assessment of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors indicates that appellant did not receive the process he was constitutionally due. Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a paternity case, an indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adversary when the child is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the evidentiary burden Connecticut imposes, lacks "a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S., at 377 . 12 Therefore, "the requirement of `fundamental fairness'" expressed by the Due Process Clause was not satisfied here. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, at 24. </s> III </s> "[A] statute . . . may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S., at 379 . Thus, "a cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard." Id., at 380. We hold that, in these specific circumstances, [452 U.S. 1, 17] the application of Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-168 (1981) to deny appellant blood grouping tests because of his lack of financial resources violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> So ordered. </s> [Footnote * Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 While the case was pending, the Court of Common Pleas was merged with the Superior Court of Connecticut. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 51-164s (1981). </s> [Footnote 2 In its entirety, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-168 (1981) states: </s> "In any proceeding in which a question of paternity is an issue, the court, on motion of any party, may order the mother, her child and the putative father or the husband of the mother to submit to one or more blood grouping tests, to be made by a qualified physician or other qualified [452 U.S. 1, 4] person, designated by the court, to determine whether or not the putative father or the husband of the mother can be excluded as being the father of the child. The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in cases where such results establish definite exclusion of the putative father or such husband as such father. The costs of making such tests shall be chargeable against the party making the motion." </s> [Footnote 3 Appellant's financial affidavit, which was filed with the motion, showed that he had weekly income of $5, expenses of $5, and no assets. App. 7. The trial court later specifically found that, at the time of the motion, appellant "was indigent and could not afford to pay the costs for blood grouping tests." Id., at 23. </s> [Footnote 4 Although appellant admitted intimacy with appellee, he expressed doubt that he was the child's father because of appellee's alleged relationship with another man and because she had not allowed him to see the child. Id., at 17-18. </s> [Footnote 5 The minimal sum of $2 was ordered presumably because appellant was indigent and incarcerated. However, his payments to the State are [452 U.S. 1, 5] subject to future increase pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-171 (1981), which provides that "[a]ny order for the payment of [child] support . . . may at any time thereafter be set aside or altered by any court issuing such order." </s> [Footnote 6 In response to an interrogatory, appellee, through her attorney, stated that her "continuing eligibility for [public] assistance required her to disclose [the] father's identity." App. 10. </s> Connecticut's disclosure requirement is fostered by 42 U.S.C. 654 (4), which directs that, as to any child born out of wedlock for whom benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program are claimed, the states must undertake "to establish . . . paternity . . . unless . . . it is against the best interests of the child to do so" and "to secure support for such child from his parent." See also 45 CFR 232.12 (1980). </s> [Footnote 7 At oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut acknowledged that the cost of any witnesses for the plaintiff in a proceeding such as this also would be paid by the State. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. </s> [Footnote 8 At oral argument, the State's Assistant Attorney General represented that "[c]urrently th[is] is the law of Connecticut," id., at 46; and, when presented with a hypothetical situation, his response illustrated the practical operation of the evidentiary rule: </s> "QUESTION: [D]oes that mean . . . that [if] she takes the stand [and says], he's the father, he's the father, he's the father, he's the father. She never deviates. . . . He takes the stand and says, I am not, I am not, I am not, I am not. And the factfinder believes him and doesn't believe her, you're saying - </s> . . . . </s> "[COUNSEL'S ANSWER]: If that was the testimony, she would win." Id., at 44. </s> [Footnote 9 In its Report on the 1974 Social Services Amendments to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 654, 655, et al., the Senate Finance Committee stated: </s> "In taking the position that a child born out of wedlock has a right to have its paternity ascertained in a fair and efficient manner, the [C]ommittee acknowledges that legislation must recognize the interest primarily at stake in the paternity action to be that of the child. . . . The Committee is convinced that . . . paternity can be ascertained with reasonable assurance, particularly through the use of scientifically conducted blood typing." S. Rep. No. 93-1356, p. 52 (1974). </s> See n. 6, supra. </s> [Footnote 10 Laboratories surveyed in a 1977 study sponsored by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now in part the Department of Health and Human Services) charged an average of approximately $245 for a [452 U.S. 1, 15] battery of test systems that led to a minimum exclusion rate of 80%. HEW Office of Child Support Enforcement, Blood Testing to Establish Paternity 35-37 (1977 Condensed Report). According to appellant, blood grouping tests were available at the Hartford Hospital for $250 at the time this paternity action was pending trial, but the cost has since been increased to $460. Brief for Appellant 4, and n. 5. </s> [Footnote 11 Other jurisdictions also have statutes by which blood grouping tests can be made available to indigents. See, e.g., Ala. Code 26-12-5 (1977); D.C. Code 16-2343 (Supp. V 1978); Haw. Rev. Stat. 584-16 (1976); Md. Ann. Code 16-66G (Supp. 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws 722.716 (c) (1970); Minn. Stat. 257.69 (2) (1980); N. D. Cent. Code 14-17-15 (Supp. 1977); Utah Code Ann. 78-25-23 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. 767.48 (5) (West Supp. 1980). In addition, the highest courts of Colorado, Massachusetts, and West Virginia have held that putative fathers may not constitutionally be denied access to blood grouping tests on the basis of indigency. See Franklin v. District Court, 194 Colo. 189, 571 P.2d 1072 (1977); Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N. E. 2d 667 (1969); State ex rel. Graves v. Daugherty, 266 S. E. 2d 142 (W. Va. 1980). </s> Apart from Connecticut, it also appears that North Carolina requires all defendants requesting blood tests in paternity proceedings, irrespective of means, "to initially be responsible for any of the expenses thereof" or do without them. N.C. Gen. Stat. 8-50.1 (b) (2) (Supp. 1979). </s> [Footnote 12 In Boddie, we held that due process prohibits a state from denying an indigent access to its divorce courts because of inability to pay filing fees and costs. However, in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the Court concluded that due process does not require waiver of filing fees for an indigent seeking a discharge in bankruptcy or appellate review of an agency determination resulting in reduced welfare benefits. Our decisions in Kras and Ortwein emphasized the availability of other relief and the less "fundamental" character of the private interests at stake than those implicated in Boddie. Because appellant has no choice of an alternative forum and his interests, as well as those of the child, are constitutionally significant, this case is comparable to Boddie rather than to Kras and Ortwein. </s> [Footnote 13 Because of our disposition of appellant's due process claim, we need not consider whether the statute, as applied, also violated the Equal Protection Clause. </s> [452 U.S. 1, 18]

United States Supreme Court GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT(1982) No. 81-611 Argued: March 29, 1982Decided: June 23, 1982 </s> Appellee Massachusetts trial court, relying on a Massachusetts statute providing for exclusion of the general public from trials of specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, ordered the exclusion of the press and public from the courtroom during the trial of a defendant charged with rape of three minor girls. Appellant newspaper publisher challenged the exclusion order, and ultimately, after the trial had resulted in the defendant's acquittal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the Massachusetts statute as requiring, under all circumstances, the exclusion of the press and public during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex-offense trial. </s> Held: </s> 1. The fact that the exclusion order expired with completion of the trial at which the defendant was acquitted does not render the controversy moot within the meaning of Art. III. The controversy is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since it can reasonably be assumed that appellant will someday be subjected to another order relying on the Massachusetts statute and since criminal trials are typically of short duration. Pp. 602-603. </s> 2. The Massachusetts statute, as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, violates the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 603-607. </s> (a) To the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that the constitutionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one. The right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly afforded protection by the First Amendment both because such trials have historically been open to the press and public and because such right of access plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Pp. 603-606. </s> (b) The right of access to criminal trials is not absolute, but the circumstances under which the press and public can be barred are limited. The State must show that denial of such right is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Pp. 606-607. [457 U.S. 596, 597] </s> 3. The Massachusetts statute cannot be justified on the basis of either the State's interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment or its interest in encouraging such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. Pp. 607-610. </s> (a) Compelling as the first interest is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule. Such interest could be just as well served by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the minor victim's well-being necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest. Pp. 607-609. </s> (b) The second asserted interest is not only speculative in empirical terms but is also open to serious question as a matter of logic and common sense. Although the statute was construed to bar the press and public from the courtroom during a minor sex victim's testimony, the press is not denied access to the transcript, court personnel, or any other source that could provide an account of such testimony, and thus the statute cannot prevent the press from publicizing the substance of that testimony, as well as the victim's identity. Pp. 609-610. </s> 383 Mass. 838, 423 N. E. 2d 773, reversed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 611. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 612. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 620. </s> James F. McHugh argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. </s> Mitchell J. Sikora, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Gerald J. Caruso and Alan B. Sherr, Assistant Attorneys General. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Carl R. Ramey, J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, Ralph E. Goldberg, Erwin G. Krasnow, J. Laurent Scharff, and Carol D. Weisman for American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., et al.; by James D. Spaniolo, Gary G. Gerlach, Robert C. Lobdell, A. Daniel Feldman, Robert Sack, P. Cameron Devore, Andrew L. Hughes, Samuel E. Klein, Alan E. Peterson, Bruce W. Sanford, [457 U.S. 596, 598] J. Laurent Scharff, W. Terry Maguire, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Arthur Sackler, Peter C. Gould, Theodore Sherbow, Alexander Wellford, James F. Henderson, David M. Olive, Conrad M. Shumadine, and Lawrence Gunnels for the Miami Herald Publishing Co. et al.; by Howard Monderer for the National Broadcasting Co., Inc.; and by E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. [457 U.S. 596, 598] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Section 16A of Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General Laws, 1 as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, requires trial judges, at trials for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that victim. The question presented is whether the statute thus construed violates the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> I </s> The case began when appellant, Globe Newspaper Co. (Globe), unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to a rape trial conducted in the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The criminal defendant in that trial had been charged with the forcible rape and forced unnatural rape of three girls who were minors at the time of trial - two 16 years of age and one 17. In April 1979, during hearings on several preliminary motions, the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed. 2 Before the trial [457 U.S. 596, 599] began, Globe moved that the court revoke this closure order, hold hearings on any future such orders, and permit appellant to intervene "for the limited purpose of asserting its rights to access to the trial and hearings on related preliminary motions." App. 12a-14a. The trial court denied Globe's motions, 3 relying on Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 278, 16A (West 1981), and ordered the exclusion of the press and general public from the courtroom during the trial. The defendant immediately objected to that exclusion order, and the prosecution stated for purposes of the record that the order was issued on the court's "own motion and not at the request of the Commonwealth." App. 18a. </s> Within hours after the court had issued its exclusion order, Globe sought injunctive relief from a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 4 The next day the justice conducted a hearing, at which the Commonwealth, "on behalf of the victims," waived "whatever rights it [might] have [had] to exclude the press." Id., at 28a. 5 Nevertheless, [457 U.S. 596, 600] Globe's request for relief was denied. Before Globe appealed to the full court, the rape trial proceeded and the defendant was acquitted. </s> Nine months after the conclusion of the criminal trial, the Supreme Judicial Court issued its judgment, dismissing Globe's appeal. Although the court held that the case was rendered moot by completion of the trial, it nevertheless stated that it would proceed to the merits, because the issues raised by Globe were "significant and troublesome, and . . . `capable of repetition yet evading review.'" Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 848, 401 N. E. 2d 360, 362 (1980), quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). As a statutory matter, the court agreed with Globe that 16A did not require the exclusion of the press from the entire criminal trial. The provision was designed, the court determined, "to encourage young victims of sexual offenses to come forward; once they have come forward, the statute is designed to preserve their ability to testify by protecting them from undue psychological harm at trial." 379 Mass., at 860, 401 N. E. 2d, at 369. Relying on these twin purposes, the court concluded that 16A required the closure of sex-offense trials only during the testimony of minor victims; during other portions of such trials, closure was "a matter within the judge's sound discretion." Id., at 864, 401 N. E. 2d, at 371. The court did not pass on Globe's contentions that it had a right to attend the entire [457 U.S. 596, 601] criminal trial under the First and Sixth Amendments, noting that it would await this Court's decision - then pending - in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 6 </s> Globe then appealed to this Court. Following our decision in Richmond Newspapers, we vacated the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of that decision. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 894 (1980). </s> On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court, adhering to its earlier construction of 16A, considered whether our decision in Richmond Newspapers required the invalidation of the mandatory closure rule of 16A. 383 Mass. 838, 423 N. E. 2d 773 (1981). 7 In analyzing the First Amendment issue, 8 the court recognized that there is "an unbroken tradition of openness" in criminal trials. Id., at 845, 423 N. E. 2d, at 778. But the court discerned "at least one notable exception" to this tradition: "In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials have been closed to some segments of the public, even when the victim was an adult." Id., at 846, 423 [457 U.S. 596, 602] N. E. 2d, at 778. The court also emphasized that 16A's mandatory closure rule furthered "genuine State interests," which the court had identified in its earlier decision as underlying the statutory provision. These interests, the court stated, "would be defeated if a case-by-case determination were used." Id., at 848, 423 N. E. 2d, at 779. While acknowledging that the mandatory closure requirement results in a "temporary diminution" of "the public's knowledge about these trials," the court did not think "that Richmond Newspapers require[d] the invalidation of the requirement, given the statute's narrow scope in an area of traditional sensitivity to the needs of victims." Id., at 851, 423 N. E. 2d, at 781. The court accordingly dismissed Globe's appeal. 9 </s> Globe again sought review in this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U.S. 1051 (1981). For the reasons that follow, we reverse, and hold that the mandatory closure rule contained in 16A violates the First Amendment. 10 </s> II </s> In this Court, Globe challenges that portion of the trial court's order, approved by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, that holds that 16A requires, under all circumstances, the exclusion of the press and general public during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex-offense trial. Because the entire order expired with the completion of the rape trial at which the defendant was acquitted, we must consider at the outset whether a live controversy remains. Under Art. III, 2, of the Constitution, our jurisdiction extends only to actual cases or controversies. Nebraska Press [457 U.S. 596, 603] Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976). "The Court has recognized, however, that jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the underlying dispute between the parties is one `capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Ibid., quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S., at 515 . </s> The controversy between the parties in this case is indeed "capable of repetition, yet evading review." It can reasonably be assumed that Globe, as the publisher of a newspaper serving the Boston metropolitan area, will someday be subjected to another order relying on 16A's mandatory closure rule. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377 -378 (1979); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 563 (plurality opinion). And because criminal trials are typically of "short duration," ibid., such an order will likely "evade review, or at least considered plenary review in this Court." Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, at 547. We therefore conclude that the controversy before us is not moot within the meaning of Art. III, and turn to the merits. </s> III </s> A </s> The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established for the first time that the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Although there was no opinion of the Court in that case, seven Justices recognized that this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment, and applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 448 U.S., at 558 -581 (plurality opinion); id., at 584-598 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 601-604 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). 11 </s> [457 U.S. 596, 604] </s> Of course, this right of access to criminal trials is not explicitly mentioned in terms in the First Amendment. 12 But we have long eschewed any "narrow, literal conception" of the Amendment's terms, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963), for the Framers were concerned with broad principles, and wrote against a background of shared values and practices. The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 579 -580, and n. 16 (plurality opinion) (citing cases); id., at 587-588, and n. 4 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs," Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). By offering such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 587 -588 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). See also id., at 575 (plurality opinion) (the "expressly guaranteed freedoms" of the First Amendment "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government"). Thus to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal [457 U.S. 596, 605] trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected "discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one. </s> Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in particular is properly afforded protection by the First Amendment. First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public. "[A]t the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 569 (plurality opinion). And since that time, the presumption of openness has remained secure. Indeed, at the time of this Court's decision in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), the presumption was so solidly grounded that the Court was "unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country." Id., at 266 (footnote omitted). This uniform rule of openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only "because the Constitution carries the gloss of history," but also because "a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 589 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). 13 </s> [457 U.S. 596, 606] </s> Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. 14 Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. 15 And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process - an essential component in our structure of self-government. 16 In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience. </s> B </s> Although the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 581, n. 18 (plurality opinion); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S., at 570 . But the circumstances under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty one. Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, [457 U.S. 596, 607] it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See, e. g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53 -54 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101 -103 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S., at 438 . 17 We now consider the state interests advanced to support Massachusetts' mandatory rule barring press and public access to criminal sex-offense trials during the testimony of minor victims. </s> IV </s> The state interests asserted to support 16A, though articulated in various ways, are reducible to two: the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment; and the encouragement of such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. 18 We consider these interests in turn. </s> We agree with appellee that the first interest - safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor 19 - is a compelling one. But as compelling as that interest is, it [457 U.S. 596, 608] does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim. 20 Among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, 21 and the interests of parents and relatives. Section 16A, in contrast, requires closure even if the victim does not seek the exclusion of the press and general public, and would not suffer injury by their presence. 22 In the case before us, for example, the names of the minor victims were already in the public record, 23 and the record indicates that the victims [457 U.S. 596, 609] may have been willing to testify despite the presence of the press. 24 If the trial court had been permitted to exercise its discretion, closure might well have been deemed unnecessary. In short, 16A cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of accommodating the State's asserted interest: That interest could be served just as well by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest. 25 </s> Nor can 16A be justified on the basis of the Commonwealth's second asserted interest - the encouragement of minor victims of sex crimes to come forward and provide accurate testimony. The Commonwealth has offered no empirical support for the claim that the rule of automatic closure contained in 16A will lead to an increase in the number of minor sex victims coming forward and cooperating with state authorities. 26 Not only is the claim speculative in empirical [457 U.S. 596, 610] terms, but it is also open to serious question as a matter of logic and common sense. Although 16A bars the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of minor sex victims, the press is not denied access to the transcript, court personnel, or any other possible source that could provide an account of the minor victim's testimony. Thus 16A cannot prevent the press from publicizing the substance of a minor victim's testimony, as well as his or her identity. If the Commonwealth's interest in encouraging minor victims to come forward depends on keeping such matters secret, 16A hardly advances that interest in an effective manner. And even if 16A effectively advanced the State's interest, it is doubtful that the interest would be sufficient to overcome the constitutional attack, for that same interest could be relied on to support an array of mandatory closure rules designed to encourage victims to come forward: Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex crimes are the only crime victims who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come forward and testify. The State's argument based on this interest therefore proves too much, and runs contrary to the very foundation of the right of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers: namely, "that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." 448 U.S., at 573 (plurality opinion). </s> V </s> For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 16A, as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, violates [457 U.S. 596, 611] the First Amendment to the Constitution. 27 Accordingly, the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 278, 16A (West 1981), provides in pertinent part: </s> "At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, . . . the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the court room, admitting only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case." </s> [Footnote 2 "The court caused a sign marked `closed' to be placed on the courtroom door, and court personnel turned away people seeking entry." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 848, 401 N. E. 2d 360, 362-363 (1980) (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 3 The court refused to permit Globe to file its motion to intervene and explicitly stated that it would not act on Globe's other motions. App. 17a-18a. </s> [Footnote 4 Globe's request was contained in a petition for extraordinary relief filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 211, 3 (West 1958 and Supp. 1982-1983). </s> [Footnote 5 The Commonwealth's representative stated: </s> "[O]ur position before the trial judge [was], and it is before this Court, that in some circumstances a trial judge, where the defendant is asserting his right to a constitutional, public trial, . . . may consider that as outweighing the otherwise legitimate statutory interests, particularly where the Commonwealth [acts] on behalf of the victims, and this is literally on behalf of the victims in the sense that they were consulted fully by the prosecutor in this case. The Commonwealth waives whatever rights it may have to exclude the press." App. 28a. </s> Some time after the trial began, the prosecuting attorney informed the judge at a lobby conference that she had "spoke[n] with each of the victims regarding . . . excluding the press." Id., at 48a. The prosecuting attorney indicated that the victims had expressed some "privacy concerns" that were based on "their own privacy interests, as well as the fact that there [457 U.S. 596, 600] are grandparents involved with a couple of these victims." Ibid. But according to the prosecuting attorney, the victims "wouldn't object to the press being included" if "it were at all possible to obtain a guarantee" that the press would not attempt to interview them or publish their names, photographs, or any personal information. Ibid. In fact, their names were already part of the public record. See 383 Mass. 838, 849, 423 N. E. 2d 773, 780 (1981). It is not clear from the record, however, whether or not the victims were aware of this fact at the time of their discussions with the prosecuting attorney. </s> [Footnote 6 Justice Quirico dissented, being of the view that the mandatory closure rule of 16A was not limited to the testimony of minor victims, but was applicable to the entire trial. </s> [Footnote 7 The court again noted that the First Amendment issue arising from the closure of the then-completed trial was "`capable of repetition yet evading review.'" Id., at 841, n. 4, 423 N. E. 2d, at 775, n. 4, quoting Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). But in contrast to the view it had taken in its prior opinion, supra, at 600, the court held that the case was not moot because of this possibility of repetition without opportunity for review. </s> [Footnote 8 The court found it unnecessary to consider Globe's argument that the mandatory closure rule violated the Sixth Amendment rights of the criminal defendant who had been acquitted in the rape trial. Those Sixth Amendment rights, the court stated, were "personal rights" that, "at least in the context of this case, [could] only be asserted by the original criminal defendant." 383 Mass., at 842, 423 N. E. 2d, at 776 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 9 Justice Wilkins filed a concurring opinion in which he expressed concern whether a statute constitutionally could require closure "without specific findings by the judge that the closing is justified by overriding or countervailing interests of the Commonwealth." Id., at 852, 423 N. E. 2d, at 782. </s> [Footnote 10 We therefore have no occasion to consider Globe's additional argument that the provision violates the Sixth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 11 JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of Richmond Newspapers. But he had indicated previously in a concurring opinion [457 U.S. 596, 604] in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), that he viewed the First Amendment as conferring on the press a right of access to criminal trials. Id., at 397-398. </s> [Footnote 12 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. </s> [Footnote 13 Appellee argues that criminal trials have not always been open to the press and general public during the testimony of minor sex victims. Brief for Appellee 13-22. Even if appellee is correct in this regard, but see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 423 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the argument is unavailing. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court discerned a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials based in part on the recognition that as a general matter criminal trials have long been presumptively open. Whether the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials can be restricted in the context of any particular criminal trial, such as a murder trial (the setting for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial, depends not on the historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state interests assertedly supporting the restriction. See Part III-B, infra. </s> [Footnote 14 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 569 (plurality opinion); id., at 596-597 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S., at 383 ; id., at 428-429 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> [Footnote 15 See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 -271 (1948); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 570 -571 (plurality opinion); id., at 595 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 428-429 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> [Footnote 16 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 570 -571 (plurality opinion); id., at 596 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S., at 394 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 428 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> [Footnote 17 Of course, limitations on the right of access that resemble "time, place, and manner" restrictions on protected speech, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 , n. 18 (1976), would not be subjected to such strict scrutiny. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 581 -582, n. 18 (plurality opinion); id., at 598, n. 23 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). </s> [Footnote 18 In its opinion following our remand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts described the interests in the following terms: </s> "(a) to encourage minor victims to come forward to institute complaints and give testimony . . .; (b) to protect minor victims of certain sex crimes from public degradation, humiliation, demoralization, and psychological damage . . .; (c) to enhance the likelihood of credible testimony from such minors, free of confusion, fright, or embellishment; (d) to promote the sound and orderly administration of justice . . .; (e) to preserve evidence and obtain just convictions." 383 Mass., at 848, 423 N. E. 2d, at 779. </s> [Footnote 19 It is important to note that in the context of 16A, the measure of the State's interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are injured by testifying, but rather in the incremental injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the press and the general public. </s> [Footnote 20 Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that individualized determinations are always required before the right of access may be denied: "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 448 U.S., at 581 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 21 "[I]f the minor victim wanted the public to know precisely what a heinous crime the defendant had committed, the imputed legislative justifications for requiring the closing of the trial during the victim's testimony would in part, at least, be inapplicable." 383 Mass., at 853, 423 N. E. 2d, at 782 (Wilkins, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 22 It appears that while other States have statutory or constitutional provisions that would allow a trial judge to close a criminal sex-offense trial during the testimony of a minor victim, no other State has a mandatory provision excluding both the press and general public during such testimony. See, e. g., Ala. Code 12-21-202 (1975); Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.3; Ga. Code 81-1006 (1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15:469.1 (West 1981); Miss. Const., Art. 3, 26; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 632-A:8 (Supp. 1981); N. Y. Jud. Law 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. Gen. Stat. 15-166 (Supp. 1981); N. D. Cent. Code 27-01-02 (1974); Utah Code Ann. 78-7-4 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, 1901 (1973); Wis. Stat. 970.03(4) (1979-1980). See also Fla. Stat. 918.16 (1979) (providing for mandatory exclusion of general public but not press during testimony of minor victims). Of course, we intimate no view regarding the constitutionality of these state statutes. </s> [Footnote 23 The Court has held that the government may not impose sanctions for the publication of the names of rape victims lawfully obtained from the [457 U.S. 596, 609] public record. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). </s> [Footnote 24 See n. 5, supra. </s> [Footnote 25 Of course, for a case-by-case approach to be meaningful, representatives of the press and general public "must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S., at 401 (POWELL, J., concurring). This does not mean, however, that for purposes of this inquiry the court cannot protect the minor victim by denying these representatives the opportunity to confront or cross-examine the victim, or by denying them access to sensitive details concerning the victim and the victim's future testimony. Such discretion is consistent with the traditional authority of trial judges to conduct in camera conferences. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 598, n. 23 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Without such trial court discretion, a State's interest in safeguarding the welfare of the minor victim, determined in an individual case to merit some form of closure, would be defeated before it could ever be brought to bear. </s> [Footnote 26 To the extent that it is suggested that, quite apart from encouraging minor victims to testify, 16A improves the quality and credibility of [457 U.S. 596, 610] testimony, the suggestion also is speculative. And while closure may have such an effect in particular cases, the Court has recognized that, as a general matter, "[o]penness in court proceedings may improve the quality of testimony." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 383 (emphasis added). In the absence of any showing that closure would improve the quality of testimony of all minor sex victims, the State's interest certainly cannot justify a mandatory closure rule. </s> [Footnote 27 We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that a rule of mandatory closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims is constitutionally infirm. In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony of minor sex-offense victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. </s> In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court held that the First Amendment protects the right of press and public to attend criminal trials. I do not interpret that decision to shelter every right that is "necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights." Ante, at 604. Instead, Richmond Newspapers rests upon our long history of open criminal trials and the special value, for both public and accused, of that openness. As the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers stresses, "it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted." 448 U.S., at 575 . Thus, I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials. </s> This case, however, does involve a criminal trial. Moreover, it involves a statute mandating automatic exclusion of the public from certain testimony. As the Court explains, Massachusetts has demonstrated no interest weighty enough to justify application of its automatic bar to all cases, even those in which the victim, defendant, and prosecutor have no objection to an open trial. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. [457 U.S. 596, 612] </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting. </s> Historically our society has gone to great lengths to protect minors charged with crime, particularly by prohibiting the release of the names of offenders, barring the press and public from juvenile proceedings, and sealing the records of those proceedings. Yet today the Court holds unconstitutional a state statute designed to protect not the accused, but the minor victims of sex crimes. In doing so, it advances a disturbing paradox. Although states are permitted, for example, to mandate the closure of all proceedings in order to protect a 17-year-old charged with rape, they are not permitted to require the closing of part of criminal proceedings in order to protect an innocent child who has been raped or otherwise sexually abused. </s> The Court has tried to make its holding a narrow one by not disturbing the authority of state legislatures to enact more narrowly drawn statutes giving trial judges the discretion to exclude the public and the press from the courtroom during the minor victim's testimony. Ante, at 611, n. 27. I also do not read the Court's opinion as foreclosing a state statute which mandates closure except in cases where the victim agrees to testify in open court. 1 But the Court's decision [457 U.S. 596, 613] is nevertheless a gross invasion of state authority and a state's duty to protect its citizens - in this case minor victims of crime. I cannot agree with the Court's expansive interpretation of our decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), or its cavalier rejection of the serious interests supporting Massachusetts' mandatory closure rule. Accordingly, I dissent. </s> I </s> The Court seems to read our decision in Richmond Newspapers, supra, as spelling out a First Amendment right of access to all aspects of all criminal trials under all circumstances. Ante, at 605, n. 13. That is plainly incorrect. In Richmond Newspapers, we examined "the right of access to places traditionally open to the public" and concluded that criminal trials were generally open to the public throughout this country's history and even before that in England. The opinions of a majority of the Justices emphasized the historical tradition of open criminal trials. 448 U.S., at 564 -573; id., at 589-591 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 601 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). The proper mode of analysis to be followed in determining whether there is a right of access was emphasized by JUSTICE BRENNAN: [457 U.S. 596, 614] </s> "As previously noted, resolution of First Amendment public access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of the specific structural value of public access in the circumstances." Id., at 597-598. </s> Today JUSTICE BRENNAN ignores the weight of historical practice. There is clearly a long history of exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those against minors. See, e. g., Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (CA8 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (CA9 1913); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (Alaska), aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (CA9 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S. W. 2d 931 (1935); State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 251 A. 2d 178 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S. E. 47 (1921), appeal dism'd, 260 U.S. 702 (1922). 2 Several States have long-standing provisions allowing closure of cases involving sexual assaults against minors. 3 </s> It would misrepresent the historical record to state that there is an "unbroken, uncontradicted history" of open proceedings in cases involving the sexual abuse of minors. Richmond Newspapers, supra, at 573. Absent such a history of openness, the positions of the Justices joining reversal in Richmond Newspapers give no support to the proposition that closure of the proceedings during the testimony of the minor victim violates the First Amendment. 4 </s> [457 U.S. 596, 615] </s> II </s> The Court does not assert that the First Amendment right it discerns from Richmond Newspapers is absolute; instead, it holds that when a "State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Ante, at 606-607. The Court's wooden application of the rigid standard it asserts for this case is inappropriate. The Commonwealth has not denied the public or the media access to information as to what takes place at trial. As the Court acknowledges, Massachusetts does not deny the press and the public access to the trial transcript or to other sources of information about the victim's testimony. Even the victim's identity is part of the public record, although the name of a 16-year-old accused rapist generally would not be a matter of public record. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 119, 60A (West Supp. 1982-1983). The Commonwealth does not deny access to information, and does nothing whatever to inhibit its disclosure. This case is quite unlike others in which we have held unconstitutional state laws which prevent the dissemination of information or the public discussion of ideas. See, e. g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). </s> The purpose of the Commonwealth in enacting 16A was to give assurance to parents and minors that they would have this moderate and limited protection from the trauma, embarrassment, and humiliation of having to reveal the intimate details of a sexual assault in front of a large group of unfamiliar spectators - and perhaps a television audience - and to lower the barriers to the reporting of such crimes which might come from the victim's dread of public testimony. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. [457 U.S. 596, 616] 846, 865, 401 N. E. 2d 360, 372 (1980); 383 Mass. 838, 847-848, 423 N. E. 2d 773, 779 (1981). </s> Neither the purpose of the law nor its effect is primarily to deny the press or public access to information; the verbatim transcript is made available to the public and the media and may be used without limit. We therefore need only examine whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable and whether the interests of the Commonwealth override the very limited incidental effects of the law on First Amendment rights. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S., at 580 -581 (plurality opinion); id., at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Our obligation in this case is to balance the competing interests: the interests of the media for instant access, against the interest of the State in protecting child rape victims from the trauma of public testimony. In more than half the states, public testimony will include television coverage. </s> III </s> For me, it seems beyond doubt, considering the minimal impact of the law on First Amendment rights and the overriding weight of the Commonwealth's interest in protecting child rape victims, that the Massachusetts law is not unconstitutional. The Court acknowledges that the press and the public have prompt and full access to all of the victim's testimony. Their additional interest in actually being present during the testimony is minimal. While denying it the power to protect children, the Court admits that the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the victimized child is a compelling interest. Ante, at 607. This meets the test of Richmond Newspapers, supra. </s> The law need not be precisely tailored so long as the state's interest overrides the law's impact on First Amendment rights and the restrictions imposed further that interest. Certainly this law, which excludes the press and public only [457 U.S. 596, 617] during the actual testimony of the child victim of a sex crime, rationally serves the Commonwealth's overriding interest in protecting the child from the severe - possibly permanent - psychological damage. It is not disputed that such injury is a reality. 5 </s> The law also seems a rational response to the undisputed problem of the underreporting of rapes and other sexual offenses. The Court rejects the Commonwealth's argument that 16A is justified by its interest in encouraging minors to report sex crimes, finding the claim "speculative in empirical terms [and] open to serious question as a matter of logic and common sense." Ante, at 609-610. There is no basis whatever for this cavalier disregard of the reality of human experience. It makes no sense to criticize the Commonwealth for its failure to offer empirical data in support of its rule; only by allowing state experimentation may such empirical evidence be produced. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 -580 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 , and n. 20 (1977). </s> The Court also concludes that the Commonwealth's assertion that the law might reduce underreporting of sexual offenses fails "as a matter of logic and common sense." This conclusion is based on a misperception of the Commonwealth's argument and an overly narrow view of the protection the statute seeks to afford young victims. The Court apparently believes that the statute does not prevent any significant [457 U.S. 596, 618] trauma, embarrassment, or humiliation on the part of the victim simply because the press is not prevented from discovering and publicizing both the identity of the victim and the substance of the victim's testimony. Ante, at 609-610. Section 16A is intended not to preserve confidentiality, but to prevent the risk of severe psychological damage caused by having to relate the details of the crime in front of a crowd which inevitably will include voyeuristic strangers. 6 In most states, that crowd may be expanded to include a live television audience, with returns on the evening news. That ordeal could be difficult for an adult; to a child, the experience can be devastating and leave permanent scars. 7 </s> The Commonwealth's interests are clearly furthered by the mandatory nature of the closure statute. Certainly if the law were discretionary, most judges would exercise that discretion soundly and would avoid unnecessary harm to the child, but victims and their families are entitled to assurance of such protection. The legislature did not act irrationally in deciding not to leave the closure determination to the idiosyncracies of individual judges subject to the pressures available [457 U.S. 596, 619] to the media. The victim might very well experience considerable distress prior to the court appearance, wondering, in the absence of such statutory protection, whether public testimony will be required. The mere possibility of public testimony may cause parents and children to decide not to report these heinous crimes. If, as psychologists report, the courtroom experience in such cases is almost as traumatic as the crime itself, 8 a state certainly should be able to take whatever reasonable steps it believes are necessary to reduce that trauma. Furthermore, we cannot expect victims and their parents to be aware of all of the nuances of state law; a person who sees newspaper, or perhaps even television, reports of a minor victim's testimony may very well be deterred from reporting a crime on the belief that public testimony will be required. It is within the power of the state to provide for mandatory closure to alleviate such understandable fears and encourage the reporting of such crimes. </s> IV </s> There is, of course, "a presumption of openness [that] inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." But we have consistently emphasized that this presumption is not absolute or irrebuttable. A majority of the Justices in Richmond Newspapers acknowledged that closure might be permitted under certain circumstances. Justice Stewart's separate opinion pointedly recognized that exclusion of the public might be justified to protect "the sensibilities of a youthful prosecution witness . . . in a criminal trial for rape." 448 U.S., at 600 , n. 5. 9 The Massachusetts statute has a relatively minor incidental impact on First [457 U.S. 596, 620] Amendment rights and gives effect to the overriding state interest in protecting child rape victims. Paradoxically, the Court today denies the victims the kind of protection routinely given to juveniles who commit crimes. Many will find it difficult to reconcile the concern so often expressed for the rights of the accused with the callous indifference exhibited today for children who, having suffered the trauma of rape or other sexual abuse, are denied the modest protection the Massachusetts Legislature provided. </s> [Footnote 1 It certainly cannot be said that the victims in this case consented to testifying in open court. During a lobby conference prior to trial, the prosecutor informed the trial judge that she had interviewed the victims, that they were concerned about publicity, and would agree to press attendance only if certain guarantees could be given: </s> "Each of [the three victims] indicated that they had the same concerns and basically they are privacy concerns. </s> "The difficulty of obtaining any kind of guarantee that the press would not print their names or where they go to school or any personal data or take pictures of them or attempt to interview them, those concerns come from their own privacy interests, as well as the fact that there are grandparents involved with a couple of these victims who do not know what [457 U.S. 596, 613] happened and if they were to find out by reading the paper, everyone was concerned about what would happen then. And they stated that if it were at all possible to obtain a guarantee that this information would not be used, then they wouldn't object to the press being included. I explained that that is [a] very difficult guarantee to obtain because the Court cannot issue a conditional order, or anything like that, but I just wanted to put on the record what their concerns were and what they are afraid of." App. 48a. </s> It is clear that the victims would "waive" the exclusion of the press only if the trial court gave them guarantees of strict privacy, guarantees that were probably beyond the authority of the court and which themselves would raise grave constitutional problems. See Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). </s> [Footnote 2 Cf. Stamicarbon, N. V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 539-540 (CA2 1974), and cases cited therein. </s> [Footnote 3 See, e. g., Ala. Const., Art. VI, 169 (1901) (repealed 1973); Fla. Stat. 918.16 (1979); Ga. Code 81-1006 (1978); Miss. Const., Art. 3, 26; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 632-A:8 (Supp. 1981); N. Y. Jud. Law 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. Gen. Stat. 15-166 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. 78-7-4 (1953). </s> [Footnote 4 It is hard to find a limiting principle in the Court's analysis. The same reasoning might require a hearing before a trial judge could hold a bench conference or any in camera proceedings. </s> [Footnote 5 For a discussion of the traumatic effect of court proceedings on minor rape victims, see E. Hilberman, The Rape Victim 53-54 (1976); S. Katz & M. Mazur, Understanding the Rape Victim: A Synthesis of Research Findings 198-200 (1979), and studies cited therein. </s> [Footnote 6 As one commentator put it: "Especially in cases involving minors, the courts stress the serious embarrassment and shame of the victim who is forced to testify to sexual acts or whose intimate life is revealed in detail before a crowd of the idly curious." Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 88 (1977). The victim's interest in avoiding the humiliation of testifying in open court is thus quite separate from any interest in preventing the public from learning of the crime. It is ironic that the Court emphasizes the failure of the Commonwealth to seal the trial transcript and bar disclosure of the victim's identity. The Court implies that a state law more severely encroaching upon the interests of the press and public would be upheld. </s> [Footnote 7 See Hilberman, supra; L. Holmstrom & A. Burgess, The Victim of Rape: Institutional Reactions 222, 227 (1978); Berger, supra, at 88, 92-93; Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 977, 1021 (1969). Holmstrom and Burgess report that nearly half of all adult rape victims were disturbed by the public setting of their trials. Certainly the impact on children must be greater. </s> [Footnote 8 See Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 Judicature 390 (1975); Katz & Mazur, supra; Holmstrom & Burgess, supra; Hilberman, supra; Berger, supra. </s> [Footnote 9 See also 448 U.S., at 580 -581; id., at 582 (WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 584 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 598 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> The duration of a criminal trial generally is shorter than the time it takes for this Court's jurisdiction to be invoked and our judgment on the merits to be announced. As a result, our power to review pretrial or midtrial orders implicating the freedom of the press has rested on the exception to the mootness doctrine for orders "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563 ; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 377 -378; Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 -547. </s> Today the Court expands that exception in order to pass on the constitutionality of a statute that, as presently construed, has never been applied in a live controversy. In this case, unlike the three cases cited above, the governing state law was materially changed after the trial court's order had expired by its own terms. There consequently is no possibility "`that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.'" Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 377 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 ). </s> The fact that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court narrowly construed - and then upheld in the abstract - the state statute that the trial court had read to mandate the closure of the entire trial bears on our review function in other respects. We have only recently recognized the First [457 U.S. 596, 621] Amendment right of access to newsworthy matter. See ante, at 603; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 582 (STEVENS, J., concurring). In developing constitutional jurisprudence, there is a special importance in deciding cases on concrete facts. Cf. Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 120 -127; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 . Only in specific controversies can the Court decide how this right of access to criminal trials can be accommodated with other societal interests, such as the protection of victims or defendants. The advisory opinion the Court announces today sheds virtually no light on how such rights should be accommodated. </s> The question whether the Court should entertain a facial attack on a statute that bears on the right of access cannot be answered simply by noting that the right has its source in the First Amendment. See, e. g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 -381; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 . For the right of access is plainly not coextensive with the right of expression that was vindicated in Nebraska Press Assn., supra. 1 Because statutes that bear on this right of access do not deter protected activity in the way that other laws sometimes interfere with the right of expression, we should follow the norm of reviewing these statutes as applied rather than on their face. </s> It is not clear when, if ever, the Court will need to confront the question whether a mandatory partial-closure statute is unconstitutional. If the order hypothesized by the Supreme Judicial Court, instead of the trial court's order, had actually been entered in this case, and if the press had been given prompt access to a transcript of the testimony of the minor victims, appellant might not even have appealed. At the [457 U.S. 596, 622] very least the press, the prosecutor, and defense counsel would have argued the constitutionality of the partial-closure order in the context of the facts relevant to such an order, and a different controversy would have been framed for appellate review. In future cases the trial courts may voluntarily follow the direction of Justice Wilkins and make specific findings demonstrating a compelling state interest supporting the mandated partial-closure order. See 383 Mass. 838, 852-853, 423 N. E. 2d 773, 782 (concurring opinion). Or the record in future cases may plainly disclose a justification for a partial closure that the Court would consider acceptable. Thus, aside from the illumination provided by live controversies, a decision to review only orders actually entered pursuant to the Massachusetts statute would advance the policy of avoiding the premature and unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions; 2 it is at least conceivable that no such order may ever have to be justified by the conclusion of the legislature that the mandatory closure of the trial during the testimony of a minor victim of a sex crime is necessary to serve important state interests. </s> The Court does not hold that on this record a closure order limited to the testimony of the minor victims would have been unconstitutional. Rather, the Court holds only that if ever such an order is entered, it must be supported by adequate findings. Normally, if the constitutional deficiency is the absence of findings to support a trial order, the Court would either remand for factfinding, or examine the record itself, before deciding whether the order measured up to constitutional standards. The infeasibility of this course of action - since no such order was entered in this case and since the order that was entered has expired - further demonstrates [457 U.S. 596, 623] that the Court's comment on the First Amendment issues implicated by the Massachusetts statute is advisory, hypothetical, and, at best, premature. 3 </s> I would dismiss the appeal. </s> [Footnote 1 For example, even though a reporter may have no right of access to a judge's side-bar conference, it surely does not follow that the judge could enjoin publication of what a reporter might have learned about such a conference. </s> [Footnote 2 "But the most fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if at all possible." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 3 The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine generally is compatible with our settled policy of avoiding the premature adjudication of constitutional questions, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 , n. 8, for an order that is capable of repetition yet evading review generally is no less ripe for review the first time it is presented than it would be on subsequent occasions. But when the "order" that is presented for review the first time is formulated in the abstract, as was the ruling of the Supreme Judicial Court in this case, the policy requires the Court to defer review of such an order until it is entered in a live controversy. </s> [457 U.S. 596, 624]

United States Supreme Court FLORIDA AVOCADO GROWERS v. PAUL(1963) No. 45 Argued: January 8, 1963Decided: May 13, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 49, Paul, Director of the Department of Agriculture of California, et al. v. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., et al., also on appeal from the same Court. </s> Appellants, who are engaged in the business of growing packing and marketing Florida avocados in interstate commerce, sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin appellees, state officers of California, from enforcing 792 of the California Agricultural Code, which prohibits the transportation or sale in California of avocados containing less than 8% of oil by weight, against Florida avocados certified as mature under federal regulations issued under the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. They contended that 792 of the California statute, as so applied, was unconstitutional, because (1) under the Supremacy Clause, it must be deemed displaced by the federal standard for determining the maturity of avocados grown in Florida; (2) its application to Florida avocados denied appellants the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) its application to them unreasonably burdened or discriminated against interstate marketing of Florida avocados in violation of the Commerce Clause. A three-judge District Court convened to hear the case denied an injunction, on the ground that the proofs did not establish that application of 792 to Florida avocados violated any provision of the Federal Constitution. Held: </s> 1. Section 792 is not invalid under the Supremacy Clause, because there is neither such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor is there evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field. Pp. 141-152. </s> (a) The present record demonstrates no inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation, despite the dissimilarity of the standards. Pp. 142-143. [373 U.S. 132, 133] </s> (b) The subject matter of the California regulation, while not concerned with health or safety, is one traditionally within the scope of the power of the States to prevent deception of consumers in the retail marketing of foodstuffs. Pp. 143-146. </s> (c) Neither the terms nor the history of the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 discloses a congressional intent to displace traditional state powers to regulate the retail distribution of agricultural commodities. Pp. 146-152. </s> 2. Section 792 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it does not work an irrational discrimination between persons or groups of persons. P. 152. </s> 3. The findings of the District Court with respect to the effect of 792 upon interstate commerce cannot be reviewed because of substantial uncertainty as to the content of the record on which those findings were predicated. Therefore, the judgment is reversed in this respect and the case is remanded to the District Court for a new trial of appellants' contentions that 792 unreasonably burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce in Florida avocados. Pp. 152-156. </s> 4. Since the appellants showed sufficient injury to warrant at least a trial of their allegations, the District Court properly refused to dismiss the complaint for want of equity jurisdiction. Pp. 157-159. </s> 197 F. Supp. 780, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. </s> Isaac E. Ferguson argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants in No. 45 and appellees in No. 49. </s> John Fourt, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees in No. 45 and appellants in No. 49. With him on the briefs were Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Lawrence E. Doxsee, Deputy Attorney General, and William A. Norris. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Section 792 of California's Agricultural Code, which gauges the maturity of avocados by oil content, prohibits the transportation or sale in California of avocados which contain "less than 8 per cent of oil, by weight . . . [373 U.S. 132, 134] excluding the skin and seed." 1 In contrast, federal marketing orders approved by the Secretary of Agriculture gauge the maturity of avocados grown in Florida by standards which attribute no significance to oil content. 2 This case presents the question of the constitutionality of the California statute insofar as it may be applied to exclude from California markets certain Florida avocados which, although certified to be mature under the federal regulations, do not uniformly meet the California requirement of 8% of oil. </s> Appellants in No. 45, growers and handlers of avocados in Florida, brought this action in the District Court for the Northern District of California to enjoin the enforcement of 792 against Florida avocados certified as mature under the federal regulations. Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the statute on three grounds: (1) that under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, the California standard must be deemed displaced by the federal standard for determining the maturity of avocados grown in Florida; (2) that the application of the California statute to Florida-grown avocados denied appellants the Equal [373 U.S. 132, 135] Protection of the Laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that its application unreasonably burdened or discriminated against interstate marketing of Florida-grown avocados in violation of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8. A three-judge District Court initially dismissed the complaint. 169 F. Supp. 774. On direct appeal we held, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 , that the suit was one for a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. 2281, and presented a justiciable controversy to be tried on the merits. After a trial the three-judge court denied an injunction against the enforcement of 792, on the ground that the proofs did not establish that its application to Florida-grown avocados violated any provision of the Federal Constitution. 197 F. Supp. 780. The District Court held for several reasons that the Supremacy Clause did not operate to displace 792: no actual conflict existed between the statute and the federal marketing orders; neither the Agricultural Act nor the marketing orders occupied the field to the exclusion of the state statute; and Congress had not ordained that a federal marketing order was to give a license to Florida producers to "market their avocados without further inspection by the states" after compliance with the federal maturity test. 197 F. Supp., at 787. Rather, the court observed, "[t]he Federal law does not cover the whole field of interstate shipment of avocados" but by necessary implication leaves the regulation of certain aspects of distribution to the States. Further, the District Court found no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the California statute was applicable on identical terms to Florida and California producers, and was reasonably designed to enforce a traditional and legitimate interest of the State of California in the protection of California consumers. The District Court concluded, finally, that 792 did not unreasonably burden or discriminate against interstate commerce in out-of-state [373 U.S. 132, 136] avocados - that the 8% oil content test served in practice only to keep off California grocers' shelves fruit which was unpalatable because prematurely picked. This holding rested in part on the conclusion that mature Florida fruit had not been shown to be incapable of attaining 8% oil content, since only a very small fraction of Florida avocados of certain varieties in fact failed to meet the California test. 3 </s> Both parties have brought appeals here from the District Court's judgment: the Florida growers urge in No. 45 that the court erred in not enjoining enforcement of the state statute against Florida-grown avocados; in No. 49 the California state officials appeal on the ground that the action should have been dismissed for want of equity jurisdiction rather than upon the merits. We noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals. 368 U.S. 964, 965 . We affirm the judgment in the respect challenged by the cross-appeal in No. 49. In No. 45 we agree that appellants have not sustained their challenges to 792 under the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses. However, we reverse and remand for a new trial insofar as the judgment sustains [373 U.S. 132, 137] 792 against appellants' challenge to the statute grounded on the Commerce Clause. We hold that the effect of the statute upon interstate commerce cannot be determined on the record now before us. </s> The California statute was enacted in 1925. Like the federal marketing regulations applicable to appellants, this statute sought to ensure the maturity of avocados reaching retail markets. 4 The District Court found on sufficient evidence that before 1925 the marketing of immature avocados had created serious problems in California. 5 An avocado, if picked prematurely, will not ripen properly, but will tend to decay or shrivel and become rubbery and unpalatable after purchase. Not only retail consumers but even experienced grocers have difficulty in distinguishing mature avocados from the immature by physical characteristics alone. 6 Thus, the District Court [373 U.S. 132, 138] concluded, "[t]he marketing of . . . [immature] avocados cheats the consumer" and adversely affects demand for and orderly distribution of the fruit. 197 F. Supp., at 783. </s> The federal marketing regulations were adopted pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. 601 et seq. The declared purposes of the Act are to restore and maintain parity prices for the benefit of producers of agricultural commodities, to ensure the stable and steady flow of commodities to consumers, and "to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality and maturity . . . as will effectuate such orderly marketing of such agricultural commodities as will be in the public interest," 2 (3), 7 U.S.C. 602 (3). Whenever he finds that it would promote these declared policies, the Secretary is empowered upon notice and hearing to adopt federal marketing orders and regulations for a particular growing area, 8c (3), (4), 7 U.S.C. 608c (3), (4). Orders thus proposed by the Secretary become effective only when approved by a majority of the growers or producers concerned, 8c (8), (9), 7 U.S.C. 608c (8), (9). </s> In 1954, after proceedings in compliance with the statute, 19 Fed. Reg. 3439, the Secretary promulgated orders governing the marketing of avocados grown in South Florida. 7 The orders established an Avocado Administrative Committee, composed entirely of South Florida avocado growers and handlers. 7 CFR 969.20. This Committee has authority to draft and recommend to the Secretary various marketing regulations governing the [373 U.S. 132, 139] quality and maturity of South Florida avocados. The maturity test for the South Florida fruit is based upon a schedule of picking dates, sizes and weights annually drafted and recommended by the Committee and promulgated by the Secretary. 8 The regulations forbid picking and shipping of any fruit before the prescribed date, although an exemption from the picking-date schedule may be granted by the Committee. 9 The regulations drafted by the Committee and promulgated by the Secretary concern other qualities and physical characteristics of Florida avocados besides maturity. See 22 Fed. Reg. 6205, 7 CFR 51.3050-51.3053, 51.3064. All regulated avocados, including those shipped under picking-date exemptions, must be inspected for compliance with certain quality standards by the Federal-State Inspection Service, a joint authority supervised by the United States and Florida Departments of Agriculture. [373 U.S. 132, 140] </s> Almost all avocados commercially grown in the United States come either from Southern California or South Florida. The California-grown varieties are chiefly of Mexican ancestry, and in most years contain at least 8% oil content when mature. 10 The several Florida species, by contrast, are of West Indian and Guatemalan ancestry. West Indian avocados, which constitute some 12% of the total Florida production, may contain somewhat less than 8% oil when mature and ready for market. They do not, the District Court found, attain that percentage of oil "until they are past their prime." 197 F. Supp., at 783. But that variety need not concern us in this case, since the District Court concluded on sufficient evidence that "poor shipping qualities and short retail store shelf-life" make it commercially unprofitable, regardless of the oil test, to market the variety in California. On the other hand, the Florida hybrid and Guatemalan varieties, which do not encounter such handicaps, may reach maturity before they attain 8% oil content. The District Court concluded, nevertheless, that 792 did not unreasonably interfere with their marketability since these species "attain or exceed 8% oil content while in a prime commercial marketing condition," so that the California test was "scientifically valid as applied to" these varieties. </s> The experts who testified at the trial disputed whether California's percentage-of-oil test or the federal marketing orders' test of picking dates and minimum sizes and weights was the more accurate gauge of the maturity of [373 U.S. 132, 141] avocados. 11 In adopting his calendar test of maturity for the varieties grown in South Florida the Secretary expressly rejected physical and chemical tests as insufficiently reliable guides for gauging the maturity of the Florida fruit. 12 </s> I. </s> We consider first appellants' challenge to 792 under the Supremacy Clause. That the California statute and the federal marketing orders embody different maturity tests is clear. However, this difference poses, rather than disposes of the problem before us. Whether a State may constitutionally reject commodities which a federal authority has certified to be marketable depends upon whether the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 . By that test, we hold that 792 is not such an obstacle; there is neither such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field. </s> We begin by putting aside two suggestions of the appellants which obscure more than aid in the solution of the problem. First, it is suggested that a federal license or certificate of compliance with minimum federal standards immunizes the licensed commerce from inconsistent or more demanding state regulations. While this suggestion draws some support from decisions which have invalidated direct state interference with the activities of interstate carriers, Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., [373 U.S. 132, 142] 348 U.S. 61 , even in that field of paramount federal concern the suggestion has been significantly qualified, e. g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 -448; Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 ; cf. Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 . That no State may completely exclude federally licensed commerce is indisputable, but that principle has no application to this case. </s> Second, it is suggested that the coexistence of federal and state regulatory legislation should depend upon whether the purposes of the two laws are parallel or divergent. This Court has, on the one hand, sustained state statutes having objectives virtually identical to those of federal regulations, California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730 -731; cf. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 156 -157; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 ; and has, on the other hand, struck down state statutes where the respective purposes were quite dissimilar, First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 . The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives. </s> The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained. See, e. g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, supra. </s> A. </s> A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a [373 U.S. 132, 143] physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce, cf. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 399 -401; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 ; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 . That would be the situation here if, for example, the federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado testing more than 7% oil, while the California test excluded from the State any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content. No such impossibility of dual compliance is presented on this record, however. As to those Florida avocados of the hybrid and Guatemalan varieties which were actually rejected by the California test, the District Court indicated that the Florida growers might have avoided such rejections by leaving the fruit on the trees beyond the earliest picking date permitted by the federal regulations, and nothing in the record contradicts that suggestion. Nor is there a lack of evidentiary support for the District Court's finding that the Florida varieties marketed in California "attain or exceed 8% oil content while in a prime commercial marketing condition," even though they may be "mature enough to be acceptable prior to the time that they reach that content . . . ." 197 F. Supp., at 783. Thus the present record demonstrates no inevitable collision between the two schemes of regulation, despite the dissimilarity of the standards. </s> B. </s> The issue under the head of the Supremacy Clause is narrowed then to this: Does either the nature of the subject matter, namely the maturity of avocados, or any explicit declaration of congressional design to displace state regulation, require 792 to yield to the federal marketing orders? The maturity of avocados seems to be an inherently unlikely candidate for exclusive federal regulation. Certainly it is not a subject by its very nature admitting only of national supervision, cf. Cooley [373 U.S. 132, 144] v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How, 299, 319-320. Nor is it a subject demanding exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national interests, cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 -244. </s> On the contrary, the maturity of avocados is a subject matter of the kind this Court has traditionally regarded as properly within the scope of state superintendence. Specifically, the supervision of the readying of foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a matter of peculiarly local concern. Many decades ago, for example, this Court sustained a State's prohibition against the importation of artificially colored oleomargarine (which posed no health problem), over claims of federal preemption and burden on commerce. In the course of the opinion, the Court recognized that the States have always possessed a legitimate interest in "the protection of . . . [their] people against fraud and deception in the sale of food products" at retail markets within their borders. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472 . See also Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189, 199 -200; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 ; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 525 -529. </s> It is true that more recently we sustained a federal statute broadly regulating the production of renovated butter. But we were scrupulous in pointing out that a State might nevertheless - at least in the absence of an express contrary command of Congress - confiscate or exclude from market the processed butter which had complied with all the federal processing standards, "because of a higher standard demanded by a state for its consumers." A state regulation so purposed was, we affirmed, "permissible under all the authorities." 13 Cloverleaf [373 U.S. 132, 145] Butter Co. v. Petterson, 315 U.S. 148, 162 . That distinction is a fundamental one, which illumines and delineates the problem of the present case. Federal regulation by means of minimum standards of the picking, processing, and transportation of agricultural commodities, however comprehensive for those purposes that regulation may be, does not of itself import displacement of state control over the distribution and retail sale of those commodities in the interests of the consumers of the commodities within the State. Thus, while Florida may perhaps not prevent the exportation of federally certified fruit by superimposing a higher maturity standard, nothing in Cloverleaf forbids California to regulate their marketing. Congressional regulation of one end of the stream of commerce does not, ipso facto, oust all state regulation at the other end. Such a displacement may not be inferred automatically from the fact that Congress has regulated production and packing of commodities for the interstate market. We do not mean to suggest that certain local regulations may not unreasonably or arbitrarily burden interstate commerce; we consider that question separately, infra, pp. 152-154. Here we are concerned only whether partial congressional superintendence of the field (maturity for the purpose of introduction of Florida fruit into the stream of interstate commerce) automatically forecloses regulation of maturity by another State in the interests of that State's consumers of the fruit. [373 U.S. 132, 146] </s> The correctness of the District Court's conclusion that 792 was a regulation well within the scope of California's police powers is thus clear. While it is conceded that the California statute is not a health measure, neither logic nor precedent invites any distinction between state regulations designed to keep unhealthful or unsafe commodities off the grocer's shelves, and those designed to prevent the deception of consumers. 14 See, e. g., Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, supra; Plumley v. Massachusetts, supra. Nothing appearing in the record before us affords any ground for departure in this case from our consistent refusal to draw such a distinction. </s> C. </s> Since no irreconcilable conflict with the federal regulation requires a conclusion that 792 was displaced, we turn to the question whether Congress has nevertheless ordained that the state regulation shall yield. The settled mandate governing this inquiry, in deference to the fact that a state regulation of this kind is an exercise of the "historic police powers of the States," is not to decree such a federal displacement "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress," Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 . In other words, we are not to conclude that Congress legislated the ouster of this California statute by the marketing orders in the absence [373 U.S. 132, 147] of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect. We search in vain for such a mandate. </s> The provisions and objectives of the Agricultural Adjustment Act bear little resemblance to those in which only last Term we found a preemptive design in Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 . In the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act involved in that case, Congress had declared "uniform standards of classification and inspection" to be "imperative for the protection of producers and others engaged in commerce and the public interest therein." 7 U.S.C. 511a. The legislative history was replete with references to a need for "uniform" or "official" standards, which could harmonize the grading and inspection of tobacco at all markets throughout the country. Under the statute a single set of standards was to be promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture, "and the standards so established would be the official standards of the United States for such purpose." S. Rep. No. 1211, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1. </s> Nothing in the language of the Agricultural Adjustment Act - passed by the same Congress the very next day 15 - discloses a similarly comprehensive congressional design. There is but one provision of the statute which intimates any purpose to make agricultural production controls the monitors of retail distribution - the reference to a policy of establishing such "minimum standards of quality and maturity and such grading and inspection requirements . . . as will effectuate . . . orderly marketing . . . in the public interest." 7 U.S.C. 602 (3). That language cannot be said, without more, to reveal a design that federal marketing orders should displace all state [373 U.S. 132, 148] regulations. By its very terms, in fact, the statute purports only to establish minimum standards. </s> Other provisions of the Act, and their history, militate even more strongly against federal displacement of these state regulations. First, the adoption of marketing agreements and orders is authorized only when the Secretary has determined that economic conditions within a particular growing area require federally supervised cooperation among the growers to alleviate those conditions. 7 U.S.C. 608c (1), (2). Moreover, the relief afforded the growers is to be temporary; "the Secretary is directed to cease exercising such powers" when "the circumstances described . . . no longer exist." H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. And consistently with these terms, the Secretary himself has characterized the marketing agreements as essentially "self-help programs" instituted and administered by the farmers involved. This view has recently been elaborated by the Secretary: </s> "The Act itself does not impose regulations over the marketing of any agricultural commodity. It merely provides the authority under which an industry can develop regulations to fit its own situation and solve its own marketing problems." United States Department of Agriculture, Marketing Agreements and Orders, AMS-230 (rev. ed. 1961), 3. See also United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment 1937-1938 (1939), 71. </s> Second, the very terms of the statute require that the Secretary promulgate marketing orders "limited in their application to the smallest regional production areas" which he finds practicable; and the orders are to "prescribe such different terms, applicable to different production areas and marketing areas" as will serve to "give due recognition to the differences in production and marketing" [373 U.S. 132, 149] between those areas. 7 U.S.C. 608c (11). While this language is not conclusive on the question before us, it indicates that Congress contemplated - quite by contrast to the design embodied in the Tobacco Inspection Act - that there might be widespread regional variations in the standards governing production and processing. Thus avocado growers in another region could, for example, propose - and the Secretary would presumably adopt - maturity regulations which would gauge the marketability of the fruit not by the calendar, as do the South Florida rules, but by the color of the skin, or the texture and color of the seed-coat, or perhaps even by oil content. Thus if the Congress of 1935 really intended that distribution would be comprehensively governed by grower-adopted quality and maturity standards, and all state regulation of the same subject would be ousted, it does not seem likely that the statute would have invited local variations at the production end while saying absolutely nothing about the effect of those production controls upon distribution for consumption. </s> A third factor which strongly suggests that Congress did not mandate uniformity for each marketing order arises from the legislative history. The provisions concerning the limited duration and local application of marketing agreements received much attention from both House and Senate Committees reporting on the bill. Though recognizing that the powers conferred upon the Secretary were novel and extensive, both Committees concluded: "These and other restrictive provisions are . . . adequately drawn to guard against any fear that the regulatory power is so broad as to subject its exercise to the risk of abuse." H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7; S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. The Committee Reports also discussed 10 (i), 7 U.S.C. 610 (i), which authorized federal-state cooperation [373 U.S. 132, 150] in the administration of the program, and cautioned significantly: </s> "Notwithstanding the authorization of cooperation contained in this section, there is nothing in it to permit or require the Federal Government to invade the field of the States, for the limitations of the act and the Constitution forbid federal regulation in that field, and this provision does not indicate the contrary. Nor is there anything in the provision to force States to cooperate. Each sovereignty operates in its own sphere but can exert its authority in conformity rather than in conflict with that of the other." H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23; S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15. </s> Thus the revealed congressional design was apparently to do no more than to invite farmers and growers to get together, under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture, to work out local harvesting, packing and processing programs and thereby relieve temporarily depressed marketing conditions. Had Congress meant the Act to have in addition a pervasive effect upon the ultimate distribution and sale of produce, evidence of such a design would presumably have accompanied the statute, as it did the Tobacco Inspection Act, see Campbell v. Hussey, supra. In the absence of any such manifestations, it would be unreasonable to infer that Congress delegated to the growers in a particular region the authority to deprive the States of their traditional power to enforce otherwise valid regulations designed for the protection of consumers. </s> An examination of the operation of these particular marketing orders reinforces the conclusion we reach from this analysis of the terms and objectives of the statute. The regulations show that the Florida avocado maturity standards are drafted each year not by impartial experts in Washington or even in Florida, but rather by the South [373 U.S. 132, 151] Florida Avocado Administrative Committee, which consists entirely of representatives of the growers and handlers concerned. It appears that the Secretary of Agriculture has invariably adopted the Committee's recommendations for maturity dates, sizes, and weights. 16 Thus the pattern which emerges is one of maturity regulations drafted and administered locally by the growers' own representatives, and designed to do no more than promote orderly competition among the South Florida growers. 17 </s> This case requires no consideration of the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to oust all state regulation of maturity, and we intimate no view upon that question. 18 </s> [373 U.S. 132, 152] It is enough to decide this aspect of the present case that we conclude that Congress has not attempted to oust or displace state powers to enact the regulations embodied in 792. The most plausible inference from the legislative scheme is that the Congress contemplated that state power to enact such regulations should remain unimpaired. </s> II. </s> We turn now to appellants' arguments under the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses. </s> It is enough to dispose of the equal protection claim that we express our agreement with the District Court that the state standard does not work an "irrational discrimination as between persons or groups of persons," Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 ; cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 . While it may well be that arguably superior tests of maturity could be devised, we cannot say, in derogation of the findings of the District Court, that this possibility renders the choice made by California either arbitrary or devoid of rational relationship to a legitimate regulatory interest. Whether or not the oil content test is the most reliable indicator of marketability of avocados is not a question for the courts to decide; it is sufficient that on this record we should conclude, as we do, that oil content appears to be an acceptable criterion of avocado maturity. </s> More difficult is the claim that the California statute unreasonably burdens or discriminates against interstate [373 U.S. 132, 153] commerce because its application has excluded Florida avocados from the State. Although Florida and California were competitors in avocado production when the statute was passed in 1925, the present record permits no inference that the California statute had a discriminatory objective. 19 Nevertheless it may be that the continued application [373 U.S. 132, 154] of this regulation to Florida avocados has imposed an unconstitutional burden on commerce, or has discriminated against another State's exports of the particular commodity. Other state regulations raising similar problems have been found to be discriminatory or burdensome notwithstanding a legitimate state interest in some form of regulation - either because they exceeded the limits necessary to vindicate that interest, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 , or because they unreasonably favored local producers at the expense of competitors from other States, Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 . Such a state regulation might also constitute an illegitimate attempt to control the conduct of producers beyond the borders of California, cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 . </s> The District Court referred to these precedents but nevertheless concluded that the California oil content test was not burdensome upon or discriminatory against interstate commerce. 197 F. Supp., at 786-787. However, we are unable to review that conclusion or decide whether the court properly applied the principles announced in these decisions because we cannot ascertain what constituted the record on which the conclusion was predicated. Much of the appellants' offered proof consisted of depositions and exhibits, designed to detail both the rejection of Florida avocados in California and the oil content of Florida avocados which had met the federal test but which might nonetheless have been excluded from California markets. [373 U.S. 132, 155] </s> The parties' own assumptions concerning the content of the record are in irreconcilable conflict: the appellants have argued the case on the apparent assumption that the depositions and exhibits were admitted before the District Court; the appellees, on the other hand, have assumed both in their briefs and in oral argument that the disputed evidence was not admitted. This lack of consensus is altogether understandable in light of the confusion created by the District Court's evidentiary rulings. The appellees objected to the introduction of the disputed materials on several grounds, both during and after the trial. The court expressly reserved its rulings on the issue of admissibility, and after the entry of its order on the merits of the case made a supplemental "ruling on evidentiary matters," in which it stated that the disputed exhibits and depositions "are not admitted into evidence, but have been considered by the Court as an offer of proof by the plaintiffs . . . ." The earlier memorandum of the court explained that it would "assume, arguendo, that the exhibits and depositions offered by plaintiffs are all admissible." 197 F. Supp., at 782. If this was intended to mean that appellants would not have made out a case for relief, even were the evidence to be admitted, then there would have been no need to rule on admissibility. But we are unable to determine, just as the parties were unable to agree, whether the District Court viewed the evidence in that posture. 20 </s> [373 U.S. 132, 156] </s> Thus the only evidence which would seem to support an injunction on the ground of burden on interstate commerce has never been formally admitted to the record in this case. For this Court to reverse and order an injunction on the basis of that evidence would be, in effect, to admit the contested depositions and exhibits on appeal without ever affording the appellees an opportunity to argue their seemingly substantial objections. 21 To assume the admissibility of the evidence under these circumstances would be to deny the appellees their day in court as to a disputed part of the case on which the trial court has never ruled because its view of the law evidently made such a ruling unnecessary. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 533 ; Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 ; Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 . On the other hand, to affirm the District Court would require us to make equally impermissible assumptions as to the state of the record. Cf. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 215 . </s> For these reasons we conclude that the judgment must, to the extent appealed from in No. 45, be reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for a new trial of appellants' Commerce Clause contentions. We intimate no view with respect to either the admissibility or the probative value of the disputed evidence, or of any other evidence which might be brought forth by either party concerning this aspect of the case. [373 U.S. 132, 157] </s> III. </s> In No. 49, the state officers cross-appeal on the ground that the District Court should have dismissed the action for want of equity, rather than for lack of merit. Their contention is that there was insufficient showing of injury to the Florida growers to invoke the District Court's equity jurisdiction. We reject that contention, and affirm the judgment insofar as it is challenged by the cross-appeal. </s> In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 , we held that because of the Florida growers' allegations that California officials had consistently condemned Florida avocados as unfit for sale in California, "thus requiring appellants [the Florida growers] - to prevent destruction and complete loss of their shipments - to reship the avocados to and sell them in other States," it was evident that "there is an existing dispute between the parties as to present legal rights amounting to a justiciable controversy which appellants are entitled to have determined on the merits." 362 U.S., at 85 -86. In view of our mandate in Jacobsen, therefore, the District Court necessarily assumed jurisdiction and heard the case on its merits. Cf. United States v. Haley, 371 U.S. 18 . </s> Even on the present ambiguous record, we think that the Florida growers have demonstrated sufficient injury to warrant at least a trial of their allegations. In the California officials' briefs below, it was conceded that the Florida growers had suffered damage in the amount of some $1,500 by reason of the enforcement of the statute. Before the bar of this Court, it was conceded that the State, in objecting to the growers' proffered evidence, did not dispute the claim that some shipments of Florida avocados had in fact been rejected by California for failure to comply with the oil content requirement. Indeed, the [373 U.S. 132, 158] State conceded in its pleadings before the trial court that rejections of Florida avocados had averaged in recent years as much as 6.4% of the total shipments of Florida fruit into California. While these concessions were not corroborated by statistical proofs at trial, and thus do not form an adequate basis for the entry of a final injunction, they nevertheless supplied an adequate basis, apart from the requirement of our remand, for the District Court's proceeding to trial on the merits. </s> In addition, it is clear that the California officials will continue to enforce the statute against the Florida-grown avocados, for the State's answer to the complaint declared that these officials "have in the past and now stand ready to perform their duties under their oath of office should they acquire knowledge of violations of the Agricultural Code of the State of California." Thus the District Court, both on the pleadings before it, and in light of our opinion in Jacobsen, properly heard the remanded case on the merits and did not err in refusing to dismiss for want of equity jurisdiction. </s> The cross-appellants rely upon the court's finding of fact that "[p]laintiffs have neither suffered nor been threatened with irreparable injury." This finding was, however, adopted pursuant to that court's prior opinion, which stated that "[p]laintiffs' monetary losses as a result of the rejected shipments are not clearly established, but at most do not appear to be over two or three thousand dollars." 197 F. Supp., at 783-784. We read this finding as importing no more than the District Court's view that whatever harm or damage the Florida growers might have suffered fell short of the "irreparable injury" requisite for the entry of an injunction against enforcement of the statute. </s> The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial limited to appellants' [373 U.S. 132, 159] claim in No. 45 that the enforcement of 792 unreasonably burdens or discriminates against interstate commerce. In the respect challenged by the cross-appeal in No. 49, the judgment is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Avocados not meeting this standard may not be sold in California. Id., 784. Substandard fruits are "declared to be a public nuisance," and they may be seized, condemned, and abated. Id., 785. Violators may be punished criminally, id., 831 ($50 to $500 fine or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both), and by civil penalty action, id., 785.6 (market value of fruits). </s> [Footnote 2 The orders are approved by the Secretary pursuant to 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. 608c. The basic marketing agreement provisions were initially adopted, in substantially their present form, in the 1935 amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 49 Stat. 750, 753-761. These sections were reenacted in 1937, 50 Stat. 246, as the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, virtually unchanged. Concerning the reasons for the reenactment, and the extent of the changes, see United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment 1937-1938 (1939), 72-73. </s> [Footnote 3 The evidence in the record concerning the actual effect of the California maturity test upon Florida avocados is sketchy at best. The appellants introduced only one witness, a marketing expert in the United States Department of Agriculture, who testified concerning the relative scientific and other merits of the federal and California maturity tests. He gave no testimony concerning the actual impact of the California regulation upon shipments from Florida. One of appellees' witnesses at trial made cursory references to the fact that California inspectors had rejected and excluded some Florida shipments, but there was no testimony concerning the dates and quantities of any rejections. In a motion for dismissal and an accompanying affidavit before the District Court, the appellees presented certain figures concerning the percentage of Florida avocados which failed to comply with the California regulation during the years 1954 through 1957. There was, however, neither data for years after 1957 nor statistical proof at the trial which would corroborate these summary figures. </s> [Footnote 4 See Roche, Regulations for Marketing Avocados in California, in California Avocado Assn. 1937 Yearbook (1937), 88-89, concerning the purpose of the California oil-test statute. It has not been contended that the purpose of this statute is to ensure a certain caloric or nutritional value in avocados which reach the consumer. No health issue has been raised in this case. See 197 F. Supp., at 785-786. </s> [Footnote 5 See also Church and Chace, Some Changes in the Composition of California Avocados During Growth (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Bull. No. 1073, 1922), 2; Hodgson, The California Avocado Industry (Calif. Agricultural Extension Service Circular No. 43, 1930), 54-55; Hodges, Immature Avocado Selling Illegal, 111 Pacific Rural Press, Apr. 3, 1926, p. 435. And for a discussion of the particular problems encountered in the marketing of immature avocados in California, see Roche, supra, note 4, at 88-89. </s> [Footnote 6 The nature of the avocado and its ripening process make it very difficult for any but the expert to gauge its maturity, and an avocado which may appear satisfactory at the time of purchase may later fail to ripen properly because it was prematurely picked. See, e. g., Ruehle, The Florida Avocado Industry (Univ. of Fla. Agr. Expt. Stations Bull. No. 602, 1958), 69; Avocado Maturity Tests, 37 California [373 U.S. 132, 138] Citrograph, Dec. 1951, p. 87; Roche, Look Out for Immature Avocados, 87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2, 1940, p. 590; Church and Chace, supra, note 5, at 2. </s> [Footnote 7 This order is applicable only to avocados grown in the South Florida growing area. The California growers have not adopted a federal marketing order or agreement. </s> [Footnote 8 The findings of the United States Department of Agriculture, contained in its order determining what terms should be contained in the avocado regulations, were that the marketing of immature fruits increases consumer resistance and materially impairs the marketing of the entire crop, that there was no satisfactory physical or chemical test for determining maturity, and that maturity can satisfactorily be determined by the picking-date-size method. Handling of Avocados Grown in South Florida, 19 Fed. Reg. 2418, 2424-2425. Each year since 1954, the Secretary has issued maturity regulations fixing the dates upon which each variety of Florida avocados may be picked and shipped. See, e. g., 27 Fed. Reg. 5135-5136, 6705, 8264-8265, 9174-9175, 10090-10091. </s> [Footnote 9 Section .53 of the regulations, 7 CFR 969.53, provides that an exemption certificate shall be granted to a grower "who furnishes proof, satisfactory to the committee, that his avocados of a particular variety are mature prior to the time such variety may be handled under such regulation." Such a certificate authorizes the recipient to "handle" the certified fruit, i. e., to "sell, consign, deliver, or transport avocados within the production area or between the production area and any point outside thereof . . . ." 7 CFR 969.10. </s> [Footnote 10 See Traub et al., Avocado Production in the United States (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Circular No. 620, 1941), 6-8. Occasionally, however, even California growers have experienced difficulty in meeting the oil content requirement, and sizable shipments have had to be destroyed. See Demand for Avocados, 74 California Cultivator, Feb. 8, 1930, p. 167; Roche, Look Out for Immature Avocados, 87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2, 1940, p. 590; California Avocado Assn. 1937 Yearbook (1937), 88. </s> [Footnote 11 Compare Hodgson, The California Avocado Industry (Calif. Agricultural Extension Service Circular No. 43, 1930), 39. </s> [Footnote 12 See 19 Fed. Reg. 2418, 2424-2425; compare Harding, The Relation of Maturity to Quality in Florida Avocados, 67 Florida State Horticultural Society Proceedings, 276 (1954). </s> [Footnote 13 It is true that the statute involved in the Cloverleaf case provided that federal law was not intended to displace state laws "enacted in the exercise of [the States'] police powers . . . ." 32 Stat. 193, [373 U.S. 132, 145] 21 U.S.C. 25. But this proviso was presumably intended to do no more than recognize explicitly an accommodation between federal and state interests to which Congress and the decisions of this Court have consistently adhered. Nor did the Court's deference to state regulation rest upon this congressional proviso. Rather, the Court simply considered it a well-settled proposition that a State may impose upon imported foodstuffs "a higher standard demanded . . . for its consumers." </s> [Footnote 14 It might also be argued that the California statute, having been designed to test the maturity only of California avocados, bears no rational relationship to the marketability of Florida fruit. Such a contention would seem untenable, however, in the face of the District Court's express finding of fact, supportable on the testimony before it, that "[a] standard requiring a minimum of 8% of oil in an avocado before it may be marketed is scientifically valid as applied to hybrid and Guatemalan varieties of avocados grown in Florida and marketed in California." And there is considerable dispute as to the oil content of Florida avocados which have been certified as mature under the federal regulations. See note 21, infra. </s> [Footnote 15 The marketing agreement provisions were enacted among the 1935 amendments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 49 Stat. 750, 753-761. These amendments were accepted by Congress the day following the enactment of the Tobacco Inspection Act, 49 Stat. 731-735. </s> [Footnote 16 Although the Manager of the Avocado Administrative Committee stated in his deposition (which was neither formally admitted nor excluded by the District Court) that the Secretary had occasionally rejected orders recommended by the Committee, he insisted that as to maturity regulations "the Secretary has always followed the Committee's recommendations." </s> [Footnote 17 Significant with regard to the essentially local nature of the orders and their administration is the testimony in a deposition (on the admissibility of which the District Court did not rule) of the supervising inspector of fruits and vegetables of the Federal and State Agricultural Inspection Service for the South Florida district: ". . . these regulations from time to time are subject to change at the direction of the Avocado Administrative Committee. Whenever they do change them, Mr. Biggar, the manager of the Avocado Administrative Committee, immediately furnishes the inspection service with copies of the effective rules and changes. There are times when they change them, and when they change them I am the first man to get the changed regulations, because I have to see that the inspectors get the revised regulations issued by the Avocado Administrative Committee." For further evidence that the avocado marketing agreement was undertaken chiefly as a "self-help program," designed only to regulate South Florida production and ensure maturity of the produce from that growing area, see Krome, The Federal Avocado Marketing Agreement, 67 Florida State Horticultural Society Proceedings 268 (1954). </s> [Footnote 18 Compare, e. g., Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 ; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 . See generally Note, Federal Inspection Legislation - A Partial Remedy for Interstate Trade Barriers, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1185 (1940). Nor have we any occasion to consider the possible applicability to the Supremacy Clause issue of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 341, since neither party has made any reference to that statute either before the District Court or in this Court. </s> [Footnote 19 The District Court assumed that in 1925 California growers faced no meaningful competition from Florida growers. It appears, however, that the Florida industry was well developed when the California industry was in its infancy, see Collins, The Avocado, A Salad Fruit From the Tropics (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Bureau of Plant Industry, Bull. No. 77, 1905), 35-36. Not only does there appear to have been vigorous competition between Florida and California producers for all markets in 1925, see Popenoe, The Avocado - California vs. Florida, 61 California Cultivator, Nov. 3, 1923, p. 459; but in some years during the 1920's the Florida production exceeded that of California. See Traub, supra, note 10, at 2. See generally Hodgson, supra, note 5, at 60, 82-83. The passage of the California statute was immediately and vigorously protested by Florida producers, and a United States Senator from Florida filed an informal complaint with the Department of Agriculture, see, e. g., California Avocado Law Unfair to Florida: New Pacific Coast Maturity Standards Practically Ban All Shipments from this State, 32 Florida Grower, Nov. 7, 1925, pp. 4, 22. See also id., Nov. 21, 1925, p. 15. Even in California there was contemporaneous recognition that passage of the statute severely restricted the access of Florida growers to the markets at least of Northern California, see Hodgson, The Florida Avocado Industry - A Survey II, 66 California Cultivator, June 26, 1926, pp. 721, 743. And see 80 American Fruit Grower, Feb. 1960, p. 64. On the other hand, there have been suggestions that neither the adoption nor the application of the California statute reflected any discriminatory or anticompetitive purpose. In some years, California growers themselves experience great difficulty meeting the oil content requirement, and sizable shipments must be destroyed - see Demand for Avocados, 74 California Cultivator, Feb. 8, 1930, p. 167; Roche, Look Out for Immature Avocados, 87 California Cultivator, Nov. 2, 1940, p. 590; California Avocado Assn., 1937 Yearbook (1937), 88 - even though the oil content of mature California avocados in good years runs substantially above 8%, see Traub, supra, note 10, at 6-8. Moreover, the California Growers' Association has regarded its ability [373 U.S. 132, 154] to market Florida fruit during the months when California fruit is not available as strengthening rather than weakening its own market position. See Fourteenth Annual Report of the General Manager of the Calavo Growers of California (1937), 20. Plainly the questions indicated by these conflicting materials can be resolved only at a trial fully developing the Commerce Clause issue. </s> [Footnote 20 At the very close of the trial, two of the three members of the court offered inconsistent views when appellees' counsel asked for clarification concerning the status of appellants' disputed depositions and exhibits. One member of the court replied that "your objections stand to every word that is in these depositions here," while another responded, "[t]hey are all in evidence subject to your objections and the Court will rule on them when it makes its ruling in the case if it is necessary." </s> [Footnote 21 Specifically, appellees offered to show that in measuring the oil content of avocados the Florida experimental test procedures did not employ the same equipment as is used in California, the former, so it was contended, extracting less oil than the California equipment would obtain from the same avocado. They claimed that the average variation amounted to a failure of the Florida equipment to remove 2.9% of the oil from the fruit, and, further, that the Florida results were erratic. In addition, appellees asserted that the avocados used in the Florida experiments were not representative of the graded, sized, and inspected fruit that appellants would normally market. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK join, dissenting in No. 45. </s> This is the second time this case has come before the Court. In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 , the case was here for review of dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Court reversed and remanded for trial and the case is now here on the merits, after the three-judge District Court refused to enjoin the appellee state officers from enforcing 792 of the California Agricultural Code against the appellant growers. 197 F. Supp. 780, probable jurisdiction noted, 368 U.S. 964, 965 . In view of the Court's disposition of the matter today, it is probable that this case like a revenant will return to us within another few Terms with a still more copious record. </s> Appellants grow, package, and market Florida avocados in interstate commerce, subject to the applicable provisions of 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C. 608c, and the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated thereunder. An average of 6.4% of the Florida avocados shipped to California each year are barred for failure to satisfy the requirements of California Agricultural Code 792, 1 which [373 U.S. 132, 160] provides in pertinent part that "all avocados, at the time of picking, and at all times thereafter, shall contain not less than 8 per cent of oil, by weight of the avocado excluding the skin and seed." 2 Appellants based their claim for relief upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. Since we in the minority have concluded that the Agricultural Adjustment Act and regulations promulgated thereunder leave no room for this inconsistent and conflicting state legislation, we reach only the Supremacy Clause issue. </s> The California statute was enacted in 1925, when, according to the District Court, practically all the avocados in the United States came from that State. 197 F. Supp., at 782. The purpose of this legislation was to prevent the marketing of immature avocados, which never [373 U.S. 132, 161] ripen properly, but decay or shrivel up and become rubbery and unpalatable after purchase by the consumer. 3 Ibid. The effect of marketing immature avocados is to "cheat the consumer," and thus have "a bad [economic] effect upon retailers and producers as a whole, since it increases future sales resistance" against buying avocados. Id., at 783. </s> In 1925, when the state law was enacted, most of the avocados grown in California were, as they are at the present time, from trees derived from Mexican varieties. Such avocados contain at least 8% oil when mature. The Florida avocado growers, however, the only substantial competitors of the California growers, 197 F. Supp., at 787, n. 8, depend in substantial part on trees of non-Mexican parentage. The Florida avocados involved here, hybrid and Guatemalan varieties, may reach maturity and be acceptable for marketing, at least under federal standards, prior to reaching an 8% oil content. 4 </s> [373 U.S. 132, 162] </s> There is expert opinion to the effect that the best gauge of maturity is the percentage of oil contained in the fruit. Id., at 783. California has adopted that physical-chemical test in 792. There is also expert opinion that the best test of maturity is the date on which the fruit is picked, and its size and weight at such time. Ibid. The United States Secretary of Agriculture has adopted that test for measuring maturity of avocados for ripening, and has specifically rejected as unsatisfactory all physical and chemical tests. Handling of Avocados Grown in South Florida, 19 Fed. Reg. 2418, 2424-2425 (Dept. Agr. Dkt. No. AO-254). The District Court found the California oil test to be of the latter type. </s> I. </s> The Agricultural Adjustment Act, 8c, 7 U.S.C. 608c, provides that, whenever the Secretary "has reason to believe that the issuance of an order will tend to effectuate the declared policy" of the Act, which is "to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality and maturity . . . [for fruit] in interstate commerce as will effectuate . . . [the] orderly marketing of . . . agricultural commodities as will be in the public interest," 2 (3), 7 U.S.C. 602 (3), he shall give notice for and hold a hearing upon a proposed order. In the case of fruits, 8c (6) (A) provides that the Secretary may limit or provide methods for the limitation of quality of produce "which may be marketed in or transported to any or all markets in the current of interstate or foreign commerce . . .," or affecting commerce, during any specified period. </s> Orders proposed by the Secretary under this statute become effective only when approved by a majority of the affected growers. See 8c (8)-(9). In 1954 the Secretary held hearings and found that a majority of the South Florida avocado growers favored imposition [373 U.S. 132, 163] of quality and maturity standards for avocados pursuant to a marketing order promulgated under the Act. 19 Fed. Reg. 3439. 5 The order, id., at 3440-3443, as amended, 7 CFR 915.1-.71 (formerly 969.1-969.71), establishes an Avocado Administrative Committee, comprised of South Florida avocado growers and shippers, with the power to recommend marketing regulations to the Secretary relating to quality and maturity standards and prohibiting the marketing of substandard fruits. 6 It [373 U.S. 132, 164] is specifically contemplated in .51 that such maturity standards be based on a picking-date schedule, and other tests are rejected as unsatisfactory. Section .53 provides that exemption from the regular picking-date regulations of .51 be allowed for portions of avocado crops of particular varieties when they are proved to be mature prior to the prescribed picking date. 7 All regulated avocados, including those with so-called picking-date exemption certificates, must be inspected by the Federal-State Inspection Service, a United States Department of Agriculture and Florida Department of Agriculture joint service, and be certified as meeting the prescribed quality and maturity standards before they may be marketed. .54. 8 At various times, other regulations governing Florida avocados have been issued which include more specific quality standards. See 22 Fed. Reg. 6205, 7 CFR 51.3050-51.3053, 51.3058. These quality standards require that the fruit be "mature," for all grades of avocados, but, as in the case of the main order, they do not refer to oil content. 9 Since 1954, each year the Secretary has issued [373 U.S. 132, 165] maturity regulations fixing the dates when and minimum sizes at which the various varieties of Florida avocados may be packed and shipped. 10 These regulations are recommended by the committee, pursuant to 7 CFR 915.50-915.51, approved by the Secretary after consideration and modification if necessary, 7 CFR 915.52 (b), and published in the Federal Register, after which they have the force of law. California Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 542 -543; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 484 ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 . </s> II. </s> The ultimate question for the Court is whether the California law may validly apply to Florida avocados which the Secretary or his inspector says are mature under the federal scheme. We in the minority believe that it cannot, for in our view the California law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 . 11 </s> [373 U.S. 132, 166] </s> The central and unavoidable fact is that six out of every 100 Florida avocados certified as mature by federal standards are turned away from the California markets as being immature, and are excluded from that State by the application of a maturity test different from the federal measure. Congress empowered the Secretary to provide for the orderly marketing of avocados and to specify the quality and maturity of avocados to be transported in interstate commerce to any and all markets. Although the Secretary determined that these Florida avocados were mature by federal standards and fit for sale in interstate markets, the State of California determined that they were unfit for sale by applying a test of the type which the Secretary had determined to be unsatisfactory. We think the state law has erected a substantial barrier to the accomplishment of congressional objectives. </s> We would hesitate to strike down the California statute if the state regulation touched a phase of the subject matter not reached by the federal law and a claim were nevertheless made that such complementary state regulation is preempted, compare Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 , with Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 . But here the Secretary has promulgated a comprehensive and pervasive regulatory scheme for determining the quality and maturity of Florida avocados, pursuant to the statutory [373 U.S. 132, 167] mandate to "effectuate orderly marketing of such agricultural commodities." He prescribes in minute detail the standards for the size, appearance, shape, and maturity of avocados. Inspection procedures and, for violation of the regulations, criminal and civil sanctions are provided. No gap exists in the regulatory scheme which would warrant state action to prevent the evils of a no-man's land - at least in relation to the issues presented in this case. Compare International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.S. 245, 254 . No aspects of avocado maturity are omitted under the federal regulations. 12 Any additional state regulation to "supplement" federal regulation would pro tanto supplant it with another scheme, thereby compromising to some degree the congressional policy expressed in the Act. 13 </s> [373 U.S. 132, 168] </s> By contrast, in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 , upon which appellees seek to rely, the federal agricultural regulatory scheme was partial and incomplete. It was contended that 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, by its own force, preempted application of the California Agricultural Prorate Act. The Court held that since no marketing order concerning the affected commodities had been promulgated under 8c, and since the Act's policies therefore must be deemed by the Secretary not to be effectuated by entry into the field, it followed that there was no preemption: "It is evident, therefore, that the Marketing Act contemplates the existence of state programs at least until such time as the Secretary shall establish a federal marketing program . . . ." Id., at 354. 14 In the case at bar, of course, the Secretary has entered the field with his own comprehensive regulatory program with which the state program conflicts. </s> Nor does the California statute further a distinctive interest of the State different from the one which the federal scheme protects. Compare Huron Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 ; Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 . There is no health interest here. The question [373 U.S. 132, 169] is, as the District Court recognized, 197 F. Supp., at 782-783, a purely economic one: the marketing of immature avocados, which do not ripen properly after purchase by the consumer but instead shrivel up and decay, has a substantial adverse effect on consumer demand for avocados. According to the testimony of appellees' expert from the California Department of Agriculture, 792 was "deemed to be necessary by representatives in the industry due to deplorable marketing conditions" - the sale of immature avocados, which was severely "damaging the reputation of the industry by providing consumers with undesirable avocado fruits." Despite the repeated suggestions to this effect in the Court's opinion, there is no indication that the state regulatory scheme has any purpose other than protecting the good will of the avocado industry - such as protecting health or preventing deception of the public - unless as a purely incidental by-product. Similar findings on damage to the industry because some growers marketed immature avocados are contained in the United States Department of Agriculture order which preceded the issuance of the federal regulations. 19 Fed. Reg., at 2419, 2424. These two regulatory schemes have precisely the same purpose, which is purely an economic one; they seek to achieve it, however, by applying different tests to the same avocados. </s> We also believe that the purpose and objective of Congress and of the marketing order promulgated under its authority call for the application of uniform standards of quality, even absent the total occupation of the field by the federal regulatory scheme. See Guss v. Utah Board, 353 U.S. 1 ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Lack of uniformity tends to obstruct commerce, to divide the Nation into many markets. When produce is accepted or rejected in different localities depending upon local vagaries, the flow of commerce is inevitably interrupted, hindered, and diminished. In recognition of this need for uniformity, [373 U.S. 132, 170] Congress stated at the outset of the Agricultural Adjustment Act: </s> "It is declared that the disruption of the orderly exchange of commodities in interstate commerce . . . destroys the value of agricultural assets which support the national credit structure . . . and burden[s] and obstruct[s] . . . commerce. </s> "It is declared to be the policy of Congress . . . to establish and maintain such minimum standards of quality and maturity and such grading and inspection requirements for agricultural commodities . . . as will effectuate . . . orderly marketing . . . ." 1, 2, 7 U.S.C. 601, 602. </s> The language of the statute is buttressed by the Committee Reports, H. R. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 22; S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15, where it is said in explanation of 10 (i) that the Secretary is authorized to negotiate with state authorities in order to secure their voluntary compliance in carrying out the declared policy of the Act of uniformity of regulatory programs. </s> The contention is made that 8c (11) negatives the policy declaration that uniformity is sought by the Act. That section directs the Secretary to issue orders limited to as small a geographic region as practicable in order to insure that due recognition be accorded to local conditions of soil, climate, and the like. This provision recognizes that while uniformity at the market-end of the flow of commerce may be necessary to prevent burdens on commerce in produce, nationwide uniformity may be neither necessary nor desirable at the production-end of the flow of commerce. It may be, as the Court suggests, that the Secretary might find for other avocado growing regions, if there were any, that different tests furnished the most convenient index of maturity for those avocados. But it [373 U.S. 132, 171] does not follow from this premise that the statutory scheme will permit equally varied standards in the Nation's various market places. Section 8c (11) does not contemplate such regional variations nor would they comport with the statutory purpose. It may not obstruct or burden commerce to admit avocados into commerce on diverse bases in different parts of the country; any individual grower in that situation would face but one standard. But it does burden commerce and frustrate the congressional purpose when each grower faces different standards in different markets. To slip from permissible nonuniformity at one end of the stream of commerce to permissible nonuniformity at the other end thus is to read the statute too casually and gloss over the congressional purpose, which expressly was to facilitate marketing in and transportation to "any and all markets in the current of interstate commerce." </s> It is also suggested that the use of the term "minimum standards" indicates a lack of desire for uniformity. This reads too much into a phrase, for it is a commonplace that when the appropriate federal regulatory agency adopts minimum standards which on balance satisfy the needs of the subject matter without disproportionate burden on the regulatees, the balance struck is not to be upset by the imposition of higher local standards. See for example Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439 . And when the cumulative operation of more strict local law is to be continued in such circumstances, despite the congressional balance struck, Congress has so provided in express terms. For example, in Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247, 255 , it was noted that the federal statute provided that "nothing in this section or section 4b shall be construed to impair any State law applicable to any transaction enumerated or described in such sections." See, to the same effect, Plumley v. Massachusetts, [373 U.S. 132, 172] 155 U.S. 461 ; Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 161 -162. </s> Nothing in the Act, marketing order, or legislative history shows any congressional intention to accommodate or permit state controls inconsistent with federal law or marketing orders issued thereunder. The authorization contained in 10 (i) to seek the cooperation of state authorities in pursuit of the goal of uniform standards of quality and maturity carries no implication that state standards contrary to the federal are to stand. The Secretary was not directed to defer to any State. The fact is that he did work out a cooperative scheme with the State of Florida where the avocados involved in this case are grown. These avocados, which California rejected, were jointly inspected by federal and state authorities applying the same standards in order to move mature avocados into the stream of interstate commerce. To read into an authorization to the Secretary to cooperate with the States a direction that he cooperate with, or that his regulatory scheme defer to, not only the State directly affected by a marketing order but every other State in which avocados might be sold would clearly frustrate the federal purpose of the orderly marketing of avocados in interstate commerce. </s> We would not, as appellees would have it and as the majority appears to suggest, construe 10 as limiting the power of the Secretary under 608c to the issuance of marketing orders which are complementary to and not inconsistent with state regulation. 15 The suggestion that [373 U.S. 132, 173] the Secretary cooperate with the States should be viewed as was a very similar authorization to the same government official in Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 . There the statute provided that the Secretary of Agriculture "may cooperate with any department or agency of the Government, any State . . . or political subdivision thereof." A unanimous Court remarked that this provision supported "the inference that Congress did not design a regulatory system which excluded state regulation not in conflict with the federal requirements," but it was careful to note that "it would be quite a different matter if the Illinois Commission adopted rules for the Board which either violated the standards of the Act or collided with rules of the Secretary." </s> The conflict between federal and state law is unmistakable here. The Secretary asserts certain Florida avocados are mature. The state law rejects them as immature. And the conflict is over a matter of central importance to the federal scheme. The elaborate regulatory scheme of the marketing order is focused upon the problem of moving mature avocados into interstate commerce. The maturity regulations are not peripheral aspects of the federal scheme. Compare International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 . On the contrary, in the Department of Agriculture order which [373 U.S. 132, 174] preceded issuance of the avocado regulations, it was found that the marketing of immature avocados was one of the principal problems, if not the principal problem, faced by the industry and that these regulations should be adopted to solve this problem which was demoralizing the industry. 19 Fed. Reg., at 2419, 2424. 16 The conflict involved in this case therefore cannot properly be deemed "too contingent, too remotely related to" ( 356 U.S., at 621 ) the policy and purpose of the Act to call for requiring the inconsistent state scheme to defer or be accommodated to the federal one. </s> California nevertheless argues that it should be permitted to apply its oil test cumulatively with the federal test to insure that only mature avocados are offered in its markets. The Court accepts this contention as "a well-settled proposition," in the name of Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 , and the uncited "all the authorities," which appear to be nonexistent, ante, p. 144 and n. 13. There are at least three answers to this contention. 17 First, it ignores the limitations of the 8% oil test as applied to the inherently less oily Florida avocados, which the District Court indicated were "acceptable prior to the time that they reach that content." As applied to California avocados, the 8% oil figure leaves an ample tolerance for individual variation, but it is otherwise as applied to the less oily Florida varieties. Second, if the argument is that the federal test is unsatisfactory and that the California test is a better one - as it would appear to be in view of the reliance on "a higher standard," [373 U.S. 132, 175] which in this case means only a more accurate standard because no one asserts that some avocados can be less highly mature than others and therefore ripen less fully - it must be remembered that the Secretary, to whom Congress delegated its power, made a legislative finding in his order adopting the picking-date-size method of determining maturity and specifically rejecting physical chemical tests of the California type. That finding cannot be impeached collaterally in this proceeding. Adopting one maturity test rather than another "is a legislative not a judicial choice" and its validity "is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if the weight of evidence presented in court appears to favor a different standard." South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 191 . See Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 . Neither California nor this Court has any place second-guessing the wisdom of Congress or its delegate. Third, Congress did not limit its interest to the picking of avocados, nor even to their transportation in commerce to markets in other States. It expressly declared its intention to regulate the maturity and quality of produce "which may be marketed in . . . any and all interstate markets." Congress sought to regulate marketing from the beginning through the end of the stream of commerce, in order to eliminate impediments at any part of that stream. The Court ignores the plain words of the statute in concluding that the California law does not frustrate the federal scheme. </s> Even if the California oil test were an acceptable test for the maturity of the Florida avocados, which the Secretary found it was not, the cumulative application of that test solely for the purpose of a second check on the maturity of Florida avocados, solely to catch possible errors in the federal scheme, would prove only that the particular [373 U.S. 132, 176] avocados actually tested (and thereby destroyed) were immature, and it would not justify the rejection of whole lots from which these samples came. If Florida avocados are to be subjected to this test, the alternatives are to leave the California market to the California producers (at least, to producers of Mexican varieties) or else, in order to avoid the hazard of rejection, to leave the Florida avocados on the trees past the normal (and federally prescribed) picking date, thereby shortening the post-picking marketing period and thus frustrating the federal scheme aimed at moving avocados mature under federal standards into all interstate markets. 18 A reasonable balancing of the state and federal interests at stake here requires that the former give way as too insubstantial to warrant frustration of the congressional purpose. </s> We have, then, a case where the federal regulatory scheme is comprehensive, pervasive, and without a hiatus which the state regulations could fill. Both the subject matter and the statute call for uniformity. The conflict is substantial - at least six out of every 100 federally certified avocados are barred for failure to pass the California test 19 - and it is located in a central portion of the federal [373 U.S. 132, 177] scheme. The effect of the conflict is to disrupt and burden the flow of commerce and the sale of Florida avocados in distant markets, contrary to the congressional policy underlying the Act. The State may have a legitimate economic interest in the subject matter, but it is adequately served by the federal regulations and this interest would be but slightly impaired, if at all, by the supersession of 792. 20 </s> In such circumstances, the state law should give way; it "becomes inoperative and the federal legislation exclusive in its application." Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 . Accord, McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 . The conclusion is inescapable that the California law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the congressional purposes and objectives, and that the California law and [373 U.S. 132, 178] the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as supplemented by the regulations promulgated thereunder, cannot be reconciled and cannot consistently stand together. 21 The Court should not allow avocados certified as mature under the federal marketing order to be embargoed by any State because it thinks that they are immature. We would therefore reverse with instructions to grant the injunction requested. </s> [Footnote 1 There is no question in this case as to whether the California oil content law keeps out of California Florida avocados which pass the federal test. In their motion to dismiss and the accompanying sworn affidavit below, the appellee state officers gave 6.4% as the average rejection figure per year, over a four-year period, basing the percentage [373 U.S. 132, 160] on the official records of the California Department of Agriculture. Rejections reached a high of 16.4% in the 1955-1956 season. It is hard to understand the Court's refusal to consider the figures because of the way they entered the record. See ante, p. 136 and n. 3, and p. 157. We believe appellees' sworn statements as to the State's official records are properly before the Court now, and that in any event they will come into the record shortly, since it is clear that on remand the same data will come in via deposition. If the majority actually has any doubt on this score, and believes that accepting as a fact that California rejects six out of every 100 Florida avocados as immature would have an effect on the result, it should remand for further findings on preemption as it does on burden on commerce. The same papers below, and the opinion of the District Court, 197 F. Supp., at 783, reveal that about 5% of the appellants' shipments to California have been rejected for failure to attain the 8% oil content required under California law. The record is silent on the in terrorem effect of the California law on interstate commerce in Florida avocados, and we therefore do not consider it here. </s> [Footnote 2 Avocados not meeting this standard may not be sold in California, are "declared to be a public nuisance," and they may be seized, condemned, and abated. Violators may be punished criminally and by civil penalty action. See ante, p. 134, at n. 1. </s> [Footnote 3 It is not contended that the purpose of the 8% minimum oil content requirement is for the purpose of insuring a high caloric or other nutritional content in the fruit. No health issue has been raised in this case. Cf. 197 F. Supp., at 785-786. Nor has it been contended at any stage of the proceedings that the statutory purpose is directly to protect local consumers from fraudulent and deceptive practices; moreover, there is no evidence to support that view. </s> [Footnote 4 "Mexican varieties of avocados contain (generally speaking) the highest oil content of any varieties, when mature. Hybrid varieties attain the next highest oil percentages, and West Indian the lowest. Hybrid varieties generally attain oil content in excess of 8% if left on the trees long enough, but they do not necessarily attain such an oil content by the time that they may be marketed under the Florida Avocado Order. They are mature enough to be acceptable prior to the time that they reach that content, according to plaintiffs' witnesses." 197 F. Supp., at 783. While it would appear to be theoretically feasible to determine the proper oil content to gauge maturity for each different variety of avocado, this is highly impracticable, as the District Court pointed out; over 40 varieties of avocado are marketed in Florida. Id., at 785. </s> [Footnote 5 The findings of the United States Department of Agriculture, contained in its order determining what terms should be contained in the avocado regulations, were that the marketing of immature fruits increases consumer resistance and materially impairs the marketing of the entire crop, that there was no satisfactory physical or chemical test for determining maturity, and that maturity can satisfactorily be determined by the picking-date-size method. Handling of Avocados Grown in South Florida, 19 Fed. Reg. 2418, 2424-2425 (Dept. of Agr. Dkt. No. AO-254). California has a statute similar to the federal law, the California Marketing Act, Cal. Agr. Code 1300.10-1300.29, which allows the Director of Agriculture to promulgate marketing orders when a majority of the affected handlers or producers assent. Id., 1300.16 (a). The purpose of the Act is to restore and maintain adequate purchasing power for California agricultural producers, establish orderly marketing, provide uniform grading, develop new and larger markets and maintain present markets for produce grown within the State, eliminate trade barriers which obstruct the free flow of such produce to the market, and permit the issuance of marketing orders which assure stabilized and orderly distribution of produce. Id., 1300.10, 1300.29; Brock v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 2d 594, 598, 241 P.2d 283, 286. The Director promulgated an avocado marketing order in 1960 and it has been upheld as valid in the state courts. Child v. Warne, 194 Cal. App. 2d 623, 15 Cal. Rptr. 437. </s> [Footnote 6 This is the customary method of administering marketing orders under the Act. See, e. g., 7 CFR 905.51, 906.39, 907.51, 907.63, 908.51, 908.63, 909.51, 909.52, 910.51, 910.65, 911.51. In the case of the avocado order, supra, note 5, the Department specifically determined that this would be the appropriate method to administer the regulatory program. 19 Fed. Reg., at 2422-2423. </s> [Footnote 7 Section .53 provides that such exemption shall be granted under procedural rules approved by the Secretary. Section .52 (b) would appear to provide for review of particular determinations before the Secretary, taken by a party aggrieved thereby or taken by the Secretary sua sponte. Exemption under .53 is allowed only from the picking-date-size standards prescribed under .51 (a) (1), and not from other regulations such as quality ( .51 (a) (2)), container and packaging ( .51 (a) (3)), or grading and labeling ( .51 (a) (4)). And inspection by the Federal-State Inspection Service for these standards and those set out as the terms and conditions of advance release under .53 is, of course, required. </s> [Footnote 8 Violation of the order is punishable by a fine of from $50 to $500. 7 U.S.C. 608c (14). Violations of regulations may also be made punishable by the Secretary by a penalty not to exceed $100. 7 U.S.C. 610 (c). </s> [Footnote 9 These regulations and others, 7 CFR 51.3055-51.3069, govern in exhaustive detail the size and shape of avocados, their color, skin condition, stem length, and the manner in which they may be shipped. </s> [Footnote 10 27 Fed. Reg. 5135-5136, 6705, 8265, 9175, 10091; 26 Fed. Reg. 3692, 4928, 5418-5419, 6429, 7694, 8663; 25 Fed. Reg. 5476, 7712, 8903, 9170, 9888; 24 Fed. Reg. 1152, 3105, 4050, 4828, 5824-5825, 6904, 7354, 8444, 9123, 9262; 23 Fed. Reg. 1025-1026, 4351-4352, 5477, 6318, 7344, 7943, 8047, 9056, 9689; 22 Fed. Reg. 3652, 4251-4252, 5680, 6746, 7173-7174, 7357-7358, 8118; 21 Fed. Reg. 3307-3308, 3488, 6329-6330; 20 Fed. Reg. 3427, 4178-4179, 6699-6700, 7876, 8328-8329, 8688; 19 Fed. Reg. 4404-4405, 4601, 4862, 5469, 5966, 5967, 6368, 6604, 6625, 7477. Similar orders have been issued from time to time concerning maturity of imported avocados. See, e. g., 25 Fed. Reg. 5445; 24 Fed. Reg. 4134, 4829, 5825, 5996; 23 Fed. Reg. 4352, 6027; 22 Fed. Reg. 3957; 21 Fed. Reg. 4257. </s> [Footnote 11 "There is not - and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be - any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the [373 U.S. 132, 166] light of . . . federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 . (Emphasis added.) Compare ante, p. 141. </s> [Footnote 12 We do not imply that these regulations governing the fitness of avocados in terms of maturity would preclude application of local regulations concerning, for example, bacteria content or DDT content. Cf. Huron Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 . Neither health regulation nor safety considerations, cf. Lyons v. Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 844, 234 P.2d 62, are involved in this case. And there is no finding that there is anything fraudulent, deceptive, or unmarketable about a Florida avocado which is mature enough to be introduced into interstate commerce under a federal certificate evidencing its quality. Compare Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472 , quoted ante, p. 144. </s> [Footnote 13 It was suggested that there is a gap in the federal scheme through which immature avocados may enter commerce bearing an exemption certificate issued "seemingly . . . in the unfettered discretion of the growers' own Committee." This contention omits the requirement of .53 that exemption from the normal picking-date-size provisions be allowed only to avocados inspected and proved mature because they satisfied special maturity tests prescribed under procedures approved by the Secretary, and the fact that such avocados carry a federal certificate as to maturity and quality. It also omits the Secretary's general review power over regulatory determinations provided by .52 (b). No contention has been made that actual abuses have occurred under the exemption certificate provisions nor has any basis upon which they may be anticipated been suggested. </s> [Footnote 14 It also came out, by representation of the Solicitor General as amicus curiae before this Court, that the Department of Agriculture had collaborated in drafting the state raisin program, and had taken other actions which "must be taken as an expression of opinion by the Department of Agriculture that the state program . . . is consistent with the policies of the Agricultural Adjustment and Agricultural Marketing Agreement Acts." Id., at 358. Hence, in holding "We find no conflict between the two acts [state and federal] and no such occupation of the legislative field by the mere adoption of the . . . [federal] Act, without the issuance of any order by the Secretary putting it into effect, as would preclude the effective operation of the state act," the Court expressly declared, "We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion would follow if the state program had not been adopted with the collaboration of officials of the Department of Agriculture . . . ." Id., at 358. </s> [Footnote 15 We note that 1300.24 (b) of the California Agricultural Code contains a provision similar to federal 10 (i): "The director is hereby authorized to confer with and cooperate with the legally constituted authorities of other States and of the United States, for the purpose of obtaining uniformity in the administration of Federal and State marketing regulations, licenses or orders, and [373 U.S. 132, 173] said director is authorized to conduct joint hearings, issue joint or concurrent marketing orders, for the purposes and within the standards set forth in this act, and may exercise any administrative authority prescribed by this act to effect such uniformity of administration and regulation." Under the reasoning suggested to us the California law should be construed not to apply to Florida avocados marketed under a federal order. And see Oil Workers Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 370 ; Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U.S. 740, 746 ; Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 277 ; Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118, 122 . </s> [Footnote 16 "Probably the most important single factor of quality is that of maturity." 19 Fed. Reg., at 2424. </s> [Footnote 17 To the extent that this contention is to be understood to be limited to "all the authorities" supporting "a higher standard for consumers," we have already indicated, pp. 168-169, supra, that the California law is not aimed at consumer protection but at avocado grower protection. </s> [Footnote 18 The avocado may remain hard and in perfect condition on the tree for some time after reaching maturity, for the fruit does not soften until after it is picked. But the harvesting and shipping of fruit which has reached the fullest possible degree of maturity on the tree is not recommended. The seed may sprout while the fruit is on the tree or the fruit may ripen so rapidly after harvesting that it cannot be shipped satisfactorily. Ruehle, The Florida Avocado Industry, 70 (Univ. of Fla. Agr. Expt. Sta. Bull. No. 602, 1958); Wolfe, Toy and Stahl, Avocado Production in Florida, 83 (Ruehle rev. ed., Fla. Agr. Ext. Serv. Bull. No. 141, 1949). </s> [Footnote 19 There is no indication in the record as to how many Florida avocados are kept out of the California market by the prudence of growers and handlers who voluntarily avoid the risks of the California oil test. Nor are we advised as to whether other States have [373 U.S. 132, 177] adopted avocado legislation, so that the cumulative burden on commerce is further increased. In any event, 6% is a not insubstantial figure in terms of restraints upon commerce. </s> [Footnote 20 It is suggested that the regulations involved here are "simply schemes for regulating competition among growers . . . initiated and administered by the growers and shippers themselves." From this proposition it is in some way reasoned that "the self-help standards of this marketing program" should not be deemed to preclude application of state law which conflicts with and interferes with the operation of the comprehensive federal marketing program. The "simply" part of the proposition overlooks, however, the fact that these are the Secretary's regulations, promulgated under congressional authority. It also overlooks the Secretary's extensive supervisory powers and his statutory duty under 7 U.S.C. 602 (3) to insure that regulations be carried on "in the public interest." And no case has been cited to us which indicates that the delegation to the regulatees of the power to propose regulations in the first instance violates any provision of general law. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 ; Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 ; United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 577 -578; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 16 ; Johnson Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (C. A. 2d Cir.). </s> [Footnote 21 And see Castle v. Hayes Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 ; First Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Dumont Labs. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (C. A. 3d Cir.). The suggestion, ante, p. 141, that the doctrine of Gibbons v. Ogden is limited to carriers is unwarranted in view of such cases as First Iowa. </s> [373 U.S. 132, 179]

United States Supreme Court NEW HAVEN INCLUSION CASES(1970) No. 915 Argued: March 30, 1970Decided: June 29, 1970 </s> [Footnote * No. 915, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. First Mortgage 4% Bondholders Committee v. United States et al., No. 917, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Trustee v. United States et al., and No. 921, Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A., Trustee v. United States et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. No. 914, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. First Mortgage 4% Bondholders Committee v. Smith, Trustee, et al., No. 916, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Trustee v. United States et al., No. 920, Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A., Trustee v. Penn Central Co. et al., No. 1038, Penn Central Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Trustee, et al., and No. 1057, United States et al. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. First Mortgage 4% Bondholders Committee et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in advance of judgment. </s> When this Court sustained the Penn-Central merger ( 389 U.S. 486 ), it upheld the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in conditioning its approval of the merger on inclusion as an operating entity of the New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. (New Haven), whose continued operation the ICC had found to be essential. Since 1961 the New Haven had been under reorganization proceedings under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act and was close to financial collapse. The basic issue in these cases concerns the propriety of the financial terms for the inclusion. The ICC had remitted the parties to negotiate the terms of the inclusion, and after considering their appraisals issued its inclusion report, in which it concluded that the net liquidation value of New Haven's assets (after deducting liquidation expenses and making a discount to present worth on the basis of hypothesized receipts over the six-year period anticipated for liquidation) was $125,000,000, a figure that the ICC found "just and reasonable" as a condition of the merger under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act and "fair and equitable" as part of a plan of reorganization under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The New Haven bondholders thereupon commenced litigation for review of the inclusion report (in its aspect as a condition of the merger) in the three-judge District Court for the Southern District of New York, [399 U.S. 392, 393] which was called upon to review the order under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The ICC certified to the reorganization court in Connecticut the sale of New Haven's assets to Penn Central, and the New Haven bondholders filed their objections in that court. The bondholders' group and the United States each tried to avoid duplicate litigation - the bondholders by an application in the three-judge court to enjoin the ICC's certification of its plan to the reorganization court (which was denied), and the United States by a motion to dismiss the complaints in the three-judge court (which was also denied). Each court, after hearings, concluded that New Haven's assets had been substantially undervalued and remanded the case to the ICC. The ICC then revalued New Haven's assets at a higher figure than that first reached, which, after deductions for certain factors not previously considered ("the added deductions"), came to $140,600,000. In addition, the ICC directed Penn Central to pay $5,000,000 toward New Haven's interim operating expenses. The reorganization court ordered New Haven's assets transferred to Penn Central, which was done on December 31, 1968. The bondholders filed objections to the revised evaluation with the reorganization court and brought actions against the United States and the ICC in the three-judge court. The reorganization court rejected the plan, though it accepted some of the ICC's determinations. The three-judge court sustained the plan with modifications. Though the two courts agreed on many substantial issues, the total evaluation reached by the reorganization court exceeded that reached by the three-judge court by $28,000,000. The bondholders appealed directly to this Court from the three-judge court's judgment and this Court noted probable jurisdiction. The bondholders appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the reorganization court; the United States, the ICC, and Penn Central cross-appealed; and this Court granted certiorari in advance of judgment. The disputed items of valuation, plus one issue affecting the consideration given by Penn Central, are as follows: (1) Though the parties have agreed that New Haven, as Penn Central's partner in the development of the Grand Central Terminal Properties, is entitled to the capitalized value of 50% of the "excess income" from those properties, the bondholders claim that no recognition has been given to New Haven's right to have its share of basic Terminal income, used to defray its share of Terminal expenses, for purposes of determining the fair price Penn Central should pay. (2) The New Haven owned two [399 U.S. 392, 394] large freight yards in the Bronx, which service important industrial enterprises in a 160-acre area and a vital municipal food market installation. The reorganization court ruled that the ICC had erred in rejecting an appraisal by a witness premised upon the yards' availability for continued industrial occupancy with existing trackage and electrical facilities, in favor of a lower appraisal based on his assumption that on New Haven's liquidation the yards would be stripped of those facilities, depressing the value of the land, and necessitating substantial removal expenses. The three-judge court approved the ICC's valuation. (3) The reorganization court rejected, but the three-judge court approved, the added deductions, one made by the ICC in the net liquidation value as an adjustment for the assumed effect of a year's anticipated delay in securing a certificate of abandonment, the other that the ICC made on the basis of a hypothetical sale of all New Haven's land assets at a bulk discount. (4) The reorganization court found that the ICC had overstated the discount for the projected six-year liquidation. (5) The ICC ordered Penn Central to assume interim losses during the actual 11-month period from merger to inclusion to the extent of a ceiling of $5,000,000 (which constituted about 61% of the total loss). The reorganization court upheld the ICC and dismissed the bondholders' contention that Penn Central bear all operating losses. (6) The bondholders attack the ICC's order that New Haven transfer to Penn Central its ownership of stock, which the ICC found worthless, in two concerns. (7) The bondholders urge that Penn Central should pay an added amount to reflect New Haven's "going-concern" value as a supplement to the liquidation value. (8) The New Haven received, in partial payment for the assets transferred to Penn Central, 950,000 shares of Penn Central common stock which were valued at $87.50 per share at the time of the valuation date used by the ICC but which had declined to $63.38 as of the inclusion date. To remedy "the unfairness [arising from] the fact that the purchaser is getting assets of sure present value while the seller is asked to gamble on the future of Penn Central," the reorganization court provided for (and the three-judge court adopted) an "underwriting" formula under which Penn Central would be called upon to make up in cash the difference between the market price of Penn Central stock in 1978 and $87.50 per share, unless before that time the market price had attained $87.50 for a five-day period. The bondholders contend that this formula fails [399 U.S. 392, 395] to cure the overvaluation. The bondholders also urge that the continued deficit operation of the New Haven from the inception of the reorganization proceeding in 1961 to the inclusion in Penn Central in 1968 resulted in their being deprived of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Held: </s> 1. The three-judge court erred in not granting the Government's motion to dismiss to the extent of deferring to the reorganization court in proceedings ultimately involving only the price to be paid for the assets of the debtor's estate. Pp. 419-430. </s> (a) The reorganization court under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act and the ICC had full power over the debtor and its property, including the power to formulate and confirm a reorganization plan providing for sale of the debtor's property, and it would have disrupted that plan for the three-judge court to have enjoined certification of the plan by the ICC to the reorganization court. Pp. 419-421. </s> (b) Though transfer of the New Haven assets was also a part of the merger under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and neither court had "complete" jurisdiction when the litigation started, the statutory interrelationship between 5 and 77 and the ability of the reorganization court to adjudicate all the inclusion issues made it advisable for the three-judge court to have yielded to the reorganization court, in which primary jurisdiction had vested. Pp. 423-427. </s> (c) When the merger occurred and no question remained of Penn Central's obligation to assume the assets of New Haven, the jurisdiction of the reorganization court became "complete" and the three-judge court had virtually nothing to decide. Pp. 427-428. </s> 2. The reorganization court is empowered by Congress to review the plan to determine whether the ICC has followed the statutory mandate that the plan be "fair and equitable" and whether there was material evidence to support the agency's conclusion. Pp. 431-435. </s> 3. There was no error in the finding of the reorganization court that, under the contractual arrangements, only after Terminal income had been applied to meeting Terminal expenses would the residue be distributed to the two railroads, and thus the basic income could not be "freed up" from the obligation to meet Terminal expenses. Nor did that court err in concluding [399 U.S. 392, 396] that New Haven's access rights to the Terminal under the agreements were not entitled to recognition in evaluating New Haven's assets, since those rights were more than offset by New Haven's deficit operations which Penn Central assumed. Pp. 438-451. </s> 4. The ICC's adherence to the lower of an expert witness' two estimates of the valuation of the Bronx freight yards was clearly erroneous as it was based on the premise that New Haven would dismantle the yards upon liquidation of the rest of the railroad even though Penn Central already had a link by which service to the yards would continue, and implied that a common carrier could deny service to industrial and public activities simply because ownership of adjoining trackage had changed hands. Pp. 451-457. </s> 5. The reorganization court did not err in disallowing the added deductions. Pp. 457-473. </s> (a) The ICC should not have made a deduction for costs that New Haven would incur during the year's period anticipated to obtain approval for abandonment of train operations, since the valuation date (December 31, 1966) represented not the date on which New Haven would have sought a certificate of abandonment but the date on which it would have commenced its six-year liquidation sale. Moreover, since the interested public bodies have not arranged to continue New Haven's transportation system during the long period New Haven has been in reorganization, there is no justification for assuming that if confronted with an abandonment application they would do so now and that a delay would be necessary for the ICC to hear from those communities. Pp. 459-466. </s> (b) The ICC's deduction from the estate's liquidation value, based on a hypothetical sale of all New Haven's land assets in bulk was properly rejected by the reorganization court as the ICC had concluded that only its power to compel the sale of the real estate to a single buyer for continued operation justified the bulk-sale discount, and there is no evidence in the record that a bulk buyer would agree to take over New Haven properties for continued service at any price. Pp. 468-473. </s> 6. The adjustment made by the reorganization court in the ICC's erroneous computation of the discount to present values of New Haven's liquidation proceeds over the six-year liquidation period is affirmed as being substantially free from error. Pp. 473-476. [399 U.S. 392, 397] </s> 7. The payment made by Penn Central for New Haven's interim operating losses between the effective date of the merger and the date of inclusion, was in accordance with a formula devised by the ICC in its inclusion report that constituted a pragmatic compromise between the competing interests of the Penn Central and the bondholders. The reorganization court's acceptance of that disposition is affirmed. Pp. 476-479. </s> 8. The argument of the Bondholders Committee that the ICC erred in ordering the transfer to Penn Central of stocks that New Haven held in two concerns, which the ICC found were valueless, is foreclosed by res judicata since the bondholders had not appealed the order of the reorganization court directing the transfer of New Haven assets. Pp. 479-481. </s> 9. The bondholders' contention that Penn Central should pay an added amount for New Haven's "going-concern" value is without merit, being entirely at odds with the liquidation hypothesis on which appraisal of New Haven's assets was predicated. Pp. 481-482. </s> 10. The "underwriting plan" of the reorganization court added to the assessment of present worth of the Penn Central stock both a reasonable assurance of realization of such worth and the opportunity of additional gain, and on the basis of the record before that court at the time of its order the package constituted full compensation for the assets transferred to Penn Central. In view, however, of the impact of recent events, which make it possible that this aspect of the decree is not realistic, further proceedings will be needed to reassess the consideration that Penn Central must give in exchange for the New Haven properties. Pp. 483-489. </s> 11. The substantial losses to the bondholders that occurred during the course of the reorganization proceedings did not result in any unconstitutional taking of the property of the bondholders, whose rights are not absolute and who will be receiving the highest and best price for the debtor's assets as of the valuation date. Moreover, the bondholders did not petition the reorganization court to dismiss the proceedings and thereby permit foreclosure on the mortgage liens until well after the valuation date. Nor is the price Penn Central must pay unfair, in view of the benefits that were anticipated from the merger. Pp. 489-495. </s> Nos. 914, 916, 920, 1038, and 1057, 304 F. Supp. 793 and 1136, affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part; Nos. 915, 917, and 921, 305 F. Supp. 1049, vacated and remanded. [399 U.S. 392, 398] </s> Whitney North Seymour argued the cause for Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. With him on the brief were Horace J. McAfee and Albert X. Bader, Jr. Lester C. Migdal argued the cause for New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. First Mortgage 4% Bondholders Committee. With him on the briefs was Lawrence W. Pollack. Joseph Auerbach argued the cause for Smith, Trustee of the property of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. With him on the briefs were James Wm. Moore, Robert G. Bleakney, Jr., and Morris Raker. Leonard S. Goodman argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Deputy Solicitor General Springer, John H. D. Wigger, and Robert W. Ginnane. Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for Penn Central Transportation Co. With him on the brief were Roswell B. Perkins, Ulrich Schweitzer, Samuel E. Gates, Robert L. King, and Harvey J. Goldschmid. Joseph Schreiber and Wilkie Bushby filed briefs for the Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Dunton F. Tynan, Assistant Solicitor General, and Walter J. Myskowski filed a brief for the State of New York. Robert K. Killian, Attorney General, Samuel Kanell, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Jack Rubin, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Connecticut. Herbert F. De Simone, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and W. Slater Allen, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, joined in the briefs for the States of New York and Connecticut. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases represent the latest stage of the litigation arising from the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads, which we upheld two Terms ago in the Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486 . A condition [399 U.S. 392, 399] of that merger was Penn Central's promise to take in the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as an operating entity - a promise that Penn Central fulfilled on December 31, 1968, 11 months after its own formation. The ultimate question presented by the cases now before us is the price Penn Central must pay for the assets of the New Haven.Fn </s> I </s> 1. The Penn Central. The proposed combination of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads first came under consideration by the parties and the Interstate Commerce Commission more than 12 years ago, a decade prior to its eventual consummation. 1 The two railroads formally sought permission to merge under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1 et seq., on March 9, 1962. 2 On April 6, 1966, the Commission authorized the merger of the two roads. 3 The union of the two carriers was the largest railroad merger in the history of the Nation, 4 bringing together the companies that "dominate rail transportation in the Northeast." 5 In 1965 the component roads enjoyed a total operating revenue in excess of $1,500,000,000 and a net annual income of over $75,000,000. 6 The two companies held [399 U.S. 392, 400] some $72,000,000 in working capital and $1,242,000,000 in combined investments. 7 With about 19,600 miles of road "sprawling between the Great Lakes on the north . . . and the Ohio and Potomac Rivers on the south," 8 Penn Central was at its inception nearly twice the size of the next largest railroad system in the East and three times that of the third largest. 9 </s> The predicted economies effected by the merger were likewise enormous; it was thought that within about eight years of the combination they would exceed $80,000,000 annually. 10 Those savings represented a value, capitalized at 8%, of $1,000,000,000. </s> On June 9, 1967, after considerable litigation involving protective conditions for various affected railroad competitors, 11 the Commission issued a modified order authorizing [399 U.S. 392, 401] the Penn-Central merger. 12 On October 19, 1967, a court of three judges, convened in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to review the Commission's order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1336, 2284, and 2321-2325, upheld the Commission's action. 13 On January 15, 1968, this Court affirmed with minor modifications, and thereby sustained the validity of the merger. 14 Two weeks later, on February 1, 1968, Pennsylvania and New York Central merged. </s> 2. The New Haven. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad is now an operating division of the Penn Central system. At the time of the merger, however, it was an independent Class I railroad operating some 1,500 miles of line in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York; as such, it was the sixth largest railroad in the northeast region and the largest in New England. 15 With an operations area extending from Boston to New York and connecting with nine other Class I railroads, the New Haven served 12 cities of greater than 100,000 population, as well as a number of important defense [399 U.S. 392, 402] establishments. 16 In 1964 the railroad employed about 9,800 people and paid them annual wages amounting to $70,000,000. 17 About 30,000 commuters used the line every day to reach work in New York City alone. 18 As described by the Commission, </s> "The New Haven has both a large passenger and freight business. It is the fourth largest passenger carrying railroad in the United States, and has the second highest commuter revenue of all such roads. . . . The volume of its freight business . . . is substantially greater . . . . It is the largest freight railroad in New England and ranks tenth in freight traffic among all railroads in the eastern district. . . . Its freight service is considered to be of extreme importance to the industrial well-being of southern New England." 19 </s> The financial history of the New Haven was for decades a history of extreme vicissitudes. The company's decline and fall, with passage into, out of, and back into railroad reorganization, have been chronicled elsewhere. 20 It first went into reorganization under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 205, on October 23, 1935. Due [399 U.S. 392, 403] in large measure to the difficulties of including formerly leased lines in the reorganized road, nearly 12 years elapsed from the filing of the debtor's petition in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to that court's eventual order approving consummation of the Commission's plan of reorganization. 21 </s> The railroad emerged from reorganization in 1947 with a vastly simplified debt structure in which only the most senior holders of secured interests survived. 22 But in the following years the financial condition of the company again deteriorated, prompting it to seek at first partial and then total discontinuance of passenger service on the former Old Colony lines in Massachusetts. 23 By 1959 the financial condition of the New Haven was such as to render the chance of surplus earnings "slight at best." 24 Through late 1960 and into early 1961 the company's management expended great efforts to stave off bankruptcy by obtaining loans or grants from the Federal and State Governments. 25 By the middle of 1961, current liabilities exceeded current assets by $36,310,000, 26 and the company was losing cash at the annual rate of $18,000,000. 27 </s> Finally, on July 7, 1961, the New Haven again petitioned for reorganization under 77 in the United States [399 U.S. 392, 404] District Court for the District of Connecticut, a step that the court was later to find had been far too long delayed: </s> "[I]n the interest of its creditors, its employees and the public [the railroad] should have petitioned . . . long before it did. The grave problems which . . . beset the reorganization would have been much less acute and infinitely more manageable if bankruptcy had not been put off until its cash was almost entirely depleted, credit was practically gone, maintenance was down and in all other respects the bottom was out of the barrel." 28 </s> Immediately upon their taking over the New Haven, the trustees appointed by the reorganization court were obliged to borrow $8,000,000 to meet the payroll. 29 The situation did not improve with the passage of time. "[I]n spite of spartan economies and a sizeable reduction in numbers of employees, the costs of operation . . . offset savings and eroded away the accumulated cash." 30 On July 6, 1964, the New Haven trustees petitioned the Commission, pursuant to 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 13a (2), for authority to discontinue suburban passenger train service in the Boston area. There followed a public hearing, an adjournment to afford Massachusetts authorities an opportunity - ultimately unavailing - to negotiate a contract with New Haven for continuation of some service, and a motion by the New Haven for expedited disposition "by reason of the critical nature of New Haven's finances, the irretrievable drain which the operations in question impose upon New Haven's resources, and the increasing adverse effect which New Haven's situation has upon [399 U.S. 392, 405] the public interest and upon New Haven's creditors . . . ." The Commission granted the trustees' application, concluding that for a period beginning four years before the 1961 reorganization petition and continuing thereafter, New Haven's financial condition had been "critical" and "drastically weak . . . ." 31 </s> By 1965 it was evident that the New Haven was on the verge of collapse. 32 Its year-end current assets amounted to $20,521,000, some $16,685,000 less than current liabilities plus long-term debt payments due within the coming year. The obligations payable after one year totaled $189,042,000. The retained income account showed a deficit of $81,672,000; the working capital account, a deficit of $16,700,000. For the year the net railway operating income showed a deficit of $16,000,000, with overall net income a deficit only $1,000,000 less. The company was in default in its payments of both principal and interest on its long-term debt. 33 In the view of the trustees, New Haven was [399 U.S. 392, 406] "absolutely faced with economic obsolescence if it continues as an independent, short-line, terminal railroad." 34 </s> On October 11, 1965, the New Haven notified the Commission, pursuant to 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 13a (1), of its intention to discontinue all its interstate passenger trains effective March 1, 1966. 35 If carried into effect, the proposed discontinuance would have drastically curtailed passenger train service in New York and Massachusetts, and ended it completely in Connecticut and Rhode Island. 36 In the spring of 1966 the Commission, noting that over an 11-year period New Haven had experienced "an unending succession of reverses," concluded that "[t]here now is totally lacking any hope or plan for future survival of this carrier, except that held out by its merger into a trunkline railroad." 37 The Commission acceded in part to the trustees' notice of discontinuance, but invoked its statutory power to keep many of the trains in operation on the ground that "passenger as well as freight service by the N[ew] H[aven] is a national necessity and that termination of either would lead to distress in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and would severely damage New York City and the Nation generally." 38 </s> As 1966 gave way to 1967, the New Haven's situation deteriorated still further. As of April 1967 the reorganization court thought "the prospect for the continued operation of the Railroad was very dim." 39 The road lacked even a current expense fund from which to satisfy the "six months" creditors, and the court thought it [399 U.S. 392, 407] "highly unlikely that there ever will be one." 40 In July 1967 the reorganization court found that the New Haven's situation had become "desperately critical"; its cash depletion was "so serious that, if the present rate of loss continues, there will be insufficient left by late September to meet the payroll of approximately $1,400,000 per week." 41 </s> As 1967 came to an end, so did the New Haven's cash reserve. By August 31 the cash balance fell to $4,500,000 - a precarious condition for a company requiring $1,750,000 a week simply to meet current operating expenses. 42 The trustees estimated that as of December 31, 1967, the balance would decline to $3,100,000 and two months later would fall to $850,000. 43 The New Haven's financial position had thus eroded to the point where its shutdown was "imminent . . . ." 44 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 408] </s> 3. The inclusion negotiations. From the outset of the 77 proceeding in 1961, the trustees of the New Haven and the reorganization court charged with conservation of the debtor's dwindling assets recognized that "a merger with a large trunk line railroad would be the most promising and feasible means of continuing the viability of the New Haven's transportation system . . . ." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451, 456; cf. 281 F. Supp. 65. After Pennsylvania and New York Central filed their merger application before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1962, the New Haven trustees sought inclusion in the new company, both by private negotiations with the component roads and by a petition to the Commission filed June 26, 1962. See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F.2d 635, 636; Merger Report, 327 I. C. C. 475, 480. As the reorganization court said, it was "apparent that the inclusion of the New Haven in the Penn-Central merger was the only salvation for the New Haven as an operating railroad . . . ." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp., at 456; see also In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 793, 800. </s> The Commission, as we have noted, authorized the merger of the two roads in 1966. But in so doing, it found that "[w]ithout some radical change in circumstances, even if this merger application were denied, N[ew] H[aven] would face a nearly insuperable task in bringing itself out of bankruptcy." Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 522. The Commission concluded that the proposed Penn-Central combination, "without complete inclusion of N[ew] H[aven], would not be consistent with the public interest . . . ." Id., at 524. Accordingly, it required "all the New Haven railroad to be included in the applicants' transaction," and conditioned its approval of the merger upon that inclusion, id., at 524, 527. In so doing, the Commission spelled out Penn [399 U.S. 392, 409] Central's obligation toward New Haven in unequivocal language. Condition 8 of the Merger Report stipulated as follows: </s> "The Pennsylvania New York Central Transportation Company shall be required to include in the transaction all the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company . . . upon such fair and equitable terms as the parties may agree subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court and the Commission. Within 6 months after the date this report is served, the parties shall file with the Commission for its approval, a plan for such inclusion. In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement (and subject to approval by the Bankruptcy Court) such inclusion shall be upon such fair and equitable terms and conditions as the Commission may impose. </s> . . . . . </s> "Jurisdiction is hereby reserved for such purposes. Consummation of the merger by applicants shall indicate their full and complete assent to these requirements." 327 I. C. C., at 553. </s> Condition 16 of the Merger Report reiterated that </s> "Consummation of the transaction approved herein shall constitute on the part of The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York Central Railroad Company, their successors and assigns, acquiescence in and assent to the conditions stated in this appendix and in the attached report." Id., at 555. </s> Having determined to require the inclusion of New Haven in Penn Central as a condition of merger, the Commission remitted the parties to private negotiation of the terms of inclusion. Id., at 527. The New Haven trustees on the one side, and the Pennsylvania and New [399 U.S. 392, 410] York Central railroads on the other, had already been bargaining for some time, having drafted preliminary documents, dated December 22, 1964, and February 5, 1965, that provided for Penn Central's assumption of New Haven's freight operations. Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 386, 393; Interstate Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C. 151, 175 n. 6. On April 21, 1966, two weeks after the Merger Report, they executed a Purchase Agreement for the transfer of substantially all the New Haven assets to Penn Central. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 508 ; see In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F.2d, at 636. 45 The Purchase Agreement provided for the transfer of the New Haven properties to Penn Central, with the consideration in exchange to consist in part of cash and in part of stocks and bonds of Penn Central. 46 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 411] </s> In September 1966 the trustees filed a petition with the reorganization court reciting the background of the negotiations with Penn Central, the New Haven's large and growing deficits, and the insufficiency of internally generated cash to meet operating demands. In the trustees' view, inclusion in Penn Central afforded "the only practicable means for reorganization of the Debtor that is consistent with the best interest of the public and of all parties interested in the Debtor's estate . . . ." They submitted that operations should continue so long as inclusion was possible, and that the court should grant them leave to press for inclusion on the basis of the Purchase Agreement. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F.2d, at 637. On October 24, 1966, the reorganization [399 U.S. 392, 412] court authorized the trustees to present the Agreement to the Commission, noting that the goal of preserving the New Haven operations "has been the policy from the beginning of these proceedings . . . ." Three days later the trustees and the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads petitioned the Commission for approval of the New Haven's inclusion on the terms of the Agreement. </s> On November 16, 1967, the Commission ratified the Purchase Agreement as the basis for the inclusion of New Haven in Penn Central. Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 331 I. C. C. 643 ("Second Supplemental Report"). It looked upon the fact that the parties had been able to reach agreement as an indication that even though the New Haven trustees were selling properties having no value as an operating entity, they nevertheless had enjoyed a degree of bargaining power by virtue of the requirement that Penn Central take in New Haven as a condition of the merger. 331 I. C. C., at 657. "[W]here a transaction is bargained at arm's length," said the Commission, "each side is presumably capable of determining its own best interest, and our primary function is to discover whether the transaction will be in the public interest." Id., at 656. The Commission then undertook its independent analysis of the value of the New Haven properties. Although the Purchase Agreement "carrie[d] some probative force as to the values of the properties involved, it [was] by no means controlling." Id., at 657. The Commission must still determine the price "on the basis of all the evidence pertaining thereto, not merely the agreement and supporting evidence." Id., at 660 n. 12. </s> Upon its independent review of the record, the Commission found that the asset value of the New Haven properties to be transferred to Penn Central and of the [399 U.S. 392, 413] consideration to be given in exchange was $125,000,000. The Commission concluded that payment of that sum by Penn Central to the New Haven estate would be both "just and reasonable" as a condition of the merger under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and "fair and equitable" as part of a plan of reorganization under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Unwilling to defer the merger until inclusion could take place but recognizing that the danger of an end to all New Haven operations was "very real," 331 I. C. C., at 654, the Commission authorized financial aid from Penn Central to prop up the debtor during the interim period between merger and inclusion to ensure New Haven's continued functioning until its acquisition by Penn Central. See Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 509 . </s> 4. The inclusion litigations. At this juncture the Commission's determination of the terms of inclusion was subjected to simultaneous judicial review in two separate forums. On January 23, 1968, eight days after this Court's approval of the merger and eight days before the merger itself, the New Haven bondholders commenced five actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set aside the Commission's order. The three-judge District Court reconvened to hear the actions and shortly thereafter consolidated the five cases into one. On March 29, 1968, the Commission certified the first step of its plan for the reorganization of the New Haven - the sale of its assets to Penn Central - to the reorganization court. 47 Pursuant [399 U.S. 392, 414] to 77 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 205 (e), the New Haven bondholders filed their objections to the Commission's plan following notice given by the reorganization court. Thus, the identical question of the price Penn Central would have to pay for the New Haven assets came at the same time before the three-judge District Court in New York and the single-judge District Court in Connecticut. </s> On July 10, 1968, the three-judge court, following extensive briefing and argument on the numerous issues underlying the price question, found itself unable to agree with the Commission in several major respects. It therefore vacated so much of the Commission's order as found the terms of Penn Central's acquisition of the New Haven's assets to be just and reasonable and remanded the cause for further proceedings. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., First Mortgage 4% Bondholders' Committee v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418. On August 13, 1968, also after extensive briefing and argument, the reorganization court independently returned the Commission's plan for further proceedings. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451. On the overriding question of price, the two courts were in accord: by fixing the worth of the New Haven at $125,000,000, the Commission had substantially understated the value of the properties to be transferred. The [399 U.S. 392, 415] three-judge court estimated the understatement to be on the order of $45,000,000 to $50,000,000; the reorganization court, $33,000,000 to $55,000,000. 289 F. Supp., at 440, 465. </s> Meanwhile, the continuing drain on the New Haven's dwindling cash reserves called for - and received - drastic action. Upon remanding the Commission's proposed plan under 77, the reorganization court ruled that unless the Commission ordered inclusion by January 1, 1969, the court would entertain a motion to dismiss the reorganization proceedings, resulting in termination of all the New Haven's train service. 289 F. Supp., at 459. The court recommended that the Commission direct the early inclusion of New Haven with a partial payment of the purchase price, deferring other issues to later resolution. Id., at 466. </s> On the remand, the Commission reopened the record for the reception of further evidence and briefing in accordance with the instructions of the two reviewing courts. Its revaluation of the New Haven properties, announced on November 25, 1968, resulted in an increase in total worth of some $37,700,000, yielding a new price of $162,700,000 for the properties to be transferred. Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 334 I. C. C. 25, 53 ("Fourth Supplemental Report"). But the Commission then invoked "other pricing considerations" not taken into account at the time of its prior report. Application of the new considerations effected a reduction of $22,081,000 from the newly calculated asset value, leaving a net value of $140,600,000 - $15,600,000 more than the Commission's initial estimate, but $17,400,000 less than the lowest range of value suggested by either of the two District Courts. In addition, the Commission required Penn Central to pay $5,000,000 toward the New Haven's interim operating expenses and, yielding to the directive of the reorganization [399 U.S. 392, 416] court, ordered Penn Central to take over the New Haven properties by January 1, 1969. 334 I. C. C., at 74, 76. </s> The Commission certified its revised plan to the reorganization court on December 2, 1968. Within three weeks the bondholders filed their objections. On December 24, 1968, the reorganization court released the assets of the debtor's estate to Penn Central without approving the price terms set by the Commission. The court reiterated that failure to include New Haven in Penn Central by January 1, 1969, would result in immediate termination of all New Haven train service. On December 31 the estate transferred its assets to Penn Central. </s> At once the bondholders pressed for judicial review of the Commission's revised evaluation. With their objections to the plan of reorganization already pending before the reorganization court, representatives of holders of the debtor's first and refunding mortgage 4% bonds commenced two separate actions against the United States and the Commission before the three-judge District Court in New York. The Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and the Chase Manhattan Bank, trustees under other mortgage bonds, commenced two more actions against the same defendants. 48 The three-judge court consolidated the four cases and granted intervention - to the New Haven trustees as parties plaintiff and to Penn Central, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the [399 U.S. 392, 417] States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York as parties defendant. </s> On May 28, 1969, the reorganization court again rejected the plan submitted by the Commission. Although it accepted the Commission's determinations on some issues, the court overruled the Commission with respect to its valuation of the New Haven's Harlem River and Oak Point freight yards and its added deductions introduced for the first time on the remand. The court also instituted its own "underwriting" plan to ensure equivalent value for the estate with respect to the Penn Central common stock given in partial consideration for the transferred New Haven properties. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 793. An order implementing decision and remanding to the Commission was entered on July 28, 1969. 304 F. Supp. 1136. </s> On June 18, 1969, the three-judge court filed its opinion in the bondholders' action. With one judge in dissent, the court upheld the Commission's valuation of the freight yards and its added deductions on the remand. The court also adopted the underwriting plan devised by the reorganization court. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., First Mortgage 4% Bondholders' Committee v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 1049. A decree fixing the terms of judgment followed on September 11, 1969. 49 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 418] </s> With the two District Courts thus in agreement, after two rounds of judicial review, on many of the substantial issues that had come before them, but in disagreement on matters amounting to more than $28,000,000 in value, the bondholders took direct appeals to this Court from the judgment of the three-judge court. They also appealed from the order of the reorganization court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The United States, the Commission, and Penn Central took no appeals from the decree of the three-judge court but cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the reorganization court. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals from the reorganization court, and the parties then petitioned this Court to grant certiorari to the Court of Appeals in advance of its judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1) and 2101 (e), and Rule 20 of this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals from the order of the three-judge court and, with respect to the judgment of the reorganization court, granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals before judgment, accelerating briefing and argument to permit disposition of these cases at the current Term. 396 U.S. 1056 . 50 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 419] </s> II </s> We first consider the dual review to which the District Courts in New York and Connecticut subjected the price determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. From the outset all the parties in the three-judge court recognized that the pricing questions presented in the litigation there were also destined to come before the reorganization court under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 51 Confronted with the prospect of duplicate litigation, the New Haven bondholders asked the three-judge court to enjoin the Commission's certification of its plan of [399 U.S. 392, 420] reorganization to the District Court in Connecticut. Counsel urged that "if such certification is not restrained, the questions presented by the complaint herein under Section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act will also be before the Bankruptcy Court under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act . . . ." The three-judge court denied the bondholders' application for injunctive relief. In its view, "the balance of convenience tilt[ed] heavily in favor of allowing the Connecticut court to proceed to such extent as it is advised," since the grant of such an injunction could delay the reorganization proceedings for a substantial time. </s> In this ruling the three-judge court was correct. The jurisdiction of the reorganization court was not open to question. Upon its approval of the New Haven's petition for reorganization in 1961, that court had acquired "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located . . . ." Bankruptcy Act, 77 (a), 11 U.S.C. 205 (a). 52 Subject to the court's control, the trustees whom it appointed were empowered "to operate the business of the debtor." Id., 77 (c) (2), 11 U.S.C. 205 (c) (2). They were thus charged with the dual responsibility of conserving the debtor's estate for the benefit of creditors and preserving an ongoing railroad in the public interest. Massachusetts v. Bartlett, 384 F.2d 819, 821, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 ; 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 77.02, at 469-470 (14th ed. 1969). 53 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 421] With these goals in view, the statute bestowed a "broad and general" authority upon both the court and the trustees. Cf. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 85 . The provisions of 77 "doubtless suffice[d] to confer upon the [reorganization court] power appropriate for adjusting property rights in the railroad debtor's estate and, as to such rights, beyond that in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings." Id., at 85-86; cf. 5 Collier, supra, § 77.11, at 498-499. Together, the court and the Commission "unquestionably" had "full and complete power not only over the debtor and its property, but also, as a corollary, over any rights that [might] be asserted against it." Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 147 . 54 One such power was precisely that which the Commission was about to propose that the reorganization court exercise - the power to confirm a plan of reorganization providing for "the sale of all . . . of the property of the debtor . . . ." Bankruptcy Act, 77 (b) (5), 11 U.S.C. 205 (b) (5). To that end the Commission was required to certify its proposal to the court as a prerequisite to judicial approval. 77 (d), 11 U.S.C. 205 (d). Injunctive intervention by the three-judge court would thus have disrupted an essential statutory phase of the New Haven reorganization. </s> The United States also sought to avoid duplicate litigation - but by bypassing the New York rather than the Connecticut federal court. In a motion filed shortly [399 U.S. 392, 422] after the commencement of the New Haven bondholders' suit in the three-judge court, the Government moved to dismiss the complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In support of the motion it was argued that (1) until the Commission certified the terms of inclusion to the reorganization court, Condition 8 under which Penn Central had pledged to take in New Haven was not satisfied and the Commission's order was not yet reviewable; (2) by virtue of the 77 aspects of the case, the reorganization court had exclusive jurisdiction over the pricing questions sought to be presented to the three-judge court; and (3) even on the assumption that the three-judge court had jurisdiction, it should stay its hand as a matter of equity to avoid an unnecessary interference with the proceedings before the reorganization court. </s> The Government's motion to dismiss was opposed by Penn Central, the New Haven trustees, the State of New York, and the bondholders. Significantly, the Commission did not oppose the motion. Indeed, the Commission agreed with the United States that "most (and perhaps all) of the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this three-judge Court will be reviewable by the Reorganization Court," conceded that "the resulting concurrent jurisdiction is awkward, at least in theory," and concluded tentatively that "the scope of judicial review . . . in the Reorganization Court would, as a practical matter[,] be the same as in this three-judge Court." The three-judge court denied the Government's motion to dismiss. The bondholders' actions, the court said, came within the letter of the statutes authorizing review of orders of the Commission. The court conceded there was "an area of overlap" between the work of the New York and Connecticut forums, but thought nothing in 77 or decisional law superseded that dual arrangement. See 289 F. Supp., at 424 n. 3. [399 U.S. 392, 423] </s> The three-judge court correctly observed that in ordering New Haven's inclusion in Penn Central the Commission had properly exercised its authority under both 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act and 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The fact that the New Haven was in reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act did not preclude the Commission from exercising its statutory power, in passing on the merger application of two railroads, to require the inclusion of a third. Interstate Commerce Act, 5 (2) (d), 49 U.S.C. 5 (2) (d). 55 "The Commission can undoubtedly carry on 5 proceedings simultaneously with 77 reorganization proceedings . . . ." Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S., at 140 . Here the transfer of the New Haven assets was as much a part of a merger under 5 as it was a plan of reorganization under 77. </s> Moreover, at the outset of the litigation, the jurisdiction of neither the New York nor the Connecticut court was "complete." On the one hand, the reorganization court lacked coercive power over Penn Central: under 77 it could neither approve nor disapprove the merger qua merger, and it could not compel Penn Central to purchase the New Haven assets. So far as 77 was concerned, Penn Central stood in the position of a potential purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy the New Haven properties. Cf. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S., at 137 ; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 , [399 U.S. 392, 424] 550; Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F.2d 413, 434 n. 5 (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Protective Committee v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 331 U.S. 858 ; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 54 F. Supp. 595, 619. On the other hand, the three-judge court could not by itself effect a conveyance of the New Haven properties to Penn Central, nor could it compel the debtor's trustees to do so without the consent of the reorganization court. </s> Moved largely by the concern that neither court might have jurisdiction over the entire case, the three-judge court was of the opinion that matters should proceed simultaneously in both forums with a view to bringing the 5 and 77 aspects before this Court at the same time. Given the complexities of the jurisdictional question and the importance of an expedited determination of the merits, the three-judge court produced an understandable solution to the problem insofar as it ensured that the entire case would come before this Court without the risk that the parties might have spent an extensive period litigating in the wrong forum. </s> But the circumstances of the case did not inexorably command review in two separate courts. There was no danger that application of the "fair and equitable" test under 77 (e) (1) would yield results different from those to be produced by the "just and reasonable" test of 5 (2) (b) for mergers or the "equitable" test for inclusions under 5 (2) (d). See Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S., at 140 . 56 The reorganization statute mandates [399 U.S. 392, 425] that any disposition of the debtor's properties must not be "inconsistent with the provisions and purposes" of the Interstate Commerce Act, Bankruptcy Act, 77 (f), 11 U.S.C. 205 (f), and "the requisite findings under the two acts are equivalent." In re Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 168 F.2d 587, 594, cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. Brown, 335 U.S. 855 . This Court has stressed that 77 incorporates the elements of 5, St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U.S. 298, 310 , and we have ruled that where the Commission proposes a merger as part of a 77 plan of reorganization, it must act "in accordance with all the requirements and restrictions applicable to mergers" under the Interstate Commerce Act, id., at 309; cf. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 448, 481 ; New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R. Co., 143 F.2d 179, 186. Here the Commission had demonstrated its awareness of the statutory interrelationship, specifically devising inclusion terms under 5 to satisfy the requirements of 77. Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 654. </s> Moreover, there was no reason to suppose that the reorganization court would be unable to adjudicate all the questions presented by the terms of the Commission's inclusion order. Although the three-judge court expressed concern that certain issues, such as a loss-sharing arrangement during the interim period between merger and inclusion, might not lie within the jurisdiction of the reorganization court, the reorganization court nevertheless reached those issues without, so far as the record discloses, jurisdictional objections from any party. </s> The three-judge court thus confronted a situation where it was asked to consider the same pricing questions, to be determined by recourse to the same standards of [399 U.S. 392, 426] review, as the reorganization court. "[N]ot only would it . . . involve . . . a duplication of labor to [accept] . . . jurisdiction but it might" - and in fact did - "result . . . in contradictory rulings upon the same issue[s]." Palmer v. Warren, 108 F.2d 164, 167, aff'd, 310 U.S. 132 . In these circumstances the three-judge court might well have stayed its hand under the traditional principle that "the court first taking over the res, draws to itself power to determine all claims upon it." Palmer v. Warren, supra; cf. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 581 ; Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118, 126 , 129; Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38, 54 ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake Street Elevated R. Co., 177 U.S. 51, 61 . We recognize that that principle has commonly applied in cases where both courts assert in rem jurisdiction over the property in dispute, and that here the three-judge court's jurisdiction was in personam in character. But the conflict was nonetheless one "between two coordinate courts of concurrent, overlapping jurisdiction, neither belonging to a class which by paramount law is categorically given a jurisdiction over the particular subject matter paramount to the jurisdiction of the other." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 26 F. Supp. 18, 24, aff'd sub nom. Palmer v. Warren, supra. And given that conflict, the three-judge court could have followed the settled proposition that "[t]he court which first acquired jurisdiction through possession of the property is vested, while it holds possession, with the power to hear and determine all controversies relating thereto." Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 89 . </s> Surely a vesting of primary jurisdiction in the reorganization court comports with the basic purpose of 77. Congress enacted that statute in part "to prevent the notorious evils and abuses of consent receiverships," New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R. Co., 143 [399 U.S. 392, 427] F.2d, at 184, of which one of the more egregious was the requirement of an ancillary filing and order of appointment in the federal court for every district in which the debtor had property. See 5 Collier, supra, § 77.02, at 467. Although, of course, the jurisdiction of the three-judge court was not ancillary to that of the reorganization court in a technical sense, dual review of issues ultimately going only to the valuation of the debtor's estate would resurrect the discredited practice of the equity receivership - it "would tend greatly to foment conflicts between coordinate courts and compel creditors, in the protection of their interests, to ride the circuit, demonstrating the basis of their positions in successive courts." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 26 F. Supp., at 23. </s> But we need not decide the question exclusively on the grounds just set out. For in the circumstances in which the United States presented its motion to dismiss in this case, the course of prior litigation had left the three-judge court virtually nothing to decide. On January 15, 1968, this Court had upheld the validity of the Penn Central merger under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, conditioned on the inclusion of New Haven on terms subject to objections to be "registered and adjudicated in the bankruptcy court or upon judicial review as provided by law." Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 511 . We had permitted a postponement of the inclusion of New Haven on the basis of Penn Central's acceptance of the inclusion requirement, id., at 509, and because by its act of merger Penn Central would "perforce accept . . . appropriate conditions respecting the New Haven . . . ." Id., at 510. </s> Two weeks later Penn Central merged. At that point the lack of jurisdictional "completeness" in the reorganization court, to which we have earlier referred, was cured; for there now remained no question of Penn Central's [399 U.S. 392, 428] obligation to take over the assets of the New Haven. With Penn Central having given its irrevocable consent to the inclusion of New Haven by its act of merger, it was evident that whatever terms the reorganization court might confirm, subject to review on appeal to the Court of Appeals followed by certiorari here, would bind Penn Central by virtue of its merger commitment. Of course, the terms of the inclusion must themselves be "just and reasonable" and "equitable" under 5. But those terms now involved only the value to be accorded the assets transferred, and resolution of that issue was the essence of the 77 process. "The heart of . . . a determination [of the validity of a plan of reorganization] is a finding of fact . . . as to the value of the debtor's property." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 147 F.2d 40, 49, cert. denied sub nom. Massachusetts v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 325 U.S. 884 . See 5 Collier, supra, § 77.14, at 538-539; cf. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 524 -525; First National Bank v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504, 527 ; Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 652. In short, with identical issues before the two courts, with those issues involving only questions going to the value of a 77 debtor's estate, with congruent standards of review, and with the irrevocable promise of Penn Central to take in New Haven, the three-judge court should have stayed its hand in the New Haven bondholders' litigation. 57 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 429] </s> Prior decisions of other three-judge courts, affirmed by this Court on direct appeal, lend support to the proposition that the three-judge court should have deferred to the reorganization court. In Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 65, the debtor railway company brought suit against the Commission in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking three-judge-court review of a plan of reorganization previously approved by the Commission and the courts. The District Court noted its "limited power" under the statute providing for review by a court of three judges, 52 F. Supp., at 66. It conceded the "seemingly applicable language" of the three-judge-court statute to "any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission," but held that once the Commission has approved a plan of reorganization under 77, "appeal from Commission orders in connection with bankruptcy proceedings lies only to a district court (of one judge) sitting in bankruptcy, not to a district court (of three judges) assembled under the Urgent Deficiencies Act." Id., at 67. 58 On direct appeal, this Court summarily affirmed the District Court's judgment. 320 U.S. 718 . </s> Even closer in point is a case that arose during the first reorganization of the New Haven Railroad - Group of Boston & Providence R. Corp. Stockholders v. ICC, 133 F. Supp. 488. Shareholders of the Boston & Providence, also undergoing reorganization, sought judicial review before a three-judge court of the Commission's refusal to provide joint rates as between New Haven and Boston & Providence - exclusively an Interstate Commerce Act function. See Act, 1 (4), 15 (6), 49 [399 U.S. 392, 430] U.S.C. 1 (4), 15 (6). The court held that to grant the shareholders the ruling they sought would contravene the revenue-allocation formula already adopted by the New Haven's reorganization court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The three-judge court accepted the view of the Commission that "so long as the Boston & Providence lines are operated by the New Haven as lessee for the account of the lessor . . ., the Connecticut district court . . . has exclusive jurisdiction to pass on the accounting for such operation." 133 F. Supp., at 493. Again, this Court summarily affirmed. Boston & Providence R. Corp. Stockholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 350 U.S. 926 . </s> We therefore hold that the three-judge court here should have granted the Government's motion to the extent of deferring to the reorganization court in proceedings ultimately involving only the price to be paid for the assets of the debtor's estate. 59 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 431] </s> III </s> In turning to the judgment of the reorganization court, we first review the standards under which that court passed upon the Commission's rulings. </s> After 35 years of 77, as amended, it is unnecessary to recanvass the two basic objectives of the statute - the conservation of the debtor's assets for the benefit of creditors and the preservation of an ongoing railroad in the public interest. See generally 5 Collier, supra, § 77.02, at 469-470. Central to the statutory objective that the reorganized company should, if at all possible, emerge as a "living, not a dying . . . enterprise," Van Schaick v. McCarthy, 116 F.2d 987, 993, is the understanding that "a railroad [is] not like an ordinary insolvent estate." Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S., at 86 . (Footnote omitted.) To the traditional equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, 77 adds the oversight of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the agency "specially charged with the public interest represented by the transportation system." Ibid. The statute contemplates that "[t]he judicial functions of the bankruptcy court and the administrative functions of the Commission [will] work cooperatively in reorganizations." Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S. 132, 138 . (Footnote omitted.) </s> In structuring the cooperative endeavor of agency and court, Congress "placed in the hands of the Commission the primary responsibility for the development of a suitable plan" for the debtor railroad. Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S., at 468 . As the Court said in Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., supra, "The ratio of debt to stock, the amount of fixed as distinguished from contingent interest, the kind of capital structure which a particular company needs to survive the vicissitudes of the business cycle - all these have been reserved by Congress for the expert [399 U.S. 392, 432] judgment and opinion of the Commission, which the courts must respect." 318 U.S., at 545 . See also In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 54 F. Supp. 595, 604. In the development of the plan of reorganization, 77 also has accorded the Commission primary responsibility for determining wherein lies the "public interest," which does not refer generally to matters of public concern apart from the public interest in the maintenance of an adequate rail transportation system, cf. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 230 , but includes "in a more restricted sense," ibid., concern for "the amount and character of the capitalization of the reorganized corporation," Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S., at 473 -474; cf. Massachusetts v. Bartlett, 384 F.2d, at 821, as well as the "adequacy of transportation service, . . . its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and . . . appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities." Texas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 531 ; New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 . As is clear from the legislative history and 77 itself, the deference to the Commission as initiator of the plan of reorganization stems from the "recognition by everyone of the advantages of utilizing the facilities of the Commission for investigation into the many-sided problems of transportation service, finance and public interest involved in even minor railroad reorganizations and utilizing the Commission's experience in these fields for the appraisals of values and the development of a plan of reorganization, fair to the public, creditors and stockholders." Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S., at 468 . (Footnote omitted.) </s> But the respect given the Commission as draftsman of the plan of reorganization entails no abdication of judicial responsibility for the workings of the administrative agency. As we have had occasion to say in describing other aspects of the Commission's work, "`Congress did not purport to transfer its legislative power to [399 U.S. 392, 433] the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body.'" Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 . Far from displacing the judicial function, 77 strikes a "balance between the power of the Commission and that of the court." Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., supra, at 468. The chancellor remains "a necessary and important factor in railroad reorganization"; the statutory objective is "attained only through properly coordinated action between the Commission and the court." Id., at 474-475. (Footnote omitted.) It remains for the reorganization court to ascertain that the Commission "has given consideration to each element of value concerned in its over-all appraisal, and has not wrongly decided legal questions involved in the problems of valuation and of allotment of equivalent securities . . . ." Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F.2d, at 420. </s> But the reorganization court may also do more. Under 77 (c) (13), 11 U.S.C. 205 (c) (13), the court on its own motion may refer matters to a special master for the hearing of such evidence as the court may desire - a provision which permits the "building up of a group of men [entirely apart from the Commission] thoroughly informed in railroad reorganization matters." H. R. Rep. No. 1897, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1933). And under 77 (e), 11 U.S.C. 205 (e), the court may itself hold hearings upon the Commission's certification of its plan of reorganization, at which the court is empowered to take evidence beyond that received by the Commission - a supplementary power, unknown to conventional judicial review, but deemed essential to the reorganization court's exercise of its extraordinary "cram down" powers. 60 See S. Rep. No. 1336, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 [399 U.S. 392, 434] (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 1283, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935). The statutory authority to appoint special masters and to hold evidentiary hearings reflects the unique powers possessed by the reorganization court in passing upon the Commission's proposed plan of reorganization. </s> In sum, Congress has confided to the reorganization court the "power to review the plan to determine whether the Commission has followed the statutory mandates . . . and whether the Commission had material evidence to support its conclusions." Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 509 ; cf. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 498 -499. In the reorganization court reposes ultimate responsibility for determining that the plan presented to it by the Commission satisfies the "fair and equitable" requirement of 77. See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 16 F. Supp. 504, 507. And at the heart of that determination, as we have already noted, is the valuation of the debtor's property. Here, as elsewhere in the reorganization proceedings, the court must look to the conclusion recommended by the Commission. See Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S., at 472 -473; cf. Freeman v. Mulcahy, 250 F.2d 463, 472-473, cert. denied sub nom. Boston & Providence R. Co. v. New York, [399 U.S. 392, 435] N. H. & H. R. Co., 356 U.S. 939 ; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 54 F. Supp. 595, 600. And often the Commission's conclusion will entail less a statement of mathematical certainty than an estimate of what the market will say when it speaks to the subject. "But that estimate must be based on an informed judgment which embraces all . . . relevant . . . facts . . . ." Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S., at 526 . "The judicial function is to see to it that the Commission's `estimate' is not a mere `guess' but rests upon an informed judgment based upon an appraisal of all . . . relevant . . . facts . . ., and is not at variance with the statutory command." Freeman v. Mulcahy, 250 F.2d, at 473. In performing that function, the court must proceed with awareness that its review of the Commission's conclusion on valuation, as with every other important determination that the court is to make, calls for an "`informed, independent judgment'" of its own. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S., at 520 ; National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426, 436 . </s> There remains to consider the scope of review in this Court in passing upon the judicial determinations of the reorganization court. That we have granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in advance of the appellate court's judgment does not alter the fact that "our task is limited." Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 498 . It is not for us to pass upon the myriad factual and legal issues as though we were trying the cases de novo. "It is not enough to reverse the District Court that we might have appraised the facts somewhat differently. If there is warrant for the action of the District Court, our task on review is at an end." Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S., at 564 . </s> IV </s> As we have earlier noted, the purchase and sale negotiated by Pennsylvania, New York Central, and the New [399 U.S. 392, 436] Haven trustees rested upon the estimated liquidation value of the New Haven properties to be transferred, rather than the earning power of the New Haven as an operating entity. Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 657. The parties to the Purchase Agreement thus gave recognition to the reality of New Haven's desperate financial situation, as well as to the power of the reorganization court to order the sale of the debtor's properties at not less than the "fair upset" price under 77 (b) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act. In approving the negotiators' approach to the price question, the Commission observed that asset value rather than earning power was the primary determinant because New Haven had "long been dry of earning power." 331 I. C. C., at 657. "If there is one thing on this record that is clear and undeniable," the Commission concluded, "it is that N[ew] H[aven] has neither earning power nor the prospect of earning power." Id., at 687. </s> In light of "the chronic deficit character" of the New Haven operation, id., at 658, the reorganization court understandably accepted the liquidation approach to valuation. "The concept of `going concern value' is fictional as applied to the New Haven," it said, "because it ignores the Railroad's long and continuing history of deficit operations." 289 F. Supp., at 455. (Footnote omitted.) </s> Before the Commission, the New Haven trustees and Penn Central submitted complete studies of the debtor's liquidation value, consisting of current assets, special funds, investments, real estate, and other assets. As the Commission described it, "Liquidation value as used by both the N[ew] H[aven] trustees and Penn-Central [was] the estimated market value that would be realized in a total liquidation, less the cost of dismantling properties and other liquidation costs and after discounting proceeds to present worth." 331 I. C. C., at 697; cf. [399 U.S. 392, 437] In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp., at 797-798. </s> The New Haven study, based on the assets held by the debtor as of December 31, 1965, was made over a nine-month period by persons who, the Commission found, were familiar with the railroad, its operating area, and the nature and condition of its properties. The Penn Central study valued the assets as of December 31, 1966; it was made in under two months by persons less familiar with the railroad. Both studies revealed that nearly half the New Haven's asset value consisted of its holdings in real estate. The New Haven study produced a gross value for all assets, exclusive of New Haven's interest in the Grand Central Terminal properties, of $230,290,000; the Penn Central study, $150,321,000. </s> Consistent with the liquidation hypothesis, both New Haven and Penn Central deducted from the gross value of the New Haven assets the expenses that would be incurred if a liquidation in fact took place. These included not only the estimated expenses of sale but, in the case of bridges, trestles, and culverts, removal costs for conversion of the realty to nonrailroad use - costs that often left the assets with a net negative value. The New Haven trustees hypothesized both a six- and a 10-year liquidation period, with expenses for liquidation operations plus taxes and interest aggregating $59,481,000 and $76,847,000, respectively; Penn Central estimated the expenses of a 10-year sale to be $62,172,000. The net liquidation value of the assets was arrived at by deducting the liquidation expenses and certain current assets not to be transferred to Penn Central, along with a further discount to present worth to reflect the hypothesis that receipts would be coming in over a six- or 10-year period. </s> The Commission concluded that once the New Haven estate embarked on a liquidation sale, it would dispose of the assets as quickly as practicable; the Commission [399 U.S. 392, 438] accordingly found that "the bulk of the liquidation could be completed within a period of 6 years." 331 I. C. C., at 663. The Commission also concluded that the 6% discount rate employed by New Haven and challenged as too low by Penn Central was offset by the conservative valuation of the assets themselves. Id., at 664. The Commission's ultimate finding was that the liquidation value of the New Haven assets to be conveyed to Penn Central "is about $125 million as of December 31, 1966." Id., at 688. </s> As we have noted earlier, the reorganization court did not accept the $125,000,000 figure, with a consequent remand and second round of review. The bulk of the Commission's valuation has now won the approval of the reorganization court and is not challenged by any of the parties here. There remains in dispute, however, the valuation of several items, aggregating nearly $200,000,000, and it is to those items that we now turn. </s> 1. The Grand Central Terminal properties. By far the largest component in the dispute over the liquidation value of the New Haven is the debtor's interest in the Grand Central Terminal properties. This real estate complex consists of several parcels in the area of midtown Manhattan bounded by 42d Street on the south, Madison Avenue on the west, 60th Street on the north, and Lexington Avenue on the east. Included in the properties are the Barclay, Biltmore, Commodore, Roosevelt, and Waldorf-Astoria hotels; the Pan American building as well as other office buildings along Park Avenue; and the Yale Club. The total assessed value of the Grand Central Terminal properties as of 1965 was $227,225,000. </s> The New Haven railroad acquired the right to run its trains into Manhattan in 1848, when it entered into an agreement for use of the tracks of the predecessor of the New York Central, to extend for the lives of the respective [399 U.S. 392, 439] charters of the two companies. In 1848 New Haven also acquired an easement over the tracks by legislation of the State of New York. See New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. ICC, 55 F.2d 1028, 1030. The 1848 agreement underlay various subsequent contracts in the 1870's, '80's, and '90's between the New York Central and the New Haven. </s> In 1903 and 1904 the State of New York enacted further legislation requiring the placement of the railroad tracks below ground through the 15-block stretch north of the present Terminal. It did not take the Central entrepreneurs long to realize that compliance with the legislative edict left the company a vast area of midtown Manhattan suitable for realty development. In 1907 Central entered into the basic contract with New Haven under which the present Grand Central Terminal was built. The 1907 instrument recited that it had become necessary to rebuild the Terminal, including yards and tracks, in order to provide facilities for the proper management and conduct of the two railroads. Central promised to buy needed land and rights-of-way; New Haven, to make payments in connection with the demolition of the old station and the construction of the new. The 1907 agreement further recited that nothing it contained should impair the rights of the parties under the 1848 agreement. It then went on to provide that Central "doth demise, let and lease" the use of the railroad terminal to New Haven in common with Central. "Railroad terminal" was defined to "mean and include the land, and interests in land, and all improvements thereon . . ., and all rights in any ways on which said land may abut . . . ." </s> Paragraph 4 of the 1907 agreement provided for joint contributions by New Haven and Central to Terminal maintenance and operation, calculated on the parties' respective car and locomotive usage of the station. The paragraph also obligated New Haven to a minimum [399 U.S. 392, 440] annual payment of $160,179.92 without regard to the percentage of its use of the Terminal. In addition, § 14 of the agreement stipulated that the manager of the enterprise should credit all rentals and other compensation received from the railroad terminal to "the fixed charges or to the cost of maintenance and operation of the said Railroad Terminal, as the same may be applicable." </s> In 1909, Central and New Haven began the joint financing of construction on the property referred to in the 1907 agreement, and in 1913, they entered into a supplemental agreement in order "to express more fully the intent of the parties hereto as to the right of the New Haven Company and the Central Company with respect to the construction, maintenance and use" of the Terminal properties. The supplemental agreement recited that New Haven's right of user included "the right . . . to join with . . . Central . . . in the construction, holding, maintenance and leasing of buildings . . . upon the land included within the Railroad Terminal." The heart of the 1913 amendment was a detailed provision for the sharing and reimbursement of construction and maintenance costs, along with a reaffirmation of the procedure established in § 14 of the 1907 agreement, under which all rentals were to be credited to the Terminal enterprise. In the following years the two parties entered into hundreds of subagreements relating to the leasing, financing, and sharing of rentals from buildings constructed in the Terminal area. Income from the buildings was credited to the fixed charges, and to the maintenance and operation of the Terminal itself. </s> None of the agreements between Central and New Haven expressly provided for the disposition of "excess income" left over after the satisfaction of the Terminal expenses. For half a century after the 1913 agreement, the "excess income" question was of academic interest only, since expenses annually exceeded revenues. But [399 U.S. 392, 441] in 1964, and in each succeeding year, the accounts showed excess income. New Haven demanded part of it, and Central refused. The trustees then brought a contract action in the New York Supreme Court to protect New Haven's interest in the income. </s> When the New Haven trustees first began negotiations with Pennsylvania and Central for the inclusion of the debtor's assets in Penn Central, they proposed that New Haven's interest in the nonoperating Terminal properties be excluded from the takeover, with final disposition deferred until the outcome of the then-pending litigation. But Central insisted it would not consider inclusion of New Haven in the merger unless it got absolute title to all the Terminal properties. The New Haven trustees thereupon sought the advice of legal counsel. They were told that under the agreements with Central, New Haven not only had no fee or leasehold interest in the properties, but had no rights at all that would survive cessation of its train service in and out of the Terminal other than the reimbursement of monies already advanced toward construction of buildings in the area. Although the New York lawsuit was pending to determine New Haven's right to participate in the excess income, the trustees concluded that as an alternative to risking "tremendous expense and long delay" in litigation, 289 F. Supp., at 462, resolution of the inclusion negotiations was of sufficient value to warrant their transferring the debtor's interest, whatever it might be, to Penn Central for no consideration whatever in exchange. </s> From the outset the bondholders dissociated themselves from the trustees on the question of the debtor's rights in the Terminal properties. Some of the New Haven creditors claimed the value of those rights to be $20,000,000 - the sum of unreimbursed advances for building construction and capital improvements as carried on the New Haven books. Others said it was $50,000,000 - the capitalization of one-half the excess income [399 U.S. 392, 442] at 5%. Still others argued for one-half the value of the fee itself - nearly $115,000,000. </s> In its Second Supplemental Report the Commission eschewed responsibility for determining the legal rights of New Haven in the properties and set out only to value the debtor's claim. Confronting the complex legal relationship between Central and New Haven, with the consequent unpredictability of litigation, and unwilling to defer valuation of New Haven's interest to the completion of all possible contract actions between the two parties, the Commission set the value of the claim at $13,000,000. It arrived at this figure by taking the average of two unrelated sums: $5,000,000, representing Penn Central's estimate of the nuisance value of New Haven's claim; and $20,000,000, representing the capitalization of New Haven's share of the average of the excess income in 1964 and 1965, based upon its proportional usage of the Terminal. </s> Faced with the Commission's disclaimer of responsibility for resolution of the legal controversy between Central and New Haven, and given the Commission's Draconian solution to the question of value, the reorganization court appointed a special master to consider New Haven's legal interest in the Terminal properties. 61 Based on his [399 U.S. 392, 443] study of the complex contractual relations between the two parties, of which we have touched above only on the salient features, the Special Master concluded that Central and New Haven had entered into a "joint venture or partnership . . . of some kind." The Special Master dismissed as untenable both Central's argument that by virtue of its sole ownership of the fee it would acquire full right, title, and interest in the Terminal properties upon the cessation of New Haven's train service, and the bondholders' argument that as a partner the debtor had an undivided one-half interest in the fee. In 1907, when the parties entered into the basic agreement, Central had had title to the realty, and New Haven had had a perpetual right to the use of the tracks by force of state legislation. New Haven thus had "not come to the bargaining table in 1907 in the posture of a supplicant." The two railroads together had joined in the design and construction of a Terminal complex greater than either needed for its own requirements; they had undertaken a "major real estate development to extend over a period of many years"; and to those ends they had provided for a sharing of the Terminal expenses on the basis of their respective car usage, along with a committal of Terminal revenues to the operation of the project. As the Special Master put it, "There can be no question that by mutual agreement these revenues from all of the Grand Central Terminal properties were pooled to apply on the fixed charges and maintenance and operational costs of the Terminal." </s> In light of the conclusion that Central and New Haven had embarked on an enterprise akin to a partnership, the Special Master concluded that once the Terminal revenues satisfied expenses, the excess income belonged equally to each of the railroads. In his view, the car-use formula of the 1907 agreement ceased to be effective once revenue met expenses, and the principle of equality between [399 U.S. 392, 444] partners took its place. The Special Master noted that the parties had not expressly dealt with the question whether New Haven's interest in the properties would end if New Haven ceased to use the Terminal. But he concluded that in such an event New Haven would still be entitled to half of the excess income; that right "would not and could not be terminated by the mere discontinuance of [New Haven] passenger service into and out of the Terminal." 62 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 445] </s> On the first round of review the reorganization court accepted the Special Master's report and incorporated it by reference in its own opinion. The court therefore remanded the matter to the Commission with instructions to value New Haven's one-half interest in the Terminal's future excess income. In addition, the court requested the Commission to "consider and make findings as to what value, if any, attaches to New Haven's present right to share in the income for the purpose of defraying its cost of operating in and out of the terminal." 289 F. Supp., at 463. </s> In its Fourth Supplemental Report the Commission accepted the determination of the reorganization court that New Haven would have retained a right to one-half the excess income even upon liquidation. 334 I. C. C., at 30-31. Following an extensive consideration of future Terminal expenses and office-building and hotel income, the Commission projected a future excess income of $4,550,000 a year, of which New Haven's 50% share, capitalized at 8%, amounted to $28,438,000. 334 I. C. C. at 39. The new figure thus came to more than twice that awarded by the Commission on the first round. </s> The Commission also complied with the request of the reorganization court that it consider the value of New Haven's right of access into the Terminal. The Commission concluded that the right would have no value to New Haven unless a buyer were willing to pay for it; that the only potential buyer in sight was the State of New York, which would not need to bid for use of the Terminal; and, accordingly, that New Haven's right of user was valueless. 334 I. C. C., at 32. The bondholders' claim of value for the right of access, the Commission said, amounted to a demand for one-half of all of the income free of the Terminal expenses. Id., at 32 n. 11. On the second round of review, the reorganization court agreed that the Commission's determinations must stand with respect to both the liquidation [399 U.S. 392, 446] value of New Haven's interest in the Terminal properties and its right of free access into the station. 63 </s> Many aspects of the controversy over the Grand Central Terminal properties have now dropped from contention. 64 The bondholders no longer claim that New Haven is entitled to one-half the value of the fee. Penn Central no longer claims that its fee ownership of the properties reduced New Haven's status to that of a mere grantee retaining only the privilege of entry into the Terminal. All parties accept New Haven's right to the capitalized value of one-half the excess income. 65 What [399 U.S. 392, 447] remains is the claim of the bondholders that New Haven is entitled to the capitalized value of its share not only of the excess income remaining after satisfaction of the Terminal expenses, but of the basic income meeting the expenses themselves. Yet the central finding of the reorganization court remains unrefuted: that by force of the agreements between New York Central and New Haven, the Terminal income was first to be devoted to meeting Terminal expenses; only then was the residue to become available for distribution to the two railroads. To be sure, the parties customarily referred to their respective shares of the Terminal revenues. But the Special Master found that the Terminal revenues were allocated to Central and New Haven on their respective car-use bases as an accounting convenience. The car-use formula established by the 1907 agreement "resulted, for accounting purposes, in the corresponding proportion of the revenue entering the Terminal Account being treated as the property of each railroad, and in each [399 U.S. 392, 448] railroad's being relieved pro tanto from the amount of its liability to meet the charges . . . ." </s> The bondholders argue that the basic income of the Terminal could somehow be "freed up" from the obligation to meet Terminal expenses. But the Special Master considered and rejected that theory. </s> "Both parties . . . committed themselves to pouring these revenues from the entire Grand Central complex into the Terminal Account under paragraph 14 of the Agreement of 1907. The revenues were to enter that account and were to be expended, superior to the individual interests of each railroad, by being applied on payment of the fixed charges and expenses of operation and maintenance of the Terminal. Those revenues were pledged to that purpose regardless of whether New Haven utilized one per cent or fifty per cent of the Terminal's passenger facilities, or whether it used any of those facilities at all. It was not contemplated that if either railroad discontinued passenger trains into Grand Central the other would be saddled with the entire expense of a terminal larger than either railroad needed without being credited with these entire revenues from the Grand Central Terminal properties to the extent that they were required to meet expenditures . . . ." </s> Nevertheless, Chase Manhattan argues that the commitment of revenues is merely a creature of the agreement between Central and New Haven as construed by the Special Master, and that the transfer of New Haven's Terminal interests on December 31, 1968 "wiped out" that agreement. "The agreement thereafter was no longer in existence," says Chase, "and Penn Central now has this [basic] income (both the former New York Central's share and the former New Haven's share) free and clear of any restriction against its use in any way [399 U.S. 392, 449] Penn Central sees fit." Stated in this fashion, the argument is self-defeating: since New Haven's right to the basic income derives solely from its agreement with Central, a "wiping out" of that agreement necessarily leaves New Haven without the right as well as without the obligation. But, more importantly, it simply is not true that Penn Central now has New Haven's former share in such income without "any restriction of any kind . . . ." Penn Central also has New Haven's loss operations into and out of the Terminal, and it must meet the expenses occasioned by those operations from some source. Since by definition New Haven's share of the basic income was, as an accounting matter, equal to its share of the Terminal expenses, by its 1968 transfer it has merely surrendered an amount equal to its gain: it has given up its share of the income pledged to the costs of operations at the Terminal, but it has relieved itself of the obligation to meet those costs. By the same token, Penn Central has gained New Haven's share of income, but with the matching loss of New Haven's expenses. </s> The bondholders' argument must be that entirely apart from the contractual arrangements with Central, New Haven had a valuable right of free access into the Terminal, which Penn Central has now taken over with no compensating payment in exchange. This argument, too, is without merit. It is a misnomer to describe New Haven's right of access to the Terminal as "free." New Haven had a right of entry, rather than a privilege, in the sense that it had access, independently of the consent of the fee owner of the tracks, by force of legislative edict. But the right bestowed by the legislature was conditioned "upon such terms . . . as [have] been or may hereafter be agreed upon by and between" New Haven and Central's predecessor. N. Y. Sess. Laws of 1848, c. 143, 6. Thus the New Haven right of access has never been free from the obligations imposed by the agreements with Central. [399 U.S. 392, 450] </s> But even if the access right were "free" in the sense that it could survive elimination of New Haven's agreements with Central, we agree with the reorganization court that the Commission correctly concluded it would have no value. And that is the case whether the right is deemed transferred to Penn Central, as in fact it was, on the date of inclusion, or whether, consistent with the liquidation hypothesis on which the parties valued New Haven's other assets, it is deemed to have been offered for sale to a third party upon New Haven's cessation of operations. In the former event, the analysis pertinent to New Haven's contract rights applies with equal force. Penn Central has in fact succeeded to New Haven's right of access, but it has also succeeded to New Haven's deficit operations. Conversely, New Haven has given up a right of entry in exchange for relief from the obligation to provide train service at the station. Indeed, to the extent that the expenses generated by New Haven's use of the Terminal exceeded the revenues attributable to that activity, Penn Central has lost and New Haven gained on the exchange. 66 </s> The same result is reached if New Haven is deemed to have gone into liquidation. For the bondholders have never shown that anyone would pay a penny for the right to carry on New Haven's deficit-ridden Terminal operation. If nobody would pay a liquidating New Haven for the right to lose money, the right is, again, [399 U.S. 392, 451] worthless. The Commission found that the only potential buyer would be the State of New York, moving to preserve the commuter service in the public interest. 334 I. C. C., at 32. Whether the State would have to pay Penn Central for the use of Penn Central's tracks and its share of Terminal expenses is not before us. On the liquidation hypothesis, the State would not have to pay Penn Central for New Haven's right of access, for Penn Central would not own it. And the State's paying New Haven depends on at least four independent contingencies: whether New Haven's right of access would survive liquidation; whether the right would exclude the power of Central to bestow a similar access right on a third party while New Haven's own went unused; whether, under the agreement with Central, the right would be capable of assignment; and whether the State, if required to pay New Haven anything to enter the Terminal, would choose instead to operate the commuter trains only to subway connections in the Bronx rather than all the way into Manhattan. We agree with the Commission and the reorganization court that these imponderables render the value of New Haven's right of access so speculative as to defy reasoned attribution of any value to it. </s> 2. The Bronx freight yards. One of New Haven's principal real estate holdings consisted of two freight yards located on some 160 acres in the south Bronx, New York, between the East River on the one side and the Major Deegan Expressway and Bruckner Boulevard on the other. The Harlem River yard occupies nearly 4,000,000 square feet across the East River from Manhattan and Queens; it has been described by a qualified appraiser as "a unique industrial facility that could be well used by any heavy industrial concern." About a mile north of the Harlem River yard, and connected to it by the existing trackage of New Haven's Harlem Division [399 U.S. 392, 452] line, lies the Oak Point yard, characterized by the appraiser as "one of the most desirable industrial facilities in New York City." </s> Two other facilities in the area are worthy of note. The first is the Hunts Point Market, located northeast of the Oak Point yard. The market is a $100,000,000 municipal installation and the central distribution area for the wholesaling of produce for the New York City metropolitan area. It lies on the promontory flanked by the Bronx and East Rivers, and is connected to the New Haven's Harlem Division line through a spur track owned by the city. The market is the largest receiver of rail traffic in the area, and plans are under way for further expansion. Fourth Supplemental Report, 334 I. C. C., at 43-44. The second facility is the former Port Morris yard of Penn Central, situated midway between the Harlem River and Oak Point yards and lying athwart the Harlem Division trackage that connects the two New Haven yards. Port Morris is linked by a branch line to Penn Central's Harlem Branch division, a principal element in the Penn Central System. An interchange track runs from the Port Morris branch line to the border of the Oak Point yard. </s> Before the Commission, the parties submitted five different estimates of the value of the Harlem River and Oak Point yards. The bondholders offered the testimony of an appraiser who thought the land would bring $32,000,000 for residential use and $26,000,000 for industrial use; the New Haven trustees offered the testimony of another appraiser who submitted two studies showing $22,650,000 and $18,090,990, both for industrial use; and Penn Central, that of a third appraiser who set the value, again for industrial use, at $15,585,000. In its Second Supplemental Report the Commission accepted the lower of the values proposed by the trustees' witness - $18,090,990. 331 I. C. C., at 668. [399 U.S. 392, 453] </s> On the first round of judicial review the reorganization court thought that on the present record "there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's valuation and not enough to show that it was unfair or inequitable," but concluded that a clarification of the basis of the Commission's valuation was desirable. 289 F. Supp., at 464. On the remand, controversy centered on the alternative appraisals offered by the trustees' witness. It soon became evident that in valuing the freight yards the Commission had pursued the liquidation hypothesis with a vengeance. The higher appraisal of the trustees' witness had rested on the premise that upon cessation of New Haven operations the Bronx yards would be available for continued industrial occupancy, with existing trackage and electrical facilities left in place. The presence of such facilities commanded at least a 10% premium in Bronx realty values. The witness' second appraisal had assumed that upon liquidation New Haven would strip the yards of these facilities, thereby depressing the value of the land and incurring substantial costs of removal. 334 I. C. C., at 42. Adoption of that assumption resulted in the loss of over $4,000,000 in value. 67 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 454] </s> In its Fourth Supplemental Report the Commission adhered to its acceptance of the lower of the witness' two estimates, reiterating its reliance upon the liquidation premise. That premise justified the assumption that New Haven would dismantle the yards once the rest of the railroad was scrapped, since with no link to Penn Central the yards would have no value either as operating facilities or for industrial use with railroad connections. </s> But the fact of the matter was that even on the liquidation hypothesis the New Haven yards did not lack rail connections to Penn Central. Penn Central already had in place a branch line running from its Port Morris yard to its Harlem Branch division. That Port Morris line, along with the interchange track running up to the border of the Oak Point yard and meeting the New Haven's line at that point, would have continued in place even upon a liquidation of New Haven. The trustees' witness acknowledged that in arriving at the lower of his two values for the New Haven yards, he had been unaware of the Penn Central link at Port Morris. Nevertheless, the Commission attributed no significance to the witness' unawareness of the Port Morris connection, because it concluded that even with the existing link to the New Haven yards, it was "extremely doubtful" that Penn Central would continue to provide service into the area after a New Haven liquidation. Once New Haven vanished, the Commission reasoned, Penn Central would be under no legal obligation to perform switching service beyond its own Port Morris line or to extend its line into the former New Haven yards. And the Commission accepted the testimony of a Penn Central witness that the company would have no economic incentive to provide service, because of the unprofitability of the perishable freight destined for the Hunts Point Market, as well as the absence of necessary track clearances and yard classifying facilities. 334 I. C. C., at 44-45. [399 U.S. 392, 455] </s> On the second round of review the reorganization court ruled that the Commission had erred in rejecting the higher of the witness' two appraisals. "It is undisputed that the Port Morris branch was and is there and operating and Penn Central has not been authorized to abandon it." 304 F. Supp., at 807. The court overruled the Commission's determination that Penn Central would cease to provide service not only to the industrial enterprises in the 160-acre area of the two yards, but to the Hunts Point Market as well. </s> "The great bulk of produce for feeding of the millions of residents of metropolitan New York is brought in by rail through these yards to this market and distribution point. To assume that the State and City of New York would stand idly by and permit the life line to its huge and costly enterprise to be cut, just as it is in the midst of planning its necessary enlargement, because it was unwilling or unable effectively to bring pressures to bear or take steps on its own to preserve the connection with Penn Central is absurd . . . ." 304 F. Supp., at 807-808. </s> The ruling of the reorganization court is, at the least, free from the error that would require us to overturn its judgment on this matter. As the Commission's own report makes evident, the agency based its startling conclusion that Penn Central could deny service to the area, not on the facts of record, but in adherence to the untenable assumption that on liquidation New Haven would have uprooted the valuable trackage and electrical facilities already in place. According to the Commission, "[t]he record does not support any finding of substantial need for Penn Central service that would justify the construction by that carrier of the trackage necessary to connect Harlem River and Oak Point yards [399 U.S. 392, 456] and the latter yard and Hunts Point, if N[ew] H[aven] were to be liquidated." 334 I. C. C., at 47. (Emphasis supplied.) Of course we may assume that Penn Central could not be forced to buy land and build track to provide service into areas, noncontiguous to its rail system, to which it did not hold itself out as a common carrier. But it is a far cry from that proposition to the statement that a common carrier could deny service to industrial and public activities simply because ownership of adjoining trackage had changed hands. 68 The record facts are that the trackage the Commission said Penn Central would have to construct is already in place, connecting the two yards and the market. 69 The Commission nonetheless continued to presuppose the removal of the New Haven's rail facilities. "On this record," the Commission reiterated, "and the assumption of N[ew] H[aven]'s liquidation and the dismantling of its system, Penn Central would not serve, and could not be compelled to serve, the Harlem River or Oak Point industries, or the Hunts Point Market." 334 I. C. C., at 47. (Emphasis supplied.) There is not a shred of record evidence to support the Commission's assumption as applied to the New Haven yards. It is not rational [399 U.S. 392, 457] to suppose that the managers of the hypothetical liquidation sale, devoted to obtaining the highest possible price for the assets of the debtor, would have ignored the best use of the yard facilities and stripped them of more than $4,000,000 in value. 70 </s> 3. The added deductions. On the remand the Commission recalculated the liquidation value of the New Haven, as directed by the reorganization court, and arrived at a new sum of $162,700,000. "A property value of this sort inheres in the assets," the Commission said, "if we assume that the railroad may immediately shut down and begin a 6-year program of selling off the road parcel-by-parcel, and virtually tie-by-tie." 334 I. C. C., at 53. But the Commission declined to approve the new figure as the proper liquidation value of the debtor. </s> "The liquidation value that results in this reopened proceeding exceeds the agreed price [of $125,000,000], obliging us to make a new determination [399 U.S. 392, 458] as to whether the price resulting from such a valuation is fair. </s> "The establishment of liquidation value as a pricing floor on this record must assume that the N[ew] H[aven] may be shut down at once and be liquidated in parcels. Such a pricing theory assumes that the public may be denied an opportunity to be heard. It is wholly inconsistent with the requirement we have imposed on Penn Central to absorb the N[ew] H[aven], which requirement rests entirely upon the public's need for a continuing N[ew] H[aven]. Any assumption that N[ew] H[aven] may be shut down and broken up must necessarily permit the conclusion that Penn Central may be relieved of its inclusion obligation. It is inequitable to conceive at the same time both a right in the bondholders to break up the N[ew] H[aven] and an obligation on Penn Central to keep it going. The demands of equity are no more satisfied by conceiving that the bondholders have a constitutional right to shut down the N[ew] H[aven] which is superior to the public's right to keep it going. </s> "The foregoing liquidation value assumes that this Commission has no function under the Interstate Commerce Act to decide whether public convenience and necessity permit the abandonment of N[ew] H[aven]'s entire line or portions of it. In view of our often repeated findings that there is a public need for the services of this railroad, there is no warrant for assuming that the creditors may now break up the railroad or devote the properties to another use. The estate is not relieved of its obligation to serve the public. A price that is premised on outright rejection of that obligation is inequitable [399 U.S. 392, 459] and awards the estate a windfall that is not supported by any record evidence." 334 I. C. C., at 54-55. </s> On the basis of this reasoning, the Commission then proceeded to take into account "other pricing considerations" - costs of liquidation it had not reached in its earlier report because of its conclusion that the $125,000,000 price arrived at by the parties was proper under the Interstate Commerce and Bankruptcy Acts. </s> "The alleged right to liquidation values derives from an alleged right to abandon; and there are recognized limitations on the right to abandon that in themselves limit the creditors' entitlement to the liquidation value we have computed under the court's instructions. Under section 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission is empowered to impose reasonable limitations on the abandonment right." 334 I. C. C., at 57. </s> The Commission's new "pricing considerations" consisted of two elements: a one-year delay the New Haven would have incurred in securing the approval of the Commission and the courts to abandon train operations; and a bulk-sale discount that a purchaser of all the debtor's assets, to whom the Commission could order the road to sell, would have commanded. Together the added deductions amounted to $22,081,000. </s> (a) The one-year delay. The Commission found that an application for a certificate of abandonment, as required by 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, would have precipitated a lengthy process of administrative action and judicial review resulting in at least a one-year delay in the commencement of actual liquidation operations. The Commission assumed that the year's delay would have occasioned a freeze on liquidation activity, following which the sell-off would have proceeded [399 U.S. 392, 460] as projected in the Second Supplemental Report. The abandonment delay, the Commission found, would have added costs of $4,940,000 in preserving the assets of the estate, $2,500,000 in real estate taxes, and $7,946,000 in a discount of the sale receipts back to present worth. </s> On review the reorganization court rejected the delay concept, ruling that the added deduction violated the liquidation hypothesis upon which the debtor's assets had been valued. Neither the parties nor the Commission had previously postulated the deduction now imposed, because the liquidation hypothesis itself had presupposed a lawful abandonment of service. 304 F. Supp., at 798. That presupposition was rooted in the hard fact that for more than three years prior to December 31, 1966, the New Haven had been kept alive, despite its hopeless financial condition, solely in the name of the public interest and in anticipation of inclusion in Penn Central. </s> "By late 1963 it was clear to the Trustees of the New Haven and to the Reorganization Court that only two courses were open: the Trustees must press to accomplish the inclusion in a Penn Central merger or they must press for liquidation. The former was obviously in the public interest and the latter was not. The course of inclusion was followed; but because the merger and the reorganization proceedings stretched out far beyond what was originally forecast, the `interim' became seven and a half years; and `losses reasonably incident to working out the solution most consistent with the public interest' eroded the debtor's estate in excess of $60 million. </s> . . . . . </s> "Like Laban of old, the Commission would now require further servitude of the debtor - in this case the creditors. But the duty of the debtor's creditors to suffer losses for an interim period has already [399 U.S. 392, 461] been fulfilled and the public interest has already been served to the extent that in fairness and equity the public had any right to demand." 304 F. Supp., at 800. (Footnote omitted.) </s> The Commission and Penn Central take issue with the reorganization court's disallowance of the deduction for delay. The dispute between them and the bondholders is not, however, broad in concept. It does not draw into question the right of the Commission to insist that New Haven obtain permission to abandon its operations: no one here quarrels with the proposition that in the event of a liquidation, New Haven would have been obliged to obtain a certificate from the Commission pursuant to 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The parties agree that since a delay occasioned by abandonment proceedings before the Commission, followed by judicial review, inheres in the liquidation process, the Commission may exercise its expertise in gauging the extent and expense of such a delay, and Penn Central need not pay for the consequent diminution in the value of the assets of the debtor. The dispute is, rather, a a narrow one. It is simply whether, in the circumstances of this case, the valuation initially arrived at by the Commission already presupposed that the debtor had a certificate of abandonment in hand, so that assignment of a cost attributable to that factor amounts to an unwarranted double deduction. </s> Before this Court the Commission and Penn Central urge the view that until the remand the Commission had not taken the delay factor into account. They justify the deduction on the second round as a development of the governing liquidation hypothesis adopted on the first. Once we enter the world of a liquidation that [399 U.S. 392, 462] never occurred, they say, the Commission is more competent than the courts to project incidental costs and delays. On the remand the Commission merely refined the liquidation approach to reflect added expenses not initially considered because of the fairness of the price arrived at by the parties. The new price ordered by the courts compelled re-examination of the elements of liquidation, of which abandonment delay is surely one. And when it comes to predicting the likelihood of delay in passing on an application for a certificate of abandonment, the Commission is, as Penn Central puts it, "a uniquely qualified finder of fact . . . ." 71 </s> At once the "refinement" rationale confronts an imposing obstacle raised by the Commission's own Second Supplemental Report. That report makes clear that the Commission had the element of delay before it in making its original valuation, but declined to apply any deduction on its account. The Commission considered - and rejected - Penn Central's request "that an allowance be made to the earliest date at which a liquidation could reasonably be anticipated for the constant diminution of N[ew] H[aven]'s assets." 331 I. C. C., at 698. (Emphasis supplied.) That rejection necessarily implied that the Commission had recognized the cost attributable to the delay occasioned by an abandonment proceeding, but determined not to weigh it in the balance. Thus we deal, not with a delay factor brought to light for the first time on the second round, but with one taken into account [399 U.S. 392, 463] now even though deliberately excluded before. Justification, if any there be, must begin with the realization that the Commission changed its mind in midstream. </s> The reorganization court rejected the Commission's conclusion that the valuation date selected in the Second Supplemental Report - December 31, 1966 - represented the date on which New Haven would have sought a certificate of abandonment rather than the date on which the railroad would have commenced its six-year sale. In doing so, the court relied on more than the Commission's shift in position between its second and fourth reports. The court rested on its express finding of fact that "but for the adoption by the Trustees of a course to serve the public interest, abandonment proceedings could and would have been commenced in late 1963 and liquidation would have been started, certainly by the valuation date of December 31, 1966." 304 F. Supp., at 801. That finding comes to us from the federal judge who has presided over the second New Haven reorganization since its inception. "In view of the district judge's familiarity with the reorganization, this finding has especial weight with us." Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 533 . Not only are we unable to say the finding is erroneous; we do not see how the record of these proceedings permits any other conclusion. </s> Indeed, the Commission and Penn Central do not challenge that conclusion. Instead, they seek support for the delay deduction by urging that if confronted with an abandonment application, the Commission would have had to "hear the communities that would be affected by the abandonment. If there is hope of a public takeover of segments, we must allow time for the States and communities to present their plans." 334 I. C. C., at 58. [399 U.S. 392, 464] But apart from the fact that this Court itself once characterized the notion that the affected States or the Federal Government might take over the road and its operations as "sheer speculation," Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 507 , the reorganization court specifically rejected the Commission's argument. </s> "During seven and one-half years, the Federal government, the states, the communities and the public in general were fully informed by the Trustees of the Railroad as to the inability of the New Haven to survive as an independent railroad. And, apart from seeking inclusion in a merged Penn Central, the Trustees were engaging in a holding operation to afford the public bodies, as the real guardians of the public interest, the opportunity to act - to take over or adopt measures to preserve the New Haven transportation system. Response to this was partial tax assistance and, in the latter half of the period, grants which covered about 1/3 of the annual passenger losses. . . . Otherwise nothing has come to the attention of this court, to indicate anything more than a highly speculative prospect, that any or all of the states concerned or their municipalities had the slightest interest in taking over and operating the New Haven or any segment of it. </s> "In spite of full awareness of the situation of the bankrupt line and with nothing to prevent their doing so, no standby legislation, for use if inclusion of the New Haven by Penn Central fell through, was ever enacted or sought to be passed in seven and one-half years by the Federal Government or by any of the states for the take over and operation of the New Haven freight and passenger system or a segment of it (except for the west-end and the Boston commuter services); nor was any plan ever [399 U.S. 392, 465] filed by the governmental bodies incorporating such take over and operation." 304 F. Supp., at 800-801. 72 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 466] </s> We think the reorganization court was entirely correct in concluding that: </s> "The policy of imposing an interim burden of losses, through its deficit operation, on a railroad in reorganization is to afford a reasonable opportunity to the responsible agencies to arrange the continuation of the railroad's operation, but the law does not require the furnishing of two or three or four opportunities. The duty was more than amply fulfilled by the New Haven. The public interest has had one huge bite of the apple; it is not entitled to another." 304 F. Supp., at 801. </s> It is argued that the Commission nonetheless should be permitted to tax New Haven with the cost of a one-year delay because in fact the debtor sought no abandonment certificate from the Commission. The Commission and Penn Central attribute this failure to New Haven's self-interest. "The fact is," the Commission said, "that both the creditors and the trustees exercised options, assuming the risks involved therein, and the bondholders may not now be heard to ascribe to someone else the responsibility for the selection of their course of action, or inaction." 334 I. C. C., at 58. (Footnote omitted.) But the continued operation of the New Haven as a railroad depleted the estate by at least $60,000,000. 304 F. Supp., at 800. We fail to see how the self-interest of either the estate or its creditors was bettered by that operation. </s> Nor is there any substance to the contention that by failing to press for immediate liquidation of the debtor, the bondholders somehow waived their right to object to the imposition of the deduction for delay. The record that shows the preservation of New Haven in the public interest long after it had ceased to be viable as an independent enterprise demonstrates at the most that the bondholders had resigned themselves to bearing the costs [399 U.S. 392, 467] of interim operations pending inclusion in Penn Central. It contains no support for the proposition that they consented to the imposition of more than $15,000,000 in hypothetical costs on top of the tens of millions in actual costs they were forced to bear. As the reorganization court put it, "[S]uch a second round of loss superimposed on the first, like Pelion on Ossa, is as unfair and inequitable as can be imagined . . . ." 304 F. Supp., at 801. It cannot be sustained under any construction of the Bankruptcy Act. 73 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 468] </s> (b) The bulk-sale discount. New Haven's land holdings consisted of over 25,000 acres located along its rights-of-way in four States. In its Second Supplemental Report the Commission accepted the New Haven trustees' appraisal of the realty. The New Haven analysis was prepared by the company's general real estate agent, who relied in some instances on the studies of outside appraisers. The agent drew on a fund of actual experience, for the New Haven had long had a real estate department engaged in the disposition of nonoperating properties. From the inception of the New Haven trusteeship through November 1966, that department had completed 853 separate realty sales for a gross consideration of some $13,900,000. The Commission found that the large volume of past sales provided a "firm base" for the New Haven estimate. 331 I. C. C., at 667. </s> The New Haven agent assumed that the company would sell off its lots in normal-sized parcels. He gave specific consideration to each part of the railroad's property and reached his values on a zone-by-zone basis. He based his estimates of fair market value on his expert judgment, sales in the area, existing tax valuations, and the adaptability of the land to nonrailroad use. He discounted by 50% whenever the New Haven's records indicated questionable title; on the six-year liquidation [399 U.S. 392, 469] hypothesis, he deducted $15,971,000 as the cost of operating the New Haven realty department; and on the further assumption that the debtor would have to sell some of the property during the final year at vastly reduced prices, he made a further deduction of $8,178,000. </s> On the remand, the Commission ordered a further deduction from the liquidation value of the estate, based on a hypothetical sale in bulk of all the New Haven's land assets. </s> "The liquidation value urged by the creditors assumes not only the immediate right to abandon, . . . but also the right to break up the railroad and sell the parcels for their highest and best price. We think such a right may be restricted when a buyer for the entire bulk of the N[ew] H[aven] properties appears who will continue the operation of needed services." 334 I. C. C., at 60. (Footnote omitted.) </s> The Commission calculated the deduction on the premise that "[t]he bulk-sale discount merely reflects a market appraisal of the risks that the estate avoids, and the bulk buyer assumes." Id., at 61. The Commission then credited the evidence that Penn Central had presented through a realty expert with respect to a bulk sale of the New Haven land properties. The expert testified to the premium to be charged by a "single purchaser of property who would, in turn, sell off the property probably to many users and who would obtain his profit by reason of its purchase and resale." On the basis of this testimony, the Commission found that a bulk buyer would command at least a 10.5% return on his investment, calculated as the sum of a 75% borrowing at 9% and a 25% self-financing at an internal charge of 15%, and that such an investment rate required an additional 4.5% discount of the New Haven land values over and above the 6% by which they had already been [399 U.S. 392, 470] reduced. This bulk-sale discount resulted in a further diminution of $6,695,000 in the valuation of the New Haven assets. 334 I. C. C., at 61-62. </s> On the second round of review the reorganization court rejected the bulk-sale deduction as "improper and without support in law or reason." 304 F. Supp., at 805. </s> "Value, under the circumstances of this case, can only be arrived at through the dismantling of the transportation plant and a piece by piece sale of the properties. It is clear from the record that a market existed for the disposition of the properties on this basis. Their value is the best price the market place will give the seller, less the costs and expenses relevant to the sale . . . . It makes no difference whether the purchaser wants to use the property as is, or to improve and develop it. The question is how much will the market place give for a particular item of property." Ibid. </s> The court answered the argument that the discount merely reflected the risk of nonsale that the seller transferred to the bulk buyer by pointing to the Commission's prior deduction of over $8,000,000 for that purpose. Moreover, the deduction violated the requirement that the sale price meet the "fair upset" minimum imposed by 77 (b) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act. "That lowest price is what the market would pay, which is implicit in the standard used here, i. e., fair liquidation value. Neither a trustee nor an equity receiver could, with the court's approval, sell for less." 304 F. Supp., at 806. </s> Penn Central now protests that the reorganization court has erred in rejecting the bulk-sale discount. It says its expert witness duplicated no discounts previously taken; he proceeded on the basis of all previous deductions. In addition, it is argued, his analysis took into account the problem of market absorption caused by the [399 U.S. 392, 471] mass marketing of some 1,700 sale parcels and the risk of further depression of land values occasioned by cessation of New Haven's operations - factors not considered by New Haven's witness. The hypothetical bulk sale, Penn Central says, was merely a construct for quantifying the risks that New Haven itself would have assumed in undertaking the sale of its realty; it afforded a means to determine "the minimum rates of return necessary to attract capital to the business of owning and disposing of the New Haven's land." Penn Central insists that the bulk-sale analysis thus constituted a "pricing out" of an additional cost of liquidation; it was "simply an analytical device for approximating risks that would occur if the land were retailed over time as promptly as possible . . . ." </s> We may assume that Penn Central's "pricing out" theory is a rational one. But the record demonstrates that the Commission rejected it as insufficient to justify application of the bulk-sale theory. Penn Central's analysis, said the Commission, </s> "overlooks what is necessarily the bondholders' position - namely that aside from principles of equity and fairness they have a fixed right to sell off N[ew] H[aven] in parcels, so that even a bulk buyer must pay the per-parcel price. Our answer is that we may compel the bulk sale and the bulk sale discount as a condition of an abandonment certificate, and, therefore, as a reduction of the present price. </s> ". . . We . . . might compel N[ew] H[aven], if it filed for abandonment, to sell in bulk and thereby make a bulk sale price appropriate." 334 I. C. C., at 61. </s> The Commission thus ruled that only by assuming an actual buyer in bulk who would take over the New Haven properties for continued railroad operations could it compel the transfer of the real property at the reduced [399 U.S. 392, 472] price. Far from setting forth a theory of compulsory transfer "completely independent" of a "pricing out" analysis, the Commission concluded that only its power to compel the sale of the real estate to a single buyer for continued operation justified the bulk-sale discount. </s> We do not consider whether the Commission could lawfully impose such a bulk-transfer obligation on a railroad in liquidation at the cost of reducing the per-parcel valuation of its assets. 74 For the record before us is devoid of evidence that a bulk buyer would agree to take over the New Haven properties for continued service at any price. When a railroad has a lengthy history of deficit operations with no prospect of improvement, and a consequent operating value of zero or even a negative figure, the Commission cannot rationally assume that a deus ex machina will emerge to spend millions for the opportunity to lose millions more. </s> Penn Central's witness gave no testimony in support of any such theory. He was a professional developer of real estate, not a railroad operator. And he testified to what extra charges he would levy, after all previous deductions for the costs and risks of sale, to assume the risk of nonsale as well as the entrepreneurial activity of retailing the realty parcels. His testimony established nothing more than that he would not undertake the task [399 U.S. 392, 473] of per-parcel sales that New Haven had assumed unless the company paid him a handsome fee. The Commission could hardly have compelled the New Haven trustees to turn over the assets of the debtor to such an entrepreneur, who would, on his own testimony, have proceeded himself to do just what the Commission said it was empowered to forbid the bondholders to do - dismantle the estate, rid himself of railroad-connected assets, and devote his talents to the disposition of the realty. </s> 4. The discount of liquidation factors. In its Second Supplemental Report the Commission accepted the projection offered by the New Haven trustees that they could substantially complete a liquidation sale in six years. 331 I. C. C., at 663. Accordingly, the Commission discounted the estimated receipts of sale over the six-year period to reflect their present value - a deduction of $17,563,000. Id., at 661. It did not, however, discount the estimated expenses of liquidation, although these, too, were projected to occur over the six-year period. The reorganization court was of the view that if future receipts were to be discounted to present value, future expenses should likewise be. 289 F. Supp., at 461; cf. id., at 427-428. On the remand the Commission concurred. It noted that the parties were very close in their estimates of the proper discount, and it concluded that $3,800,000 represented the correct figure. Fourth Supplemental Report, 334 I. C. C., at 39-40. </s> On the second round of review the reorganization court observed that despite three valuation changes netting a $6,600,000 reduction in estimated worth, the Commission had failed to adjust the old, inapplicable discount figure. Accordingly, the court directed the Commission to file "a new formulation and computation of the discount for present value of the New Haven's liquidation proceeds, in accordance with generally recognized [399 U.S. 392, 474] accounting principles and based upon the changes made in valuation items through and including those stated in the present opinion." 304 F. Supp., at 810-811. The court added that the Commission could submit its new formulation and computation in the form of a letter or short brief, and afforded other parties in interest one week to file their comments, as well as any formulations and computations of their own, also in a letter or brief. In accordance with this directive of the court, the Commission submitted its new calculations, and the bondholders replied. In its order adjudging the price to be paid, the reorganization court ruled that "[t]he sum of $2,415,899 should be added to liquidation value inasmuch as it was improperly deducted in applying the discount to present value found by the Commission . . . ." 304 F. Supp. 1136, 1137. </s> In its brief before this Court the Bondholders Committee states that the reorganization court's directive resulted from the Commission's continued failure to calculate discounts back to present value with respect to four items, three of them to the detriment of New Haven and one to the detriment of Penn Central. The first is the $8,177,633 deducted as the cost of hypothetical forced sales of New Haven realty during the last years of the liquidation. The Commission could have treated the item either as part of the value of the unsold land and then written it off as a cost of sale, with a discount back to present value for both sides of the balance sheet, or as a wash to be eliminated in computing both receipts and expenses. In fact the Commission did neither: it included the figure on both sides of the books, but discounted back only in the asset column. The result, says the Committee, is an error of $2,066,488. A similar shortcoming in determining the liquidation values of road property, such as ties and rails, added another error of $1,474,057. Third, says the Committee, the Commission [399 U.S. 392, 475] erroneously spread the sale of certain realty over the full six-year period when the undisputed evidence showed that New Haven could sell the land in 12 to 18 months; this resulted in an overstatement of $118,000 in the discount attributable to the net proceeds. Finally, the Commission assumed that New Haven could sell off $47,121,400 in equipment, investments, and materials during the first year of the liquidation, but failed to spread the assumed receipts over the entirety of that year, with a consequent understatement of $1,372,646 in the applicable discount. A netting of the four items, together with an added correction of $130,000 made by the Commission, results in the $2,415,899 adjustment ordered by the reorganization court. </s> The Commission does not dispute that it made the errors as alleged by the Committee. Its sole reply is that the bondholders have waived their claims in this regard by failing to present them to the Commission. Penn Central concedes that "the first two errors asserted by the bondholders represent miscomputations" in Penn Central's favor. But it argues that the amount of the fourth error and the existence of the third were the subject of conflicting testimony before the Commission, and it joins in the Commission's contention that the bondholders have waived the right to a resolution in their favor by failing to press a timely objection before the Commission when the agency first made its alleged mistakes. </s> The record demonstrates that the bondholders have the better of this argument. It is undisputed that both the bondholders and Penn Central presented witnesses to the Commission on the remand who agreed that the Commission had erred in its discounts and who differed only in minor amounts. See Fourth Supplemental Report, 334 I. C. C., at 40. But the Commission simply bypassed the agreement, unpersuaded that it had erred [399 U.S. 392, 476] in its prior opinion. Id., at n. 17. The bondholders then carried the persistent discounting error to the reorganization court on the second round and won corrective relief. The submission of proposed adjustments by way of a letter was not, as is suggested, an untimely filing of claims, but a proper presentation pursuant to the instruction of the court - an instruction made necessary by the Commission's failure to straighten out the discounts after two rounds of hearings and reports, with errors that the bondholders on one side and Penn Central on the other now frankly concede aggregate over $5,000,000. Of the four items advanced by the Committee, only the third is subject to any real doubt, and that $118,000 item can hardly be considered a substantial sum in the context of these cases. A further remand to the Commission to resolve the accuracy of such a figure would serve no useful purpose at this stage of the litigation. The reorganization court resolved the controversy in favor of the bondholders following extensive oral argument on the issue. We affirm its judgment on these issues as free from that degree of error that would require us to overturn its finding. </s> 5. The loan-loss formula. In its Second Supplemental Report the Commission, projecting a three-year interim period between merger and inclusion and concluding that a short-term lease would not be appropriate, required Penn Central to extend $25,000,000 in loans to the New Haven in exchange for first-priority trustees' certificates. 331 I. C. C., at 702-706. 75 In addition, it ordered Penn Central to share in New Haven's operating losses to the extent of 100% in the first year, 50% in the second, [399 U.S. 392, 477] and 25% in the third, not to exceed $5,500,000 in any one year. Id., at 718-719. On the first round of judicial review the sliding-scale aspect of the formula was disapproved as an improper deterrent to the bondholders' assertion of their legal rights, 289 F. Supp., at 444, pursuant to the suggestion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS at an earlier stage of the proceedings, see Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 557 -558 (separate opinion), and on the remand the Commission abandoned it. 334 I. C. C., at 71-72. </s> The $5,500,000 annual ceiling derived from the assumption, based on calculations provided by the New Haven trustees and accepted by the Commission, that despite the massive cash drain in 1967, future annual New Haven operating losses would be unlikely to exceed $5,400,000 in succeeding years. 331 I. C. C., at 718-719. Coupled with the sliding-scale formula, the annual ceiling thus proposed that Penn Central absorb the entirety of New Haven's 1968 cash loss. On the first round the reorganization court expressed the opinion that even with the abrogation of the sliding scale, Penn Central's share of that loss "should be a substantial percentage." 289 F. Supp., at 464. </s> By the time the parties returned to the Commission on the remand, it was evident that the trustees' appraisal of their ability to contain the New Haven's deficits had been far too optimistic. From February through December 1968, the trustees had already drawn down $14,000,000 of the $25,000,000 loan that was supposed to last for three years; at that rate they would exhaust the loan in another six or seven months. 334 I. C. C., at 72. The cash loss was equally grim: the projected 1968 cash deficit stood at $15,672,000, with an estimated operating deficit of $8,200,000. Despite the $2,800,000 increase in the operating deficit over the trustees' initial prediction, the Commission adhered to its original ceiling and, pro-rating [399 U.S. 392, 478] over the 11-month period from merger to inclusion, required Penn Central to pay $5,000,000. 334 I. C. C., at 74. On the second round of review the reorganization court affirmed without discussion. </s> The bondholders now urge that Penn Central be required to bear the entire operating loss from merger to inclusion. New Haven incurred that loss as an independent entity, say the bondholders, only because it remained outside of Penn Central after the merger, at Penn Central's request and for Penn Central's convenience. It is urged that the Commission's ceiling was originally calculated to place the entire loss of the first year on Penn Central, and that the original intention should be carried out. 76 </s> Penn Central denies responsibility for the fact that inclusion took place some 11 months after merger rather than along with it, and puts the blame at the door of the bondholders for their litigious insistence upon working out the terms of inclusion prior to the event. It also notes that it has been obliged to take over New Haven less than a year after its own formation, rather than at a later point in the three-year period originally envisaged by the Commission. [399 U.S. 392, 479] </s> While the issue is not free from doubt, we cannot say the reorganization court committed error in letting the Commission's action stand. Without ascribing fault to any party, we note the unfairness to the bondholders in requiring them to bear whatever portion of the operating loss Penn Central does not pay due to the inability of Penn Central and the trustees to negotiate an interim lease. On the other hand, there is a countervailing unfairness to Penn Central in requiring it to bear the full burden of New Haven's losses while it lacked exclusive and assured control over the operations of the debtor. The $5,000,000 paid by Penn Central is no drop in the bucket; it amounts to 61% of the operating loss as figured by the Commission and nearly one-third of the entire cash loss for the interim period. In no sense did Penn Central's contribution represent a payment for assets received; on the liquidation hypothesis, the Commission could rationally have declined to require any payment at all. Chase Manhattan argues that "[e]ither there was no equitable obligation on the part of Penn Central to pay any of the New Haven loss during the period from the date of the Penn Central merger to the date of its acquisition of the New Haven assets or there was an obligation to pay the entire loss." We cannot agree that the Commission was obliged to adopt such an all-or-nothing approach. Under the circumstances, the Commission's final disposition represents a pragmatic compromise of the competing interests, and in the abence of a controlling contrary principle of law we do not disturb the reorganization court's acceptance of the Commission's judgment. </s> 6. New Haven investments. The Bondholders Committee complains that New Haven has transferred its stock ownership in two concerns - the New York Connecting Railroad and the Railway Express Agency - with no value given in exchange. The Connecting Railroad [399 U.S. 392, 480] was owned jointly by New Haven and Penn Central on a 50-50 basis, Fourth Supplemental Report, 334 I. C. C., at 44 n. 20, and is now presumably a wholly owned subsidiary of the merged company. REA is owned by various railroads; at the time of inclusion New Haven held about 4.5% of the outstanding stock. </s> In both instances the Commission valued New Haven's investment interest on the liquidation hypothesis. A witness presented by the New Haven trustees, whose testimony the Commission accepted, stated that because of Connecting Railroad's $18,000,000 funded debt its stock would have no liquidation value whatever. As to the REA, he said that its stock would have little or no value because of pending litigation over a tender offer for the stock 77 as well as recent legislation increasing the permissible size and weight of parcel post packages. Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 678. </s> The Bondholders Committee does not attack the Commission's finding of zero value for the Connecting Railroad and REA stock. Instead, the Committee says that if the shares were worthless, the Commission erred in requiring their transfer to Penn Central. Were the stock to have had no value on the liquidation of New Haven, the Committee argues, the reorganization court would, in the absence of bids for the shares, have ordered their distribution to the creditors to do with as they pleased. Accordingly, the Committee calls for the return of the stock to New Haven. </s> The Committee's request overlooks the fact that even though the shares in question might be worthless to a New Haven undergoing liquidation, the Commission could nonetheless order their transfer on the ground of their value to an ongoing Penn Central required to take in New Haven as an operating entity. But entirely apart [399 U.S. 392, 481] from that consideration, and without pausing to assess the correctness of the zero valuation placed on the stock, we agree with Penn Central that the Committee's request for the return of the stock is foreclosed by res judicata. For the Committee - as well as all the other bondholders - took no appeal from the order of the reorganization court directing the transfer of the New Haven assets subject to a later determination of value. 78 </s> 7. "Going-concern" value. The bondholders urge that Penn Central should pay an added amount to reflect the "going-concern" value of the New Haven. This sum, it is stressed, would be calculated, not as an alternative to liquidation value, but as a supplement to it. Since it is universally agreed that the New Haven was a losing operation in the form in which Penn Central was obliged to take it over, the bondholders display considerable temerity in pressing for inclusion of what could prove, in an ultimate analysis, to be only a substantial negative figure. 79 </s> The Commission rejected the notion that the New Haven had a going-concern value over and above the liquidation value of its physical properties. In the Commission's view, the bondholders' estimate of $55,075,000 for such intangibles as organizational costs was premised on the replacement of a defunct railroad and [399 U.S. 392, 482] overlooked the probability that no one would ever have rebuilt the New Haven in its present form. More fundamentally, the Commission correctly repudiated the claims based on going-concern value as antithetical to the liquidation hypothesis on which the appraisal of the New Haven's assets had proceeded. As the Commission said, "It is not realistic to assume that a potential buyer would pay the liquidated value of the N[ew] H[aven] assets and then pay additional amounts representing elements of going concern value in the face of N[ew] H[aven]'s past deficit operations and its bleak prospects for the future." Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 686-687. </s> The Bondholders Committee concedes that the intangible assets in fact acquired by Penn Central "would be worthless to the New Haven in an assumed liquidation . . . ." That is enough to end the matter. The bondholders are not entitled to treat the New Haven as a liquidating enterprise with respect to certain items and as an operating railroad with respect to others, depending on which approach happens to yield the higher value. Nothing could be more unfair or inequitable to Penn Central than to permit the New Haven bondholders, at its expense, to have the best of both worlds. 80 </s> [399 U.S. 392, 483] </s> 8. The "underwriting" plan for the Penn Central stock. Thus far we have considered the disputes over the valuation of the New Haven assets transferred to Penn Central. We now reach the one issue raised in connection with the consideration given by Penn Central in exchange. The Purchase Agreement negotiated by Pennsylvania and New York Central on the one side and the New Haven trustees on the other provided that Penn Central should pay in part for the New Haven properties with 950,000 shares of its common stock. 81 As a New Haven trustee stated, "[O]ne of the principles for which we negotiated at considerable length was that the bulk of [399 U.S. 392, 484] the consideration should be in the form of common stock or, failing that, should be debt instruments having either conversion rights or options which would permit the claimants to the New Haven's Estate to participate in the benefits of the merger." In confirming the terms of the agreement, the Commission accepted the testimony of a New Haven trustee that the value of the stock could range anywhere from $75 to $100 a share on the date of closing and that the average, $87.50, represented his estimate of market value at the time of inclusion. 331 I. C. C., at 688-689. The Commission adopted the $87.50 per share value placed on the Penn Central stock by the trustee as reasonable. Id., at 689-690. </s> On the first round of review the reorganization court agreed that the $87.50 per share figure represented a fair value for the Penn Central stock, based on the Commission's calculation of the estimated future earning power of the new company and the testimony of the New Haven trustee, "a well qualified expert." The court saw "no reason why recent fluctuations in the market value of these shares should change the disposition of the matter . . . ." 289 F. Supp., at 462. </s> On the remand, the bondholders challenged the Commission's stock valuation. The Commission cursorily rejected the attack on the ground that the bondholders' witness was unfamiliar with Penn Central's operating and financial plans, gave undue weight to extraordinary past expenses, and generally neglected the future prospects of the company. 334 I. C. C., at 68 n. 40. </s> By the time of the second round of judicial review, inclusion had taken place and the Penn Central had given its consideration in exchange. The bondholders, renewing their charge that the Commission's prophecy had been erroneous, pointed to the actual market performance of the stock. As of the inclusion date, December 31, 1968, the market price stood at 63 3/8, more than [399 U.S. 392, 485] 20 points below the Commission's estimated value. If that date should be thought suspect because of year-end sell-offs, the bondholders noted that throughout 1968 the price had fluctuated between 53 1/2 and 86 1/2, with a mean price between February 1 and December 31 of 69 1/2. Thus, the bondholders contended, the primary component of their bundle of consideration had turned out to be worth anywhere from $17,000,000 to $23,000,000 less than it was supposed to be. </s> On the second round the reorganization court rejected the bondholders' contention that the Commission had predicted an $87.50 value as of the closing date. </s> "[T]he Commission, presumably in an effort to assure fairness to Penn Central, did not use the market value of December 31, 1966 or an average of the values at or about December 31, 1968, the actual date of transfer. Instead, it adopted the theory that, after all, the purpose of using stock in payment was to tap the expected future economic benefit of the Penn Central merger which would come to full fruition seven to ten years after its effective date on February 1, 1968, but would be reflected in an upward trend of the stock at the time of closing or transfer of New Haven's assets to Penn Central, then estimated to be in 1970. </s> . . . . . </s> "[T]he theory of giving recognition to an intrinsic value in the shares, which will be realized when the full economic benefits of the merger have been achieved, not only assists the Penn Central by relieving it of the need to divest itself of a crippling amount of cash, which would be prejudicial to its merger program, but affords the New Haven an opportunity to participate in probable future profits." 304 F. Supp., at 808-809. [399 U.S. 392, 486] </s> The court nonetheless recognized an element of unfairness to the New Haven bondholders in that the New Haven was compelled to accept the stock "at a substantial present loss on an assurance of future gain." As the court put it, "The nub of the unfairness and inequity is not the 87 1/2 fixed for present calculations, but the fact that the purchaser is getting assets of sure present value while the seller is asked to gamble for its payment on the future of the Penn Central." Id., at 809. The court concluded that this did not necessitate a change in price or an amendment to the valuations postulated by the Commission. "To be fair and equitable, however, it does require a supplemental provision fulfilling the implicit promise by the purchaser to pay $83.1 million as part of the price for the assets conveyed." Accordingly, the court provided that </s> "if at any time the market price of Penn Central common shares reaches and maintains 87 1/2 per share on the New York Stock Exchange for a period of five consecutive days on which the Exchange is open and doing business (not counting days on which the Exchange is closed to trading) between the date of final consummation of the plan of reorganization and February 1, 1978, then and in that event it will be conclusively presumed that Penn Central has, in transferring the shares to the New Haven, made payment of the $83.1 million of the purchase price represented by the shares. If, however, the common shares of Penn Central do not reach and maintain the price as aforesaid, then the value of the shares will be determined by the average of the means between high and low prices of Penn Central shares on the New York Stock Exchange for the 30 business days next preceding February 1, 1978, on which the Exchange is actually operating and there are [399 U.S. 392, 487] sales of Penn Central shares. Penn Central will forthwith become liable to pay in cash to the New Haven, or its successor or successors, the difference between said mean market prices of those 30 days and 87 1/2 for each share . . . ." 304 F. Supp., at 809-810. </s> The court provided that the benefit of Penn Central's underwriting of any difference between the mean market price and 87 1/2 would inure only to the New Haven and would not follow the shares into the hands of third-party buyers. </s> In addition, the court afforded Penn Central the option of relieving itself of the 1978 underwriting obligation in the following manner: </s> "The Penn Central is granted an option, operative between the date of final consummation of the plan and February 1, 1978, to discharge its obligation to underwrite and pay the difference between such average market price and the higher 87 1/2 at the end of the ten year period by paying on one or more blocks of 50,000 shares to the New Haven . . . the difference between the mean market prices for sales of Penn Central common shares and 87 1/2 per share as of a specific day of sales on the Exchange which shall previously have been designated by Penn Central in a written notice delivered to the New Haven at least 5 days prior to such market date." Id., at 810. </s> The underwriting plan of the reorganization court thus combined a series of essential findings and protective features. First, it ratified the Commission's determination that intrinsic value rather than market price should guide the appraisal of the worth of the Penn Central common stock; second, it predicted that that intrinsic value would be reflected in a market price of at least [399 U.S. 392, 488] $87.50 per share by the time Penn Central fully realized the benefits of its merger; third, it provided that Penn Central would secure the New Haven estate against the risk that the market price of its stock would not reflect that minimum intrinsic value within the first nine years after inclusion; and fourth, it contemplated that New Haven would be left free to participate in whatever future appreciations in value Penn Central's stock might enjoy. In sum, the reorganization court devised a plan that added to its assessment of present worth both a reasonable assurance of realization of such worth and the opportunity of additional gain. In so doing, the reorganization court in effect determined that postponement of immediate realization of $87.50 per share was offset by the possibility of even greater future market price of the stock, and that the package constituted fair compensation for the assets transferred to Penn Central. </s> On the basis of the record before the District Court at the time of its order, we would have no hesitancy in accepting its findings, conclusions, and proposed underwriting plan as consistent with the history of the reorganization proceedings and supported by substantial evidence. But we cannot avoid the impact of recent events in assessing the propriety of the decree that that court has entered. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 445. And those events make it possible that this aspect of the reorganization court's decree may be wholly unrealistic. </s> The fairness and equity that are the essence of a 77 proceeding forbid our approval of a payment for the transferred New Haven properties that may be worth only a fraction of its purported value. And the same considerations of fairness and equity prevent imposing on Penn Central the burden of immediate payment in full, particularly when it is remembered that the New Haven bondholders have never objected to the receipt [399 U.S. 392, 489] of Penn Central stock in exchange for the New Haven assets. </s> Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Connecticut District Court insofar as it determines that an intrinsic value of $87.50 inheres in the Penn Central common stock and implements an underwriting plan to secure payment of that sum. Further proceedings before the Commission and the appropriate federal courts will be necessary to determine the form that Penn Central's consideration to New Haven should properly take and the status of the New Haven estate as a shareholder or creditor of Penn Central. </s> V </s> We turn finally to the contention of the bondholders that quite apart from the specific items that together go to make up the price to be paid for the New Haven assets, the plan of reorganization itself is not only unfair and inequitable under the Bankruptcy Act but violates the Fifth Amendment as a taking of property without just compensation. </s> The purchase price that the Commission and the reorganization court have required Penn Central to pay to the New Haven estate is based upon the liquidation value of the seller's assets, appraised as of December 31, 1966. That price hypothesizes a shutdown of New Haven followed by a sell-off of its assets at their highest and best value. In the circumstances of this case, and for the reasons we have already set out at length, we agree with the reorganization court that it would be unfair and inequitable to allow Penn Central to take the properties for any lesser sum. Moreover, we today require a reassessment of the consideration that Penn Central is to give in exchange for those properties. We thereby accord the bondholders the right to a liquidation and a per-parcel sale that is theirs by virtue [399 U.S. 392, 490] of their mortgage liens. The Bankruptcy Act does not require that they be given more. Nor is it necessary to consider the bondholders' claim that anything less than full liquidation value would amount to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. </s> But the Bondholders Committee presses another Fifth Amendment argument. It points to the Commission's own finding that from the inception of the New Haven reorganization through 1968 the debtor's estate had amassed more than $70,000,000 in administrative and pre-bankruptcy claims that take priority over the bondholders' liens. Fourth Supplemental Report, 334 I. C. C., at 126. The reorganization court itself noted that "`losses reasonably incident to working out the solution most consistent with the public interest' [have] eroded the debtor's estate in excess of $60 million." 304 F. Supp., at 800. (Footnote omitted.) Although the extent to which the ongoing deficit operation has impaired the bondholders' security is unclear, it is undeniable that the continued operation of the railroad into the late 1960's, together with the legal uncertainties engendered by the doubtful future of the company, have greatly depressed the value of the bondholders' interests. Cf. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 509 . 82 </s> A 77 reorganization court may not, of course, disregard a claim that injurious consequences will result to a secured creditor from the suspension of the right to enforce his lien against the property of a debtor. That claim, however, "presents a question addressed not to [399 U.S. 392, 491] the power of the court but to its discretion - a matter not subject to the interference of an appellate court unless such discretion be improvidently exercised." Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 677 . Here the reorganization court recognized its duties under the Bankruptcy Act and the Constitution. In August 1968 it ruled as follows: </s> "In view of the history of this deficit operation from the time of the filing of the petition under 77 and even before, the size of the losses, the long period of time necessarily involved in seeking to work out a solution, short of liquidation, through inclusion in the Penn-Central, the present condition of the Railroad and the rate of loss and out-flow of cash in the recent past and in the foreseeable future, this court finds that the continued erosion of the Debtor's estate from operational losses after the end of 1968 will clearly constitute a taking of the Debtor's property and consequently the interests of the bondholders, without just compensation. It is therefore constitutionally impermissible, and obviously no reorganization plan which calls for such a taking can be approved." 289 F. Supp., at 459. </s> We do not doubt that the time consumed in the course of the proceedings in the reorganization court has imposed a substantial loss upon the bondholders. But in the circumstances presented by this litigation we see no constitutional bar to that result. The rights of the bondholders are not absolute. As we have had occasion to say before, security holders </s> "cannot be called upon to sacrifice their property so that a depression-proof railroad system might be created. But they invested their capital in a public [399 U.S. 392, 492] utility that does owe an obligation to the public. . . . [B]y their entry into a railroad enterprise, [they] assumed the risk that in any depression or any reorganization the interests of the public would be considered as well as theirs." Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 535 -536. </s> Only two Terms ago, when we last considered the Penn Central merger, we quoted approvingly the Commission's statement that "[i]t is a fundamental aspect of our free enterprise economy that private persons assume the risks attached to their investments, and the N[ew] H[aven] creditors can expect no less because the N[ew] H[aven]'s properties are devoted to a public use." Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 510 . We added: </s> "While the rights of the bondholders are entitled to respect, they do not command Procrustean measures. They certainly do not dictate that rail operations vital to the Nation be jettisoned despite the availability of a feasible alternative. The public interest is not merely a pawn to be sacrificed for the strategic purposes or protection of a class of security holders . . . ." Id., at 510-511. </s> In this context we appraise the bondholders' claim that the continued operation of the New Haven from the inception of the reorganization proceeding in 1961 to the inclusion in Penn Central in 1968 worked an unconstitutional taking of their property. There is no longer room for dispute that the bondholders will receive the highest and best price for the assets of the debtor as of December 31, 1966. That price of course reflects the depreciation of the properties and the losses incurred in the operation of the railroad from the commencement of reorganization proceedings under 77 in the middle of 1961. But the Bondholders Committee does not tell [399 U.S. 392, 493] us what the depreciation and losses attributable to the prevaluation period are. Moreover, no bondholder formally petitioned the reorganization court to dismiss the proceedings and thereby permit a foreclosure on the mortgage liens until April 1967 - well after the 1966 valuation date. 83 </s> Nor can Penn Central be held liable for the further decline in New Haven's value from the valuation date to the actual inclusion. The new company did not even come into existence until midway through that period, and from the point of its own creation until it took in the New Haven, it contributed substantially to recompense the debtor for its operating losses. Moreover, the failure of the bondholders to press for early liquidation of the New Haven meant that their initial application for a dismissal of the reorganization proceedings came just as the objective of salvaging the New Haven appeared possible to achieve. As the reorganization court noted, only two of the several bondholder groups made that initial application; it was not joined by the trustees, nor was it endorsed by other representatives of the bondholders and creditors; and it came just as the Commission was about to certify a feasible plan of reorganization to the court. "To jettison everything achieved and turn back just as a glimmer of light begins to show at the end of a long dark tunnel," said the court, "not only carries with it an aura of unreality but borders on the fantastic." In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 281 F. Supp., at 68. </s> On the other hand, we must also reject any lingering suggestion by Penn Central that the price it must pay for the New Haven assets is unfair in either a statutory or a constitutional sense. At first glance there is a [399 U.S. 392, 494] seeming anomaly in the requirement that Penn Central pay a liquidating value for property it must operate at a loss. But it is not correct to say that New Haven's right to liquidate is inconsistent with Penn Central's obligation to operate, or that if the New Haven's creditors had such a right, Penn Central must have it as well. The bondholders had the right by force of their state-created liens under the New Haven's mortgage obligations. Penn Central had no such right, because its merger was expressly conditioned on its assumption of responsibility for continued New Haven service. There was nothing inequitable in an arrangement that permitted the bondholders to recover the value of their liens on the property of the debtor at the same time that it required Penn Central to pay that value in exchange for the nearly $1,000,000,000 worth of benefits that the merger was then anticipated to produce. </s> As the Commission said at the time of its Second Supplemental Report, "Calling upon Penn-Central to pay more than the N[ew] H[aven] is worth as a going concern is not unreasonable within the meaning of section 5 (2). . . . The Penn-Central merger (which will bring substantial dollar savings to the merger applicants) was approved with the thought that some of the merger savings would be available specifically to ward off a liquidation and shutdown of the N[ew] H[aven] so that adequate transportation service would remain available to the public which now relies on the N[ew] H[aven]." 331 I. C. C., at 687-688. </s> The reorganization court made the point with clarity and force: </s> "The whole purpose of making the inclusion of the New Haven a condition of the merger was to require Penn-Central, which, in being permitted to merge, was granted the opportunity to realize tremendous economic benefits, to take over and operate [399 U.S. 392, 495] a helplessly sick but still needed railroad, which it could well afford to do. It is part of the price Penn-Central is called upon to pay for the right to merge. The right to merge was granted, the merger has taken place, and the price should be paid." 289 F. Supp., at 465-466. </s> For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, reviewed on writs of certiorari in Nos. 914, 916, 920, 1038, and 1057, is affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, appealed from in Nos. 915, 917, and 921, is vacated, and those cases are remanded with instructions to abstain pending the further proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission and the reviewing courts under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the decision of these cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Fn [399 U.S. 392, 399] On June 21, 1970, the Penn Central Transportation Company filed a petition for reorganization under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 205, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Whether the financial obligations dealt with in the present opinion may become subject to modification in or because of those proceedings is a question with which the present opinion in no way deals. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 494 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372, 379 . </s> [Footnote 2 Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 327 I. C. C. 475, 479 ("Merger Report"). </s> [Footnote 3 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 4 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S., at 392 . </s> [Footnote 5 Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 493 . </s> [Footnote 6 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 7 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S., at 380 . </s> [Footnote 8 Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 489. </s> [Footnote 9 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S., at 447 (separate opinion of DOUGLAS, J.). </s> [Footnote 10 Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 493 ; Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 501. </s> [Footnote 11 As part of its initial merger order, the Commission had prescribed special traffic and indemnity provisions for the benefit of the Delaware & Hudson, Boston & Maine, and Erie-Lackawanna railroads. The Commission had not yet determined whether those three "protected carriers" should be included in either Penn Central or the recently formed Norfolk & Western, but concluded they required sheltering conditions if they were to survive the interim period pending decision as to their ultimate disposition. Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 531-532. On September 16, 1966, following objections to the initial order from various parties, the Commission abrogated the indemnity provisions originally prescribed for the protected carriers and announced it would reconsider its earlier decision, with possible modifications to be given retroactive effect. Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 328 I. C. C. 304 ("Reconsideration Report"). On October 4, 1966, a three-judge District Court in the Southern District of New York declined, one judge dissenting, to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's order. Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States, [399 U.S. 392, 401] 259 F. Supp. 964. Later, the District Court denied injunctive relief sought by bondholders of the New Haven railroad. Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 386. On March 27, 1967, this Court reversed and remanded Erie-Lackawanna with instructions that the Commission complete its proceedings relating to the protected roads. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372 . We later vacated and remanded Oscar Gruss for reconsideration in light of Baltimore & Ohio, 386 U.S. 776 . Ensuing developments are recounted in the text. </s> [Footnote 12 Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 330 I. C. C. 328 ("First Supplemental Report"). </s> [Footnote 13 Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 316. </s> [Footnote 14 Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486 . </s> [Footnote 15 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S., at 381 ; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Trustees Discontinuance of Passenger Service, 327 I. C. C. 77, 79-80 ("Suburban Discontinuance Case"). </s> [Footnote 16 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., Trustees, Discontinuance of All Interstate Passenger Trains, 327 I. C. C. 151, 163 ("Interstate Discontinuance Case"). </s> [Footnote 17 Id., at 163-164. </s> [Footnote 18 Id., at 169. </s> [Footnote 19 Suburban Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C., at 80. </s> [Footnote 20 See generally Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 386 U.S., at 452 -454 (separate opinion of DOUGLAS, J.); L. Brandeis, Financial Condition of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company and of the Boston & Maine Railroad (1907); L. Brandeis, Other People's Money 129-136 (1933); Report of the Joint New England Railroad Committee to the Governors of the New England States 53-73 (1923); E. Sunderland, A Brief History of the Reorganization of The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company 1-5 (1948); Capture of the New Haven, Fortune Magazine, April 1949, p. 86 et seq. </s> [Footnote 21 See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 169 F.2d 337, 338 n. 6, cert. denied sub nom. Mulcahy v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 335 U.S. 867 . </s> [Footnote 22 See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F.2d 635, 640. </s> [Footnote 23 Commission of Department of Public Utilities v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 178 F.2d 559, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943 ; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 163 F. Supp. 59. </s> [Footnote 24 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 278 F. Supp. 592, 606, aff'd, 405 F.2d 50, cert. denied sub nom. Abex Corp. v. Trustees, 394 U.S. 999 . </s> [Footnote 25 278 F. Supp., at 606. </s> [Footnote 26 Id., at 601. </s> [Footnote 27 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451, 456; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 281 F. Supp. 65. </s> [Footnote 28 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 278 F. Supp., at 606. </s> [Footnote 29 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 405 F.2d, at 52. </s> [Footnote 30 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 281 F. Supp., at 65-66. </s> [Footnote 31 Suburban Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C., at 79, 80, 106. </s> [Footnote 32 By this time the railroad's freight operations were also operating at deficit levels. The Commission explained this aspect of the problem as follows: </s> "Southern New England is a deficit area in terms of food, fuel, and the raw materials for industry. Accordingly, in serving this economy, the New Haven is a short haul railroad with a heavily unbalanced flow of traffic and equipment. As a terminal railroad it faces the constant problems and added costs of switching and deadheading foreign line freight cars to move them back off its own lines. Moreover, as a result of national and regional economic and industrial shifts, New England's outbound products have become increasingly high-value and light-weight in character. With the expansion in the region of a modern, comprehensive highway system during the past 20 years, this outbound freight traffic has become especially susceptible to diversion from rail to private and for-hire trucking service." Interstate Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C., at 170. </s> [Footnote 33 Id., at 164. </s> [Footnote 34 See id., at 175. </s> [Footnote 35 See Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 488. </s> [Footnote 36 Interstate Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C., at 152. </s> [Footnote 37 Id., at 172, 173. </s> [Footnote 38 Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 507 . </s> [Footnote 39 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 281 F. Supp. 65. </s> [Footnote 40 In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 278 F. Supp., at 602. </s> [Footnote 41 See Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp., at 333. The three-judge court, writing in October 1967, expressed full agreement with these findings: </s> "No one has contested the forecast of the NH Trustees that their cash will run out at the end of 1967; no one has indicated any probable source of funds for that beleaguered property other than the merged Penn-Central. . . . For our part we are unwilling to take responsibility for such devastating hardship as even a temporary cessation of NH's operations would bring to New England and New York and in a lesser degree to other sections of the country when in our view there is no reason why the merger should not proceed; indeed we believe we have no right to do so. . . ." 279 F. Supp., at 355. "[W]ith the situation now so serious, there can hardly be doubt that it is better to accept what is good for the New Haven than permit the patient to die while in quest of the best." Id., at 335. </s> [Footnote 42 Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 331 I. C. C. 643, 651 ("Second Supplemental Report"). </s> [Footnote 43 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 44 Id., at 653. </s> [Footnote 45 The transfer was to be free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, with certain minor exceptions. The liens and encumbrances would shift to the proceeds of the sale and thus remain an obligation of the New Haven estate. </s> By negotiating a purchase and sale of the New Haven assets, the parties to the agreement elected not to attempt a recapitalization of New Haven, an enlarged merger that would bring New Haven into the Penn Central system as a corporate entity, or a lease of the New Haven operating assets. At one point, when it appeared the New Haven might not long survive, the Commission had directed the parties to negotiate a lease to be "immediately available upon consummation of the Penn-Central merger," but the negotiators reported they were unable to do so and instead suggested various loan-loss formulas. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 508 ; Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp., at 334; Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 648. </s> [Footnote 46 Subsequent modifications to the Agreement were executed October 4, 1966, and December 20, 1967. </s> The bondholders were not bound by the trustees' acceptance of the Purchase Agreement. The trustees acted on behalf of the debtor, subject to the directive of the reorganization court, but [399 U.S. 392, 411] they never submitted the Agreement to that court for its approval. Moreover, they had stipulated with Pennsylvania and Central that they would not challenge the terms of the Purchase Agreement. The preliminary memoranda negotiated between the trustees and the two railroads contained a provision, substantially embodied in 11.7 of the Agreement itself, that New Haven would not make or file </s> "any further statement, stipulation or other document in the pending Pennsylvania-Central merger proceedings before the I. C. C. . . ., or any judicial review thereof, other than in connection with (a) a position relating to the New Haven taken by any other party . . ., or (b) a failure of the I. C. C. to find either (i) that the New Haven should be included in such merger or (ii) that jurisdiction is to be retained by the I. C. C. for later determination of any petition by the New Haven for such inclusion, provided, however, that any such statement, stipulation or other document made or filed by the Trustees shall not be inconsistent with the provisions and intent of this Agreement." </s> The reorganization court suggested that the bondholders rather than the trustees press for early inclusion due to the impropriety of the trustees' taking "any action which would be or appear to be a repudiation of [the contract's] letter or spirit." See Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp., at 333; and see Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States, 261 F. Supp., at 393-394. </s> [Footnote 47 The reorganization court had authorized the New Haven trustees to pursue a "two-step" plan before the Commission, in which the debtor's estate would sell its assets to Penn Central and then the trustees would file a specification of the terms to be accorded the security holders. In 1967, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's authorization order with certain modifications not here pertinent, postponing consideration of the [399 U.S. 392, 414] merits of the "two-step" plan because of the prematurity of the question as then presented. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F.2d 635, 639. Pursuant to the plan of reorganization, the New Haven is to be reconstituted as a closed-end, nondiversified management investment company. See Pennsylvania R. Co. - Merger - New York Central R. Co., 334 I. C. C. 25, 93 ("Fourth Supplemental Report"). The reorganization court has withheld disposition of the second or "distributive" step of the plan pending this Court's resolution of the question of price. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1121, 1123-1124. </s> [Footnote 48 The United States Trust Company, as indenture trustee under the New Haven's Harlem River Division mortgage, had been one of the bondholder plaintiffs on the first round. At the suggestion of the reorganization court, 289 F. Supp., at 464, it received recognition of its secured status on the remand, when the Commission directed Penn Central to assume the Division bonds. 334 I. C. C., at 70. The trustee sought no further review. </s> [Footnote 49 In a Fifth Supplemental Report, decided July 10, 1969, and modified August 26, 1969, the Commission complied with the directive of the three-judge court to prepare and serve a proposed decree reflecting the changes ordered in that court's opinion of June 18, 1969. After making the required adjustments, the Commission ordered Penn Central to pay New Haven an additional $990,000 in stocks, bonds, and cash in the same relative percentages as provided in the Fourth Supplemental Report. In addition, the Commission called upon the parties to submit proposed terms of a detailed decree relating to the underwriting plan originated by the reorganization court and adopted by the three-judge court. 334 I. C. C. 528. The order of the Commission accompanying the [399 U.S. 392, 418] Fifth Supplemental Report does not appear to have undergone judicial review. At any rate, it is moot in light of the action we take today with respect to the judgments of the New York and Connecticut District Courts relating to the Second and Fourth Supplemental Reports. </s> [Footnote 50 At the same time we affirmed the judgment of the three-judge court in No. 919, Providence & Worcester Co. v. United States, 396 U.S. 555 , and denied certiorari in No. 918, Providence & Worcester Co. v. Smith, 396 U.S. 1062 . In these cases, companions to the main litigation, the Providence & Worcester Company sought plenary review of the District Courts' orders insofar as they had sustained the Commission (1) in requiring Penn Central to operate its trains over the Providence & Worcester tracks as a leased line under the conditions of a former long-term lease to New [399 U.S. 392, 419] Haven, subject to Penn Central's right to commence an abandonment proceeding before the Commission under 1 (18) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 1 (18), and subject further to Providence & Worcester's securing a charter revision to eliminate voting restrictions against Penn Central as a principal shareholder; and (2) in limiting the liability of Penn Central with respect to certain claims of Providence & Worcester, both in rem and in personam, arising against the New Haven prior to the latter's inclusion in Penn Central. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 185 (opinion of three-judge court). </s> [Footnote 51 A similar problem had presented itself in the immediately preceding round of the litigation arising from the merger. There the Commission's order had embraced not only the Penn Central combination and the takeover of New Haven, but the inclusion of the "protected carriers" in the Norfolk & Western system as well. See n. 11, supra. Despite the variety of issues and the number of parties, the cases eventually came before a single District Court, and the danger of multiple litigation in six or more different courts was avoided. See Erie-Lackawanna R. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp., at 323-324, aff'd sub nom. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S., at 497 n. 2, 503, 505 n. 4. Even earlier, when the Commission had first ordered inclusion of all New Haven service as a condition to the Penn Central merger, it had pointed out that "since New Haven is in bankruptcy, its inclusion will entail reorganization problems under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act which must be resolved in conjunction with any inclusion proceeding herein." Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 525; see also id., at 527; and see Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 652. </s> [Footnote 52 Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 ; Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 164 ; Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483 ; Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 662 ; cf. Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 615 ; Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734, 737 . </s> [Footnote 53 Cf. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S., at 676 ; Van Schaick v. McCarthy, 116 F.2d 987, 992. </s> [Footnote 54 In Callaway, this Court stressed the control the reorganization court has over the debtor's property, including any leasehold estate: </s> "Clearly, control of the physical property must remain in the court which has the ultimate responsibility for operating it. And in order to protect the estate of the debtor from dissipation through losses suffered in the operation of the lessor's property, responsibility for the determination of the amount of the losses and provision for their recoupment from the lessor was properly lodged in the court supervising the reorganization of the debtor." 336 U.S., at 144 . </s> [Footnote 55 Section 5 (2) (d) provides: "The Commission shall have authority in the case of a proposed [merger] transaction under this paragraph involving a railroad or railroads, as a prerequisite to its approval of the proposed transaction, to require, upon equitable terms, the inclusion of another railroad or other railroads in the territory involved, upon petition by such railroad or railroads requesting such inclusion, and upon a finding that such inclusion is consistent with the public interest." </s> [Footnote 56 For the text of 5 (2) (d), see n. 55, supra. Section 5 (2) (b) provides in pertinent part: "If the Commission finds that, subject to such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the proposed [merger] transaction is within the scope of [an earlier subdivision of the statute] . . . and will be consistent with the public interest, it shall enter an order [399 U.S. 392, 425] approving and authorizing such transaction, upon the terms and conditions, and with the modifications, so found to be just and reasonable . . . ." </s> [Footnote 57 Such abstention would in no way have limited Penn Central's full participation in judicial review of the Commission proceedings. Penn Central came before the reorganization court as a "party in interest" under 77 (e) and did not oppose the order of the court making it a party to the proceeding; the company participated fully in all further hearings in the reorganization court; it took a protective appeal from the judgment of the court remanding the matter to the Commission after the first round of review, and it appealed again from the judgment of the court following the second round of review. At no time has anyone questioned Penn Central's [399 U.S. 392, 429] status as a party litigant in the reorganization court or challenged its right to make a full presentation of its case there, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, or on review by writ of certiorari in this Court. </s> [Footnote 58 The District Court also relied upon the prior adjudication of the validity of the plan. See 52 F. Supp., at 66 n. 1, 67. </s> [Footnote 59 It is noteworthy that when the Commission drafted the provision under which Penn Central was obligated to take in New Haven, it evidently contemplated that review would take place only in the reorganization court. Condition 8 of the Merger Report, the text of which is set out in the text above at 409, required Penn Central to take in New Haven with terms of inclusion to be "fair and equitable" - language peculiar to the Bankruptcy Act, and instinct with legal significance peculiar to that statute. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 -119; Bankruptcy Act, 77 (e) (1), 11 U.S.C. 205 (e) (1). Condition 8 subjected the agreement negotiated by the parties to "the approval of the Bankruptcy Court and the Commission." And it also provided, in the event the parties were unable to agree to the elements of inclusion, for the imposition of "such fair and equitable terms and conditions as the Commission may impose, . . . subject to approval by the Bankruptcy Court . . . ." Repeated references to terms of art in bankruptcy law and to the bankruptcy court cannot be thought to lack meaning. Still less can we assume that the studied omission of any mention of the three-judge court was without significance. </s> [Footnote 60 Pursuant to 77 (e), 11 U.S.C. 205 (e), "the judge shall confirm the plan [of reorganization] if satisfied that it has been accepted by or on behalf of creditors of each class to which submission is required . . . holding more than two-thirds in amount of [399 U.S. 392, 434] the total of the allowed claims of such class which have been reported in said submission as voting on said plan, and by or on behalf of stockholders of each class to which submission is required . . . holding more than two-thirds of the stock of such class which has been reported in said submission as voting on said plan; and that such acceptances have not been made or procured by any means forbidden by law: Provided, That, if the plan has not been so accepted by the creditors and stockholders, the judge may nevertheless confirm the plan if he is satisfied and finds, after hearing, that it makes adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment for the interests or claims of those rejecting it; that such rejection is not reasonably justified in the light of the respective rights and interests of those rejecting it and all the relevant facts; and that the plan conforms to the [statutory] requirements . . . ." </s> [Footnote 61 Without pausing to assess the propriety of the method by which the Commission originally assessed the value of New Haven's interest in the Terminal properties, we think the reorganization court was correct in undertaking its own resolution of the contractual question. The validity of New Haven's claim "present[ed] a legal question which must necessarily be taken into account" in determining value. Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F.2d 413, 422, cert. denied sub nom. Protective Committee v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 331 U.S. 858 . The legal question was one "to which the Commission's specialized skill and experience do not extend." 161 F.2d, at 429 (L. Hand, J., concurring). The authority of the court to take further evidence is unquestioned. Bankruptcy Act, 77 (c) (13), 77 (e), 11 U.S.C. 205 (c) (13), 205 (e). </s> [Footnote 62 In 1912 Central and New Haven had erected the Hotel Biltmore through a subsidiary, each railroad supplying half the funds, which were finally reimbursed in 1957. In 1958 Central sought to lease the Biltmore to a controlled subsidiary over New Haven's objection. When New Haven refused to sign the lease, Central claimed that New Haven had broken its agreement and thereby had forfeited all interest in that portion of the enterprise. Central brought suit in New York state court to secure a determination of the parties' respective interests in the property. See New York Central R. Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 24 Misc. 2d 414, 208 N. Y. S. 2d 605, aff'd as modified, 13 App. Div. 2d 309, 216 N. Y. S. 2d 928, aff'd per curiam, 11 N. Y. 2d 1077, 184 N. E. 2d 194. The conclusions of the New York courts paralleled those of the Special Master. The Supreme Court ruled that New Haven's right to share in rentals after credits to Terminal expenses survived reimbursement of its investment, 24 Misc. 2d, at 428, 208 N. Y. S. 2d, at 618. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that the parties had, "in effect, converted themselves into owners of the fee together" and that "the development of the lands over the tracks was but another step in the joint exploitation of the railroad properties made possible by the covering of the tracks . . . in which [properties] each party had a joint interest . . . ." 13 App. Div. 2d, at 318, 216 N. Y. S. 2d, at 936. The latter court rejected the notion that after paying large sums of money for the construction of buildings and assuming the risk of loss operations in the Terminal enterprise, New Haven should have acquired no right "except the right to join docilely in each of the decisions made by Central." Id., at 319, 216 N. Y. S. 2d, at 937. Although Central retained sole ownership in the fee, that fee was encumbered by the rights of New Haven. The Appellate Division concluded that New Haven's position vis-a-vis Central could be described as that of a partner. Id., at 320, 216 N. Y. S. 2d, at 937. </s> [Footnote 63 "The Special Master . . . concluded there was no value in the interest, principally because it is not the kind of interest that would survive liquidation; nor, if it did, could it be assigned. Moreover, there was no evidence that the expenses of maintaining the terminal would be any less. And the idea that the State of New York, or an interstate authority might pay, directly or indirectly, some consideration for availing itself of that use is highly speculative in view of the bargaining positions of the states and the disposition of the I. C. C. to require Penn Central to furnish such access free of charge to a state or public authority which assumed the commuter service, as a condition of Penn Central's getting rid of that much of the losing and burdensome passenger service. While mitigation of a burden may in some circumstances furnish a consideration, it is not a measurable one for the purpose of this issue in the case." 304 F. Supp., at 806. </s> [Footnote 64 At one stage the litigation over the value of New Haven's interest in the Terminal properties also involved disputes over which of four different sets of account books the Commission should use, the base period from which the Commission might extrapolate future income and expenses, the rate at which the projected income flow should be capitalized, and the probable income flow from a new office building to be constructed on the site of the railroad station. </s> [Footnote 65 The Bondholders Committee presses its challenge that the Commission has understated New Haven's share of excess income by $700,000 a year, with a capitalized loss of $8,750,000 in value. The challenge is predicated on the claim that the Commission improperly concluded that future hotel profits would not increase but would remain constant. 334 I. C. C., at 38. The reorganization court upheld the Commission in this regard, 304 F. Supp., at 806. We do [399 U.S. 392, 447] not overturn its judgment on a matter such as this, calling for an informed prediction of future income, expenses, and the rate of return on invested capital in a specific business activity uniquely located in midtown Manhattan. </s> In addition, it is suggested that upon a cessation of New Haven Terminal operations the costs of maintaining the station would decrease, with a consequent augmentation in the excess income. Of course the station revenues would decrease as well - perhaps as much as or more than the expenses. In the absence of any record evidence on the point, we cannot assume that liquidation would thus have benefited New Haven. </s> On the second round of review the reorganization court ordered Penn Central to pay New Haven the latter's share of accrued excess income for 1967 and 1968, as a separate sum apart from the purchase price. 304 F. Supp., at 806-807. The Bondholders Committee now asks us to award interest with respect to this payment. The reorganization court rejected the claim, doubtless because the uncertainty of New Haven's legal interest in the excess income precluded a finding that the amount represented a liquidated obligation owed by New York Central. We agree with the court's ruling. </s> [Footnote 66 The parties have devoted much discussion to Penn Central's negotiations with the States of New York and Connecticut for the transfer of the New Haven commuter service to a public authority. Manufacturers Hanover says the States have agreed to pay an annual toll to run the trains into the Terminal, thus demonstrating that the New Haven right of access does have value; Penn Central claims the States are to pay only for the use of the tracks and that it will give them a right of entry into the Terminal for nothing. Both sides point to newspaper articles in support of their arguments. None of this is record evidence, and we do not consider it. </s> [Footnote 67 "An example of the difference in approach in the trustees' two appraisals is afforded by the so-called REA Building in the Harlem River yard. This building was specially built for REA Express with four tracks running through the center of its ground floor. In the first, and higher, trustee appraisal the building was valued at $675,000 because of these tracks and the railroad service they provided. In the second, and lower appraisal, it was assumed that the tracks were dismantled. This would require reconstruction of the ground floor. The building would then be suitable only for an entirely different type of tenant. Without tracks, it would have a lower rental value. Its appraised value was, therefore, reduced to $400,000 in the second appraisal. Differences in the values of various other tenant-occupied buildings in the two yards resulted from following similar procedures in their appraisals." 334 I. C. C., at 43. (Footnote omitted.) </s> [Footnote 68 Under the Interstate Commerce Act, Penn Central is obliged to "provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor," 1 (4), 49 U.S.C. 1 (4), and to offer switch connections and cars for traffic to branch lines or private side track constructed by shippers to connect with the railroad wherever practicable and justified by the added business, 1 (9), 49 U.S.C. 1 (9). </s> [Footnote 69 Penn Central claims it could not provide service to the yards over the Port Morris branch because of clearance difficulties on the line. The reorganization court observed that Penn Central's own evidence largely refuted the contention. This finding of the District Court, based on its study of the record and its intimate familiarity with the subject matter, is free from clear error, and we do not disturb it. </s> [Footnote 70 Penn Central's own witnesses conceded the Port Morris connection would "doubtless" enable the industries at Harlem River and Oak Point to continue their rail usage even after a New Haven liquidation; that someone, whether the City of New York or a third party, would have to acquire access for rail service to the Hunts Point Market; and that the only rational way to provide such service would be to move cars from the Penn Central system via the Port Morris connection. The Commission itself found that during a test month in the summer of 1968 more than 2,300 cars passed from the Penn Central main lines to the market and yard industries via the Port Morris connection. 334 I. C. C., at 44. </s> At one point Penn Central claimed that even on the higher of the two appraisals, the record evidence required a downward adjustment of $461,000. The reorganization court made a partial correction to reflect a conceded duplication, but implicitly rejected Penn Central's argument as to the balance. Since Penn Central does not press the issue here, we do not consider it. </s> [Footnote 71 The Commission itself justified the refusal of the hearing examiner to take evidence on the question of delay by saying: "To the extent that evidence was proffered on the processing time of possible abandonment proceedings involving N[ew] H[aven], such matters are within our knowledge and evidence thereon was unnecessary." 334 I. C. C., at 29. </s> [Footnote 72 These findings comport with the observations of the reorganization court in February 1965, when the trustees sought permission to discontinue all passenger service: </s> "The record shows that the public interest has been thus far supported by the creditors of this estate with no substantial participation from the states. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "Far from being indifferent to the public interest, the court has indulged that interest and allowed it to prevail over the creditors' rights for three and one-half years. </s> "In spite of this long interval, very little has been produced. Massachusetts never fulfilled its commitment to grant tax relief. New York, by conditioning future tax relief on a commitment by the Trustees to lease new equipment and conduct commutation service at present levels with no assurance that the deficits would be underwritten, has used it as a lash over the back of the debtor to compel it to do the State's will at a time when it has not had the strength to do so. Tax relief in Connecticut and Rhode Island was continued, but with a requirement that certain standards of service be met and, accordingly, that the passenger deficits continue to be incurred. </s> "If the public interest so urgently demands the continuance of the New Haven's passenger service, as the States seem suddenly to have discovered, they should have stopped taxing its property a long time ago. Commuters and other passengers demand better equipment and better service; the States insist upon imposing a continuing tax burden - everyone wants to draw the last ounces of blood out of this near corpse; but no one gives it the transfusion it so badly needs. It is now too late in the day to talk about saving the situation with tax relief. As the Railroad has not been able to use its vital cash for taxes, liens have been accumulating ahead of the creditors, forcing them further down the ladder of priorities, and accelerating and compelling the action which the court has taken today. If this tax burden continues to grow and the Railroad is not otherwise relieved, the creditors will be compelled to move for liquidation of the New Haven and the court will have no recourse but to order it. If the states wish essential passenger services continued, an underwriting which goes far beyond tax relief will be necessary." </s> [Footnote 73 What we have said disposes of the deduction for delay on the ground advanced by the reorganization court. Entirely apart from that explanation, a second line of reasoning leads to the same result. The delay deduction assumed the postponement of the commencement of liquidation for one year; the Commission postulated a one-year freeze prior to the beginning of sale. See 334 I. C. C., at 60 n. 2. But the Commission thereby assumed that during the one-year delay period nothing would happen; the trustees would sell no properties and enter into no contingent contracts for disposition of the debtor's assets. Absent Commission explanation, we cannot assume that the delay would have resulted in so total a suspension of the sales program during the first year, as well as a failure of the sale managers to expedite disposition of the properties and thereby shorten the contemplated six-year liquidation period. It is not for us to determine the extent to which imposition of a one-year pause at the outset would have enabled the trustees to accelerate the sale in the fifth and sixth years. But acceptance of the delay deduction in principle would compel a remand to the Commission for explanation of its tacit assumptions that the initial year would have been devoid of activity and the later years would merely have proceeded as before. </s> It is suggested that with the one-year freeze the delay concept may be viewed as a mere shifting of the valuation date to December 31, 1967. That date, it is said, is as rational as the date originally chosen. And so it may be. But the adjustments in value take into account only the expenses and depreciation attributable to a one-year pause, with no consideration to countervailing income and increases in capital value. The Commission says a comprehensive revaluation of the debtor's assets as of December 31, 1967, would produce a much greater loss than the $15,386,000 [399 U.S. 392, 468] actually deducted. But in the absence of proof we again cannot assume that that would be the case. For authority to that effect we need look no further than to the Commission itself, which, as we have earlier noted, rejected Penn Central's request on the first round for a further allowance for the "constant diminution of N[ew] H[aven]'s assets" to reflect the occurrence of abandonment delay. On that occasion the Commission noted that "a large portion of N[ew] H[aven] assets consists of land," and added: "We cannot assume that these values will diminish. It is at least as reasonable to presuppose that the values will increase." 331 I. C. C., at 698. If the Commission could not assume diminution in realty values at the time of the Second Supplemental Report, we do not see how, without some explanation, it could assume it at the time of the Fourth. </s> [Footnote 74 The Commission frequently requires an abandoning railroad to sell its properties in bulk to a party (typically a public authority) that will undertake continued operation of the service, but typically sets the sale price at "not less than net salvage value of the property sought to be acquired." See, e. g., Rutland R. Corp. Abandonment, 317 I. C. C. 393, 425; Chicago N. S. & M. R. Abandonment, 317 I. C. C. 191, 200, aff'd sub nom. Illinois v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 83, aff'd per curiam, 373 U.S. 378 ; Fort Dodge, D. M. & S. R. Co. Abandonment, 312 I. C. C. 708, 712; Chicago A. & E. R. Corp. Abandonment, 312 I. C. C. 533, 537; Arkansas & O. R. Corp. Abandonment, 312 I. C. C. 501, 505. </s> [Footnote 75 In its Fourth Supplemental Report the Commission provided for payment of the trustees' certificates by cancellation against the price adjustments provided for in the Purchase Agreement. 334 I. C. C., at 70. </s> [Footnote 76 In addition, the bondholders contend the calculation of the operating loss upon which the formula is based is itself unfair. Chase Manhattan and the Committee say the calculation excludes items such as rent for leased roads and interest paid during bankruptcy, aggregating some $2,600,000. The Commission refused to include such items because it thought them "more nearly capital charges, that is, costs of providing the railroad plant . . . ." Second Supplemental Report, 331 I. C. C., at 718. Chase Manhattan attacks the Commission's ruling on the ground that New Haven paid out the monies in question in 1968 only because it had not yet been included in Penn Central. But the test for an operating loss as opposed to a capital charge is not whether a cash disbursement took place; the Commission could properly limit Penn Central's liability to the former category. </s> [Footnote 77 See Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 . </s> [Footnote 78 The Bondholders Committee raised the question in its petition for certiorari whether the reorganization court had erred in its assignment of zero value to the certificates of contingent beneficial interest issued in connection with the reorganization of the Boston & Providence Railroad. See 304 F. Supp., at 810. The Committee has not revived the issue in its brief, nor has it responded in its reply brief to the Government's contention that it has abandoned the claim. Accordingly, we do not consider the matter further. </s> [Footnote 79 In 1968 the New Haven suffered an estimated operating deficit of $8,200,000. That figure, capitalized at 8%, amounts to more than $100,000,000. </s> [Footnote 80 The decisions of the New York state courts relied upon by the bondholders are inapposite. In In re City of New York, 18 N. Y. 2d 212, 219 N. E. 2d 410, appeal dismissed sub nom. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines v. City of New York, 386 U.S. 778 , the city had condemned the Fifth Avenue Coach lines. The trial court treated the takeover as one of a going concern and fixed the award at reproduction cost new less depreciation. The Court of Appeals agreed that since Fifth Avenue had demonstrated a capacity for profitable operations under reasonable rates, it was entitled to going-concern value, but that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence of value of the "intangible going concern assets, that is, the component of value in the business which in addition to the value of the tangible assets reflects an efficient operation." Id., at 220, 221, 219 N. E. 2d, [399 U.S. 392, 483] at 412, 413. The opinion of the Court of Appeals does not disclose whether payment of liquidating value would have yielded a higher price. In In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 20 N. Y. 2d 457, 231 N. E. 2d 734, cert. denied sub nom. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., 390 U.S. 1002 , the Court of Appeals dealt with a public taking of railroad tunnels under the Hudson River owned by a company in reorganization and having only a "dim financial future . . . ." 20 N. Y. 2d, at 465, 231 N. E. 2d, at 736. The tunnels, which required only $88,000 to be put in working order, had cost $32,000,000 to build, and would have cost $400,000,000 to replace; their liquidating value was a negative figure, because of costs that would have been incurred in plugging them up. Id., at 467 and n. 2, 470, 231 N. E. 2d, at 737 and n. 2, 739. Because the Port Authority was taking the tunnels for continued operation, the Court of Appeals held the proper valuation was depreciated original cost plus the value of intangible assets also attributable to the operation as a going concern. Id., at 471-472, 231 N. E. 2d, at 740. In neither of these cases did the New York courts require the taking authorities to pay both an operating and a liquidating value. Rather, they awarded the owners the value reflecting the highest and best price for their properties - precisely the treatment accorded the New Haven here. </s> [Footnote 81 At the time of the Second Supplemental Report, an issue of 950,000 Penn Central common shares to New Haven would have given the debtor 4% of the total shareholder equity in the new company. 331 I. C. C., at 689. </s> [Footnote 82 As previously noted, the holders of the Harlem River Division bonds have received satisfactory security by Penn Central's assumption of the mortgage. See n. 48, supra. We are informed that the right of the holders of the General Income bonds to participate in the reorganized company depends on the outcome of this litigation. The holders of the First and Refunding Mortgage bonds stand somewhere in between. See 289 F. Supp., at 442 n. 18. </s> [Footnote 83 As late as October 1966 the reorganization court noted that the policy of preserving the New Haven as an ongoing railroad "has been concurred in by the bondholders . . . ." </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, dissenting. </s> The central issue in these cases, easily lost I fear in the 98-page opinion of the Court, can in my judgment be briefly and simply stated. After this Court's decision in the Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486 , the Interstate Commerce Commission assumed its difficult statutory task of determining the liquidation value of the assets of the New Haven Railroad, a determination which if upheld by the courts would decide the purchase price [399 U.S. 392, 496] Penn Central would have to pay for the bankrupt New Haven. The Commission made that valuation determination, and the question before this Court is whether, under the appropriate standards of court review, the Commission's valuation of the New Haven's properties should have been sustained or rejected by the reviewing courts. This question comes here from two federal district courts, both of which were called upon to review the Commission's valuation of the New Haven properties, (1) a bankruptcy court convened under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 205, to consider the reorganization of the New Haven, and (2) a three-judge merger court convened under 28 U.S.C. 1336 (a), 2321-2325, to review the Commission's merger and inclusion orders. Both district courts had jurisdiction under these statutes to examine the Commission's valuation decisions. And the proper scope for each court's review was the same: were the Commission's findings supported by substantial evidence and consistent with applicable statutory requirements? Yet the reception the Commission's determination received from the two courts on the final round of review was dramatically different. The bankruptcy court took issue with several of the Commission's important findings as to the New Haven's liquidation value and, substituting its own ideas of the proper method of appraising the railroad's properties, increased by over $28,000,000 the value the Commission had placed on the assets of the New Haven. 304 F. Supp. 793. In sharp contrast, the three-judge merger court noted the "severe limitations" on the scope of its review of valuation matters, 305 F. Supp. 1049, 1053, and, after carefully examining the Commission plan, sustained the agency's determinations. 1 Judge Friendly, writing for the three-judge [399 U.S. 392, 497] merger court, stated the fundamental reason for that court's disagreement with the bankruptcy court: </s> "Essentially, we think our disagreements . . . reflect a difference in view concerning how far we are at liberty to substitute our own notions for the decisions the Commission has taken in what we regard as a sincere effort to comply with the tasks both courts assigned it on remand." 305 F. Supp., at 1065. </s> I </s> Both district court decisions are now properly before this Court for our review, and, contrary to the position taken by the Court today, it is my view that the Court has an obligation to pass upon both those judgments, not just one. As the quoted passage from Judge Friendly's opinion for the three-judge merger court indicates, the answer to the question whether this Court should follow the three-judge court and sustain the Commission's valuation of the New Haven properties turns largely on the proper scope of judicial inquiry into the agency determination. Our previous cases make it clear that the scope of judicial review of the Commission's appraisal of such properties is narrowly limited to ensuring that the agency findings are supported by material evidence and consistent with statutory standards. The federal courts, this Court included, should defer whenever possible to Commission expertise on complex questions of valuation. It is my position, elaborated in what follows, that the application of this test to the record before the Commission in these cases can only lead to the conclusion that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in valuing the New Haven and, accordingly, that the three-judge court was correct in sustaining its determinations and the bankruptcy court wrong in rejecting them. The three-judge court's excellent opinion is, in my view, compelling support for the idea that a reasonable reviewing court exercising [399 U.S. 392, 498] the proper scope of review would find that the Commission acted wholly within its discretion. Moreover, I find myself in agreement with Judge Friendly that the bankruptcy court greatly exceeded its reviewing authority and in so doing improperly substituted its own views on valuation for those of the Commission. 2 </s> The Court today reaches conclusions completely at odds with those stated above and affirms the decision of the bankruptcy court. I do not think the Court could reach the result it does but for its mistaken assumption that the bankruptcy court was somehow the more appropriate of the two courts to review the Commission's valuation determinations and that, accordingly, the excellent opinion of the three-judge court could be simply ignored on the ground that that court should have abstained in favor of the bankruptcy court. Congress has granted jurisdiction to review the Commission findings to both courts under the peculiar circumstances presented in these cases, and the Court offers only make-weight arguments to support its holding that the three-judge court should have abstained from reaching the valuation questions. In my view, both courts were obligated to fulfill their statutory mandate to review the Commission's valuation findings, and this Court has an obligation to treat with equal dignity the decisions of each of those courts. For this reason I cannot agree that the Court is justified in proceeding as if Judge Friendly's opinion for the three-judge merger court simply did not exist. [399 U.S. 392, 499] Nor can I accept the Court's position that in reviewing the conclusions of the bankruptcy court it should apply a standard of review that attaches great weight to the conclusions of that court rather than to those of the Commission. Our prior cases indicate that the correct rule is just the opposite. In sum, the Court first disposes of the three-judge court's opinion by assuming that that court should have abstained, and it then adopts a deferential posture toward the conclusions of the bankruptcy court. In so doing the Court clears the way for its affirmance of the bankruptcy court. The Court's approach and the result it reaches are intimately related, and I regret that I cannot agree with either. </s> II </s> On the question of valuing the New Haven's assets, the tasks which the three-judge merger court and the bankruptcy court were called upon to perform in these cases were virtually identical, and for both courts that task was a narrowly circumscribed one. The statutes governing review in both courts provide the same flexible standard: under 77 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act the bankruptcy court was to determine if the terms for the sale of the New Haven's assets were "fair and equitable," and under 5 (2) (b) and (d) of the Interstate Commerce Act the three-judge court was to ensure that the terms of the merger and inclusion were "just and reasonable" and "equitable." More important, our previous cases leave no doubt that the two district courts and, accordingly, this Court are permitted only a limited scope for their review of the Commission's valuation findings. In Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 448, 472 , this Court emphasized that under 77 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act, "Valuation is a function limited to the Commission, without the necessity of approval [399 U.S. 392, 500] by the [bankruptcy] court." The Court elaborated its holding this way: </s> "The function of valuation thus left to the Commission is the determination of the worth of the property valued, whether stated in dollars, in securities or otherwise. One of the primary objects of the bill was the elimination of obstructive litigation on the issue of valuation and the form finally chosen approached as near to that position as seemed to the draftsmen legally possible. Judicial reexamination was not considered desirable . . . . The language chosen leaves to the Commission, we think, the determination of value without the necessity of a reexamination by the court, when that determination is reached with material evidence to support the conclusion and in accordance with legal standards." 318 U.S., at 472 -473. </s> See also Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 508 -509; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 536 -542. These cases make it clear that Congress delegated the valuation function to the Commission and that the Commission's determinations can be reviewed by the federal courts under 77 (e) only to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence and conform to the applicable statutory standards. </s> The scope of review of the three-judge merger court under 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act is virtually identical to that of the reorganization court under 77. The function of the three-judge court is only to determine if the Commission's actions "are based upon substantial evidence and to guard against the possibility of gross error or unfairness." Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 524 . If a court finds the Commission's [399 U.S. 392, 501] "conclusions to be equitable and rational," it should not, as it seems to me this Court does today, "second-guess each step in the Commission's process of deliberation." Ibid. </s> The reasons compelling such judicial restraint lie not only in the accumulated expertise of the Commission but also in the inherent uncertainty of the valuation process itself. "An intelligent estimate of probable future values . . ., and even indeed of present ones, is at best an approximation . . . . There is left in every case a reasonable margin of fluctuation and uncertainty." Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290, 310 . These inevitable uncertainties of a complex valuation were greatly magnified in this case, for here the Commission was called upon to determine what values the New Haven properties would have, as the three-judge court put it, in "a liquidation that never happened, that in the world as we know it scarcely could have happened, and that, if it had happened, could have happened in any one of a number of equally imaginary ways . . . ." 305 F. Supp., at 1056. Given the extremely hypothetical context in which the Commission made its determinations, it is impossible for any reviewing court to know if the Commission's findings even approximated the true liquidation value of the railroad. Because of this enhanced uncertainty, the area in which the Commission was required to exercise its judgment in this case was unusually wide, and a reviewing court could properly upset its conclusions in only the clearest instances of abuse. </s> I indicated previously that when these criteria for judicial review are taken into account, it becomes impossible for me to believe that the Commission abused its discretion in deciding as it did the exceedingly complex and difficult valuation issues discussed at length in the Court's opinion. The three-judge merger court concluded [399 U.S. 392, 502] that the Commission's findings in this regard were supported by substantial evidence and consistent with relevant principles, and, after reviewing the record and the opinion of the Commission, I find myself in wholehearted agreement with the three-judge court's conclusion. Judge Friendly's fine opinion leaves no doubt in my mind that the court for which he wrote was fully aware of both the limited scope of its reviewing power and also its obligation within those limits to scrutinize carefully each of the significant decisions of the Commission. Thus, the court assumed that "[i]f the Commission made demonstrable errors, it is our duty to correct these . . .," but, unlike the Court today, it refused "to re-examine every judgment made by the Commission and to substitute our own whenever we think it better." 305 F. Supp., at 1056. The three-judge court's opinion sets out fully and adequately the reasons why the Commission should be affirmed on each of the disputed points, and there is nothing to be gained from my repeating those reasons here. </s> III </s> The Court's opinion affirming the bankruptcy court attempts to avoid the force of the foregoing considerations by first holding that the three-judge court should have abstained from reaching the valuation issue and then assuming for some reason which is not clear to me that this Court should apply a limited scope of review to the valuation findings of the bankruptcy court rather than to the Commission's findings. This approach is, I submit, premised on erroneous assumptions. </s> A </s> There can be no question but that under relevant federal statutes both the three-judge merger court and the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to review the Commission's determination of the New Haven's liquidation [399 U.S. 392, 503] value. See 11 U.S.C. 205; 28 U.S.C. 1336 (a), 2321-2325. The Court today does not really dispute this conclusion, but argues instead that the bankruptcy court might have had "primary jurisdiction" to decide the valuation issues, citing to support this idea several quite inapposite cases dealing with in rem jurisdiction, and, alternatively, that the three-judge court should have "abstained" because the only remaining issue was "the value to be accorded the assets transferred, and resolution of that issue was the essence of the 77 process." Ante, at 428. Actually, the only "primary jurisdiction" involved here was the primary jurisdiction of the Commission to decide questions of valuation. Moreover, the question of the New Haven's value may well have been central to the 77 proceedings, but, in ordering the New Haven's inclusion in Penn Central, the Commission exercised authority under both 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act and 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The question of the New Haven's value was equally central to the requirement under 5 that the Commission determine before issuing an inclusion order that the terms of the inclusion are "equitable." 49 U.S.C. 5 (2) (d). Review of the Commission's valuation was therefore as appropriate on the merger and inclusion side as on the bankruptcy side, and the Court's argument to the contrary is completely conclusory. Accordingly, I think the three-judge merger court was correct when it decided that, "unfortunate as the duplicitous system of review may be, we see no basis on which we can properly decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon us . . . ." 289 F. Supp. 418, 425. </s> B </s> The Court also errs, I think, when it assumes that it should defer to the findings of the bankruptcy court rather than to those of the Commission. The reasoning [399 U.S. 392, 504] behind this novel approach is never clearly stated. At times, the Court seems to take the view that the proper role of the bankruptcy court on valuation questions lies somewhere between that of a trial court charged with the responsibility of making a fair estimate of the value of the New Haven properties and an appellate court whose responsibility is limited to reviewing the Commission's valuation. The adoption of this hybrid role for the bankruptcy court is strenuously urged upon us in some of the briefs in this case. Such a theory arguably justifies a deferential attitude on the part of this Court toward the reorganization court's determinations and also provides at least a partial justification for the bankruptcy court's de novo valuation estimates. However, the notion that the bankruptcy court has special powers in reviewing Commission valuations and in weighing the public interest is completely untenable in light of Western Pacific and the cases following it. Those cases make it clear that while the bankruptcy court does have certain special functions in 77 reorganizations, the role of the bankruptcy court in the areas of concern here is simply that of an appellate court. As we said in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 508 : </s> "[T]he experience and judgment of the Commission must be relied upon for final determinations of value and of matters affecting the public interest, subject to judicial review to assure compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements." </s> To like effect was the conclusion reached in Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Fleming, 157 F.2d 241, 245, a case following Western Pacific: </s> "[T]he Commission is allowed wide discretion in reaching its conclusions, and if its findings are supported by substantial evidence and follow [399 U.S. 392, 505] legal standards they must be affirmed by the courts . . . ." </s> In my opinion these and other cases preclude the notion that the bankruptcy court has special factfinding and interest-weighing functions sufficient to justify this Court's viewing it as a quasi-trial court. </s> Alternatively, the majority's position might be that even though the reorganization court had no special review powers, this Court should still give great weight to its conclusions concerning the Commission's price determinations. This position might have some force were there grounds for confidence that the bankruptcy court in this case applied the correct scope of review in examining the Commission determinations, but no such grounds for confidence exist here. This Court has an obligation to examine carefully the opinion of the bankruptcy court to determine if that court did in fact apply the correct scope of review. Such an inquiry necessarily involves the Court in determining if the agency's decisions are consistent with applicable law and supported by substantial evidence. As I indicated earlier, the record in this case simply does not support the conclusion that the reorganization court stayed within its proper scope of review of the Commission determinations. Since the reorganization court applied the wrong reviewing standard, there is no justification for this Court's giving any deference to the valuation determinations of that court. </s> The Court's opinion is thus poised between two equally unsatisfactory alternatives. Its conclusions must either rest on the theory that the reorganization court has extraordinary reviewing powers, a theory which I think is precluded by Western Pacific and the cases which follow it, or the Court must take the position that the reorganization court correctly applied the Western Pacific standard, a conclusion which seems to me untenable in [399 U.S. 392, 506] light of the record in these cases and the opinion of the three-judge merger court. </s> IV </s> Today's decision will have the effect of greatly burdening the Penn Central by increasing the amount that company owes to the New Haven bondholders by an additional $28,000,000. The imposition of this additional burden can only bring about a further deterioration of the Penn Central's already seriously compromised financial position 3 and will further reduce the ultimate chances of success of this venture in which the public has a considerable stake. The public interest in these cases certainly lies in establishing and maintaining the Penn Central as a viable private enterprise with reasonable rates and efficient services. Here the Commission had a duty "to plan reorganizations with an eye to the public interest as well as the private welfare of creditors and stockholders." Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 535 . See also the Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 510 -511. Because Penn Central's economic soundness will be vitally affected by the price it has to pay for the New Haven assets, the Commission had an obligation, which I think it fulfilled in these cases, to prevent an overvaluation of the New Haven assets which might unnecessarily jeopardize the newly merged Penn Central system. If the Commission resolved close and fairly debatable issues of valuation in favor of Penn Central rather than the New Haven bondholders, the agency's actions were wholly justifiable in terms of its statutory mandate to protect the public. Although the courts must review Commission determinations [399 U.S. 392, 507] of value to guarantee that those valuations are "fair and equitable" to the bondholders, that reviewing authority does not permit a court to substitute its views for those of the Commission. Judicial review of Commission valuations must be exercised in light of the fact that "Congress has entrusted the Commission, not the courts, with the responsibility of formulating a plan of reorganization which `will be compatible with the public interest.' 77 (d)." Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 544 . Here the Commission struck a balance between public and private interests that was clearly within its discretion, and I think it is both improper and unwise for this Court to upset that balance and place an additional $28,000,000 burden on the Penn Central, a burden that I fear may ultimately be borne by the consumers of the Penn Central's services or by the Federal Treasury. </s> For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the judgment of the three-judge merger court on the valuation issue and would reverse the judgment of the bankruptcy court to the extent that it is inconsistent with the three-judge court. </s> [Footnote 1 The three-judge merger court corrected the Commission's findings on minor valuation points which are not relevant here. The Commission has subsequently made findings consistent with the three-judge court opinion on these questions. 334 I. C. C. 528. </s> [Footnote 2 Of course, the bankruptcy court and the three-judge merger court agreed on many of the issues that were presented to them, some of which were questions of valuation and some of which were not. Apart from the question of the underwriting plan, ante, at 488-489, the Court today affirms both district courts on those issues on which both agreed, and I concur in that result. I differ with the Court, however, on its handling of all those questions of valuation over which the two district courts disagreed. </s> [Footnote 3 As the Court notes in a footnote to its opinion, ante, at 399, the Penn Central Transportation Company has filed a petition for reorganization under 77 of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. </s> [399 U.S. 392, 508]

United States Supreme Court TIBBS v. FLORIDA(1982) No. 81-5114 Argued: March 2, 1982Decided: June 7, 1982 </s> Held: </s> Where the Florida Supreme Court's reversal of petitioner's murder and rape convictions at a jury trial was based on the weight of the evidence, a retrial is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 39-47. </s> (a) A reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the evidence, unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence where the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a retrial, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 ; Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 , does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. Instead, the appellate court sits as a "thirteenth juror" and disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Just as a deadlocked jury does not result in an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause, an appellate court's disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence does not require the special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal. Moreover, a reversal based on the weight of the evidence can occur only after the State has presented sufficient evidence to support conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek an acquittal. Giving him this second chance does not amount to governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect. Pp. 39-44. </s> (b) There is no merit to petitioner's arguments that a distinction between the weight and sufficiency of the evidence is unworkable and will undermine the Burks rule by encouraging appellate judges to base reversals on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence. Pp. 44-45. </s> 397 So.2d 1120, affirmed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 47. </s> Louis R. Beller, by appointment of the Court, 454 U.S. 1078 , argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Deborah A. Osmond, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause pro hac vice for respondent. With her [457 U.S. 31, 32] on the briefs were Jim Smith, Attorney General, and Michael A. Palecki, Assistant Attorney General. * </s> [Footnote * Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Samuel J. Alito, Jr., and John Fichter De Pue filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause 1 bars retrial after a state appellate court sets aside a conviction on the ground that the verdict was against "the weight of the evidence." After examining the policies supporting the Double Jeopardy Clause, we hold that a reversal based on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence permits the State to initiate a new prosecution. </s> I </s> In 1974, Florida indicted petitioner Delbert Tibbs for the first-degree murder of Terry Milroy, the felony murder of Milroy, and the rape of Cynthia Nadeau. Nadeau, the State's chief trial witness, testified that she and Milroy were hitchhiking from St. Petersburg to Marathon, Fla., on February 3, 1974. A man in a green truck picked them up near Fort Myers and, after driving a short way, turned off the highway into a field. He asked Milroy to help him siphon gas from some farm machinery, and Milroy agreed. When Nadeau stepped out of the truck a few minutes later, she discovered the driver holding a gun on Milroy. The driver told Milroy that he wished to have sex with Nadeau, and ordered her to strip. After forcing Nadeau to engage in sodomy, the driver agreed that Milroy could leave. As Milroy started to walk away, however, the assailant shot him in the shoulder. When Milroy fell to the ground, pleading for his life, the gunman walked over and taunted, "Does it hurt, boy? You in [457 U.S. 31, 33] pain? Does it hurt, boy?" Tr. 508. Then, with a shot to the head, he killed Milroy. </s> This deed finished, the killer raped Nadeau. Fearing for her life, she suggested that they should leave together and that she "would be his old lady." Id., at 510. The killer seemed to agree and they returned to the highway in the truck. After driving a short distance, he stopped the truck and ordered Nadeau to walk directly in front of it. As soon as her feet hit the ground, however, she ran in the opposite direction. The killer fled with the truck, frightened perhaps by an approaching car. When Nadeau reached a nearby house, the occupants let her in and called the police. </s> That night, Nadeau gave the police a detailed description of the assailant and his truck. Several days later a patrolman stopped Tibbs, who was hitchhiking near Ocala, Fla., because his appearance matched Nadeau's description. The Ocala Police Department photographed Tibbs and relayed the pictures to the Fort Myers police. When Nadeau examined these photos, she identified Tibbs as the assailant. 2 Nadeau subsequently picked Tibbs out of a lineup and positively identified him at trial as the man who murdered Milroy and raped her. 3 </s> [457 U.S. 31, 34] </s> Tibbs' attorney attempted to show that Nadeau was an unreliable witness. She admitted during cross-examination that she had tried "just about all" types of drugs and that she had smoked marihuana shortly before the crimes occurred. Id., at 526, 545-546. She also evidenced some confusion about the time of day that the assailant had offered her and Milroy a ride. Finally, counsel suggested through questions and closing argument that Nadeau's former boyfriend had killed Milroy and that Nadeau was lying to protect her boyfriend. Nadeau flatly denied these suggestions. 4 </s> In addition to these attempts to discredit Nadeau, Tibbs testified in his own defense. He explained that he was college educated, that he had published a story and a few poems, and that he was hitchhiking through Florida to learn more about how people live. He claimed that he was in Daytona Beach, across the State from Fort Myers, from the evening of February 1, 1974, through the morning of February 6. He also testified that he did not own a green truck, and [457 U.S. 31, 35] that he had not driven any vehicle while in Florida. Finally, he denied committing any of the crimes charged against him. </s> Two Salvation Army officers partially corroborated Tibbs' story. These officers produced a card signed by Tibbs, indicating that he had slept at the Daytona Beach Salvation Army Transit Lodge on the evening of February 1, 1974. Neither witness, however, had seen Tibbs after the morning of February 2. Tibbs' other witnesses testified to his good reputation as a law-abiding citizen and to his good reputation for veracity. </s> On rebuttal, the State produced a card, similar to the one introduced by Tibbs, showing that Tibbs had spent the night of February 4 at the Orlando Salvation Army Transit Lodge. This evidence contradicted Tibbs' claim that he had remained in Daytona Beach until February 6, as well as his sworn statements that he had been in Orlando only once, during the early part of January 1974, and that he had not stayed in any Salvation Army lodge after February 1. After the State presented this rebuttal evidence, Tibbs took the stand to deny both that he had been in Orlando on February 4 and that the signature on the Orlando Salvation Army card was his. </s> The jury convicted Tibbs of first-degree murder and rape. Pursuant to the jury's recommendation, the judge sentenced Tibbs to death. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed. Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788 (1976) (Tibbs I). A plurality of three justices, while acknowledging that "the resolution of factual issues in a criminal trial is peculiarly within the province of a jury," id., at 791, identified six weaknesses in the State's case. 5 First, except for Nadeau's testimony, the State introduced no evidence placing Tibbs in or near Fort Myers on the day of the crimes. Second, although [457 U.S. 31, 36] Nadeau gave a detailed description of the assailant's truck, police never found the vehicle. Third, police discovered neither a gun nor car keys in Tibbs' possession. Fourth, Tibbs cooperated fully with the police when he was stopped and arrested. Fifth, the State introduced no evidence casting doubt on Tibbs' veracity. 6 Tibbs, on the other hand, produced witnesses who attested to his good reputation. Finally, several factors undermined Nadeau's believability. Although she asserted at trial that the crimes occurred during daylight, other evidence suggested that the events occurred after nightfall when reliable identification would have been more difficult. Nadeau, furthermore, had smoked marihuana shortly before the crimes and had identified Tibbs during a suggestive photograph session. 7 These weaknesses left the plurality in "considerable doubt that Delbert Tibbs [was] the man who committed the crimes for which he ha[d] been convicted." Id., at 790. Therefore, the plurality concluded that the "interests of justice" required a new trial. Ibid. 8 </s> Justice Boyd concurred specially, noting that "`[t]he test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict.'" Id., at 792 (quoting Griffis v. Hill, 230 So.2d 143, [457 U.S. 31, 37] 145 (Fla. 1969)). Apparently applying that standard, Justice Boyd found the State's evidence deficient. He concluded that "the weakness of the evidence presented in the trial court might well require that [Tibbs] be released from incarceration without further litigation," but "reluctantly concur[red]" in the plurality's decision to order a new trial because he understood Florida law to permit retrial. 337 So.2d, at 792. 9 </s> On remand, the trial court dismissed the indictment, concluding that retrial would violate the double jeopardy principles articulated in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). 10 An intermediate appellate court disagreed and remanded the case for trial. 370 So.2d 386 (Fla. App. 1979). The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the latter decision, carefully elaborating the difference between a reversal stemming from insufficient evidence and one prompted by the weight of the evidence. 397 So.2d 1120 (1981) (per curiam) (Tibbs II). As the court explained, a conviction rests upon insufficient evidence when, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A reversal based on the weight of the evidence, on the other hand, draws the appellate court into questions of credibility. The "weight of the evidence" refers to "a determination [by] the trier of fact that [457 U.S. 31, 38] a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other." Id., at 1123. 11 </s> The Florida Supreme Court then classified Tibbs I as a reversal resting on the weight of the evidence. Nadeau's testimony, if believed by the jury, was itself "legally sufficient to support Tibbs' conviction under Florida law." 397 So.2d, at 1126. In deciding to upset Tibbs' conviction, the court in Tibbs I had stressed those "aspects of Nadeau's testimony which cast serious doubt on her believability," 397 So.2d, at 1126, an approach that bespoke a reweighing of the evidence. "Only by stretching the point . . .," the court concluded in Tibbs II, "could we possibly use an `insufficiency' analysis to characterize our previous reversal of Tibbs' convictions." Ibid. 12 </s> [457 U.S. 31, 39] </s> Having found that it could not "fairly conclude . . . that Tibbs' convictions were reversed on the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency," id., at 1127, the Florida Supreme Court held that Greene and Burks do not bar retrial. Those decisions, the court believed, as well as United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause to preclude retrial after reversal of a conviction only when the appellate court has set the conviction aside on the ground that the evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction. Other reversals, including those based on the weight of the evidence or made in the "interests of justice," do not implicate double jeopardy principles. 13 We granted certiorari to review this interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 454 U.S. 963 (1981). </s> II </s> In 1896, this Court ruled that a criminal defendant who successfully appeals a judgment against him "may be tried anew . . . for the same offence of which he had been convicted." [457 U.S. 31, 40] United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 . This principle, that the Double Jeopardy Clause "imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside," North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969), has persevered to the present. See United States v. DiFrancesco, supra, at 131; United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 89 -92 (1978). Two considerations support the rule. First, the Court has recognized that society would pay too high a price "were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction." United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). Second, the Court has concluded that retrial after reversal of a conviction is not the type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Scott, supra, at 91. See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, supra, at 131. 14 </s> Burks v. United States and Greene v. Massey carved a narrow exception from the understanding that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction is subject to retrial. In those cases, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes retrial "once the reviewing court has found the evidence [457 U.S. 31, 41] legally insufficient" to support conviction. Burks, 437 U.S., at 18 ; Greene, 437 U.S., at 24 . This standard, we explained, "means that the government's case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury." Burks, 437 U.S., at 16 (emphasis in original). A conviction will survive review, we suggested, whenever "the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution would warrant the jury's finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Ibid. See also Greene, supra, at 25. In sum, we noted that the rule barring retrial would be "confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear." Burks, supra, at 17. </s> So defined, the exception recognized in Burks and Greene rests upon two closely related policies. First, the Double Jeopardy Clause attaches special weight to judgments of acquittal. 15 A verdict of not guilty, whether rendered by the jury or directed by the trial judge, absolutely shields the defendant from retrial. 16 A reversal based on the insufficiency of the evidence has the same effect because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to convict the defendant. </s> Second, Burks and Greene implement the principle that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." Burks, supra, at 11. This prohibition, lying at the core of the Clause's protections, prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance. [457 U.S. 31, 42] See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 -188 (1957); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S., at 130 . For this reason, when a reversal rests upon the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecutor from making a second attempt at conviction. </s> As we suggested just last Term, these policies do not have the same force when a judge disagrees with a jury's resolution of conflicting evidence and concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44 -45, n. 5 (1981). A reversal on this ground, unlike a reversal based on insufficient evidence, does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict. Instead, the appellate court sits as a "thirteenth juror" and disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony. This difference of opinion no more signifies acquittal than does a disagreement among the jurors themselves. A deadlocked jury, we consistently have recognized, does not result in an acquittal barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 17 Similarly, an appellate court's disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence does not require the special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal. </s> A reversal based on the weight of the evidence, moreover, can occur only after the State both has presented sufficient [457 U.S. 31, 43] evidence to support conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment. 18 An appellate court's decision to give the defendant this second chance does not create "an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its superior resources, [will] wear down [the] defendant" and obtain conviction solely through its persistence. United States v. DiFrancesco, supra, at 130. 19 </s> [457 U.S. 31, 44] </s> While an appellate ruling based on the weight of the evidence thus fails to implicate the policies supporting Burks and Greene, it does involve the usual principles permitting retrial after a defendant's successful appeal. Just as the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require society to pay the high price of freeing every defendant whose first trial was tainted by prosecutorial error, it should not exact the price of immunity for every defendant who persuades an appellate panel to overturn an error-free conviction and give him a second chance at acquittal. Giving the defendant this second opportunity, when the evidence is sufficient to support the first verdict, hardly amounts to "governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S., at 91 . </s> Petitioner Tibbs resists these arguments on the grounds that a distinction between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence is unworkable and that such a distinction will undermine the Burks rule by encouraging appellate judges to base reversals on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence. We find these arguments unpersuasive for two reasons. First, trial and appellate judges commonly distinguish between the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. 20 We have no reason to believe that today's decision [457 U.S. 31, 45] will erode the demonstrated ability of judges to distinguish legally insufficient evidence from evidence that rationally supports a verdict. </s> Second, our decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), places some restraints on the power of appellate courts to mask reversals based on legally insufficient evidence as reversals grounded on the weight of the evidence. We held in Jackson that the Due Process Clause forbids any conviction based on evidence insufficient to persuade a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Due Process Clause, in other words, sets a lower limit on an appellate court's definition of evidentiary sufficiency. 21 This limit, together with our belief that state appellate judges faithfully honor their obligations to enforce applicable state and federal laws, persuades us that today's ruling will not undermine Burks. In sum, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent an appellate court from granting a convicted defendant an opportunity to seek acquittal through a new trial. 22 </s> [457 U.S. 31, 46] </s> III </s> We turn, finally, to apply the above principles to the present case. A close reading of Tibbs I suggests that the Florida Supreme Court overturned Tibbs' conviction because the evidence, although sufficient to support the jury's verdict, did not fully persuade the court of Tibbs' guilt. The plurality based its review on a Florida rule directing the court in capital cases to "review the evidence to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground of appeal or not." See n. 8, supra. References to the "interests of justice" and the justices' own "considerable doubt" of Tibbs' guilt mark the plurality's conclusions. 23 Those conclusions, moreover, stem from the justices' determination that Tibbs' testimony was more reliable than that of Nadeau. This resolution of conflicting testimony in a manner contrary to the jury's verdict is a hallmark of review based on evidentiary weight, not evidentiary sufficiency. </s> Any ambiguity in Tibbs I, finally, was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II. Absent a conflict with the Due Process Clause, see n. 21, supra, that court's construction [457 U.S. 31, 47] of its prior opinion binds this Court. 24 In Tibbs II, of course, the court unequivocally held that Tibbs I was "one of those rare instances in which reversal was based on evidentiary weight." 397 So.2d, at 1126 (per curiam). Thus, we conclude that Tibbs' successful appeal of his conviction rested upon a finding that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence, not upon a holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. Under these circumstances, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial. Accordingly, the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. The Clause applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). </s> [Footnote 2 The State's witnesses conceded that, at the time of this identification, Nadeau saw only photographs of Tibbs; she did not have the opportunity to pick his picture out of a photographic array. An officer explained, however, that Nadeau had viewed photographs of single suspects on three or four other occasions and had not identified the killer on any of those occasions. Nadeau also had examined several books of photographs without making an identification. We do not pass upon any possible due process questions raised by the State's identification procedures, see generally Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), because Tibbs' challenge to retrial rests solely upon double jeopardy grounds. </s> [Footnote 3 The State's remaining witnesses included law enforcement agents, a man who had driven Milroy and Nadeau to Fort Myers, the houseowner who had called the police for Nadeau, acquaintances of Milroy, a doctor who had examined Nadeau shortly after the crimes, and the doctor who had performed the autopsy on Milroy. The doctors confirmed that Nadeau had had intercourse on the evening of February 3 and that Milroy [457 U.S. 31, 34] had died that evening from a bullet wound in the head. The other witnesses confirmed that Nadeau and Milroy had been hitchhiking through Fort Myers on February 3 and that Nadeau had arrived at a house, in a hysterical condition, that evening. </s> A Florida prisoner, sentenced to life imprisonment for rape, also testified for the State. This prisoner claimed that he had met Tibbs while Tibbs was in jail awaiting trial and that Tibbs had confessed the crime to him. The defense substantially discredited this witnesses on cross-examination, revealing inconsistencies in his testimony and suggesting that he had testified in the hope of obtaining leniency from the State. </s> [Footnote 4 The results of two polygraph examinations, described in a report read to the jury, indicated that Nadeau was "truthful as to the fact that a black male driving a green pickup truck had picked them up and that this black male had murdered Terry Milroy," Tr. 302. The polygraphs also suggested that Nadeau was truthful when she identified Tibbs as the assailant. Id., at 303. Tibbs challenged the admissibility of these polygraphs during his first appeal. See Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788, 796 (Fla. 1976) (Roberts, J., dissenting). The justices who voted to reverse Tibbs' conviction, however, did not reach the issue and we express no opinion on this matter of state law. </s> [Footnote 5 The plurality completely discounted the testimony of the convicted rapist who recounted Tibbs' alleged confession. See n. 3, supra. This testimony, the justices concluded, appeared "to be the product of purely selfish considerations." 337 So.2d, at 790. </s> [Footnote 6 The plurality opinion summarily dismissed the effect of the rebuttal evidence showing that Tibbs was in Orlando on February 4. A "superficial comparison" of the signature on the Orlando transit card with Tibbs' own signature, the plurality found, supported Tibbs' claim that he had not signed the card. Moreover, evidence that Tibbs was in Orlando on February 4 still did not place him in Fort Myers on February 3. Id., at 790, n. 1. </s> [Footnote 7 See n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 8 At the time of Tibbs' first appeal, Florida Appellate Rule 6.16(b) (1962) provided in part: </s> "Upon an appeal from the judgment by a defendant who has been sentenced to death the appellate court shall review the evidence to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial, whether the insufficiency of the evidence is a ground of appeal or not." </s> The substance of this Rule has been recodified as Florida Appellate Rule 9.140(f). </s> [Footnote 9 At two points, Justice Boyd stated that he "concur[red] in the majority opinion." 337 So.2d, at 792. However, because we are uncertain what weight Florida attaches to special concurrences of this sort and because Justice Boyd's views differed from those of the other justices voting to reverse, we have chosen to designate the lead opinion a "plurality" opinion. </s> Three justices dissented from the court's disposition of Tibbs' appeal. They declared that "the evidence in the record before us does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial be awarded," id., at 796-797, and rejected Tibbs' other assignments of error. </s> [Footnote 10 We decided Burks and Greene after the Florida Supreme Court reversed Tibbs' conviction, but before he could be retried. We have applied Burks to prosecutions that were not yet final on the date of that decision. See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981). </s> [Footnote 11 Other courts similarly have explained the difference between evidentiary weight and evidentiary sufficiency. In United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313 (CA8 1980), for example, the court declared: </s> "The court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, whether it be the trial or appellate court, must apply familiar principles. It is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving the prosecution the benefit of all inferences reasonably to be drawn in its favor from the evidence. The verdict may be based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt . . . ." Id., at 1316. </s> "When a motion for new trial is made on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the issues are far different . . . . The district court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses. If the court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by another jury." Id., at 1319. </s> See generally 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 553 (1969). </s> [Footnote 12 Elsewhere in its opinion, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Florida appellate courts no longer may reverse convictions on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 397 So.2d, at 1125. This ruling does not diminish the importance of the issue before us. Courts in other jurisdictions sometimes rely upon the weight of the evidence to overturn [457 U.S. 31, 39] convictions. For example, some federal courts have interpreted Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes a new trial & if required in the interest of justice," to permit the trial judge to set aside a conviction that is against the weight of the evidence. E. g., United States v. Lincoln, supra, at 1319; United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 387 (CA1 1979); United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 593 (ED Mich. 1979), affirmance order, 633 F.2d 219 (CA6 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Felice, 481 F. Supp. 79, 90-91 (ND Ohio 1978). </s> [Footnote 13 Three justices dissented from the court's decision to permit Tibbs' retrial. Chief Justice Sundberg suggested that the reversal in Tibbs I must have rested upon a finding of evidentiary insufficiency, because the Florida Supreme Court lacked authority to reweigh the evidence. He also rejected the majority's distinction between evidentiary weight and evidentiary sufficiency, proposing that the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar retrial whenever an appellate court reverses "for a substantive lack of evidence to support the verdict." 397 So.2d, at 1128. Justice England merely stated that he would discharge Tibbs "in the interest of justice." Id., at 1130. Justice Boyd concluded that Tibbs I had rested on a finding of evidentiary insufficiency and, accordingly, that Tibbs "should be forever discharged from the accusations made against him." 397 So.2d, at 1131. </s> [Footnote 14 The rule also appears to coincide with the intent of the Fifth Amendment's drafters. James Madison's proposed version of the Double Jeopardy Clause provided that "[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offence." 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789). Several Representatives objected that this language might prevent a defendant from seeking a new trial after conviction. Representative Sherman, for example, observed that "[i]f the [defendant] was acquitted on the first trial, he ought not to be tried a second time; but if he was convicted on the first, and any thing should appear to set the judgment aside, he was entitled to a second, which was certainly favorable to him." Id., at 753. Madison's supporters explained that the language would not prevent a convicted defendant from seeking a new trial, and the House approved Madison's proposal. Ibid. The Senate later substituted the language appearing in the present Clause. S. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 71, 77 (1820 ed.). See generally United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340 -342 (1975); Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 283, 304-306 (1963). </s> [Footnote 15 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam). </s> [Footnote 16 See, e. g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 666 -671 (1896). </s> [Footnote 17 See, e. g., Arizona v. Washington, supra, at 509; United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 16 (1976) (per curiam); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401 -402 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735 -736 (1963); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 -86 (1902); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892); United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824). </s> Our decisions also make clear that disagreements among jurors or judges do not themselves create a reasonable doubt of guilt. As JUSTICE WHITE, writing for the Court in Johnson v. Louisiana, supra, explained, "[t]hat rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the State, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt standard." 406 U.S., at 362 . </s> [Footnote 18 The dissent suggests that a reversal based on the weight of the evidence necessarily requires the prosecution to introduce new evidence on retrial. Once an appellate court rules that a conviction is against the weight of the evidence, the dissent reasons, it must reverse any subsequent conviction resting upon the same evidence. We do not believe, however, that jurisdictions endorsing the "weight of the evidence" standard apply that standard equally to successive convictions. In Florida, for example, the highest state court once observed that, although "[t]here is in this State no limit to the number of new trials that may be granted in any case, . . . it takes a strong case to require an appellate court to grant a new trial in a case upon the ground of insufficiency of conflicting evidence to support a verdict when the finding has been made by two juries." Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 893, 110 So. 547, 552 (1926) (en banc). The weight of the evidence rule, moreover, often derives from a mandate to act in the interests of justice. See nn. 8 and 12, supra. Although reversal of a first conviction based on sharply conflicting testimony may serve the interests of justice, reversal of a second conviction based on the same evidence may not. See United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 714, n. 14 (CA2 1971) ("We do not join in the . . . forecast that the granting of a new trial would doom the defendant and the Government to an infinite regression. . . . [I]f a third jury were to find [the defendant] guilty, we should suppose any judge would hesitate a long time before concluding that the interests of justice required still another trial"), cert. denied sub nom. Grunberger v. United States, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). While the interests of justice may require an appellate court to sit once as a thirteenth juror, that standard does not compel the court to repeat the role. </s> [Footnote 19 A second chance for the defendant, of course, inevitably affords the prosecutor a second try as well. It is possible that new evidence or advance understanding of the defendant's trial strategy will make the State's case even stronger during a second trial than it was at the first. It is also possible, however, that the passage of time and experience of defense counsel will weaken the prosecutor's presentation. In this case, for example, more than eight years have elapsed since the crimes. Nadeau's ability [457 U.S. 31, 44] to recall the events of February 3, 1974, may have diminished significantly, and a jury may be less willing to credit her identification of a man she saw almost a decade ago. When the State has secured one conviction based on legally sufficient evidence, it has everything to lose and little to gain by retrial. Thus, the type of "second chance" that the State receives when a court rests reversal on evidentiary weight does not involve the overreaching prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. </s> [Footnote 20 See, e. g., United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d, at 1319; United States v. Weinstein, supra, at 714-716; United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36-37 (CA4), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969); Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453-454 (Alaska 1981); Ridley v. State, 236 Ga. 147, 149, 223 S. E. 2d 131, 132 (1976); State v. McGranahan, ___ R. I. ___, ___ - ___, 415 A. 2d 1298, 1301-1303 (1980); Tyacke v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 513, 521, 223 N. W. 2d 595, 599 (1974). </s> [Footnote 21 The evidence in this case clearly satisfied the due process test of Jackson v. Virginia. As we stressed in Jackson, the reviewing court must view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution." 443 U.S., at 319 . The trier of fact, not the appellate court, holds "the responsibility . . . fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Ibid. In this case, Nadeau provided eyewitness testimony to the crimes. If the jury believed her story, the State's presentation was more than sufficient to satisfy due process. </s> [Footnote 22 We note that a contrary rule, one precluding retrial whenever an appellate court rests reversal on evidentiary weight, might prompt state legislatures simply to forbid those courts to reweigh the evidence. Rulemakers willing to permit a new trial in the face of a verdict supported by legally sufficient evidence may be less willing to free completely a defendant convicted by a jury of his peers. Acceptance of Tibbs' double jeopardy theory might also lead to restrictions on the authority of trial judges to order new trials based on their independent assessment of evidentiary weight. Although Tibbs limits his argument to appellate reversals, his contentions logically apply to a trial judge's finding that a conviction was against the [457 U.S. 31, 46] weight of the evidence. Cf. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981) (applying Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), to trial judge's postverdict ruling that evidence was insufficient to support conviction). Endorsement of Tibbs' theory, therefore, might only serve to eliminate practices that help shield defendants from unjust convictions. </s> [Footnote 23 At one point, the opinion does refer to "`evidence which is not sufficient to convince a fair and impartial mind of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 337 So.2d, at 791 (quoting McNeil v. State, 104 Fla. 360, 361-362, 139 So. 791, 792 (1932)). This reference, however, occurs in a lengthy quotation from an earlier Florida decision. When read in context, it does not appear that the plurality actually applied this standard to the evidence in Tibbs' case. Moreover, the quotation containing this sufficiency language also speaks of evidence that is "not satisfactory" to the appellate court and that is not "substantial in character." Ibid. This language, in line with the remainder of Tibbs I, evidences a weighing of the evidence. </s> [Footnote 24 In Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978), we recognized that the meaning attached to an ambiguous prior reversal is a matter of state law. In that case, we remanded a double jeopardy issue to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, directing the court to consider the effect under state law of several peculiarities in the state court's opinion. Id., at 25-26, and nn. 8-10. We even suggested that the Court of Appeals might "direct further proceedings in the District Court or . . . certify unresolved questions . . . to the Florida Supreme Court" to resolve these problems of state law. Id., at 27. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. </s> As our cases in this area indicate, the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause is not always readily apparent. See, e. g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (overruling Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955), and Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960)); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)). For this reason, we should begin with a clear understanding of what is at stake in this case. </s> To sustain the convictions in this case, the prosecution was required to convince the Florida Supreme Court not only that the evidence was sufficient under the federal constitutional [457 U.S. 31, 48] standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), but also that as a matter of state law, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The Florida Supreme Court found the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, thus holding that as a matter of state law the prosecution failed to present evidence adequate to sustain the convictions. Were the State to present this same evidence again, we must assume that once again the state courts would reverse any conviction that was based upon it. * The State was not prevented from presenting its best case because of some incorrect procedural ruling by the trial court; rather, the State had a full opportunity to present its case, but that case was not adequate as a matter of state law. If the State presents no new evidence, the defendant has no new or additional burden to meet in successfully presenting a defense: He may stand on, i. e., repeat, what he has already presented. Thus, the only point of any second trial in this case is to allow the State to present additional evidence to bolster its case. If it does not have such evidence, reprosecution can serve no purpose other than harassment. The majority holds that reprosecution under these circumstances does not offend the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution. I do not agree. </s> The majority concedes, as it must under Burks, supra, that if the State's evidence failed to meet the federal due [457 U.S. 31, 49] process standard of evidentiary sufficiency, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar reprosecution. The majority fails to explain why the State should be allowed another try where its proof has been held inadequate on state-law grounds, when it could not do so were it inadequate on federal-law grounds. In both cases the State has failed to present evidence adequate to sustain the conviction. The interests of the State in overcoming the evidentiary insufficiencies of its case would seem to be exactly the same in the two cases; the interests of the defendant in avoiding a second trial would also seem to be exactly the same in each case. Yet the majority holds that the Double Jeopardy Clause leads to different results in the two instances. </s> The majority offers two arguments in its attempt to distinguish the two cases. First, it emphasizes that the Double Jeopardy Clause "attaches special weight to judgments of acquittal." But in neither of the situations posited has there been a judgment of acquittal by the initial factfinder. In each instance, a reviewing court decides that, as a matter of law, the decision of the factfinder cannot stand. Second, the majority thinks it to be of some significance that when the evidence is determined to be insufficient as a matter of federal law, then no rational factfinder could have voted to convict on that basis. On the other hand, when the conviction is reversed on the basis of the state-law rule applying a "weight of the evidence" test, that "does not mean that acquittal was the only proper verdict." Ante, at 42. The constraints of the Double Jeopardy Clause, however, do not depend upon a determination that an "acquittal was the only proper verdict." The fact remains that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty in accordance with the evidentiary requirements of state law. </s> The majority opinion rests finally on a mischaracterization of the appellate court's ruling: "The reversal simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment." Ante, at 43. But as I described above, it is not [457 U.S. 31, 50] the defendant who has the burden of coming up with a new case on retrial; it is the prosecution. The defendant has already demonstrated that a conviction based on the State's case, as so far developed, is "against the weight of the evidence." </s> Having concluded that the majority opinion fails to justify the distinction it draws, I too turn to "the policies supporting the Double Jeopardy Clause," ante, at 32, to determine whether this distinction is relevant. I do not believe it necessary to look beyond the articulation of those policies in the majority opinion itself to conclude that it is not: </s> "Burks and Greene [v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978)] implement the principle that `[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.' This prohibition, lying at the core of the Clause's protections, prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Repeated prosecutorial sallies would unfairly burden the defendant and create a risk of conviction through sheer governmental perseverance." Ante, at 41 (citations omitted). </s> These same policy considerations are at stake when a conviction is reversed on state-law grounds going to the adequacy of the evidence. The relevant question is whether the reversal is "`due to a failure of proof at trial' where the State received a `fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble.'" Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43 (1981) (quoting Burks, 437 U.S., at 16 ). That the proof fails on state-law, rather than federal-law, grounds is immaterial to these policy considerations. Thus, the relevant distinction is between reversals based on evidentiary grounds and those based on procedural grounds: Only in the latter case can the State proceed to retrial without offending the deeply ingrained [457 U.S. 31, 51] principle that "the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). </s> It must also be noted that judges having doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence under the Jackson standard may prefer to reverse on the weight of the evidence, since retrial would not be barred. If done recurringly, this would undermine Jackson, Burks, and Greene. But under Burks and Greene, retrial is foreclosed by the Double Jeopardy Clause if the evidence fails to satisfy the Jackson standard. Hence, the Jackson issue cannot be avoided; if retrial is to be had, the evidence must be found to be legally sufficient, as a matter of federal law, to sustain the jury verdict. That finding must accompany any reversal based on the weight of the evidence if retrial is contemplated. The upshot may be that appellate judges will not be inclined to proclaim the evidence in a case to be legally sufficient, yet go on to disagree with the jury and the trial court by reversing on weight-of-the-evidence grounds. Indeed, in this case, the Florida Supreme Court declared that prospect to be an anomaly and a mistake and proclaimed that it would never again put itself in this position. </s> With all due respect, I dissent. </s> [Footnote * Only Chief Justice Sundberg, concurring in part and dissenting in part, reached this issue below: "Since the same evidence must be used, an appellate court would have no choice but once again to reverse a conviction because of our reversal under identical circumstances." 397 So.2d 1120, 1130 (1981). Because the majority concluded that it would not in the future reverse convictions on grounds of evidentiary weight, it is not clear whether that court, were it presented with the exact same evidence in a Tibbs III, would follow its new rule and affirm or again reverse on "law of the case" grounds. I agree with the majority, however, that the peculiar procedural posture of this case does not affect our consideration of the issue because other jurisdictions, including the Federal Government, make use of a similar rule with respect to evidentiary weight. </s> [457 U.S. 31, 52]

United States Supreme Court KIEFER-STEWART CO. v. SEAGRAM & SONS(1951) No. 297 Argued: December 8, 1950Decided: January 2, 1951 </s> 1. An agreement among competitors in interstate commerce to fix maximum resale prices of their products violates the Sherman Act. P. 213. </s> 2. Under the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se. P. 213. </s> 3. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support a finding by the jury that respondents had conspired to fix maximum resale prices. Pp. 213-214. </s> 4. In an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages, brought by a complainant injured by a conspiracy of sellers of liquor in interstate commerce to fix maximum resale prices, it is no defense that the complainant had conspired with others to fix minimum prices for liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. P. 214. </s> 5. The fact that corporations are under common ownership and control does not relieve them from liability under the antitrust laws, especially where they hold themselves out as competitors. P. 215. </s> 6. Since the District Court's instructions to the jury submitted to them only the cause of action under the Sherman Act, it did not err in refusing a more formal withdrawal of an issue concerning a violation of the Clayton Act, which had been charged in the complaint but which was not proved. P. 215. </s> 182 F.2d 228, reversed. </s> In an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages, the jury returned a verdict for petitioner and damages were awarded. The Court of Appeals reversed. 182 F.2d 228. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 863 . Reversed, p. 215. [340 U.S. 211, 212] </s> Joseph J. Daniels and Paul A. Porter argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Paul Y. Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Joseph M. Hartfield and Thomas Kiernan. </s> Solicitor General Perlman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Underhill and Charles H. Weston filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The petitioner, Kiefer-Stewart Company, is an Indiana drug concern which does a wholesale liquor business. Respondents, Seagram and Calvert corporations, are affiliated companies that sell liquor in interstate commerce to Indiana wholesalers. Petitioner brought this action in a federal district court for treble damages under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. 1, 15. The complaint charged that respondents had agreed or conspired to sell liquor only to those Indiana wholesalers who would resell at prices fixed by Seagram and Calvert, and that this agreement deprived petitioner of a continuing supply of liquor to its great damages. * On the trial, evidence was introduced tending to show that respondents had fixed maximum prices above which the wholesalers could not resell. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner and damages were awarded. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 182 F.2d 228. It held that an agreement among respondents to fix maximum resale prices did not violate the Sherman Act because such prices promoted rather than restrained competition. It also held the evidence insufficient to show that respondents had acted in concert. Doubt as to the correctness [340 U.S. 211, 213] of the decision on questions important in antitrust litigation prompted us to grant certiorari. 340 U.S. 863 . </s> The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an agreement among competitors to fix maximum resale prices of their products does not violate the Sherman Act. For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 : "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." </s> The Court of Appeals also erred in holding the evidence insufficient to support a finding by the jury that respondents had conspired to fix maximum resale prices. The jury was authorized by the evidence to accept the following as facts: Seagram refused to sell to petitioner and others unless the purchasers agreed to the maximum resale price fixed by Seagram. Calvert was at first willing to sell without this restrictive condition and arrangements were made for petitioner to buy large quantities of Calvert liquor. Petitioner subsequently was informed by Calvert, however, that the arrangements would not be carried out because Calvert had "to go along with Seagram." Moreover, about this time conferences were held by officials of the respondents concerning sales of liquor to petitioner. Thereafter, on identical terms as to the fixing of retail prices, both Seagram and Calvert resumed sales to other Indiana wholesalers who agreed to abide by such conditions, but no shipments have been made to petitioner. </s> The foregoing is sufficient to justify the challenged jury finding that respondents had a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding when they forbade [340 U.S. 211, 214] their purchasers to exceed the fixed ceilings. Thus, there is support for the conclusion that a conspiracy existed, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 -810, even though, as respondents point out, there is other testimony in the record indicating that the price policies of Seagram and Calvert were arrived at independently. </s> Respondents also seek to support the judgment of reversal on other grounds not passed on by the Court of Appeals but which have been argued here both orally and in the briefs. These grounds raise only issues of law not calling for examination or appraisal of evidence and we will consider them. Respondents introduced evidence in the District Court designed to show that petitioner had agreed with other Indiana wholesalers to set minimum prices for the sale of liquor in violation of the antitrust laws. It is now contended that the trial court erred in charging the jury that petitioner's part in such a conspiracy, even if proved, was no defense to the present cause of action. We hold that the instruction was correct. Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the Sherman Act makes it an offense for respondents to agree among themselves to stop selling to particular customers. If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Government or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those they injured. Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild v. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 ; Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 242 -243. [340 U.S. 211, 215] </s> Respondents next suggest that their status as "mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing unit" makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act. But this suggestion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws. E. g. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 . The rule is especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as competitors. </s> It is also claimed that the District Court improperly refused to withdraw from the jury an issue as to respondents' violation of the Clayton Act which had been charged in the complaint but which was not proved. A fair reading of the instructions to the jury, however, reveals that the trial court submitted to them only the cause of action under the Sherman Act. We are convinced from this record that a more formal withdrawal of the Clayton Act issue would have served solely to confuse. </s> Other contentions of error in the admission of evidence and in the charge to the jury are so devoid of merit that it is unnecessary to discuss them. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * Petitioner also charged a violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, but this theory has been abandoned and is not important here. See p. 215, infra. </s> [340 U.S. 211, 216]

United States Supreme Court RAILWAY CLERKS v. FLORIDA E. C. R. CO.(1966) No. 750 Argued: April 20, 1966Decided: May 23, 1966 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 782, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., and No. 783, Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Following union demands for a 25 hourly wage increase and a six months' notice requirement for layoffs and job abolitions made on behalf of nonoperating railroad employees of virtually all Class I railroads, including the Florida East Coast Railway Company (FEC), negotiations and mediation occurred under the Railway Labor Act. Section 2 Seventh provides in part that no carrier shall change employee pay rates, rules, or working conditions as embodied in agreements except as prescribed in such agreements or in 6, which, together with 5, requires negotiation and mediation. Thereafter following hearings a Presidential Emergency Board constituted under 10 recommended, and all the carriers but FEC accepted, a pay increase of about 10 an hour and a five days' notice before job abolition. Following further mediation under the Act, the parties' refusal voluntarily to arbitrate as suggested by the National Mediation Board; and further unsuccessful negotiations, the nonoperating unions struck, and most operating employees refused to cross the picket lines. After a brief shutdown, FEC resumed operations with a substantially different labor force consisting of supervisory personnel and replacements, with whom it made individual employment agreements which were substantially different from the existing collective bargaining agreements. FEC refused union-proposed mediation by the National Mediation Board. Then, although both sides had rejected arbitration prior to the strike, the unions changed their position and urged arbitration; again FEC refused. The Government brought this suit, in which the nonoperating unions intervened as plaintiffs, charging that FEC's unilateral departures [384 U.S. 238, 239] from the collective bargaining agreements violated the Act. In a parallel injunctive suit against FEC by an operating union, the Court of Appeals held that while FEC could not abrogate the existing collective bargaining agreements, it could make such changes in the agreements as the District Court found were "reasonably necessary" for it to operate under strike conditions. Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172. The District Court, in the Trainmen case and this case, enjoined FEC to adhere to the collective bargaining agreements except upon court authorization after a finding that such changes were "reasonably necessary" for continued operations under strike conditions. FEC applied to the District Court for permission to make numerous departures from the existing agreements, some of which that court sanctioned and some of which it disallowed. Both sides appealed, and, following the Trainmen case, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: </s> 1. All the procedures for settlement of the major dispute involved under 2 Seventh of the Act arising from the unions' demands having been exhausted, the unions were warranted in striking; at that point self-help was also available to the carrier. Pp. 243-244. </s> 2. A carrier, though not under an absolute duty to operate, must make reasonable efforts to maintain public service even during a strike. P. 245. </s> 3. After a strike occurs, the carrier, if its right of self-help and its duty to operate are to be meaningful, must be allowed to depart from the collective bargaining agreement without first following the Act's lengthy course for negotiation and mediation. P. 246. </s> 4. If, however, the spirit of the Act is to be honored, a carrier's power to make new terms governing its replacement labor force must be strictly confined to those truly necessary in light of the new labor force's inexperience or the lesser number of employees available for continued operation. Pp. 246-248. </s> 5. FEC, which did not refuse arbitration until after the strike had begun and its right of self-help had accrued, was not precluded from seeking the assistance of the federal court. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U.S. 50 , distinguished. Pp. 247-248. </s> 348 F.2d 682, affirmed. [384 U.S. 238, 240] </s> Neal Rutledge argued the cause for petitioners in No. 750. With him on the briefs were Lester P. Schoene and Allan Milledge. </s> Paul Bender argued the cause for the United States in Nos. 782 and 783, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Douglas and David L. Rose. </s> William B. Devaney argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 750 and 782, and for petitioner in No. 783. With him on the briefs was George B. Mickum III. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Gregory S. Prince, Jonathan C. Gibson and C. George Niebank, Jr., for the Association of American Railroads, and by Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and James L. Highsaw, Jr., for the Railway Labor Executives' Association. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This controversy started with a union demand on behalf of the nonoperating employees for a general 25-cent-per-hour wage increase and a requirement of six months' advance notice of impending layoffs and abolition of job positions. The demand was made of virtually all Class I railroads, including Florida East Coast Railway Co. (hereinafter called FEC). The dispute underwent negotiations and mediation as required by the Railway Labor Act. 1 When those procedures proved unsuccessful, a Presidential Emergency Board was created [384 U.S. 238, 241] under 10 of the Act, 2 which after hearings recommended a general pay increase of about 10 cents per hour and a requirement of at least five days' notice before job abolition. In June 1962, this settlement was accepted by all the carriers except FEC. Thereupon, further mediation was invoked under the Act but again no settlement was reached. The Act makes no provision for compulsory arbitration. Section 5 First 3 does, however, provide for voluntary arbitration at the suggestion of the National Mediation Board. The suggestion was made but both the unions and FEC refused. Further negotiations were unsuccessful and on January 23, 1963, the nonoperating unions struck. When that happened, most operating employees refused to cross the picket lines. </s> FEC shut down for a short period; and then on February 3, 1963, resumed operations by employing supervisory personnel and replacements to fill the jobs of the strikers and of those operating employees who would not cross the picket lines. FEC made individual agreements with the replacements concerning their rates of pay, rules and working agreements on terms substantially different from those in the outstanding collective bargaining agreements with the various unions. Thereafter, FEC proposed formally to abolish all the existing collective bargaining agreements and to substitute another agreement that would make rather sweeping departures in numerous respects from the existing collective bargaining agreements. Negotiations between FEC and the unions broke down. The unions then invoked the mediation services of the National Mediation Board relative to the proposed changes, but the carrier refused. [384 U.S. 238, 242] The unions thereafter agreed to submit the underlying dispute - the one concerning wages and notice - to arbitration. But FEC refused arbitration and shortly thereafter established another new agreement by unilateral action and operated under it until the present action was instituted by the United States in 1964 - a suit charging that the unilateral promulgation of the new agreement violated the Act. 4 The nonoperating unions intervened as plaintiffs and hearings were held. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals decided Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, a parallel injunctive suit brought against FEC by an operating union and similarly complaining of FEC's unilateral promulgation of the new agreement. That court held that FEC had violated the Act by its unilateral abrogation of the existing collective bargaining agreements. It ruled, however, that FEC could unilaterally institute such changes in its existing agreements as the District Court found to be "reasonably necessary to effectuate its right to continue to run its railroad under the strike conditions." 336 F.2d, at 182. The District Court thereafter entered injunctions in the Trainmen case, and in the present case, requiring FEC to abide by all the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions specified in the existing collective bargaining agreements until the termination of the statutory mediation procedure "except upon specific authorization of this Court after a finding of reasonable necessity therefor upon application of the FEC to this Court." [384 U.S. 238, 243] </s> Thereupon FEC filed an application for approval of some departures from its existing agreements with its nonoperating unions. The District Court, after hearings, granted some requests and denied others. Thus it permitted FEC to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and age limitations established by the collective bargaining agreements, to contract out certain work, and to use supervisory personnel to perform certain specified jobs where it appeared that trained personnel were unavailable. The District Court denied FEC's request that it be permitted to disregard completely craft and seniority district restrictions, that it be allowed to use supervisors to perform craft work whenever it desired, that it be relieved of the duty to provide seniority rosters, that it be permitted to contract out work whenever trained personnel were unavailable, and that the union shop be declared void and unenforceable as to employees hired after January 23, 1963. Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of its decision in the Trainmen case. 348 F.2d 682. The unions, the United States, and FEC each petitioned for a writ of certiorari which we granted. 382 U.S. 1008 . </s> The controversy centers around 2 Seventh of the Act, 5 which provides: </s> "No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 6 of this Act." </s> The demand for a 25-cent-per-hour wage increase and for six months' advance notice of impending layoffs and job abolitions was a major dispute covered by 2 Seventh (Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 ) and it had proceeded through all the major dispute procedures [384 U.S. 238, 244] required by the Act without settlement. The unions, having made their demands and having exhausted all the procedures provided by Congress, were therefore warranted in striking. For the strike has been the ultimate sanction of the union, compulsory arbitration not being provided. </s> At that juncture self-help was also available to the carrier as we held in Locomotive Engineers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 372 U.S. 284 ; 291: ". . . both parties, having exhausted all of the statutory procedures, are relegated to self-help in adjusting this dispute . . . ." </s> The carrier's right of self-help is underlined by the public service aspects of its business. "More is involved than the settlement of a private controversy without appreciable consequences to the public." Virginian Ry. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 . The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, places a responsibility on common carriers by rail to provide transportation. 6 </s> [384 U.S. 238, 245] The duty runs not to shippers alone but to the public. In our complex society, metropolitan areas in particular might suffer a calamity if rail service for freight or for passengers were stopped. Food and other critical supplies might be dangerously curtailed; vital services might be impaired; whole metropolitan communities might be paralyzed. </s> We emphasize these aspects of the problem not to say that the carrier's duty to operate is absolute, but only to emphasize that it owes the public reasonable efforts to maintain the public service at all times, even when beset by labor-management controversies and that this duty continues even when all the mediation provisions of the Act have been exhausted and self-help becomes available to both sides of the labor-management controversy. </s> If all that were involved were the pay increase and the notice to be given on layoffs or job abolition, the problem would be simple. The complication arises because the carrier, having undertaken to keep its vital services going with a substantially different labor force, finds it necessary or desirable to make other changes in the collective bargaining agreements. Thus we find FEC in this case anxious to exceed the ratio of apprentices to journeymen and the age limitations in the collective bargaining agreements, to make changes in the contracting-out provisions, to disregard requirements for trained personnel, to discard craft and seniority restrictions, the union shop provision, and so on. Each of these technically is included in the words "rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements" within the meaning of 2 Seventh of the Act. It is, therefore, argued with force that each of these issues must run the same gantlet of negotiation and mediation, as did the pay and notice provisions that gave rise to this strike. [384 U.S. 238, 246] </s> The practical effect of that conclusion would be to bring the railroad operations to a grinding halt. For the procedures of the Act are purposely long and drawn out, based on the hope that reason and practical considerations will provide in time an agreement that resolves the dispute. If, therefore, 2 Seventh is applicable after a lawful strike has been called and after lawful self-help has been invoked by the carrier, the right of self-help might well become unilateral to the workers alone, and denied the carrier. For when a carrier improvises and employs an emergency labor force it may or may not be able to comply with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, drafted to meet the sophisticated requirements of a trained and professional labor force. The union remains the bargaining representative of all the employees in the designated craft, whether union members or not. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 . All these employees of the railroad are entitled to the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement, and the carrier may not supersede the agreement by individual contracts even though particular employees are willing to enter into them. See Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 347 . But when a strike occurs, both the carrier's right of self-help and its duty to operate, if reasonably possible, might well be academic if it could not depart from the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement without first following the lengthy course the Act otherwise prescribes. </s> At the same time, any power to change or revise the basic collective agreement must be closely confined and supervised. These collective bargaining agreements are the product of years of struggle and negotiation; they represent the rules governing the community of striking employees and the carrier. That community is not destroyed by the strike, as the strike represents only an [384 U.S. 238, 247] interruption in the continuity of the relation. 7 Were a strike to be the occasion for a carrier to tear up and annul, so to speak, the entire collective bargaining agreement, labor-management relations would revert to the jungle. A carrier could then use the occasion of a strike over a simple wage and hour dispute to make sweeping changes in its work-rules so as to permit operation on terms which could not conceivably have been obtained through negotiation. Having made such changes, a carrier might well have little incentive to reach a settlement of the dispute that led to the strike. It might indeed have a strong reason to prolong the strike and even break the union. The temptation might be strong to precipitate a strike in order to permit the carrier to abrogate the entire collective bargaining agreement on terms most favorable to it. The processes of bargaining and mediation called for by the Act would indeed become a sham if a carrier could unilaterally achieve what the Act requires be done by the other orderly procedures. </s> While the carrier has the duty to make all reasonable efforts to continue its operations during a strike, its power to make new terms and conditions governing the new labor force is strictly confined, if the spirit of the Railway Labor Act is to be honored. 8 The Court of Appeals used [384 U.S. 238, 248] the words "reasonably necessary." We do not disagree, provided that "reasonably necessary" is construed strictly. The carrier must respect the continuing status of the collective bargaining agreement and make only such changes as are truly necessary in light of the inexperience and lack of training of the new labor force or the lesser number of employees available for the continued operation. The collective bargaining agreement remains the norm; the burden is on the carrier to show the need for any alteration of it, as respects the new and different class of employees that it is required to employ in order to maintain that continuity of operation that the law requires of it. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 6, 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. 156 (1964 ed.); 5 First, 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195, 45 U.S.C. 155 First (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 2 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. 160 (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 3 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195, 45 U.S.C. 155 First (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 4 We have no doubt that the United States had standing to bring this action. Section 2 Tenth, 48 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. 152 Tenth (1964 ed.), makes it the duty of the United States attorney to "institute in the proper court and to prosecute . . . all necessary proceedings for the enforcement" of 2 (emphasis added) which FEC is here charged with violating. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 -492. </s> [Footnote 5 48 Stat. 1188, 45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh (1964 ed.). </s> [Footnote 6 49 U.S.C. 1 (4) (1964 ed.) provides in part: </s> "It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable thereto; . . ." </s> 49 U.S.C. 1 (11) (1964 ed.) provides in part: </s> "It shall be the duty of every carrier by railroad subject to this chapter to furnish safe and adequate car service and to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service; . . ." </s> 49 U.S.C. 8 (1964 ed.) provides in part: </s> "In case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter, or thing in this chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this chapter required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this chapter . . . ." </s> [Footnote 7 In this connection, it bears emphasis that the District Court's authorization to deviate in part from the collective bargaining agreement would, as FEC readily concedes, terminate at the conclusion of the strike. At that time, the terms of the earlier collective bargaining agreement, except as modified by any new agreement of the parties, would be fully in force. </s> [Footnote 8 If FEC had precipitated the strike by refusing to arbitrate, then it would be barred by Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U.S. 50 , from obtaining injunctive relief in the courts since it would have failed to make "every reasonable effort" to settle the dispute within the meaning of 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 72, 29 U.S.C. 108 (1964 ed.). And we assume that seeking relief from provisions of the collective bargaining agreements [384 U.S. 238, 248] would have fallen under the same ban. But in the instant case both FEC and the unions refused voluntary arbitration and the strike followed. Later the unions changed their mind and agreed to arbitration, FEC refusing. But by then the strike was on and the right to "self-help" had accrued. If an issue concerning the good faith of a party in refusing a pre-strike opportunity to arbitrate were presented, different considerations would apply. </s> Moreover, since the justification for permitting the carrier to depart from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement lies in its duty to continue to serve the public, a district court called upon to grant a carrier's relief from provisions of the collective bargaining agreement should satisfy itself that the carrier is engaged in a good-faith effort to restore service to the public and not, e. g., using the strike to curtail that service. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. </s> The Act provides that until bargaining procedures are exhausted there shall be neither strikes nor changes in the contract. Section 2 Seventh (45 U.S.C. 152 Seventh (1964 ed.)); 5 First (45 U.S.C. 155 First (1964 ed.)); 6 (45 U.S.C. 156 (1964 ed.)). Here, bargaining was exhausted only on wages and notice of [384 U.S. 238, 249] layoffs and job abolition. At that point the union was free to strike and the carrier to make such changes as had been bargained for. The carrier was free to operate, if it could, but in my view only under the terms of the existing collective bargaining contract as modified with respect to those subjects on which the Act's procedures had been followed. </s> The Court agrees that 2 Seventh forbids the carrier itself to make any changes in the contract other than those on which bargaining has taken place, regardless of how necessary these changes are to the successful operation of the railroad. But with the consent of a United States court, or a state court for that matter, the carrier may now make any change essential to its continued operation. 1 Although the union remains the bargaining agent for all employees, strikers and replacements alike, Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 , the carrier need not bargain with it, but with the court, if it wants to make changes which the Act forbids it to make alone. The union is free to strike and thereby to attempt to halt the operation of the railroad; but if it does, the court may - indeed, it must in some circumstances - permit the railroad to make any change in wages, hours and working conditions which is necessary to obviate the normal consequences of the strike. I fail to see how this exception can be read into the unequivocal language of 2 Seventh. [384 U.S. 238, 250] </s> This is very close to a judgment that there shall be no strikes in the transportation business, a judgment which Congress rejected in drafting the Railway Labor Act. True, the Act was designed to maximize settlements and minimize strikes, 2 but Congress stopped short of imposing compulsory arbitration, the most obvious technique to insure the settlement of disputes and to prevent strikes. 5, 45 U.S.C. 155 (1964 ed.). Certainly it was not anticipated that a struck railroad could invoke the aid of the court to make changes in a contract which Congress had forbidden it to make. Nor did Congress anticipate what is in effect a new type of railroad receivership designed to last as long as necessary to blunt the effectiveness of a strike which the Act left the union free to call. 3 Had Congress impressed upon the railroads an absolute duty to continue operating while struck, perhaps an implied exception to 2 Seventh might be warranted. But, as the majority recognizes, no such duty has been placed on the railroads. </s> Of course the railroad was free to operate, but the Congress specified in 2 Seventh the terms on which it might do so. To change those terms is a task for Congress, not for a federal or a state court. </s> [Footnote 1 Congress has generally entrusted the specialized and unique affairs of the railroad industry to a few expert boards and agencies. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 752 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Permitting the wholesale intervention of the courts in this manner seems inconsistent with these congressional policies of uniformity and expert supervision. Cf. Labor Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 299 (WHITE, J., dissenting); American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, 380 U.S. 300, 325 -327 (WHITE, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 2 It is certainly questionable whether the procedures approved by the majority will minimize strikes or maximize settlements. This particular strike is one of the longest in railroad history. There can be no doubt that the procedures followed in this case have helped prolong the strike. For example, in part because of these procedures, Florida East Coast enjoyed a substantial increase in its operating profits during the strike period. See Brief for Government, p. 8, n. 7. </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. 77 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 205 (n) (1964 ed.), which provides "No judge or trustee acting under this title shall change the wages or working conditions of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in the Railway Labor Act . . . ." Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572. </s> [384 U.S. 238, 251]

United States Supreme Court RANDALL WRIGHT, SHERIFF, SHAWANO COUNTY, WISCONSIN v. JOSEPH L. VAN PATTEN(2008) No. 07-212 Argued: Decided: January 7, 2008 </s> Per Curiam. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that respondent Joseph Van Patten was entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254, reasoning that his lawyer's assistance was presumptively ineffective owing to his participation in a plea hearing by speaker phone. Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038 (2006). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. ___ (2006). On remand, the Seventh Circuit adhered to its original decision, concluding that "[n]othing in Musladin requires that our 2006 opinion be changed." Van Patten v. Endicott, 489 F.3d 827, 828 (2007). We grant the petition for certiorari now before us and this time reverse the judgment of the Seventh Circuit. I </s> Van Patten was charged with first-degree intentional homicide and pleaded no contest to a reduced charge of first-degree reckless homicide. His counsel was not physically present at the plea hearing but was linked to the courtroom by speaker phone. After the state trial court imposed the maximum term of 25 years in prison, Van Patten retained different counsel and moved in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to withdraw his no-contest plea. The thrust of the motion was that Van Patten's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by his trial counsel's physical absence from the plea hearing. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that, under state law, a postconviction motion to withdraw a no-contest plea will be granted only if a defendant establishes "manifest injustice" by clear and convincing evidence. See State v. Van Pattten, No. 96-3036-CR (Wis. App., May 28, 1997), App. to Pet. for Cert. A47-A48. While the court acknowledged that "the violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel may constitute a manifest injustice," id., at A48, it found that the absence of Van Patten's lawyer from the plea hearing did not violate his right to counsel: "The plea hearing transcript neither indicates any deficiency in the plea colloquy, nor suggests that Van Patten's attorney's participation by telephone interfered in any way with [Van Patten's] ability to communicate with his attorney about his plea. Van Patten confirmed that he had thoroughly discussed his case and plea decision with his attorney and was satisfied with the legal representation he had received. The court gave Van Patten the opportunity to speak privately with his attorney over the phone if he had questions about the plea, but Van Patten declined. Further, when Van Patten exercised his right to allocution at sentencing, in the personal presence of his attorney, he raised no objection to his plea." Id., at A49-A50. </s> Applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court concluded that "[t]he record does not support, nor does Van Patten's appellate brief include, any argument that counsel's performance was deficient or prejudicial," No. 96-3036-CR, App. to Pet. for Cert. A51, and denied Van Patten's motion. </s> After the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined further review, Van Patten petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in Federal District Court. The District Court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It held that Van Patten's Sixth Amendment claim should have been resolved, not under Strickland's two-pronged test (which requires a showing of deficient performance and prejudice to the defendant), but under the standard discussed in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (under which prejudice may be presumed). Although the Seventh Circuit recognized that this case "presents [a] novel ... question," Deppisch, 434 F.3d, at 1040, and conceded that "[u]nder Strickland, it seems clear [that] Van Patten would have no viable claim," id., at 1042, the court concluded that "it is clear to us that Van Patten's case must be resolved under Cronic," id., at 1043. The resolution was in Van Patten's favor. </s> While the prison warden's petition for certiorari was pending, this Court decided Musladin, supra. Musladin had invoked this Court's cases recognizing "that certain courtroom practices are so inherently prejudicial that they deprive the defendant of a fair trial," id., at ___ (slip op., at 1). The issue was the significance of these precedents in a case under §2254, which bars relief on any claim "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). </s> The prejudicial conduct involved in Musladin was courtroom conduct of private actors. We held that the "inheren[t] prejudic[e]" test, which we thus far have applied only in cases involving government-sponsored conduct, see, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), did not clearly extend to the conduct of independently acting courtroom spectators. See Musladin, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5) ("[A]lthough the Court articulated the test for inherent prejudice that applies to state conduct in Williams and Flynn, we have never applied that test to spectators' conduct. Indeed, part of the legal test of Williams and Flynn--asking whether the practices furthered an essential state interest--suggests that those cases apply only to state-sponsored practices"). For that reason, we reversed the Court of Appeals' grant of habeas relief. </s> Musladin's explanation of the "clearly established Federal law" requirement prompted us to remand Van Patten's case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration. A majority of the panel reaffirmed its original judgment, however, on the ground that "[u]nlike Musladin, this case does not concern an open constitutional question," because "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized a defendant's right to relief if his defense counsel was actually or constructively absent at a critical stage of the proceedings." 489 F.3d, at 828. Judge Coffey disagreed, observing that "the United States Supreme Court has never held that an attorney is presumed to be ineffective if he participates in a plea hearing by speaker phone rather than by physical appearance." Ibid. (emphasis deleted). He found that "[t]he Majority Opinion does not comport with Musladin," ibid., and dissented from "the court's erroneous decision to allow" its original opinion "to stand as written," id., at 829. We reach the same conclusion. II </s> Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ordinarily applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea hearing stage. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) ("[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel"). And it was in a different context that Cronic "recognized a narrow exception to Strickland's holding that a defendant who asserts ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate not only that his attorney's performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced the defense." Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (discussing Cronic). Cronic held that a Sixth Amendment violation may be found "without inquiring into counsel's actual performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had on the trial," Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002), when "circumstances [exist] that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified," Cronic, supra, at 658. Cronic, not Strickland, applies "when ... the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial," 466 U.S., at 659-660,** and one circumstance warranting the presumption is the "complete denial of counsel," that is, when "counsel [is] either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding," id., at 659, and n.25. No decision of this Court, however, squarely addresses the issue in this case, see Deppisch, supra, at 1040 (noting that this case "presents [a] novel ... question"), or clearly establishes that Cronic should replace Strickland in this novel factual context. Our precedents do not clearly hold that counsel's participation by speaker phone should be treated as a "complete denial of counsel," on par with total absence. Even if we agree with Van Patten that a lawyer physically present will tend to perform better than one on the phone, it does not necessarily follow that mere telephone contact amounted to total absence or "prevented [counsel] from assisting the accused," so as to entail application of Cronic. The question is not whether counsel in those circumstances will perform less well than he otherwise would, but whether the circumstances are likely to result in such poor performance that an inquiry into its effects would not be worth the time. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 7) (Sixth Amendment ensures "effective (not mistake-free) representation" (emphasis in original)). Our cases provide no categorical answer to this question, and for that matter the several proceedings in this case hardly point toward one. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held counsel's performance by speaker phone to be constitutionally effective; neither the Magistrate Judge, the District Court, nor the Seventh Circuit disputed this conclusion; and the Seventh Circuit itself stated that "[u]nder Strickland, it seems clear Van Patten would have no viable claim." Deppisch, 434 F.3d, at 1042. </s> Because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in Van Patten's favor, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" Musladin, 549 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)). Under the explicit terms of §2254(d)(1), therefore, relief is unauthorized. *  *  * </s> Petitioner tells us that "[i]n urging review, [the State] does not condone, recommend, or encourage the practice of defense counsel assisting clients by telephone rather than in person at court proceedings, even in nonadversarial hearings such as the plea hearing in this case," Pet. for Cert. 5, and he acknowledges that "[p]erhaps, under similar facts in a direct federal appeal, the Seventh Circuit could have properly reached the same result it reached here," ibid. Our own consideration of the merits of telephone practice, however, is for another day, and this case turns on the recognition that no clearly established law contrary to the state court's conclusion justifies collateral relief. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. </s> RANDALL WRIGHT, SHERIFF, SHAWANO COUNTY, WISCONSIN v. JOSEPH L. VAN PATTEN on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit No. 07-212. Decided January 7, 2008 </s> Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment. </s> An unfortunate drafting error in the Court's opinion in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), makes it necessary to join the Court's judgment in this case. </s> In Cronic, this Court explained that some violations of the right to counsel arise in "circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Id., at 658. One such circumstance exists when the accused is "denied the presence of counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution." Id., at 662. We noted that the "presence" of lawyers "is essential because they are the means through which the other rights of the person on trial are secured." Id., at 653. Regrettably, Cronic did not "clearly establish" the full scope of the defendant's right to the presence of an attorney. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). </s> The Court of Appeals apparently read "the presence of counsel" in Cronic to mean "the presence of counsel in open court." Initially, all three judges on the panel assumed that the constitutional right at stake was the right to have counsel by one's side at all critical stages of the proceeding.** See also Van Patten v. Deppisch, No. 04-1276, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5147 (CA7, Feb. 27, 2006) (noting that no member of the Seventh Circuit requested a vote on the warden's petition for rehearing en banc). In my view, this interpretation is correct. The fact that in 1984, when Cronic was decided, neither the parties nor the Court contemplated representation by attorneys who were not present in the flesh explains the author's failure to add the words "in open court" after the word "present." </s> As the Court explains today, however, the question is not the reasonableness of the federal court's interpretation of Cronic, but rather whether the Wisconsin court's narrower reading of that opinion was "objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). In light of Cronic's references to the "complete denial of counsel" and "totally absent" counsel, 466 U.S., at 659, and n. 25, and the opinion's failure to state more explicitly that the defendant is entitled to "the presence of counsel [in open court]," id., at 662, I acquiesce in this Court's conclusion that the state-court decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In doing so, however, I emphasize that today's opinion does not say that the state courts' interpretation of Cronic was correct, or that we would have accepted that reading if the case had come to us on direct review rather than by way of 28 U.S.C. §2254. See ante, at 6-7; see also Williams, 529 U.S., at 410 ("[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law"). </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote **Cronic also applies when "there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial process," 466 U.S., at 662, such that "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," id., at 659. We have made clear that "[w]hen we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be complete." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-697 (2002). It is undisputed that this standard has not been met here. FOOTNOTESFootnote **In his opinion for a unanimous panel, Judge Evans explained at length why respondent had not had the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding--the plea hearing--which resulted in a sentence of imprisonment for 25 years. He wrote, in part: </s> The Sixth Amendment's right-to-counsel guarantee recognizes 'the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). 'Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.' Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 (citation omitted). Thus, a defendant requires an attorney's 'guiding hand' through every stage of the proceedings against him. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. It is well-settled that a court proceeding in which a defendant enters a plea (a guilty plea or, as here, a plea of no contest) is a 'critical stage' where an attorney's presence is crucial because 'defenses may be ... irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted.' Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). See also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963); United States ex rel. Thomas v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1988). Indeed, with plea bargaining the norm and trial the exception, for most criminal defendants a change of plea hearing is the critical stage of their prosecution. </s> In deciding whether to dispense with the two-part Strickland inquiry, a court must evaluate whether the 'surrounding circumstances make it unlikely that the defendant could have received the effective assistance of counsel,' Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666, and thus 'justify a presumption that [the] conviction was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution,' id. at 662. In this case, although the transcript shows that the state trial judge did his best to conduct the plea colloquy with care, the arrangements made it impossible for Van Patten to have the 'assistance of counsel' in anything but the most perfunctory sense. Van Patten stood alone before judge and prosecutor. Unlike the usual defendant in a criminal case, he could not turn to his lawyer for private legal advice, to clear up misunderstandings, to seek reassurance, or to discuss any last-minute misgivings. Listening over an audio connection, counsel could not detect and respond to cues from his client's demeanor that might have indicated he did not understand certain aspects of the proceeding, or that he was changing his mind. If Van Patten wished to converse with his attorney, anyone else in the courtroom could effectively eavesdrop. (We assume the district attorney would balk if he were expected to conduct last-minute consultations with his staff via speakerphone in open court, 'on the record,' with the defendant taking in every word.) No advance arrangements had been made for a private line in a private place, and even if one could 'perhaps' have been provided, it would have required a special request by Van Patten and, apparently, a break in the proceedings. In short, this was not an auspicious setting for someone about to waive very valuable constitutional rights." Van Patten v. Deppisch, 434 F.3d 1038, 1042-1043 (CA7 2006).

United States Supreme Court MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY(1974) No. 73-434 Argued: February 27, 1974Decided: July 25, 1974 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 73-435, Allen Park Public Schools et al. v. Bradley et al., and No. 73-436, Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Respondents brought this class action, alleging that the Detroit public school system is racially segregated as a result of the official policies and actions of petitioner state and city officials, and seeking implementation of a plan to eliminate the segregation and establish a unitary nonracial school system. The District Court, after concluding that various acts by the petitioner Detroit Board of Education had created and perpetuated school segregation in Detroit, and that the acts of the Board, as a subordinate entity of the State, were attributable to the State, ordered the Board to submit Detroit-only desegregation plans. The court also ordered the state officials to submit desegregation plans encompassing the three-county metropolitan area, despite the fact that the 85 outlying school districts in these three counties were not parties to the action and there was no claim that they had committed constitutional violations. Subsequently, outlying school districts were allowed to intervene, but were not permitted to assert any claim or defense on issues previously adjudicated or to reopen any issue previously decided, but were allowed merely to advise the court as to the propriety of a metropolitan plan and to submit any objections, modifications, or alternatives to any such plan. Thereafter, the District Court ruled that it was proper to consider metropolitan plans, that Detroit-only plans submitted by the Board and respondents were inadequate to accomplish desegregation, and that therefore it would seek a solution beyond the limits of the Detroit School District, and concluded that "[s]chool district lines are simply matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights." Without having evidence that the suburban school districts had committed acts of de jure segregation, the court appointed a panel to submit a plan for the [418 U.S. 717, 718] Detroit schools that would encompass an entire designated desegregation area consisting of 53 of the 85 suburban school districts plus Detroit, and ordered the Detroit Board to acquire at least 295 school buses to provide transportation under an interim plan to be developed for the 1972-1973 school year. The Court of Appeals, affirming in part, held that the record supported the District Court's finding as to the constitutional violations committed by the Detroit Board and the state officials; that therefore the District Court was authorized and required to take effective measures to desegregate the Detroit school system; and that a metropolitan area plan embracing the 53 outlying districts was the only feasible solution and was within the District Court's equity powers. But the court remanded so that all suburban school districts that might be affected by a metropolitan remedy could be made parties and have an opportunity to be heard as to the scope and implementation of such a remedy, and vacated the order as to the bus acquisitions, subject to its reimposition at an appropriate time. Held: The relief ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was based upon erroneous standards and was unsupported by record evidence that acts of the outlying districts had any impact on the discrimination found to exist in the Detroit schools. A federal court may not impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy for single-district de jure school segregation violations where there is no finding that the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary school systems or have committed acts that effected segregation within the other districts, there is no claim or finding that the school district boundary lines were established with the purpose of fostering racial segregation, and there is no meaningful opportunity for the included neighboring school districts to present evidence or be heard on the propriety of a multidistrict remedy or on the question of constitutional violations by those districts. Pp. 737-753. </s> (a) The District Court erred in using as a standard the declared objective of development of a metropolitan area plan which, upon implementation, would leave "no school, grade or classroom . . . substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition" of the metropolitan area as a whole. The clear import of Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 , is that desegregation, in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial balance. Pp. 739-741. [418 U.S. 717, 719] </s> (b) While boundary lines may be bridged in circumstances where there has been a constitutional violation calling for inter-district relief, school district lines may not be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience; substantial local control of public education in this country is a deeply rooted tradition. Pp. 741-742. </s> (c) The interdistrict remedy could extensively disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan, since that remedy would require, in effect, consolidation of 54 independent school districts historically administered as separate governmental units into a vast new super school district, and, since - entirely apart from the logistical problems attending large-scale transportation of students - the consolidation would generate other problems in the administration, financing, and operation of this new school system. Pp. 742-743. </s> (d) From the scope of the interdistrict plan itself, absent a complete restructuring of the Michigan school district laws, the District Court would become, first, a de facto "legislative authority" to resolve the complex operational problems involved and thereafter a "school superintendent" for the entire area, a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of local control of schools through elected school boards. Pp. 743-744. </s> (e) Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must be first shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district; i. e., specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Pp. 744-745. </s> (f) With no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect, the District Court transcended the original theory of the case as framed by the pleadings, and mandated a metropolitan area remedy, the approval of which would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a standard not previously hinted at in any holding of this Court. P. 745. </s> (g) Assuming, arguendo, that the State was derivatively responsible for Detroit's segregated school conditions, it does not follow [418 U.S. 717, 720] that an interdistrict remedy is constitutionally justified or required, since there has been virtually no showing that either the State or any of the 85 outlying districts engaged in any activity that had a cross-district effect. Pp. 748-749. </s> (h) An isolated instance of a possible segregative effect as between two of the school districts involved would not justify the broad metropolitanwide remedy contemplated, particularly since that remedy embraced 52 districts having no responsibility for the arrangement and potentially involved 503,000 pupils in addition to Detroit's 276,000 pupils. Pp. 749-750. </s> 484 F.2d 215, reversed and remanded. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 753. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 757. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 762. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, and WHITE, JJ., joined, post, p. 781. </s> Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 73-434. With him on the brief were Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Eugene Krasicky, Gerald F. Young, George L. McCargar, and Thomas F. Schimpf, Assistant Attorneys General. William M. Saxton argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 73-435 and 73-436. With him on the brief in No. 73-435 were John B. Weaver, Robert M. Vercruysse, and Xhafer Orhan. Douglas H. West filed a brief for petitioner in No. 73-436. </s> J. Harold Flannery and Nathaniel R. Jones argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With them on the brief for respondents Bradley et al. were Jack Greenberg, Norman Chachkin, and Louis R. Lucas. George T. Roumell, Jr., and C. Nicholas Revelos filed a brief for respondents Board of Education for the School District of the city of Detroit et al. John Bruff and William Ross filed a brief for respondent Professional Personnel of Van [418 U.S. 717, 721] Dyke. Robert J. Lord filed a brief for respondents Green et al. </s> Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief was Assistant Attorney General Pottinger.Fn </s> Fn [418 U.S. 717, 721] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Donald P. Bogard, Deputy Attorney General, and William F. Harvey for the State of Indiana; by Lewis C. Bose and William M. Evans for the Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township, Indiana, et al.; by Richard D. Wagner and Richard L. Brown for the town of Speedway, Indiana, et al.; and by Harold H. Fuhrman for the National Suburban League, Ltd. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leonard P. Strickman for the city of Boston, Massachusetts; by Alexander A. Goldfarb for the city of Hartford, Connecticut; by Sanford Jay Rosen for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund; and by Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Charles F. Clippert, Charles E. Keller, Thomas H. Schwarze, John F. Shantz, Raymond McPeters, Walter J. Guth, Jr., Raymond G. Glime, Tony Ferris, and Perry Christy for Bloomfield Hills School District et al.; by Stephen J. Pollak, Richard M. Sharp, and David Rubin for the National Education Assn.; and by David I. Caplan for the Jewish Rights Council. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to determine whether a federal court may impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary school systems within their districts, absent any claim or finding that the boundary lines of any affected school district were established with the purpose of fostering racial segregation in public schools, absent any finding that the included districts committed acts which effected segregation within the other districts, and absent a [418 U.S. 717, 722] meaningful opportunity for the included neighboring school districts to present evidence or be heard on the propriety of a multidistrict remedy or on the question of constitutional violations by those neighboring districts. 1 </s> I </s> The action was commenced in August 1970 by the respondents, the Detroit Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 2 and individual parents and students, on behalf of a class later defined by order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, dated February 16, 1971, to include "all school children in the City of Detroit, Michigan, and all Detroit resident parents who have children of school age." The named defendants in the District Court included the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Board of Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Board of Education of the city of Detroit, its members, and the city's former superintendent of schools. The State of Michigan as such is not a party to this litigation and references to the State must be read as references to the public officials, state and local, through whom the State is alleged to have acted. In their complaint respondents attacked the constitutionality of a statute of the State of Michigan known as Act 48 of the 1970 Legislature on the ground that it put the State of Michigan in the position of unconstitutionally interfering with the execution and operation of a voluntary plan of partial high school desegregation, known as the April 7, 1970, Plan, which had been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education to be effective beginning [418 U.S. 717, 723] with the fall 1970 semester. The complaint also alleged that the Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions of the defendants and their predecessors in office, and called for the implementation of a plan that would eliminate "the racial identity of every school in the [Detroit] system and . . . maintain now and hereafter a unitary, nonracial school system." </s> Initially the matter was tried on respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of Act 48 so as to permit the April 7 Plan to be implemented. On that issue, the District Court ruled that respondents were not entitled to a preliminary injunction since at that stage there was no proof that Detroit had a dual segregated school system. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the "implementation of the April 7 plan was [unconstitutionally] thwarted by State action in the form of the Act of the Legislature of Michigan," 433 F.2d 897, 902 (CA6 1970), and that such action could not be interposed to delay, obstruct, or nullify steps lawfully taken for the purpose of protecting rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was remanded to the District Court for an expedited trial on the merits. </s> On remand, the respondents moved for immediate implementation of the April 7 Plan in order to remedy the deprivation of the claimed constitutional rights. In response, the School Board suggested two other plans, along with the April 7 Plan, and urged that top priority be assigned to the so-called "Magnet Plan" which was "designed to attract children to a school because of its superior curriculum." The District Court approved the Board's Magnet Plan, and respondents again appealed to the Court of Appeals, moving for summary reversal. The Court of Appeals refused to pass on the merits of the Magnet Plan and ruled that the District Court had [418 U.S. 717, 724] not abused its discretion in refusing to adopt the April 7 Plan without an evidentiary hearing. The case was again remanded with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial on the merits of respondents' substantive allegations concerning the Detroit school system. 438 F.2d 945 (CA6 1971). </s> The trial of the issue of segregation in the Detroit school system began on April 6, 1971, and continued through July 22, 1971, consuming some 41 trial days. On September 27, 1971, the District Court issued its findings and conclusions on the issue of segregation, finding that "Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area." 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (ED Mich. 1971). While still addressing a Detroit-only violation, the District Court reasoned: </s> "While it would be unfair to charge the present defendants with what other governmental officers or agencies have done, it can be said that the actions or the failure to act by the responsible school authorities, both city and state, were linked to that of these other governmental units. When we speak of governmental action we should not view the different agencies as a collection of unrelated units. Perhaps the most that can be said is that all of them, including the school authorities, are, in part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists. And we note that just as there is an interaction between residential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the racial composition of the schools." Ibid. [418 U.S. 717, 725] </s> The District Court found that the Detroit Board of Education created and maintained optional attendance zones 3 within Detroit neighborhoods undergoing racial transition and between high school attendance areas of opposite predominant racial compositions. These zones, the court found, had the "natural, probable, foreseeable and actual effect" of allowing white pupils to escape identifiably Negro schools. Ibid. Similarly, the District Court found that Detroit school attendance zones had been drawn along north-south boundary lines despite the Detroit Board's awareness that drawing boundary lines in an east-west direction would result in significantly greater desegregation. Again, the District Court concluded, the natural and actual effect of these acts was the creation and perpetuation of school segregation within Detroit. </s> The District Court found that in the operation of its school transportation program, which was designed to relieve overcrowding, the Detroit Board had admittedly bused Negro Detroit pupils to predominantly Negro schools which were beyond or away from closer white schools with available space. 4 This practice was found to have continued in recent years despite the Detroit Board's avowed policy, adopted in 1967, of utilizing transportation to increase desegregation: </s> "With one exception (necessitated by the burning of a white school), defendant Board has never bused [418 U.S. 717, 726] white children to predominantly black schools. The Board has not bused white pupils to black schools despite the enormous amount of space available in inner-city schools. There were 22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or more black." Id., at 588. </s> With respect to the Detroit Board of Education's practices in school construction, the District Court found that Detroit school construction generally tended to have a segregative effect with the great majority of schools being built in either overwhelmingly all-Negro or all-white neighborhoods so that the new schools opened as predominantly one-race schools. Thus, of the 14 schools which opened for use in 1970-1971, 11 opened over 90% Negro and one opened less than 10% Negro. </s> The District Court also found that the State of Michigan had committed several constitutional violations with respect to the exercise of its general responsibility for, and supervision of, public education. 5 The State, for example, was found to have failed, until the 1971 Session of the Michigan Legislature, to provide authorization or [418 U.S. 717, 727] funds for the transportation of pupils within Detroit regardless of their poverty or distance from the school to which they were assigned; during this same period the State provided many neighboring, mostly white, suburban districts the full range of state-supported transportation. </s> The District Court found that the State, through Act 48, acted to "impede, delay and minimize racial integration in Detroit schools." The first sentence of 12 of Act 48 was designed to delay the April 7, 1970, desegregation plan originally adopted by the Detroit Board. The remainder of 12 sought to prescribe for each school in the eight districts criteria of "free choice" and "neighborhood schools," which, the District Court found, "had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of segregation." 338 F. Supp., at 589. 6 </s> The District Court also held that the acts of the Detroit Board of Education, as a subordinate entity of the State, were attributable to the State of Michigan, thus creating a vicarious liability on the part of the State. Under Michigan law, Mich. Comp. Laws 388.851 (1970), for example, school building construction plans had to be approved by the State Board of Education, and, prior to 1962, the State Board had specific statutory authority to supervise schoolsite selection. The proofs concerning the effect of Detroit's school construction program were, [418 U.S. 717, 728] therefore, found to be largely applicable to show state responsibility for the segregative results. 7 </s> Turning to the question of an appropriate remedy for these several constitutional violations, the District Court deferred a pending motion 8 by intervening parent defendants [418 U.S. 717, 729] to join as additional parties defendant the 85 outlying school districts in the three-county Detroit metropolitan area on the ground that effective relief could not be achieved without their presence. 9 The District Court concluded that this motion to join was "premature," since it "has to do with relief" and no reasonably specific desegregation plan was before the court. 338 F. Supp., at 595. Accordingly, the District Court proceeded to order the Detroit Board of Education to submit desegregation plans limited to the segregation problems found to be existing within the city of Detroit. At the same time, however, the state defendants were directed to submit desegregation plans encompassing the three-county metropolitan area 10 despite the fact that the 85 outlying school [418 U.S. 717, 730] districts of these three counties were not parties to the action and despite the fact that there had been no claim that these outlying districts had committed constitutional violations. 11 An effort to appeal these orders to the Court of Appeals was dismissed on the ground that the orders were not appealable. 468 F.2d 902 (CA6), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972). The sequence of the ensuing actions and orders of the District Court are significant factors and will therefore be catalogued in some detail. </s> Following the District Court's abrupt announcement that it planned to consider the implementation of a multidistrict, metropolitan area remedy to the segregation problems identified within the city of Detroit, the District Court was again requested to grant the outlying school districts intervention as of right on the ground that the District Court's new request for multidistrict plans "may, as a practical matter, impair or impede [the intervenors'] ability to protect" the welfare of their students. The District Court took the motions to intervene under advisement pending submission of the requested desegregation plans by Detroit and the state officials. On March 7, 1972, the District Court notified all parties and the petitioner school districts seeking intervention, that March 14, 1972, was the deadline for submission of recommendations for conditions of intervention and the [418 U.S. 717, 731] date of the commencement of hearings on Detroit-only desegregation plans. On the second day of the scheduled hearings, March 15, 1972, the District Court granted the motions of the intervenor school districts 12 subject, inter alia, to the following conditions: </s> "1. No intervenor will be permitted to assert any claim or defense previously adjudicated by the court. </s> "2. No intervenor shall reopen any question or issue which has previously been decided by the court. </s> . . . . . </s> "7. New intervenors are granted intervention for two principal purposes: (a) To advise the court, by brief, of the legal propriety or impropriety of considering a metropolitan plan; (b) To review any plan or plans for the desegregation of the so-called larger Detroit Metropolitan area, and submitting objections, modifications or alternatives to it or them, and in accordance with the requirements of the United States Constitution and the prior orders of this court." 1 Joint Appendix 206 (hereinafter App.). </s> Upon granting the motion to intervene, on March 15, 1972, the District Court advised the petitioning intervenors that the court had previously set March 22, 1972, as the date for the filing of briefs on the legal propriety of a "metropolitan" plan of desegregation and, accordingly, that the intervening school districts would have one week to muster their legal arguments on the issue. 13 </s> [418 U.S. 717, 732] Thereafter, and following the completion of hearings on the Detroit-only desegregation plans, the District Court issued the four rulings that were the principal issues in the Court of Appeals. </s> (a) On March 24, 1972, two days after the intervenors' briefs were due, the District Court issued its ruling on the question of whether it could "consider relief in the form of a metropolitan plan, encompassing not only the City of Detroit, but the larger Detroit metropolitan area." It rejected the state defendants' arguments that no state action caused the segregation of the Detroit schools, and the intervening suburban districts' contention that interdistrict relief was inappropriate unless the suburban districts themselves had committed violations. The court concluded: </s> "[I]t is proper for the court to consider metropolitan plans directed toward the desegregation of the Detroit public schools as an alternative to the present intra-city desegregation plans before it and, in the event that the court finds such intra-city plans inadequate to desegregate such schools, the court is of the opinion that it is required to consider a metropolitan remedy for desegregation." Pet. App. 51a. </s> (b) On March 28, 1972, the District Court issued its findings and conclusions on the three Detroit-only plans submitted by the city Board and the respondents. It found that the best of the three plans "would make the Detroit school system more identifiably Black . . . thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system." Id., at 55a. From this the court concluded that the plan "would not accomplish desegregation . . . within the corporate geographical limits of the city." Id., at 56a. Accordingly, the District Court held that it "must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school [418 U.S. 717, 733] district for a solution to the problem," and that "[s]chool district lines are simply matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights." Id., at 57a. </s> (c) During the period from March 28 to April 14, 1972, the District Court conducted hearings on a metropolitan plan. Counsel for the petitioning intervenors was allowed to participate in these hearings, but he was ordered to confine his argument to "the size and expanse of the metropolitan plan" without addressing the intervenors' opposition to such a remedy or the claim that a finding of a constitutional violation by the intervenor districts was an essential predicate to any remedy involving them. Thereafter, on June 14, 1972, the District Court issued its ruling on the "desegregation area" and related findings and conclusions. The court acknowledged at the outset that it had "taken no proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school districts in the counties [in the Detroit area], nor on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of Detroit school district, such school districts have committed acts of de jure segregation." Nevertheless, the court designated 53 of the 85 suburban school districts plus Detroit as the "desegregation area" and appointed a panel to prepare and submit "an effective desegregation plan" for the Detroit schools that would encompass the entire desegregation area. 14 The plan was to be based on 15 clusters, each containing part of the Detroit system and two or more suburban districts, [418 U.S. 717, 734] and was to "achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition." 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED Mich. 1972). </s> (d) On July 11, 1972, and in accordance with a recommendation by the court-appointed desegregation panel, the District Court ordered the Detroit Board of Education to purchase or lease "at least" 295 school buses for the purpose of providing transportation under an interim plan to be developed for the 1972-1973 school year. The costs of this acquisition were to be borne by the state defendants. Pet. App. 106a-107a. </s> On June 12, 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 484 F.2d 215 (CA6). 15 The Court of Appeals held, first, that the record supported the District Court's findings and conclusions on the constitutional violations committed by the Detroit Board, id., at 221-238, and by the state defendants, id., at 239-241. 16 It stated that the acts of racial discrimination [418 U.S. 717, 735] shown in the record are "causally related to the substantial amount of segregation found in the Detroit school system," id., at 241, and that "the District Court was therefore authorized and required to take effective measures to desegregate the Detroit Public School System." Id., at 242. </s> The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that "any less comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems, with an overwhelmingly white majority population in the total metropolitan area." Id., at 245. The court went on to state that it could "not see how such segregation can be any less harmful to the minority students than if the same result were accomplished within one school district." Ibid. </s> Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan." Id., at 249. It reasoned that such a plan would be appropriate because of the State's violations, and could be implemented because of the State's authority to control local school districts. Without further elaboration, and without any discussion of the claims that no constitutional violation by the outlying districts had been [418 U.S. 717, 736] shown and that no evidence on that point had been allowed, the Court of Appeals held: </s> "[T]he State has committed de jure acts of segregation and . . . the State controls the instrumentalities whose action is necessary to remedy the harmful effects of the State acts." Ibid. </s> An interdistrict remedy was thus held to be "within the equity powers of the District Court." Id., at 250. 17 </s> The Court of Appeals expressed no views on the propriety of the District Court's composition of the metropolitan "desegregation area." It held that all suburban school districts that might be affected by any metropolitanwide remedy should, under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19, be made parties to the case on remand and be given an opportunity to be heard with respect to the scope and implementation of such a remedy. 484 F.2d, at 251-252. Under the terms of the remand, however, the District Court was not "required" to receive further evidence on the issue of segregation in the Detroit schools or on the propriety of a Detroit-only remedy, or on the question of whether the affected districts had committed any violation of the constitutional rights of Detroit pupils or others. Id., at 252. Finally, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order directing the acquisition of school buses, subject to the right of the District Court to consider reimposing the order "at the appropriate time." Ibid. [418 U.S. 717, 737] </s> II </s> Ever since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), judicial consideration of school desegregation cases has begun with the standard: </s> "[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of `separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id., at 495. </s> This has been reaffirmed time and again as the meaning of the Constitution and the controlling rule of law. </s> The target of the Brown holding was clear and forthright: the elimination of state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils. This duality and racial segregation were held to violate the Constitution in the cases subsequent to 1954, including particularly Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). </s> The Swann case, of course, dealt </s> "with the problem of defining in more precise terms than heretofore the scope of the duty of school authorities and district courts in implementing Brown I and the mandate to eliminate dual systems and establish unitary systems at once." 402 U.S., at 6 . </s> In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Court's first encounter with the problem of remedies in school desegregation cases, the Court noted: </s> "In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, [418 U.S. 717, 738] equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Id., at 300 (footnotes omitted). </s> In further refining the remedial process, Swann held, the task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, "the condition that offends the Constitution." A federal remedial power may be exercised "only on the basis of a constitutional violation" and, "[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." 402 U.S., at 16 . </s> Proceeding from these basic principles, we first note that in the District Court the complainants sought a remedy aimed at the condition alleged to offend the Constitution - the segregation within the Detroit City School District. 18 The court acted on this theory of the case and in its initial ruling on the "Desegregation Area" stated: </s> "The task before this court, therefore, is now, and . . . has always been, how to desegregate the Detroit public schools." 345 F. Supp., at 921. </s> Thereafter, however, the District Court abruptly rejected the proposed Detroit-only plans on the ground that "while [they] would provide a racial mix more in keeping with the Black-White proportions of the student population [they] would accentuate the racial identifiability of the [418 U.S. 717, 739] [Detroit] district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation." Pet. App. 56a. "[T]he racial composition of the student body is such," said the court, "that the plan's implementation would clearly make the entire Detroit public school system racially identifiable" (id., at 54a), "leav[ing] many of its schools 75 to 90 per cent Black." Id., at 55a. Consequently, the court reasoned, it was imperative to "look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem of segregation in the Detroit public schools . . ." since "[s]chool district lines are simply matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights." Id., at 57a. Accordingly, the District Court proceeded to redefine the relevant area to include areas of predominantly white pupil population in order to ensure that "upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition" of the entire metropolitan area. </s> While specifically acknowledging that the District Court's findings of a condition of segregation were limited to Detroit, the Court of Appeals approved the use of a metropolitan remedy largely on the grounds that it is </s> "impossible to declare `clearly erroneous' the District Judge's conclusion that any Detroit only segregation plan will lead directly to a single segregated Detroit school district overwhelmingly black in all of its schools, surrounded by a ring of suburbs and suburban school districts overwhelmingly white in composition in a State in which the racial composition is 87 per cent white and 13 per cent black." 484 F.2d, at 249. </s> Viewing the record as a whole, it seems clear that the District Court and the Court of Appeals shifted the primary [418 U.S. 717, 740] focus from a Detroit remedy to the metropolitan area only because of their conclusion that total desegregation of Detroit would not produce the racial balance which they perceived as desirable. Both courts proceeded on an assumption that the Detroit schools could not be truly desegregated - in their view of what constituted desegregation - unless the racial composition of the student body of each school substantially reflected the racial composition of the population of the metropolitan area as a whole. The metropolitan area was then defined as Detroit plus 53 of the outlying school districts. That this was the approach the District Court expressly and frankly employed is shown by the order which expressed the court's view of the constitutional standard: </s> "Within the limitations of reasonable travel time and distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be effected within the clusters described in Exhibit P. M. 12 so as to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom [will be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition." 345 F. Supp., at 918 (emphasis added). </s> In Swann, which arose in the context of a single independent school district, the Court held: </s> "If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse." 402 U.S., at 24 . </s> The clear import of this language from Swann is that desegregation, in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial balance in [418 U.S. 717, 741] each "school, grade or classroom." 19 See Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). </s> Here the District Court's approach to what constituted "actual desegregation" raises the fundamental question, not presented in Swann, as to the circumstances in which a federal court may order desegregation relief that embraces more than a single school district. The court's analytical starting point was its conclusion that school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines on a map drawn "for political convenience." Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to [418 U.S. 717, 742] quality of the educational process. See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S., at 469 . Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973), we observed that local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence." </s> The Michigan educational structure involved in this case, in common with most States, provides for a large measure of local control, 20 and a review of the scope and character of these local powers indicates the extent to which the interdistrict remedy approved by the two courts could disrupt and alter the structure of public education [418 U.S. 717, 743] in Michigan. The metropolitan remedy would require, in effect, consolidation of 54 independent school districts historically administered as separate units into a vast new super school district. See n. 10, supra. Entirely apart from the logistical and other serious problems attending large-scale transportation of students, the consolidation would give rise to an array of other problems in financing and operating this new school system. Some of the more obvious questions would be: What would be the status and authority of the present popularly elected school boards? Would the children of Detroit be within the jurisdiction and operating control of a school board elected by the parents and residents of other districts? What board or boards would levy taxes for school operations in these 54 districts constituting the consolidated metropolitan area? What provisions could be made for assuring substantial equality in tax levies among the 54 districts, if this were deemed requisite? What provisions would be made for financing? Would the validity of long-term bonds be jeopardized unless approved by all of the component districts as well as the State? What body would determine that portion of the curricula now left to the discretion of local school boards? Who would establish attendance zones, purchase school equipment, locate and construct new schools, and indeed attend to all the myriad day-to-day decisions that are necessary to school operations affecting potentially more than three-quarters of a million pupils? See n. 10, supra. </s> It may be suggested that all of these vital operational problems are yet to be resolved by the District Court, and that this is the purpose of the Court of Appeals' proposed remand. But it is obvious from the scope of the interdistrict remedy itself that absent a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to school districts the District Court will become first, a de facto [418 U.S. 717, 744] "legislative authority" to resolve these complex questions, and then the "school superintendent" for the entire area. This is a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives. </s> Of course, no state law is above the Constitution. School district lines and the present laws with respect to local control, are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies. See, e. g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972) (state or local officials prevented from carving out a new school district from an existing district that was in process of dismantling a dual school system); cf. Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364 (CA8 1970) (State contributed to separation of races by drawing of school district lines); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (ED Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (CA5 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (one or more school districts created and maintained for one race). But our prior holdings have been confined to violations and remedies within a single school district. We therefore turn to address, for the first time, the validity of a remedy mandating cross-district or interdistrict consolidation to remedy a condition of segregation found to exist in only one district. </s> The controlling principle consistently expounded in our holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann, 402 U.S., at 16 . Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must [418 U.S. 717, 745] first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy. </s> The record before us, voluminous as it is, contains evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools; indeed, that was the theory on which the litigation was initially based and on which the District Court took evidence. See supra, at 725-726. With no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect, the court went beyond the original theory of the case as framed by the pleadings and mandated a metropolitan area remedy. To approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding of this Court. </s> In dissent, MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL undertake to demonstrate that agencies having statewide authority participated in maintaining the dual school system found to exist in Detroit. They are apparently of the view that once such participation is [418 U.S. 717, 746] shown, the District Court should have a relatively free hand to reconstruct school districts outside of Detroit in fashioning relief. Our assumption, arguendo, see infra, at 748, that state agencies did participate in the maintenance of the Detroit system, should make it clear that it is not on this point that we part company. 21 The difference between us arises instead from established doctrine laid down by our cases. Brown, supra; Green, supra; Swann, supra; Scotland Neck, supra; and Emporia, supra, each addressed the issue of constitutional wrong in terms of an established geographic and administrative school system populated by both Negro and white children. In such a context, terms such as "unitary" and "dual" systems, and "racially identifiable schools," have meaning, and the necessary federal authority to remedy the constitutional wrong is firmly established. But the remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. Disparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited to that system. Swann, supra, at 16. </s> The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district. Unless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or arranged for white students [418 U.S. 717, 747] residing in the Detroit District to attend schools in Oakland and Macomb Counties, they were under no constitutional duty to make provisions for Negro students to do so. The view of the dissenters, that the existence of a dual system in Detroit can be made the basis for a decree requiring cross-district transportation of pupils, cannot be supported on the grounds that it represents merely the devising of a suitably flexible remedy for the violation of rights already established by our prior decisions. It can be supported only by drastic expansion of the constitutional right itself, an expansion without any support in either constitutional principle or precedent. 22 </s> [418 U.S. 717, 748] </s> III </s> We recognize that the six-volume record presently under consideration contains language and some specific incidental findings thought by the District Court to afford a basis for interdistrict relief. However, these comparatively isolated findings and brief comments concern only one possible interdistrict violation and are found in the context of a proceeding that, as the District Court conceded, included no proof of segregation practiced by any of the 85 suburban school districts surrounding Detroit. The Court of Appeals, for example, relied on five factors which, it held, amounted to unconstitutional state action with respect to the violations found in the Detroit system: </s> (1) It held the State derivatively responsible for the Detroit Board's violations on the theory that actions of Detroit as a political subdivision of the State were attributable to the State. Accepting, arguendo, the correctness of this finding of state responsibility for the segregated conditions within the city of Detroit, it does not follow that an interdistrict remedy is constitutionally justified or required. With a single exception, discussed later, there has been no showing that either the State or any of the 85 outlying districts engaged in activity that had a cross-district effect. The boundaries of the Detroit School District, which are coterminous with the boundaries of the city of Detroit, were established over a century ago by neutral legislation when the city was incorporated; there is no evidence in the record, nor is there any suggestion by the respondents, that either the original boundaries of the Detroit School District, or any other school district in Michigan, were established for the purpose of creating, maintaining, or perpetuating segregation of races. There is no claim and there is no evidence hinting that petitioner outlying school districts and their [418 U.S. 717, 749] predecessors, or the 30-odd other school districts in the tricounty area - but outside the District Court's "desegregation area" - have ever maintained or operated anything but unitary school systems. Unitary school systems have been required for more than a century by the Michigan Constitution as implemented by state law. 23 Where the schools of only one district have been affected, there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing the racial composition of that district's schools with those of the surrounding districts. </s> (2) There was evidence introduced at trial that, during the late 1950's, Carver School District, a predominantly Negro suburban district, contracted to have Negro high school students sent to a predominantly Negro school in Detroit. At the time, Carver was an independent school district that had no high school because, according to the trial evidence, "Carver District . . . did not have a place for adequate high school facilities." 484 F.2d, at 231. Accordingly, arrangements were made with Northern High School in the abutting Detroit School District so that the Carver high school students could obtain a secondary school education. In 1960 the Oak Park School District, a predominantly white suburban district, annexed the predominantly Negro Carver School District, through the initiative of local officials. [418 U.S. 717, 750] Ibid. There is, of course, no claim that the 1960 annexation had a segregative purpose or result or that Oak Park now maintains a dual system. </s> According to the Court of Appeals, the arrangement during the late 1950's which allowed Carver students to be educated within the Detroit District was dependent upon the "tacit or express" approval of the State Board of Education and was the result of the refusal of the white suburban districts to accept the Carver students. Although there is nothing in the record supporting the Court of Appeals' supposition that suburban white schools refused to accept the Carver students, it appears that this situation, whether with or without the State's consent, may have had a segregative effect on the school populations of the two districts involved. However, since "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy," Swann, 402 U.S., at 16 , this isolated instance affecting two of the school districts would not justify the broad metropolitanwide remedy contemplated by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals, particularly since it embraced potentially 52 districts having no responsibility for the arrangement and involved 503,000 pupils in addition to Detroit's 276,000 students. </s> (3) The Court of Appeals cited the enactment of state legislation (Act 48) which had the effect of rescinding Detroit's voluntary desegregation plan (the April 7 Plan). That plan, however, affected only 12 of 21 Detroit high schools and had no causal connection with the distribution of pupils by race between Detroit and the other school districts within the tri-county area. </s> (4) The court relied on the State's authority to supervise schoolsite selection and to approve building construction as a basis for holding the State responsible for the segregative results of the school construction program in Detroit. Specifically, the Court of Appeals asserted [418 U.S. 717, 751] that during the period between 1949 and 1962 the State Board of Education exercised general authority as overseer of site acquisitions by local boards for new school construction, and suggested that this state-approved school construction "fostered segregation throughout the Detroit Metropolitan area." 484 F.2d, at 241. This brief comment, however, is not supported by the evidence taken at trial since that evidence was specifically limited to proof that schoolsite acquisition and school construction within the city of Detroit produced de jure segregation within the city itself. Id., at 235-238. Thus, there was no evidence suggesting that the State's activities with respect to either school construction or site acquisition within Detroit affected the racial composition of the school population outside Detroit or, conversely, that the State's school construction and site acquisition activities within the outlying districts affected the racial composition of the schools within Detroit. </s> (5) The Court of Appeals also relied upon the District Court's finding: </s> "This and other financial limitations, such as those on bonding and the working of the state aid formula whereby suburban districts were able to make far larger per pupil expenditures despite less tax effort, have created and perpetuated systematic educational inequalities." Id., at 239. </s> However, neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court offered any indication in the record or in their opinions as to how, if at all, the availability of state-financed aid for some Michigan students outside Detroit, but not for those within Detroit, might have affected the racial character of any of the State's school districts. Furthermore, as the respondents recognize, the application of our recent ruling in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), to this state education financing system is questionable, and this issue was not [418 U.S. 717, 752] addressed by either the Court of Appeals or the District Court. This, again, underscores the crucial fact that the theory upon which the case proceeded related solely to the establishment of Detroit city violations as a basis for desegregating Detroit schools and that, at the time of trial, neither the parties nor the trial judge was concerned with a foundation for interdistrict relief. 24 </s> IV </s> Petitioners have urged that they were denied due process by the manner in which the District Court limited their participation after intervention was allowed, thus precluding adequate opportunity to present evidence that they had committed no acts having a segregative effect in Detroit. In light of our holding that, absent an interdistrict violation, there is no basis for an interdistrict remedy, we need not reach these claims. It is clear, however, that the District Court, with the approval of the Court of Appeals, has provided an interdistrict remedy in the face of a record which shows no constitutional violations that would call for equitable relief except within the city of Detroit. In these circumstances there was no occasion for the parties to address, or for the District Court to consider whether there were racially discriminatory acts for which any of the 53 outlying districts were responsible and which had direct and significant segregative effect on schools of more than one district. </s> We conclude that the relief ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was based upon an erroneous standard and was unsupported by record evidence that acts of the outlying districts effected the discrimination found to exist in the schools of Detroit. [418 U.S. 717, 753] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 484 F.2d 215 (CA6), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973). </s> [Footnote 2 The standing of the NAACP as a proper party plaintiff was not contested in the trial court and is not an issue in this case. </s> [Footnote 3 Optional zones, sometimes referred to as dual zones or dual overlapping zones, provide pupils living within certain areas a choice of attendance at one of two high schools. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court of Appeals found record evidence that in at least one instance during the period 1957-1958, Detroit served a suburban school district by contracting with it to educate its Negro high school students by transporting them away from nearby suburban white high schools, and past Detroit high schools which were predominantly white, to all-Negro or predominantly Negro Detroit schools. 484 F.2d, at 231. </s> [Footnote 5 School districts in the State of Michigan are instrumentalities of the State and subordinate to its State Board of Education and legislature. The Constitution of the State of Michigan, Art. 8, 2, provides in relevant part: </s> "The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law." </s> Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated: "The school district is a State agency. Moreover, it is of legislative creation. . . ." Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N. W. 289, 290 (1902); "`Education in Michigan belongs to the State. It is no part of the local self-government inherent in the township or municipality, except so far as the legislature may choose to make it such. The Constitution has turned the whole subject over to the legislature. . . .'" Attorney General ex rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Board of Education, 154 Mich. 584, 590, 118 N. W. 606, 609 (1908). </s> [Footnote 6 "Sec. 12. The implementation of any attendance provisions for the 1970-71 school year determined by any first class school district board shall be delayed pending the date of commencement of functions by the first class school district boards established under the provisions of this amendatory act but such provision shall not impair the right of any such board to determine and implement prior to such date such changes in attendance provisions as are mandated by practical necessity. . . ." Act No. 48, 12, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1970; Mich. Comp. Laws 388.182 (1970) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 7 The District Court briefly alluded to the possibility that the State, along with private persons, had caused, in part, the housing patterns of the Detroit metropolitan area which, in turn, produced the predominantly white and predominantly Negro neighborhoods that characterize Detroit: </s> "It is no answer to say that restricted practices grew gradually (as the black population in the area increased between 1920 and 1970), or that since 1948 racial restrictions on the ownership of real property have been removed. The policies pursued by both government and private persons and agencies have a continuing and present effect upon the complexion of the community - as we know, the choice of a residence is a relatively infrequent affair. For many years FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the maintenance of `harmonious' neighborhoods, i. e., racially and economically harmonious. The conditions created continue." 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (ED Mich. 1971). </s> Thus, the District Court concluded: </s> "The affirmative obligation of the defendant Board has been and is to adopt and implement pupil assignment practices and policies that compensate for and avoid incorporation into the school system the effects of residential racial segregation." Id., at 593. </s> The Court of Appeals, however, expressly noted that: </s> "In affirming the District Judge's findings of constitutional violations by the Detroit Board of Education and by the State defendants resulting in segregated schools in Detroit, we have not relied at all upon testimony pertaining to segregated housing except as school construction programs helped cause or maintain such segregation." 484 F.2d, at 242. </s> Accordingly, in its present posture, the case does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations. </s> [Footnote 8 On March 22, 1971, a group of Detroit residents, who were parents of children enrolled in the Detroit public schools, were permitted to intervene as parties defendant. On June 24, 1971, the District Judge alluded to the "possibility" of a metropolitan school system stating: "[A]s I have said to several witnesses in this case: [418 U.S. 717, 729] `How do you desegregate a black city, or a black school system.'" Petitioners' Appendix 243a (hereinafter Pet. App.). Subsequently, on July 16, 1971, various parents filed a motion to require joinder of all of the 85 outlying independent school districts within the tri-county area. </s> [Footnote 9 The respondents, as plaintiffs below, opposed the motion to join the additional school districts, arguing that the presence of the state defendants was sufficient and all that was required, even if, in shaping a remedy, the affairs of these other districts was to be affected. 338 F. Supp., at 595. </s> [Footnote 10 At the time of the 1970 census, the population of Michigan was 8,875,083, almost half of which, 4,199,931, resided in the tri-county area of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb. Oakland and Macomb Counties about Wayne County to the north, and Oakland County abuts Macomb County to the west. These counties cover 1,952 square miles, Michigan Statistical Abstract (9th ed. 1972), and the area is approximately the size of the State of Delaware (2,057 square miles), more than half again the size of the State of Rhode Island (1,214 square miles) and almost 30 times the size of the District of Columbia (67 square miles). Statistical Abstract of the United States (93d ed. 1972). The populations of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties were 2,666,751; 907,871; and 625,309, respectively, in 1970. Detroit, the State's largest city, is located in Wayne County. </s> In the 1970-1971 school year, there were 2,157,449 children enrolled in school districts in Michigan. There are 86 independent, [418 U.S. 717, 730] legally distinct school districts within the tri-county area, having a total enrollment of approximately 1,000,000 children. In 1970, the Detroit Board of Education operated 319 schools with approximately 276,000 students. </s> [Footnote 11 In its formal opinion, subsequently announced, the District Court candidly recognized: </s> "It should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of Detroit school district, such school districts have committed acts of de jure segregation." 345 F. Supp. 914, 920 (ED Mich. 1972). </s> [Footnote 12 According to the District Court, intervention was permitted under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a), "Intervention of Right," and also under Rule 24 (b), "Permissive Intervention." </s> [Footnote 13 This rather abbreviated briefing schedule was maintained despite the fact that the District Court had deferred consideration of a motion made eight months earlier, to bring the suburban districts into the case. See text accompanying n. 8, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 As of 1970, the 53 school districts outside the city of Detroit that were included in the court's "desegregation area" had a combined student population of approximately 503,000 students compared to Detroit's approximately 276,000 students. Nevertheless, the District Court directed that the intervening districts should be represented by only one member on the desegregation panel while the Detroit Board of Education was granted three panel members. 345 F. Supp., at 917. </s> [Footnote 15 The District Court had certified most of the foregoing rulings for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b) (1 App. 265-266) and the case was initially decided on the merits by a panel of three judges. However, the panel's opinion and judgment were vacated when it was determined to rehear the case en banc, 484 F.2d, at 218. </s> [Footnote 16 With respect to the State's violations, the Court of Appeals held: (1) that, since the city Board is an instrumentality of the State and subordinate to the State Board, the segregative actions of the Detroit Board "are the actions of an agency of the State," id., at 238; (2) that the state legislation rescinding Detroit's voluntary desegregation plan contributed to increasing segregation in the Detroit schools, ibid.; (3) that under state law prior to 1962 the State Board had authority over school construction plans and therefore had to be held responsible "for the segregative results," [418 U.S. 717, 735] ibid.; (4) that the "State statutory scheme of support of transportation for school children directly discriminated against Detroit," id., at 240, by not providing transportation funds to Detroit on the same basis as funds were provided to suburban districts, id., at 238; and (5) that the transportation of Negro students from one suburban district to a Negro school in Detroit must have had the "approval, tacit or express, of the State Board of Education," ibid. </s> [Footnote 17 The court sought to distinguish Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (CA4 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973), on the grounds that the District Court in that case had ordered an actual consolidation of three school districts and that Virginia's Constitution and statutes, unlike Michigan's, gave the local boards exclusive power to operate the public schools. 484 F.2d, at 251. </s> [Footnote 18 Although the list of issues presented for review in petitioners' briefs and petitions for writs of certiorari do not include arguments on the findings of segregative violations on the part of the Detroit defendants, two of the petitioners argue in brief that these findings constitute error. This Court's Rules 23 (1) (c) and 40 (1) (d) (2), at a minimum, limit our review of the Detroit violation findings to "plain error," and, under our decision last Term in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the findings appear to be correct. </s> [Footnote 19 Disparity in the racial composition of pupils within a single district may well constitute a "signal" to a district court at the outset, leading to inquiry into the causes accounting for a pronounced racial identifiability of schools within one school system. In Swann, for example, we were dealing with a large but single independent school system, and a unanimous Court noted: "Where the . . . proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominantly of one race [the school authority has] the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory." 402 U.S., at 26 . See also Keyes, supra, at 208. However, the use of significant racial imbalance in schools within an autonomous school district as a signal which operates simply to shift the burden of proof, is a very different matter from equating racial imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy. Keyes, supra, also involved a remedial order within a single autonomous school district. </s> [Footnote 20 Under the Michigan School Code of 1955, the local school district is an autonomous political body corporate, operating through a Board of Education popularly elected. Mich. Comp. Laws 340.27, 340.55, 340.107, 340.148, 340.149, 340.188. As such, the day-to-day affairs of the school district are determined at the local level in accordance with the plenary power to acquire real and personal property, 340.26, 340.77, 340.113, 340.165, 340.192, 340.352; to hire and contract with personnel, 340.569, 340.574; to levy taxes for operations, 340.563; to borrow against receipts, 340.567; to determine the length of school terms, 340.575; to control the admission of nonresident students, 340.582; to determine courses of study, 340.583; to provide a kindergarten program, 340.584; to establish and operate vocational schools, 340.585; to offer adult education programs, 340.586; to establish attendance areas, 340.589; to arrange for transportation of nonresident students, 340.591; to acquire transportation equipment, 340.594; to receive gifts and bequests for educational purposes, 340.605; to employ an attorney, 340.609; to suspend or expel students, 340.613; to make rules and regulations for the operation of schools, 340.614; to cause to be levied authorized millage, 340.643a; to acquire property by eminent domain, 340.711 et seq.; and to approve and select textbooks, 340.882. </s> [Footnote 21 Since the Court has held that a resident of a school district has a fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution to vote in a district election, it would seem incongruous to disparage the importance of the school district in a different context. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). While the district there involved was located in New York, none of the facts in our possession suggest that the relation of school districts to the State is significantly different in New York from that in Michigan. </s> [Footnote 22 The suggestion in the dissent of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL that schools which have a majority of Negro students are not "desegregated," whatever the racial makeup of the school district's population and however neutrally the district lines have been drawn and administered, finds no support in our prior cases. In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), for example, this Court approved a desegregation plan which would have resulted in each of the schools within the district having a racial composition of 57% Negro and 43% white. In Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), the optimal desegregation plan would have resulted in the schools' being 66% Negro and 34% white, substantially the same percentages as could be obtained under one of the plans involved in this case. And in United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 491 n. 5 (1972), a desegregation plan was implicitly approved for a school district which had a racial composition of 77% Negro and 22% white. In none of these cases was it even intimated that "actual desegregation" could not be accomplished as long as the number of Negro students was greater than the number of white students. </s> The dissents also seem to attach importance to the metropolitan character of Detroit and neighboring school districts. But the constitutional principles applicable in school desegregation cases cannot vary in accordance with the size or population dispersal of the particular city, county, or school district as compared with neighboring areas. </s> [Footnote 23 People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Education of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400 (1869): Act 34, 28, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1867. The Michigan Constitution and laws provide that "[e]very school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin." Mich. Const. 1963, Art. 8, 2; that "[n]o separate school or department shall be kept for any person or persons on account of race or color," Mich. Comp. Laws 340.355; and that "[a]ll persons, residents of a school district . . . shall have an equal right to attend school therein," id., 340.356. See also Act 319, Part II, c. 2, 9, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1927. </s> [Footnote 24 Apparently, when the District Court, sua sponte, abruptly altered the theory of the case to include the possibility of multidistrict relief, neither the plaintiffs nor the trial judge considered amending the complaint to embrace the new theory. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. </s> In joining the opinion of the Court, I think it appropriate, in view of some of the extravagant language of the dissenting opinions, to state briefly my understanding of what it is that the Court decides today. </s> The respondents commenced this suit in 1970, claiming only that a constitutionally impermissible allocation of educational facilities along racial lines had occurred in public schools within a single school district whose lines were coterminous with those of the city of Detroit. In the course of the subsequent proceedings, the District Court found that public school officials had contributed to racial segregation within that district by means of improper use of zoning and attendance patterns, optional-attendance areas, and building and site selection. This finding of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and is accepted by this Court today. See ante, at 738 n. 18. In the present posture of the case, therefore, the Court does not deal with questions of substantive constitutional law. The basic issue now before the Court concerns, rather, the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction. 1 </s> [418 U.S. 717, 754] </s> No evidence was adduced and no findings were made in the District Court concerning the activities of school officials in districts outside the city of Detroit, and no school officials from the outside districts even participated in the suit until after the District Court had made the initial determination that is the focus of today's decision. In spite of the limited scope of the inquiry and the findings, the District Court concluded that the only effective remedy for the constitutional violations found to have existed within the city of Detroit was a desegregation plan calling for busing pupils to and from school districts outside the city. The District Court found that any desegregation plan operating wholly "`within the corporate geographical limits of the city'" would be deficient since it "`would clearly make the entire Detroit public school system racially identifiable as Black.'" 484 F.2d 215, 244, 243. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision that an interdistrict remedy was necessary, noted that a plan limited to the city of Detroit "would result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems, with an overwhelmingly white majority population in the total metropolitan area." Id., at 245. </s> The courts were in error for the simple reason that the remedy they thought necessary was not commensurate with the constitutional violation found. Within a single school district whose officials have been shown to have engaged in unconstitutional racial segregation, a remedial decree that affects every individual school may be dictated by "common sense," see Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 203 , and indeed may provide the only effective means to eliminate segregation "root and branch," Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 , and to "effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school [418 U.S. 717, 755] system." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 . See Keyes, supra, at 198-205. But in this case the Court of Appeals approved the concept of a remedial decree that would go beyond the boundaries of the district where the constitutional violation was found, and include schools and schoolchildren in many other school districts that have presumptively been administered in complete accord with the Constitution. </s> The opinion of the Court convincingly demonstrates, ante, at 742-743, that traditions of local control of schools, together with the difficulty of a judicially supervised restructuring of local administration of schools, render improper and inequitable such an interdistrict response to a constitutional violation found to have occurred only within a single school district. </s> This is not to say, however, that an interdistrict remedy of the sort approved by the Court of Appeals would not be proper, or even necessary, in other factual situations. Were it to be shown, for example, that state officials had contributed to the separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines, see Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364; cf. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 ; United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 ; by transfer of school units between districts, United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, aff'd, 447 F.2d 441; Turner v. Warren County Board of Education, 313 F. Supp. 380; or by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws, then a decree calling for transfer of pupils across district lines or for restructuring of district lines might well be appropriate. </s> In this case, however, no such interdistrict violation was shown. Indeed, no evidence at all concerning the administration of schools outside the city of Detroit was presented other than the fact that these schools contained [418 U.S. 717, 756] a higher proportion of white pupils than did the schools within the city. Since the mere fact of different racial compositions in contiguous districts does not itself imply or constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of a showing that such disparity was imposed, fostered, or encouraged by the State or its political subdivisions, it follows that no interdistrict violation was shown in this case. 2 The formulation of an interdistrict remedy was thus simply not responsive to the factual record before the District Court and was an abuse of that court's equitable powers. [418 U.S. 717, 757] </s> In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals this Court is in no way turning its back on the proscription of state-imposed segregation first voiced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 , or on the delineation of remedial powers and duties most recently expressed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 . In Swann the Court addressed itself to the range of equitable remedies available to the courts to effectuate the desegregation mandated by Brown and its progeny, noting that the task in choosing appropriate relief is "to correct . . . the condition that offends the Constitution," and that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy . . . ." Id., at 16. </s> The disposition of this case thus falls squarely under these principles. The only "condition that offends the Constitution" found by the District Court in this case is the existence of officially supported segregation in and among public schools in Detroit itself. There were no findings that the differing racial composition between schools in the city and in the outlying suburbs was caused by official activity of any sort. It follows that the decision to include in the desegregation plan pupils from school districts outside Detroit was not predicated upon any constitutional violation involving those school districts. By approving a remedy that would reach beyond the limits of the city of Detroit to correct a constitutional violation found to have occurred solely within that city the Court of Appeals thus went beyond the governing equitable principles established in this Court's decisions. </s> [Footnote 1 As this Court stated in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 : "[E]quity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These [school desegregation] cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power." </s> [Footnote 2 My Brother MARSHALL seems to ignore this fundamental fact when he states, post, at 799, that "the most essential finding [made by the District Court] was that Negro children in Detroit had been confined by intentional acts of segregation to a growing core of Negro schools surrounded by a receding ring of white schools." This conclusion is simply not substantiated by the record presented in this case. The record here does support the claim made by the respondents that white and Negro students within Detroit who otherwise would have attended school together were separated by acts of the State or its subdivision. However, segregative acts within the city alone cannot be presumed to have produced - and no factual showing was made that they did produce - an increase in the number of Negro students in the city as a whole. It is this essential fact of a predominantly Negro school population in Detroit - caused by unknown and perhaps unknowable factors such as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of private racial fears - that accounts for the "growing core of Negro schools," a "core" that has grown to include virtually the entire city. The Constitution simply does not allow federal courts to attempt to change that situation unless and until it is shown that the State, or its political subdivisions, have contributed to cause the situation to exist. No record has been made in this case showing that the racial composition of the Detroit school population or that residential patterns within Detroit and in the surrounding areas were in any significant measure caused by governmental activity, and it follows that the situation over which my dissenting Brothers express concern cannot serve as the predicate for the remedy adopted by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> The Court of Appeals has acted responsibly in these cases and we should affirm its judgment. This was the fourth time the case was before it over a span of less than three years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District [418 U.S. 717, 758] Court on the issue of segregation and on the "Detroit-only" plans of desegregation. The Court of Appeals also approved in principle the use of a metropolitan area plan, vacating and remanding only to allow the other affected school districts to be brought in as parties, and in other minor respects. </s> We have before us today no plan for integration. The only orders entered so far are interlocutory. No new principles of law are presented here. Metropolitan treatment of metropolitan problems is commonplace. If this were a sewage problem or a water problem, or an energy problem, there can be no doubt that Michigan would stay well within federal constitutional bounds if it sought a metropolitan remedy. In Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 , we had a case involving the Virginia school system where local school boards had "exclusive jurisdiction" of the problem, not "the State Board of Education," 462 F.2d, at 1067. Here the Michigan educational system is unitary, maintained and supported by the legislature and under the general supervision of the State Board of Education. 1 The State controls the boundaries of school districts. 2 The State supervises schoolsite selection. 3 The construction is done through municipal bonds approved by several state agencies. 4 Education in Michigan is a state project with very little completely local control, 5 except that the schools are financed locally, not on a statewide basis. Indeed [418 U.S. 717, 759] the proposal to put school funding in Michigan on a statewide basis was defeated at the polls in November 1972. 6 Yet the school districts by state law are agencies of the State. 7 State action is indeed challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Whatever the reach of that claim may be, it certainly is aimed at discrimination based on race. </s> Therefore as the Court of Appeals held there can be no doubt that as a matter of Michigan law the State itself has the final say as to where and how school district lines should be drawn. 8 </s> When we rule against the metropolitan area remedy we take a step that will likely put the problems of the blacks and our society back to the period that antedated the "separate but equal" regime of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . The reason is simple. </s> The inner core of Detroit is now rather solidly black; 9 and the blacks, we know, in many instances are likely to [418 U.S. 717, 760] be poorer, 10 just as were the Chicanos in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 . By that decision the poorer school districts 11 must pay their own way. It is therefore a foregone conclusion that we have now given the States a formula whereby the poor must pay their own way. 12 </s> [418 U.S. 717, 761] </s> Today's decision, given Rodriguez, means that there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are segregated by race and though the black schools are not only "separate" but "inferior." </s> So far as equal protection is concerned we are now in a dramatic retreat from the 7-to-1 decision in 1896 that blacks could be segregated in public facilities, provided they received equal treatment. </s> As I indicated in Keyes v. School District No. 1 Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 214 -217, there is so far as the school cases go no constitutional difference between de facto and de jure segregation. Each school board performs state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes when it draws the lines that confine it to a given area, when it builds schools at particular sites, or when it allocates students. The creation of the school districts in Metropolitan Detroit either maintained existing segregation or caused additional segregation. Restrictive covenants maintained by state action or inaction build black ghettos. It is state action when public funds are dispensed by housing agencies to build racial ghettos. Where a community is racially mixed and school authorities segregate schools, or assign black teachers to black schools or close schools in fringe areas and build new schools in black areas and in more distant white areas, the State creates and nurtures a segregated school system, just as surely as did those States involved in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 , when they maintained dual school systems. </s> All these conditions and more were found by the District Court to exist. The issue is not whether there should be racial balance but whether the State's use of [418 U.S. 717, 762] various devices that end up with black schools and white schools brought the Equal Protection Clause into effect. Given the State's control over the educational system in Michigan, the fact that the black schools are in one district and the white schools are in another is not controlling - either constitutionally or equitably. 13 No specific plan has yet been adopted. We are still at an interlocutory stage of a long drawn-out judicial effort at school desegregation. It is conceivable that ghettos develop on their own without any hint of state action. But since Michigan by one device or another has over the years created black school districts and white school districts, the task of equity is to provide a unitary system for the affected area where, as here, the State washes its hands of its own creations. </s> [Footnote 1 Mich. Const., Art. 8, 2, 3. </s> [Footnote 2 See 484 F.2d 215, 247-248; Mich. Comp. Laws 340.402, 340.431, 340.447, 388.681 (1970). </s> [Footnote 3 Mich. Comp. Laws 388.851 (1948), as amended by Act 231, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1949, and Act 175, Mich. Pub. Acts 1962. </s> [Footnote 4 See Mich. Comp. Laws 132.1 and 132.2 (1970); 3 App. 157. </s> [Footnote 5 See 484 F.2d, at 248-249. </s> [Footnote 6 See Detroit Free Press, Nov. 8, 1972, p. 1A, col. 3. Michigan has recently passed legislation which could eliminate some, but not all, of the inequities in school financing. See Act 101, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1973. </s> [Footnote 7 See 484 F.2d, at 246-247; Mich. Const. Art. 8, 2, 3. </s> [Footnote 8 See n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 9 A tremendous change has occurred in the distribution of this country's black population since World War I. See Hauser, Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro, Daedalus 847-877 (fall 1965). In 1910, 73% of all blacks lived on farms and in rural areas; by 1960, 73% lived in urban areas, mainly in the largest metropolitan areas. Moreover, due to the fact that the black population is younger than the white population, the concentration of blacks in the cities is even more pronounced for the school-age population. The pattern of change which has existed since World War I is continuing, and hence the proportion of blacks in the urban North and West will continue to increase. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, J. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity 39-40 (1966). </s> [Footnote 10 "There are some definite and systematic directions of difference between the schools attended by minorities and those attended by the majority. It appears to be in the most academically related areas that the schools of minority pupils show the most consistent deficiencies." Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Coleman et al., supra, n. 9, at 120. </s> [Footnote 11 That some school districts are markedly poorer than others is beyond question. The California Supreme Court has noted that per-pupil expenditures in two different districts - both located in the same county - were $2,223 and $616. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 600 n. 15, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252 n. 15 (1971). In New York the Fleischmann Commission reported that the two Long Island districts of Great Neck and Levittown spent $2,078 and $1,189 respectively per pupil. 1 New York State Commission on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education, Fleischmann Report 58 (1973). "A further glaring inequity resulting from the current systems of school finance is that variations in per pupil expenditures among school districts tend to be inversely related to educational need. City students, with greater than average educational deficiencies, consistently have less money spent on their education and have higher pupil/teacher ratios than do their high-income counterparts in the favored schools of suburbia." Glickstein & Want, Inequality in School Financing: The Role of the Law, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 338 (1973). </s> [Footnote 12 Cities face an especially difficult problem in paying the cost of education, since they have the "municipal overburden" which results from greater costs for health, public safety, sanitation, public works, transportation, public welfare, public housing, and recreation. Because of municipal overburden, cities on the average devote only about 30% of their budgets to their schools. This compares with the over 50% which is spent on schools by the suburbs. J. Berke & J. Callahan. Inequities in School Finance (1971), reprinted in Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational [418 U.S. 717, 761] Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Issues in School Finance 129, 142 (Comm. Print 1972); see Glickstein & Want, supra, n. 11, at 387. </s> [Footnote 13 MR. JUSTICE STEWART indicates that equitable factors weigh in favor of local school control and the avoidance of administrative difficulty given the lack of an "interdistrict" violation. Ante, at 755. It would seem to me that the equities are stronger in favor of the children of Detroit who have been deprived of their constitutional right to equal treatment by the State of Michigan. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that over a long period of years those in charge of the Michigan public schools engaged in various practices calculated to effect the segregation of the Detroit school system. The Court does not question these findings, nor could it reasonably do so. Neither does it question the obligation of the federal courts to devise a feasible and effective remedy. But it promptly cripples the ability of the judiciary to perform this task, which is of fundamental importance to our constitutional system, by [418 U.S. 717, 763] fashioning a strict rule that remedies in school cases must stop at the school district line unless certain other conditions are met. As applied here, the remedy for unquestioned violations of the equal protection rights of Detroit's Negroes by the Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan must be totally confined to the limits of the school district and may not reach into adjoining or surrounding districts unless and until it is proved there has been some sort of "interdistrict violation" - unless unconstitutional actions of the Detroit School Board have had a segregative impact on other districts, or unless the segregated condition of the Detroit schools has itself been influenced by segregative practices in those surrounding districts into which it is proposed to extend the remedy. </s> Regretfully, and for several reasons, I can join neither the Court's judgment nor its opinion. The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local school districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case in most States. </s> There are undoubted practical as well as legal limits to the remedial powers of federal courts in school desegregation cases. The Court has made it clear that the achievement of any particular degree of racial balance in the school system is not required by the Constitution; [418 U.S. 717, 764] nor may it be the primary focus of a court in devising an acceptable remedy for de jure segregation. A variety of procedures and techniques are available to a district court engrossed in fashioning remedies in a case such as this; but the courts must keep in mind that they are dealing with the process of educating the young, including the very young. The task is not to devise a system of pains and penalties to punish constitutional violations brought to light. Rather, it is to desegregate an educational system in which the races have been kept apart, without, at the same time, losing sight of the central educational function of the schools. </s> Viewed in this light, remedies calling for school zoning, pairing, and pupil assignments, become more and more suspect as they require that schoolchildren spend more and more time in buses going to and from school and that more and more educational dollars be diverted to transportation systems. Manifestly, these considerations are of immediate and urgent concern when the issue is the desegregation of a city school system where residential patterns are predominantly segregated and the respective areas occupied by blacks and whites are heavily populated and geographically extensive. Thus, if one postulates a metropolitan school system covering a sufficiently large area, with the population evenly divided between whites and Negroes and with the races occupying identifiable residential areas, there will be very real practical limits on the extent to which racially identifiable schools can be eliminated within the school district. It is also apparent that the larger the proportion of Negroes in the area, the more difficult it would be to avoid having a substantial number of all-black or nearly all-black schools. </s> The Detroit school district is both large and heavily populated. It covers 139.6 square miles, encircles two [418 U.S. 717, 765] entirely separate cities and school districts, and surrounds a third city on three sides. Also, whites and Negroes live in identifiable areas in the city. The 1970 public school enrollment in the city school district totaled 289,763 and was 63.6% Negro and 34.8% white. 1 If "racial balance" were achieved in every school in the district, each school would be approximately 64% Negro. A remedy confined to the district could achieve no more desegregation. Furthermore, the proposed intracity remedies were beset with practical problems. None of the plans limited to the school district was satisfactory to the District Court. The most promising proposal, submitted by respondents, who were the plaintiffs in the District Court, would "leave many of its schools 75 to 90 percent Black." 484 F.2d 215, 244 (CA6 1973). 2 Transportation on a "vast scale" would be required; 900 buses would have to be purchased for the transportation of pupils who are not now bused. Id., at 243. The District Court also found that the plan "would change a school system which is now Black and White to one that would be perceived as Black, thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system, thereby increasing the Black student population." Id., at 244. For the District Court, "[t]he conclusion, under the evidence in this case, is inescapable that relief of segregation in the public schools of the [418 U.S. 717, 766] City of Detroit cannot be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of the city." Ibid. </s> The District Court therefore considered extending its remedy to the suburbs. After hearings, it concluded that a much more effective desegregation plan could be implemented if the suburban districts were included. In proceeding to design its plan on the basis that student bus rides to and from school should not exceed 40 minutes each way as a general matter, the court's express finding was that "[f]or all the reasons stated heretofore - including time, distance, and transportation factors - desegregation within the area described is physically easier and more practicable and feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate geographic limits of the city of Detroit." 345 F. Supp. 914, 930 (ED Mich. 1972). </s> The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the remedy must extend beyond the city limits of Detroit. It concluded that "[i]n the instant case the only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan." 484 F.2d, at 249. (Emphasis added.) It also agreed that "any Detroit only desegregation plan will lead directly to a single segregated Detroit school district overwhelmingly black in all of its schools, surrounded by a ring of suburbs and suburban school districts overwhelmingly white in composition in a State in which the racial composition is 87 percent white and 13 percent black." Ibid. There was "more than ample support for the District Judge's findings of unconstitutional segregation by race resulting in major part from action and inaction of public authorities, both local and State. . . . Under this record a remedial order of a court of equity which left the Detroit school system overwhelmingly black (for the foreseeable [418 U.S. 717, 767] future) surrounded by suburban school systems overwhelmingly white cannot correct the constitutional violations herein found." Id., at 250. To conclude otherwise, the Court of Appeals announced, would call up "haunting memories of the now long overruled and discredited `separate but equal doctrine' of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . . . (1896)," and "would be opening a way to nullify Brown v. Board of Education which overruled Plessy . . . ." 484 F.2d, at 249. </s> This Court now reverses the Court of Appeals. It does not question the District Court's findings that any feasible Detroit-only plan would leave many schools 75 to 90 percent black and that the district would become progressively more black as whites left the city. Neither does the Court suggest that including the suburbs in a desegregation plan would be impractical or infeasible because of educational considerations, because of the number of children requiring transportation, or because of the length of their rides. Indeed, the Court leaves unchallenged the District Court's conclusion that a plan including the suburbs would be physically easier and more practical and feasible than a Detroit-only plan. Whereas the most promising Detroit-only plan, for example, would have entailed the purchase of 900 buses, the metropolitan plan would involve the acquisition of no more than 350 new vehicles. </s> Despite the fact that a metropolitan remedy, if the findings of the District Court accepted by the Court of Appeals are to be credited, would more effectively desegregate the Detroit schools, would prevent resegregation, 3 and would be easier and more feasible from many [418 U.S. 717, 768] standpoints, the Court fashions out of whole cloth an arbitrary rule that remedies for constitutional violations occurring in a single Michigan school district must stop at the school district line. Apparently, no matter how much less burdensome or more effective and efficient in many respects, such as transportation, the metropolitan plan might be, the school district line may not be crossed. Otherwise, it seems, there would be too much disruption of the Michigan scheme for managing its educational system, too much confusion, and too much administrative burden. </s> The District Court, on the scene and familiar with local conditions, had a wholly different view. The Court of Appeals also addressed itself at length to matters of local law and to the problems that interdistrict remedies might present to the State of Michigan. Its conclusion, flatly contrary to that of this Court, was that "the constitutional right to equality before the law [is not] hemmed in by the boundaries of a school district" and that an interdistrict remedy </s> "is supported by the status of school districts under Michigan law and by the historical control exercised over local school districts by the legislature of Michigan and by State agencies and officials . . . . [I]t is well established under the Constitution and laws of Michigan that the public school system is a State function and that local school districts are instrumentalities of the State created for administrative convenience." 4 484 F.2d, at 245-246. [418 U.S. 717, 769] </s> I am surprised that the Court, sitting at this distance from the State of Michigan, claims better insight than the Court of Appeals and the District Court as to whether an interdistrict remedy for equal protection violations practiced by the State of Michigan would involve undue difficulties for the State in the management of its public schools. In the area of what constitutes an acceptable desegregation plan, "we must of necessity rely to a large extent, as this Court has for more than 16 years, on the informed judgment of the district courts in the first instance and on courts of appeals." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). Obviously, whatever difficulties there might be, they are surmountable; for the Court itself concedes that, had there been sufficient evidence of an interdistrict violation, the District Court could have fashioned a single remedy for the districts implicated rather than a different remedy for each district [418 U.S. 717, 770] in which the violation had occurred or had an impact. </s> I am even more mystified as to how the Court can ignore the legal reality that the constitutional violations, even if occurring locally, were committed by governmental entities for which the State is responsible and that it is the State that must respond to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment. An interdistrict remedy for the infringements that occurred in this case is well within the confines and powers of the State, which is the governmental entity ultimately responsible for desegregating its schools. The Michigan Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he school district is a State agency," Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N. W. 289, 290 (1902), and that "`[e]ducation in Michigan belongs to the State. It is no part of the local self-government inherent in the township or municipality, except so far as the legislature may choose to make it such. The Constitution has turned the whole subject over to the legislature. . . .'" Attorney General ex rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Board of Education, 154 Mich. 584, 590, 118 N. W. 606, 609 (1908). </s> It is unnecessary to catalogue at length the various public misdeeds found by the District Court and the Court of Appeals to have contributed to the present segregation of the Detroit public schools. The legislature contributed directly by enacting a statute overriding a partial high school desegregation plan voluntarily adopted by the Detroit Board of Education. Indirectly, the trial court found the State was accountable for the thinly disguised, pervasive acts of segregation committed by the Detroit Board, 5 for Detroit's school construction [418 U.S. 717, 771] plans that would promote segregation, and for the Detroit school district's not having funds for pupil transportation within the district. The State was also chargeable with responsibility for the transportation of Negro high school students in the late 1950's from the suburban Ferndale School District, past closer suburban and Detroit high schools with predominantly white student bodies, to a predominantly Negro high school within Detroit. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 20-21, and Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), make abundantly clear that the tactics employed by the Detroit Board of Education, a local instrumentality of the State, violated the constitutional rights of the Negro students in Detroit's public schools and required equitable relief sufficient to accomplish the maximum, practical desegregation within the power of the political body against which the Fourteenth Amendment directs its proscriptions. No "State" may deny any individual the equal protection of the laws; and if the Constitution and the Supremacy Clause are to have any substance at all, the courts must be free to devise workable remedies against the political entity with the effective power to determine local choice. It is also the case here that the State's legislative interdiction of Detroit's voluntary effort to desegregate its school system was unconstitutional. See North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). </s> The Court draws the remedial line at the Detroit school district boundary, even though the Fourteenth Amendment is addressed to the State and even though [418 U.S. 717, 772] the State denies equal protection of the laws when its public agencies, acting in its behalf, invidiously discriminate. The State's default is "the condition that offends the Constitution," Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 16, and state officials may therefore be ordered to take the necessary measures to completely eliminate from the Detroit public schools "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." Id., at 15. I cannot understand, nor does the majority satisfactorily explain, why a federal court may not order an appropriate interdistrict remedy, if this is necessary or more effective to accomplish this constitutionally mandated task. As the Court unanimously observed in Swann: "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." Ibid. In this case, both the right and the State's Fourteenth Amendment violation have concededly been fully established, and there is no acceptable reason for permitting the party responsible for the constitutional violation to contain the remedial powers of the federal court within administrative boundaries over which the transgressor itself has plenary power. </s> The unwavering decisions of this Court over the past 20 years support the assumption of the Court of Appeals that the District Court's remedial power does not cease at the school district line. The Court's first formulation of the remedial principles to be followed in disestablishing racially discriminatory school systems recognized the variety of problems arising from different local school conditions and the necessity for that "practical flexibility" traditionally associated with courts of equity. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 -301 (1955) (Brown II). Indeed, the district courts to which [418 U.S. 717, 773] the Brown cases were remanded for the formulation of remedial decrees were specifically instructed that they might consider, inter alia, "revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis . . . ." Id., at 300-301. The malady addressed in Brown II was the statewide policy of requiring or permitting school segregation on the basis of race, while the record here concerns segregated schools only in the city of Detroit. The obligation to rectify the unlawful condition nevertheless rests on the State. The permissible revision of school districts contemplated in Brown II rested on the State's responsibility for desegregating its unlawfully segregated schools, not on any segregative effect which the condition of segregation in one school district might have had on the schools of a neighboring district. The same situation obtains here and the same remedial power is available to the District Court. </s> Later cases reinforced the clearly essential rules that state officials are fully answerable for unlawfully caused conditions of school segregation which can effectively be controlled only by steps beyond the authority of local school districts to take, and that the equity power of the district courts includes the ability to order such measures implemented. When the highest officials of the State of Arkansas impeded a federal court order to desegregate the public schools under the immediate jurisdiction of the Little Rock School Board, this Court refused to accept the local board's assertion of its good faith as a legal excuse for delay in implementing the desegregation order. The Court emphasized that "from the point of view of the Fourteenth Amendment, they [the local school board members] stand in this litigation as the agents of the State." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). Perhaps [418 U.S. 717, 774] more importantly for present purposes, the Court went on to state: </s> "The record before us clearly establishes that the growth of the Board's difficulties to a magnitude beyond its unaided power to control is the product of state action. Those difficulties . . . can also be brought under control by state action." Ibid. </s> See also Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 228 , 233-234 (1964). </s> In the context of dual school systems, the Court subsequently made clear the "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch" and to come forward with a desegregation plan that "promises realistically to work now." Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437 -438, 439 (1968). "Freedom of choice" plans were rejected as acceptable desegregation measures where "reasonably available other ways . . . promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system . . ." exist. Id., at 441. Imperative insistence on immediate full desegregation of dual school systems "to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools" was reiterated in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969), and Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970). </s> The breadth of the equitable authority of the district courts to accomplish these comprehensive tasks was reaffirmed in much greater detail in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, and the companion case of Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971), where there was unanimous assent to the following propositions: </s> "Having once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities should make every effort to [418 U.S. 717, 775] achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation. A district court may and should consider the use of all available techniques including restructuring of attendance zones and both contiguous and noncontiguous attendance zones. . . . The measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness." Id., at 37. </s> No suggestion was made that interdistrict relief was not an available technique. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education itself, the Court, without dissent, recognized that the District Judge, in fulfilling his obligation to "make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation[,] will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." 402 U.S., at 26 . Nor was there any dispute that to break up the dual school system, it was within the District Court's "broad remedial powers" to employ a "frank - and sometimes drastic - gerrymandering of school districts and attendance zones," as well as "pairing, `clustering,' or `grouping' of schools," to desegregate the "formerly all-Negro schools," despite the fact that these zones might not be compact or contiguous and might be "on opposite ends of the city." Id., at 27. The school board in that case had jurisdiction over a 550-square-mile area encompassing the city of Charlotte and surrounding Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The Mobile County, Alabama, board in Davis embraced a 1,248-square-mile area, including the city of Mobile. Yet the Court approved the District Court's authority to award countywide relief in each case in order to accomplish desegregation of the dual school system. </s> Even more recently, the Court specifically rejected the claim that a new school district, which admittedly would operate a unitary school system within its borders, was beyond the reach of a court-ordered desegregation plan [418 U.S. 717, 776] for other school districts, where the effectiveness of the plan as to the other districts depended upon the availability of the facilities and student population of the new district. In Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 470 (1972), we held "that a new school district may not be created where its effect would be to impede the process of dismantling a dual system." MR. JUSTICE STEWART's opinion for the Court made clear that if a proposal to erect new district boundary lines "would impede the dismantling of the [pre-existing] dual system, then a district court, in the exercise of its remedial discretion, may enjoin it from being carried out." Id., at 460. In United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972), this same standard was applied to forbid North Carolina from creating a new city school district within a larger district which was in the process of dismantling a dual school system. The Court noted that if establishment of the new district were permitted, the "traditional racial identities of the schools in the area would be maintained," id., at 490. </s> Until today, the permissible contours of the equitable authority of the district courts to remedy the unlawful establishment of a dual school system have been extensive, adaptable, and fully responsive to the ultimate goal of achieving "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." There are indeed limitations on the equity powers of the federal judiciary, but until now the Court has not accepted the proposition that effective enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment could be limited by political or administrative boundary lines demarcated by the very State responsible for the constitutional violation and for the disestablishment of the dual system. Until now the Court has instead looked to practical considerations in effectuating a desegregation [418 U.S. 717, 777] decree such as excessive distance, transportation time, and hazards to the safety of the schoolchildren involved in a proposed plan. That these broad principles have developed in the context of dual school systems compelled or authorized by state statute at the time of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), does not lessen their current applicability to dual systems found to exist in other contexts, like that in Detroit, where intentional school segregation does not stem from the compulsion of state law, but from deliberate individual actions of local and state school authorities directed at a particular school system. The majority properly does not suggest that the duty to eradicate completely the resulting dual system in the latter context is any less than in the former. But its reason for incapacitating the remedial authority of the federal judiciary in the presence of school district perimeters in the latter context is not readily apparent. </s> The result reached by the Court certainly cannot be supported by the theory that the configuration of local governmental units is immune from alteration when necessary to redress constitutional violations. In addition to the well-established principles already noted, the Court has elsewhere required the public bodies of a State to restructure the State's political subdivisions to remedy infringements of the constitutional rights of certain members of its populace, notably in the reapportionment cases. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), for example, which held that equal protection of the laws demands that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned on a population basis, thus necessitating wholesale revision of Alabama's voting districts, the Court remarked: </s> "Political subdivisions of States - counties, cities, or whatever - never were and never have been considered [418 U.S. 717, 778] as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions." Id., at 575. </s> And even more pointedly, the Court declared in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 -345 (1960), that "[l]egislative control of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution." </s> Nor does the Court's conclusion follow from the talismanic invocation of the desirability of local control over education. Local autonomy over school affairs, in the sense of the community's participation in the decisions affecting the education of its children, is, of course, an important interest. But presently constituted school district lines do not delimit fixed and unchangeable areas of a local educational community. If restructuring is required to meet constitutional requirements, local authority may simply be redefined in terms of whatever configuration is adopted, with the parents of the children attending schools in the newly demarcated district or attendance zone continuing their participation in the policy management of the schools with which they are concerned most directly. The majority's suggestion that judges should not attempt to grapple with the administrative problems attendant on a reorganization of school attendance patterns is wholly without foundation. It is precisely this sort of task which the district courts have been properly exercising to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro students since Brown I and which the Court has never suggested they lack the capacity to perform. Intradistrict revisions of attendance zones, and pairing and grouping of schools, are techniques unanimously approved in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg [418 U.S. 717, 779] Board of Education which entail the same sensitivity to the interest of parents in the education their children receive as would an interdistrict plan which is likely to employ the very same methods. There is no reason to suppose that the District Court, which has not yet adopted a final plan of desegregation, would not be as capable of giving or as likely to give sufficient weight to the interest in community participation in schools in an interdistrict setting, consistent with the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority's assumption that the District Court would act otherwise is a radical departure from the practical flexibility previously left to the equity powers of the federal judiciary. </s> Finally, I remain wholly unpersuaded by the Court's assertion that "the remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." Ante, at 746. In the first place, under this premise the Court's judgment is itself infirm; for had the Detroit school system not followed an official policy of segregation throughout the 1950's and 1960's, Negroes and whites would have been going to school together. There would have been no, or at least not as many, recognizable Negro schools and no, or at least not as many, white schools, but "just schools," and neither Negroes nor whites would have suffered from the effects of segregated education, with all its shortcomings. Surely the Court's remedy will not restore to the Negro community, stigmatized as it was by the dual school system, what it would have enjoyed over all or most of this period if the remedy is confined to present-day Detroit; for the maximum remedy available within that area will leave many of the schools almost totally black, and the system itself will be predominantly black and will become increasingly so. Moreover, when a State has engaged in acts of official segregation over a lengthy [418 U.S. 717, 780] period of time, as in the case before us, it is unrealistic to suppose that the children who were victims of the State's unconstitutional conduct could now be provided the benefits of which they were wrongfully deprived. Nor can the benefits which accrue to school systems in which schoolchildren have not been officially segregated, and to the communities supporting such school systems, be fully and immediately restored after a substantial period of unlawful segregation. The education of children of different races in a desegregated environment has unhappily been lost, along with the social, economic, and political advantages which accompany a desegregated school system as compared with an unconstitutionally segregated system. It is for these reasons that the Court has consistently followed the course of requiring the effects of past official segregation to be eliminated "root and branch" by imposing, in the present, the duty to provide a remedy which will achieve "the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." It is also for these reasons that once a constitutional violation has been found, the district judge obligated to provide such a remedy "will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." These concerns were properly taken into account by the District Judge in this case. Confining the remedy to the boundaries of the Detroit district is quite unrelated either to the goal of achieving maximum desegregation or to those intensely practical considerations, such as the extent and expense of transportation, that have imposed limits on remedies in cases such as this. The Court's remedy, in the end, is essentially arbitrary and will leave serious violations of the Constitution substantially unremedied. </s> I agree with my Brother DOUGLAS that the Court of Appeals has acted responsibly in these cases. Regrettably, [418 U.S. 717, 781] the majority's arbitrary limitation on the equitable power of federal district courts, based on the invisible borders of local school districts, is unrelated to the State's responsibility for remedying the constitutional wrongs visited upon the Negro schoolchildren of Detroit. It is oblivious to the potential benefits of metropolitan relief, to the noneducational communities of interest among neighborhoods located in and sometimes bridging different school districts, and to the considerable interdistrict cooperation already existing in various educational areas. Ultimately, it is unresponsive to the goal of attaining the utmost actual desegregation consistent with restraints of practicability and thus augurs the frequent frustration of the remedial powers of the federal courts. </s> Here the District Court will be forced to impose an intracity desegregation plan more expensive to the district, more burdensome for many of Detroit's Negro students, and surely more conducive to white flight than a metropolitan plan would be - all of this merely to avoid what the Detroit School Board, the District Court, and the en banc Court of Appeals considered to be the very manageable and quite surmountable difficulties that would be involved in extending the desegregation remedy to the suburban school districts. </s> I am therefore constrained to record my disagreement and dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The percentage of Negro pupils in the Detroit student population rose to 64.9% in 1971, to 67.3% in 1972, and to 69.8% in 1973, amid a metropolitan school population whose racial composition in 1970 was 81% white and 19% Negro. 5 App. 16; Racial-Ethnic Distribution of Students and Employees in the Detroit Public Schools, October 1972, and October 1973; 484 F.2d 215, 250. </s> [Footnote 2 The District Court's ruling on the Detroit-only desegregation plans is set out in full by the Court of Appeals, id., at 242-245, and is not otherwise officially reported. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court has previously disapproved the implementation of proposed desegregation plans which operate to permit resegregation. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 -460 (1968) ("free transfer" plan). </s> [Footnote 4 The Court of Appeals also noted several specific instances of school district mergers ordered by the State Board of Education for financial reasons. 484 F.2d, at 247. Limitations on the authority of local school districts were also outlined by the Court of Appeals: </s> "Local school districts, unless they have the approval of the State Board of Education or the Superintendent of Public Instruction, cannot [418 U.S. 717, 769] consolidate with another school district, annex territory, divide or attach parts of other districts, borrow monies in anticipation of State aid, or construct, reconstruct or remodel school buildings or additions to them." Id., at 249. (Footnotes and supporting statutory citations omitted.) </s> And the Court of Appeals properly considered the State's statutory attempt to undo the adoption of a voluntary high school desegregation plan by the Detroit Board of Education as evidencing state control over local school district affairs. Ibid. Finally, it is also relevant to note that the District Court found that the school district boundaries in that segment of the metropolitan area preliminarily designated as the desegregation area "in general bear no relationship to other municipal, county, or special district governments, needs or services," that some educational services are already provided to students on an interdistrict basis requiring their travel from one district to another, and that local communities in the metropolitan area share noneducational interests in common, which do not adhere to school district lines, and have applied metropolitan solutions to other governmental needs. 345 F. Supp. 914, 934-935 (ED Mich. 1972). </s> [Footnote 5 These included the creation and alteration of attendance zones and feeder patterns from the elementary to the secondary schools in a manner naturally and predictably perpetuating racial segregation of students, the transportation of Negro students beyond predominantly [418 U.S. 717, 771] white schools with available space to predominantly Negro schools, the use of optional attendance areas in neighborhoods in which Negro families had recently begun to settle to permit white students to transfer to predominantly white schools nearer the city limits, and the construction of schools in the heart of residentially segregated areas, thereby maximizing school segregation. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting. </s> In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), this Court held that segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race deprives minority group children of equal educational opportunities and therefore denies them the equal protection of the laws under the [418 U.S. 717, 782] Fourteenth Amendment. This Court recognized then that remedying decades of segregation in public education would not be an easy task. Subsequent events, unfortunately, have seen that prediction bear bitter fruit. But however imbedded old ways, however ingrained old prejudices, this Court has not been diverted from its appointed task of making "a living truth" of our constitutional ideal of equal justice under law. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958). </s> After 20 years of small, often difficult steps toward that great end, the Court today takes a giant step backwards. Notwithstanding a record showing widespread and pervasive racial segregation in the educational system provided by the State of Michigan for children in Detroit, this Court holds that the District Court was powerless to require the State to remedy its constitutional violation in any meaningful fashion. Ironically purporting to base its result on the principle that the scope of the remedy in a desegregation case should be determined by the nature and the extent of the constitutional violation, the Court's answer is to provide no remedy at all for the violation proved in this case, thereby guaranteeing that Negro children in Detroit will receive the same separate and inherently unequal education in the future as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past. </s> I cannot subscribe to this emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws and must respectfully dissent. Our precedents, in my view, firmly establish that where, as here, state-imposed segregation has been demonstrated, it becomes the duty of the State to eliminate root and branch all vestiges of racial discrimination and to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation. I agree with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that, under the facts of this case, this duty cannot be fulfilled unless the State [418 U.S. 717, 783] of Michigan involves outlying metropolitan area school districts in its desegregation remedy. Furthermore, I perceive no basis either in law or in the practicalities of the situation justifying the State's interposition of school district boundaries as absolute barriers to the implementation of an effective desegregation remedy. Under established and frequently used Michigan procedures, school district lines are both flexible and permeable for a wide variety of purposes, and there is no reason why they must now stand in the way of meaningful desegregation relief. </s> The rights at issue in this case are too fundamental to be abridged on grounds as superficial as those relied on by the majority today. We deal here with the right of all of our children, whatever their race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach their full potential as citizens. Those children who have been denied that right in the past deserve better than to see fences thrown up to deny them that right in the future. Our Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's refusal to remedy separate and unequal education, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. </s> I </s> The great irony of the Court's opinion and, in my view, its most serious analytical flaw may be gleaned from its concluding sentence, in which the Court remands for "prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970." Ante, at 753. The majority, however, seems to have forgotten the District Court's explicit finding that a Detroit-only decree, the only remedy permitted under today's decision, "would not accomplish desegregation." [418 U.S. 717, 784] </s> Nowhere in the Court's opinion does the majority confront, let alone respond to, the District Court's conclusion that a remedy limited to the city of Detroit would not effectively desegregate the Detroit city schools. I, for one, find the District Court's conclusion well supported by the record and its analysis compelled by our prior cases. Before turning to these questions, however, it is best to begin by laying to rest some mischaracterizations in the Court's opinion with respect to the basis for the District Court's decision to impose a metropolitan remedy. </s> The Court maintains that while the initial focus of this lawsuit was the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools, the District Court abruptly shifted focus in mid-course and altered its theory of the case. This new theory, in the majority's words, was "equating racial imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy." Ante, at 741 n. 19. As the following review of the District Court's handling of the case demonstrates, however, the majority's characterization is totally inaccurate. Nowhere did the District Court indicate that racial imbalance between school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area or within the Detroit School District constituted a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief. The focus of this case was from the beginning, and has remained, the segregated system of education in the Detroit city schools and the steps necessary to cure that condition which offends the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> The District Court's consideration of this case began with its finding, which the majority accepts, that the State of Michigan, through its instrumentality, the Detroit Board of Education, engaged in widespread purposeful acts of racial segregation in the Detroit School District. Without belaboring the details, it is sufficient to [418 U.S. 717, 785] note that the various techniques used in Detroit were typical of methods employed to segregate students by race in areas where no statutory dual system of education has existed. See, e. g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Exacerbating the effects of extensive residential segregation between Negroes and whites, the school board consciously drew attendance zones along lines which maximized the segregation of the races in schools as well. Optional attendance zones were created for neighborhoods undergoing racial transition so as to allow whites in these areas to escape integration. Negro students in areas with overcrowded schools were transported past or away from closer white schools with available space to more distant Negro schools. Grade structures and feeder-school patterns were created and maintained in a manner which had the foreseeable and actual effect of keeping Negro and white pupils in separate schools. Schools were also constructed in locations and in sizes which ensured that they would open with predominantly one-race student bodies. In sum, the evidence adduced below showed that Negro children had been intentionally confined to an expanding core of virtually all-Negro schools immediately surrounded by a receding band of all-white schools. </s> Contrary to the suggestions in the Court's opinion, the basis for affording a desegregation remedy in this case was not some perceived racial imbalance either between schools within a single school district or between independent school districts. What we confront here is "a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools . . . and facilities within the school system . . . ." Id., at 201. The constitutional violation found here was not some de facto racial imbalance, but rather the purposeful, intentional, massive, de jure segregation of the Detroit city schools, [418 U.S. 717, 786] which under our decision in Keyes, forms "a predicate for a finding of the existence of a dual school system," ibid., and justifies "all-out desegregation." Id., at 214. </s> Having found a de jure segregated public school system in operation in the city of Detroit, the District Court turned next to consider which officials and agencies should be assigned the affirmative obligation to cure the constitutional violation. The court concluded that responsibility for the segregation in the Detroit city schools rested not only with the Detroit Board of Education, but belonged to the State of Michigan itself and the state defendants in this case - that is, the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Board of Education, and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. While the validity of this conclusion will merit more extensive analysis below, suffice it for now to say that it was based on three considerations. First, the evidence at trial showed that the State itself had taken actions contributing to the segregation within the Detroit schools. Second, since the Detroit Board of Education was an agency of the State of Michigan, its acts of racial discrimination were acts of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the District Court found that under Michigan law and practice, the system of education was in fact a state school system, characterized by relatively little local control and a large degree of centralized state regulation, with respect to both educational policy and the structure and operation of school districts. </s> Having concluded, then, that the school system in the city of Detroit was a de jure segregated system and that the State of Michigan had the affirmative duty to remedy that condition of segregation, the District Court then turned to the difficult task of devising an effective remedy. It bears repeating that the District Court's focus at this stage of the litigation remained what it had [418 U.S. 717, 787] been at the beginning - the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools. As the District Court stated: "From the initial ruling [on segregation] to this day, the basis of the proceedings has been and remains the violation: de jure school segregation. . . . The task before this court, therefore, is now, and . . . has always been, how to desegregate the Detroit public schools." </s> The District Court first considered three desegregation plans limited to the geographical boundaries of the city of Detroit. All were rejected as ineffective to desegregate the Detroit city schools. Specifically, the District Court determined that the racial composition of the Detroit student body is such that implementation of any Detroit-only plan "would clearly make the entire Detroit public school system racially identifiable as Black" and would "leave many of its schools 75 to 90 per cent Black." The District Court also found that a Detroit-only plan "would change a school system which is now Black and White to one that would be perceived as Black, thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system, thereby increasing the Black student population." Based on these findings, the District Court reasoned that "relief of segregation in the public schools of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of the city" because a Detroit-only decree "would accentuate the racial identifiability of the district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation." The District Court therefore concluded that it "must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem of segregation in the Detroit public schools . . . ." </s> In seeking to define the appropriate scope of that expanded desegregation area, however, the District Court continued to maintain as its sole focus the condition shown to violate the Constitution in this case - the segregation of the Detroit school system. As it stated, the [418 U.S. 717, 788] primary question "remains the determination of the area necessary and practicable effectively to eliminate `root and branch' the effects of state-imposed and supported segregation and to desegregate the Detroit public schools." </s> There is simply no foundation in the record, then, for the majority's accusation that the only basis for the District Court's order was some desire to achieve a racial balance in the Detroit metropolitan area. 1 In fact, just the contrary is the case. In considering proposed desegregation areas, the District Court had occasion to criticize one of the State's proposals specifically because it had no basis other than its "particular racial ratio" and did not focus on "relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools [and] accomplishing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public schools." Similarly, in rejecting the Detroit School Board's proposed desegregation area, even though it included more all-white districts and therefore achieved a higher white-Negro ratio, the District Court commented: </s> "There is nothing in the record which suggests that these districts need be included in the desegregation area in order to disestablish the racial [418 U.S. 717, 789] identifiability of the Detroit public schools. From the evidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board's interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not racial desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters." </s> The Court also misstates the basis for the District Court's order by suggesting that since the only segregation proved at trial was within the Detroit school system, any relief which extended beyond the jurisdiction of the Detroit Board of Education would be inappropriate because it would impose a remedy on outlying districts "not shown to have committed any constitutional violation." Ante, at 745. 2 The essential foundation of interdistrict relief in this case was not to correct conditions within outlying districts which themselves engaged in purposeful segregation. Instead, interdistrict relief was seen as a necessary part of any meaningful effort by the State of Michigan to remedy the state-caused segregation within the city of Detroit. </s> Rather than consider the propriety of interdistrict relief on this basis, however, the Court has conjured up a largely fictional account of what the District Court was attempting to accomplish. With all due respect, the Court, in my view, does a great disservice to the District Judge who labored long and hard with this complex litigation by accusing him of changing horses in midstream and shifting the focus of this case from the pursuit of a remedy for the condition of segregation [418 U.S. 717, 790] within the Detroit school system to some unprincipled attempt to impose his own philosophy of racial balance on the entire Detroit metropolitan area. See ante, at 738-739. The focus of this case has always been the segregated system of education in the city of Detroit. The District Court determined that interdistrict relief was necessary and appropriate only because it found that the condition of segregation within the Detroit school system could not be cured with a Detroit-only remedy. It is on this theory that the interdistrict relief must stand or fall. Unlike the Court, I perceive my task to be to review the District Court's order for what it is, rather than to criticize it for what it manifestly is not. </s> II </s> As the foregoing demonstrates, the District Court's decision to expand its desegregation decree beyond the geographical limits of the city of Detroit rested in large part on its conclusions (A) that the State of Michigan was ultimately responsible for curing the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools, and (B) that a Detroit-only remedy would not accomplish this task. In my view, both of these conclusions are well supported by the facts of this case and by this Court's precedents. </s> A </s> To begin with, the record amply supports the District Court's findings that the State of Michigan, through state officers and state agencies, had engaged in purposeful acts which created or aggravated segregation in the Detroit schools. The State Board of Education, for example, prior to 1962, exercised its authority to supervise local schoolsite selection in a manner which contributed to segregation. 484 F.2d 215, 238 (CA6 1973). Furthermore, the State's continuing authority, after 1962, [418 U.S. 717, 791] to approve school building construction plans 3 had intertwined the State with site-selection decisions of the Detroit Board of Education which had the purpose and effect of maintaining segregation. </s> The State had also stood in the way of past efforts to desegregate the Detroit city schools. In 1970, for example, the Detroit School Board had begun implementation of its own desegregation plan for its high schools, despite considerable public and official resistance. The State Legislature intervened by enacting Act 48 of the Public Acts of 1970, specifically prohibiting implementation of the desegregation plan and thereby continuing the growing segregation of the Detroit school system. Adequate desegregation of the Detroit system was also hampered by discriminatory restrictions placed by the State on the use of transportation within Detroit. While state aid for transportation was provided by statute for suburban districts, many of which were highly urbanized, aid for intracity transportation was excepted. One of the effects of this restriction was to encourage the construction of small walk-in neighborhood schools in Detroit, thereby lending aid to the intentional policy of creating a school system which reflected, to the greatest extent feasible, extensive residential segregation. Indeed, that one of the purposes of the transportation restriction was to impede desegregation was evidenced when the Michigan Legislature amended the State Transportation Aid Act to cover intracity transportation but expressly prohibited the allocation of funds for cross-busing of students within a school district to achieve racial balance. 4 Cf. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971). [418 U.S. 717, 792] </s> Also significant was the State's involvement during the 1950's in the transportation of Negro high school students from the Carver School District past a closer white high school in the Oak Park District to a more distant Negro high school in the Detroit system. Certainly the District Court's finding that the State Board of Education had knowledge of this action and had given its tacit or express approval was not clearly erroneous. Given the comprehensive statutory powers of the State Board of Education over contractual arrangements between school districts in the enrollment of students on a nonresident tuition basis, including certification of the number of pupils involved in the transfer and the amount of tuition charged, over the review of transportation routes and distances, and over the disbursement of transportation funds, 5 the State Board inevitably knew and understood the significance of this discriminatory act. </s> Aside from the acts of purposeful segregation committed by the State Legislature and the State Board of Education, the District Court also concluded that the State was responsible for the many intentional acts of segregation committed by the Detroit Board of Education, an agency of the State. The majority is only willing to accept this finding arguendo. See ante, at 748. I have no doubt, however, as to its validity under the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> "The command of the Fourteenth Amendment," it should be recalled, "is that no `State' shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958). While a State can act only through "the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted," Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880), actions by an agent or officer of [418 U.S. 717, 793] the State are encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment for, "as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State." Ibid. See also Cooper v. Aaron, supra; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). </s> Under Michigan law a "school district is an agency of the State government." School District of the City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591, 600, 116 N. W. 2d 866, 870 (1962). It is "a legal division of territory, created by the State for educational purposes, to which the State has granted such powers as are deemed necessary to permit the district to function as a State agency." Detroit Board of Education v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 319 Mich. 436, 450, 29 N. W. 2d 902, 908 (1947). Racial discrimination by the school district, an agency of the State, is therefore racial discrimination by the State itself, forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). </s> We recognized only last Term in Keyes that it was the State itself which was ultimately responsible for de jure acts of segregation committed by a local school board. A deliberate policy of segregation by the local board, we held, amounted to "state-imposed segregation." 413 U.S., at 200 . Wherever a dual school system exists, whether compelled by state statute or created by a local board's systematic program of segregation, "the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty `to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system' [and] to eliminate from the public schools within their school system `all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.'" Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> Vesting responsibility with the State of Michigan for Detroit's segregated schools is particularly appropriate as [418 U.S. 717, 794] Michigan, unlike some other States, operates a single statewide system of education rather than several separate and independent local school systems. The majority's emphasis on local governmental control and local autonomy of school districts in Michigan will come as a surprise to those with any familiarity with that State's system of education. School districts are not separate and distinct sovereign entities under Michigan law, but rather are "`auxiliaries of the State,'" subject to its "absolute power." Attorney General of Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 240 (1905). The courts of the State have repeatedly emphasized that education in Michigan is not a local governmental concern, but a state function. </s> "Unlike the delegation of other powers by the legislature to local governments, education is not inherently a part of the local self-government of a municipality . . . . Control of our public school system is a State matter delegated and lodged in the State legislature by the Constitution. The policy of the State has been to retain control of its school system, to be administered throughout the State under State laws by local State agencies organized with plenary powers to carry out the delegated functions given [them] by the legislature." School District of the City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, supra, at 595, 116 N. W. 2d, at 868. </s> The Supreme Court of Michigan has noted the deep roots of this policy: </s> "It has been settled by the Ordinance of 1787, the several Constitutions adopted in this State, by its uniform course of legislation, and by the decisions of this court, that education in Michigan is a matter of State concern, that it is no part of the local self-government of a particular township or municipality [418 U.S. 717, 795] . . . . The legislature has always dictated the educational policy of the State." In re School District No. 6, 284 Mich. 132, 145-146, 278 N. W. 792, 797 (1938). </s> The State's control over education is reflected in the fact that, contrary to the Court's implication, there is little or no relationship between school districts and local political units. To take the 85 outlying local school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area as examples, 17 districts lie in two counties, two in three counties. One district serves five municipalities; other suburban municipalities are fragmented into as many as six school districts. Nor is there any apparent state policy with regard to the size of school districts, as they now range from 2,000 to 285,000 students. </s> Centralized state control manifests itself in practice as well as in theory. The State controls the financing of education in several ways. The legislature contributes a substantial portion of most school districts' operating budgets with funds appropriated from the State's General Fund revenues raised through statewide taxation. 6 The State's power over the purse can be and is in fact used to enforce the State's powers over local districts. 7 In addition, although local districts obtain funds through local property taxation, the State has assumed the responsibility to ensure equalized property valuations throughout the State. 8 The State also establishes [418 U.S. 717, 796] standards for teacher certification and teacher tenure; 9 determines part of the required curriculum; 10 sets the minimum school term; 11 approves bus routes, equipment, and drivers; 12 approves textbooks; 13 and establishes procedures for student discipline. 14 The State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State Board of Education have the power to remove local school board members from office for neglect of their duties. 15 </s> Most significantly for present purposes, the State has wide-ranging powers to consolidate and merge school districts, even without the consent of the districts themselves or of the local citizenry. 16 See, e. g., Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N. W. 289 (1902), aff'd, 199 U.S. 233 (1905). Indeed, recent years have witnessed an accelerated program of school district consolidations, mergers, and annexations, many of which were state imposed. Whereas the State had 7,362 local districts in 1912, the number had been reduced to 1,438 in 1964 and to 738 in 1968. 17 By June 1972, only 608 school districts remained. Furthermore, the State has broad powers to transfer property from one district to another, again without the consent of the local school districts affected by the transfer. 18 See, e. g., School District [418 U.S. 717, 797] of the City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, supra; Imlay Township District v. State Board of Education, 359 Mich. 478, 102 N. W. 2d 720 (1960). </s> Whatever may be the history of public education in other parts of our Nation, it simply flies in the face of reality to say, as does the majority, that in Michigan, "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools . . . ." Ante, at 741. As the State's Supreme Court has said: "We have repeatedly held that education in this State is not a matter of local concern, but belongs to the State at large." Collins v. City of Detroit, 195 Mich. 330, 335-336, 161 N. W. 905, 907 (1917). See also Sturgis v. County of Allegan, 343 Mich. 209, 215, 72 N. W. 2d 56, 59 (1955); Van Fleet v. Oltman, 244 Mich. 241, 244, 221 N. W. 299, 300 (1928); Child Welfare Society of Flint v. Kennedy School District, 220 Mich. 290, 296, 189 N. W. 1002, 1004 (1922). Indeed, a study prepared for the 1961 Michigan Constitutional Convention noted that the Michigan Constitution's articles on education had resulted in "the establishment of a state system of education in contrast to a series of local school systems." Elementary and Secondary Education and the Michigan Constitution, Michigan Constitutional Convention Studies 1 (1961). </s> In sum, several factors in this case coalesce to support the District Court's ruling that it was the State of Michigan itself, not simply the Detroit Board of Education, which bore the obligation of curing the condition of segregation within the Detroit city schools. The actions of the State itself directly contributed to Detroit's segregation. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the State is ultimately responsible for the actions of its local agencies. And, finally, given the structure of Michigan's educational system, Detroit's segregation cannot be [418 U.S. 717, 798] viewed as the problem of an independent and separate entity. Michigan operates a single statewide system of education, a substantial part of which was shown to be segregated in this case. </s> B </s> What action, then, could the District Court require the State to take in order to cure Detroit's condition of segregation? Our prior cases have not minced words as to what steps responsible officials and agencies must take in order to remedy segregation in the public schools. Not only must distinctions on the basis of race be terminated for the future, but school officials are also "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437 -438 (1968). See also Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (MD Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). Negro students are not only entitled to neutral nondiscriminatory treatment in the future. They must receive "what Brown II promised them: a school system in which all vestiges of enforced racial segregation have been eliminated." Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 463 (1972). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). These remedial standards are fully applicable not only to school districts where a dual system was compelled by statute, but also where, as here, a dual system was the product of purposeful and intentional state action. See Keyes, 413 U.S., at 200 -201. </s> After examining three plans limited to the city of Detroit, the District Court correctly concluded that none would eliminate root and branch the vestiges of [418 U.S. 717, 799] unconstitutional segregation. The plans' effectiveness, of course, had to be evaluated in the context of the District Court's findings as to the extent of segregation in the Detroit city schools. As indicated earlier, the most essential finding was that Negro children in Detroit had been confined by intentional acts of segregation to a growing core of Negro schools surrounded by a receding ring of white schools. 19 Thus, in 1960, of Detroit's 251 [418 U.S. 717, 800] regular-attendance schools, 100 were 90% or more white and 71 were 90% or more Negro. In 1970, of Detroit's 282 regular-attendance schools, 69 were 90% or more white and 133 were 90% or more Negro. While in 1960, 68% of all schools were 90% or more one race, by 1970, 71.6% of the schools fell into that category. The growing core of all-Negro schools was further evidenced in total school district population figures. In 1960 the Detroit system had 46% Negro students and 54% white students, but by 1970, 64% of the students were Negro and only 36% were white. This increase in the proportion of Negro students was the highest of any major Northern city. </s> It was with these figures in the background that the District Court evaluated the adequacy of the three Detroit-only plans submitted by the parties. Plan A, proposed by the Detroit Board of Education, desegregated the high schools and about a fifth of the middle-level schools. It was deemed inadequate, however, because it did not desegregate elementary schools and left the middle-level schools not included in the plan more segregated than ever. Plan C, also proposed by the Detroit Board, was deemed inadequate because it too covered only some grade levels and would leave elementary schools segregated. Plan B, the plaintiffs' plan, though requiring the transportation of 82,000 pupils and the acquisition of 900 school buses, would make little [418 U.S. 717, 801] headway in rooting out the vestiges of segregation. To begin with, because of practical limitations, the District Court found that the plan would leave many of the Detroit city schools 75% to 90% Negro. More significantly, the District Court recognized that in the context of a community which historically had a school system marked by rigid de jure segregation, the likely effect of a Detroit-only plan would be to "change a school system which is now Black and White to one that would be perceived as Black . . . ." The result of this changed perception, the District Court found, would be to increase the flight of whites from the city to the outlying suburbs, compounding the effects of the present rate of increase in the proportion of Negro students in the Detroit system. Thus, even if a plan were adopted which, at its outset, provided in every school a 65% Negro-35% white racial mix in keeping with the Negro-white proportions of the total student population, such a system would, in short order, devolve into an all-Negro system. The net result would be a continuation of the all-Negro schools which were the hallmarks of Detroit's former dual system of one-race schools. </s> Under our decisions, it was clearly proper for the District Court to take into account the so-called "white flight" from the city schools which would be forthcoming from any Detroit-only decree. The court's prediction of white flight was well supported by expert testimony based on past experience in other cities undergoing desegregation relief. We ourselves took the possibility of white flight into account in evaluating the effectiveness of a desegregation plan in Wright, supra, where we relied on the District Court's finding that if the city of Emporia were allowed to withdraw from the existing system, leaving a system with a higher proportion of Negroes, it "`may be anticipated that the proportion [418 U.S. 717, 802] of whites in county schools may drop as those who can register in private academies' . . . ." 407 U.S., at 464 . One cannot ignore the white-flight problem, for where legally imposed segregation has been established, the District Court has the responsibility to see to it not only that the dual system is terminated at once but also that future events do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish segregation. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 21 . See also Green, 391 U.S., at 438 n. 4; Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968). </s> We held in Swann, supra, that where de jure segregation is shown, school authorities must make "every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." 402 U.S., at 26 . This is the operative standard re-emphasized in Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). If these words have any meaning at all, surely it is that school authorities must, to the extent possible, take all practicable steps to ensure that Negro and white children in fact go to school together. This is, in the final analysis, what desegregation of the public schools is all about. </s> Because of the already high and rapidly increasing percentage of Negro students in the Detroit system, as well as the prospect of white flight, a Detroit-only plan simply has no hope of achieving actual desegregation. Under such a plan white and Negro students will not go to school together. Instead, Negro children will continue to attend all-Negro schools. The very evil that Brown I was aimed at will not be cured, but will be perpetuated for the future. </s> Racially identifiable schools are one of the primary vestiges of state-imposed segregation which an effective desegregation decree must attempt to eliminate. In Swann, supra, for example, we held that "[t]he district judge or school authorities . . . will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." 402 [418 U.S. 717, 803] U.S., at 26. There is "a presumption," we stated, "against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition." Ibid. And in evaluating the effectiveness of desegregation plans in prior cases, we ourselves have considered the extent to which they discontinued racially identifiable schools. See, e. g., Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, supra; Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, supra. For a principal end of any desegregation remedy is to ensure that it is no longer "possible to identify a `white school' or a `Negro school.'" Swann, supra, at 18. The evil to be remedied in the dismantling of a dual system is the "[r]acial identification of the system's schools." Green, 391 U.S., at 435 . The goal is a system without white schools or Negro schools - a system with "just schools." Id., at 442. A school authority's remedial plan or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its effectiveness in achieving this end. See Swann, supra, at 25; Davis, supra, at 37; Green, supra, at 439. </s> We cautioned in Swann, of course, that the dismantling of a segregated school system does not mandate any particular racial balance. 402 U.S., at 24 . We also concluded that a remedy under which there would remain a small number of racially identifiable schools was only presumptively inadequate and might be justified. Id., at 26. But this is a totally different case. The flaw of a Detroit-only decree is not that it does not reach some ideal degree of racial balance or mixing. It simply does not promise to achieve actual desegregation at all. It is one thing to have a system where a small number of students remain in racially identifiable schools. It is something else entirely to have a system where all students continue to attend such schools. </s> The continued racial identifiability of the Detroit schools under a Detroit-only remedy is not simply a reflection of their high percentage of Negro students. [418 U.S. 717, 804] What is or is not a racially identifiable vestige of de jure segregation must necessarily depend on several factors. Cf. Keyes, 413 U.S., at 196 . Foremost among these should be the relationship between the schools in question and the neighboring community. For these purposes the city of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs must be viewed as a single community. Detroit is closely connected to its suburbs in many ways, and the metropolitan area is viewed as a single cohesive unit by its residents. About 40% of the residents of the two suburban counties included in the desegregation plan work in Wayne County, in which Detroit is situated. Many residents of the city work in the suburbs. The three counties participate in a wide variety of cooperative governmental ventures on a metropolitanwide basis, including a metropolitan transit system, park authority, water and sewer system, and council of governments. The Federal Government has classified the tri-county area as a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, indicating that it is an area of "economic and social integration." United States v. Connecticut National Bank, ante, at 670. </s> Under a Detroit-only decree, Detroit's schools will clearly remain racially identifiable in comparison with neighboring schools in the metropolitan community. Schools with 65% and more Negro students will stand in sharp and obvious contrast to schools in neighboring districts with less than 2% Negro enrollment. Negro students will continue to perceive their schools as segregated educational facilities and this perception will only be increased when whites react to a Detroit-only decree by fleeing to the suburbs to avoid integration. School district lines, however innocently drawn, will surely be perceived as fences to separate the races when, under a Detroit-only decree, white parents withdraw their children [418 U.S. 717, 805] from the Detroit city schools and move to the suburbs in order to continue them in all-white schools. The message of this action will not escape the Negro children in the city of Detroit. See Wright, 407 U.S., at 466 . It will be of scant significance to Negro children who have for years been confined by de jure acts of segregation to a growing core of all-Negro schools surrounded by a ring of all-white schools that the new dividing line between the races is the school district boundary. </s> Nor can it be said that the State is free from any responsibility for the disparity between the racial makeup of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs. The State's creation, through de jure acts of segregation, of a growing core of all-Negro schools inevitably acted as a magnet to attract Negroes to the areas served by such schools and to deter them from settling either in other areas of the city or in the suburbs. By the same token, the growing core of all-Negro schools inevitably helped drive whites to other areas of the city or to the suburbs. As we recognized in Swann: </s> "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods. . . . [Action taken] to maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from the formal principles of `neighborhood zoning' . . . does more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student body . . . . It may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with `neighborhood zoning,' further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a proper [418 U.S. 717, 806] showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy." 402 U.S., at 20 -21. </s> See also Keyes, 413 U.S., at 202 . The rippling effects on residential patterns caused by purposeful acts of segregation do not automatically subside at the school district border. With rare exceptions, these effects naturally spread through all the residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. See id., at 202-203. </s> The State must also bear part of the blame for the white flight to the suburbs which would be forthcoming from a Detroit-only decree and would render such a remedy ineffective. Having created a system where whites and Negroes were intentionally kept apart so that they could not become accustomed to learning together, the State is responsible for the fact that many whites will react to the dismantling of that segregated system by attempting to flee to the suburbs. Indeed, by limiting the District Court to a Detroit-only remedy and allowing that flight to the suburbs to succeed, the Court today allows the State to profit from its own wrong and to perpetuate for years to come the separation of the races it achieved in the past by purposeful state action. </s> The majority asserts, however, that involvement of outlying districts would do violence to the accepted principle that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Swann, supra, at 16. See ante, at 744-745. Not only is the majority's attempt to find in this single phrase the answer to the complex and difficult questions presented in this case hopelessly simplistic, but more important, the Court reads these words in a manner which perverts their obvious meaning. The nature of a violation determines the scope of the remedy simply because the function of any remedy is to cure the violation to which it is addressed. In school segregation [418 U.S. 717, 807] cases, as in other equitable causes, a remedy which effectively cures the violation is what is required. See Green, 391 U.S., at 439 ; Davis, 402 U.S., at 37 . No more is necessary, but we can tolerate no less. To read this principle as barring a district court from imposing the only effective remedy for past segregation and remitting the court to a patently ineffective alternative is, in my view, to turn a simple commonsense rule into a cruel and meaningless paradox. Ironically, by ruling out an interdistrict remedy, the only relief which promises to cure segregation in the Detroit public schools, the majority flouts the very principle on which it purports to rely. </s> Nor should it be of any significance that the suburban school districts were not shown to have themselves taken any direct action to promote segregation of the races. Given the State's broad powers over local school districts, it was well within the State's powers to require those districts surrounding the Detroit school district to participate in a metropolitan remedy. The State's duty should be no different here than in cases where it is shown that certain of a State's voting districts are malapportioned in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Overrepresented electoral districts are required to participate in reapportionment although their only "participation" in the violation was to do nothing about it. Similarly, electoral districts which themselves meet representation standards must frequently be redrawn as part of a remedy for other over- and under-inclusive districts. No finding of fault on the part of each electoral district and no finding of a discriminatory effect on each district is a prerequisite to its involvement in the constitutionally required remedy. By the same logic, no finding of fault on the part of the suburban school districts in this case [418 U.S. 717, 808] and no finding of a discriminatory effect on each district should be a prerequisite to their involvement in the constitutionally required remedy. </s> It is the State, after all, which bears the responsibility under Brown of affording a nondiscriminatory system of education. The State, of course, is ordinarily free to choose any decentralized framework for education it wishes, so long as it fulfills that Fourteenth Amendment obligation. But the State should no more be allowed to hide behind its delegation and compartmentalization of school districts to avoid its constitutional obligations to its children than it could hide behind its political subdivisions to avoid its obligations to its voters. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 575. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). </s> It is a hollow remedy indeed where "after supposed `desegregation' the schools remained segregated in fact." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 495 (DDC 1967). We must do better than "`substitute . . . one segregated school system for another segregated school system.'" Wright, 407 U.S., at 456 . To suggest, as does the majority, that a Detroit-only plan somehow remedies the effects of de jure segregation of the races is, in my view, to make a solemn mockery of Brown I's holding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal and of Swann's unequivocal mandate that the answer to de jure segregation is the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation. </s> III </s> One final set of problems remains to be considered. We recognized in Brown II, and have re-emphasized ever since, that in fashioning relief in desegregation cases, "the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for [418 U.S. 717, 809] adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Brown II, 349 U.S., at 300 . See also Swann, supra. </s> Though not resting its holding on this point, the majority suggests that various equitable considerations militate against interdistrict relief. The Court, for example, refers to financing and administrative problems, the logistical problems attending large-scale transportation of students, and the prospect of the District Court's becoming a "de facto `legislative authority'" and "`school superintendent' for the entire area." Ante, at 743-744. The entangling web of problems woven by the Court, however, appears on further consideration to be constructed of the flimsiest of threads. </s> I deal first with the last of the problems posed by the Court - the specter of the District Court qua "school superintendent" and "legislative authority" - for analysis of this problem helps put the other issues in proper perspective. Our cases, of course, make clear that the initial responsibility for devising an adequate desegregation plan belongs with school authorities, not with the District Court. The court's primary role is to review the adequacy of the school authorities' efforts and to substitute its own plan only if and to the extent they default. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 16 ; Green, 391 U.S., at 439 . Contrary to the majority's suggestions, the District Judge in this case consistently adhered to these procedures and there is every indication that he would have continued to do so. After finding de jure segregation the court ordered the parties to submit proposed Detroit-only plans. The state defendants were also ordered to submit a proposed metropolitan plan extending beyond Detroit's boundaries. As the District Court stated, "the State defendants . . . bear the initial burden of coming forward with a proposal that promises to work." The state defendants defaulted in this obligation, however. [418 U.S. 717, 810] Rather than submit a complete plan, the State Board of Education submitted six proposals, none of which was in fact a desegregation plan. It was only upon this default that the District Court began to take steps to develop its own plan. Even then the District Court maximized school authority participation by appointing a panel representing both plaintiffs and defendants to develop a plan. Pet. App. 99a-100a. Furthermore, the District Court still left the state defendants the initial responsibility for developing both interim and final financial and administrative arrangements to implement interdistrict relief. Id., at 104a-105a. The Court of Appeals further protected the interests of local school authorities by ensuring that the outlying suburban districts could fully participate in the proceedings to develop a metropolitan remedy. </s> These processes have not been allowed to run their course. No final desegregation plan has been proposed by the panel of experts, let alone approved by the District Court. We do not know in any detail how many students will be transported to effect a metropolitan remedy, and we do not know how long or how far they will have to travel. No recommendations have yet been submitted by the state defendants on financial and administrative arrangements. In sum, the practicality of a final metropolitan plan is simply not before us at the present time. Since the State and the panel of experts have not yet had an opportunity to come up with a workable remedy, there is no foundation for the majority's suggestion of the impracticality of interdistrict relief. Furthermore, there is no basis whatever for assuming that the District Court will inevitably be forced to assume the role of legislature or school superintendent. 20 </s> [418 U.S. 717, 811] Were we to hold that it was its constitutional duty to do so, there is every indication that the State of Michigan would fulfill its obligation and develop a plan which is workable, administrable, financially sound, and, most important, in the best interest of quality education for all of the children in the Detroit metropolitan area. </s> Since the Court chooses, however, to speculate on the feasibility of a metropolitan plan, I feel constrained to comment on the problem areas it has targeted. To begin with, the majority's questions concerning the practicality of consolidation of school districts need not give us pause. The State clearly has the power, under existing law, to effect a consolidation if it is ultimately determined that this offers the best prospect for a workable and stable desegregation plan. See supra, at 796-797. And given the 1,000 or so consolidations of school districts which have taken place in the past, it is hard to believe that the State has not already devised means of solving most, if not all, of the practical problems which the Court suggests consolidation would entail. </s> Furthermore, the majority ignores long-established Michigan procedures under which school districts may enter into contractual agreements to educate their pupils in other districts using state or local funds to finance non-resident education. 21 Such agreements could form an [418 U.S. 717, 812] easily administrable framework for interdistrict relief short of outright consolidation of the school districts. The District Court found that interdistrict procedures like these were frequently used to provide special educational services for handicapped children, and extensive statutory provision is also made for their use in vocational education. 22 Surely if school districts are willing to engage in interdistrict programs to help those unfortunate children crippled by physical or mental handicaps, school districts can be required to participate in an interdistrict program to help those children in the city of Detroit whose educations and very futures have been crippled by purposeful state segregation. </s> Although the majority gives this last matter only fleeting reference, it is plain that one of the basic emotional and legal issues underlying these cases concerns the propriety of transportation of students to achieve desegregation. While others may have retreated from its standards, see, e. g., Keyes, 413 U.S., at 217 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I continue to adhere to the guidelines set forth in Swann on this issue. See 402 U.S., at 29 -31. And though no final desegregation plan is presently before us, to the extent the outline of such a plan is now visible, it is clear that the transportation it would entail will be fully consistent with these guidelines. </s> First of all, the metropolitan plan would not involve the busing of substantially more students than already ride buses. The District Court found that, statewide, 35%-40% of all students already arrive at school on a bus. In those school districts in the tri-county Detroit metropolitan area eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs, 42%-52% of all students rode buses to school. In the tri-county areas as a whole, approximately [418 U.S. 717, 813] 300,000 pupils arrived at school on some type of bus, with about 60,000 of these apparently using regular public transit. In comparison, the desegregation plan, according to its present rough outline, would involve the transportation of 310,000 students, about 40% of the population within the desegregation area. </s> With respect to distance and amount of time traveled, 17 of the outlying school districts involved in the plan are contiguous to the Detroit district. The rest are all within 8 miles of the Detroit city limits. The trial court, in defining the desegregation area, placed a ceiling of 40 minutes one way on the amount of travel time, and many students will obviously travel for far shorter periods. As to distance, the average statewide bus trip is 8 1/2 miles one way, and in some parts of the tri-county area, students already travel for one and a quarter hours or more each way. In sum, with regard to both the number of students transported and the time and distances involved, the outlined desegregation plan "compares favorably with the transportation plan previously operated . . . ." Swann, supra, at 30. </s> As far as economics are concerned, a metropolitan remedy would actually be more sensible than a Detroit-only remedy. Because of prior transportation aid restrictions, see supra, at 791, Detroit largely relied on public transport, at student expense, for those students who lived too far away to walk to school. Since no inventory of school buses existed, a Detroit-only plan was estimated to require the purchase of 900 buses to effectuate the necessary transportation. The tri-county area, in contrast, already has an inventory of 1,800 buses, many of which are now under-utilized. Since increased utilization of the existing inventory can take up much of the increase in transportation involved in the interdistrict remedy, the District Court found that only 350 additional buses would [418 U.S. 717, 814] probably be needed, almost two-thirds fewer than a Detroit-only remedy. Other features of an interdistrict remedy bespeak its practicality, such as the possibility of pairing up Negro schools near Detroit's boundary with nearby white schools on the other side of the present school district line. </s> Some disruption, of course, is the inevitable product of any desegregation decree, whether it operates within one district or on an interdistrict basis. As we said in Swann, however: </s> "Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided . . . ." 402 U.S., at 28. </s> Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task. Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years. But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the rights of others, so public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to divert this Court from the enforcement of the constitutional principles at issue in this case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles of law. In [418 U.S. 717, 815] the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities - one white, the other black - but it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret. I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Contrary to the Court's characterization, the use of racial ratios in this case in no way differed from that in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Here, as there, mathematical ratios were used simply as "a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement." Id., at 25. It may be expected that a final desegregation plan in this case would deviate from a pure mathematical approach. Indeed, the District Court's most recent order appointing a panel of experts to draft an interdistrict plan requires only that the plan be designed "to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation . . . [w]ithin the limitations of reasonable travel time and distance factors." 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED Mich. 1972). Cf. 402 U.S., at 23 . </s> [Footnote 2 It does not appear that even the majority places any real weight on this consideration since it recognizes that interdistrict relief would be proper where a constitutional violation within one district produces a significant segregative effect in another district, see ante, at 744-745, thus allowing interdistrict relief to touch districts which have not themselves violated the Constitution. </s> [Footnote 3 See Mich. Comp. Laws 388.851 (1970). </s> [Footnote 4 See 388.1179. </s> [Footnote 5 See 388.629 and 340.600. </s> [Footnote 6 See 388.611. The State contributed an average of 34% of the operating budgets of the 54 school districts included in the original proposed desegregation area. In 11 of these districts, state contributions exceeded 50% of the operating budgets. </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., id., 340.575. See also 1949-1950 Report of the Attorney General 104 (Roth); Vol. 1, 1955 Report of the Attorney General 561 (Kavanagh); 1961-1962 Report of the Attorney General 533 (Kelley). </s> [Footnote 8 See Mich. Comp. Laws 211.34 and 340.681. </s> [Footnote 9 340.569. </s> [Footnote 10 257.811 (c), 340.361, 340.781, 340.782, 388.371. </s> [Footnote 11 340.575. </s> [Footnote 12 388.1171. </s> [Footnote 13 340.887 (1) </s> [Footnote 14 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 4705 (July 7, 1970), 1969-1970 Report of the Attorney General 156 (Kelley). </s> [Footnote 15 See Mich. Comp. Laws 340.253. </s> [Footnote 16 See generally 340.401-340.415 (consolidations), 340.431-340.449 (annexations). </s> [Footnote 17 See 1 Michigan Senate Journal, 1968, p. 423. </s> [Footnote 18 See generally Mich. Comp. Laws 340.461-340.468. </s> [Footnote 19 Despite MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S claim to the contrary, ante, at 756 n. 2, of his concurring opinion, the record fully supports my statement that Negro students were intentionally confined to a core of Negro schools within the city of Detroit. See, e. g., supra, at 784-785, 790-792. Indeed, MR. JUSTICE STEWART acknowledges that intentional acts of segregation by the State have separated white and Negro students within the city, and that the resulting core of all-Negro schools has grown to encompass most of the city. In suggesting that my approval of an interdistrict remedy rests on a further conclusion that the State or its political subdivisions have been responsible for the increasing percentage of Negro students in Detroit, my Brother STEWART misconceives the thrust of this dissent. In light of the high concentration of Negro students in Detroit, the District Judge's finding that a Detroit-only remedy cannot effectively cure the constitutional violation within the city should be enough to support the choice of an interdistrict remedy. Whether state action is responsible for the growth of the core of all-Negro schools in Detroit is, in my view, quite irrelevant. </s> The difficulty with MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S position is that he, like the Court, confuses the inquiry required to determine whether there has been a substantive constitutional violation with that necessary to formulate an appropriate remedy once a constitutional violation has been shown. While a finding of state action is of course a prerequisite to finding a violation, we have never held that after unconstitutional state action has been shown, the District Court at the remedial stage must engage in a second inquiry to determine whether additional state action exists to justify a particular remedy. Rather, once a constitutional violation has been shown, the District Court is duty-bound to formulate an effective remedy and, in so doing, the court is entitled - indeed, it is required - to consider all the factual circumstances relevant to the framing of an effective decree. Thus, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education [418 U.S. 717, 800] we held that the District Court must take into account the existence of extensive residential segregation in determining whether a racially neutral "neighborhood school" attendance plan was an adequate desegregation remedy, regardless of whether this residential segregation was caused by state action. So here, the District Court was required to consider the facts that the Detroit school system was already predominantly Negro and would likely become all-Negro upon issuance of a Detroit-only decree in framing an effective desegregation remedy, regardless of state responsibility for this situation. </s> [Footnote 20 In fact, the District Court remarked "that this court's task is to enforce constitutional rights not to act as a schoolmaster; the [418 U.S. 717, 811] court's task is to protect the constitutional rights here found violated with as little intrusion into the education process as possible. The court's objective is to establish the minimum constitutional framework within which the system of public schools may operate now and hereafter in a racially unified, non-discriminatory fashion. Within that framework the body politic, educators, parents, and most particularly the children must be given the maximum opportunity to experiment and secure a high quality, and equal, educational opportunity." Pet. App. 82a. </s> [Footnote 21 See, e. g., Mich. Comp. Laws 340.69, 340.121 (d), 340.359, 340.582, 340.582a, 340.590. </s> [Footnote 22 See id., 340.330-340.330u. </s> [418 U.S. 717, 1]

United States Supreme Court BLAU v. UNITED STATES(1951) No. 21 Argued: November 7, 1950Decided: January 15, 1951 </s> Petitioner, a witness before a federal grand jury in response to a summons, declined to answer questions concerning activities and records of the Communist Party in Colorado, claiming his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Asserting his privilege against disclosing confidential communications between husband and wife, he also refused to reveal the whereabouts of his wife, who was wanted by the grand jury as a witness in connection with the same investigation. It was undisputed that he obtained his knowledge of his wife's whereabouts by communication from her. The District Court overruled both claims of privilege and sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for contempt of court. Held: </s> 1. Failure to sustain petitioner's claim of privilege against self-incrimination was error. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 . P. 333. </s> 2. Petitioner was entitled to rely on his privilege against disclosing confidential communications between husband and wife because the Government failed to overcome the presumption that the communications were confidential. Pp. 333-334. </s> 179 F.2d 559, reversed. </s> The District Court sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for contempt of court, for refusing to answer questions before a federal grand jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 179 F.2d 559. This Court granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 956 . Reversed, p. 334. </s> Samuel D. Menin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General McInerney, John F. Davis and J. F. Bishop. [340 U.S. 332, 333] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner was summoned to appear before a federal district grand jury in Denver, Colorado. Both before that body and before the district judge where he was later taken, petitioner declined to answer questions concerning the activities and records of the Communist Party of Colorado, claiming his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. He also refused to reveal the whereabouts of his wife, who was wanted by the grand jury as a witness in connection with the same investigation. As to this refusal to testify, petitioner asserted his privilege against disclosing confidential communications between husband and wife. The district judge overruled both claims of privilege and sentenced petitioner to six months in prison for contempt of court. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 179 F.2d 559. </s> For the reasons set out in our recent opinion in Patricia Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 , we hold it was error to fail to sustain the claim of privilege against self-incrimination. </s> This leaves for consideration the validity of the sentence insofar as it rests on the failure of petitioner to disclose the whereabouts of his wife. In Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 , this Court recognized that a confidential communication between husband and wife was privileged. It is not disputed in the present case that petitioner obtained his knowledge as to where his wife was by communication from her. Nevertheless, the Government insists that he should be denied the benefit of the privilege because he failed to prove that the information was privately conveyed. This contention ignores the rule that marital communications are presumptively confidential. Wolfle v. United States, supra, at 14; Wigmore, Evidence, 2336. The Government made no effort to overcome the presumption. In this case, moreover, [340 U.S. 332, 334] the communication to petitioner was of the kind likely to be confidential. Petitioner's wife, according to the district judge, knew that she and a number of others were "wanted" as witnesses by the grand jury but she "hid out, apparently so that the process . . . could not be served upon her." 1 Several of the witnesses who appeared were put in jail for contempt of court. Under such circumstances, it seems highly probable that Mrs. Blau secretly told her husband where she could be found. Petitioner's refusal to betray his wife's trust therefore was both understandable and lawful. We have no doubt that he was entitled to claim his privilege. 2 </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Petitioner's wife, when apprehended, was sentenced to one year's imprisonment for contempt, Patricia Blau v. United States, supra, although other witnesses who refused to testify received shorter sentences. In sentencing Mrs. Blau, the judge stated: "I haven't much sympathy for this lady because, as I said, she defied the Court by avoiding the process of the Court when she knew very well that she was wanted here, and yet she hid out, apparently so that the process of this court could not be served upon her." </s> [Footnote 2 In view of our decision on this phase of the case, it is unnecessary to reach the question whether the single conviction for contempt (which was based on the refusal to give incriminating testimony and on the refusal to reveal a confidential marital communication) would be valid if petitioner were entitled to claim one, but not both, of the privileges. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON, with whom MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins, dissenting. </s> If a communication between husband and wife is made under circumstances obviously not intended to be confidential, it is not privileged. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 . [340 U.S. 332, 335] </s> Where the privilege suppresses relevant testimony, as it did here, it should "be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence can not otherwise reasonably be preserved." Id., at 17. </s> Unless the wife is in concealment, which does not appear to be the case here, the disclosure of her whereabouts to the husband is obviously not intended to be confidential and therefore is not privileged. Not every communication between husband and wife is blessed with the privilege. The general rule of evidence is competency. Incompetency is the exception, and to bring one within the exception, one must come within the reason for the exception. The reason here is protection of marital confidence, not merely of communication between spouses. It seems to me clear that all that is shown here is communication. The circumstances of confidence are absent; what all may know is certainly not confidential. </s> For refusal to divulge his wife's whereabouts, petitioner was in contempt. Since the sentence he received was such as he might have received for that single act of contempt, his conviction is valid. Cf. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 , n. 1; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 . If petitioner conceived his sentence to be illegal, he would not be without remedy, for he might seek a reduction thereof on remand of this case under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I intimate nothing as to that issue. </s> I would affirm the conviction. </s> [340 U.S. 332, 336]

United States Supreme Court WHEAT v. WASHINGTON(1968) No. 1301 Argued: Decided: June 17, 1968 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 1535, Misc., Aiken v. Washington, also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court. </s> Certiorari granted; 72 Wash. 2d 306, 434 P.2d 10, vacated and remanded. </s> Charles M. Stokes for petitioner in No. 1301, Misc. Anthony Savage, Jr., for petitioner in No. 1535, Misc. </s> James E. Kennedy for respondent in both cases. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Washington are vacated and the cases remanded to that court for reconsideration in the light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 . </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents for the reasons stated in MR. JUSTICE BLACK's dissenting opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 532 , and MR. JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138 . </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinions in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 540 , and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 138 . </s> [392 U.S. 652, 653]

United States Supreme Court VAN ORDEN v. PERRY, in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXAS and CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATION BOARD, et al.(2005) No. 03-1500 Argued: March 2, 2005Decided: June 27, 2005 </s> Among the 21 historical markers and 17 monuments surrounding the Texas State Capitol is a 6-foot-high monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments. The legislative record illustrates that, after accepting the monument from the Fraternal Order of Eagles--a national social, civic, and patriotic organization--the State selected a site for it based on the recommendation of the state organization that maintains the capitol grounds. Petitioner, an Austin resident who encounters the monument during his frequent visits to those grounds, brought this 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit seeking a declaration that the monument's placement violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its removal. Holding that the monument did not contravene the Clause, the District Court found that the State had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commending the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency, and that a reasonable observer, mindful of history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this passive monument conveyed the message that the State endorsed religion. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held:The judgment is affirmed. 351 F.3d 173, affirmed. The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, concluded that the Establishment Clause allows the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds. Reconciling the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout our Nation's history, see School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-213, with the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom requires that the Court neither abdicate its responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-314. While the Court has sometimes pointed to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, for the governing test, Lemon is not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its capitol grounds. Instead, the analysis should be driven by both the monument's nature and the Nation's history. From at least 1789, there has been an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of religion's role in American life. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674. Texas' display of the Commandments on government property is typical of such acknowledgments. Representations of the Commandments appear throughout this Court and its grounds, as well as the Nation's Capital. Moreover, the Court's opinions, like its building, have recognized the role the Decalogue plays in America's heritage. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442, 462. While the Commandments are religious, they have an undeniable historical meaning. Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 680, 687. There are, of course, limits to the government's display of religious messages or symbols. For example, this Court held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public schoolroom. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42. However, neither Stone itself nor subsequent opinions have indicated that Stone's holding would extend beyond the context of public schools to a legislative chamber, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, or to capitol grounds. Texas' placement of the Commandments monument on its capitol grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the text confronted elementary school students every day. Indeed, petitioner here apparently walked by the monument for years before bringing this suit. Schempp, supra, and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, distinguished. Texas has treated her capitol grounds monuments as representing several strands in the State's political and legal history. The inclusion of the Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government, that cannot be said to violate the Establishment Clause. Pp.3-12. </s> Justice Breyer concluded that this is a difficult borderline case where none of the Court's various tests for evaluating Establishment Clause questions can substitute for the exercise of legal judgment. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). That judgment is not a personal judgment. Rather, as in all constitutional cases, it must reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses--to assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all, to avoid the religious divisiveness that promotes social conflict, and to maintain the separation of church and state. No exact formula can dictate a resolution to fact-intensive cases such as this. Despite the Commandments' religious message, an inquiry into the context in which the text of the Commandments is used demonstrates that the Commandments also convey a secular moral message about proper standards of social conduct and a message about the historic relation between those standards and the law. The circumstances surrounding the monument's placement on the capitol grounds and its physical setting provide a strong, but not conclusive, indication that the Commandments' text as used on this monument conveys a predominantly secular message. The determinative factor here, however, is that 40 years passed in which the monument's presence, legally speaking, went unchallenged (until the single legal objection raised by petitioner). Those 40 years suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals, whatever their belief systems, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to establish religion. See ibid. The public visiting the capitol grounds is more likely to have considered the religious aspect of the tablets' message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage. For these reasons, the Texas display falls on the permissible side of the constitutional line. Pp.1-8. Rehnquist, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed concurring opinions. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas join. </s> The question here is whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment allows the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds. We hold that it does. </s> The 22 acres surrounding the Texas State Capitol contain 17 monuments and 21 historical markers commemorating the "people, ideals, and events that compose Texan identity." Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. (2001).1 The monolith challenged here stands 6-feet high and 3-feet wide. It is located to the north of the Capitol building, between the Capitol and the Supreme Court building. Its primary content is the text of the Ten Commandments. An eagle grasping the American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, and two small tablets with what appears to be an ancient script are carved above the text of the Ten Commandments. Below the text are two Stars of David and the superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which represent Christ. The bottom of the monument bears the inscription "PRESENTED TO THE PEOPLE AND YOUTH OF TEXAS BY THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES OF TEXAS 1961." App. to Pet. for Cert. 21. </s> The legislative record surrounding the State's acceptance of the monument from the Eagles--a national social, civic, and patriotic organization--is limited to legislative journal entries. After the monument was accepted, the State selected a site for the monument based on the recommendation of the state organization responsible for maintaining the Capitol grounds. The Eagles paid the cost of erecting the monument, the dedication of which was presided over by two state legislators. </s> Petitioner Thomas Van Orden is a native Texan and a resident of Austin. At one time he was a licensed lawyer, having graduated from Southern Methodist Law School. Van Orden testified that, since 1995, he has encountered the Ten Commandments monument during his frequent visits to the Capitol grounds. His visits are typically for the purpose of using the law library in the Supreme Court building, which is located just northwest of the Capitol building. </s> Forty years after the monument's erection and six years after Van Orden began to encounter the monument frequently, he sued numerous state officials in their official capacities under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking both a declaration that the monument's placement violates the Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its removal. After a bench trial, the District Court held that the monument did not contravene the Establishment Clause. It found that the State had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and commending the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency. The District Court also determined that a reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this passive monument conveyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse religion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holdings with respect to the monument's purpose and effect. 351 F.3d 173 (CA5 2003). We granted certiorari, 543 U.S. ___ (2004), and now affirm. </s> Our cases, Januslike, point in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One face looks toward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout our Nation's history. As we observed in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963): "It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history and government.... The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself.... It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are 'earnestly praying, as ... in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe ... guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his [blessing ....]'" Id., at 212-213.2 </s> The other face looks toward the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom. </s> This case, like all Establishment Clause challenges, presents us with the difficulty of respecting both faces. Our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not press religious observances upon their citizens. One face looks to the past in acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage, while the other looks to the present in demanding a separation between church and state. Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage: "When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups.... [W]e find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-314 (1952). </s> See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-846 (1995) (warning against the "risk [of] fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires").3 </s> These two faces are evident in representative cases both upholding4 and invalidating5 laws under the Establishment Clause. Over the last 25 years, we have sometimes pointed to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), as providing the governing test in Establishment Clause challenges.6 Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (applying Lemon), with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (not applying Lemon). Yet, just two years after Lemon was decided, we noted that the factors identified in Lemon serve as "no more than helpful signposts." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). Many of our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). Others have applied it only after concluding that the challenged practice was invalid under a different Establishment Clause test. </s> Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation's history. </s> As we explained in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984): "There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789." Id., at 674. For example, both Houses passed resolutions in 1789 asking President George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation to "recommend to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many and signal favors of Almighty God." 1 Annals of Cong. 90, 914. President Washington's proclamation directly attributed to the Supreme Being the foundations and successes of our young Nation: "Now, therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday, the 26th day of November next, to be devoted by the people of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be; that we may then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for His kind care and protection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of His providence in the course and conclusion of the late war; for the great degree of tranquillity, union, and plenty which we have since enjoyed; for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national one now lately instituted; for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge; and, in general, for all the great and various favors which He has been pleased to confer upon us." 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1899). </s> Recognition of the role of God in our Nation's heritage has also been reflected in our decisions. We have acknowledged, for example, that "religion has been closely identified with our history and government," School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962).7 This recognition has led us to hold that the Establishment Clause permits a state legislature to open its daily sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State. Marsh v. Chambers, 366 U.S. 420, 431-440 (1961); see id., at 470-488 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.). </s> In this case we are faced with a display of the Ten Commandments on government property outside the Texas State Capitol. Such acknowledgments of the role played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation's heritage are common throughout America. We need only look within our own Courtroom. Since 1935, Moses has stood, holding two tablets that reveal portions of the Ten Commandments written in Hebrew, among other lawgivers in the south frieze. Representations of the Ten Commandments adorn the metal gates lining the north and south sides of the Courtroom as well as the doors leading into the Courtroom. Moses also sits on the exterior east facade of the building holding the Ten Commandments tablets. </s> Similar acknowledgments can be seen throughout a visitor's tour of our Nation's Capital. For example, a large statue of Moses holding the Ten Commandments, alongside a statue of the Apostle Paul, has overlooked the rotunda of the Library of Congress' Jefferson Building since 1897. And the Jefferson Building's Great Reading Room contains a sculpture of a woman beside the Ten Commandments with a quote above her from the Old Testament (Micah 6:8). A medallion with two tablets depicting the Ten Commandments decorates the floor of the National Archives. Inside the Department of Justice, a statue entitled "The Spirit of Law" has two tablets representing the Ten Commandments lying at its feet. In front of the Ronald Reagan Building is another sculpture that includes a depiction of the Ten Commandments. So too a 24-foot-tall sculpture, depicting, among other things, the Ten Commandments and a cross, stands outside the federal courthouse that houses both the Court of Appeals and the District Court for the District of Columbia. Moses is also prominently featured in the Chamber of the United States House of Representatives.9 </s> Our opinions, like our building, have recognized the role the Decalogue plays in America's heritage. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 442; id., at 462 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).10 The Executive and Legislative Branches have also acknowledged the historical role of the Ten Commandments. See, e.g., Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 157 (1965); S. Con. Res. 13, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); H. Con. Res. 31, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). These displays and recognitions of the Ten Commandments bespeak the rich American tradition of religious acknowledgments. </s> Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious--they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore, has religious significance. According to Judeo-Christian belief, the Ten Commandments were given to Moses by God on Mt. Sinai. But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning, as the foregoing examples demonstrate. Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 397 U.S. 664, 676-678 (1970). </s> There are, of course, limits to the display of religious messages or symbols. For example, we held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in every public schoolroom. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). In the classroom context, we found that the Kentucky statute had an improper and plainly religious purpose. Id., at 41. As evidenced by Stone's almost exclusive reliance upon two of our school prayer cases, id., at 41-42 (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)), it stands as an example of the fact that we have "been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools," Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-584 (1987). Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596-597 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a prayer at a secondary school graduation), with Marsh v. Chambers, supra (upholding a prayer in the state legislature). Indeed, Edwards v. Aguillard recognized that Stone--along with Schempp and Engel--was a consequence of the "particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and secondary schools." 482 U.S., at 584-585. Neither Stone itself nor subsequent opinions have indicated that Stone's holding would extend to a legislative chamber, see Marsh v. Chambers, supra, or to capitol grounds.11 </s> The placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the text confronted elementary school students every day. Indeed, Van Orden, the petitioner here, apparently walked by the monument for a number of years before bringing this lawsuit. The monument is therefore also quite different from the prayers involved in Schempp and Lee v. Weisman. Texas has treated her Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands in the State's political and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government. We cannot say that Texas' display of this monument violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Justice Scalia, concurring. </s> I join the opinion of The Chief Justice because I think it accurately reflects our current Establishment Clause jurisprudence--or at least the Establishment Clause jurisprudence we currently apply some of the time. I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation's past and present practices, and that can be consistently applied--the central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments. See McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at 1-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Justice Thomas, concurring. </s> The Court holds that the Ten Commandments monument found on the Texas State Capitol grounds does not violate the Establishment Clause. Rather than trying to suggest meaninglessness where there is meaning, The Chief Justice rightly recognizes that the monument has "religious significance." Ante, at 10. He properly recognizes the role of religion in this Nation's history and the permissibility of government displays acknowledging that history. Ante, at 6-8. For those reasons, I join The Chief Justice's opinion in full. </s> This case would be easy if the Court were willing to abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted for addressing Establishment Clause challenges,** and return to the original meaning of the Clause. I have previously suggested that the Clause's text and history "resis[t] incorporation" against the States. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 46, (2004) (opinion concurring in judgment); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-680, and n. 3 (2002) (opinion concurring). If the Establishment Clause does not restrain the States, then it has no application here, where only state action is at issue. </s> Even if the Clause is incorporated, or if the Free Exercise Clause limits the power of States to establish religions, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. ___ , ___, n.3 (2005) (slip op., at 3, n.3) (Thomas, J., concurring), our task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning of the word "establishment" than it is under the various approaches this Court now uses. The Framers understood an establishment "necessarily [to] involve actual legal coercion." Newdow, supra, at 52 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty"). "In other words, establishment at the founding involved, for example, mandatory observance or mandatory payment of taxes supporting ministers." Cutter, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 4) (Thomas, J., concurring). And "government practices that have nothing to do with creating or maintaining ... coercive state establishments" simply do not "implicate the possible liberty interest of being free from coercive state establishments." Newdow, supra, at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring injudgment). </s> There is no question that, based on the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, the Ten Commandments display at issue here is constitutional. In no sense does Texas compel petitioner Van Orden to do anything. The only injury to him is that he takes offense at seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the Texas Supreme Court Library. He need not stop to read it or even to look at it, let alone to express support for it or adopt the Commandments as guides for his life. The mere presence of the monument along his path involves no coercion and thus does not violate the Establishment Clause. </s> Returning to the original meaning would do more than simplify our task. It also would avoid the pitfalls present in the Court's current approach to such challenges. This Court's precedent elevates the trivial to the proverbial "federal case," by making benign signs and postings subject to challenge. Yet even as it does so, the Court's precedent attempts to avoid declaring all religious symbols and words of longstanding tradition unconstitutional, by counterfactually declaring them of little religious significance. Even when the Court's cases recognize that such symbols have religious meaning, they adopt an unhappy compromise that fails fully to account for either the adherent's or the nonadherent's beliefs, and provides no principled way to choose between them. Even worse, the incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application. All told, this Court's jurisprudence leaves courts, governments, and believers and nonbelievers alike confused--an observation that is hardly new. See Newdow, supra, at 45, n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (collecting cases). </s> First, this Court's precedent permits even the slightest public recognition of religion to constitute an establishment of religion. For example, individuals frequenting a county courthouse have successfully challenged as an Establishment Clause violation a sign at the courthouse alerting the public that the building was closed for Good Friday and containing a 4-inch high crucifix. Granzeier v. Middleton, 955 F.Supp. 741, 743, and n.2, 746-747 (ED Ky. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 173 F.3d 568, 576 (CA6 1999). Similarly, a park ranger has claimed that a cross erected to honor World War I veterans on a rock in the Mojave Desert Preserve violated the Establishment Clause, and won. See Buono v. Norton, 212 F.Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-1205, 1215-1217 (CD Cal. 2002). If a cross in the middle of a desert establishes a religion, then no religious observance is safe from challenge. Still other suits have charged that city seals containing religious symbols violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Robinson v. Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (CA10 1995); Murray v. Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (CA5 1991); Friedman v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cty., 781 F.2d 777 (CA10 1985) (en banc). In every instance, the litigants are mere "[p]assersby ... free to ignore [such symbols or signs], or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any other form of government speech." County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 664 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> Second, in a seeming attempt to balance out its willingness to consider almost any acknowledgment of religion an establishment, in other cases Members of this Court have concluded that the term or symbol at issue has no religious meaning by virtue of its ubiquity or rote ceremonial invocation. See, e.g., id., at 630-631 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716-717 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But words such as "God" have religious significance. For example, just last Term this Court had before it a challenge to the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the phrase "one Nation under God." The declaration that our country is "'one Nation under God'" necessarily "entail[s] an affirmation that God exists." Newdow, supra, at 48 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). This phrase is thus anathema to those who reject God's existence and a validation of His existence to those who accept it. Telling either nonbelievers or believers that the words "under God" have no meaning contradicts what they know to be true. Moreover, repetition does not deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional meaning. Words like "God" are not vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each successive utterance. </s> Even when this Court's precedents recognize the religious meaning of symbols or words, that recognition fails to respect fully religious belief or disbelief. This Court looks for the meaning to an observer of indeterminate religious affiliation who knows all the facts and circumstances surrounding a challenged display. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (presuming that a reasonable observer is "aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears"). In looking to the view of this unusually informed observer, this Court inquires whether the sign or display "sends the ancillary message to ... nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.'" SantaFe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-310 (2000) (quoting Lynch, supra, at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). </s> This analysis is not fully satisfying to either nonadherents or adherents. For the nonadherent, who may well be more sensitive than the hypothetical "reasonable observer," or who may not know all the facts, this test fails to capture completely the honest and deeply felt offense he takes from the government conduct. For the adherent, this analysis takes no account of the message sent by removal of the sign or display, which may well appear to him to be an act hostile to his religious faith. The Court's foray into religious meaning either gives insufficient weight to the views of nonadherents and adherents alike, or it provides no principled way to choose between those views. In sum, this Court's effort to assess religious meaning is fraught with futility. </s> Finally, the very "flexibility" of this Court's Establishment Clause precedent leaves it incapable of consistent application. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 640 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Lemon test's "flexibility" as "the absence of any principled rationale" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The inconsistency between the decisions the Court reaches today in this case and in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, p. --, only compounds the confusion. </s> The unintelligibility of this Court's precedent raises the further concern that, either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections. See, e.g., Harris v. Zion, Lake Cty., Ill., 927 F.2d 1401, 1425 (CA7 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("Line drawing in this area will be erratic and heavily influenced by the personal views of the judges"); post, at 3 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) ("I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment"). The outcome of constitutional cases ought to rest on firmer grounds than the personal preferences of judges. </s> Much, if not all, of this would be avoided if the Court would return to the views of the Framers and adopt coercion as the touchstone for our Establishment Clause inquiry. Every acknowledgment of religion would not give rise to an Establishment Clause claim. Courts would not act as theological commissions, judging the meaning of religious matters. Most important, our precedent would be capable of consistent and coherent application. While the Court correctly rejects the challenge to the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas Capitol grounds, a more fundamental rethinking of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains in order. </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment. </s> In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Harlan, wrote, in respect to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, that there is "no simple and clear measure which by precise application can readily and invariably demark the permissible from the impermissible." Id., at 306 (concurring opinion). One must refer instead to the basic purposes of those Clauses. They seek to "assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all." Id., at 305. They seek to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-729 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). They seek to maintain that "separation of church and state" that has long been critical to the "peaceful dominion that religion exercises in [this] country," where the "spirit of religion" and the "spirit of freedom" are productively "united," "reign[ing] together" but in separate spheres "on the same soil." A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 282-283 (1835) (H. Mansfield & D. Winthrop transls. and eds. 2000). They seek to further the basic principles set forth today by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at 1. </s> The Court has made clear, as Justices Goldberg and Harlan noted, that the realization of these goals means that government must "neither engage in nor compel religious practices," that it must "effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion," and that it must "work deterrence of no religious belief." Schempp, supra, at 305 (concurring opinion); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). The government must avoid excessive interference with, or promotion of, religion. See generally County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593-594 (1989); Zelman, supra, at 723-725 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Such absolutism is not only inconsistent with our national traditions, see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-678 (1984), but would also tend to promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid. </s> Thus, as Justices Goldberg and Harlan pointed out, the Court has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case. See Schempp, 374 U.S., at 306 (concurring opinion). Where the Establishment Clause is at issue, tests designed to measure "neutrality" alone are insufficient, both because it is sometimes difficult to determine when a legal rule is "neutral," and because "untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious." Ibid. </s> Neither can this Court's other tests readily explain the Establishment Clause's tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, see Marsh, supra; certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving. See, e.g., Lemon, supra, at 612-613 (setting forth what has come to be known as the "Lemon test"); Lynch, supra, at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth the "endorsement test"); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800, n. 5 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing that an "endorsement test" should apply but criticizing its "reasonable observer" standard); SantaFe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 319 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting Lemon's "checkered career in the decisional law of this Court"); County of Allegheny, supra, at 655-656 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Lemon test). </s> If the relation between government and religion is one of separation, but not of mutual hostility and suspicion, one will inevitably find difficult borderline cases. And in such cases, I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment. See Schempp, supra, at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring); cf. Zelman, supra, at 726-728 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (need for similar exercise of judgment where quantitative considerations matter). That judgment is not a personal judgment. Rather, as in all constitutional cases, it must reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the Clauses, and it must take account of context and consequences measured in light of those purposes. While the Court's prior tests provide useful guideposts--and might well lead to the same result the Court reaches today, see, e.g., Lemon, supra, at 612-613; Capitol Square, supra, at 773-783 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)--no exact formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases. </s> The case before us is a borderline case. It concerns a large granite monument bearing the text of the Ten Commandments located on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. On the one hand, the Commandments' text undeniably has a religious message, invoking, indeed emphasizing, the Diety. On the other hand, focusing on the text of the Commandments alone cannot conclusively resolve this case. Rather, to determine the message that the text here conveys, we must examine how the text is used. And that inquiry requires us to consider the context of the display. </s> In certain contexts, a display of the tablets of the Ten Commandments can convey not simply a religious message but also a secular moral message (about proper standards of social conduct). And in certain contexts, a display of the tablets can also convey a historical message (about a historic relation between those standards and the law)--a fact that helps to explain the display of those tablets in dozens of courthouses throughout the Nation, including the Supreme Court of the United States. See generally App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 1a-7a. </s> Here the tablets have been used as part of a display that communicates not simply a religious message, but a secular message as well. The circumstances surrounding the display's placement on the capitol grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended the latter, nonreligious aspects of the tablets' message to predominate. And the monument's 40-year history on the Texas state grounds indicates that that has been its effect. </s> The group that donated the monument, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a private civic (and primarily secular) organization, while interested in the religious aspect of the Ten Commandments, sought to highlight the Commandments' role in shaping civic morality as part of that organization's efforts to combat juvenile delinquency. See 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 1995. The Eagles' consultation with a committee composed of members of several faiths in order to find a nonsectarian text underscores the group's ethics-based motives. See Brief for Respondents 5-6, and n.9. The tablets, as displayed on the monument, prominently acknowledge that the Eagles donated the display, a factor which, though not sufficient, thereby further distances the State itself from the religious aspect of the Commandments' message. </s> The physical setting of the monument, moreover, suggests little or nothing of the sacred. See Appendix A, infra. The monument sits in a large park containing 17 monuments and 21 historical markers, all designed to illustrate the "ideals" of those who settled in Texas and of those who have lived there since that time. Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. (2001); see Appendix B, infra. The setting does not readily lend itself to meditation or any other religious activity. But it does provide a context of history and moral ideals. It (together with the display's inscription about its origin) communicates to visitors that the State sought to reflect moral principles, illustrating a relation between ethics and law that the State's citizens, historically speaking, have endorsed. That is to say, the context suggests that the State intended the display's moral message--an illustrative message reflecting the historical "ideals" of Texans--to predominate. </s> If these factors provide a strong, but not conclusive, indication that the Commandments' text on this monument conveys a predominantly secular message, a further factor is determinative here. As far as I can tell, 40 years passed in which the presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged (until the single legal objection raised by petitioner). And I am not aware of any evidence suggesting that this was due to a climate of intimidation. Hence, those 40 years suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals, whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote religion over nonreligion, to "engage in" any "religious practic[e]," to "compel" any "religious practic[e]," or to "work deterrence" of any "religious belief." Schempp, 374 U.S., at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Those 40 years suggest that the public visiting the capitol grounds has considered the religious aspect of the tablets' message as part of what is a broader moral and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage. </s> This case, moreover, is distinguishable from instances where the Court has found Ten Commandments displays impermissible. The display is not on the grounds of a public school, where, given the impressionability of the young, government must exercise particular care in separating church and state. See, e.g., Weisman, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). This case also differs from McCreary County, where the short (and stormy) history of the courthouse Commandments' displays demonstrates the substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them, and the effect of this readily apparent objective upon those who view them. See, post, at 21-25 (opinion of the Court). That history there indicates a governmental effort substantially to promote religion, not simply an effort primarily to reflect, historically, the secular impact of a religiously inspired document. And, in today's world, in a Nation of so many different religious and comparable nonreligious fundamental beliefs, a more contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument has not. </s> For these reasons, I believe that the Texas display--serving a mixed but primarily nonreligious purpose, not primarily "advanc[ing]" or "inhibit[ing] religion," and not creating an "excessive government entanglement with religion,"--might satisfy this Court's more formal Establishment Clause tests. Lemon, 403 U.S., at 612-613 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Capitol Square, 515 U.S., at 773-783 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But, as I have said, in reaching the conclusion that the Texas display falls on the permissible side of the constitutional line, I rely less upon a literal application of any particular test than upon consideration of the basic purposes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses themselves. This display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations. That experience helps us understand that as a practical matter of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive. And this matter of degree is, I believe, critical in a borderline case such as this one. </s> At the same time, to reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily upon on the religious nature of the tablets' text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions. Such a holding might well encourage disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation. And it could thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid. Zelman, 536 U.S., at 717-729 (Breyer, J., dissenting). </s> Justices Goldberg and Harlan concluded in Schempp that "[t]he First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercise or in the favoring of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact." 374 U.S., at 308 (concurring opinion). </s> That kind of practice is what we have here. I recognize the danger of the slippery slope. Still, where the Establishment Clause is at issue, we must "distinguish between real threat and mere shadow." Ibid. Here, we have only the shadow. </s> In light of these considerations, I cannot agree with today's plurality's analysis. See, e.g., ante, at 3-4, n.3, 6-9. Nor can I agree with Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary County, post, at 1. I do agree with Justice O'Connor's statement of principles in McCreary County, post, at 1, though I disagree with her evaluation of the evidence as it bears on the application of those principles to this case. </s> I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> [Graphic omitted: see printed opinion.] </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting. </s> The sole function of the monument on the grounds of Texas' State Capitol is to display the full text of one version of the Ten Commandments. The monument is not a work of art and does not refer to any event in the history of the State. It is significant because, and only because, it communicates the following message: "I AM the LORD thy God. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me. </s> "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images. </s> "Thou shalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain. </s> "Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy. </s> "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. </s> "Thou shalt not kill. </s> "Thou shalt not commit adultery. </s> "Thou shalt not steal. </s> "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. </s> "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house. </s> "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his cattle, nor anything that is thy neighbor's." See Appendix, infra.1 </s> Viewed on its face, Texas' display has no purported connection to God's role in the formation of Texas or the founding of our Nation; nor does it provide the reasonable observer with any basis to guess that it was erected to honor any individual or organization. The message transmitted by Texas' chosen display is quite plain: This State endorses the divine code of the "Judeo-Christian" God. </s> For those of us who learned to recite the King James version of the text long before we understood the meaning of some of its words, God's Commandments may seem like wise counsel. The question before this Court, however, is whether it is counsel that the State of Texas may proclaim without violating the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. If any fragment of Jefferson's metaphorical "wall of separation between church and State"2 is to be preserved--if there remains any meaning to the "wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's [Establishment Clause] cases speak," School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)--a negative answer to that question is mandatory. I </s> In my judgment, at the very least, the Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public property. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 650 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The adornment of our public spaces with displays of religious symbols and messages undoubtedly provides comfort, even inspiration, to many individuals who subscribe to particular faiths. Unfortunately, the practice also runs the risk of "offend[ing] nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful." Allegheny County, 492 U.S., at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).3 Government's obligation to avoid divisiveness and exclusion in the religious sphere is compelled by the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, which together erect a wall of separation between church and state.4 This metaphorical wall protects principles long recognized and often recited in this Court's cases. The first and most fundamental of these principles, one that a majority of this Court today affirms, is that the Establishment Clause demands religious neutrality--government may not exercise a preference for one religious faith over another. See, e.g., McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Ky., post, at 27-29.5 This essential command, however, is not merely a prohibition against the government's differentiation among religious sects. We have repeatedly reaffirmed that neither a State nor the Federal Government "can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (footnote omitted).6 This principle is based on the straightforward notion that governmental promotion of orthodoxy is not saved by the aggregation of several orthodoxies under the State's banner. See Abington, 374 U.S., at 222. </s> Acknowledgments of this broad understanding of the neutrality principle are legion in our cases.7 Strong arguments to the contrary have been raised from time to time, perhaps the strongest in then-Justice Rehnquist's scholarly dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 91-114 (1985).8 Powerful as his argument was, we squarely rejected it and thereby reaffirmed the principle that the Establishment Clause requires the same respect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a Christian faith. As we wrote, "the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embodies the right to select any religious faith or none at all." Id., at 52-53. </s> In restating this principle, I do not discount the importance of avoiding an overly strict interpretation of the metaphor so often used to define the reach of the Establishment Clause. The plurality is correct to note that "religion and religious traditions" have played a "strong role ... throughout our nation's history." Ante, at 3. This Court has often recognized "an unbroken history of official acknowledgment ... of the role of religion in American life." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984); accord, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606-608 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring). Given this history, it is unsurprising that a religious symbol may at times become an important feature of a familiar landscape or a reminder of an important event in the history of a community. The wall that separates the church from the State does not prohibit the government from acknowledging the religious beliefs and practices of the American people, nor does it require governments to hide works of art or historic memorabilia from public view just because they also have religious significance. </s> This case, however, is not about historic preservation or the mere recognition of religion. The issue is obfuscated rather than clarified by simplistic commentary on the various ways in which religion has played a role in American life, see ante, at 3-8 (plurality opinion), and by the recitation of the many extant governmental "acknowledgments" of the role the Ten Commandments played in our Nation's heritage.9 Ante, at 8-9, and n.8. Surely, the mere compilation of religious symbols, none of which includes the full text of the Commandments and all of which are exhibited in different settings, has only marginal relevance to the question presented in this case. </s> The monolith displayed on Texas Capitol grounds cannot be discounted as a passive acknowledgment of religion, nor can the State's refusal to remove it upon objection be explained as a simple desire to preserve a historic relic. This Nation's resolute commitment to neutrality with respect to religion is flatly inconsistent with the plurality's wholehearted validation of an official state endorsement of the message that there is one, and only one, God. II </s> When the Ten Commandments monument was donated to the State of Texas in 1961, it was not for the purpose of commemorating a noteworthy event in Texas history, signifying the Commandments' influence on the development of secular law, or even denoting the religious beliefs of Texans at that time. To the contrary, the donation was only one of over a hundred largely identical monoliths, and of over a thousand paper replicas, distributed to state and local governments throughout the Nation over the course of several decades. This ambitious project was the work of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a well-respected benevolent organization whose good works have earned the praise of several Presidents.10 As the story goes, the program was initiated by the late Judge E. J. Ruegemer, a Minnesota juvenile court judge and then-Chairman of the Eagles National Commission on Youth Guidance. Inspired by a juvenile offender who had never heard of the Ten Commandments, the judge approached the Minnesota Eagles with the idea of distributing paper copies of the Commandments to be posted in courthouses nationwide. The State's Aerie undertook this project and its popularity spread. When Cecil B. DeMille, who at that time was filming the movie The Ten Commandments, heard of the judge's endeavor, he teamed up with the Eagles to produce the type of granite monolith now displayed in front of the Texas Capitol and at courthouse squares, city halls, and public parks throughout the Nation. Granite was reportedly chosen over DeMille's original suggestion of bronze plaques to better replicate the original Ten Commandments.11 </s> The donors were motivated by a desire to "inspire the youth" and curb juvenile delinquency by providing children with a "code of conduct or standards by which to govern their actions."12 It is the Eagles' belief that disseminating the message conveyed by the Ten Commandments will help to persuade young men and women to observe civilized standards of behavior, and will lead to more productive lives. Significantly, although the Eagles' organization is nonsectarian, eligibility for membership is premised on a belief in the existence of a "Supreme Being."13 As described by the Eagles themselves: "'in searching for a youth guidance program, [we] recognized that there can be no better, no more defined program of Youth Guidance, and adult guidance as well, than the laws handed down by God Himself to Moses more than 3000 years ago, which laws have stood unchanged through the years. They are a fundamental part of our lives, the basis of all our laws for living, the foundation of our relationship with our Creator, with our families and with our fellow men. All the concepts we live by--freedom, democracy, justice, honor--are rooted in the Ten Commandments. ..... </s> "'The erection of these monoliths is to inspire all who pause to view them, with a renewed respect for the law of God, which is our greatest strength against the forces that threaten our way of life.'" Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 348 F. Supp. 1170, 1172 (Utah 1972), rev'd, 475 F.2d 29 (CA10 1973). </s> The desire to combat juvenile delinquency by providing guidance to youths is both admirable and unquestionably secular. But achieving that goal through biblical teachings injects a religious purpose into an otherwise secular endeavor. By spreading the word of God and converting heathens to Christianity, missionaries expect to enlighten their converts, enhance their satisfaction with life, and improve their behavior. Similarly, by disseminating the "law of God"--directing fidelity to God and proscribing murder, theft, and adultery--the Eagles hope that this divine guidance will help wayward youths conform their behavior and improve their lives. In my judgment, the significant secular by-products that are intended consequences of religious instruction--indeed, of the establishment of most religions--are not the type of "secular" purposes that justify government promulgation of sacred religious messages. </s> Though the State of Texas may genuinely wish to combat juvenile delinquency, and may rightly want to honor the Eagles for their efforts, it cannot effectuate these admirable purposes through an explicitly religious medium. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 639-640 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It should be undeniable by now that religious dogma may not be employed by government even to accomplish laudable secular purposes"). The State may admonish its citizens not to lie, cheat or steal, to honor their parents and to respect their neighbors' property; and it may do so by printed words, in television commercials, or on granite monuments in front of its public buildings. Moreover, the State may provide its schoolchildren and adult citizens with educational materials that explain the important role that our forebears' faith in God played in their decisions to select America as a refuge from religious persecution, to declare their independence from the British Crown, and to conceive a new Nation. See Edwards, 482 U.S., at 606-608 (Powell, J., concurring). The message at issue in this case, however, is fundamentally different from either a bland admonition to observe generally accepted rules of behavior or a general history lesson. </s> The reason this message stands apart is that the Decalogue is a venerable religious text.14 As we held 25 years ago, it is beyond dispute that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths." Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam) (footnote omitted). For many followers, the Commandments represent the literal word of God as spoken to Moses and repeated to his followers after descending from Mount Sinai. The message conveyed by the Ten Commandments thus cannot be analogized to an appendage to a common article of commerce ("In God we Trust") or an incidental part of a familiar recital ("God save the United States and this honorable Court"). Thankfully, the plurality does not attempt to minimize the religious significance of the Ten Commandments. Ante, at 10 ("Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious--they were so viewed at their inception and so remain"); ante, at 1 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Attempts to secularize what is unquestionably a sacred text defy credibility and disserve people of faith. </s> The profoundly sacred message embodied by the text inscribed on the Texas monument is emphasized by the especially large letters that identify its author: "I AM the LORD thy God." See Appendix, infra. It commands present worship of Him and no other deity. It directs us to be guided by His teaching in the current and future conduct of all of our affairs. It instructs us to follow a code of divine law, some of which has informed and been integrated into our secular legal code ("Thou shalt not kill"), but much of which has not ("Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images.... Thou shalt not covet"). </s> Moreover, despite the Eagles' best efforts to choose a benign nondenominational text,15 the Ten Commandments display projects not just a religious, but an inherently sectarian message. There are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these differences may be of enormous religious significance.16 See Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 Constitutional Commentary 471, 474-476 (Fall 1998). In choosing to display this version of the Commandments, Texas tells the observer that the State supports this side of the doctrinal religious debate. The reasonable observer, after all, has no way of knowing that this text was the product of a compromise, or that there is a rationale of any kind for the text's selection.17 </s> The Establishment Clause, if nothing else, forbids government from "specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Given that the chosen text inscribed on the Ten Commandments monument invariably places the State at the center of a serious sectarian dispute, the display is unquestionably unconstitutional under our case law. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another"). </s> Even if, however, the message of the monument, despite the inscribed text, fairly could be said to represent the belief system of all Judeo-Christians, it would still run afoul of the Establishment Clause by prescribing a compelled code of conduct from one God, namely a Judeo-Christian God, that is rejected by prominent polytheistic sects, such as Hinduism, as well as nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism.18 See, e.g., Allegheny County, 492 U.S., at 615 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("The simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and Christianity is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity alone"). And, at the very least, the text of the Ten Commandments impermissibly commands a preference for religion over irreligion. See, e.g., id., at 590 (The Establishment Clause "guarantee[s] religious liberty and equality to the 'infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism'" (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S., at 52)). Any of those bases, in my judgment, would be sufficient to conclude that the message should not be proclaimed by the State of Texas on a permanent monument at the seat of its government. </s> I do not doubt that some Texans, including those elected to the Texas Legislature, may believe that the statues displayed on the Texas Capitol grounds, including the Ten Commandments monument, reflect the "ideals . . . that compose Texan identity." Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg. 6473 (2001). But Texas, like our entire country, is now a much more diversified community than it was when it became a part of the United States or even when the monument was erected. Today there are many Texans who do not believe in the God whose Commandments are displayed at their seat of government. Many of them worship a different god or no god at all. Some may believe that the account of the creation in the Book of Genesis is less reliable than the views of men like Darwin and Einstein. The monument is no more an expression of the views of every true Texan than was the "Live Free or Die" motto that the State of New Hampshire placed on its license plates in 1969 an accurate expression of the views of every citizen of New Hampshire. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). </s> Recognizing the diversity of religious and secular beliefs held by Texans and by all Americans, it seems beyond peradventure that allowing the seat of government to serve as a stage for the propagation of an unmistakably Judeo-Christian message of piety would have the tendency to make nonmonotheists and nonbelievers "feel like [outsiders] in matters of faith, and [strangers] in the political community." Pinette, 515 U.S., at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[D]isplays of this kind inevitably have a greater tendency to emphasize sincere and deeply felt differences among individuals than to achieve an ecumenical goal." Allegheny County, 492 U.S., at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).19 </s> Even more than the display of a religious symbol on government property, see Pinette, 515 U.S., at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Allegheny County, 492 U.S., at 650-651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), displaying this sectarian text at the state capitol should invoke a powerful presumption of invalidity. As Justice Souter's opinion persuasively demonstrates, the physical setting in which the Texas monument is displayed--far from rebutting that presumption--actually enhances the religious content of its message. See post, at 6-8. The monument's permanent fixture at the seat of Texas government is of immense significance. The fact that a monument: "is installed on public property implies official recognition and reinforcement of its message. That implication is especially strong when the sign stands in front of the seat of government itself. The 'reasonable observer' of any symbol placed unattended in front of any capitol in the world will normally assume that the sovereign--which is not only the owner of that parcel of real estate but also the lawgiver for the surrounding territory--has sponsored and facilitated its message." Pinette, 515 U. S., at 801-802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). </s> Critical examination of the Decalogue's prominent display at the seat of Texas government, rather than generic citation to the role of religion in American life, unmistakably reveals on which side of the "slippery slope," ante, at 8 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment), this display must fall. God, as the author of its message, the Eagles, as the donor of the monument, and the State of Texas, as its proud owner, speak with one voice for a common purpose--to encourage Texans to abide by the divine code of a "Judeo-Christian" God. If this message is permissible, then the shining principle of neutrality to which we have long adhered is nothing more than mere shadow. III </s> The plurality relies heavily on the fact that our Republic was founded, and has been governed since its nascence, by leaders who spoke then (and speak still) in plainly religious rhetoric. The Chief Justice cites, for instance, George Washington's 1789 Thanksgiving Proclamation in support of the proposition that the Establishment Clause does not proscribe official recognition of God's role in our Nation's heritage, ante, at 7-8.20 Further, the plurality emphatically endorses the seemingly timeless recognition that our "institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," ante, at 4. Many of the submissions made to this Court by the parties and amici, in accord with the plurality's opinion, have relied on the ubiquity of references to God throughout our history. The speeches and rhetoric characteristic of the founding era, however, do not answer the question before us. I have already explained why Texas' display of the full text of the Ten Commandments, given the content of the actual display and the context in which it is situated, sets this case apart from the countless examples of benign government recognitions of religion. But there is another crucial difference. Our leaders, when delivering public addresses, often express their blessings simultaneously in the service of God and their constituents. Thus, when public officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are not exclusively a transmission from the government because those oratories have embedded within them the inherently personal views of the speaker as an individual member of the polity.21 The permanent placement of a textual religious display on state property is different in kind; it amalgamates otherwise discordant individual views into a collective statement of government approval. Moreover, the message never ceases to transmit itself to objecting viewers whose only choices are to accept the message or to ignore the offense by averting their gaze. Cf. Allegheny County, 492 U.S., at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); ante, at 4 (Thomas, J., concurring). In this sense, although Thanksgiving Day proclamations and inaugural speeches undoubtedly seem official, in most circumstances they will not constitute the sort of governmental endorsement of religion at which the separation of church and state is aimed.22 </s> The plurality's reliance on early religious statements and proclamations made by the Founders is also problematic because those views were not espoused at the Constitutional Convention in 178723 nor enshrined in the Constitution's text. Thus, the presentation of these religious statements as a unified historical narrative is bound to paint a misleading picture. It does so here. In according deference to the statements of George Washington and John Adams, The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, see ante, at 7 (plurality opinion); McCreary County, post, at 3-4 (dissenting opinion), fail to account for the acts and publicly espoused views of other influential leaders of that time. Notably absent from their historical snapshot is the fact that Thomas Jefferson refused to issue the Thanksgiving proclamations that Washington had so readily embraced based on the argument that to do so would violate the Establishment Clause.24 The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia disregard the substantial debates that took place regarding the constitutionality of the early proclamations and acts they cite, see, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 The Founders' Constitution 105-106 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) (hereinafter Founders' Constitution) (arguing that Congress' appointment of Chaplains to be paid from the National Treasury was "not with my approbation" and was a "deviation" from the principle of "immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction"),25 and paper over the fact that Madison more than once repudiated the views attributed to him by many, stating unequivocally that with respect to government's involvement with religion, the "'tendency to a usurpation on one side, or the other, or to a corrupting coalition or alliance between them, will be best guarded against by an entire abstinence of the Government from interference, in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect against trespasses on its legal rights by others.'"26 </s> These seemingly nonconforming sentiments should come as no surprise. Not insignificant numbers of colonists came to this country with memories of religious persecution by monarchs on the other side of the Atlantic. See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States 3-23 (rev. ed. 1964). Others experienced religious intolerance at the hands of colonial Puritans, who regrettably failed to practice the tolerance that some of their contemporaries preached. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-429 (1962). The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia ignore the separationist impulses--in accord with the principle of "neutrality"--that these individuals brought to the debates surrounding the adoption of the Establishment Clause.27 </s> Ardent separationists aside, there is another critical nuance lost in the plurality's portrayal of history. Simply put, many of the Founders who are often cited as authoritative expositors of the Constitution's original meaning understood the Establishment Clause to stand for a narrower proposition than the plurality, for whatever reason, is willing to accept. Namely, many of the Framers understood the word "religion" in the Establishment Clause to encompass only the various sects of Christianity. </s> The evidence is compelling. Prior to the Philadelphia Convention, the States had begun to protect "religious freedom" in their various constitutions. Many of those provisions, however, restricted "equal protection" and "free exercise" to Christians, and invocations of the divine were commonly understood to refer to Christ.28 That historical background likely informed the Framers' understanding of the First Amendment. Accordingly, one influential thinker wrote of the First Amendment that "'[t]he meaning of the term "establishment" in this amendment unquestionably is, the preference and establishment given by law to one sect of Christians over every other.'" Jasper Adams, The Relation of Christianity to Civil Government in the United States (Feb. 13, 1833) (quoted in Dreisbach 16). That definition tracked the understanding of the text Justice Story adopted in his famous Commentaries, in which he wrote that the "real object" of the Clause was: "not to countenance, much less to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus sought to cut off the means of religious persecution, (the vice and pest of former ages,) and the power of subverting the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age." 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §991, p. 701 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds. 1987) (hereinafter Story); see also Wallace, 472 U.S., at 52-55, and n. 36.29 </s> Along these lines, for nearly a century after the Founding, many accepted the idea that America was not just a religious nation, but "a Christian nation." Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).30 </s> The original understanding of the type of "religion" that qualified for constitutional protection under the Establishment Clause likely did not include those followers of Judaism and Islam who are among the preferred "monotheistic" religions Justice Scalia has embraced in his McCreary County opinion. See post, at 10-11 (dissenting opinion).31 The inclusion of Jews and Muslims inside the category of constitutionally favored religions surely would have shocked Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story. Indeed, Justice Scalia is unable to point to any persuasive historical evidence or entrenched traditions in support of his decision to give specially preferred constitutional status to all monotheistic religions. Perhaps this is because the history of the Establishment Clause's original meaning just as strongly supports a preference for Christianity as it does a preference for monotheism. Generic references to "God" hardly constitute evidence that those who spoke the word meant to be inclusive of all monotheistic believers; nor do such references demonstrate that those who heard the word spoken understood it broadly to include all monotheistic faiths. See supra, at 21. Justice Scalia's inclusion of Judaism and Islam is a laudable act of religious tolerance, but it is one that is unmoored from the Constitution's history and text, and moreover one that is patently arbitrary in its inclusion of some, but exclusion of other (e.g., Buddhism), widely practiced non-Christian religions. See supra, at 12, 13-14, and n. 16 (noting that followers of Buddhism nearly equal the number of Americans who follow Islam). Given the original understanding of the men who championed our "Christian nation"--men who had no cause to view anti-Semitism or contempt for atheists as problems worthy of civic concern--one must ask whether Justice Scalia "has not had the courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply [his originalism] principle consistently." McCreary County, post, at 7. </s> Indeed, to constrict narrowly the reach of the Establishment Clause to the views of the Founders would lead to more than this unpalatable result; it would also leave us with an unincorporated constitutional provision--in other words, one that limits only the federal establishment of "a national religion." See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); cf. A. Amar, The Bill of Rights 36-39 (1998). Under this view, not only could a State constitutionally adorn all of its public spaces with crucifixes or passages from the New Testament, it would also have full authority to prescribe the teachings of Martin Luther or Joseph Smith as the official state religion. Only the Federal Government would be prohibited from taking sides, (and only then as between Christian sects). </s> A reading of the First Amendment dependent on either of the purported original meanings expressed above would eviscerate the heart of the Establishment Clause. It would replace Jefferson's "wall of separation" with a perverse wall of exclusion--Christians inside, non-Christians out. It would permit States to construct walls of their own choosing--Baptists inside, Mormons out; Jewish Orthodox inside, Jewish Reform out. A Clause so understood might be faithful to the expectations of some of our Founders, but it is plainly not worthy of a society whose enviable hallmark over the course of two centuries has been the continuing expansion of religious pluralism and tolerance. Cf. Abington, 536 U.S. 639, 720, 723 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). </s> Unless one is willing to renounce over 65 years of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and cross back over the incorporation bridge, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), appeals to the religiosity of the Framers ring hollow.32 But even if there were a coherent way to embrace incorporation with one hand while steadfastly abiding by the Founders' purported religious views on the other, the problem of the selective use of history remains. As the widely divergent views espoused by the leaders of our founding era plainly reveal, the historical record of the preincorporation Establishment Clause is too indeterminate to serve as an interpretive North Star.33 </s> It is our duty, therefore, to interpret the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" not by merely asking what those words meant to observers at the time of the founding, but instead by deriving from the Clause's text and history the broad principles that remain valid today. As we have said in the context of statutory interpretation, legislation "often [goes] beyond the principal evil [at which the statute was aimed] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). In similar fashion, we have construed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit segregated schools, see Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955), even though those who drafted that Amendment evidently thought that separate was not unequal.34 We have held that the same Amendment prohibits discrimination against individuals on account of their gender, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), despite the fact that the contemporaries of the Amendment "doubt[ed] very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision," Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1873). And we have construed "evolving standards of decency" to make impermissible practices that were not considered "cruel and unusual" at the founding. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 1) (Stevens, J., concurring). </s> To reason from the broad principles contained in the Constitution does not, as Justice Scalia suggests, require us to abandon our heritage in favor of unprincipled expressions of personal preference. The task of applying the broad principles that the Framers wrote into the text of the First Amendment is, in any event, no more a matter of personal preference than is one's selection between two (or more) sides in a heated historical debate. We serve our constitutional mandate by expounding the meaning of constitutional provisions with one eye towards our Nation's history and the other fixed on its democratic aspirations. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 415 (1819) ("[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding" that is intended to "endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs"). Constitutions, after all, "are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas." Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910). </s> The principle that guides my analysis is neutrality.35 The basis for that principle is firmly rooted in our Nation's history and our Constitution's text. I recognize that the requirement that government must remain neutral between religion and irreligion would have seemed foreign to some of the Framers; so too would a requirement of neutrality between Jews and Christians. But cf. Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, R.I. (Aug. 18, 1790), in 6 Papers of George Washington 284, 285 (D. Twohig ed. 1996). Fortunately, we are not bound by the Framers' expectations--we are bound by the legal principles they enshrined in our Constitution. Story's vision that States should not discriminate between Christian sects has as its foundation the principle that government must remain neutral between valid systems of belief. As religious pluralism has expanded, so has our acceptance of what constitutes valid belief systems. The evil of discriminating today against atheists, "polytheists[,] and believers in unconcerned deities," McCreary County, post, at 10 (Scalia, J., dissenting), is in my view a direct descendent of the evil of discriminating among Christian sects. The Establishment Clause thus forbids it and, in turn, forbids Texas from displaying the Ten Commandments monument the plurality so casually affirms. IV </s> The Eagles may donate as many monuments as they choose to be displayed in front of Protestant churches, benevolent organizations' meeting places, or on the front lawns of private citizens. The expurgated text of the King James version of the Ten Commandments that they have crafted is unlikely to be accepted by Catholic parishes, Jewish synagogues, or even some Protestant denominations, but the message they seek to convey is surely more compatible with church property than with property that is located on the government side of the metaphorical wall. The judgment of the Court in this case stands for the proposition that the Constitution permits governmental displays of sacred religious texts. This makes a mockery of the constitutional ideal that government must remain neutral between religion and irreligion. If a State may endorse a particular deity's command to "have no other gods before me," it is difficult to conceive of any textual display that would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. </s> The disconnect between this Court's approval of Texas's monument and the constitutional prohibition against preferring religion to irreligion cannot be reduced to the exercise of plotting two adjacent locations on a slippery slope. Cf. ante, at 8 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Rather, it is the difference between the shelter of a fortress and exposure to "the winds that would blow" if the wall were allowed to crumble. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). That wall, however imperfect, remains worth preserving. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Graphic omitted: see printed opinion.] </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Justice O'Connor, dissenting. </s> For essentially the reasons given by Justice Souter, post, p.___ (dissenting opinion), as well as the reasons given in my concurrence in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at ___, I respectfully dissent. </s> THOMAS VAN ORDEN, PETITIONER v. RICK PERRY,in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF TEXASand CHAIRMAN, STATE PRESERVATIONBOARD, etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit [June 27, 2005] </s> Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. </s> Although the First Amendment's Religion Clauses have not been read to mandate absolute governmental neutrality toward religion, cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Establishment Clause requires neutrality as a general rule, e.g., Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), and thus expresses Madison's condemnation of "employ[ing] Religion as an engine of Civil policy," Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 187 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). A governmental display of an obviously religious text cannot be squared with neutrality, except in a setting that plausibly indicates that the statement is not placed in view with a predominant purpose on the part of government either to adopt the religious message or to urge its acceptance by others. </s> Until today, only one of our cases addressed the constitutionality of posting the Ten Commandments, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (per curiam). A Kentucky statute required posting the Commandments on the walls of public school classrooms, and the Court described the State's purpose (relevant under the tripartite test laid out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)) as being at odds with the obligation of religious neutrality. "The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact. The Commandments do not confine themselves to arguably secular matters, such as honoring one's parents, killing or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and covetousness. Rather, the first part of the Commandments concerns the religious duties of believers: worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord's name in vain, and observing the Sabbath Day." 449 U.S, at 41-42 (footnote and citations omitted). </s> What these observations underscore are the simple realities that the Ten Commandments constitute a religious statement, that their message is inherently religious, and that the purpose of singling them out in a display is clearly the same.1 </s> Thus, a pedestrian happening upon the monument at issue here needs no training in religious doctrine to realize that the statement of the Commandments, quoting God himself, proclaims that the will of the divine being is the source of obligation to obey the rules, including the facially secular ones. In this case, moreover, the text is presented to give particular prominence to the Commandments' first sectarian reference, "I am the Lord thy God." That proclamation is centered on the stone and written in slightly larger letters than the subsequent recitation. To ensure that the religious nature of the monument is clear to even the most casual passerby, the word "Lord" appears in all capital letters (as does the word "am"), so that the most eye-catching segment of the quotation is the declaration "I AM the LORD thy God." App. to Pet. for Cert. 21. What follows, of course, are the rules against other gods, graven images, vain swearing, and Sabbath breaking. And the full text of the fifth Commandment puts forward filial respect as a condition of long life in the land "which the Lord they God giveth thee." See ibid. These "[w]ords ... make [the] ... religious meaning unmistakably clear." County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989). </s> To drive the religious point home, and identify the message as religious to any viewer who failed to read the text, the engraved quotation is framed by religious symbols: two tablets with what appears to be ancient script on them, two Stars of David, and the superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho as the familiar monogram of Christ. Nothing on the monument, in fact, detracts from its religious nature,2 see ibid. ("Here, unlike in Lynch [v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984)], nothing in the context of the display detracts from the cr&ccaron;che's religious message"), and the plurality does not suggest otherwise. It would therefore be difficult to miss the point that the government of Texas3 is telling everyone who sees the monument to live up to a moral code because God requires it, with both code and conception of God being rightly understood as the inheritances specifically of Jews and Christians. And it is likewise unsurprising that the District Court expressly rejected Texas's argument that the State's purpose in placing the monument on the capitol grounds was related to the Commandments' role as "part of the foundation of modern secular law in Texas and elsewhere." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32. </s> The monument's presentation of the Commandments with religious text emphasized and enhanced stands in contrast to any number of perfectly constitutional depictions of them, the frieze of our own Courtroom providing a good example, where the figure of Moses stands among history's great lawgivers. While Moses holds the tablets of the Commandments showing some Hebrew text, no one looking at the lines of figures in marble relief is likely to see a religious purpose behind the assemblage or take away a religious message from it. Only one other depiction represents a religious leader, and the historical personages are mixed with symbols of moral and intellectual abstractions like Equity and Authority. See County of Allegheny, supra, at 652 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since Moses enjoys no especial prominence on the frieze, viewers can readily take him to be there as a lawgiver in the company of other lawgivers; and the viewers may just as naturally see the tablets of the Commandments (showing the later ones, forbidding things like killing and theft, but without the divine preface) as background from which the concept of law emerged, ultimately having a secular influence in the history of the Nation. Government may, of course, constitutionally call attention to this influence, and may post displays or erect monuments recounting this aspect of our history no less than any other, so long as there is a context and that context is historical. Hence, a display of the Commandments accompanied by an exposition of how they have influenced modern law would most likely be constitutionally unobjectionable.4 And the Decalogue could, as Stone suggested, be integrated constitutionally into a course of study in public schools. Stone, 449 U.S., at 42.5 </s> Texas seeks to take advantage of the recognition that visual symbol and written text can manifest a secular purpose in secular company, when it argues that its monument (like Moses in the frieze) is not alone and ought to be viewed as only 1 among 17 placed on the 22 acres surrounding the state capitol. Texas, indeed, says that the Capitol grounds are like a museum for a collection of exhibits, the kind of setting that several Members of the Court have said can render the exhibition of religious artifacts permissible, even though in other circumstances their display would be seen as meant to convey a religious message forbidden to the State. County of Allegheny, 465 U. S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). So, for example, the Government of the United States does not violate the Establishment Clause by hanging Giotto's Madonna on the wall of the National Gallery. </s> But 17 monuments with no common appearance, history, or esthetic role scattered over 22 acres is not a museum, and anyone strolling around the lawn would surely take each memorial on its own terms without any dawning sense that some purpose held the miscellany together more coherently than fortuity and the edge of the grass. One monument expresses admiration for pioneer women. One pays respect to the fighters of World War II. And one quotes the God of Abraham whose command is the sanction for moral law. The themes are individual grit, patriotic courage, and God as the source of Jewish and Christian morality; there is no common denominator. In like circumstances, we rejected an argument similar to the State's, noting in County of Allegheny that "[t]he presence of Santas or other Christmas decorations elsewhere in the . . . [c]ourthouse, and of the nearby gallery forum, fail to negate the [cr&ccaron;che's] endorsement effect. . . . The record demonstrates . . . that the cr&ccaron;che, with its floral frame, was its own display distinct from any other decorations or exhibitions in the building." 492 U.S., at 598-599, n. 48.6 </s> If the State's museum argument does nothing to blunt the religious message and manifestly religious purpose behind it, neither does the plurality's reliance on generalities culled from cases factually different from this one. E.g., ante, at 8 ("We have acknowledged, for example, that 'religion has been closely identified with our history and government,' School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962)"). In fact, it is not until the end of its opinion that the plurality turns to the relevant precedent of Stone, a case actually dealing with a display of the Decalogue. </s> When the plurality finally does confront Stone, it tries to avoid the case's obvious applicability by limiting its holding to the classroom setting. The plurality claims to find authority for limiting Stone's reach this way in the opinion's citations of two school-prayer cases, School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). But Stone relied on those cases for widely applicable notions, not for any concept specific to schools. The opinion quoted Schempp's statements that "it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment," Schempp, supra, at 225, quoted in Stone, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). Stone did not, for example, speak of children's impressionability or their captivity as an audience in a school class. In fact, Stone's reasoning reached the classroom only in noting the lack of support for the claim that the State had brought the Commandments into schools in order to "integrat[e] [them] into the school curriculum." 449 U.S., at 42. Accordingly, our numerous prior discussions of Stone have never treated its holding as restricted to the classroom.7 </s> Nor can the plurality deflect Stone by calling the Texas monument "a far more passive use of [the Decalogue] than was the case in Stone, where the text confronted elementary school students every day." Ante, at 12. Placing a monument on the ground is not more "passive" than hanging a sheet of paper on a wall when both contain the same text to be read by anyone who looks at it. The problem in Stone was simply that the State was putting the Commandments there to be seen, just as the monument's inscription is there for those who walk by it. </s> To be sure, Kentucky's compulsory-education law meant that the schoolchildren were forced to see the display every day, whereas many see the monument by choice, and those who customarily walk the Capitol grounds can presumably avoid it if they choose. But in my judgment (and under our often inexact Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such matters often boil down to judgment, see ante, at 3-4 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)), this distinction should make no difference. The monument in this case sits on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. There is something significant in the common term "statehouse" to refer to a state capitol building: it is the civic home of every one of the State's citizens. If neutrality in religion means something, any citizen should be able to visit that civic home without having to confront religious expressions clearly meant to convey an official religious position that may be at odds with his own religion, or with rejection of religion. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S., at 626 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("I agree that the cr&ccaron;che displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, the seat of county government, conveys a message to nonadherents of Christianity that they are not full members of the political community .... The display of religious symbols in public areas of core government buildings runs a special risk of making religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community" (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). </s> Finally, though this too is a point on which judgment will vary, I do not see a persuasive argument for constitutionality in the plurality's observation that Van Orden's lawsuit comes "[f]orty years after the monument's erection . . . ," ante, at 2, an observation that echoes the State's contention that one fact cutting in its favor is that "the monument stood ... in Austin . . . for some forty years without generating any controversy or litigation," Brief for Respondents 25. It is not that I think the passage of time is necessarily irrelevant in Establishment Clause analysis. We have approved framing-era practices because they must originally have been understood as constitutionally permissible, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative prayer), and we have recognized that Sunday laws have grown recognizably secular over time, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). There is also an analogous argument, not yet evaluated, that ritualistic religious expression can become so numbing over time that its initial Establishment Clause violation becomes at some point too diminished for notice. But I do not understand any of these to be the State's argument, which rather seems to be that 40 years without a challenge shows that as a factual matter the religious expression is too tepid to provoke a serious reaction and constitute a violation. Perhaps, but the writer of Exodus chapter 20 was not lukewarm, and other explanations may do better in accounting for the late resort to the courts. Suing a State over religion puts nothing in a plaintiff's pocket and can take a great deal out, and even with volunteer litigators to supply time and energy, the risk of social ostracism can be powerfully deterrent. I doubt that a slow walk to the courthouse, even one that took 40 years, is much evidentiary help in applying the Establishment Clause. </s> I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The monuments are: Heroes of the Alamo, Hood's Brigade, Confederate Soldiers, Volunteer Fireman, Terry's Texas Rangers, Texas Cowboy, Spanish-American War, Texas National Guard, Ten Commandments, Tribute to Texas School Children, Texas Pioneer Woman, The Boy Scouts' Statue of Liberty Replica, Pearl Harbor Veterans, Korean War Veterans, Soldiers of World War I, Disabled Veterans, and Texas Peace Officers. Footnote 2See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962) ("The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"). Footnote 3Despite Justice Stevens' recitation of occasional language to the contrary, post, at 4-5, and n. 7 (dissenting opinion), we have not, and do not, adhere to the principle that the Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental preference for religion over irreligion. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. __ (2005); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Even the dissenters do not claim that the First Amendment's Religion Clauses forbid all governmental acknowledgments, preferences, or accommodations of religion. See post, at 6 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (recognizing that the Establishment Clause permits some "recognition" or "acknowledgment" of religion); post, at 5, and n.4 (opinion of Souter, J.) (discussing a number of permissible displays with religious content). Footnote 4Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school voucher program); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that allowing religious school groups to use school facilities does not violate the Establishment Clause); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (approving a program that provided public employees to teach remedial classes at religious and other private schools), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (barring public school teachers from going to parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (striking down a program that provided classes to religious school students at public expense in classrooms leased from religious schools); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar disbursement of funds from student activity fees to religious organizations); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a public school district to provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf student at a Catholic high school as part of a federal program for the disabled); Lynch v. Donnelly, supra (upholding a Christmas display including a cr&ccaron;che); Marsh v. Chambers, supra (upholding legislative prayer); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding tax deduction for certain expenses incurred in sending one's child to a religious school). Footnote 5Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding unconstitutional student-initiated and student-led prayer at school football games); Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (invalidating a state law that created a new school district for a single religious community); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting officially sponsored graduation prayers); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding the display of a cr&ccaron;che in a courthouse unconstitutional but allowing the display of a menorah outside a county building); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a sales tax exemption for all religious periodicals); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a law mandating the teaching of creationism if evolution was taught); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating state law that gave employees an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating law mandating a daily minute of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer). Footnote 6Lemon sets out a three-prong test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" 403 U.S., at 612-613 (citation omitted). Footnote 7See also Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) ("Examples of patriotic invocations of God and official acknowledgments of religion's role in our Nation's history abound"); id., at 35-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is unsurprising that a Nation founded by religious refugees and dedicated to religious freedom should find references to divinity in its symbols, songs, mottoes, and oaths"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 675 ("Our history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance"). Footnote 8Indeed, we rejected the claim that an Establishment Clause violation was presented because the prayers had once been offered in the Judeo-Christian tradition: In Marsh, the prayers were often explicitly Christian, but the chaplain removed all references to Christ the year after the suit was filed. 463 U.S., at 793-794, and n. 14. Footnote 9Other examples of monuments and buildings reflecting the prominent role of religion abound. For example, the Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln Memorials all contain explicit invocations of God's importance. The apex of the Washington Monument is inscribed "Laus Deo," which is translated to mean "Praise be to God," and multiple memorial stones in the monument contain Biblical citations. The Jefferson Memorial is engraved with three quotes from Jefferson that make God a central theme. Inscribed on the wall of the Lincoln Memorial are two of Lincoln's most famous speeches, the Gettysburg Address and his Second Inaugural Address. Both inscriptions include those speeches' extensive acknowledgments of God. The first federal monument, which was accepted by the United States in honor of sailors who died in Tripoli, noted the dates of the fallen sailors as "the year of our Lord, 1804, and in the 28 year of the independence of the United States." Footnote 10See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Footnote 11Nor does anything suggest that Stone would extend to displays of the Ten Commandments that lack a "plainly religious," "pre-eminent purpose," id., at 41. See Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, at 593-594 ("[Stone] did not mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively religious role in the history of Western Civilization"). Indeed, we need not decide in this case the extent to which a primarily religious purpose would affect our analysis because it is clear from the record that there is no evidence of such a purpose in this case. FOOTNOTESFootnote **See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-594 (1989) (employing endorsement test); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (setting forth three-pronged test); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-792 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer due to its "unique history"); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-681 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area"). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1At the bottom of the message, the observer learns that the display was "[p]resented to the people and youth of Texas by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of Texas" in 1961. See Appendix, infra. Footnote 2Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879); see also Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Footnote 3As Senator Danforth recently reminded us, "efforts to haul references of God into the public square, into schools and courthouses, are far more apt to divide Americans than to advance faith." Danforth, Onward, Moderate Christian Soldiers, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2005, p.A27. Footnote 4The accuracy and utility of this metaphor have been called into question. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally P. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (2002). Whatever one may think of the merits of the historical debate surrounding Jefferson and the "wall" metaphor, this Court at a minimum has never questioned the concept of the "separation of church and state" in our First Amendment jurisprudence. The Chief Justice's opinion affirms that principle. Ante, at 4 (demanding a "separation between church and state"). Indeed, even the Court that famously opined that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952), acknowledged that "[t]here cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated," id., at 312. The question we face is how to give meaning to that concept of separation. Footnote 5There is now widespread consensus on this principle. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another"); School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another"); see also Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I have always believed ... that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others"); but see Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470-471 (1892). Footnote 6In support of this proposition, the Torcaso Court quoted James Iredell, who in the course of debating the adoption of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina, stated: "'it is objected that the people of America may perhaps choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that Pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?'" 367 U.S., at 495, n.10 (quoting 4 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 197 (1836 ed.)). Footnote 7See Everson, 330 U.S., at 18 (the Establishment Clause "requires the state to be ... neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington, 374 U.S., at 216 (rejecting the proposition that the Establishment Clause "forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another"); Wallace, 472 U.S., at 52-55 (the interest in "forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian sects--or even intolerance among 'religions'--to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain"); cf. Zorach, 343 U.S., at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be free for religion--except for the sect that can win political power"). Footnote 8Justice Scalia's dissent in the other Ten Commandments case we decide today, see McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at 1-11, raises similar objections. I address these objections directly in Part III. Footnote 9Though this Court has subscribed to the view that the Ten Commandments influenced the development of Western legal thought, it has not officially endorsed the far more specific claim that the Ten Commandments played a significant role in the development of our Nation's foundational documents (and the subsidiary implication that it has special relevance to Texas). Although it is perhaps an overstatement to characterize this latter proposition as "idiotic," see Tr. of Oral Arg. 34, as one Member of the plurality has done, at the very least the question is a matter of intense scholarly debate. Compare Brief for Legal Historians and Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., O. T. 2004, No. 03-1693, with Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amici Curiae. Whatever the historical accuracy of the proposition, the District Court categorically rejected respondent's suggestion that the State's actual purpose in displaying the Decalogue was to signify its influence on secular law and Texas institutions. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-32. Footnote 10See Brief for Fraternal Order of Eagles as Amicus Curiae 2-3. The Order was formed in 1898 by six Seattle theater owners, promptly joined by actors, playwrights, and stagehands, and rapidly expanded to include a nationwide membership numbering over a million. Id., at 2; see also Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d 224, 229, 59 P.3d 655, 657 (2002) (en banc); Lahmann v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 180 Ore. App. 420, 422, 43 P.3d 1130, 1131 (2002). Footnote 11See Books v. Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294-295 (CA7 2000); State v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 898 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Colo. 1995) (en banc); see also U.S. Supreme Court will hear Ten Commandments Case in Early 2005, http://www.foe.com/tencommandments/index.html (all Internet materials as visited June 24, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Footnote 12Freedom from Religion Foundation, 898 P.2d, at 1017; accord, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 1995 ("These plaques and monoliths have been presented by the Eagles to promote youth morality and to help stop the alarming increase in delinquency"); Brief for Fraternal Order of Eagles as Amicus Curiae 4. Footnote 13According to its articles of incorporation, the Eagles' purpose is to: "'Unite fraternally for mutual benefit, protection, improvement, social enjoyment and association, all persons of good moral character who believe in a Supreme Being to inculcate the principles of liberty, truth, justice and equality ...'" Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d, at 229, 59 P.3d, at 657. See also Aerie Membership Application-Fraternal Order of Eagles http://www.foe.com/membership/applications/aerie.html ("I, being of sound body and mind, and believing in the existence of a Supreme Being ..."). Footnote 14In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), I noted that certain displays of religious images may convey "an equivocal message, perhaps of respect for Judaism, for religion in general, or for law." Id., at 652 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is rather misleading, however, to quote my comment in that case to imply that I was referring to the text of the Ten Commandments simpliciter. See McCreary County, post, at 13-14. Footnote 15See ante, at 5 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Despite the Eagles' efforts, not all of the monuments they donated in fact conform to a "universally-accepted" text. Compare, e.g., Appendix, infra (including the command that "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images"), and Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 475 (CA6 2002) (same), with Freedom from Religion Foundation, 898 P.2d, at 1016 (omitting that command altogether). The distinction represents a critical divide between the Protestant and Catholic faiths. During the Reformation, Protestants destroyed images of the Virgin Mary and of Jesus Christ that were venerated in Catholic churches. Even today there is a notable difference between the imagery in different churches, a difference that may in part be attributable to differing understandings of the meaning of what is the Second Commandment in the King James Bible translation and a portion of the First Commandment in the Catholic translation. See Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 Ford. L.Rev. 1477, 1493-1494 (2005). Footnote 16For example, in the Jewish version of the Sixth Commandment God commands: "You shall not murder"; whereas, the King James interpretation of the same command is: "Thou shalt not kill." Compare W. Plaut, The Torah: A Modern Commentary 534 (1981), with Appendix, infra. The difference between the two versions is not merely semantic; rather, it is but one example of a deep theological dispute. See Finkelman, supra, at 1481-1500; P. Maier, Enumerating the Decalogue; Do We Number the Ten Commandments Correctly? 16 Concordia J. 18, 18-26 (1990). Varying interpretations of this Commandment explain the actions of vegetarians who refuse to eat meat, pacifists who refuse to work for munitions makers, prison officials who refuse to administer lethal injections to death row inmates, and pharmacists who refuse to sell morning-after pills to women. See Finkelman, supra, at 1494-1496; Brief for American Jewish Congress etal. as Amici Curiae 22-23. Although the command is ambiguous, its power to motivate likeminded interpreters of its message cannot be denied. Footnote 17Justice Scalia's willingness to dismiss the distinct textual versions adhered to by different faiths in the name of generic "monotheism" based on mere speculation regarding their significance, McCreary County, post, at 19, is not only somewhat ironic, see A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 23-25 (1997), but also serves to reinforce the concern that interjecting government into the religious sphere will offend "adherents who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful." Allegheny County, 492 U.S., at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Footnote 18See Brief for Hindu American Foundation etal. as Amici Curiae. Though Justice Scalia disagrees that these sentiments are consistent with the Establishment Clause, he does not deny that our cases wholeheartedly adopt this expression of neutrality. Instead, he suggests that this Court simply discard what he terms the "say-so of earlier Courts," based in part on his own "say-so" that nonmonotheists make up a statistically insignificant portion of this Nation's religious community. McCreary County, post, at 6. Besides marginalizing the belief systems of more than 7 million Americans by deeming them unworthy of the special protections he offers monotheists under the Establishment Clause, Justice Scalia's measure of analysis may be cause for concern even for the self-proclaimed "popular" religions of Islam and Judaism. The number of Buddhists alone is nearly equal to the number of Muslims in this country, and while those of the Islamic and Jewish faiths only account for 2.2% of all believers, Christianity accounts for 95.5%. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005, p.55 (124th ed. 2004) (Table No. 67). Footnote 19The fact that this particular display has stood unchallenged for over forty years does not suggest otherwise. One need look no further than the deluge of cases flooding lower courts to realize the discord these displays have engendered. See, e.g., Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (CA7 2005); ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (CA8 2004); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (CA6 2002); Summum v. Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (CA10 2002); Books v. Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (CA7 2000); State v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (CA10 1973). Footnote 20This is, of course, a rhetorical approach not unique to the plurality's opinion today. Appeals to such religious speeches have frequently been used in support of governmental transmission of religious messages. See, e.g., Wallace, 505 U.S. 577, 633-636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); SantaFe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675-676 (1984). Footnote 21It goes without saying that the analysis differs when a listener is coerced into listening to a prayer. See, e.g., SantaFe Independent School Dist., 530 U.S., at 308-312. Footnote 22With respect to the "legislative prayers" cited approvingly by The Chief Justice, ante, at 8, I reiterate my view that "the designation of a member of one religious faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of 16 years constitutes the preference of one faith over another in violation of the Establishment Clause." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 823 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Scalia and I are in agreement with respect to at least one point--this Court's decision in Marsh "ignor[ed] the neutrality principle" at the heart of the Establishment Clause. McCreary County, post, at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Footnote 23See, e.g., J. Hutson, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic 75 (1998) (noting the dearth of references to God at the Philadelphia Convention and that many contemporaneous observers of the Convention complained that "the Framers had unaccountably turned their backs on the Almighty" because they "'found the Constitution without any acknowledgement of God'"). Footnote 24 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. S. Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 5 Founders' Constitution 98; 11 Jefferson's Writings 428-430 (1905); see also Lee, 505 U.S., at 623-625 (Souter, J., concurring) (documenting history); Lynch, 465 U.S., at 716, n. 23 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same). Footnote 25See also James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in 5 Founders' Constitution 103-104. Madison's letter to Livingston further argued that: "There has been another deviation from the strict principle in the Executive Proclamations of fasts & festivals, so far, at least, as they have spoken the language of injunction, or have lost sight of the equality of all religious sects in the eve of the Constitution.... Notwithstanding the general progress made within the last two centuries in favour of this branch of liberty, & the full establishment of it, in some parts of our Country, there remains in others a strong bias towards old error, that without some sort of alliance or coalition between [Government] & Religion neither can be duly supported. Such indeed is the tendency to such a coalition, and such its corrupting influence on both the parties, that the danger cannot be too carefully guarded [against].... Every new & successful example therefore of a perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters, is of importance. And I have no doubt that every new example, will succeed, as every past one has done, in shewing that religion & [Government] will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together." Id., at 105-106. Footnote 26Religion and Politics in the Early Republic 20-21 (D. Dreisbach ed. 1996) (hereinafter Dreisbach) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Jasper Adams (1833)). See also Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 Founders' Constitution 106 ("We are teaching the world the great truth that [Governments] do better without Kings & Nobles than with them. The merit will be doubled by the other lesson that Religion flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of [Government]"). Footnote 27The contrary evidence cited by The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia only underscores the obvious fact that leaders who have drafted and voted for a text are eminently capable of violating their own rules. The first Congress was--just as the present Congress is--capable of passing unconstitutional legislation. Thus, it is no answer to say that the Founders' separationist impulses were "plainly rejected" simply because the first Congress enacted laws that acknowledged God. See McCreary County, post, at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To adopt such an interpretive approach would misguidedly give authoritative weight to the fact that the Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted laws that tolerated segregation, and the fact that the Congress that passed the First Amendment also enacted laws, such as the Alien and Sedition Act, that indisputably violated our present understanding of the First Amendment. See n. 36, infra; Lee, 505 U.S., at 626 (Souter, J., concurring). Footnote 28See, e.g., Strang, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment, 40 Duquesne L.Rev. 181, 220-223 (2002). Footnote 29Justice Story wrote elsewhere that "'Christianity is indispensable to the true interests & solid foundations of all free governments. I distinguish ... between the establishment of a particular sect, as the Religion of the State, & the Establishment of Christianity itself, without any preference of any particular form of it. I know not, indeed, how any deep sense of moral obligation or accountableness can be expected to prevail in the community without a firm persuasion of the great Christian Truths." Letter to Jasper Adams (May 14, 1833) Dreisbach 19. Footnote 30See 143 U.S., at 471 ("'[W]e are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of ... imposters'" (quoting People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811))); see also Vidal v. Philadelphia, 2 How. 127, 198-199 (1844). These views should not be read as those of religious zealots. Chief Justice Marshall himself penned the historical genesis of the Court's assertion that our "'institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,'" see Zorach, 343 U.S., at 313, writing that the "American population is entirely Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be strange, indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, & did not often refer to it, & exhibit relations with it." Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1833) (quoted in Dreisbach 18-19). Accord, Story §988, p. 700 ("[A]t the time of the adoption of the constitution, . . . the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state ..." (footnote omitted)). Footnote 31Justice Scalia's characterization of this conclusion as nothing more than my own personal "assurance" is misleading to say the least. McCreary County, post, at 13. Reliance on our Nation's early constitutional scholars is common in this Court's opinions. In particular, the author of the plurality once noted that "Joseph Story, a Member of this Court from 1811 to 1845, and during much of that time a professor at the Harvard Law School, published by far the most comprehensive treatise on the United States Constitution that had then appeared." Wallace, 515 U.S. 506, 510-511 (1995) (Fifth Amendment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 981-982 (1991) (Eighth Amendment). Footnote 32Justice Scalia's answer--that incorporation does not empty "the incorporated provisions of their original meaning," McCreary County, post, at 15--ignores the fact that the Establishment Clause has its own unique history. There is no evidence, for example, that incorporation of the Confrontation Clause ran contrary to the core of the Clause's original understanding. There is, however, some persuasive evidence to this effect regarding the Establishment Clause. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the Clause was originally understood to be a "federalism provision" intended to prevent "Congress from interfering with state establishments"). It is this unique history, not incorporation writ large, that renders incoherent the postincorporation reliance on the Establishment Clause's original understanding. </s> Justice Thomas, at least, has faced this problem head-on. See id., at 45 (opinion concurring in judgment). But even if the decision to incorporate the Establishment Clause was misguided, it is at this point unwise to reverse course given the weight of precedent that would have to be cast aside to reach the intended result. See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1937) ("The labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case"). Footnote 33See Lee, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); cf. Feldman, Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 346, 404-405 (2002) (noting that, for the Framers, "the term 'establishment' was a contested one" and that the word "was used in both narrow and expansive ways in the debates of the time"). Footnote 34See Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 Yale L.J. 2309, 2337-2342 (1995) ("Equal protection had not been identified with social integration when the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in 1866, nor when it was ratified in 1868, nor when Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537] was decided in 1896"); see also 1 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §1-14, pp. 54-55, and n. 19 (3d ed. 2000) (collecting scholarship). Footnote 35Justice Thomas contends that the Establishment Clause cannot include such a neutrality principle because the Clause reaches only the governmental coercion of individual belief or disbelief. Ante, at 4 (concurring opinion). In my view, although actual religious coercion is undoubtedly forbidden by the Establishment Clause, that cannot be the full extent of the provision's reach. Jefferson's "wall" metaphor and his refusal to issue Thanksgiving proclamations, see supra, at 19, would have been nonsensical if the Clause reached only direct coercion. Further, under the "coercion" view, the Establishment Clause would amount to little more than a replica of our compelled speech doctrine, see, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943), with a religious flavor. A Clause so interpreted would not prohibit explicit state endorsements of religious orthodoxies of particular sects, actions that lie at the heart of what the Clause was meant to regulate. The government could, for example, take out television advertisements lauding Catholicism as the only pure religion. Under the reasoning endorsed by Justice Thomas, those programs would not be coercive because the viewer could simply turn off the television or ignore the ad. See ante, at 3 ("[T]he mere presence of the monument ... involves no coercion" because the passerby "need not stop to read it or even to look at it"). </s> Further, the notion that the application of a "coercion" principle would somehow lead to a more consistent jurisprudence is dubious. Enshrining coercion as the Establishment Clause touchstone fails to eliminate the difficult judgment calls regarding "the form that coercion must take." McCreary County, post, at 25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Coercion may seem obvious to some, while appearing nonexistent to others. Compare SantaFe Independent School Dist., 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain"). In short, "reasonable people could, and no doubt would, argue about whether coercion existed in a particular situation." Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y. U. L.Rev. 346, 415 (2002). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The clarity of the religious manifestation in Stone was unaffected by the State's effort to obscure it: the Kentucky statute that mandated posting the Commandments in classrooms also required the addition to every posting of a notation reading, "[t]he secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States." 449 U.S., at 39-40, n.1. </s> In the present case, the religious purpose was evident on the partof the donating organization. When the Fraternal Order of Eagles, the group that gave the monument to the State of Texas, donated identical monuments to other jurisdictions, it was seeking to impart a religious message. See Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 475 (CA6 2002) (quoting the Eagles' statement in a letter written to Kentucky when a monument was donated to that Commonwealth: "Most of today's younger generation either have not seen the Ten Commandments or have not been taught them. In our opinion the youth of today is in dire need of learning the simple laws of God . . ."). Accordingly, it was not just the terms of the moral code, but the proclamation that the terms of the code were enjoined by God, that the Eagles put forward in the monuments they donated. Footnote 2That the monument also surrounds the text of the Commandments with various American symbols (notably the U.S. flag and a bald eagle) only underscores the impermissibility of Texas's actions: by juxtaposing these patriotic symbols with the Commandments and other religious signs, the monument sends the message that being American means being religious (and not just being religious but also subscribing to the Commandments, i.e., practicing a monotheistic religion). Footnote 3There is no question that the State in its own right is broadcasting the religious message. When Texas accepted the monument from the Eagles, the state legislature, aware that the Eagles "for the past several years have placed across the country . . . parchment plaques and granite monoliths of the Ten Commandments . . . [in order] to promote youth morality and help stop the alarming increase in delinquency," resolved "that the Fraternal Order of the Eagles of the State of Texas be commended and congratulated for its efforts and contributions in combating juvenile delinquency throughout our nation." App. 97. The State, then, expressly approved of the Eagles' proselytizing, which it made on its own. Footnote 4For similar reasons, the other displays of the Commandments that the plurality mentions, ante, at 9, do not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. The statues of Moses and St. Paul in the Main Reading Room of the Library of Congress are 2 of 16 set in close proximity, statues that "represent men illustrious in the various forms of thought and activity ...." The Library of Congress: The Art and Architecture of the Thomas Jefferson Building 127 (J. Cole and H. Reeds eds. 1997). Moses and St. Paul represent religion, while the other 14 (a group that includes Beethoven, Shakespeare, Michelangelo, Columbus, and Plato) represent the nonreligious categories of philosophy, art, history, commerce, science, law, and poetry. Ibid. Similarly, the sculpture of the woman beside the Decalogue in the Main Reading Room is one of 8 such figures "represent[ing] eight characteristic features of civilized life and thought," the same 8 features (7 of them nonreligious) that Moses, St. Paul, and the rest of the 16 statues represent. Id., at 125. </s> The inlay on the floor of the National Archives Building is one of four such discs, the collective theme of which is not religious. Rather, the discs "symbolize the various types of Government records that were to come into the National Archive." Letter from Judith A. Koucky, Archivist, Records Control Section to Catherine Millard, Oct. 1, 2003 (on file with Clerk of the Court). (The four categories are war and defense, history, justice, and legislation. Each disc is paired with a winged figure; the disc containing the depiction of the Commandments, a depiction that, notably, omits the Commandments' text, is paired with a figure representing legislation. Ibid.) </s> As for Moses's "prominen[t] featur[ing] in the Chamber of the United States House of Representatives," ante, at 9 (plurality opinion), Moses is actually 1 of 23 portraits encircling the House Chamber, each approximately the same size, having no religious theme. The portraits depict "men noted in history for the part they played in the evolution of what has become American law." Art in the United States Capitol 282; House Doc. No. 94-660 (1978). More importantly for purposes of this case, each portrait consists only of the subject's face; the Ten Commandments appear nowhere in Moses's portrait. Footnote 5Similarly permissible, though obviously of a different character, are laws that can be traced back to the Commandments (even the more religious ones) but are currently supported by nonreligious considerations. See McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., post, at 10 (opinion of the Court) (noting that in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court "upheld Sunday closing laws on practical secular grounds after finding that the government had forsaken the religious purposes motivating centuries-old predecessor laws"). Footnote 6It is true that the Commandments monument is unlike the display of the Commandments considered in the other Ten Commandments case we decide today, McCreary County. There the Commandments were posted at the behest of the county in the first instance, whereas the State of Texas received the monument as a gift from the Eagles, which apparently conceived of the donation at the suggestion of a movie producer bent on promoting his commercial film on the Ten Commandments, Books v. Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 294-295 (CA7 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001). But this distinction fails to neutralize the apparent expression of governmental intent to promote a religious message: although the nativity scene in Allegheny County was donated by the Holy Name Society, we concluded that "[n]o viewer could reasonably think that [the scene] occupies [its] location [at the seat of county government] without the support and approval of the government." County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989). Footnote 7In any event, the fact that we have been, as the plurality says, "particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools," ante, at 11, does not of course mean that anything goes outside the schoolhouse. As cases like County of Allegheny and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), illustrate, we have also closely scrutinized government displays of religious symbols. And for reasons discussed in the text, the Texas monument cannot survive even a relaxed level of scrutiny.

United States Supreme Court LAWN v. UNITED STATES(1958) No. 10 Argued: October 14, 1957Decided: January 13, 1958 </s> Indictments returned by a grand jury in 1952, charging petitioners with evading and conspiring to evade federal income taxes, were dismissed by the District Court on the ground that their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination had been violated by requiring them to testify and produce records before that grand jury while criminal informations charging tax evasions were pending against them, without being warned of their constitutional privilege. In 1953, they were indicted by another grand jury for substantially the same offenses; and they were convicted in a federal court. Both before and at the beginning of their trial, they moved (1) for a hearing to determine whether, in procuring the indictment, the Government had used testimony given or documents produced by them before the 1952 grand jury or leads and clues furnished thereby, and (2) to suppress the use at the trial of all such evidence and all evidence derived therefrom. The court denied these motions, but said that, if during the trial petitioners had reason to believe that illegally obtained material was being or might be used against them, they could object at that time. On appeal, they challenged the validity of their convictions because of denial of these motions and on other grounds. Held: The convictions are sustained. Pp. 341-363. </s> 1. In the circumstances of this case, petitioners were not entitled to a preliminary hearing to enable them to satisfy their unsupported suspicions that the 1953 grand jury which returned this indictment had made direct or derivative use of the materials they had produced before the 1952 grand jury. Pp. 348-350. </s> (a) Petitioners had laid no foundation for the holding of such a preliminary hearing. Pp. 348-349. [355 U.S. 339, 340] </s> (b) An indictment returned by a legally constituted unbiased grand jury, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits and satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 349-350. </s> 2. Receipt in evidence at the trial of a photostatic copy of a canceled check and its corresponding check stub, obtained from petitioner Lawn in the 1952 grand jury proceeding, did not deprive him of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it appears from the record that his counsel consciously and intentionally waived any objection to their receipt in evidence. Pp. 350-355. </s> (a) In the circumstances of this case, denial of petitioners' pretrial motion to suppress the use in evidence of materials obtained from petitioners in the 1952 grand jury proceeding did not preserve Lawn's objections to these exhibits when his counsel consciously and intentionally waived objection to them. Pp. 353-354. </s> (b) The Government has filed in this Court what is said to be a transcript of a hearing accorded Lawn at his request in 1952, which it says contains photostatic copies of the check and check stub in question voluntarily produced by him; but his motion to strike the transcript and the portions of the Government's brief relating thereto is sustained, as this Court looks only to the certified record in deciding questions presented. P. 354. </s> 3. On the record in this case, there is no factual basis for petitioners' contention that they were denied an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses at the trial to determine whether evidence derived from leads and clues furnished by materials obtained from them in the 1952 grand jury proceedings was used by the prosecution at the trial, and that this deprived them of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 355-358. </s> 4. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions of petitioners Lawn and Livorsi. Pp. 358-362. </s> 5. On the record in this case, petitioner Lawn was not deprived of a fair trial by a statement made by government counsel in his closing summation to the jury that, "We vouch for [Roth and Lubben] because we think they are telling the truth." P. 359, n, 15. </s> 6. The contention of petitioners Giglio and Livorsi that the trial court erred in denying their motion for production of Lubben's federal income tax return for 1946, all testimony given by him before the grand jury and all written statements made by him to [355 U.S. 339, 341] any agent of the Government, is not properly before this Court, because that issue was not raised in the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court. P. 362, n, 16. </s> 232 F.2d 589, affirmed. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 10, Giglio et al. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same Court, argued October 15, 1957. </s> Milton Pollack argued the cause for petitioner in No. 9. With him on the brief were Francis E. Koch, Brainerd Currie and Philip B. Kurland. </s> Joseph Leary Delaney argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10. With him on the brief were James B. Burke and Harold W. Wolfram. </s> Roger Fisher argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Joseph F. Goetten. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On July 23, 1953, a 10-count indictment was returned in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging petitioners and others with evading, and conspiring to evade, assessment and payment of a large amount of federal income taxes for the year 1946 in violation of the internal revenue laws ( 145 (b) and 3793 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939) 1 and of the general conspiracy statute [355 U.S. 339, 342] (18 U.S.C. 371). After a protracted trial before a jury petitioners were found guilty as charged. 2 On appeal the Court of Appeals found that there was substantial evidence that petitioners, operating through the media of several partnerships and corporations, 3 conspired to evade, and by a variety of means did evade, both the [355 U.S. 339, 343] assessment 4 and the payment 5 of more than $800,000 of individual and corporate federal income taxes for the year 1946 6 upon income derived from the World War II black market in sugar and that petitioners Giglio and Livorsi, who owned equal interests in the several enterprises of which Giglio was the chief executive, were the principals in the conspiracy, but Roth, an accountant, and Lawn, a lawyer, 7 provided the accounting and legal services required to carry out the conspiracy. It found that the evidence amply sustained the verdicts and that no prejudicial error was committed at the trial, and it affirmed the judgments of conviction. 232 F.2d 589. Upon petition by Lawn in No. 9, and by Giglio and Livorsi in No. 10, we granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 865 . Because the challenged convictions resulted from a common trial at which petitioners were represented by the same counsel, and because several of the questions presented in each case are similar, the two cases will be decided in one opinion. </s> Petitioners ask this Court to reverse their convictions upon four main grounds. First, they contend, Lawn only [355 U.S. 339, 344] tangentially, that they were deprived of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment by the refusal of the District Court to conduct a full-dress hearing to determine whether testimony or documents obtained from them in a prior grand jury investigation, or evidence derived from leads and clues furnished thereby, was considered by the grand jury that returned the present indictment. Second, petitioner Lawn contends that receipt in evidence at the trial of a photostatic copy of a canceled check and its corresponding check stub, obtained from him in a prior grand jury investigation, deprived him of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Third, petitioners contend they were denied an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses at the trial to determine whether evidence derived from leads and clues furnished by testimony and documents obtained from petitioners in a prior grand jury investigation was used by the prosecution at the trial, and that this deprived them of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. And fourth, petitioners Lawn and Livorsi contend that the evidence does not support their convictions. </s> Understanding of petitioners' first and second contentions, and to a lesser extent their third contention, requires a review of the underlying facts upon which they are based. Revenue agents began an investigation in 1948 of petitioners' income tax liabilities, and on September 14, 1950, three criminal informations were filed charging them with violation of the federal income tax laws. Those informations were not brought to trial because the Government had not completed its investigation and later concluded that "much more serious crimes [were] involved." In early July 1952, petitioners and Roth were served with subpoenas duces tecum commanding them to appear and testify before a grand jury on July 14, 1952, and to produce certain partnership and corporate records of the Giglio and Livorsi enterprises. [355 U.S. 339, 345] They appeared and testified, but were not warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Lawn produced three canceled checks made by Tavern Fruit Juice Co. payable to his order and the checkbook stub corresponding to the second check. Those instruments were there marked "G. J. Ex. [1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively] 7/15/52 L. F. G." and were photostated by the United States Attorney and returned to Lawn. Giglio produced a quantity of records, including some partnership records, but stated that "practically all of these companies and corporations turned over the books and records to the Internal Revenue Department on some date in 1949." On October 20, 1952, the grand jury returned six indictments against petitioners charging them with offenses similar to those charged in the present indictment. Petitioners moved to dismiss those indictments upon the ground that they had been procured, in part at least, upon evidence obtained from petitioners in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights. The District Court held that to require petitioners to testify and produce partnership and personal records before the grand jury, while criminal informations charging tax evasions were pending against them, without warning them of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, violated their Fifth Amendment rights. It therefore dismissed the indictments and directed the Government "to return, to the respective defendants, the partnership and personal records produced by them in response to the subpoenas." United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 678. The Government appealed from that order but the appeal was dismissed as untimely on October 19, 1953. United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467. 8 While that appeal was pending [355 U.S. 339, 346] the Government caused a new investigation to be made of petitioners' federal income tax liabilities by another grand jury, before whom petitioners did not appear, and on July 23, 1953, that grand jury returned the present indictment which was sealed. After the Government's appeal from the order dismissing the 1952 indictment had been dismissed (United States v. Roth, supra) the new sealed indictment was opened, and soon afterward petitioners moved (1) to dismiss the indictment, and in that connection (2) to have a hearing to determine whether the Government had used testimony given or documents produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury, or evidence obtained through leads and clues furnished thereby, in procuring the indictment, and (3) to inspect the minutes of the grand jury and, if the motion to dismiss the indictment be denied, (4) to suppress the use at the trial of all testimony and documents procured from petitioners in the 1952 grand jury proceeding and all evidence derived therefrom. These motions were submitted to the court upon affidavits. 9 After considering them and [355 U.S. 339, 347] hearing extensive arguments of counsel, the court found that the affidavits left no room for an inference that the Government had used illegally obtained materials in securing the present indictment, that petitioners' claim did not have the "solidity" required to justify the holding of such a hearing, and that to do so "on the basis of the showing made by the defendants and the Government would indeed be subordinating `the need for rigorous administration of justice to undue solicitude for potential . . . disobedience of the law by the law's officers.' [Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 .]" United States v. Giglio, 16 F. R. D. 268, 270. The court declined to hold the requested hearing and denied the motion to inspect the grand jury minutes and the motion to dismiss the indictment. The court also denied the motion to suppress, 10 but in that connection said: "Of course, if during [355 U.S. 339, 348] the course of the trial defendants have reason to believe that illegally obtained material is being or may be used against them, they can object at that time and it will be incumbent upon the trial judge to rule on their objections." United States v. Giglio, supra, at 271. </s> Pursuant to order of the court the Government produced for inspection by petitioners, before the trial, the corporate records delivered by Giglio to the 1952 grand jury in compliance with its subpoena, the documents which had been abandoned by petitioners and examined by the Government, and the documents relating to petitioners' businesses obtained from the New Jersey receiver. At the beginning of the trial petitioners renewed the above-mentioned motions which were again denied. In the course of the trial the Government furnished petitioners a transcript of their testimony before the 1952 grand jury. </s> I. </s> As stated, petitioners first contend that they were deprived of due process by the refusal of the court to conduct the requested full-dress hearing to enable them to attempt to determine whether materials obtained from them in the 1952 grand jury proceeding, or evidence derived therefrom, was considered by the 1953 grand jury. We believe there is no merit in this contention. The District Court's order dismissing the 1952 indictments because of the use of such evidence before that grand jury, though final, could not in any way determine that any direct or derivative use of such evidence was made by the 1953 grand jury that returned the present indictment. The affidavits submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion for the requested hearing disclosed, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, with which findings we agree, that petitioners had no reason, beyond suspicion, to believe that the 1953 grand jury considered [355 U.S. 339, 349] any of the materials produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury. These facts make clear that petitioners laid no foundation for the holding of a protracted preliminary hearing (at which they would, in effect, take the depositions of the Government's witnesses) to determine whether there was any substance to their suspicion that some direct or derivative use may have been made by the 1953 grand jury of materials produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury. </s> Moreover, this Court has several times ruled that an indictment returned by a legally constituted nonbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by a prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits and satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. In Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , this Court was required to decide whether an indictment should be quashed because procured in part by incompetent evidence of an admission by the accused, aside from which "there was very little evidence against the accused." Id., at 247. This Court refused to hold that such an indictment should be quashed, stating: "The abuses of criminal practice would be enhanced if indictments could be upset on such a ground." Id., at 248. In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 , this Court squarely faced and decided the question, saying: </s> "If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased [355 U.S. 339, 350] grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more." Id., at 363. </s> This Court was urged in that case to "establish a rule permitting defendants to challenge indictments on the ground that they are not supported by adequate or competent evidence," id., at 364, but the Court declined to do so, saying: </s> "It would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules. Neither justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a change. In a trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to a strict observance of all the rules designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule which would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial." Ibid. </s> It should be unnecessary to say that we are not here dealing with the use of incompetent or illegal evidence in a trial on the merits, nor with the right to decline to give incriminating testimony in legal proceedings or to suppress the direct or derivative use at the trial of evidence illegally obtained. We deal here only with the question whether petitioners, in the circumstances of this case, were entitled to a preliminary hearing to enable them to satisfy their unsupported suspicions that the 1953 grand jury that returned this indictment made direct or derivative use of the materials which they produced before the 1952 grand jury. We hold that they were not. </s> II. </s> We come now to petitioner Lawn's contention that receipt in evidence at the trial of a photostatic copy of a [355 U.S. 339, 351] canceled check and its corresponding check stub, obtained from him in the 1952 grand jury proceeding, deprived him of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. As earlier stated, Lawn, pursuant to subpoena, produced before the 1952 grand jury a canceled check of Tavern Fruit Juice Co. payable to his order in the amount of $15,000, endorsed by him, and the corresponding stub, which were marked on their faces "G. J. Ex. 2 7/15/52 L. F. G." and "G. J. Ex. 4 7/15/52 L. F. G.," respectively, and were photostated by the United States Attorney and returned to Lawn. Those photostats were offered in evidence - it appears inadvertently - by the prosecution at the trial, as Exhibits 61-A and 61-B. However, before those exhibits were offered, Exhibit 58-A, being a statement of assets, liabilities, income, profit and loss and supporting schedules of Tavern Fruit Juice Company prepared some time after Tavern's fiscal year had ended on March 31, 1946, and Exhibit 7, being Tavern's information tax return for 1946 which was filed on September 15, 1947, had been received in evidence without objection. The former contained an item of "legal expenses $16,000," while the latter recited "legal fees $1,600." Roth, in explanation, testified that "sometime during the operation of the partnership a check for $15,000 was drawn to Howard Lawn," and that a question had arisen about how to enter it on the books. After discussing the matter with Giglio, Roth charged it to legal expense. Months later Lawn asked Roth how the item was carried on Tavern's books and Roth told him that it was carried as a legal expense. Lawn advised Roth that this handling was incorrect, as the item was a loan from Giglio and not a legal expense of Tavern. Thereupon, after consulting Giglio, Roth altered Tavern's books by removing the item from legal expense and charging it to Giglio. Roth did not remember just when the alteration of the [355 U.S. 339, 352] books was made, except that it was after the preparation of Exhibit 58-A and prior to the filing of Exhibit 7. </s> It is important to note that at this stage of the trial there was thus clear evidence before the jury, corroborated by Exhibits 58-A and 7, all admitted without objection, showing that Lawn had received the $15,000 check from Tavern, but an issue existed whether it was an innocent loan from Giglio or an incriminatory payment by Tavern in the guise of a legal fee. The prosecution then offered in evidence Exhibits 61-A and 61-B, being the $15,000 check and corresponding stub. Petitioners' able and experienced counsel (now deceased) then asked, and was granted, permission to examine the witness Roth preparatory to a possible objection to those exhibits. He then questioned the witness at some length about the handwriting on the check and stub, 11 and concluded by asking the witness: "Q. And under that check stub or in that No. 640 [the number of the check stub], which corresponds with the check itself, there is a parenthetical statement, `Bill G'? A. Yes, sir. Q. Indicating it is for [355 U.S. 339, 353] Mr. Giglio's account? A. Yes, sir." And petitioners' counsel then stated, "No objection," and the exhibits were received. This examination and use of those exhibits (showing on their face that they had been exhibits before the 1952 grand jury) by petitioners' able counsel to show that the check was an innocent loan by Giglio and not an incriminatory payment by Tavern in the guise of a legal fee - his only opportunity to drive that point home to the jury if petitioners were not to take the stand, as they did not - and his affirmative statement that he had "no objection" to receipt of the exhibits show, we believe, a conscious and intentional waiver of all objections to receipt of those documents in evidence. </s> Lawn argues that the denial, before the trial, of petitioners' motion to suppress, and the unequivocal affidavit of the United States Attorney in charge of the case stating that materials obtained from petitioners pursuant to subpoena in the 1952 grand jury proceeding would not be used in the future course of the case, preserved his objections to these exhibits and made it unnecessary again to object to them at the trial. It is quite true generally that the overruling of a pretrial motion to suppress the use at the trial of particular evidence preserves the point and renders it unnecessary again to object when such evidence is offered at the trial. Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 223 ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312 , 313; Waldron v. United States, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 66, 69-70, 219 F.2d 37, 41; and compare Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515. But the rule is one of practice and is not without exceptions, nor is it to be applied as a hard-and-fast formula to every case regardless of its special circumstances. Cogen v. United States, supra, at 223, 224; Gouled v. United States, supra, at 312, 313. It will be remembered that the court in passing on the motion to suppress said, respecting [355 U.S. 339, 354] the affidavit of the United States Attorney, that "at this stage of the proceedings that oath is sufficient" (United States v. Giglio, 16 F. R. D., at 271), but he expressly left the matter of suppression of evidence to the trial court and admonished petitioners that if during the course of the trial they "have reason to believe that illegally obtained material is being or may be used against them, they can object at that time and it will be incumbent upon the trial judge to rule on their objections." Id., at 271. The record shows that petitioners' counsel was fully aware of all this when Exhibits 61-A and 61-B were offered in evidence, and when, after using them for his purposes, he affirmatively said he had "no objection" to them. </s> The Government argues that, had its attention been called to the fact that these particular photostatic copies had been exhibits before the 1952 grand jury by an objection to them, it could and would have produced other copies obtained from other sources before the 1952 grand jury proceeding was commenced. In that connection it has filed here what is said to be a transcript of a hearing accorded to Lawn at his request on May 12, 1952, which it says contains photostatic copies of the check and check stub in question voluntarily produced by Lawn. Lawn has moved to strike that transcript and the portions of the Government's brief relating thereto. That motion must be sustained as we must look only to the certified record in deciding questions presented. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 . </s> We believe that the facts from the certified record, above discussed, show that petitioners' counsel, after using the check and check stub to make his point before the jury that the check was an innocent loan from Giglio and not an incriminatory payment by Tavern in the guise of a legal fee, wisely (as, we believe, every impartial and experienced trial lawyer would agree) said that he had [355 U.S. 339, 355] "no objection" to those exhibits, and thus consciously and intentionally waived any objection to their receipt in evidence. </s> III. </s> Petitioners argue that they were denied an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses at the trial to determine whether evidence derived from leads and clues furnished by materials obtained from them in the 1952 grand jury proceedings was used by the prosecution at the trial, and that this deprived them of due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. It cannot be doubted that petitioners had that right in the circumstances of this case, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 , 342, and the Government does not otherwise contend. Moreover, as earlier stated, the District Court, in ruling the pretrial motion to suppress, expressly left this subject open to inquiry at the trial. United States v. Giglio, 16 F. R. D., at 271. The contention is wholly factual, and a thorough study of the record discloses that petitioners were accorded that right. The court did not sustain objections to petitioners' examination or cross-examination of witnesses attempting to show derivative use at the trial of any evidence produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury, but only sustained objections to questions attacking the procedural validity of the indictment. 12 At no time did counsel for petitioners point [355 U.S. 339, 356] specifically to any evidence offered at the trial which they claimed was derived from materials furnished by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury. Near the close of the Government's case, the court stated that, so far as he could detect, there had been no direct or derivative use of any tainted evidence by the Government at the trial, and he requested counsel for petitioners, on two occasions, to submit a memorandum of any evidence offered by the Government which he believed was obtained through leads or clues from materials produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury. No such memorandum was ever furnished. </s> Petitioners point to three instances where they say the trial court denied them the right to examine witnesses about the source of evidence offered by the Government at the trial. First, they say that in cross-examining the Government's witness Roth they sought to question him concerning an affidavit he had made in support of the motion to dismiss the 1953 indictment, but the court sustained an objection to the question. It is clear that the ruling was made upon the ground, as petitioners' counsel stated at the time, that the purpose of the interrogation was to "go into the question of what evidence was used to obtain this indictment," rather than to show the use by the Government of tainted evidence at the trial. Second, they point to the fact that during the cross-examination [355 U.S. 339, 357] of Treasury Agent Present, their counsel asked him whether, in his audits, he had examined any other books or records about which counsel had failed to ask; and they argue that the purpose of the question was to determine whether tainted evidence had been or was being used by the Government at the trial, and that they were denied an answer to the question. But examination of the record discloses that counsel's announced purpose in asking the question was not to determine whether tainted evidence had been or was being used at the trial, but was, rather, to determine whether tainted evidence was "used by the grand jury that found this indictment." 13 Third, petitioners argue that in examining their own witness, former Assistant United States Attorney Leone, they were denied an opportunity to show [355 U.S. 339, 358] derivative use of tainted evidence by the Government at the trial. The record shows that there is no basis whatever for this contention. 14 </s> IV. </s> Petitioners Lawn and Livorsi argue that the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions. In support of Count 10, the conspiracy count, the record contains evidence tending to show that Lawn, formerly Chief of the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey, was employed by Giglio and Livorsi because "he had a terrific entry with some of the highest government offices," "was a part of the organization" and was "there to prevent any trouble." He was frequently in Giglio's private office, which adjoined his own. Lawn was present in Giglio's office when it was decided that Eatsum would purchase corn at blackmarket prices and have it refined into syrup to be sold for over-ceiling prices, and Lubben began the handling of those matters. But Lawn later told him that he "had terrific connections" with a syrup company and with a prominent political figure in the midwest and that he could procure the corn and syrup more advantageously, and Lawn then took over the handling of those matters. Lubben was called into Giglio's office in September 1945, where Giglio, Roth and Lawn were present, and Giglio stated "that the profits from [Tavern's] candy business and primarily [Eatsum's] corn syrup business were becoming terrific, and that he wasn't interested in paying a lot of income tax and something had to be done, and done quick"; that "it had been decided to form a number [355 U.S. 339, 359] of companies" to siphon off the profits of the partnerships through "phony invoices"; and that the companies would "be dissolved . . . before it came time to pay the income tax." Soon afterward Lawn was instrumental in the creation of a number of corporations bearing in some combination the word "American." Lawn was an officer and nominal stockholder in several of these corporations, and owned 25% of the stock of one of them which had been given to him by Giglio and Livorsi, and Lawn received substantial payments from the Giglio and Livorsi enterprises in addition to his salary. In September 1947, near the time the delinquent income tax returns were filed for the year 1946 by Giglio, Livorsi and their several corporations, a meeting was held in Lawn's private office with Giglio and Roth where it was agreed that Giglio would transfer his home to Roth so that the Government would "not be able to take the house," and Lawn said the arrangement "would save Mr. Giglio's home." Soon afterward the transfer was made. There was other evidence tending to show Lawn's participation in the conspiracy, but we believe the above-recited evidence, with the legitimate inferences that might be drawn therefrom by the jury, was clearly sufficient to support the verdict on the conspiracy count. </s> Lawn also contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts against him on Counts 7 and 9, but since the sentences upon those counts run concurrently with the sentence on Count 10, which we have found sustained by the evidence, it is unnecessary for us to consider those contentions. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 ; Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 . 15 </s> [355 U.S. 339, 360] </s> Petitioner Livorsi argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdicts against him. As to Count 6, which charged him with attempting to evade assessment of his income taxes for the year 1946 by filing a fraudulent return, the record shows that his return disclosed income from Eatsum for that year of $101,123.88. However, the Government introduced evidence showing that his income from that source in that year was $228,288.58, and that his income from Tavern for that year was understated by more than $40,000. During the trial an issue arose concerning the proper "distributive [355 U.S. 339, 361] shares" of Giglio and Livorsi in the profits of Eatsum for the year 1946, by reason of the sale by Lubben of his "distributive share" in the profits of that partnership to Giglio and Livorsi (on March 8, 1946) prior to the close of its accounting year on May 31, 1946. Because of that complication the court, in an effort to simplify the matter, gave a supplemental charge to the jury in which, among other things, he said: "[W]hen you get to counts 5 and 6, where it was claimed that the income received from Eatsum wasn't fully reported by the defendant Giglio and by the defendant Livorsi, in connection with their individual returns, I say because of that distributive share difficulty, don't consider Eatsum at all . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Livorsi now contends that the effect of that charge was to eliminate the $101,123.88 of income which he had reported in his sworn return as received from that source in that year and to give him a credit in that amount which more than offset his understatement of income from other sources, and, thus, established that there was no deficiency in his reporting of income. This contention need not detain us long. While, of course, a conviction upon a charge of attempting to evade assessment of income taxes by the filing of a fraudulent return cannot stand in the absence of proof of a deficiency, the court's charge did not create the credit claimed by Livorsi. It only withdrew from the jury's consideration the Government's claim that his income from Eatsum in that year was $127,164.70 more than he had reported in his return. That meaning of the charge could not have been misunderstood by the jury. </s> Count 9 charged Livorsi and others with attempting to evade payment of income taxes of American Brands Corporation for the calendar year 1946 by converting and diverting its assets. Livorsi argues that there is no evidence to support his conviction on that count. We must disagree. The evidence disclosed that Livorsi owned half [355 U.S. 339, 362] of the capital stock of that corporation and frequently conferred with Giglio, who owned the other half of its capital stock, concerning the operations of the corporation and was familiar with its affairs; that no income tax was withheld by the corporation from his salary; and that from January 1, 1946, to June 16, 1947, he withdrew from the corporation more than $122,000, including salary, while the corporation had a federal income tax liability for the year 1946 of more than $100,000, as shown by its own return, of which only $300 had been paid. This evidence, with the legitimate inferences that might be drawn therefrom by the jury, was clearly sufficient to support the verdict on Count 9. </s> Livorsi's contention that there was not sufficient evidence to support the verdict against him on Count 10, the conspiracy count, when viewed in the light of all the foregoing facts, and those found by the Court of Appeals, which we find are supported by the record, is entirely without merit. </s> Livorsi also contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict against him on Count 8, but since the sentence on that count runs concurrently with the sentence on Count 6, which we have affirmed, it is unnecessary to consider his contentions concerning Count 8. Sinclair v. United States, supra; Hirabayashi v. United States, supra; and Pinkerton v. United States, supra. 16 </s> [355 U.S. 339, 363] </s> Several other points raised by petitioners have been carefully considered and are found to be without merit. The judgment in each case must be </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 26 U.S.C. (1952 ed.) 145 (b) and 3793 (b). </s> The first five counts named only petitioner Giglio and Louis J. Roth as defendants. Since Giglio does not here contest the adequacy of the evidence to sustain those or any of the other counts against him, and since Roth pleaded guilty to all counts of the indictment and was a principal witness for the prosecution at the trial, those counts are not here summarized. </s> The remaining counts in essence charged as follows: </s> Count 6 charged that Livorsi and Roth, on or about September 15, 1947, willfully attempted to evade assessment of income taxes of Livorsi for the calendar year 1946 by filing a fraudulent return. </s> Count 7 charged that Giglio, Lawn and Roth, from about September [355 U.S. 339, 342] 1, 1947, to the date of filing of the indictment, willfully attempted to evade payment of Giglio's income taxes for the calendar year 1946 by concealing his assets. </s> Count 8 charged that Livorsi, from about September 1, 1947, to the date of filing of the indictment, willfully attempted to evade payment of his income taxes for the calendar year 1946 by concealing his assets. </s> Count 9 charged that Giglio, Livorsi, Lawn and Roth, from about January 1, 1946, to the date of filing of the indictment, willfully attempted to evade payment of income taxes of American Brands Corporation for the calendar year 1946 by converting and diverting its assets. </s> Count 10 charged that Giglio, Livorsi, Lawn, Roth and American Brands Corporation, from about July 1, 1945, to the date of filing of the indictment, willfully conspired to commit the substantive offenses charged in Counts 1 through 9 of the indictment. </s> Count 10 of the indictment was dismissed by the court as to American Brands Corporation after the jury failed to report as to it. </s> [Footnote 2 Lawn was sentenced to a year and a day on each of Counts 7, 9 and 10, the sentences to run concurrently. Giglio was sentenced to a total of 15 years. Livorsi was sentenced to 5 years on each of Counts 6, 9 and 10 to run consecutively, and was sentenced to 5 years on Count 8 to run concurrently with the sentence on Count 6. </s> [Footnote 3 The principal organizations were: Tavern Fruit Juice Company, a partnership owned by Giglio and Livorsi; Eatsum Food Products Co., Ltd., a partnership owned 25% by Giglio, 25% by Livorsi, and 50% by one Lubben until March 8, 1946, when he left the enterprise and sold his "distributive share" in the profits thereof to Giglio and Livorsi; and a series of corporations bearing in some combination the word "American" which were created in early 1946 to drain off the profits of Eatsum through the use of fraudulent invoices and were to be dissolved before their income taxes became due. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court of Appeals found that generally three means of evasion of tax assessment were used: (1) the fraudulent allocation of income among the various companies and individuals in the conspiracy; (2) the fraudulent overstatement of expenses; and (3) the failure to disclose income. </s> [Footnote 5 The evasion of payment was in general accomplished by delaying disclosure of income tax liabilities through the filing of returns from 5 to 15 months late; by failing to withhold income taxes on salaries; by concealment of the individual assets of Giglio and Livorsi; and by the misappropriation, conversion and diversion of corporate assets. </s> [Footnote 6 Of the total, $573,683.73 was admitted to be owing by Giglio, Livorsi and American Brands Corporation in the long-overdue returns they filed, and only $16,735.95 was paid. </s> [Footnote 7 They were full-time employees of the several Giglio and Livorsi enterprises. </s> [Footnote 8 In their brief on that appeal petitioners had argued that the Government's notice of appeal was not timely filed, but they did not move to dismiss the appeal until after the period of limitations had run in late September 1953. </s> [Footnote 9 In support of their motions petitioners filed a number of affidavits reciting in essence that the 1952 indictment was returned after the Government had secured testimony and documents from petitioners in violation of their constitutional rights; that the present indictment is very similar to the prior one, and that a revenue agent had implied that some of his computations were based on documents stored in a room in which the documents obtained from petitioners were also kept. </s> In opposition to the motions the Government filed affidavits made by all of the revenue agents who had conducted investigations leading to the indictment and by all the United States Attorneys who had been responsible for the prosecution of the case. In essence, they recited that after the District Court dismissed the 1952 indictment a conference was called, by an assistant United States Attorney, of all revenue agents who had conducted the investigations; that they were there told that it would be necessary to obtain a new indictment which was not to be based in any way, however remote, upon testimony or personal or partnership documents obtained from petitioners in the 1952 grand jury proceedings, and any doubts about the use of any evidence were to be resolved in favor of exclusion; that none of the testimony or personal or partnership records, produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury, was in any way used in obtaining the present indictment; and that long before 1952 the Government had in its possession copies and microfilm enlargements of bank checks, bank statements and books and records pertaining to petitioners' transactions, which had been secured from banks, third persons, a New Jersey receiver, government agencies, and abandoned books and records relating to petitioners' businesses. The affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the case unequivocally recited that none of the materials obtained from [355 U.S. 339, 347] petitioners in the 1952 grand jury proceeding would be used in the future course of the case. </s> [Footnote 10 The court stated as its reasons: "The United States Attorney has sworn that this material will not be used in the future course of this case, and at this stage of the proceedings, that oath is sufficient. The granting of defendants' motion to suppress at this time would necessitate an investigation of all of the Government's evidence. Such an investigation would entail a great deal of useless effort because much of this material, which has been collected since 1948, will not be used at the trial." United States v. Giglio, 16 F. R. D., at 270, 271. </s> [Footnote 11 "Q. In whose handwriting are the entries on Government's Exhibit 61-B for identification? I think you said it is the stub book. </s> A. To the best of my recollection, those are Mr. Cerone's. </s> "Q. How do you spell Cerone? A. C-e-r-o-n-e. </s> "Q. He was one of your employees, Mr. Roth? A. No, he was a bookkeeper employed by Tavern Fruit Juice. </s> "Q. Would the same be true with regard to the check, the face of the check, payee of the check? A. The payee of the check and the amount? </s> "Q. The handwriting is what I am asking about. A. The handwriting, that looks like William Giglio's handwriting. </s> "Q. The maker of the check [for] the $15,000? A. Yes, the signature. </s> "Q. They look like his handwriting, do they? A. Yes, sir. </s> "Q. And this 61-B for identification, you have told me that that looked like the printing or the writing of Mr. Cerone, did you not? </s> A. Yes, sir." </s> [Footnote 12 Though at times, in colloquies with the court, counsel for petitioners was equivocal, the following is typical of the position taken by him: </s> Counsel: "I really don't see how I can get adjudicated the question of the illegality of the indictment before you without calling all these people who made affidavits before Judge Palmieri. Now, that obviously would be, well, very disruptive of your trial. I would never think of doing it if . . . it didn't seem to me that was all I had. . . . Have I made it plain? </s> "The Court: I think you have, but I want to be sure. Now, the [355 U.S. 339, 356] whole purpose of this is to go to the procedural validity of the indictment." </s> Counsel: "That is it, yes, sir. That is it, that is just it exactly. </s> "The Court: And it is a question, really, of what happened before the grand jury." </s> Counsel: "That's it, really, just that. </s> "The Court: Rather than its effect upon what you might call the substantive issues of the case or the guilt or innocence of these defendants, let us say." </s> Counsel: "My answer is an unequivocal yes, and I don't have to look at a record to answer it." </s> [Footnote 13 The record shows that, although there was no objection to the question, counsel for the Government stated to the court, out of the hearing of the jury, that prior to the dismissal of the 1952 indictment the witness had examined partnership records produced by petitioners before the 1952 grand jury, and said: "If counsel elicits testimony now about those facts, there is going to be before this court evidence which Judge Goddard held improper. . . . If counsel wishes to examine into this field I think he should do it outside the presence of the jury, because it might be prejudicial error even if he voluntarily does it." Counsel for petitioners then made plain that his purpose was to determine whether tainted evidence was "used by the grand jury that found this indictment," and he further said, "I have no other way . . . than to do it here." Counsel for the Government then said to the court: "Now, the question specifically presented to the witness was broad and includes partnership records illegally produced and partnership records legally obtained. There can't be objection to the second part, but the question is too broad." Counsel for petitioners replied: "Well, I am not going into something half-way. . . ." The court then said: "All right, I think that is the way I should rule." It is obvious that none of this constitutes any support for petitioners' claim that they were denied an opportunity to cross-examine the witness to determine whether tainted evidence had been or was being used by the Government at the trial. </s> [Footnote 14 In fact, all petitioners sought to show by this witness was that when he caused petitioners to be subpoenaed to appear before the 1952 grand jury he knew that criminal informations charging tax evasions were then pending against them, and that these prosecutions were instituted in "bad faith." </s> [Footnote 15 Petitioner Lawn also contends that a statement made by the Government's attorney in his closing summation to the jury, saying, in pertinent part, "We vouch for [Roth and Lubben] because we [355 U.S. 339, 360] think they are telling the truth," deprived him of a fair trial. No objection was made to the statement at the trial. The Government's attorney did not say nor insinuate that the statement was based on personal knowledge or on anything other than the testimony of those witnesses given before the jury, and therefore it was not improper. Cf. Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d 14, 19; United States v. Holt, 108 F.2d 365, 370; Tuckerman v. United States, 291 F. 958, 969. Moreover, petitioners' counsel in his summation to the jury had argued that the Government's case was a persecution of petitioners, had been instituted in bad faith at the instance of a group of revenue agents, and was supported "solely" by the testimony of Roth and Lubben who were admitted perjurers, and counsel in his opening statement had said that the United States Attorney and his assistant in charge of the case "had been instructed, or in my opinion they never would have done this." These comments clearly invited the reply which petitioner Lawn now attacks. Cf. Gridley v. United States, 44 F.2d 716, 739; United States v. Battiato, 204 F.2d 717. In addition, the court in his charge to the jury, after telling them that they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, called particular attention to the fact that Roth was an accomplice and said: "You have got to be particularly careful in scrutinizing his testimony to see whether to save his own skin he lied to hurt somebody else or whether he had some other motive for lying to hurt somebody else." As to Lubben, the charge continued: "I am going to tell you to be just as careful with his testimony as you would with an accomplice, and look and scrutinize it carefully." We think the foregoing shows clearly that there is no merit in Lawn's contention. </s> [Footnote 16 Petitioners Giglio and Livorsi contend that the trial court erred in refusing their motion, made after several days of cross-examination of Lubben at the trial, for production of Lubben's federal income tax return for 1946, all testimony given by Lubben "before the grand jury that found this indictment or found any other indictment against these defendants," and all written statements made by Lubben to any agent of the Government. This issue was not raised in the Court of Appeals. Only in exceptional cases will this Court review a question not raised in the court below. Duignan v. United States, [355 U.S. 339, 363] 274 U.S. 195, 200 ; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 , 702. There are no exceptional circumstances here. Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 . Moreover, the question was not mentioned in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court. Our Rule 23 (1) (c) provides, in pertinent part: "Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court." The question is not properly here. Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129 . </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I agree with all of the Court's opinion except Part II relating to Government exhibits 61-A and 61-B, which are the copies of the canceled check and stub evidencing the $15,000 payment to Lawn. This leads me to concur in the affirmance of the convictions of Giglio and Livorsi, but as to Lawn I think a different result is required. </s> The Court appears to recognize that these exhibits were excludable as "tainted" evidence, since they were government-made copies of documents which, as held in a prior decision, United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, had been obtained from Lawn in violation of his constitutional rights. Nevertheless the Court sustains their admissibility on the ground that Lawn's counsel "consciously and intentionally" waived at trial any objection to them. This view I cannot share, for it seems to me the Court's action falls short of what we should do in holding the Government to the strictest measure of accountability on its repeated representations to court and defense counsel that it was not using any "tainted" evidence at the trial. [355 U.S. 339, 364] </s> The Court justifies its finding of waiver by reasoning that the "no objection" remark of Lawn's counsel at the time these exhibits were introduced reflected his deliberate choice between having these documents in, or securing their exclusion from, the case. But to me this reasoning is quite unconvincing. At the outset, it should be noted that the Court here assumes that counsel realized these particular photostats of the original check and stub were "tainted" copies. That, in my opinion, is a hazardous assumption. It is true that each exhibit bore the tell-tale 1952 grand jury markings, but assuming, as I do, that the Government's use of these documents was the result of inadvertence, it is equally true that this red light escaped the notice of the prosecutor as well as that of the trial judge, who the record shows was constantly alert and sensitive throughout the trial to the possibility of "tainted" evidence filtering into the case. I see no reason for attributing to defense counsel greater awareness on this score than that possessed by the prosecutor and the judge. </s> Further, it is by no means as apparent to me as it is to the Court that counsel wanted these exhibits in the case for the purpose of corroborating Lawn's explanation of the $15,000 payment as being an innocent personal loan from Giglio rather than, as claimed by the Government, an incriminatory payment from the partnership. 1 As I [355 U.S. 339, 365] read the record on this episode, it seems just as reasonable to suppose that counsel's voir dire examination of the witness through whom these exhibits were introduced, ending with his "no objection" remark, was but the familiar kind of jury play which a good trial lawyer sometimes uses to affect an appearance of unconcern towards damaging evidence which he knows he cannot keep out of the case. It is of interest that defense counsel did not even mention the loan theory in his summation; this tends to show that, having done what he could with these exhibits at the time of their receipt in evidence, his tactics were to leave well enough alone. On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that from a jury's standpoint the actual canceled check bearing Lawn's endorsement was of great value to the Government. In a jury's eyes the canceled check would be apt to be considered an instrument of crime implicating Lawn in the conspiracy, and so indeed the prosecutor played it up with telling effect in his summation. </s> In short, I think the Court has viewed this episode in an unreal light. At least there is much room for doubt as to what counsel actually intended. Where, as here, we are dealing with exhibits whose use the Government can justify at all only on a plea of good-faith inadvertence, I think the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, particularly in view of the Government's repeated unequivocal representations that it would not use any of the "tainted" evidence at the trial. The Court's contrary view I deem inconsistent with the high standards which past decisions have insisted be maintained in the conduct of federal criminal trials. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 -341. "The dignity of the United States Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony." Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 . [355 U.S. 339, 366] </s> In my opinion the admission of these exhibits was prejudicial error, and if nothing further appeared I think we would be required to reverse for a new trial. However, additional evidence now proffered by the Government indicates that other "innocent" copies of the same check and stub were in the hands of the New Jersey federal authorities at the time of the New York trial. 2 Had the existence of such copies been known to the New York prosecutor, the error arising from the use of the "tainted" copies should be deemed harmless, for if objection to these exhibits had been made the prosecutor could have substituted "innocent" copies. If, on the other hand, the federal authorities in New Jersey had no such copies or if in any event the New York prosecutor was unaware of their possession of the copies, reversal would still be required on grounds of prejudicial error, since the prosecutor would not have been in a position to substitute "innocent" copies had the "tainted" copies been objected to and excluded at the trial. </s> Although, as the Court properly holds, we cannot pass upon the accuracy of this additional evidence in determining the issues before us, I think the Government's proffer may properly be taken into account in deciding the nature of the judgment we should enter. See 28 U.S.C. 2106; cf. United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Co., 355 U.S. 233 . The petitioner, by making his specific objection to admission of the disputed exhibits for the first time on appeal, gave the Government no occasion to introduce the "innocent" copies at the trial and thereby avoid error. He should not now be permitted to preclude the Government from showing that the error complained of was harmless. [355 U.S. 339, 367] In these circumstances I think the proper course for us is to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to Lawn, and to remand the case to the District Court for the purpose of determining whether "innocent" copies of these exhibits were within reach of the New York prosecutor at the time of trial. If the court so finds, it should be instructed to let Lawn's conviction stand, and if it finds otherwise, to grant him a new trial. </s> [Footnote 1 It is difficult to believe that counsel could have found in these exhibits the important corroborative value which the Court now attributes to them. The original recording of the $15,000 payment as "legal expense" on Tavern's books had been made by the company accountant only after he had consulted Giglio, and there is no dispute that the subsequent alteration in this entry to reflect the payment as a transaction involving Giglio personally rather than the partnership was urged by Lawn. Only because of Lawn's insistence did the $15,000 "payment" take on its subsequent guise as a loan from Giglio. </s> [Footnote 2 The Government asserts that such copies were voluntarily produced by Lawn at a hearing with reference to his own income tax returns which was held in New Jersey on May 12, 1952. </s> [355 U.S. 339, 368]

United States Supreme Court MARINO V. RAGEN(1947) No. 93 Argued: Decided: December 22, 1947 </s> Motion for Instructions to Circuit Court Denied March 15, 1948. See 333 U.S. 852 . Tony Marino, pro se. George F. Barrett, Wm. C. Wines and James C. Murray, all of Chicago, Ill., for respondent. </s> PER CURIAM. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Illinois, alleging that his conviction in 1925 on a charge of murder was the result of a denial of his rights under the ederal Constitution. That court, after a hearing, quashed the writ; and as its order cannot be reviewed by any higher Illinois court under Illinois practice, this petition for a writ of certiorari is properly addressed to this Court. See Woods v. [ Marino v. Ragen 332 U.S. 561 (1948) ] </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 562] </s> Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 ; 15 U. of Chic.L. Rev. 118, 122. The facts conceded by respondent are as follows: The common-law record recites that petitioner was arraigned in open court and advised through interpreters of the meaning and effect of a plea of guilty and that petitioner signed a statement waiving jury trial and pleading guilty. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. It does not appear, however, that an attorney was appointed to represent him. The waiver was not in fact signed by him, and no plea of guilty was entered at the trial. He was 18 years old at that time and had been in this country only two years. He did not understand the English language and it is doubtful that he understood American trial court procedure. The arresting officer served as an interpreter for petitioner at the original trial. The State of Illinois speaking through the Attorney General admits the foregoing facts, confesses error, and consents to a reversal of the judgment below. He states that the writ of habeas corpus is a proper remedy in Illinois in this case because the facts, which he concedes to be a denial of due process of law under the decisions of this Court, were known to the court at the time of the original trial, though they were not a matter of record at the trial. Whether or not on this showing habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy in the court to correct a denial of due process is a question of state law as to which we accept the concession of the state's Attorney General. In light of the confession of error (see Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 ; Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 ; cf. Baltzer v. United States, 248 U.S. 593 ) and the undisputed facts, we conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 563] </s> Permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment below is vacated and remanded to the Circuit Court. Judgment vacated. So ordered. </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MURPHY join, concurring. This case sharply points up a much larger problem, of growing concern to this Court, than merely the disposition to be made of Marino's petition in view of the state's confession of error. I agree that relief is due him, and I join in the Court's opinion. But I do not find his case different, except in one respect, from many others which have come regularly to this Court from Illinois in recent years, in which relief has been as regularly denied. The only substantial difference, in my judgment, is that here the state has confessed error. That confession raises, in my opinion, the question of the course this Court should follow in the future concerning the disposition of similar petitions from Illinois. During the last three terms we have been flooded with petitions from Illinois alleging deprivations of due process and other constitutional rights. Thus in the 1944 term, out of a total of 339 petitions filed in forma pauperis, almost all by prisoners, 141 came from Illinois; in the 1945 term, 175 out of 393 were from Illinois; and in the 1946 term, 322 out of 528 came from that state. 1 With mechanical regularity petitions for certiorari to review </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 564] </s> Illinois' refusals to grant relief, often even to grant a hearing, have been denied. 2 We have adhered consistently to the practice of not entertaining such a petition when it seemed to appear that the applicant had not sought the appropriate state remedy. Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 . And, as a corolarly of this practice, we have i sisted that the federal courts deny a hearing to an applicant for habeas corpus who has not exhausted his state remedies. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 ; Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U.S. 219 and cases cited. This rule, requiring exhaustion of state remedies as a condition precedent to federal relief, has been firmly established by repeated decisions of this Court. Even in extreme situations its application has been justified by sound administrative reasons. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 , 343, 98 A.L.R. 406. But it has always been clear that the rule may be applied only on the assumption that an adequate state remedy is actually available. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 176 , 219; Woods v. Nierstheimer, supra, 328 U.S. 211 , at page 217, 999; Ex parte Hawk, supra, 321 U.S. 114 , at page 118, 450. And it would be nothing less than abdication of our constitutional duty and function to rebuff petitioners with this mechanical formula whenever it may become clear that the alleged state remedy is nothing but a procedural morass offering no substantial hope of relief. Experience has convinced me that this is true of Illinois. This case presents a flagrant example of deprivation of due process. In 1925 petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was then 18 years old and unable to speak English, having arrived in the United States from Italy less than two years before. </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 565] </s> The police officer who arrested him served as one of the two interpreters at his trial. He was not represented by counsel nor, as far as can be determined, was his right to counsel explained to him. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 , dissenting opinion 141, 1720. Although the record shows that petitioner signed a written shows that petitioner signed a written had entered a plea of guilty, in fact he did not sign any such waiver, and no guilty plea appears to have been entered. His sentence was imposed one week after the indictment. Twenty-two years later these facts were established at a hearing in the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Illinois, on petitioner's application for habeas corpus. Nevertheless, the writ was denied without assignment of any ground. 3 Petitioner sought certiorari in this Court, and when called upon for a response, Illinois confessed error. While I concur in the Court's judgment, the light which the confession of error sheds on the Illinois procedural labyrinth confirms the growing conviction that Illinois offers no adequate remedy to prisoners situated as is the present petitioner. The trouble with Illinois is not that it offers no procedure. It is that it offers too many, and makes them so intricate and ineffective that in practical effect they amount to none. The possibility of securing effective determination on the merits is substantially foreclosed by the probability, indeed the all but mathematical certainty, that the case will go off on the p ocedural ruling that the wrong one of several possible remedies has been followed. 4 </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 566] </s> Thus, our understanding of Illinois law at the time of Woods v. Nierstheimer, supra, was that habeas corpus would not lie in such a case as this because petitioner neither challenged the jurisdiction of the court which convicted him, nor alleged any subsequent events having the effect of voiding that conviction. 328 U.S. 211, 215 . Hence we assumed that coram nobis would be the appropriate remedy. But Illinois now suggests that we have oversimplified the situation. That habeas corpus is appropriate here is explained by the state's attorney general as follows: 'In order to keep Illinois' position constant and consistent before this court, we venture to point out that although the present Attorney General has prevailed upon this court to recognize that coram nobis is a remedy in Illinois exclusive of habeas corpus, where the facts constituting denial of due process but dehors the record were not known to the trial court at the time of the imposition of sentence, we have always conceded that where, as in the instant case, those facts although not a matter of record at the trial were nevertheless known to the trial court, habeas corpus may be available in proper cases. We deem habeas corpus to be clearly appropriate under the Illinois law in this case. We do not concede, however, that there are no cases in which writ of error, as distinct from either coram nobis or habeas corpus, would be the proper remedy.' Notwithstanding the explanation, the extent of the applicability of this expanded scope of habeas corpus 'in </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 567] </s> proper cases' is by no means clear. Perhaps it is limited to a case where over 20 years have elapsed since the conviction, and hence neither writ of error nor coram nobis is available; perhaps it would be available any time after the five-year statute of limitations on coram nobis had run. 5 Possibly the rule is general for cases of deprivation of constitutional rights whenever the judge responsible for the deprivation had knowledge of the facts. I can only indulge in speculation, because I am aware of nothing in the Illinois statutes or decisions which defines these novel limitations on the use of habeas corpus or supports the attorney general's position. Nor do I know whether the lower Illinois courts accept this position in view of the limited area to which the writ has been confined by the state supreme court decisions. See e.g., Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N.E.2d 343; Barrett v. Bradley, 391 Ill. 169, 62 N.E.2d 788. In short, the effect of the state's confession of error in this case is not to clarify, it is rather to confuse further, a situation already so muddled that only one rational conclusion may be drawn. It is that the Illinois procedural labyrinth is made up entirely of blind alleys, each of which is useful only as a means of convincing the federal courts that the state road which the petitioner has taken was the wrong one. If the only state remedy is the possibility that the attorney general will confess error when he det rmines that a flagrant case will not survive scrutiny by this Court,6 it is hardly necessary to point out that the federal courts should be open to a petitioner even though he has not made his way through several </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 568] </s> courts applying for habeas corpus, then writ of error, and finally coram nobis. 7 </s> Moreover, even though there may be an avenue of escape through the state courts in a rare case, the situation is no different as long as the technical distinctions between the various remedies are so fine that only an oracle could point out the proper procedural road. The exhaustion-of- state-remedies rule should not be stretched to the absurdity of requiring the exhaustion of three separate remedies when at the outset a petitioner cannot intelligently select the proper way, and in conclusion he may find only that none of the three is appropriate or effective. That each is severely restricted is clear. 8 That any one </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 569] </s> is available as a matter of right is by no means clear. 9 And even if each has a limited function exclusive of the other two, it may well be that no one is adequate in a case where the petitioner must show a combination of facts to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. 10 </s> The Illinois scheme affords a theoretical system of remedies. In my judgment it is hardly more than theoretical. Experience has shown beyond all doubt that, in any practical sense, the remedies available there are inadequate. 11 Whether this is true because in fact no remedy </s> [332 U.S. 561 , 570] </s> exists, or because every remedy is so limited as to be inadequate, or because the procedural problem of selecting the proper one is so difficult, is beside the point. If the federal guarantee of due process in a criminal trial is to have real significance in Illinois, it is imperative that men convicted in violation of their constitutional rights have an adequate opportunity to be heard in court. This opportunity is not adequate so long as they are required to ride the Illinois merry-go-round of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and writ of error before getting a hearing in a federal court. Consequently, as far as I am concerned, the Illinois remedies are exhausted here, apart from the state's confession of error. I also think that, until that state affords a reasonably clear and adequate means for presenting and disposing of such questions as Marino's case involves, this Court should no longer require exhaustion of its present scheme of ineffective and inadequate remedies before permitting resort to the federal district courts sitting in Illinois. 12 We should neither delay nor deny justice, nor clog its administration, with so useless and harmful a procedural strangling of federal constitutional rights. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 This increasing volume no doubt is due in part to the assiduity with which prisioners seek relief either from prison or from the tedium of prison life. But that not all of it can be attributed to that factor seems clear from the facts that no other state presents anything approaching such a volume of petitions or so complicated a procedure for finally disposing of the questions raised. </s> [Footnote 2 Of the 322 petitions filed in the 1946 term, only two were granted. In Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 , the narrow scope of review by writ of error in Illinois precluded relief here; in McLaren v. Nierstheimer, 329 U.S. 685 , the judgment was vacated and the case remanded after the state confessed error. </s> [Footnote 3 But for the state's confession of error, our usual practice in these cases would lead us to assume that the denial had been on the ground that habeas corpus was not the appropriate state remedy. See note 4. [Footnote 4 Since the petitions more often than otherwise are disposed of by mere denial without assignment of grounds, it is seldom possible for this Court to know whether the Illinois court has acted on the merits or on the state ground that the wrong remedy has been followed. It is therefore always possible to assume here that the ruling was of the latter type and this would seem to be true, if not of every such determination, at least of all until the last conceivably possible route has been followed. </s> [Footnote 5 Ill.Rev.Stat. (1947) c. 110, 196. This five-year limitation period applies to 'all coram nobis proceedings.' People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 26, 72 N.E.2d 827, 831; People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 N.E.2d 23. Writ of error is governed by a common-law limitation period of 20 years. People v. Chapman, 392 Ill. 168, 64 N.E.2d 529; People v. Murphy, 296 Ill. 532, 129 N.E. 868. [Footnote 6 See McLaren v. Nierstheimer, 329 U.S. 685 . </s> [Footnote 7 'Under present procedures, it is nearly impossible to secure adjudication of the in Violation of Due Process in Illinois, judgments of conviction in Illinois courts; yet petitioners must present their applications for consideration seven to twelve times in order to escape the procedural maze of the state courts and to secure their initial hearings on the truth of their allegations in the federal courts.' Note, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 107, 120. [Footnote 8 Review by writ of error in Illinois is limited to matters in the common-law record where no bill of exceptions is filed. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 ; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 ; People v. Owens, 397 Ill. 166, 73 N.E.2d 274. The bill of exceptions must be preserved within 50 days after judgment was entered unless an extension is granted during that time. Ill.Rev.Stat. c. 110, 259.70A. Habeas corpus has been thought to be available only to challenge jurisdiction in the narrow sense of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, or to show events subsequent to the trial which render the original conviction void. Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 ; Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N.E.2d 343; Barrett v. Bradley, 391 Ill. 169, 62 N.E.2d 788. Coram nobis is available only to present factual questions of a certain kind, People v. Drysch, 311 Ill. 342, 349, 143 N.E. 100, which were not known to the trial court, People v. Schuedter, 336 Ill. 244, 168 N.E. 323, which do not conflict with jury findings, and which petitioner failed to raise because of excusable mistake rather than negligence on his, or his attorney's part, see People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 440, 65 N.E.2d 23. See Comment, Collateral Relief from Convictions in Violation of Dur Process in Illinois, 42 Ill.L.Rev. 329. </s> [Footnote 9 It is questionable whether Illinois affords a remedy for a man deprived of his right to counsel. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 , dissenting opinion 141, 1720; People v. Evans, 397 Ill. 430, 74 N.E.2d 708. The trial judge would surely know that he had refused to appoint counsel and would be presumed to be familiar with the record, see People v. Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 440, 65 N.E.2d 23; hence coram nobis would not lie. Assuming that the clerk makes the routine entry to the effect that the accused was apprised of his rights, which he promptly waived, see People v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N.E. 500, writ of error would afford inadequate review. See Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 . Only if the attorney general's view of habeas corpus would extend to such a case would a remedy be available. There may even be doubt whether an allegation that a confession was obtained by coercion would warrant review, see People v. Drysch, 311 Ill. 342, 143 N.E. 100; People v. Schuedter, 336 Ill. 244, 168 N.E. 323. [Footnote 10 For example, petitioner might allege that he had inadequate time to prepare his defense, that the trial court denied him counsel, and that a forced confession was used as evidence at the trial. The first allegation could be made only by writ of error because the crucial dates would be a matter of record; the second only by habeas corpus, if at all, because the trial court is presumed to know what is in the record and he would certainly know that he had refused to appoint counsel; and the third allegation only by coram nobis because the facts would be unknown to the trial court. Perhaps none of the allegations considered separately would establish a deprivation of due process, yet with the whole picture before the court a violation of constitutional rights would be apparent. [Footnote 11 See note 1 and text; also note 2. '(The) inevitable conclusion must be reached that the state of Illinois provides no satisfactory or adequate method for post-conviction hearings * * *.' Note, A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 107, 128. </s> [Footnote 12 This Court has frequently recognized that the policy underlying the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine does not require the exhaustion of inadequate remedies. Hillsborough Twp. v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 ; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 ; Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 ; Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, 299 U.S. 167 ; Corporation Commission v. Cary, 296 U.S. 452 ; Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 ; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 ; Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 .9

United States Supreme Court ONE LOT EMERALD CUT STONES v. UNITED STATES(1972) No. 72-376 Argued: Decided: December 11, 1972 </s> A forfeiture of imported merchandise not included in a declaration and entry pursuant to the tariff provision in 19 U.S.C. 1497 is not barred by a prior acquittal under 18 U.S.C. 545, which (unlike the civil forfeiture proceeding) requires proof of an intent to defraud; nor is the forfeiture action barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, since Congress may impose both a criminal and civil sanction respecting the same act or omission. </s> Certiorari granted; 461 F.2d 1189, affirmed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> On June 5, 1969, Francisco Farkac Klementova entered the United States without declaring to United States Customs one lot of emerald cut stones and one ring. Klementova was indicted, tried, and acquitted of charges of violating 18 U.S.C. 545 1 by willfully and knowingly, [409 U.S. 232, 233] with intent to defraud the United States, smuggling the articles into the United States without submitting to the required customs procedures. Following the acquittal, the Government instituted a forfeiture action in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, under 18 U.S.C. 545 and 497 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 728, 19 U.S.C. 1497. 2 Klementova intervened in the proceeding and argued that his acquittal of charges of violating 18 U.S.C. 545 barred the forfeiture. The District Court held that the forfeiture was barred by collateral estoppel and the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a forfeiture action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1497 was not barred by an acquittal of charges of violating 18 U.S.C. 545. We grant certiorari, affirm, and thereby resolve a conflict among the circuits as to whether a forfeiture is barred in these circumstances. 3 </s> [409 U.S. 232, 234] </s> Collateral estoppel would bar a forfeiture under 1497 if, in the earlier criminal proceeding, the elements of a 1497 forfeiture had been resolved against the Government. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). But in this case acquittal on the criminal charge did not necessarily resolve the issues in the forfeiture action. For the Government to secure a conviction under 545, it must prove the physical act of unlawful importation as well as a knowing and willful intent to defraud the United States. An acquittal on the criminal charge may have involved a finding that the physical act was not done with the requisite intent. Indeed, the court that tried the criminal charge specifically found that the Government had failed to establish intent. 4 To succeed in a forfeiture action under 1497, on the other hand, the Government need only prove that the property was brought into the United States without the required declaration; the Government bears no burden with respect to intent. Thus, the criminal acquittal may not be regarded as a determination that the property was not unlawfully brought into the United States, and the forfeiture [409 U.S. 232, 235] proceeding will not involve an issue previously litigated and finally determined between these parties. 5 </s> Moreover, the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented "`an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.'" Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938). As to the issues raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in civil proceedings. See Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897). </s> If for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments. "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits merely [409 U.S. 232, 236] punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense." Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 399. See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 6 Forfeiture under 1497 is a civil sanction. The provision was originally enacted as 497 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 964. The Tariff Act of 1930 re-enacted the forfeiture remedy, 46 Stat. 728, and added 593, 46 Stat. 751, which became 18 U.S.C. 545. The forfeiture provision fell within Title IV of the Act, which contained the "Administrative Provisions." Part III of that title, of which 1497 was a part, dealt with "Ascertainment, Collection, and Recovery of Duties." Section 545, on the other hand, was part of the "Enforcement Provisions" and became part of the Criminal Code of the United States. The fact that the sanctions were separate and distinct and were contained in different parts of the statutory scheme is relevant in determining the character of the forfeiture. Congress could and did order both civil and criminal sanctions, clearly distinguishing them. There is no [409 U.S. 232, 237] reason for frustrating that design. See Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 404. </s> The 1497 forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for investigation and enforcement expenses. In other contexts we have recognized that such purposes characterize remedial rather than punitive sanctions. See id., at 401; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra, at 549-550; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 -154 (1956). Moreover, it cannot be said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress in 1497 is so unreasonable or excessive that it transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, supra, at 154. See Murphy v. United States, supra; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, supra. </s> "Forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable sums of money are other sanctions which have been recognized as enforcible by civil proceedings . . . . In spite of their comparative severity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions." Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 400. </s> The question of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is one of statutory construction. Id., at 399. It appears that the 1497 forfeiture is civil and remedial, and, as a result, its imposition is not barred by an acquittal of charges of violating 545. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States, smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any merchandise which should have been invoiced, or makes out or passes, or attempts to pass, through the custom house any false, forged, or fraudulent invoice, or other document or paper; or </s> "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law - </s> "Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. </s> "Proof of defendant's possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for violation of this section. </s> "Merchandise introduced into the United States in violation of this section, or the value thereof, to be recovered from any person described [409 U.S. 232, 233] in the first or second paragraph of this section, shall be forfeited to the United States. </s> "The term `United States,' as used in this section, shall not include the Philippine Islands, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island, or Guam." </s> [Footnote 2 Title 19 U.S.C. 1497 provides: </s> "Any article not included in the declaration and entry as made, and, before examination of the baggage was begun, not mentioned in writing by such person, if written declaration and entry was required, or orally if written declaration and entry was not required, shall be subject to forfeiture and such person shall be liable to a penalty equal to the value of such article." </s> [Footnote 3 In United States v. Two Hundred and One Fifty-Pound Bags of Furazolidone, No. 71-1329 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment on the basis of a previous acquittal of charges of violating 545 in favor of the owner of property in a forfeiture action commenced by the Government under 18 U.S.C. 545 and 19 U.S.C. 1460. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agrees with the view of the Fifth Circuit in the present case. See [409 U.S. 232, 234] Leiser v. United States, 234 F.2d 648, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 893 (1956). </s> We need not, and do not, decide whether an acquittal under 545 bars a forfeiture under 545. </s> [Footnote 4 The judge at the criminal trial specifically stated: </s> "He is, obviously, a sophisticated dealer in emeralds and other jewelry. </s> "I don't condone nor do I approve, for one minute, what he did in this instance. I think he knew that that jewelry - that that ring and those emeralds should have been declared. </s> "He made a declaration of some cigarettes and some whiskey, several other little odd, meager items there, but I'm not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he did what he did with the intent to defraud the United States." </s> [Footnote 5 The difference in the issues involved in the criminal proceeding, on the one hand, and the forfeiture action, on the other, serves to distinguish Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), relied upon by the District Court in the present case. Coffey involved a forfeiture action commenced after an acquittal. This Court noted, in holding the forfeiture barred, that "[t]he information [for forfeiture] is founded on 3257, 3450 and 3453; and there is no question, on the averments in the answer, that the fraudulent acts and attempts and intents to defraud, alleged in the prior criminal information, and covered by the verdict and judgment of acquittal, embraced all of the acts, attempts and intents averred in the information in this suit." Id., at 442. The Court specifically distinguished the situation where "a certain intent must be proved to support the indictment, which need not be proved to support the civil action." Id., at 443. See also Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897). </s> [Footnote 6 The District Court relied upon the following language in United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971): </s> "But as Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886), makes clear, `proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal' for Fifth Amendment purposes." (Emphasis in United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency.) </s> Section 1497 does not result in a forfeiture by reason of the commission of a criminal offense. A forfeiture results from the act of importation without following customs procedures; no criminal offense, much less a criminal conviction, is required. Cf. id., at 718-722. </s> One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), is likewise inapposite for it dealt with a forfeiture that could not be had without a "determination that the criminal law has been violated." Id., at 701. </s> [409 U.S. 232, 238]

United States Supreme Court ANDERSON BROS. FORD v. VALENCIA(1981) No. 80-84 Argued: March 23, 1981Decided: June 8, 1981 </s> Section 128 (a) (10) of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) provides that in connection with closed-end consumer credit transactions, the creditor must disclose "any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates." Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board (Board), promulgated pursuant to the Board's authority under the TILA, essentially repeats the statute's disclosure requirement, defines "security interest" and "security" as "any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation," and sets forth a nonexhaustive list of interests included in the terms. In 1977, respondents purchased an automobile from petitioner dealer under a retail installment contract that was assigned to petitioner Ford Motor Credit Co. A provision on the face of the contract disclosed that the seller retained a security interest in the automobile but did not refer to a provision on the back of the contract whereby the buyers, who were required to purchase physical damage insurance on the automobile protecting the interests of both the buyers and the seller, assigned to the seller any unearned insurance premiums that might be returned if the policy were canceled. Before making any payments on the contract or the insurance policy, respondents returned the automobile to the dealer and filed suit in federal court, alleging that the contract violated the TILA for failure to disclose on its face that the seller had acquired a "security interest" in unearned insurance premiums, and seeking statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that the assignment of unearned insurance premiums created a "security interest" within the meaning of 128 (a) (10), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Such an assignment of unearned insurance premiums does not create a "security interest" that must be disclosed pursuant to the TILA. Pp. 211-223. </s> (a) In a proposed official staff interpretation, the Board has expressly stated that Regulation Z does not require a creditor to disclose as a security interest its right to receive insurance proceeds or unearned premiums [452 U.S. 205, 206] from a property insurance policy. Also the Board's revised Regulation Z, which was issued pursuant to the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, defines "security interest" as not including "incidental interests" such as interests in insurance proceeds or premium rebates. This definition does not purport to change the original Regulation Z with respect to whether an incidental interest in unearned insurance premiums must be disclosed, and thus is persuasive authority as to whether such an interest should be disclosed as a "security interest" under the unrevised regulation. Neither the original TILA nor the 1980 Act defines the term "security interest," and the legislative history of the 1980 Act fully supports the Board's revised regulation and its proposed interpretation of the unrevised regulation. Pp. 211-219. </s> (b) Although neither the 1980 Act's legislative history nor the Board's construction of the term "security interest" conclusively establishes the meaning of these words in the TILA, the Board's regulation implementing this legislation, as well as its interpretation of its own regulation, should be accepted by the courts since they are not repugnant to any provision in the TILA. Cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 . The Board's position is supported by the legislative history of both the TILA and the 1980 Act, and is a permissible interpretation of the term "security interest" as used in the TILA. Pp. 219-223. </s> 617 F.2d 1278, reversed and remanded. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 223. </s> Aaron J. Kramer argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. </s> Alan A. Alop argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were James O. Latturner and James D. Weill. * </s> [452 U.S. 205, 207] </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The issue presented in this case is whether an assignment of certain unearned insurance premiums created a "security interest" that should have been disclosed pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 82 Stat. 146, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. 1 </s> I </s> In September 1977, respondents purchased an automobile from petitioner Anderson Bros. Ford. They signed the dealer's standard automobile retail installment contract. This contract was assigned for value to petitioner Ford Motor Credit Co. A provision on the face of the contract disclosed that the seller retained a security interest in the automobile. 2 A provision on the back of the contract stated that the buyer was required to purchase and maintain physical damage insurance on the automobile, "protecting the interests of Buyer and Seller," and further stated: </s> "Buyer hereby assigns to Seller any monies payable under such insurance, by whomever obtained, including returned or unearned premiums, and Seller hereby is authorized on behalf of both Buyer and Seller to receive or collect same, to endorse checks or drafts in payment thereof, to cancel such insurance or to release or settle any claim with respect thereto. The proceeds from such insurance, by whomever obtained, shall be applied toward replacement of the Property or payment of the indebtedness hereunder in the sole discretion of Seller." [452 U.S. 205, 208] </s> If the insurance policy on the automobile were canceled for any reason prior to the expiration of the term of the policy, this provision would permit the creditor to apply any unearned insurance premiums toward payment of the remaining debt. 3 </s> In October 1977, before making any payments on the installment contract or on the insurance policy, respondents returned the automobile to Anderson Bros. Ford. They subsequently brought this action in federal court, 4 alleging, inter alia, that the sales contract violated the TILA because it did not disclose on the face of the contract that the seller had acquired a "security interest" in unearned insurance premiums. 5 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 209] This claim was based on 128 (a) (10) of the TILA, which provides in pertinent part: </s> "In connection with each consumer credit sale not under an open end credit plan, the creditor shall disclose each of the following items which is applicable: </s> . . . . . </s> "A description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates." 82 Stat. 155, 15 U.S.C. 1638 (a) (10). </s> This disclosure requirement is essentially repeated in 226.8 (b) (5) of Regulation Z, a Federal Reserve Board regulation promulgated pursuant to the Board's authority under 105 of the TILA. 6 Under the regulation, a creditor must disclose: </s> "A description or identification of the type of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates . . . ." 12 CFR 226.8 (b) (5) (1980). </s> Respondents sought statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. 7 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 210] </s> The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that an assignment of unearned insurance premiums creates a "security interest" within the meaning of 128 (a) (10). App. 33-35. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 617 F.2d 1278 (1980). Recognizing that the TILA does not define the term "security interest," the Court of Appeals relied on the definition contained in Regulation Z: </s> "`Security interest' and `security' mean any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by operation of law, and any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an obligation." 12 CFR 226.2 (gg) (1980). </s> The Court of Appeals concluded that the assignment of unearned insurance premiums created an "interest in property which secure[d] payment or performance of an obligation" within the meaning of Regulation Z, and thus created a "security interest" that must be disclosed under 128 (a) (10). The Court of Appeals accordingly affirmed the judgment below. 8 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 211] </s> We granted certiorari to settle whether such an assignment of unearned insurance premiums must be disclosed as a "security interest" under the TILA. 9 </s> 449 U.S. 981 (1980). We reverse. </s> II </s> Although the Court of Appeals' construction of the Act and of Regulation Z is shared by three of the four other Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the question, 10 this view, which is essentially a claim that the plain language of the statute and the regulation requires the result reached by [452 U.S. 205, 212] the court below, has recently been challenged on several fronts. First, based in part on the legislative history of the 1980 amendments to the TILA, see infra, at 218-219, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has concluded that the meaning of the term "security interest" as used in the TILA is not so plain and has held that the creditor's interest in unearned insurance premiums need not be disclosed as a security interest under either the statute or Regulation Z. James v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 638 F.2d 147 (1980). </s> Second, in September 1980, the Board, the agency that issued Regulation Z, published for comment Official Staff Interpretation FC-0173, regarding security interest disclosures in closed-end consumer credit transactions. 45 Fed. Reg. 63295. Although the staff recognized that several courts held a contrary view, its clearly expressed position was that neither 226.2 (gg) nor 226.8 (b) (5) requires a creditor to disclose as a security interest its right to receive insurance proceeds or unearned premiums from a property insurance policy: </s> "The staff believes that a creditor is not required by [ 226.8 (b) (5)] to disclose its right to receive insurance proceeds or unearned insurance premiums nor to disclose that it is named as loss payee or beneficiary on an insurance policy. Truth in Lending disclosures are meant to provide useful information to consumers to enhance credit shopping. Consumers do need to know that they risk the loss of certain property if they default. The disclosures under 226.8 (b) (5) inform consumers of which property is subject to that risk at the time the credit decision is being made. We believe that information regarding the creditor's interest in insurance proceeds and unearned premiums would not be used in comparison shopping. Although a technical reading of the security interest definition might cover a creditor's interest in insurance proceeds and unearned premiums, it is our opinion that such incidental interests are not [452 U.S. 205, 213] the type of interests meant to be covered by 226.8 (b) (5)." Ibid. </s> This construction of Regulation Z, the staff concluded, "better serves the purpose of the statute and the regulation to convey in a meaningful way information that can be used by consumers in shopping for credit." Ibid. </s> We are aware that after we granted certiorari in this case, the Board deferred final action on FC-0173; but we cannot agree that the staff's views expressed in the proposed ruling are wholly without significance. The comment period on the proposed interpretation expired on October 24, 1980, the proposal has not been withdrawn or revised, and it appears from the Board's public statement that final action was deferred only because it was "inappropriate" to do otherwise in the light of our intervening grant of certiorari. Id., at 84074. </s> We need not, however, rest on FC-0173 for the Board's construction of the statute or of Regulation Z with respect to the scope of the security interest disclosure requirement. On March 31, 1980, the President approved the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act (1980 Act) as Title VI of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. 94 Stat. 168. The 1980 Act, which will be fully effective on April 1, 1982, will amend the TILA in many respects but will leave substantial portions of the TILA unchanged. It will amend 128 (a) (10) of the TILA to require a creditor to make the following disclosure with respect to any "security interest" acquired by the creditor in a closedend consumer credit transaction: </s> "Where the credit is secured, a statement that a security interest has been taken in (A) the property which is purchased as part of the credit transaction, or (B) property not purchased as part of the credit transaction identified by item or type." 614 (a) (9), 94 Stat. 179. [452 U.S. 205, 214] </s> Like the TILA, however, the 1980 Act does not define the term "security interest." </s> The 1980 Act provides that all implementing regulations must be promulgated at least one year prior to the effective date of the Act and that any creditor may comply with the revised regulations prior to the effective date of the Act. 625, 94 Stat. 185-186. The Board accordingly revised Regulation Z, effective April 1, 1981, but with compliance being optional until April 1, 1982. 46 Fed. Reg. 20848 (1981). Section 226.18 (m) of revised Regulation Z requires the creditor to disclose in connection with closed-end consumer credit transactions. </s> "[t]he fact that the creditor has or will acquire a security interest in the property purchased as part of the transaction, or in other property identified by item or type." Id., at 20903. </s> Section 226.2 (a) (25) defines the term "security interest" as follows: </s> "`Security interest' means an interest in property that secures performance of a consumer credit obligation and that is recognized by state or federal law. It does not include incidental interests such as interests in proceeds, accessions, additions, fixtures, insurance proceeds (whether or not the creditor is a loss payee or beneficiary), premium rebates, or interests in after-acquired property. For purposes of disclosure under 226.6 and 226.18, the term does not include an interest that arises solely by operation of law. However, for purposes of the right of rescission under 226.15 and 226.23, the term does include interests that arise solely by operation of law." Id., at 20894. </s> Although the new regulation changes the Board's prior definition of a "security interest" in some respects, 11 there is [452 U.S. 205, 215] no indication that the definition was being changed with respect to unearned premiums. When the Board issued revised Regulation Z, the Board explained that it distinguishes an incidental interest in unearned insurance premiums from a "security interest" that must be disclosed: </s> "[T]here is a difference between an incidental interest and an interest that is the essence of the transaction. For example, when an automobile is financed, the insurance proceeds are incidental to the primary security interest, the automobile. The creditor's interest in such insurance would not be a security interest under the regulation. On the other hand, when the credit transaction is the financing of an insurance policy, the creditor's interest in that policy is just like a purchase money security interest and would be disclosed as a security interest." 12 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 216] </s> Since this reasoning applies to the TILA as well as to the 1980 Act, we do not understand the Board to have revised Regulation Z with respect to whether an incidental interest in unearned insurance premiums must be disclosed. 13 The Board's revised regulation construes the statutory term "security [452 U.S. 205, 217] interest" which appears, undefined, in both the TILA and the 1980 Act; it also defines the term "security interest" appearing in the revised regulation. The same term had been used in the original Regulation Z, and it seems to us that the Board's definition of "security interest" in the revised regulation is persuasive authority as to whether an interest in unearned insurance premiums should be disclosed as a "security interest" under the unrevised regulation. As we see it, the term "security interest" as used in both the revised and unrevised versions of Regulation Z does not include an interest in unearned insurance premiums in a transaction such as this. </s> Under the TILA and the 1980 Act, the Board is authorized to prescribe regulations, which "may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper" to carry out the purposes of the statute. 14 In light of this statutory authority, we should not expressly or by implication invalidate as contrary to the statute the Board's revised regulation concerning disclosure of security interests, which with respect to the disclosure of interests in unearned premiums did not purport to change the original Regulation Z and reiterates the view expressed in FC-0173 that an interest in unearned premiums is not a "security interest" for purposes of the disclosure provision. 15 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 218] </s> The legislative history of the 1980 Act fully supports the Board's revised regulation regarding disclosure of a creditor's interest in unearned insurance premiums and its proposed interpretation of the unrevised regulation. The Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on the 1980 Act explained: </s> "When a security interest is being taken in property purchased as part of the credit transaction, this section requires a statement that a security interest has been or will be taken in the property purchased. When a security interest is being taken in property not purchased as part of the credit transaction, the Committee intends this provision to require a listing by item or type of the property securing the transaction, but not a listing of related or incidental interests in the property. For example, a loan secured by an automobile (not being purchased with the proceeds of the loan) would require a statement indicating that the loan is secured by an automobile but would not require a listing of incidental or related rights which the creditor may have such as insurance proceeds or unearned insurance premiums, rights arising under, or waived in accord with state law, accessions, accessories, or proceeds." S. Rep. No. 96-368, p. 30 (1979). 16 </s> Furthermore, on the floor of the Senate a member of the responsible Committee observed: </s> "Many cases have resulted from the complex security interest disclosure requirements under the law. An illustrative [452 U.S. 205, 219] case is Gennuso v. Commercial Bank and Trust Co., 455 F. Supp. 461 (W. D. Pa. 1976); 566 F.2d 437, (3rd Cir. 1977), which required the creditor's right in property insurance proceeds and unearned property insurance premiums, to be disclosed as a `security interest.' Although as presently written the law does not require that result, S. 108 should prevent such ludicrous interpretations by requiring merely a positive indication if a security interest is being taken in the property purchased and if it is in property not being purchased in the transaction, simply a general listing of the type of property without a listing of incidental related interests." 125 Cong. Rec. 9160 (1979). </s> With one exception, not pertinent here, the Committee Chairman, Senator Proxmire, who was the sponsor of the TILA, agreed with these remarks. Id., at 9159, 9972. In light of these indications from the 1980 Act's history, it is unlikely that the courts would invalidate as contrary to the 1980 Act or the TILA either the security interest disclosure provisions with respect to unearned insurance premiums in revised Regulation Z or the interpretation of the unrevised regulation contained in FC-0173. </s> III </s> Of course, neither the legislative history of the 1980 Act nor the Board's construction of the term "security interest" under either the TILA or the 1980 Act conclusively establishes the meaning of these words in the TILA. But as we so plainly recognized in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), absent some obvious repugnance to the statute, the Board's regulation implementing this legislation should be accepted by the courts, as should the Board's interpretation of its own regulation. We discern no such repugnance with any provision in the TILA. </s> The purpose of the TILA is to promote the "informed use of credit" by consumers. 15 U.S.C. 1601. See Ford [452 U.S. 205, 220] Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, supra, at 559, 568; Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 -368 (1973). Congress sought to assure "a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him." 15 U.S.C. 1601. </s> The TILA was enacted in May 1968. As originally drafted, the House and Senate truth-in-lending bills focused primarily on the cost of credit. 17 Neither bill required disclosure of security interests acquired by a creditor in connection with a consumer credit transaction. In January 1968, while the legislation was under consideration in the House, Representative Cahill, who was not a member of the Committee that had reported out the bill, offered several amendments designed "to improve the truth-in-lending provisions with respect to mortgage transactions." 114 Cong. Rec. 1611 (1968). One of the amendments, which was adopted without debate, required the following disclosure in closed-end consumer credit transactions: </s> "[A] description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates." Id., at 1610. 18 </s> This provision became 128 (a) (10) of the TILA. [452 U.S. 205, 221] </s> The Cahill amendments were principally designed to prevent homeowners from being victimized by "vicious secondary mortgage schemes." Id., at 1611. It was explained that "in many cases [a homeowner entering into a consumer credit transaction] is never informed nor aware that his home is being made subject to a mortgage." Ibid. The amendment would require the creditor to disclose that he was acquiring a security interest in the borrower's residence. Insofar as pertinent here, the Cahill amendments were accepted by the Senate and became part of the TILA as finally adopted. 19 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 222] Despite the focus on the second mortgage problem, Congress did not limit 128 (a) (10) to security interests in real property. The statutory language requires disclosure of "any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor." It is thus uncontested that 128 (a) (10) requires a creditor to disclose to a consumer purchasing an automobile or other property on credit that the creditor retains a security interest in the property purchased. </s> Unaided by an administrative construction of the TILA and Regulation Z, a court could easily conclude, based on the language of the statute and of Regulation Z, that the interest in unearned insurance premiums acquired by the creditor in this case should be characterized as a "security interest" that must be disclosed. But, in light of the proposed official staff interpretation of Regulation Z, the revised regulation defining a "security interest," and the Board's commentary on the difference between an "incidental interest" in unearned insurance premiums and a "security interest," it is evident that the Board does not consider the creditor's interest in unearned insurance premiums in a transaction such as this one to be a "security interest" that must be disclosed under the TILA. The Board's position is supported by the legislative history of both the TILA and the 1980 Act, and we hold that it is a permissible interpretation of the term "security interest" as used in the TILA. 20 Although designed to provide meaningful guidance to consumers in [452 U.S. 205, 223] shopping for credit, the TILA as originally drafted did not require disclosure of or otherwise deal with security interests; and the security interest disclosure provision was added to the TILA because of Congress' particular concern about the need to warn consumers of the creditor's acquisition of a particular type of security interest - a second mortgage on the borrower's home. The Board's view that disclosure of a creditor's incidental interest in unearned insurance premiums would not measurably further the TILA's purpose of aiding consumers to shop for credit, and that the term "security interest" as used in the TILA, the 1980 Act, and in Regulation Z should not be construed as including such an interest, is consistent with the underlying purpose of the TILA. This interpretation of the term "security interest" strikes a balance between "meaningful disclosure" and "informational overload." 21 As we emphasized in Milhollin, the task of striking the proper balance is "an empirical process that entails investigation into consumer psychology and that presupposes broad experience with credit practices." Administrative agencies are "better suited than [the] courts to engage in such a process." 444 U.S., at 568 -569. </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> So ordered. </s> [Footnote * Peter D. Schellie filed a brief for the Consumer Bankers Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. </s> Richard Scupi filed a brief for the UAW Legal Services Plan as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> Richard J. Rubin filed a brief for Indian Pueblo Legal Services, Inc., as amicus curiae. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Truth in Lending Act was enacted as Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146. </s> [Footnote 2 The provision stated: </s> "Security Interest: Seller shall have a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Property (described above) and in the proceeds thereof to secure the payment in cash of the Total of Payments and all other amounts due or to become due hereunder." </s> The "Property" was defined as the automobile. </s> [Footnote 3 Respondents contend that under the contract provision quoted above, unearned insurance premiums could only be used to replace the automobile or to make payments on the buyer's debt. Petitioners assert that "[u]nder the assignment provision . . . any unearned [insurance] premiums will be used to provide replacement insurance coverage or applied to the debt." Brief for Petitioners 4. The Court of Appeals stated that the unearned premiums "may be used to purchase replacement insurance coverage," citing petitioners' brief on appeal. 617 F.2d 1278, 1281 (CA7 1980). We need not resolve the proper interpretation of this contract provision to decide the issue before us. </s> [Footnote 4 The TILA authorizes suits against original creditors and their assignees. 15 U.S.C. 1614 and 1640. </s> [Footnote 5 The TILA does not state that the disclosure required by the statute must be made on the face of the contract. It simply provides: </s> "Each creditor shall disclose clearly and conspicuously, in accordance with the regulations of the Board, to each person to whom consumer credit is extended, the information required under this part or part D of this subchapter." 15 U.S.C. 1631 (a). </s> However, the applicable Federal Reserve Board regulations provide: </s> "All of the [required] disclosures shall be made together on either: </s> "(1) The note or other instrument evidencing the obligation on the same side of the page and above the place for the customer's signature; or </s> "(2) One side of a separate statement which identifies the transaction." 12 CFR 226.8 (a) (1980). </s> See also 12 CFR 226.8 (b) (5) (1980). Petitioners do not challenge the validity or applicability of this regulation. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 105 of the TILA, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1604, provides: </s> "The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith." </s> [Footnote 7 A consumer who files an individual action against a creditor for failure to make the disclosures required by the TILA may recover twice the amount of the finance charge, with a minimum recovery of $100 and a maximum recovery of $1,000, or may recover any actual damages [452 U.S. 205, 210] sustained as a result of the failure to disclose. 15 U.S.C. 1640 (a). Respondents did not contend that they had suffered any actual damages as a result of the alleged TILA violation. </s> [Footnote 8 Two judges filed separate concurring opinions, joining in the opinion for the panel but expressing concern that by requiring the prominent disclosure of an "incidental" security interest, the court was increasing the [452 U.S. 205, 211] complexity of the disclosures required by the TILA without furthering the purposes of the statute. </s> Judge Cudahy stated in his concurring opinion: </s> "I do not read [the opinion for the panel] as seriously suggesting that the result we reach furthers the underlying purposes of the Truth in Lending Act. Among these meritorious purposes are the disclosure to buyers of the costs of credit and the alerting of customers to the possibility that their property may be reached to satisfy the obligation which they have incurred. </s> "Here we require the prominent disclosure of a rather esoteric right to unearned premiums for physical damage insurance (protecting both the seller's and the buyer's interest in the property), which may be used to provide replacement insurance coverage or applied against the buyer's debt in the event of cancellation of the insurance. This `security interest' is normal in the circumstances but is entirely incidental to the principal consumer credit transaction. . . . </s> "To disclose this `security interest' on the face of the contract (which is the point here) is merely to add virtually inconsequential information - lengthening, complicating and trivializing the disclosure for no apparent benefit." 617 F.2d, at 1293. </s> [Footnote 9 We also granted certiorari to consider petitioners' contention that if we were to hold that disclosure of an assignment of unearned insurance premiums is required under the TILA, our ruling should be made prospective only. Since we hold that such disclosure is not required, we need not address that issue. </s> [Footnote 10 See Murphy v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 629 F.2d 556 (CA8 1980); Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291 (CA5 1978); Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437 (CA3 1977). </s> [Footnote 11 For example, the revised regulation excludes a creditor's interest in [452 U.S. 205, 215] after-acquired property from the definition of a "security interest." The regulations implementing the TILA, however, expressly require disclosure of a creditor's interest in after-acquired property. See 12 CFR 226.8 (b) (5) (1980). </s> [Footnote 12 46 Fed. Reg. 20853 (1981). </s> The Board's analysis demonstrates that the staff's proposed official interpretation of Regulation Z does not conflict with FRB Public Information Letter No. 377, cited by respondents. FRB Public Information Letter No. 377 is an informal staff interpretation of Regulation Z that was issued in 1970. The interpretation was requested by a loan company whose customers purchased single premium lifetime accidental death and dismemberment policies with the proceeds of their loans. The loan company was designated as the owner of the policy and retained the right to cancel the policy and apply any premium refund to the unpaid balance of the loan if the customer defaulted on the loan. The staff responded: "Under the circumstances, we think it would be appropriate to disclose the loan company's ownership of the policy as a type of `security interest' . . . ." CCH [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] Cons. Cred. Guide § 30,555. </s> Petitioners contend that the loan company's interest in the policy differs from petitioners' interest in the unearned insurance premiums in this case. The loan company's interest "was not merely incidental or subordinate to some far more significant interest securing payment of the loan." Reply [452 U.S. 205, 216] Brief for Petitioners 9, n. 12. We agree with petitioners that the situation described in the letter is distinguishable from this case. </s> One other informal staff interpretation of Regulation Z referred to disclosure of unearned insurance premiums. In FRB Public Information Letter No. 1263, the staff responded to an inquiry regarding how an interest in unearned insurance premiums should be identified. The letter pointed out that "a more fundamental matter [is] whether a security interest exists at all" and then suggested that the creditor determine whether as a matter of state law he had acquired an interest in property securing payment of the debt. CCH [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] Cons. Cred. Guide § 31,736. "[A]ssuming this is a security interest for purposes of Regulation Z, the determination of what type of security interest it is should be made in accordance with State law." Ibid. This informal interpretation did not resolve whether disclosure of a creditor's interest in unearned insurance premiums is required under the TILA. Although this letter focused on state law, revised Regulation Z defines a "security interest" as an "interest in property that secures performance of a consumer credit obligation and that is recognized by state or federal law." 46 Fed. Reg. 20894 (1981). </s> [Footnote 13 When the Board issued proposed regulations implementing the 1980 Act, it stated that the 1980 Act had clarified "certain complex legal questions" regarding the proper interpretation of the TILA, including questions about adequate disclosure of security interests. 45 Fed. Reg. 80731, 80733 (1980). </s> In its commentary accompanying the revised regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 20853 (1981), the Board noted that its definition of "security interest" was considerably narrower than 226.2 (gg) of the unrevised regulation, in that it excluded a number of interests that would have been considered security interests under the unrevised regulation. Some of these interests were identified. The Board went on to observe that "there is a difference between an incidental interest and an interest that is the essence of the transaction." Ibid. Only the latter must be disclosed as a "security interest." We do not understand the Board's commentary to indicate in any way that the revised regulation altered the meaning of Regulation Z with respect to whether a creditor must disclose an interest in unearned insurance premiums in a transaction such as is involved in this case. </s> [Footnote 14 15 U.S.C. 1604. This section will be renumbered 1604 (a) under the 1980 Act. 94 Stat. 170. </s> [Footnote 15 Because we do not understand the exclusion of unearned insurance premiums from the definition of "security interest" to have changed the administrative construction of the statute, we need not consider whether if the revised regulation had worked such a change, the case should be decided under the revised regulation which was effective as of April 1, 1981. See Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 281 -283 (1969); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110 (1801). </s> [Footnote 16 Although the Committee Report states that the creditor is not required to disclose his "incidental interest" in unearned insurance premiums if the loan is secured by an automobile that is not purchased with the proceeds of the loan, there is no sensible reason for applying a different rule if the loan is secured by an automobile that is purchased with the proceeds of the loan. In either situation the 1980 Act requires the creditor to disclose any "security interest" he has acquired. </s> [Footnote 17 The 1967 Committee Reports explained that "by requiring all creditors to disclose credit information in a uniform manner, and by requiring all additional mandatory charges imposed by the creditor as an incident to credit [to] be included in the computation of the applicable percentage rate, the American consumer will be given the information he needs to compare the cost of credit and to make the best informed decision on the use of credit." H. R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 13; S. Rep. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (virtually identical language). </s> [Footnote 18 Representative Cahill proposed that this language be added to 203 (b) of H. R. 11601, governing disclosures for consumer credit sales other than sales under an open-end credit plan. Section 203 (b) later became 128 of the TILA, 15 U.S.C. 1638. He proposed that the same [452 U.S. 205, 221] language be added to 203 (c) of H. R. 11601, governing disclosures for extensions of credit other than sales under an open-end credit plan. Section 203 (c) later became 129 of the TILA, 15 U.S.C. 1639. </s> [Footnote 19 In drawing the Senate's attention to Representative Cahill's amendments, the sponsor of the Senate truth-in-lending bill, stated: </s> "Congressman CAHILL, of New Jersey, has offered an important amendment to the truth-in-lending bill which tightens up on the second mortgage racket. First, it would require a 3-day waiting period before a second mortgage transaction can be completed. Second, it would require a disclosure of the fact that credit is being secured by a mortgage on the homeowner's property. Third, the amendment increases the legal rights of consumers with respect to those who purchase mortgages from the original home improvement contractor." 114 Cong. Rec. 5024 (1968). </s> In presenting the Conference Report on the TILA to the House, Representative Sullivan explained that the House conferees had succeeded in retaining the protections created by the Cahill amendments. She described those amendments as "a series of amendments in the House, to strike at home improvement racketeers who trick homeowners, particularly the poor, into signing contracts at exorbitant rates, which turn out to be liens on the family residences. Any credit transaction which involves a security interest in property must be clearly explained to the consumer as involving a mortgage or lien; any such transaction involving the consumer's residence - other than in a purchase-money first mortgage for the acquisition of the home - carries a 3-day cancellation right." Id., at 14388. </s> Similarly, Senator Proxmire, presenting the Conference Report on the truth-in-lending bill to the Senate, described the Cahill amendments as providing "additional safeguards in the second mortgage area" and explained that the security interest disclosure provisions would require creditors to "describe any security interest in real property - such as a second mortgage - arising from the credit transaction." Id., at 14488. </s> [Footnote 20 This Court has frequently relied on the principle that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). See, e. g., Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). "When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute [or regulation], is available, there certainly can be no `rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on `superficial examination.'" United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543 -544 (1940) (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 21 In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), we stressed that the TILA seeks to provide "meaningful disclosure" of credit terms: </s> "Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance between `competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and [452 U.S. 205, 224] the need to avoid . . . [informational overload].'" Id., at 568, quoting S. Rep. No. 96-73, p. 3 (1979) (accompanying the 1980 Act). </s> JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BRENNAN, and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> The Court correctly states that the respondents in this case maintain "that the plain language of the statute and the [452 U.S. 205, 224] regulation requires the result reached by the court below." Ante, at 211-212. Yet the Court nowhere attempts a direct answer to the respondents' contention. Despite the elementary principle that the starting point in construing a statute is the language of the statute itself, the Court simply ignores the plain language of the TILA and the equally plain language of the only applicable Federal Reserve Board construction of it. Instead, the Court contrives to discover contrary legislative intent in such dubious materials as the legislative history of a subsequent statute which does not cover the transaction at hand, a regulation issued to implement that inapplicable statute, and an unofficial administrative staff interpretation which, by its own express terms, is a mere proposal intended to have no legal effect. 1 </s> In my opinion, the statutory language at issue here unequivocally supports the decision of the Court of Appeals, and should itself dispose of this case. See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96 (Marshall, C. J.). But even were the Court justified in leaping over the language of Congress in search of a conflicting indication of congressional intent, the secondary authority on which the Court relies does not withstand examination. As a result, the Court does damage to settled principles of administrative law and statutory construction - damage that could extend to issues of far greater moment than the very narrow question under the Truth in Lending Act at issue here. [452 U.S. 205, 225] </s> Section 128 (a) (10) of the TILA requires the creditor to disclose </s> "[a] description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates." 15 U.S.C. 1638 (a) (10) (emphasis added). 2 </s> The word "any" can only mean exactly what it says, and so the sole question is whether the credit company's right to the consumer's unearned insurance premium is a "security interest." The credit contract requires the consumer to buy physical damage insurance "protecting the interests of Buyer and Seller," and grants to the seller any unearned insurance premiums, to be "applied toward replacement of the Property or payment of the indebtedness hereunder in the sole discretion of Seller." If unaided common sense cannot identify the seller's rights under this clause as a "security interest," the language of the applicable Federal Reserve Board definition of "security interest" under the TILA quickly and unmistakably does so: </s> "`Security interest' and `security' mean any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's liens in both real and personal property, the interest [452 U.S. 205, 226] of a seller in a contract for the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by operation of law, and any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an obligation." 12 CFR 226.2 (gg) (1980) (emphasis added). </s> Ford's assignment clause clearly meets the Federal Reserve Board definition. First, the assignment clause plainly creates an interest in property. In this case, the annual premium for physical damage insurance was $215, and in other instances it could be considerably higher. The amount of the unearned insurance premium acquired by the creditor will depend on the timing of the cancellation which triggers the creditor's rights under the assignment clause. But except in the rare case in which the repossession of the car precisely coincides with the end of the insurance term, the creditor will be able to recover a refund of some sort, and since repossession might occur right after a new term of insurance begins, the contract essentially represents an interest equal to the value of the premium itself. 3 </s> Second, the assignment clause clearly "secure[s] payment or performance of an obligation." The contract expressly [452 U.S. 205, 227] states that the creditor is to use any refunded premiums for "replacement of the Property or payment of the indebtedness hereunder." Even if Ford is correct in asserting that the purpose of the assignment is to continue the insurance coverage on the car during the life of the loan, see ante, at 208, n. 3, the assignment is still a security interest under Regulation Z, since it will be used to secure performance of the buyer's obligation to maintain insurance coverage. 4 The applicable statute and regulation thus both clearly declare the assignment of unearned insurance premiums to be a security interest which must be disclosed on the face of the credit contract. 5 </s> Virtually ignoring the Federal Reserve Board definition of "security interest" in 226.2 (gg) of Regulation Z - the applicable administrative pronouncement which effectively settles the issue in favor of the respondents - the Court relies instead on an unofficial staff interpretation which, by its own [452 U.S. 205, 228] terms, is entitled to no weight whatsoever. In September 1980, the Board released Proposed Official Staff Interpretation FC-0173, 45 Fed. Reg. 63295, asking for comments on a proposed staff opinion that a creditor's right to unearned insurance premiums is not required to be disclosed under the statute. The proposal expressly stated: </s> "(2) The letter is being issued as a proposal, rather than in final form, and interested persons are invited to submit relevant comment. </s> "(3) After comments are considered, this official staff interpretation may be amended, may be withdrawn or may remain unchanged." </s> The Board went on to tell creditors in a November 1980 mailing that "[t]his proposed interpretation may not be relied upon until final action is taken." As the Court correctly notes, the Board has never taken any final action. On December 16, 1980, it deferred further consideration indefinitely. 6 The Court's reliance on this proposal therefore directly contravenes the intention of the proposal itself - that it is to have no legal effect. 7 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 229] </s> Whatever the significance of the present case, the Court's approach threatens general damage to important principles of administrative law and statutory interpretation. An administrative agency issues proposals to invoke public comment which the agency can evaluate and assimilate in formulating new regulations. If an agency is to infer from the Court's opinion that its proposals may be ascribed significant or even decisive weight in litigation involving construction of the statute governing the agency, it may take any of three extremely unfortunate courses. First, an agency may decide not to issue proposals at all for fear of binding itself in future action. Second, an agency may rush to issue ill-conceived proposals in the hope of affecting the decisions of courts or the conduct of regulated persons, evading the risks and responsibilities of submitting its proposals to public comment and other rulemaking procedures. Third, an agency may frame its proposals in interrogative, rather than declarative, form, thereby denying itself the benefit of public comments that evaluate or interpret the precise language of a hypothetical final rule. The Court's use of FC-1073 here thus threatens to undermine the very purpose of public comment in rulemaking procedures. 8 </s> [452 U.S. 205, 230] </s> The Court continues its attack on established principles of statutory construction by invoking the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980 to help it discover the meaning of the TILA, which was enacted 12 years earlier. First, the Court considers the revised sections of Regulation Z issued by the Board to implement the new statute, and in a remarkable ipse dixit, pronounces that the new definition, which excludes such "incidental interests" as liens on insurance premiums, reveals "no indication that the definition was being changed with respect to unearned premiums." Ante, [452 U.S. 205, 231] at 215. The new definition is, of course, utterly inconsistent with the earlier definition. The Court then mistakenly declares that the Board explanation for the new definition published in the Federal Register in 1981 "applies to the TILA as well as to the 1980 Act." Ante, at 216. 9 </s> To compound the error, the Court goes on to examine the legislative history of the 1980 Simplification Act. There is no suggestion that the new statute applies retroactively, and there could not be. Rather, the Court states that the legislative history of the 1980 Act "fully supports the Board's revised regulation . . . and its proposed interpretation of the unrevised regulation." Ante, at 218 (emphasis added). Since the new regulation, issued to implement a new nonretroactive statute, cannot apply to the case at hand, I cannot understand how it is at all relevant in this case that the new regulation is consistent with the new statute. </s> The legislative history of the 1980 Act cited by the Court, ante, at 218-219, proves the perfectly reasonable - and irrelevant - proposition that the new Regulation Z properly construes the intent of the 1980 Act in excluding liens on unearned insurance premiums as security interests. But nothing in the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs suggests any intent to construe the old law applicable to this case. "If the legislative history . . . indicates anything, it is that Congress thought that it was changing the law by changing the language of the Act." United States v. Plesha, 352 U.S. 202, 208 . Doubtless Congress thought the TILA deficient, but that is why it wrote a new law. </s> The Court also cites a statement by Senator Garn purportedly attributing to the TILA a meaning contrary to its [452 U.S. 205, 232] plain language. Ante, at 218-219. But the postenactment pronouncements of individual legislators purporting to construe an earlier statute have little, if any, weight in the judicial construction of the statute. E. g., Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 , n. 10. And according any weight to the pronouncements of a single legislator is particularly unjustified when the legislator, like Senator Garn in this case, was not even a Member of Congress when the law was enacted. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281 -282. 10 </s> The Court believes that requiring disclosure of an assignment of unearned insurance premiums on the face of the credit contract would be a gratuitous "informational overload" of no significant benefit to the consumer. Ante, at 223. But when the statute and regulation governing the transaction speak unambiguously to the contrary, any independent judgment about the psychology and economics of consumer credit is not for the Court to make. 11 </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court does indirectly refer to the plain language of the TILA when it concedes that "[u]naided by an administrative construction of the TILA and Regulation Z, a court could easily conclude, based on the language of the statute and Regulation Z, that the interest in unearned insurance premiums acquired by the creditor in this case should be characterized as a `security interest' that must be disclosed." Ante, at 222. But the Court does not rely on the one administrative construction that resolves any possible uncertainty in the statutory language, see 12 CFR 226.2 (gg) (1980), and never explains why any further aid is necessary. </s> [Footnote 2 Regulation Z virtually duplicates the statutory language, requiring a creditor to disclose </s> "[a] description or identification of the type of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates. . . ." 12 CFR 226.8 (b) (5) (1980) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 3 The assignment clause may therefore be of more than minor significance to a buyer. It would allow the creditor to attach, without full court procedure, perhaps hundreds of dollars which the buyer has spent on insurance for a car which he no longer possesses. A consumer might well want to avoid giving his creditor such a right, and so disclosure of the assignment might well advance the congressional goal of informed credit shopping by consumers. 15 U.S.C. 1601. But in any event, where the language of the statute clearly covers this security interest, it is not for the courts to assess the significance of the interest. </s> The Court quotes, apparently with approval, the concurring opinion of Judge Cudahy of the Court of Appeals in this case, which laments that disclosure of the "virtually inconsequential information" about the assignment of the insurance premiums trivializes the disclosure "for no apparent benefit." Ante, at 211, n. 8. Even were Judge Cudahy right about the value of the disclosure at issue here, he, unlike today's Court, did not allow his own appraisal of the question to obscure unequivocal statutory language. </s> [Footnote 4 Even if the comprehensive language with which the applicable version of Regulation Z begins were insufficient to demonstrate that the assignment clause is a security interest under the TILA, the assignment falls within at least two of the nonexhaustive enumerated examples in the definition. Clauses assigning unearned insurance premiums may well qualify as "consensual . . . liens whether or not recorded," 12 CFR 226.2 (gg) (1980), or "security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code," see Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 26, §§ 1-201 (37), 9-102 (2), 9-306, 9-312 (1979). </s> [Footnote 5 The Court seeks to find some support for its restrictive reading of the TILA in the legislative history of the Act. Representative Cahill, who introduced the "security interest" provision in the House, stated that the primary reason for the provision was to combat the second-mortgage schemes to which many homeowners had fallen prey, and sponsors of the provision in both Houses appear to have reinforced this view. But the quoted statements from the legislative history do not purport to be explanations of specific statutory language. Rather, they are generalized declarations about the primary purpose of the bill, and so do not preclude other situations clearly covered by the language of the statute. Indeed, the Court seems to agree, recognizing that the narrow focus of the quoted legislative history on the problem of second mortgages on real estate cannot possibly explain the broad language of 128 (a) (10). Ante, at 222. </s> [Footnote 6 Conceding, as it must, that the Board took no final action on the proposal, the Court offers two unpersuasive reasons for nevertheless according it weight in interpreting the statute. Ante, at 213. First, the Court notes that the period for public comment ended on October 24, 1980. That fact hardly justifies treating the proposed rule as final, because we do not know the views expressed in the comments received, nor can we speculate on whether those comments would have reinforced or altered the staff's view on the statutory question at hand. Second, the Court states that the Board deferred final action only because it thought final action was inappropriate in light of our grant of certiorari in the present case. I do not see how this purported ground for deferral indicates what the Board would have done had it not deferred final action. If anything, we might assume that the Board thought its opinion on the issue unnecessary in light of the impending decision by this Court. If so, it is rather curious that the Court believes it can rely on the proposal. </s> [Footnote 7 That the Board intended the proposal to have no legal effect finds further proof in the unusual procedure the Board used in issuing the [452 U.S. 205, 229] proposal. Normally, a creditor requests the Board for an official interpretation, of a statutory or regulatory provision. The Board will then issue an official interpretation, and then decide whether to request public comment. If it does so, the interpretation is withdrawn while comments are received; otherwise, the official interpretation stands. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 567 , n. 10. For FC-1073, however, the Board never issued an official interpretation, but only a proposal, and immediately requested public comment. </s> [Footnote 8 The Court's reliance on FC-1073 finds no support in our decision in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, supra. The Court there stated that "absent a clear expression, it becomes necessary to consider the implicit character of the statutory scheme." Id., at 560 (emphasis added). In that case, the Court found no clear expression in the statute or regulation on the question whether the creditor had to disclose an acceleration clause on the face of the agreement, and therefore found it necessary and proper [452 U.S. 205, 230] to defer to the views of the Federal Reserve Board staff in construing the statute. Ibid. Here, by contrast, the statute and definitional rule combine in an unequivocally clear expression on the disclosure issue. </s> Moreover, in Milhollin, the Court inferred a congressional preference for resolving interpretive issues by "uniform administrative decision." Id., at 568 (emphasis added). But FC-1073 hardly represents a uniform Board view of the statute. As quoted by the Court, the proposal concedes that a "technical reading of the security interest definition might cover a creditor's interest in insurance proceeds and unearned insurance premiums," but concludes that "it is our opinion that such incidental interests are not the type of interests meant to be covered by 226.8 (b) (5)." Ante, at 212-213 (emphasis added). </s> What FC-1073 calls a "technical reading" of the Board definition of "security interest" in 226.2 (gg) of Regulation Z is in fact the only permissible reading of that definition. The proposal letter effectively concedes that it is in conflict with the applicable official Board regulation, and nothing in Regulation Z supports the view in the proposal that 15 U.S.C. 1638 (a) (10), which speaks of "any" security interest, was intended to exclude "incidental" interests. FC-1073 thus directly contravenes the higher administrative authority of an official regulation. The proposal, indeed, also conflicts with at least one other informal staff interpretation by the Board. In FRB Public Information Letter No. 377, CCH [1969-1974 Transfer Binder] Cons. Cred. Guide § 30,555, the Board expressly told an inquiring creditor that he should disclose to the debtor that in the event of default the credit company could cancel the life insurance policy the debtor was to buy with the loan money, and could apply any premium refund to the balance of the loan. Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 215-216, n. 12, Letter No. 377 does not rely on the notion that in that instance, as opposed to the present case, the credit was extended expressly to enable the consumer to buy insurance. </s> [Footnote 9 The explanation states: "This definition [of `security interest'] is based on 226.2 (gg) of the current regulation, but is much narrower. The revised definition lists a number of interests that have been considered security interests under the current regulation but no longer will be . . . ." 46 Fed. Reg. 20853 (1981) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 10 There are other reasons why Senator Garn's statement merits little weight. First, the statement was written and inserted in the Congressional Record, rather than made on the floor of the Senate. Second, Senator Garn's opinion is not reflected in the Report of the Committee, of which he was a member. </s> [Footnote 11 Indeed, even were it appropriate for the Court to proffer its own view about the practical necessity of a particular credit disclosure, the Court's view is at least questionable. Disclosing an assignment of unearned insurance premiums might be of considerable interest to the credit-shopping consumer. See n. 3, supra. And far from creating an "informational overload," such a disclosure could result in replacing convoluted assignment language, such as that on the back of the contract in this case, with a simple statement that "the buyer gives the creditor an interest in the vehicle and in all insurance charges," such as the statement Ford, in response to the nationwide litigation over this issue, now includes on the face of its contracts. </s> [452 U.S. 205, 233]

United States Supreme Court BOB-LO EXCURSION CO. V. PEOPLE OF STATE OF MICHIGAN(1948) No. 374 Argued: Decided: February 2, 1948 </s> Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. Mr. Wilson W. Mills, of Detroit, Mich., for appellant. Mr. Edmund E. Shepherd, of Lansing, Mich., for appellee. [ Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People of State of Michigan 333 U.S. 28 (1948) ] </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 29] </s> Mr. Justice RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court. Bois Blanc Island is part of the Province of Ontario, Canada. It lies just above the mouth of the Detroit River, some fifteen miles from Michigan's metropolis upstream. The island, known in Detroit by the corruption 'Bob-Lo,' has been characterized as that city's Coney Island. Appellant owns almost all of Bois Blanc in fee. 1 For many years it has operated the island, during the summer seasons, as a place of diverse amusements for Detroit's varied population. Appellant also owns and operates two steamships for transporting its patrons of the island's attractions from Detroit to Bois Blanc and return. The vessels engage in no other business on these trips. 2 No freight, mail or express is carried; the only passengers are the patrons bent on pleasure, who board ship at Detroit; </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 30] </s> they go on round-trip one-day limit3 tickets which include the privilege of landing at Bois Blanc and going back by a later boat. 4 No intermediate stops are made on these excursions. In conducting this business of amusement and transportation, appellant long has followed the policy, by advertisement and otherwise, to invite and encourage all comers, except two classes. One is the disorderly; the other, colored people. 5 From the latter exclusion this case arises. In June of 1945 Sarah Elizabeth Ray, the complaining witness, was employed by the Detroit Ordnance District. She and some forty other girls were also members of a class conducted at the Commerce High School under the auspices of the ordnance district. The class planned an excursion to Bois Blanc for June 21 under the district's sponsorship. On that morning thirteen girls with their teacher appeared at appellant's dock in Detroit to go on the outing. All were white except Miss Ray. Each girl paid eighty-five cents to one of the group, who purchased round-trip tickets and distributed them. The party then passed </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 31] </s> through the gate, each member giving in her ticket without question from the ticket taker. They then checked their coats, went to the upper decks and took chairs. Shortly afterward Devereaux, appellant's assistant general manager, and a steward named Fox appeared and stated that Miss Ray could not go along because she was colored. At first she remonstrated against the discrimination and refused to leave. But when it appeared she would be ejected forcibly, she said she would go. Devereaux and Fox then escorted her ashore, saying the company was a private concern and could exclude her if it wished. They took her to the ticket office and offered to return her fare. She refused to accept it, took their names, and left the company's premises. There is no suggestion that she or any member of her party was guilty of unbecoming conduct. Nor is there any dispute concerning the facts. This criminal prosecution followed in the Recorder's Court for Detroit, for violation of the Michigan civil rights act6 in the discrimination practiced against Miss Ray. Jury trial being formally waived, the court after hearing evidence and argument found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced it to pay a fine of $25.7 On appeal the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the judgment, holding the statute applicable to the circumstances presented by the case and valid in that application, as against the constitutional and other objections put forward. 317 Mich. 686, 27 N.W.2d 139. In due course probable jurisdiction was noted here. Judicial Code, 237(a), 28 U.S.C.A. 344(a). </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 32] </s> The Michigan civil rights Act, 146, enacts: 'All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, hotels, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, billiard parlors, stores, public conveyances on land and water, theatres, motion picture houses, public educational institutions, in elevators, on escalators, in all methods of air transportation and all other places of public accommodation, amusement, and recreation, where refreshments are or may hereafter be served, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens and to all citizens alike, with uniform prices.'8 </s> By 147, any owner, lessee, proprietor, agent or employee of any such place who directly or indirectly withholds any accommodation secured by 146, on account of race, creed or color, becomes guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable as the section states, and liable to a civil action for treble damages. 9 </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 33] </s> The Michigan statute is one of the familiar type enacted by many states before and after this Court's invalidation of Congress' similar legislation in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 .10 The Michigan Supreme Court held the statute applicable to appellant's business over its objection that as a matter of local law it is not a 'public conveyance' within the meaning of 146.11 We accept this conclusion of the state court as a matter of course. That court also impliedly rejected appellant's </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 34] </s> constitutional objections based upon alleged denial of due process of law and equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, issues now eliminated from the case. 12 </s> We have therefore only to consider the single and narrow question whether the state courts correctly held that the commerce clause, Art. I, 8, of the Federal Constitution does not forbid applying the Michigan civil rights act to sustain appellant's conviction. We agree with their determination. There can be no doubt that appellant's transportation of its patrons is foreign commerce within the scope of Art. I, 8.13 Lord v. Goodall Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541 ; cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 . Appellant's vessels sail to and from a port or place in foreign territory wholly under another nation's sovereignty. They cross the international boundary, which is the thread of the Detroit River, several times in the course of each short </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 35] </s> trip. Appellant necessarily complies with federal regulations applicable to foreign commerce, including those governing customs, immigration and navigation matters. It likewise satisfies similar regulations of the Canadian authorities. 14 </s> Of course we must be watchful of state intrusion into intercourse between this country and one of its neighbors. But if any segment of foreign commerce can be said to have a special local interest, apart from the necessity of safeguarding the federal interest in such matters as immigration, customs and navigation, the transportation of appellant's patrons falls in that characterization. It would be hard to find a substantial business touching foreign soil of more highly local concern. Except for the small fenced-off portion reserved for the lighthouse and three cottage sites,15 the island is economically and socially, though not politically, an amusement adjunct of the city of Detroit. Not only customs and immigrations regulations of both countries, but physical barriers prevent intercourse, both commercial and social, between Canadians and appellant's patrons, except as the former may come first by other means to Detroit, then go to the island from American soil on appellant's vessels, and return from the holiday by the same roundabout route. </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 36] </s> The record indicates there are no established means of access from the Canadian shore to the island. There is no evidence of even surreptitious entry trom the Canadian mainland. Appellant's vessels not only are the sole meas of transportation to and from the island, but carry only its own patrons of Bois Blanc's recreational facilities. These travel exclusively on round-trip tickets for passage beginning and ending on American soil. They are principally residents of Detroit and vicinity. All go aboard there and return the same day. None go from the island to the Canadian bank of the river. The only business conducted at the island is the operation of appellant's recreational and accessory facilities, which apparently do not include provision for overnight guests. No other persons than appellant's patrons come to the island, or have a right to come, from Canada's mainland or elsewhere, or go from the island to Detroit. The sum of these facts makes Bois Blanc an island in more than the geographic sense. They insulate it and appellant's business done in connection with it from all commercial or social intercourse and traffic with the people of another country usually characteristic of foreign commerce, in short from the normal flow and incidents of such commerce. Since the enterprise is conducted in this highly closed and localized manner with Canada's full consent, no detraction whatever from that friendly neighbor's sovereignty is implied by saying that the business itself is economically and socially an island of local Detroit business, although so largely carried on in Canadian waters. As now conducted, apart from presently applicable Canadian and federal regulations and until Canada or Congress or both countries by treaty see fit to add others, the business is of greater concern to Detroit and the State of Michigan than to Dominion or Ontario interests or to those of the United States in regulating our foreign commerce. </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 37] </s> The regulation in this application contains nothing out of harmony, much less inconsistent with our federal policy in the regulation of commerce between the two countries nor, so far as we are advised, with Canadian law and policy. 16 Appellant urges, however, that Canada might adopt regulations in conflict with Michigan's civil rights act, thus placing it in an inescapable dilemma if that act may be applied to its operations. Conceding the possibility, we think the state is right in viewing it as so remote that it is hardly more than conceivable. The same thing, we think, is true of the possibility that Congress might take conflicting action. If therefore in any case a state may regulate foreign commerce, the facts here would seem clearly to justify Michigan's application of her civil rights act. It is far too late to maintain that the states possess no regulatory powers over such commerce. From the first meeting of Congress they have regulated important phases of both foreign and intes tate commerce, particularly in relation to transportation by water, with Congress' express con- </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 38] </s> sent. 17 And without such consent for nearly a hundred years they have exercised like power under the local diversity branch of the formula announced in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299.18 See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 , 152 A.L.R. 1072; Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 , and authorities cited in both cases. Indeed the Cooley criterion has been applied so frequently in cases concerning only commerce among the several states that it is often forgotten that that historic decision dealt indiscriminately with such commerce and foreign commerce. 19 </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 39] </s> Appellant hardly suggests that the power of Congress over foreign commerce excludes all regulation by the states. But it verges on that view in regarding Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 , supplemented by Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 33 , 165 A.L.R. 574, and Pryce v. Swedish-American Lines, D.C., 30 F.Supp. 371, as flatly controlling this case. We need only say that no one of those decisions is comparable in its facts, whether in the degree of localization of the commerce involved; in the attenuating effects, if any, upon the commerce with foreign nations and among the several states likely to be produced by applying the state regulation; or in any actual probability of conflicting regulations by different sovereignties. None involved so completely and locally insulated a segment of foreign or interstate commerce. 20 In none was the business affected merely an adjunct of a single locality or community as is the business here so largely. And in none was a complete exclusion from passage made. The Pryce case, of course, is not authority in this Court, and we express no opinion on the problem it presented. The regulation of traffic along the </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 40] </s> Mississippi River, such as the Hall case comprehended and of interstate motor carriage of passengers by common carriers like that in the Morgan case, are not factually comparable to this regulation of appellant's highly localized business, and those decisions are not relevant here. It is difficult to imagine what national interest or policy, whether of securing uniformity in regulating commerce, affecting relations with foreign nations, or otherwise, could reasonably be found to be adversely affected by applying Michigan's statute to these facts or to outweigh her interest in doing so. Certainly there is no national interest which overrides the interest of Michigan to forbid the type of discrimination practiced here. And, in view of these facts, the ruling would be strange indeed, to come from this Court, that Michigan could not apply her long- settled policy against racial and creedal discrimination to this segment of foreign commerce, so peculiarly and almost exclusively affecting her people and institutions. The Supreme Court of Michigan concluded 'that holding the provisions of the Michigan statute effective and applicable in the instant case results only in this, defendant will be required in operating its ships as 'public conveyances' to accept as passengers persons of the negro race indiscriminately with others. Our review of this record does not disclose that such a requirement will impose any undue burden on defendant in its business in foreign commerce.' 317 Mich. 686, 694, 27 N.W.2d 139, 142. Those conclusions were right. The judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. </s> Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring. The case is, I think, controlled by a principle which cuts deeper than that announced by the Court and which is so important that it deserves to be stated separately. </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 41] </s> Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 , and Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 , 165 A.L.R. 574, presented phases of the problem of segregation. The former held unconstitutional a Louisiana law forbidding steamboats (which plied the Mississippi) from segregating passengers according to race. The latter held unconstitutional a Virginia law requiring segregation of passengers on interstate motor buses. It was held that diverse regulations of that character by the severalStates through which the traffic moved would be an undue or unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. But the question here is a simpler one. It is whether a State can prevent a carrier in foreign commerce from denying passage to a person because of his race or color. For this is a case of a discrimination against a Negro by a carrier's complete denial of passage to her because of her race. It is unthinkable to me that we would strike down a state law which required all carriers-local and interstate-to transport all persons regardless of their race or color. The common-law duty ofc arriers was to provide equal service to all, a duty which the Court has held a State may require of interstate carriers in the absence of a conflicting federal law. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 619 , 623, 624, 216, 218. And the police power of a State under our constitutional system is adequate for the protection of the civil rights of its citizens against discrimination by reason of race or color. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 . Moreover, in this situation there is no basis for saying that the Commerce Clause itself defeats such a law. This regulation would not place a burden on interstate commerce within the meaning of our cases. It does not impose a regulation which discriminates against interstate commerce or which, by specifying the mode in which it shall be conducted, disturbs and uniformity essential to its proper functioning. See Southern </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 42] </s> Pacific R. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 ; Morgan v. Virginia, supra. I see nothing in the Commerce Clause which places foreign commerce on a more protected level. There is in every case, of course, a possibility that Congress may pass laws regulating foreign or interstate commerce in conflict with regulations prescribed by a State. Or in the case of foreign commerce the national government might act through a treaty. Inconsistent State law would then give way to any exercise of federal power within the scope of constitutional authority. But I am aware of no power which Congress has to create different classes of citizenship according to color so as to grant freedom of movement in the channels of commerce to certain classes only. Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 , 177-181, 168-170. The federal policy reflected in Acts of Congress indeed bars any such discrimination (see Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 , 61 S. Ct. 873) and so is wholly in harmony with Michigan's law. And no treaty reveals a different attitude. Moreover, there is no danger of burden and confusion from diverse state laws if Michigan's regulation is sustained. If a sister State undertook to bar Negroes from passage on public carriers, that law would not only contravene the federal rule but also invade a 'fundamental individual right which is guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.' Mitchell v. United States, supra, 313 U.S. at page 94, 61 S.Ct. at page 877. Nothing short of at least 'equality of legal right' (Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350 , 236) in obtaining transportation can satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Hence I do not see how approval of Michigan's law in any way interferes with the uniformity essential for the movement of vehicles in commerce. The only constitutional uniformity is uniformity in the Michigan pattern. </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 43] </s> If a State's law made a head-on collision with the policy of a foreign power whose shores were reached by our vessels, a different problem might be presented. But no such conflict is present here. Mr. Justice BLACK, who joins in the opinion of the Court, concurs also in this opinion. </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON, with whom The CHIEF JUSTICE agrees, dissenting. This Michigan statute undoubtedly is valid when applied to Michigan intrastate commerce, just as a Congressional enactment of like tenor would undoubtedly be valid as to commerce among the states and with foreign countries. The question here, however, is whether the Michigan statute can validly be applied to that commerce which is set apart by the Constitution for regulation by the Congress. The sphere of a state's power has not been thought to expand or contract because of the policy embodied in a particular regulation. A state statute requiring equality of accommodations for white and Negro passengers was held invalid as applied to interstate commerce. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 . On the sm e principle a state statute requiring segregation was held invalid as applied to interstate commerce. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 , 165 A.L.R. 574. Heretofore the Court steadily has held that the failure of Congress to enact a law on this specific subject does not operate to expose interstate commerce to the burden of local rules, no matter what policy in this highly controversial matter a state sought to advance. It would seem to me that the constitutional principles which have been so apparent to the Court that it would not permit local policies to burden national commerce, are even more obvious in relation to foreign commerce. </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 44] </s> Certainly if any state can enforce regulations concerning embarkation and landing, it can in effect control much that pertains to the foreign journey. To determine what persons and commodities shall be taken abroad is to control what persons and commodities may become the subject of foreign commerce, and that is to control the lifeblood of the commerce itself. These are identical with matters in which this commerce is subject to control by federal and foreign governments. The Federal Government takes active control of the inbound movement of goods by virtue of its customs service and of the movement of persons by virtue of its immigration service across these boundaries. The Canadian government does the same on the outbound crossing of the international line. It does so in this case, and it does so even if the bulk of the travelers do not go very far or stay very long and are merely amusement bent. The wholesome and amiable situation detailed in the Court's opinion is made possible only by international relations wholly controlled by the Federal Government. It alone can effectively protect or foster this kind of commerce, and it alone should be allowed to burden it. If we are to concede this power over foreign commerce to one state, it would seem that it could logically be claimed by every state which has a port, border, or landing field used by foreign commerce. The Court admits that the commerce involved in this case is foreign commerce, but subjects it to the state police power on the ground that it is not very foreign. It fails to lay down any standard by which we can judge when foreign commerce is foreign enough to become free of local regulation. The commerce involved here is not distinguishable from a great deal of the traffic across our Canadian and Mexican borders, except perhaps in volume. Communities have sprung up on either side, whose social </s> [333 U.S. 28 , 45] </s> and economic relations are interdependent, but are conducted with scrupulous regard for the international boundary. Localities on either side of the line may develop in reliance on a certain reciprocity and stability of policy which has characterized two nations for years, when they cannot rely on similar stability or farsightedness in local policy. It seems to me no adequate protection of foreign commerce from a multitude and diversity of burdening and capricious local regulations that this Court may stand ready, as in this case, to apply itself to an analysis of the traffic involved and determine in each case whether the local interest in it is sufficiently strong and the foreign element is sufficiently weak so that we will permit the regulation to stand. We do not and apparently cannot enunciate any legal criteria by which those who engage in foreign commerce can predict which classification we will impose upon any particular operation and we lay down no rule other than our passing impression to guide ourselves or our successors. All is left to case-by-case conjecture. The commerce clause was intended to promote commerce rather than litigation. I believe that once it is conceded, as it is in this case, that the commerce involved is foreign commerce, that fact alone should be enough to prevent a state from controlling what may, or what must, move in the stream of that commerce. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 A small fenced-off tract at one end is reserved for lighthouse purposes, and three small cottage lots. Appellant is a Michigan corporation, authorized by its charter to 'lease, own and operate amusement parks in Canada, and to charter, lease, own and operate excursion steamers and ferry boats in interstate and foreign commerce, together with dock and terminal facilities pertaining thereto,' as well as to acquire, own, use and dispose of real and personal property 'as may be necessary or convenient in connection with the aforesaid business of the company.' [Footnote 2 The record shows that at times during the season appellant uses these ships to provide excursion trips for residents of the Province of Ontario, but these excursions are kept entirely separate from those between Detroit and Bois Blanc and we are concerned with no question relating to them. </s> [Footnote 3 Apparently no facilities are provided at the island for overnight guests. [Footnote 4 The company fixes its own rates. The usual round-trip charge is 85, except for Saturday nights and Sundays when a higher rate applies. Special excursions at times are arranged for churches, Sunday schools, clubs, lodges, etc., for which the regular charge is paid by the passenger but the company allows the organization a discount which permits it to make a profit. The discounts are not uniform. [Footnote 5 Appellant's assistant general manager, Devereaux, testified: 'The defendant adopted the policy of excluding so-called 'Zoot-suiters,' the rowdyish, the rough and the boisterous and it also adopted the policy of excluding colored.' Appellant printed on the back of each ticket: 'Right reserved to reject this ticket by refunding the purchs e price.' The record contains no evidence of any exclusion or policy of exclusion of others than disorderly or colored persons. </s> [Footnote 6 Mich. Penal Code 146Ä148, as amended by Act No. 117, Mich. Pub. Acts 1937, Mich. Comp.Laws (Supp.1940) 17115-146 to 17115-148, Mich. Stat.Ann. (1946 Cum.Supp.) 28.343Ä28.346. These sections of the Penal Code reenacted and broadened the application of Act No. 130, Mich. Pub. Acts 1885. See notes 8 and 10. [Footnote 7 Appellant's motion for 'directed' verdict of not guilty was denied, as was also its motion after judgment for a new trial. The trial court filed a written opinion which is unreported. </s> [Footnote 8 The appropriate statutory citations are set forth in note 6. [Footnote 9 Section 147 is as follows: 'Any person being an owner, lessee, proprietr , manager, superintendent, agent or employe of any such place who shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof or directly or indirectly publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed communications, notice or advertisement to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such places shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed or color or that any particular race, creed or color is not welcome, objectionable or not acceptable, not desired or solicited, shall for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars or imprisoned for not less than fifteen days or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court; and every person being an owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employe of any such place, and who violates any of the provisions of this section, shall be liable to the injured party, in treble damages sustained, to be recovered in a civil action: Provided, however, That any right of action under this section shall be unassignable.' No suggestion is made that the phrase 'on account of race, creed or color' does not apply to the withholding and denying provisions of the section as well as those relating to publishing, etc., the notices or advertisements specified. Section 148 of the Act forbids discrimination because of race, creed or color in selecting grand and petit jurors. </s> [Footnote 10 These cases were decided in 1883. The Michigan statute was enacted originally in 1885. Seventeen other states have similar, and in many instances substantially identical, legislation. The statutory citations are given in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 , 382, n. 24, 1056, 165 A.L.R. 574. [Footnote 11 Appellant urged that it was not a common carrier, a public utility, or a 'public conveyance' within the specific terms of 146. The state supreme court said: 'There is no escape from the conclusion that defendant herein is engaged in the business of operating 'public conveyances' by water, and the Michigan statute provides: 'All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations' afforded by such conveyances. The Michigan enactment has been held constitutional. Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241, 53 A.L.R. 183. Our conclusion is * * * that the Michigan civil rights act * * * is applicable to the business carried on by defendant * * *.' 317 Mich. 686, 695, 27 N.W.2d 139, 143. The court distinguished Meisner v. Detroit, Belle Isle & Windsor Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N.W. 14, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 872, 129 Am.St.Rep. 493, in which appellant's corporate predecessor was held not liable in tort for breach of an alleged duty as a common carrier of passengers, by pointing out that no right apparently had been asserted in that case grounded on the civil rights act. 317 Mich. 686, 696, 27 N.W.2d 139. </s> [Footnote 12 The jurisdictional statement sought review of these Fourteenth Amendment questions, as well as the commerce clause issue. But appellant's reply brief stats : 'The cause before us is a business case arising under the Michigan Civil Rights Act and the Commerce Clause: not one arising under the (federal) Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment.' And we were given to understand at the oral argument, in response to specific inquiry, that the only issue on which decision was sought as of that time was the commerce clause question. The Michigan Supreme Court did not refer explicitly in its opinion to appellant's Fourteenth Amendment contentions, but the record shows they were presented to that court in the assignments of error on appeal and were therefore necessarily rejected by its affirmance of the judgment of the Recorder's Court. [Footnote 13 Until the case reached this Court, apparently, the state had maintained that foreign commerce was not involved and the trial court so held, although the ruling was hedged with the further one that, if it was erroneous, still the state's power to apply the civil rights act was not nullified by the commerce clause. </s> [Footnote 14 E.g., on arrival at Bois Blanc all passengers who land pass through Canadian customs and immigration inspection. Prior to the late war, on returning to Detroit, similar inspections were made by United States authorities. During the war the latter inspection was suspended, appellant filing a bond to indemnify the Treasury against loss of revenue and expenses arising from any free importation of dutiable goods from Bois Blanc or Canada and an agreement with the Immigration Service not to bring in aliens ineligible for entry. [Footnote 15 It does not appear whether these sites are inhabited, but presumably a keeper of the lighthouse occupies some part of the reserved premises. </s> [Footnote 16 The Province of Ontario enacted in 1944 its Racial Discrimination Act, Session Laws 1944, c. 51. Federal legislation has indicated a national policy against racial discrimination in the requirement, not urged here to be specifically applicable in this case, of the Interstate Commerce Act that carriers subject to its provisions provide equal facilities for all passengers, 49 U.S.C. 3(1), 49 U.S.C.A. 3(1), extended to carriers by water and air, 46 U.S.C. 815, 49 U.S.C. 484, 905, 46 U.S.C.A. 815, 49 U.S.C.A. 484, 905. Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 . Federal legislation also compels a collective bargaining agent to represent all employees in the bargaining unit without discrimination because of race. 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., 45 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 . The direction of national policy is clearly in accord with Michigan policy. Cf. also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 ; Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 , 65 S. Ct. 208. </s> [Footnote 17 It is hardly necessary to recall again that by the Act of August 7, 1789, the First Congress declared that pilotage in bays, inlets, rivers, harbors and ports of the United States should continue to be regulated in conformity with existing state laws or others thereafter enacted until further action by Congress. 1 Stat. 54. Congress on occasion has modified such state legislation, e.g., by the Act of March 2, 1837, 5 Stat. 153, 46 U.S.C.A. 212, making it lawful for vessels navigating waters constituting the boundary between two states to take on pilots qualified under the laws of either. [Footnote 18 In Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 , the Court sustained a Texas statute regulating pilotage of a British vessel coming from a foreign port. The contention that the state was without power to legislate in this field was disposed of in one sentence. 'The unsoundness of this contention is demonstrated by the previous decisions of this court, since it has long since been settled that even although state laws concerning pilotage are regulations of commerce, 'they fall within that class of powers which may be exercised by the states until Congress has seen fit to act upon the subject.' (Citing the Cooley and other cases).' 195 U.S. at page 341, 25 S.Ct. at page 53. Other cases upholding state regulation of foreign commerce are to the same effect. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572 ; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 . Cf. Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 , and cases cited; Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 158 , 159, 366. [Footnote 19 The Court's opinion in that case deals expressly but indiscriminately with both types of commerce. And from the record and arguments of counsel it seems clear that both were actually involved. There were two cases relating to two different vessels, the Consul, which was engaged in coastwise trade between Philadelphia and New York, and the Undine, which appears to have been engaged exclusively in foreign commerce. The destination, whether foreign or domestic, of the Undine is not shown by the record, which merely states that it sailed 'from the port of Philadelphia to a certain port not within the river Delaware * * *.' But from the specific 'addition' by counsel for argumentative purposes, 12 How. 299, at pages 302, 303, of the facts that the Consul held a federal coasting license and was bound from one domestic port to another, plus the omission of any reference in argument or in the record to a similar license for the Undine (when such a reference would have supported the additional argument), the inference seems justified that the Undine had sailed for a foreign port. Moreover counsel argued that both ships were engaged in foreign commerce, although only the Consul was engaged in coastwise trading. </s> [Footnote 20 Cf. Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, 234 U.S. 317, 331 , 332, 825, 826.

United States Supreme Court CLANCY v. UNITED STATES(1961) No. 88 Argued: January 10, 1961Decided: February 27, 1961 </s> At the trial in a Federal District Court at which petitioners were convicted of violating federal criminal statutes, government witnesses testified to conversations with certain of the petitioners and admitted that they subsequently prepared memoranda of such conversations. Counsel for petitioners moved under the Jencks Act, 28 U.S.C. 3500, for production of such memoranda, and the motions were denied. Before this Court, the Government alleged that, despite denial of the motion for production, verbatim copies of these memoranda were in fact delivered to counsel for petitioners, although the record did not show it and counsel for petitioners denied it; and the Government contended that the case should merely be remanded to the District Court to determine whether this was so. Held: At least as to some of the statements, reversible error was committed, and petitioners are entitled to a new trial. Pp. 313-316. </s> (a) Such memoranda were "statements" within the meaning of the Act. Pp. 313-315. </s> (b) This Court deals with the record as it finds it. Since the production of at least some of the statements withheld was a right of the defendants, it is for the defense, not the District Court or this Court, to determine whether they could be utilized effectively; and petitioners are entitled to a new trial. Pp. 315-316. </s> 276 F.2d 617, reversed. </s> Paul P. Waller, Jr. and John F. O'Connell argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. </s> Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Wilkey, Robert S. Erdahl, Philip R. Monahan, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit. [365 U.S. 312, 313] </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents an important question under 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. 3500, the statute sometimes referred to as the Jencks Act, as it deals with the problems presented in our decision by that name. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 . Petitioners were charged with making false statements (18 U.S.C. 1001), with attempting to evade the wagering excise tax (26 U.S.C. 7201), and with conspiring to defraud the United States of internal revenue taxes (18 U.S.C. 371). They were found guilty and the judgments of conviction were affirmed. 276 F.2d 617. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 363 U.S. 836 . </s> At the trial Minton, a government agent, testified concerning an interview with petitioner, Kastner, at which he was present. Minton testified "I did not take any notes at the time, but afterwards I returned to the office and made a memorandum of the interview." Counsel for Kastner asked the court for the production of that memorandum pursuant to the Jencks Act. 1 </s> [365 U.S. 312, 314] </s> Other government witnesses testified to conversations they had had with Clancy, Kastner, and a third partner in petitioners' wagering business. One of the witnesses, Agent Buescher, testified he had taken no notes during these interviews, but had "compiled a memorandum" from notes taken at the time of the interview by the second witness, Agent Mochel. Both Buescher and Mochel testified that they had signed the later memoranda of the conversations. Counsel for petitioners requested production of the memoranda, and the requests were refused. </s> The trial court, though directing delivery to the defense of notes made by the witnesses at the time of the interviews, refused the requests for the memoranda, saying that written statements were not covered by the Jencks Act unless they were made "contemporaneously" with the interview. The Government now concedes that this was an erroneous ruling, as indeed it was. Each of these statements related "to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified." 2 Each was a "statement" as that word is defined in the Act. 3 The requirement that it be contemporaneous applies only to "a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement" made to a government agent. 4 By the terms of the Act, 5 "a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or [365 U.S. 312, 315] approved by him" is also included. These statements fell in that category and should have been produced. Campbell v. United States, ante, p. 85. And see United States v. Sheer, 278 F.2d 65, 67-68. As the Senate Report on the bill that became the Jencks Act states: 6 </s> "The committee believes that legislation would clearly be unconstitutional if it sought to restrict due process. On the contrary, the proposed legislation, as reported, reaffirms the decision of the Supreme Court in its holding that a defendant on trial in a criminal prosecution is entitled to reports and statements in possession of the Government touching the events and activities as to which a Government witness has testified at the trial. </s> "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to establish a procedural device that will provide such a defendant with authenticated statements and reports of Government witnesses which relate directly upon his testimony." </s> The Government, however, contends that as to Agent Minton the error was harmless. It also asserts - though the record is silent and counsel for petitioners deny it - that verbatim carbon copies of the reports of Agents Buescher and Mochel were delivered to the defense at the trial. But since its version of what transpired is contested, the Government urges that the most we do is to remand the case to the District Court to determine whether verbatim copies of the reports were delivered to the defense at the trial. If they were so delivered, the Government argues, the court's denial of their production was harmless error. </s> We do not follow that suggestion. We deal with the record as we find it, which gives no support to the Government's [365 U.S. 312, 316] assertion that verbatim reports were delivered to the defense. Moreover, the Government's assertion is not a positive statement of the prosecution. Those who present the case here say with candor that they speak only "according to our information," which admittedly falls short of an assertion that the copies were delivered to the defense at the trial. Since the defense earnestly denies the statement, we can only conclude that on the record before us petitioners were denied an inspection of the documents to which they were entitled. </s> We put to one side Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367 , where a failure to produce a document was considered to be harmless error under the particular circumstances of that case. We do not reach the harmless error point because, if applicable, it is relevant only to the report of one of the agents, not to those of the other two. Since the production of at least some of the statements withheld was a right of the defense, it is not for us to speculate whether they could have been utilized effectively. As we said in Jencks v. United States, supra, 667: </s> "Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the version of the events given in his report is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony." </s> Accordingly we conclude that at least as respects some of these statements reversible error was committed and that petitioners are entitled to a new trial. There are other questions raised that we do not reach, as we have no way of knowing whether they will arise on a new trial. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 18 U.S.C. 3500 provides in relevant part: </s> "(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. </s> "(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use. </s> . . . . . </s> "(e) The term `statement', as used in subsections (b), (c), and [365 U.S. 312, 314] (d) of this section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means - </s> "(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; or </s> "(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement." </s> [Footnote 2 18 U.S.C. 3500 (b), supra, note 1. </s> [Footnote 3 18 U.S.C. 3500 (e), supra, note 1. </s> [Footnote 4 18 U.S.C. 3500 (e) (2), supra, note 1. </s> [Footnote 5 18 U.S.C. 3500 (e) (1), supra, note 1. </s> [Footnote 6 S. Rep. No. 569, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. [365 U.S. 312, 317] </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN join, dissenting. </s> Petitioners were convicted of tax evasion and conspiracy to defraud the United States in the operation of a horse race booking enterprise. During the trial the defense asked for the production, under the Jencks Act, of certain signed memoranda of interviews of petitioners by government agents. The request was refused at the time. The Government, in its brief filed November 14, 1960, agrees that this refusal was error. It insists, however, that verbatim copies of the memoranda were delivered to the defense attorneys at a later stage in the trial during the cross-examination of one of the Government's agents. It requested, "unless petitioners agree with the [Government's] version of the facts," a remand of the case in order that the trial court might determine this sole question. </s> The attorneys for the petitioners made no reply to this claim of the Government until Thursday, January 5, 1961. In their reply brief on that date they categorically denied that verbatim copies had been delivered. This statement was later supported by affidavit of the attorneys. </s> The case came on for argument on Tuesday, January 10. The Government advised that the government employees involved in the case had not been available until the previous day and hence counter affidavits had not been obtainable. However, it offered to produce affidavits of the agents, as well as the Assistant United States Attorney who tried the case, that would support its claim. In explaining the situation that confronted it, the government counsel stated that he had personally talked by telephone to the United States Attorney after petitioners' brief was filed. This conversation, he said, together with that had with the Assistant United States Attorney who tried the case, confirmed the earlier conclusion that the [365 U.S. 312, 318] Government's contention was correct. However, since both the United States Attorney and his assistant made reference to the Government's witness (Agent Mochel, who had written the memoranda in controversy), government counsel also made every effort to reach Mochel and was successful on January 9. Mochel advised that when he was on the witness stand during the trial he had the carbon copies of his memoranda in his pocket and that upon request he took them out and handed them either (1) directly to petitioners' counsel, or (2) to the Assistant United States Attorney trying the case, who passed them on to petitioners' counsel in the courtroom. This was verified by the Assistant United States Attorney who, however, candidly admitted that he was somewhat "hazy" as to what documents were actually passed by him to counsel. The record indicates that he had made available to petitioners' counsel a large number of documents, including the original notes of the agents. The Government insists that this factual situation creates "sufficient doubt" to require a hearing by the trial judge and a determination of whether or not the memoranda in controversy were actually delivered to petitioners' counsel. </s> This Court, of course, cannot determine these conflicting factual assertions on an affidavit basis. In view of the lateness of petitioners' denial, however, the Government was not afforded sufficient time to supplement the record on the point. The original record lodged here indicates that Agent Mochel, in his testimony, made reference to "memoranda" and, in context, the indications are that the "memoranda" in controversy were at that time in the hands of petitioners' counsel, who were questioning him. Under these circumstances it appears to me that justice does require that we remand the case solely for determination of this point. If the verbatim copies were not delivered, no harm will have been done, for the trial court could then set aside the judgments of conviction [365 U.S. 312, 319] and grant a new trial. On the other hand, if the copies were actually delivered there could have been no prejudicial error and the judgments of conviction should stand. </s> The Court, however, refuses to order this done. It reverses the case on this technicality, regardless of the fact that the Government has persuasive evidence that petitioners' counsel actually had access to the very documents on which its reversal is based. The Court indicates that the Government's claim is outside the record. However, if the memoranda were in fact made available, as the Government claims, they were delivered during the trial and the record does have fleeting references that support such a conclusion. It would be a simple matter for these references to be made more complete at a hearing. In my view it is only fair that the Government should be given this opportunity. Moreover, I note that the Court has granted just such relief in many cases. See Campbell v. United States, ante, p. 85 (1961); United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233 (1957); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956). </s> [365 U.S. 312, 320]

United States Supreme Court PARKER V. LOS ANGELES COUNTY(1949) No. 49 Argued: November 8, 1949Decided: December 5, 1949 </s> Messrs. John T. McTernan, A. L. Wirin, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner. [ Parker v. Los Angeles County 338 U.S. 327 (1949) ] </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 328] </s> Mr. Gerald G. Kelly, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents. </s> Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. In No. 49, twenty-five classified civil servants of the County of Los Angeles brought an action in the Superior Court of that County, and in No. 50, suit was brought by one such employee. The respective plaintiffs sought relief against enforcement by the County and its officials of what is colloquially known as a loyalty test, and they did so for themselves and 'in a representative capacity * * * on behalf of 20,000 employees of Los Angeles County similarly situated.' The plaintiffs, petitioners here, alleged that on August 26, 1947, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles adopted as part of its 'Loyalty Check' program the requirement that all County employees execute a prescribed affidavit. It consisted of four parts, fully set forth in the Appendix. By Part A each employee is required to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution and laws of the State of California; by Part B he forswears that since December 7, 1941, he has been a member of any organization advocating the </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 329] </s> forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of California or of the County of Los Angeles, that he now advocates such overthrow, or that he will in the future so advocate directly or through an organization; by Part C he is required to list his aliases; and by Part D he is asked to indicate whether he has ever been 'a member of, or directly or indirectly supported or followed' any of an enumerated list of 145 organizations. Asserting fear of penalizing consequences from the loyalty program, and claiming that the law of California and the Constitution of the United States barred coercive measures by the County to secure obedience to the alleged affidavit requirement, petitioners brought these actions. Demurrers to the complaints were sustained by the Superior Court and its judgments were affirmed by the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District. 88 Cal.App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review we brought the case here because, on the showing then before us, serious questions seemed raised as to the scope of a State's power to safeguard its security with due regard for the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 337 U.S. 929 . In view, however, of the circumstances that became manifest after the cases came to argument, we are precluded from reaching these constitutional issues on their merits. To begin with, the California decision under review does not tell us unambiguously what compulsion, if any, the loyalty order of August 26, 1947, carried. It is unequivocally clear that the lower court refused to decide whether an employee who discloses his so-called 'subversive' activities or connections may for that reason be discharged. It is not clear, however, whether, as petitioners contend, the lower court meant to hold that the </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 330] </s> Board of Supervisors may discharge an employee who refuses to file an affidavit. 1 This ambiguity renders so doubtful whether an issue under the United States Constitution is before us that at most we would exercise jurisdiction to obtain clarification by the State court. See Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U.S. 14 ; State of Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 ; State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 ; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 . But the circumstances which were called to our attention after the cases reached us leave no doubt that the issues which lead us to bring them here are not ripe for constitutional adjudication. American Wood Paper </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 331] </s> Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333; Id., 131 U.S.Append. xcii; Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 . As of July 20, 1948, nearly a year after the original loyalty order, all but 104 of the 22,000 officers and employees of the County had executed the prescribed affidavit. On that day, these noncomplying employees were advised that the Board of Supervisors had adopted an order providing (1) that unless they had executed Parts A, B and C of the affidavit by July 26 they would be discharged, and (2) that unless they had executed Part D by that time they would be discharged 'if and when the loyalty test litigation now pending is finally concluded with a determination that the County was justified in requiring from its employees the information embodied in Paragraph 'D."2 This order was the first explicit announcement of sanctions by the Board in furtherance of its loyalty program. By July 26 the entire affidavit had been executed by all but 45 employees. Of these, 29 had executed only Parts A, B and C. Sixteen stood their ground against any compliance. They invoked their administrative remedy of review before the Civil Service Commission which decided against them. On June 24 of this year these sixteen discharged employees sought a writ of mandate from the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission, with a prayer for reinstatement and back pay. We are advised that this litigation is now pending in the Superior Court. The petitioners here, except one in No. 49, signed Parts A, B and C, and that petitioner is a party in the case before the Superior Court. </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 332] </s> From this it appears that the California courts have before them for the first time since the inception of the loyalty program an order which expressly threatens sanctions. These sanctions are being challenged under State law as well as under the United States Constitution. For all we know the California courts may sustain these claims under local law. 3 The present cases are here from an intermediate State appellate court because the State Supreme Court did not deem the records before it to present issues deserving of its discretionary review. The explicit sanctions of the modified order may lead the Supreme Court of California to pass on them should the litigation now pending in the lower courts go against the contentions of these petitioners. It is relevant to note that when claims not unrelated to those now urged before us, but based on State law, have come before the Supreme Court of California that tribunal has not been insensitive to them. See Communist Party of United States of America v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900. If their claims are recognized by the California courts, petitioners would of course have no basis for asserting denial of a Federal right. It will be time enough for the petitioners to urge denial of a Federal right after the State courts have definitively denied their claims under State law. Due regard for our Federal system requires that this Court stay its hand until the opportunities afforded by State courts have exhausted claims of litigants under </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 333] </s> State law. This is not what is invidiously called a technical rule. The best teaching of this Court's experience admonishes us not to entertain constitutional questions in advance of the strictest necessity. Decent respect for California and its courts demands that this Court wait until the State courts have spoken with knowledge of the events brought to light for the first time at the bar of this Court. Since the writs must be dismissed because constitutional questions which brought these cases here are not ripe for decision, all subsidiary questions fall. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 585 , 1427; Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union No. 103, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 ; C.I.O. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472 . Dismissed. Mr. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or disposition of these cases. Appendix. The affidavit prescribed by the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles on August 26, 1947, as part of its 'Loyalty Check' program is as follows: Oath and Affidavit Department .......... </s> A. Oath of Office or Employment I, ......, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of California, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 334] </s> and faithfully discharge the duties of the office or employment on which I am about to enter or am now engaged. So Help Me God. </s> B. Affidavit re Subversive Activity I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I now a member, nor have I been since December 7, 1941, a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States, or State of California, or County of Los Angeles, by force or violence, except those specified as follows: ...... and that during such time as I am an officer or employee of the County of Los Angeles, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States, or State of California, or County of Los Angeles by force or violence. </s> C. Affidavit re Aliases I do further swear (or affirm) that I have never used or been known by any names other than those listed as follows: ............ </s> D. Membership in Organizations I do further swear (or affirm) that I have never been a member of, or directly or indirectly supported or followed any of the hereinafter listed organizations, except those which I indicate by an X mark. NAME Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Academic and Civil Rights Council of California. After School Clubs. Agitprop. American Artists Congress. </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 335] </s> America for Americans. American Comm. for a Free Idonesia. American Comm. for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom. American Comm. for Protection of the Foreign Born. American Comm. to Save Refugees. Americans Communications Assn. American Communist Party. American Council on Soviet Relations. American Federation for Political Unity. American Friends of the Chinese People. American Guard. American League Against War and Fascism. American League for Peace and Democracy. American League of Christian Women. American Peace Mobilization. American Russian Institute. American Society for Technical Aid for Spain. American Student Union. American Veterans Comm. American Writers Congress. American Youth Congress. American Writers School. American Youth for Democracy. Anti-Axis Comm. Anti-Hearst Examiner. Anti-Nazi League. Anti-Nazi League of Hollywood. Anti-ROTC Committee Arcos Limited. Artist Front to Win the War. Arts Advisory Council. Authors League. Ballila. Bay Area Council Against Discrimination. [335-Continued.] California Conference for Democratic Action. California Labor School. California Youth Legislature. Centro Anti-Communists. China Aid Council of American League for Peace and Democracy. Citizens Committee for Better Education. Citizens Comm. for Defense of Mexican-American Youth. Citizens Comm. to Free Earl Browder. Citizens Comm. to Support Labors Right. Citizens No Foreign Wars Coalition. Civil Rights Congress. Civil Rights Council for Northern California. Comintern. Comm. for Boycott Against Japanese Aggression. Comm. for Defense of Mexican-American Youth. Comm. for Support of S. W. Garson. Comm. Protesting Attacks Against the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Comm. to Defend America by Keeping Out of War. Communist International. </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 336] </s> Communist Party's Little Theatre. Communist Workers School. Communist Political Assn. Conference for Democratic Action. Consumers National Federation. Contemporary Theatre. Co-ordinating Commission to Lift Embargo (To Spain). Council for Pan American Democracy. Cultural and Professional Projects Assn. Congress of Mexican and Spanish-Mexican Peoples of U.S. Daily Worker. Democratic Youth Federation. Elizabeth Curley Flynn Club. Elizalde Anti-Discrimination Comm. Emergency Comm. to Aid Spain. Emergency Trade Union Conference to Aid Spanish Democracy. Ex Combattanti Society. Farmer Labor Party. Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians. Field Workers School. First Congress of Mexican and Spanish-American People of U.S. Friends of Soviet Russia. Friends of Soviet Union. German-American Bund. Greater New York Emergency Conference on Inalienable Rights. Harry Bridges Defense Commn. Hold the Price Line Commn. Hollywood Anti Nazi League. [336-Continued.] Hollywood Cultural Commission. Hollywood Community Radio Group. Hollywood Independent Citizens Comm. of Arts, Sciences and Professions. Hollywood League for Democratic Action. Hollywood Theatre Alliance. Hollywood Writers Mobilization. Humanist Society of Friends. Independent Citizens Comm. of Arts, Sciences and Professions. International Labor Defense. International Red Aid. International Workers Order. Jewish Peoples Committee. John Reed Clubs. Joint Committee for Trade Union Rights. Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee Committee. League Against War and Fascism. League for Democratic Action. League for Peace and Democracy. League for American Writers. League for Struggle for Negro Rights. League of Women Shoppers. League to Save America First. Los Angeles County Political Commission. Los Angeles County Trade Union Commission. Mooney Defense Commission. </s> [338 U.S. 327 , 337] </s> Marine Cooks and Stewards Union. Maritime Federation of the Pacific. Mobilization for Democracy. Motion Picture Cooperative Buyers Guild. Motion Picture Democratic Committee. National Citizens Political Action Committee. National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax. National Council on Soviet American Friendship. National Emergency Conference. National Federation for Constitutional Liberties. National Negro Women's Council. National Negro Congress. National Students League. New Masses. New Theatre League. North American Commission to Aid Spanish Democracy. Pen and Hammer Club. Peoples Council of America. Peoples Front. Progressive Comm. to Rebuild the American Labor Party. Refugee Scholarship and Peace Comm. Second Annual California Model Legislature. Simon J. Lubin Society. Social Problems Club. Spanish Relief Committee. Student Rights Assn. United Farmers League. United Federal Workers. Western Workers. Workers Alliance. World Committee Against War. Workers School. Young Communist League. The Young Pioneers. Footnotes 1. Clearly enough some discharges or demotions of classified employees by the Board of Supervisors are not final. The division of authority between the Board and the County Civil Service Commission is thus formulated by the lower court: 'In case the appointing power wishes to discharge a civil service employee the reasons therefor must be given and, thereupon, if the employee so desires he is entitled to a hearing before the commission. If the commission finds that the reasons are not sufficient, the discharge is void, despite anything the appointing power can do about it. </s> 'From what has so far been said, it is self-evident that neither the Board nor its agents can discharge a civil service employee for any cause that the Civil Service Commission finds insufficient. Accordingly, if in the view of the Board of Supervisors, or its agents as the appointing power, a civil service employee should be discharged on the sole ground that the employee is 'subversive', the discharge or attempt to discharge on that ground is of no effect if, on hearing, the commission holds otherwise. </s> 'Whether the appointing power will or will not discharge employees as claimed by the plaintiffs, for causes of the character enumerated, and whether the Civil Service Commission will uphold such discharges, if any, on such causes, are not matters upon which this Court may speculate or adjudicate at this time. * * *' 88 Cal.App.2d 481, 493, 497, 199 P.2d 429, 436, 438Ä439. See Los Angeles County Charter, Art. IX, 34(13) in Cal. Laws 1913, p. 1495, as amended, Cal.Stat.1939, p. 3147. </s> 2. The affidavit in the order of July 20, 1948, differed from the affidavit in the original order only in that Part B was elucidated to an extent not here relevant and a few organizations listed in Part D were omitted. 3. Article IX, 41 of the Los Angeles Charter provides: 'No person in the classified service, or seeking admission thereto, shall be appointed, reduced or removed or in any way favored or discriminated against because of his political or religious opinions or affiliations.' Cal.Laws 1913, p. 1496. Article I, 1, 4, 9, 10, 16, 21 of the California Constitution contains safeguards against infringement of the rights at which petitioners claim the loyalty investigation strikes.

United States Supreme Court SPEVACK v. KLEIN(1967) No. 62 Argued: November 7, 1966Decided: January 16, 1967 </s> In a proceeding to discipline petitioner, a member of the New York bar, for professional misconduct for failure to produce demanded financial records and for refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry, petitioner defended on the ground that production of the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred, holding that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available in light of Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 . The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the authority of Cohen v. Hurley, and on the further ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to a demand, not for oral testimony, but for records required by the Appellate Division to be kept by an attorney. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 512-520. </s> 16 N. Y. 2d 1048, 213 N. E. 2d 457, 17 N. Y. 2d 490, 214 N. E. 2d 373, reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concluded that: </s> 1. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, extends its protection to lawyers, and should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of livelihood as a penalty for asserting it. Cohen v. Hurley, supra, is overruled. Pp. 514-516. </s> 2. Since petitioner had been disbarred on the theory that the privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the demanded records, but that the invocation of the privilege could lead to disbarment, his disbarment cannot be affirmed on the ground that the privilege was not applicable thereto in the first place, as that would deny him an opportunity to show that the records demanded were outside the scope of the court rule requiring attorneys to keep records relating to contingent fee cases, and that the records demanded had no "public aspects." Pp. 516-519. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS concluded that: </s> 1. Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, and petitioner cannot be disbarred for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 519-520. [385 U.S. 511, 512] </s> 2. The right of a lawyer, who is not an employee of the State, to remain silent, is to be distinguished from that of a public employee who is asked questions by his employer directly relating to the performance of his official duties. P. 519. </s> 3. As stated in MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS' opinion, the issue of the validity and scope of the required records doctrine is not appropriately presented here. P. 520. </s> Lawrence J. Latto argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William H. Dempsey, Jr., and Martin J. Flynn. </s> Solomon A. Klein, respondent, pro se, argued the cause and filed a brief. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Israel Steingold, for the American Trial Lawyers Association; Herman B. Gerringer for the New York State Association of Trial Lawyers; Ralph Shapiro for the New York City Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild; and by Emanuel Redfield for the New York Civil Liberties Union. </s> John G. Bonomi filed a brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN concur. </s> This is a proceeding to discipline petitioner, a member of the New York Bar, for professional misconduct. Of the various charges made, only one survived, viz., the refusal of petitioner to honor a subpoena duces tecum served on him in that he refused to produce the demanded financial records and refused to testify at the judicial inquiry. Petitioner's sole defense was that the production of the records and his testimony would tend [385 U.S. 511, 513] to incriminate him. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered petitioner disbarred, holding that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was not available to him in light of our decision in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 . See 24 App. Div. 2d 653. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 16 N. Y. 2d 1048, 213 N. E. 2d 457, 17 N. Y. 2d 490, 214 N. E. 2d 373. The case is here on certiorari which we granted to determine whether Cohen v. Hurley, supra, had survived Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 . </s> Cohen v. Hurley was a five-to-four decision rendered in 1961. It is practically on all fours with the present case. There, as here, an attorney relying on his privilege against self-incrimination refused to testify and was disbarred. The majority of the Court allowed New York to construe her own privilege against self-incrimination so as not to make it available in judicial inquiries of this character ( 366 U.S., at 125 -127) and went on to hold that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Id., at 127-129. The minority took the view that the full sweep of the Fifth Amendment had been absorbed into the Fourteenth and extended its protection to lawyers as well as other persons. </s> In 1964 the Court in another five-to-four decision held that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 . While Cohen v. Hurley was not overruled, the majority indicated that the principle on which it rested had been seriously eroded. 378 U.S., at 11 . One minority view espoused by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE CLARK stated that Cohen v. Hurley flatly decided that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not applicable against the States (id., at 17) and urged that it be followed. [385 U.S. 511, 514] The others in dissent - MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE STEWART - thought that on the facts of the case the privilege was not properly invoked and that the state trial judge should have been sustained in ruling that the answers would not tend to incriminate. Id., at 33-38. </s> The Appellate Division distinguished Malloy v. Hogan on the ground that there the petitioner was not a member of the Bar. 24 App. Div. 2d, at 654. And the Court of Appeals rested squarely on Cohen v. Hurley as one of the two grounds for affirmance. 1 </s> And so the question emerges whether the principle of Malloy v. Hogan is inapplicable because petitioner is a member of the Bar. We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. These views, expounded in the dissents in Cohen v. Hurley, need not be elaborated again. </s> We said in Malloy v. Hogan: </s> "The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement - the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence." 378 U.S., at 8 . 2 </s> [385 U.S. 511, 515] </s> In this context "penalty" is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege "costly." Id., at 614. We held in that case that the Fifth Amendment, operating through the Fourteenth, "forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt." Id., at 615. What we said in Malloy and Griffin is in the tradition of the broad protection given the privilege at least since Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 -635, where compulsory production of books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited was held to be compelling him to be a witness against himself. </s> "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." 116 U.S., at 635 . [385 U.S. 511, 516] </s> The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of compulsion as "the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him . . . ." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 . As we recently stated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 , "In this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal construction." It is in that tradition that we overrule Cohen v. Hurley. We find no room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to others. Lawyers are not excepted from the words "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"; and we can imply no exception. Like the school teacher in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 , and the policemen in Garrity v. New Jersey, 3 ante, p. 493, lawyers also enjoy first-class citizenship. </s> The Court of Appeals alternately affirmed the judgment disbarring petitioner on the ground that under Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 , and the required records doctrine he was under a duty to produce the withheld records. The Court of Appeals did not elaborate on the point; nor did the Appellate Division advert to it. At the time in question the only Rule governing the matter was entitled "Preservation of records of actions, claims and proceedings." 4 It provided that in cases involving "contingent fee compensation" attorneys [385 U.S. 511, 517] for all the parties shall preserve "the pleadings, records and other papers pertaining to such action, claim and proceeding, and also all data and memoranda of the disposition thereof, for the period of at least five years after any settlement or satisfaction of the action, claim or proceeding or judgment or final order thereon, or after the dismissal or discontinuance of any action or proceeding brought." </s> The documents sought in the subpoena were petitioner's daybook, cash receipts book, cash disbursements book, checkbook stubs, petty cashbook and vouchers, general ledger and journal, canceled checks and bank statements, passbooks and other evidences of accounts, record of loans made, payroll records, and state and federal tax returns and worksheets relative thereto. </s> The Shapiro case dealt with a federal price control regulation requiring merchants to keep sales records. The Court called them records with "public aspects," as distinguished from private papers ( 335 U.S., at 34 ); and concluded by a divided vote that their compelled production did not violate the Fifth Amendment. We are asked to overrule Shapiro. But we find it unnecessary to reach it. </s> Rule 5, requiring the keeping of records, was broad and general - "the pleadings, records and other papers pertaining to such action, claim and proceeding, and also all data and memoranda of the disposition thereof." The detailed financial aspects of contingent-fee litigation demanded might possibly by a broad, generous construction of the Rule be brought within its intendment. Our problem, however, is different. Neither the referee of the inquiry, nor counsel for the inquiry, nor the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court questioned the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to the records. All proceeded on the basis that petitioner could invoke the privilege with respect to the [385 U.S. 511, 518] records, but that the price he might have to pay was disbarment. The Court of Appeals was the first to suggest that the privilege against self-incrimination was not applicable to the records. Petitioner, however, had been disbarred on the theory that the privilege was applicable to the records, but that the invocation of the privilege could lead to disbarment. His disbarment cannot be affirmed on the ground that the privilege was not applicable in the first place. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 . For that procedure would deny him all opportunity at the trial to show that the Rule, fairly construed and understood, should not be given a broad sweep 5 and to [385 U.S. 511, 519] make a record that the documents demanded by the subpoena had no "public aspects" within the required records rule but were private papers. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Order affirmed on the authority of Cohen v. Hurley ( 366 U.S. 117 ) and on the further ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to a demand, not for oral testimony, but that an attorney produce records required by law to be kept by him (Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 ; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 )." 16 N. Y. 2d 1048, 1050, 213 N. E. 2d 457-458. </s> [Footnote 2 Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 , much relied on here, was a five-to-four decision the other way and accurately reflected the pre-Malloy [385 U.S. 511, 515] v. Hogan construction of the Fifth Amendment. We do not stop to re-examine all the other prior decisions of that vintage to determine which of them, if any, would be decided the other way because of "the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence," as declared in Malloy v. Hogan, supra, at 8. (Italics added.) </s> [Footnote 3 Whether a policeman, who invokes the privilege when his conduct as a police officer is questioned in disciplinary proceedings, may be discharged for refusing to testify is a question we did not reach. </s> [Footnote 4 Rule 5 of the Special Rules of the Second Dept., Appellate Division. Rule 5 was subsequently amended and renumbered as Special Rule IV (6). See Civil Practice Annual of New York 9-24 (1964). </s> [Footnote 5 Counsel for respondent conceded on oral argument that the subpoena was broader than Rule 5: </s> "Q. Is this subpoena coextensive with the provisions of the order about keeping the financial records or does the subpoena go beyond? </s> "A. I would say in my judgment it goes beyond. . . . There is room for reasonable argument that some of the items called for in the subpoena might perhaps be argued to not come within the required records I am talking about. </s> "Q. Would you mind relating those to us? Tell us what those are. . . . Cash disbursements? </s> "A. I would say do come under the records. . . . I would exclude as not coming within the statute the federal and state tax returns for example. . . . </s> "Q. How about worksheets . . . ? </s> "A. Worksheets? Out. . . . </s> "Q. You mean all of item 12 . . . would be out? </s> "A. Item 12 - copies of federal and state tax returns, accountants' worksheets, and all other . . . I do not include them. </s> "Q. They would all be outside the rules? </s> "A. Yes. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. But the demand was for records beyond the records that he was required to keep. </s> . . . . . </s> "A. [T]he New York Court of Appeals, speaking for the State of New York, says these are required records. </s> "Q. I suppose that if he produced just the records that were required [385 U.S. 511, 519] - that he was required to keep - that that might very well constitute a waiver as to other records. </s> "A. No, no it would not . . . . </s> "Q. Why not? </s> "A. Because if the other records were held not to come within the required records doctrine he would have the privilege to do that, but he has no privilege. </s> "Q. I am not sure. Are you sure about that? . . . I would say that the common understanding is that if he produces some of the records relating to a given subject matter, that is a waiver of privilege as to the balance of the records relating to the subject matter. Am I wrong about that? </s> "A. I would not agree with that. It is an argument that could be made but I would disagree with it for this reason. Under the doctrine of Shapiro v. United States, he has no Fifth Amendment privilege as to records that are required to be kept. He does have Fifth Amendment privilege as to records he is not required to keep and also as to refusal to give oral testimony." </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree that Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), should be overruled. But I would distinguish between a lawyer's right to remain silent and that of a public employee who is asked questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties as distinguished from his beliefs or other matters that are not within the scope of the specific duties which he undertook faithfully to perform as part of his employment by the State. This Court has never held, for example, that a policeman may not be discharged for refusal in disciplinary proceedings to testify as to his conduct as a police officer. It is quite a different matter if the State seeks to use the testimony given under this [385 U.S. 511, 520] lash in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Garrity v. New Jersey, ante, p. 493. </s> But a lawyer is not an employee of the State. He does not have the responsibility of an employee to account to the State for his actions because he does not perform them as agent of the State. His responsibility to the State is to obey its laws and the rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as part of its licensing procedures. The special responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of the State and officer of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth Amendment rights. Accordingly, I agree that Spevack could not be disbarred for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. </s> If this case presented the question whether a lawyer might be disbarred for refusal to keep or to produce, upon properly authorized and particularized demand, records which the lawyer was lawfully and properly required to keep by the State as a proper part of its functions in relation to him as licensor of his high calling, I should feel compelled to vote to affirm, although I would be prepared in an appropriate case to re-examine the scope of the principle announced in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). I am not prepared to indicate doubt as to the essential validity of Shapiro. However, I agree that the required records issue is not appropriately presented here, for the reasons stated by my Brother DOUGLAS. On this basis I join in the judgment of the Court. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting. </s> This decision, made in the name of the Constitution, permits a lawyer suspected of professional misconduct to thwart direct official inquiry of him without fear of disciplinary action. What is done today will be disheartening [385 U.S. 511, 521] and frustrating to courts and bar associations throughout the country in their efforts to maintain high standards at the bar. </s> It exposes this Court itself to the possible indignity that it may one day have to admit to its own bar such a lawyer unless it can somehow get at the truth of suspicions, the investigation of which the applicant has previously succeeded in blocking. For I can perceive no distinction between "admission" and "disbarment" in the rationale of what is now held. The decision might even lend some color of support for justifying the appointment to the bench of a lawyer who, like petitioner, prevents full inquiry into his professional behavior. And, still more pervasively, this decision can hardly fail to encourage oncoming generations of lawyers to think of their calling as imposing on them no higher standards of behavior than might be acceptable in the general market-place. The soundness of a constitutional doctrine carrying such denigrating import for our profession is surely suspect on its face. </s> Six years ago a majority of this Court, in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 , set its face against the doctrine that now prevails, bringing to bear in support of the Court's holding, among other things, the then-established constitutional proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment as such. Three years later another majority of the Court, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , decided to make the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States and in doing so cast doubt on the continuing vitality of Cohen v. Hurley. The question now is whether Malloy requires the overruling of Cohen in its entirety. For reasons that follow I think it clear that it does not. </s> It should first be emphasized that the issue here is plainly not whether lawyers may "enjoy first-class citizenship." [385 U.S. 511, 522] Nor is the issue whether lawyers may be deprived of their federal privilege against self-incrimination, whether or not criminal prosecution is undertaken against them. These diversionary questions have of course not been presented or even remotely suggested by this case either here or in the courts of New York. The plurality opinion's vivid rhetoric thus serves only to obscure the issues with which we are actually confronted, and to hinder their serious consideration. The true question here is instead the proper scope and effect of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment in state disciplinary proceedings against attorneys. 1 In particular, we are required to determine whether petitioner's disbarment for his failure to provide information relevant to charges of misconduct in carrying on his law practice impermissibly vitiated the protection afforded by the privilege. This important question warrants more complete and discriminating analysis than that given to it by the plurality opinion. </s> This Court reiterated only last Term that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination "has never been given the full scope which the values it helps to protect suggest." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 . The Constitution contains no formulae with which we can calculate the areas within this "full scope" to which the privilege should extend, and the Court has therefore been obliged to fashion for itself standards for the application of the privilege. In federal cases stemming from Fifth Amendment claims, the Court has chiefly derived its standards from consideration of two factors: the history and purposes of the privilege, and the character and urgency of the other public interests [385 U.S. 511, 523] involved. See, e. g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 ; Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 ; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 . If, as Malloy v. Hogan, supra, suggests, the federal standards imposed by the Fifth Amendment are now to be extended to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , it would follow that these same factors must be no less relevant in cases centering on Fourteenth Amendment claims. In any event, the construction consistently given to the Fourteenth Amendment by this Court would require their consideration. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 . I therefore first turn to these factors to assess the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of petitioner's disbarment. </s> It cannot be claimed that the purposes served by the New York rules at issue here, compendiously aimed at "ambulance chasing" and its attendant evils, are unimportant or unrelated to the protection of legitimate state interests. This Court has often held that the States have broad authority to devise both requirements for admission and standards of practice for those who wish to enter the professions. E. g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 ; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 ; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 . The States may demand any qualifications which have "a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity," Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 , and may exclude any applicant who fails to satisfy them. In particular, a State may require evidence of good character, and may place the onus of its production upon the applicant. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 . Finally, a State may without constitutional objection require in the same fashion continuing evidence of professional and moral fitness as a condition of the retention of the right to practice. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 . All this is in no way questioned by today's decision. [385 U.S. 511, 524] </s> As one prerequisite of continued practice in New York, the Appellate Division, Second Department, of the Supreme Court of New York has determined that attorneys must actively assist the courts and the appropriate professional groups in the prevention and detection of unethical legal activities. The Second Department demands that attorneys maintain various records, file statements of retainer in certain kinds of cases, and upon request provide information, all relevant to the use by the attorneys of contingent fee arrangements in such cases. These rules are intended to protect the public from the abuses revealed by a lengthy series of investigations of malpractices in the geographical area represented by the Second Department. It cannot be said that these conditions are arbitrary or unreasonable, or that they are unrelated to an attorney's continued fitness to practice. English courts since Edward I have endeavored to regulate the qualification and practice of lawyers, always in hope that this might better assure the integrity and evenhandedness of the administration of justice. 2 Very similar efforts have been made in the United States since the 17th century. 3 These efforts have protected the systems of justice in both countries from abuse, and have directly contributed to public confidence in those systems. Such efforts give appropriate recognition to the principle accepted both here and in England that lawyers are officers of the court who perform a fundamental role in the administration of justice. 4 The rules at issue here are in form and spirit a continuation [385 U.S. 511, 525] of these efforts, and accordingly are reasonably calculated to serve the most enduring interests of the citizens of New York. </s> Without denying the urgency or significance of the public purposes served by these rules, the plurality opinion has seemingly concluded that they may not be enforced because any consequence of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which renders that claim "costly" is an "instrument of compulsion" which impermissibly infringes on the protection offered by the privilege. Apart from brief obiter dicta in recent opinions of this Court, this broad proposition is entirely without support in the construction hitherto given to the privilege, and is directly inconsistent with a series of cases in which this Court has indicated the principles which are properly applicable here. The Court has not before held that the Federal Government and the States are forbidden to permit any consequences to result from a claim of the privilege; it has instead recognized that such consequences may vary widely in kind and intensity, and that these differences warrant individual examination both of the hazard, if any, offered to the essential purposes of the privilege, and of the public interests protected by the consequence. This process is far better calculated than the broad prohibition embraced by the plurality to serve both the purposes of the privilege and the other important public values which are often at stake in such cases. It would assure the integrity of the privilege, and yet guarantee the most generous opportunities for the pursuit of other public values, by selecting the rule or standard most appropriate for the hazards and characteristics of each consequence. </s> One such rule has already been plainly approved by this Court. It seems clear to me that this rule is applicable to the situation now before us. The Court has repeatedly recognized that it is permissible to deny a status or authority to a claimant of the privilege against [385 U.S. 511, 526] self-incrimination if his claim has prevented full assessment of his qualifications for the status or authority. Under this rule, the applicant may not both decline to disclose information necessary to demonstrate his fitness, and yet demand that he receive the benefits of the status. He may not by his interjection of the privilege either diminish his obligation to establish his qualifications, or escape the consequences exacted by the State for a failure to satisfy that obligation. </s> This rule was established by this Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 . The Court there held that a doctor who refused, under a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, to divulge whether he was a Communist was not entitled by right to receive a commission as an Army officer, although he had apparently satisfied every other prerequisite for a commission. The Court expressly noted that "[n]o one believes he can be punished" for asserting the privilege, but said that it had "no hesitation" in holding that the petitioner nonetheless could not both rely on the privilege to deny relevant information to the commissioning authorities and demand that he be appointed to a position of "honor and trust." 345 U.S., at 91 . The Court concluded that "we cannot doubt that the President of the United States, before certifying his confidence in an officer and appointing him to a commissioned rank, has the right to learn whatever facts the President thinks may affect his fitness." Ibid. </s> Analogous problems were involved in Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 , in which the Court held that an alien whose deportation had been ordered was ineligible for a discretionary order permitting his voluntary departure. The alien was held to be ineligible because he had failed to establish that he was not affiliated with the Communist Party, in that he refused to answer questions about membership in the Party on grounds that the [385 U.S. 511, 527] answers might incriminate him. The petitioner could not prevent the application of a sanction imposed as a result of his silence by interposing the privilege against self-incrimination as a basis for that silence. </s> These principles have also been employed by this Court to hold that failure to incriminate one's self can result in denial of the removal of one's case from a state to a federal court, Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 , and by the Fourth Circuit to hold that a bankrupt's failure to disclose the disposition of his property, although disclosure might incriminate him, requires the denial of a discharge in bankruptcy. Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210. </s> This Court has applied similar principles in a series of cases involving claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases all antedate Malloy v. Hogan, and thus are presumably now subject to the "federal standards," but until today those standards included the principles of Orloff v. Willoughby, and Malloy v. Hogan therefore could not alone require a different result. The fulcrum of these cases has been Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 . The appellant there was an associate professor at Brooklyn College who invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege before an investigating committee of the United States Senate, and was subsequently discharged from his position at the college by reason of that occurrence. The Court held that his removal was a denial of the due process demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Its reasons were apparently two: first, the Board had attached a "sinister meaning," in the form of an imputation of guilt, to Slochower's invocation of the privilege; and second, the Board was not engaged in a bona fide effort to elicit information relevant to assess the "qualifications of its employees." The state authorities "had possessed the pertinent information for 12 years," and in any event the questions put to Slochower [385 U.S. 511, 528] by the committee were "wholly unrelated" to his university functions. 350 U.S., at 558 . </s> The elements of the holding in Slochower have subsequently been carefully considered on several occasions by this Court. See, e. g., Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 ; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 ; Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 . These cases, when read with Slochower, make plain that so long as state authorities do not derive any imputation of guilt from a claim of the privilege, they may in the course of a bona fide assessment of an employee's fitness for public employment require that the employee disclose information reasonably related to his fitness, and may order his discharge if he declines. Identical principles have been applied by this Court to applicants for admission to the bar who have refused to produce information pertinent to their professional and moral qualifications. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 ; In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 . In sum, all these cases adopted principles under the Fourteenth Amendment which are plainly congruent with those applied in Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, and other federal cases to Fifth Amendment claims. </s> The petitioner here does not contend, and the plurality opinion does not suggest, that the state courts have derived any inference of guilt from petitioner's claim of the privilege. The state courts have expressly disclaimed all such inferences. 24 App. Div. 2d 653, 654. Nor is it suggested that the proceedings against petitioner were not an effort in good faith to assess his qualifications for continued practice in New York, or that the information sought from petitioner was not reasonably relevant to those qualifications. It would therefore follow that under the construction consistently given by this Court both to the privilege under the Fifth Amendment and to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, petitioner's disbarment is constitutionally permissible. [385 U.S. 511, 529] </s> The plurality opinion does not pause either to acknowledge the previous handling of these issues or to explain why the privilege must now be supposed to forbid all consequences which may result from privileged silence. This is scarcely surprising, for the plurality opinion would create a novel and entirely unnecessary extension of the privilege which would exceed the needs of the privilege's purpose and seriously inhibit the protection of other public interests. The petitioner was not denied his privilege against self-incrimination, nor was he penalized for its use; he was denied his authority to practice law within the State of New York by reason of his failure to satisfy valid obligations imposed by the State as a condition of that authority. The only hazard in this process to the integrity of the privilege is the possibility that it might induce involuntary disclosures of incriminating materials; the sanction precisely calculated to eliminate that hazard is to exclude the use by prosecuting authorities of such materials and of their fruits. This Court has, upon proof of involuntariness, consistently forbidden their use since Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , and now, as my Brother WHITE has emphasized, the plurality has intensified this protection still further with the broad prohibitory rule it has announced today in Garrity v. New Jersey, ante, p. 493. It is true that this Court has on occasion gone a step further, and forbidden the practices likely to produce involuntary disclosures, but those cases are readily distinguishable. They have uniformly involved either situations in which the entire process was thought both to present excessive risks of coercion and to be foreign to our accusatorial system, as in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , or situations in which the only possible purpose of the practice was thought to be to penalize the accused for his use of the constitutional privilege, as in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 . Both situations are plainly remote from that in issue here. None of the reasons thought to require the prohibitions [385 U.S. 511, 530] established in those cases have any relevance in the situation now before us; nothing in New York's efforts in good faith to assure the integrity of its judicial system destroys, inhibits, or even minimizes the petitioner's constitutional privilege. There is therefore no need to speculate whether lawyers, or those in any other profession or occupation, have waived in some unspecified fashion a measure of the protection afforded by the constitutional privilege; it suffices that the State is earnestly concerned with an urgent public interest, and that it has selected methods for the pursuit of that interest which do not prevent attainment of the privilege's purposes. </s> I think it manifest that this Court is required neither by the logic of the privilege against self-incrimination nor by previous authority to invalidate these state rules, and thus to overturn the disbarment of the petitioner. Today's application of the privilege serves only to hamper appropriate protection of other fundamental public values. 5 </s> In view of these conclusions, I find it unnecessary to reach the alternative basis of the Court of Appeals' decision, the "required records doctrine." See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 . </s> I would affirm the judgment of disbarment. </s> [Footnote 1 No claim has been made either here or in the state courts that the underlying facts representing petitioner's alleged conduct were not such as to entitle him to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. We therefore deal with the case on the premise that his claim of privilege was properly asserted. </s> [Footnote 2 The history of these efforts is outlined in Cohen, A History of the English Bar and Attornatus to 1450, 277 et seq., 2 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 317, 504 et seq.; 6 id., 431 et seq. </s> [Footnote 3 These efforts are traced in Warren, History of the American Bar, passim. </s> [Footnote 4 Evidences of this principle may be found in the opinions of this Court. See, e. g., Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 . </s> [Footnote 5 It should be noted that the principle that a license or status may be denied to one who refuses, under the shelter of the constitutional privilege, to disclose information pertinent to that status or privilege, has been adopted in a variety of situations by statute. See, e. g., 12 U.S.C. 481; 47 U.S.C. 308 (b), 312 (a) (4): 5 U.S.C. 2283. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. * </s> In No. 13, Garrity v. New Jersey, the Court apparently holds that in every imaginable circumstance the threat [385 U.S. 511, 531] of discharge issued by one public officer to another will be impermissible compulsion sufficient to render subsequent answers to questions inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. I would agree that in some, if not in most, cases this would be the proper result. But the circumstances of such confrontations are of infinite variety. Rather than the Court's inflexible, per se rule, the matter should be decided on the facts of each particular case. In the situation before us now, I agree with my Brother HARLAN that the findings of the two courts below should not be overturned. </s> However that may be, with Garrity on the books, the Court compounds its error in Spevack v. Klein, No. 62. The petitioner in that case refused to testify and to produce any of his records. He incriminated himself in no way whatsoever. The Court nevertheless holds that he may not be disbarred for his refusal to do so. Such a rule would seem justifiable only on the ground that it is an essential measure to protect against self-incrimination - to prevent what may well be a successful attempt to elicit incriminating admissions. But Garrity excludes such statements, and their fruits, from a criminal proceeding and therefore frustrates in advance any effort to compel admissions which could be used to obtain a criminal conviction. I therefore see little legal or practical basis, in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment, for preventing the discharge of a public employee or the disbarment of a lawyer who refuses to talk about the performance of his public duty.Fn [385 U.S. 511, 532] </s> In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 , the Court held that "a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him." 378 U.S., at 79 . To implement this holding the Court further ruled that the Federal Government would be constitutionally prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits. This holding was based on the desirability of accommodating the interests of the State and the Federal Government in investigating and prosecuting crime. </s> A similar accommodation should be made here, although the multiple interests involved are those of the State alone. The majority does not deny that the State and its citizens have a legitimate interest in ridding themselves of faithless officers. Admittedly, however, in attempting to determine the present qualifications of an employee by consultation with the employee himself, the State may ask for information which, if given, would not only result in a discharge but would be very useful evidence in a criminal proceeding. Garrity, in my view, protects against the latter possibility. Consequently, I see no reason for refusing to permit the State to pursue its other valid interest and to discharge an employee who refuses to cooperate in the State's effort to determine his qualifications for continued employment. </s> In my view, Spevack was properly disbarred. With all due respect, I therefore dissent. </s> [Footnote * [This opinion applies also to No. 13, Garrity v. New Jersey, ante, p. 493.] </s> Fn [385 U.S. 511, 531] The opinion of my Brother DOUGLAS professes not to resolve whether policemen may be discharged for refusing to cooperate with an investigation into alleged misconduct. However, the reasoning used to reach his result in the case of lawyers would seemingly apply with equal persuasiveness in the case of public employees. </s> [385 U.S. 511, 533]

United States Supreme Court FREEMAN v. PITTS(1992) No. 89-1290 Argued: October 7, 1991Decided: March 31, 1992 </s> In a class action filed by respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, the District Court, in 1969, entered a consent order approving a plan to dismantle the de jure segregation that had existed in the DeKalb County, Georgia, School System (DCSS). The court retained jurisdiction to oversee implementation of the plan. In 1986, petitioner DCSS officials filed a motion for final dismissal of the litigation, seeking a declaration that DCSS had achieved unitary status. Among other things, the court found that DCSS "has traveled the . . . road to unitary status almost to its end," noted that it had "continually been impressed by [DCSS'] successes . . . and its dedication to providing a quality education for all," and ruled that DCSS is a unitary system with regard to four of the six factors identified in Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 : student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities. In particular, the court found with respect to student assignments that DCSS had briefly achieved unitary status under the court-ordered plan, that subsequent and continuing racial imbalance in this category was a product of independent demographic changes that were unrelated to petitioners' actions and were not a vestige of the prior de jure system, and that actions taken by DCSS had achieved maximum practical desegregation from 1969 to 1986. Although ruling that it would order no further relief in the foregoing areas, the court refused to dismiss the case because it found that DCSS was not unitary with respect to the remaining Green factors: faculty assignments and resource allocation, the latter of which the court considered in connection with a non-Green factor, the quality of education being offered to the white and black student populations. The court ordered DCSS to take measures to address the remaining problems. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that a district court should retain full remedial authority over a school system until it achieves unitary status in all Green categories at the same time for several years; that, because, under this test, DCSS had never achieved unitary status, it could not shirk its constitutional duties by pointing to demographic shifts occurring prior to unitary status; and that DCSS would have to take further actions to correct the racial imbalance, even though such actions might be "administratively awkward, [503 U.S. 467, 468] inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations," Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 . </s> Held: </s> 1. In the course of supervising a desegregation plan, a district court has the authority to relinquish supervision and control of a school district in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations, and may, while retaining jurisdiction over the case, determine that it will not order further remedies in areas where the school district is in compliance with the decree. Pp. 485-492. </s> (a) Green held that the duty of a former de jure district is to take all necessary steps to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination is eliminated, set forth factors that measure unitariness, and instructed the district courts to fashion remedies that address all these factors. Although the unitariness concept is helpful in defining the scope of the district court's authority, the term "unitary" does not have a fixed meaning or content, and does not confine the court's discretion in a way that departs from traditional equitable principles. Under such principles, a court has the inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to correct the constitutional violation, Swann, supra, at 15-16, with the end purpose of restoring state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance, see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 -281. Where justified by the facts of the case, incremental or partial withdrawal of judicial supervision and control in areas of compliance, and retention of jurisdiction over the case with continuing supervision in areas of noncompliance, provides an orderly means for fulfilling this purpose. In particular, the court may determine that it will not order further remedies in the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional violations. See Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436 . Pp. 485-491. </s> (b) Among the factors which must inform the court's discretion to order the incremental withdrawal of its supervision in an equitable manner are the following: whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; whether retention of control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance in other areas; and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good faith commitment to the whole of the decree and to those statutory and constitutional provisions that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance. In considering these factors, a court should give particular attention to the school system's record of compliance; i.e., whether its policies form a consistent [503 U.S. 467, 469] pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations. And with the passage of time, the degree to which racial imbalances continue to represent vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish, and the practicability and efficacy of various remedies can be evaluated with more precision. Pp. 491-492. </s> 2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that, as a matter of law, the District Court had no discretion to permit DCSS to regain control over student assignments and three other Green factors, while retaining supervision over faculty assignments and the quality of education. Pp. 492-500. </s> (a) The District Court exercised its discretion appropriately in addressing the Green elements, inquiring into quality of education, and determining whether minority students were being disadvantaged in ways that required the formulation of new and further remedies in areas of noncompliance. This approach illustrates that the Green factors need not be a rigid framework, and demonstrates the proper use of equitable discretion. By withdrawing control over areas where judicial supervision is no longer needed, a district court can concentrate its own and the school district's resources on the areas where the effects of de jure discrimination have not been eliminated and further action is necessary. Pp. 492-493. </s> (b) The related premises underlying the Court of Appeals' rejection of the District Court's order - first, that, given noncompliance in some discrete categories, there can be no partial withdrawal of judicial control; and second, until there is full compliance, Swann, supra, requires that heroic measures be taken to ensure racial balance in student assignments system wide - are incorrect under this Court's analysis and precedents. Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake, but is to be pursued only when there is a causal link between an imbalance and the constitutional violation. Once racial imbalance traceable to the constitutional violation has been remedied, a school district is under no duty to remedy an imbalance that is caused by demographic factors. Id., at 31-32. The decree here accomplished its objective of desegregation in student assignments in the first year of its operation, and the District Court's finding that the subsequent resegregation is attributable to independent demographic forces is credible. A proper rule must be based on the necessity to find a feasible remedy that ensures systemwide compliance with the decree and that is directed to curing the effect of the specific violation. Pp. 493-497. </s> (c) Resolution of the question whether retention of judicial control over student attendance is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance in other facets of DCSS must await further proceedings on remand. The District Court did not have this Court's analysis before it when [503 U.S. 467, 470] it addressed the faculty assignment problem, and specific findings and conclusions should be made on whether student reassignments would be a proper way to remedy the defect. Moreover, the District Court's praise for DCSS' successes, dedication, and progress, and its failure to find that DCSS had acted in bad faith or engaged in post-decree acts of discrimination with respect to those areas where compliance had not been achieved, may not be the equivalent of the necessary finding that DCSS has an affirmative commitment to comply in good faith with the entirety of the desegregation plan. Pp. 497-500. </s> 887 F.2d 1438 (CA 11 1989), reversed and remanded. </s> KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., post, p. 500, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 507, filed concurring opinions. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 509. THOMAS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, Gary M. Sams, Charles L. Weatherly, and J. Stanley Hawkins. </s> Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States as amicus Curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Dunne, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clegg, Ronald J. Mann, David K. Flynn, and Lisa J. Stark. </s> Christopher A. Hansen argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Steven R. Shapiro, Helen Hershkoff, John A. Powell, and Willie Abrams. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Intervenors in Carlin v. Board of Education San Diego Unified School District by Elmer Enstrom, Jr.; and for the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., by G. Stephen Parker. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by Norman Redlich and Burke Marshall; and for the NAACP, DeKalb County, Georgia, Branch et al. by William H. Allen and Elliott Schulder. </s> Charles S. Johnson III filed a brief for plaintiff-intervenors as amici curiae. [503 U.S. 467, 471] </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> DeKalb County, Georgia, is a major suburban area of Atlanta. This case involves a court-ordered desegregation decree for the DeKalb County School System (DCSS). DCSS now serves some 73,000 students in kindergarten through high school, and is the 32d largest elementary and secondary school system in the Nation. </s> DCSS has been subject to the supervision and jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia since 1969, when it was ordered to dismantle its dual school system. In 1986, petitioners filed a motion for final dismissal. The District Court ruled that DCSS had not achieved unitary status in all respects, but had done so in student attendance and three other categories. In its order, the District Court relinquished remedial control as to those aspects of the system in which unitary status had been achieved, and retained supervisory authority only for those aspects of the school system in which the district was not in full compliance. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, 887 F.2d 1438 (1989), holding that a district court should retain full remedial authority over a school system until it achieves unitary status in six categories at the same time for several years. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand, holding that a district court is permitted to withdraw judicial supervision with respect to discrete categories in which the school district has achieved compliance with a court-ordered desegregation plan. A district court need not retain active control over every aspect of school administration until a school district has demonstrated unitary status in all facets of its system. </s> I </s> A </s> For decades before our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), and our mandate in Brown [503 U.S. 467, 472] v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II), which ordered school districts to desegregate with "all deliberate speed," DCSS was segregated by law. DCSS initial response to the mandate of Brown II was an all-too-familiar one. Interpreting "all deliberate speed" as giving latitude to delay steps to desegregate, DCSS took no positive action toward desegregation until the 1966-1967 school year, when it did nothing more than adopt a freedom of choice transfer plan. Some black students chose to attend former de jure white schools, but the plan had no significant effect on the former de jure black schools. </s> In 1968, we decided Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 . We held that adoption of a freedom of choice plan does not, by itself, satisfy a school district's mandatory responsibility to eliminate all vestiges of a dual system. Green was a turning point in our law in a further respect. Concerned by more than a decade of inaction, we stated that "`[t]he time for mere "deliberate speed" has run out.'" Id., at 438, quoting Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). We said that the obligation of school districts once segregated by law was to come forward with a plan that "promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." 391 U.S., at 439 (emphasis in original). The case before us requires an understanding and assessment of how DCSS responded to the directives set forth in Green. </s> Within two months of our ruling in Green, respondents, who are black schoolchildren and their parents, instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. After the suit was filed, DCSS voluntarily began working with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to devise a comprehensive and final plan of desegregation. The District Court, in June, 1969, entered a consent order approving the proposed plan, which was to be implemented in the 1969-1970 school year. The order abolished the freedom of choice plan and adopted [503 U.S. 467, 473] a neighborhood school attendance plan that had been proposed by DCSS and accepted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare subject to a minor modification. Under the plan, all of the former de jure black schools were closed, and their students were reassigned among the remaining neighborhood schools. The District Court retained jurisdiction. </s> Between 1969 and 1986, respondents sought only infrequent and limited judicial intervention into the affairs of DCSS. They did not request significant changes in student attendance zones or student assignment policies. In 1976, DCSS was ordered to expand its Majority-to-Minority (M-to-M) student transfer program, allowing students in a school where they are in the majority race to transfer to a school where they are in the minority; to establish a biracial committee to oversee the transfer program and future boundary line changes; and to reassign teachers so that the ratio of black to white teachers in each school would be, in substance, similar to the racial balance in the school population systemwide. From 1977 to 1979, the District Court approved a boundary line change for one elementary school attendance zone and rejected DCSS proposals to restrict the M-to-M transfer program. In 1983, DCSS was ordered to make further adjustments to the M-to-M transfer program. </s> In 1986, petitioners filed a motion for final dismissal of the litigation. They sought a declaration that DCSS had satisfied its duty to eliminate the dual education system, that is to say, a declaration that the school system had achieved unitary status. Green, supra, at 441. The District Court approached the question whether DCSS had achieved unitary status by asking whether DCSS was unitary with respect to each of the factors identified in Green. The court considered an additional factor that is not named in Green: the quality of education being offered to the white and black student populations. [503 U.S. 467, 474] </s> The District Court found DCSS to be "an innovative school system that has traveled the often long road to unitary status almost to its end," noting that the court has continually been impressed by the successes of the DCSS and its dedication to providing a quality education for all students within that system." App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. It found that DCSS is a unitary system with regard to student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities, and ruled that it would order no further relief in those areas. The District Court stopped short of dismissing the case, however, because it found that DCSS was not unitary in every respect. The court said that vestiges of the dual system remain in the areas of teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education. DCSS was ordered to take measures to address the remaining problems. </s> B </s> Proper resolution of any desegregation case turns on a careful assessment of its facts. Green, supra, at 439. Here, as in most cases where the issue is the degree of compliance with a school desegregation decree, a critical beginning point is the degree of racial imbalance in the school district, that is to say, a comparison of the proportion of majority to minority students in individual schools with the proportions of the races in the district as a whole. This inquiry is fundamental, for under the former de jure regimes, racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by disparagement, of or hostility towards, the disfavored race. In accord with this principle, the District Court began its analysis with an assessment of the current racial mix in the schools throughout DCSS and the explanation for the racial imbalance it found. The Respondents did not contend on appeal that the findings of fact were clearly erroneous, and the Court of Appeals did not find them to be erroneous. The Court of Appeals did disagree with the conclusion reached [503 U.S. 467, 475] by the District Court respecting the need for further supervision of racial balance in student assignments. </s> In the extensive record that comprises this case, one fact predominates: Remarkable changes in the racial composition of the county presented DCSS and the District Court with a student population in 1986 far different from the one they set out to integrate in 1969. Between 1950 and 1985, DeKalb County grew from 70,000 to 450,000 in total population, but most of the gross increase in student enrollment had occurred by 1969, the relevant starting date for our purposes. Although the public school population experienced only modest changes between 1969 and 1986 (remaining in the low 70,000's), a striking change occurred in the racial proportions of the student population. The school system that the District Court ordered desegregated in 1969 had 5.6% black students; by 1986, the percentage of black students was 47%. </s> To compound the difficulty of working with these radical demographic changes, the northern and southern parts of the county experienced much different growth patterns. The District Court found that, "[a]s the result of these demographic shifts, the population of the northern half of DeKalb County is now predominantly white, and the southern half of DeKalb County is predominantly black." App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. In 1970, there were 7,615 nonwhites living in the northern part of DeKalb County and 11,508 nonwhites in the southern part of the county. By 1980, there were 15,365 nonwhites living in the northern part of the county, and 87,583 nonwhites in the southern part. Most of the growth in the nonwhite population in the southern portion of the county was due to the migration of black persons from the city of Atlanta. Between 1975 and 1980 alone, approximately 64,000 black citizens moved into southern DeKalb County, most of them coming from Atlanta. During the same period, approximately 37,000 white citizens moved out of southern DeKalb County to the surrounding counties. [503 U.S. 467, 476] </s> The District Court made findings with respect to the number of nonwhite citizens in the northern and southern parts of the county for the years 1970 and 1980 without making parallel findings with respect to white citizens. Yet a clear picture does emerge. During the relevant period, the black population in the southern portion of the county experienced tremendous growth, while the white population did not, and the white population in the northern part of the county experienced tremendous growth, while the black population did not. </s> The demographic changes that occurred during the course of the desegregation order are an essential foundation for the District Court's analysis of the current racial mix of DCSS. As the District Court observed, the demographic shifts have had "an immense effect on the racial compositions of the DeKalb County schools." Ibid. From 1976 to 1986, enrollment in elementary schools declined overall by 15%, while black enrollment in elementary schools increased by 86%. During the same period, overall high school enrollment declined by 16, while black enrollment in high schools increased by 119%. These effects were even more pronounced in the southern portion of DeKalb County. </s> Concerned with racial imbalance in the various schools of the district, respondents presented evidence that, during the 1986-1987 school year, DCSS had the following features: (1) 47% of the students attending DCSS were black; (2) 50% of the black students attended schools that were over 90% black; (3) 62% of all black students attended schools that had more than 20% more blacks than the system-wide average; (4) 27% of white students attended schools that were more than 90% white; (5) 59% of the white students attended schools that had more than 20% more whites than the systemwide average; (6) of the 22 DCSS high schools, five had student populations that were more than 90% black, while five other schools had student populations that were more than 80% white; and (7) of the 74 elementary schools [503 U.S. 467, 477] in DCSS, 18 are over 90% black, while 10 are over 90% white. Id., at 31a. (The Respondents' evidence on these points treated all nonblack students as white. The District Court noted that there was no evidence that nonblack minority students constituted even 1% of DCSS student population.) </s> Respondents argued in the District Court that this racial imbalance in student assignment was a vestige of the dual system, rather than a product of independent demographic forces. In addition to the statistical evidence that the ratio of black students to white students in individual schools varied to a significant degree from the system-wide average, respondents contended that DCSS had not used all available desegregative tools in order to achieve racial balancing. Respondents pointed to the following alleged shortcomings in DCSS desegregative efforts: (1) DCSS did not break the county into subdistricts and racially balance each subdistrict; (2) DCSS failed to expend sufficient funds for minority learning opportunities; (3) DCSS did not establish community advisory organizations; (4) DCSS did not make full use of the freedom of choice plan; (5) DCSS did not cluster schools, that is, it did not create schools for separate grade levels which could be used to establish a feeder pattern; (6) DCSS did not institute its magnet school program as early as it might have; and (7) DCSS did not use busing to facilitate urban to suburban exchanges. </s> According to the District Court, respondents conceded that the 1969 order assigning all students to their neighborhood schools "effectively desegregated the DCSS for a period of time" with respect to student assignment. Id., at 35a. The District Court noted, however, that, despite this concession respondents contended there was an improper imbalance in two schools even in 1969. Respondents made much of the fact that, despite the small percentage of blacks in the county in 1969, there were then two schools that contained a majority of black students: Terry Mill Elementary School [503 U.S. 467, 478] was 76% black, and Stoneview Elementary School was 51% black. </s> The District Court found the racial imbalance in these schools was not a vestige of the prior de jure system. It observed that both the Terry Mill and Stoneview schools were de jure white schools before the freedom of choice plan was put in place. It cited expert witness testimony that Terry Mill had become a majority black school as a result of demographic shifts unrelated to the actions of petitioners or their predecessors. In 1966, the overwhelming majority of students at Terry Mill were white. By 1967, due to migration of black citizens from Atlanta into DeKalb County - and into the neighborhood surrounding the Terry Mill school in particular - 23% of the students at Terry Mill were black. By 1968, black students constituted 50% of the school population at Terry Mill. By 1969, when the plan was put into effect, the percentage of black students had grown to 76. In accordance with the evidence of demographic shifts, and in the absence of any evidence to suggest that the former dual system contributed in any way to the rapid racial transformation of the Terry Mill student population, the District Court found that the pre-1969 unconstitutional acts of petitioners were not responsible for the high percentage of black students at the Terry Mill school in 1969. Its findings in this respect are illustrative of the problems DCSS and the District Court faced in integrating the whole district. </s> Although the District Court found that DCSS was desegregated for at least a short period under the court-ordered plan of 1969, it did not base its finding that DCSS had achieved unitary status with respect to student assignment on that circumstance alone. Recognizing that "[t]he achievement of unitary status in the area of student assignment cannot be hedged on the attainment of such status for a brief moment," id., at 37a, the District Court examined the interaction between DCSS policy and demographic shifts in DeKalb County. [503 U.S. 467, 479] </s> The District Court noted that DCSS had taken specific steps to combat the effects of demographics on the racial mix of the schools. Under the 1969 order, a biracial committee had reviewed all proposed changes in the boundary lines of school attendance zones. Since the original desegregation order, there had been about 170 such changes. It was found that only three had a partial segregative effect. An expert testified, and the District Court found, that even those changes had no significant effect on the racial mix of the school population, given the tremendous demographic shifts that were taking place at the same time. </s> The District Court also noted that DCSS, on its own initiative, started an M-to-M program in the 1972 school year. The program was a marked success. Participation increased with each passing year, so that, in the 1986-1987 school year, 4,500 of the 72,000 students enrolled in DCSS participated. An expert testified that the impact of an M-to-M program goes beyond the number of students transferred, because students at the receiving school also obtain integrated learning experiences. The District Court found that about 19% of the students attending DCSS had an integrated learning experience as a result of the M-to-M program. Id., at 40a. </s> In addition, in the 1980's, DCSS instituted a magnet school program in schools located in the middle of the county. The magnet school programs included a performing arts program, two science programs, and a foreign language program. There was testimony in the District Court that DCSS also had plans to operate additional magnet programs in occupational education and gifted and talented education, as well as a preschool program and an open campus. By locating these programs in the middle of the county, DCSS sought to attract black students from the southern part of the county and white students from the northern part. </s> Further, the District Court found that DCSS operates a number of experience programs integrated by race, including [503 U.S. 467, 480] a writing center for fifth and seventh graders, a driving range, summer school programs, and a dialectical speech program. DCSS employs measures to control the racial mix in each of these special areas. </s> In determining whether DCSS has achieved unitary status with respect to student assignment, the District Court saw its task as one of deciding if petitioners "have accomplished maximum practical desegregation of the DCSS, or if the DCSS must still do more to fulfill their affirmative constitutional duty." Id., at 41a. Petitioners and respondents presented conflicting expert testimony about the potential effects that desegregative techniques not deployed might have had upon the racial mix of the schools. The District Court found that petitioners' experts were more reliable, citing their greater familiarity with DCSS, their experience, and their standing within the expert community. The District Court made these findings: </s> "[The actions of DCSS] achieved maximum practical desegregation from 1969 to 1986. The rapid population shifts in DeKalb County were not caused by any action on the part of the DCSS. These demographic shifts were inevitable as the result of suburbanization, that is, work opportunities arising in DeKalb County as well as the City of Atlanta, which attracted blacks to DeKalb; the decline in the number of children born to white families during this period while the number of children born to black families did not decrease; blockbusting of formerly white neighborhoods leading to selling and buying of real estate in the DeKalb area on a highly dynamic basis; and the completion of Interstate 20, which made access from DeKalb County into the City of Atlanta much easier. . . . There is no evidence that the school system's previous unconstitutional conduct may have contributed to this segregation. This court is convinced that any further actions taken by defendants, while the actions might have made marginal adjustments in the [503 U.S. 467, 481] population trends, would not have offset the factors that were described above and the same racial segregation would have occurred at approximately the same speed. Id., at 44a-45a. </s> The District Court added: </s> "[A]bsent massive bussing, which is not considered as a viable option by either the parties or this court, the magnet school program and the M-to-M program, which the defendants voluntarily implemented and to which the defendants obviously are dedicated, are the most effective ways to deal with the effects on student attendance of the residential segregation existing in DeKalb County at this time. Id., at 46a. </s> Having found no constitutional violation with respect to student assignment, the District Court next considered the other Green factors, beginning with faculty and staff assignments. The District Court first found that DCSS had fulfilled its constitutional obligation with respect to hiring and retaining minority teachers and administrators. DCSS has taken active steps to recruit qualified black applicants, and has hired them in significant numbers, employing a greater percentage of black teachers than the statewide average. The District Court also noted that DCSS has an "equally exemplary record" in retention of black teachers and administrators. App. to pet. for Cert. 49a. Nevertheless, the District Court found that DCSS had not achieved or maintained a ratio of black to white teachers and administrators in each school to approximate the ratio of black to white teachers and administrators throughout the system. See Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970). In other words, a racial imbalance existed in the assignment of minority teachers and administrators. The District Court found that, in the 1984-1985 school year, seven schools deviated by more than 10 from the system-wide average [503 U.S. 467, 482] of 26.4 minority teachers in elementary schools and 24.9 minority teachers in high schools. The District Court also found that black principals and administrators were over-represented in schools with high percentages of black students and underrepresented in schools with low percentages of black students. </s> The District Court found the crux of the problem to be that DCSS has relied on the replacement process to attain a racial balance in teachers and other staff and has avoided using mandatory reassignment. DCSS gave as its reason for not using mandatory reassignment that the competition among local school districts is stiff, and that it is difficult to attract and keep qualified teachers if they are required to work far from their homes. In fact, because teachers prefer to work close to their homes, DCSS has a voluntary transfer program in which teachers who have taught at the same school for a period of three years may ask for a transfer. Because most teachers request to be transferred to schools near their homes, this program makes compliance with the objective of racial balance in faculty and staff more difficult. </s> The District Court stated that it was not "unsympathetic to the difficulties that DCSS faces in this regard," but held that the law of the Circuit requires DCSS to comply with Singleton. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. The court ordered DCSS to devise a plan to achieve compliance with Singleton, noting that "[i]t would appear that such compliance will necessitate reassignment of both teachers and principals." App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. With respect to faculty, the District Court noted that meeting Singleton would not be difficult, citing petitioners' own estimate that most schools' faculty could conform by moving, at most, two or three teachers. </s> Addressing the more ineffable category of quality of education, the District Court rejected most of respondents' contentions that there was racial disparity in the provision of certain educational resources (e.g., teachers with advanced [503 U.S. 467, 483] degrees, teachers with more experience, library books), contentions made to show that black students were not being given equal educational opportunity. The District Court went further, however, and examined the evidence concerning achievement of black students in DCSS. It cited expert testimony praising the overall educational program in the district, as well as objective evidence of Black achievement: Black students at DCSS made greater gains on the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills than white students, and black students at DCSS are more successful than black students nationwide on the Scholastic Aptitude Test. It made the following finding: </s> "While there will always be something more that the DCSS can do to improve the chances for black students to achieve academic success, the court cannot find, as plaintiffs urge, that the DCSS has been negligent in its duties to implement programs to assist black students. The DCSS is a very innovative school system. It has implemented a number of programs to enrich the lives and enhance the academic potential of all students, both blacks and whites. Many remedial programs are targeted in the majority black schools. Programs have been implemented to involve the parents and offset negative socioeconomic factors. If the DCSS has failed in any way in this regard, it is not because the school system has been negligent in its duties. App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a-70a (footnote omitted). </s> Despite its finding that there was no intentional violation, the District Court found that DCSS had not achieved unitary status with respect to quality of education because teachers in schools with disproportionately high percentages of white students tended to be better educated and have more experience than their counterparts in schools with disproportionately high percentages of black students, and because per-pupil expenditures in majority white schools exceeded [503 U.S. 467, 484] per-pupil expenditures in majority black schools. From these findings, the District Court ordered DCSS to equalize spending and remedy the other problems. </s> The final Green factors considered by the District Court were: (1) physical facilities, (2) transportation, and (3) extracurricular activities. The District Court noted that, although respondents expressed some concerns about the use of portable classrooms in schools in the southern portion of the county, they in effect conceded that DCSS has achieved unitary status with respect to physical facilities. </s> In accordance with its factfinding, the District Court held that it would order no further relief in the areas of student assignment, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities. The District Court, however, did order DCSS to establish a system to balance teacher and principal assignments and to equalize per-pupil expenditures throughout DCSS. Having found that blacks were represented on the school board and throughout DCSS administration, the District Court abolished the biracial committee as no longer necessary. </s> Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ultimate conclusion that DCSS has not yet achieved unitary status, but reversed the District Court's ruling that DCSS has no further duties in the area of student assignment. 887 F.2d 1438 (1989). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred by considering the six Green factors as separate categories. The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's incremental approach, an approach that has also been adopted by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 318-319 (1987), and held that a school system achieves unitary status only after it has satisfied all six factors at the same time for several years. 887 F.2d, at 1446. Because, under this test, DCSS had not achieved unitary status at any time, the Court of Appeals held that DCSS could "not shirk [503 U.S. 467, 485] its constitutional duties by pointing to demographic shifts occurring prior to unitary status." Id., at 1448. The Court of Appeals held that petitioners bore the responsibility for the racial imbalance, and, in order to correct that imbalance, would have to take actions that "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations," Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971), such as pairing and clustering of schools, drastic gerrymandering of school zones, grade reorganization, and busing. We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 1081 (1991). </s> II </s> Two principal questions are presented. The first is whether a district court may relinquish its supervision and control over those aspects of a school system in which there has been compliance with a desegregation decree if other aspects of the system remain in noncompliance. As we answer this question in the affirmative, the second question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court's order providing for incremental withdrawal of supervision in all the circumstances of this case. </s> A </s> The duty and responsibility of a school district once segregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system. This is required in order to ensure that the principal wrong of the de jure system, the injuries and stigma inflicted upon the race disfavored by the violation, is no longer present. This was the rationale and the objective of Brown I and Brown II. In Brown I, we said: "To separate [black students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S., at 494 . We [503 U.S. 467, 486] quoted a finding of the three-judge District Court in the underlying Kansas case that bears repeating here: </s> "`Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.'" Ibid. </s> The objective of Brown I was made more specific by our holding in Green that the duty of a former de jure district is to "take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." 391 U.S., at 437 -438. We also identified various parts of the school system which, in addition to student attendance patterns, must be free from racial discrimination before the mandate of Brown is met: faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. 391 U.S., at 435 . The Green factors are a measure of the racial identifiability of schools in a system that is not in compliance with Brown, and we instructed the District Courts to fashion remedies that address all these components of elementary and secondary school systems. </s> The concept of unitariness has been a helpful one in defining the scope of the district courts' authority, for it conveys the central idea that a school district that was once a dual system must be examined in all of its facets, both when a remedy is ordered and in the later phases of desegregation when the question is whether the district courts' remedial control ought to be modified, lessened, or withdrawn. But, as we explained last Term in Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City of Public [503 U.S. 467, 487] Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245 -246 (1991), the term "unitary" is not a precise concept: </s> "[I]t is a mistake to treat words such as `dual' and "unitary" as if they were actually found in the Constitution. . . . Courts have used the terms `dual' to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and `unitary' to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution. We are not sure how useful it is to define these terms more precisely, or to create subclasses within them." </s> It follows that we must be cautious not to attribute to the term a utility it does not have. The term "unitary" does not confine the discretion and authority of the District Court in a way that departs from traditional equitable principles. </s> That the term "unitary" does not have fixed meaning or content is not inconsistent with the principles that control the exercise of equitable power. The essence of a court's equity power lies in its inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate the conditions or redress the injuries caused by unlawful action. Equitable remedies must be flexible if these underlying principles are to be enforced with fairness and precision. In this respect, as we observed in Swann, "a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution." Swann, 402 U.S., at 15 -16. The requirement of a unitary school system must be implemented according to this prescription. </s> Our application of these guiding principles in Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), is instructive. There we held that a District Court exceeded its remedial authority in requiring annual readjustment of school [503 U.S. 467, 488] attendance zones in the Pasadena school district when changes in the racial makeup of the schools were caused by demographic shifts "not attributed to any segregative acts on the part of the [school district]." Id., at 436. In so holding we said: </s> "It may well be that petitioners have not yet totally achieved the unitary system contemplated by . . . Swann. There has been, for example, dispute as to the petitioners' compliance with those portions of the plan specifying procedures for hiring and promoting teachers and administrators. See 384 F.Supp. 846 (1974), vacated, 537 F.2d 1031 (1976). But that does not undercut the force of the principle underlying the quoted language from Swann. In this case, the District Court approved a plan designed to obtain racial neutrality in the attendance of students at Pasadena's public schools. No one disputes that the initial implementation of this plan accomplished that objective. That being the case, the District Court was not entitled to require the [Pasadena Unified School District] to rearrange its attendance zones each year so as to ensure that the racial mix desired by the court was maintained in perpetuity. For having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the defendants, the District Court had fully performed its function of providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns." Ibid. </s> See also id., at 438, n. 5 ("Counsel for the original plaintiffs has urged, in the courts below and before us, that the District Court's perpetual `no majority of any minority' requirement was valid and consistent with Swann, at least until the school system achieved `unitary' status in all other respects, such as the hiring and promoting of teachers and administrators. Since we have concluded that the case is moot with [503 U.S. 467, 489] regard to these plaintiffs, these arguments are not properly before us. It should be clear from what we have said that they have little substance"). </s> Today, we make explicit the rationale that was central in Spangler. A federal court in a school desegregation case has the discretion to order an incremental or partial withdrawal of its supervision and control. This discretion derives both from the constitutional authority which justified its intervention in the first instance and its ultimate objectives in formulating the decree. The authority of the court is invoked at the outset to remedy particular constitutional violations. In construing the remedial authority of the district courts, we have been guided by the principles that "judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation," and that "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Swann, supra, at 16. A remedy is justifiable only insofar as it advances the ultimate objective of alleviating the initial constitutional violation. </s> We have said that the court's end purpose must be to remedy the violation and, in addition, to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in compliance with the Constitution. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 -281 (1977) ("[T]he federal courts, in devising a remedy, must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution"). Partial relinquishment of judicial control, where justified by the facts of the case, can be an important and significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and control of schools to local authorities. In Dowell, we emphasized that federal judicial supervision of local school systems was intended as a "temporary measure." 498 U.S., at 247 . Although this temporary measure has lasted decades, the ultimate objective has not changed - to return school districts to the control of local authorities. Just as a court has the obligation [503 U.S. 467, 490] at the outset of a desegregation decree to structure a plan so that all available resources of the court are directed to comprehensive supervision of its decree, so too must a court provide an orderly means for withdrawing from control when it is shown that the school district has attained the requisite degree of compliance. A transition phase in which control is relinquished in a gradual way is an appropriate means to this end. </s> As we have long observed, "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition." Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (Dayton I). Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental system. When the school district and all state entities participating with it in operating the schools make decisions in the absence of judicial supervision, they can be held accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary course. As we discuss below, one of the prerequisites to relinquishment of control in whole or in part is that a school district has demonstrated its commitment to a course of action that gives full respect to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Yet it must be acknowledged that the potential for discrimination and racial hostility is still present in our country, and its manifestations may emerge in new and subtle forms after the effects of de jure segregation have been eliminated. It is the duty of the State and its subdivisions to ensure that such forces do not shape or control the policies of its school systems. Where control lies, so too does responsibility. </s> We hold that, in the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the court may determine that it will not order further [503 U.S. 467, 491] remedies in areas where the school district is in compliance with the decree. That is to say, upon a finding that a school system subject to a court-supervised desegregation plan is in compliance in some but not all areas, the court, in appropriate cases, may return control to the school system in those areas where compliance has been achieved, limiting further judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance with the court decree. In particular, the district court may determine that it will not order further remedies in the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional violations. </s> A court's discretion to order the incremental withdrawal of its supervision in a school desegregation case must be exercised in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of its equitable power. Among the factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court in ordering partial withdrawal are the following: whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn; whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system; and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good-faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the Constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance. </s> In considering these factors, a court should give particular attention to the school system's record of compliance. A school system is better positioned to demonstrate its good faith commitment to a constitutional course of action when its policies form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations. And with the passage of time, the degree to which racial imbalances continue to represent vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish, [503 U.S. 467, 492] and the practicability and efficacy of various remedies can be evaluated with more precision. </s> These are the premises that guided our formulation in Dowell of the duties of a district court during the final phases of a desegregation case: "The District Court should address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." 498 U.S., at 249 -250. </s> B </s> We reach now the question whether the Court of Appeals erred in prohibiting the District Court from returning to DCSS partial control over some of its affairs. We decide that the Court of Appeals did err in holding that, as a matter of law, the District Court had no discretion to permit DCSS to regain control over student assignment, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities, while retaining court supervision over the areas of faculty and administrative assignments and the quality of education, where full compliance had not been demonstrated. </s> It was an appropriate exercise of its discretion for the District Court to address the elements of a unitary system discussed in Green, to inquire whether other elements ought to be identified, and to determine whether minority students were being disadvantaged in ways that required the formulation of new and further remedies to ensure full compliance with the court's decree. Both parties agreed that quality of education was a legitimate inquiry in determining DCSS' compliance with the desegregation decree, and the trial court found it workable to consider the point in connection with its findings on resource allocation. Its order retaining supervision over this aspect of the case has not been challenged by the parties, and we need not examine it except as it underscores the school district's record of compliance in some areas, but not others. The District Court's approach illustrates [503 U.S. 467, 493] that the Green factors need not be a rigid framework. It illustrates also the uses of equitable discretion. By withdrawing control over areas where judicial supervision is no longer needed, a district court can concentrate both its own resources and those of the school district on the areas where the effects of de jure discrimination have not been eliminated and further action is necessary in order to provide real and tangible relief to minority students. </s> The Court of Appeals' rejection of the District Court's order rests on related premises: first, that, given noncompliance in some discrete categories, there can be no partial withdrawal of judicial control; and second, until there is full compliance, heroic measures must be taken to ensure racial balance in student assignments system wide. Under our analysis and our precedents, neither premise is correct. </s> The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that our opinion in Swann requires "awkward," "inconvenient," and "even bizarre" measures to achieve racial balance in student assignments in the late phases of carrying out a decree, when the imbalance is attributable neither to the prior de jure system nor to a later violation by the school district, but rather to independent demographic forces. In Swann, we undertook to discuss the objectives of a comprehensive desegregation plan and the powers and techniques available to a district court in designing it at the outset. We confirmed that racial balance in school assignments was a necessary part of the remedy in the circumstances there presented. In the case before us, the District Court designed a comprehensive plan for desegregation of DCSS in 1969, one that included racial balance in student assignments. The desegregation decree was designed to achieve maximum practicable desegregation. Its central remedy was the closing of black schools and the reassignment of pupils to neighborhood schools, with attendance zones that achieved racial balance. The plan accomplished its objective in the first year of operation, before dramatic demographic changes altered residential [503 U.S. 467, 494] patterns. For the entire 17-year period respondents raised no substantial objection to the basic student assignment system, as the parties and the District Court concentrated on other mechanisms to eliminate the de jure taint. </s> That there was racial imbalance in student attendance zones was not tantamount to a showing that the school district was in noncompliance with the decree or with its duties under the law. Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation. Once the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors. Swann, 402 U.S., at 31 -32 ("Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but, in the absence of a showing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary"). If the unlawful de jure policy of a school system has been the cause of the racial imbalance in student attendance, that condition must be remedied. The school district bears the burden of showing that any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation. </s> The findings of the District Court that the population changes which occurred in DeKalb County were not caused by the policies of the school district, but rather by independent factors, are consistent with the mobility that is a distinct characteristic of our society. In one year (from 1987 to 1988), over 40 million Americans, or 17.6% of the total population, [503 U.S. 467, 495] moved households. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 19, Table 25 (111th ed. 1991). Over a third of those people moved to a different county, and over six million migrated between States. Ibid. In such a society, it is inevitable that the demographic makeup of school districts, based as they are on political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, may undergo rapid change. </s> The effect of changing residential patterns on the racial composition of schools, though not always fortunate, is somewhat predictable. Studies show a high correlation between residential segregation and school segregation. Wilson & Taeuber, Residential and School Segregation: Some Tests of Their Association, in Demography and Ethnic Groups 57-58 (F. Bean & W. Frisbie eds. 1978). The District Court in this case heard evidence tending to show that racially stable neighborhoods are not likely to emerge, because whites prefer a racial mix of 80 white and 20% black, while blacks prefer a 50-50 mix. </s> Where resegregation is a product not of state action, but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results would require ongoing and never-ending supervision by the courts of school districts simply because they were once de jure segregated. Residential housing choices, and their attendant effects on the racial composition of schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address through judicial remedies. </s> In one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state decree do remain in our society and in our schools. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and persist. But though we cannot escape our history, neither must we overstate its consequences [503 U.S. 467, 496] in fixing legal responsibilities. The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible, but nonetheless they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied. It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing population change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure violation. And the law need not proceed on that premise. </s> As the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link between current conditions and the prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good faith. In light of its finding that the demographic changes in DeKalb County are unrelated to the prior violation, the District Court was correct to entertain the suggestion that DCSS had no duty to achieve system wide racial balance in the student population. It was appropriate for the District Court to examine the reasons for the racial imbalance before ordering an impractical, and no doubt massive, expenditure of funds to achieve racial balance after 17 years of efforts to implement the comprehensive plan in a district where there were fundamental changes in demographics, changes not attributable to the former de jure regime or any later actions by school officials. The District Court's determination to order instead the expenditure of scarce resources in areas such as the quality of education, where full compliance had not yet been achieved, underscores the uses of discretion in framing equitable remedies. </s> To say, as did the Court of Appeals, that a school district must meet all six Green factors before the trial court can declare the system unitary and relinquish its control over school attendance zones, and to hold further that racial balancing by all necessary means is required in the interim, is [503 U.S. 467, 497] simply to vindicate a legal phrase. The law is not so formalistic. A proper rule must be based on the necessity to find a feasible remedy that ensures system-wide compliance with the court decree and that is directed to curing the effects of the specific violation. </s> We next consider whether retention of judicial control over student attendance is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance in other facets of the school system. Racial balancing in elementary and secondary school student assignments may be a legitimate remedial device to correct other fundamental inequities that were themselves caused by the constitutional violation. We have long recognized that the Green factors may be related or interdependent. Two or more Green factors may be intertwined or synergistic in their relation, so that a constitutional violation in one area cannot be eliminated unless the judicial remedy addresses other matters as well. We have observed, for example, that student segregation and faculty segregation are often related problems. See Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 (1979) (Dayton II) ("`[P]urposeful segregation of faculty by race was inextricably tied to racially motivated student assignment practices'"); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198, 200 (1965) (students have standing to challenge racial allocation of faculty because "racial allocation of faculty denies them equality of educational opportunity without regard to segregation of pupils"). As a consequence, a continuing violation in one area may need to be addressed by remedies in another. See, e.g., Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per curiam) ("There is no merit to the suggestion that the relation between faculty allocation on an alleged racial basis and the adequacy of the desegregation plans is entirely speculative"); Vaughns v. Board of Education of Prince George's County, 742 F.Supp. 1275, 1291 (D.Md. 1990) ("[T]he components of [503 U.S. 467, 498] a school desegregation plan are interdependent upon, and interact with, one another, so that changes with respect to one component may impinge upon the success or failure of another"). </s> There was no showing that racial balancing was an appropriate mechanism to cure other deficiencies in this case. It is true that the school district was not in compliance with respect to faculty assignments, but the record does not show that student reassignments would be a feasible or practicable way to remedy this defect. To the contrary, the District Court suggests that DCSS could solve the faculty assignment problem by reassigning a few teachers per school. The District Court, not having our analysis before it, did not have the opportunity to make specific findings and conclusions on this aspect of the case, however. Further proceedings are appropriate for this purpose. </s> The requirement that the school district show its good-faith commitment to the entirety of a desegregation plan so that parents, students, and the public have assurance against further injuries or stigma also should be a subject for more specific findings. We stated in Dowell that the good-faith compliance of the district with the court order over a reasonable period of time is a factor to be considered in deciding whether or not jurisdiction could be relinquished. Dowell, 498 U.S., at 249 -250 ("The District Court should address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable"). A history of good faith compliance is evidence that any current racial imbalance is not the product of a new de jure violation, and enables the district court to accept the school board's representation that it has accepted the principle of racial equality and will not suffer intentional discrimination in the future. See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 [503 U.S. 467, 499] F.2d, at 321 ("A finding of good faith . . . reduces the possibility that a school system's compliance with court orders is but a temporary constitutional ritual"). </s> When a school district has not demonstrated good faith under a comprehensive plan to remedy ongoing violations, we have, without hesitation, approved comprehensive and continued district court supervision. See Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461 (1979) (predicating liability in part on the finding that the school board "`never actively set out to dismantle [the] dual system,'" Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Education, 429 F.Supp. 229, 260 (SD Ohio 1977)); Dayton II, supra, at 534 (adopting Court of Appeals holding that the "intentionally segregative impact of various practices since 1954 . . . were of systemwide import, and an appropriate basis for a systemwide remedy"). </s> In contrast to the circumstances in Penick and Brinkman, the District Court in this case stated that, throughout the period of judicial supervision, it has been impressed by the successes DCSS has achieved and its dedication to providing a quality education for all students, and that DCSS "has traveled the often long road to unitary status almost to its end." With respect to those areas where compliance had not been achieved, the District Court did not find that DCSS had acted in bad faith or engaged in further acts of discrimination since the desegregation plan went into effect. This, though, may not be the equivalent of a finding that the school district has an affirmative commitment to comply in good faith with the entirety of a desegregation plan, and further proceedings are appropriate for this purpose as well. </s> The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals. It should determine what issues are open for its further consideration in light of the previous briefs and arguments of the parties and in light of the principles set forth in this opinion. [503 U.S. 467, 500] Thereupon it should order further proceedings as necessary or order an appropriate remand to the District Court. </s> Each party is to bear its own costs. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring. </s> The District Court in the present case found that the imbalances in student assignment were attributable to private demographic shifts, rather than governmental action. Without disturbing this finding, and without finding that revision of student assignments was necessary to remedy some other unlawful government action, the Court of Appeals ordered DeKalb County to institute massive busing and other programs to achieve integration. The Court convincingly demonstrates that this cannot be reconciled with our cases, and I join its opinion. </s> Our decision will be of great assistance to the citizens of DeKalb County, who, for the first time since 1969, will be able to run their own public schools, at least so far as student assignments are concerned. It will have little effect, however, upon the many other school districts throughout the country that are still being supervised by federal judges, since it turns upon the extraordinarily rare circumstance of a finding that no portion of the current racial imbalance is a remnant of prior de jure discrimination. While it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to decide this case on that narrow basis, we must resolve - if not today, then soon - what is to be done in the vast majority of other districts where, though our cases continue to profess that judicial oversight of school operations is a temporary expedient, democratic processes remain suspended, with no prospect of restoration, 38 years after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). [503 U.S. 467, 501] </s> Almost a quarter of century ago, in Green v. School Bd., New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437 -438 (1968), this Court held that school systems which had been enforcing de jure segregation at the time of Brown had not merely an obligation to assign students and resources on a race-neutral basis, but also an "affirmative duty" to "desegregate," that is, to achieve, insofar as practicable, racial balance in their schools. This holding has become such a part of our legal fabric that there is a tendency, reflected in the Court of Appeals opinion in this case, to speak as though the Constitution requires such racial balancing. Of course it does not: the Equal Protection Clause reaches only those racial imbalances shown to be intentionally caused by the State. As the Court reaffirms today, if "desegregation" (i.e., racial balancing) were properly to be ordered in the present case, it would be not because the extant racial imbalance in the DeKalb County School System public schools offends the Constitution, but rather because that imbalance is a "lingering effect" of the pre-1969 de jure segregation that offended the Constitution. For all our talk about "unitary status," "release from judicial supervision," and "affirmative duty to desegregate," the sole question in school desegregation cases (absent an allegation that current policies are intentionally discriminatory) is one of remedies for past violations. </s> Identifying and undoing the effects of some violations of the law is easy. Where, for example, a tax is found to have been unconstitutionally imposed, calculating the funds derived from that tax (which must be refunded), and distinguishing them from the funds derived from other taxes (which may be retained), is a simple matter. That is not so with respect to the effects of unconstitutionally operating a legally segregated school system; they are uncommonly difficult to identify and to separate from the effects of other causes. But one would not know that from our instructions to the lower courts on this subject, which tend to be at a level of generality that assumes facile reduction to specifics. [503 U.S. 467, 502] "`[Desegregation] decrees,'" we have said, "`exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation,'" Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 247 (1991); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977). We have never sought to describe how one identifies a condition as the effluent of a violation, or how a "vestige" or a "remnant" of past discrimination is to be recognized. Indeed, we have not even betrayed an awareness that these tasks are considerably more difficult than calculating the amount of taxes unconstitutionally paid. It is time for us to abandon our studied disregard of that obvious truth, and to adjust our jurisprudence to its reality. </s> Since parents and school boards typically want children to attend schools in their own neighborhood, "[t]he principal cause of racial and ethnic imbalance in . . . public schools across the country - North and South - is the imbalance in residential patterns." Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). That imbalance in residential patterns, in turn, "doubtless result[s] from a melange of past happenings prompted by economic considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assignments, or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or ethnic background." Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); see also Pasadena Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 -437 (1976). Consequently, residential segregation "is a national, not a southern, phenomenon" which exists "regardless of the character of local laws and policies, and regardless of the extent of other forms of segregation or discrimination." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 223 , and n. 9 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting K. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities 36 (1965). [503 U.S. 467, 503] </s> Racially imbalanced schools are, hence, the product of a blend of public and private actions, and any assessment that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in the absence of a particular one of those factors is guesswork. It is similarly guesswork, of course, to say that they would be segregated, or would be as segregated, in the absence of one of those factors. Only in rare cases such as this one and Spangler, see 427 U.S., at 435 -437, where the racial imbalance had been temporarily corrected after the abandonment of de jure segregation, can it be asserted with any degree of confidence that the past discrimination is no longer playing a proximate role. Thus, allocation of the burden of proof foreordains the result in almost all of the "vestige of past discrimination" cases. If, as is normally the case under our equal protection jurisprudence (and in the law generally), we require the plaintiffs to establish the asserted facts entitling them to relief - that the racial imbalance they wish corrected is at least in part the vestige of an old de jure system - the plaintiffs will almost always lose. Conversely, if we alter our normal approach and require the school authorities to establish the negative - that the imbalance is not attributable to their past discrimination - the plaintiffs will almost always win. See Penick, supra, at 471 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). </s> Since neither of these alternatives is entirely palatable, an observer unfamiliar with the history surrounding this issue might suggest that we avoid the problem by requiring only that the school authorities establish a regime in which parents are free to disregard neighborhood school assignment, and to send their children (with transportation paid) to whichever school they choose. So long as there is free choice, he would say, there is no reason to require that the schools be made identical. The constitutional right is equal racial access to schools, not access to racially equal schools; whatever racial imbalances such a free choice system might produce would be the product of private forces. We apparently [503 U.S. 467, 504] envisioned no more than this in our initial post-Brown cases. * It is also the approach we actually adopted in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 407 -409 (1986), (White, J., concurring), which concerned remedies for prior de jure segregation of state university-operated clubs and services. </s> But we ultimately charted a different course with respect to public elementary and secondary schools. We concluded in Green that a "freedom of choice" plan was not necessarily sufficient, 391 U.S., at 439 -440, and later applied this conclusion to all jurisdictions with a history of intentional segregation: </s> "Racially neutral" assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a district court may be inadequate; such plans may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. When school authorities present a district court with a `loaded game board,' affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). [503 U.S. 467, 505] </s> Thus began judicial recognition of an "affirmative duty" to desegregate, id., at 15; Green, supra, at 437-438, achieved by allocating the burden of negating causality to the defendant. Our post-Green cases provide that, once state-enforced school segregation is shown to have existed in a jurisdiction in 1954, thee arises a presumption, effectively irrebuttable (because the school district cannot prove the negative), that any current racial imbalance is the product of that violation, at least if the imbalance has continuously existed, see, e.g., Swann, supra, at 26; Keyes, 413 U.S., at 209 -210. </s> In the context of elementary and secondary education, the presumption was extraordinary in law but not unreasonable in fact. "Presumptions normally arise when proof of one fact renders the existence of another fact `so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of [the inferred] fact . . . until the adversary disproves it.'" NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 788 -789 (1990), quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 343, p. 969 (3d ed. 1984). The extent and recency of the prior discrimination, and the improbability that young children (or their parents) would use "freedom of choice" plans to disrupt existing patterns "warrant[ed] a presumption [that] schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition" were remnants of the de jure system. Swann, supra, at 26. </s> But granting the merits of this approach at the time of Green, it is now 25 years later. "From the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Dowell, 498 U.S. 247 (emphasis added). We envisioned it as temporary partly because "[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools," Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 , (1974) (Milliken I), and because no one's interest is furthered by subjecting the Nation's educational system to "judicial tutelage for the indefinite future." Dowell, supra, at 549; see also [503 U.S. 467, 506] Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd of Education, 611 F.2d 1239, 1245, n. 5 (CA9 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But we also evisioned it as temporary, I think, because the rational basis for the extraordinary presumption of causation simply must dissipate as the de jure system and the school boards who produced it recede further into the past. Since a multitude of private factors has shaped school systems in the years after abandonment of de jure segregation - normal migration, population growth (as in this case), "white flight" from the inner cities, increases in the costs of new facilities - the percentage of the current makeup of school systems attributable to the prior, government-enforced discrimination has diminished with each passing year, to the point where it cannot realistically be assumed to be a significant factor. </s> At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current operation of schools. We are close to that time. While we must continue to prohibit, without qualification, all racial discrimination in the operation of public schools, and to afford remedies that eliminate not only the discrimination but its identified consequences, we should consider laying aside the extraordinary, and increasingly counterfactual, presumption of Green. We must soon revert to the ordinary principles of our law, of our democratic heritage, and of our educational tradition: that plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations must prove intent and causation, and not merely the existence of racial disparity, see Bazemore, supra, at 407-409; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976); that public schooling, even in the South, should be controlled by locally elected authorities acting in conjunction with parents, see, e.g., Dowell, supra, at 248; Dayton, supra, at 410; Milliken I, supra, at [503 U.S. 467, 507] 741-742; and that it is "desirable" to permit pupils to attend "schools nearest their homes," Swann, supra, 402 U.S., at 28 . </s> [Footnote * See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) ("[O]bedience to the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general admission of Negro children . . . at particular schools"), Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a minority-to-majority transfer policy which was unaccompanied by a policy allowing majority-to-minority transfers, but noting that, "if the transfer provisions were made available to all students, regardless of their race and regardless as well of the racial composition of the school to which he requested transfer, we would have an entirely different case. Pupils could then, at their option (or that of their parents), choose, entirely free of any imposed racial considerations, to remain in the school of their zone or transfer to another"). </s> JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion holding that, where there are vestiges of a dual system in some of a judicially supervised school system's aspects, or Green-type factors, * a district court will retain jurisdiction over the system, but need not maintain constant supervision or control over factors as to which compliance has been achieved. I write separately only to explain my understanding of the enquiry required by a district court applying the principle we set out today. </s> We recognize that, although demographic changes influencing the composition of a school's student population may well have no causal link to prior de jure segregation, judicial control of student assignments may still be necessary to remedy persisting vestiges of the unconstitutional dual system, such as remaining imbalance in faculty assignments. See ante at 497-498. This is, however, only one of several possible causal relationships between or among unconstitutional acts of school segregation and various Green-type factors. I think it is worth mentioning at least two others: the dual school system itself as a cause of the demographic shifts with which the district court is faced when considering a partial relinquishment of supervision, and a Green-type factor other than student assignments as a possible cause of imbalanced student assignment patterns in the future. </s> The first would occur when demographic change toward segregated residential patterns is itself caused by past school segregation and the patterns of thinking that segregation creates. Such demographic change is not an independent, supervening cause of racial imbalance in the student body, and we have said before that, when demographic change is [503 U.S. 467, 508] not independent of efforts to segregate, the causal relationship may be considered in fashioning a school desegregation remedy. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971). Racial imbalance in student assignments caused by demographic change is not insulated from federal judicial oversight where the demographic change is itself caused in this way, and before deciding to relinquish supervision and control over student assignments, a district court should make findings on the presence or absence of this relationship. </s> The second and related causal relationship would occur after the district court has relinquished supervision over a remedied aspect of the school system, when future imbalance in that remedied Green-type factor (here, student assignments) would be caused by remaining vestiges of the dual system. Even after attaining compliance as to student composition, other factors such as racial composition of the faculty, quality of the physical plant, or per-pupil expenditures may leave schools racially identifiable. (In this very case, for example, there is a correlation in particular schools of overrepresentation of black principals and administrators, lower per pupil expenditures, and high percentages of black students. Moreover, the schools in the predominantly black southern section of the school district are the only ones that use "portable classrooms," i.e., trailers. See ante, at 481-482 484.) If such other factors leave a school identifiable as "black," as soon as the district court stops supervising student assignments, nearby white parents may move in the direction of racially identifiable "white" schools, or may simply move their children into these schools. In such a case, the vestige of discrimination in one factor will act as an incubator for resegregation in others. Before a district court ends its supervision of student assignments, then, it should make a finding that there is no immediate threat of unremedied Green-type factors causing population or student enrollment changes that in turn may imbalance student composition [503 U.S. 467, 509] in this way. And, because the district court retains jurisdiction over the case, it should, of course, reassert control over student assignments if it finds that this does happen. </s> [Footnote * Green v. New Kent County School Bd. of, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Green's list of specific factors, of course, need not be treated as exclusive. See ante, at 492-493. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, concurring in the judgment. </s> It is almost 38 years since this Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In those 38 years, the students in DeKalb County, Ga., never have attended a desegregated school system even for one day. The majority of "black" students never have attended a school that was not disproportionately black. Ignoring this glaring dual character of the DeKalb County School System (DCSS), part "white" and part "black," the District Court relinquished control over student assignments, finding that the school district had achieved "unitary status" in that aspect of the system. No doubt frustrated by the continued existence of duality, the Court of Appeals ordered the school district to take extraordinary measures to correct all manifestations of this racial imbalance. Both decisions, in my view, were in error, and I therefore concur in the Court's decision to vacate the judgment and remand the case. </s> I also am in agreement with what I consider to be the holdings of the Court. I agree that, in some circumstances, the District Court need not interfere with a particular portion of the school system, even while, in my view, it must retain jurisdiction over the entire system until all vestiges of state-imposed segregation have been eliminated. See ante at 490-491. I also agree that whether the District Court must order DCSS to balance student assignments depends on whether the current imbalance is traceable to unlawful state policy and on whether such an order is necessary to fashion an effective remedy. See ante at 491, 493-49, 497-498. Finally, I agree that the good faith of the school board is relevant to these inquiries. See ante at 498-499. [503 U.S. 467, 510] </s> I write separately for two purposes. First, I wish to be precise about my understanding of what it means for the District Court in this case to retain jurisdiction while relinquishing "supervision and control" over a subpart of a school system under a desegregation decree. Second, I write to elaborate on factors the District Court should consider in determining whether racial imbalance is traceable to board actions and to indicate where, in my view, it failed to apply these standards. </s> I </s> Beginning with Brown and continuing through the Court's most recent school desegregation decision in Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991), this Court has recognized that, when the local government has been running de jure segregated schools, it is the operation of a racially segregated school system that must be remedied, not discriminatory policy in some discrete subpart of that system. Consequently, the Court in the past has required, and decides again today, that, even if the school system ceases to discriminate with respect to one of the Green-type factors, "the [district] court should retain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis added); Raney v. Board of Ed. of Gould School Dist., 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968); see ante, at 491. </s> That the District Court's jurisdiction should continue until the school board demonstrates full compliance with the Constitution follows from the reasonable skepticism that underlies judicial supervision in the first instance. This Court noted in Dowell: "A district court need not accept at face value the profession of a school board which has intentionally discriminated that it will cease to do so in the future." 498 U.S., at 249 . It makes little sense, it seems to me, for the court to disarm itself by renouncing jurisdiction in one aspect of a school system while violations of the Equal Protection [503 U.S. 467, 511] Clause persist in other aspects of the same system. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 207 (1973). It would seem especially misguided to place unqualified reliance on the school board's promises in this case, because the two areas of the school system the District Court found still in violation of the Constitution - expenditures and teacher assignments - are two of the Green factors over which DCSS exercises the greatest control. </s> The obligations of a district court and a school district under its jurisdiction have been clearly articulated in the Court's many desegregation cases. Until the desegregation decree is dissolved under the standards set forth in Dowell, the school board continues to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green, 391 U.S., at 437 -438. The duty remains enforceable by the district court without any new proof of a constitutional violation, and the school district has the burden of proving that its actions are eradicating the effects of the former de jure regime. See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Keyes, 413 U.S., at 208 -211; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S., 1, 26 (1971); Green, 391 U.S., at 439 . </s> Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, however, retaining jurisdiction does not obligate the district court in all circumstances to maintain active supervision and control, continually ordering reassignment of students. The "duty" of the district court is to guarantee that the school district "`eliminate[s] the discriminatory effects of the past as well as to bar like discrimination in the future.'" Green, 391 U.S., at 438 , n. 4. This obligation requires the court to review school board actions to ensure that each one "will further, rather than delay, conversion to a unitary, nonracial nondiscriminatory school system." Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968); see also Dayton Board of Education, 443 U.S., at 538 ; United States v. [503 U.S. 467, 512] Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484, 489 (1972). But this obligation does not always require the district court to order new, affirmative action simply because of racial imbalance in student assignment. </s> Whether a district court must maintain active supervision over student assignment, and order new remedial actions, depends on two factors. As the Court discusses, the district court must order changes in student assignment if it "is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance in other facets of the school system." Ante, at 497; see also ante at 507 (SOUTER, J., concurring). The district court also must order affirmative action in school attendance if the school district's conduct was a "contributing cause" of the racially identifiable schools. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 , n. 13 (1979); see also Keyes, 413 U.S., at 211 , and n. 17 (the school board must prove that its conduct "did not create or contribute to" the racial identifiability of schools or that racially identifiable schools are "in no way the result of" school board action). It is the application of this latter causation requirement that I now examine in more detail. </s> II </s> A </s> DCSS claims that it need not remedy the segregation in DeKalb County schools because it was caused by demographic changes for which DCSS has no responsibility. It is not enough, however, for DCSS to establish that demographics exacerbated the problem; it must prove that its own policies did not contribute. 1 Such contribution can occur in at [503 U.S. 467, 513] least two ways: DCSS may have contributed to the demographic changes themselves, or it may have contributed directly to the racial imbalance in the schools. </s> To determine DCSS' possible role in encouraging the residential segregation, the court must examine the situation with special care. "[A] connection between past segregative acts and present segregation may be present even when not apparent and . . . close examination is required before concluding that the connection does not exist." Keyes, 413 U.S., at 211 . Close examination is necessary, because what might seem to be purely private preferences in housing may, in fact, have been created, in part, by actions of the school district. </s> "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area, and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods." Swann, 402 U.S., at 20 -21. </s> This interactive effect between schools and housing choices may occur because many families are concerned about the racial composition of a prospective school and will make residential decisions accordingly. 2 Thus, schools that are demonstrably black or white provide a signal to these families, perpetuating and intensifying the residential movement. See Keyes, 413 U.S., at 202 ; Columbus Board of Education, 443 U.S., at 465 , n. 13; ante, at 507-508 (SOUTER, J., concurring). </s> School systems can identify a school as "black" or "white" in a variety of ways; choosing to enroll a racially identifiable [503 U.S. 467, 514] student population is only the most obvious. The Court has noted: "[T]he use of mobile classrooms, the drafting of student transfer policies, the transportation of students, and the assignment of faculty and staff, on racially identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmarking schools according to their racial composition." Keyes, 413 U.S., at 202 . Because of the various methods for identifying schools by race, even if a school district manages to desegregate student assignments at one point, its failure to remedy the constitutional violation in its entirety may result in resegregation, as neighborhoods respond to the racially identifiable schools. See ante, at 508-509 (SOUTER, J., concurring). Regardless of the particular way in which the school district has encouraged residential segregation, this Court's decisions require that the school district remedy the effect that such segregation has had on the school system. </s> In addition to exploring the school district's influence on residential segregation, the District Court here should examine whether school-board actions might have contributed to school segregation. Actions taken by a school district can aggravate or eliminate school segregation independent of residential segregation. School-board policies concerning placement of new schools and closure of old schools and programs such as magnet classrooms and majority-to-minority (M-to-M) transfer policies affect the racial composition of the schools. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 20 -21, 26-27. A school district's failure to adopt policies that effectively desegregate its schools continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Columbus Board of Education, 443 U.S., at 458 -459; Dayton Board of Education, 443 U.S., at 538 . The Court many times has noted that a school district is not responsible for all of society's ills, but it bears full responsibility for schools that have never been desegregated. See, e.g., Swann, supra. [503 U.S. 467, 515] </s> B </s> The District Court's opinion suggests that it did not examine DCSS' actions in light of the foregoing principles. The court did note that the migration farther into the suburbs was accelerated by "white flight" from black schools and the "blockbusting" of former white neighborhoods. It did not examine, however, whether DCSS might have encouraged that flight by assigning faculty and principals so as to identify some schools as intended respectively for black students or white students. See App. 226-231. Nor did the court consider how the placement of schools, the attendance zone boundaries, or the use of mobile classrooms might have affected residential movement. The court, in my view, failed to consider the many ways DCSS may have contributed to the demographic shifts. </s> Nor did the District Court correctly analyze whether DCSS' past actions had contributed to the school segregation independent of residential segregation. The court did not require DCSS to bear the "heavy burden" of showing that student assignment policies - policies that continued the effects of the dual system - served important and legitimate ends. See Dayton Board of Education, 443 U.S., at 538 ; Swann, 402 U.S., at 26 . Indeed, the District Court said flatly that it would "not dwell on what might have been," but would inquire only as to "what else should be done now." App. 221. But this Court's decisions require the District Court to "dwell on what might have been." In particular, they require the court to examine the past to determine whether the current racial imbalance in the schools is attributable in part to the former de jure segregated regime or any later actions by school officials. </s> As the Court describes, the District Court placed great emphasis on its conclusion that DCSS, in response to the court order, had desegregated student assignment in 1969. DCSS' very first action taken in response to the court decree, however, was to shape attendance zones to result [503 U.S. 467, 516] in two schools that were more than 50% black, despite a district-wide black student population of less than 6%. See ante, at 477-478. Within a year, another school became majority black, followed by four others within the next two years. App. 304, 314, 350, 351, 368. Despite the existence of these schools, the District Court found that DCSS effectively had desegregated for a short period of time with respect to student assignment. See ante at 9. The District Court justified this finding by linking the school segregation exclusively to residential segregation existing prior to the court order. See ibid. </s> But residential segregation that existed prior to the desegregation decree cannot provide an excuse. It is not enough that DCSS adopt race-neutral policies in response to a court desegregation decree. Instead, DCSS is obligated to "counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation." Swann, 402 U.S., at 28 . Accordingly, the school district did not meet its affirmative duty simply by adopting a neighborhood-school plan, when already existing residential segregation inevitably perpetuated the dual system. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971); Swann, 402 U.S., at 25 -28, 30. </s> Virtually all the demographic changes that DCSS claims caused the school segregation occurred after 1975. See ante, at 475; App. 215, 260. Of particular relevance to the causation inquiry, then, are DCSS' actions prior to 1975; failures during that period to implement the 1969 decree render the school district's contentions that its noncompliance is due simply to demographic changes less plausible. </s> A review of the record suggests that, from 1969 until 1975, DCSS failed to desegregate its schools. During that period, the number of students attending racially identifiable schools actually increased, and increased more quickly than the increase in black students. By 1975, 73% of black elementary students and 56% of black high school students were attending majority black schools, although the percentages of black [503 U.S. 467, 517] students in the district population were just 20% and 13%, respectively. Id., at 269-380. </s> Of the 13 new elementary schools DCSS opened between 1969 and 1975, 6 had a total of four black students in 1975. Id., at 272, 299, 311, 316, 337, 353. One of the two high schools DCSS opened had no black students at all. 3 Id., at 367, 361. The only other measure taken by DCSS during the 1969-1975 period was to adopt the M-to-M transfer program in 1972. Due, however, to limitations imposed by school-district administrators - including a failure to provide transportation, "unnecessary red tape," and limits on available transfer schools - only one-tenth of 1% of the students were participating in the transfer program as of the 1975-1976 school year. Id, at 75, 80. </s> In 1976, when the District Court reviewed DCSS' actions in the program, it concluded that DCSS' limitations on the program "perpetuate the vestiges of a dual system." Id., at 83. Noting that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had found that DCSS had ignored its responsibility affirmatively to eradicate segregation and perpetuate desegregation, the District Court found that attendance zone changes had perpetuated the dual system in the county. Id., at 89, 91. </s> Thus, in 1976, before most of the demographic changes, the District Court found that DCSS had not complied with the 1969 order to eliminate the vestiges of its former de jure school system. Indeed, the 1976 order found that DCSS had contributed to the growing racial imbalance of its schools. Given these determinations in 1976, the District Court, at a minimum, should have required DCSS to prove that, but for the demographic changes between 1976 and 1985, its actions would have been sufficient to "convert promptly to a system without a `white' school and a `Negro' school, but just [503 U.S. 467, 518] schools." Green, 391 U.S., at 442 . The available evidence suggests that this would be a difficult burden for DCSS to meet. </s> DCSS has undertaken only limited remedial actions since the 1976 court order. The number of students participating in the M-to-M program has expanded somewhat, composing about 6% of the current student population. The district also has adopted magnet programs, but they involve fewer than 1% of the system's students. Doubtless DCSS could have started and expanded its magnet and M-to-M programs more promptly; it could have built and closed schools with a view toward promoting integration of both schools and neighborhoods; redrawn attendance zones; integrated its faculty and administrators; and spent its funds equally. But it did not. DCSS must prove that the measures it actually implemented satisfy its obligation to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation originally discovered in 1969, and still found to exist in 1976. </s> III </s> The District Court apparently has concluded that DCSS should be relieved of the responsibility to desegregate because such responsibility would be burdensome. To be sure, changes in demographic patterns aggravated the vestiges of segregation and made it more difficult for DCSS to desegregate. But an integrated school system is no less desirable because it is difficult to achieve, and it is no less a constitutional imperative because that imperative has gone unmet for 38 years. </s> Although respondents challenged the District Court's causation conclusions in the Court of Appeals, that court did not reach the issue. Accordingly, in addition to the issues the Court suggests be considered in further proceedings, I would remand for the Court of Appeals to review, under the foregoing principles, the District Court's finding that DCSS has met its burden of proving the racially identifiable schools are in no way the result of past segregative action. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Court's cases make clear that there is a presumption in a former de jure segregated school district that the board's actions caused the racially identifiable schools, and it is the school board's obligation to rebut that presumption. See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979), Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 208 , 211 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971); ante, at 494-495. </s> [Footnote 2 See Taeuber, Housing, Schools, and Incremental Segregative Effects, 441 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 157 (1979); Orfield, School Segregation and Residential Segregation, in School Desegregation: Past, Present, and Future 227, 234-237 (W. Stephan & J. Feagins, ed. 1980); Elam, The 22nd Annual Gallup Poll of Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, 72 Phi Delta Kappan 41, 4445 (1990). </s> [Footnote 3 By 1986, one of those two high schools was 2.4% black. The other was 91.7% black. Of the elementary schools, 8 were either virtually all black or all white, and all were racially identifiable. App. 269-359. </s> [503 U.S. 467, 519]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. LESLIE SALT CO.(1956) No. 74 Argued: December 7, 1955Decided: March 5, 1956 </s> In 1949, a corporation in need of funds to meet maturing bank loans and for working capital borrowed $3,000,000 from one insurance company and $1,000,000 from another for 15 years, giving each a single typewritten instrument entitled "3 1/4% Sinking Fund Promissory Note Due February 1, 1964." Each not was subject to the terms of an underlying agreement containing elaborate provision for the protection of the note holders and a provision under which each insurance company could require the borrower to convert its note into a series of new notes in denominations of $1,000 or multiples thereof, "either in registered form without coupons or in coupon form, and in printed or in fully engraved form." This option had not been exercised by either note holder. Held: These two notes are not subject to the documentary stamp taxes laid under 1800 and 1801 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 on "all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation . . . ." Pp. 384-398. </s> (a) It is significant that the stamp tax which was levied on "promissory notes" for many years, but which has been repealed, was always carried in a separate section from that containing the tax on "bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness" and was always at a lower rate than the tax on the latter instruments. P. 388. </s> (b) That these notes are for large amounts and of long maturity and are secured by an elaborate underlying agreement does not prevent them from being promissory notes, nor does anything in the earlier legislation or its history indicate that this type of note would not have been taxable at the lower rate provided in the promissory-note section of the former statute. P. 389. </s> (c) Even if these notes could not fairly be called "promissory notes," it does not follow that they must be regarded as "debentures" or "certificates of indebtedness." P. 389. </s> (d) The administrative history of the statute establishes that, until 1947, when General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 161 F.2d 593, was decided, the Treasury considered no instruments [350 U.S. 383, 384] subject to the "debenture" tax except those which were issued (1) in series, (2) under trust indentures, and (3) in registered form or with coupons attached. Pp. 389-393. </s> (e) Since 1920, the Treasury has considered "certificates of indebtedness" as akin to bonds and debentures and as including "only instruments having the general character of investment securities," which these notes do not have. Pp. 393-395. </s> (f) The stamp taxes on "debentures" and "certificates of indebtedness" are based upon the character of the instruments employed, not upon the nature of the transactions involved; and an instrument which is neither a "debenture" nor a "certificate of indebtedness" does not become such merely because it evidences a longterm debt obligation supported by elaborate protective covenants. Pp. 395-396. </s> (g) In view of the Treasury's prior long-standing and consistent administrative interpretation of the terms "debentures" and "certificates of indebtedness" and the fact that Congress has let that administrative interpretation remain undisturbed for many years, the Treasury's present ad hoc contention that those terms should now be construed as including the notes here involved cannot stand. Pp. 396-397. </s> (h) The fact that the agreement underlying these notes provides for the substitution of instruments which might qualify as "debentures" does not render these notes taxable as "debentures." P. 398. </s> 218 F.2d 91, affirmed. </s> John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, A. F. Prescott and Fred E. Youngman. </s> Bruce M. Casey, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Walter C. Fox, Jr. </s> Chester Rohrlich filed a brief for Rayonier Incorporated, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On February 1, 1949, Leslie Salt Company, being in need of funds to meet maturing bank loans and for working [350 U.S. 383, 385] capital, borrowed $3,000,000 from the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York and $1,000,000 from the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company. As evidence of the indebtedness Leslie Salt delivered to each insurance company its "3 1/4% Sinking Fund Promissory Note Due February 1, 1964" in these amounts. The question presented is whether these instruments are subject to the documentary stamp taxes laid on "all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation . . . ." under 1800 and 1801 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 1 </s> The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held the tax applicable, considering the two instruments to be "debentures" within the meaning of 1801. However, in a tax recovery suit instituted by Leslie Salt, following payment of the tax under protest and the Commissioner's denial of a refund, the District Court 2 and the Court of Appeals 3 held the instruments not to be "debentures" or otherwise subject to stamp taxes. We brought the case here, 349 U.S. 951 , to resolve the uncertainty left by lower court [350 U.S. 383, 386] decisions as to whether 1801 applies to corporate notes of this type. 4 </s> Except as to amounts and payees, the two instruments in question were in identical terms, having these principal features: (1) each instrument carried the promissory note description already indicated; (2) each had a maturity of 15 years; (3) each carried interest of 3 1/4% payable August 1 and February 1 of each year on the unpaid balance; and (4) each was subject to the terms of an underlying agreement containing elaborate provisions for the protection of the note holders. Among those provisions was one under which each insurance company could require [350 U.S. 383, 387] Leslie Salt to convert its note, which was typewritten on ordinary white paper, into a series of new notes in denominations of $1,000 or multiples thereof, "either in registered form without coupons or in coupon form, and in printed or in fully engraved form." 5 This option has not been exercised by either note holder. </s> These transactions with the two insurance companies constituted a variety of "private placement," a method of corporate financing which, because of its economies and conveniences, has become popular since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933. The Government claims that these notes are taxable under 1801 either as "debentures" or "certificates of indebtedness." The taxpayer, on the other hand, contends that these terms, undefined in the statute, do not include notes of the type [350 U.S. 383, 388] here in issue. Taking the statute in light of its legislative and administrative history, we agree with the taxpayer's contention. </s> "Debentures" and "certificates of indebtedness," along with other kinds of corporate securities, have been subject to stamp taxes since 1898, except for the period between 1902 and 1914. 6 "Promissory notes" were also subject to stamp duties from 1898 to 1901 and from 1914 until 1924, when the tax was repealed; 7 it has never been re-enacted. The tax on "promissory notes," however, was always carried in a section separate from that containing the tax on "bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness," and was always at a rate lower than the tax on those instruments. Since promissory notes, debentures, and certificates of indebtedness all serve the same basic purpose - that is, as evidence of a debt - this former legislative distinction between promissory notes and the other instruments assumes significance in determining whether the present notes are taxable. For unless the earlier statutes were intended to impose two taxes on the same instruments, which we should not assume, or the present tax on debentures and certificates of indebtedness is broader in scope than that in effect in 1924, of which there is no indication, it would seem to follow that these notes should not now be taxed if they can be said to fall within the class of "promissory notes" on which the tax was repealed. [350 U.S. 383, 389] </s> The Government argues that the repealed promissory note provision related only to ordinary short-term paper customarily used in day-to-day commercial transactions, and that it did not embrace notes, like those here involved, of large amounts, long maturity, and secured by an elaborate underlying agreement. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 161 F.2d 593, 595. The existence of these features, however, does not render either of the Leslie Salt instruments any the less a promissory note, as each was captioned. Nor do we find anything in the earlier legislation or in its history which satisfies us that this type of note would not have been taxable at the lower rate provided in the promissory note section of the former statute. See Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 213 F.2d 305, 308-310. Moreover, the administrative interpretations of the Treasury, discussed below, affirmatively indicate that they would have been considered taxable under that section. </s> But even assuming that these notes could not fairly be called "promissory notes," it does not follow that they must therefore be regarded as "debentures" or "certificates of indebtedness." That depends upon the meaning of those terms in the statute, and upon whether these notes, regardless of their descriptive caption, have the essential characteristics of "debentures" or "certificates of indebtedness," as those terms are used in the statute. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, supra; Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, supra. And in determining the scope of the statute, which has remained substantially unchanged since its first enactment, the Treasury's interpretations of it are entitled to great weight. White v. Winchester Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 . </s> The administrative history of the statute establishes that until 1947, when the General Motors case, supra, was decided, only those instruments were considered subject to the "debenture" tax which were issued (1) in series, [350 U.S. 383, 390] (2) under a trust indenture, and (3) in registered form or with coupons attached. In other words, that tax was considered to apply only to marketable corporate securities, as that term is generally understood. Conversely, corporate promissory notes lacking any of those features, such as those issued by respondent, were taxed at the lower promissory note rate until that tax was repealed in 1924, and were not taxed thereafter until the Government's success in the General Motors case in 1947. </s> As early as 1918 the Treasury, in distinguishing instruments taxable at the "bond" and "debenture" rate from those taxable at the lower "promissory note" rate, then still in force, drew the line as follows: </s> "(3) Instruments containing the essential features of a promissory note, but issued by corporations in numbers under a trust indenture, either in registered form or with coupons attached, embodying provisions for acceleration of maturity in the event of any default by the obligor, for optional registration in the case of bearer bonds, for authentication by the trustee, and sometimes for redemption before maturity, or similar provisions, are bonds within the meaning of the statute, whether called bonds, debentures, or notes. However, a short-term instrument, although issued by a corporation under a trust indenture, may be regarded as a note if every instrument of such issue both (a) is payable to bearer and incapable of registration and (b) lacks interest coupons and so requires presentation upon each payment of interest." T. D. 2713, May 14, 1918, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 358 (1918). 8 </s> [350 U.S. 383, 391] </s> When Congress in 1918 amended the existing statute by adding the language "and all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities . . .," still found in 1801, the Treasury recognized that this was in effect an enactment of its prior restrictive interpretation. 9 The regulations which followed the repeal in 1924 of the tax on promissory notes did not purport to enlarge the scope of the tax on "bonds" or "debentures"; the Treasury adhered to the same interpretation issued under the previous statute. 10 The regulations [350 U.S. 383, 392] were amended in 1941 to the less specific, but not inconsistent, form under which the present notes were taxed. 11 Finally, explicit recognition that the attempt to tax notes not having the features of marketable corporate [350 U.S. 383, 393] securities was a departure from prior Treasury practice is found in a ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that General Motors would not be applied retroactively: </s> "The Bureau has for a considerable period of time held that an instrument termed `note,' not in registered form and issued without interest coupons, is not subject to the stamp tax upon issuance or transfer. Because of this long and uniform holding of the Bureau and the consequent reliance of corporations on these rulings, it has been concluded that, under the authority contained in section 3791 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code, the decision in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Higgins, supra, will not be applied retroactively, except that any tax which has been paid on the issuance or transfer of instruments falling within the scope of the decision will not be refunded." Cum. Bull. 1948-2, M. T. 32, p. 160. </s> The term "certificate of indebtedness" has a similar administrative background. Since 1920 the Treasury has considered certificates of indebtedness as akin to bonds and debentures, including "only instruments having the general character of investment securities, as distinguished from instruments evidencing debts arising in ordinary transaction between individuals . . . ." Sales Tax Rulings, L. O. 909, December 1920, ST. 1-20-85; Regs. 55 (Art. 14), October 26, 1920, 22 T. D. Int. Rev. 502 (1920). 12 The essence of an "investment security" [350 U.S. 383, 394] is, of course, marketability, and this basic feature the Leslie Salt notes did not have. The Treasury itself has acknowledged that promissory notes lacking this quality have never been taxed as "certificates of indebtedness," [350 U.S. 383, 395] Cum. Bull. 1948-2, M. T. 32, p. 160 (supra, p. 393), and none of the lower court cases, including General Motors, supra, have regarded instruments such as the Leslie Salt notes as being certificates of indebtedness. Moreover, it may be observed that in the stamp tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the words "certificates of indebtedness," consistently with this administrative history, have been eliminated as a separate taxable category of corporate instruments, and are employed simply as a term of art embracing all the instruments taxed, that is, "bonds," "debentures" and other instruments in registered form or with coupons. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 4311, 4381, 68A Stat. 514, 523, 26 U.S.C. 4311, 4381. </s> In contrast to the position it had consistently taken throughout the many years preceding the decision in the General Motors case, the Treasury now argues "that Congress intended in Section 1801 to cover all long-term debt obligations supported by elaborate protective covenants and that this is so regardless of the details of the papers used, the language by which the transaction was consummated or the nature of the purchaser's business." This contention seems to stem from the belief that had the "private placement" method of financing been as widely known in 1924 as it is now, Congress would not have repealed the promissory note tax in its entirety, as it did. But if that be so it is nevertheless for Congress, not the courts, to change the statute. We must deal with the statute as we find it, and if these instruments are neither [350 U.S. 383, 396] "debentures" nor "certificates of indebtedness" they may not be taxed under the present statute. These taxes are based not upon the nature of the transaction involved, but upon the character of the instruments employed. As long ago as 1873, this Court said: "The liability of an instrument to a stamp duty, as well as the amount of such duty, is determined by the form and face of the instrument, and cannot be affected by proof of facts outside of the instrument itself." United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 504. </s> There are persuasive reasons for construing "debentures" and "certificates of indebtedness" in accordance with the Treasury's original interpretation of those terms in this statute's altogether comparable predecessors. In Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 , Mr. Justice Cardozo said: </s> "administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 ; Logan v. Davis, 233 U.S. 613, 627 ; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 ; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 ; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 U.S. 178 . The practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." </s> Against the Treasury's prior longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation its more recent ad hoc contention as to how the statute should be construed cannot stand. Moreover, that original interpretation has had both express and implied congressional acquiescence, [350 U.S. 383, 397] through the 1918 amendment to the statute (supra, p. 391), which has ever since continued in effect, and through Congress having let the administrative interpretation remain undisturbed for so many years. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 53 ; Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, supra, at p. 313. 13 Still further, it is an interpretation which is in accord with the generally understood meaning of the term "debentures." Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504, 508 . 14 "The words of the statute [a stamp tax statute] are to be taken in the sense in which they will be understood by that public in which they are to take effect." United States v. Isham, supra, at p. 504. [350 U.S. 383, 398] </s> Construing the statute as we have, we conclude that the Leslie Salt notes are neither "debentures" nor "certificates of indebtedness" within its meaning. The fact that the agreement underlying these notes provides for the substitution of instruments which might qualify as debentures does not render these notes taxable, for until debentures are in existence the "debenture" tax cannot be imposed. </s> We hold these notes are not subject to stamp taxes under the statute. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 SEC. 1800. "There shall be levied, collected, and paid, for and in respect of the several bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock and of indebtedness, and other documents, instruments, matters, and things mentioned and described in sections 1801 to 1807, inclusive, or for or in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or things, or any of them, are written or printed, the several taxes specified in such sections." 53 Stat. 195, 26 U.S.C. 1800. </s> SEC. 1801. "On all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation, and all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in registered form known generally as corporate securities, on each $100 of face value or fraction thereof, 11 cents: Provided, That every renewal of the foregoing shall be taxed as a new issue . . . ." 53 Stat. 195-196, 26 U.S.C. 1801. </s> [Footnote 2 110 F. Supp. 680. </s> [Footnote 3 218 F.2d 91. </s> [Footnote 4 Decisions in the Courts of Appeals pointing toward the taxpayer's view are Curtis Publishing Co. v. Smith, 220 F.2d 748 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 213 F.2d 305 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 201 F.2d 584 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Allen v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 197 F.2d 460 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Belden Mfg. Co. v. Jarecki, 192 F.2d 211 (C. A. 7th Cir.), and in the District Courts are Bijou Theatrical Enterprise Co. v. Menninger, 127 F. Supp. 16 (D.C. E. D. Mich.); Knudsen Creamery Co. of California v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 860 (D.C. S. D. Calif.); Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Campbell, 107 F. Supp. 764 (D.C. N. D. Tex.); Follansbee Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 P-H 1955 Fed. Tax Serv. § 72,715 (D.C. W. D. Pa.); United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 4 P-H 1955 Fed. Tax Serv. § 72,567 (D.C. N. D. Ill.); Motor Finance Corp. v. United States, 4 P-H 1954 Fed. Tax Serv. § 72,706 (D.C. D. N. J.). Decisions in the Courts of Appeals pointing the other way are General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 161 F.2d 593 (C. A. 2d Cir.), and Commercial Credit Co. v. Hofferbert, 188 F.2d 574 (C. A. 4th Cir.), and in the District Courts are S. S. Pierce Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 396 (D.C. D. Mass.); H. Kobacker & Sons Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 211 (D.C. N. D. Ohio); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 120 F. Supp. 737 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.); United States v. General Shoe Corp., 117 F. Supp. 668 (D.C. M. D. Tenn.); Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. Kelm, 112 F. Supp. 872 (D.C. D. Minn.); Sharon Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 P-H 1955 Fed. Tax Serv. § 72,716 (D.C. W. D. Pa.); and Stuyvesant Town Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 686, 111 F. Supp. 243 (Ct. Cl.). </s> [Footnote 5 Other provisions of these agreements may be summarized as follows: (1) The basic terms under which the insurance companies agreed to "purchase" the Leslie Salt notes. (2) Representations by Leslie Salt that financial statements and lists of property holdings submitted by it were complete and accurate. (3) Various conditions precedent to the purchase of the notes, including: opinion by counsel that the transaction was authorized under the applicable state law; that the balance of the $4,000,000 loan was subscribed; and that the loan documents would be in form satisfactory to counsel. (4) A representation by the lender that it was not acquiring the note for the purpose of sale. (5) A provision for prepayment by Leslie Salt of $285,000 principal amount for each year, without premium, and of an additional $285,000 annually at the option of Leslie Salt, also without premium, as long as the prepayment came from earnings or liquidation of assets. Leslie Salt had the right to make further prepayments, but subject to a premium of 3%, which after the first three years of the note descended in amount at the rate of 1/4% each year. (6) Leslie Salt promised to pay all its taxes, keep its property in repair, keep accurate records, insure its properties, and make regular financial statements to the holders of the notes. (7) Leslie Salt promised not to become indebted, not to pay dividends or retire stock, except as provided in the agreement, and not to change the nature of its business or let its working capital decline beneath a specified amount. </s> [Footnote 6 Act of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 448, 451, 458; Act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 938, 940, 942; repealed by the Act of April 12, 1902, 32 Stat. 96, 97; re-enacted in the Act of October 22, 1914, 38 Stat. 745, 753, 759, and carried forward in subsequent Revenue Acts. </s> [Footnote 7 Act of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 448, 451, 459; repealed by the Act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 942; re-enacted in the Act of October 22, 1914, 38 Stat. 745, 753, 760; carried over in the Revenue Acts of 1917, 1918, and 1921, 40 Stat. 300, 319, 323; 40 Stat. 1057, 1133, 1137; 42 Stat. 227, 301, 305, and repealed by the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 352. </s> [Footnote 8 In this same Treasury Decision "promissory note" was defined as "An instrument not under seal containing a simple promise to pay a sum of money at a specified time, such as is common in everyday commercial use, is a promissory note within the meaning of the [350 U.S. 383, 391] statute." It should be noted that the qualification which we have italicized was omitted from the definition of "promissory note" in the Regulations promulgated one year later. See note 10, infra. </s> [Footnote 9 The then Solicitor of Internal Revenue, Mr. Robert N. Miller, expressed this view: </s> "The words `all instruments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities,' were clearly added in recognition of the varied forms in which corporate securities are issued, and to defeat any attempt by a corporation to avoid the tax by issuing instruments of the general character of bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness under a different name." Sales Tax Rulings, L. O. 909, December 1920, ST. 1-20-85. </s> [Footnote 10 "ART. 8. Instruments issued in numbers, under a trust indenture, are bonds. - Instruments containing the essential features of a promissory note, but issued in series, secured by a trust indenture, either in registered form or with coupons attached, embodying provisions for acceleration of maturity in the event of any default by the obligor, for optional registration in the case of bearer bonds, for authentication by the trustee, and in some instances for redemption before maturity, or similar provisions, are bonds within the meaning of the statute, whether called bonds, debentures, or notes." Treasury Regulations 55, September 13, 1924. </s> The regulations preceding the repeal of the tax on promissory notes provided: </s> "ART. 8. Instruments issued by corporations in numbers, under a trust indenture, are bonds. - Instruments containing the essential [350 U.S. 383, 392] features of a promissory note, but issued by corporations in series, secured by a trust indenture, either in registered form or with coupons attached, embodying provisions for acceleration of maturity in the event of any default by the obligor, for optional registration in the case of bearer bonds, for authentication by the trustee, and in some instances for redemption before maturity, or similar provisions, are bonds within the meaning of the statute, whether called bonds, debentures, or notes. </s> . . . . . </s> "ART. 48. `Promissory note' defined. - A promissory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker engaging to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to such other person or to order or to bearer, free from restrictions as to registration or transfer and usually without coupons." Treasury Regulations 55, June 11, 1919. </s> The 1920 revision of Regulations 55 was substantially identical, as were the Regulations issued under the Revenue Act of 1921 (Regulations 55, Articles 8 and 35). </s> [Footnote 11 SEC. 113.50. "Scope of tax. Section 1801 imposes a tax upon the issue by any corporation of bonds, debentures, certificates of indebtedness, and all instruments, however termed, with interest coupons or in registered form and known generally as corporate securities. Every renewal of the above described instruments is taxable as a new issue." </s> SEC. 113.55. "Issues subject to tax. Ordinarily, a corporate instrument styled a bond, debenture, or certificate of indebtedness is subject to the tax. However, the taxability of an instrument is not determined by the name alone but depends upon all the circumstances, such as the name, form, and terms of the instrument, etc. Hence, an instrument, however designated, having all the essential characteristics of a bond, debenture, or certificate of indebtedness is taxable as such. Similarly, an instrument issued with interest coupons, or with provision for registration, and coming within the class known generally as corporate securities will be held subject to the tax regardless of the name by which it may be called." 26 CFR, 1944 Cum. Supp., 113.50, 113.55. </s> [Footnote 12 The ruling by the Solicitor of Internal Revenue said: </s> "The Century Dictionary defines `debenture' as `A writing acknowledging a debt; specifically, an instrument, generally under seal, for the repayment of money lent; usually, if not exclusively, used as obligations of corporations or large moneyed copartnerships, issued in a form convenient to be bought and sold as investments.' This [350 U.S. 383, 394] definition was adopted by the court in Barton Nat. Bank v. Atkins, 72 Vt. 55; 47 Atl. 176, 180. The term `certificates of indebtedness' has also come to have in commercial use a similar meaning. In Denver v. Home Savings Bank, 236 U.S. 101, 105 , the court said: </s> "`What is true about bonds is true about certificates of indebtedness. Indeed it is difficult to see any distinction between them as they are commonly known to the business world. The essence of each is that they contain a promise under seal of the corporation to pay a certain sum to order or bearer.' </s> "If the term `certificates of indebtedness' standing by itself be susceptible of a broader meaning than that given to it above, its association here with bonds and debentures excludes such broader meaning. The maxim noscitur a sociis applies. </s> "A consideration of Title XI as a whole supports the conclusion above arrived at. Three classes of paper issued by individuals, partnerships, and corporations are subject thereunder to stamp tax: Bonds of indebtedness (subdivision 1), certificates of stock (subdivision 3), and drafts or checks and promissory notes (subdivision 6); i. e., instruments possessing to a greater or less extent the attributes of commercial paper. </s> "The premises lead inevitably to the conclusion that it was not the intention of Congress to tax under subdivision 1 of the said Schedule A every evidence of indebtedness other than those included under the heads of shares or certificates of stock, promissory notes, or bills of exchange, but only those evidences of indebtedness which have the general character of investment securities and which may properly be included under the term `bonds of indebtedness.' The definition of `certificate of indebtedness' as `primarily any instrument acknowledging liability for the payment of money, not in the recognized form of a promissory note or bill of exchange,' contained in T. D. 2713, is too inclusive and does not sufficiently delimit the instruments included in the term. </s> "It is therefore held that the term `certificate of indebtedness' as used in subdivision 1 of Schedule A, Title XI, Revenue Act of 1918, includes only instruments having the general character of investment [350 U.S. 383, 395] securities, as distinguished from instruments evidencing debts arising in ordinary transaction between individuals; and that conditional bills of sale are not certificates of indebtedness. </s> "T. D. 2713 should be modified to conform with this holding. </s> "ROBERT N. MILLER, "Solicitor of Internal Revenue." </s> [Footnote 13 It should be said that the administrative practice, which we consider as crucial here, was not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals in Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Fitzpatrick, supra. Nor do General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, supra, or any of the cases cited in note 4, supra, advert to that practice. </s> [Footnote 14 As long ago as 1916, no less an authority on corporate finance than the late Mr. F. L. Stetson described debentures in the following terms: </s> "In the United States, as already mentioned, the term `debenture' is understood to mean serial obligations of a corporation not secured by a specific mortgage, pledge or assignment of property. Of course a series of debentures may be issued without the execution of any indenture relating thereto. Prior to 1900 the few issues that had been made of such debentures were not accompanied by a trust agreement. In such case the rights and privileges given to bondholders were set forth at length in the obligation, thus making a somewhat lengthy instrument. Since an issue of debentures under trust agreements by the Lake Shore R. R. Co. and by the New York Central, the custom of adopting such agreements has become general. Originally in 1893 the General Electric Company made a large issue of debentures without an agreement, but at the time of the refunding in 1912 a trust agreement was executed." "Preparation of Corporate Bonds, Mortgages, Collateral Trusts and Debenture Indentures," in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation, p. 66 (Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, 1917). </s> [350 U.S. 383, 399]

United States Supreme Court HOWARD v. LYONS(1959) No. 57 Argued: Decided: June 29, 1959 </s> While petitioner was a Captain in the Navy and Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard, he withdrew recognition of the Federal Employees Veterans Association, of which respondents were officers, and sent an official report of his action, reciting his dissatisfaction with the activities of the Association, to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Industrial Relations of the Department of the Navy. In accordance with the policy and usual practice of the Navy, he also sent copies of the report to the members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation. Respondents sued him in a Federal District Court for libel, alleging malice. In defense, he pleaded absolute privilege. Held: </s> 1. The validity of petitioner's claim of absolute privilege in the performance of his duties as an officer of the Federal Government must be judged by federal standards, to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress. P. 597. </s> 2. On the record in this case, it appears that the sending of copies of the report to the Massachusetts congressional delegation, the only publication before this Court, was in the discharge of petitioner's official duties and in relation to matters committed to him for determination. Therefore, his plea of absolute privilege must be sustained. Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 564. Pp. 597-598. </s> 250 F.2d 912, reversed. </s> Paul A. Sweeney argued the cause and Daniel M. Friedman reargued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Morton Hollander and Bernard Cedarbaum. </s> Claude L. Dawson argued and reargued the cause, and filed a brief, for respondents. [360 U.S. 593, 594] </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a companion case to Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 564, decided today. Petitioner Howard in 1955 was a Captain in the United States Navy and Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard. Respondent Lyons was National Commander of the Federal Employees Veterans Association, Inc., and respondent McAteer a local officer of that Association. Both respondents were at all material times civilian employees at the Boston Naval Shipyard, and for several years before September 8, 1955, the Association was recognized by the shipyard as an employees' representative group. On that date petitioner withdrew official recognition of the Association - an action which is not here challenged. </s> Respondents brought suit in the Massachusetts District Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction, and making the following allegations: that on September 8, 1955, petitioner circulated a statement defaming them; that the statement purported to be an official memorandum to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Navy Industrial Relations, but was released by petitioner "outside of his official duties" to various newspapers and wire services and to the members of the Massachusetts delegation in the Congress of the United States; that in circulating the statement petitioner acted "maliciously, wilfully, wickedly, recklessly and falsely and with malice aforesight [sic]"; and that the statement was intended to and did injure the reputation of respondents. </s> A copy of the statement complained of was filed with the complaint. It is in the form of an official report directed to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Industrial Relations of the Department of the Navy, reciting petitioner's dissatisfaction with the activities [360 U.S. 593, 595] of the Federal Employees Veterans Association at the shipyard and announcing his intention to withdraw the recognition previously accorded it. 1 </s> Petitioner answered, stating that the statement complained of was in fact an official communication, and that in sending copies of it to the Massachusetts congressional delegation he was acting within the scope of his duties and pursuant to Department of the Navy policy; and denying that outside of his official duties he had released copies of the communication to the newspapers. He thereupon moved for summary judgment, attaching to the motion his own affidavit essentially repeating the statements from his answer above summarized, and an affidavit from the Commandant of the First Naval District. That affidavit stated that the Commandant was petitioner's commanding officer; that the making of reports to the Bureau of Ships relative to any significant personnel action at the shipyard was one of petitioner's official duties; that also among those duties was the furnishing of copies of such [360 U.S. 593, 596] reports to the Massachusetts congressional delegation; and that the dissemination of the report of September 8, 1955, to the newspapers had been made through official channels and approved by the acting Commandant of the First Naval District. </s> The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioner, holding that the uncontradicted affidavits conclusively showed that the statement complained of was published by petitioner "in the discharge of his official duties and in relation to matters committed to him for determination," and that it was therefore absolutely privileged. On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the sending of the official report to petitioner's superior officers was protected by an absolute privilege, and noted that reliance on the dissemination to the newspapers had been abandoned by respondents on appeal in the face of petitioner's sworn statement that he had not been responsible for that publication. As to the publication to the Massachusetts congressional delegation, however, the court, one judge dissenting, refused to allow more than a qualified privilege, although recognizing that "it is true that these members of Congress did have an official interest in being kept advised of important developments in labor relations at the Boston Naval Shipyard," and that "the Commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard might have conceived it to be a proper exercise of his official functions to see to it that the members of Congress should receive copies of such official report . . . ." Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for trial. 250 F.2d 912. </s> We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals had erred in failing to recognize his plea of absolute privilege in respect of the publication to members of Congress. 357 U.S. 903 . Respondents did not cross-petition for certiorari. [360 U.S. 593, 597] </s> At the outset, we take note of a question which the Court of Appeals, on its view of the case, did not find it necessary to resolve - whether the extent of the privilege in respect of civil liability for statements allegedly defamatory under state law which may be claimed by officers of the Federal Government, acting in the course of their duties, is a question as to which the federal courts are bound to follow state law. We think that the very statement of the question dictates a negative answer. The authority of a federal officer to act derives from federal sources, and the rule which recognizes a privilege under appropriate circumstances as to statements made in the course of duty is one designed to promote the effective functioning of the Federal Government. No subject could be one of more peculiarly federal concern, and it would deny the very considerations which give the rule of privilege its being to leave determination of its extent to the vagaries of the laws of the several States. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 . We hold that the validity of petitioner's claim of absolute privilege must be judged by federal standards, to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress. </s> Our decision in Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 564, governs this case. As has been observed, petitioner and his commanding officer both stated in uncontradicted affidavits that the sending of copies of the report here at issue to members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation was part of petitioner's official duties. Although of course such an averment by the defendant cannot foreclose the courts from examination of the question, we think that the affidavit of petitioner's commanding officer, and a Memorandum of Instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy which petitioner has with our leave filed in this Court, 2 </s> [360 U.S. 593, 598] plainly show that the District Court was correct in finding that the circulation of the report to the Massachusetts congressional delegation was "in the discharge of [petitioner's] . . . official duties and in relation to matters committed to him for determination." </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 576. </s> [For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, see ante, p. 586.] </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 No purpose would be served by setting out the entire, lengthy report. It is adequately summarized in the Court of Appeals' opinion as follows: </s> "This letter alleged that plaintiff Lyons by name, and the other plaintiff by description, `exercise a predominant influence' in the organizational activities; that this organization has been giving wide distribution to a newsletter or bulletin; that this bulletin has become more and more unfairly critical of the shipyard administration, for the purpose of not only thwarting the aims of the shipyard administration in the accomplishment of its mission, but also to further personal aims and self-interests of the individuals in control of the labor organization; that these `editorial expletives' have adversely affected the general morale of employees of the shipyard, who are entitled to be protected against such `overt subversion' by any labor group `whose methods and whose motives are unethical, uninhibited, and lack the integrity of purpose that could reasonably be expected.'" 250 F.2d 912, 913. </s> [Footnote 2 SECNAV Instruction 5730.5, issued February 3, 1955, paragraph 12: "Congressional Notification of Actions of Interest. Members of [360 U.S. 593, 598] Congress are very anxious to keep in touch with what is going on in their respective states and districts. Navy agencies shall keep them advised, if possible in advance, of any new actions or curtailment of actions which may affect them." </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> I cannot agree that Captain Howard's action in sending a copy of his report to the Massachusetts Congressional Delegation was absolutely privileged. 1 In its argument in this case, the Government consistently distinguished this case from Barr v. Matteo, ante, p. 564, decided today, by characterizing Captain Howard as a man who was acting under strict orders and who had no discretion. </s> Until reargument in this Court, the only indications that it was mandatory for Captain Howard to report matters of this sort to Congress were the bald assertions to that effect in Captain Howard's affidavit and in the affidavit of his superior, Admiral Schnackenberg, in the District Court. No naval regulation was cited and no [360 U.S. 593, 599] other authority was offered. It is significant that, in the same affidavit, when Captain Howard was explaining why he had transmitted copies of the report to a superior, he was able to cite chapter and verse of the U.S. Navy Public Information Manual as authority for that action. </s> For the first time on reargument in this Court, the Government produced the letter from the Secretary of the Navy referred to in the Court's opinion. The paragraph relied on is nothing more than a general policy statement applicable only to "Navy agencies." 2 The letter was in no way directed toward labor problems - and the quoted portion is but a few lines in a five-page letter sent to a general distribution list and apparently never inserted in the Federal Register or any Navy Manual. Obviously, this letter was not cited by Captain Howard because he was unaware of its existence - or its applicability. </s> The short explanation is that the Captain thought that since the plaintiffs had attacked the administration of the shipyard by sending copies of their newsletters and charges to Congress, he should send Congress his side of the story. This he had a right to do but in doing so he should have no greater privilege than his critic. The plaintiffs in this case at most received qualified privilege for their complaints to Congress, 3 yet the Captain's answer is given absolute privilege. [360 U.S. 593, 600] </s> As my dissent in Barr v. Matteo indicates, the burden of proof is on the defendant to sustain his claim of privilege, ante, p. 579. I do not read this record as placing a mandatory duty on Captain Howard to make the report in question to Congress. 4 </s> I would affirm. </s> [Footnote 1 I agree with the Court in its determination that federal law controls this matter. </s> [Footnote 2 "Navy agencies" is defined in paragraph 2b of the same letter as follows: </s> "This term includes the Civilian Executive Assistants to the Secretary, the Naval Professional Assistants to the Secretary and the Heads of Offices and Boards of the Navy Department." </s> Surely it was never intended that every naval officer who thought that he knew something in which Congress might be interested, was required to contact Congress directly. </s> [Footnote 3 See, e. g., Sweeney v. Higgins, 117 Me. 415, 104 A. 791; Tyree v. Harrison, 100 Va. 540, 42 S. E. 295; Hancock v. Mitchell, 83 W. Va. 156, 98 S. E. 65. </s> [Footnote 4 On this record, I cannot believe that Captain Howard would have been derelict in his duty if he had not sent the report to Congress - and it has never been suggested that such action would have warranted disciplinary measures. </s> [360 U.S. 593, 601]

United States Supreme Court COLUMBIA BROADCASTING v. DEMOCRATIC COMM.(1973) No. 71-863 Argued: October 16, 1972Decided: May 29, 1973 </s> The Democratic National Committee requested a declaratory ruling from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that the Communications Act or the First Amendment precluded a licensee from having a general policy of refusing to sell time to "responsible entities" to present their views on public issues. The Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace filed a complaint with the FCC, alleging that a broadcaster had violated the First Amendment by refusing to sell it time to broadcast spot announcements expressing the group's views on the Vietnam conflict and that the station's coverage of antiwar views did not meet the requirements of the Fairness Doctrine. The FCC rejected the Fairness Doctrine challenge and ruled that a broadcaster was not prohibited from having a policy of refusing to accept paid editorial advertisements by individuals and organizations like respondents. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "a flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted," and remanded the causes to the FCC to develop regulations governing which, and how many, editorial announcements would be aired. Held: Neither the Communications Act nor the First Amendment requires broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements. Pp. 101-114; 121-170. </s> 146 U.S. App. D.C. 181, 450 F.2d 642, reversed. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, finding that: </s> 1. The basic criterion governing use of broadcast frequencies is the right of the public to be informed; the manner by which this [412 U.S. 94, 95] interest is best served is dispositive of the respondents' statutory and First Amendment contentions. Pp. 101-114. </s> (a) In evaluating respondents' claims, great weight must be afforded the decisions of Congress and the experience of the FCC. Pp. 101-103. </s> (b) Congress has consistently rejected efforts to impose on broadcasters a "common carrier" right of access for all persons wishing to speak out on public issues. Instead, it reposed in the FCC regulatory authority by which the Fairness Doctrine was evolved to require that the broadcaster's coverage of important public issues must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints; thus, no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities. Pp. 103-114. </s> 2. The "public interest" standard of the Communications Act, which incorporates First Amendment principles, does not require broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements. Pp. 121-131. </s> (a) The FCC was justified in concluding that the public interest in having access to the marketplace of "ideas and experiences" would not be served by ordering a right of access to advertising time. There is substantial risk that such a system would be monopolized by those who could and would pay the costs, that the effective operation of the Fairness Doctrine itself would be undermined, and that the public accountability which now rests with the broadcaster would be diluted. Pp. 121-125. </s> (b) The difficult problems involved in implementing an absolute right of access would inevitably implicate the FCC in a case-by-case determination of who should be heard and when, thus enlarging the involvement of the Government in broadcasting operations. The FCC could properly take into account the fact that listeners and viewers constitute a kind of "captive audience" and that the public interest requires that a substantial degree of journalistic discretion must remain with broadcasters. Pp. 126-130. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concluded, in Part III, that a broadcast licensee's refusal to accept a paid editorial advertisement does not constitute "governmental action" for First Amendment purposes. The Government is neither a "partner" to the action complained of nor engaged in a "symbiotic relationship" with the licensee. Pp. 114-121. </s> (a) Under the Communications Act a broadcast licensee is vested with substantial journalistic discretion in deciding how to meet its statutory obligations as a "public trustee." Pp. 114-117. [412 U.S. 94, 96] </s> (b) The licensee's policy against accepting editorial advertising is compatible with the Communications Act and with the broadcaster's obligation to provide a balanced treatment of controversial questions. Pp. 118-121. </s> (c) The FCC has not fostered the licensee policy against accepting editorial advertisements; it has merely declined to command acceptance because the subject was a matter within the area of journalistic discretion. P. 118. </s> BURGER, C. J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in which as to Parts I, II, and III STEWART and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in Parts I, II, and III, post, p. 132. WHITE. J., filed an opinion concurring in Parts I, II, and IV, post, p. 146. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in Parts I, II, and IV, in which POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 147. DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 148. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 170. </s> [Footnote * Together with Nos. 71-864, Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace et al.; 71-865, Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, Inc. v. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace; and 71-866, American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> J. Roger Wollenberg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-863. With him on the briefs were Lloyd N. Cutler, Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel Marcus, Robert V. Evans, John D. Appel, and Joseph DeFranco. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for petitioners in No. 71-864. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Comegys, Howard E. Shapiro, and John W. Pettit. Ernest W. Jennes argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-865. With him on the briefs were Charles A. Miller and Michael Boudin. Vernon L. Wilkinson argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-866. With him on the brief were James A. McKenna, Jr., and Carl R. Ramey. </s> Joseph A. Califano, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Democratic National Committee in Nos. 71-863, 71-864, and 71-866. With him on the brief was John G. Kester. Thomas R. Asher argued the cause for respondent Business [412 U.S. 94, 97] Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace in Nos. 71-864 and 71-865. With him on the brief was Albert H. Kramer.Fn </s> Fn [412 U.S. 94, 97] Floyd Abrams and Corydon B. Dunham filed a brief for National Broadcasting Co., Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II, and IV) together with an opinion (Part III), in which MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined. </s> We granted the writs of certiorari in these cases to consider whether a broadcast licensee's general policy of not selling advertising time to individuals or groups wishing to speak out on issues they consider important violates the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., or the First Amendment. </s> In two orders announced the same day, the Federal Communications Commission ruled that a broadcaster who meets his public obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues is not required to accept editorial advertisements. Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d 216; Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d 242. A divided Court of Appeals reversed the Commission, holding that a broadcaster's fixed policy of refusing editorial advertisements violates the First Amendment; the court remanded the cases to the Commission to develop procedures and guidelines for administering a First Amendment right of access. Business Executives' Move For Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 146 U.S. App. D.C. 181, 450 F.2d 642 (1971). </s> The complainants in these actions are the Democratic [412 U.S. 94, 98] National Committee (DNC) and the Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM), a national organization of businessmen opposed to United States involvement in the Vietnam conflict. In January 1970, BEM filed a complaint with the Commission charging that radio station WTOP in Washington, D.C., had refused to sell it time to broadcast a series of one-minute spot announcements expressing BEM views on Vietnam. WTOP, in common with many, but not all, broadcasters, followed a policy of refusing to sell time for spot announcements to individuals and groups who wished to expound their views on controversial issues. WTOP took the position that since it presented full and fair coverage of important public questions, including the Vietnam conflict, it was justified in refusing to accept editorial advertisements. WTOP also submitted evidence showing that the station had aired the views of critics of our Vietnam policy on numerous occasions. BEM challenged the fairness of WTOP's coverage of criticism of that policy, but it presented no evidence in support of that claim. </s> Four months later, in May 1970, DNC filed with the Commission a request for a declaratory ruling: </s> "That under the First Amendment to the Constitution and the Communications Act, a broadcaster may not, as a general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible entities, such as the DNC, for the solicitation of funds and for comment on public issues." </s> DNC claimed that it intended to purchase time from radio and television stations and from the national networks in order to present the views of the Democratic Party and to solicit funds. Unlike BEM, DNC did not object to the policies of any particular broadcaster but claimed that its prior "experiences in this area make it [412 U.S. 94, 99] clear that it will encounter considerable difficulty - if not total frustration of its efforts - in carrying out its plans in the event the Commission should decline to issue a ruling as requested." DNC cited Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), as establishing a limited constitutional right of access to the airwaves. </s> In two separate opinions, the Commission rejected respondents' claims that "responsible" individuals and groups have a right to purchase advertising time to comment on public issues without regard to whether the broadcaster has complied with the Fairness Doctrine. The Commission viewed the issue as one of major significance in administering the regulatory scheme relating to the electronic media, one going "to the heart of the system of broadcasting which has developed in this country . . . ." 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 221. After reviewing the legislative history of the Communications Act, the provisions of the Act itself, the Commission's decisions under the Act, and the difficult problems inherent in administering a right of access, the Commission rejected the demands of BEM and DNC. </s> The Commission also rejected BEM's claim that WTOP had violated the Fairness Doctrine by failing to air views such as those held by members of BEM; the Commission pointed out that BEM had made only a "general allegation" of unfairness in WTOP's coverage of the Vietnam conflict and that the station had adequately rebutted the charge by affidavit. The Commission did, however, uphold DNC's position that the statute recognized a right of political parties to purchase broadcast time for the purpose of soliciting funds. The Commission noted that Congress has accorded special consideration for access by political parties, see 47 U.S.C. 315 (a), and that solicitation of funds by political parties is both [412 U.S. 94, 100] feasible and appropriate in the short space of time generally allotted to spot advertisements. 1 </s> A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the Commission, holding that "a flat ban on paid public issue announcements is in violation of the First Amendment, at least when other sorts of paid announcements are accepted." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 185, 450 F.2d, at 646. Recognizing that the broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource inherently unavailable to all, the court nevertheless concluded that the First Amendment mandated an "abridgeable" right to present editorial advertisements. The court reasoned that a broadcaster's policy of airing commercial advertisements but not editorial advertisements constitutes unconstitutional discrimination. The court did not, however, order that either BEM's or DNC's proposed announcements must be accepted by the broadcaster; rather, it remanded the cases to the Commission to develop "reasonable procedures and regulations determining which and how many `editorial advertisements' will be put on the air." Ibid. </s> Judge McGowan dissented; in his view, the First Amendment did not compel the Commission to undertake the task assigned to it by the majority: </s> "It is presently the obligation of a licensee to advance the public's right to know by devoting a substantial amount of time to the presentation of controversial views on issues of public importance, striking a balance which is always subject to redress by reference to the fairness doctrine. Failure to do so puts continuation of the license at risk - a sanction of tremendous potency, and one which the Commission is under increasing pressure to employ. [412 U.S. 94, 101] </s> "This is the system which Congress has, wisely or not, provided as the alternative to public ownership and operation of radio and television communications facilities. This approach has never been thought to be other than within the permissible limits of constitutional choice." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 205, 450 F.2d, at 666. </s> Judge McGowan concluded that the court's decision to overrule the Commission and to remand for development and implementation of a constitutional right of access put the Commission in a "constitutional straitjacket" on a highly complex and far-reaching issue. </s> I </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion for the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), makes clear that the broadcast media pose unique and special problems not present in the traditional free speech case. Unlike other media, broadcasting is subject to an inherent physical limitation. Broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource; they must be portioned out among applicants. All who possess the financial resources and the desire to communicate by television or radio cannot be satisfactorily accommodated. The Court spoke to this reality when, in Red Lion, we said "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id., at 388. </s> Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public resource, there is also present an unusual order of First Amendment values. Red Lion discussed at length the application of the First Amendment to the broadcast media. In analyzing the broadcasters' claim that the Fairness Doctrine and two of its component rules violated their freedom of expression, we [412 U.S. 94, 102] held that "[n]o one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license because `the public interest' requires it `is not a denial of free speech.'" Id., at 389. Although the broadcaster is not without protection under the First Amendment, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC." Red Lion, supra, at 390. </s> Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's right to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty. The process must necessarily be undertaken within the framework of the regulatory scheme that has evolved over the course of the past half century. For, during that time, Congress and its chosen regulatory agency have established a delicately balanced system of regulation intended to serve the interests of all concerned. The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence. </s> Thus, in evaluating the First Amendment claims of respondents, we must afford great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the Commission. Professor Chafee aptly observed: </s> "Once we get away from the bare words of the [First] Amendment, we must construe it as part of a Constitution which creates a government for the purpose of performing several very important tasks. [412 U.S. 94, 103] The [First] Amendment should be interpreted so as not to cripple the regular work of the government. A part of this work is the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, and this has come in our modern age to include the job of parceling out the air among broadcasters, which Congress has entrusted to the FCC. Therefore, every free-speech problem in the radio has to be considered with reference to the satisfactory performance of this job as well as to the value of open discussion. Although free speech should weigh heavily in the scale in the event of conflict, still the Commission should be given ample scope to do its job." 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 640-641 (1947). </s> The judgment of the Legislative Branch cannot be ignored or undervalued simply because one segment of the broadcast constituency casts its claims under the umbrella of the First Amendment. That is not to say we "defer" to the judgment of the Congress and the Commission on a constitutional question, or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution should we determine that the Commission has not fulfilled its task with appropriate sensitivity to the interests in free expression. The point is, rather, that when we face a complex problem with many hard questions and few easy answers we do well to pay careful attention to how the other branches of Government have addressed the same problem. Thus, before confronting the specific legal issues in these cases, we turn to an examination of the legislative and administrative development of our broadcast system over the last half century. </s> II </s> This Court has on numerous occasions recounted the origins of our modern system of broadcast regulation. See, e. g., Red Lion, supra, at 375-386; National Broadcasting [412 U.S. 94, 104] Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 -217 (1943); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 -138 (1940). We have noted that prior to the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, broadcasting was marked by chaos. The unregulated and burgeoning private use of the new media in the 1920's had resulted in an intolerable situation demanding congressional action: </s> "It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government. Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacaphony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard." Red Lion, supra, at 376. </s> But, once it was accepted that broadcasting was subject to regulation, Congress was confronted with a major dilemma: how to strike a proper balance between private and public control. Cf. Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 528 (1959). </s> One of the earliest and most frequently quoted statements of this dilemma is that of Herbert Hoover, when he was Secretary of Commerce. While his Department was making exploratory attempts to deal with the infant broadcasting industry in the early 1920's, he testified before a House Committee: </s> "We can not allow any single person or group to place themselves in [a] position where they can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that the Government should ever be placed in the position of censoring this material." Hearings on H. R. 7357 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1924). [412 U.S. 94, 105] That statement foreshadowed the "tightrope" aspects of Government regulation of the broadcast media, a problem the Congress, the Commission, and the courts have struggled with ever since. Congress appears to have concluded, however, that of these two choices - private or official censorship - Government censorship would be the most pervasive, the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain and hence the one most to be avoided. </s> The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, the model for our present statutory scheme, see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 137, reveals that in the area of discussion of public issues Congress chose to leave broad journalistic discretion with the licensee. Congress specifically dealt with - and firmly rejected - the argument that the broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues. Some members of Congress - those whose views were ultimately rejected - strenuously objected to the unregulated power of broadcasters to reject applications for service. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (minority report). They regarded the exercise of such power to be "private censorship," which should be controlled by treating broadcasters as public utilities. 2 The provision that came closest to imposing an unlimited right of access to broadcast time was part of the bill reported to the Senate by the Committee on Interstate Commerce. The [412 U.S. 94, 106] bill that emerged from the Committee contained the following provision: </s> "[I]f any licensee shall permit a broadcasting station to be used . . . by a candidate or candidates for any public office, or for the discussion of any question affecting the public, he shall make no discrimination as to the use of such broadcasting station, and with respect to said matters the licensee shall be deemed a common carrier in interstate commerce: Provided, that such licensee shall have no power to censor the material broadcast." 67 Cong. Rec. 12503 (1926) (emphasis added). </s> When the bill came to the Senate floor, the principal architect of the Radio Act of 1927, Senator Dill, offered an amendment to the provision to eliminate the common carrier obligation and to restrict the right of access to candidates for public office. Senator Dill explained the need for the amendment: </s> "When we recall that broadcasting today is purely voluntary, and the listener-in pays nothing for it, that the broadcaster gives it for the purpose of building up his reputation, it seemed unwise to put the broadcaster under the hampering control of being a common carrier and compelled to accept anything and everything that was offered him so long as the price was paid." 67 Cong. Rec. 12502. </s> The Senators were also sensitive to the problems involved in legislating "equal opportunities" with respect to the discussion of public issues. Senator Dill stated: </s> "[`Public questions'] is such a general term that there is probably no question of any interest whatsoever that could be discussed but that the other side of it could demand time; and thus a radio station [412 U.S. 94, 107] would be placed in the position that the Senator from Iowa mentions about candidates, namely, that they would have to give all their time to that kind of discussion, or no public question could be discussed." Id., at 12504. </s> The Senate adopted Senator Dill's amendment. The provision finally enacted, 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1170, was later re-enacted as 315 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 3 but only after Congress rejected another proposal that would have imposed a limited obligation on broadcasters to turn over their microphones to persons wishing to speak out on certain [412 U.S. 94, 108] public issues. 4 Instead, Congress after prolonged consideration adopted 3 (h), which specifically provides that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, [412 U.S. 94, 109] insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 5 </s> Other provisions of the 1934 Act also evince a legislative desire to preserve values of private journalism under a regulatory scheme which would insure fulfillment of certain public obligations. Although the Commission was given the authority to issue renewable three-year licenses to broadcasters 6 and to promulgate rules and regulations governing the use of those licenses, 7 both consistent [412 U.S. 94, 110] with the "public convenience, interest, or necessity," 326 of the Act specifically provides that: </s> "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 47 U.S.C. 326. </s> From these provisions it seems clear that Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations. Only when the interests of the public are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will government power be asserted within the framework of the Act. License renewal proceedings, in which the listening public can be heard, are a principal means of such regulation. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 (1966), and 138 U.S. App. D.C. 112, 425 F.2d 543 (1969). </s> Subsequent developments in broadcast regulation illustrate how this regulatory scheme has evolved. Of particular importance, in light of Congress' flat refusal to impose a "common carrier" right of access for all persons wishing to speak out on public issues, is the Commission's "Fairness Doctrine," which evolved gradually over the years spanning federal regulation of the broadcast media. 8 Formulated under the Commission's power to [412 U.S. 94, 111] issue regulations consistent with the "public interest," the doctrine imposes two affirmative responsibilities on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints. See Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 377 . In fulfilling the Fairness Doctrine obligations, the broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation of opposing views if a paid sponsor is unavailable, Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963), and must initiate programming on public issues if no one else seeks to do so. See John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); Red Lion, supra, at 378. </s> Since it is physically impossible to provide time for all viewpoints, however, the right to exercise editorial judgment was granted to the broadcaster. The broadcaster, therefore, is allowed significant journalistic discretion in deciding how best to fulfill the Fairness Doctrine obligations, 9 although that discretion is bounded by rules designed to assure that the public interest in fairness is furthered. In its decision in the instant cases, the Commission described the boundaries as follows: </s> "The most basic consideration in this respect is that the licensee cannot rule off the air coverage of important issues or views because of his private ends or beliefs. As a public trustee, he must present [412 U.S. 94, 112] representative community views and voices on controversial issues which are of importance to his listeners. . . . This means also that some of the voices must be partisan. A licensee policy of excluding partisan voices and always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive manner would run counter to the 'profound national commitment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc., v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (n. 18) (1969) . . . ." 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222-223. </s> Thus, under the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters are responsible for providing the listening and viewing public with access to a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance. 10 The basic principle underlying that responsibility is "the right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the [412 U.S. 94, 113] Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views on any matter . . . ." Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246, 1249 (1949). Consistent with that philosophy, the Commission on several occasions has ruled that no private individual or group has a right to command the use of broadcast facilities. 11 See, e. g., Dowie A. Crittenden, 18 F. C. C. 2d 499 (1969); Margaret Z. Scherbina, 21 F. C. C. 2d 141 (1969); Boalt Hall Student Assn., 20 F. C. C. 2d 612 (1969); Madalyn Murray, 40 F. C. C. 647 (1965); Democratic State Central Committee of California, 19 F. C. C. 2d 833 (1968); U.S. Broadcasting Corp., 2 F. C. C. 208 (1935). Congress has not yet seen fit to alter that policy, although since 1934 it has amended the Act on several occasions 12 and considered various [412 U.S. 94, 114] proposals that would have vested private individuals with a right of access. 13 </s> With this background in mind, we next proceed to consider whether a broadcaster's refusal to accept editorial advertisements is governmental action violative of the First Amendment. </s> III </s> That "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" is a restraint on government action, not that of private persons. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). The Court has not previously considered whether the action of a broadcast licensee such as that challenged here is "governmental action" for purposes of the First [412 U.S. 94, 115] Amendment. The holding under review thus presents a novel question, and one with far-reaching implications. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 782-787 (1972). </s> The Court of Appeals held that broadcasters are instrumentalities of the Government for First Amendment purposes, relying on the thesis, familiar in other contexts, that broadcast licensees are granted use of part of the public domain and are regulated as "proxies" or "`fiduciaries' of the people." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 191, 450 F.2d, at 652. These characterizations are not without validity for some purposes, but they do not resolve the sensitive constitutional issues inherent in deciding whether a particular licensee action is subject to First Amendment restraints. 14 </s> In dealing with the broadcast media, as in other contexts, the line between private conduct and governmental action cannot be defined by reference to any general formula unrelated to particular exercises of governmental authority. When governmental action is alleged there must be cautious analysis of the quality and degree of Government relationship to the particular acts in question. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). [412 U.S. 94, 116] </s> In deciding whether the First Amendment encompasses the conduct challenged here, it must be kept in mind that we are dealing with a vital part of our system of communication. The electronic media have swiftly become a major factor in the dissemination of ideas and information. More than 7,000 licensed broadcast stations undertake to perform this important function. To a large extent they share with the printed media the role of keeping people informed. </s> As we have seen, with the advent of radio a half century ago, Congress was faced with a fundamental choice between total Government ownership and control of the new medium - the choice of most other countries - or some other alternative. Long before the impact and potential of the medium was realized, Congress opted for a system of private broadcasters licensed and regulated by Government. The legislative history suggests that this choice was influenced not only by traditional attitudes toward private enterprise, but by a desire to maintain for licensees, so far as consistent with necessary regulation, a traditional journalistic role. The historic aversion to censorship led Congress to enact 326 of the Act, which explicitly prohibits the Commission from interfering with the exercise of free speech over the broadcast frequencies. Congress pointedly refrained from divesting broadcasters of their control over the selection of voices; 3 (h) of the Act stands as a firm congressional statement that broadcast licensees are not to be treated as common carriers, obliged to accept whatever is tendered by members of the public. Both these provisions clearly manifest the intention of Congress to maintain a substantial measure of journalistic independence for the broadcast licensee. 15 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 117] </s> The regulatory scheme evolved slowly, but very early the licensee's role developed in terms of a "public trustee" charged with the duty of fairly and impartially informing the public audience. In this structure the Commission acts in essence as an "overseer," but the initial and primary responsibility for fairness, balance, and objectivity rests with the licensee. This role of the Government as an "overseer" and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest and the role of the licensee as a journalistic "free agent" call for a delicate balancing of competing interests. The maintenance of this balance for more than 40 years has called on both the regulators and the licensees to walk a "tightrope" to preserve the First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and its successor, the Communications Act. </s> The tensions inherent in such a regulatory structure emerge more clearly when we compare a private newspaper with a broadcast licensee. The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers - and hence advertisers - to assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers. A broadcast licensee has a large measure of journalistic freedom but not as large as that exercised by [412 U.S. 94, 118] a newspaper. A licensee must balance what it might prefer to do as a private entrepreneur with what it is required to do as a "public trustee." To perform its statutory duties, the Commission must oversee without censoring. This suggests something of the difficulty and delicacy of administering the Communications Act - a function calling for flexibility and the capacity to adjust and readjust the regulatory mechanism to meet changing problems and needs. </s> The licensee policy challenged in this case is intimately related to the journalistic role of a licensee for which it has been given initial and primary responsibility by Congress. The licensee's policy against accepting editorial advertising cannot be examined as an abstract proposition, but must be viewed in the context of its journalistic role. It does not help to press on us the idea that editorial ads are "like" commercial ads, for the licensee's policy against editorial spot ads is expressly based on a journalistic judgment that 10- to 60-second spot announcements are ill-suited to intelligible and intelligent treatment of public issues; the broadcaster has chosen to provide a balanced treatment of controversial questions in a more comprehensive form. Obviously the licensee's evaluation is based on its own journalistic judgment of priorities and newsworthiness. </s> Moreover, the Commission has not fostered the licensee policy challenged here; it has simply declined to command particular action because it fell within the area of journalistic discretion. The Commission explicitly emphasized that "there is of course no Commission policy thwarting the sale of time to comment on public issues." 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 226. The Commission's reasoning, consistent with nearly 40 years of precedent, is that so long as a licensee meets its "public trustee" obligation to provide balanced coverage of issues and events, it has broad discretion to decide how that obligation will be [412 U.S. 94, 119] met. We do not reach the question whether the First Amendment or the Act can be read to preclude the Commission from determining that in some situations the public interest requires licensees to re-examine their policies with respect to editorial advertisements. The Commission has not yet made such a determination; it has, for the present at least, found the policy to be within the sphere of journalistic discretion which Congress has left with the licensee. </s> Thus, it cannot be said that the Government is a "partner" to the action of the broadcast licensee complained of here, nor is it engaged in a "symbiotic relationship" with the licensee, profiting from the invidious discrimination of its proxy. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174 -177 (1972), with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S., at 723 -724. The First Amendment does not reach acts of private parties in every instance where the Congress or the Commission has merely permitted or failed to prohibit such acts. </s> Our conclusion is not altered merely because the Commission rejected the claims of BEM and DNC and concluded that the challenged licensee policy is not inconsistent with the public interest. It is true that in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), we found governmental action sufficient to trigger First Amendment protections on a record involving agency approval of the conduct of a public utility. Though we held that the decision of a District of Columbia bus company to install radio receivers in its public buses was within the reach of the First Amendment, there Congress had expressly authorized the agency to undertake plenary intervention into the affairs of the carrier and it was pursuant to that authorization that the agency investigated the challenged policy and approved it on public interest standards. Id., at 462. [412 U.S. 94, 120] </s> Here, Congress has not established a regulatory scheme for broadcast licensees as pervasive as the regulation of public transportation in Pollak. More important, as we have noted. Congress has affirmatively indicated in the Communications Act that certain journalistic decisions are for the licensee, subject only to the restrictions imposed by evaluation of its overall performance under the public interest standard. In Pollak there was no suggestion that Congress had considered worthy of protection the carrier's interest in exercising discretion over the content of communications forced on passengers. A more basic distinction, perhaps, between Pollak and this case is that Pollak was concerned with a transportation utility that itself derives no protection from the First Amendment. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). </s> Were we to read the First Amendment to spell out governmental action in the circumstances presented here, few licensee decisions on the content of broadcasts or the processes of editorial evaluation would escape constitutional scrutiny. In this sensitive area so sweeping a concept of governmental action would go far in practical effect to undermine nearly a half century of unmistakable congressional purpose to maintain - no matter how difficult the task - essentially private broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to public interest standards. To do this Congress, and the Commission as its agent, must remain in a posture of flexibility to chart a workable "middle course" in its quest to preserve a balance between the essential public accountability and the desired private control of the media. </s> More profoundly, it would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints urged by respondents. To do so in the name [412 U.S. 94, 121] of the First Amendment would be a contradiction. Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on Government. Application of such standards to broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the very ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public interest. Every licensee is already held accountable for the totality of its performance of public interest obligations. </s> The concept of private, independent broadcast journalism, regulated by Government to assure protection of the public interest, has evolved slowly and cautiously over more than 40 years and has been nurtured by processes of adjudication. That concept of journalistic independence could not co-exist with a reading of the challenged conduct of the licensee as governmental action. Nor could it exist without administrative flexibility to meet changing needs and swift technological developments. We therefore conclude that the policies complained of do not constitute governmental action violative of the First Amendment. See McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597, 601 (CA3 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946); Massachusetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (CA1 1950); Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799, 803 (EDNY 1971). </s> IV </s> There remains for consideration the question whether the "public interest" standard of the Communications Act requires broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements or, whether, assuming governmental action, broadcasters are required to do so by reason of the First Amendment. In resolving those issues, we are guided by the "venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong . . . ." Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 381 . Whether [412 U.S. 94, 122] there are "compelling indications" of error in these cases must be answered by a careful evaluation of the Commission's reasoning in light of the policies embodied by Congress in the "public interest" standard of the Act. Many of those policies, as the legislative history makes clear, were drawn from the First Amendment itself; the "public interest" standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles. Thus, the question before us is whether the various interests in free expression of the public, the broadcaster, and the individuals require broadcasters to sell commercial time to persons wishing to discuss controversial issues. In resolving that issue it must constantly be kept in mind that the interest of the public is our foremost concern. With broadcasting, where the available means of communication are limited in both space and time, the admonition of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn that "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said" is peculiarly appropriate. Political Freedom 26 (1948). </s> At the outset we reiterate what was made clear earlier that nothing in the language of the Communications Act or its legislative history compels a conclusion different from that reached by the Commission. As we have seen, Congress has time and again rejected various legislative attempts that would have mandated a variety of forms of individual access. That is not to say that Congress' rejection of such proposals must be taken to mean that Congress is opposed to private rights of access under all circumstances. Rather, the point is that Congress has chosen to leave such questions with the Commission, to which it has given the flexibility to experiment with new ideas as changing conditions require. In this case, the Commission has decided that on balance the undesirable effects of the right of access urged by respondents would outweigh the asserted benefits. The Court of [412 U.S. 94, 123] Appeals failed to give due weight to the Commission's judgment on these matters. </s> The Commission was justified in concluding that the public interest in providing access to the marketplace of "ideas and experiences" would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to wealth. Cf. Red Lion, supra, at 392. Even under a first-come-first-served system, proposed by the dissenting Commissioner in these cases, 16 the views of the affluent could well prevail over those of others, since they would have it within their power to purchase time more frequently. Moreover, there is the substantial danger, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 203, 450 F.2d, at 664, that the time allotted for editorial advertising could be monopolized by those of one political persuasion. </s> These problems would not necessarily be solved by applying the Fairness Doctrine, including the Cullman doctrine, to editorial advertising. If broadcasters were required to provide time, free when necessary, for the discussion of the various shades of opinion on the issue discussed in the advertisement, the affluent could still determine in large part the issues to be discussed. Thus, the very premise of the Court of Appeals' holding - that a right of access is necessary to allow individuals and groups the opportunity for self-initiated speech - would have little meaning to those who could not afford to purchase time in the first instance. 17 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 124] </s> If the Fairness Doctrine were applied to editorial advertising, there is also the substantial danger that the effective operation of that doctrine would be jeopardized. To minimize financial hardship and to comply fully with its public responsibilities a broadcaster might well be forced to make regular programming time available to those holding a view different from that expressed in an editorial advertisement; indeed, BEM has suggested as much in its brief. The result would be a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the coverage of public issues, and a transfer of control over the treatment of public issues from the licensees who are accountable for broadcast performance to private individuals who are not. The public interest would no longer be "paramount" but, rather, subordinate to private whim especially since, under the Court of Appeals' decision, a broadcaster would be largely precluded from rejecting editorial advertisements that dealt with matters trivial or insignificant or already fairly covered by the broadcaster. 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 196 n. 36, 197, 450 F.2d, at 657 n. 36, 658. If the Fairness Doctrine and the Cullman doctrine were suspended to alleviate these problems, as respondents suggest might be appropriate, the question arises whether we would have abandoned more than we have gained. Under such a regime the congressional objective of balanced coverage of public issues would be seriously threatened. </s> Nor can we accept the Court of Appeals' view that every potential speaker is "the best judge" of what the listening public ought to hear or indeed the best judge of the merits of his or her views. All journalistic tradition and experience is to the contrary. For better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and editing is selection and choice of material. That editors - newspaper or broadcast - can and do abuse this power is beyond doubt, but that is no reason to deny the discretion Congress [412 U.S. 94, 125] provided. Calculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values. The presence of these risks is nothing new; the authors of the Bill of Rights accepted the reality that these risks were evils for which there was no acceptable remedy other than a spirit of moderation and a sense of responsibility - and civility - on the part of those who exercise the guaranteed freedoms of expression. </s> It was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the public interest in being informed requires periodic accountability on the part of those who are entrusted with the use of broadcast frequencies, scarce as they are. In the delicate balancing historically followed in the regulation of broadcasting Congress and the Commission could appropriately conclude that the allocation of journalistic priorities should be concentrated in the licensee rather than diffused among many. This policy gives the public some assurance that the broadcaster will be answerable if he fails to meet its legitimate needs. No such accountability attaches to the private individual, whose only qualifications for using the broadcast facility may be abundant funds and a point of view. To agree that debate on public issues should be "robust, and wide-open" does not mean that we should exchange "public trustee" broadcasting, with all its limitations, for a system of self-appointed editorial commentators. </s> The Court of Appeals discounted those difficulties by stressing that it was merely mandating a "modest reform," requiring only that broadcasters be required to accept some editorial advertising. 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 202, 450 F.2d, at 663. The court suggested that broadcasters could place an "outside limit on the total amount of editorial advertising they will sell" and that the Commission and the broadcasters could develop "`reasonable regulations' designed to prevent domination by a few groups or a few viewpoints." Id., at 202. [412 U.S. 94, 126] 203, 450 F.2d, at 663, 664. If the Commission decided to apply the Fairness Doctrine to editorial advertisements and as a result broadcasters suffered financial harm, the court thought the "Commission could make necessary adjustments." Id., at 203, 450 F.2d, at 664. Thus, without providing any specific answers to the substantial objections raised by the Commission and the broadcasters, other than to express repeatedly its "confidence" in the Commission's ability to overcome any difficulties, the court remanded the cases to the Commission for the development of regulations to implement a constitutional right of access. </s> By minimizing the difficult problems involved in implementing such a right of access, the Court of Appeals failed to come to grips with another problem of critical importance to broadcast regulation and the First Amendment - the risk of an enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues. See, e. g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). This risk is inherent in the Court of Appeals' remand requiring regulations and procedures to sort out requests to be heard - a process involving the very editing that licensees now perform as to regular programming. Although the use of a public resource by the broadcast media permits a limited degree of Government surveillance, as is not true with respect to private media, see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S., at 216 -219, the Government's power over licensees, as we have noted, is by no means absolute and is carefully circumscribed by the Act itself. 18 </s> Under a constitutionally commanded and Government supervised right-of-access system urged by respondents and mandated by the Court of Appeals, the Commission [412 U.S. 94, 127] would be required to oversee far more of the day-to-day operations of broadcasters' conduct, deciding such questions as whether a particular individual or group has had sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint and whether a particular viewpoint has already been sufficiently aired. Regimenting broadcasters is too radical a therapy for the ailment respondents complain of. </s> Under the Fairness Doctrine the Commission's responsibility is to judge whether a licensee's overall performance indicates a sustained good-faith effort to meet the public interest in being fully and fairly informed. 19 The Commission's responsibilities under a right-of-access system would tend to draw it into a continuing case-by-case determination of who should be heard and when. Indeed, the likelihood of Government involvement is so great that it has been suggested that the accepted constitutional principles against control of speech content would need to be relaxed with respect to editorial advertisements. 20 To sacrifice First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is not warranted, and it was well within the Commission's discretion to construe the Act so as to avoid such a result. 21 </s> The Commission is also entitled to take into account the reality that in a very real sense listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." Cf. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S., at 463 ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The "captive" nature of the broadcast audience was recognized as early as 1924, [412 U.S. 94, 128] when Commerce Secretary Hoover remarked at the Fourth National Radio Conference that "the radio listener does not have the same option that the reader of publications has - to ignore advertising in which he is not interested - and he may resent its invasion of his set." 22 As the broadcast media became more pervasive in our society, the problem has become more acute. In a recent decision upholding the Commission's power to promulgate rules regarding cigarette advertising, Judge Bazelon, writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals, noted some of the effects of the ubiquitous commercial: </s> "Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are `in the air.' In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word." Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 32-33, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-1101 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). </s> It is no answer to say that because we tolerate pervasive commercial advertisements we can also live with its political counterparts. </s> The rationale for the Court of Appeals' decision imposing a constitutional right of access on the broadcast media was that the licensee impermissibly discriminates [412 U.S. 94, 129] by accepting commercial advertisements while refusing editorial advertisements. The court relied on decisions holding that state-supported school newspapers and public transit companies were prohibited by the First Amendment from excluding controversial editorial advertisements in favor of commercial advertisements. 23 The court also attempted to analogize this case to some of our decisions holding that States may not constitutionally ban certain protected speech while at the same time permitting other speech in public areas. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). This theme of "invidious discrimination" against protected speech is echoed in the briefs of BEM and DNC to this Court. Respondents also rely on our recent decisions in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), and Police Dept, of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where we held unconstitutional city ordinances that permitted "peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute," id., at 93, but prohibited demonstrations for any other purposes on the streets and sidewalks within 150 feet of the school. </s> Those decisions provide little guidance, however, in resolving the question whether the First Amendment requires the Commission to mandate a private right of access to the broadcast media. In none of those cases did the forum sought for expression have an affirmative and independent statutory obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues, such as Congress has imposed on [412 U.S. 94, 130] all broadcast licensees. In short, there is no "discrimination" against controversial speech present in this case. The question here is not whether there is to be discussion of controversial issues of public importance on the broadcast media, but rather who shall determine what issues are to be discussed by whom, and when. </s> The opinion of the Court of Appeals asserted that the Fairness Doctrine, insofar as it allows broadcasters to exercise certain journalistic judgments over the discussion of public issues, is inadequate to meet the public's interest in being informed. The present system, the court held, "conforms . . . to a paternalistic structure in which licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues are `important,' and how `fully' to cover them, and the format, time and style of the coverage." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 195, 450 F.2d, at 656. The forced sale of advertising time for editorial spot announcements would, according to the Court of Appeals majority, remedy this deficiency. That conclusion was premised on the notion that advertising time, as opposed to programming time, involves a "special and separate mode of expression" because advertising content, unlike programming content, is generally prepared and edited by the advertiser. Thus, that court concluded, a broadcaster's policy against using advertising time for editorial messages "may well ignore opportunities to enliven and enrich the public's overall information." Id., at 197, 450 F.2d, at 658. The Court of Appeals' holding would serve to transfer a large share of responsibility for balanced broadcasting from an identifiable, regulated entity - the licensee - to unregulated speakers who could afford the cost. </s> We reject the suggestion that the Fairness Doctrine permits broadcasters to preside over a "paternalistic" regime. See Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 390 . That doctrine admittedly has not always brought to the public perfect or, indeed, even consistently high-quality treatment of all [412 U.S. 94, 131] public events and issues; but the remedy does not lie in diluting licensee responsibility. The Commission stressed that, while the licensee has discretion in fulfilling its obligations under the Fairness Doctrine, it is required to "present representative community views and voices on controversial issues which are of importance to [its] listeners," and it is prohibited from "excluding partisan voices and always itself presenting views in a bland, inoffensive manner . . . ." 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222. A broadcaster neglects that obligation only at the risk of losing his license. </s> Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission - or the broadcasters - may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable. Indeed, the Commission noted in these proceedings that the advent of cable television will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues. In its proposed rules on cable television the Commission has provided that cable systems in major television markets </s> "shall maintain at least one specially designated, noncommercial public access channel available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis. The system shall maintain and have available for public use at least the minimal equipment and facilities necessary for the production of programming for such a channel." 37 Fed Reg. 3289, 76.251 (a) (4). </s> For the present, the Commission is conducting a wideranging study into the effectiveness of the Fairness Doctrine to see what needs to be done to improve the coverage and presentation of public issues on the broadcast media. Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 30 F. C. C. 2d 26, 36 Fed. Reg. 11825. Among other things, the study will attempt to determine whether "there is any feasible method of providing access for discussion of public issues [412 U.S. 94, 132] outside the requirements of the fairness doctrine." 30 F. C. C. 2d, at 33. The Commission made it clear, however, that it does not intend to discard the Fairness Doctrine or to require broadcasters to accept all private demands for air time. 24 The Commission's inquiry on this score was announced prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case and hearings are under way. </s> The problems perceived by the Court of Appeals majority are by no means new; as we have seen, the history of the Communications Act and the activities of the Commission over a period of 40 years reflect a continuing search for means to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amendment rights of the public and the licensees. The Commission's pending hearings are but one step in this continuing process. At the very least, courts should not freeze this necessarily dynamic process into a constitutional holding. See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 392 U.S. 571, 590 -593 (1968). </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Commission's rulings against BEM's Fairness Doctrine complaint and in favor of DNC's claim that political parties should be permitted to purchase air time for solicitation of funds were not appealed to the Court of Appeals and are not before us here. </s> [Footnote 2 Congressman Davis, for example, stated on the floor of the House the view that Congress found unacceptable: "I do not think any member of the committee will deny that it is absolutely inevitable that we are going to have to regulate the radio public utilities just as we regulate other public utilities. We are going to have to regulate the rates and the service, and to force them to give equal service and equal treatment to all." 67 Cong. Rec. 5483 (1926). See also id., at 5484. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 315 (a) now reads: "If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any - "(1) bona fide newscast, "(2) bona fide news interview, "(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), or "(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), "shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 47 U.S.C. 315 (a). </s> [Footnote 4 The Senate passed a provision stating that: "[I]f any licensee shall permit any person to use a broadcasting station in support of or in opposition to any candidate for public office, or in the presentation of views on a public question to be voted upon at an election, he shall afford equal opportunity to an equal number of other persons to use such station in support of an opposing candidate for such public office, or to reply to a person who has used such broadcasting station in support of or in opposition to a candidate, or for the presentation of opposite views on such public questions." See Hearings on S. 2910 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1934) (emphasis added). The provision for discussion of public issues was deleted by the House-Senate Conference. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1918 on S. 3285, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 49. Also noteworthy are two bills offered in 1934 that would have restricted the control of broadcasters over the discussion of certain issues. Congressman McFadden proposed a bill that would have forbidden broadcasters to discriminate against programs sponsored by religious, charitable, or educational associations. H. R. 7986, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. The bill was not reported out of committee. And, during the debates on the 1934 Act, Senators Wagner and Hatfield offered an amendment that would have ordered the Commission to "reserve and allocate only to educational, religious, agricultural, labor, cooperative, and similar non-profit-making associations one-fourth of all the radio broadcasting facilities within its jurisdiction." 78 Cong. Rec. 8828. Senator Dill explained why the Committee had rejected the proposed amendment, indicating that the practical difficulties and the dangers of censorship were crucial: "MR. DILL. . . . If we should provide that 25 percent of time shall be allocated to nonprofit organizations, someone would have to determine - Congress or somebody else - how much of the 25 percent should go to education, how much of it to religion, and how much of it to agriculture, how much of it to labor, how much of it to fraternal organizations, and so forth. When we enter this [412 U.S. 94, 109] field we must determine how much to give to the Catholics probably and how much to the Protestants and how much to the Jews." 78 Cong. Rec. 8843. Senator Dill went on to say that the problem of determining the proper allocation of time for discussion of these subjects should be worked out by the Commission. Id., at 8844. The Senate rejected the amendment. Id., at 8846. </s> [Footnote 5 Section 3 (h) provides as follows: "`Common carrier' or `carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 48 Stat. 1066, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 153 (h). </s> [Footnote 6 48 Stat. 1083, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 307. </s> [Footnote 7 Section 303, 48 Stat. 1082, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 303, provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall - . . . . . "(b) Prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed stations and each station within any class; . . . . . "(r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter . . . ." </s> [Footnote 8 In 1959, Congress amended 315 of the Act to give statutory approval to the Fairness Doctrine. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 1, 73 Stat. 557, 47 U.S.C. 315 (a). For a summary of the development and nature of the Fairness Doctrine, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 -386 (1969). </s> [Footnote 9 See Madalyn Murray, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 263 (1965). Factors that the broadcaster must take into account in exercising his discretion include the following: "In determining whether to honor specific requests for time, the station will inevitably be confronted with such questions as whether the subject is worth considering, whether the viewpoint of the requesting party has already received a sufficient amount of broadcast time, or whether there may not be other available groups or individuals who might be more appropriate spokesmen for the particular point of view than the person [or group] making the request." Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246, 1251-1252 (1949). </s> [Footnote 10 The Commission has also adopted various component regulations under the Fairness Doctrine, the most notable of which are the "personal attack" and "political editorializing" rules which we upheld in Red Lion. The "personal attack" rule provides that "[w]hen, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person," the licensee must notify the person attacked and give him an opportunity to respond. E. g., 47 CFR 73.123. Similarly, the "political editorializing" rule provides that, when a licensee endorses a political candidate in an editorial, he must give other candidates or their spokesmen an opportunity to respond. E. g., id., 73.123. The Commission, of course, has taken other steps beyond the Fairness Doctrine to expand the diversity of expression on radio and television. The chain broadcasting and multiple ownership rules are established examples. E. g., id., 73.131, 73.240. More recently, the Commission promulgated rules limiting television network syndication practices and reserving 25% of prime time for non-network programs. Id., 73.658 (j), (k). </s> [Footnote 11 The Court of Appeals, respondents, and the dissent in this case have relied on dictum in United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515 (1945), as illustrating Commission approval of a private right to purchase air time for the discussion of controversial issues. In that case the complaint alleged, not only that the station had a policy of refusing to sell time for the discussion of public issues, but also that the station had applied its policy in a discriminatory manner, a factor not shown in the cases presently before us. Furthermore, the decision was handed down four years before the Commission had fully developed and articulated the Fairness Doctrine. See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949). Thus, even if the decision is read without reference to the allegation of discrimination, it stands as merely an isolated statement, made during the period in which the Commission was still working out the problems associated with the discussion of public issues; the dictum has not been followed since and has been modified by the Fairness Doctrine. </s> [Footnote 12 In 1959, as noted earlier, Congress amended 315 (a) of the Act to give statutory approval to the Commission's Fairness Doctrine. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 1, 73 Stat. 557, 47 U.S.C. 315 (a). Very recently, Congress amended 312 (a) of the 1934 Act to authorize the Commission to revoke a station license "for willful [412 U.S. 94, 114] or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." Campaign Communications Reform Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 4. This amendment essentially codified the Commission's prior interpretation of 315 (a) as requiring broadcasters to make time available to political candidates. Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 534 (1959). See FCC Memorandum on Second Sentence of Section 315 (a), in Political Broadcasts - Equal Time, Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. J. Res. 247, pp. 84-90. </s> [Footnote 13 See, e. g., H. R. 3595, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). A more recent proposal was offered by Senator Fulbright. His bill would have amended 315 of the Act to provide: "(d) Licensees shall provide a reasonable amount of public service time to authorized representatives of the Senate of the United States, and the House of Representatives of the United States, to present the views of the Senate and the House of Representatives on issues of public importance. The public service time required to be provided under this subsection shall be made available to each such authorized representative at least, but not limited to, four times during each calendar year." S. J. Res. 209, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). </s> [Footnote 14 The dissent offers the same analysis as the Court of Appeals. As one distinguished commentator has recognized, this line of reasoning "stretch[es] the concept of state action very far." Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 784 (1972). The notion that broadcasters are engaged in "governmental action" because they are licensed to utilize the "public" frequencies and because they are regulated is superficially appealing but, as Professor Jaffe observes, "not entirely satisfactory." Id., at 783. </s> [Footnote 15 The dissenting view would appear to "want to have it both ways" on the question of Government control of the broadcast media. In finding governmental action, the dissent stresses what is [412 U.S. 94, 117] perceived as an "elaborate statutory scheme governing virtually all aspects of the broadcast industry." "Indeed," the dissent suggests, "federal agency review and guidance of broadcaster conduct is automatic, continuing, and pervasive." Post, at 176-177. Yet later in the dissent, when discussing the constitutional need for a right of access, the dissent objects to the substantial independence afforded broadcasters in covering issues of public importance. Thus, it is said that "broadcasters retain almost exclusive control over the selection of issues and viewpoints to be covered, the manner of presentation and, perhaps most important, who shall speak." Post, at 187. </s> [Footnote 16 See 25 F. C. C. 2d 216, 230, 234-235 (Johnson, dissenting). </s> [Footnote 17 To overcome this inconsistency it has been suggested that a "submarket rate system" be established for those unable to afford the normal cost for air time. See Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 695-696 (1972). That proposal has been criticized, we think justifiably, as raising "incredible administrative problems." Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 789 (1972). </s> [Footnote 18 See n. 8, supra. </s> [Footnote 19 See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C., at 1251-1252. </s> [Footnote 20 See Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 697 (1973). </s> [Footnote 21 DNC has urged in this Court that we at least recognize a right of our national parties to purchase air time for the purpose of discussing public issues. We see no principled means under the First Amendment of favoring access by organized political parties over other groups and individuals. </s> [Footnote 22 Reprinted in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on Radio Control, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1926). </s> [Footnote 23 Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (WD Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (CA7 1971): Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (SDNY 1969); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (SDNY 1967); Hillside Community Church, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 76 Wash. 2d 63, 455 P.2d 350 (1969); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982 (1967). </s> [Footnote 24 Subsequent to the announcement of the Court of Appeals' decision, the Commission expanded the scope of the inquiry to comply with the Court of Appeals' mandate. Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33 F. C. C. 2d 554, 37 Fed. Reg. 3383. After we granted certiorari and stayed the mandate of the Court of Appeals, the Commission withdrew that notice of an expanded inquiry and continued its study as originally planned. Order and Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket 19260, 33 F. C. C. 2d 798, 37 Fed. Reg. 4980. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. </s> While I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, and the opinion in Part III, my views closely approach those expressed by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurring in the judgment. [412 U.S. 94, 133] </s> The First Amendment prohibits the Government from imposing controls upon the press. 1 Private broadcasters are surely part of the press. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 . Yet here the Court of Appeals held, and the dissenters today agree, that the First Amendment requires the Government to impose controls upon private broadcasters - in order to preserve First Amendment "values." The appellate court accomplished this strange convolution by the simple device of holding that private broadcasters are Government. This is a step along a path that could eventually lead to the proposition that private newspapers "are" Government. Freedom of the press would then be gone. In its place we would have such governmental controls upon the press as a majority of this Court at any particular moment might consider First Amendment "values" to require. It is a frightening specter. </s> I </s> There is some first-blush appeal in seeking out analogies from areas of the law where governmental involvement on the part of otherwise private parties has led the Court to hold that certain activities of those parties were tantamount to governmental action. 2 The evolution of the "state action" concept under the Fourteenth Amendment is one available analogy. 3 Another is the decision of this [412 U.S. 94, 134] Court in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 , where a policy of a privately owned but publicly regulated bus company that had been approved by the regulatory commission was held to activate First Amendment review. The First Amendment has also been held applicable where private parties control essentially public forums. Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 , Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 ; cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 . </s> The problem before us, however, is too complex to admit of solution by simply analogizing to cases in very different areas. For we deal here with the electronic press, that is itself protected from Government by the First Amendment. 4 Before woodenly accepting analogies from cases dealing with quasi-public racial discrimination, regulated industries other than the press, or "company towns," we must look more closely at the structure of broadcasting and the limits of governmental regulation of licensees. </s> When Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, and followed it with the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., it was responding to a then-evident need to regulate access to the public airwaves. Not every member of the public could broadcast over the air as he chose, since the scarcity [412 U.S. 94, 135] of frequencies made this a sure road to chaos. 5 The system selected by the Congress was a hybrid. The Federal Radio Commission (succeeded by the Federal Communications Commission), was to license broadcasters for no more than three-year periods. 47 U.S.C. 307 (d). The licensees, though subject to some public regulation, were to be private companies. </s> Scarcity meant more than a need to limit access. Because access was to be limited, it was thought necessary for the regulatory apparatus to take into account the public interest in obtaining "the best practicable service to the community reached by his [the licensee's] broadcasts." FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 . Public regulation has not, then, been merely a matter of electromagnetic engineering for the sake of keeping signals clear. It has also included some regulation of programming. Writing in defense of Commission regulations regarding chain broadcasting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "These provisions [of the Act], individually and in the aggregate, preclude the notion that the Commission is empowered to deal only with technical and engineering impediments to the `larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.'" National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 . </s> Over time, federal regulation of broadcasting in the public interest has been extensive, and, pro tanto, has rightly or wrongly been held to be tolerable under the First Amendment. We now have the Fairness Doctrine, with its personal-attack, editorial-reply, and fair-coverage-of-controversial-issue requirements. 6 In Red Lion Broadcasting [412 U.S. 94, 136] Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 , this Doctrine was held to constitute permissible governmental regulation of broadcasters, despite the First Amendment. The Court said: </s> "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> ". . . Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id., at 388, 390. </s> The Fairness Doctrine has been held applicable to paid advertising as well as to other programming, Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 405 F.2d 1082. And the public interest in broadcasting has been recognized as a rationale for liberalized standing on the part of listener [412 U.S. 94, 137] groups in Commission licensing proceedings. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328. 359 F.2d 994. </s> Throughout this long history of regulation, however, it has been recognized that broadcasters retain important freedoms, and that the Commission's regulatory power has limits. Quite apart from what may be required by the First Amendment itself, the regulatory legislation makes clear what some of these freedoms are. Section 3 (h) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 153 (h), provides that broadcasters are not to be treated as common carriers. Were broadcasters common carriers within the meaning of the Act, they would be subject to 47 U.S.C. 201, 202. Section 201 provides, in pertinent part, that: </s> "(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request therefore . . . ." </s> Section 202 provides that: </s> "(a) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage." </s> The Act also specifically gives licensees "freedom of speech": </s> "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals [412 U.S. 94, 138] transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 47 U.S.C. 326. </s> Thus, when examined as a whole, the Federal Communications Act establishes a system of privately owned broadcast licensees. These licensees, though regulated by the Commission under a fairly broad "public interest" standard, have, quite apart from whatever additional protections the First Amendment may provide, important statutory freedoms in conducting their programming. </s> In Red Lion, supra, this Court held that, despite the First Amendment, the Commission may impose a so-called Fairness Doctrine upon broadcasters, requiring them to present balanced coverage of various and conflicting views on issues of public importance. I agreed with the Court in Red Lion, although with considerable doubt, because I thought that that much Government regulation of program content was within the outer limits of First Amendment tolerability. Were the Commission to require broadcasters to accept some amount of editorial advertising as part of the public interest mandate upon which their licenses are conditional, the issue before us would be in the same posture as was the Fairness Doctrine itself in Red Lion, and we would have to determine whether this additional governmental control of broadcasters was consistent with the statute and tolerable under the First Amendment. Here, however, the Commission imposed no such requirement, but left private broadcasters free to accept or reject such advertising as they saw fit. The Court of Appeals held that the First Amendment compels the Commission to require broadcasters to accept such advertising, because it equated broadcaster action with governmental action. [412 U.S. 94, 139] This holding not only raises a serious statutory question under 3 (h) of the Act, which provides that broadcasters are not common carriers, but seems to me to reflect an extraordinarily odd view of the First Amendment. </s> The dissenting opinion today argues, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, that only a limited right of access is sought by the respondents and required by the First Amendment, and that such a limited right would not turn broadcasters into common carriers. The respondents argue, somewhat differently, that the Constitution requires that only "responsible" individuals and groups be given the right to purchase advertising. These positions are said to be arrived at by somehow balancing "competing First Amendment values." But if private broadcasters are Government, how can the First Amendment give only a limited right to those who would speak? Since when has the First Amendment given Government the right to silence all speakers it does not consider "responsible?" </s> The First Amendment protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government. 7 To hold that broadcaster action is governmental action would thus simply strip broadcasters of their own First Amendment rights. They would be obligated to grant the demands of all citizens to be heard over the air, subject only to reasonable regulations as to "time, place and manner." Cf. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 ; Cox v. Louisiana, [412 U.S. 94, 140] 379 U.S. 536, 554 ; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 . If, as the dissent today would have it, the proper analogy is to public forums 8 - that is, if broadcasters are Government for First Amendment purposes - then broadcasters are inevitably drawn to the position of common carriers. For this is precisely the status of Government with respect to public forums - a status mandated by the First Amendment. 9 </s> To hold that broadcaster action is governmental action would thus produce a result wholly inimical to the broadcasters' own First Amendment rights, and wholly at odds with the broadcasting system established by Congress and with our many decisions 10 approving those legislative [412 U.S. 94, 141] provisions. 11 As Judge McGowan wrote, dissenting from the judgment of the Court of Appeals in these cases. </s> "This is the system which Congress has, wisely or not, provided as the alternative to public ownership and operation of radio and television communications facilities. This approach has never been thought to be other than within the permissible limits of constitutional choice." 146 U.S. App. D.C. 181, 205, 450 F.2d 642. 666. </s> II </s> Part IV of the Court's opinion, as I understand it, seems primarily to deal with the respondents' statutory argument - that the obligation of broadcasters to operate in the "public interest" supports the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Yet two of my concurring Brethren understand Part IV as a discussion of the First Amendment issue that would exist in these cases were the action of broadcasters to be equated with governmental action. So, according to my Brother BLACKMUN, "the governmental action issue does not affect the outcome of this case." Post, at 148. The Court of Appeals also conflated the constitutional and statutory issues in these cases. It reasoned that whether its decision "is styled as a `First Amendment decision' or as a decision interpreting the fairness and public interest requirements `in light of the First Amendment' matters little." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 188, 450 F.2d. at 649. [412 U.S. 94, 142] </s> I find this reasoning quite wrong and wholly disagree with it, for the simple reason that the First Amendment and the public interest standard of the statute are not coextensive. The two are related in the sense that the Commission could not "in the public interest" place a requirement on broadcasters that constituted a violation of their First Amendment rights. The two are also related in the sense that both foster free speech. But we have held that the Commission can under the statute require broadcasters to do certain things "in the public interest" that the First Amendment would not require if the broadcasters were the Government. For example, the Fairness Doctrine is an aspect of the "public interest" regulation of broadcasters that would not be compelled or even permitted by the First Amendment itself if broadcasters were the Government. 12 </s> If the "public interest" language of the statute were intended to enact the substance of the First Amendment, a discussion of whether broadcaster action is governmental action would indeed be superfluous. For anything that Government could not do because of the First Amendment, the broadcasters could not do under the statute. But this theory proves far too much, since it would make the statutory scheme, with its emphasis on [412 U.S. 94, 143] broadcaster discretion and its proscription on interference with "the right of free speech by means of radio communication." a nullity. Were the Government really operating the electronic press, it would as my Brother DOUGLAS points out, be prevented by the First Amendment from selection of broadcast content and the exercise of editorial judgment. It would not be permitted in the name of "fairness" to deny time to any person or group on the grounds that their views had been heard "enough." Yet broadcasters perform precisely these functions and enjoy precisely these freedoms under the Act. The constitutional and statutory issues in these cases are thus quite different. </s> In evaluating the statutory claims, the starting point must be the "venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong . . . ." Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 381 . </s> Though I have no doubt that the respondents here were attempting to communicate what they considered to be important messages, it does not follow that the Commission erred when it refused to require every broadcaster to communicate those messages. Contrary to what is said in dissent today, it is not the case that a seller of goods is granted instant access to the media, while someone "seeking to discuss war, peace, pollution, or the suffering of the poor is denied this right to speak." Post, at 200. There is no indication that the thousands of broadcasters regulated by the Commission have anything like a uniform policy of turning down "controversial" or "editorial" advertising. In the cases before us, the Business Executives' spot advertisements were rejected by a single radio station. Of the three television networks, only one turned down the Democratic National Committee's request for air time. We are told that many, if not most, broadcasters do accept advertising of [412 U.S. 94, 144] the type at issue here. This variation in broadcaster policy reflects the very kind of diversity and competition that best protects the free flow of ideas under a system of broadcasting predicated on private management. 13 </s> Even though it would be in the public interest for the respondents' advertisements to be heard, it does not follow that the public interest requires every broadcaster to broadcast them. And it certainly does not follow that the public interest would be served by forcing every broadcaster to accept any particular kind of advertising. In the light of these diverse broadcaster policies - and the serious First Amendment problem that a contrary ruling would have presented - there are surely no "compelling indications" that the Commission misunderstood its statutory responsibility. </s> III </s> There is never a paucity of arguments in favor of limiting the freedom of the press. The Court of Appeals concluded that greater Government control of press freedom is acceptable here because of the scarcity of frequencies for broadcasting. But there are many more broadcasting stations than there are daily newspapers. 14 And it [412 U.S. 94, 145] would require no great ingenuity to argue that newspapers too are Government. After all, newspapers get Government mail subsidies and a limited antitrust immunity. 15 The reasoning of the Court of Appeals would then lead to the conclusion that the First Amendment requires that newspapers, too, be compelled to open their pages to all comers. </s> Perhaps I overstate the logic of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Perhaps its "balancing" of First Amendment "values" would require no more than that newspapers be compelled to give "limited" access to dissident voices, and then only if those voices were "responsible." And perhaps it would require that such access be compelled only when there was a single newspaper in a particular community. But it would be a close question for me which of these various alternative results would be more grossly violative of the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press. For that guarantee gives every newspaper the liberty to print what it chooses and reject what it chooses, free from the intrusive editorial thumb of Government. </s> I profoundly trust that no such reasoning as I have attributed to the Court of Appeals will ever be adopted by this Court. And if I have exaggerated, it is only to make clear the dangers that beset us when we lose sight of the First Amendment itself, and march forth in blind pursuit of its "values." </s> Those who wrote our First Amendment put their faith in the proposition that a free press is indispensable to a free society. They believed that "fairness" was far too fragile to be left for a Government bureaucracy to accomplish. [412 U.S. 94, 146] History has many times confirmed the wisdom of their choice. </s> This Court was persuaded in Red Lion to accept the Commission's view that a so-called Fairness Doctrine was required by the unique electronic limitations of broadcasting, at least in the then-existing state of the art. Rightly or wrongly, we there decided that broadcasters' First Amendment rights were "abridgeable." But surely this does not mean that those rights are nonexistent. And even if all else were in equipoise, and the decision of the issue before us were finally to rest upon First Amendment "values" alone, I could not agree with the Court of Appeals. For if those "values" mean anything. they should mean at least this: If we must choose whether editorial decisions are to be made in the free judgment of individual broadcasters, or imposed by bureaucratic fiat, the choice must be for freedom. </s> [Footnote 1 U.S. Const., Amdt. I, provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 See Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 ; Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 ; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 . </s> [Footnote 3 "Conduct that is formally `private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental [412 U.S. 94, 134] character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 . Earlier, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 , the Court held that a privately owned restaurant located within a public parking garage was sufficiently involved with state authority to bring its racially discriminatory actions within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 . The Federal Communications Act also prohibits the Commission from interfering with "the right of free speech by means of radio communication." 47 U.S.C. 326. </s> [Footnote 5 For a history of regulatory legislation regarding broadcasters, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 -386; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 -214. </s> [Footnote 6 The personal-attack and editorial-reply rules appear at 47 CFR 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679. The public issue aspect of the [412 U.S. 94, 136] Fairness Doctrine requires the broadcaster to give adequate coverage to public issues, fairly reflecting divergent views. United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515; New Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258; see generally Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415. This coverage must be provided at the broadcaster's own expense if necessary, Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895, and the duty must be met by providing programming obtained at the licensee's own initiative if it is available from no other source. John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615. </s> [Footnote 7 Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression, cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 -729 (STEWART, J., concurring). As Professor Thomas Emerson has written, "The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect private expression and nothing in the guarantee precludes the government from controlling its own expression or that of its agents." The System of Freedom of Expression 700 (1970). </s> [Footnote 8 "[T]he right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum - whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency." Post, at 193. </s> [Footnote 9 Professor Emerson has recognized the scope of the "access" argument: "The licensee therefore can only be considered as the agent of the government, or trustee of the public, in a process of further allocation. Hence the licensee would have no direct First Amendment rights of his own, except as to his own expression." Supra, n. 7, at 663. Though the licensee would be free to say what it wished during its own broadcasting, whatever that might mean, it seems clear that the licensee would have no special claim to broadcast time and would lose entirely the freedom to program and schedule according to its own judgment, values, and priorities. Cf. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 ; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 . Licensees would be forced to develop a procedurally fair and substantively nondiscriminatory system for controlling access, and in my view this is precisely what Congress intended to avoid through 3 (h) of the Act. </s> [Footnote 10 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 ; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 ; FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 ; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 . </s> [Footnote 11 None of this suggests any disagreement on my part with the evolution of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. I recognize that if Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 , were relevant, the fact that the Commission considered and rejected a challenge to broadcaster policy might be sufficient to constitute "state action." This, in fact, was the basis of the Court's decision in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 . </s> [Footnote 12 The basis for a Fairness Doctrine is statutory, not constitutional. As the Court said in Red Lion: "In light of the fact that the `public interest' in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the public; the fact that the FCC has rested upon that language from its very inception a doctrine that these issues must be discussed, and fairly; and the fact that Congress has acknowledged that the analogous provisions of 315 are not preclusive in this area, and knowingly preserved the FCC's complementary efforts, we think the fairness doctrine and its component personal attack and political editorializing regulations are a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority." 395 U.S., at 385 . </s> [Footnote 13 The Democratic National Committee cited this very lack of uniformity as a reason for seeking a declaratory ruling from the Commission. There was too much diversity, it thought, for it to plan effectively an advertising campaign. In the DNC's request for a declaratory ruling before the Commission, it stated: "In addition to the three national commercial networks, as of April 1, 1970, there were, on the air, 509 commercial VHF television stations, 180 commercial UHF stations, 4,280 standard broadcast stations, and 2,111 commercial FM stations. While several of these stations have common owners, it does not necessarily follow that every station owned by an individual or group would follow the same policies." </s> [Footnote 14 There are 1,792 daily newspapers in the United States, Ayer Directory of Publications VIII (1973). Compare the number of broadcasters, n. 13, supra. </s> [Footnote 15 Newspapers and other periodicals receive a Government subsidy in the form of second-class postage rates, 39 CFR 132. An antitrust immunity is established by the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. </s> I join Parts I, II, and IV of the Court's opinion and its judgment. I do not, however, concur in the Part III opinion. </s> I do not suggest that the conduct of broadcasters must always, or even often, be considered that of a government for the purposes of the First Amendment. But it is at least arguable, and strongly so, that the Communications Act and the policies of the Commission, including the Fairness Doctrine, are here sufficiently implicated to require review of the Commission's orders under the First Amendment. For myself, the heart of the argument is simply stated. The claim in these cases was that the Communications Act and the First Amendment should be interpreted to confer a right of access on those who wished to buy time for editorial advertising and to raise political funds. The Commission rejected both the statutory and constitutional positions. To confer a right [412 U.S. 94, 147] of access, it said, would be contrary to the Communications Act and to the policies adopted by the Commission to implement that Act. Congress intended that the Fairness Doctrine be complied with, but it also intended that broadcasters have wide discretion with respect to the method of compliance. There is no requirement that broadcasters accept editorial ads; they could, instead, provide their own programs, with their own format, opinion and opinion sources. Congress intended that there be no right of access such as claimed in these cases; and, in the Commission's view, to recognize that right would require major revisions in statutory and regulatory policy. The Commission also ruled, contrary to the views of its dissenting member, that rejection of the asserted right of access was wholly consistent with the First Amendment. </s> In this context I am not ready to conclude, as is done in the Part III opinion, that the First Amendment may be put aside for lack of official action necessary to invoke its proscriptions. But, assuming, arguendo, as the Court does in Part IV of its opinion, that Congress or the Commission is sufficiently involved in the denial of access to the broadcasting media to require review under the First Amendment, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Given the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine, and accepting Part IV of the Court's opinion, I have little difficulty in concluding that statutory and regulatory recognition of broadcaster freedom and discretion to make up their own programs and to choose their method of compliance with the Fairness Doctrine is consistent with the First Amendment. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring. </s> In Part IV the Court determines "whether, assuming governmental action, broadcasters are required" to accept [412 U.S. 94, 148] editorial advertisements "by reason of the First Amendment." Ante, at 121. The Court concludes that the Court of Appeals erred when it froze the "continuing search for means to achieve reasonable regulation compatible with the First Amendment rights of the public and the licensees" into "a constitutional holding." Ante, at 132. The Court's conclusion that the First Amendment does not compel the result reached by the Court of Appeals demonstrates that the governmental action issue does not affect the outcome of this case. I therefore refrain from deciding it. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the judgment. </s> While I join the Court in reversing the judgment below, I do so for quite different reasons. </s> My conclusion is that TV and radio stand in the same protected position under the First Amendment as do newspapers and magazines. The philosophy of the First Amendment requires that result, for the fear that Madison and Jefferson had of government intrusion is perhaps even more relevant to TV and radio than it is to newspapers and other like publications. That fear was founded not only on the spectre of a lawless government but of government under the control of a faction that desired to foist its views of the common good on the people. In popular terms that view has been expressed as follows: </s> "The ground rules of our democracy, as it has grown, require a free press, not necessarily a responsible or a temperate one. There aren't any halfway stages. As Aristophanes saw, democracy means that power is generally conferred on second-raters by third-raters, whereupon everyone else, from first-raters to fourth-raters, moves with great glee to try to dislodge them. It's messy but most politicians understand [412 U.S. 94, 149] that it can't very well be otherwise and still be a democracy." Stewart, reviewing Epstein, News From Nowhere: Television and the News (1972), Book World, Washington Post, March 25, 1973, pp. 4-5. </s> I </s> Public broadcasting, of course, raises quite different problems from those tendered by the TV outlets involved in this litigation. </s> Congress has authorized the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, whose Board of Directors is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 47 U.S.C. 396. A total of 223 television and 560 radio stations made up this nationwide public broadcasting system as of June 30, 1972. See 1972 Corporation for Public Broadcasting Annual Report. It is a nonprofit organization and by the terms of 396 (b) is said not to be "an agency or establishment of the United States Government." Yet, since it is a creature of Congress whose management is in the hands of a Board named by the President and approved by the Senate, it is difficult to see why it is not a federal agency engaged in operating a "press" as that word is used in the First Amendment. If these cases involved that Corporation, we would have a situation comparable to that in which the United States owns and manages a prestigious newspaper like the New York Times, Washington Post, or Sacramento Bee. The Government as owner and manager would not, as I see it, be free to pick and choose such news items as it desired. For by the First Amendment it may not censor or enact or enforce any other "law" abridging freedom of the press. Politics, ideological slants, rightist or leftist tendencies could play no part in its design of programs. See Markel, Will It be Public or Private TV?, World, Mar. 13, 1973, p. 57; [412 U.S. 94, 150] Shales, WGBH-TV: An Ultimatum Against "Improper" White House Influence, Washington Post, Apr. 27, 1973, p. E2. More specifically, the programs tendered by the respondents in the present cases could not then be turned down. </s> Governmental action may be evidenced by various forms of supervision or control of private activities. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 . I have expressed the view that the activities of licensees of the government operating in the public domain are governmental actions, so far as constitutional duties and responsibilities are concerned. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 183 -185 (concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281 (concurring); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (dissenting). It is somewhat the same idea expressed by the first Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 . But that view has not been accepted. If a TV or radio licensee were a federal agency, the thesis of my Brother BRENNAN would inexorably follow. For a licensee of the Federal Government would be in precisely the situation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. A licensee, like an agency of the Government, would within limits of its time be bound to disseminate all views. For, being an arm of the Government, it would be unable by reason of the First Amendment to "abridge" some sectors of thought in favor of others. The Court does not, however, decide whether a broadcast licensee is a federal agency within the context of these cases. </s> II </s> If a broadcast licensee is not engaged in governmental action for purposes of the First Amendment, I fail to see how constitutionally we can treat TV and radio differently than we treat newspapers. It would come [412 U.S. 94, 151] as a surprise to the public as well as to publishers and editors of newspapers to be informed that a newly created federal bureau would hereafter provide "guidelines" for newspapers or promulgate rules that would give a federal agency power to ride herd on the publishing business to make sure that fair comment on all current issues was made. In 1970 Congressman Farbstein introduced a bill, 1 never reported out of the Committee, which provided that any newspaper of general circulation published in a city with a population greater than 25,000 and in which only one separately owned newspaper of general circulation is published "shall provide a reasonable opportunity for a balanced presentation of conflicting views on issues of public importance" and giving the Federal Communications Commission power to enforce the requirement. </s> Thomas I. Emerson, our leading First Amendment scholar, has stated that: </s> "[A]ny effort to solve the broader problems of a monopoly press by forcing newspapers to cover all `newsworthy' events and print all viewpoints, under the watchful eyes of petty public officials, is likely to undermine such independence as the press now shows without achieving any real diversity." The System of Freedom of Expression 671 (1970). </s> The sturdy people who fashioned the First Amendment would be shocked at that intrusion of Government into a field which in this Nation has been reserved for individuals, whatever part of the spectrum of opinion they represent. Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founders who was in the newspaper business, wrote in simple and graphic form what I had always assumed was the basic [412 U.S. 94, 152] American newspaper tradition that became implicit in the First Amendment. In our early history one view was that the publisher must open his columns </s> "to any and all controversialists, especially if paid for it. Franklin disagreed, declaring that his newspaper was not a stagecoach, with seats for everyone; he offered to print pamphlets for private distribution, but refused to fill his paper with private altercations." 2 F. Mott, American Journalism 55 (3d ed. 1962). </s> It is said that TV and radio have become so powerful and exert such an influence on the public mind that they must be controlled by Government. 3 Some [412 U.S. 94, 153] newspapers in our history have exerted a powerful - and some have thought - a harmful interest on the public mind. But even Thomas Jefferson, who knew how base and obnoxious the press could be, never dreamed of interfering. For he thought that government control of newspapers would be the greater of two evils. 4 </s> "I deplore . . . the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those who write them. . . . These ordures are rapidly depraving the public taste. </s> "It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." </s> Of course there is private censorship in the newspaper field. But for one publisher who may suppress a fact, there are many who will print it. But if the Government is the censor, administrative fiat, not freedom of choice, carries the day. </s> As stated recently by Harry Kalven, Jr.: </s> "It is an insufficiently noticed aspect of the First Amendment that it contemplates the vigorous use of self-help by the opponents of given doctrines, ideas, and political positions. It is not the theory that all ideas and positions are entitled to flourish under freedom of discussion. It is rather then that they must survive and endure against hostile criticism. There is perhaps a paradox in that the suppression of speech by speech is part and parcel of the principle of freedom of speech. Indeed, one big reason why policy dictates that government keep its hands off communication is that, in this area, self-help of criticism is singularly effective. . . . </s> "Free, robust criticism of government, its officers, and its policy is the essence of the democratic [412 U.S. 94, 154] dialectic - of `the belief,' again to quote Brandeis, `in the power of reason as applied through public discussion.' The government cannot reciprocally criticize the performance of the press, its officers, and its policies without its criticism carrying implications of power and coercion. The government simply cannot be another discussant of the press's performance. Whether it will it or not, it is a critic who carries the threat of the censor and more often than not it wills it. Nor is it at all clear that its voice will be needed; surely there will be others to champion its view of the performance of the press. </s> "The balance struck, then, is avowedly, and even enthusiastically, one-sided. The citizen may criticize the performance and motives of his government. The government may defend its performance and its policies, but it may not criticize the performance and motives of its critics." 6 The Center Magazine, No. 3, pp. 36-37 (May/June 1973). </s> Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 , in a carefully written opinion that was built upon predecessor cases, put TV and radio under a different regime. I did not participate in that decision and, with all respect, would not support it. The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime. It puts the head of the camel inside the tent and enables administration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent ends. In 1973 - as in other years - there is clamoring to make TV and radio emit the messages that console certain groups. There are charges that these mass media are too slanted, too partisan, too hostile in their approach to candidates and the issues. </s> The same cry of protest has gone up against the newspapers and magazines. When Senator Joseph McCarthy [412 U.S. 94, 155] was at his prime, holding in his hand papers containing the names of 205 "Communists" in the State Department (R. Feuerlicht. Joe McCarthy and McCarthyism 54 (1972)), there were scarcely a dozen papers in this Nation that stood firm for the citizen's right to due process and to First Amendment protection. That, however, was no reason to put the saddle of the federal bureaucracy on the backs of publishers. Under our Bill of Rights people are entitled to have extreme ideas, silly ideas, partisan ideas. </s> The same is true, I believe, of TV and radio. At times they have a nauseating mediocrity. At other times they show the dazzling brilliance of a Leonard Bernstein; and they very often bring humanistic influences of faraway people into every home. </s> Both TV and radio news broadcasts frequently tip the news one direction or another and even try to turn a public figure into a character of disrepute. Yet so do the newspapers and the magazines and other segments of the press. The standards of TV, radio, newspapers, or magazines - whether of excellence or mediocrity - are beyond the reach of Government. Government - acting through courts - disciplines lawyers. Government makes criminal some acts of doctors and of engineers. But the First Amendment puts beyond the reach of Government federal regulation of news agencies save only business or financial practices which do not involve First Amendment rights. Conspicuous is Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 , where enforcement of the antitrust laws against a news-gathering agency was held to be not inconsistent with First Amendment rights. </s> Government has no business in collating, dispensing, and enforcing, subtly or otherwise, any set of ideas on the press. Beliefs, proposals for change, clamor for controls, protests against any governmental regime are protected [412 U.S. 94, 156] by the First Amendment against governmental ban or control. </s> There has been debate over the meaning of the First Amendment as applied to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Some have thought that at the state level the First Amendment was somewhat "watered down" and did not have the full vigor which it had as applied to the Federal Government. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 -503 (Harlan, J., concurring). So far, that has been the minority view. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 . But it is quite irrelevant here, for the First Amendment, like other parts of the Bill of Rights, was at the outset applicable only to the Federal Government. 5 The First Amendment is written in terms that are absolute. Its command is that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." </s> That guarantee, can, of course, be changed by a constitutional amendment which can make all the press or segments of the press organs of Government and thus control the news and information which people receive. Such a restructuring of the First Amendment cannot be done by judicial fiat or by congressional action. The ban of "no" law that abridges freedom of the press is in my view total and complete. 6 The Alien and Sedition Acts, 1 Stat. 566, 570, 596, passed early in our history were [412 U.S. 94, 157] plainly unconstitutional, as Jefferson believed. Jefferson, indeed, said that by reason of the First Amendment </s> "libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the act of the Congress of the United States, passed on the 14th of July, 1798, entitled `An Act in Addition to the Act entitled "An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States,"' which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void, and of no force." 4 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 541 (1876). </s> And see 15 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 214 (Memorial ed. 1904); 14 id., at 116; 11 id., at 43-44. </s> Those Acts had but a short life, and we never returned to them. We have, however, witnessed a slow encroachment by Government over that segment of the press that is represented by TV and radio licensees. Licensing is necessary for engineering reasons; the spectrum is limited and wavelengths must be assigned to avoid stations interfering 7 with each other. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 388 . The Commission has a duty to encourage a multitude of voices but only in [412 U.S. 94, 158] a limited way, viz., by preventing monopolistic practices and by promoting technological developments that will open up new channels. 8 But censorship 9 or editing or the screening by Government of what licensees may broadcast goes against the grain of the First Amendment. </s> The Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 , said, "Unlike other modes of [412 U.S. 94, 159] expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation." </s> That uniqueness is due to engineering and technical problems. But the press in a realistic sense is likewise not available to all. Small or "underground" papers appear and disappear; and the weekly is an established institution. But the daily papers now established are unique in the sense that it would be virtually impossible for a competitor to enter the field due to the financial exigencies of this era. The result is that in practical terms the newspapers and magazines, like TV and radio, are available only to a select few. Who at this time would have the folly to think he could combat the New York Times or Denver Post by building a new plant and becoming a competitor? That may argue for a redefinition of the responsibilities of the press in First Amendment terms. 10 But I do not think it gives us [412 U.S. 94, 160] carte blanche to design systems of supervision and control or empower Congress to read the mandate in the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press" to mean that Congress may, acting directly or through any of its agencies such as the FCC make "some" laws "abridging" freedom of the press. </s> Powerful arguments, summarized and appraised in T. Emerson. The System of Freedom of Expression, cc. XVII and XVIII (1970), can be made for revamping or reconditioning the system. The present one may be largely aligned on the side of the status quo. The problem implicates our educational efforts which are bland and conformist and the pressures on the press, from political and from financial sources, to foist boilerplate points of view on our people rather than to display the diversities of ideologies and culture in a world which, as Buckminster Fuller said, has been "communized" by the radio. </s> What kind of First Amendment would best serve our needs as we approach the 21st century may be an open question. But the old-fashioned First Amendment that we have is the Court's only guideline; and one hard and fast principle which it announces is that Government [412 U.S. 94, 161] shall keep its hands off the press. That principle has served us through days of calm and eras of strife and I would abide by it until a new First Amendment is adopted. That means, as I view it, that TV and radio, as well as the more conventional methods for disseminating news, are all included in the concept of "press" as used in the First Amendment and therefore are entitled to live under the laissez-faire regime which the First Amendment sanctions. </s> The issues presented in these cases are momentous ones. TV and radio broadcasters have mined millions by selling merchandise, not in selling ideas across the broad spectrum of the First Amendment. But some newspapers have done precisely the same, loading their pages with advertisements; they publish, not discussions of critical issues confronting our society, but stories about murders, scandal, and slanderous matter touching the lives of public servants who have no recourse due to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 . Commissioner Johnson of the FCC wrote in the present case a powerful dissent. He said: </s> "Although the First Amendment would clearly ban governmental censorship of speech content, government must be concerned about the procedural rules that control the public forums for discussion. If someone - a moderator, or radio-television licensee - applies rules that give one speaker, or viewpoint, less time (or none at all) to present a position, then a censorship exists as invidious as outright thought control. There is little doubt in my mind that for any given forum of speech the First Amendment demands rules permitting as many to speak and be heard as possible. And if this Commission does not enact them, then the courts must require them." 25 F. C. C. 2d 216, 232. [412 U.S. 94, 162] </s> But the prospect of putting Government in a position of control over publishers is to me an appalling one, even to the extent of the Fairness Doctrine. The struggle for liberty has been a struggle against Government. The essential scheme of our Constitution and Bill of Rights was to take Government off the backs of people. Separation of powers was one device. An independent judiciary was another device. The Bill of Rights was still another. And it is anathema to the First Amendment to allow Government any role of censorship over newspapers, magazines, books, art, music, TV, radio, or any other aspect of the press. There is unhappiness in some circles at the impotence of Government. But if there is to be a change, let it come by constitutional amendment. The Commission has an important role to play in curbing monopolistic practices, in keeping channels free from interference, in opening up new channels as technology develops. But it has no power of censorship. </s> It is said, of course, that Government can control the broadcasters because their channels are in the public domain in the sense that they use the airspace that is the common heritage of all the people. But parks are also in the public domain. Yet people who speak there do not come under Government censorship. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 -453; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 -516. It is the tradition of Hyde Park, not the tradition of the censor, that is reflected in the First Amendment. TV and radio broadcasters are a vital part of the press; and since the First Amendment allows no Government control over it. I would leave this segment of the press to its devices. </s> Licenses are, of course, restricted in time and while, in my view, Congress has the power to make each license limited to a fixed term and nonreviewable, there is no power to deny renewals for editorial or ideological reasons. [412 U.S. 94, 163] The reason is that the First Amendment gives no preference to one school of thought over others. 11 </s> The Court in today's decision by endorsing the Fairness Doctrine sanctions a federal saddle on broadcast licensees that is agreeable to the traditions of nations that never have known freedom of press 12 and that is tolerable in countries that do not have a written constitution containing prohibitions as absolute as those in the First Amendment. Indeed after these cases were argued the FCC instituted a "non-public" inquiry 13 to [412 U.S. 94, 164] determine whether any broadcaster or cablecaster has broadcast "`obscene, indecent or profane language' in violation of" 18 U.S.C. 1464. </s> In April 1973, the FCC fined Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., which operates station WGLD in Oak Park, Illinois, for allowing "obscene" conversations on a telephone "talk show." It used Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 , and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , as supplying the criteria for broadcasting. It fined the corporation $2,000 under 18 U.S.C. 1464, which reads, "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." </s> Commissioner Johnson dissented, saying that the FCC prefers "to sit as an omniscient programming review board, allegedly capable of deciding what is and is not good for the American public to see and hear"; and that when the FCC bars a particular program it casts "a pall over the entire broadcasting industry" for the reason that the licensees "fear the potential loss of their highly profitable broadcast licenses." That, he concluded, creates a "chilling effect" which has "enormous proportions" and reaches "all forms of broadcast expression." </s> We ourselves have, of course, made great inroads on the First Amendment of which obscenity is only one of the many examples. So perhaps we are inching slowly toward a controlled press. But the regime of federal supervision under the Fairness Doctrine is contrary to our constitutional mandate and makes the broadcast licensee an easy victim of political pressures and reduces him to a timid and submissive segment of the press whose measure of the public interest will now be echoes of the dominant political voice that emerges after every election. The affair with freedom of which we have been [412 U.S. 94, 165] proud will now bear only a faint likeness of our former robust days. </s> III </s> I said that it would come as a surprise to the public as well as to publishers and editors of newspapers to learn that they were under a newly created federal bureau. Perhaps I should have said that such an event should come as a surprise. In fact it might not in view of the retrogressive steps we have witnessed. </s> We have allowed ominous inroads to be made on the historic freedom of the newspapers. The effort to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers failed only by a narrow margin and actually succeeded for a brief spell in imposing prior restraint on our press for the first time in our history. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 . </s> In recent years the admonition of Mr. Justice Black that the First Amendment gave the press freedom so that it might "serve the governed, not the governors" (id., at 717) has been disregarded. </s> "The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell." Ibid. </s> The right of the people to know has been greatly undermined by our decisions requiring, under pain of contempt, a reporter to disclose the sources of the information he comes across in investigative reporting. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 . [412 U.S. 94, 166] </s> The Boston Globe reports: 14 </s> "In the last two years at least 20 Federal Grand Juries have been used to investigate radical or antiwar dissent. With the power of subpoena, the proceedings secret, and not bound by the rules of evidence required in open court, they have a lot more leverage than, for example, the old House Un-American Activities Committee." </s> Many reporters have been put in jail, a powerful weapon against investigative reporting. As the Boston Globe states, "in reality what is being undermined here is press freedom itself." 15 </s> In the same direction is the easy use of the stamp "secret" or "top secret" which the Court recently approved in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 . That decision makes a shambles of the Freedom of Information Act. In tune with the other restraints on the press are provisions of the new proposed Rules of Evidence which the Court recently sent to Congress. Proposed Rule 509 (b) provides: </s> "The government has a privilege to refuse to give evidence and to prevent any person from giving evidence upon a showing of reasonable likelihood of danger that the evidence will disclose a secret of state or official information, as defined in this rule." </s> Under the statute if Congress does not act, 16 this new regime of secrecy will be imposed on the Nation and the [412 U.S. 94, 167] right of people to know will be further curtailed. The proposed code sedulously protects the Government; it does not protect newsmen. It indeed pointedly omits any mention of the privilege of newsmen to protect their confidential sources. </s> These growing restraints on newspapers have the same ominous message that the overtones of the present opinion have on TV and radio licensees. </s> The growing specter of governmental control and surveillance over all activities of people makes ominous the threat to liberty by those who hold the executive power. Over and over again, attempts have been made to use the Commission as a political weapon against the opposition, whether to the left or to the right. </s> Experience has shown that unrestrained power cannot be trusted to serve the public weal even though it be in governmental hands. The fate of the First Amendment should not be so jeopardized. 17 The constitutional mandate that the Government shall make "no law" abridging freedom of speech and the press is clear; the orders and rulings of the Commission are covered by that ban; and it must be carefully confined lest broadcasting - now our most powerful media - be used to subdue the minorities or help produce a Nation of people who walk submissively to the executive's notions of the public good. [412 U.S. 94, 168] </s> Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 , involved a prosecution of a newspaper editor for publishing, contrary to a state statute, an editorial on election day urging the voters to vote against the existing city commission and to replace it with a mayor-council government. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, reversed the judgment saying: </s> "[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publishing editorials such as the one here silences the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press." Id., at 219. </s> I would apply the same test to TV or radio. 18 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 169] </s> What Walter Lippman wrote about President Coolidge's criticism of the press has present relevancy. Coolidge, he said, had </s> "`declared for peace, good-will, understanding moderation; disapproved of conquest, aggression, exploitation; pleaded for a patriotic press, for a free press; denounced a narrow and bigoted nationalism, and announced that he stood for law, order, protection of life, property, respect for sovereignty and principle of international law. Mr. Coolidge's catalog of the virtues was complete except for one virtue. . . . That is the humble realization that God has not endowed Calvin Coolidge with an infallible power to determine in each concrete case exactly what is right, what is just, what is patriotic. . . . Did he recognize this possibility he would not continue to lecture the press in such a way as to make it appear that when newspapers oppose him they are unpatriotic, and that when they support him they do so not because they think his case is good but because they blindly support him. Mr. Coolidge's notion . . . would if it were accepted by the American press reduce it to utter triviality.'" J. Luskin, Lippman, Liberty, and the Press 60 (1972). [412 U.S. 94, 170] </s> The same political appetite for oversight of most segments of the press has markedly increased since the bland days of Calvin Coolidge. </s> [Footnote 1 H. R. 18927, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. </s> [Footnote 2 Congress provided in 47 U.S.C. 153 (h) that "a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." </s> [Footnote 3 "To say that the media have great decisionmaking powers without defined legal responsibilities or any formal duties of public accountability is both to overestimate their power and to put forth a meaningless formula for reform. How shall we make the New York Times `accountable' for its anti-Vietnam policy? Require it to print letters to the editor in support of the war? If the situation is as grave as stated, the remedy is fantastically inadequate. But the situation is not that grave. The New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, NBC, ABC, and CBS play a role in policy formation, but clearly they were not alone responsible, for example, for Johnson's decision not to run for re-election, Nixon's refusal to withdraw the troops from Vietnam, the rejection of the two billion dollar New York bond issue, the defeat of Carswell and Haynsworth, or the Supreme Court's segregation, reapportionment and prayer decisions. The implication that the people of this country - except the proponents of the theory - are mere unthinking automatons manipulated by the media, without interests, conflicts, or prejudices is an assumption which I find quite maddening. The development of constitutional doctrine should not be based on such hysterical overestimation of media power and underestimation of the good sense of the American public." Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 786-787 (1972). </s> [Footnote 4 T. Jefferson, Democracy 150-151 (Padover ed. 1939). </s> [Footnote 5 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243. </s> [Footnote 6 The press in this country, like that of Britain, was at one time subject to contempt for its comments on pending litigation. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 . But that position was changed. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 267 . Federal habeas corpus, however, is available to give a man his freedom and the prosecution an opportunity for a new trial where the conduct of the press has resulted in an unfair trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 . And change of venue may be had where the local atmosphere has saturated the community with prejudice. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 . </s> [Footnote 7 The Senate Report which accompanied the bill that became the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 stated: "If the channels of radio transmission were unlimited in number the importance of the regulatory body would be greatly lessened, but these channels are limited and restricted in number and the decision as to who shall be permitted to use them and on what terms and for what periods of time, together with the other questions connected with the situation, requires the exercise of a high order of discretion and the most careful application of the principles of equitable treatment to all the classes and interests affected. For these and other reasons your committee decided that all power to regulate radio communication should be centered in one independent body, a radio commission, granting it full and complete authority over the entire subject of radio." S. Rep. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 3. </s> [Footnote 8 Scarcity may soon be a constraint of the past, thus obviating the concerns expressed in Red Lion. It has been predicted that it may be possible within 10 years to provide television viewers 400 channels through the advances of cable television. R. Smith, The Wired Nation 7 (1972); see Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 153 U.S. App. D.C. 305, 362-365, 473 F.2d 16, 73-76 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 9 Currently, press censorship covers most of the globe. In Brazil the present regime of censorship is pervasive. As reported in the New York Times for Feb. 17, 1973, p. 11: "The censors' rules, issued a few months ago and constantly amended, cover a vast field and if strictly applied would leave the press little to discuss. In practice, however, much depends on the whims and suspicions of the local censors. "General prohibitions include protests against censorship, any discussion of a successor to President Emilio Garrastazu Medici, whose term is up in 1974, campaigns against the Government's special powers by decree and sensational news that might hurt the image of Brazil. "Others are campaigns to discredit the national housing program, the financial market or other matters of vital importance to the Government, the playing up of assaults on banks or credit establishments, tension between the Roman Catholic Church and the state, agitation in union and student circles, and publicity for Communist personalities and nations. Criticism of state governors and `exaltation of immorality' through news of homosexuality, prostitution and drugs are also barred. "The most controversial order, issued by the Minister of Justice last September, bans all news, comment or interviews on a political relaxation of the regime, on democracy for Brazil, and on the economic and financial situation in general." </s> [Footnote 10 Indeed, it can be argued that the existence of newspapers, and thus their access to the public, is dependent upon the preferential mailing privileges newspapers receive through second-class postage rates. This is a privilege afforded by the Government, and, as my Brother STEWART recognizes, a form of subsidy. Under the Postal Reorganization Act, the new Postal Rate Commission is empowered to fix postage rates at levels high enough to make each class of mail pay its own way. John Fischer reports that the increase in second-class mail rates for magazines and periodicals (127%) is "nothing less than a death sentence for an unpredictable number of publications." The Easy Chair, Harper's Magazine 30, 31 (May 1973). It is not the established giants of the publishing field that will suffer most, for it is estimated that some 10,000 magazines and small newspapers will be forced out of existence. Id., at 30. Fischer mentions specifically the National Review, Human Events, The Nation, and The New Republic. These are the publications that offer us the rich diversity of opinion and [412 U.S. 94, 160] reporting the First Amendment is designed to promote and protect. As Senator MeGee, Chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, has said: "I believe that the American public generally has a vested interest in the survival of newspapers and magazines. Regardless of the economic, political, or social policies which they espouse, they contribute to the nation's thought process. I am personally convinced that the Congress should not permit magazines to go under because the cost of distributing them through the postal system is higher than their readers are willing to pay." Id., at 32. In addition to the benefits of reduced postage rates, newspapers have been afforded a limited antitrust exemption. Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. </s> [Footnote 11 Judge Bazelon, dissenting in Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 153 U.S. App. D.C., at 358-359, 473 F.2d, at 69-70, said: "WXUR was no doubt devoted to a particular religious and political philosophy; but it was also a radio station devoted to speaking out and stirring debate on controversial issues. The station was purchased by Faith Theological Seminary to propagate a viewpoint which was not being heard in the greater Philadelphia area. The record is clear that through its interview and call-in shows it did offer a variety of opinions on a broad range of public issues; and that it never refused to lend its broadcast facilities to spokesmen of conflicting viewpoints. "The Commission's strict rendering of fairness requirements, as developed in its decision, has removed WXUR from the air. This has deprived the listening public not only of a viewpoint but also of robust debate on innumerable controversial issues. It is beyond dispute that the public has lost access to information and ideas. This is not a loss to be taken lightly, however unpopular or disruptive we might judge these ideas to be." (Footnotes omitted.) </s> [Footnote 12 If Eastern European experience since World War II is any criterion, the newspapers are pretty much the company paper in the huge company (Communist) nation. The easiest target, however, seems to be TV where the input can be carefully controlled and "prime time" filled with tapes of official meetings, political speeches, and the tedious accounts of achievement of the workers. See Morgan, Press Obedience in East Europe, Washington Post, May 19, 1973, p. A14. </s> [Footnote 13 FCC Order No. 73-331, 39 Fed. Reg. 8301 (Mar. 27, 1973). </s> [Footnote 14 The People's Need to Know, Editorial Series, Jan. 21-27, 1973, reprinted from Boston Globe, p. 12. </s> [Footnote 15 Id., at 13. </s> [Footnote 16 By reason of an Act of Congress of Mar. 30, 1973, the Rules of Evidence - and amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and to the Rules of Criminal Procedure (which we sent up Nov. 20, 1972, and Dec. 18, 1972) - will have no force or effect except to the extent that Congress expressly approves. 87 Stat. 9. </s> [Footnote 17 Alexander Bickel has spurned the "total agnosticism" that allows the First Amendment to have its way because "who really knows, after all, what is true or false, evil or good, noxious or wholesome." The Press and Government: Adversaries Without Absolutes, Freedom at Issue 5 (May-June 1973). He attributes this view to Mr. Justice Holmes. He would place at least partial responsibility with the Government for determining the "good counsels and wholesome doctrine." Ibid. But, it was precisely the mistrust of the evanescent, narrow, factional views of those in power and the belief that no one has a patent on the "truth" that underlay the First Amendment. </s> [Footnote 18 The monetary and other burdens imposed on the press by the right of a criticized person to reply, like the traditional damage remedy for libel, lead of course to self-censorship respecting matters of importance to the public that the First Amendment denies the Government the power to impose. The burdens certainly are as onerous as the indirect restrictions on First Amendment rights which we have struck down: (1) the requirement that a bookseller examine the contents of his shop, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959): (2) the requirement that a magazine publisher investigate his advertisers, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 492 -493 [412 U.S. 94, 169] (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.); (3) the requirement that names and addresses of sponsors be printed on handbills, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); (4) the requirement that organizations supply membership lists, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); and (5) the requirement that individuals disclose organizational membership, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In each instance we held the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that it discouraged or chilled constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, or association. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs, dissenting. </s> These cases require us to consider whether radio and television broadcast licensees may, with the approval of the Federal Communications Commission, 1 refuse absolutely to sell any part of their advertising time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance. In practical effect, the broadcaster policy here under attack permits airing of only those paid presentations which advertise products or deal with "noncontroversial" matters, while relegating the discussion of controversial public issues to formats such as documentaries, the news, or panel shows, which are tightly controlled and edited by the broadcaster. The Court holds today that this policy - including the absolute ban on the sale of air time for the discussion of controversial issues - is consistent with the "public interest" requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 307 (d), 309 (a). 2 The Court also holds that the [412 U.S. 94, 171] challenged policy does not violate the First Amendment. It is noteworthy that, in reaching this result, the Court does not hold that there is insufficient "governmental involvement" in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged ban to activate the commands of the First Amendment. On the contrary, only THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and my Brothers STEWART and REHNQUIST express the view that the First Amendment is inapplicable to this case. My Brothers WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL quite properly do not decide that question, for they find that the broadcaster policy here under attack does not violate the "substance" of the First Amendment. Similarly, there is no majority for the holding that the challenged ban does not violate the "substance" of the First Amendment. For, although THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and my Brother REHNQUIST purport to "decide" that question, their disposition of the "governmental involvement" issue necessarily renders their subsequent discussion of the "substantive" question mere dictum. [412 U.S. 94, 172] </s> In my view, the principle at stake here is one of fundamental importance, for it concerns the people's right to engage in and to hear vigorous public debate on the broadcast media. And balancing what I perceive to be the competing interests of broadcasters, the listening and viewing public, and individuals seeking to express their views over the electronic media, I can only conclude that the exclusionary policy upheld today can serve only to inhibit, rather than to further, our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). I would therefore affirm the determination of the Court of Appeals that the challenged broadcaster policy is violative of the First Amendment. </s> I </s> The command of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" is, on its face, directed at governmental rather than private action. Nevertheless, our prior decisions make clear that "[c]onduct that is formally `private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon [governmental] action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). Thus, the reach of the First Amendment depends not upon any formalistic "private-public" dichotomy but, rather, upon more functional considerations concerning the extent of governmental involvement in, and public character of, a particular "private" enterprise. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the [Government] in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. [412 U.S. 94, 173] Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). And because of the inherent complexity of this case-by-case inquiry, "[t]his Court has never attempted the `impossible task' of formulating an infallible test" for determining in all instances whether particular conduct must be deemed private or governmental. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); see Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947). </s> This does not mean, of course, that our prior experience in this area offers no guidance for the purposes of our present inquiry. On the contrary, our previous decisions have focused on myriad indicia of "governmental action," many of which are directly applicable to the operations of the broadcast industry. 3 As the Court of Appeals recognized, "the general characteristics of the broadcast industry reveal an extraordinary relationship between the broadcasters and the federal government - a relationship which puts that industry in a class with few others." 146 U.S. App. D.C. 181, 190, 450 F.2d 642, 651. More specifically, the public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally created preferred status of broadcast licensees, the pervasive federal regulation of broadcast programming, and the Commission's specific approval of the challenged broadcaster policy combine in this case to bring the promulgation and enforcement of that policy within the orbit of constitutional imperatives. </s> At the outset, it should be noted that both radio and television broadcasting utilize a natural resource - the electromagnetic spectrum 4 - that is part of the public [412 U.S. 94, 174] domain. And, although broadcasters are granted the temporary use of this valuable resource for terminable three-year periods, "ownership" and ultimate control remain vested in the people of the United States. Thus, 301 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 301, specifically provides: </s> "It is the purpose of this [Act] . . . to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license. . . ." </s> Such public "ownership" of an essential element in the operations of a private enterprise is, of course, an important and established indicium of "governmental involvement." In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, for example, we emphasized the fact of "public ownership" in holding the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to a privately owned restaurant leasing space in a building owned by the State. 5 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 175] In reaching that result, we explained that, in part because of the "public ownership" of the building, the State "has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the" actions of the privately owned restaurant. 365 U.S., at 725 . And, viewing the relationship in its entirety, we concluded that "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . ." Ibid.; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 172-173, 175; Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (SDNY 1967); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (SDNY 1964). </s> A second indicium of "governmental involvement" derives from the direct dependence of broadcasters upon the Federal Government for their "right" to operate broadcast frequencies. There can be no doubt that, for the industry as a whole, governmental regulation alone makes "radio communication possible by . . . limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). 6 Moreover, with respect to individual licensees, it is equally clear that "existing broadcasters have often attained their present position," not as a result of free market pressures 7 but, rather, "because of their initial government selection. . . ." Id., at 400. Indeed, the "quasi-monopolistic" advantages enjoyed by broadcast licensees "are the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government." Ibid. [412 U.S. 94, 176] Thus, as MR. CHIEF JUSTICE (then Judge) BURGER has himself recognized, "[a] broadcaster seeks and is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations." Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 337, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966). And, along these same lines, we have consistently held that "when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950); see, e. g., Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 n. 8 (1952). </s> A further indicium of "governmental involvement" in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged broadcaster policy may be seen in the extensive governmental control over the broadcast industry. It is true, of course, that this "Court has never held" that actions of an otherwise private entity necessarily constitute governmental action if that entity "is subject to . . . regulation in any degree whatever." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 173. Here, however, we are confronted, not with some minimal degree of regulation, but, rather, with an elaborate statutory scheme governing virtually all aspects of the broadcast industry. 8 Indeed, federal [412 U.S. 94, 177] agency review and guidance of broadcaster conduct is automatic, continuing, and pervasive. 9 Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted, "[a]lmost no other private business - almost no other regulated private business - is so intimately bound to government . . . ." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 191, 450 F.2d, at 652. </s> Even more important than this general regulatory scheme, however, is the specific governmental involvement in the broadcaster policy presently under consideration. There is, for example, an obvious nexus between the Commission's Fairness Doctrine and the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell any part of their air time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance. Indeed, in defense of this policy, the broadcaster-petitioners argue vigorously that this exclusionary policy is authorized and even compelled by the Fairness Doctrine. And the Court itself recognizes repeatedly that the Fairness Doctrine and other Communications Act policies are [412 U.S. 94, 178] inextricably linked to the challenged ban. Thus, at one point, the Court suggests that "[i]f the Fairness Doctrine were applied to editorial advertising, there is . . . the substantial danger that the effective operation of that doctrine would be jeopardized." Ante, at 124. Similarly, the Court maintains that, in light of the Fairness Doctrine, there simply is no reason to allow individuals to purchase advertising time for the expression of their own views on public issues. See ante, at 130-131. 10 Although I do not in any sense agree with the substance of these propositions, they serve at least to illustrate the extent to which the Commission's Fairness Doctrine has influenced the development of the policy here under review. </s> Moreover, the Commission's involvement in the challenged policy is not limited solely to the indirect effects of its Fairness Doctrine. On the contrary, in a decision which must inevitably provide guidance for future broadcaster action, the Commission has specifically considered and specifically authorized the flat ban. See Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d 242 (1970); Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d 216 (1970). In so doing, the Commission - and through it the Federal Government - has unequivocally given its imprimatur to the absolute ban on editorial advertising. And, of course, it is now well settled that specific governmental approval of or acquiescence in challenged action by a private entity indicates "governmental action." </s> Thus, in McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), for example, the Court dealt with a statute which, as construed by the Court, simply [412 U.S. 94, 179] authorized rail carriers to provide certain types of cars for white passengers without offering equal facilities to blacks. Although dismissal of the complaint on procedural grounds was affirmed, we made clear that such a statute, even though purely permissive in nature, was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because a carrier refusing equal service to blacks would be "acting in the matter under the authority of a state law." Id., at 162. And, some 50 years later, we explained this finding of "governmental action" in McCabe as "nothing less than considering a permissive state statute as an authorization to discriminate and as sufficient state action to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S., at 379 . Thus, "[o]ur prior decisions leave no doubt" that any action of the Government, through any of its agencies, approving, authorizing, encouraging, or otherwise supporting conduct which, if performed by the Government, would violate the Constitution, "constitutes illegal [governmental] involvement in those pertinent private acts . . . that subsequently occur." Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 202 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); see, e. g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra; Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra; Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra. </s> Finally, and perhaps most important, in a case virtually identical to those now before us, we held that a policy promulgated by a privately owned bus company, franchised by the Federal Government and regulated by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, must be subjected to the constraints of the First Amendment. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, [412 U.S. 94, 180] 343 U.S. 451 (1952). In reaching that result, we placed primary emphasis on the specific regulatory acquiescence in the challenged action of the bus company. Thus, after noting that the bus company "operates its service under the regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress," we explained that our finding of "governmental action" was predicated specifically </s> "upon the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the [challenged policy], ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were not impaired thereby." Id., at 462. </s> See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 175-176, n. 3. </s> Although THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, strains valiantly to distinguish Pollak, he offers nothing more than the proverbial "distinctions without a difference." Here, as in Pollak, the broadcast licensees operate "under the regulatory supervision of . . . an agency authorized by Congress." 343 U.S., at 462 . And, again as in Pollak, that agency received "protests" against the challenged policy and, after formal consideration, "dismissed" the complaints on the ground that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" were not "impaired" by that policy. Indeed, the argument for finding "governmental action" here is even stronger than in Pollak, for this case concerns, not an incidental activity of a bus company, but, rather, the primary activity of the regulated entities - communication. </s> Thus, given the confluence of these various indicia of "governmental action" - including the public nature [412 U.S. 94, 181] of the airwaves, 11 the governmentally created preferred status of broadcasters, the extensive Government regulation of broadcast programming, and the specific governmental approval of the challenged policy - I can only conclude that the Government "has so far insinuated itself into a position" of participation in this policy that the absolute refusal of broadcast licensees to sell air time to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance must be subjected to the restraints of the First Amendment. 12 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 182] </s> II </s> Radio and television have long been recognized as forms of communication "affected by a First Amendment interest" and, indeed, it can hardly be doubted that broadcast licensees are themselves protected by that Amendment. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 386 . See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 545-546 (1941). Recognition of this fact does not end our inquiry, however, for it is equally clear that the protection of the First Amendment in this context is not limited solely to broadcasters. On the contrary, at least one set of competing claims to the [412 U.S. 94, 183] protection of that Amendment derives from the fact that, because of the limited number of broadcast frequencies available and the potentially pervasive impact of the electronic media, "the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390. </s> Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes sounded what has since become a dominant theme in applying the First Amendment to the changing problems of our Nation. "[T]he ultimate good," he declared, "is better reached by free trade in ideas," and "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . ." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 -376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 -673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, the First Amendment itself testifies to our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 13 and the Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . . ." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). For "it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 -327 (1937). [412 U.S. 94, 184] </s> With considerations such as these in mind, we have specifically declared that, in the context of radio and television broadcasting, the First Amendment protects "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 390. 14 And, because "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee," "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Ibid. </s> Thus, we have explicitly recognized that, in light of the unique nature of the electronic media, the public have strong First Amendment interests in the reception of a full spectrum of views - presented in a vigorous and uninhibited manner - on controversial issues of public importance. And, as we have seen, it has traditionally been thought that the most effective way to insure this "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate is by fostering a "free trade in ideas" by making our forums of communication readily available to all persons wishing to express their views. Although apparently conceding the legitimacy of these principles, the Court nevertheless upholds the absolute ban on editorial advertising because, in its view, the Commission's Fairness Doctrine, in and of itself, is sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment interests of the public. I cannot agree. [412 U.S. 94, 185] </s> The Fairness Doctrine originated early in the history of broadcast regulation and, rather than being set forth in any specific statutory provision, 15 developed gradually in a long series of Commission rulings in particular cases. 16 In essence, the doctrine imposes a twofold duty upon broadcast licensees: (1) coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate, 17 and (2) such coverage must fairly reflect opposing viewpoints. 18 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 377. In fulfilling their obligations under the Fairness Doctrine, [412 U.S. 94, 186] however, broadcast licensees have virtually complete discretion, subject only to the Commission's general requirement that licensees act "reasonably and in good faith," 19 "to determine what issues should be covered, how much time should be allocated, which spokesmen should appear, and in what format." 20 Thus, the Fairness Doctrine does not in any sense require broadcasters to allow "non-broadcaster" speakers to use the airwaves to express their own views on controversial issues of public importance. 21 On the contrary, broadcasters may meet [412 U.S. 94, 187] their fairness responsibilities through presentation of carefully edited news programs, panel discussions, interviews, and documentaries. As a result, broadcasters retain almost exclusive control over the selection of issues and viewpoints to be covered, the manner of presentation, and, perhaps most important, who shall speak. Given this doctrinal framework, I can only conclude that the Fairness Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient - in theory as well as in practice - to provide the kind of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" exchange of views to which the public is constitutionally entitled. </s> As a practical matter, the Court's reliance on the Fairness Doctrine as an "adequate" alternative to editorial advertising seriously overestimates the ability - or willingness - of broadcasters to expose the public to the "widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." 22 As Professor Jaffe has noted, "there is considerable possibility the broadcaster will exercise a large amount of self-censorship and try to avoid as much controversy as he safely can." 23 Indeed, in light of the strong interest of broadcasters in maximizing their audience, and therefore their profits, it seems almost naive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and controversiality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints. Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and, in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply "bad business" to espouse - or even to allow others to espouse - the heterodox or the controversial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only established [412 U.S. 94, 188] - or at least moderated - views to enter the broadcast world's "marketplace of ideas." 24 </s> Moreover, the Court's reliance on the Fairness Doctrine as the sole means of informing the public seriously misconceives and underestimates the public's [412 U.S. 94, 189] interest in receiving ideas and information directly from the advocates of those ideas without the interposition of journalistic middlemen. Under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters decide what issues are "important," how "fully" to cover them, and what format, time, and style of coverage are "appropriate." The retention of such absolute control in the hands of a few Government licensees is inimical to the First Amendment, for vigorous, free debate can be attained only when members of the public have at least some opportunity to take the initiative and editorial control into their own hands. </s> Our legal system reflects a belief that truth is best illuminated by a collision of genuine advocates. Under the Fairness Doctrine, however, accompanied by an absolute ban on editorial advertising, the public is compelled to rely exclusively on the "journalistic discretion" of broadcasters, who serve in theory as surrogate spokesmen for all sides of all issues. This separation of the advocate from the expression of his views can serve only to diminish the effectiveness of that expression. Indeed, we emphasized this fact in Red Lion: 25 </s> "Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them." </s> Thus, if the public is to be honestly and forthrightly apprised of opposing views on controversial issues, it is imperative that citizens be permitted at least some [412 U.S. 94, 190] opportunity to speak directly for themselves as genuine advocates on issues that concern them. </s> Moreover, to the extent that broadcasters actually permit citizens to appear on "their" airwaves under the Fairness Doctrine, such appearances are subject to extensive editorial control. Yet it is clear that the effectiveness of an individual's expression of his views is as dependent on the style and format of presentation as it is on the content itself. And the relegation of an individual's views to such tightly controlled formats as the news, documentaries, edited interviews, or panel discussions may tend to minimize, rather than maximize the effectiveness of speech. Under a limited scheme of editorial advertising, however, the crucial editorial controls are in the speaker's own hands. </s> Nor are these cases concerned solely with the adequacy of coverage of those views and issues which generally are recognized as "newsworthy." For also at stake is the right of the public to receive suitable access to new and generally unperceived ideas and opinions. Under the Fairness Doctrine, the broadcaster is required to present only "representative community views and voices on controversial issues" of public importance. 26 Thus, by definition, the Fairness Doctrine tends to perpetuate coverage of those "views and voices" that are already established, while failing to provide for exposure of the public to those "views and voices" that are novel, unorthodox, or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion. 27 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 191] </s> Finally, it should be noted that the Fairness Doctrine permits, indeed requires, broadcasters to determine for themselves which views and issues are sufficiently "important" to warrant discussion. The briefs of the broadcaster-petitioners in this case illustrate the type of "journalistic discretion" licensees now exercise in this regard. Thus, ABC suggests that it would refuse to air those views which it considers "scandalous" or "crackpot," 28 while CBS would exclude those issues or opinions that are "insignificant" 29 or "trivial." 30 Similarly, NBC would bar speech that strays "beyond the bounds of normally accepted taste," 31 and WTOP would protect the public from subjects that are "slight, parochial or inappropriate." 32 </s> The genius of the First Amendment, however, is that it has always defined what the public ought to hear by permitting speakers to say what they wish. As the Court of Appeals recognized, "[i]t has traditionally been thought that the best judge of the importance of a particular viewpoint or issue is the individual or group holding the viewpoint and wishing to communicate it to others." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 195, 450 F.2d, at 656. Indeed, "supervised and ordained discussion" is directly contrary to the underlying purposes of the First Amendment, 33 for that Amendment "presupposes that right [412 U.S. 94, 192] conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection." 34 Thus, in a related context, we have explicitly recognized that editorial advertisements constitute "an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to [media] facilities," and the unavailability of such editorial advertising can serve only "to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure `the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.'" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 266 . </s> The Fairness Doctrine's requirement of full and fair coverage of controversial issues is, beyond doubt, a commendable and, indeed, essential tool for effective regulation of the broadcast industry. But, standing alone, it simply cannot eliminate the need for a further, complementary airing of controversial views through the limited availability of editorial advertising. Indeed, the availability of at least some opportunity for editorial advertising is imperative if we are ever to attain the "`free and general discussion of public matters [that] seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.'" Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). </s> III </s> Moreover, a proper balancing of the competing First Amendment interests at stake in this controversy must consider, not only the interests of broadcasters and of the listening and viewing public, but also the independent First Amendment interest of groups and individuals in effective self-expression. See, e. g., T. Emerson, Toward [412 U.S. 94, 193] a General Theory of the First Amendment 4-7 (1966); Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1941). "[S]peech concerning public affairs . . . is the essence of self-government," Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 -75 (1964), and the First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the right of the public to hear debate, but also the right of individuals to participate in that debate and to attempt to persuade others to their points of view. See, e. g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 . 429-430 (1963). And, in a time of apparently growing anonymity of the individual in our society, it is imperative that we take special care to preserve the vital First Amendment interest in assuring "self-fulfillment [of expression] for each individual." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). For our citizens may now find greater than ever the need to express their own views directly to the public, rather than through a governmentally appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they can achieve at least some measure of control over their own destinies. </s> In light of these considerations, the Court would concede, I assume, that our citizens have at least an abstract right to express their views on controversial issues of public importance. But freedom of speech does not exist in the abstract. On the contrary, the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to operate in an effective forum - whether it be a public park, a schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television frequency. For in the absence of an effective means of communication, the right to speak would ring hollow indeed. And, in recognition of these principles, we have consistently held that the First Amendment embodies, not only the abstract right to be free from censorship, but also the right of an individual to utilize an appropriate and effective medium for the expression of his views. [412 U.S. 94, 194] See, e. g., Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 559 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). </s> Here, of course, there can be no doubt that the broadcast frequencies allotted to the various radio and television licensees constitute appropriate "forums" for the discussion of controversial issues of public importance. 35 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 195] Indeed, unlike the streets, parks, public libraries, and other "forums" that we have held to be appropriate for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the broadcast media are dedicated specifically to communication. And, since the expression of ideas - whether political, commercial, musical, or otherwise - is the exclusive purpose of the broadcast spectrum, it seems clear that the adoption of a limited scheme of editorial advertising would in no sense divert that spectrum from its intended use. Cf. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, supra, at 563; Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, supra, at 320. </s> Moreover, it is equally clear that, with the assistance of the Federal Government, the broadcast industry has become what is potentially the most efficient and effective "marketplace of ideas" ever devised. 36 Indeed, the electronic media are today "the public's prime source of information," 37 and we have ourselves recognized that broadcast "technology . . . supplants atomized, relatively [412 U.S. 94, 196] informal communication with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news . . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 386 n. 15. Thus, although "full and free discussion" of ideas may have been a reality in the heyday of political pamphleteering, modern technological developments in the field of communications have made the soapbox orator and the leafleteer virtually obsolete. And, in light of the current dominance of the electronic media as the most effective means of reaching the public, any policy that absolutely denies citizens access to the airwaves necessarily renders even the concept of "full and free discussion" practically meaningless. </s> Regrettably, it is precisely such a policy that the Court upholds today. And, since effectuation of the individual's right to speak through a limited scheme of editorial advertising can serve only to further, rather than to inhibit, the public's interest in receiving suitable exposure to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on controversial issues, the challenged ban can be upheld only if it is determined that such editorial advertising would unjustifiably impair the broadcaster's assertedly overriding interest in exercising absolute control over "his" frequency. 38 Such an analysis, however, hardly reflects the delicate balancing of interests that this sensitive question demands. Indeed, this "absolutist" approach wholly disregards the competing First Amendment rights of all "non-broadcaster" citizens, ignores the [412 U.S. 94, 197] teachings of our recent decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, and is not supported by the historical purposes underlying broadcast regulation in this Nation. </s> Prior to 1927, it must be remembered, it was clearly recognized that the broadcast spectrum was part of the public domain. As a result, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, 39 and groups and individuals therefore had the same right of access to radio facilities as they had, and still have, to the printed press - that is, "anyone who will may transmit." 40 Under this scheme, however, the number of broadcasters increased so dramatically that by 1927 every frequency was occupied by at least one station, and many were occupied by several. "The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on the air, nobody could be heard." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). It soon became "apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 376. Thus, in the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, Congress placed the broadcast spectrum under federal regulation and sought to reconcile competing uses of the airwaves by setting aside a limited number of frequencies for each of the important uses of radio. 41 And, since the number of frequencies allocated to public broadcasting was necessarily limited, the [412 U.S. 94, 198] Government was compelled to grant licenses to some applicants while denying them to others. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 375-377, 388; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 210-214. </s> Although the overriding need to avoid overcrowding of the airwaves clearly justifies the imposition of a ceiling on the number of individuals who will be permitted to operate broadcast stations 42 and, indeed, renders it "idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish," 43 it does not in any sense dictate that the continuing First Amendment rights of all nonlicensees be brushed aside entirely. Under the existing system, broadcast licensees are granted a preferred status with respect to the airwaves, not because they have competed successfully in the free market but, rather, "because of their initial government selection . . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 400. And, in return for that "preferred status," licensees must respect the competing First Amendment [412 U.S. 94, 199] rights of others. Thus, although the broadcaster has a clear First Amendment right to be free from Government censorship in the expression of his own views 44 and, indeed, has a significant interest in exercising reasonable journalistic control over the use of his facilities, "[t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster . . . does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others." Id., at 387 (emphasis added). Indeed, after careful consideration of the nature of broadcast regulation in this country, we have specifically declared that </s> "as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to . . . monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens." Id., at 389. </s> Because I believe this view is as sound today as when voiced only four years ago, I can only conclude that there is simply no overriding First Amendment interest of broadcasters that can justify the absolute exclusion of virtually all of our citizens from the most effective "marketplace of ideas" ever devised. </s> This is not to say, of course, that broadcasters have no First Amendment interest in exercising journalistic supervision over the use of their facilities. On the contrary, such an interest does indeed exist, and it is an interest that must be weighed heavily in any legitimate effort to balance the competing First Amendment interests involved in this case. In striking such a balance, however, it must be emphasized that these cases deal only with the allocation of advertising time - air time that broadcasters regularly relinquish to others without the retention of significant editorial control. Thus, we are concerned here, not with the speech of broadcasters themselves, 45 </s> [412 U.S. 94, 200] but, rather, with their "right" to decide which other individuals will be given an opportunity to speak in a forum that has already been opened to the public. </s> Viewed in this context, the absolute ban on editorial advertising seems particularly offensive because, although broadcasters refuse to sell any air time whatever to groups or individuals wishing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance, they make such air time readily available to those "commercial" advertisers who seek to peddle their goods and services to the public. Thus, as the system now operates, any person wishing to market a particular brand of beer, soap, toothpaste, or deodorant has direct, personal, and instantaneous access to the electronic media. He can present his own message, in his own words, in any format he selects, and at a time of his own choosing. Yet a similar individual seeking to discuss war, peace, pollution, or the suffering of the poor is denied this right to speak. Instead, he is compelled to rely on the beneficence of a corporate "trustee" appointed by the Government to argue his case for him. </s> It has long been recognized, however, that although access to public forums may be subjected to reasonable "time, place, and manner" regulations, 46 "[s]elective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone . . . ." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S., at 96 (emphasis added); see, e. g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); [412 U.S. 94, 201] Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). Here, of course, the differential treatment accorded "commercial" and "controversial" speech clearly violates that principle. 47 Moreover, and not without some irony, the favored treatment given "commercial" speech under the existing scheme clearly reverses traditional First Amendment priorities. For it has generally been understood that "commercial" speech enjoys less First Amendment protection than speech directed at the discussion of controversial issues of public importance. See, e. g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). </s> The First Amendment values of individual self-fulfillment through expression and individual participation in public debate are central to our concept of liberty. If these values are to survive in the age of technology, it is essential that individuals be permitted at least some opportunity to express their views on public issues over the electronic media. Balancing those interests against the limited interest of broadcasters in exercising "journalistic supervision" over the mere allocation of advertising time that is already made available to some members of the public, I simply cannot conclude that the interest of broadcasters must prevail. </s> IV </s> Finally, the Court raises the specter of administrative apocalypse as justification for its decision today. The Court's fears derive largely from the assumption, implicit [412 U.S. 94, 202] in its analysis, that the Court of Appeals mandated an absolute right of access to the airwaves In reality, however, the issue in these cases is not whether there is an absolute right of access but, rather, whether there may be an absolute denial of such access. The difference is, of course, crucial, and the Court's misconception of the issue seriously distorts its evaluation of the administrative difficulties that an invalidation of the absolute ban might conceivably entail. </s> Specifically, the Court hypothesizes three potential sources of difficulty: (1) the availability of editorial advertising might, in the absence of adjustments in the system, tend to favor the wealthy; (2) application of the Fairness Doctrine to editorial advertising might adversely affect the operation of that doctrine; and (3) regulation of editorial advertising might lead to an enlargement of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion. These are, of course, legitimate and, indeed, important concerns. But, at the present time, they are concerns - not realities. We simply have no sure way of knowing whether, and to what extent, if any, these potential difficulties will actually materialize. The Court's bare assumption that these hypothetical problems are both inevitable and insurmountable indicates an utter lack of confidence in the ability of the Commission and licensees to adjust to the changing conditions of a dynamic medium. This sudden lack of confidence is, of course, strikingly inconsistent with the general propositions underlying all other aspects of the Court's approach to this case. </s> Moreover, it is noteworthy that, 28 years ago, the Commission itself declared that </s> "the operation of any station under the extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the discussion [412 U.S. 94, 203] of controversial public issues . . . is inconsistent with the concept of public interest. . . . The Commission recognizes that good program balance may not permit the sale or donation of time to all who may seek it for such purposes and that difficult problems calling for careful judgment on the part of station management may be involved in deciding among applicants for time when all cannot be accommodated. However, competent management should be able to meet such problems in the public interest and with fairness to all concerned. The fact that it places an arduous task on management should not be made a reason for evading the issue by a strict rule against the sale of time for any programs of the type mentioned." United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515, 518 (1945). </s> I can see no reason why the Commission and licensees should be deemed any less competent today then they were in 1945. And even if intervening developments have increased the complexities involved in implementing a limited right of access, there is certainly no dearth of proposed solutions to the potential difficulties feared by the Court. See, e. g., Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 723, 754-757 (1972); Malone, Broadcasting, the Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 193, 252-269 (1972); Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 Va. L. Rev. 574 (1971); Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 693-699 (1972). </s> With these considerations in mind, the Court of Appeals confined itself to invalidating the flat ban alone, [412 U.S. 94, 204] leaving broad latitude 48 to the Commission and licensees to develop in the first instance reasonable regulations to govern the availability of editorial advertising. In the context of these cases, this was surely the wisest course to follow, for "if experience with the administration of these doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing [First Amendment values], there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional implications." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 393 . </s> For the present, however, and until such time, if ever, as these assertedly "overriding" administrative difficulties actually materialize, I must agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that although "it may unsettle some of us to see an antiwar message or a political party message in the accustomed place of a soap or beer commercial . . . we must not equate what is habitual with what is right - or what is constitutional. A society already so saturated with commercialism can well afford another outlet for speech on public issues. All that we may lose is some of our apathy." 49 </s> [Footnote 1 See Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d 242 (1970); Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d 216 (1970). </s> [Footnote 2 I do not specifically address the "statutory" question in this case because, in practical effect, the considerations underlying the "statutory" question are in many respects similar to those relevant to the "substance" of the "constitutional" claim. There is one aspect of the Court's "statutory" discussion, however, that merits at least brief attention. In upholding the absolute ban on the sale of editorial advertising, the Court relies heavily upon 47 U.S.C. 153 (h), which declares that broadcasters shall not be deemed "common carriers." In my view, this reliance is misplaced. Even a cursory examination of the legislative history of this provision reveals that it was enacted in recognition of the fact that [412 U.S. 94, 171] traditional doctrines governing true "common carriers," such as transportation companies, would not suit the particular problems of radio broadcasting. Specifically, it was feared that such "common carrier" status for broadcasters would mean that they "would have to give all their time to [public issues]." 67 Cong. Rec. 12504 (Sen. Dill) (emphasis added); see also ibid. (Sen. Broussard); id., at 12356 (Sen. Fess). Section 153 (h) was intended solely to assure that broadcasters would not be required to surrender all of their air time to willing purchasers; it does not bear upon the question whether they may be required to sell a reasonable and limited amount of air time to members of the public for discussion of controversial issues. See 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 635 n. 75 (1947). Indeed, the Commission itself has rejected the Court's interpretation of 153 (h) when it declared, over 25 years ago, that "the operation of any station under the extreme principles that no time shall be sold for the discussion of controversial public issues . . . is inconsistent with the concept of public interest established by the Communications Act. . . ." United Broadcasting Co., 10 F. C. C. 515, 518 (1945). </s> [Footnote 3 See generally Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 253-264 (dissenting opinion), wherein Commissioner Johnson identified no less than eight separate indicia of "governmental action" involved in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged broadcaster policy. </s> [Footnote 4 For a discussion of the attributes of the electromagnetic spectrum, see generally W. Jones, Regulated Industries 1019 (1967); Levin. The Radio Spectrum Resource. 11 J. Law & Econ. 433 (1968). </s> [Footnote 5 It is true, of course, that unlike the State in Burton, the Federal Government here does not receive substantial financial compensation for the use of the "public" property. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 723 -724 (1961); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174 -175 (1972). Nevertheless, the absence of such a financial arrangement represents, in practical effect, Government subsidization of broadcasters, thereby enhancing the degree of governmental involvement. Cf. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. Law & Econ. 15, 31 (1967). Moreover, as in Burton, the publicly owned property is "not surplus state property" but, rather, constitutes an "integral and, indeed, indispensable part" of the governmental scheme. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, at 723. See also 47 U.S.C. 303 (g). </s> [Footnote 6 For a discussion of the Fairness Doctrine and its relevance to this case, see text and notes, at nn. 15-34, infra. </s> [Footnote 7 Indeed, the Communications Act of 1934 makes it a criminal offense to operate a broadcast transmitter without a license. See 47 U.S.C. 501. Thus, the Federal Government specifically insulates the licensee from any real threat of economic competition. </s> [Footnote 8 Thus, the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the Federal Communications Commission to assign frequency bands, 47 U.S.C. 303 (c); allocate licenses by location, 303 (d); regulate apparatus, 303 (e); establish service areas, 303 (h); regulate chain ownership, 303 (i); require the keeping of detailed records, 303 (j); establish qualifications of licensees, 303 (l); suspend licenses, 303 (m) (1); inspect station facilities, 303 (n); require publication of call letters and other information, 303 (p); make rules to effect regulation of radio and television, 303 (r); require that television sets be capable of receiving all signals, 303 (s); regulate [412 U.S. 94, 177] the granting of licenses and the terms thereof, 307, 309; prescribe information to be supplied by applicants for licenses, 308 (b); regulate the transfer of licenses, 310; impose sanctions on licensees, including revocation of license, 312; require fair coverage of controversial issues, 315; control the operation of transmitting apparatus, 318; and prohibit the use of offensive language, 18 U.S.C. 1464. </s> [Footnote 9 Pursuant to statutory authority, see n. 8, supra, the Commission has promulgated myriad regulations governing all aspects of licensee conduct. See 47 CFR 73.17 et seq. These regulations affect such matters as hours of operation, 73.23; multiple ownership of licenses by a single individual, 73.35; station location and program origination, 73.30; maintenance of detailed logs of programming, operation, and maintenance, 73.111-116; billing practices. 73.124; the personal attack and political editorial fairness requirements, 73.123; relationship of licensees to networks, 73.131-139; permissible equipment, 73.39-50. The above-cited regulations relate only to AM radio, but similar regulations exist for FM radio, 73.201 et seq., and television, 73.601 et seq. </s> [Footnote 10 In addition, the Court contends that, because of the Fairness Doctrine, the challenged broadcaster policy does not discriminate against controversial speech. See ante, at 128-130. </s> [Footnote 11 Moreover, the appropriateness of a particular forum, even if privately owned, for effective communication has in some instances been emphasized to establish the relevance of First Amendment protections. See, e. g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Here, as the Court of Appeals recognized, "the broadcast media are specifically dedicated to communication. They function as both our foremost forum for public speech and our most important educator of an informed people." 146 U.S. App. D.C. 181, 192, 450 F.2d 642, 653. See also text and notes, at nn. 35-37, infra. </s> [Footnote 12 In his concurring opinion, my Brother STEWART suggests that a finding of governmental action in this context necessarily means that "private broadcasters are Government." Ante, at 139 (emphasis in original). In my view, this assertion reflects a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the governmental involvement in these cases. Here, the Government has selected the persons who will be permitted to operate a broadcast station, extensively regulates those broadcasters, and has specifically approved the challenged broadcaster policy. Thus, the commands of the First Amendment come into play, not because "private broadcasters are Government," but, rather, because the Government "has so far insinuated itself into a position" of participation in the challenged policy as to make the Government itself responsible for its effects. Similarly, I cannot agree with my Brother STEWART'S suggestion that a finding of governmental involvement here "would . . . simply strip broadcasters of their own First Amendment rights." Ibid. The actions of a purely private individual are, of course, not subject to the constraints of the First Amendment. But where, as here, the [412 U.S. 94, 182] Government has implicated itself in the actions of an otherwise private individual, that individual must exercise his own rights with due regard for the First Amendment rights of others. In other words, an accommodation of competing rights is required, and "balancing," not the "absolutist" approach suggested by my Brother STEWART, is the result. Indeed, it is this misunderstanding of the significance of governmental involvement that apparently leads to my Brother STEWART'S disagreement with my Brothers WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL as to the relationship between the "public interest" standard of the Act and First Amendment "values." I might also note that, contrary to the suggestion of my Brother STEWART, a finding of governmental involvement in this case does not in any sense command a similar conclusion with respect to newspapers. Indeed, the factors that compel the conclusion that the Government is involved in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged broadcaster policy have simply no relevance to newspapers. The decision as to who shall operate newspapers is made in the free market, not by Government fiat. The newspaper industry is not extensively regulated and, indeed, in light of the differences between the electronic and printed media, such regulation would violate the First Amendment with respect to newspapers. Finally, since such regulation of newspapers would be impossible, it would likewise be impossible for the Government to approve an exclusionary policy of newspapers in the sense that it has approved the challenged policy of the broadcasters. </s> [Footnote 13 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). </s> [Footnote 14 This was not new doctrine, for we have long recognized in a variety of contexts that the First Amendment "necessarily protects the right to receive [information]." Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); see, e. g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). </s> [Footnote 15 The Fairness Doctrine was recognized and implicitly approved by Congress in the 1959 amendments to 315 of the Communications Act. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 1, 73 Stat. 557, 47 U.S.C. 315 (a). As amended, 315 (a) recognizes the obligation of broadcasters "to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." </s> [Footnote 16 The Fairness Doctrine was first fully set forth in Report in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F. C. C. 1246 (1949), and was elaborated upon in Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964). The statutory authority of the Commission to promulgate this doctrine and related regulations derives from the mandate to the "Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires," to promulgate "such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions . . . as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act]. . . ." 47 U.S.C. 303 (r). </s> [Footnote 17 See John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950); see also Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 P & F Radio Reg. 602 (1960); The Evening News Assn., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 283 (1950). </s> [Footnote 18 If the broadcaster presents one side of a question, and does not wish to present the other side himself, he can fulfill his fairness obligation by announcing his willingness to broadcast opposing views by volunteers. See Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F. C. C. 620 (1964). If the broadcaster rejects a volunteer spokesman as "inappropriate," he must seek out others. See Richard G. Ruff, 19 F. C. C. 2d 838 (1969). The broadcaster must provide free time for the presentation of opposing views if sponsorship is unavailable. See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963). </s> [Footnote 19 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, supra, n. 16, at 10424. </s> [Footnote 20 Notice of Inquiry: The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F. C. C. 2d 26, 27-28 (1971); see also Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, supra, n. 16, at 10416; Report in the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, supra, n. 16. </s> [Footnote 21 Thus, the Fairness Doctrine must be sharply distinguished from the "equal time" requirement, which provides that a broadcaster who affords air time to one political candidate must make equal time available to other candidates for the same office. 47 U.S.C. 315. See also Nicholas Zapple, 23 F. C. C. 2d 707 (1970) (extension of "equal time" rule to cover a candidate's supporters where spokesmen for other candidates are permitted to purchase air time). Similarly, the Fairness Doctrine must not be confused with the Commission's "personal attack" and "political editorializing" rules which were upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The "personal attack" rule provides that "[w]hen during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person," the licensee must notify the person attacked and offer him an opportunity to respond. 47 CFR 73.123. The "political editorializing" rule provides that when a licensee endorses a candidate for political office it must give other candidates or their spokesmen an opportunity to respond. See, e. g., 47 CFR 73.123. Thus, unlike the Fairness Doctrine, the "equal time," "personal attack," and "political editorializing" rules grant a particular group or individual a limited "right of access" to the airwaves not subject to the "journalistic supervision" of the broadcaster. </s> [Footnote 22 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). </s> [Footnote 23 Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 773 n. 26 (1972). </s> [Footnote 24 See generally D. Lacy, Freedom and Communications 69 (1961); Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward the Enforcement of Discretion, 1973 Duke L. J. 89, 94-95, 98-99; Jaffe, supra, n. 23, at 773 n. 26; Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 723, 727 (1972); Malone, Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 193, 205-211, 216 (1972); Johnson & Westen, A Twentieth Century Soapbox: The Right to Purchase Radio and Television Time, 57 Va. L. Rev. 574 (1971); Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 Va. L. Rev. 636 (1971); Note, A Fair Break for Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 532 (1971); Note, The Wasteland Revisited: A Modest Attack Upon the FCC's Category System, 17 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 868, 870-875 (1970); Comment, Freedom of Speech and the Individual's Right of Access to the Airwaves, 1970 Law & Social Order 424, 428; Note, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation of a Right of Access to the Mass Media, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 294, 296 (1969). Although admitting that the Fairness Doctrine "has not always brought to the public perfect or, indeed, even consistently high-quality treatment of all public events and issues," the Court nevertheless suggests that a broadcaster who fails to fulfill his fairness obligations does so "at the risk of losing his license." Ante, at 130-131. The Court does not cite a single instance, however, in which this sanction has ever been invoked because of a broadcaster's failure to comply with the Fairness Doctrine. Indeed, this is not surprising, for the Commission has acted with great reluctance in this area, intervening in only the most extreme cases of broadcaster abuse. See Mallamud, supra, at 115-122; Canby, supra, at 725-727; Malone, supra, at 215-216; see also Cox & Johnson, Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F. C. C. 2d 1 (1968). </s> [Footnote 25 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 392 n. 18, quoting J. Mill, On Liberty 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947). </s> [Footnote 26 Democratic National Committee, 25 F. C. C. 2d, at 222 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 27 Indeed, the failure to provide adequate means for groups and individuals to bring new issues or ideas to the attention of the public explains, at least to some extent, "the development of new media to convey unorthodox, unpopular, and new ideas. Sit-ins and demonstrations testify to . . . the inability to secure access to the conventional means of reaching and changing public opinion. [For by] [412 U.S. 94, 191] the bizarre and unsettling nature of his technique, the demonstrator hopes to arrest and divert attention long enough to compel the public to ponder his message." Barron, 80 Harv. L. Rev., at 1647; cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50 -51 (1966) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 28 Brief for American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 52. </s> [Footnote 29 Brief for Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 34. </s> [Footnote 30 Id., at 40. </s> [Footnote 31 Brief for National Broadcasting Company, Inc. 10. </s> [Footnote 32 Brief for Post-Newsweek Stations, Capital Area, Inc. 31. </s> [Footnote 33 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). </s> [Footnote 34 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (SDNY 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 35 The Court does make the rather novel suggestion, however, that editorial advertising might indeed be "inappropriate" because "listeners and viewers constitute a `captive audience.'" Ante, at 127. In support of this proposition, the Court cites our decisions in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). In Pollak, however, we explicitly rejected a claim that the broadcasting of radio programs in streetcars violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of passengers who did not wish to listen to those programs. And in Kovacs, although we upheld an ordinance forbidding the use on public streets of sound trucks which emit "loud and raucous noises," we did so because the ordinance was concerned, not with the content of speech, but, rather, with the offensiveness of the sounds themselves. Here, however, the Court seems perfectly willing to allow broadcasters to continue to invade the "privacy" of the home through commercial advertising and even controversial programming under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus, the Court draws its line solely on the basis of the content of the particular speech involved and, of course, we have consistently held that, where content is at issue, constitutionally protected speech may not be prohibited because of a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S., at 509 ; see, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972). The suggestion that constitutionally protected speech may be banned because some [412 U.S. 94, 195] persons may find the ideas expressed offensive is, in itself, offensive to the very meaning of the First Amendment. </s> [Footnote 36 Indeed, approximately 95% of American homes contain at least one television set, and that set is turned on for an average of more than five and one-half hours per day. See Hearings on H. R. 13721 before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1970) (statement of Dean Burch, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission). As to the potential influence of the electronic media on American thought, see generally A. Krock, The Consent of the Governed 66 (1971); H. Mendelsohn & I. Crespi, Polls, Television, and the New Politics 256, 264 (1970); Malone, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform, at 197. </s> [Footnote 37 H. R. Rep. No. 91-257, p. 6 (1969). According to one study, 67% of Americans prefer the electronic media to other sources of information. See G. Wyekoff, The Image Candidates 13-14 (1968). See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules, 22 F. C. C. 2d 339, 344 (1970) (59% of Americans depend on television as their principal source of news). </s> [Footnote 38 It should be noted that, although the Fairness Doctrine is at least arguably relevant to the public's interest in receiving suitable exposure to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on controversial issues, it is not in any sense relevant to the individual's interest in obtaining access to the airwaves for the purpose of effective self-expression. For the individual's interest in expressing his own views in a manner of his own choosing is an inherently personal one, and it can never be satisfied by the expression of "similar" views by a surrogate spokesman. </s> [Footnote 39 Indeed, pre-1927 regulation of radio gave no discretion to the Federal Government to deny the right to operate a broadcast station. See 1 A. Socolow, The Law of Radio Broadcasting 38 (1939); H. Warner, Radio & Television Law 757 et seq. (1948); see generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 . 210-214 (1943). </s> [Footnote 40 67 Cong. Rec. 5479 (Rep. White). </s> [Footnote 41 These include, of course, not only public broadcasting, but also "amateur operation, aircraft, police, defense, and navigation . . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 388 . </s> [Footnote 42 Although this licensing scheme necessarily restricts the First Amendment rights of those groups or individuals who are denied the "right" to operate a broadcast station, it does not, in and of itself, violate the First Amendment. For it has long been recognized that when "[c]onflicting demands on the same [forum] . . . compel the [Government] to make choices among potential users and uses," neutral rules of allocation to govern that scarce communications resource are not per se unconstitutional. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). And, in the context of broadcasting, it would be ironic indeed "if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible . . . by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 389. </s> [Footnote 43 Id., at 388. </s> [Footnote 44 See, e. g., 47 U.S.C. 326. </s> [Footnote 45 Thus, as the Court of Appeals recognized, "[i]n normal programming time, closely controlled and edited by broadcasters, the constellation of constitutional interests would be substantially different." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 193, 450 F.2d, at 654. </s> [Footnote 46 See, e. g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, at 98; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S., at 115 ; Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 554; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 398 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, at 575-576; Schneider v. State, supra, at 160. </s> [Footnote 47 Contrary to the Court's assertion, the existence of the Fairness Doctrine cannot in any sense rationalize this discrimination. Indeed, the Fairness Doctrine is wholly unresponsive to the need for individual access to the airwaves for the purpose of effective self-expression. See also n. 38, supra. </s> [Footnote 48 The Court of Appeals did, however, suggest certain possible contours of implementation. For example, the court noted that broadcasters should be permitted "to place an outside limit on the total amount of editorial advertising they will sell," and "`reasonable regulation' of the placement of advertisements is altogether proper." 146 U.S. App. D.C., at 202, 450 F.2d, at 663. </s> [Footnote 49 Id., at 204-205, 450 F.2d, at 665-666. </s> [412 U.S. 94, 205]

United States Supreme Court UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA v. EEOC(1990) No. 88-493 Argued: November 7, 1989Decided: January 9, 1990 </s> After petitioner university denied tenure to associate professor Rosalie Tung, she filed a charge with respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the course of its investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena seeking, inter alia, Tung's tenure-review file and the tenure files of five male faculty members identified in the charge as having received more favorable treatment than Tung. Petitioner refused to produce a number of the tenure-file documents and applied to the EEOC for modification of the subpoena to exclude what it termed "confidential peer review information." The EEOC denied the application and successfully sought enforcement of the subpoena by the District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner's claim that policy considerations and First Amendment principles of academic freedom required the recognition of a qualified privilege or the adoption of a balancing approach that would require the EEOC to demonstrate some particularized need, beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials. </s> Held: </s> A university does not enjoy a special privilege requiring a judicial finding of particularized necessity of access, beyond a showing of mere relevance, before peer review materials pertinent to charges of discrimination in tenure decisions are disclosed to the EEOC. Pp. 188-202. </s> (a) The claimed privilege cannot be grounded in the common law under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. This Court is reluctant to recognize petitioner's asserted privilege where it appears that Congress, in expressly extending Title VII's coverage to educational institutions in 1972 and in thereafter continuing to afford the EEOC a broad right of access to any evidence "relevant" to a charge under investigation, balanced the substantial costs of invidious discrimination in institutions of higher learning against the importance of academic autonomy, but did not see fit to create a privilege for peer review documents. In fact, Congress did provide a modicum of protection for an employer's interest in the confidentiality of its records by making it a crime for EEOC employees to publicize before the institution of court proceedings materials obtained during investigations. Petitioner has not offered [493 U.S. 182, 183] persuasive justification for its claim that this Court should go further than Congress thought necessary to safeguard confidentiality. Disclosure of peer review materials will often be necessary in order for the EEOC to determine whether illegal discrimination has taken place. Moreover, the adoption of a requirement that the EEOC demonstrate a specific reason for disclosure, beyond a showing of relevance, would place a substantial litigation-producing obstacle in the EEOC's way and give universities a weapon to frustrate investigations. It would also lead to a wave of similar privilege claims by other employers, such as writers, publishers, musicians, and lawyers, who play significant roles in furthering speech and learning in society. Furthermore, petitioner's claim is not supported by this Court's precedents recognizing qualified privileges for Presidential and grand and petit jury communications and for deliberative intra-agency documents, since a privilege for peer review materials lacks a historical, constitutional, or statutory basis similar to that of those privileges. Pp. 188-195. </s> (b) Nor can the claimed privilege be grounded in First Amendment "academic freedom." Petitioner's reliance on this Court's so-called academic freedom cases is somewhat misplaced, since, in invalidating various governmental actions, those cases dealt with attempts to control university speech that were content based and that constituted a direct infringement on the asserted right to determine on academic grounds who could teach. In contrast, petitioner here does not allege any content-based regulation but only that the "quality of instruction and scholarship [will] decline" as a result of the burden EEOC subpoenas place on the peer review process. The subpoena at issue does not provide criteria that petitioner must use in selecting teachers or prevent it from using any such criteria other than those proscribed by Title VII, and therefore respects legitimate academic decisionmaking. In any event, the First Amendment does not embrace petitioner's claim to the effect that the right of academic freedom derived from the cases relied on should be expanded to protect confidential peer review materials from disclosure. By comparison with cases in which the Court has recognized a First Amendment right, the complained-of infringement is extremely attenuated in that the burden of such disclosure is far removed from the asserted right, and, if petitioner's claim were accepted, many other generally applicable laws, such as tax laws, might be said to infringe the First Amendment to the extent they affected university hiring. In addition, the claimed injury to academic freedom is speculative, since confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review systems, and since some disclosure of peer evaluations would take place even if the "special necessity" test were adopted. Moreover, this Court will not assume that most evaluators will become less candid if the possibility of disclosure [493 U.S. 182, 184] increases. This case is in many respects similar to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , where, in rejecting the contention that the First Amendment prohibited requiring a reporter to testify as to information obtained in confidence without a special showing that such testimony was necessary, the Court declared that the Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of generally applicable laws, id., at 682, and indicated a reluctance to recognize a constitutional privilege of uncertain effect and scope, id., at 693, 703. Pp. 195-202. </s> 850 F.2d 969, affirmed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Steven B. Feirson, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, Nancy J. Bregstein, Shelley Z. Green, and Neil J. Hamburg. </s> Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Deputy Solicitors General Wallace and Merrill, Stephen L. Nightingale, Charles A. Shanor, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Lorraine C. Davis, and Harry F. Tepker, Jr. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of University Professors by William W. Van Alstyne, Ann H. Franke, and Martha A. Toll; for the President and Fellows of Harvard College by Allan A. Ryan, Jr., and Daniel Steiner; for Stanford University et al. by Steven L. Mayer, Iris Brest, Susan K. Hoerger, and Thomas H. Wright, Jr.; and for the American Council on Education by Sheldon Elliot Steinbach. </s> Susan Deller Ross, R. Bruce Keiner, Jr., and Sarah E. Burns filed a brief for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In this case we are asked to decide whether a university enjoys a special privilege, grounded in either the common law or the First Amendment, against disclosure of peer review materials that are relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination in tenure decisions. [493 U.S. 182, 185] </s> I </s> The University of Pennsylvania, petitioner here, is a private institution. It currently operates 12 schools, including the Wharton School of Business, which collectively enroll approximately 18,000 full-time students. </s> In 1985, the University denied tenure to Rosalie Tung, an associate professor on the Wharton faculty. Tung then filed a sworn charge of discrimination with respondent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). App. 23. As subsequently amended, the charge alleged that Tung was the victim of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin, in violation of 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1982 ed.), which makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." </s> In her charge, Tung stated that the department chairman had sexually harassed her and that, in her belief, after she insisted that their relationship remain professional, he had submitted a negative letter to the University's Personnel Committee which possessed ultimate responsibility for tenure decisions. She also alleged that her qualifications were "equal to or better than" those of five named male faculty members who had received more favorable treatment. Tung noted that the majority of the members of her department had recommended her for tenure, and stated that she had been given no reason for the decision against her, but had discovered of her own efforts that the Personnel Committee had attempted to justify its decision "on the ground that the Wharton School is not interested in China-related research." App. 29. This explanation, Tung's charge alleged, was a pretext for discrimination: "simply their way of saying they do not want a Chinese-American, Oriental, woman in their school." Ibid. [493 U.S. 182, 186] </s> The Commission undertook an investigation into Tung's charge and requested a variety of relevant information from petitioner. When the University refused to provide certain of that information, the Commission's Acting District Director issued a subpoena seeking, among other things, Tung's tenure-review file and the tenure files of the five male faculty members identified in the charge. Id., at 21. Petitioner refused to produce a number of the tenure-file documents. It applied to the Commission for modification of the subpoena to exclude what it termed "confidential peer review information," specifically, (1) confidential letters written by Tung's evaluators; (2) the department chairman's letter of evaluation; (3) documents reflecting the internal deliberations of faculty committees considering applications for tenure, including the Department Evaluation Report summarizing the deliberations relating to Tung's application for tenure; and (4) comparable portions of the tenure-review files of the five males. The University urged the Commission to "adopt a balancing approach reflecting the constitutional and societal interest inherent in the peer review process" and to resort to "all feasible methods to minimize the intrusive effects of its investigations." Exhibit 2 to EEOC's Memorandum in Support of Application for Order to Show Cause 6. </s> The Commission denied the University's application. It concluded that the withheld documents were needed in order to determine the merit of Tung's charges. The Commission found: "There has not been enough data supplied in order for the Commission to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the allegations of sex, race and national origin discrimination is [sic] true." App. to Pet. for Cert. A31. The Commission rejected petitioner's contention that a letter, which set forth the Personnel Committee's reasons for denying Tung tenure, was sufficient for disposition of the charge. "The Commission would fall short of its obligation" to investigate charges of discrimination, the EEOC's order [493 U.S. 182, 187] stated, "if it stopped its investigation once [the employer] has . . . provided the reasons for its employment decisions, without verifying whether that reason is a pretext for discrimination." Id., at A32. The Commission also rejected petitioner's proposed balancing test, explaining that "such an approach in the instant case . . . would impair the Commission's ability to fully investigate this charge of discrimination." Id., at A33. The Commission indicated that enforcement proceedings might be necessary if a response was not forthcoming within 20 days. Ibid. </s> The University continued to withhold the tenure-review materials. The Commission then applied to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for enforcement of its subpoena. The court entered a brief enforcement order. 1 Id., at A35. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the enforcement decision. 850 F.2d 969 (1988). 2 Relying upon its earlier opinion in EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, [493 U.S. 182, 188] 775 F.2d 110 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986), the court rejected petitioner's claim that policy considerations and First Amendment principles of academic freedom required the recognition of a qualified privilege or the adoption of a balancing approach that would require the Commission to demonstrate some particularized need, beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials. Because of what might be thought of as a conflict in approach with the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337 (1983), and because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari limited to the compelled-disclosure question. 488 U.S. 992 (1988), and amended, 490 U.S. 1015 (1989). </s> II </s> As it had done before the Commission, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals, the University raises here essentially two claims. First, it urges us to recognize a qualified common-law privilege against disclosure of confidential peer review materials. Second, it asserts a First Amendment right of "academic freedom" against wholesale disclosure of the contested documents. With respect to each of the two claims, the remedy petitioner seeks is the same: a requirement of a judicial finding of particularized necessity of access, beyond a showing of mere relevance, before peer review materials are disclosed to the Commission. </s> A </s> Petitioner's common-law privilege claim is grounded in Federal Rule of Evidence 501. This provides in relevant part: </s> "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution . . . as provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . ., the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." [493 U.S. 182, 189] </s> The University asks us to invoke this provision to fashion a new privilege that it claims is necessary to protect the integrity of the peer review process, which in turn is central to the proper functioning of many colleges and universities. These institutions are special, observes petitioner, because they function as "centers of learning, innovation and discovery." Brief for Petitioner filed June 23, 1989, p. 24 (hereinafter Brief for Petitioner). </s> We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence . . . ." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). Inasmuch as "[t]estimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that `the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,'" id., at 50, quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), any such privilege must "be strictly construed." 445 U.S., at 50 . </s> Moreover, although Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire "not to freeze the law of privilege" but rather to provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, id., at 47, we are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively. We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). The balancing of conflicting interests of this type is particularly a legislative function. </s> With all this in mind, we cannot accept the University's invitation to create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials. We begin by noting that Congress, in extending Title VII to educational institutions and in providing for broad EEOC subpoena powers, did not see fit to create a privilege for peer review documents. </s> When Title VII was enacted originally in 1964, it exempted an "educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational [493 U.S. 182, 190] activities of such institution." 702, 78 Stat. 255. Eight years later, Congress eliminated that specific exemption by enacting 3 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103. This extension of Title VII was Congress' considered response to the widespread and compelling problem of invidious discrimination in educational institutions. The House Report focused specifically on discrimination in higher education, including the lack of access for women and minorities to higher ranking (i. e., tenured) academic positions. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, pp. 19-20 (1971). Significantly, opponents of the extension claimed that enforcement of Title VII would weaken institutions of higher education by interfering with decisions to hire and promote faculty members. 3 Petitioner therefore cannot seriously contend that Congress was oblivious to concerns of academic autonomy when it abandoned the exemption for educational institutions. </s> The effect of the elimination of this exemption was to expose tenure determinations to the same enforcement procedures applicable to other employment decisions. This Court previously has observed that Title VII "sets forth `an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure' that enables the Commission to detect and remedy instances of discrimination." EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984), quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977). The Commission's enforcement responsibilities are triggered by the filing of a specific sworn charge of discrimination. The Act obligates the Commission to investigate a charge of discrimination to determine whether there is "reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) (1982 ed.). If it finds no such reasonable cause, the Commission is directed to dismiss the charge. If it does find reasonable cause, the Commission shall "endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment [493 U.S. 182, 191] practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Ibid. If attempts at voluntary resolution fail, the Commission may bring an action against the employer. 2000e-5(f)(1). 4 </s> To enable the Commission to make informed decisions at each stage of the enforcement process, 2000e-8(a) confers a broad right of access to relevant evidence: </s> "[T]he Commission or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated . . . that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by [the Act] and is relevant to the charge under investigation." </s> If an employer refuses to provide this information voluntarily, the Act authorizes the Commission to issue a subpoena and to seek an order enforcing it. 2000e-9 (incorporating 29 U.S.C. 161). </s> On their face, 2000e-8(a) and 2000e-9 do not carve out any special privilege relating to peer review materials, despite the fact that Congress undoubtedly was aware, when it extended Title VII's coverage, of the potential burden that access to such material might create. Moreover, we have noted previously that when a court is asked to enforce a Commission subpoena, its responsibility is to "satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is `relevant' to the charge . . . and more generally to assess any contentions by the employer that the demand for information is too indefinite or has been made for an illegitimate purpose." It is not then to determine "whether the charge of discrimination is `well founded' or `verifiable.'" EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S., at 72 , n. 26. </s> The University concedes that the information sought by the Commission in this case passes the relevance test set [493 U.S. 182, 192] forth in Shell Oil. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Petitioner argues, nevertheless, that Title VII affirmatively grants courts the discretion to require more than relevance in order to protect tenure review documents. Although petitioner recognizes that Title VII gives the Commission broad "power to seek access to all evidence that may be `relevant to the charge under investigation,'" Brief for Petitioner 38 (emphasis added), it contends that Title VII's subpoena enforcement provisions do not give the Commission an unqualified right to acquire such evidence. Id., at 38-41. This interpretation simply cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the text of 2000e-8(a), which states that the Commission "shall . . . have access" to "relevant" evidence (emphasis added). The provision can be read only as giving the Commission a right to obtain that evidence, not a mere license to seek it. </s> Although the text of the access provisions thus provides no privilege, Congress did address situations in which an employer may have an interest in the confidentiality of its records. The same 2000e-8 which gives the Commission access to any evidence relevant to its investigation also makes it "unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding" under the Act. A violation of this provision subjects the employee to criminal penalties. Ibid. To be sure, the protection of confidentiality that 2000e-8(e) provides is less than complete. 5 But this, if anything, weakens petitioner's argument. Congress apparently considered the issue of confidentiality, and it provided a modicum of protection. Petitioner urges us to go further than Congress thought necessary to safeguard that value, that is, to strike the balance differently from the one Congress adopted. Petitioner, however, [493 U.S. 182, 193] does not offer any persuasive justification for that suggestion. </s> We readily agree with petitioner that universities and colleges play significant roles in American society. Nor need we question, at this point, petitioner's assertion that confidentiality is important to the proper functioning of the peer review process under which many academic institutions operate. The costs that ensue from disclosure, however, constitute only one side of the balance. As Congress has recognized, the costs associated with racial and sexual discrimination in institutions of higher learning are very substantial. Few would deny that ferreting out this kind of invidious discrimination is a great, if not compelling, governmental interest. Often, as even petitioner seems to admit, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 15, disclosure of peer review materials will be necessary in order for the Commission to determine whether illegal discrimination has taken place. Indeed, if there is a "smoking gun" to be found that demonstrates discrimination in tenure decisions, it is likely to be tucked away in peer review files. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressed it this way: </s> "Clearly, an alleged perpetrator of discrimination cannot be allowed to pick and choose the evidence which may be necessary for an agency investigation. There may be evidence of discriminatory intent and of pretext in the confidential notes and memorand[a] which the [college] seeks to protect. Likewise, confidential material pertaining to other candidates for tenure in a similar time frame may demonstrate that persons with lesser qualifications were granted tenure or that some pattern of discrimination appears. . . . [T]he peer review material itself must be investigated to determine whether the evaluations are based in discrimination and whether they are reflected in the tenure decision." EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d, at 116 (emphasis deleted). [493 U.S. 182, 194] </s> Moreover, we agree with the EEOC that the adoption of a requirement that the Commission demonstrate a "specific reason for disclosure," see Brief for Petitioner 46, beyond a showing of relevance, would place a substantial litigation-producing obstacle in the way of the Commission's efforts to investigate and remedy alleged discrimination. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S., at 705 -706. A university faced with a disclosure request might well utilize the privilege in a way that frustrates the EEOC's mission. We are reluctant to "place a potent weapon in the hands of employers who have no interest in complying voluntarily with the Act, who wish instead to delay as long as possible investigations by the EEOC." EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S., at 81 . </s> Acceptance of petitioner's claim would also lead to a wave of similar privilege claims by other employers who play significant roles in furthering speech and learning in society. What of writers, publishers, musicians, lawyers? It surely is not unreasonable to believe, for example, that confidential peer reviews play an important part in partnership determinations at some law firms. We perceive no limiting principle in petitioner's argument. Accordingly, we stand behind the breakwater Congress has established: unless specifically provided otherwise in the statute, the EEOC may obtain "relevant" evidence. Congress has made the choice. If it dislikes the result, it of course may revise the statute. </s> Finally, we see nothing in our precedents that supports petitioner's claim. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), upon which petitioner relies, we recognized a qualified privilege for Presidential communications. It is true that in fashioning this privilege we noted the importance of confidentiality in certain contexts: </s> "Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705. [493 U.S. 182, 195] </s> But the privilege we recognized in Nixon was grounded in the separation of powers between the branches of the Federal Government. "[T]he privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar constitutional underpinnings." Id., at 705-706 (footnote omitted). As we discuss below, petitioner's claim of privilege lacks similar constitutional foundation. </s> In Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979), the Court recognized the privileged nature of grand jury proceedings. We noted there that the rule of secrecy dated back to the 17th century, was imported into our federal common law, and was eventually codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) as "an integral part of our criminal justice system." 441 U.S., at 218 , n. 9. Similarly, in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933), the Court recognized a privilege for the votes and deliberations of a petit jury, noting that references to the privilege "bear with them the implications of an immemorial tradition." More recently, in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), we construed an exception to the Freedom of Information Act in which Congress had incorporated a well-established privilege for deliberative intraagency documents. A privilege for peer review materials has no similar historical or statutory basis. </s> B </s> As noted above, petitioner characterizes its First Amendment claim as one of "academic freedom." Petitioner begins its argument by focusing our attention upon language in prior cases acknowledging the crucial role universities play in the dissemination of ideas in our society and recognizing "academic freedom" as a "special concern of the First Amendment." Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). In that case the Court said: [493 U.S. 182, 196] "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned." See also Adler v. Board of Education of City of New York, 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (academic freedom is central to "the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to protect" (Douglas, J., dissenting)). Petitioner places special reliance on Justice Frankfurter's opinion, concurring in the result, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957), where the Justice recognized that one of "four essential freedoms" that a university possesses under the First Amendment is the right to "determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach" (emphasis added). </s> Petitioner contends that it exercises this right of determining "on academic grounds who may teach" through the process of awarding tenure. A tenure system, asserts petitioner, determines what the university will look like over time. "In making tenure decisions, therefore, a university is doing nothing less than shaping its own identity." Brief for Petitioner 19. </s> Petitioner next maintains that the peer review process is the most important element in the effective operation of a tenure system. A properly functioning tenure system requires the faculty to obtain candid and detailed written evaluations of the candidate's scholarship, both from the candidate's peers at the university and from scholars at other institutions. These evaluations, says petitioner, traditionally have been provided with express or implied assurances of confidentiality. It is confidentiality that ensures candor and enables an institution to make its tenure decisions on the basis of valid academic criteria. </s> Building from these premises, petitioner claims that requiring the disclosure of peer review evaluations on a finding of mere relevance will undermine the existing process of awarding tenure, and therefore will result in a significant infringement of petitioner's First Amendment right of academic [493 U.S. 182, 197] freedom. As more and more peer evaluations are disclosed to the EEOC and become public, a "chilling effect" on candid evaluations and discussions of candidates will result. And as the quality of peer review evaluations declines, tenure committees will no longer be able to rely on them. "This will work to the detriment of universities, as less qualified persons achieve tenure causing the quality of instruction and scholarship to decline." Id., at 35. Compelling disclosure of materials "also will result in divisiveness and tension, placing strain on faculty relations and impairing the free interchange of ideas that is a hallmark of academic freedom." Ibid. The prospect of these deleterious effects on American colleges and universities, concludes petitioner, compels recognition of a First Amendment privilege. </s> In our view, petitioner's reliance on the so-called academic-freedom cases is somewhat misplaced. In those cases government was attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the university or those affiliated with it. In Sweezy, for example, the Court invalidated the conviction of a person found in contempt for refusing to answer questions about the content of a lecture he had delivered at a state university. Similarly, in Keyishian, the Court invalidated a network of state laws that required public employees, including teachers at state universities, to make certifications with respect to their membership in the Communist Party. When, in those cases, the Court spoke of "academic freedom" and the right to determine on "academic grounds who may teach" the Court was speaking in reaction to content-based regulation. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S., at 250 (plurality opinion discussing problems that result from imposition of a "strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S., at 603 (discussing dangers that are present when a "pall of orthodoxy" is cast "over the classroom"). [493 U.S. 182, 198] </s> Fortunately, we need not define today the precise contours of any academic-freedom right against governmental attempts to influence the content of academic speech through the selection of faculty or by other means, 6 because petitioner does not allege that the Commission's subpoenas are intended to or will in fact direct the content of university discourse toward or away from particular subjects or points of view. Instead, as noted above, petitioner claims that the "quality of instruction and scholarship [will] decline" as a result of the burden EEOC subpoenas place on the peer review process. </s> Also, the cases upon which petitioner places emphasis involved direct infringements on the asserted right to "determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach." In Keyishian, for example, government was attempting to substitute its teaching employment criteria for those already in place at the academic institutions, directly and completely usurping the discretion of each institution. In contrast, the EEOC subpoena at issue here effects no such usurpation. The Commission is not providing criteria that petitioner must use in selecting teachers. Nor is it preventing the University from using any criteria it may wish to use, except those - including race, sex, and national origin - that are proscribed under Title VII. 7 In keeping with Title VII's [493 U.S. 182, 199] preservation of employers' remaining freedom of choice, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), courts have stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of legitimate academic judgments. This Court itself has cautioned that "judges. . . asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment." Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985). Nothing we say today should be understood as a retreat from this principle of respect for legitimate academic decisionmaking. </s> That the burden of which the University complains is neither content based nor direct does not necessarily mean that petitioner has no valid First Amendment claim. Rather, it means only that petitioner's claim does not fit neatly within any right of academic freedom that could be derived from the cases on which petitioner relies. In essence, petitioner asks us to recognize an expanded right of academic freedom to protect confidential peer review materials from disclosure. Although we are sensitive to the effects that content-neutral government action may have on speech, see, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 -648 (1981), and believe that burdens that are less than direct may sometimes pose First Amendment concerns, see, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), we think the First Amendment cannot be extended to embrace petitioner's claim. </s> First, by comparison with the cases in which we have found a cognizable First Amendment claim, the infringement the University complains of is extremely attenuated. To repeat, it argues that the First Amendment is infringed by disclosure of peer review materials because disclosure undermines the confidentiality which is central to the peer review process, and this in turn is central to the tenure process, which in turn is the means by which petitioner seeks to exercise [493 U.S. 182, 200] its asserted academic-freedom right of choosing who will teach. To verbalize the claim is to recognize how distant the burden is from the asserted right. </s> Indeed, if the University's attenuated claim were accepted, many other generally applicable laws might also be said to infringe the First Amendment. In effect, petitioner says no more than that disclosure of peer review materials makes it more difficult to acquire information regarding the "academic grounds" on which petitioner wishes to base its tenure decisions. But many laws make the exercise of First Amendment rights more difficult. For example, a university cannot claim a First Amendment violation simply because it may be subject to taxation or other government regulation, even though such regulation might deprive the university of revenue it needs to bid for professors who are contemplating working for other academic institutions or in industry. We doubt that the peer review process is any more essential in effectuating the right to determine "who may teach" than is the availability of money. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (discussing how money is sometimes necessary to effectuate First Amendment rights). </s> In addition to being remote and attenuated, the injury to academic freedom claimed by petitioner is also speculative. As the EEOC points out, confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review systems. See, e. g., G. Bednash, The Relationship Between Access and Selectivity in Tenure Review Outcomes (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland). Moreover, some disclosure of peer evaluations would take place even if petitioner's "special necessity" test were adopted. Thus, the "chilling effect" petitioner fears is at most only incrementally worsened by the absence of a privilege. Finally, we are not so ready as petitioner seems to be to assume the worst about those in the academic community. Although it is possible that some evaluators may become less candid as the possibility of disclosure increases, others may simply ground their evaluations in specific examples [493 U.S. 182, 201] and illustrations in order to deflect potential claims of bias or unfairness. Not all academics will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they evaluate their peers. </s> The case we decide today in many respects is similar to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, the Court rejected the notion that under the First Amendment a reporter could not be required to appear or to testify as to information obtained in confidence without a special showing that the reporter's testimony was necessary. Petitioners there, like petitioner here, claimed that requiring disclosure of information collected in confidence would inhibit the free flow of information in contravention of First Amendment principles. In the course of rejecting the First Amendment argument, this Court noted that "the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability." Id., at 682. We also indicated a reluctance to recognize a constitutional privilege where it was "unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury." Id., at 693. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 174 (1979). We were unwilling then, as we are today, "to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to . . . an uncertain destination." 408 U.S., at 703 . 8 </s> Because we conclude that the EEOC subpoena process does not infringe any First Amendment right enjoyed by petitioner, the EEOC need not demonstrate any special justification to sustain the constitutionality of Title VII as applied to tenure peer review materials in general or to the subpoena involved in this case. Accordingly, we need not address the [493 U.S. 182, 202] Commission's alternative argument that any infringement of petitioner's First Amendment rights is permissible because of the substantial relation between the Commission's request and the overriding and compelling state interest in eradicating invidious discrimination. 9 </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Three days before the stated 20-day period expired, petitioner brought suit against the EEOC in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and an order quashing the subpoena. App. 4. The Pennsylvania District Court declined to follow its controlling court's announced "first-filed" rule, which counsels the stay or dismissal of an action that is duplicative of a previously filed suit in another federal court. See Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929 (CA3 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887, n. 10 (CA3 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 457 U.S. 1105 (1982). This declination, however, was upheld by the Third Circuit. See 850 F.2d 969, 972 (1988). Since the applicability of the "first-filed" rule to the facts of this case is not a question on which we granted certiorari, we do not address it. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals did not rule on the question whether the Commission's subpoena permits petitioner to engage in any redaction of the disputed records before producing them, because the District Court had not fully considered that issue. The Third Circuit therefore ordered that the case be remanded for further consideration of possible redaction. See id., at 982. </s> [Footnote 3 See, e. g., 118 Cong. Rec. 311 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., at 946 (remarks of Sen. Allen); id., at 4919 (remarks of Sen. Ervin). </s> [Footnote 4 Similarly, the charging party may bring an action after it obtains a "right-to-sue" letter from the Commission. 2000e-5(f)(1). </s> [Footnote 5 The prohibition on Commission disclosure does not apply, for example, to the charging party. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 598 -604 (1981). </s> [Footnote 6 Obvious First Amendment problems would arise where government attempts to direct the content of speech at private universities. Such content-based regulation of private speech traditionally has carried with it a heavy burden of justification. See, e. g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 , 98-99 (1972). Where, as was the situation in the academic-freedom cases, government attempts to direct the content of speech at public educational institutions, complicated First Amendment issues are presented because government is simultaneously both speaker and regulator. Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 , n. 18 (1987) (citing Block v. Meese, 253 U.S. App. D.C. 317, 327-328, 793 F.2d 1303, 1313-1314 (1986)). See generally, M. Yudof, When Government Speaks (1983). </s> [Footnote 7 Petitioner does not argue in this case that race, sex, and national origin constitute "academic grounds" for the purposes of its claimed First [493 U.S. 182, 199] Amendment right to academic freedom. Cf. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 -313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). </s> [Footnote 8 In Branzburg we recognized that the bad-faith exercise of grand jury powers might raise First Amendment concerns. 408 U.S., at 707 . The same is true of EEOC subpoena powers. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72 , n. 26 (1984). There is no allegation or indication of any such abuse by the Commission in this case. </s> [Footnote 9 We also do not consider the question, not passed upon by the Court of Appeals, whether the District Court's enforcement of the Commission's subpoena will allow petitioner to redact information from the contested materials before disclosing them. See n. 2, supra. </s> [493 U.S. 182, 203]

United States Supreme Court LEITER MINERALS, INC., v. UNITED STATES(1957) No. 26 Argued: Decided: January 14, 1957 </s> Petitioner filed a petitory action in a Louisiana state court against respondent mineral lessees of the United States, seeking to have itself declared owner of the mineral rights under land owned by the United States, and an accounting for oil and other minerals removed by respondent lessees under their lease from the United States. Petitioner's claim was founded on a Louisiana statute, which allegedly made "imprescriptible" a reservation of mineral rights in a deed to the United States by its predecessor in title. The United States then brought suit against petitioner and other interested parties in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to quiet title in the mineral rights and for a preliminary injunction to restrain petitioner from prosecuting its action in the state court. The District Court issued the injunction and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: </s> 1. 28 U.S.C. 2283, which restricts the granting of injunctions by federal courts to stay proceedings in state courts, is inapplicable to stays sought by the United States. Pp. 224-226. </s> 2. In the circumstances of this case, the granting of the injunctions was proper. United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 , distinguished. Pp. 226-228. </s> 3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to permit an interpretation of the state statute to be sought with every expedition in the state court. Pp. 228-230. </s> 224 F.2d 381, modified and affirmed. </s> Samuel W. Plauche, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Assistant Attorney General Morton argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Roger P. Marquis and Fred W. Smith. [352 U.S. 220, 221] </s> Charles D. Marshall argued the cause for the California Company et al., respondents. With him on the brief was Eugene D. Saunders. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents for decision important questions regarding the applicability to the United States of the restrictions against stay of state court proceedings contained in 28 U.S.C. 2283 and the propriety of the injunction decreed by the District Court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner in 1953 had filed a petitory action in a Louisiana state court against respondent-mineral-lessees of the United States. In that action, a suit by one out of possession claiming title to, and possession of, immovables, petitioner sought to have itself declared owner of the mineral rights under land owned by the United States, and it also sought an accounting for oil and other minerals removed by respondent-lessees under their lease from the United States. Petitioner founded its claim on Louisiana Act No. 315 of 1940, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, 9:5806, which, it alleged, made "imprescriptible" a reservation of mineral rights in a deed of December 21, 1938, to the United States by its predecessor in title. 1 </s> [352 U.S. 220, 222] </s> Respondent-lessees filed exceptions in the state court proceedings, urging that under Louisiana law the lessor should be made a party and the lessees discharged from the suit, that this was essentially a suit against the United States, which had not consented to be sued, that the United States was an indispensable party, and that no cause of action had been stated. The state trial court found that a cause of action had been stated, and it overruled the exceptions. </s> At this point the United States, joining petitioner and other interested parties as defendants, brought the present [352 U.S. 220, 223] suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to quiet title to the mineral rights; it also sought a preliminary injunction to restrain petitioner from prosecuting its action in the state court. The United States based its claim of ownership on the provision in the 1938 deed from petitioner's predecessor in title that the reservation of mineral rights would expire on April 1, 1945, subject to certain conditions not material to this case. The United States claimed that irreparable injury in the form of loss of royalties would result from any temporary, wrongful dispossession of its lessees by the state court proceedings. Affidavits were also submitted in support of the claim that permanent loss of wells currently producing oil would probably result from any temporary cessation of production. The petitioner moved to dismiss the United States' complaint on the ground that the state court had already assumed jurisdiction over the property in question; in the alternative, petitioner moved to stay the federal proceedings pending determination of the state court action because questions of state law were involved. </s> The District Court held that, since the United States was not a party to the state court suit, the title of the United States could be tried only in the federal court action and that an injunction against prosecution of the state proceedings should issue to protect its jurisdiction pending determination of the ownership of the property. 127 F. Supp. 439. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preliminary injunction was proper because "the district court under the clear provisions of the statute. 28 U.S.C. 1345, became vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the title of the United States to the mineral rights claimed by appellant." 224 F.2d 381, 383-384. Because of the presence of important and difficult questions of federal-state relations, questions [352 U.S. 220, 224] more difficult than the Government appears to have found them, we granted certiorari. 350 U.S. 964 . </s> 28 U.S.C. 2283 provides: </s> "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." </s> It must first be decided whether this section applies to stays sought by the United States because different answers to this question will put different aspects on other issues in the case. An analogous problem was presented in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 , where the Court held that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. 101, that no federal court had jurisdiction, subject to qualifications, to issue an injunction in labor disputes to prohibit certain acts, did not apply to the United States. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, like 28 U.S.C. 2283, effected, in general language, a limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Furthermore, since it was largely the diversity jurisdiction which spawned the substantive problems that the Norris-LaGuardia Act removed from the federal courts, the limitations on the federal courts imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, like those of 28 U.S.C. 2283, were in an area of federal-state relations calling for particular circumspection in adjudication. </s> In interpreting the general language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court relied heavily on "an old and well-known rule," albeit a rule of construction, "that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect." 330 U.S., at 272 . [352 U.S. 220, 225] While, strictly speaking, any "pre-existing" rights would have to be found in the 1789-1793 pre-statute period, 2 the rationale of the rule requires not that the rights be "pre-existing" but rather that they would exist apart from the statute. There can be no doubt, apart from the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. 2283, of the right of the United States to enjoin state court proceedings whenever the prerequisites for relief by way of injunction be present. Treating the rule invoked in the United Mine Workers case merely as an aid to construction, it would by itself lead us to hold that the general language of 28 U.S.C. 2283 did not apply to the United States in the absence of countervailing considerations, such as significant legislative history pointing toward its inclusion or inferences clearly to be drawn from relevant presuppositions for so including it. </s> In United Mine Workers, the Court did not rely entirely on the rule of construction because its reading of the Act as a whole and the legislative history supported the conclusion that the United States was not to be included. In this case, there is no legislative material to support or to gainsay the applicability of the rule of construction. There is, however, a persuasive reason why the federal court's power to stay state court proceedings might have been restricted when a private party was seeking the stay but not when the United States was seeking similar relief. The statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and state courts. This policy is much more compelling when it is the litigation of private parties which threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than when it is the United States which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a [352 U.S. 220, 226] national interest. The frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue from precluding the Federal Government from obtaining a stay of state court proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28 U.S.C. 2283 would be so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. 2283 alone. It is always difficult to feel confident about construing an ambiguous statute when the aids to construction are so meager, but the interpretation excluding the United States from the coverage of the statute seems to us preferable in the context of healthy federal-state relations. 3 </s> The question still remains whether the granting of an injunction was proper in the circumstances of this case. We start with one certainty. The suit in the federal court was the only one that could finally determine the basic issue in the litigation - whether the title of the United States to the mineral rights was affected by Louisiana Act No. 315 of 1940. The United States was not a party to the state suit and, under settled principles, title to land in possession of the United States under a claim of interest cannot be tried as against the United States by a suit against persons holding under the authority of the United States. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 . Although the state court might mould petitioner's [352 U.S. 220, 227] suit to try title into a suit for possession or might merely order respondent-lessees to account for minerals removed, nevertheless such proceedings could not settle the basic issue in the litigation and might well cause confusion if they resulted in a judgment inconsistent with that subsequently rendered by the federal court. </s> Petitioner relies heavily on United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463 . There, in a federal district court proceeding, the United States was claiming by assignment certain funds of three Russian insurance companies that were being held in the custody of a state court, in connection with the liquidation of the companies, subject to court orders concerning distribution to claimants under the state insurance laws. On the basis of this claim, the United States sought to enjoin distribution of the funds and to require payment of them to it. This Court, affirming dismissal of the complaints and denial of the injunction, held that the state court had obtained jurisdiction over the funds first and that the litigation should be resolved in that court. The Court also noted that there were numerous other claimants, indispensable parties, who had not been made parties to the federal court suit. In remitting the United States to the state court, the Court saw no "impairment of any rights" of the United States or "any sacrifice of its proper dignity as a sovereign." Id., at 480-481. </s> The situation in the present case is different. All the parties in the state court proceeding have been joined in the federal proceeding. Moreover, the Bank of New York case presented the more unusual situation where the United States, like any private claimant, made a claim against funds that it never possessed and that were in the hands of depositaries appointed by the state court. In this case, a private party is seeking by a state proceeding to obtain property currently in the hands of [352 U.S. 220, 228] persons holding under the United States; the United States is seeking to protect that possession and quiet title by a federal court proceeding. Therefore, since the position of the United States is essentially a defensive one, we think that it should be permitted to choose the forum in this case, even though the state litigation has the elements of an action characterized as quasi in rem. We therefore hold that the District Court properly exercised its jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the federal court and to prevent the effectuation of state court proceedings that might conflict with the ultimate federal court judgment. </s> One further aspect of the case remains to be considered. The District Court advanced this additional ground for its decision: </s> "Moreover, if the state court suit is allowed to proceed to final judgment, the rights of the United States to the property in question will actually be determined `behind its back' . . . for the reason that, since ownership of these mineral rights will turn on an interpretation of a state statute . . . this court and the appellate federal courts may be required, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins . . . to follow that judgment in spite of the fact that the United States is not a party to those proceedings. . . ." 127 F. Supp., at 444. </s> But the fact that the United States is not a party to the state court litigation does not mean that the federal court should initiate interpretation of a state statute. In fact, where questions of constitutionality are involved - and the Government contends that an application of the state statute adverse to its interests would be unconstitutional - our rule has been precisely the opposite: "as questions of federal constitutional power have become more [352 U.S. 220, 229] and more intertwined with preliminary doubts about local law, we have insisted that federal courts do not decide questions of constitutionality on the basis of preliminary guesses regarding local law." Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 ; see Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383 ; Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 -502. </s> The Government contends that Act No. 315 of 1940 does not apply when the parties themselves have contracted for a reservation of specific duration and that if the statute is construed to apply to this situation, it would impair the obligation of the Government's contract. Petitioner disagrees. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has never considered the specific issue or even discussed generally the rationale of the statute, especially with reference to problems of constitutionality. The District Court recognized the importance of the statute in deciding this case; it also recognized that a problem of interpretation was involved, that the statute cannot be read by him who runs. What are the situations to which the statute is applicable? Is the statute merely declaratory of prior Louisiana law? What are the problems that it was designed to meet? The answers to these questions are, or may be, relevant. Before attempting to answer them and to decide their relation to the issues in the case, we think it advisable to have an interpretation, if possible, of the state statute by the only court that can interpret the statute with finality, the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana declaratory judgment procedure appears available to secure such an interpretation, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, 13:4231 et seq., and the United States of course may appear to urge its interpretation of the statute. See Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 512 -513. It need hardly be added that the state courts in such a proceeding can decide definitively only [352 U.S. 220, 230] questions of state law that are not subject to overriding federal law. </s> We therefore modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to permit an interpretation of the state statute to be sought with every expedition in the state court in conformity with this opinion. </s> Modified and affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The reservation, in its pertinent portion, provided: "The Vendor reserves from this sale the right to mine and remove, or to grant to others the right to mine and remove, all oil, gas and other valuable minerals which may be deposited in or under said lands, and to remove any oil, gas or other valuable minerals from the premises; the right to enter upon said lands at any time for the purpose of mining and removing said oil, gas and minerals, said right, subject to the conditions hereinafter set forth, to expire April 1, 1945, it being understood, however, that the vendors will pay to the United States of America, 5% of the gross proceeds received by them as royalties or otherwise from all oil or minerals so removed from in or under the aforedescribed lands, until such time as the vendors [352 U.S. 220, 222] shall have paid to the United States of America, the sum of $25,000, being the purchase price paid by said United States of America for the aforedescribed properties. </s> . . . . . </s> "Provided that at the termination of the ten (10) year period of reservation, if not extended, or at the termination of any extended period in case the operation has not been carried on for the number of days stated, the right to mine shall terminate, and complete fee in the land become vested in the United States. </s> "The reservation of the oil and mineral rights herein made for the original period of ten (10) years and for any extended period or periods in accordance with the above provisions shall not be affected by any subsequent conveyance of all or any of the aforementioned properties by the United States of America, but said mineral rights shall, subject to the conditions above . . . set forth, remain vested in the vendors." </s> Act No. 315 provides:". . . when land is acquired by conventional deed or contract, condemnation or expropriation proceedings by the United States of America, or any of its subdivisions or agencies, from any person, firm or corporation, and by the act of acquisition, verdict or judgment, oil, gas, and/or other minerals or royalties are reserved, or the land so acquired is by the act of acquisition conveyed subject to a prior sale or reservation of oil, gas and/or other minerals or royalties, still in force and effect, said rights so reserved or previously sold shall be imprescriptible." See also the prior Act No. 151 of 1938 providing that prescription should not run against a reservation of mineral rights in real estate acquired by the United States or the State of Louisiana. </s> [Footnote 2 The basic provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2283 go back to 1793, 1 Stat. 335. </s> [Footnote 3 Most of the lower federal courts that have considered this problem have, without much discussion, reached the same result. E. g., United States v. Taylor's Oak Ridge Corp., 89 F. Supp. 28; United States v. Cain, 72 F. Supp. 897; United States v. Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261, reversed on other grounds, 312 U.S. 246 ; United States v. McIntosh, 57 F.2d 573; United States v. Babcock, 6 F.2d 160, reversed for modification, 9 F.2d 905; United States v. Inaba, 291 F. 416. But see United States v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 90 F.2d 970; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 62 F. Supp. 1017, appeal dismissed by stipulation, 151 F.2d 1022. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting in part. </s> I agree that the state action was properly enjoined; and so I concur in the opinion of the Court to that extent. But I dissent from the direction to the District Court to hold the case while the parties repair to the state court to get an interpretation of the Louisiana statute around which this litigation turns. </s> That procedure is an advisable one where private parties question the constitutionality of a state statute. An authoritative construction of the state law may avoid the constitutional issue or put it in new perspective. See Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 104 -105. In the Spector case, the plaintiff's claim was within the jurisdiction of the federal court solely because of the attack on the constitutionality of a state statute. Under 28 U.S.C. 1331, the federal district court has jurisdiction where the matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount "and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." In litigation in the federal courts under that statute, the necessity of construing state law arises because of the federal court's duty to avoid if possible a federal constitutional question. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 . In the Spector case, then, matters of state law were only ancillary to the primary responsibility of the federal court to resolve the constitutional issues. [352 U.S. 220, 231] </s> But here, although potential constitutional questions may lurk in the background, this litigation primarily concerns not federal questions but title to land claimed by the United States. It is litigation which Congress by 28 U.S.C. 1345, 1346, has entrusted to the federal district court. Those sections allow civil litigation of the United States - whether it involves federal or state law questions - to be conducted in the federal courts. In that situation it is the duty of the federal court to decide all issues in the case - those turning on state law as well as those turning on federal law. In Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 , a case in the federal courts by reason of diversity of citizenship, we refused to remit the parties to the state court for decision of difficult state law questions. We held that it was the duty of the federal court to decide all issues in the case - state or federal, difficult or easy. And see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 . There have been exceptions to this policy, notably in bankruptcy proceedings where trustees are sometimes sent into state courts to obtain adjudications on local law questions pertinent to the administration of the bankrupt's estate. See Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 309 U.S. 478 . It is peculiarly inappropriate to follow that course here. Congress has decided that the United States should have the benefit of the protection of its own courts in this type of litigation. We properly hold that the District Court, not the state court, has jurisdiction of the controversy. But we beat the devil around the bush when, having taken the litigation out of the state court, we send the parties back to the state court for its construction of Louisiana law which is the most significant issue in the case. The problem is not only to construe the state statute but to construe it constitutionally. The federal court can make that construction as readily as the state court. That is the congressional scheme and we should not change it by judicial fiat. </s> [352 U.S. 220, 232]

United States Supreme Court NEW MEXICO v. EARNEST(1986) No. 85-162 Argued: April 1, 1986Decided: June 27, 1986 </s> 103 N. M. 95, 703 P.2d 872, vacated and remanded. </s> Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was William McEuen, Assistant Attorney General. </s> J. Thomas Sullivan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Gary C. Mitchell. * </s> [Footnote * A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Indiana et al. by Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, William E. Daily and Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Attorneys General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John J. Kelly, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly, Attorney General of Delaware, Richard Opper, Attorney General of Guam, Corinne K. A. Watanabe, Attorney General of Hawaii, Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey, Anthony Celebrezze, Attorney General of Ohio, Michael Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, William G. Broaddus, Attorney General of Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Archie G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the New Mexico Public Defender Department by David Stafford and Susan Gibbs; and for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Burt Neuborne and Charles S. Sims. [477 U.S. 648, 649] </s> PER CURIAM. </s> We vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Mexico and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, concurring. </s> I agree that the decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico should be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration in light of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the admission against respondent of an out-of-court statement of a codefendant violated respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court believed that Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), was "directly on point" and mandated the reversal of respondent's conviction because there had been no opportunity for respondent to cross-examine the codefendant, either at the time the statement was made or at trial. 103 N. M. 95, 98-99, 703 P.2d 872, 875-876 (1985). </s> As Lee v. Illinois makes clear, to the extent that Douglas v. Alabama interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-examination prior to the admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no longer good law. Although Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), did not attempt to set forth specific standards for constitutional admissibility applicable to all categories of hearsay, see United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 -393 (1986), that decision did establish that a lack of cross-examination is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under the Confrontation Clause. See Lee v. Illinois, supra, at 543. * In the instant case, therefore, the State is entitled to an opportunity to overcome the weighty [477 U.S. 648, 650] presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns. </s> [Footnote * For example, in a case in which the State claims that a codefendant's confession is admissible because it "interlocks" with the defendant's confession, Lee v. Illinois sets out the following test: "If those portions of the codefendant's purportedly `interlocking' statement which bear to any significant degree on the defendant's participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by the defendant's own confession, the admission of the statement poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In other words, when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the codefendant's confession may not be admitted." 476 U.S., at 545 . </s> [477 U.S. 648, 1]

United States Supreme Court PARK'N FLY, INC. v. DOLLAR PARK AND FLY, INC.(1985) No. 83-1132 Argued: October 9, 1984Decided: January 8, 1985 </s> Petitioner operates long-term parking lots near airports in St. Louis, Cleveland, Houston, Boston, Memphis, and San Francisco. In 1969, petitioner applied to the United States Patent and Trademark Office to register a service mark consisting of the logo of an airplane and the words "Park'N Fly." The registration issued in 1971, and nearly six years later petitioner filed an affidavit with the Patent and Trademark Office to establish the incontestable status of the mark under 33(b) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), which provides that "registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark," subject to the provisions of 15 and 33(b) itself. Respondent provides long-term airport parking services called "Dollar Park and Fly," but only operates in Portland, Ore. Petitioner filed an infringement action in Federal District Court seeking to enjoin respondent from using the words "Park and Fly" in connection with its business. The District Court granted the injunction, rejecting, inter alia, respondent's defense that petitioner's mark is unenforceable because it is merely descriptive. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that incontestability provides a defense against the cancellation of a mark but may not be used offensively to enjoin another's use, that, under this analysis, petitioner could obtain an injunction only if its mark would be entitled to continued registration without regard to its incontestable status, and that therefore respondent could defend by showing that the mark was merely descriptive. The court then determined that petitioner's mark is merely descriptive and respondent should not be enjoined from using the words "Park and Fly." </s> Held: </s> The holder of a registered mark may rely on incontestability to enjoin infringement, and an infringement action may not be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. Pp. 193-205. </s> (a) The Lanham Act nowhere distinguishes between a registrant's offensive and defensive use of an incontestable mark, but, on the contrary, 33(b)'s declaration that the registrant has an "exclusive right" to use the mark indicates that incontestable status may be used to enjoin infringement. The Act's language also refutes any conclusion that an incontestable mark may be challenged as merely descriptive. Pp. 193-197. [469 U.S. 189, 190] </s> (b) Nothing in the Lanham Act's legislative history supports a departure from the plain language of the provisions concerning incontestability. Indeed, a conclusion that incontestable status may provide the basis for enforcement of the registrant's exclusive right to use a mark promotes the Act's goals in providing national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the mark's owner the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers. Pp. 197-202. </s> (c) There is no merit to respondent's argument that the Court of Appeals' decision should be upheld because trademark registrations are issued after an ex parte proceeding and generally without inquiry into the merits of an application. The facts of this case belie the suggestion that registration is virtually automatic, and respondent is simply wrong to suggest that third parties do not have an opportunity to challenge applications for trademark registration. The power of courts under 34 of the Lanham Act to grant injunctions "according to principles of equity" does not encompass a substantive challenge to the validity of an incontestable mark on the grounds that it lacks secondary meaning. Otherwise, the meaning of "equity" would be expanded to the point of vitiating the Act's more specific provisions. Similarly, the power of courts to cancel registrations and "otherwise rectify the register" under 37 of the Act must be subject to the specific provisions concerning incontestability. Pp. 202-203. </s> (d) The Court of Appeals was not justified in relying on its decision in Tillamook County Creamery v. Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Assn., 345 F.2d 158, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 , for the proposition that a registrant may not rely on incontestability to enjoin the use of a mark. Pp. 203-205. </s> 718 F.2d 327, reversed and remanded. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 206. </s> Alan E. Popkin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Timothy F. Noelker. </s> John M. McCormack argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was J. Pierre Kolisch. * </s> [Footnote * J. Thomas McCarthy filed a brief for the American Intellectual Property Law Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. [469 U.S. 189, 191] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In this case we consider whether an action to enjoin the infringement of an incontestable trade or service mark may be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. We conclude that neither the language of the relevant statutes nor the legislative history supports such a defense. </s> I </s> Petitioner operates long-term parking lots near airports. After starting business in St. Louis in 1967, petitioner subsequently opened facilities in Cleveland, Houston, Boston, Memphis, and San Francisco. Petitioner applied in 1969 to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) to register a service mark consisting of the logo of an airplane and the words "Park'N Fly." 1 The registration issued in August 1971. Nearly six years later, petitioner filed an affidavit with the Patent Office to establish the incontestable status of the mark. 2 As required by 15 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 433, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1065, the affidavit stated that the mark had been registered and in continuous use for five consecutive years, that there had been no final adverse decision to petitioner's claim of ownership or right to registration, and [469 U.S. 189, 192] that no proceedings involving such rights were pending. Incontestable status provides, subject to the provisions of 15 and 33(b) of the Lanham Act, "conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark . . . ." 33(b), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b). </s> Respondent also provides long-term airport parking services, but only has operations in Portland, Oregon. Respondent calls its business "Dollar Park and Fly." Petitioner filed this infringement action in 1978 in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon and requested the court permanently to enjoin respondent from using the words "Park and Fly" in connection with its business. Respondent counterclaimed and sought cancellation of petitioner's mark on the grounds that it is a generic term. See 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1064(c). Respondent also argued that petitioner's mark is unenforceable because it is merely descriptive. See 2(e), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e). As two additional defenses, respondent maintained that it is in privity with a Seattle corporation that has used the expression "Park and Fly" since a date prior to the registration of petitioner's mark, see 33(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(5), and that it has not infringed because there is no likelihood of confusion. See 32(1), 15 U.S.C. 1114(1). </s> After a bench trial, the District Court found that petitioner's mark is not generic and observed that an incontestable mark cannot be challenged on the grounds that it is merely descriptive. App. 75. The District Court also concluded that there was no evidence of privity between respondent and the Seattle corporation. App. 76. Finally, the District Court found sufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion. App. 76. The District Court permanently enjoined respondent from using the words "Park and Fly" and any other mark confusingly similar to "Park'N Fly." App. 77. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 718 F.2d 327 (1983). The District Court did not err, the Court of Appeals held, in refusing to invalidate petitioner's mark. Id., at 331. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that it [469 U.S. 189, 193] previously had held that incontestability provides a defense against the cancellation of a mark, but it may not be used offensively to enjoin another's use. Ibid. Petitioner, under this analysis, could obtain an injunction only if its mark would be entitled to continued registration without regard to its incontestable status. Thus, respondent could defend the infringement action by showing that the mark was merely descriptive. Based on its own examination of the record, the Court of Appeals then determined that petitioner's mark is in fact merely descriptive, and therefore respondent should not be enjoined from using the name "Park and Fly." Ibid. </s> The decision below is in direct conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984), and we now reverse. </s> II </s> Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 in order to provide national protection for trademarks used in interstate and foreign commerce. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1946). Previous federal legislation, such as the Federal Trademark Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 724, reflected the view that protection of trademarks was a matter of state concern and that the right to a mark depended solely on the common law. S. Rep. No. 1333, at 5. Consequently, rights to trademarks were uncertain and subject to variation in different parts of the country. Because trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of product quality, Congress determined that "a sound public policy requires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given them." Id., at 6. Among the new protections created by the Lanham Act were the statutory provisions that allow a federally registered mark to become incontestable. 15, 33(b), 15 U.S.C. 1065, 1115(b). </s> The provisions of the Lanham Act concerning registration and incontestability distinguish a mark that is "the common [469 U.S. 189, 194] descriptive name of an article or substance" from a mark that is "merely descriptive." 2(e), 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), 1064(c). Marks that constitute a common descriptive name are referred to as generic. A generic term is one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (CA2 1976). Generic terms are not registrable, and a registered mark may be canceled at any time on the grounds that it has become generic. See 2, 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052, 1064(c). A "merely descriptive" mark, in contrast, describes the qualities or characteristics of a good or service, and this type of mark may be registered only if the registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, i. e., it "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." 2(e), (f), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), (f). </s> This case requires us to consider the effect of the incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act in the context of an infringement action defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982). With respect to incontestable trade or service marks, 33(b) of the Lanham Act states that "registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark" subject to the conditions of 15 and certain enumerated defenses. 3 </s> [469 U.S. 189, 195] Section 15 incorporates by reference subsections (c) and (e) of 14, 15 U.S.C. 1064. An incontestable mark that becomes generic may be canceled at any time pursuant to 14(c). That section also allows cancellation of an incontestable mark at any time if it has been abandoned, if it is being used to misrepresent the source of the goods or services in connection with which it is used, or if it was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of 4, 15 U.S.C. 1054, or 2(a)-(c), 15 U.S.C. 1052(a)-(c). 4 </s> [469 U.S. 189, 196] </s> One searches the language of the Lanham Act in vain to find any support for the offensive/defensive distinction applied by the Court of Appeals. The statute nowhere distinguishes between a registrant's offensive and defensive use of an incontestable mark. On the contrary, 33(b)'s declaration that the registrant has an "exclusive right" to use the mark indicates that incontestable status may be used to enjoin infringement by others. A conclusion that such infringement cannot be enjoined renders meaningless the "exclusive right" recognized by the statute. Moreover, the language in three of the defenses enumerated in 33(b) clearly contemplates the use of incontestability in infringement actions by plaintiffs. See 33(b)(4)-(6), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4)-(6). </s> The language of the Lanham Act also refutes any conclusion that an incontestable mark may be challenged as merely descriptive. A mark that is merely descriptive of an applicant's goods or services is not registrable unless the mark has secondary meaning. Before a mark achieves incontestable status, registration provides prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce. 33(a), 15 U.S.C. 1115(a). The Lanham Act expressly provides that before a mark becomes incontestable an opposing party may prove any legal or equitable defense which might have been asserted if the mark had not been registered. Ibid. Thus, 33(a) would have allowed respondent to challenge petitioner's mark as merely descriptive if the mark had not become incontestable. With respect to incontestable marks, however, 33(b) provides that registration is conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark, subject to the conditions of 15 and the seven defenses enumerated in 33(b) itself. Mere descriptiveness is not recognized by either 15 or 33(b) as a basis for challenging an incontestable mark. </s> The statutory provisions that prohibit registration of a merely descriptive mark but do not allow an incontestable [469 U.S. 189, 197] mark to be challenged on this ground cannot be attributed to inadvertence by Congress. The Conference Committee rejected an amendment that would have denied registration to any descriptive mark, and instead retained the provisions allowing registration of a merely descriptive mark that has acquired secondary meaning. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1946) (explanatory statement of House managers). The Conference Committee agreed to an amendment providing that no incontestable right can be acquired in a mark that is a common descriptive, i. e., generic, term. Id., at 5. Congress could easily have denied incontestability to merely descriptive marks as well as to generic marks had that been its intention. </s> The Court of Appeals in discussing the offensive/defensive distinction observed that incontestability protects a registrant against cancellation of his mark. 718 F.2d, at 331. This observation is incorrect with respect to marks that become generic or which otherwise may be canceled at any time pursuant to 14(c) and (e). Moreover, as applied to marks that are merely descriptive, the approach of the Court of Appeals makes incontestable status superfluous. Without regard to its incontestable status, a mark that has been registered five years is protected from cancellation except on the grounds stated in 14(c) and (e). Pursuant to 14, a mark may be canceled on the grounds that it is merely descriptive only if the petition to cancel is filed within five years of the date of registration. 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 1064(a). The approach adopted by the Court of Appeals implies that incontestability adds nothing to the protections against cancellation already provided in 14. The decision below not only lacks support in the words of the statute; it effectively emasculates 33(b) under the circumstances of this case. </s> III </s> Nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act supports a departure from the plain language of the statutory [469 U.S. 189, 198] provisions concerning incontestability. Indeed, a conclusion that incontestable status can provide the basis for enforcement of the registrant's exclusive right to use a trade or service mark promotes the goals of the statute. The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers. See S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3, 5. National protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation. Id., at 4. The incontestability provisions, as the proponents of the Lanham Act emphasized, provide a means for the registrant to quiet title in the ownership of his mark. See Hearings on H. R. 82 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Lanham); id., at 21, 113 (testimony of Daphne Robert, ABA Committee on Trade Mark Legislation); Hearings on H. R. 102 et al. before the Subcommittee on Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 73 (1941) (remarks of Rep. Lanham). The opportunity to obtain incontestable status by satisfying the requirements of 15 thus encourages producers to cultivate the goodwill associated with a particular mark. This function of the incontestability provisions would be utterly frustrated if the holder of an incontestable mark could not enjoin infringement by others so long as they established that the mark would not be registrable but for its incontestable status. </s> Respondent argues, however, that enforcing petitioner's mark would conflict with the goals of the Lanham Act because the mark is merely descriptive and should never have been registered in the first place. 5 Representative Lanham, [469 U.S. 189, 199] respondent notes, explained that the defenses enumerated in 33(b) were "not intended to enlarge, restrict, amend, or modify the substantive law of trademarks either as set out in other sections of the act or as heretofore applied by the courts under prior laws." 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946). Respondent reasons that because the Lanham Act did not alter the substantive law of trademarks, the incontestability provisions cannot protect petitioner's use of the mark if it were not originally registrable. Moreover, inasmuch as petitioner's mark is merely descriptive, respondent contends that enjoining others from using the mark will not encourage competition by assisting consumers in their ability to distinguish among competing producers. </s> These arguments are unpersuasive. Representative Lanham's remarks, if read in context, clearly refer to the effect of the defenses enumerated in 33(b). 6 There is no question that the Lanham Act altered existing law concerning trademark rights in several respects. For example, 22, [469 U.S. 189, 200] 15 U.S.C. 1072, provides for constructive notice of registration and modifies the common-law rule that allowed acquisition of concurrent rights by users in distinct geographic areas if the subsequent user adopted the mark without knowledge of prior use. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 -416 (1916) (describing pre-Lanham Act law). Similarly, 14 cuts off certain grounds for cancellation five years after registration and thereby modifies the previous rule that the validity of a trademark could be attacked at any time. See White House Milk Products Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 27 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 1194, 111 F.2d 490 (1940). Most significantly, Representative Lanham himself observed that incontestability was one of "the valuable new rights created by the act." 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946). </s> Respondent's argument that enforcing petitioner's mark will not promote the goals of the Lanham Act is misdirected. Arguments similar to those now urged by respondent were in fact considered by Congress in hearings on the Lanham Act. For example, the United States Department of Justice opposed the incontestability provisions and expressly noted that a merely descriptive mark might become incontestable. Hearings on H. R. 82, at 59-60 (statement of the U.S. Dept. of Justice). This result, the Department of Justice observed, would "go beyond existing law in conferring unprecedented rights on trade-mark owners," and would undesirably create an exclusive right to use language that is descriptive of a product. Id., at 60; see also Hearings on H. R. 102, at 106-107, 109-110 (testimony of Prof. Milton Handler); id., at 107, 175 (testimony of attorney Louis Robertson). These concerns were answered by proponents of the Lanham Act, who noted that a merely descriptive mark cannot be registered unless the Commissioner finds that it has secondary meaning. Id., at 108, 113 (testimony of Karl Pohl, U.S. Trade Mark Assn.). Moreover, a mark can be challenged for [469 U.S. 189, 201] five years prior to its attaining incontestable status. Id., at 114 (remarks of Rep. Lanham). The supporters of the incontestability provisions further observed that a generic mark cannot become incontestable and that 33(b)(4) allows the nontrademark use of descriptive terms used in an incontestable mark. Id., at 110-111 (testimony of Wallace Martin, chairman, ABA Committee on Trade Mark Legislation). </s> The alternative of refusing to provide incontestable status for descriptive marks with secondary meaning was expressly noted in the hearings on the Lanham Act. Id., at 64, 69 (testimony of Robert Byerley, New York Patent Law Assn.); Hearings on S. 895 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1942) (testimony of Elliot Moyer, Special Assistant to the Attorney General). Also mentioned was the possibility of including as a defense to infringement of an incontestable mark the "fact that a mark is a descriptive, generic, or geographical term or device." Id., at 45, 47. Congress, however, did not adopt either of these alternatives. Instead, Congress expressly provided in 33(b) and 15 that an incontestable mark could be challenged on specified grounds, and the grounds identified by Congress do not include mere descriptiveness. </s> The dissent echoes arguments made by opponents of the Lanham Act that the incontestable status of a descriptive mark might take from the public domain language that is merely descriptive. Post, at 214-216. As we have explained, Congress has already addressed concerns to prevent the "commercial monopolization," post, at 214, of descriptive language. The Lanham Act allows a mark to be challenged at any time if it becomes generic, and, under certain circumstances, permits the nontrademark use of descriptive terms contained in an incontestable mark. Finally, if "monopolization" of an incontestable mark threatens economic competition, 33(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(7), provides a defense on the grounds that the mark is being used to violate federal [469 U.S. 189, 202] antitrust laws. At bottom, the dissent simply disagrees with the balance struck by Congress in determining the protection to be given to incontestable marks. </s> IV </s> Respondent argues that the decision by the Court of Appeals should be upheld because trademark registrations are issued by the Patent Office after an ex parte proceeding and generally without inquiry into the merits of an application. This argument also unravels upon close examination. The facts of this case belie the suggestion that registration is virtually automatic. The Patent Office initially denied petitioner's application because the examiner considered the mark to be merely descriptive. Petitioner sought reconsideration and successfully persuaded the Patent Office that its mark was registrable. </s> More generally, respondent is simply wrong to suggest that third parties do not have an opportunity to challenge applications for trademark registration. If the Patent Office examiner determines that an applicant appears to be entitled to registration, the mark is published in the Official Gazette. 12(a), 15 U.S.C. 1062(a). Within 30 days of publication, any person who believes that he would be damaged by registration of the mark may file an opposition. 13, 15 U.S.C. 1063. Registration of a mark provides constructive notice throughout the United States of the registrant's claim to ownership. 22, 15 U.S.C. 1072. Within five years of registration, any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by registration may seek to cancel a mark. 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 1064(a). A mark may be canceled at any time for certain specified grounds, including that it was obtained fraudulently or has become generic. 14(c), 15 U.S.C. 1064(c). </s> The Lanham Act, as the dissent notes, post, at 217, authorizes courts to grant injunctions "according to principles of equity." 34, 15 U.S.C. 1116. Neither respondent nor the opinion of the Court of Appeals relies on this provision [469 U.S. 189, 203] to support the holding below. Whatever the precise boundaries of the courts' equitable power, we do not believe that it encompasses a substantive challenge to the validity of an incontestable mark on the grounds that it lacks secondary meaning. To conclude otherwise would expand the meaning of "equity" to the point of vitiating the more specific provisions of the Lanham Act. 7 Similarly, the power of the courts to cancel registrations and "to otherwise rectify the register," 37, 15 U.S.C. 1119, must be subject to the specific provisions concerning incontestability. In effect, both respondent and the dissent argue that these provisions offer insufficient protection against improper registration of a merely descriptive mark, and therefore the validity of petitioner's mark may be challenged notwithstanding its incontestable status. Our responsibility, however, is not to evaluate the wisdom of the legislative determinations reflected in the statute, but instead to construe and apply the provisions that Congress enacted. </s> V </s> The Court of Appeals did not attempt to justify its decision by reference to the language or legislative history of the Lanham Act. Instead, the court relied on its previous decision in Tillamook County Creamery v. Tillamook Cheese & Dairy Assn., 345 F.2d 158, 163 (CA9), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965), for the proposition that a registrant may not rely on incontestability to enjoin the use of the mark by others. Examination of Tillamook, however, reveals that there is no persuasive justification for the judicially created distinction between offensive and defensive use of an incontestable mark. [469 U.S. 189, 204] </s> Tillamook discussed in dicta the offensive/defensive distinction and observed that incontestability protects a registrant against cancellation but cannot be used to obtain relief from an infringing use. Tillamook's authority for this proposition was John Morrell & Co. v. Reliable Packing Co., 295 F.2d 314, 316 (CA7 1961), which did reverse a finding of infringement on the grounds that incontestable status confers only defensive rights. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit based its holding in John Morrell on Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S. P. Q. 499 (1955), aff'd 44 C. C. P. A. 861 (Pat.), 242 F.2d 776 (1957), but the latter case did not in fact involve the use of an incontestable mark in an enforcement action. </s> The Patent Office in Rand McNally denied a petition to cancel a mark challenged as merely descriptive. The petitioner feared that if the mark became incontestable, use of the same mark in connection with a service different from the one specified in the registration could be enjoined. 105 U.S. P. Q., at 500. The Assistant Commissioner of Patents answered this concern by observing that an incontestable mark does not provide the registrant "with an `offensive weapon' of any greater magnitude than that which it has had since the registration issued. . . ." Id., at 501. These comments do not suggest that incontestability may never provide the basis for injunctive relief, but instead indicate that a mark may not be expanded beyond the good or service for which it was originally designated. </s> John Morrell, the judicial authority providing the most direct support for the decision below, was subsequently overruled in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (CA7), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). In Union Carbide the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its earlier decision in John Morrell was unsupported by the language or legislative history of the Lanham Act and had been based on a misreading of Rand McNally. 531 F.2d, at 373, 377. A registrant may rely on [469 U.S. 189, 205] the incontestable status of the mark in an infringement action, Union Carbide concluded, and a "`[d]efendant faced with an incontestable registered mark cannot defend by claiming that the mark is invalid because it is descriptive.'" Id., at 377 (quoting 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 11.16, p. 377 (1st ed. 1973)). </s> Other courts have subsequently followed Union Carbide and concluded that a plaintiff may rely on the incontestable status of a trade or service mark in an infringement action. See, e. g., United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 137 (CA3 1981); Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184-1185 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981). The Patent Office has also rejected any offensive/defensive distinction with respect to the use of an incontestable mark. See Ansul Co. v. Malter International Corp., 199 U.S. P. Q. 596, 599-600 (TTAB 1978). Thus, the doctrine relied on by the Court of Appeals in this case is best described as flawed in its origin and subsequently discredited by its progenitors. </s> VI </s> We conclude that the holder of a registered mark may rely on incontestability to enjoin infringement and that such an action may not be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. Respondent urges that we nevertheless affirm the decision below based on the "prior use" defense recognized by 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act. Alternatively, respondent argues that there is no likelihood of confusion and therefore no infringement justifying injunctive relief. The District Court rejected each of these arguments, but they were not addressed by the Court of Appeals. 718 F.2d, at 331-332, n. 4. That court may consider them on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., generally applies the same principles concerning registration and protection to both trade and service marks. See 3, 15 U.S.C. 1053. The Lanham Act defines a trademark to include "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 45, 15 U.S.C. 1127. A service mark is "a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 2 Petitioner also applied in 1977 to register a mark consisting only of the words "Park'N Fly." That mark issued in 1979, but has not become incontestable. The existence of this mark does not affect our resolution of the issues in this case. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1115(b) provides: </s> "If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce or in connection with the goods or services specified in the affidavit filed under the provisions of said section 1065 subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein except when one of the following defenses or defects is established: [469 U.S. 189, 195] </s> "(1) That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently; or </s> "(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or </s> "(3) That the registered mark is being used, by or with the permission of the registrant or a person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used; or </s> "(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a trade or service mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; or </s> "(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been continuously used by such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to registration of the mark under this chapter or publication of the registered mark under subsection (c) of section 1062 of this title: Provided, however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which such continuous prior use is proved; or </s> "(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and used prior to the registration under this chapter or publication under subsection (c) of section 1062 of this title of the registered mark of the registrant, and not abandoned: Provided, however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which the mark was used prior to such registration or such publication of the registrant's mark; or </s> "(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United States." </s> [Footnote 4 Sections 2(a)-(c) prohibit registration of marks containing specified subject matter, e. g., the flag of the United States. Sections 4 and 14(e) concern certification marks and are inapplicable to this case. </s> [Footnote 5 The dissent similarly takes the position that the mark was improperly issued because it was descriptive and petitioner failed to prove that it had [469 U.S. 189, 199] secondary meaning. Post, at 206-207. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals made any finding whether the mark was properly issued in 1971. After the Patent Office denied the initial application for registration in 1970, petitioner filed a request for reconsideration arguing that the mark was not descriptive. App. 54-56. The Patent Office subsequently granted registration without specifying whether the mark had secondary meaning or instead was not descriptive. Id., at 57-59. Unlike the dissent, we decline to determine in the first instance whether the mark improperly issued. Our holding is not affected by the possibility that the mark was or has become merely descriptive. </s> [Footnote 6 Representative Lanham made his remarks to clarify that the seven defenses enumerated in 33(b) are not substantive rules of law which go to the validity or enforceability of an incontestable mark. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946). Instead, the defenses affect the evidentiary status of registration where the owner claims the benefit of a mark's incontestable status. If one of the defenses is established, registration constitutes only prima facie and not conclusive evidence of the owner's right to exclusive use of the mark. Ibid. See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1946) (explanatory statement of House managers). </s> [Footnote 7 We note, however, that we need not address in this case whether traditional equitable defenses such as estoppel or laches are available in an action to enforce an incontestable mark. See generally Comment, Incontestable Trademark Rights and Equitable Defenses in Infringement Litigation, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 1067 (1982). [469 U.S. 189, 206] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> In trademark law, the term "incontestable" is itself somewhat confusing and misleading because the Lanham Act expressly identifies over 20 situations in which infringement of an allegedly incontestable mark is permitted. 1 Moreover, in 37 of the Act, Congress unambiguously authorized judicial review of the validity of the registration "in any action involving a registered mark." 2 The problem in this case arises because of petitioner's attempt to enforce as "incontestable" a mark that Congress has plainly stated is inherently unregistrable. </s> The mark "Park'N Fly" is at best merely descriptive in the context of airport parking. 3 Section 2 of the Lanham Act [469 U.S. 189, 207] plainly prohibits the registration of such a mark unless the applicant proves to the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office that the mark "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce," or to use the accepted shorthand, that it has acquired a "secondary meaning." See 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), (f). Petitioner never submitted any such proof to the Commissioner, or indeed to the District Court in this case. Thus, the registration plainly violated the Act. </s> The violation of the literal wording of the Act also contravened the central purpose of the entire legislative scheme. Statutory protection for trademarks was granted in order to safeguard the goodwill that is associated with particular enterprises. 4 A mark must perform the function of distinguishing the producer or provider of a good or service in order to have any legitimate claim to protection. A merely descriptive mark that has not acquired secondary meaning does not perform that function because it simply "describes the qualities or characteristics of a good or service." Ante, at 194. No legislative purpose is served by granting anyone a monopoly in the use of such a mark. </s> Instead of confronting the question whether an inherently unregistrable mark can provide the basis for an injunction against alleged infringement, the Court treats the case as though it presented the same question as Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (CA7), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976), a case in which the merely descriptive mark had an obvious and well-established secondary meaning. In such a case, I would agree with the Court that the descriptive character of the mark does not provide an infringer with a defense. In this case, however, the provisions [469 U.S. 189, 208] of the Act dealing with incontestable marks do not support the result the Court has reached. I shall first explain why I agree with the conclusion that the Court of Appeals reached; I shall then comment on each of the three arguments that the Court advances in support of its contrary conclusion. </s> I </s> The word "incontestable" is not defined in the Act. Nor, surprisingly, is the concept explained in the Committee Reports on the bill that was enacted in 1946. 5 The word itself implies that it was intended to resolve potential contests between rival claimants to a particular mark. And, indeed, the testimony of the proponents of the concept in the Committee hearings that occurred from time to time during the period when this legislation was being considered reveals that they were primarily concerned with the problem that potential contests over the ownership of registrable marks might present. 6 No one ever suggested that any public purpose would be served by granting incontestable status to a mark that should never have been accepted for registration in the first instance. </s> In those hearings the witnesses frequently referred to incontestability as comparable to a decree quieting title to real property. 7 Such a decree forecloses any further contest over ownership of the property, but it cannot create the property itself. Similarly the incontestability of a trademark [469 U.S. 189, 209] precludes any competitor from contesting the registrant's ownership, but cannot convert unregistrable subject matter into a valid mark. Such a claim would be clearly unenforceable. 8 </s> The case that petitioner principally urges in support of reversal, Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., supra, does not conflict with this simple proposition. The court there was dealing with a contest between two companies over the name "Eveready." There was no question that the name had acquired a well-established secondary meaning, although it was not originally registered under 1052(f). 9 The problem presented in such a case is properly resolved by [469 U.S. 189, 210] giving effect to the incontestable language of the Act, but a wholly different question is presented when the record establishes that a mark should not have been registered at all. </s> The legislative history of the incontestability provisions indicates that Congress did not intend to prevent the use of mere descriptiveness as a substantive defense to a claim of infringement if the mark has not acquired secondary meaning. The testimony in the Committee hearings concerning the public interest in preventing the grant of monopoly privileges in the use of merely descriptive phrases expressly relied on the administrative practice that was incorporated into 2(f), 15 U.S.C. 1052(f), 10 as a protection against the improper registration of merely descriptive marks. Thus, Dr. Karl Pohl testified: </s> "On the question of so-called nontechnical trademarks, Professor Handler assumes that they have been improperly registered. </s> "Now, where does that idea originate? </s> "They have very carefully circumscribed procedure for getting these marks on the register. It will by no means be easy, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, it will be exceedingly difficult to get these descriptive words on the register. The Patent Office will, in the first place, reject them, and you will have [469 U.S. 189, 211] to submit a substantial body of evidence that these words by long-continued usage, have acquired a secondary meaning, and by that long-continued usage have acquired that special status which entitles them to be protected in their secondary meaning sense. </s> "Therefore, to call these marks improperly registered trade-marks is, I believe, a misnomer. </s> "Now, if you look at the problem from that point of view, you will see that the apprehensions of Mr. Handler are more or less obviated. I believe personally that they are completely obviated, but as to nontechnical trade-marks and only a very carefully circumscribed number of trade-marks will be entitled to that protection." 11 </s> The record in this case demonstrates that Professor Handler's concern was justified, and that Dr. Pohl's assurance to the Committee was somewhat misleading; for the "Park'N Fly" mark issued without any evidence of secondary meaning having been presented to the Patent and Trademark Office. In light of this legislative history, it is apparent that Congress could not have intended that incontestability should preserve a merely descriptive trademark from challenge when the statutory procedure for establishing secondary meaning was not followed and when the record still contains no evidence that the mark has ever acquired a secondary meaning. </s> If the registrant of a merely descriptive mark complies with the statutory requirement that prima facie evidence of secondary meaning must be submitted to the Patent and Trademark Office, it is entirely consistent with the policy of the Act to accord the mark incontestable status after an additional [469 U.S. 189, 212] five years of continued use. For if no rival contests the registration in that period, it is reasonable to presume that the initial prima facie showing of distinctiveness could not be rebutted. But if no proof of secondary meaning is ever presented, either to the Patent and Trademark Office or to a court, there is simply no rational basis for leaping to the conclusion that the passage of time has transformed an inherently defective mark into an incontestable mark. </s> No matter how dedicated and how competent administrators may be, the possibility of error is always present, 12 especially in nonadversary proceedings. 13 For that reason [469 U.S. 189, 213] the Court normally assumes that Congress intended agency action to be subject to judicial review unless the contrary intent is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. 14 In this statute Congress has expressed no such intent. On the contrary, it has given the courts the broadest possible authority to determine the validity of trademark registrations "in any action involving a registered mark." 15 The exercise of that broad power of judicial review should be informed by the legislative purposes that motivated the enactment of the Lanham Act. 16 </s> Congress enacted the Lanham Act "to secure trade-mark owners in the goodwill which they have built up." 17 But without a showing of secondary meaning, there is no basis upon which to conclude that petitioner has built up any goodwill that is secured by the mark "Park'N Fly." In fact, without a showing of secondary meaning, we should presume [469 U.S. 189, 214] that petitioner's business appears to the consuming public to be just another anonymous, indistinguishable parking lot. When enacting the Lanham Act, Congress also wanted to "protect the public from imposition by the use of counterfeit and imitated marks and false trade descriptions." 18 Upon this record there appears no danger of this occurrence, and as a practical matter, without any showing that the public can specifically identify petitioner's service, it seems difficult to believe that anyone would imitate petitioner's marks, or that such imitation, even if it occurred, would be likely to confuse anybody. 19 </s> On the basis of the record in this case, it is reasonable to infer that the operators of parking lots in the vicinity of airports may make use of the words "park and fly" simply because those words provide a ready description of their businesses, rather than because of any desire to exploit petitioner's goodwill. 20 There is a well-recognized public interest in prohibiting the commercial monopolization of [469 U.S. 189, 215] phrases such as "park and fly." When a business claims the exclusive right to use words or phrases that are a part of our common vocabulary, this Court should not depart from the statutorily mandated authority to "rectify the register," 15 U.S.C. 1119, absent a clear congressional mandate. Language, even in a commercial context, properly belongs to the public unless Congress instructs otherwise. 21 In this case we have no such instruction; in fact, the opposite command guides our actions: Congress' clear insistence that a merely descriptive mark, such as "Park'N Fly" in the context of airport parking, remain in the public domain unless secondary meaning is proved. </s> The basic purposes of the Act, the unambiguous congressional command that no merely descriptive mark should be registered without prior proof that it acquired secondary meaning, and the broad power of judicial review granted by 37 combine to persuade me that the registrant of a merely descriptive mark should not be granted an injunction against [469 U.S. 189, 216] infringement without ever proving that the mark acquired secondary meaning. </s> II </s> The Court relies on three different, though not unrelated, arguments to support its negative answer to the question "whether an action to enjoin the infringement of an incontestable mark may be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive," ante, at 191: (1) the language of 33(b) is too plain to prevent any other conclusion; (2) the legislative history indicates that Congress decided not to deny incontestable status to merely descriptive marks; and (3) the practical value of incontestable status would be nullified if the defense were recognized. Each of these arguments is unpersuasive. </s> The Plain Language </s> After the right to use a registered mark has become incontestable, 33(b) provides that "the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark." 15 U.S.C. 1115(b). Read in isolation, this provision surely does lend support to the Court's holding. Indeed, an isolated and literal reading of this language would seem to foreclose any nonstatutory defense to an action to enjoin the infringement of an incontestable mark. The Court, however, wisely refuses to adopt any such rigid interpretation of 33(b). 22 </s> [469 U.S. 189, 217] </s> An examination of other provisions of the Act plainly demonstrates that no right to injunctive relief against infringement automatically follows from the achievement of incontestable status. Thus, 34 states that courts with proper jurisdiction "shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable." 15 U.S.C. 1116. If a registrant establishes the violation of any right, 35 additionally emphasizes that any recovery shall be "subject to the principles of equity." 15 U.S.C. 1117. These sections are in addition to the broad power that 37 grants to courts in "any action involving a registered mark" to "determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action." 15 U.S.C. 1119. Moreover, it is well established that injunctions do not issue as a matter of course, 23 and that "the essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity," 24 particularly when an important public interest is involved. 25 </s> [469 U.S. 189, 218] </s> In exercising its broad power to do equity, the federal courts certainly can take into account the tension between the apparent meaning of 33(b) and the plain command in 2(e), (f) of the Act prohibiting the registration of a merely descriptive mark without any proof of secondary meaning. Because it would be "demonstrably at odds with the intent of [Congress]" 26 to grant incontestable status to a mark that was not eligible for registration in the first place, the Court is surely authorized to require compliance with 2(f) before granting relief on the basis of 33(b). 27 </s> The Legislative History </s> The language of 2(e), (f) expressly demonstrates Congress' concern over granting monopoly privileges in merely descriptive marks. However, its failure to include mere descriptiveness in its laundry list of grounds on which incontestability could be challenged is interpreted by the Court today as evidence of congressional approval of incontestable status for all merely descriptive marks. </s> This history is unpersuasive because it is perfectly clear that the failure to include mere descriptiveness among the grounds for challenging incontestability was based on the understanding that such a mark would not be registered without a showing of secondary meaning. See supra, at 210-211. To read Congress' failure as equivalent to an endorsement of incontestable status for merely descriptive [469 U.S. 189, 219] marks without secondary meaning can only be described as perverse. </s> The Practical Argument </s> The Court suggests that my reading of the Act "effectively emasculates 33(b) under the circumstances of this case." Ante, at 197. But my reading would simply require the owner of a merely descriptive mark to prove secondary meaning before obtaining any benefit from incontestability. If a mark is in fact "distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce" as 2(f) requires, that burden should not be onerous. If the mark does not have any such secondary meaning, the burden of course could not be met. But if that be the case, the purposes of the Act are served, not frustrated, by requiring adherence to the statutory procedure mandated by Congress. 28 </s> [469 U.S. 189, 220] </s> In sum, if petitioner had complied with 2(f) at the time of its initial registration, or if it had been able to prove secondary meaning in this case, I would agree with the Court's disposition. I cannot, however, subscribe to its conclusion that the holder of a mark which was registered in violation of an unambiguous statutory command "may rely on incontestability to enjoin infringement." Ante, at 205; see also ante, at 196. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 33(b) enumerates seven categories of defenses to an action to enforce an incontestable mark. See 15 U.S.C. 1115(b), quoted ante, at 194, n. 3. In addition, a defendant is free to argue that a mark should never have become incontestable for any of the four reasons enumerated in 15. 15 U.S.C. 1065. Moreover, 15 expressly provides that an incontestable mark may be challenged on any of the grounds set forth in subsections (c) and (e) of 14, 15 U.S.C. 1064, and those sections, in turn, incorporate the objections to registrability that are defined in 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. 1052(a), (b), and (c). </s> [Footnote 2 Section 37, in pertinent part, provides: </s> "In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of registrations in whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action." 15 U.S.C. 1119. </s> [Footnote 3 In the Court of Appeals petitioner argued that its mark was suggestive with respect to airport parking lots. The Court of Appeals responded: </s> "We are unpersuaded. Given the clarity of its first word, Park'N Fly's mark seen in context can be understood readily by consumers as an offering of airport parking - imagination, thought, or perception is not needed. Simply understood, `park and fly' is a clear and concise description of a characteristic or ingredient of the service offered - the customer parks his car and flies from the airport. We conclude that Park'N Fly's mark used in the context of airport parking is, at best, a merely descriptive mark." 718 F.2d 327, 331 (CA9 1983). </s> Although the Court appears to speculate that even though the mark is now merely descriptive it might not have been merely descriptive in 1971 [469 U.S. 189, 207] when it was first registered, see ante, at 198-199, n. 5, I find such speculation totally unpersuasive. But even if the Court's speculation were valid, the entire rationale of its opinion is based on the assumption that the mark is in the "merely descriptive" category. See, for example, the statement of the question presented, ante, at 191. </s> [Footnote 4 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1946). </s> [Footnote 5 See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). </s> [Footnote 6 Hearing on H. R. 102, H. R. 5461, and S. 895 before the Subcommittee on Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 48 (1941) (statement of Charles Kramer, Chairman, House Committee on Patents); id., at 51, 193-194. </s> [Footnote 7 Hearings on H. R. 82 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1944) (statements of Rep. Lanham); id., at 21, 112 (testimony of Daphne Robert, ABA Committee on Trade Mark Legislation); Hearings on H. R. 102, H. R. 5461, and S. 895, supra, at 73 (statements of Rep. Lanham). </s> [Footnote 8 This distinction is not new. In 1875 and 1883 Great Britain enacted statutes which provided, in essence, that registration was conclusive evidence of the registrant's right to the exclusive use of the mark after the expiration of five years following registration. See An Act to Establish a Register of Trade Marks, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 91, 3 (1875); An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Patents for Inventions, Registration of Designs, and of Trade Marks, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 57, 76 (1883). Those statutes did not use the word "incontestable," but in other respects there is a striking similarity between the language of those Acts and the relevant provision of the Lanham Act that we construe today. It is noteworthy that the English judges refused to give the statutory language its plain meaning if a showing was made that the mark had not been properly registered in the beginning. See Edwards v. Dennis, 30 Ch. D. 454 (1885); Jackson & Co. v. Napper (Re Schmidt's Trade-Mark), 4 Rep. Pat. Cas. 45 (1886); cf. In re J. B. Palmer's Trade-Mark, 24 Ch. D. 504 (1883). </s> [Footnote 9 Although its conclusion regarding secondary meaning was contained in an alternative holding, it seems clear that the distinctiveness of the mark heavily influenced the Court of Appeals' disposition regarding incontestability. The court wrote: </s> "[W]e find it difficult to believe that anyone living in our society, which has daily familiarity with hundreds of battery-operated products, can be other than thoroughly acquainted with the EVEREADY mark. While perhaps not many know that Carbide is the manufacturer of EVEREADY products, few would have any doubt that the term was being utilized other than to indicate the single, though anonymous, source. A court should not play the ostrich with regard to such general public knowledge." 531 F.2d, at 381. </s> [Footnote 10 As I have already noted, 2(e), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e), expressly prohibits the registration of a merely descriptive mark. The exception from that prohibition, which petitioner did not satisfy in processing its application, reads as follows: </s> "Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as applied to the applicant's goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years next preceding the date of the filing of the application for its registration." 15 U.S.C. 1052(f) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 11 Hearings on H. R. 102, H. R. 5461, and S. 895 before the Subcommittee on Trade-Marks of the House Committee on Patents, supra n. 6, at 113. Dr. Pohl appeared in the hearings on behalf of the New York Merchants' Association Trade-mark Committee and was a member of the Coordination Committee. Id., at 136. </s> [Footnote 12 Recently, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, gave the following testimony before Congress: </s> "[O]ne of the biggest problems we have had is that, at any one time, about 7 percent of our 25 million documents are either missing or misfiled. The paper system was set up in 1836 and has remained virtually unchanged since then. During that time it simply has deteriorated to the point where 7 percent of the documents are missing." Hearing before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1983). </s> [Footnote 13 One treatise gives the following "advice" regarding registration: </s> "Registration on the Principal Register should be attempted if it is at all possible. As a matter of strategy, an applicant should not in the application concede that the term falls within any of the statutory bars of 2(e) which require proof of secondary meaning under 2(f). The applicant should let the Trademark Examiner prove that the term falls within one of the categories of 2(e). Since an ex parte application is like a contested proceeding between the applicant and the Federal Government, the applicant can merely await the Examiner's response and possible contention that the mark requires proof of secondary meaning. If the Examiner never makes this contention, or if the applicant convinces the Examiner or Trademark Board that the mark does not fall within 2(e), then the whole problem of 2(f) proof of secondary meaning is avoided. If the Examiner is adamant in his or her argument that the mark falls within a 2(e) category, then the applicant has several choices: He may appeal the determination: he may agree to have the mark registered on the Supplemental Register; or he may submit proof under 2(f) of secondary meaning. If the applicant qualifies for registration on the Supplemental Register, [469 U.S. 189, 213] he may thereafter apply to register the mark on the Principal Register, and perhaps rely on the five-year presumption on secondary meaning. After the examiner's initial response that the mark is barred by a 2(e) ground, as being not inherently distinctive, there is no doubt that applicant may respond in the alternative. That is, applicant may argue that (1) the mark is inherently distinctive (e. g., is not `merely descriptive') and/or (2) that even if barred by a 2(e) ground as not inherently distinctive, the mark has become distinctive through the acquisition of secondary meaning. The point is that the applicant's attorney should not concede any more weakness in the mark than is absolutely necessary. The object is to get the mark on the Principal Register as soon as possible, one way or another." 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 19:7 (1984) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 14 United States v. Erika, 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 -374 (1974); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 -141 (1967). </s> [Footnote 15 37, 15 U.S.C. 1119. </s> [Footnote 16 Cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 536 (1980) (the Court should look to the statutory language, and the objects and policy of the law, so that the Court's construction of the statute will execute Congress' true intent). </s> [Footnote 17 S. Rep. No. 1333, supra n. 4, at 5. </s> [Footnote 18 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 19 Respondent did raise the issue of "no likelihood of confusion justifying an injunction insofar as [petitioner] has no present intention of expanding into the Pacific Northwest." Because of its disposition, the Court of Appeals did not reach this issue. 718 F.2d, at 331-332, n. 4. </s> [Footnote 20 The Patent and Trademark Office's own handbook explains this point in general terms: </s> "Matter which merely describes the goods or services to which it is applied is prohibited from being registered on the Principal Register. First, to permit one person to appropriate exclusively a mark which is merely the ordinary language to describe the goods or services involved would obviously be detrimental to others who deal in the same goods or service by hindering their use of normal language in association with their goods or services. Second, there would be no assurance that a mark which merely describes would in fact be a mark indicating origin, since the purchasing public would be likely to recognize only the descriptive meaning of the matter as it would be to accord to it any significance as indicating a single source of origin of the goods or services." U.S. Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure 144 (1983). </s> [Footnote 21 See Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1320 (CCPA 1981) (recognizing the importance of the "free use of the language" in the trademark context); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (CA9) ("[O]ne competitor will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce by preventing his fellows from fairly describing their own goods"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916 (1970). Additionally, before the Lanham Act was enacted, this Court, in Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 323-324 (1872), wrote words that are still applicable today: </s> "`[T]he owner of an original trade-mark has an undoubted right to be protected in the exclusive use of all the marks, forms, or symbols, that were appropriated as designating the true origin or ownership of the article or fabric to which they were affixed; but he has no right to the exclusive use of any words, letter, figures, or symbols, which have no relation to the origin or ownership of the goods, but are only meant to indicate their name or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or symbol which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the same purpose.'" (Quoting Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599, 606-607 (N. Y. Super. 1849).) </s> [Footnote 22 The Court emphasizes that it does not address whether traditional equitable defenses are available in an action to enforce an incontestable mark. Ante, at 203, n. 7. Thus, the Court chooses not to rule on whether the language of 33(b) can be ignored when a defense such as laches or estoppel is asserted. Several courts have indicated that such defenses are allowed. See, e. g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1153 (CA9 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); Cuban Cigar Brands N. V. v. Upmann International, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1090, 1092, n. 5 (SDNY 1978), aff'd without opinion, 607 F.2d 995 (CA2 1979); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E. B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 298 F. Supp. 1309 (SDNY 1969), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971); Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 [469 U.S. 189, 217] F. Supp. 928, 955 (SDNY 1967). Several commentators have also written on the subject. 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 761 (1984). One early article noted: </s> "The fact that Section 33(b) limits the defenses against an incontestable mark to seven specific issues is possibly not conclusive. It is difficult to imagine an equity court granting injunctive relief to a registrant who comes into court with unclean hands, even though the defendant is unable to establish one of the seven specific defenses listed in Section 33(b). Other equitable doctrines such as laches and estoppel would probably also preclude injunction and damages in the case of an incontestable mark. However, there is always the possibility that the courts might give the Act a strict and technical construction, precluding any defense except those specifically enumerated." Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 35 Geo. L. J. 147, 195 (1947). </s> [Footnote 23 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982). </s> [Footnote 24 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). </s> [Footnote 25 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) ("[C]ourts of equity may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right [469 U.S. 189, 218] asserted contrary to the public interest"); Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937). </s> [Footnote 26 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); see also Garcia v. United States, ante, at 80 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 27 Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 (1982) (all parts of a statute should be given effect if possible); American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (same); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word that Congress used"). </s> [Footnote 28 Moreover, even if the owner of a registered mark may not enjoin infringement, it is not true that the registration has become "meaningless." See ante, at 196. A registration may be used to prevent the importation of goods bearing infringing marks into this country. See 15 U.S.C. 1124, 19 U.S.C. 1526, and 19 U.S.C. 1337(a). Additionally, registration in this country is a prerequisite to registration in some foreign countries. A. Seidel, What the General Practitioner Should Know About Trademarks and Copyrights 26 (4th ed. 1979); E. Vandenburgh, Trademark Law and Procedure 58 (2d ed. 1968). Further, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in an opinion recognizing that Congress had expressed its desire that scandalous matter not be registered, wrote the following regarding the benefits of registration: </s> "Once a registration is granted, the responsibilities of the government with respect to a mark are not ended. The benefits of registration, in part with government assistance, include public notice of the mark in an official government publication and in official records which are distributed throughout the world, maintenance of permanent public records concerning the mark, availability of Customs Service for blocking importation of infringing goods, access to federal courts where there is a presumption of validity of the registration . . ., notices to the registrant concerning maintenance of the registration, and, to some extent, direct government protection of the mark in that the PTO searches its records and refuses registration [469 U.S. 189, 220] to others of conflicting marks. Apart from nominal fees, these costs are underwritten by public funds." In re Robert L. McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (1981). </s> [469 U.S. 189, 221]