title: Contesting Mutual Security: India- Nepal Relations
body: The present paper analyses the existing security relations and strategic perceptions of India and Nepal and attempts to identify the common and divergent perceptions existing, if any. It tries to understand the reasons for the erosion of mutuality and its impact on Indo- Nepal relationship.
  The present paper analyses the existing security relations and strategic perceptions of India and Nepal and attempts to identify the common and divergent perceptions existing, if any. It tries to understand the reasons for the erosion of mutuality and its impact on Indo- Nepal relationship.
  India’s Security Concerns
  The geo-strategic significance of Nepal’s location between India and China has been emphasized as a prominent variable in defining India’s security perceptions towards it. If British India regarded Nepal as a buffer between the Indian and Russian empires, independent India considered it as a `principal barrier to India’ defending the northern frontiers. The security concerns of India became alive after the northern border became alive for security concerns with China going Communist in 1949 and annexing Tibet in 1950. Though India had sent protest notes to China deploring its military operations in Tibet, it accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in 1954 after realistically assessing its own limitations on being able to make any difference to the situation. Consequently, to make its exposed frontiers more secure, India tried to consolidate its security interests in the north. It signed treaties of Peace and Friendship with Bhutan in 1949 and with Nepal and Sikkim in 1950 with distinct clauses that continue to bind the security of these states with that of India. In 1949, India and Nepal had also signed an agreement on the recruitment of the Nepali Gorkhas in the Indian Army which bound the two countries with a military link. Some of the measures that were taken to strengthen India’s security interests were: setting up check posts on the border, joint monitoring and patrolling of the border by the Indian and Nepalese army personnel and intelligence sharing. India also sent military missions to help Nepal reorganise its Armed Forces. The need to reorganise the army first appeared in 1952 when a small armed force revolted against King Tribhuvan. In fact India’s security concern was not only to keep China away from Nepal but also to assist in achieving political and economic stability that could act as a guard against any foreign intervention. These sentiments find expression in Nehru’s statement in the Parliament saying “our interests in the internal conditions of Nepal became still more acute and personal, if I may say so, because of the developments across our border, because of the developments in China and Tibet, to be frank”. Consequently India’s involvement increased in developing the infrastructure and economy of Nepal which could take care of the latter’s security interests also. Indian Army Engineers constructed roads and airfields linking places of strategic importance. Significant emphasis was laid on development sectors such as education, health, agriculture, power, irrigation etc.
  However, fissures in the commonality of the security interests were visible in the late fifties and early sixties. Nepal had signed agreements with China such as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1960, road construction project from Kathmandu to Kodari (1961) and resolving the boundary issue between the two countries (1961) coinciding with strained Sino- India relations. The road had immense strategic and political importance because it was a major breach of Nepal Himalayas from the North from where there was connectivity to India. This is not to negate a country’s sovereignty to establish diplomatic relations with another country but Nepal did not show reciprocity in understanding India’s security concerns that emanated from Chinese activism in South Asia. Moreover, China’s attempts at road construction were not confined to Nepal. It had constructed the Sin kiang- Tibet Highway that cuts across the Ladakh region to India by 1958 and had built link roads from it reaching the borders of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Even Nepal’s relations with India were strained after King Mahendra took over power in his hands after dismissing the democratically elected Koirala government. If Nehru considered the royal take over as a `set back to democracy’ Mahendra considered that statements, propaganda and activities by irresponsible elements against the Kingdom could affect the friendship between the two countries and act as a hurdle in cementing the friendly ties on a permanent basis. Similarly in a press conference Mahendra said that the Kathmandu- Kodari road had economic significance for Nepal which was an internal matter of the country and, hence, outside the purview of consultations with India. Nepal, however, took a neutral stand during the Sino India war in 1962. Its Gorkha soldiers in the Indian Army fought the war.
  The convergence and divergence of security interests were once again visible on the issue of the Arms Assistance Agreement, signed in 1965, to assist in reorganization and modernization of the Royal Nepal Army with the objective of strengthening the security and independence of Nepal. The agreement was a recognition of the military links between the two countries and it established India as the primary supplier of arms to Nepal. The Government of India undertook to `supply arms, ammunition and equipment for the entire Nepalese Army on the basis of a total strength of about 17,000 men, comprising of four recognized brigades’ (clause 3(a) and also agreed to `replace the existing stock of Nepalese weapons’ (clause 3(b) The military assistance provided by India was for Nepal’s use only and `not to be diverted to any third party’ (clause 3(f). In case of India’s inability to provide arms the Government of US and UK would furnish some defence assistance to Nepal (clause 4). India also took the responsibility to train the Nepalese armed forces personnel in the defence establishments in India. (clause 3(c)).
  Though India was the primary supplier of arms and ammunitions to Nepal, it was not exclusive. Nepal could buy arms or ammunitions essential for its security from or through the territory of India (clause 5). In fact Nepal has been buying arms from sources other than India including China. However its major arms purchase from China in 1989 strained relations with India. Nepal had bought anti-aircraft guns, medium range SSM, and AK- 47 rifles. Nepal insisted on it’s sovereign and independent right to buy arms for defence against anti- terrorist activities threatening the country’s internal security. Nepal’s arms purchase from China technically was not against the arms assistance agreement or the treaty of peace and friendship. However it was against the spirit of the 1950 Treaty and 1965 Agreement, implying that the underlying motive behind signing the treaties was to have a common threat perception on China. Arms purchase from China was a step diverging from reciprocity in security concerns. Nepal did not consider China as a threat to its security, nor was it ready to accept mutuality of security concerns.
  As a sovereign country Nepal has a right to buy arms for its security. Nonetheless it is treaty bound to buy arms from India and in case of inability of India in providing arms it can approach the US and UK. In recent years to counter the Maoists insurgency Nepal has procured arms from the US, UK, Belgium and India. India has given arms worth one billion Indian rupees and has pledged to give a billion worth more.
  India’s security concerns became pronounced when smugglers, militants, , terrorists and criminals misused its open border with Nepal. Stricter vigilance on the Indo- Pak border, and concerted anti- terrorist activities in various parts of the country made Nepal a favourite refuge for extremists, thanks mainly to it’s thick jungles and porous borders which provide easy access to cross border terrorism. Pakistan has increased its presence in Nepal through Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and other means directed against India. Pakistan sees Nepal as a launching pad in India because of the easy accessibility to cross border due to lack of security checks in Nepal.
  Pakistan embassy in Nepal is alleged to be rendering regular financial assistance and providing transit facilities and fake passports to the Kashmiri and Sikh militants. It is involved in large-scale counterfeit Indian currency. ISI is said to have purchased benami land in the Terai from where anti- India activities are carried out.
  Pakistan is also alleged to be the lead player of the Islamic nexus that has started focusing on Nepal by funding madrasas. The increase in the number of madrasas astride India Nepal border and the possibility of Pakistan utilizing them for anti India activities cannot be ruled out. Madrasas per se do not posse’ a problem but their misuse in misguiding people through religious extremism is a cause of concern. More so because ISI activities are reported to be concentrated in the Terai region. Besides this, ISI is also involved in fake Indian currency operations from Nepal.
  India’s allegation of ISI activities from its soil disturbs Nepal. Even if Nepal is not directly involved in the increase of these activities, it has little resistance capacity to stop them. The hijacking of Indian Airlines plane IC 814 after it left Tribhuvan International airport at Kathmandu in December 2000 once again brought fore Indian vulnerabilities from its northern border. In a statement issued in Parliament, the then Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh said, “the hijacking incident has once again highlighted the complicity of Pakistan and of organisations patronised and supported by it in terrorist acts against India… The hijacking was masterminded by Pakistan’s ISI with the assistance of the Harkat ul Mujahideen”. The incident not only illustrates the strategic significance of Nepal in India’s security parameters but also exposes how serious were the security lacunae in the northern border. Flights between the two countries were stopped and were resumed after Nepal agreed to allow Indian officials to carry out security checks at the airport.
  Pakistan’s Nepal policy is active in trying to create wedge between India and Nepal and use it to its advantage. For example, on more than one occasion Pakistan has raised the Kashmir issue in its bilateral discussions with Nepal. However, Nepal has constantly maintained the Kashmir issue to be a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan that has to be resolved amicably by the two countries. Though Nepal tries to decrease its dependence on India, it has not taken policies against India. Such as its stand on Kashmir is closer to that of India’s position. Similarly on terrorists and extremists the Government of Nepal has assured India its full cooperation. In fact, way back in 1992 Prime Minister G.P. Koirala had assured his government’s cooperation to resist terrorism and to deter terrorists from using Nepal as a transit camp. Subsequent governments in Nepal have reiterated their cooperation with India.
  India and Nepal have agreed to resist the misuse of open border and unrestricted movement of population to each other’s territory by strengthening mechanisms for monitoring at airports, terminals and border crossings. In 1997, a Joint Working Group was established to determine modalities to monitor the border. In April 1997, Uttar Pradesh – Nepal Border Police force was raised to check illegal activities along the border.
  Nepal’s Threat Perception
  As said earlier, Nepal’s geo-strategic location has an overarching impact in defining its security perception. The description of Nepal as the `Yam between the two boulder’ by Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of the Shah dynasty, still holds true in the Nepalese perception. He had realized the vulnerability of Nepal’s landlocked location between India and China and advocated a policy of friendship with both. In the early fifties, military threat from China became prominent after it had made claims on Tibet. Nepal’s apprehensions found support in India, which was also disturbed by the political changes in the north. The common security perception found expression in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
  Nepal’s threat perception was defined by the elite in power that equated regime security with state security. Nationalism was narrowly defined as loyalty to the regime. Consequently, anti-monarchy pro-democracy forces were viewed as a threat to the regime and their ideological links with political parties and ideologues in India was seen as a threat to state security. This is not to discount the personality of the leaders. King Tribhuvan, brought in to power with the help of India, was content to be working with the political parties. However subsequent rulers wanted to marginalise democratic forces and consolidate power in their hands. Instead of following the policy of special relationship with India, King Mahendra followed the policy of equidistance between its neighbours. There by, Nepal accepted the Chinese gestures to begin diplomatic initiatives and maintain cordial relations with it. In July 1955 both Nepal and China signed an agreement for the establishment of diplomatic relations based on Panchasheel. From here on the threat perceptions of both India and Nepal diverged not because of the diplomatic relations but due to the subsequent measures that were taken to erode India’s security interests. Such as Kathmandu Kodari road construction projects to China at the time of worsening of Sino -India relations, which finally culminated in the war in 1962, was not an expression of Nepal’s reciprocity to India’s security concerns. Projects related to development work or infrastructure developments were granted to China astride India’s border. This is not to negate the sovereign rights of a country to develop diplomatic relations with another country but they ought not to be directed at the security interests of a third country.
  Nepal’s policy to pursue equidistance between its two neighbours found expression in its `Zone of Peace Concept’ in 1975. The proposal became the major foreign policy objective when on 15 December 1980 through the third amendment it was incorporated in Nepal’s constitution. Article 19 (6) of the amended Constitution declared that `The Foreign Policy of the Panchayat system shall be striven for making for making Nepal a Zone of Peace in pursuance of the basic purpose of the UNO and the Principles of non- alignment”. Thus Nepal’s policy was solemnized as equal to both its neighbours. Where as in reality Nepal had an open border and unrestricted movement of population with India and not with China. Nepal’s proposal equated the geographical reality of India with China and ignored the security concerns of India. Ignoring the reciprocity in relations Nepalese Prime Minister Tulsi Giri said that `since Nepal’s territory lies both to the North as well as to the South of the Himalayas, there is no reason to suppose that Nepal’s geopolitical importance in India is greater than it is to China’. India considered the proposal lacking in clarity and asked clarification in terms of motives and objectives achieved through the proposal. There was little difference in the attitude of the Janata Government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai and the Congress Government of Narsimha Rao in their stand on the peace zone proposal. Both wanted the entire region to be declared as a Zone of Peace. Acceptance of the proposal would have been at the cost of the neglecting geopolitical reality. There did not seem to be any mutual agreement between India and Nepal. Nepal’s insistence that its relations with China were independent of India did not find a favourable response by the latter.
  Despite Government of India’s assurances on various occasions, Nepal apprehended India’s support to the forces opposed to the regime. One reason could be that certain political ideologues in India like the socialists supported the cause of the Nepali Congress. Even during the agitation against the monarchy in 1989, a few political leaders from India were present in Kathmandu to extend their support to the democrats.
  A shift in the perception of Nepal was visible after the multi party democracy was established in 1990. Firstly, at the regional level Sino – India relations were improving. Democratic Nepal has not been overtly concerned with regime insecurity. Though India is still an important factor in the internal and external politics of Nepal, the fear of Indian interference does not seem to be prominent. The mutuality in security perception was once again emphasised in the Joint Communiqué that was signed during the visit of Prime Minister K.P. Bhattarai to India in 1991. It stressed to have “prior consultations with a view to reaching agreement on such defence related matters which in view of either country could pose a threat to its security”. These assurances not just reiterated the understanding reached in the 1950 Treaty or the 1965 Agreement but also gave an implicit assurance that Nepal would not use its policy of equidistance violating Indian security sensitivities. By accepting `prior consultations’ both the signatories accepted mutuality and sensitivity to each other’s security interests. On subsequent occasions Nepal’s policy pronouncements have been closer to India such as during the Kargil incident, Foreign Minister Dr Ram Sharan Mahat said that “the sanctity of the LOC should be maintained, the party which had violated the LOC, should restore it immediately and all intruders withdraw across the LOC”. The statement was much closer to India’s official position on LOC in the context of the Pakistani infiltration in Kargil.
  However most of Nepal’s security concerns emanate from inside the country such as the political instability, poor governance, dismal economic performance, Maoist insurgency etc. India’s response has been issue based. For example India considers the Maoists insurgency as an internal matter of Nepal and is ready to provide assistance when asked for. India has extended financial aid and arms to Nepal and has handed over a few Maoists from its territory taking care of Nepal’s sensitivity on Maoists links with the extreme Marxist groups in India. India considers multi-party democracy and constitutional monarchy as the two pillars essential for the peaceful accommodation and resolution of differences. However on the issue of Bhutanese refugees Nepal wanted India to be a party in its negotiations with Bhutan. Where as, the Indian stand has been to treat it as a bilateral issue between the two countries.
  To understand the element of mutuality in the security concerns of both the countries the Treaty of Peace and Friendship has been analysed. The Treaty was particularly selected because it contains most of the variables in the relationship whether related to security concerns or socio- economic interests. Violation of the treaty suggests breach in the mutuality of interests.
  Treaty Of Peace And Friendship
  A holistic approach of security was encapsuled in the Treaty, which takes into consideration the external and internal dimensions of threats. The treaty binds the two countries through socio- cultural and economic ties. Through the treaty India tried to be accommodative to Nepal’s socio- economic progress and stability and Nepal accepted to be sensitive to India’s security interests.
  Signed at the time of Chinese expansion towards Tibet, the treaty highlights the security considerations of both India and Nepal from its northern border. Both the governments agreed `to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments’. (clause 2) Here, the name of neighbouring state was not mentioned. No treaty categorically mentions names of an unfriendly country or those countries from which the threat emanates. Highlighting the reciprocity in security interests both India and Nepal agreed to share information on any eventuality or crisis and agreed to solve the problem through mutual consultation. Both also agreed to act in consultation on Nepal’s `imports of arms, ammunitions or war like material from or through the territory of India’.(clause 5) In fact, in the letter exchanged along with the treaty the complimentarity in the security interests gets reinforced with both the signatories agreeing `that neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor’. Both also agreed to `devise effective counter measures’ to deal with such threats. It meant that the threat to one country would be looked upon by the other as a threat to its own security. This common threat perception was the hallmark of the treaty.
  The other provisions of the treaty addressed the socio- economic variables in the relationship. Such as the citizens of one country could participate in industrial and economic development in another country without any discrimination. (Clause 6) Similarly, citizens could enjoy right of `residence, ownership or property, participation in trade and commerce and movement’ in each other’s country. (Clause 7) The provisions were favourable to Nepal as people could enter India unhindered in search of better opportunities. The letters exchanged along with the treaty explicitly states that `it may be necessary for some time to come to offer the Nepalese nationals in India protection from unrestricted competition” (clause 3). This was done to protect the interests of the Nepalese. At the same time, Nepal also agreed to give first preference to the Government of India or Indian nationals in development projects related to natural resources. India showed interest and primacy in developing the economy of Nepal.
  Though voices against India -Nepal mutual security were heard in Nepal from earlier days, officially, the Prime Minister of Nepal, K.N. Bista spoke against it following the then Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh’s statement that `situated as India and Nepal are with an open and common border both had similar problems of security, which however, did not mean there was any defence pact between the two’. Reacting to the phrase `similar problems of security’ Bista said that the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was outdated and non- operative and it was not essential to inform each other while developing relations with any third country. Holding India responsible for violating certain provisions of the Treaty, Bista said that `developments have taken place in India’s relations with the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand and with Pakistan and China on the other. Nepal was not informed about of these developments and India therefore herself assumed and has led Nepal to assume that exchange of information in such cases is unnecessary’. He also said that the arms assistance agreement does not exist’.
  Officially, the Government of Nepal took the issue of the review of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship during Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari’s visit to India in 1994. The provisions related to the security provisions (refer article 2 and 5) and the letter exchanged along with was considered out of date. Adhikari said that his government was `prepared to commit totally for strengthening India’s security and from Nepal there can be no harm on India but the concept of security umbrella is outdated”. On the provision related to the open border and the unrestricted movement of population Adhikari said, “India could absorb many Nepalese but so many Indians coming on its soils would swamp Nepal”.
  Several academicians and foreign policy experts from Nepal have raised voice against the treaty. Many feel that the review and updating of the Treaty is essential in the changing political conditions. It is said that the Treaty was signed between the Indian Government and the Rana rulers who were overthrown form power in 1951 revolution. However, treaties do not change with the changing governments. The security clauses (articles 2 and 5) are considered to be contradictory to Nepal’s policy of maintaining equidistance with its neighbours. As mentioned earlier this provision has been breached on a number of occasions by Nepal.
  Often mentioned is clause 6 of the Treaty which allows the citizens to participate in industrial and national development in each other’s country and clause 7 which grants the citizens the right to reside, own property, participate in trade and commerce and enjoy other privileges in one another’s country. Nepal is concerned about the inflow of Indians in its territory. It is often mentioned that the number of Indians moving towards Nepal is increasing and it is not in a position to allow unrestricted immigration into the country because of its size, population and economy.
  The reciprocity inherent in this provision was infringed when Government of Nepal passed an order in 1957 that made mandatory possession of a citizen ship certificate for all the Indian teachers working in Nepal. Restrictions were levied on all the foreigners including Indians from buying immovable property in Nepal in 1958. The underlying motives of these provisions were to provide a special treatment to the citizens of both countries that were not extended to people from neighbouring countries except Bhutan. For example people from neighbouring countries moving in India without visa or passport are treated as illegal but the Nepalese can move in, reside and avail job opportunities legally. But Nepal equated Indians with people from other nations.
  The political parties in Nepal are not in unison in their demands on the treaty. The Nepali Congress manifesto speaks of resolving all the problems through diplomatic dialogues by keeping intact the Nepal’s national interest, sovereignty, integrity and dignity. It doesn’t want to abrogate treaty.
  The Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) manifesto states that `the unequal and derogatory treaties and agreements including the 1950 treaty, and others signed by the Nepali Congress Panchayat and earlier Governments will all be reviewed and will be modified in compliance with the principle of equality, mutual respect and benefit’.
  The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) manifesto refers to the treaty as a black mark upon the name of peace and friendship. For Nepal it is humiliating and unequal. It is harmful to Nepal’s sovereignty, independence, security, national integrity and well being.
  None of the political parties has spelt out how the treaty has been an affront to Nepali respect and dignity. None of them have given alternatives to the existing treaty except a non- paper that was presented by Kamal Thapa, the Foreign Minister of Nepal in 1997. During Prime Minister G.P. Koirala’s visit to Indian in July- August 2000, the two sides agreed that the foreign secretaries of India and Nepal would review issues pertaining to the 1950 treaty. The first meeting of the two foreign secretaries was held on January 30 and 31, 2001 in Delhi.
  Government of India has agreed to the Nepalese demand to review the treaty but has not shown any attempt to take initiatives in providing alternatives to the existing treaty. Unlike Nepal the manifestos of the political parties in India do include comments and opinions on India- Nepal relations.
  The need to review the treaty has been mentioned mechanically by Nepal in every state level bilateral meeting with India with out clearly stating what the review means. The treaty shows lack of mutual understanding in the security concerns of both the countries. Nepal’s possible gains from review of the Treaty could be: lessened dependence on India on strategic perception, pursuing a policy of equidistance between India and China, reduced India’s economic stakes in Nepal by abolishing reciprocity meanwhile enjoying a favourable treatment from India on socio- economic issues. The emerging relation envisaged is based on non- reciprocity. This non- reciprocal relation for India would imply vulnerable border in the north and additional measures to consolidate its security. However, even with the Treaty in place India’s strategic vulnerability emerges from time to time. No treaty can bring forth mutual trust and reciprocity in security interests unless both the signatories want it. A strained treaty brings forth more suspicion and distrust on each other impacting on cooperation in other variables involved in a relationship such economy, trade, transit, harnessing of water resources, power trade. Hence the moot question is does it help to continue with a Treaty which creates more strains in relations?
  Conclusion
  Security relations between India and Nepal have been characterized by two factors: desire of India for mutual security understanding that emanates from geo-strategic significance of the northern border and Nepal’s desire to reduce salience of this by pursuing policy of equidistance between India and China. The 1950 treaty incorporated the concept of mutuality between both the countries and its operationality shows the contradictions inherent in it. The Indian effort has been to use a strong economic and social leverage which results from the open border, Nepalese working in India, and reliance of Nepal on India for transit facilities to ensure that Nepal’s behaviour corresponds to the Indian strategic requirement. The Nepalese, on the other hand, have tried to maintain closer relations with China and to thin out their defence cooperation with India to suit their purpose at various levels in an attempt to achieve their aim. If for India a secure northern border is essential for its security, for Nepal it is sovereignty and independence. Though, many a times, regime security was equated with state security. The fear emanating from mistrust and suspicion of each other has brought in tensions in the relations. In India- Nepal relations their own set of priorities and interests come in the way of mutual understanding on security interests.
  Sangeeta Thapliyal, Research Fellow, ORF