Datasets:

vblagoje

/

Law-StackExchange-Deduplicated

like 0

Can a US citizen who moves from Puerto Rico to Canada vote in the presidential election?

An American who moves abroad maintains the status he had when he lived in the homeland. So a New Yorker who moves to Canada still can vote for his congressman, senator and the nation's president. (Quite exceptionally, the former New Yorker is also responsible to continue filing his state and federal tax returns but that's a separate issue) Puerto Rican residents are usually US citizens but do not have the right to vote for representation in Washington, including not being able to vote for president. So the question arises, what happens when a Puerto Rican moves abroad? Does he acquire the right to vote? Can it be that the former New Yorker and former Puerto Rican find themselves as neighbors in Vancouver, but one is eligible to vote for US president and one isn't?

A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not.

Is it legal to secretly buy your employer's factory?

An EU factory manager is offered an opportunity to purchase the building from which his employer's business operates. He buys it and says nothing to his employer about his intention before actually becoming the new owner. By secretly becoming his employer's landlord, surely the manager now has the capacity to further increase his powers within his employer's business. For example, he may threaten to increase the rent unless he is given more freedom in relation to commercial decisions of the business. Or he may demand a stake in the business in exchange for security of tenure on the premises. In the extreme he may force the existing business out of the building entirely. But can his employer, upon learning the identity of the new premises owner, fire the manager for breach of trust in the implied terms of his contract as his acquisition of the business premises effectively makes him a partner in the business ?

This might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty. The Cornell Legal Information Institute, for example, defines the Duty of Loyalty as: The duty of loyalty stands for the principle that directors and officers of a corporation in making all decisions in their capacities as corporate fiduciaries, must act without personal economic conflict. The duty of loyalty can be breached either by making a self-interested transaction or taking a corporate opportunity. It appears that using his dual roles as the company’s landlord and its manager to negotiate a better deal for himself at his employer’s expense, would breach that. It’s difficult to see how the manager/landlord would be able to avoid taking advantage of the situation, even if he tried. For instance, would the company be able to replace him as manager if they knew he would then evict them in his capacity as landlord? The purchase itself might breach rules as well. This might, depending on circumstances, fall under the doctrine of a corporate opportunity : ". . . a corporate officer or director may not take a business opportunity for his own if: (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line of business; (3) the corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) by taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate fiduciary will thereby be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the corporation. The Court in Guth also derived a corollary which states that a director or officer may take a corporate opportunity if: (1) the opportunity is presented to the director or officer in his individual and not his corporate capacity; (2) the opportunity is not essential to the corporation; (3) the corporation holds no interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and (4) the director or officer has not wrongfully employed the resources of the corporation in pursuing or exploiting the opportunity. Guth, 5 A.2d at 509."

Is it common that a country has a law that supports additional taxing for national media?

An European country Slovenia (That small thing east of Italy) has a law that basically forces each household to pay additional tax each month for national radio-and-tv station. The amount is fixed to nearly 15€ per month regardless of household financial position. This is not about companies or public-like places such as pubs. By law a person or a family needs to pay this monthly fee regardless of actual usage of this service. A person or family may opt out of this by ensuring that they have no way of connecting to the national radio or television. So already owning a car or even a phone with internet capabilities is out of question. Is this common/normal? Does every (or most) country have such a law? This kind of law to me seems very dangerous and scary. In a way I feel like every year a new such law could be created and suddenly after 10 laws you pay 150€ per month additional tax regardless of your financial status and/or usage of services you are charged with extra. Just for more info (though I feel a bit weak with my English at this point): The law basically states that the institute for national radio and television may gather data from those paying for electricity. They are to use this list to demand payment. So basically each household needs to pay once per month. And to opt out there should be no technically possible solution to connect to radio or television at all.

Given that there are almost 200 countries on Earth and most people don't have any information about Lesotho (etc) it is impossible to say what the frequency of such taxes is. There are also many ways in which media-taxes are imposed, so it depends on which sub-class of taxes you're interested in. However, such taxes are by no means rare. Many countries impose a license requirement on televisions and / or radio: Albania, Austria, Bosnia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Montenegro, South Korea, South Africa, UK and so on. It is also indirectly collected as a fee on electric bills in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Serbia, Pakistan, Turkey, Mauritius. In general, when broadcasting is state-supported, the state gets its money from taxes, so the case in Norway and Sweden seems to be that you pay a tax for broadcast, and it's just part of your taxes, just like in the US the local transit tax becomes part of your property tax. Note that I did not list a majority of the countries in the world, because I don't know about taxing and broadcasting in Lesotho (etc.). This page gives some information, but it's not authoritative or exhaustive.

Why would this law apply?

An Extract from Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; From my research it has been implemented mainly in pharmaceutical(Pfizer/Flynn) and food industry(United brands). But it has also been implemented in the non-essential industries - technology(Rambus & IMAX). Doesn't this goes against the core of the free market and why does the CJEU believe it is fair to limit how much can be made for non-essential goods or services, especially when the customer has a choice not to buy those goods? Furthermore, wouldn't this automatically bring luxury brands such as Louis Vuitton under fire because they naturally have very large markups, which are not at all relative to the risk?

Unfair trading usually means selling below cost or engaging in cartel behaviour LV is not captured because they sell well above the cost of production, distribution, and retail. The type of behaviour that is captured is known as predatory pricing where a large competitor sells below cost in a market to drive smaller competitors out of business either by cross-subsidies from other markets or by simply absorbing the losses from greater capital reserves. A large North American coffee company has been accused of doing this when expanding into new markets. Another type of unfair practice is actively conspiring with your competitors to agree a market price, or to not compete in other dimensions - perhaps by agreeing not to advertise in certain markets. This deprives consumers of choice because there is no price differentiation or there is no opportunity to learn about competition. Other types of (arguable) unfair practices is buying up your competitors or refusing to supply certain markets (i.e. tacit or explicit agreements not to compete).

Foreign director of an Indian company passes away

An Indian company has two foreign directors and both are non resident. What happens when one of the directors passes away.

What happens when one of the directors passes away? The fact that the directors are foreign and non-resident is basically irrelevant. Filling the vacancy The governing documents of the company, probably called "bylaws" or an "operating agreement" will tell you what to do. The death of a director creates a vacancy in that directorship. Generally speaking, there will be a portion of the governing documents that applies to vacancies in directorships. Usually, it will say something like, "in the event of a directorship vacancy, a meeting of the owners of the company shall be held to elect a new director". Sometimes it will provide that all of the owners get to vote, and sometimes, it will provide that certain owners elect someone to one directorship, and the other owners elect someone to the other directorship. What if the deceased director is also an owner of the company? If the deceased director was also one of the owners of the company, the governing documents will make clear whether the surviving owners get to fill the vacancy, or if this is handled by the executor of the estate of the deceased director-owner. It also isn't uncommon for a small company to have a governing document often called a "buy-sell agreement" or "shareholder agreement". If the company has a buy-sell agreement, this will state that the company, the remaining owners, or both, have a right and/or a duty to buy out the ownership interest of a deceased owner, and will spell out the details of how this right is exercised. Management of the company until the vacancy is filled In the meantime, before the vacancy is filled, the governing documents of the company will tell you what management rights the surviving director has in the company. Usually, the governing documents will state that management of the company, at least with respect to issues that don't require supermajority votes of the owners, can continue to be conducted by the surviving director until the vacancy is filled. What if there are no governing documents? If for some reason the company has no governing documents that address these issues, which would be very unusual, the statute under which the company is organized in the first place will provide the default rules that apply if there is no agreement to the contrary. There is more than one possible statute under which a company can be organized in India. But usually, the default rules of the statute will state that the vacancy in the directorship is filled by a majority vote of the owners. The statute will also usually clarify, in the case of a deceased director-owner, if the executor of the deceased owner's estate is entitled to vote when filling that vacancy. Obligations With Regard To Third-Parties Updating public corporate records Once the vacancy is filled, this information may have to be provided to the government agency in India responsible for handling corporate records for the kind of company in question, either within a statutorily set deadline after the vacancy is filled, or in its next regularly report filed with agency. Tax filing consequences The death of a director-owner will probably also require certain things to be done on the company's annual tax returns that would not normally be done in years when a director-owner of the company does not die, and the company may need to coordinate with the estate of the deceased director-owner to provide information necessary for the preparations of the final tax returns of the deceased director-owner. Default conditions in contracts with third parties. Finally, it isn't uncommon for loan agreements or important contracts with a company that also have personal guarantees by the directors, to provide that the death of a director constitutes a default under the agreement in question. The remaining director should review the agreements and contracts of the company to determine if this is the case. If the death of the director is a condition of default under a loan agreement and/or key contract with the company, the remaining director should pro-actively seek to take whatever action the agreements or contracts state can cure the default, or should pro-actively negotiate with the other parties to the agreements or contracts to have them expressly waive the default arising from the director's death. This may make it necessary for the company or the remaining director make some sort of concession to the other parties in these contracts or agreements. For example, the other parties to a loan agreement that was personally guaranteed both both directors may insist that the company provide additional collateral for a loan that now has one guarantor instead of two, in order to convince them to refrain from calling the loan due immediately.

Can a user request the deletion of their IP address that is stored for moderation purposes?

An Internet forum logs their users' IP addresses for moderation purposes (fighting abusive sockpuppetry, temporary banning a dynamic IP address range in case of a spam attack, permanently banning static IP addresses in case of persistent toxic behaviors, etc) An abusive user request the deletion of their IP address from the logs under GDPR This seems to be in an effort to prevent the moderators from exercising the aforementioned tools, so that the user can abuse the forum undisturbed Do I need to comply?

No. Art. 17(1) GDPR lists conditions when erasure can be requested. None of the listed grounds would apply in this case. However, you might have to explain why you process the data (for moderation purposes as you explained above), and why that is lawfully. In particular Art. 5 and Art. 6 need to be taken into account. In your case, processing will be based on Art. 6(1)(f): (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Even if the data subject would be a 9 year old child, the legitimate interests of you and other forum users outweigh the objection of the data subject. Based on Art. 5 , there will be a moment when the data has to be deleted. For example 1 year after the last login attempt.

Is there a type of LLC or company where new employees are automatically members?

An LLC can be filed with the owners as employees, but what about after? Every time you add a new employee who is to be part owner of the company, you'd have to re-file. Is there a way to avoid this? Is there a type of company where employees are automatically part owners?

An LLC can be filed with the owners as employees, but what about after? Every time you add a new employee who is to be part owner of the company, you'd have to re-file. Is there a way to avoid this? In the United States, almost no U.S. state or territory, if any, require that the ownership of the company be disclosed in state business records. Instead, that is generally handled in the internal records of the company. So, the notion that something has to be filed with the government every time there is a change of ownership is mistaken in the case of the U.S. (with the caveat that a new federal law that was supposed to be effective in January 2022 but has not yet been fully implemented requires some closely held companies in the U.S. to file information about large percentage owners with an anti-money laundering agency that is not available to the general public). Outside of the United States, however, public disclosure requirements of closely held entities owners, are common. What is publicly filed is typically called "Articles of Organization" which basically contains a name, initial registered agent, and whether the entity is manger or member managed. Membership is usually governed by an Operating Agreement which is not a matter of public record. Is there a type of company where employees are automatically part owners? There is no type of entity in the United States that works like that. But, a grant of ownership, or a status as a beneficiary of a corporation's employee stock ownership plan , can be made a standard part of a particular corporation or other entity's standard employee hiring paperwork, and while this is unusual, this isn't terribly uncommon (although usually restricted to only some classes of employees), especially in unionized workplaces. These ownership records are maintained privately by the company, a third-party nominee stock holder that manages records of stockholders for a company, or by an employee stock ownership plan administrator, rather than a government entity, and would typically involve too small a percentage of ownership in too large of a business to require it to be disclosed to the federal money laundering agency.

GDPR: Applied Security vs Employee Contracts

An Organisation has 10,000 employees. All 10,000 employees have unrestricted access to ALL Customer PII data stored by the Organisation. Only 200 employees require access to the PII data for the purpose of their Job. The 10,000 employee contracts cover an agreement with the Organisation that the Employee will not abuse any PII data. Does the contract protect the Organisation, removing the need to implement Technical measures to restrict data access to the relevant 200 employees?

Almost surely not It is difficult to see how this meets the “secure by design” and “accountability” requirements of the directive. A system that allows unnecessary organisation wide access to PII (particularly unencrypted PII) is prima facie not “secure by design”. Similarly, if a data breach occurs, say by a disgruntled loading dock employee copying it to a USB key and uploading it at home, where is the “accountability”? Finding a leak among 10,000 people is way harder than among 200.

How can a lender of a small loan protect himself from the borrower not paying them back?

An acquaintance asked me to lend him money. I believed his story and lent him $100. He promised to pay me back $150 in 5 days time. It's been months and he hasn't paid me anything. I have heard that this interest rate is illegally high for a loan. Is this correct? I hadn't really consider this to be a loan but I guess it is. How can small loan lenders protect themselves? Going to court for such a small amount isn't worth it and I don't know his current address. Would have holding collateral been a legal solution? Some loan agreements found on Docracy have terms that may mitigate the impact on the lender when the borrow doens't repay (on time). Late Charge: Any payment not remunerated within 10 days of its due date shall be subject to a belatedly charge of 5 percent (%) of the payment, not to exceed $500 for any such late installment. ... Collection fees: If this note is placed with a legal representative for collection, then Borrower agrees to pay an attorney's fee of ten percent (10%) of the voluntary balance. This fee will be added to the unpaid balance of the loan. ... Costs: The Borrower shall be liable for the costs, if any, in respect of the drafting and execution of this contact [sic]. Would any of these terms or similar ones make it productive to take legal action against a borrower of $100? Would a term like "if the lender needs to resort to legal action to enforce a term of this agreement, the borrow will reimburse him for all related expenses and his time" be enforceable?

I have heard that this interest rate is illegally high for a loan. Is this correct? Yes. This is an annualized interest rate of 715,586,124,880,210%, which is far, far in excess of the maximum interest rate allowed by law. The maximum legally allowed interest rate in British Columbia is 60% per annum. So, an interest rate of 65 cents or more in a five day period on a loan of $100.00 is illegal. I don't know his current address. Lending money without collateral to people without knowing their current address is just plain stupid when it comes to lending practices. Nobody does that without a primarily donative intent. Would have holding collateral been a legal solution? Potentially. This is essentially the business model of a pawn shop. In the case of a pawn shop, the borrower delivers tangible personal property to the pawn shop owner who takes custody of it, which serves as collateral for a small loan with a set, legal interest rate, for a fixed period of time much greater than five days (typically several weeks or to several months). If the loan is not repaid, the collateral becomes the property of the lender in full payment of the loan, and the parties haggle in advance over the fair market value of the collateral against which the customer may borrow the full amount. A pawn is essentially equivalent to an outright sale of tangible personal property (almost always used) in exchange for cash, with a right to rescind the deal for a modest interest charge within X number of days after the sale. Since the pawn shop owner has some asset of the borrower to collect from in the event of non-payment, and the loan is "non-recourse" (i.e. collection rights are limited to taking ownership of the collateral), it isn't important to even know the address of the borrower, and no lawsuits are necessary for the lending pawn shop owner to be made whole if the loan is not repaid. The down side of running a pawn shop is that the owner needs to have considerable skill to value the collateral at a price sufficient to repay the loan together with a fair share of the administrative expenses of the operation on a case by case basis, for the very modest profit margin associated with a typical pawn shop. Most people who are skilled enough to value tangible personal property accurately enough to make money running a pawn ship are also skilled enough to do other things that pay better. Late Charge: Any payment not remunerated within 10 days of its due date shall be subject to a belatedly charge of 5 percent (%) of the payment, not to exceed $500 for any such late installment. Late charges are considered in the maximum interest rate calculation, so you need a much longer term loan and a much lower interest rate for this to be legally permissible. Collection fees: If this note is placed with a legal representative for collection, then Borrower agrees to pay an attorney's fee of ten percent (10%) of the voluntary balance. This fee will be added to the unpaid balance of the loan. Not sure what is meant by the "voluntary balance." It isn't inherently improper to include the costs of collection in a loan agreement, and indeed, I think that this may be the default rule of law in British Columbia without any contractual term under loser pays rules of civil procedure. But, a court can decline to award more than the "reasonable" legal fees incurred to collect a debt, and it is not at all clear that even the minimal amount of legal fees one could incur to collect a debt would be reasonable to collect a loan of $100 and interest. Likewise, while there are "hard money loans" (i.e. loans secured only by collateral and no personal obligation to pay that can be enforced against an individual's assets in court), where it is customary for the legal costs of drafting the loan documents to be paid by the borrower rather than the lender, for the most part, this simply makes no sense, because even 12 minutes of legal time (0.2 hours in the typical legal billing format) is an excessive amount to charge for a $100 loan for a five day period of time. This would typically be $50-$60 or more. It would probably be treated as an interest charge and hence would be illegal in British Columbia. Would a term like "if the lender needs to resort to legal action to enforce a term of this agreement, the borrow will reimburse him for all related expenses and his time" be enforceable? Reimbursement for out of pocket court filing fees and any photocopying costs and process server costs is likely to be enforceable. Reimbursement for the lenders own time to enforce the loan in the event of a default is probably not enforceable in the case of a $100 loan, even at minimum wage. Making small loans has historically been a marginal economic sector for precisely this reason. Even if the default rate is low, the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing (in the event of defaults) a small loan and the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing these promise for a much larger loan are similar. But the dollar amount of interest generated by a small loan is much smaller relative to the administrative costs involved than the interest on a large loan. Credit card companies and similar lenders make small loans affordable by automating the lending process, screening borrowers based upon credit ratings, making many loans each month to the same borrower, and making loans to many, many borrowers to spread the risk out. But making small loans on a one-off basis is not a profitable venture. Business models that charge enough to be profitable with small loans, like payday lenders and car title lenders in the United States, usually have some sort of collateral or de facto collateral (like a post-dated check), and tend to be shut down by regulators because their interest rates typically need to be on the order of 150%-400% per annum to make a profit, due to high administrative costs involved in making small loans relative to the amount of the loan. But interest rates this high are considered exploitive and are illegal. Another business model, which essentially describes the business model in the question except for the enforcement method, is called "loan sharking". The main difference between legitimate or almost legitimate small loan lending and loan sharking, is that loan sharks enforce their loans by having organized crime enforcers beat up people who don't pay, rather than using lawsuits to deal with loan defaults. This is, of course, completely illegal and a serious crime.

Furlough/partial-unemployment and demand by employer to perform different role than hired for

An acquaintance is employed for a role in housekeeping and is currently on furlough but receiving benefits and unemployment plus federal supplement. Employer called today and demanded they come back to work in landscape (completely different job than they were hired for) and threatened them with loss of employment and refusal to rehire in the future if they don't accept. Is this legal, and if they refuse and lose their job, how does it affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? Location is Virginia, USA.

A person might have an employment contract with specific start and stop dates, but otherwise in the US an employee can be fired at any time for any reason. An employment contract might specifically spell out particular duties, so if they are hired to weld, they cannot be required to program computers under the conditions of the contract. Explicit contracts with job security and limits on duties that can be assigned are often negotiated for employees by their union. In lieu of any contractual obligations to the contrary, a person can be hired and fired for any or no reason, so a person who is furloughed can be fired, if they don't come back and do something totally different, if that's what the boss requires. In Virginia, you have to seek employment and accept it if suitable employment is available. Refusing to take a different job would normally disqualify you for unemployment benefits. If the requirements of the employment are impossible to satisfy (e.g. requires an unreasonable commute), you would not be disqualified. It is possible that a landscaping job would not be "suitable" for a person working housekeeping, but far from guaranteed. It is not a valid reason to refuse an offer "because I don't like that job", but "I physically can't lift more than 10 lbs" would be valid, if the replacement position involves lifting 80 lb stones.

Why are books contraband in a US boot camp?

An acquaintance of mine has signed up for the US army and is now in his first six months, I guess what's called basic training. He was not allowed to bring books and asked us to send him reading material. A military website states for basic training: Dice, playing cards, dominoes, magazines, newspapers and books will be confiscated. (For completeness: There is an exemption for one religious book.) I understand that there may be little time or remaining energy in boot camp to read but is there an official rationale which was brought forward when the regulation was instated?

When it comes to preventing disciplinary issues, the military much prefers simple solutions that work. This will at times result in rules which ban things that aren't really a problem, along with the things that really are, but to tailor the regulation to ban only what needs to be banned can result in rules that take two lawyers and a judge to puzzle out. Your drill sergeant hasn't got time for that. And there are magazines that the military will see as needing to be banned. Porn (even though the on-base store sells it) was prohibited when I went through boot camp. I don't know if it was from a moralistic stance, or the simple fact that someone will steal someone else's copy of Playboy , which will probably result in a fight. Shortly before I enlisted in the military, the recruiter held a meeting at which a former drill sergeant told us about what to expect in boot camp. He touched on the things that we were told to leave at home. I asked whether a paperback novel was allowed or not, and he said that there isn't enough spare time in six months of boot camp to finish a book. It may seem, from the outside, that disallowing a novel is an unreasonable abridgement of your rights, but the actual effect on you is minimal. Boot camp only runs from two to three months, and the last time I checked nobody ever died from a lack of entertainment. There are hills more worthy of dying on than this. Gaming materials are probably be contraband because they might be used for gambling. That can lead to an outright brawl, and while a good fighting spirit is quite welcome, fisticuffs in the barracks are not.

Is this fraud by abuse of position?

An acquaintance of mine is the leaseholder of a flat. The management company for the block has appointed Ms P to be the person specifically responsible for this block. Ms P has awarded a significant part of the maintenance work to Cleaning Ltd without going through the usual tender process. The work done by Cleaning Ltd was shoddy and not good value for money. According to Companies House, Cleaning Ltd is at least 75% owned by Mr Q, who shares a home address with Ms P. Companies House also shows that Ms P and Mr Q were previously both directors of another company, now dissolved. The UK Fraud Act 2006 includes: 4 Fraud by abuse of position (1) A person is in breach of this section if he— (a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another person, (b) dishonestly abuses that position, and (c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position— (i) to make a gain for himself or another, or (ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. (2) A person may be regarded as having abused his position even though his conduct consisted of an omission rather than an act. Clearly Miss P has failed in her fiduciary duty, and the management company has paid compensation accordingly. My question is, does the conduct of Ms P and Mr Q rise to the level of fraud? Edit: The management company has already paid compensation for this; I was wondering about criminal fraud rather than civil actions to recover damages.

does the conduct of Ms P and Mr Q rise to the level of fraud? Yes, it does if it can be proved that Ms P's misconduct actually caused losses to her employer or other cognizable stakeholders. The only entities with standing to proceed against Ms P are the ones incurring losses as a result of Ms P's conflict of interest. Your inquiry does not reflect how or whether the misconduct reasonably affects the leaseholder. Thus, my presumption is that the leaseholder only pays the landlord or management company a pre-established fee and has no cognizable interest in the company's internal affairs (such as Ms P's work performance). A viable claim against Mr Q would require proving additional conditions and/or knowing the contract between Mr Q and the management company, neither of which are palpable in your inquiry. But the aforementioned remark on standing applies here as well.

Can someone who primarily lives abroad vote in America if they happen to be a citizen?

An acquintance of mine is in an interesting situation. This person is a student in America, but their primary residence, personal upbringing, and national identity belong to another country. However, they happen to be an American citizen because they were physically born here . Assuming I have my facts straight, this means that a lot of complications that normally surround immigration to America are not relevant to this person. Does this include voting? Can this person register to vote (and then do so) with no more stringent a process than full-time Americans would go through? If this person were to leave America after they graduate (but maintain their citizenship), from which address could they maintain voter registration?

Yes, so long as you are still a US citizen, it does not matter if you no longer maintain residence in the United States. If you no longer have any sort of residence that can be claimed as a current residence, you simply register at whatever the last residence you used was when you lived in the United States (even if someone else lives there now). You would then have an absentee ballot mailed to you overseas. However, if you don't maintain any sort of residence in the United States, you will only be eligible to vote for federal offices (president, senate, house). You won't be allowed to vote in state or local elections. The keywords you'll need for voting are: UOCAVA, which is a program that allows for easier voting overseas (in some cases the ballot can actually be emailed to you and you are only responsible for printing it out, filling it out, and mailing it back). FPCA, which is the form you fill out. It actually doubles as a registration and an absentee ballot request, so you only have to fill out one form. The absentee request is good for all elections in the calendar year it is submitted, so you only have to fill it out once for both the primary and the general.

Organizational rights to access users' emails?

An administrator over the Google Apps (Gmail) account within my organization had some concerns about a user and discovered some problematic emails. The user was suspended and Google Apps access revoked. The user didn't really do anything illegal, but it was against organizational policy, etc. There is some question of legal liability that has arisen. The user who feels "violated" is now threatening that their account was accessed illegally and is saying he's looking into suing the administrator for getting into his email. Everything we've read seems to indicate that any kind of email server (even a service like Google Apps/Gmail) is not considered private and that you can't do anything (legal or otherwise) about someone like an administrator or account owner accessing it. Is this true?

If this is a company provided account it is the company’s not the user’s. The user has no reasonable expectation of privacy.

Can a hit and run victim sue the car owner for not having insurance?

An adult driver hit-and-ran someone who found the car later at the driver's mom's house. Her son had been driving but she owned the car. She talked to the police and gave them the insurance card, which had expired 9 months prior. If one sued the son in small claims court for the damages, could one sue her also? She has more assets so a victim could be fully paid sooner than just from her son. UPDATE 1: Jurisdiction is Bonneville County, Idaho; inside Idaho Falls city limits. Re: previous question, I didn't word it well, and some users edited it to remove information which caused answers that weren't applicable anymore. I decided to narrow the focus and try asking again. UPDATE 2: Damages are about $5k. A cop told me later that she's alo responsible for costs because she didn't have insurance, that's where I got the idea about sueing her also. I don't know if he's wrong. Idaho is an at-fault state and requires proof of $25k/$15k bodily and property liability insurance before registering a car. He lives with her and drives her car; therefore he should be on her insurance. They also check VIN every two months with a nationwide database to ensure they still have insurance. Violations include suspended car registration, license suspension, and required SR-22 insurance (expensive). Second violation is up to six months jail and up to $1k fine. The mom has court history of not having car insurance, but they've been dismissed. It's odd she didn't have card in car each time, so she either she really does forget to put in her car, or she buys a policy the same day as citation to prove to court she was insured and get charges dismissed. I think she does have insurance, but gave officer cancelled card so she only pays $75 ticket, her rates don't go up, and her son can make payments over several years. I hope by suing her with son, that I can force her to bring forth the insurance or risk a lien on her house, force sale of valuable items, etc. That's why I'm hoping to include her in lawsuit.

You can't sue her for not having insurance. You sue for the damage you suffered. You can name her as a defendant alongside her son on the theory that she contributed to the accident by letting her son use the car, and then let the judge sort out who gets landed with the liability. Depending on the rules in your jurisdiction you might have to pay her travel expenses and/or lost wages if the judge decides she wasn't to blame (and the same for her son, but that sounds like a slam-dunk). However you might be better off going for victim restitution . That way the order gets made as part of the criminal case against the son. Less hassle for you, and the state authorities are responsible for actually getting the money out of them. Edit: It turns out that Idaho has the Family Car Doctrine in its law, so the mother is legally liable for her son's accident (thanks to ohwilleke for the pointer).

What is unearned advance payment?

An advance payment is unearned per se, they didn't work for it, they were just given it. Why reiterate that is is unearned? The way I understand it is that somebody is given an advance payment but did nothing to earn it afterwards, for example it says here "...for failure to promptly return unearned advance payments of fees after Hammond did not take reasonable steps to advance Mrs. McBratney's case." Movant v. Maxwell Lee HAMMOND Otherwise it is a fine example of tautology.

An advance payment is given in expectation that it will be earned. In the future when the work has been done the payment is now an "earned advance payment" It seems that the case is about someone who took an advance and then took no steps towards earning it and presumably did not return it, hence it is "unearned". There is no tautology here as an advance that happened in the past may be earned or unearned.

Is my name and email address being sent to another customer a GDPR violation?

An agency, to which I provided my personal email address (contains my full name), has emailed me and another of their customers (both emails in "TO" field). The other customer and I have nothing to do with each other and should have been contacted in separate emails. This was just laziness on the agent's part. Is this a breach of GDPR and, if so, what should the agency do now?

Yes, it’s a breach of the GDPR They should report the breach to the regulator within 72 hours of the breach. For a high risk breach, they should also inform the individuals. However, if the only personal information disclosed was an email address, this is not high risk because people regularly reveal this to many people and organization. Of course, if the context reveals more personal info (e.g. if the email is a client circular from a brothel), then that’s more serious.

Must a law be broken for a court to hear the case?

An agreement between a union and association has expired. Though it had been renewed for many years an impasse has been reached and lockouts have happened. The union has taken the association to court for negotiating in bad faith. They claim they want an opt out clause which allegedly would give them the choice as to when the agreement applies to them. Would such a contract be enforceable if one party gets to decide when it applies to them? Both sides claim the other is spreading disinformation which is destabilizing the industry and will cause work to go to other jurisdictions/countries. When do courts hear a case and issue orders? Is it only when a law is alleged to have been broken? Is it technically breaking a law to negotiate in bad faith? If a company is doing something to cause wide spread economic damage would a court order them to stop?

Short Answer Must a law be broken for a court to hear the case? Generally speaking a union or management group involved in a labor dispute has to allege that the other side did something that entitled them to some sort of relief under the applicable labor laws and any surviving provisions of the collective bargaining agreement of the parties. But an adjudicator can only extremely rarely impose the economic terms of a new collective bargaining agreement, and then generally only after the parties have been ordered to participate in mediation and failure to produce a collective bargaining agreement. The far more common resolution of a failure to reach a new collective bargaining agreement is to allow a strike or lockout to continue until an agreement is reached. But, in rare circumstances, typically when a strike is not permitted for public policy reasons, a third-party arbitrator can sometimes impose economic terms for a new collective bargaining agreement when efforts to negotiation new terms fail. This said, different subjects of labor disputes, and different kinds of employment (in industry or occupational type) are often handled differently from each other. Canada has at least twenty-one different labor boards or tribunals to handle different kinds of labor disputes, each with its own separate authorizing statute. Long Answer There Is More Than One Set Of Labor Laws In Canada Labor law is a somewhat tricky thing that doesn't always follow general principles of contract law. There is considerable statutory guidance in this area that is not present in ordinary contract law, and it isn't entirely one size fits all. In particular, the labor laws that apply to public sector unions are different from those that apply to private sector unions, and there are some industries and occupations that are regulated differently than others in the union-management relations area. For example, the actions that janitors at a private medical facility may legally take in a labor dispute are different from the actions that doctor-employees at a private medical facility may take, which are different again from the actions that military personnel in a government owned and run military hospital may take. Special rules and forums are also often implicated if the employer is in the midst of a bankruptcy. The main details regarding these categories of laws are discussed under the last heading of this answer. The exact extent of a labor board or tribunals' authority depends upon the nature of the dispute, whether the dispute is public sector or private sector, and if the dispute is in the private sector, whether it involves one of the 10% of so of private sector unionized employers that are governed by special federal laws that apply to critical or pervasively multi-province or international industries. There Are Several Main Kinds Of Union-Management Disagreements When a collective bargaining agreement is or was in place between a recognized union and an employer unit as defined under the applicable labor laws (which are not always defined in the same way in every union, with factories, for example, usually organized on a work place basis, but the movie industry, in contrast, usually organized on an industrywide basis), there are several of kinds of disputes that can arise. Disputes Over Future Contract Terms One kind of dispute is a dispute over what the economic terms of a future collective bargaining agreement. Usually, in the context of private sector employees that aren't subject to any special rules, the decision making authority will not impose particular economic terms on either side, although it might order the union and management to mediate their dispute with a labor law mediator selected in a method provided by the old collective bargaining agreement or by law. If a mediation order has been entered, there could conceivably be a violation of that mediation order arising from failing to negotiate in good faith, but failing to negotiate in good faith usually involves failing to listen to what the mediator and/or the other side has to say for a reasonable amount of time, or failing to present any opening offer in the negotiation that the other side could accept if it wanted to, or presenting an offer so absurd (e.g. a $1000 dollar an hour minimum wage of entry level janitors in 2022) that it amounts to not making an offer at all. But generally speaking, unless some special circumstances (e.g. public employees or critical essential employees of some kind defined by statute) are involved a court won't impose economic terms on either party and won't consider a mere failure to compromise meaningfully from an initial stance after hearing out the other side to constitute bad faith negotiation. The law applicable to collective bargaining in Canada (as of April 2008) is reviewed here . Unfair Labor Practice Disputes The other kind of dispute between a union and the management group that it is dealing with, is that one side or the other has engaged in something that is defined by law as an unfair labor practice. For example, in Canada (although the same conduct would usually be ignored by authorities in China or France) if union members kidnap the labor negotiators for the management team and detail them in a windowless room without access to the outside world, that would probably constitute an unfair labor practice by the union, while a management action to hire goons to intimate the union members, or informants to spy in the inner discussions of the union negotiators would probably constitute an unfair labor practice on the management side. Obviously, I've presented some very extreme examples, and the interplay of what does or does not constitute an unfair labor practice in light of the relevant statutes and case law is arcane to the point of being byzantine in practice, with lots of legal guidance and lots of room for lawyers for both sides to disagree over how to apply the law to the facts. Also, some of these disputes may be defined as criminal conduct to be handled by criminal prosecutors, rather than in the labor law context, or may be handled in parallel in both forums. The authority deciding the matter can consider allegations of unfair labor practices and impose sanctions or issue court orders accordingly, if there are. Disputes Over Contract Implementation There is also a third kind of dispute, over how a collective bargaining agreement that is in place should be implied in practice to incidents involving particular workers or to particular employer policies. For example, there might be a dispute over whether a particular employee was properly fired for good cause, or over whether a proposed fringe benefits plan is consistent with the collective bargaining agreements terms. These are frequently hired by an agreed panel of arbitrators that handles all of the disputes that arise over the term of a collective bargaining agreement. But this kind of dispute is really beyond the scope of the question. Disputes Between Union Members And Unions Over Union Operations Another kind of dispute sometimes handled in a labor law forum in accordance with union-management laws is a dispute that arises between one or more union members and their own union (e.g. a disputed election of union officers). See, e.g. here (reviewing the substantive law that applies, while largely glossing over the procedural side of these disputes). But this also appears to be beyond the scope of the question. Who Is Authorized To Resolve Or Address Particular Disputes? I have avoided using the term "court" in lieu of the "authority deciding the question" because I am not familiar enough with the procedural side of Canadian labor law to know who this authority is, and that is something that is likely to vary based upon the kind of employer involved, the nature of the dispute, and the stage of the process that the dispute adjudication process for the dispute has reached. At least in the first instance, these kinds of disputes are almost never handled by ordinary courts that handle non-union related civil or criminal matters, unless an unfair labor practices dispute simultaneously constitutes a criminal offense that is prosecuted like any other crime. There are at least twenty-one labor boards or tribunals in Canada. One for the federal public sector, one or more for national private sector essential industries at the federal level, one for all private and public sector workers in Quebec, and a respective public sector and private sector body in each of the other nine provinces. These boards or tribunals handle labor disputes in the first instance and possibly an initial review of a delegated hearing officer's decision, but at some point their decisions are appealable by some process to one or more provincial courts in the case of the at least nineteen provincial level labor boards or tribunals, and ultimately to the Canadian Supreme Court, and to one of more federal courts (and at a minimum ultimately to the Canadian Supreme Court) in the case of the two ore more federal labor boards or tribunals. It is also conceivable in at least some cases that the union and management could agree, either post-dispute, or in some cases even pre-dispute under the previous expired collective bargaining agreement, to have matters that they set forth as the subject-matter subject to this treatment, resolved by a panel of private arbitrators rather than the usual labor labor tribunals or boards. The particular forum that applies to a particular kind of labor law dispute in Canada doesn't really change, however, the basic sketchy outline of the substantive Canadian labor law described above that applies to whomever is the adjudicator between the union and management in a particular labor dispute. The article on collective bargain cited above states: In Canada collective bargaining is shaped by a tight statutory structure used to regulate almost every aspect of of the union-manangement relationship. Such legislation closely regulates the formation of the collective bargaining relationship, governs the conduct and timing of the bargaining process, places restrictions on economic conflict, and may, in some cases, mandate certain terms of the collective agreement. The legislation confers broad administrative powers on labour relations boards or tribunals, which play a major role in the application of the legislation (Carter 1995). Labour tribunals regulate both management and union activity and may restrain some forms of employer interference with union organizing and bargaining activity as well as the untimely use of economic sanctions by trade unions. Unlike the United States, the labour relations jurisdiction of the Canadian federal government is much more extensive than that of the state governments. Legislative authority in Canada is divided among eleven different jurisdictions, ten provincial and one federal. As a result of various court interpretations of the Canadian Consitution, the jurisdiction of the federal government has been restricted to undertakings falling within its specific legislative authority and to conduct falling within its criminal law power. Due to the constitutional division of legislative authority, most private sector employees in Canada fall under the jurisdiction of the labour laws of the province in which they work. Approximately 90% of private sector workers are provincially regulated.In addition to workers employed in manufacturing, mining (excluding uranium), forest products industries, construction, service industries, and local transportation, employees of provincial and local government are covered by provincial jurisdiction. Although the federal government’s labour relations jurisdiction covers a relatively small percentage of private sector employees, these include workers in a number of important areas of the economy including: interprovincial or international air, rail shipping and trucking operations; broadcasting, banks, uranium mines, and grain elevator operations. All federal public sector employees fall within federal jurisdiction but are covered by a different collective bargaining statute than federal private sector employees. The article then continues to explain that: In 1967, the Public Services Staff Relations Act (PSSRA) was passed, creating a new and distinctive collective bargaining structure for employees of the federal government and providing for arbitration or the conciliation/strike route as its final dispute resolution mechanism. The PSSRA granted collective bargaining rights to workers in federal departments, a number of federal agencies for which the Treasury Board is the designated employer, and a number of government agencies or separate employers who administer their own labour relations programs. Since the passage of this legislation, all provincial governments have given their public servants the right to collectively bargain, including the right to strike in some jurisdictions and arbitration in others. In Quebec, all workers, private, public and parapublic, come under the Quebec Labour Code. In Manitoba and Prince Edward Island, public servants are granted the right to collective bargaining through their respective civil service statutes. The remaining seven provinces have special public-sector labour relations statutes, which grant the right to collective bargaining. Since the middle of the 1970s, the public sector has become the most highly unionized segment of the Canadian economy. Collective bargaining has been extended to cover not only workers in the public sector employed by federal, provincial and municipal governments, but workers in the parapublic sector not directly employed by governments, but rather by organizations extensively supported by government funding—this includes teachers, health-care workers, police officers and firefighters. The evolution of the collective bargaining process, which now includes public sector workers in health care, education, government services, has affected not only the way public services are provided but has also contributed to higher levels of taxation and forced the re-definition of the meaning of public services. For example, in Quebec, publicly funded religious schools operated on something akin to U.S. voucher systems are subject to its labor laws which are more or less similar between private sector and public sector unions and are dealt with by a single tribunal with any distinctions between the two treating unions at these schools as public sector, rather than private sector unions.

Notarization in the absence of parties

An agreement between two parties ( one Indian and another South Korean) is to be Notarized in India. The authorized signatory ( a foreign nation) of the first party is in South Korea. I suppose Notarization requires physical presence of both the parties in presence of a Notary. So in this case what should be done? Can a PoA be sent by the first party to a friend here in India, who signs in front of Notary on the behalf of the first party?

There is no reason that both parties must be present in front of a notary at the same time. It is common place to have multiple signature pages executed at different times by different people in different places. The guy in India signs his page of the contract in the presence of a notary in India, and the guy in South Korea signs his page of the contract in the presence of a notary in South Korea. I have parties sign contracts like that several times a week. If an original copy needs to be maintained for some reason, the original can be mailed or sent by FedEx or the equivalent. Also, your obsession with notarization makes no sense and suggests that you really have no understanding of contract law or business practice. The only documents that are routinely notarized are: conveyances of real estate, mortgages, wills, durable powers of attorney, trusts, living wills, and affidavits in court cases or real estate records. Notarization hasn't been important in commercial agreements since the 19th century and is usually dispensed with entirely.

India/Japan: Validity of Indian Notarised Agreement in Japan

An agreement between two parties (one from India and one from Japan) is notarised in India. As per the terms of the agreement the arbitration (if the need arise in future) venue would be Japan. 1- What is the validity of such an agreement which is stamped by a notary in India (but the arbitration venue will be Japan)? 2- Is there any need to get it notarised in Japan also?

The agreement doesn't have to be notarized under either the law of India or the law of Japan (unless there are some highly unusual facts in this case not mentioned in the question). In this situation, the notarization merely provides one additional means to prove that the agreement was actually signed by the parties whose signatures appear on the agreement, rather than being forged. It is not possible to determine, without knowing more about the agreement, whether the arbitration agreement would be valid. The validity of the arbitration agreement would probably be determined under the law of Japan since that is the specified venue, unless the agreement provided otherwise. Japan allows disputes over some agreements to be resolved by arbitration, but not every possible kind of dispute. For example, Japan prohibits arbitration in domestic relations and adoption cases . India likewise has certain kinds of disputes for which arbitration is prohibited (for example, rent control). A subject matter that cannot legally be arbitrated in India might also render the arbitration agreement void despite a Japanese forum. Both India and Japan do, however, permit arbitration of international "commercial" disputes, which normally would involve business to business contracts.

Breaching and unconditional agreement

An agreement is drafted between 2 parties to sell a small business. The agreement is unconditional. The agreement requires the vendor provide a breakdown of prepaid amounts on settlement by a given time (say 12pm) so the purchase price can be adjusted. The purchaser is then required to settle by a given time (say end of the day). There is nothing in the agreement that specifically contemplates how breaches are to be addressed. There is nothing specifically stating that payment is contingent on receipt of the information required to the adjustment. Preparation of the adjustment document reveal that key representations made by the seller (and stated as being key representations) were substantially incorrect. It is accepted that the seller has breached the agreement in at least 2 ways - They did not provide a settlement document on time, and they made a material misrepresentation. Questions (Absent any clauses in the agreement speaking to how conflicts are resolved) - Does a material breach of the agreement by the vendor allow the purchaser to withhold payment and/or void the agreement? If the vendor subsequently supplies a correct adjustment (which reflects turnover less then represented and relied on by the purchaser) is the purchaser obligated to settle, even though the vendor is in breach of the agreement? (Although the jurisdiction is NZ, I am also interested in how this is contemplated in places with similar legal systems like Australia, UK and Canada)

Does a material breach of the agreement by the vendor allow the purchaser to withhold payment and/or void the agreement? The purchaser's right to rescind the contract largely depends on whether the vendor's key misrepresentations were fraudulent, since their fraudulent nature contravenes the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing . If not fraudulent, then the analysis would center on what ascertainable losses (if any) the vendor would incur as a result of the purchaser's decision. If the vendor subsequently supplies a correct adjustment (which reflects turnover less then represented and relied on by the purchaser) is the purchaser obligated to settle, even though the vendor is in breach of the agreement? It depends on who acts first. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 256 implies that, before the vendor retracts the misrepresentations, the purchaser insofar as injured party would have to notify the vendor that the key misrepresentations have changed his position or that these constitute a repudiation he considers to be final. Obviously the purchaser would be entitled to the reimbursement of his prepayments (see Restatement at § 373).

What is the meaning of "exploitation" in a publicity agreement and is it necessary for a waiver of claims?

An agreement says: "I hereby expressly release, discharge and waive all claims, demands, losses and liabilities...which may arise from my participation...hereunder or as a result of the exploitation of the rights granted hereunder." What is exactly is meant by "exploitation" here? Seems like " as a result of the utilization of the rights granted hereunder " would have the same meaning and reach the same goal (waiver of claims). Not sure if this is a term of art, so to speak, though and if it's not used then the meaning of the provision would change (lessen the company's protection).

"Utilization of" and "exploitation of" mean the same thing in this context.

Does volunteer photographer own copyright?

An amateur photographer at a scenic rest stop sees a couple trying to compose a decent photo of themselves with the beautiful river in the background. This happens so often that as he approaches nobody even needs to say a word: They hand him their camera, and then step back so he can take their picture with it. But in this hypothetical scenario something extraordinary happens: As he takes their picture a commercial airplane doing an emergency landing hits the river in the frame of the photo . So he happens to have pressed the shutter button on what turned out to be a very valuable picture. Let us supposed that a media buyer offers $10k to license the photo. Who owns the copyright to that photo? On the one hand, the camera owners could argue that the photographer exercised no more "creative expression" than does a tripod or selfie stick. They just didn't have one handy, so they composed the photo and the photographer was just a mechanism to hold the camera and release the shutter. Therefore, they must own the copyright. On the other hand, the photographer could argue that he "fixed the expression" of the creative work. As an experienced photographer he made subtle decisions regarding framing and timing of the photo that were outside of the control of the couple. Alternatively, if he hadn't been volunteering to photograph the couple with their camera, he could have instead been holding his own camera and captured the valuable element of the photo, which was the serendipitous emergency landing. Does any law or jurisprudence inform who owns the copyright in this scenario? If the aforementioned facts suggest it is the couple (and owners of the camera), then let us change one fact: After taking the couple's desired photo, the photographer sees the airplane out of the corner of his eye and, with no time to spare, shifts the camera to capture a separate spectacular photo of the water landing. Does he now have firm claim on the copyright to that photo? And if so, can the photographer enforce his property rights in the photo, given that it was captured and is stored on equipment he does not own and cannot legitimately possess? I.e., can't the camera owner say, "OK, you own the photo copyright, but I own the medium where you put its only copy, and I will not sell or grant you access to that medium except for the full value of the photo."

What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now . The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states , copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.

What is the process for obtaining an anonymous internet poster's identity for a civil lawsuit?

An anonymous person can, given some effort and a minimum of expertise, ruin a person's life on the internet through defamation. (The popular method currently is to forge authentic looking screenshots of a person posting insensitive or hateful statements, and setting them loose online) If a person is victimized by an anonymous person online in this way, what are the steps for them to exact damages in a civil court case? Not too interested in if it's practical, I'm wondering if it's even possible. How would a person compel Twitter/Reddit/etc. to disclose the ISP information on their account? How would a person compel an ISP to disclose the subscriber information (address, name) for the IP address? Is obtaining the ISP subscriber's information enough to bring a lawsuit against them? Would they able to argue they didn't post the messages and bear no liability, even if it originated from their network? If it originated from an open wifi hotspot, would the proprietor bear responsibility at this point? Can the extensive legal costs of pursuing the case to its conclusion be added to the damages sought easily?

First, read the definitions of defamation and libel be sure you understand them: Defamation | Wex Legal Dictionary | Cornell . Yes, posting to Twitter and Reddit is publishing, and people can post provably false facts on those services and defame someone in a civil law sense. But Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (Electronic Frontier Foundation) mostly protects those services from defamation claims based on statements made by users of such a service. (Things are different if the case is criminal as a result of clear threats of violence, terrorism, etc.) ...what are the steps for them to exact damages in a civil court case? Find a lawyer, convince him/her to take the case, and file suit. if you don't know the person's real name, your lawyer will have to sue "John Doe" and point that out in the suit (and subpoenas) with the alleged Twitter handle or Reddit user name. How would a person compel Twitter/Reddit/etc to disclose the ISP information on their account? Read the various legal aspects of each service, i.e. Twitter Legal FAQs and User Agreement - Reddit and others. Your lawyer can explain that you can only try to compel them to disclose the IP and the ISP used with a subpoena during your lawsuit. How would a person compel an ISP to disclose the subscriber information (address, name) on the IP address? Since most ISPs protect their customer data, you will probably have to subpoena the ISP during your lawsuit. But your ability to do this can depend on if the ISP is a private company or a government entity, such as a university. State laws may come into play. Is obtaining the ISP subscriber's information enough to bring a lawsuit against them? Would they able to argue they didn't post the messages and bear no liability, even if it originated from their network? If it originated from an open wifi hotspot, would the proprietor bear responsibility at this point? Yes, you can sue an individual with such information; but there's no guarantee you'd win. Sure, because they can claim anything, such as someone else was using their computer or IP. No, owners of hotspots are generally not liable, and they protect themselves with TOS you agree to when you use the hotspot. Can the extensive legal costs of pursuing the case to it's conclusion be added to the damages sought easily? Legal costs can possibly be added, depending on jurisdiction. But seeking damages and actually winning them through a jury verdict are completely different things.

Do faculty own the copyright to course materials they create even if their contract or university IP policy specify otherwise?

An answer on Academia.SE claims that in general, any lectures, slides, textbooks, or scholarly articles you [as faculty] write belong to you and not your school, and this is true regardless of whether the school posts a policy on its web site claiming otherwise, and even regardless of whether they get you to sign a contract stating otherwise. and cites Weinstein v. University of Illinois and Hays v. Sony Corp in support of this statement. However, it seems to me that Weinsten v. University of Illinois explicitly considers university IP policy in making the determination of whether the scholarly work under consideration was "work for hire". First it says The statute is general enough to make every academic article a "work for hire" and therefore vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars. See DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. Copyright Society 17 (1984). The University of Illinois, like many other academic institutions, responded to the 1978 revision of the copyright laws by adopting a policy defining "work for hire" for purposes of its employees, including its professors. then it quotes the university policy on work for hire, and then it makes a determination based on whether the university IP policy on work for hire can be interpreted to apply to the particular work under consideration : The University's copyright policy [on work for hire] reads more naturally when applied to administrative duties. Perhaps the University forms a committee to study the appropriate use of small computers and conscripts professors as members. The committee may publish a report, in which the University will claim copyright. We do not say that a broader reading is impossible, but such a reading should be established by evidence about the deliberations underlying the policy and the course of practice Furthermore, the more recent Bosch v. Ball-Kell refers to a directive in Weinstein, to look for evidence of intent from the history and deliberations that occurred in implementing the University's policy. Thus it is not clear to me whether the so-called "teacher exception" to work for hire applies if the university's intellectual property policy or contract asserts ownership of copyright of course materials.

The leading case in this area is Commun. for Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 1 There are two routes to employers automatically being the first owner of copyright in a work produced by a hired party: in an employee-employer relationship, or in certain works by independent contractors if an express agreement is made. CCNV construed the definition of "work made for hire" in 17 USC 101 to split paid work into two categories: work done by "employees" and work done by "independent contractors". Copyright in "employees" are automatically owned by the employer. Copyright in work by independent contractors can also be owned by the employer if it falls under a set of specific categories of work (which course materials are certainly included in) and "parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire". The term "employee" above takes on a special meaning in this context. The court held that the test is to use common law agency principles: To determine whether a work is a "work made for hire" within the § 101 definition, a court should first apply general common law of agency principles to ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor The court listed 12 (non-exhaustive) factors to be taken into account when deciding whether a hired party is a an employee under common law agency and thus the work would be automatically considered a "work for hire": the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished the skill required the source of the instrumentalities and tools the location of the work the duration of the relationship between the parties whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work the method of payment the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party whether the hiring party is in business the provision of employee benefits the tax treatment of the hired party This is a case-by-case judgement, and courts have not made a ruling that applies to all university course materials universally. I'm sure we could all imagine arrangements that would fall squarely on the "employee" side of the test, and thus give the employer first ownership of copyright in course material just as easily as we could imagine arrangements that would fall squarely on "independent-contractor" side. There are arguments on both sides regarding whether the typical university professor or lecturer relationship would be considered an "employee" relationship for the purpose of the "work made for hire" definition (I'll come back to reference some law journal articles later). Regardless, even if particular relationship is found to be an "independent-contractor", the employer can still be the first owner of copyright in the works if "parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire" (assuming the work is one of the categories listed in the 17 USC 101 definition of "work made for hire" part (2), and course material certainly is). Last, even for independently contracted work that doesn't fall under one of the special categories in "work made for hire" (2), parties could agree to a contract requiring assignment of copyright. In this case, the employer wouldn't be the initial owner, but they would be due equitable assignment of the copyright by the author. 1. There are various reasons why Weinstein (mentioned in the question) is not relevant. Weinstein doesn't hold that the author of course material is automatically the copyright owner. Weinstein is pre-CCNV. Weinstein was a Seventh Circuit opinion; CCNV is a Supreme Court opinion. The test that was being used at the time by the Seventh Circuit (an "actual control of the work" test) was rejected by the Supreme Court in CCNV.

Can an employment contract regulate relationships between employees?

An answer to a Workplace question raised my curiosity. The idea is that a company could legally (contractually) forbid its employees to have a relationship. Is this at all possible somewhere? (The discussion under that answer seems to point to the US). How is "relationship" defined in such a case? Talking OK but holding hands not OK? Going to the cinema OK but sleeping together not OK?

Contracts are allowed to address or stipulate anything that is not illegal. Employers are generally allowed to apply restrictions that do not discriminate against protected characteristics. I.e., unless there is a law against it, employers are almost certainly allowed to regulate the relationships between employees. In the U.S. this is quite common. For example, many companies have "anti-nepotism" and/or "fraternization" policies . The former restricts employment of people with a (usually pre-existing) familial relationship. The latter restricts behavior that could be perceived as "dating." Sometimes the restrictions only apply to employees with a supervisor/subordinate relationship, but it is not unusual to see a blanket prohibition.

Practicing medicine across state lines

An answer to a question on MedicalSciences.SE prompts my question. Suppose I live in Wisconsin and I fly to Texas to undergo a procedure with a specialist there (I chose the states arbitrarily; I'm not asking about state-specific laws). So I have my procedure and fly back home. This procedure requires medications and months of follow-up care, which means I'll be receiving instructions from the Texas doctor and his staff, refills on prescriptions, and so forth. These interactions are all via phone or email while I remain physically in the state of Wisconsin. I'm fairly sure all these interactions would be considered "practicing medicine" under the law. However, the Texas doctor is not licensed to practice medicine in the state of Wisconsin; and yet, that's exactly what he's doing. How does the law view this? Do state laws typically make a specific exception for an ongoing doctor/patient relationship or is this covered only by case law? If it's based on case law, a citation would be a nice addition to an answer. Bonus points for adding how it would work if the specialist was in Europe instead of Texas.

I think it really is a state-by-state answer. From a web site for doctors getting involved in Telemedicine. Some medical boards such as Alabama, Montana and Oregon offer a special purpose telemedicine license. Other states that regulate telepractice in medicine include Texas, Florida, California and Colorado. The levels of regulation vary greatly by state. For example, California and Florida, similar to New York, require full licensure to perform any function relating to patient care, with some exceptions for consultation in some instances. Other states are exploring the issue of telepractice and in general, how to regulate it. That site has a state-by-state break out of the rules. I see other things about reciprocity among some nearby states. Three states (MD, NY, VA) and Washington DC provide reciprocity to bordering states. Alabama and Pennsylvania have agreements with other states to grant licenses to out-of-state physicians who have licenses in states that reciprocally accept their home state licenses. In Connecticut, an out-of-state physician can obtain an in-state license based on his or her home state standards.

Where does the "liquidated" in "liquidated damages" come from?

An answer to a recent question mentions that "all the money you have" is not a valid liquidated-damages clause in a contract. The main use of "liquidation" that I'm familiar with is in the context of bankruptcy, where it does indeed mean (roughly) "all the money you have". (Well, strictly speaking it means converting all your assets to cash, with the implication that you then give all the money you have your creditors.) Are these usages of "liquidated"/"liquidation" related? Or more generally, where does the term "liquidated" in "liquidated damages" come from?

Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition 1979) states that "Liquidated" means Ascertained; determined; fixed; settled; made clear or manifest. This is the sense of the term in which damages are "liquidated" by a liquidated damages term in a contract or statute. The damages are settled by a contractual determine rather than being "unliquidated" (i.e. uncertain or unresolved or undetermined.) The sense of the word meaning sold or reduced to money, is derivative of this prior and more fundamental sense of the word. When assets or an estate are reduced to money their fair market value is fixed or settled. How a word meaning "liquid" came to mean "make clear" when modified is speculative (given what my brief research uncovered), but I think that are some very plausible paths by which that could have happened. According to Oxford Languages : liq·ui·date /ˈlikwəˌdāt/ Origin mid 16th century (in the sense ‘set out (accounts) clearly’): from medieval Latin liquidat- ‘made clear’, from the verb liquidare, from Latin liquidus (see liquid). liquidate (sense 1) was influenced by Italian liquidare and French liquider, liquidate (sense 2) by Russian likvidirovatʹ A second online dictionary source states: liquidate (v.) 1570s, of accounts, "to reduce to order, to set out clearly" (a sense now obsolete), from Late Latin or Medieval Latin liquidatus, past participle of liquidare "to melt, make liquid, make clear, clarify," from Latin liquidus "fluid, liquid, moist" (see liquid (adj.)). Sense of "clear away" (a debt) first recorded 1755. The meaning "wipe out, kill" is from 1924, possibly from Russian likvidirovat, ultimately from the Latin word. Related: Liquidated; liquidating. English.StackExchange has some answers of essentially the same question that doesn't shed much more light on the matter but one excerpt is notable: The meaning is already present in the Latin liquidus which means both "liquid" and "clear, evident". This obviously comes from liquids being limpid (transparent). Limpid by the way (another Latin cognate, originally from Oscan origin) gives Spanish limpido and limpiar. Also liquare means "to filter". So that the idea of transparency and purity is already strongly associated with liquids in Latin.

What is the effect of a pardon by the President of the United States?

An answer to a recent question stated : In modern, peacetime U.S. practice, the main use of the pardon power has been to restore the civil rights of people who admit to having committed crimes and have served their sentences and reformed, so that they can, for example, apply for a job not available to felons, or vote, or get a hunting license and use a firearm. Only a tiny share of modern pardons are granted to people who are currently serving sentences for the crimes of which they were convicted or to people who have not yet been convicted of crimes. My understanding is that a pardon only effects that you no longer must bear the consequences of a conviction, it does not remove the conviction. Thus I want to ask for clarification on the part where it states that pardoned individuals " apply for a job not available to felons, or vote, or get a hunting license and use a firearm ". I figure the three options are either: I am not entirely correct about what a pardon by the President does. The prohibitions on felons to applying for jobs not available to felons, voting, get a hunting license and using a firearm are part of the pardon The statement is not correct. What are the actual legal effects of pardons issued by the President of the United States?

It depends on your location. A felony conviction can limit your rights in various ways, and those rights may or may not be restored at the state level. See this article for discussion of federal convictions and collateral civil disabilities. The Dept. of Justics says that "a presidential pardon will restore various rights lost as a result of the pardoned offense and should lessen to some extent the stigma arising from a conviction, it will not erase or expunge the record of your conviction", and "most civil disabilities attendant upon a federal felony conviction, such as loss of the right to vote and hold state public office, are imposed by state rather than federal law, and also may be removed by state action". This article surveys civil disabilities of convicts on a state by state basis, as well as at the federal level. For example, voting rights are set at the state level, so a state has to have statutes restoring rights upon a pardon if you are to get your voting rights back. Service on a federal jury would be restored per 28 USC 1865(b)(5) ; the federal felon in possession crime has an exception encoded in it in the definition of "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" which says What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. So if you are a state felon, you need a state pardon (or other state procedure) and if you are a federal felon, a state pardon does no good, you need a federal pardon. However, 21 USC 862 makes mandatory the ineligibility for federal benefits after a third conviction for drug trafficking (either state of federal law), and there is no "rights restoration" clause that restores such rights after a pardon even if the convictions are all federal. I have not located any case law establishing whether federal benefits rights restoration for federal convictions flows automatically from a federal pardon (not many 3-time drug dealers get federal pardons). A federal felony conviction can also be used as a factor in granting a security clearance (applicable to certain jobs), and current law does not say that a pardoned conviction cannot be considered in deciding on a clearance.

What does in between them mean?

An applicant seeking registration to act as a trustee shall have in its employment a minimum of two persons who, between them , have atleast five years experience in activities related to securitisation and atleast one among them shall have a professional qualification in law from any university or institution recognised by the Central Government or any State Government or a foreign university. What does in between them mean in the above statement do both the employee should have 5 years experience each or the experience jointly be of 5 years.

What it means is that when you add together the total experience of both employees, it must be equal to or greater than 5 years. So Employee A and B can have experience such that one has 1 year and the other has 4 or one has 2 and the other 3 or one has Zero and the other has 5 (debatable... if both employees need experience this might be out of the question). They could work the same calendar years and count them as separate years of experience.

When two promissory notes represent the same debt, which one is legally valid?

An application was completed for a FFEL guaranteed student loan consolidation including a signature on the bottom, promissory note section. The guarantee company insisted a second, computer generated full promissory note be signed. I assumed they would void the first. The list of banks representing the loans to be consolidated on the second note are in conflict with the list on the first note. I am not sure which list is accurate. Is either note valid and/or enforceable? The information is in conflict. Also, my signature is crossed out on the second, initialed and signed differently. I don't remember doing that and it's not on the copy I have. And lastly, both notes were printed years before the 1992 amendments so not all options for repayment are listed and the disclosure "this is a loan which must be repaid" is not present anywhere. I had read in the Colorado Student Loan Training Manual that duplicate notes are not enforceable.

Without reading the exact language of the documents it is hard to tell. Two possible interpretations of these documents are most plausible. One interpretation is that the first note is the true promissory note and the second note is a written reaffirmation of the original promissory note which would extend the statute of limitations for enforcing it if there had not been regular payments, but does not create a new obligation or supersede the original note. But, it probably could be enforced if push came to shove, on some legal theory if the original first note was unavailable. A second interpretation is that the second note is a novation of the original note that replaces and supersedes the original note. Given the differences in the parties to the second note, I would be inclined to give this interpretation a greatly likelihood of being correct, but again, it would come down to the exact language of the documents. Promissory notes are tricky because they are "negotiable instruments" which means that the right to receive payment and enforce the note can be transferred to a new "Note Holder" by transferring the physical original note and endorsing the back. The concern in the case of a promissory note is that someone with a photocopy could claim to be the Note Holder when in fact, the physical original has been negotiated to another person who is the true Note Holder to whom the obligation is now currently owed. If judgment were entered against the former Note Holder that might not prevent the true Note Holder from also getting a judgment against you, leaving you to try to vacate the judgment in favor of the former Note Holder and to seek restitution of any funds paid to the former Note Holder. This could be prevented by insisting on an original note or by requiring the party bringing suit without an original note to post a bond to protect you in the event that the note was actually physically negotiated to someone else. The risk could be mitigated, but not entirely eliminated, if you were sued in a collection action, by joining all of the note holders listed on either note and their successors in interest, as third-party defendants. While I'm not aware of any significant litigation concerning who the Note Holder is in the case of student loans, there was quite a bit of litigation concerning the true Note Holder in the subprime mortgage loan context around the time of the Financial Crisis of 2008. The modification of the signature, apparently without your authorization, is deeply problematic and might amount to fraud, but could be found by a court to be harmless because you admit to signing the original. Fraud in a matter that is immaterial is usually not actionable, although it could still constitute grounds to disbar an attorney if this action was authorized by an attorney. The fact that neither of the notes complies with subsequently enacted legislation is irrelevant as you can't have an ex post facto law that impairs obligations of contracts under the U.S. Constitution. In the meantime, don't throw out anything related to this loan or delete any files related to it. You could need them to defend yourself in future litigation.

Copyright infringement in paid course

An art instructor who charges for his courses is using one of my photographs in his class. All the students including himself have painted the photograph and he has posted his painting on his site. I did not give permission to any of these people to paint my photograph. This is my most popular photograph which I sell in many shops in the area (I live in Canada). Is my copyright infringed and what can I do to remedy it?

This may well be infringement, but I agree that you should start by reaching out to the instructor. You don't want to pay a lawyer if the matter can be be adjusted peacefully. In the US there is a special limited exemption to copyright for "use in classroom instruction" which might apply in such a case. I am not sure if there is a similar provision in Canadian copyright law. But the instructor is likely to change his practice if you notify him of your objection, even if he has the technical right to use the photo. At least it is worth finding out. If he won't, then you can always consult a lawyer.

What's the difference between a petition vs. declaratory judgment action?

An article by WikiHow states: Many people are familiar with responding to a lawsuit with a motion to compel arbitration. However, you can also file a petition to compel even when no lawsuit is pending. I was researching this area of law and I came across a different (but overlapping) concept known as a declaratory judgement action : A declaratory judgment is a binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before the court. When there is uncertainty as to the legal obligations or rights between two parties, a declaratory judgment offers an immediate means to resolve this uncertainty. What's the difference between the two types of fillings/lawsuits? In what circumstances should each one be used?

A motion to compel means that the court orders a party to do something. A declaratory judgment means that the court confirms some fact or legal position but without ordering anyone to do anything. E.g.: "The court orders Party A to disclose document X to Party B". vs. "The court declares that Party A is under an obligation to disclose document X to Party B". A declaration is typically sought when two parties merely want to understand what their position is without actually entering into a dispute. For example, they disagree on what their obligations are under a contract, but there isn't actually a breach of contract which one party wants to sue the other for.

Why would someone get a fine when using a disabled parking space when the disabled person is not in the car?

An article in LA Times about someone parking on a disabled parking space without the disabled person being in the car: (...) I saw a woman pull into a disabled parking space and begin to exit her car. Two men in plain clothes flashed badges as they approached the car. One of them asked to see the registration slip that went with the disabled placard that hung from the driver’s rearview mirror. It turned out that the placard was in the name of her son, but he wasn’t in the car. So the officers confiscated the placard, which her son will have to reapply for, and wrote her a citation. I have a hard time understanding how one can get a citation for this? My wife is disabled (in France, so the laws may vary) and I sometimes park, alone, in the disabled spot in order to bring her to the car (or wait for her to come) . The disabled parking space is there to help disabled people, when they arrive to the place, but also when they leave from it. Both do not always happen in sequence (I can drop someone off, or wait for someone to get to the car). I would be ideally interested in a French (or EU) perspective (but still keeping it open as the article is from the US)

There isn't any indication in that news story that the disabled son was anywhere nearby. I agree the situation you describe sounds like a legitimate use of the placard, but it seems in this situation, the placard was being used in a manner totally unrelated to the transport of a disabled person. My guess is that the cops cited her because the son wasn't in the car, and was not inside the establishment at which she parked. California code has this to say: A person to whom a disabled person placard has been issued may permit another person to use the placard only while in the presence or reasonable proximity of the disabled person for the purpose of transporting the disabled person. So as long as the disabled person is within a "reasonable proximity", and the placard is being used to transport them, they do not have to be inside the car to make using the placard legitimate. In this case, the woman was just transporting herself and using the placard anyway, which is illegal.

Explain the concept of "filing a claim on behalf of the government"

An article on Wall Street Journal stated that for false patent marking and whistle-blower laws: ... Anyone can file a claim on behalf of the government , and plaintiffs must split any fine award evenly with it... How does "filing a claim on behalf of the government" work ? What is it exactly, how does it contrast with the principle of privity , and how is it applied ? Also, is the concept of "filing a claim on behalf of the government" unique to the United States, or are there other countries that have such laws and procedures?

This is called a qui tam action. It's a concept that's been around a long time in the English legal system (predating the US), to encourage people to help the government enforce its laws. The more contemporary system is to give private parties the right to sue on their own behalf for some wrong (known as a "private attorney general" system), which is how things like civil rights claims tend to work; the difference with qui tam is that the government is the plaintiff ( source ) It's possible when the law says that a claim under some section may be filed by a private person on behalf of the government; at the time the article was written, the false marking statute ( 35 USC 292 ) stated that "Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of the United States." In a qui tam action, the government is the plaintiff; it's just that instead of a public attorney handling the case, it's handled by a private party. There were three active qui tam statutes in US federal law as of 2009 (source: CRS ): the False Claims Act ( 31 USC 3730 ), the patent marking claim, and an Indian protection statute ( 25 USC 201 ). The patent marking qui tam provision has been repealed, leaving just the two. For the Indian protection statute, I can't find any reference to any special procedure; for the False Claims Act, there is a special procedure included in the law. In the False Claims Act, when an action is submitted, the government is notified and the complaint kept sealed for 60 days while the US government decides what to do. If the government wants to take over the case itself, it can do that; if it wants the private party to run the case, it can do that too; if it wants to dismiss or settle the case it can do that as well. It can also ask for the time to be extended, or for discovery to be delayed to gather evidence or prosecute a separate criminal or civil case. If the government lets the private party run the case, they can still intervene later if they have a good reason. After the case finishes, the private party gets 15-25% of the judgment or settlement (if the government took over the case) or 25-30% (if the private party ran the case), plus attorney fees. If the facts the case was brought under were publicly known when it was filed, the amount shrinks to 0-10% if the person supplied information to the government that wasn't publicly known when it was supplied, and the case is dismissed if the person just learned about it from public sources. For the false marking statute, a district court actually found it unconstitutional in part because of the lack of the extensive procedure found in the False Claims Act. There, the procedure was just to file the case like normal; the clerk had to tell the Patent Office that a claim had been filed within a month, but one issue was that a settlement could have happened in that time and bound the government. It's possible higher courts would have ruled had that section not been repealed later that year. As for other countries, the idea came to the US from England, but the Common Informers Act 1951 eliminated it there. However, private prosecutions (which do exist in England) are similar in that the case is on behalf of the Crown, but handled by a private party; they're different in that the private party doesn't get any part of the judgment. While it's hard to prove a negative, I can't find any evidence of qui tam provisions outside the US.

Is controlled burning of wooden buildings a legal demolition method in the USA?

An article on the BBC News website about the "Disaster Girl" meme claims that this photograph of a burning building was taken in 2005 in North Carolina at a "controlled burn", which the BBC explains is "a fire intentionally started to clear a property". I was quite stunned by this information. Was/is this a legal way to demolish wooden buildings in the USA? Is this method used often? (I suppose it's quicker than taking a building apart bit by bit, but the debris becomes unusable, I guess you have to pay the fire department to keep an eye on things, you probably need insurance... I can't imagine it being much cheaper than hiring a bulldozer.) Disaster Girl meme, photograph by Dave Roth

Most controlled burns are used as training exercises. A search of the Mebane FD page (where this picture was taken) shows multiple instances of training burns . Also from local press about training from 2018, “A lot of departments have stopped doing it (control burns). We’re still pretty active with it, we’ve got five to burn in the next two months.”

Is the difference between the most and least severe violent crimes subjective?

An assault can be defined as anything which is perceived as injuring or threatening. A kidnapping is anything perceived as limiting someones movement. Since an assault necessarily involves a limitation on movement, for example you move someone by punching them, aren't they the same? Is it just a matter of severity and discretion and aren't all violent crimes degrees of kidnapping?

If I were to try to reduce all "violent" crimes to just one thing, I would have tried to reduce them all to assault (the initiation of force, to different degrees). The fact that they have something in common does not mean they are indistinguishable. There are situations where kidnapping does not include the elements of assault. You can trick a person into getting locked into a room, where there is no contact or threat of contact at all (assault is intentionally causing the reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact). The rationale behind classifying offenses differently in terms of their consequences stems from a proportional-justice view of punishment (the punishment should fit the crime), therefore murder and shoving someone should not be treated identically. The specific distinctions made are somewhat political, but are fundamentally about the level of harm done to a person, i.e. the severity. But the procedure for encoding that judgment of severity into law is entirely political, precisely to limit discretion. The punishment for shoving is never execution nor life in prison, and the punishment for premeditated murder is hopefully never a $100 fine or 30 days. I should point out that one does not "perceive" the legal nature of an act, one concludes based on definitions and evidence that an act satisfies a certain definition, or fails to satisfy that definition.

How to write a retroactive letter of representation?

An attorney began representation of Mr. X some months ago, as assigned counsel, without a letter of representation. Such a letter is needed now in order to make a court-ordered restitution payment to a certain company (which requires a signed letter of representation). Should this letter be back-dated, or should it be written in the past tense, stating the date that representation began? Or should it be a regular letter, with the current date (I'm thinking that for the purposes of the restitution payment, maybe the only thing that matters is the fact that Mr. X is currently represented.)

Since Mr X has a lawyer, the lawyer should advise what form this letter should take to be most helpful to Mr X's interests. In the absence of such advice, I would suggest soemthing like My lawyer, Y, now represents me in connection with {matter} and has done so since {date}. Plus any additional content that the company wants to see.

Legal Justification for China not following decision in Philippines v. China

An award was given by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China . However, as I knowledge tells me, except internet domain name disputes, all arbitration requires both parties to be agree on the dispute to be resolved by the arbitration tribunal. Therefore, my question comes: Are China not legally required to follow that decision as China did not agreed to put this case in the court? Or are there any conventions force China to follow that decision? **I am not really familiar with Public International Law, so please tell me if I have made any mistakes in my question.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration is a bit confusing, but essentially, it's an arbitrator rather than a court. The primary reason for this is that it deals with sovereign states, which recognise no higher authority. Like all arbitration, the parties agree to the arbitrator's decision being binding prior to entering into arbitration. If this were a matter between private parties, breach of the agreement following an unfavourable decision could be enforced by a court of competent jurisdiction. However, when dealing with sovereign states, a breach of the agreement is somewhat more complicated; there is no court that can compel performance under the agreement. That leaves the aggrieved state with a number of means of redress, which may be economical (trade embargoes), military (declaring war), or something else... maybe diplomatic, such as withdrawing ambassadorial privileges and the ability for the other state's nationals to enter territory. Of course, this is vastly more complicated than the scope of an answer on this site; the legal answer is that the Permanent Court of Arbitration is not a court, it has no power to and does not enforce its rulings (and the International Court of Justice is in a similar position anyway).

Order status Cancelled on the merchant website considered as relevant proof with legal common sense

An e-commerce order was returned back to the merchant, but they didn't give me reciept, a practice common in Indian e-eCommerce. But on the merchants website now the order is marked as cancelled. In terms of relevant proof isn't this ample proof that the business for which the amount was paid is terminated and the moneys should be refunded back to me. I am not a lawyer, but any proof that is registered on a merchant website isnt that a relevant proof?

It is certainly relevant evidence : on the face of it the order status would seem to be an admission of liability by the merchant. However evidence doesn't quite work like that. Courts don't hear one side and say "thats it, we have all the evidence we need, we don't need to hear the other side". Civil cases like this are decided on the balance of evidence (I'm assuming that the Indian civil system follows the English one in this), so it depends what evidence the other side brings, if any.

Free english content, translation rights and fan translation

An editor published a free scenario for a role-playing game. The French editor possesses the translation rights for all the content of the game, free content included. Is it possible for the French editor to legally stop a translation by fans of the free content from being shared publicly? The translation is not yet published.

It depends on the terms of the license(s) If the copyright owner has given exclusive rights to translate into French to all content it produces into French and then issues a license to a third party which allows them to also make a translation, then it has broken its contract with the translator. This would allow the translator to sue the owner for damages but it is unlikely that it would be able to stop a third-party. In general, a contract can only bind the parties subject to that contract. If the third-party knew about the exclusive license with the translator the translator could sue them for tortious interference . If the third-party made the translation without permission of the copyright owner then that is, of course, copyright violation allowing the owner to sue and, if the terms of the license with the translator permit, the translator to sue in place of the owner.

Elder relative unwilling to change will to reflect current wishes

An elder relative, over 100 years old but with their mental faculties remarkably intact, has informed me after the death of their eldest child that I will be the executor of their estate. Let's say the estate's total value is more than $1 million and less than $6 million. It will be divided among ten beneficiaries, each receiving a percentage. One heir currently lives in a house that would be part of the estate. The elder relative has stated that they must keep the house, anything inside it, and perhaps some additional funds for property taxes and such "off the top" (meaning, they receive this in addition to their percentage of the remainder). For reasons that stretch over decades of family history, I believe strongly in the justice of this arrangement (which I do not benefit from). The beneficiary in the house devoted considerable time and energy to caring for the testator. Other beneficiaries have their own opinions, but most at least accept it as their relative's wishes. Unfortunately, this arrangement is not reflected in the will. While I have expressed that I think this plan needs to be specified in the will, I doubt that will happen. In our culture, it is not well received to tell an older family member they must do something. The testator is the unquestioned benevolent head of the family. What can I do, now and/or after the testator is deceased, to make their wishes occur? I'm guessing that if beneficiaries decide they want to fight about this, then there isn't much that can be done, but are there elegant solutions available if the other beneficiaries are cooperative?

The executor must follow the will The executors legal duty is to execute the testator’s intent as detailed in their will . While I have no doubt that you understand the testators verbal wishes as expressed to you on a particular day - how do you know they didn’t change their mind some time after that? As others have said, with the beneficiaries’ agreement you can override the express written wishes but if one or more don’t agree, you will have to follow the will. To do otherwise exposes you to personal liability if a disgruntled beneficiary sues. The will is your shield, you step out from behind it at your peril. Now, the beneficiaries may be perfectly happy with the verbal intent now but … when there is money on the table, they may see it differently. Do yourself a favour, have the difficult conversation and get the will changed or refuse to be the executor.

What to do if you have a possible 'zombie' relative

An elderly uncle of mine spent the last 10 years of so in assisted living until dying in his late 90s. He has a sister (who has mild dementia) and a brother who has been not reachable for ages, along with a few nephews and nieces. Lately he has had a guardianship under the state, but our state is so underfunded that I don't think the guardian did anything. Medicaid paid at least some of his assisted living. He died about a year ago and I assumed that the state would initiate probate (possibly so that they could get some or all of the estate to make up the medicaid expenditures). I'm not sure that his estate has positive value above what might be owed to medicaid, but I'm not sure. Well, recently I got notices that he owed taxes on his property, so I'm not sure if probate was ever started. I don't think there is a will and I'm not sure that there is any named executor. I think I ought to initiate probate or at least see if probate has started. How do I do this? He lived in Alaska if that makes any difference.

While the state, or a creditor, can initiate a probate if no one else does (if the state does so, the official in charge of this is called the "public administrator"), neither are required to do so. Also, sometimes a guardianship is converted to a probate, but this doesn't appear to have happened. This is a thankless job that probably doesn't make sense to bother with if estate liabilities exceed the assets of the estate, but most states have a "non-claim statute" that bars creditors claims, other than liens including property tax liens, after a certain amount of time after the death. So, even if the estate may have been insolvent at death, if enough time has elapsed, many of the potential claims may now be barred, making the estate solvent again. Siblings generally have priority for appointment over a nephew, so to be appointed yourself, you would ordinarily have to receive a renunciation of their right to serve as executor before applying to do so yourself, but some states disregard that priority if no one has taken action after a certain period of time. You would initiate probate by contacting an Alaska lawyer in the vicinity of the place he was domiciled at death. The lawyer can review the guardianship court file, determine if an executor was appointed, and determine if there are assets that could justify opening an estate relative to lien debts including Medicaid liens. If there are not, letting the assets be lost to a property tax lien may make more sense that spending money to transfer his property in an orderly fashion to his creditors with nothing in it for any of his family.

Does revealing my personal email address in the To field constitute/qualify as a data breach for under the Australian Privacy Act

An email address was given for contact to a "charity". The charity then decided to notify a number of individuals on the list without using the BCC field. A number of individual were not authorised to access this information. That offender was alerted to the existence of the BCC field but today he either brazenly or inadvertently decided to ignore the warning. Does this constitute a data breach under Australian Privacy Act (Cwlth)? Also, I know that this vorboten under the GDPR. If this information was sent to a an European hosted service and one of the victims was a citizen of one of the European Union countries

It probably violates APP6 Assuming the charity is covered by the Privacy Act - if it has an annual turnover of less than $3 million, it isn’t. Under APP6, personal information, like an email address, can only be disclosed for the primary purpose for which it was collected or for a secondary purpose if an exception applies. Assuming that the communication falls within the primary or accepted secondary purpose then disclosing it to people responsible for routing emails is OK. This is true whether there are multiple emails or one email with multiple recipients. Disclosing it to everyone else on the list probably isn’t. Obviously context matters here; if you were a board member say, and the email disclosed the email addresses of all other board members this is probably a legal disclosure. Similarly, if you are part of a volunteer team and the email was for organising that team. However, if there is no need for you to contact the other people within the approved usage, then this would appear to be a breach. The act does not give you any individual rights but you can make a complaint .

Hearsay in email

An email sent to me is represented as the opinion of the organization's attorney. The complete original context is not known as it seems to be cut and paste (email metadata of who sent and when is absent) Is the forwarded opinion excerpt 'hearsay'? Had the original complete attorney message (with email metadata) been forwarded: would it be hearsay? I understad that a forwarded message is not necessarily authentic (message may have been modified). Assume US jurisdiction

"Hearsay" is a term used for statements offered in evidence in court that are not admissible because the person who originally made the statement has not testified to it. The hearsay rule is complex, and has many ramifications and exceptions. Legal texts take hundreds of pages to explain all these complications. But the term is not appropriate unless the statement is offered as evidence in court, or there is a plan to offer it. An ordinary email that no one plans to offer in court is neither hearsay nor not-hearsay, it is just a set of statements that may be true or untrue, accurate or mistaken. If for some reason this email were to be placed in evidence in court, the default procedure would be to call the person who originally wrote it to testify, and ask questions like "Did you write this? When did you write it? was it the truth to the best of your knowledge when you sent it?" If the original sender cannot or will not be a witness, then whether the email will be accepted as evidence will depend on what is sought to be proved by the email, and what evidence there is that the email was sent, and by whom, and was the truth as far as the sender knew. If what you really want to know is whether the email accurately quotes the organization's lawyer, just email or write that lawyer, saying something like "Does the attached email accurately represent an opinion that you gave to {organization} as I have been told it does?"

Can an employee be sued for gross negligence by reusing personal passwords at work?

An employee is using some easy guessable reused passwords well known to Have I Been Pwned . OUCH. Something bad happens. Can an employee be sued? Option A: An organization does not have password policy. Option B: An organization has a policy but does not enforce it

Firstly: that depends on the jurisdiction. It might not even be possible at all for employers to attempt to sue their own employees for damages caused by negligence. Even terminating an employment contract for reasons of negligence is quite difficult in many jurisdictions. Second, if it is possible, the question is wether such legal proceedings could be expected to be successful. Employees making mistakes is part of the risk of doing business, and distinguishing a "mistake" from "negligence" , "gross negligence" , or "intentional wrongdoing" by the employee ought to place quite a burden of proof on the employer. To be held negligent in the first place, the employer will have to to prove that the employee was aware of the fact that the password they used was common, well-known and extremely insecure. Knowledge of which passwords are common and well-known is, unless you are considered a skilled IT security professional, not something that a typical employee can reasonably be expected to know. Before there can be a case for negligence by the employee, the employer needs to make a strong case that: either the employee is that skilled IT security professional that really should have know better or the company can demonstrate that they provide all employees with adequate instruction and security training that includes how to select good passwords and which bad ones to avoid and that they seriously ensure both awareness of their password and security policies and compliance. even then, not enforcing a good password policy in your IT systems and assigning or allowing users to select weak passwords is in itself already negligent...

Cost of reallocation on changing employer

An employee joined a job 2 years ago. Initially, the employer paid him for re-allocation fees as stated in the contract. The contract also states that "Under our relocation policy, leavers with less than three years of service are required to pay back a proportion of their claimed relocation expenses, at a rate that decreases by 1/36 for every month of completed service." However, after a year, the employee had an issue with his employer and the employer decided to change his position. Therefore, they decided to terminate the older contract and started a new contract with a continuous date and the probation period is reseted on the new contract. After a year from this, (i.e. after 2 years from initial start) the employee found another job and decided to leave the job. Therefore, the employer made the employee pay for the reallocation fees. Is this legitimate as the employee signed a new contract where there is no compensation and the probation period was reset? All of this is under UK employment law.

Do you have a new contract? If so, the original contract ended (at your request) after 1 year meaning you owe 24/36ths. Do you have a variation to the original contract? This is much more likely. If so, it ended after 2 years (at your request) meaning you owe 12/36ths.

Response time for reasonable accommodation

An employee of a state government agency in the US submits a request for reasonable accommodation for a condition diagnosed by an LPC. After one month, the employee contacts the agency (in particular the attorney at the agency that handles personnel matters) and asks for an update. The attorney responds that they're still working on it. Three months have now passed since the original request. The request it to work at home full-time, which the employee has been doing since the start of Covid. EDIT: https://www.justice.gov/usao/reasonable-accommodation-policy-and-procedure Disposition and Provision of Accommodation A final decision and provision of the accommodation should be made within 30 business days of the request, barring extenuating circumstances. Where an accommodation can be provided in less than the maximum time frame, failure to provide an accommodation in a prompt manner may result in a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. How much time is the agency allowed?

The agency is allowed a reasonable time to implement the request, given the nature of the request and surrounding circumstances. Superficially, it would seem that the request is to continue working at home as has been the case for a couple of years, so the agency would not seem to have to change anything in order to implement the request, and unnecessary delays would be a violation of ADA. There is no fixed time requirement for evaluating and implementing the request.

How does "apparent authority" work for a company's directors?

An employee or agent of a company has apparent authority to transact on behalf of the company if his function or standing with the company will lead a reasonable person to believe that the company person has authority to transact, whether or not s/he actually has that authority. For instance, if a company made someone VP of Purchasing, one would reasonably believe that this person can purchase on behalf of the company. More to the point, if a Manager of Purchasing had the authority to purchase up to $1 million, and actually made a purchase of $2 million, in most cases the manager would have "apparent" (though not actual) authority to make the $2 million purchase. If one is a member of the company's Board of Directors, the term "ostensible authority" is used to describe apparent authority. How does this work, and does it differ in any way from "apparent authority." Put another way, what gives (or removes) "ostensible authority" from a board member to deal on behalf of the company.

They are the same thing. We turn then to the subject of apparent or, as it is sometimes called, ostensible authority , essentially the legal wellspring from which, absent actual authority... Greene drew the right to hold Hellman for the acts of Driscoll. GREENE v. HELLMAN 51 N.Y.2d 197 (1980) apparent authority is dependent on verbal or other acts by a principal which reasonably give an appearance of authority to conduct the transaction

Employer failed to report my income or pay taxes. Do I have any rights to file a lawsuit?

An employer based in the state of Georgia (my residence is Ohio) hired me, paying me a monthly salary in addition to funds to purchase health insurance. When they did not feel I was an asset to them they made me a 1099 employee without my agreement. In addition, they did not collect any taxes or issue a pay stub. They deposited the money in my checking account via wire transfer. Now I am with no income and unable to file for unemployment. In addition, I will now have to pay back taxes and don't even have a job. Do I have any legitimate cause for filing a lawsuit against this employer?

Summary If they didn't steal your withholding, it depends a great deal. But if your employer stole your withholding, the IRS will sue them on your behalf. You will absolutely have grounds to sue them, and because tax law is so cut and dried in these situations, in that case, you will almost certainly win. You need to contact the IRS immediately and advise them what your employer has done. This is more important than anything else because until you do, you can't be sure the IRS will figure out what happened (they might. They're really good at tax stuff). If your employer didn't advise you that you are now responsible for paying your own quarterly estimated income taxes, the IRS will almost certainly grant you relief from penalties for failure to file timely and they could potentially abate interest as well, depending on the circumstances. They are especially likely to grant penalty and possibly interest abatement if you've never filed 1099 before. If your employer withheld tax from your pay that they then failed to turn over to the IRS, good news for you - bad news for them. The IRS takes no mercy whatsoever on employers who steal tax withholding from employees. Advising the IRS that this may have been the case is all you should need to do - the IRS can check its own records, your employer's records, etc. They will let you know once they've determined whether your money is where it's supposed to be; if anything is out of order, rest assured they will already be pursuing the case against your employer. In this case, the IRS will waive all penalties and interest that may have been assessed as a consequence of your employer's failure to turn over your withholding. If you are currently unable to pay, that's not the end of the world. Make the IRS aware of your current financial circumstances and your inability to pay due to unemployment. They have installment agreements you can request, or if that won't work, they can temporarily suspend collection action while you get things straightened out. There's a bunch of paperwork they'll ask for, and penalties and interest will continue to accrue, but as long as you let them know the situation, they will apply a dramatically reduced rate to reflect your efforts to comply.

What does the law say or accept about consistency of signatures used for employment?

An employer in USA is hiring contractors who will work remotely from India. They plan to setup an office in India within a year. The offer letter is sent via https://<companyName>.workable.com , and signing the offer letter can be done by either uploading a photo of the candidate's signature, signing using the computer mouse or by typing the candidate's name, which gets displayed in a fancy font. Question: If a candidate chooses to sign by simply typing their name as shown (as an example) in the first and second photos, they'd obviously have to stick to the same name and font when signing the contract and non-disclosure agreement. But what repercussions would it have in future? If the candidate has to sign any more company documents much later (signing physically with a pen on paper or even signing electronically), would it have to match with the signatures that were first made in the offer letter? Or would commonsense be accepted, that the signature is basically the candidate's acceptance of the terms of the agreement, and that the signature can vary? ps: I'm hoping this can't be misused by the employer or any third-party that gets hold of the document.

If a candidate chooses to sign by simply typing their name as shown (as an example) in the first and second photos, they'd obviously have to stick to the same name and font when signing the contract and non-disclosure agreement. This assertion is incorrect. But what repercussions would it have in future? If the candidate has to sign any more company documents much later (signing physically with a pen on paper or even signing electronically), would it have to match with the signatures that were first made in the offer letter? No. Or would commonsense be accepted, that the signature is basically the candidate's acceptance of the terms of the agreement, and that the signature can vary? Yes. A signature is ritualized way of showing legal agreement. The content of the signature does not impact its legal validity. For example, it used to be commonplace for illiterate people to sign contracts, wills, and other documents prepared by someone else and read to them with an "X". So long as a signature is made by the person who is supposed to be signing it with an intent to legally agree to what they are signing, it is a valid signature. When a signature is obtained in a manner that does not reflect the intent of the person signing it to legally agree to what they are actually signing, that is a special category of fraud called "fraud in the factum". For example, substituting a deed to a house from a receipt for a package delivery at the last moment when the person signing it doesn't notice the switch, is "fraud in the factum". A court's conclusion that there has been "fraud in the factum" has the legal effect of causing the document signed to be treated as if it was never signed at all. In contrast, different legal consequences are present when someone signs a document, knowing what they are signing, for reasons that rely on false statements that have been made to them, which is called "fraud in the inducement." If someone tries to enforce an agreement that purports to be signed, and the person who allegedly signed it claims that the signature was forged by a third-party, inconsistency between the signature and other times that the person who allegedly signed something did so is evidence that the signature is a forgery. But it is not conclusive evidence. People's signatures change over time for a variety of reasons, sometimes dramatically in a short period of time, for example, in the case of a stroke or a hand injury. When signatures differ over time and there are allegations of forgery, then it is a question of proof for a finder of fact (i.e. a judge or jury) to decide if the alleged forgery is really a forgery. Many businesses that routinely accept small dollar value personal checks, for example, also take a thumb-print of the person signing the check in order to make it cheap and easy to litigate the question of whether a signature on a check is forged, and to discourage litigants from falsely claiming that a check was forged in the first place. This practice was established because lying and claiming that a check was forged used to be a tactic that was used on a recurring basis in civil cases and in criminal bad check passing prosecutions to escape liability.

Is it illegal for an employer to know that their employees are lying to the companies customers for their own personal financial gain?

An employer is aware that their employees are lying to customers of the company for their own personal financial gain. Is that against the law? If an employer is aware and continues to let the employees do so.

If the lies amount to fraud, and if the company also benefits from the fraud, the company might be held to be a party to the fraud. Even if the company does not benefit, the company, or more likely the responsible executives who had actual knowledge of the fraud, might be held to be accomplices in the fraud, if the fraud is treated as a criminal matter. Most fraud, of course, is treated as a tort, not a crime. A lie would only constitute fraud if it was: Intentional : the person telling the lie knew that it was false, intended it to be believed, and to affect the target's decisions; Materiel : a reasonable person would be significantly influenced in whether to take an action by the content of the false statement; Damaging : actual harm occurred as a result to the person defrauded relying on the false statement; and Reasonable : it was reasonable for the target of the false statement to accept it and rely on it. If the statement was implausible, or if any reasonable person would check it, it is not reasonable to rely on it. Only if all of those are proved in court will a lie be treated as a fraud.

How are employer pay statutes enforced against offending employers?

An employer recently made some strange demands as a part of a job offer. On advice from The Workplace Stack Exchange I'm going to look for work somewhere else, but I'm concerned the employer is engaged in illegal activity and I feel I have a responsibility to make certain someone enforces the law against them. (the specific demands they were making are illegal for them to make). Note that there is a known form of scam where an employer will try to get an employee to do this so that the employer can conduct fraud on someone else without being as obviously involved in the conduct, and that is one of several reasons that these laws exist. When an employer is violating these rules, what is the employee's next course of action? Is there a specific government enforcement agency I should file a complaint with, such as a banking regulator? Does the employee have to file a lawsuit in some specific jurisdiction (the job offer crossed state lines)? Since this is a matter that relates banking, labor law, and to both state and federal law, and has intersections with both civil and criminal law, what agencies or jurisdictions should this be pursued under? Since there were initially some who argued that these laws don't actually exist I have added the following paragraph to clarify: If you were not aware, U.S. federal law (and some state laws) restrict how an employer can implement their payroll. One of the restriction s is that they can't force you to receive direct deposit at any specific institution. (They can't, for example, tell you that your direct deposit must happen at the same bank the employer uses.) In some states the restrictions are even more severe , prohibiting the requirement of direct deposit. The cited rules include some legal definitions that differ slightly from how you might read something at home (for example, the definition of a consumer, which can include employees). The definitions can be found here .

You can file a complaint with the CFPB regarding 12 CFR §1005.10(e)(2)-1 . Your individual state Department of Labor may enforce similar state level regulations too. And, yes, this technically falls under the FDIC as well. You can also file a complaint with them , although it's very unlikely they would pursue any action against a non-bank employer. The FTC has also pursued cases in violation to this statute, however those have only targeted lenders forcing the use of certain banks, and were not aimed at employers.

Ambiguous numbers in contract: which will be deemed to be valid (if so)?

An employment contract states that notice of resignation (edit: or termination) should be given 30 (sixty) days prior to end of employment. Clearly, the number represented by the digits contradicts the number given in words. Which of the two should prevail (and why)? Or will the containing clause be deemed invalid? The text is in a word processor format file (editable). Jurisdiction: South Africa. In the past, in my experience, employment contract in this field (and many others) specified a notice period of 30 days / 1 calendar month, so I see that as a sort of "norm". Although I have seen a 6-week notice period in the recent past, so maybe there is a trend towards longer notice periods. (As an aside: I can see the value of this practice (giving a number both in digits and spelling it out) when a document is hand-written (or faxed) and may be unclear, but in the age of the electronic documents and e-mail???)

The general principle is that when one party writes a contract, and there is an ambiguity, the ambiguity is interpreted against the interest of the writer ( contra proferentem ). The case of Hypercheck v. Mutual and Federal Ins . confirms that South African law operates under this doctrine.

What would happen to a minor who was blackmailed into robbing a bank and killing a man?

An episode of Black Mirror Season 3 Episode 3, Shut Up and Dance, presents what seems like an interesting legal scenario, at least to me (NAL). A kid's computer gets a virus. Let's say he's 16. Someone records him masturbating to child porn via his webcam secretly, then blackmails him into going to a location. At the location he's given a cake, and told to bring it to another location, where another blackmailed accomplice joins him and they're told to go to another location where they find a bank. I'm explaining this in order in case the vagueness of each instruction and timing is pertinent legally to the charges. As a side question, I'd be interested to know if these details, such as the way he originally didn't plan to rob a bank or kill someone, but each thing developed in a vicious cycle, would affect the charges. They're then told to look inside the cake where they find a gun. The boy is told to rob the bank at gunpoint, he does it, and then leaves with the cash in the drawer. Then they get to a drop point, the kid's told to bring the money out into a secluded patch of woods, where he finds another blackmailed man, and they're both instructed to fight to the death. The boy tries to shoot himself, but the gun isnt loaded, kills the man (after trying to run, so this actually appears to be in self defense), walks away and is soon chased down by cops after his location is reported by the blackmailers (who didnt care about the money) with the money on his person, and his masturbation video to child porn is released to the public also. With the blackmail and not being an adult, it seems like an interesting legal scenario. What charges might this kid face? I live in the US, so I'm really interested in an answer for any state in the US, but the episode actually takes place in the UK, so an answer that covers UK law would be interesting as well!

Jurisdiction: Ohio. What charges might this kid face? Let's deal with each individually. Possession of Child Pornography Based on the facts contained in your narrative, the suspect is guilty of possession of child pornography. Here is the relevant code statute . (2907.323 Illegal use of minor in nudity-oriented material or performance.) There might or might not be a problem with the admissibility of the evidence under the circumstances. This defect can be cured if the prosecution obtains a search warrant for the suspect's computer as possession alone meets the statutory threshold. Aggravated Robbery In Ohio, aggravated robbery is not a strict liability (i.e., statutory ) crime. Therefore, mens rea (mental state) of the offender can be a legal defense. In this case, the suspect can argue duress as an exculpatory and/or mitigating factor. Here is the relevant code section . Murder As you pointed out in your narrative, the facts suggest the suspect killed in self-defense and, therefore, is not guilty of murder.

Can customers be kicked out because a store employee personally dislikes them?

An ex-friend works at a store. I know she has a way of manipulating situations in her favor. If I go into the store to purchase items without causing any trouble, could they kick me out of the store just because a worker there doesn’t like me? If they do kick me out of the store without any real reason, can I bring legal matters into it?

Legally, they can kick you out for any reason that isn't illegal discrimination. They can't kick you out for being black. They also can't kick you out for being white. But they can kick you out for not liking your face. Now the question is: Who can kick you out? The store owner obviously can. Anyone who is given the authority by the store owner can. Actually, anyone with the apparent authority can kick you out. However, everyone other than the store owner has been hired to work towards making profits. If throwing you out is bad for business, then whoever did it would have to answer to the store owner. So the ex-friend can't go to court for throwing you out, but they might get into trouble with their boss about it. PS. I interpreted "kicking out" as saying "Please leave our premises. If you don't leave then you will be trespassing and I will call the police", not actually kicking the person with your foot which would be most likely assault.

Can the same person be charged multiple times for the same crime?

An example of this is, let's say someone is accused of animal cruelty (misdemeanor) and has 10 animals involved, would it be fair to charge this person with 10 counts of cruelty to animals? Even though it is from the same incident and a first offense? Wouldn't this be double Jeopardy? Especially if the sentence stacks among charges, like for example let's say each charge carries a sentence of 3 months probation, would it be fair to charge the same person (all from the same incident) with 10 counts of cruelty to animals and have a maximum sentence of 30 months probation? To be clear, in my state the "cruelty to animals" charge is very vague and no animals need to be dead or hurt for the state to prosecute.

A person who commits one act of animal cruelty against each of ten dogs (Ace, Biscuit, Coco etc) could be prosecuted for ten charges (or 'counts') of animal cruelty. This is because each act is a distinct offence. (The person who commmits ten acts of animal cruelty against one dog, or five acts against two dogs, etc, could be prosecuted for ten counts of animal cruelty too.) That is not double jeopardy. Double jeopardy is a procedural defence to being tried for a second or subsequent time for a particular act. If a person was tried and acquitted of being cruel to Ace on a given occasion, generally they can't be tried again for being cruel to Ace on that occasion. They can be tried for another occasion of cruelty to Ace.

Does secret or semi-secret prior art invalidate granted patents when presented?

An example would be inventions from the former Soviet Union that were officially secret, then some became semi-secret as they leaked into the public realm but so obscure that only very narrow circles knew or were interested in knowing about them. And of course there may still be inventions that have never been leaked to the public, that are officially secret, that may still qualify as prior art to some current patents.

The patented RSA algorithm (public key exchange) was independently developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. However the algorithm had been found much earlier and secretly by Ellis and Cocks. This was eventually revealed, but the RSA patent remained valid until it expired in 2000. The prior art must be known to the patent office before the patent is granted to stop a patent from being granted. What the patent office grants will obviously depend on what they know. To invalidate a patent later, what counts is the date when the "secret" prior art became public knowledge. So if the patent office could have theoretically found the prior art, then you have a chance. In the case of RSA, that wasn't the case. It is clearly documented that Ellis and Cocks invented the algorithm earlier, and it was even shared with US intelligence, but it was not known to the public when RSA got their patent. For your semi-secret prior art: If I try to get a patent, could you write to the patent officer "there's a small village named XYZ in Siberia, and in their public library there's a book titled "Secrets of ABC" that has prior art to gnasher's patent" before I get my patent? So it's public, but so obscure that nobody would ever find it in practice, but the patent officer could book a flight to Siberia, a bus to the village, and he could enter the library and find the book with the prior art?

Moving detained person(non-civilian) in Non-international armed conflict (NIACs)

An example: some English guys converted to Islam and fought against the UK in Iraq in favor of ISIS. How were they moved to the UK? bellow I wrote my idea, am I right? I need a legal basis for it. I knew that detained persons in International armed conflict (IACs) could be moved to the third state under specific conditions. (Article 12 Geneva III). But I wonder whether the detained person (non-civilian) in transnational non-international armed conflict (NAIC) can be displaced to another country or not. And I knew that some ideas tried to apply analogy between IACs and NIAC to grant these detained persons, Prisoner of War status (PoW), or civilian status. But they were clearly fighting, and they can not belong to the civilian. And also, ICRC commentary explicitly wrote that there is no POW status in NIAC, and internment rules are minimal. I guess, there is a kind of gap here, and we can not fill it by the customary law. So the only way for us is using the potential of domestic law to move them from Iraq to the UK.

I wonder whether the detained person (non-civilian) in transnational non-international armed conflict (NAIC) can be displaced to another country or not. Yes, in france in certain circumstances This answer is in response to this the France 24 article provided by the OP in a comment: Le Guen’s court case, which will end on Tuesday, is the first to test a law approved in 2012 that allows French prosecutors to go after citizens who are suspected of participating in terrorist acts on foreign soil, or who have left the country to receive terrorist training. And this updated article by The Local : [Le Guen] has been sentenced to eight years behind bars for his involvement in Al-Qaeda networks in northern Africa. ... ... he became the first French national to be convicted of breaking terror laws unveiled in 2012 which allow French officials to hunt suspected French terrorists on foreign soil. These French "terror laws" seem to be Act No. 2012-1432 which, at Article 2, inserted Article 113-13 in to the Penal Code: French criminal law applies to crimes and misdemeanors qualified as acts of terrorism and punished by Title II of Book IV committed abroad by a French person or by a person habitually residing on French territory. At the time Mali was experiencing a Non-International Armed Conflict , with France providing military support to the government. I cannot find the Malian-French Protocol Agreement to be sure, but I assume that this support would have included giving the French authorities certain in-country law enforcement powers allowing the arrest of terror suspects for offences falling within Article 113-13 and their transportation to France for trial.

It is illegal to name software releases after pop-culture things?

An example: version 2.0 of a software is named "Thresh", version 2.1 is named "Cassiopeia", and so on? (taking names from a single source)

This is permitted so long as it doesn't violate a valid trademark or service mark (or a few equivalent rights in names that are comparable such as collective rights to market beef under the name "Waygu" only if it is produced in a certain area of Japan under Japanese law) that covers goods or services of the same type in the same economic market. A trademark arises either when a term acquires a "secondary meaning" associating its use in connection with a particular kind of good or services in a particular market with a particular provider of that good or that service, or by registration of the trademark or service mark. "Tresh" and "Cassiopeia" are not terms that inherently are related to software, so they are permissible to use as trademarks for software unless someone else already has established trademark protection for them.

Vacating Tenant - Notice based on conditions

An excerpt from a mail sent to a real estate agent by a tenant in a situation where the notice for not renewing a real estate contract is 2 months. The time period of 2 months has been agreed by both parties at the time of contract. My contract renewal is happening on the month of June 2017. I am happy to continue in the same apartment if we can find a mutually agreeable rent amount. In the case that it is not so, Please do consider this as my notice for vacating the apartment. Suppose the negotiation for rent breaks down in May, can the agent argue that the mail above does not suffice as a notice ? Does the content above serve as a sufficient notice of vacating ?

Legal talk has to be "definite", and it is insufficient, when it comes to "giving notice", to give a hint as to a probable instruction. If a contract requires you to notify the other party of a decision before a certain date, then you have to give an unambiguous, unconditional answer by that date. Before the end of April, if you determine that the currently offered rate is not acceptable and you therefore do not accept the offer, then you need to explicitly notify then of non-renewal. Describing a hypothetical situation whereby you would or would not terminate the contract is not clear enough. Suppose, for example, that for some other reason you discover that you want out of the arrangement before the deadline (maybe you realized that the place smells bad), but you have actually arrived at an agreeable price – it's just that your interest in the place has changed. You still have the right to cancel the agreement: your "please consider" statement is not a promise to continue the contract if and only if price issues are (eventually) worked out.

Is social distancing compliance the area of responsibility of the Police?

An excerpt from: https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/volusia-county/os-ne-daytona-beach-shooting-investigation-20200524-wtjxnox26fhpxdriov5ccetlj4-story.html Chief Capri said despite the various incidents, authorities “never lost control” of the area and were able to disperse crowds as they popped up. “I know people were scared and I know people were upset about the numbers of crowds there,” he said. “We don’t take this lightly especially with the crowds gathering together right now as we got the coronavirus still going around and people not practicing social distancing. But I’m not the social distancing police — that’s not my job .” Under what conditions is it the responsibility of the police to enforce social distancing?

He is the (social distancing) police Which is to say, that police are responsible for enforcing the law without fear or favour but are allowed to employ their discretion in how and when they do so. Police have limited resources and legally have discretion in their response to lawbreaking: they can make arrests and bring charges, they can issue tickets,they can give formal and informal warnings or they can walk away. They are allowed to consider whether what they do is ‘just’, achievable and worthwhile. In the circumstances, it was probably reasonable for the police to conclude that trying to enforce social distancing laws would be arbitrary and not worthwhile.

Do corporations have any constitutional rights?

An existing answer establishes fairly well that corporations in the United States do not have Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. That leads me to wonder, do corporations in the US have any Constitutional rights at all? For example, can the US Army lawfully quarter troops at a Holiday Inn somewhere in the USA in peacetime, against the will of the owner, on the basis that the owner is a corporation and thus not eligible for the Third Amendment right against quartering of troops in private homes? Similarly, could a US court inflict cruel and unusual punishment on a corporation or require it to pay excessive bail or fines on the basis that a corporation doesn't have Eighth Amendment rights? Similarly, could Congress provide a means to shut down a corporate-owned news broadcaster on the basis that only natural humans have the right to freedom of the press under the First Amendment? Similarly, would a warrantless search of a corporate facility be lawful on the basis that the Fourth Amendment only requires police to obtain a search warrant when investigating a natural human? If corporations have some Constitutional rights but lack others, which rights have they been found to have? To be clear, I know that corporations actually exercise many of these rights in fact every day. My question, then, is if the possession of these rights by corporations is purely statutory or if their rights actually flow from the Constitution in the same way that the rights of human beings do. For example, suppose Congress passes a law authorizing Federal agents to enter Disney facilities without a warrant, blow up the printing presses used to produce Marvel comics, broadcast religious propaganda on ESPN, construct housing for US Air Force personnel in Space Mountain, arbitrarily and summarily impose the most cruel and unusual penalties you can imagine, require the payment of nearly unimaginably excessive bail and fines, forbid them from submitting a petition for redress of grievances under penalty of catapult, and then sell the entire corporation into slavery without a qualifying conviction. Would that be Constitutional?

In Grosjean v. American Press Co ., 297 U.S. 233, SCOTUS held that A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment Citizens United v. FEC , 558 U.S. 310 and numerous preceding cases find that "the First Amendment applies to corporations". Corporations also enjoy the right to contract (protected by the Contract Clause ), meaning that the government cannot willy-nilly invalidate a contract because one of the parties is a corporation, see Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward , 17 U.S. 518. (But, of course, any government can regulate any contract by process of law). In general, under 1 USC 1 , In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise...the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals We know that corporations do not have the right to vote. Second Amendment corporate rights are district-specific at present: Seventh Circuit courts view firearms sellers like booksellers — as holders of constitutional rights. While gun sellers are subject to much stricter regulation than are booksellers, they are both protected by the Bill of Rights. Conversely, in the courts of the Fourth Circuit, gun sellers have no Second Amendment rights. Third Amendment rights are unknown. Engblom v. Carey , 677 F.2d 957 which is binding only in a few states, is the entirety of 3rd Amendment case law and does not enter the relevant legal territory. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385, the court held that The Fourth Amendment protects a corporation and its officers from compulsory production of the corporate books and papers for use in a criminal proceeding against them when the information upon which the subpoenas were framed was derived by the Government through a previous unconstitutional search and seizure, planned and executed by its officials under color of a void writ, provided the defense of the Amendment be seasonably interposed, and not first raised as a collateral issue at the trial of the indictment. The article "A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial under the Sixth Amendment", 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375 explores the question of Sixth Amendment rights of corporations esp. the right to trial by jury – the summary is that this has yet to be clearly determined. US v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 finds such a right as does United States v. R. L. Polk and Co., 438 F.2d 377 A corporation does not have the same right not to incriminate itself as does a natural person, but it does enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury. However, corporate trial-by-jury rights are buried deep in questions about the "seriousness" of the prosecution. Muniz v. Hoffman , 422 U.S. 454 held that "Petitioners are not entitled to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692", but this is about a specific statute and a question of whether the offense is petty, and the broad constitutional question remains. The right to an attorney seems to be secure, see this opinion by Merrick Garland, and citations therein.

Does a residential address get re-classified as commercial if it used to register a one-person-company?

An independent consultant working from home in India wishes to incorporate as a one-person-company to cater to clients who won't contract with individuals. Will his residential address get/have to get re-classified as commercial (under The Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 1961 pdf ) if it is used as registered address for the one-person-company? More information in response to comments: State: Karnataka 100% remote consulting No separate office. Nature of business: Consulting on digital transformation.

No, it would be the other way round: If you are at a residential address, you may not be able to run a business that interferes with other residential addresses. It would depend on exactly what you are doing - if your work involves clients visiting and your neighbours complain, you may have to stop doing this.

Access rights to professional photographs

An independent professional photographer uses a sales tactic of candidly taking photos of others in public and then approaching them and offering them copies for a price. Suppose one of these photographed subjects turns around and subject-access-requests their photo under the Data Protection Act. Are there intellectual property / creative work / other exemptions that may apply that would allow the photographer to insist on charging for access to the work? Or is the subject entitled to (even full resolution) versions of the photos?

australia You must be given access The organisation may charge a reasonable administration fee for this. They may impose a licence on copyrighted materials such as prohibiting use other than verifying the information held and they you must destroy it once that purpose is accomplished. So, yes, you can get the photo but you can’t practically use the photo

Using an Apartment&#39;s Recycling Bin

An individual drives into an apartment complex, of which they do not reside, and adds an item to the recycling bin. This occurance is hypothetically during COVID-19, during Washington's "Stay Home, Stay Healthy, Stay Safe". Are there legal grounds to punish?

Punishment is probably not possible, though there are so many recycling schemes in the state and the law changes in three waves this summer: it depends on where this recycling comes from. As described, it does not constitute " dumping ". The lockdown does not contribute anything (it is not a punishable offense to be outside or to put stuff in a recycling bin). State trespass law does not clearly apply, since it requires knowingly entering upon premises (still, a prosecutor might creatively argue that it is). There might be local ordinance. The owner of the complex could sue the errant recycler for damages, depending on what harm was done. In a worst-case scenario, the substance could be something illegal to recycle and the owner could be fined, so the owner could sue to recover for his loss. Since most recycling schemes don't restrict you to just what fits in the bin, the "used up our space" argument doesn't work, but there is a small chance that addition of legally-recyclable material could make other material not recyclable on this run. (Civil liability is about compensating a person for the damage that you did, whereas punishment is about the government meting out a statutorily specified consequence for committing a crime; being required to pay damages is not a punishment).

Is a person with a warrant in one US state immune in another

An individual has a warrant in two US states (Colorado and Illinois) for running away from probation for a domestic abuse/stalking issue. This person is now in Arizona. Are there systems whereby they can be "deported" to CO to deal with their crime or do they have immunity while away?

Not immune The process is called rendition and is similar to extradition between sovereign nations. Uniform laws to give effect to this are in place in 48 of 50 states (the only exceptions being South Carolina and Missouri). The process in these states is: A valid arrest warrant issued by the demanding state A request from the Executive Authority of the demanding state (typically the Governor) A judicial hearing in the state having custody of the wanted person A waiver of extradition by the wanted person or a judicial finding that the Governor’s request follows all legal requirements if extradition is not waived Custody taken by the demanding state of the wanted person within 30 days If the demanding state does not take custody within 30 days, the prisoner may be discharged. For other states and for rendition between states and the Federal government slightly different processes apply.

Can someone be arrested in the UK solely on the basis of the Interpol Red Notice against him/her?

An individual has an Interpol Red Notice issued against him, requesting his detention and extradition. The Notice comes to the attention of the London Metropolitan Police, who discover this individual in London. Is a constable entitled to arrest him solely on the basis of the Interpol Red Notice, or must the constable first seek out a warrant from a UK court?

Corker Binning, reportedly a law firm with good reputation in the field of handling extradition representation, describes a red notice as ... an alert issued by Interpol at the request of one of its member countries, indicating that the country seeks the individual’s provisional arrest with a view to extradition. Red notices are recorded on Interpol’s databases for instant circulation to police forces and border agencies around the world. This description is presumably correct, if perhaps incomplete. A key term in this description is extradition - the removal of a person, in custody, from one state to another state. This can cause problems for the application by local law enforcement. A British man was in 2009 the subject of a red notice . Having left Dubai for personal reasons, he was reported for fraud based on the defaulting of a car loan, but ... despite featuring in Interpol's list of the 45 most wanted Britons, he was told by officers there was no outstanding warrant against him in the UK and therefore could not be arrested. This suggests that at least for citizens of the United Kingdom, it is not possible to arrest the red notice subject for that reason alone. More generally, Interpol cannot require action (arrest or otherwise) on the basis of a red notice. They are for information purposes only. This is pointed out by Interpol themselves, when they say that INTERPOL cannot compel any member country to arrest an individual who is the subject of a Red Notice. Each member country decides for itself what legal value to give a Red Notice within their borders. Given the above story and several others online of police declining to arrest red notice subjects without significant political pressure, it does not appear an individual subject to a red notice can be arrested for that reason alone.

Is equity in a company that owns property considered personal or real property?

An individual owns an LLC. The LLC owns property. The value of the property is essentially the entire value of the company. Is the individual's ownership of the company considered "real property" or "personal property"? Or something else? Edited for context I'm named as executor in a will for a close relative who passed away suddenly. The decedent was sole proprietor of two closely held companies. One was a small business ("INC") doing actual work, with customers, suppliers, revenue, phones, and all. The other business ("LLC") owns the commercial building, in which the first business was one tenant, and just collects rents, and maintains the property. The property was heavily mortgaged but self-sustaining. One doc the probate attorney sent me says I will bind myself ("Bond of legal representative of surety") to discharge faithfully the duties as executor. This bond amount is twice the market value of the property held by the LLC, ignoring mortgage and debt, so it's millions of dollars. Um, yikes?!? Per Google, the state says the bond must be 200% of the value of personal property, excluding real property. Obviously, I'll get a real opinion from an attorney whom the estate pays, and who knows the details. But in the meantime I'm curious -- if you own a company that's little but a shell around real property, is equity in the company itself real property or personal property? Or neither?

I think it's personal property. Here's why. I think the purpose of the bond is to protect the estate from malfeasance of the executor. I.e., to deter an unscrupulous executor from transferring the personal property of the decedent out of the estate at below market value and, thus, inequitably damaging the value of the estate. The bond gives the estate equitable recourse. The estate's remedy is to enforce a potential judgment by collecting against the bond. So, in this case, in theory, because the executor might have the power to transfer ownership of the LLC (or its equitable interest , hat tip: @Scott) to a third party at below market value (subject to the Operating Agreement; but then, who would complain anyway against an inappropriate sale of membership interest, if not the estate?), the state will require a bond to ensure the estate is protected against potential malfeasance by the executor. I believe the reason for excluding real property from the bond requirement is because in order to clear title, the probate judge must specifically approve the sale of any real estate. At which time s/he will withhold her approval if the sale price is out-of-line with market. One can imagine this is done as a practical matter. In other words, it would be impractical to have the judge personally approve the sale of lots of low-value items (personal property). But more practical to have the judge approve the sale of a few high-value items (real property). But, as above described, if the sale could circumvent the probate court (as in the case of an LLC membership interest) then the sale should be required to be covered by the bond. Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. Consult a real attorney to get real advice and don't rely on anything I write here.

Does signing a contract after explaining it was not legally binding count as contract fraud?

An individual recently claimed to have run into a situation where he was charged with "fraudulent contract activities" in a situation that my (admittedly quite limited) understanding of contract law says should not have violated any laws. The individual in question was donating sperm as a known sperm donor to a lesbian couple. The couple wanted to sign a contract saying that the resulting child would be legally theirs and he wouldn't file for child support etc. The individual claims he informed the couple that in his state there is already legal precedent that states these sort of contracts are unenforceable as void, but since the couple was insistent on signing the contract anyways he eventually agreed to do so, even while telling them it was not legally binding. He claims he was sued for "fraudulent contract activities" (his exact words). Supposedly because he admitted he knew the contract was meaningless he was now guilty of fraud by signing it. However, he gained no benefit from the contract, as the same scenario would have happened exactly as it is without a contract, and he claims he clearly explained the contract was worthless. I find it odd that he could be charged with anything under such a situation. He makes it sound like this is a criminal charge, as opposed to some sort of civil case, and he says the judge chose to 'charge' him. Again, common law, and contract in particular, has always seemed to apply common sense so I was a little skeptical. Of course the individual making the claim also has a history of questionable truthhoods as well, and is making claims that further his personal agenda, so I'm not quite willing to take his words as 100% true. Would this scenario warrant any kind of potential fraud charges, civil or criminal? The individual in question lives in Oklahoma so probably that's where the contract was signed.

Does signing a contract after explaining it was not legally binding count as contract fraud? No. However, depending on the details of the contract, the circumstances, and the parties' subsequent conduct, the donor's ability to prove he actually disclosed it to the couple would strengthen his position. The prima facie elements of fraud are listed in Key Finance, Inc. v. Koon , 371 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2015) : (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) known to be false at the time made; (3) made with specific intent that a party would rely on it; and (4) reliance and resulting damage. The donor's disclaimer to the couple " telling them [the contract] was not legally binding " strikes elements (1) and (2). That preempts the relevance of (3). No matter how bizarre it is that the donor eventually bowed to the couple's pressure, that does not change the fact that elements (1) and (2) are stricken. Your description does not reflect whether or how the couple incurred any losses, but the requirement of the couple's reliance is preempted by virtue of the donor's disclaimer. Furthermore, the donor's " history of questionable truthhoods " can only weaken the couple's position of "reasonable" reliance on any representation the donor makes (in case the couple shared back then your concept of donor's reliability). The donor's questionable assertions " [to] further his personal agenda " seems to be irrelevant in this matter because, as you say, " he gained no benefit from the contract ". Also, it is unclear from your description whether or not the donor has been sued/charged at all. The donor's mere allegation that he was sued has no legal effect --such as defamation or malicious prosecution-- unless one adds intricate assumptions into this matter. As for " he says the judge chose to 'charge' him ", it is possible that he was charged for something else and he is (whether unintentionally or on purpose) mischaracterizing whatever proceedings in which he was involved. The sole act of signing that contract upon proper disclaimer does not render the donor liable for fraud.

Police and failure to enter home of suicidal person

An individual with a known mental health/substance abuse history was held in protective custody on a given night due to heavy drinking and unsafe behavior. That individual was released from custody in the morning. That afternoon police were called due to a videochat in which the individual had a noose hanging in the background. The police department made no attempt to enter the house although all doors were open and did not attempt to call the concerned caller (parent) for additional information? Is there any potential liability for the municipality or police department which told the parent that they would send police and an ambulance -- and nothing was done to intervene.

In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject.

Is the term &quot;evil&quot; defined in law?

An infamous clause found occasionally in software licenses is: The Software shall be used for Good, not Evil. This clause has been discussed in many places, including Software Engineering Stack Exchange and Open Source Stack Exchange . While a lot of people don't seem to like this clause, I wanted to step back and analyze the idea of "evil" from a purely legal perspective rather than the social milieu of the open source community. To that end, is the term "evil" a proper term in law with a distinct meaning? One idea I had was to interpret it as a synonym of "unlawful" or maybe "criminal". The other idea is to understand it more in the sense of legal positivism, where socially-defined "good" and "evil" are distinguished from legally-defined "lawful" and "unlawful", and so a particular act might be "good" but "unlawful" or "evil" but "lawful". Neither of these definitions seems satisfactory. The problem I have with the first definition is that it adds unnecessary complexity to what should be more simply expressed as "This software is not to be used for any unlawful purpose." or "Committing any felony or gross misdemeanor with the software shall constitute a breach of the license agreement.". It also likely places someone who commits an unlawful act as minor as forgetting to add coins to a parking meter on the same level as a cackling comic book supervillain who gets off on bombing orphanages, which seems disingenuous. The problem I have with the legal positivism definition is that it empowers a court to define social rules, which it is not designed to do. For example, some people (based on their beliefs) might characterize using scheduling software to manage abortion clinic appointments to be an "evil" use (and thus a breach of the license), while others might take the opposite perspective and claim that using the same scheduling software to plan anti-abortion protests or manage the shifts of law enforcement officers investigating suspected clandestine abortion clinics are "evil" usages forbidden by the license. I'm interested in either an analysis of the meaning of "evil" in a general legal sense (in any jurisdiction in which the term might have been given a specific meaning or been interpreted by a court) or a sense restricted to software licenses, if such has ever been done. Discussion: As hinted at by respondents and commentators, I do see a distinction between acts that the vast majority of reasonable people would see as "clearly" evil such as ethnic cleansing, slavery, or rape and acts where the evil-ness or lack thereof is a valid point of debate, such as abortion, marketing habit-forming drugs, or not eating vegan. An answer might cover this. For example, is determination of whether a questionable act qualifies as evil a question of law for the judge or a question of fact for the trier of fact (e.g. jury)? Are the personal moral beliefs of the software licensor and/or licensee relevant? For example, if I have a personal moral belief (not shared by most of the members of my community) that eating at Burger King is evil because they buy from factory farms but I nonetheless use scheduling software with a "no evil" clause to schedule a lunch date at Burger King, am I in breach of the license? If the software's owner/licensor is a highly devout Catholic who considers any form of birth control to be pure evil but I (the licensee) disagree, is my act of using the software to facilitate an otherwise lawful condom purchase a breach? I do recognize that none of the situations I described above are likely to land me inside a courtroom due to practical matters. That is why my question is about the nature and definition of "evil" for legal purposes rather than advice for any specific situation, license, or use. I know what "love" means, but what does "evil" mean?

While not defined, in common law systems, there is a concept of Malum in se which can be translated to "Wrong or Evil in itself" and is used to describe criminal actions that are wrong because they are immoral as opposed to criminal actions that are wrong because they are prohibited ( Malum Prohibitum ). As an example, Murder is considered Malum in se while driving on the wrong side of the road is Malum Prohibitum . Malum in se thus is a crime because the action is immoral.

Is there an authoritative definition of what a terrorist is?

An intelligent unbiased observer from another galaxy wants to understand the notion of a 'terrorist' because the alien sees: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” Is there an authoritative definition of terrorism that would enable a set of unbiased observers arrive at consistent labeling of terrorism and freedom fighters?

There is a definition Or rather, there are as many definitions as there are jurisdictions who have passed laws about them. In australia , a terrorist is a person who commits a terrorist act . A terrorist act is an act, or a threat to act, that meets both these criteria: it intends to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. it causes one or more of the following: ◦ death, serious harm or danger to a person ◦ serious damage to property ◦ a serious risk to the health of safety of the public ◦ serious interference with, disruption to, or destruction of critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network. Advocating, protesting, dissenting or taking industrial action are not terrorist acts where the person doing the activity does not intend to cause serious harm to a person or create a serious risk to public safety. If the Crown accuses someone of being a terrorist then they have to convince, beyond reasonable doubt, a set of unbiased observers (a jury) that they did these things. “Freedom fighter” is not a term defined in Australian law so it would take on its normal meaning as someone who fights or otherwise struggles for “freedom” - a word that is so broad and subjective that it would be context dependent. Fighting could range from peaceful protest to armed insurrection. The hypothetical “freedom fighter” might or might not engage in “terrorist acts” so the terms “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” are not mutually exclusive.

Volenti non fit injuria in English Law

An interesting situation had just happened to me and made me think about a potential line of defence in case of troubles. From the beginning: my neighbour asked if I could let him jump from my balcony to his flat one's located below mine as he's lost his door keys. After ensuring that he knew it might be dangerous and was able to do it, I let him go down and fortunately nothing had happened to him but I started thinking about his potential fall and, shame to admit, how would I defend myself if someone would try to blame me for the accident. My very first thought was the volenti non fit injuria rule. I was pleased to find that this rule is present in English law therefore that would be my first attempt to defend myself as this guy acted on his own will. Questions: 1) Does this approach make any sense in UK? 2) Would it be different if the situation would happen in Scotland? 3) Does the face that I'm not British (I'm EU citizen) change anything here?

The type of claim that would be brought in such a case would be under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. The volenti defence is spelled out in the 1957 Act at s2(5): The common duty of care does not impose on an occupier any obligation to a visitor in respect of risks willingly accepted as his by the visitor (the question whether a risk was so accepted to be decided on the same principles as in other cases in which one person owes a duty of care to another). There are evidential questions about how one would demonstrate it (it’d be your word against his), but the law is on your side here. As for Scottish law, the same principles apply in delict, and there is a Scottish equivalent to the 1957 Act, the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960, which has an equivalent provision as the 1957 Act, namely s2(3): Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall be held to impose on an occupier any obligation to a person entering on his premises in respect of risks which that person has willingly accepted as his; and any question whether a risk was so accepted shall be decided on the same principles as in other cases in which one person owes to another a duty to show care. One of the classic cases in the literature around volenti and occupiers’ liability, Titchener v British Railways Board [1983] 1 WLR 1427 started in Scotland as an action under the 1960 Act. As for your citizenship, no, being an EU citizen rather than a UK citizen has no bearing at all on the question.

Patent Claims: software vs machine taxonomy classification

An invention consists of a system and method. The system component comprises an electronic measurement system, which is software configurable \ programmable. I would like to understand which of the two labels the invention will be classified. LABEL 1: SOFTWARE As I understand the USPTO patent landscape regarding software , this usually refers to products that are downloadable such as MS-Office: they lack physical embodiment and they are difficult to patent \ maintain due to the challenge of being merely an implementation of an abstract idea . LABEL 2: MACHINERY \ HARDWARE In contrast, there is software that is associated with hardware that has been granted patents. INVENTION The invention's best embodiment of electronic hardware (computer) is not 'invented' in the sense that all parts can be purchased from a vendor. The inventive step (design) is the arrangement / deployment of the measurement devices to produce high-fidelity measurements for the invention's methods. QUESTIONS The Mayo/Alice Framework's Step 1 poses the question: Which of the four categories labels the claim: a process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter? Based on the limited information, does the invention fall into Label 1 or 2? What strategies, wording, etc. can be engaged to tip the scales in favor of Label 2? Update: How to engineer an application to avoid Alice rejections Update: Testing a claim against an abstract idea If the patent claims an electronic measurement system and describes its functionality (inputs / algorithm / outputs), is there any benefit to claiming the software? (this assumes category 2)

The patentability issues you appear to be concerned about (specifically, those relating to subject matter eligibility under 35 USC 101) are not based on a distinction between labeling claims as "software" or "machinery/hardware". Rather, the question of subject matter eligibility will be decided based on a two-part test (originating from the Alice decision, and since refined by other court decisions and USPTO guidance ), which asks: Is the claim directed toward an "abstract idea"; and if so, does the claim include elements that amount to "significantly more" than the abstract idea? Determining the answers to these questions can be difficult, and the decisions made by the USPTO (and the courts) are often conflicting and may appear arbitrary at times. That said, if the invention relies on "the arrangement / deployment of the measurement devices to produce high-fidelity measurements", a claim that includes that arrangement will have a higher likelihood of being patentable than one that does not, because tying the method to a specific (non-generic) structure is a common way of including elements that are "significantly more" than the abstract idea. Regarding the third question, it is often preferable to claim the steps taken by the software as a method (e.g., tied to the enabling structure, such as the "electronic measurement system"). Although functional descriptions in system claims are frequently employed, they may not be afforded any patentable weight (that is, any system capable of implementing the functionality may count as prior art, whether or not that system actually implements it). Further, such functional descriptions may lead to undesired limitations of the claims under arguments analogous to those of Williamson v. Citrix . Also, please note that there is no requirement for an embodiment (let alone the best embodiment) to be available for purchase from an vendor in order for the invention to be "invented". Rather, the invention must have been "reduced to practice", which means either that it has actually been implemented in some manner, or that the inventor is capable of describing it in a manner that would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to implement it. Essentially, if you can describe it in sufficient detail to enable someone else to make it, then it qualifies as an invention.

How are pending patents sold / assigned?

An inventor has filed a utility patent. It is now in pending status. If a large cooperation really believes in this invention and buys it in its pending state, what happens if for some reason the patent is rejected? Is this merely a risk that the cooperation has to assume?

The contract should allocate the risk That’s what contracts are for.

To what extent is a lawyer guilty of malpractice for material misrepresentations to a client, and the client&#39;s counterparties?

An investor agreed to invest an amount of money, 2X, in a startup through a convertible note. At the end of two years, the investor had the option of receiving back the monetary amount of his note with accrued interest, or converting his note into equity at a pre determined rate. The terms of the deal were that the investor would invest X up front, to allow the company to acquire a particular asset, and the remaining X upon the company's successful acquisition of this asset, which everyone involved agreed was key to the deal. The company failed to acquire the key asset, and in this contingency, the terms of the contract called for the company to return X to the investor. The company notified the investor's lawyer of this fact, but the lawyer falsely told the client that the asset had been acquired, and asked the client to forward the remaining X. The client failed to do so, which would have been a "default" had the asset, in fact, been acquired. The lawyer also represented to the company that he had reviewed the finances of the investor (he had not), and that the investor was an "accredited investor" as defined by the SEC, who could invest in unregistered securities, even though this was not the case. After two years, the client sued for the return of X, which the company had spent. The company counterclaimed for the remaining X by saying that it would have survived if the investor had invested the whole amount. Because of certain jurisdictional and procedural issues, this set of lawsuits will take years to resolve. Did the lawyer violate a fiduciary duty by telling the client that the asset had been acquired when, in fact it had not been, and if so, what are the consequences to the lawyer? What responsibilities did the lawyer have under "know your customer" or similar legislation to verify the client's ability to invest as an accredited investor? And to what extent is the lawyer liable for the relevant mispresentations? Normally, malpractice is not held against the lawyer unless the client wins the underlying case against the company. Is this true here, or are the lawyer's lapses so egregious and so material to the issues involved that the lawyer can be found liable regardless of the outcome of the investor-company litigation?

Did the lawyer violate a fiduciary duty by telling the client that the asset had been acquired when, in fact it had not been, and if so, what are the consequences to the lawyer? Yes. A lawyer has the obligation that his representations to his client be diligent and materially truthful. Lawyer's violation of that duty prevents his client from making informed decisions. At the outset, the lawyer's malpractice would warrant sanctions by the disciplinary board where he incurred legal malpractice. A possible suspension, public reprimand, and/or the amount of a monetary sanctions depend on several variables such as lawyer's intent, board's rules & discretion, and lawyer's severity & history of malpractice. Quantification of the lawyer's liability to his client depends on the losses the client incurred as a result of the lawyer's misrepresentations. This largely depends on the terms of the contract between the investor and the company. The intentionality (as opposed to negligence) of lawyer's misrepresentations are likely to support a claim of fraud, for which many jurisdictions entitle the injured party to treble damages . What responsibilities did the lawyer have under "know your customer" or similar legislation to verify the client's ability to invest as an accredited investor? Know Your Customer mostly relates to prevention and detection of money-laundering (and, to a lesser extent, of tax evasion), not to provider's awareness of his client's financial sophistication. KYC entails a duty the service provider has --if at all-- toward the authorities, not toward the client and typically not either toward the company in which the client intends to invest. Therefore KYC seems inapplicable in the scenario you describe. It is unclear from your post why the status of accredited investor would be any relevant in this scenario. A startup in need for a particular asset seems unlikely to have a duty to ensure that its investors are classified as accredited for SEC purposes. Normally, malpractice is not held against the lawyer unless the client wins the underlying case against the company. Is this true here That seems unlikely. Despite the several gaps in your description, it certainly reflects separate causes of action involving different parties, different types of relation between them, unrelated states of mind, simultaneous fictions devised by the lawyer, and so forth. Accordingly, the outcomes of investor's ensuing claims against his lawyer are independent of investor's suit against the company. For instance, the extent to which the contract between the investor and the company remained is inconclusive because crucial details of the investor-company contract are missing. Nor is it clear whether the company incurred what is known as invited error by not pressing the investor on the second installment of X the company was expecting. But, regardless of the legal position of the investor and the company with respect to each other, both entities [detrimentally] acted in reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations a third-party made to each of them.

Maltese company with CEO living in Portugal. Where to pay corporate tax?

An investor asked me this question a few days ago and I couldn't answer: If a company based (thus paying taxes) in Malta has the CEO and some employees living in Portugal, is there any legal ground for Portugal to pretend company taxes to be paid in Portugal? The investor was wondering if the fact that the decision-making part of the company (and some employees) are based in the country will cause problems.

International allocation of corporate taxes is a complex and technical issue. Normally, a firm hires a specialist international accounting firm to handle this issue for them. Generally speaking, a corporation owes taxes where it does business, and not necessarily where it is incorporated or has its headquarters. One needs to consider all of the places where the corporation does business. But, there are a variety of formulas for allocating a corporation's taxes between countries (based on sales, costs, employees, property ownership, transfer pricing, etc.), and frequently there is a rough justice formula established by tax treaty that applies. The Malta-Portugal Tax Treaty is obviously relevant. But, if the company also does business in countries other than Malta and Portugal, that may not be enough to resolve the question. Far more facts than those found in the question would be relevant. On the other hand, owing corporate taxes in more than one country is not normally something that a business would consider to be "a problem." It is just the normal reality of daily life in a multi-national business, and it does not imply that the company will be paying taxes twice on the same income - sometimes it does, but often it doesn't or even results of fewer combined taxes than if the business was only in one country.

Does The Crown have the authority to restrict the rights of a Royal family member?

An issue that somehow got lost in the recent Meghan and Harry allegations is the claim that Meghan had to give up her driver's license and keys. The only reference to legality of this action I found was this article in which several Royal family experts express doubt that The Crown would actually deny her the possessions. However could the Queen act in this manner since she isn't legally accountable?

She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that.

Am I entitled to information that the DMCA claimant is taking a legal action against me within 10 business days after receiving counter DMCA notice?

An item of mine was removed from a third-party website due to a DMCA copyright claim. I'd gone thoroughly into it and noticed serious issues with the document. Namely, contact credentials were incomplete and misleading (lack of full address), and the document was written in an absolutely abhorent English (e.g. "a item are") despite the fact that the name and surname were American/English. This person claimed to work for a renown, non-profit company located in the US and claimed the rights to my product in their name. The thing is, he didn't send this notice from that company's email domain, but instead used other third-party email provider located in a different continet that boasts one would need a warrant from this country's court to get access to the mailbox. I tried contacting the company he represented, but no one responded.I even sent a mail to his supposedly company's mailbox, but I got an error stating it didn't exist. Even the copyright claim was easily refutable. Therefore, everything looked extremely suspicious. I informed the file-host company about the issues withthe DMCA, but they said they can't ignore it on the basis of its legitimacy, as they're just passing the information. So I filed a counter notice, received the information that my item would be restored within 14 days. Unfotunately, 18 days my item is still disabled. I haven't received any feedback despite contacting the file-host company. I assume what happened is the guy told them in his third-world English that he's taking a legal action, but I highly doubt any action will ever be taken. I'm not a US citizen, but I thought he'd need to present a legal document, an injunction, from the court to stop the process, but to do so, he'd have to be thoroughly checked. I'm being kept in the dark and haven't received any legal notice. Unfortunately, I can't even sue him since his personal credentials are made up or incomplete. Am I not even entitled to receive any type of court document at this or some point in the future? How do I know he took or will take any legal action against me? What if he doesn't? Should I pressure the hosting company for more information? They haven't replied to my previous email, so maybe a need a solicitor to send them a notice and scare them a little bit? The thing is, the value of this item isn't even worth that much and the costs of legal actions would be huge I assume. I'd appreciate any advice at this point. Thank you for your time.

The person submitting the DMCA takedown must state which work they believe has been infringed upon, and then they have to state under threat of perjury that they are the copyright owner or represent the copyright owner. So if the item that has been taken down is definitely you, then the complainant must have made a mistake (identified the wrong work), which is legal, or they are guilty of perjury. That's the threat of the DMCA, to keep complainants honest. And just for your information: If the site takes the item down because of a DMCA takedown notice, and then restores it because of a counter notice, then they are perfectly safe from any threats, even if your item were indeed infringing. So they seem to be just slow.

Is it legal for a bartender to serve &quot;virgin&quot; drinks to an intoxicated patron without telling them?

An occasional trope in media, or in real life, is to have someone who is obviously intoxicated handed another drink and, when someone calls the server on it, they say that they gave them water instead of vodka, or a Jack and Coke without the Jack, with the implication being that they're doing the right thing by not giving the person more alcohol, but also avoiding conflict by fooling the person into thinking they're getting alcohol when they're not. Leaving aside that the effects of alcohol are sometimes as much about thinking you're drinking , it also occurred to me that, in a business situation, it could be argued that the bartender is instituting a sort of fraud on the customer by doing an extreme version of "watering the drinks". I assume that there'd be some degree of leniency if the bartender argues that they were trying to avoid harm by doing a reduced version of refusing service, and that a further method of avoiding trouble would be not charging at all for the substitute drinks (not even charging them for the soda you substituted, for example), but I could see a case still being made for a customer, or someone with them noticing the switch, claiming they are being defrauded. So, is it legal for a bartender to switch someone to non-alcoholic drinks without telling them in the United States?

Bartenders and their employers face stiff regulatory penalties (including fines and loss of a license to serve alcohol), and they also face potentially massive lawsuit liability for serving alcohol to someone is who too drunk if the patron later leaves and drives drunk or other harm results (such lawsuits are sometimes called "dramshop actions"). If a bartender serves a "virgin" drink when a regular one is ordered, without the customer's knowledge, this could result in liability for breach of contract (with the damages likely being either a nominal $1 or the difference between the cost of the regular drink and the virgin drink if the customer is charged the higher price). But affirmative defenses of illegality of the proposed contract (when the customers orders an alcoholic drink) might void liability. It could also result in liability for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment. But again, unless the customer is up-charged for the alcoholic price while getting a less expensive drink, the damages would be nominal (unlikely to exceed $1) and affirmative defenses might apply.

How can I make them pay me back?

An old friend messaged me saying they were stranded 4 hours home and needed a cab to get home and it cost 80$ dollars. He asked if I could send him $80 and he has $500 at home and will pay me back when he gets home. I told him I only have 30$ and I need this paid by next day and can allow him to borrow for a day. I also mentioned it was really important as that’s all I have right now and I need it to buy food for my boyfriends kids. He agreed and I sent him the money on Facebook. I kept messaging him to know if was able to get remaining $50 and reach home. There was no response. Two days later he messages me saying he’s gonna return the money and to just be patient. I’ve asked him multiple times to update me and give me a time frame of when he was able to return me the money. He is already late and the least he could do is update me. He reads the messages and ignores me. I can see that he is active on Facebook and has logged in and out. I also had another friend message him just to see if he would reply and he did. I need to be paid back and I no longer believe that he is going to pay me back at all. Is there anyway I can go about getting it back? What are me legal options? All the messages are through Facebook and I sent the money through Facebook. I have kept them all.

Sorry to hear about this. It is possible that your friend’s Facebook account was hacked and the hacker scammed you. It is unlikely that you can get your money back. If the taxi fare cost $80, then $30 wouldn’t have got them home. Unless you paid the taxi company direct, whoever you corresponded with had access to electronic banking of some sort. One would imagine that someone with $500 at home probably has access to $80 electronically themselves. It is a pretty bad day when getting scammed by a stranger is the optimistic case, but I post this answer in the hope that it’s not your friend who scammed you. Before writing off the friendship, you might want to phone or visit your friend to check whether their Facebook account was hacked.

Who is the data controller of footage taken on a retail worker’s personal phone?

An on-duty retail employee draws their personal smartphone while in uniform and commences recording a customer. Who is the data recorded and held/controlled by, for GDPR purposes? Does the customer enjoy Subject access rights to the footage?

The data would be recorded and held/controlled by the retail employee, making them a controller under the Data Protection Act 2018. In Article 4 of the GDPR a controller is defined as (7) ‘controller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data (but see section 6 of the 2018 Act); Section 6 of the 2018 Act is irrelevant to this question. In this case, it seems clear that the employee determines, on their own, the purposes and means of processing personal data by recording a customer using their personal smartphone. They control the data. In theory, the customer would enjoy subject access rights to view the recording under Article 15 of the GDPR because the recording constitutes personal data. In reality, it seems unlikely the employee would give them access. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data [...]

Can a bank force you to use their app in order to use their services under the PSD2?

An online bank I am using (Qonto) contacted my recently by email to tell me that I will not be able to use my account from 5th July unless I install their app in my phone. They say it is mandatory for PSD2 compliance. While I understand PSD2 may enforce security mechanisms, it surprises me that under the EU, an open standard is not promoted/enforced for banks (like One-Time-Password/OTP mechanisms). Enforcing to use their app could be discriminatory since it assumes you can install it in your device (you may not have a compatible phone). Also, being a proprietary app, it could be used to track information about you that you do not want to share with your bank. Can a European bank do this? Wouldn't PSD2 protect users from this somehow?

The PSD2 article 4(30) defines multifactor authentication : ‘strong customer authentication’ means an authentication based on the use of two or more elements categorised as knowledge (something only the user knows), possession (something only the user possesses) and inherence (something the user is) that are independent, in that the breach of one does not compromise the reliability of the others, and is designed in such a way as to protect the confidentiality of the authentication data; The EBA published an opinion about the means of 2FA that are compliant with the Strong Customer Authentication of the PDS2 it surprises me that under the EU, an open standard is not promoted/enforced for banks (like One-Time-Password/OTP mechanisms). OTP/TOTP is not a compliant way to conduct SCA because of : The EBA is also of the view that an OTP that contributes to providing evidence of possession would not constitute a knowledge element for approaches currently observed in the market. Indeed, knowledge, by contrast with possession, is an element that should exist prior to the initiation of the payment or the online access. TOTP would be compliant if it used a non-transferrable token that is only useable on that device alone (which a normal SOTP isn't) : As stated in the EBA Opinion on the implementation of the RTS (paragraph 35), a device could be used as evidence of possession, provided that there is a ‘reliable means to confirm possession through the generation or receipt of a dynamic validation element on the device’. Evidence could, in this context, be provided through the generation of a one-time password (OTP), whether generated by a piece of software or by hardware, such as a token, text message (SMS) or push notification. In the case of an SMS, and as highlighted in Q&A 4039, the possession element ‘would not be the SMS itself, but rather, typically, the SIM-card associated with the respective mobile number’. Can a European bank do this? App-based auth is compliant because : The EBA is of the view that approaches relying on mobile apps, web browsers or the exchange of (public and private) keys may also be evidence of possession, provided that they include a device-binding process that ensures a unique connection between the PSU’s app, browser or key and the device. This may, for instance, be through hardware crypto-security, web browser and mobile-device registration or keys stored in the secure element of a device Also, being a proprietary app, it could be used to track information about you that you do not want to share with your bank. You need to read the Privacy Policy of the app/service and exert your country/EU consent modification/retraction right Can a European bank do this? Why wouldn't they be allowed? There are many services that you can only access on a proprietary app. Wouldn't PSD2 protect users from this somehow? PSD2 gives security requirements, not anything else

Why did the US Supreme Court hear this case?

An op-ed entitled A Major Church-State Ruling That Shouldn't Have Happened claims that In Trinity v. Comer , there was no remaining dispute between the actual parties As I understand it, courts have no power to seek out cases or issues to rule on. A party with standing must bring the case to the court. (I've usually heard this in response to rhetoric about "activist judges.") So either my understanding has been wrong, or there's more to the story of Trinity v. Comer . If there was no remaining dispute, why did SCOTUS hear this case?

The explanation in the decision (fn 1) is that That announcement does not moot this case. We have said that such voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not moot a case unless “subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” [citations] The Department has not carried the “heavy burden” of making “absolutely clear” that it could not revert to its policy of excluding religious organizations... “there is no clearly effective barrier that would prevent the [Department] from reinstating [its] policy in the future”

Transit through US for Indian travelers during Covid

An order was passed by the US government restricting travel to the USA, for non-US-citizens who have been physically present in India in the 14 days prior to their arrival in the USA. This question is about interpreting the following exception in Section 2. a) viii) : any noncitizen traveling as a nonimmigrant pursuant to a C-1, D, or C-1/D nonimmigrant visa as a crewmember or any noncitizen otherwise traveling to the United States as air or sea crew; I have the following three related questions: Q1: Does this exception apply to any non-immigrant with a C-1 visa, or only those non-immigrants who serve as crew? Q2: The part of the clause before the first or would imply that anyone can transit with a C-1 visa. Is this interpretation correct? Q3: According to this page , nonimmigrants with a B visa can transit through the US and do not need a separate C visa. Would Section 2. a) viii) then also allow any non-immigrant with a B visa to transit through the US?

The relevant part can be parsed as: (any noncitizen traveling as a nonimmigrant pursuant to a C-1, D, or C-1/D nonimmigrant visa as a crewmember) or (any noncitizen otherwise traveling to the United States as air or sea crew) where either the first part has to be true, or the second. Being a crew member is a requirement of both of the options. It is not true that " Anyone can transit with a C-1 visa": you must also be a crew member. Since the rule does not state an exception for a B visa holder, a B-visa holder may not avail themselves of the "transit / crew" exception. The State department suggestion simply means that you can also transit with a B visa. A C visa is not equivalent to a B visa.

anonymisation/redaction of public website content as response to &#39;right to erasure&#39;

An organisation runs some public email lists. These are archived, and the archives are also publically available from its website. A user of the mailing list asserts their "right to be forgotten" and asks that all personal data held by the organisation be deleted. The organisation redacts all references to A. Person having email address a.person@example.com (as well as other identifying header information like IP addresses) in the list archives, replacing them with Anonymous 12345 , anon-12345@example.org , and so on, and retains no record of the mapping. Would this comply with the request? The organisation itself has no way to reverse the mapping, but clearly anyone who has received a copy of the message is able to do so. I am considering this in respect to Recital 26 . If not acceptable, presumably there is no way to allow for archives to be maintained in the face of such a request other than by claiming exemption? (Is this perhaps stackexchange's approach? ie. delete personal data (accounts) on request but claim exemption on supplied content.) For electronic mailing list archives, one might also substitute tournament results; or the timetable of a conference that the person attended as a speaker.

I agree with Ben that there are many exemptions to the right to be forgotten. For example if messages are removed from a mailing list archive, the replies to deleted messages will become useless. That would impact the right of freedom of expression and information of those authors. That is one of the exemptions to the right to be forgotten. So there is no right to delete complete messages. Replacing references to names and email addresses, is a very good solution. It must not be possible to de-anomize the data. So having anon-20190213-123@example.org , it must not be possible to get back A. Person <a.person@example.org> . Sure, everyone who received a copy of those messages can find that message in their own archive, and see the author that way. But that is because they simply have a copy of the full archive. The right to be forgotten is independent of someone else having the same information you request to delete. For example google removes search results in its index, even though the same information can still be found on the original website. To fully exercise the right to be forgotten, you have to make a request to everyone who has that data. In Austria there is a recent case ( ECLI:AT:DSB:2018:DSB.D123.270.0009.DSB.2018 ) (available only in German) where someone's data was anonymized after asserting his "right to be forgotten". He did not agree and wanted his data to be fully deleted, so he filed a complaint at the Austrian DPA . The DPA denied his request. I have tried to make a translation of the relevant part of the judgment, note that many references are to other Austrian judgments or books (where I listed the ISBN instead). D.1 The binding part of the GDPR does not contain the term "anonymisation". Only recital 26 states that the GDPR does not apply to anonymous data. D.2 The term "erasure of personal data" as used in Art. 17 is neither found in the binding part nor in the recitals. In Art. 4(2) erasure and destruction are listed as alternative forms of processing which are not necessary identical. This means that erasure does not necessarily requires final destruction. (cf. K121.375/0012-DSK/2008 , with regard to Directive 95/46/EC, where also a distinction was made between erasure and destruction; cf. ISBN 978-3-406-72006-2). Such a differentiation also results from the case-law of the Constitutional Court (cf. VfSlg. 19.937/2014). Therefore, the person in charge is entitled to make a choice with regard to the means - i.e. the manner in which the data is deleted - (cf. again ISBN 978-3-406-72006-2, according to which reference is made to the destruction of keys or other decryption devices without the removal of the data itself; cf. in this sense also ISBN 978-3-406-71932-5, which refers to the impossibility of perceiving the information previously embodied in the data to be deleted; cf. also ISBN 978-3-406-72007-9, according to which deletion is to be understood as any kind of conceilment of stored personal data; cf. also Warter, Dako 2/2018 , 39 [40], according to which the result of the deletion action is decisive). The removal of the personal reference from personal data ("anonymisation") can thus in principle be a possible means of deletion within the meaning of Art. 4(2) in conjunction with Art. 17(1) GDPR. However, it must be ensured that neither the person responsible himself nor a third party can restore a personal reference without disproportionate effort (cf. RS0125838 , according to which it is not sufficient to merely change the data organisation in such a way that "targeted access" is not possible any more; cf. also the judgment of the CJEU of 19 October 2016, C-582/14 , 45 ff.). Only if the person responsible aggregates the data in a way that no data can be identified, can the resulting data stock be described as anonymous (i.e. without personal reference) (see Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques of the former Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP216 , p. 10). The Administrative Court has also ruled - with regard to the comparable legal situation under the DSG 2000 - that a redaction (blacking out), for example, can be regarded as a form of deletion. By making the name of the data subject and all other data relating to him or her unrecognisable, his or her request for deletion is complied with (cf. the decision of 23 November 2009, 2008/05/0079 ). So anonymisation is sufficient to comply with a right to be forgotten request.

Does a NY divorce court have jurisdiction to rule on an action that involves the use of Supplemental Security Income funds?

An over 21 mentally challenged person who was certified to receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) at the age of 18 elects a "Payee" who happens to be a parent. For several years the parent manages the funds and utilizes them for the upkeep, clothing, medical, food etc; for the challenged person. Years later the parents file for divorce and the child elects to switch payee roles to the other parent that they will reside with. The parent who currently is the payee sues the other parent citing mis-use of the funds and submits an amount to the court that the needs to be payed to the current parent managing the funds. Notes: The person is over 21, neither parent has legal guardianship nor does any state or federal agency. The person is legally emancipated by virtue of being over 21. What, if any, legal cause in NY does a person who is not a legal recognized representative, guardian, power of attorney, not legally incompetent or incapacitated.

It turns out that this seemingly pretty simple question is actually quite involved and has multiple subcomponents at a level of complexity similar to a difficult bar exam question. I am providing my best good faith analysis of how these questions should be resolved, but more than one of them is legitimately debatable and one could non-frivolously argue for a different interpretation of some of these points. The Court with jurisdiction over divorces in New York State is the New York State Supreme Court (trial division) (not, contrary to all common sense, the New York State Family Court, which has no jurisdiction over anything discussed in this question). The New York State Supreme Court (trial division) is New York State's court of general jurisdiction. The intermediate appellate court in New York State is the appellate division of the New York State Supreme Court, and the next level of appeal is to the New York State Court of Appeals which is what most states would call a "supreme court". New York State also has courts of limited jurisdiction called Surrogate's Courts that handle many kinds of cases mostly involving probate and guardianship, which is roughly co-equal to the New York State Supreme Court (trial division) in the areas where it does have jurisdiction. Implicit in this question are three subquestions with some subparts to those: Is some or all of this claim a matter properly raised in the context of a divorce case? Can a new claim related to recovery of funds be joined to the divorce action? Does the New York State Supreme Court have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim? If not, which courts do? Who has standing to bring this claim (i.e. who is legally allowed to sue over this question)? (Standing is considered a subpart of subject matter jurisdiction for some purposes, but for this purpose it is best to think of it as something separate.) Notes: The person is over 21, neither parent has legal guardianship nor does any state or federal agency. The person is legally emancipated by virtue of being over 21. In order for this arrangement to happen, the federal Social Security Administration must have made, at least, an administrative determination that there is some form of incapacity present, and the SSI qualification likewise probably involved such a determination. So, this premise in the question is problematic. The parent who currently is the payee sues the other parent citing mis-use of the funds and submits an amount to the court that the needs to be payed to the current parent managing the funds. The decision of who the funds are paid to would be handled by the United States Social Security Administration over which New York State courts do not have jurisdiction. It is conceivable, that if there has been a switch of payee with the Social Security Administration, that a divorce court could order the turnover of unspent SSI proceeds currently in the possession of the former payee to the current payee as part of the property division in the divorce. But, neither parent would have standing, in their own right, to sue for breach of fiduciary duty by the payee parent who received the funds and failed to use them for the benefit of their child, and that claim could not be joined to the divorce case in the New York State Supreme Court (trial division). Standing would be in the child, although the other parent could initiate a lawsuit as the "next friend" of the child and could seek to be appointed as a guardian, conservator, or guardian ad litem of the child in order to pursue the litigation on behalf of the child. Recognition of "next friend" status, and possibly even appointment of a guardian ad litem (i.e. for purposes of a lawsuit) might be handled by the court handling the primary case. Appointment as a guardian or conservator for the child would be a question for the New York State Surrogate's Court. In any of these scenarios, the parent would be involved only in some fiduciary capacity and not as the true plaintiff in a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit to recover funds previously misappropriated by a payee parent. It isn't entirely clear to me (without significant case law research that might be inconclusive which I have not undertaken), whether the New York State Supreme Court (trial division) or the New York State Surrogate's Court would have jurisdiction over the breach of fiduciary duty claim against the payee parent (it could be that both courts have jurisdiction over that claim and the court in which the claim is first filed would assert authority over the case), although that claim to recover funds misspent in the past could not be joined to the divorce case. It would also probably be possible to bring suit in the relevant U.S. District Court (or to remove the case to this federal court if it was initially brought in state court) since this involves funds paid pursuant to a federal government program by a federal agency pursuant to federal law authorization. Again, a parent would not have standing to bring suit in their own light, but the federal court could conceivably recognize the parent as a "next friend" or appoint the parent as a guardian ad litem for the adult child. Or, a parent could be appointed by the New York State Surrogate's Court as guardian and/or conservator for the child, and then bring suit in that capacity for the child in federal court.

One Identical Twin Proven Guilty

An unlikely scenario but one I've always wondered about: Let's say that a murder was committed. There is a pair of identical twins. Both twins had means, motive, and opportunity for the murder. It has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that one of them committed the crime. A witness actually saw one of the twins stab someone, to death but he can't tell which one. The knife has been found, and has the twins' DNA on it. Of course, their DNA is identical, so it is evidence that one of them did it, but tells us nothing about which one. Neither twin has been able to establish an alibi. Am I correct in assuming that a conviction is impossible, because either twin could argue that the other did it? What if one twin established an alibi, would that be sufficient to convict the other?

A conviction isn't ever impossible, but it could well be highly unjust. Indeed, there is a current case where a man alleged that he was the murder, though his identical twin brother was convicted. This article indicates that identical twins are not necessarily genetically indistinguishable. Assuming there is a lack of positive evidence such as fingerprints or an alibi which clearly identifies one versus the other, then one would predict no conviction because there would be a highly reasonable doubt. See the case of Orlando Nemnhard , where one of two twins did it but the DA concluded that they couldn't prove which one, so the charges were dropped.

Is there a general business equivalent of &quot;stage names&quot; or &quot;pen names&quot;

And by that I mean: a situation where an individual can conduct their general business activities privately within a proprietorship under a fictitious "pseudonym" or via proxy? Though I'd imagine if so there would at least be provisions within the law that would allow for one's identity to be revealed by subpoena or some other means in cases that constitute personal legal liability—especially under criminal investigations.

If I understood you right, you want to use a company name rather than your own. Normally, that is done with a dba, or doing business as. Check this site: https://www.fundera.com/blog/what-is-dba When your business is a sole proprietorship, meaning its not a legally registered corporation, you file for a DBA. Registered Corporations pick a name while registering and don't have to have a DBA, but can if they want.

Can countries that apply the dualist approach to international law indefinitely delay the implementation of a treaty into domestic law?

And can states be held accountable for any violations of the treaty that occurred before they incorporated the treaty into domestic law ?

Yes, treaties can be indefinitely delayed For example, the United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War against Germany. This is only one of many . Of course, because the legislature is inherently involved in the ratification of treaties in the United States, this may not qualify as a dualist entity. For a more directly dualist approach, the Section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth Parliament the right to legislate on "external affairs" which includes the implementation of international treaties into domestic law. Australia has agreed to be bound by human rights treaties but they are only enforcable once incorporated into domestic law - some parts of these treaties have not been. In general, no country is a pure dualist.

Who actually drafts legislation in all its nitty gritty detail in the U.K.?

And what is the process like? It seems surprisingly meticulously drafted and most elaborate as to account for every conceivable scenario and counter argument that one might ever encounter or think of. Often it is so meticulous that there are provisions that one can’t make sense of in themselves but once I’ve hears them explained then they actually make perfect sense. So who’s job is it to consider all of these things? Who went down the housing act and picked all the grounds that would be included in section 8, and then decided what length of notice period would go with each? Not just that, but like all the legislation in general. What is the composition process like? Or, who thought up the scheme that immigration would be out of legal aid in laspo for example, unless it implicated HRA art. 3? Innumerable examples abound by the question is basically the same. Not sure what tags to give this but please feel free to add any to think might be suitable.

Parliamentary draftspeople The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel is a group of government lawyers who specialise in drafting legislation. We work closely with departments to translate policy into clear, effective and readable law. Our role will often begin when legislation is first being considered and we will remain involved throughout the Parliamentary process and beyond. I’m afraid you give them too much credit - most legislation is good, some is bad, a small amount is appalling. In the latter case I place the several newly minted laws I've read where there are such large ambiguities that the only way to work out what's legal is to try something, get sued and have the courts decide - good statutes should leave litigants arguing the facts rather than the law as far as possible.

What in essence are PCSOs? (Organizationally and career trajectory wise)

And where do they fit into the system of police? Are they aspiring police constables in training who will hopefully one day progress into full policedom? Do they report under the met?

What in essence are PCSOs? Police Community Support Officers (PCSO) are civilian employees (also known as police staff) of the relevant police force, a role created by section 38 Police Reform Act 2002. They may be designated with (i.e. authorised to use) any power or duty of a constable except those identified in Part 1 of Schedule 3B and any or all of the various powers and duties found in Schedule 3C ( far too many to repoduce here ). Where do they fit into the system of police? Each force area has its own requirements, priorities and demands, but for the Metropolitan Police Service (the Met) PCSO roles include: Safer Neighbourhood Teams – focussing on crime and antisocial behaviour within the community. Safer Transport Teams – focussing on over-ground transport, working with the public to ensure and reassure that our transport networks are safe. Roads Policing Teams – working alongside Traffic Officers, dealing with collision scenes, incidents and broken down vehicles. Reassurance Tasking Teams – visible presence on the roads, enforcing red routes and managing network disruption. Tunnel Team- focussing on keeping London’s Tunnel network operating at full capacity and dealing with associated issues. Are they aspiring police constables in training who will hopefully one day progress into full policedom? Some are, some are not. There is neither an expectation nor requirement to apply to be a constable. Do they report under the Met? Not all, as each police force has reporting responsibilities for its own employees.

What did Andrew Bell SC (as he then was) do, that no other barrister had done to Gummow J in 17 years?

Andrew Bell SC got appointed to the Supreme Court of NSW, then NSW Court of Appeal from 28 Feb 2019 -, and now Chief Justice of NSW. He was Vinerian Scholar on the BCL, and got a DPhil. Scroll down half way on https://justinian.com.au/archive/off-with-the-rent.html , which cites Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar & Ors; Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] HCATrans 294 (26 October 2011). Bell: Well, your Honour, we do not know what the recollections were - - - Gummow: Just a minute, Mr Bell. French CJ: Just let Justice Gummow finish his question. Gummow: No, I am not going to finish the question. Bell: Sorry, I thought you had. We do not know what the recollections were but he was willing to discuss those with ASIC. He was not willing to discuss those with us. The fact that he did not have or may have had few recollections would be – may itself be significant if the court were to find that one would expect him to have recollections. This was a pretty major matter of public interest and public importance. Gummow: You managed to do something, Mr Bell, which no other counsel has done to me in 17 years on this court, but I will not say any more and I do not think it is funny. Bell: I do not know what your Honour is referring to, sir - I am just trying genuinely to answer your Honour’s questions. Now, the point is, there was a witness who ASIC should have, as a public interest body, no interest in securing findings of contravention and disqualifications on the basis of an imperfect record, no interest, whatsoever, and really - - - Don't you just love the occasional weird judicial brain snap?

The issue actually arose a few lines earlier in the transcript: Gummow: He also seems to have said that he had 'few recollections' and did not recall - et cetera, the February meeting. So why do we assume that there was this - - - Bell: Well, your Honour, we do not know what the recollections were - - - Gummow: Just a minute, Mr Bell. French CJ: Just let Justice Gummow finish his question. Gummow: No, I am not going to finish the question. Bell merely interrupted Justice Gummow. This is a serious breach of etiquette in an oral argument.

Andrew Cuomo suing over the 2018 tax plan

Andrew Cuomo (Governor of New York) is planning on suing over the 2018 tax plan, claiming it to be unconstitutional: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/03/cuomo-new-york-sue-over-federal-tax-law/1001655001/ It sounds like the biggest complaint he has is the changes to the state and local tax deductions. This affects states like NY with high state taxes more than other states and might cause high earning people to leave the state. Given that constitutionally congress has the power to levy taxes, does the claim that it is unconstitutional to not have a state and local tax deduction have any merit at all?

I see this question as asking whether the state and local tax deduction to the federal income tax is constitutionally required, which is the proposed basis of the lawsuit as stated in the question. The answer is that it is not. One simple way to see this is that people who do not itemize their deductions have never been able to take this tax deduction. The power of the federal government to impose taxes is not entirely unlimited under the U.S. Constitution, but it has the express power to impose an income tax, and income defined without a state and local tax deduction is not so far afield from the meaning of "income" that it ceases to be an income tax without it. In contrast, denying a deduction for the cost of goods sold of a business, converts the income tax from an income tax to a sales tax and this interpretation when applied in the case of Internal Revenue Code Section 280E was held to violate the constitution, forcing a different interpretation of that section that allowed a cost of goods sold deduction, in order to make the section constitutional. Therefore, the hypothetical case has little legal merit.

Could the act of emailing publicly available information be deemed illegal?

Andy and Mary are friends. Andy discovers that Mary is secretly working as an escort. Nobody knows about this activity beyond Andy. He tries to convince her that escorting is harmful and will have a serious impact on her mental well-being in the future. Mary disagrees and asserts that her activities are solely relevant to her private life. To stop her, Andy decides to send an anonymous email to her family in which he provides a link to the PUBLIC page she is using to promote her escort services. Does Andy commit any crime in revealing a PUBLIC website to her family? Could this in particular be considered a cyberstalking crime? I stress that all the information shared by Andy is PUBLIC and visible on the web.

In the united-states , those actions would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Andy has a constitutional right to speak freely about essentially whatever he wants -- including Mary's criminal conduct -- unless his speech falls into one of several narrowly defined categories , none of which would apply in this case. And because Mary has already put this information out on the Internet, it is likely not sufficiently private to support an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the unfortunate reality is that complainants, police, prosecutors, and judges frequently ignore First Amendment protections. Indeed, many states have laws against "cyberstalking" and "telecommunications harassment" that are incredibly broad, and that clearly apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment. For instance, Ohio's telecommunications harassment statute makes it a crime to send an e-mail "with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person." This means that many people who engage in First Amendment-protected speech end up getting prosecuted anyway. If they pay for a good lawyer who knows how to properly raise a First Amendment defense, they may escape any penalties. But because most defendants do not have those resources, and because many lawyers are unaware of the First Amendment implications of such prosecutions, most defendants in such situations likely end up being convicted despite behaving perfectly legally. In the united-kingdom , though, the situation is very different. Even if Mary is breaking the law, and even if Andy limits himself to strictly factual information about what's he's learned about her conduct, he may still be held civilly liable. Mary may also be able to pursue Andy criminally for harassment if his e-mail causes her substantial emotional distress, and civilly for "harassment by publication." The fact that this information is already public is likely not going to go very far in changing the analysis. Andy's best course of action is therefore to play it safe by keeping his mouth shut. Doing so has both legal and nonlegal benefits: He avoids exposure to the hassles of defending himself from criminal charges and he gets some time to examine the resentment, jealousy, paranoia that makes him want to humiliate his "friend."

If one is threatened, are they allowed to stay silent with no legal consequences?

Andy the abuser is doing unspeakable things to his child. His wife Wendy witnesses and is aware of this. Normally, Wendy would also be held liable for not reporting this horrible crime (at least I assume so @.@). But what if Andy threatens Wendy? Is Wendy's silence allowed with no repercussions in that case? As a simple example, Andy could say that he'll beat Wendy badly if she ever goes to the police. As a more elaborate example, Andy could be a mafioso, and say that he has "his boys" tailing Wendy at all times, so she "better not try anything funny".

Following RCW 26.44.080 , Every person who is required to make, or to cause to be made, a report pursuant to RCW 26.44.030 and 26.44.040, and who knowingly fails to make, or fails to cause to be made, such report, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Mandatory reporting applies to many people such as doctors, teachers, coaches, also (d) The reporting requirement shall also apply to any adult who has reasonable cause to believe that a child who resides with them, has suffered severe abuse, and is able or capable of making a report. There is a defense to criminal charges in RCW 9a.16.060 which says (1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that: (a) The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he or she or another would be liable to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and (b) That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and (c) That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved. There are limits to the duress defense: (2) The defense of duress is not available if the crime charged is murder, manslaughter, or homicide by abuse. (3) The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself or herself in a situation in which it is probable that he or she will be subject to duress. (4) The defense of duress is not established solely by a showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her spouse. What you describe sounds like duress. Technically, Wendy could report the abuse to all sorts of other government entities besides the police and not run afoul of the threat, but it is quite reasonable to assume that Andy intended the beating regardless of who receives the report.

Is an illegal abortion a Malum in Se offense or a Malum Prohibitum offense?

Anglo-American Common Law generally divides criminal offenses into two categories . Malum in Se offenses are inherently wrong . This includes traditional offenses such as Murder, Robbery, and Assault. Some sources define the concept as encompassing acts that would be wrong even if there was no specific law against it . Malum Prohibitum offenses, on the other hand, are not inherently wicked acts - they are just against the law for whatever reason (often public order, safety, or health). Common examples of such offenses are DUI, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, evading an immigration checkpoint, and possessing a controlled substance. Wikipedia cites : Criminal offenses can be broken down into two general categories malum in se and malum prohibitum. The distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum offenses is best characterized as follows: a malum in se offense is "naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community," whereas a malum prohibitum offense is wrong only because a statute makes it so. State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (1905). Also see Book 4, Chapter 1 of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, in which he states (my emphasis) AS to the power of human punifhment, or the right of the temporal legiflator to inflict difcretionary penalties for crimes and mifdemefnors. It is clear, that the right of punifhing crimes agianft the law of nature, as murder and the like, is in a ftate of mere nature vefted in every individual. For it muft be vefted in fomebody ; otherwife the laws of nature would be vain and fruitlefs, if none were empowered to put them in execution : and if that power is vefted in any one, it muft alfo be vefted in all mankind ; fince all are by nature equal. Whereof the firft murderer Cain was fo fenfible, that we find him expreffing his apprehenfions, that whoever fhould find him would flay him. In a ftate of fociety this right is transferred from individuals to the fovereign power ; whereby men are prevented from being judges in their own caufes, which is one of the evils that civil government was intended to remedy. Whatever power therefore individuals had of punifhing offences aginft the law of nature, that is now vefted in the magiftrate alone ; who bears the fword of juftice by the confent of the whole community. And to this precedent natural power of individuals muft be referred that right, which fome have argued to belong to every ftate, (though, in fact, never exercifed by any) of punifhing not only their own fubjects, but alfo foreign embaffadors, even with death itfelf ; in cafe they have offended, not indeed againft the municipal laws of the country, but againft the divine laws of nature, and become liable thereby to forfeit their lives for their guilt. AS to offences merely againft the laws of fociety, which are only mala prohibita, and not mala in fe ; the temporal magiftrate is alfo empowered to infict coercive penalties for fuch tranfgreffions : and this by the confent of individuals ; who, in forming focieties, did either tacitly or expreffly inveft the fovereign power with a right making laws, and of enforcing obedience to them when made, by exercifing, upon their nonobfervance, feverities adequate to the evil. The lawfulnefs therefore of punifhing fuch criminals is founded upon this principle, that the law by which they fuffer was by their own confent ; it is part to the original contract into which they entered, when firft they engaged in fociety ; it was calculated for, and has long contributed to. their own fecurtiy. Is obtaining an abortion contrary to local law a malum in se or a malum prohibitum offense? I can think of arguments in favor of either: Illegal abortions are Malum In Se Abortion is often considered by opponents as a form of Murder, which is a traditional malum in se offense. Arguments against abortion are often couched in moralistic terms, rather than arguments based on public good. That is, activists typically claim that banning abortion is a moral or religious duty rather than claiming that banning it would improve people's health, build the economy, reduce pollution, or make elections fairer for minority candidates. Illegal abortions are Malum Prohibitum Laws on when, if, and how an abortion may be lawfully performed vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A law based on a timeless moral "truth" would be expected to be harmonious nearly everywhere. Restated, is Abortion inherently a Malum in Se act, with statutes in various places changing the rule to allow it in certain scenarios, or is abortion inherently permitted according to the Common Law view of morality, with modern anti-abortion laws being strictly statutory in nature? As Nate Eldredge mentioned, I am aware that some people may approach this from the perspective of their own religious or moral views. What I'm interested in is whether this has been analyzed from a purely legal perspective or whether a court has ruled on it.

This distinction was once important in English law, and other common-law systems derived from it, because common-law courts felt free to punish a Malum in Se even when there was no relevant statute, while a Malum Prohibitum would be punished only if it violated a specific statute. But today in the US, and to a large degree in the UK and other common-law countries, nearly all law has a statutory basis (although subject to interpretation by courts). Thus the distinction between Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum no longer makes a significant difference, and is pretty much purely academic, except in a historical context.

Bob occupies Anna&#39;s parking lot. How could Anna prove it?

Anna owns a parking lot. However Bob frequently uses it as his guests' parking lot for two years. The average rental rate for a parking lot is about $40 a month, totaling about $1000 for the two years period. Bob denied everything. How could Anna prove this? Here are the possible options: Send Bob a bill. But, without proofs, Bob could simply refuse it. Spend about $1000+ dollars to install a surveillance system to record how Bob's guests parked in that lot. However, Bob could deny that the car is affiliated with his guests. Take pictures or call the police. However, this can only prove that Bob used the lot on a specific date. After a lengthy research, I found that it is very very hard for Anna to recover any money for the lot-usage in the past and in the future.

The question of how to prove something isn't really a legal question, but there are implicit legal questions about proof here. The starting point is the assertion that "Bob frequently uses it as his guests' parking lot": how do you know? For example "Anna sees cars parking in unreserved slots every day, between 6:00pm and 10:pm, and the drivers are seen walking to and from Bob's apartment". Sure, Bob can deny it, but Anna got some of the license numbers and subpoenaed the owners. At least some of the owners testified that Bob told them that there was free evening parking in slots 64 and 58. Bob still denies it: the question is, is there more evidence that Anna is wrong, or right, about her claim about parking? In a civil case, you can't just say "Nu-uh, I did not!", you have to present evidence to support your denial that is better than the evidence that supports the accusation. It may be that Bob can defend himself simply by (correctly) denying that he is responsible. and his defense could be testimony from guests who said "No, Bob never mentioned the parking lot, we just decided we could get away with it".

What is a mercantile court?

Another answer cites the Birmingham mercantile court. I've never heard of a mercantile court before despite having researched the English court system before. What is this court and where does it fit into the overall system?

From the Circuit Commercial (Mercantile) Court Guide : The Circuit Commercial Courts (formerly the Mercantile Courts) operate in eight regional centres throughout England and Wales as part of the Queens [King's] Bench Division of the High Court. They decide business disputes of all kinds apart from those which, because of their size, value or complexity, will be dealt with by the Commercial Court. As well as large cases, the Circuit Commercial Courts decide smaller disputes and recognise the importance of these, particularly to small and medium sized businesses. They form part of the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales. More info: Circuit Commercial Courts FAQ The Birmingham Circuit Commercial Court