---
base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
- cosine_accuracy
- dot_accuracy
- manhattan_accuracy
- euclidean_accuracy
- max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:10000
- loss:TripletLoss
widget:
- source_sentence: individual autonomous human beings who make up the corporation
and who intentionally bring about corporate acts through their own bodily movements.
Such human individuals, and not "the corporation," are morally responsible for
corporate acts. Moreover, to say that an entity is "morally responsible" for a
wrongful act is to say that the entity is liable to blame and punishment. But
it is not possible to impose blame and punishment on a corporation without inflicting
it on corporate members. Thus, to say that a corporation (as an entity distinct
from its members) is "morally responsible" for a wrongful corporate act is to
imply that a (possibly innocent) corporate member legitimately may be punished
for something for which another entity was morally responsible. This violates
the moral principles that underlie blame and punishment. To hold that the corporation
can be morally responsible for its acts is to adopt a dangerous organicism. [Published
in vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 1983)] The proposition that corporations can and should
be viewed as morally responsible agents in society has been challenged and defended
frequently in the growing literature on business ethics. Challenges to this proposition
usually follow one of two paths. Either it is argued that corporations can be
viewed as unified entities (more than the sum of their parts) but are amoral,
or it is argued that corporations are not to be viewed as unified entities in
the morally relevant sense. It is tri?" latter path that Manuel Velasquez seems
to be taking in
sentences:
- '"Why Corporations Are Not Responsible for Anything They Do." Velasquez offers
two broad lines of argument against the view that corporations can be morally
responsible. The first line of argument is analytical; it turns on the conditions
governing the phrase "moral respon sibility" in what he calls its "backward-looking"
sense. The conclusion he comes to is that attributions of moral responsibility
to corporations do not "make sense." The second line of argument is moral, not
analytical; it concludes that we should not attribute moral responsibility to
corporations, quite apart from the question of whether it makes sense to do so.
Both lines of argument are flawed, in my view, and most of my comments will be
devoted to explaining how and why. I hope, however, to be fair to the intuitions
lying behind the arguments. The Analytical Line Of Argument The basic form of
the analytical line of argument as Velasquez presents it is straightforward. I
will touch on each of the premises in an effort to evaluate both validity and
soundness. The argument may be rendered as follows: Premise (Ai): The concept
of moral responsibility (properly under stood) has at its core the concept of
origination, which is further tied to the idea of liability for blame and punishment.
Premise (A2): The concept of origination requires both a mental or intentional
component (mens rea) and a physical or bodily component (actus reus). Premise
(A3): Corporations (as opposed to persons who are members ot corporations) are
possessed of neither minds nor'
- agents is that they assume that the existence of corporate agency implies UCMR.7
But this is not obvious. One might hold, as I do, that corporations are moral
agents because the reciprocal adjustment of individual intentions and plans that
takes place in such organizations yields a corporate intentionality that is more
like human intentionality than it is like the efficient causality that might be
attributed to blindly operating social wholes such as markets. One might hold
that corporations are moral agents because to say so "saves the phenomena" of
many things we say about corporate actions entirely apart from the issue posed
by UCMR. Manuel Velasquez denies that corporations are moral agents in any sense.8
For this reason, the question concerning redistribution of corporate moral responsibility
does not arise explicitly for him. If corporations cannot be morally responsible
then, of course, there is no corporate moral responsibility to be redistributed.
At the opposite extreme, French holds that corporations are moral agents and persons
in the same sense as human beings. If this is true, it is difficult to separate
the problem of corporate moral agency from the question whether UCMR is true,
inasmuch as it would be an embarrassment for French's univocality thesis that
corporate moral responsibility could be completely reassigned to corporate associates
when obviously human respon sibility is not reassignable to the parts of the human
being at all. But French's practice supports the claim that UCMR is a distinct
issue, for he does not introduce UCMR until chapter 10 of
- available information' as the propositions accepted by the science of the agent's
day, plus factual propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence (including
testimony of others about themselves) and the principles of logic."8 Brandt notes
that the 'information' need not be true. Finally, he adds that it is important
to see that defining "rational" in this way does not import any substantive value
judgments into the concept of rational action or rational desire. II In this section
I shall present and consider objections to Brandt's account of rational action
and rational desire. There are several problems with this view involving the notion
of one's desires being what they would be were one exposed to available information
or all the knowable facts that would strengthen or weaken one's desires. This
condition would imply that certain actions which we ought not to think rational
are rational and that certain actions which we ought to think rational are not
rational. Let us imagine a man who has a headache and who wants to take some aspirin
in order to be free from his headache. Suppose he goes to his attic, opens a bottle
labeled "poison", and takes two of the pills which he believes, without any evidence,
to be aspirin. Fortunately, his wicked uncle has replaced the poison tablets with
aspirin and put the poison in the aspirin bottle. We may fmally suppose that the
wicked uncle has had a change of heart and is at that moment confessing his evil
deed to the police.
- source_sentence: 'one or the other or both of these ways. A single solution to both
problems might seem to lie in Kant''s transcendental idealism: the conception
of the world that human beings come up with would be nothing less than the way
the world in general must be. But that doctrine as Sacks understands it implies
that there is none the less a way things are in themselves that remains necessarily
unavailable to minds like ours. That residual ''ontological'' concession is ''the
price Kant pays for securing knowledge of empirical reality'' (p. 317). Sacks,
to his credit, is not willing to pay the price: it would still leave us without
''genuinely objective knowledge''. But behind the Kantian distinction between
''transcendental'' and ''empirical'' modes of investigation he finds an insight
that promises a new and ''critical'' conception of objectivity that would overcome
or render ineffective both lines of dispiriting ''sceptical'' reflection. More
than two thirds of the book is devoted to exhibiting the inevitable pressures
towards the two varieties of ''scepticism'' implicit in ''the standard conception
of objectivity''. A rather textbook-like outline of the empiricist theories of
mind of Locke and (mostly) Hume is followed by a similar fifty-page digest of
the Critique of Pure Reason. William James and Bergson are then sympathetically
expounded for their opposition to the entrenched psychological atomism thought
to be responsible for the failure of those earlier theories. But even they do
not avoid the ''epistemic cost'' of the basic ''Cartesian'' assumption of a gulf
between the subject with his thoughts'
sentences:
- 'Hungarian population (N = 500). When defining the sample, we aimed at being able
to segment the database by demographic variables (gender, age, qualification and
region) during the analysis. Due to the random query, the database can be considered
representative of the Hungarian population along these attributes. The aim of
the telephone inquiry was to explore the expectations of the population in the
field of corporate responsibility. While developing the questionnaire focusing
on the population segment due to the lack of information in the field of CSR we
concentrated on knowledge of and expectations on sponsorship. 3. Inner survey:
during the year 2006 and 2007, the Kurt Lewin Foundation completed several studies
among small and medium sized enterprises. The aim of the examinations was in all
cases to scrutinize the commitment of employees towards the company''s CSR activity
laying emphasis on their motivations, attitudes and willingness for action. The
survey method consisted of combining interviews with participant observation.
4. Action research elements: in the last two years, the Kurt Lewin Foundation
worked together CSR Communication in Hungary 139 with numerous companies in working
out their CSR strategy, implementing training courses aiming at social sensitivity,
and researching (by means of questionnaire and interview) the attitudes of employees
and the process of organizing and monitoring company charity acts. These projects
provided information which could not be gained by other methods such as interviews
or questionnaires. Csr Activities Of Hungarian Enterprises Although the focus
of our research is not CSR'
- begins to sense the impossibility of shrugging off their empirical interpretation.
But this is something which can be understood only in realist terms, as betrayed
in our standard ways of speaking, and, so understood, it is false. Nevertheless,
the characterization does, Dummett continues, "succeed in conveying something
of the psychological effect of the two opinions". Should it turn out that, ultimately,
only a characterization of this unsatisfactory kind is possible, then the point
would be established. Anti-realist views would be among those whose fate is that
they have to be stated in ways that are not right. In this essay, I hope to draw
certain conclusions from Williams' contention that the predicament is also latent
in the later work of Wittgenstein. I shall offer no substantial arguments for
the contention, since I am principally interested in its consequences. It does
however seem to me to be correct, subject to Williams's own qualification that
the element of idealism in the later work of Wittgenstein which gives rise to
the predicament is "concealed, qualified, overlaid with other things".'6 The predicament
is certainly no more than latent. It arises with none of the dramatic urgency
that accompanies it in Kant, for example. Given Wittgenstein's later conception
of the correct way to do philosophy, this is hardly surprising. Philosophy, he
tells us, consists of assembled reminders for particular purposes, not of theses.'7
So we should not expect to find him directly propounding some philosophical theory,
still less one which
- 'and the rest of the surrounding world. More or less equal expository space is
given on the other side to the rejection of an ''egological'' conception of the
immersed thinking subject and to 380 Book Reviews sketches of a number of more
recent ''naturalized Hegelian'' conceptions. The views of Habermas, McDowell,
Davidson, Wittgenstein, and Bernard Williams''s idealist reading of Wittgenstein
figure prominently in this story of the struggle with ''relativism''. One can
come to wonder whether a selective historical survey of quite so much material
on both sides of Sacks''s fundamental issue is really needed for his philosophical
purposes, especially since its stated aim is not primarily historical accuracy
or interpretative thoroughness. The point is ''philosophical geography'': to describe
certain significant positions that he thinks would be worthy of attention even
if they did not actually fit the thinkers that have been saddled with them in
the past. The geography provided here goes well beyond what is needed for finding
one''s way without confusion from one place to another on Sacks''s itinerary.
The new and potentially liberating conception of objectivity pursued in the last
third of the book is to be reached within a thoroughly ''naturalist'' and ''post-metaphysical''
setting, without appeal to ''any ontological system or order that transcends the
empirical world towards which the natural sciences are directed'' (p. 2). It will
come from acknowledging and insisting on two different levels of possible reflection
on ourselves and the world. The distinction is Kantian in spirit,'
- source_sentence: G3466 from the National Science Foundation, and under a grant from
the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, U.S.A. 74 but in the absence of (jp0
^ q0) -> p = q this is an incomplete principle of extensionality, which at first
sight seems to offer us a world in which intensions and extensions can coexist
peacefully. Intensions (for example predicates of individuals) are denoted by
X-expressions in the following way. If ...xK is a propositional function in which
xL and xl alone is free, then (Xxt)(... jtt ) is the property asserted by ...
x^ to characterize xK' one cannot prove, despite (2), that two coextensive properties
of this kind are identical. (Of course by (1) and (2) we can assert (*a)(...xa=
. -xa . .)_>(Xxa)(...xa) = (Xxa)(. -*a . .); (3) but unless we could prove ( p0
< > Qo)-* P = <7 we could not establish (3) with the first identity replaced by
a material equivalence, and so we are entitled to regard X-expressions of type
(oa) as denoting predicates rather than sets.) Extensions, running parallel with
intensions, are introduced by the following ingenious device. A primitive description-operator
ta(oa) obeys the axiom (E! xa) (foa x) >/(ta(oa)/) (4) where E! denotes unique
existence. To each predicate /oa we now assign the characteristic function Ext
/ = (X *a) i(X «)[(« = 1 &fx) v (n = 0 &^/x)] (5) where 1 and 0 can be any two
objects of the same type. Now if we define
sentences:
- relativity. But now after their sublation by this concrete category, they are
no longer just being and nothing, as they were when they were regarded as pure
disparates. Each of them now is invested with express relativity, and so neither
of them can rightly be given its former name of being or of nothing. The process
of sublation, in brief, has not only put the two together, but has changed them.
Now this change of factors is of supreme importance in the logical dialectic.
If we overlook it we lose sight of the significant fact that the synthesis is
always more than an aggregating of elements. Hegel is well aware of this factor
of change and of the consequent need for a continual reinterpretation of the elements
that enter each synthesis. Hence being and nothing are now new meanings; in his
metaphorical and, unfortunately, misleading terminology, they are both becomings,
exhibiting in their movement the distinction between a becoming from nothing to
being, that is, an arising, and from being to nothing, that is, a ceasing. Expressed
in more strictly logical terms, we ought perhaps to say that each, now, is not
simply a moment of a category of relativity, but each is itself expressly a category
of relativity, the distinction between them being the difference of reference
necessarily present where two factors are related. When we reach Daseyn, which
is the synthesis of being and nothing as they are transformed into arising and
ceasing, the same process of reinterpretation
- x e y as short for G/MA & y Ext/) or alternatively as short for (yx) = 1, we can
use (2) to establish (*) (* s (Ext/) <_> x e (Ext g)) -> (Ext/) = (Ext g) (6)
and (1) (4) and (5) to establish ... * > * e ( Ext (X y) (... y )) (7) so that
expressions of the form Ext /oa can function in all ways as (extensional) class-names.
(We have been increasingly sparing of typesubscripts of late; this practice will
be continued as long as it favors legibility.) This concludes an account, sketchy
but I hope adequate for our purposes, of the system of Church's early paper. Let
us recall; it contains as theorems all formulae (1) (2) and (4), and in addition
(like all the systems to be considered in this paper) the classical propositional
calculus and the classical functional calculus in each type. It suggests the idea
of a combined intensional-extensional system which admits both sets and predicates
and distinguishes between them, thereby (we hope) escaping all the criticisms
which have been made by the 75 extensionalists without involving us in the complexities
of the sense-anddenotation solution. As it stands, the system (call it System
I) is liable to a form of the numberof-the-planets paradox. For one can easily
prove in it (actually without using either its intensional features or the modicum
of extensionality provided by (2)) the harmless-looking formula fx = v -> ((fx
= y) = (/* =fx)) (8) from
- presumably, of all systems whatsoever. It is this sort of generality that the
present approach aims to achieve. The system proposed in this paper will not be
directly defined, but rather a formulation of it, namely the calculus K. It is
assumed that the nature of the system will be sufficiently clear from the nature
of K. Indications will be given for supposing that every one of the general class
of calculi mentioned above is "represented" in K, and from this it would follow
that every combinatory system (and hence presumably every system) is definable
in the formuland of K. 2. Formation rules for K. Let Y be an infinite class of
symbols, no one of which occurs as part of any other. The members of Y will not
be actually specified, since such specification is irrelevant to the results of
this paper. It is assumed, however, that Y does not contain parentheses or other
symbols specified hereafter to serve special purposes. The following definition
will constitute, in effect, the "formation rules" for the calculus K. We may think
of U as the class of sentences which can be constructed (but not necessarily proved)
in the calculus K,4 whereas K itself (that is, the class of provable sentences
of K) will be a proper subclass of U. 3 These sentences are to be thought of as
already "interpreted," that is, as already understood as regards their meanings.
In syntactical investigations a calculus is usually treated in abstraction from
the meanings
- source_sentence: if his theory of deduction is to run smoothly.7 But the require
ments of deduction are as good a constraint as any, if the theory of truth is
to run smoothly in its turn, and so his remarks on regimentation can stand as
one component in a theory of predication, in the service of the compo nent still
to come, namely, a theory of truth. A need for regimentation of the kind described
is typical of token sen tences as uttered or as written. But Aristotle leaves
room for a further set of sentences in which, apparently, the needed regimentation
has already been achieved. Preparation for this further kind of sentence is made
in a well known passage in the first chapter of the de InP. Now spoken sounds
are symbols (oiSjiPoAxx) of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols
of spoken sound. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither
are spoken sounds. But what in the first place (cbv... rcpokcov) these are signs
(ar|p,evoi) of affections of the soul are the same for all;8 and what these affec
tions are likenesses (0|ioia>|iaTa) of—pragmata ("things") — are also right off
("n5r)) the pale, in this case it is because both are accidents of the same thing,"
Metaphysics A7, 1017al5-16, cf. T4, 1007b2-5, 13-17,An.Po. A22, 83al0-12. 7) Topics
A13-14; see also An. Pr. A32, 46b38 ff, where the project "is somewhat com parable
to translating natural-language arguments into a formal language," namely, the
language of Aristotle's theory of deduction, Robin Smith, Aristotle Prior Analytics,
India
sentences:
- paper as nothing that follows turns on this distinction. 4 In the context of this
paper I shall only consider mathematical rigour as it was conceived of after Frege
and will ignore different conceptions of rigour operating before that. Informal
al Rigour algorithmic system) which may be legitimately applied to produce such
derivations. This historical process started with Prege's [8] and led to the revision
of the old concept of mathematical rigour into the current one. The current notion
of rigour combines the older idea of the virtues of gapless proof (a proof in
which each inferential step is made explicit) with the understanding of rigour
in terms of formalisation.5 Incompleteness results in mathematical logic seriously
undermined the formalist-reductionist project and showed that the project could
not provide the desired secure foundations for mathematics, at least not in its
original formulât ion (s). More specifically, the incompleteness theorems undermined
the claim that mathematical provability was indeed reducible to provability within
a formal system, and accordingly a fundamental part of the project of giving axiomatic
foundations to mathematics. Even though the effects of the incompleteness results
were crucial to reductionist enterprises of tracing back mathematical theorems
to a restricted class of truths, they did not extend as far as to undermine a
second important aspect of the formalistreductionist project namely that of providing
epistemic foundations for the edifice of mathematical knowledge.6 In particular
the goal of identifying a notion of rigorous proof by which we can guarantee the
certainty
- napolis/Cambridge 1989, p. 161. It bears mentioning, however, that the theory
of infer ence Aristotle prepares for in the Analytics has no interest in the simple
singular predications that are our topic here, cf. n. 14 below. Aristotle is taken
to task for the limitations of the Analytics account in Peter Geach, "History
of the Corruption of Logic," Leeds Inaugural Lecture, in his Logic Matters, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1972; for a more charitable assessment, see most recently Max Kôlbel,
"Aristotle's Logical Syntax," History and Philosophy of Logic (forthcoming). 8)
Like the rest of the passage quoted, this clause is as contested a text as any
in Aristotle. Commentators generally take the antecedent to 'these' ('what in
the first place these are signs of) to be 'spoken sounds,' from the immediately
preceding context. I prefer to think that the antecedent instead is, indifferently,
'written marks' and 'spoken sounds' from the previous sentence, so that Aristotle's
point is that linguistic tokens as inscribed and tokens as uttered are both interpreted
finally through tokens as thought the former at two removes, the latter at one.
Aristotle means to favour spoken over written tokens, and this preference is preserved
if we think that, unlike the vaguer sign-of relation, the symbol-of relation is
not transitive. But far more elaborate readings of the passage, and the sign-of/
symbol-of distinction, are available, see the discussion in C. W. A. Whitaker,
Aristotle's De Lnterpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford
- call a "sentence," since even a "phrase" suffices as X6yo;. The complexity of
articulation, therefore, is opposed to the simplicity of expression (p6at;). Hence
"sentence" is too determinate as a translation of X6yo;. Another possible translation
of koXyo;, of course, is "speech," although in On Interpretation this rendering
is too vague. 6 By translating Tr as "ones," I do not intend to suggest anything
as specific as "units"; rather, I am using "ones" merely as a place-filler for
the previously mentioned linguistic entities, more along the lines of "those"
or "what are." I prefer such a rendering to "things" or "entities," since these
latter may obscure the continuity between [11 and [2] as well as introduce notions
too determinate in this context. THE OPENING OF ON INTERPRETATION 233 tC Cv tTpv,
that is found in [2], and he is comfortable moving from a universal claim about
"what are in vocal-sound" to a particular claim about "affirmations in vocal-sound."7
Recognizing the continuity between [1] and [2], moreover, justifies the presence
of 16a3-9 in On Interpretation, since it implies that this passage concerns the
same linguistic entities discussed individually from Chapter 2 onward. In Chapter
I as a whole, Aristotle is concerned with these linguistic entities as a group.
In 16a3-9, on which this paper will focus, Aristotle attempts to explain how linguistic
entities exist as both natural and conventional. In the remainder of the chapter
(1 6a918), Aristotle divides the group. He sets names and verbs apart from the
- source_sentence: the role. The basic idea is that it is the role of a semantic theory
to assign to each assertoric sentence a mental state which it serves to express
in virtue of the fact that being in that mental state is the assertability condition
for that sentence. The full story begins with atomic sentences, assigning beliefs
to the descriptive sentences and some sort of noncognitive state to the normative
sentences. More complex sentences involving sentential connectives assign a more
complex mental state to these more complex constructions, with the exact nature
of the complex state depending on a function contributed by the connective and
arguments contributed by the semantic values of the atomic sentences. It is only
after these states have been determined as the semantic values of the sentences
that certain types of sentences, the descriptive sentences, get associated with
propositions—the propositions that are the objects of the beliefs which those
sentences express. This means that expressivists are committed to a certain order
of explanation being the correct one for natural language descriptive sentences.
It isn’t that descriptive natural language sentences express beliefs because they
express the propositions which are the contents of the beliefs that they are therefore
apt to express. It is rather that they express these propositions because they
are the contents of the mental states that are the appropriateness conditions
for asserting those sentences (29–35). The Frege‐Geach Problem Peter Geach and
John Searle famously highlighted noncognitivist shortcomings at providing a general
sentences:
- 'semantics for moral language.2 Noncognitivists had, at the time of this complaint,
told us what free‐standing assertive utterances of simple declarative moral sentences
meant by telling us about the noncognitive state that such utterances expressed,
or the speech act they were used to perform.3 But without more it is not obvious
how to extend their suggestions to embedded uses of these same expressions in
more complex constructions. These complexes can be accepted by speakers who do
not have the attitude which would be expressed were the embedded sentence to be
used unembedded. Thus one simple extension of the noncognitivist story for simple
declarations—that the embedded sentence expresses the very same attitude as its
unembedded counterpart—seems to be ruled out from the start. Yet a criterion of
adequacy for completing the noncognitivist story is that it explain the logical
relations between different moral sentences. And the obvious way to accomplish
that is for sentences to contribute the same contents to utterances whether they
occur embedded or by themselves. This is why Geach thought it relevant to emphasize
what he called “The Frege Point”: “A thought may have just the same content whether
you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted,
now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition.” Contemporary expressivists
such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have taken this challenge especially
seriously. Their central idea is that we can make the most headway in understanding
all the features of moral discourse by beginning with an account'
- 'Humean metaphor of projection). The realist fiction is understood as a philosophical
miscon ception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose
intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist
fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no
need of debunking but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed.
Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains,
but in uttering a moral sentence competent speakers do not assert the moral proposition
expressed but rather convey by means of it the noncognitive attitude centrally
involved in moral acceptance. Moral fictionalism is this alternative to standard
noncognitivism. Moral fiction alism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism. Not
only does the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism and nonfactualism
raise the logical possibility of moral fictionalism, but it also makes clear the
general form of argument required to establish its truth. To establish the truth
of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) argue for the psychological claim of
noncognitivism. (2) argue against expressivist nonfactualism. Indeed, this was
the argumentative strategy that I pursued in Moral Fictionalism. I am not going
to talk about my case for noncognitivism, but I will talk about the problem that
formed the basis of my case against expressivist nonfactualism. 2. The Frege-Geach
Problem The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33-34) and independently
by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed
at expressivist proposals such as Ayer''s emotivism: It is worth mentioning that
ethical terms do'
- other hand, a view that identifies natural kinds with groups the distinguishing
of which helps us to achieve our ends (e.g., Kitcher 2007) transparently fails
the content-independence requirement, as its fundamental categorical principle
explic itly refers to features of the categorizer. Alternatively, some views fail
the content independence requirement only when the commitments that inform the
intended interpretation of the fundamental categorical principle are themselves
considered. For instance, accounts that tie the naturalness of a kind to the role
of that kind (or its connected category) in explanation and induction (e.g., Boyd
1991) will be anti realist if explanatory and inductive norms are themselves understood
as correct or incorrect only relative to us. They would also be anti-realist,
via a somewhat different route, if the particular explanations and inductions
that a kind (or its connected category) must serve were to be selected by us,
rather than being privileged by the agenda of the mind-independent universe. After
all, different categories are suitable to different explanatory and inductive
targets, a circumstance that (as will be considered more below) can yield mind-dependent—and
thus anti realist—natural kinds. Somewhat more subtly, a theory of natural kinds
is status independent just in case its fundamental categorical principle is understood
as correct or incorrect mind independently, rather than it having an ultimately
subjective grounding. That subjective grounding might involve some feature of
our innate conceptual architecture or the output of a circuitous process of cultural
change. No matter what,
model-index:
- name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
results:
- task:
type: triplet
name: Triplet
dataset:
name: nomic
type: nomic
metrics:
- type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.97
name: Cosine Accuracy
- type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.03
name: Dot Accuracy
- type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.968
name: Manhattan Accuracy
- type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.97
name: Euclidean Accuracy
- type: max_accuracy
value: 0.97
name: Max Accuracy
- type: cosine_accuracy
value: 0.9785
name: Cosine Accuracy
- type: dot_accuracy
value: 0.0215
name: Dot Accuracy
- type: manhattan_accuracy
value: 0.979
name: Manhattan Accuracy
- type: euclidean_accuracy
value: 0.9785
name: Euclidean Accuracy
- type: max_accuracy
value: 0.979
name: Max Accuracy
---
# SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.
## Model Details
### Model Description
- **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
- **Base model:** [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1)
- **Maximum Sequence Length:** 8192 tokens
- **Output Dimensionality:** 768 tokens
- **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
### Model Sources
- **Documentation:** [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
- **Repository:** [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
- **Hugging Face:** [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)
### Full Model Architecture
```
SentenceTransformer(
(0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel
(1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
(2): Normalize()
)
```
## Usage
### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)
First install the Sentence Transformers library:
```bash
pip install -U sentence-transformers
```
Then you can load this model and run inference.
```python
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v7")
# Run inference
sentences = [
'the role. The basic idea is that it is the role of a semantic theory to assign to each assertoric sentence a mental state which it serves to express in virtue of the fact that being in that mental state is the assertability condition for that sentence. The full story begins with atomic sentences, assigning beliefs to the descriptive sentences and some sort of noncognitive state to the normative sentences. More complex sentences involving sentential connectives assign a more complex mental state to these more complex constructions, with the exact nature of the complex state depending on a function contributed by the connective and arguments contributed by the semantic values of the atomic sentences. It is only after these states have been determined as the semantic values of the sentences that certain types of sentences, the descriptive sentences, get associated with propositions—the propositions that are the objects of the beliefs which those sentences express. This means that expressivists are committed to a certain order of explanation being the correct one for natural language descriptive sentences. It isn’t that descriptive natural language sentences express beliefs because they express the propositions which are the contents of the beliefs that they are therefore apt to express. It is rather that they express these propositions because they are the contents of the mental states that are the appropriateness conditions for asserting those sentences (29–35). The Frege‐Geach Problem Peter Geach and John Searle famously highlighted noncognitivist shortcomings at providing a general',
'semantics for moral language.2 Noncognitivists had, at the time of this complaint, told us what free‐standing assertive utterances of simple declarative moral sentences meant by telling us about the noncognitive state that such utterances expressed, or the speech act they were used to perform.3 But without more it is not obvious how to extend their suggestions to embedded uses of these same expressions in more complex constructions. These complexes can be accepted by speakers who do not have the attitude which would be expressed were the embedded sentence to be used unembedded. Thus one simple extension of the noncognitivist story for simple declarations—that the embedded sentence expresses the very same attitude as its unembedded counterpart—seems to be ruled out from the start. Yet a criterion of adequacy for completing the noncognitivist story is that it explain the logical relations between different moral sentences. And the obvious way to accomplish that is for sentences to contribute the same contents to utterances whether they occur embedded or by themselves. This is why Geach thought it relevant to emphasize what he called “The Frege Point”: “A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition.” Contemporary expressivists such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have taken this challenge especially seriously. Their central idea is that we can make the most headway in understanding all the features of moral discourse by beginning with an account',
"Humean metaphor of projection). The realist fiction is understood as a philosophical miscon ception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in uttering a moral sentence competent speakers do not assert the moral proposition expressed but rather convey by means of it the noncognitive attitude centrally involved in moral acceptance. Moral fictionalism is this alternative to standard noncognitivism. Moral fiction alism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism. Not only does the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism and nonfactualism raise the logical possibility of moral fictionalism, but it also makes clear the general form of argument required to establish its truth. To establish the truth of moral fictionalism, it suffices to: (1) argue for the psychological claim of noncognitivism. (2) argue against expressivist nonfactualism. Indeed, this was the argumentative strategy that I pursued in Moral Fictionalism. I am not going to talk about my case for noncognitivism, but I will talk about the problem that formed the basis of my case against expressivist nonfactualism. 2. The Frege-Geach Problem The Frege-Geach problem was first raised by Ross (1939: 33-34) and independently by Geach (1958, 1960, 1965) and Searle (1962, 1969) and was originally directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayer's emotivism: It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do",
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 768]
# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]
```
## Evaluation
### Metrics
#### Triplet
* Dataset: `nomic`
* Evaluated with [TripletEvaluator](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)
| Metric | Value |
|:-------------------|:---------|
| cosine_accuracy | 0.97 |
| dot_accuracy | 0.03 |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.968 |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.97 |
| **max_accuracy** | **0.97** |
#### Triplet
* Dataset: `nomic`
* Evaluated with [TripletEvaluator](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)
| Metric | Value |
|:-------------------|:----------|
| cosine_accuracy | 0.9785 |
| dot_accuracy | 0.0215 |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.979 |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.9785 |
| **max_accuracy** | **0.979** |
## Training Details
### Training Dataset
#### Unnamed Dataset
* Size: 10,000 training samples
* Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative |
|:--------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string |
| details | - min: 263 tokens
- mean: 330.21 tokens
- max: 483 tokens
| - min: 278 tokens
- mean: 331.97 tokens
- max: 529 tokens
| - min: 271 tokens
- mean: 330.7 tokens
- max: 480 tokens
|
* Samples:
| anchor | positive | negative |
|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Plutarch of Athens, the teacher of Proclus' teacher, Syrianus, and argues that the demiurge is not the highest principle for Hierocles, nor does his work show any particular closeness to Christianity. However S. thinks that the One is not mentioned in the Commentary on the Golden Verses because the Commentary deals with ethics, rather than, as Hadot thought, because it is an elementary work. He suggests on p. 56 that Hierocles did differ from Plotinus in his view of man's ethical end: this was not return to the One or even full assimilation to the demiurge but rather a return to the highest level beneath the moon, which for Hierocles was the place from which the soul had fallen. The notes to the translations in Parts II and III are very full, offering a commentary on the text rather than just explanatory notes to the translations. S.'s work makes Hierocles much more accessible than before and will be required reading for anyone working on these texts. Commentaries on individual treatises of Plotinus continue to appear at a steady rate. The latest addition to the French series commentaries under I Hermann S. Schibli, Alexandria. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. P . xvi 419 60. the broader series title of 'Histoire des doctrines de l'antiquite classique' is Richard Dufour's edition of Ennead 2.1.2 Like the other volumes in the series this offers a full introduction to the treatise, a Greek text, taken from Henry and Schwyzer's OCT editio minor, a French translation and a very full commentary. Alongside it comes a reprint of the edition of | Ennead 6.6 first published in 1980 and arising out of Jean Pepin's seminar at the CNRS.3 A photographic reprint of the first edition is complemented by a final page of additional bibliography compiled by Luc Brisson. Meanwhile Pavlos Kalligas has produced another volume of his full edition of the Enneads, covering the whole of Ennead III.4 Like the previous volumes this offers a Greek text, a modern Greek translation and a full modern Greek commentary; bibliography is given both for individual treatises and in a general bibliography at the end of the volume. Two translations of a rather different kind have been published in the series CAGL (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Versiones latinae temporis resuscitatarum litterarum). Both are facsimile editions of Renaissance Latin translations of the Aristotelian commentators.5 Vol. 9 contains Gauricus' translation of Ammonius' commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and Rasarius' translation of Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories, while vol. 10 offers Hieronymus Bagolinus' translation of Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione. The translations of Ammonius are preceded by an introduction by Rainer Thiel, who covers Ammonius' life and work and the two commentaries included in the volume, and Charles Lohr, who contributes a couple of pages on Ammonius in the Latin tradition. Frans de Haas has written the introduction to the translation of Philoponus, including a discussion of Philoponus' GC commentary in the Latin tradition. Both introductions are useful but that by de | that group, are the most consistently provocative. They are unique documents in the history of philosophy, full of surprising and challenging arguments. The third part, outside the purview of this review, contains the works of some of the eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine commentators. This is material at the outermost reaches of the empire of Ancient Greek philosophy, but it is not without interest, particularly as a counterbalance to the mediaeval Latin Christian interpretations of the Greeks. The translations of Alexander by Madigan and Dooley, which continue their joint work in the publication of Metaphysics 2 and 3, reflect accurately the commentator's lapidary and somewhat pedantic style. There is an admirable consistency in vocabulary employed by the two translators. Scrupulous attention to the details of the text make these highly reliable tools. What philosophers will no doubt be interested in learning is to what extent these tools, and the other Alexander commentaries in the series, are of use in understanding Aristotle, and whether or not they have been permanently superseded by contemporary commentaries such as those in the Oxford Aristotle series. I can think of at least two reasons why the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias should be regarded by all students of Aristotle as indispensable. I shall confine my remarks to Metaphysics 4 and 5, but I believe they apply to all the rest. First, Alexander manifestly attempts to follow the arguments in their own terms. He is not so far removed from Aristotle in philosophical culture as |
| route of influence. However. I am not interested in chartThe ing causal chronology. I suspect that feminist perspectives are sometimes partial contributors to the shifts that have occurred in aesthetics over the past two decades, though sometimes there is less influence than coincidental kinship of conclusions. My aim is to outline several feminist challenges to concepts of art and cultural value, noting their congruence with changes in similar concepts and approaches operating in aesthetics. I hope that these considerations will suggest areas where awareness of gender issues ought to prod aesthetic theory to further revisions. I begin with an observation about philosophy in general and the recent dramatic rise of interest in theories of emotions in this discipline. This new attention to emotion can be found in moral theory, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science, as well as in aesthetics. Moreover, many of these analyses are devoted to refuting the bad reputation emotions have had since antiquity and to arguing for their cognitive, moral, and aesthetic value. In this aspect of their work, the vindicators of emotion are in stride with feminist critiques of the way the concept of reason operates in traditional philosophical discourse. A deep, basic claim of feminist scholarship in virtually all its guises is that a good portion of the history and tradition of philosophy is flawed by gender bias, often because of its reliance on concepts of rationality. Rationality-as a philosophical concept-is a human trait that has been delimited by its contrast to other mental capacities, | such as appetites, desires, and emotions. Classically (and medievally and modernly) the powers of the rational mind are conceived as the highest achievement of man. There is some generic connotation to this claim (for rationality distinguishes men from beasts), but also a good dose of the specific, for rationality fully achieved is usually cast as a preeminently masculine accomplishment. Just how equal is the potential for rational activity between males and females is a point of dispute. Plato gets a lot of credit for arguing for equal mental talents in Republic V; Aristotle comes in for a lot of blame for founding a pernicious and powerful tradition that limits the rational capability of females.3 In the Renaissance there is a flurry of debate over this issue, including arguments for complete equality of rationality between the sexes.4 In spite of a history of debate on the subject, when it comes to characterizing the field generally, there is an intransigent alignment of feminine temperament with the "less rational" regions of sensation, appetite-and emotion.5 Feminist scholars have discovered gender bias in basic philosophical concepts and argued that the reliance on rationality and correlative concepts like objectivity belies the putative universal scope of philosophical claims, revealing their gendered tailoring. This has opened the way to explorations of concepts less arrogated to males. Thus many feminist philosophers have turned their attentions to studies of the emotions. Perspectives emphasizing care rather than justice are being explored in ethics, and degrees of affect and | in generation? Do women and men relate to wisdom in the same or in different ways? Do women and men have the same or different virtues? These questions, she says, correspond to four traditional areas of philosophical thought: metaphysics, natural philosophy, epistemology, and moral philosophy. Allen then shows how the answers given by the philosophers to the above questions reveal a limited number of alternative theories about the relation of the sexes. These theories are: sex unity (men and women are equal and not significantly different), sex neutrality (ignores the issue of male and female differentiation), sex polarity (men and women are different and the male is superior), reverse sex polarity (men and women are different and the female is superior), and sex complementarity (men and women are different but equal). The primary debate in the history of philosophy, Allen claims, has been between theories of sex unity, championed by Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and sex polarity, developed by Aristotle and institutionalized by the early medieval philosophers. Not until Hildegard of Bingen do we find a secure foundation for the theory of sex complementarity, a theory which, by the way, is Allen's own preference. After Hildegard, according to Allen, there was a "movement back and forth between theories of sex unity, sex complementarity, and sex polarity, without any one theory dominating Western thought ... "(361). But with the discovery of certain Aristotelian texts and their translation into Latin, and with the decision of Thomas Aquinas to use Aristotle |
| too much of a good thing that grates on the nerves, an excessive beauty that strains the ears. That this should be James' orientation toward Bergson seems strange, given that the two of them were good friends, and that James openly appreciated both the thought and the style, the form and the content, of Bergson's work. It is not necessary, however, to tum to biographical information in order to undermine Stevens' dual interpretations of James' remarks. One has merely to turn to the broader quote from James from which Stevens is quoting in order to encounter a strikingly different appearance: 0 my Bergson, you are a magician, and your book is a marvel, a real wonder in the history of philosophy.... In finishing it I found the same after-taste remaining as after finishing Madame Bovary, such a flavor of persistent euphony, as of a rich river that never foamed or ran thin, but steadily and firmly proceeded with its banks full to the brim.3 Taken thus in its completion, James' remarks are anything but pejorative. James opens with a warm and affectionate greeting. The words magician, marvel, and wonder all suggest power and greatness. James' use of imagery from the sen sory modalities of taste and hearing—"after-taste," "flavor," and "euphony"— demonstrates one aspect of his literary, poetic flair and thereby reinforces the complimentary nature of his remarks. Lastly, James compares this "persistent euphony" to one of the most prominent images in all of his work, perhaps even the metaphor for which he is | most famous—that of the river or stream, as in the stream of consciousness. And the river Bergson has created, according to James, is of a near-perfect nature, never foaming or running thin, but "steadily and firmly proceeding] with its banks full to the brim." Evidently, when one plugs this more exhaustive understanding of James' quote into the two quotes from Stevens above, one recognizes that Stevens has completely obscured, misrepresented, and disguised James' perspective on Bergson. And this disguise thereby extends not only to James' evaluation of Bergson's style but also—with regard to the first quote from Stevens—to the content of Bergson's philosophy and to the content of philosophy in general as well. My next step in this now suspiciously attuned investigation is to turn to a closer examination of the entirety of Stevens Hall 2 Stevens On Poetry-Philosophy "I am not a philosopher," Stevens writes in this philosophically rich essay posit ing the existence of poetic philosophical ideas. This first irony aside, he defines these ideas as "ideas that are inherently poetic, as, for example, the concept of the infinity of the world" which "is a poetic idea because it gives the imagina tion sudden life" (cpp, 860,851). The tide of the essay, "A Collect of Philosophy," refers to the collect, "[a] brief prayer that is used in various Western liturgies before the epistle and var ies with the day."4 The title, then, suggests that Stevens is thinking of these remarks on poetic philosophical ideas as | sublime is of a character that, while yet an aspect of nature, is an aspect in some sense superior to nature, in that it grants nature its symmetry and concord: it grants its aesthetic. The sublime, as this aesthetic of nature, is thus realized by the human process in infinitely many ways: indeed, in works of art, but in the cosmic structures of the multiverse or in the snowbound fields of rural iowa as the eagles soar and swoop and circle above. And so the divine is thus subsumed, though not consumed, within and through the sublime. The divine becomes now an artwork, its infinite expressions infinite expressions of the sublime, thus in their turn inspiring poetry and symphonies and sculptures. And as expressions of the sublime, the gods can then too be translated to be more efficacious and less oppressive expressions: the divine is freed from the darker realms of the depth dimensions of nature to become a means to achieve wholeness and completeness. complimenting corriington’s refiguring of the divine through the sublime are notions of the American poet Wallace stevens to be found in two essays, “Two or Three ideas” and “A collect of Philosophy.”12 stevens was indeed a philosopher as well as a poet: in a letter to Paul Weiss, stevens expressed his 6. ibid., 167. 7. ibid., 181. 8. ibid., 171. 9. ibid., 172. 10. ibid. 11. ibid., 181. 12. belief that philosophy is a cosmic poetry. stevens was thus very much at home in |
* Loss: [TripletLoss](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
"triplet_margin": 0.05
}
```
### Evaluation Dataset
#### Unnamed Dataset
* Size: 500 evaluation samples
* Columns: anchor, positive, and negative
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
| | anchor | positive | negative |
|:--------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| type | string | string | string |
| details | - min: 271 tokens
- mean: 331.61 tokens
- max: 526 tokens
| - min: 277 tokens
- mean: 331.71 tokens
- max: 469 tokens
| - min: 279 tokens
- mean: 328.47 tokens
- max: 431 tokens
|
* Samples:
| anchor | positive | negative |
|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| the cases which it is intended to include, the fact that acquaintance is in volved seems a priori evident, and not merely a statistical occurrence. I do not know what, precisely, is the logical difference between these two kinds of connection, but it seems plain that there is a difference. The kind of con nection intended in the definition is what we may call the a priori kind; and since the difficulties of the distinction belong solely to logic, we need not investigate them further at present. Theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is more difficult to define. To begin with, no definition can be satisfactory which introduces the word "knowledge," both because this word is highly ambiguous, and because every one of its possible meanings can only be made clear after much epistemological discussion. Then again, difficulties arise as regards the relations of epistemology to psychology and to logic respectively. It is obvious that much of episte mology is included in psychology. The analysis of experi ence, the distinctions between sensation, imagination, mem ory, attention, etc., the nature of belief or judgment, in 584 THE MONIST. short all the analytic portion of the subject, in so far as it does not introduce the distinction between truth and falsehood, must, I think, be regarded as strictly part of psychology. On the other hand, the distinction between truth and falsehood, which is plainly relevant to the theory of knowledge, would seem to belong to logic, though this is open to some | degree of doubt. And in any case, as soon as we reach the theory of judgment, even apart from truth and falsehood, the difficulties encountered are almost en tirely logical, and logical discoveries are what are most re quired for the progress of the subject. It can be shown1 that a judgment, and generally all thought whose expres sion involves propositions, must be a fact of a different logical form from any of the series : subject-predicate facts, dual relations, triple relations, etc. In this way, a difficult and interesting problem of pure logic arises, namely the problem of enlarging the inventory of logical forms so as to include forms appropriate to the facts of epistemology. It would seem, therefore, that it is impossible to assign to the theory of knowledge a province distinct from that of logic and psychology. Any attempt to mark out such a province must, I believe, be artificial and therefore harmful. The central problem of epistemology is the problem of distinguishing between true and false beliefs, and of find ing, in as many regions as possible, criteria of true belief within those regions. This problem takes us, through the analysis of belief and its presuppositions, into psychology and the enumeration of cognitive relations, while it takes us into logic through the distinction of truth and falsehood, which is irrelevant in a merely psychological discussion of belief. We may define epistemology in terms of this prob lem, as : The analysis of true and false belief and | assumption, that has been subjected or that can be subjected to critical evaluation and justification. In its first characterization, knowledge is trustworthy belief. It is a belief or a system of beliefs that can be logically justified. Within logical justification I include everything that may be thought relevant and adequate in logic and epistemology and scientific method. When we consider the trustworthiness of a belief apart from chains or systems of beliefs it is usual to speak of epistemology. When we consider beliefs in chains of deductive or. inductive proof or in other systematic interconnections we usually consider the subject as being logic. Yet, fundamentally, there is little difference here. In all these problems we are considering the logical evaluation or criticism of beliefs as purporting to be knowledge. Many philosophers seem to long for the good old days when they could be competent experts in the field of psychology. For better or for worse, those days are gone, probably never to return. The task of the philosopher now in this field is the same as his primary task has always been, to show what distinguishes more trustworthy from less trustworthy thought. Our beliefs, in all their groupings, are found, under critical or evaluative examination, to fall into a scale. With no pretence here of an adequate account of the matter, it seems that beliefs constitute a scale which runs from what might be called zero probability or zero evidence or zero plausibility to more and |
| draws a contrast between scientific objectivity and practical reason. He takes the unfashionably sane view that science tells us about the world that is already there independent of our theories, and elaborates this in terms of the idea (taken from his earlier book on Descartes) of an "absolute" conception of reality, a conception which is to a maximum degree independent of our human or personal perspectives and their peculiarities, but which at the same time places those perspectives within the world and explains both why the world appears to them as it does and how it is possible for us to form the absolute conception itself. The way the world really is explains how we can form a correct conception of it by transcending the appearances, even if we start from distinct subjective points of view. But ethical thought is concerned with the question how we should live, not how things are. Even if this question were to admit of convergence on a single answer from different perspectives, the explanation could not be anything like the one science offers for convergence in our beliefs about what the world is like. tions and disagreements are not like perceptions caused by the action on our senses of a single external world. So the defense of objective principles in ethics requires an alternative account of how convergence on the truth is possible, as well as a theory of error to explain the evident and frequent failures of convergence. But Williams argues that there is no such alternative. Mathematics provides no better a model for | ethical truth and knowledge than science does: any account must be specifically suited to the subject matter. The question is whether any of the leading candidates has a chance of being right. Not every ethical theory tries to provide ethics with a universal and inescapable foundation. Williams also criticizes certain forms of utilitarianism and contractualism, represented by R. M. Hare, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, which start from the motivational assumption of some form of impartiality without claiming that such impartiality is itself universally required. He argues that they are in different ways motivationally unrealistic. [About the peculiar state of moral consciousness required by indirect or two-level utilitarianism, for example, he says: "One cannot separate, except by an imposed and illusory dissociation, the theorist in oneself from the self whose dispositions are being theorized" (110).] But I want to concentrate on his objections to the two traditions of strictly foundational theory he thinks it most important to rule out: the Kantian and the Aristotelian. One tries to ground ethics in our rationality and the other, in our humanity. This means the first has somewhat more universal pretensions than the second, but both attempt to prove the authority of ethics inescapable by basing it on something essential about us. And both purport to offer an objective solution, in the form of an endorsement of certain principles and dispositions from a standpoint outside the cultural and personal contingencies of our lives-a | philsophical appetites whetted turn to a careful reading of the book itself. 1. Williams is skeptical about the role of philosophy in ethical thought. We can think about ethics, he suggests. But philosophy cannot tell us how to do it. Neither can it play a crucial role in the process of ethical thinking. On the other hand, philosophy has had and continues to have a distorting impact on ethics because of its penchant for theory and for abstract and general thought. Much of what Williams has to say on this topic is developed around a discussion of prejudice, a phenomenon that has concerned moral theCritical Notice of Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 291 orists like R.M. Hare deeply. Williams' view is that prejudice cannot be shown to be irrational. It is wrong because it is unethical. Furthermore, the best way to deal with it is by thinking clearly using the 'thick' ethical notions made available by one's culture, not by spinning abstract ethical theories that distort the nature of ethical thought. What Williams has to say on this topic raises a serious problem. Who should be considered members of the moral community and who should not? Williams rejects the answer given to this question by utilitarians like Singer arguing that speciesism, for example, is not a mistake (118). Equally, he rejects the view that philosophical analysis of concepts like the concept of a person can be of any value, citing the abortion debate as an |
| while, the traditional approach and that he had spent more time doing what he promised early in the book to do. But I suppose this is asking for an altogether different kind of book. This is a report of the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949. The formal papers read before the conference, supplemented by an introductory chapter by the editor and a concluding chapter of reports from the seminars of the conference, constitute the content of the volume. The addresses are presented under the three heads of methodology, metaphysics, and ethics and social philzsophy; the reports of seminars are from the same three fields of inquiry. In the subtitle, the volume is advertised as an attempt at world philosophical synthesis"a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and West." No claim is made that such a synthesis was achieved by the conference. According to the editor, most participants in the conference were agreed that "the most significant general results of the conference consisted in a highly developed attitude of openmindedness and cordiality, without which no synthesis of East and West will ever be possible," and that "the great single result of the Conference-and its chief contribution to world philosophy-consists of the numerous provocative and highly significant proposed syntheses, or avenues towards synthesis, of Eastern and Western philosophy" (pp. 6, 9). There is talk of "the ideal of 'orchestrated unity'" and of "the attitude of world perspective-one way of expressing the entire spirit | of the Conference." But the question remains how the former differs from eclecticism and the latter from the attitude of open-mindedness and in what sense the attainment of these ideals would give us a world philosophy. There is no question, however, that the conference succeeded in sharpening the points of agreement and the points of disagreement between oriental and occidental methods of philosophizing and conceptions of its objective. To an outsider this appears to be the most significant accomplishment of the 72 ETHICS conference, and it is, in any event, an indispensable first step toward a world philosophical synthesis. title of this book is understood "roughly the twentieth century with a little background of the nineteenth." The currents of philosophy surveyed are, primarily, British and American: neo-Hegelian idealism; pragmatism; realism, New and Critical; the theory of sense data; emergent evolution; logical positivism. Croce and Gentile are given one chapter together, and Bergson and Whitehead one chapter each. The philosophical aspects of Marxism are outlined and evaluated in a chapter of seventeen pages, while Indian thought is given a chapter of forty pages under the title of "Indian Idealism" (K. C. Bhattacharya and S. Radhakrishnan) and an Appendix of eighteen pages, abstracted from the author's article in the November, 1948, issue of the Philosophical Review, under the title "The Contributions of Modern Indian Philosophy to World Philosophy" (Aurobindo, Tagore, Gandhi). An account of "existentialism" is omitted on the ground that it "is yet a little | subject in their departments of philosophy. Why should philosophy remain so little touched by the rapid currents of modern life? The philosophic thought of India and China has been far from insignificant. The influence of these philosophies upon millions of people is quite sufficient to justify their study. Under modern circumstances, a school of philosophy which allows its students to graduate without an acquaintance with non-European philosophical thought is really an anachronism. The fact that there are now three important centers of philosophy, not merely one, sets the problem of this paper: what are the tasks a modern philosophy should undertake with regard to these nonEuropean philosophies? The first task is naturally that of searching through these philosophies for new or previously unstressed concepts or solutions to philosophical problems. The larger the number of people and the more varied their backgrounds, the more likely that all the pertinent solutions to a problem will appear. In philosophy, the East does have important contributions to make. In recent centuries the concept of divine immanence, the stimulus to which came from India, has revolutionized the philosophy of religion, and the end of its transforming power is still far from having been reached. American Transcendentalism owed much to Hindu philosophy. The philosophers of the enlightenment, especially the continental philosophers, eagerly studied what they could find of Chinese philosophy, even though it came to them in an imperfect and garbled form. Only a few years ago there |
* Loss: [TripletLoss](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
```json
{
"distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
"triplet_margin": 0.05
}
```
### Training Hyperparameters
#### Non-Default Hyperparameters
- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `weight_decay`: 0.01
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
#### All Hyperparameters
Click to expand
- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
- `do_predict`: False
- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `prediction_loss_only`: True
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `weight_decay`: 0.01
- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
- `num_train_epochs`: 3
- `max_steps`: -1
- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `warmup_steps`: 0
- `log_level`: passive
- `log_level_replica`: warning
- `log_on_each_node`: True
- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
- `save_safetensors`: True
- `save_on_each_node`: False
- `save_only_model`: False
- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
- `no_cuda`: False
- `use_cpu`: False
- `use_mps_device`: False
- `seed`: 42
- `data_seed`: None
- `jit_mode_eval`: False
- `use_ipex`: False
- `bf16`: False
- `fp16`: False
- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
- `half_precision_backend`: auto
- `bf16_full_eval`: False
- `fp16_full_eval`: False
- `tf32`: None
- `local_rank`: 0
- `ddp_backend`: None
- `tpu_num_cores`: None
- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
- `debug`: []
- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
- `past_index`: -1
- `disable_tqdm`: False
- `remove_unused_columns`: True
- `label_names`: None
- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
- `ignore_data_skip`: False
- `fsdp`: []
- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
- `deepspeed`: None
- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
- `optim`: adamw_torch
- `optim_args`: None
- `adafactor`: False
- `group_by_length`: False
- `length_column_name`: length
- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
- `push_to_hub`: False
- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
- `hub_model_id`: None
- `hub_strategy`: every_save
- `hub_private_repo`: False
- `hub_always_push`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
- `fp16_backend`: auto
- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
- `mp_parameters`:
- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
- `full_determinism`: False
- `torchdynamo`: None
- `ray_scope`: last
- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
- `torch_compile`: False
- `torch_compile_backend`: None
- `torch_compile_mode`: None
- `dispatch_batches`: None
- `split_batches`: None
- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
- `optim_target_modules`: None
- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
- `eval_on_start`: False
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional