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b2cd7a80-1c32-4d92-bfb8-364c78790ff5 | Tierney v. District Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29904
MICHAEL C. TIERNEY, Petitioner, &
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FiRsT cracurt, | = =
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(By: Moony Ges) Nakayana, Resea, Bufty, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Michael C. Tierney and the papers in
eupport, it appears that petitioner submitted to the district
court of the first circuit, pursuant to HAS § 604-10.5 (Supp.
2008), a Petition for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and
for Injunction Against Harassment (petition). The district court
upon receipt and review of the petition -- struck the petition
without filing and returned it to petitioner. Petitioner seeks a
writ of mandamus directing the district court to file the
petition.
A writ of mandamus will issue where a petitioner
demonstrates a cl
© and indisputable right to relief and a lack
of other means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain
ted action. Kema v, Gaddia, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982
lief is available to compel an
the requ
P.2d 334, 338 (1999), Mandamus
official to perform a duty allegedly owed to an individual if the
individual's claim is clear and certain, the official's duty is
ministerial and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt,
aa
and no other remedy is available. In Re Disciplinary Bd. of
Hawaii Suprene Court, 91 Hawai'i 363, 368, 984 P.24 688, 693
(1999), citing Barnett v, Broderick, 84 Hawai'i 109, 111, 929
P.2d 1359, 1361 (1996).
Petitioner has an indisputable right to have his
petition for temporary restraining order filed. gee DCRCP S(e)
(Any other rule to the contrary notwithstanding, the clerk shall
not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that
purpose solely because it is not presented in proper fozm[.
The filing of the petition is a ministerial duty of the district
court. The district court struck the petition without filing and
returned it to petitioner. Petitioner has no remedy other than
mandamus. Therefore,
IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petition for writ of mandamus without
Payment of the filing fee.
17 18 FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for writ of
mandamus is granted as follows:
1. ‘The clerk of the appellate court shall forthwith
transmit to the District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu
Division, the papers enclosed with the petition for writ of
mandamus, to wit: (1) Petition for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order and for Injunction Against Har:
sment; (2) Return of
Service; (3) Ex Parte Application for Relief from Costs; and (4)
district court Form 10-P-985.
Division,
forthvith
order and
2. The District Court of the First Circuit, Honolulu
upon receipt of ¢
1e aforementioned papers, shall
file the Petition for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
for Injunction Against Harassment.
Dated: Honolulu, Haw
» duly 8, 2008.
Grrr
Becta OS rtutiay ine
aL
Gane Dele +
Pia 2. Meet benef
| d684b2617fc18239491a2dacab04545857cbe5a9999f4f16e1ecc15b0e6b93a1 | 2009-07-08T00:00:00Z |
f3eddc46-3a28-418a-88ee-b40346f06679 | State v. Johnson | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | *** NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
The Honorable Paula Devens presided.
1
HRS § 291C-105 mandates, in pertinent part:
(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at
a speed exceeding:
(1) The applicable state or county speed
limit by thirty miles per hour or more; or
(2) Eighty miles per hour or more
irrespective of the applicable state or
county speed limit.
2
NO. 29100
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Respondent-Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KESEAN JOHNSON, Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(HPD TRAFFIC NO. 1DTC-07-060926)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.,
Circuit Judge Crandall in place of Recktenwald, J., recused,
and Acoba, J., concurring separately)
Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant Kesean Johnson
(“Johnson”) petitions this court to review the Intermediate Court
of Appeals’ (“ICA’s”) April 15, 2009 judgment on appeal. The
ICA’s judgment was entered pursuant to the court’s March 31, 2009
summary disposition order affirming the District Court of the
First Circuit’s (“trial court’s”)1 March 12, 2008 judgment
convicting Johnson of the offense of excessive speeding, in
violation of Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-105(a)(1)
and/or (a)(2) (Supp. 2006).2 In his application for writ of
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
See State v. Assaye, 112 Hawai#i 204, ___, 216 P.3d 1227, 1233-37
3
(2009); see also State v. Manewa, 115 Hawai#i 343, 353-56, 167 P.3d 336, 346-
49 (2007).
2
certiorari before this court, Johnson asserts that the ICA
gravely erred (1) “in concluding that [Respondent-Appellee-
Plaintiff, State of Hawai#i (“prosecution”),] laid the requisite
foundation for the admissibility of the laser gun reading
pursuant to State v. Stoa, 112 Hawai#i 260, 265, 145 P.3d 803,
808 (App. 2006),” and (2) “by failing to recognize that the
[prosecution] did not lay the requisite foundation for
admissibility of the laser gun reading as required by State v.
Wallace, 80 Hawai#i 382, 910 P.2d 695 (1996), and State v.
Manewa, 115 Hawai#i 343, 167 P.2d 336 (2007).”
Upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we hold that: (1)
proof that the “LTI 2020 laser gun” (“laser gun”) was tested
according to manufacturer recommended procedures is required to
establish a sufficient foundation for the speed reading given by
the same laser gun, which was not adduced in this case;3 (2) the
prosecution did not establish whether Honolulu Police Officer
Clarence Clites (“Officer Clites”) was qualified by training and
experience to operate the laser gun because it was not shown
whether the nature and extent of Officer Clites’ training in the
operation of the laser gun met the requirements indicated by the
*** NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
See Assaye, 112 Hawai#i at ___, 216 P.3d at 1237-39;
4
see also State v. Mitchell, 94 Hawai#i 388, 398, 15 P.3d 314, 324
(App. 2000); State v. Ito, 90 Hawai#i 225, 244, 978 P.2d 191, 210
(App. 1999).
See Assaye, 112 Hawai#i at ___, 216 P.3d at 1239; see also HRS §
5
291C-105(a).
See Assaye, 112 Hawai#i at ___, 216 P.3d at 1239; see also Manewa,
6
115 Hawai#i at 358, 167 P.3d at 351.
3
manufacturer;4 and (3) inasmuch as the prosecution did not
provide a sufficient foundation for the admission of Officer
Clites’ testimony regarding the speed reading given by the laser
gun, and there being no other evidence to indicate the speed that
Johnson was traveling at in the afternoon of June 25, 2007, the
record in this case is devoid of any evidence of the required
speed reading, which is a material element of the offense
charged.5 Consequently, the prosecution has not adduced
sufficient evidence to prove every element of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.6 Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the circuit court’s March 12,
2008 judgment is reversed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, December 11, 2009.
James S. Tabe,
Deputy Public Defender,
for Petitioner-Defendant-
Appellant Kesean Johnson
on the application
Brian R. Vincent,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for Respondent-Plaintiff-
Appellee State of Hawai#i
| 4ff719ad62664a86fbd670eb655e742c7b961bda3cf82b29ee77b59bf001e565 | 2009-07-16T00:00:00Z |
8a4b784c-2fea-4535-aa46-302ad6254c5e | Eline v. Department of Public Safety, State of Hawaii | null | 29883 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | ay
No, 29883
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RAWAT’: &
RICHARD ELINE, Petitioner,
> a
“920K L
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Res;
neni OOOO
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
ORDER
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Richard Eline, it appears that
petitioner fails to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to
relief and therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus
relief, See Kema v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.24 334,
338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that
will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and
indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to
redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action.). Accordingly,
I 18 HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petition for a writ of mandamus without
payment of the filing fee.
IT 1S FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 7, 2009.
ren
Seca 6 etyare
(PN
Comm €.1Detye fe
TNE. Mehiteut/
UBRARY
aa
| a93c00050573fff8661bf53651625bbce11719e71f10bf6127926c082597f1ed | 2009-07-07T00:00:00Z |
87e4f06c-15b0-483d-be23-dbb242267a5f | Estate of Roxas v. Marcos. ICA Opinion, filed 02/12/2009 [pdf], 120 Haw. 123. Concurring Opinion by J. Leonard [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakamura [pdf]. ICA Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion, filed 03/02/2009 [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/31/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/06/2009 [pdf]. | 121 Haw. 59 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
UPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT
ESTATE OF ROGER ROKAS; and THE GOLDEN BUDHA CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation, Petitioners/Plaintifts-Appellges, a
INELDA MARCOS, Respondent/Defendant-Aappeliant; = SE
Soe oF
ana Be
FERDINAND MARCOS, Defendant. 3
wo. 28702
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO, 88-0522-02)
AUGUST 10, 2009
C.J., NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
3, RECUSED,
IN PLACE OF ACOBA,
Moon,
ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
CIRCUIT JUDGE DEL” ROSARIO,
‘AND CIRCUIT JUDGE POLLACK,
oe: RY BY NAL
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellees The Estate of Roger
Roxas and The Golden Budha Corporation ("GEC") (collectively,
“petitioners") petition this court to review the Intermediate
("ICA's") March 5, 2009 judgment on appeal.
court of Appeals’
‘The ICA's judgment was entered pursuant to its February 12, 2009
published opinion,’ Estate of Roxas v, Marcos (“Roxas II”), 120
(App. 2009), which reversed
Hawai'i 123, 126, 202 P.3d 584, 587
‘The opinion was authored by Associate Judge Daniel R, Foley, with
‘Leonard concurring separately. Associate Judge
Associate Judge Kathe:
Graig #. Nekamora wrote @ dissenting opinica.
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the firet circuit court's ("circuit court's”)? July 24, 2007
order grant
1g Pet:
loners’ two May 8, 2007 motions to extend the
second and fourth amended judgments. The ICA held that the
circuit court erred in extending the Plaintiffs’ second and
fourth amended judgments because, under Hawai'i Revised Statute
(“HRS”) § 657-5 (2006),? “the August 28, 1996 [Judgment is the
‘original judgment’ for purposes of this case and the limitation
period for an extension commenced on its August 28, 1996 entry
date.” Roxas II, 120 Hawai'i at 126, 202 P.3d at 587. We
accepted Petitioners’ application for a writ of certiorari, and
oral argument was held on June 4, 2009.
Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred by
interpreting “original judgment” of HRS § 657-5 as the “first
judgment rendered by a court.” Id, at 126, 202 P.3d at 587.
‘They argue that this construction creates “an unreasonable result
in cases in which more than one judgment is entered between
different parties or as to different claims.” Petitioners
‘The Honorable Karen 3, 5. Abn presided
> RS § 657-5 provides:
Uniess an extension is granted, every judgment and decree of any
court of the State shall be presumed to be paid and discharged at
the expiration of ten years after the judgment or decree wi
fendered, No action shall be commenced after the expiration of
ten years from the date a judgnent or decree was rendered oF
cntended, Noveatension of a judanent cr decree shail be azanted
unless the extension is sought within ten vears of the date she
Siginal iudanect or decree was rendered. A court shall noe
extend any judgnent oF decree Bayona twenty years from the aate of
the original Judgnent or decree.” No extension shall be granted
hithout notice and che filing of @ nonchearing notion axa hearing
motion to extend the life of the judgment or decree.
(Emphasis added.)
IBLICATION IN WEST'S HA\
maintain that the limitations period on extending a judgment is
ten years from the date that the judgment to be extended was
firet entered.
We hold that the “original judgment” of HRS § 657-5
refers to the judgment that creates the rights and
responsibilities seeking to be extended, and, therefore, the
circuit court did not err in extending the second and fourth
amended judgments. Nevertheless, the circuit court erred when i
extended the fourth amended judgment until September 5, 2021,
because that date is beyond twenty years of the “original
judgment,” entered on June 26, 2000. Accordingly, we (1) vacate
the ICA’s March 5, 2009 judgment, (2) vacate the circuit court's
July 24, 2007 order, to the extent that it granted Petitioners’
motion to extend the fourth amended judgment until September 5,
2021, and (3) remand this case to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
On January 24, 1971, Roger Roxas ("Roxas") discovered
the legendary “Yamashita Treasure,” which, among other things,
consisted of a gold-colored buddha statue and bars of gold.
Roxas vi Marcos (“Roxas 1”), 89 Hawai'i 91, 100-1, 969 P.2d 1209,
1218-19 (1998).* Subsequently, on April 5, 1971, under the
direction of Ferdinand Marcos, individuals claiming to be from
. X provides a more detailed description of the background
facts established at trial. See Roxas f, 68 Hawai’ at 100-108, 969 F.2d at
1218-1227
HAWAII REPORTS AND PACTE
‘OR PUBLICATION IN W1
two Philippine national security agencies, knocked on Roxas’ s
door, claiming to have a search warrant for his house. Id, at
102, 969 P.2d at 1220, The men broke Roxas’s windows, pointed
the barrels of their rifles inside, and threatened to shoot him
Af he did not open the door. Id. Roxas opened the door, and the
men beat Roxas’s brother and ordered his family and two
bodyguards to lie down on the floor. Id, The men stole the
buddha, the diamonds, seventeen bars of gold, samurai swords, a
piggy bank belonging to Roxas’s children, and his wife's coin
collection, Id.
Subsequently, on May 18, 1971, Roxas was arrested and
tortured for information about his treasure. Id, at 103, 969
P.2d at 1221. He was kept in a room for two weeks, and he was
forced to sign an affidavit declaring that the raid in his house
had been performed “in a peaceful manner.” Id. Roxas eventually
escaped. Id.
In late 1974, Ferdinand Marcos and his aides and
generals, as well as Inelda Marcos’ personal security, sought the
services of Robert Curtis, an American who owned a mining
company, Id, at 105-06, 969 P.2d at 1223-24, They asked Curtis
to resmelt gold bars that Ferdinand Marcos claimed were from the
Yenashite Treasure. Id, Curtis testified that he entered = room
“tabout roughly 40 by 40,’ stacked to the ceiling with bars of
gold,” and also saw the solid gold buddha statue that Roxas had
discovered. Id.
On June 3, 1986, Roxas assigned all of his rights to
the Yamashita Treasure to GBC, in exchange for a minority holding
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
of non-voting shares. Id. at 107, 969 ®.2d at 1225.
B. Judgment And Amended Judgment
on February 19, 1988, Roxas and GBC filed a lawsuit
against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. Id at 109, 969 P.2d at
1227. Roxas asserted claims of false inprisonment and battery
against Ferdinand Marcos. Id, GBC asserted clains against
Ferdinand and Inelda Marcos for conversion, constructive trust,
and fraudulent conveyances. 1
During the litigation, on September 29, 1989, Ferdinand
Marcos died, and the parties subsequently stipulated to
substitute Inelda Marcos as his estate’s personal representative.
Id, In 1993, during the litigation, Roxas also died, and the
circuit court granted a motion to substitute Felix Dacanay
("Dacanay"), personal representative of the Roxas Estate, for
Roxas as a party plaintiff. Ide
Pursuant to a July 13, 1996 jury verdict, the circuit
court filed 2 judgment on August 28, 1996 ("first-in-tine
judgment”) (1) in favor of Dacanay, as personal representative of
the Estate of Roger Roxas and against Ferdinand Marcos on the
battery and false imprisonment clains, (2) in favor of GBC and
against Ferdinand Marcos on the conversion claim, and (3) in
favor of Imelda Marcos, in her individual capacity, and against
Petitioners on all claims they asserted against her. Id. at 114,
969 P.2d at 1232.
The circuit court filed an amended judgment on October
21, 1996 ("Amended Judgment”), pursuant to Petitioners’ request
to correct the first-in-!
© judgment by “add{ing] the ‘Estate of
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
Ferdinand Marcos’ as a proper party defendant.” Id, at 114-15,
969 P.2d at 1232-33. Pursuant to the circuit court's prior
substitution of Imelda Marcos as a representative for the Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos, the court filed an Amended Judgment against
“Defendant Imelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,” (1) in favor of Dacanay, as personal
representative of the Estate of Roger Roxas, in the anount of $6
million in damages for battery and false imprisonment, and (2) in
favor of GBC, in the amount of over $22 billion for conversion.
. The 1998 Roxas X Decision
Inelda Marcos, “in her alleged capacity as personal
representative of the Marcos Estate,” appealed from the Amended
Judgment, arguing that the court erred by amending the judgment
against her as “personal representative” of the Marcos Estate,
where she was substituted as “the representative of Defendant
Ferdinand Marcos deceased.” Id, at 99, 117, 969 .2¢ at 1217,
1235. Petitioners cross-appealed. Id. at 99, 969 P.2d at 1217.
This court issued Roxas I on November 17, 1998,
affirming, reversing, and vacating and remanding parte of the
Amended Judgment. Id, at 157, 969 P.2d at 1275. We held, among
other things, that generally, “an heir of an undistributed
estate, who has not been judicially appointed as the personal
representative of a decedent’s estate, is not = ‘proper party’
for substitution pursuant to [Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure
(HRCP")) Rule 25(a)(1)." Ide at 122, 969 P.2d at 1240. We
noted that Petitioners did not establish that Imelda Marcos was
appointed as the personal representative of the Marcos Estate,
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAM REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
and, therefore, Imelda Marcos did not bind the Marcos Estate to
the Judgment. Id, at 122 n,18, 126, 969 P.2d at 1240 n.18, 1248.
ie ruled, however, that Imelda Marcos deceived the court into
permitting her to represent Ferdinand Narcos, and, that
an ord
judieie!
to achieve justice consistent with the doctrine of
hota
tent of he:
nincaat in the aussts-of the Marsce Estate, for the anount of the
Blaintiffs-appeliees” Judgnent against Ferdinand (Marcos), a= that
Snount has been modified according to this opinion.
Id. at 126, 969 2.20 at 1244 (emphasis added). We vacated the
portion of the circuit court's Amended Judgment entered against
“efendant Inelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos” with respect to the (Petitioners’)
battery, false imprisonment, and conversion claims, and remanded
for entry of judgment as to those claims against “Imelda
[Marcos], in her personal capacity, to the extent of her interest
in the Marcos Estate.” Id, at 126-27, 969 P.2d at 1244-45.
Further, Roxas I (1) reversed that part of the Amended
Judgment avarding GBC $22 billion for “one storage area” of gold
bullion, (2) vacated the portion of the Amended Judgment awarding
Gac $1.4 million in damages for conversion of the golden buddha
statue and the seventeen gold bars, and entering judgment in
favor of Imelda Marcos and against Petitioners on GBC’s claim for
constructive trust, and (3) remanded for
({a1) a new trial on the value of the converted golden buddha
ue and seventeen gold bars, ((b]} an award of prejudgment
.stSn"the dazages awarded a2 2 consequence of the conversion
fe golden buddha and seventeen gold bars, commencing trex the
Gate corresponding to the value of the gold Sesignea by the sur;
and ({2]) furtner proceedings, to the extent necessary, on GBC's
equitable claim agsinst Imelda, in her personal capacity, for
Id. at 157, 969 P.2d at 1275.
#17 FOR PUBLI
D. Second, Third, And Fourth Anended Judgments
on October 18, 1999, the circuit court filed a second
amended judgment ("Second Amended Judgment") pursuant to Roxas I.
In pertinent part, the Second Amended Judgnent granted judgment
“in favor of (Dacanay,] as personal representative of the estate
of Roger Roxas in the amount of $6 million in general damages for
false imprisonment and battery against Imelda Marcos in her
personal capacity, to the extent of her interest in the Marcos
Estate." It also stated that the “judgment is entered nune pro
tune as of October 21, 1996," the date of the Amended Judgment.
on February 28, 2000, the circuit court held a bench
trial on the issue of damages for conversion. ‘The court filed a
third amended judgment (“Third Anended Judgment”) on June 26,
2000, amending the Second Amended Judgment’s sixth paragraph
stating that the court retained jurisdiction over GEC's
conversion claims. The Third Amended Judgment awarded GEC over
$13 million in damages and prejudgment interest (calculated from
the highest value of gold until the date of the Amended Judgment)
against “Imelda Marcos in her personal capacity, to the extent of
her interest in the Marcos Estate,” for conversion of the gold
buddha and seventeen small bars of gold. The Third Anended
Judgment was entered nunc pro tunc as of October 21, 1996, the
date of the Anended Judgment.
The parties appealed the Third Amended Judgment to this
court, but the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. In an order dated March 21, 2001, we ruled that
the Third Amended Judgment
s** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
dia not meet the certification requirements of BRCP (Rule) $4{b)
land the judgment is not an appeslable final Judgment on the
for conversion. ee NRCP [Rule] 84(B) ("(T)Re court may direct
ERE chery of a finest juagment a2 to one or nore but fewer than all.
‘the claime or parties only upon an express determination th:
there is no just reason for delay and upen direction for the ef
3. judgment
Further, we noted that the Amended Judgnent’s certification was
“effective only as to those claims certified as final on October
21, 1996 and not to claims subsequently decided by the (Second
and Third Amended Judgments), even though those judgments were
entered nunc pro tunc to October 21, 1996.”
‘The circuit court filed a fourth amended judgment
("Fourth Amended Judgment”) on Septenber 6, 2001, which amended
the Third Amended Judgnent by stating: “The court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly
directs for the entry of judgment.” This judgment was also
entered nunc pro tune as of October 21, 1996,” the date of the
Amended Judgment. All parties appealed from the Fourth Amended
Judgment. In a summary disposition order dated November 30,
2005, this court affirmed the Fourth Amended Judgment.
E. Motions To Extend Second and Fourth Amended Judgments
on May 8, 2007, Petitioners filed motions to extend the
Second Amended Judgment (filed on October 18, 1999) and Fourth
Amended Judgment (filed on September 6, 2001) for an additional
ten-year period. Imelda Marcos objected, arguing that an
extension was precluded under HRS § 657-5, which requires that
the extension “is sought within ten years of the date the
original judgment or decree was rendered.” She asserted that the
“original judgment” was rendered in 1996, and that, therefore,
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the subject motions, filed more than ten years after that date,
on May @, 2007, were untimely. in response, Petitioners argued
that the 1996 judgment ceased to exist due to Roxas I vacating
the Amended Judgment and remanding the case. Moreover, they
pointed out that the Second and Fourth Amended Judgments are
against a “new and differest party defendant” from the first-in-
tine
doment.
on July 24, 2007, the circuit court granted
Petitioners’ motions to extend the Second and Fourth Amended
Judgments. The court ruled that “[a] vacation or reversal
extinguishes a judgment,” and noted that Roxas I reversed,
affirmed, vacated, and remanded differing portions of the first-
in-time judgment. Furthermore, the court stated that HRS § 657-
5's term “original judgment” is “plain and unambiguous” and
“reflect [s] the legislature’s intent to distinguish within [HRS]
§ 657-5 a judgment which has been extended from an initial
judgment and thus make clear that a [s]tate [c]ourt judgment may
enjoy but one extension.” The court ruled that the “entry of
final judgment should mark the beginning of the Limitations
period," and, therefore, Petitioners’ ten-year period to extend
the judgments had not expized. The court ordered that the Second
Amended Judgnent (filed on October 18, 1999) extend until October
17, 2019, and that the Fourth Amended Judgment (filed on
Septenber 6, 2001) extend until September 5, 2021.
on August 22, 2007, Imelda Marcos filed a timely notice
of appeal.
10
F. Roxas If Reversing The Circuit Court! s Order
on appeal, Inelda Narcos argued that the “original
judgment was rendered in 1996, and that, under HRS § 657-5,
Petitioners’ May 8, 2007 motions to extend the Second and Fourth
Judgments were untimely. Imelda Marcos contended that “original
judgment” does not mean “final judgment after appeal,” or
“amended judgment,” inasmuch as “original” refers to the “first
stage of existence” or “the first form.” Finally, she contended
that the motions were untimely because, even if the Second and
Fourth Amended Judgments were the starting point for extending
the judgments, they were entered nunc pro tune “as of October 21,
1996," and “relate[d) back to October 21, 1996, ‘as if the
judgment {s] had been rendered on that date.’” (Quoting Keahole
v. Board of
110 Haw. 419, 431, 134 P.3d 585, 597 (2006).
Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that under HRS
657-5, the “ten-year statute of limitations on judgments{] can be
extended for an additional ten years 1f application for an
extension is made before the original ten years has run.”
Because Roxas I vacated the Amended Judgment (filed in 1996), the
Amended Judgment “is no longer a valid and existing judgnent.”
Accordingly, they argued, their motions to extend the Second and
Fourth Amended Judgnents (entered on October 1, 1999 and
Septenber 6, 2001), which were filed within ten years of those
judgments, were timely. Moreover, they contended that the fact
that the amended judgments were entered nunc pro tune “has no
effect on when the statute of Limitations period begins to run,”
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because the judgnes
Were not actually awarded until
actually filed.
In a February 12, 2009 published opinion, the ICA held
that the circuit court erred in extending Petitioners’ Second and
Fourth Amended Judgments. Roxas II, 120 Hawai'i at 126-27, 202
P.3d at 587-88. Based on the “ordinary use” of the word
“original,” the ICA ruled that the “‘toriginal judgment’ logically
at 126,
refers to the first judgment rendered by a court.'” Ide
202 P.3d at 587. It concluded that “the August 28, 1996 judgment
is the ‘original judgment’ for purposes of this case and the
Limitation period for an extension commenced on its August 28,
1996 entry date.” Id, at 126, 202 F.3d at 587. Under this
interpretation of HRS $ 657-5, Petitioners’ motions to extend the
Second and Fourth Judgments were untimely and the ICA reversed
the cireuit court’s orders. Id. at 127, 202 P.3d at 588.
Associate Judge Katherine G. Leonard wrote @ concurring
opinion emphasizing that “parties and the courts are best served
by the clear, plain understanding that, under HRS § 657-5, the
original judgment in any case is the first judgment entered.”
Id, at 128, 202 P.2d at $89 (Leonard, J., concurring). she
further asserted that (1) Roxas I did not extinguish the first~
in-time judgment, (2) the nunc pro tune judgments “shall have the
same legal force and effect” as if done at the 1996 date, and (3)
extending the 1ife of any final judgnent that is amended by,
before, or after an appeal would “eliminate the quality or state
of originality from the term original judgment.” Id. at 127-28,
202 P.3d at 588-89 (Leonard, J., concurring).
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Associate Judge Craig H. Nakamura dissented, reasoning
that, “original judgment” as used in HRS § 657-5 means “the first
enforceable judgment that has not been vacated or extinguished.”
Id at 129, 202 P.3d at 590 (Nakamura, J., dissenting). In his
view, Roxas I “effectively extinguished the prior judgments
entered by the circuit court by changing the party against whom
the monetary awarde could be enforced." Id. Judge Nakamura
noted that the Second Amended Judgment was the first judgment
entered against Imelda Marcos in a personal capacity, but posited
that, because the Second and Third Amended Judgments did not
“contain{] the certification required by HRCP Rule 54(b) to make
4 judgment rendered on fewer than all of the claims or parties a
final judgment," they were not “enforceable” and thus, not
“rendered” under HRS § 657-5. Id. at 134, 202 P.3d at 595
(Nakamura, J., dissenting). Judge Nakamura’s dissent explained
that the original judgment was only rendered when the Fourth
Amended Judgnent was issued, inasmuch as it satisfied the HRC
Rule S4(b) certification requirements. Id. Moreover, Judge
Nakamura argued that the entry of the Second, Third, and Fourth
Amended Judgments nunc Eo tune as of October 21, 1996 “was a
‘fiction of law’ and did not change the date they actually becane
enforceable,” September 6, 2001. Id. at 135, 202 P.3d at 596
(Nakamura, J., dissenting).
‘he ICA filed a judament on appeal on March 5, 2009.
Petitioners filed an application for a writ of certiorari on
March 31, 2009. Imelda Marcos filed a response to the
application on April 15, 2008.
1B
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32, STANDARD OF REVIEW
othe interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewable de nove.” Capua v, Weyerhaeuser Co,, 117 Hawai'i 439,
443, 184 P.3d 191, 196 (2008) (citing Flor v, Holguin, 94 Hawai'i
70, 16, 9 P.3d 382, 388 (2000)) (brackets, citations, and
ellipses omitted). statutory construction is guided by the
following rules:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
Interpretation se the Language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory Language 1s plain and
nanbiguous, oor sole duty is ts give effect to its plain
ind obvious meaning. Thifd, implicit in the task of
Statutory construction 12 our foremost obligation to
Abcertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, which 12 to be obtained primarily from the
Language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there Ss dubt, doubleness of meaning, of indistinct veness
Sr uncertainty of an expression used ina statute, an
Gnbiguity exists. "And fifth, in construing an ambiguous
Statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
Granining the context, with which the esbiguous words,
Phrases, and sestences nay be compared, in order to
Recertain their true meaning
Carlisle v. one (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i 245, 256, 195 P.3d 1177,
1188 (2008) (quoting In _xe Contested Case Hearing op Water Use
Permit Application, 116 Hawai'i 481, 489-90, 174 P.3d 320, 328-29
(2007)) (block quotation format altered).
IIT, DIScussroN
Plain Language of HRS § 657-5
HRS § 657-5 ia a “[etatute of limitations) that applies
to actions seeking enforcement of domestic judgments and
decrees.” Brooks vs Minn, 73 Haw. 566, 575, 836 2.24 1081, 1086
14
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992) (referring to HRS § 657-5 (1985)).? The issue in this
case, determining whether the ICA gravely erred by reversing the
trial court’s order granting Petitioners’ motions to extend the
Second and Fourth Amended Judgments, depends on when the
Limitations on the extension of these judgnents began to run
In intexpreting HRS § 657-5, we first look to the
language of the statute. See One (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i at 256,
195 P.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). HRS § 657-5 provides:
Oniess an extension is granted, every Judgment and decree of any
Court of the State shal! be presimed to be paid and sischarged at
the expiration of ten years after the judgnent oF decree was
fendered. "Ro action shall be commenced after the expiration of
ten years from the date a judgnent or decree was rendered oF
Sxtended, Noveatension of 2 qudament or decree shall be granted
unless the extension is sought within ten veare of the date the
at iuanent R court ahali noe
Satend any judgrent oF decree beyond treaty years fron the aate of
the original Judgment or decree. No extension shall be granted
without notice and the filing of a non-hearing action or a hearing
otion to extend the Life of the judgment or decree.
(Emphasis added.) Although the statute precludes a court from
extending a judgment where the extension is sought more than ten
years after “the original judgment . . . was rendered,” the term
“original judgment” is not entirely clear.
As we have explained, when a “term is not statutorily
defined, this court may resort to legal or other well accepted
dictionaries as one way to determine its ordinary meaning.”
Gillan _v, Gov't Employees ins, Co., 119 Hawai'i 109, 115, 194
* tn 1985, HRS § 657-5 stated:
Every judgrant and decree of any court of record of the state
shell be presumed to be paid and discharged at the expiration of
ten years after the Judgment of decree was rendered, and no action
shall be commenced thereon after the expiration of ten years after
The jusoment oF decree was rendered.
15
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P.3d 1071, 1077 (2008) (citations, brackets, and internal
quotation marks omitted), Accordingly, the ICA looked to the
dictionary definition of “original” and ruled that “ ‘original
judgment’ logically refers to the first judgment rendered by a
court.” Roxas Il, 120 Hawai'i at 126, 202 P.3d at $87 (citing
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language 1015 (1989).
Ruling that a motion to extend any judgment must be
filed within ten years of the date of the first-in-time judgment
would provide substantially more rights to a first-in-tine
judgment than a subsequent judgment. Under this rule, a first-
in-time judgment is valid for ten years and may be extended for
an additional ten year period, thus being able to be enforced for
a maximum of twenty years. In contrast, a judgment rendered
subsequent to the first-i
‘time judgnent would be afforded less
than twenty years to enforce the judgment. In fact, a judgrent
that is rendered ten or more years after the first-in-tine
judgment could not be extended and would only be enforceable a
maximum of ten years.
It ie true that there is no court rule or
constitutional right to extend every judgment. Nevertheless, if
We were to construe the “original judgment,” as the first-in-time
judgnent, it would “produce an absurd and unjust result, . .
clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the
statute.” State v. Lagat, 97 Hawai'i 492, 499, 40 P.3d 894, 902
(2002) (quoting State v. Villeza, 85 Hawai'i 258, 272-73, 942
P.2d 522, 534-35 (1997)) (block formatting altered). It is well-
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established that “departure from a literal construction of a
statute ‘ie justified when such construction would produce an
absurd . . . result and the literal construction in the
particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and
policies of the act.'” Richardson v. City and County of
Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 668 P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994) (quoting
Exanks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 341, 843 P.2d
668, 674 (1993))+ see also HRS § 1-15 (1993) (“Where the words of
a law are ambiguous[,] . . . (elvery construction which leads to
fan absurdity shall be rejected.”); Flores v. Rawlings Co., LLC,
117 Hawad't 153, 164, 177 P.34 341, 352 (2008) (**(T]he
legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and
legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible,
inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality [.]"" (quoting
Beneficial Hawai'i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai'i 289, 309, 30 P.ad
995, 914-15 (2001)); State v, Gomes, 117 Hawai" 218, 232, 177
P.3d 928, 942 (2008) (Nakayama, J., dissenting) (**[E]ven where
there is no ambiguity, a departure from the Literal application
of statutory Language will be justified if such literal
application will lead to absurd consequences[,]’ for *{s|tatutory
language must be read in the context of the entire statute, and
the harm or evil it seeks to prevent must point the way to its
construction.'” (quoting State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 518, 572
P.2d 1222, 1225 (1977).
Holding that the first-in-time judgment controls the
statute of limitations for subsequent judgments would produce an
absurd result when the first-in-time judgment does not address or
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HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
wes
resolve any of the claims ruled on by the subsequent judgment.
As Petitioners point out, a firet-in-time interpretation would
mean that the statute of limitations for extending judgments
would begin at the date of entry of the first-in-time judgment,
even if it is not “in his name,” “on his claim," or “against the
party against whom he seeks to enforce his own judgment." This
would arbitrarily confer more rights on the party that obtained
the first-in-time judgment than a party in a subsequent judgment.
In addition, the term “Judgment,” as used throughout
HRS § 657-5, must refer to a valid and enforceable judgment.
Although the statute states that “every judgment . . . shall be
presumed to be paid and discharged at the expiration of ten years
after the judgment . . . was rendered” (emphasis added), the
presumption that “every judgment” is “paid and discharged” in ten
years cannot be made when the judgment is invalid. See 2 Abrahan
Clark Freeman, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments Including ALL
Final Determinations of the Rights of Parties in Actions or
Proceedings at Law or in Equity § 1091, at 2268 (Edward W.
Tuttle, ed., rev. Sth ed, 1925) (*[I)£ the original judgment has
been reversed or satisfied, there can be no execution issued
pursuant to the revival by scire facias.”). Construing
“judgnent” as a valid judgment, therefore, requires that an
Yoriginal judgment” is a valid judgment. A first-in-time
judgment that has been vacated or reversed is no longer valid and
therefore cannot be an “original judgment.”
Consistent with this construction of “judgment,”
18
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Petitioners contend that an “original judgment” is simply a valid
Judgment that has not been extended. According to Petitioners,
the statutory use of “original judgment,” as opposed to
“judgment” in HRS § 657-5, distinguishes an “original judgment”
from an extended judgment in order to clarify that an original
judgment, but not an extended judgment, may be extended.
Pursuant to this interpretation, they contend that a valid
judgment may be extended and enforced during the same ten year
period. Thus, under Petitioners’ interpretation, “original
judgment” ie not necessarily the first-in-time judgment of a
In light of these conflicting interpretations of the
term “original judgment,” we do not agree with the ICA or the
circuit court that the meaning of the term, as it appears in HRS
§ 657-5, is “plain” or “unambiguous.” See Roxas II, 120 Hawai'i
at 126, 202 P.3d at 587; cf. Gillan v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co.,
119 Hawai'i 109, 117, 194 P.3d 1071, 1079 (2008). As we have
stated, “{a] statute is ambiguous if it 1s capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more
different senses.” Gillan, 119 Hawai'i at 117, 194 P.3d at 1079
(citations omitted). Our analysis of the plain language of HRS §
657-5 indicates that reasonable minds could differ as to which
judgment an “original judgment” refers to, and, as such, we hold
that the term is ambiguous. See id. (concluding that the term
“independent medical examiner” in HRS § 431:10C-308.5(b) (Supp.
2002) was ambiguous because it could be interpreted as requiring
an actual examination). Inasmuch as “original judgment” is
13
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susceptible to two interpretations,‘ we next look to extrinsic
aids to assist our interpretation of HRS § 657-5.
B. Extrinsic Aids
‘This court has numerous tools to construe an anbiguous
statute:
(t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining
the context, with whlch the ambiguous words, phrases, and
Sentences may be compares, in order to ascertain their true
Meanings, Moreover, the courte may Fescrt to extrinsic aids in
Getermining legislative intent. "One avenue is the use of
Jegislative history az an interpretave tool. This court may also
Consider the reason and spirit of the lax, and the cause which
Snduced the legislature to enact it to digcover its true meaning.
Lave in PAE gasaria, or upon the sane subject matter, shall be
construed with seference to cach other. What is clear in one
Starute may be called spon in aid to explain what is doubt ful in
nether.
in re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai'i 97, 144, 9 P.3d
409, 456 (2000) (internal citations, internal quotation marks,
brackets, and ellipses omitted; block quote format changed). See
also HRS $ 1-15 ("Where the words of a law are ambiguous[,]
[t)he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining
the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and
«__imelda marcos points to a
Anternational savings 4 Loan Agen vs
wise, £2 Howat’ 197, 921 ¢-2d 117 (i996), to support her claim that ARS §
Gs7-5 ss Gnambiquovs. (Quoting Miia for stating that “the plain Lanauaze of
HBs § 6578 clearly mandates... + Recordingly, pursuant to the plain
Language Of HAS $E57-5, the judgnont expired on March 8, 1994 =~ ven years
after the original judgnent was rendered.” (ellipses added) .) Io Mila, this
Court considered ‘whether a garnishment of wages survives the expiration of
ten year statutory limitation pursuant to [HRS § 657-5) on the life of the
Ungeflying judgment.” 82 #awal't at 198, 921 P.2d at 118. The plaintitr aia
hot renew OF extend its judgment against the defendant before the ten year
Period had fun, 2nd, thus, pleisly expized ten years after the first ang only
Susgnent was rendered, Id. at 199, 921 P24 at 119. tn Wiig, we were
Zoncerned with whether the garnishment order “tolled” the Iie of the judgment
beyond the ten year period, whereas Petitioners here do not seek to argue that
Snorder tolled the life of the judgment. gaealge Boxaz Ii, 120 Hewal't at
i2e-27, 202 F.3d at 587-86 (explaining that the circuit court erred by relying
on LLG in extending the judgment because that case is inapplicable). Because
lig dis net analyse the effect of multiple Judgnente on extending 2 Judgment,
St hae limited application to this case.
20
sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true
meaning.”
The 1992 Hawai'i Legislature anended HRS § 657-5 by
inserting the extension provisions at issue. 1992 Haw. Sess.
Laws Act 74, § 1 at 110, The amendments prohibited an “extension
of a judgment or decree” where (1) the extension was not “sought
within ten years of the date the original judgment was rendered,”
(2) it is “beyond twenty years from the date of the original
judgment or decree," and (3) there was no “notice and the filing
of @ non-hearing motion or a hearing motion to extend the life of
the judgment or decree.” Id, The legislative committee reports
on this bill offer limited guidance in interpreting “original
judgment .“?
The most telling statement about the limitation to
extend a judgment is from the House Judiciary Committee’s report.
In passing the bill that became Act 74, this committee stated,
“the purpose of this bill is to amend [HRS §] 657-5, to prohibit
a judgnent or decree of any court of the State from being
extended, renewed, or revived beyond ten years after the date the
Judament_or decree was rendered.” H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 543
in 1992 House Journal, at 1036 (emphasis added). This stated
purpose of the amendment indicates that the relevant date for
>the Senate Judiciary coomittee’s report on this Bill explained
that the committee amended the Gill “so that the statute of linitations for
extensions ia the same for all decrees and judgnents.”” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep.
No. 2480 in 1982 Senate Journal, at 1117. The legislative intent that “all
decrees and Judgnenta” have the “sine” ton your statute of Limitations for
extensions 12 open to two interpretations, The legislature nay have intended
that each Sudgrent fay be extensed (1) for the “sane” amount of time (ten
years fom the date that the judgment 439 entered), or (2) until the “sane
Gate (cen years after the firse-in-tine judgment) «
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extending a judgment is the “date the judgment or decree was
rendered.” Id, (Emphasis added.)
While the legislative intent of this statutory language
is not entirely clear, the statute is clearly designed to
prohibit a party from seeking to extend a judgment more than ten
years after the “original judgment” is rendered. The statute of
Limitations for extending a judgnent begins to run on “the date
the original judgment or decree was rendered.” HRS § 657-5.
This provision is part of the HRS § 657 “Limitation of
Actions” chapter. Under HRS § 1-16 (1993): “Laws dn pari
materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with
reference to each other, What is clear in one statute may be
called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” The
sections in this chapter have similar elements and aid in our
interpretation of BRS § 657-5. See State v. Cardus, 86 Hawai'i
426, 435, 949 P.2d 1047, 1056 (App. 1997) (referring to other
sexual assault statutes in construing the offense of sexual
assault in the second degree because the statute was included in
the “series of offenses”).
Other statutes of limitations in HRS Chapter 657 begin
when the “cause of action accrued.” See HRS § 657-1 (1) (1993)
(relating to, among other things, actions to recover debt
“founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability"); HRS §
657-4 (1993) (relating to libel or slander); HRS § 687-6 (1993)
(relating to causes arising in foreign jurisdictions); HRS § 657-
7 (1993) (zelating to recovering for damage to persons or
property); see also Kaho'chanchano v. Dep't of Hunan Servs., 117
22
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Hawal's 262, 315, 178 P.3d $38, $91 (2008) ("In a negligence
on, the claim for relief does not accrue until plaintiff knew
or should have known of defendant’s negligence.”). Black’s Law
Dictionary 22 (8th ed. 2004) defines “accrue” as “[t]o come into
“original judgment” of HRS § 657-5, in pari materia within the
tence as an enforceable claim or right.” In construing
framework of the entire statutory scheme governing limitations of
actions, the statute of Limitations for extending a judgment
begins to run when the cause of action -- the judgment that
creates the enforceable claim or right -- “come[s] into existence
as an enforceable claim or right.” All judgments, even those
that aze modified or amended, becone “enforceable claim{s] or
rights)” only when the judgments creating those rights are
entered. It is only at the time that the judgment is rendered
when the parties are (1) aware of their rights and
responsibilities created by the judgment and (2) able to enforce
these rights. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for
extending a judgment begins to run at the creation of the
Judgment that creates the rights and responsibilities that the
party is seeking to extend.
‘The foregoing construction comports with other states’
statutes that permit a party to bring an action to extend a
judgment before that judgment to be extended expires.‘ See Llift
+ other juriedietions permit 2 litigant to revive a judgment even
after it has expired. See Magnun Conme’ns Ltd., v. Samoluk, 620 5.6. 439, 4st
(ca. ce. App. 2008); Inge Seoadand, 240 B-R. iil, 116-17 (Bankr. W.9, ono
2000); Bevis intern, inc. ex rel. Patel v. Berryman, 730 So. 24 242, 244
(Ala. Civ. App. 1999)7 Gaxdner v Garduee, 916 P.2d 43, 45 (Kan. Ct.” App.
1996); Fitet Nat. Bonk of Maenoo v, Loffelmacher, 603'w.£.24 80, 63-84 (111
‘cont inved.
23
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ve Dustrud, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1201, 1207-08, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d
848, 852-53 (2003)7 accord Robbins v. A.B, Goldberg, 185 P.3d
794, 796 (Colo. 2008) ("A revived judgment must be entered within
twenty years after the entry of the judgment which it revives.”
(quoting C.R.C.P. Rule 54)); Shamrock, Dev, Inc., 737 N.W.2d at
376 (observing that a party may move to renew a judgment if it is
prior to the judgment’s expiration) (citation omitted); Citizens
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v, McDonald, 80 P.3d $32, 535 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (observing that the state statute permits a court to extend
a judgment before it expires): Kroop ¢ Kurland, PA. v. Lambros,
703 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) ("A notice of
renewal may be filed by the judgment holder at any time before
the expiration of the judgnent.”); Hanks v. Rees, 943 S.W.2d 1,
3-4 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the motion to revive a
judgment must be filed before the judgment expires).*
In considering whether the period to renew an amended judgment
*(.s.continuea)
app. ct. 1992)
* _tnelda Marcos pointed to cases that referred to the first~in-tine
judgment as the “original judgnent.” (eLeing Pos v
Board, 98 Hawaii 4i6, 417, 49 F.30 382, 363 (2002); Chattem Inc. v. Baile,
TeeU.s, 1059, 2831 fahite, J., dissenting) ). Gee als Tit? v. dusted, 10:
Gal. ip. 0n'1201, 1206, 132 "Cal. sper. 24.848, 652 (2003) .
However, other coufts have referred to the judgment that may be extended
ag the “original judgment.” See Shamrock Dev, tne. v. Smith, 737 NoW.2a372,
376 Minn. Ct. App. 2007), geversed on other arqunds py 754 N.w.2d 377" (Minn.
2008) "{cuiing that a party aay move to renew a judgsont “within ten years
Gfter entry of the original judgment,” “so that the judgments extend beyond
the initial ten-year period”); Jannet v. Jacob, S18 N.W.24 263, 186 (ND.
$854)" [providing that an “original sudgment™ may be renewed under state law
Ange Sitars, 130 B.R, 720, 725 8,20 (Bankr. D. Minn, 1998) (noting that the
Sgriginal sudgrent lapses” and is unenforceable if at is not renewed). 8y
atating that an "original judgeent” nay be extended, the courts wore
Recesssrily referring to a Judgnent with enforceable claims, because only
valid judgnent may be extended. Ses SURE.
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begins at the date of the first-in-time or amended judgment, the
California Court of Appeals held that, based on state law, “any
money judgment . . . regardless of whether it be a modified or
amended judgrent, and without regard to finality” may be extended
“before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability.”
LLiEE, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 1207-08, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852-53
(citing California Code of Civil Procedure $ 683.130").
‘This construction does not contradict the definition of
“original” as provided by the ICA. See Roxas IL, 120 Hawai'i at
126, 202 P.3d at SE7. The ICA posited that, “{i}n its ordinary
use, the word ‘original’ denotes the ‘beginning of something, .
. sa primary form or type from which varieties are derive.’”
See id, (quoting Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of
the English Language 1015 (1989)). Although it concluded, in
reliance of this definition, that “original judgment” “refers to
the firet judgment rendered by a court,” a first-in-time judgment
will not always conform with the definition of “original” as
supplied by the ICA. Id, The first-in-time judgment is not “a
primary form or type from which varieties are derived” in certain
circumstances. For example, the first-in-time judgment is not a
“primary form or type from which varieties are derived” where an
issue is not resolved in the first-in-time judgment, but rather,
California Code of Civil Procedure $ 663.020 states: “Except a=
otherwise provided By statute, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date
Of entry of a money juognent cr a judgment for possessica of property: (a)
The Judgment may not be enforced, LEC, 107 Cal, App. dth at 1207, 132 Cal,
pte, at 853,” California Code of Civil Procedure § 682.130(z) states in
jt a lump-sum money judgment may be extended by renewal of
py tine before the expiration of the 10-year period of
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in a subsequent judgment. In addition, the first-in-time
judgment may not even “begin{]” to resolve a claim or cause of
on for a party in a case that involves multiple plaintiffs or
defendants. Under such conditions, the first-in-time judgment
has absolutely no bearing on subsequent judgments and does not
create any “form or type from which varieties are derived.”
In contrast, an unextended valid judgment that created
the rights that a party is seeking to extend is consistent with
the foregoing definition of an “original” judgment. The
“beginning” stage of a valid and not previously extended judgment,
is the “primary form or type from which varieties(, i.e, extended
Judgments, ] are derived.” Webster’'s Encyclopedic Unabridged
Dictionary of the English Language 1015. Each unextended
judgment that has an enforceable claim -- even those that pertain
to only one of multiple parties or issues -- is an “original”
judgment under the foregoing definition, because it may be the
“primary form or type from which” extended judgments are
derived. Based on the plain language of the statute, we cannot
conclude that “original judgment” refers to the first-in-tine
judgment. We hold, rather, that “original judgment” of HRS §
657-5 pertains to the judgment that creates the rights and
responsibilities that the moving party is seeking to enforce and
extend.
Under this construction of original judgment,” there may be more
than one “original judgment." See Konstadtv, Konstadt, 570 Av2d 48s, 486,
488 (N.3, Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) {referring to two judgments that’ decided
different issues on the case as “original judgments” in the context of
Geviving the original judgrents under 2 law that permite enforcement "within
five years of the Judgeent’s original rendering”)
26
‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAM REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Imelda Marcos does not point to a single jurisdi
that (1) prohibits an extension on an unextended judgment that is
not expired or (2) starts the statute of limitations for
extending an amended judgment at the time the first-in-time
judgment is rendered. We can think of no reason why the first
in-time judgment should control the timing of the extension of
all subsequent judgments."
Based upon the plain language of the statute, and
construed in pari materia within the framework of the entire
statutory scheme governing limitations of actions, “original
Judgment” of HRS § 657-5 refers to the judgment that creates the
rights and responsibilities that the party is seeking to extend.
C. An Amended “Original Judgment”
We next must address the issue of when the time limit
begins for extending a judgment where the judgment that created
the enforceable rights was amended. In light of the above
interpretation of “original judgment,” the time limit for
extending a judgment that created the enforceable rights at issue
and is later amended, depends on the type of amendment. Cf. Boe
v.Hawai's Labor Relations Bd, 98 Hawai'i 416, 418-19, 49 P.3d
382, 384-85 (2002). In Poe, this court determined whether the
appellant timely filed a notice of appeal under Hawai'i Rules of
% Ag discussed auata, the ICA's construction of HRS § 657-5 ie
fawed particularly where the enforceable claim or right that a party seeks to
Gutend Say aot save Deen created at the tine of the farst-in-tine judgment
ed on the procedural history of the case, the firat-in-time Judgment 19 an
arbitrary starting point to Degin the statute of limitations for a subsequent
Judgment that wes amended in a natersal ang substantial way. Further, here.
Lego basis for pemstting the firet-in-tine judgment to be enforceable for up
to twenty years, while precluding sone judgeents fros any extensicn at all.
27
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a) (1), which requires the notice to be
£
d “within [thirty] days after entry of the judgment or
appealable order.” 98 Hawai'i at 418, 49 P.3d at 384, The
appellant filed a notice of appeal twenty-nine days after a
second amended judgment, but more than thirty days after the
entry of the first amended judgment. Id, at 417, 49 P.3d at 383.
In deciding from what date to measure the time for
appeal, this court declared:
The general rule is that where @ judgment is amended in a material
ang Substantial respect, the time within which an appeal from uch
determination nay be taken begins to run from the date of the
Gnendnent, aithsdgh where the snendsent relates only te the
Correction of a clerical... error, it does not affect the tine
Sllowed for appeals
Id, at 418, 49 P.3d at 384 (quoting Korsak v, Hawai'| Permanente
Medical Group, 94 Hawai'i 297, 304, 12 P.3d 1238, 1245 (2000)
(quoting Interstate Printing Co, v, Department of Revenue, 459
N.W.2d 519 (Web, 1990))). Bos observed that an amended judgment
that did not materially alter rights “did not create a right of
appeal where one did not exist,” and, thus, did not extend the
time allowed for appeal. Id. at 419, 49 P.3d at 385.
We hold that a rule similar to Poe and Korsak should be
adopted here. Where an unextended judgment is “amended in a
material and substantial respect,” so that it creates the rights
that are being extended, the time within which a motion to extend
the judgment may be brought “begins to run from the date of the
amendnent,” because that judgment created those rights. See Poe,
98 Hawai'i at 418-19, 49 P.3d at 384-85. Where, on the other
hand, the unextended judgment merely makes non-substantive or
non-material amendments to a prior judgment, it does not create
28
{+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
an enforceable right. In that situation, it is not appropriate
nd the time allowed to revive the
that the amended judgment ¢:
enforceable judgnent.”
Under the foregoing rule, a judgment that is entered
nunc pre tunc as of a prior date may be the “original judgment”
for purposes of HRS § 657-5 if it changed a prior order in 2
material and substantial manner. Although we have stated that a
“pune pro tung order relates back to the original date of the
matter it affects,” Keahole Defense Coalition, Inc. v. Board of
and and Natural Resources, 110 Hawai'i 419, 430, 134 P.3d 585,
596 (2006) (quoting Bos, 98 Hawai'i at 423, 49 P.3d at 389
(Acoba, J., dissenting)), the date of the prior entry is not “the
effective date of the judgment for all purposes.” Horer va
Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 602 (1887). As the United States Supreme
Court explained, a nune pro tune date is “a fiction of law, made
and considered to be the true date of the judgment” only to “bind
the defendant by the obligation” of the earlier date. Borer, 119
U.s. at 602.
Hawai'i appellate courts have determined that, even
when a judgment is entered nunc pro tunc to a prior date, the
statute of limitations for filing a notice of appeal begins on
the date that the judgment was actually entered, rather than from
the nunc pre tunc date. See One Boat, 119 Hawai'i at 250-52,
254, 199 P.3d at 1182-84, 1196 (holding that the defendant timely
» This construction addresses Judge Leonard’ s concern againat
vefsectively extend|ing] the life of any final judgsent that is amended
before, by, of after an appeal, no fatter how significant of insignificant en
amenanent might be-” KoxaS 1,120 Hawai'i at 128, 202 P.3d at 389. (Leonard,
Sey concureing)-
23
+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’
HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
ed a notice of appeal from a judgment that was entered pune
pro tune, effective on a date two years prior, because the
defendant could not actually appeal from the order until it was
reduced to a judgment); Carlisle v, One Boat, 118 Hawai'i 107,
185 P.3d 855 (App. 2008).* Similarly, even though a judgment is
entered pune pre tune as of a prior date, a court can only exten«
that judgment after it is actually entered. The fact that the
judgment is entered nunc pro tune does not alter the date that
the “original judgment” was rendered. Pursuant to the “original
judgment” test set forth above, the nunc pro tune date will only
serve as the date the “original judgment” was rendered if the
subsequent judgment made a non-
jubstantive change. However, a
judgment that is entered nunc pro tun will begin the limitations
period for extending the judgment where it materially or
substantially amended the earlier judgment.
Thus, where multiple judgments created the same rights
that the party is seeking to extend, the “original judgment” is
(2) the unamended judgment where the amended judgnent makes non-
material amendments to a prior judgment, but (2) the amended
judgment whi
fe it amended the prior judgment “in a material and
substantial respect.”
In One Boat, the circuit court entered an order dismissing
petition against the defendant on February 1, 2002, and it entered a judgment
Over two years later, on Gecenber 6, 2006. 19 Hawai'l at 250-52, 195 F.3d at
1182-84. "Defendant moved to anend the judgrent to correct errors and ester
the judgment pune pro tune, effective on the date of the order, February 1,
2002, ds at 251, 195 P.34 at 1163. The circuit court granted this motich,
But it “held that’ the puse pko iunc provision could not be used to defeat the
State's right to appeal from the Judgnent and the State’s time to appeal ran
from the date of entry of the circuit court's order.” Ida
30
D. Moving To Extend The Second and Fourth Amended Judgments
Under the foregoing construction of HRS § 657-5,
Petitioners timely sought to extend the Second and Fourth Amended
Judgments. Petitioners moved to extend these judgments within
ten years of the date that the judgments that created the rights
to be extended were rendered.
‘The Second Anended Judgment, filed on October 18, 1999,
granted judgment “in favor of [Dacanay,] as personal
representative of the estate of Roger Roxas in the amount of 6
million in general damages for false imprisonment and battery
against Inelda Marcos in her personal capacity, to the extent of
her interest in the Marcos Estate.” This right was created by
the Second Amended Judgment. The firat-in-time judgment
(rendered on August 28, 1996) and the Amended Judgment (rendered
on October 21, 1996) do not qualify as an “original judgrent” for
purposes of extending the Second Amended Judgment, because they
did not present enforceable rights on Petitioners’ claims of
battery and false imprisonment against Imelda Marcos in her
peraonal capacity. See Roxas I, 89 Hawai'i at 114, 969 P.2d at
1232 (vacating the portion of the Amended Judgment entered
against “Defendant Imelda Marcos, as Personal Representative of
the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos”). The first-in-time judgment and
Amended Judgment were materially and substantially ch:
Second Amended Judgment." Accordingly, the Second Amended
aged by the
‘The fact that the Second, Third, and Fourth Amended Judgments we
“entered nunc Bra func 28 of October 21, 1996," the date of the Anended
assent, doe2 nov alter the date that the “original Judgments” were rendered
See sunsa-
3
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Judgment ig the “original judgment” on the false imprisonment and
by
ery claims against “Imelda Marcos in her personal capacity,
to the extent of her interest in the Marcos Estate.”
Petitioners sought to extend the Second Amended
judgment on May 8, 2007, This motion was filed within ten years
of the date the original
dgment, the Second Anended Judgment
(giled on October 18, 1999) was rendered. Accordingly, the
circuit court properly ordered that the Second Amended Judgnent
be extended.
Petitioners also sought to extend the Fourth Amended
Judgment, which awarded GBC over $13 million in damages and pre-
judgment interest against “Imelda Marcos in her personal
capacity, to the extent of her interest in the Marcos Estate” for
a conversion claim. The “original judgnent” that created this
right is the Third Amended Judgment. ‘The first-in-time, Amended,
and Second Arended Judgments** did not render this right to GBC.
See Roxas I, 89 Hawai'i at 187, 969 P.2¢ at 1275 (reversing the
edzcuit court's Amended Judgment against Defendant Imelda Marcos,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
with respect to GBC’s conversion claim and remanding the matter
for a new trial on the value of this claim).
The Third Amended Judgment, which was entered on June
26, 2000, was amended by the Fourth Amended Judgment on September
6, 2001. Yet, the Fourth Amended Judgment’s only change to the
Third Amended Judgment was an additional paragraph, stating, “The
1 the Second Amended Judgrent did not present any enforceable right
fon GRC’s conversion claim, It stated that the court retained jurisdiction
Over Gac's conversion claims.
32
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay
and expressly directs for the entry of judgment.” This was
merely a non-substantiv
change -- it did not change the Third
Amended Judgment in a material manner. Thus, the “original
judgment,” for purposes of extending the Fourth Anended Judgme:
is the Third Amended Judgnent. Petitioners sought to extend the
Fourth Amended Judgment on May 8, 2007, within ten years of June
26, 2000, the date the Third Amended Judgment was rendered.
Accordingly, the circuit court was permitted to extend the Fourth
Amended Judgnent.
1B. Extending The Fourth Anended Judgment Beyond Twenty Years of
the Original Judgnent
‘The circuit court extended the Second Anended Judgment
until October 17, 2019, and the Fourth Anended Judgment until
Septenber 5, 2021. The extension of the Second Anended Judament
to October 17, 2019 was proper, inasmuch as this date is less
than twenty years from the date of its “original judgment” (the
Second Anended Judgment, entered on October 18, 1999). See HRS $
657-5 ("A court shall not extend any judgment or decree beyond
twenty years from the date of the original judgment or decree.”)
However, the circuit court erred by extending the Fourth Anended
Judgment (filed on September 6, 2001) to September 5, 2021,
inasmuch as the extension is more than twenty years beyond the
date of the “original judgment.”
As detexmined supra, the “original judgaent” for
purposes of extending the Fourth Amended Judgment is the Third
Anended Judgment. Because the Third Anended Judgment was
33
FOR PUBLICATION IN.
IAWAN REPORTS AND PACIFIC
rendered on June 26, 2000, the court was precluded from extending
the Fourth Amended Judgment beyond June 25, 2020. See HRS $ 657-
5 ("A court shall not extend any judgment or
al. judgment
years from the date of the o}
court, therefore, erred when it extended the
Judgment beyond June 25, 2020.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis,
ICA's March 5, 2009 judgment, (2) vacate the
decree beyond twenty
or decree.”). The
Fourth Amended
we (1) vacate the
eireuit court's July
24, 2007 order, to the extent that it granted Petitioners’ motion
to extend the fourth amended judgment until September 5, 2021,
and (3) remand this case to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
nR. Magana, pro hac vice,
(Daniel C. Cathcart, pro hac
vice, of Nagana, Catheart &
Motarthy and Ward D. Jones Gorm
of Bervar 5 Jones, with him
fon the application and briefs)
for petitioners/plaintiffs- Peceetea Telia are
appellees
Joseph A. Stewart (Lex R. Smith Venwe Ducts +
and Maria Y. Wang of Kobayashi,
Sugita & Goda and Janes P. Linn Meld that fotsio
and D, Patrick Long (special
counsel to the firm) of James P.
Linn Law Firm, with him on the buch Weck,
response and briefs) for respondent/
defendant-appellant
34
| c85b8dc34287756fda2db3cf3af2c0b307c68ec68735d3f0e20855dee09a2501 | 2009-08-10T00:00:00Z |
f09c524d-dfea-4fc1-ae4c-abc2c05e820d | Pflueger v. Watanabe | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | 8- nr eae
Wo. 29896
arte
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
———————
Individually and as Trustee of the
‘and
JANES H. PFLUEGER,
Mary N. Lucas’ Trust; PFLUEGER PROPERTIES:
PFLUEGER PARTNERS, Petitioners,
THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN NA. WATANABE, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I; BRUCE FEHRING,
Individually and as Special Administrator of the Estates of
AUROA FEHRING and ALAN DINGWALL FEHRING? CYNTHIA FEHRING;
INGRID DINGWALL; PAUL ROTSTEIN; MARGUERITE ROTSTEIN;
JULIO ARROYO; VIVIAN ARROYO; ROGER McNEES; MARYANN McNEES;
BRUCE FEHRING, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
ROWAN GREY MAKANA FEHRING-DINGWALL; GARY ROTSTEIN, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of WAYNE CARL ROTSTEIN;
JULIO A, ARROYO, as Personal Representative of the Estate of
DANIEL JAY ARROYO; ROGER McNBES and MARYANN McNEES, as
Co-Personal Representatives of the Estates of CHRISTINA McNEES
and BABY DOE McNEES; TIMOTAY W. NOONAN, SR., Individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate ‘of TIMOTHY W. NOONAN, JR.
MARJORIE NOONAN; and NATALIE STARR MUDD, Individually and as
Next Friend of RHEA STARR NOONAN MUDD, Respondents.
oye He
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CIVIL Nos. 96-1-0082, 08-1-0050, 08-1-0051)
‘ORDER
(By: Duffy, J. for the court*)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioners Janes H. Pflueger, individually and
as Trustee of the Mary N. Lucas Trust, Pflueger Properties, and
Pflueger Partners, and the papers in support, and having been
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Aecba, and Duffy, JJ. and
‘Court of Appeals Judge Fujise, in place of Recktenwald, J.,
informed that the civil trial date has been continued to the week
of May 3, 2010. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is dismissed as moot.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 9, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Gort, Badly,
Associate Justice
| ece99255d6ae52685710c1eb616bcbdfec6262b364b49a290838957a2f2c9478 | 2009-07-09T00:00:00Z |
337be7d8-f910-4f21-9b04-1a3cf0d3c033 | State v. Ampong | null | 28862 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 28862
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee
a3
FOSTER R. AMPONG,
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE NO. 2D7C-06-005235)
gir oj
NG
Acoba, J., for the court")
(By:
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
June 22, 2009 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Foster R. Ampong
is hereby rejected.
Honolulu, Hawaii,
FOR THE COURT:
DATED: guly 8, 2009.
Associate Justice
David J. Peterson
(Ranken & Drewyer), on
the application for
petitioner/defendant-
appellant.
Acoba, and Duffy, Jd., and
1 considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama,
Circuit Judge Trader, in place of Recktenwald, J., recused
| 63eb95fb24f598b0475b9d438cb55b3de01c85759224126dc2c588eca344fc3f | 2009-07-08T00:00:00Z |
2ba1a21c-780b-452c-91b1-38f533b8f6e7 | Walden v. Flanigan | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | uw
No. 28807
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'T
R. CODY WALDEN and HANATIAN FOREST
SECURITIES, INC., Petitioners/Plaintiffs/
Counterclaim Defendant s-Appellants
CHRIS FLANIGAN; JACKIE FLANIGAN;
KEVIN B, FLANIGAN? ONOMEA
PLANTATION, LLC, Respondents/Defendants/
Counterclaimants-Appellees
hezine 6~ Noe side
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(crv. No, 04-21-0035)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Acoba, J., for the court")
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on May 11,
2009 by Petitioner/Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants-Appellants
R. Cody Walden and Hawaiian Forest Securities, Inc. is hereby
rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 9, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
John $. Edmunds,
Ronald J. Verga’and
Joy 8. Omonaka (Edmunds &
Vergata) and Robert G.
Klein (McCorriston Miller
Mukai MacKinnon), on
the application for
petitioners/plaintiffs/
5 considered by: Moon, C.J-, Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and
Recktenwald, 09
qa
counterclaim defendante-
appellants.
Bert T. Kobayashi, Jr. and
Bruce Nakamura (Kobayashi
Sugita & Goda) and
Robert D. Triantos and
Edmund W.K, Haitsuka
(Carlsmith Ball, LLP),
on the response’ for
respondent s/defendants/
counterclaimants-appellees.
No. 28807 - Walden v. Flanigan, Order Rejecting Application for
Writ’ of Certiorari
| 3010375d3bb3db861cab6fb12c5dae327e95dafb65a05d77379b8884bb95d6b3 | 2009-06-09T00:00:00Z |
4a4e951c-3b09-49da-b96d-350fe333cb55 | Jelks v. State | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 29449
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
KENNETH JELKS,
Pet itioner/Petitioner~
STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Respondent /Respondent-Appellee, =
APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(S.P.B. NO. 05-1-0061; CR. NO. 94-0257)
‘ORDER DISMISSING APPLICATION FOR WRLT_OF CERTIORARI
(By: Moon, C.J. for the court’)
Petitioner /petitioner-appellant Kenneth Jeiks’
application for a writ of certiorari, filed on June 12, 2009, is
deemed filed on dune 5, 2009, the date that petitioner certifies
that the application was tendered to corrections officials for
mailing to the suprene court. See Setala v. J.C, Penney Co., 97
Hawai'i 484, 40 P.3d 886 (2002). ‘The time for filing an
application for a writ of certiorari expired on June 3, 2009,
ninety days after the filing of the intermediate court of
appeals’ March 5, 2002 dismissal order. See HRS § 602-59(c)
(Supp. 2008). Therefore, the application for a writ of
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald,
gs
certiorari, deemed filed on June 5, 2009, is untimely.
Accordingly,
I? IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s application for
a writ of certiorari is dismissed,
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, duly 6, 2009.
FOR THE CouRT:
Ge Justice
‘3,
&
eat
| 3e2479a2bcd696337106c158f3ae3a89b28f269ccb58447b83c8cb03df7eabae | 2009-07-06T00:00:00Z |
9be47f80-7340-4ab3-a037-7a2023a9170c | State v. Mundon | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
no. 26448 .
8 THE SUPREME couRD OF THE stare oF Haars SS
=F
=P
STATE OF HAWAT'I, Respondent/Plaintitt-Appeljiee, c
JAMES MUNDON, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 05-1-0206)
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORAR
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Circuit Judge Marks, assigned in place
of Recktenwald J., recused)
Petitioner/defendant-appellant James Mundon’s application
filed May 21, 2009, is accepted and will
‘The parties will be notified by
for writ of cert
be scheduled for oral argunent.
the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 1, 2009
DATED:
FOR THE COURT:
Stuart N. Fujioka,
for petitioner/
defendant appellant,
on the application Em,
Yee Faath
| faaf8683474b2c5aa1f05e04a22f0ffe10f49f2656394a9e187d5dbafbb0cd66 | 2009-07-01T00:00:00Z |
1952b5bd-476e-4db2-afc8-be6edf9d4529 | Villanueva v. Hawaii Paroling Authority | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29833
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
No, 29833
GERALD VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
HAWAII PAROLING AUTHORITY and ALBERT TUFONO, Ré
No, 29849
GERALD VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Po
(CR. NO, 05-1-0946) - @
ORDER
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petitions for writs of habeas
corpus filed by petitioner Gerald Villanueva in No. 29633 and
No, 29849, it appears that habeas corpus relief is available to
petitioner in the circuit court and petitioner presents no
special reason for invoking the supreme court’s original
Jurisdiction, See Oili v. chang, 57 Haw. S11, 512, $57 P.2d 787,
788 (1976). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petitions for writs of habeas corpus
without payment of the filing fees.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitions for writs of
habeas corpus are denied without prejudice to seeking habeas
corpus relief in the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 660-3
(2993).
DATE!
Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 12, 2009.
Som
Bsseeee 6. Ted ames
> an
Veron s Setdye dy
TE Petts bom
| 8938090c4f81ada952f96d3f7be9aaa4a2df9e9018af99601529c832d6c89e21 | 2009-06-12T00:00:00Z |
399e65a7-f6a4-492e-b873-e2b8ae80e7e2 | Kapuwai v. City and County of Honolulu, Department of Parks and Recreation. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 11/12/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 304. ICA Order of Correction, filed 12/08/2008 [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/23/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/03/2009 [pdf]. | 121 Haw. 33 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
* FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
=== 00 ---
DARRELL N. KAPUVAT, Respondent /Claimant-Appellant,
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND
RECREATION, Petitioner/imployer-Appellee, Self-Insured.
wo, 27915
“le
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE NO, AB 2004-328 (2-01-13437)) =
JULY 16, 2009 |
al
21-OkY 91 Tar cooe
MOON, C.d., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KIM, ASSIGNED BY REASON
‘OF VACANCY; ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY, WITH
WHOM DUFFY, J. JOINS; AND NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING
OPINION BY MOON, C.J., ANNOUNCING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT
on March 3, 2009, this court accepted a tinely
application for a writ of certiorari, filed by
petitioner /enployer-appellee City and County of Honolulu,
Department of Parks and Recreation (the City) on January 23,
2009, requesting that this court review the Intermediate Court of
Appeals’ (ICA) Decenber 8, 2008 judgment on appeal, entered
pursuant to its November 12, 2008 published opinion in Kapuwai vw.
City & County of Honolulu, 119 Hawai'i 304, 196 P.34 306 (App
2008). Therein, the ICA vacated the February 6, 2006 decision
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
and order of the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board
(EIRAB), which, in turn, had modified the decision of the
director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations
(director).
Briefly stated, respondent /employee-appellant Darrell
N. Kapuwai -- who was employed by the City as a mason
-+ sustained a work-related injury to his right great toe. The
City eventually accepted liability for Kapuwai’s injury, and
the director awarded Kapuwai, inter alia, benefits for 96
percent permanent partial disability (PPD) of his right great
toe. The City appealed to the LIRAB, and the LIRAB modified
the director’s decision, concluding that Kapuwai was entitled
to 4 percent PPD on the whole person. Additionally, the LIRAB
denied Kapuwai's request for attorney’s fees and costs, made
pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statues (HRS) § 386-93(b) (1993),
quoted infra. Kapuwai appealed the LIRAB’s decision to the
ICK, arguing that the LIRAB should have converted the "whole
person’ rating to a PPD rating of the great toe, pursuant to
HRS § 386-32(a) (Supp. 2001), quoted infra, and should have
granted his request for attorney's fees and costs. 0n appeal,
the ICA held that Kepuwai was entitled to a PPD award based on
the impairment of his great toe as opposed to a whole person
rating if the award for the former exceeded the award for the
latter; thus, the ICA remanded the case to the LIRAS for such
determination. Based upon its remand of the case to the LIRAB,
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the ICA recognized that it could not decide the attorney's fees
issue but, nevertheless, provided ‘guidance" to the LIRAB
regarding the application of HRS § 386-93(b) on remand
on application, the City essentially contends that
the ICA erred: (1) by renanding Kapuwai's case to the LIRAB
for a ‘determination of a [PPD] award based on an impairment of
(Kapuwai's) great toe"; and (2) in its interpretation of HRS
§ 386-93(b). We agree with the ICA's rationale and ultimate
@isposition remanding the case to the LIRAB for a determination
of a PPD award based on the impairment of Kapuwai’s great toe
and, therefore, affirm that portion of the ICA’s opinion.
However, as discussed more fully infxa, we hold that the ICA
erred in delving into the interpretation of HRS § 386-93 (b)
because, based on the ICA‘s remand of the case to the LIRAB,
the issue of attorney's fees and costs was not ripe for
decision. Accordingly, we vacate section II of the ICA's
opinion relating to attorney's fees and costs.
1. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Backaround and Procedural History
As aptly summarized by the ICA:
Kapuwai was eqployed by (ene city) as a
mason. He developed a bunion and calluses on hia right
Great toe which were aggravated by wearing steel-toed
Shoes at work. On Noverber 23, 2001, Rapuvai underwent
Surgery on Ala right foot that consisted of metatarsal
osteotemy and distal phalangeal excstectony. The surgery
Was pot successful in alleviating the pain and
Sensitivity Kapuvai experienced in his right great toe.
Kapuwai walked with a mild limp, had difficulty going up
and down stairs, and had probleas with balance. ‘Ne gave
Up ariving because he experienced twitching under his toe
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when stepping on the accelerator. The surgery left a
Scar anda flexion deformity of hie right great toe.
‘The Cley accepted Iiability for Kapuwai's injury on
october 28, 2002, and on December 1, 2002, the [dl irector
‘ordered the City to pay for Kapuwai's necessary,
hhodial expenses as well as $5,421.25 in temporary cotal
Gisability benetite.
Zn Decenber 2003, Kapuvai was evaluated by [Wayne
K. Madanoto, M.D. (Dr. Ntadanote) } for permanent
[npairment.” Dr. Nadanoto used the Fifth Edition of the
Anerican Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment (ANA Guides) in rating Fapuwai's
impairment.” Dr. Nadaroto applied the gait-derangement
method rather that the range-of-notion method for
Sesessing inpatrment under the Fifth Edition of the AMA
Guides.{'] Based on the gait-derangenent method, Or
Nadanoto rated Rapuwai's inpairsent as a 7 percent PPD of
the whole person
A hearing was held before the (d)ixector on the
isoues of permanent disability and disfigurement. The
[alirector credited Dr. Nadanoto's evaluation that
Kapuwai suffered a 7 percent whole person disability
‘The [d)irector found that *(eJhis percentage should
properly be converted co an award for the great toe only
That vas the site of the injury." The (4]ivector used
the Third Edition (Revised) of the AMA Guides to conver=
Dr. Nadanoto's 7 percent whole person disability rating
to\a.96 percent PPD of the right great toe, resulting in
Pep award of $19,954.56. The (d)irector also ordered
the city to pay Kapuwai $600.00 for disfigurement, to pay
adaitional temporary total disability benefits, and to
Feimburse Yapuwai for the cost of Dr. Nadanote’s
evaluation’
‘The City appealed the [d]irector’s decision to the
LIRAB on July 13, 2004. The LIRAB isaved a pretrial
order identifying the issues on appeal
2. what ia the extent of permanent
Gisability resulting from [Rapuwai's) work
injury. 7 (andl
2. What ig the extent of disfigurement
resulting from (Kapuwai's) work injury.
At the Clty's request, [8.Y. Tan, M.D. (Dr. Tan) }
conducted an independent medical aamination of Kepuwal,
Br. Tan prepared a report and testified at the (hearing)
+ specifically, Dr. radanoto determined that Rapuvai could not *be
rated under the range of motion impairment value since (Kapuvai'a injury was]
not a degenerative condition and definitely caused a gait abnormality waich
(aia) not sericely fall under Table 17-5 of he AKA Ouide to Evaluation of
Permanent Inpairent Sth Edition since there [was] no document (ed) moderste-
advanced arthritie changes to the hip, knee, or ankle.”
a4
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held before the LIRA on the City's appeal. Dr. Tan
Aleagreed with Dr, Nadaoto’s use of the gait-derangement
fethod of assessing Kapuvai's inpairment because
Kapiwai'a condition did not fit the criteria for using
that method under the Fifth Rdition of che AMA Guides.
Dr. Tan concluded that the range-of-notion sethod, which
was based on meaduring the range of motion of the great
foe, waa the appropriace method to use./'] Applying the
Fangesof-notion sethod, Dr. Tan determined chat kapuval
had sustained a mild toe ixpairent equivalent toa t
percent PPO of the whole person.
on February 6, 2006, the LIRAB entered a decision
what modified the [director's PPD award and affirmed the
[@lirector’s disfigurement award. The LIRAB credited Dr
Tan's opinion in finding [(11) that Kapawai should be
fated under the vange-of-notion method and [()2) chat [,
under the Pifth Baition Co the AYA Guides, Rapuvai’s
Tenge of notion measurenents corresponded to a 1 percent
[npairment of the whole person. The LIRAB also credited
Kapuvai’s testinony on "how his toe condition has
interfered with his activities of dally living, such as
walking, golng up and down stairs, driving, and
standing.”
‘The LIRAB concluded:
Based on the foregoing, including Dr. Tan‘s
impairment rating and [Kapuwal’s) testimony
regarding his pain symptons and bow his toe
condition has interfered with his activities of
Gally 1iving, we conclude that [Kapuwal) te
featitied co benefits for ¢ (percent) permanent
partial disability of the whole person
* speciticatiy, Dr. Tan stated in his report:
With all due respect, 2 believe Dr. Nakamoto [sic] is
{ncovrect in his analysis, Piretly, [riange of [mlotion
{mpalraent’ (which incorporates pain) should be the logical
choice in this case, and this is specifically covered under
Section 17.2 on page 533. The section makes no mention
whatsoever regarding the requirenent of a ‘degenerative
Condition* as stated by Dr. Nakanoto [sic]. secondly, che
Use of Table 17-5 to caleuiate impairment in this cage
violates the expressed conditions precedent. Section 17.2¢
(Gale Derangement) on page 529 specifically notes that
wo." the percentages given in Table 17-5 are for full-time
gain derangements of persons who aze dependent on assistive
@evices (bold font in text). Furthermore, the relevant
paragraph (niid severity under a) is applicable only to
Patients with documented moderate to advanced arthritic
Changes of hip, knee{,) or ankie. Table 17-5 is
Gnapplicable to the claimant’... Rapuval because he
neither uses assistance devices, nor does he have arthritic
Changes tn the hip, knee, oF elbow.
(Gephasie in original.)
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‘The LIRAB’s decision did not separately determine
what, Kapuwai's PPD avard would have been if based solely
Oa the inpairment to his right great toe. The LIRAS
Agreed with the (d)irector’s $600 disfigurement award
{On February 16, 2006,] Kapuwai moved for
reconsideration of the ground that the LIRAB failed to
convert its award of 4 percent PPD of the whole person to
‘an award based on the impairment of his right great toe,
a specific body part covered by the schedule of awards,
for PFD under HRS § 386-32 (a) (°). ‘The LIRAB denied
Kapuwai’s motion fer reconsideration on March 29, 2006
° HRS § 386-32(a) provides in relevant part that:
mere a work injury causes permanent partial
Aisability, the emplover shal.
‘sospensaticn {nan anount detersined by pultiniving the
Stiective saxinan weekly Denefit race prescribed ia-sertion
iii by the number of weeks specified for the disability
ae follows
of use, Permanent lose of the use of a hand,
farm, foot, ieg, thumb, finger, toe, or phalanx shall be
‘equal to and compensated as the loss of a hand, arm, foot,
Teg, thumb, finger, toe, or phalanx:
Partial lose or loss of use of senber naned in
Schedule. Where a work injury causes permanent partial
Gisability resulting from partial loss of use of a rember
haned in this schedsle, and where the disability is not
Stherwise compensated in this schedule, compensation shall
be paid for a period that stands in the same proportion to
the period specified for the total lose or loss of use of
the menber as the partial loss or loss of use of that menber
stands to the total loss or loss of use thereof;
Other cases, In all other cases of permanent partial
disability resulting from the loss or lose of use of @ part
of the body or from the inpairnent of any physical function,
weekly benefits shail be paid at the rate and subject to the
Tinieactons specified In this subsection for a period that
bears the sane relation to a period named in the schedule as
the disability sustained beare toa comparable disability
Samed in the schedule. mm cages in whlch tb
Partial disability mst be rated as a percer
Eotal loss or inpairment of a physical or mestal function of
the whole person, the maximin compensation shall be computed
on the basis of the corresponding percentage of the product
of three hundred twelve times the effective maximum weekly
Benefit rate prescribed in section 386-3
(Emphases added.)
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Kapuwa{ algo subeitted a request to the LIRAB thi
the city be Fequired to pay $2,535, (pursuant to HRS
§ 386-93 (b),*) which represented one-half of the
Attorney's fees and cost (s) incurred by Kapuvai in the
City's appeal RAB. In support of his request,
Kapiwai argued that the City raised two issues in the
appeal (the extent of the PFD award and the extent of the
Gistigurenent ward); that xapuvai was the prevailing
party on the Jeaue of disfigurement; and that the LINAB
Gia noe reverse but only modified the (d)irector’s
Gecision on the teeve of PFD. The LIRAB effectively
denied Rapuvai's request by not assessing the City with
50 percent of Kapuwai's attorney's fees and costs, Sut
Snatead making Rapovai's attorney's feea and costs a lien
lupon the compensation payable by the City to Kapuwal
Kapuwai, 119 Hawai'i at 307-08, 196 P.3d at 309-10. On April
28, 2006, Kapuwai filed a timely notice of appeal from the
LIRAB‘s (1) February 6, 2006 decision and order and (2) March
29, 2006 order denying Kapuwai’s motion for reconsideration.
B. Appeal Before the ICA
on direct appeal, Kapuwai contended that the LIRAB
erred ‘as a matter of law" when it “failed to ‘convert’ its
award of 4 [percent] PPD of the ‘whole person’ to an award of
the right great toe under the ‘schedule’ of injuries pursuant
to [HRS] § 386-32(a).* Specifically, Kapuwai argued that:
+ tn 2001 -- the date that Kapuwai becane permanently disabled -~ HRs
386-93(b) provided in relevant part that:
anomplover anpeals a decision of the director or
amellate board, the costs of the proceedings of the
Sppeliate board of the supreno court of the state, Logether
with reasonable attorneys fees shall be asseseed aoainst
the cunlover, 4 the employer loses: provided that if an
Geployer or an insurance carrier, ocher than the employer
Who appealed, is held Liable for compensation, the costs of
the proceedings of the appellate board or the suprese court
tate together with reasonable attorney's fees shall
fed against the party held liable for the
compensation.
(Emphases added.)
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lihere an injured worker suffers a work injury which
Casee permanent partial disability to Ma/her great toe
(HRS § 386-32(a)] mandates that *. . an exployer shall
pay the scheduled amount determined by sulesplying the
Etfective maximum weekly benefit rate prescribes in
| MRS by "38 weeks" as identified in the
fo." By the use of the word "shall," it ia clear
that the Havai'i Legislature determined that the paysent
of [PPD] benefits pursuant co the *acheduied"
anoint are mandatory in hature requiring that certain
“Compulsory action’ be taken. The ‘compulsory action”
required by the LIRAB was to "convert the *4” [percent)
PPD of the whole person" toa PPD award of the scheduled
injury, that being “great toe."
(Bold emphasis in original.) (Internal citations omitted.)
Moreover, Kapuwai asserted that the AMA Guides, Third Edition,
should be used in converting the PPD award from 4 percent whole
person permanent partial impairment to a percentage of an
impairment of the right great toe. According to Kapuwai, under
the AMA Guides, the 4 percent whole person award would be
converted to a °73 [percent] permanent partial impairment
through 90 [percent] permanent partial impairment] for a PPD
award within the range of $15,173.78 through $18,707.40.°
Kapuwai further argued that, *[wlhere two remedies are
available (i.¢., lower percentage within the range of 73
[percent] to 90 [percent]), . . . Kapuwai should receive the
benefit of the most favorable remedy (ive,, 90 [percent] PPD of
the right great toe)." He contended that this "most favorable
remedy" approach was “consistent with the benevolent purpose
and scope of Hawaii’s workers’ compensation law.*
Kapuwai additionally contended that the LIRAB erred
in denying his request for attorney's fees and costs
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specifically, Kapuwai argued that the LIRAB should have ordered
the City to pay his costs and 50 percent of his attorney's fees
because HRS § 386-93(b) reflects the legislature’s intention to
relieve « claimant of the burden of paying attorney*s
Tees and coste where an enployer appeals and the non
Appealing enployer or insurance carrier i held Liable
fer compensation due to the claimant, Moreover, the
legislative history clearly indicates that the appealing
employer should pay for costs and foes seven where he
Goes not loge the appeal." This ‘may happen when an
employer appeais on the grounds that the anount of
Conpensation i excesnive and succeeds in having the
amount reduced." Under this bill, "the appealing
Employer would be required to pay such conta and feea,*
piovenne (ijegislature|'s) reference to the appealing
Gmployer to be (sicl "required to pay such costs and
fees" could only refer to the situation now at hand.
‘he City responded that the LIRAB correctly awarded
Kapuwai 4 percent PPD of the whole person inasmuch as it ‘was
not compelled or obligated to convert its award of 4 (percent)
PPD of the whole person to that of the right great toe because
use of . . . [the HRS §] 386-32 . . . schedule is not exclusive
when an injury is not clean cut and there are complications to
other parts of the body,” that is, Kapuawai’s injury caused him
to have an unsteady gait and permanent limp and interfered with
his daily living activities. As such, the City maintained that
the LIRAB correctly awarded Kapuwai PPD based on his whole
person, Additionally, the City contended that the LIRAB did
not abuse its discretion in failing to order it to pay
Kapuwai's attorney's fees and costs because *[the City]
prevailed on the crucial issue of PPD on appeal and [was] the
prevailing party under (HRS 5] 386-93(b).*
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on Novenber 12, 2008, the ICA issued ite opinion,
concluding that Kapuwai was entitled to a PPD award based on
the impairment of his great toe if that award is determined to
exceed an award based on the impairment of his whole person.
Kanuaai, 119 Hawai'i at 306-07, 196 P.34 at 308-09. In
reaching such conclusion, the ICA relied on this court
decision in Respicio v, Waialua Sugar Co., 67 Haw. 16, 675 P.2a
770 (1984), wherein we adopted the trend of “departing from the
8 of scheduled allowances" and held that, under HRS
exclusive:
§ 386-32 (a), *[blenefits will be limited to schedule amounts if
the loss is ‘clean cut,’ ive., where there are no complications
to other parts of the body" but *(1Joss of a smaller member may
be treated as a percentage loss of a larger member if the
effects of the loss extend to other parts of the body." 67
Haw. at 18, 675 P.24 at 772 (citation omitted). The ICA
determined that Respicio applied to the case at bar and
concluded that, inasmuch as “[tJhere was evidence in the record
that the effects of Kapuwai’s great toe injury extended to and
interfered with the efficiency of other parts of the body and
his whole person[,] . . . the LIRAB was not limited to basing
its PPD award on the impairment of Kapuwai’s great toe, but
could determine the extent to which the effects of Kapuwai’s
great toe injury resulted in the impairment of his whole
person.” Kapuwai, 119 Hawai'l at 211, 196 P.3d at 313.
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However, the ICA ultimately concluded that HRS
§ 385-32 (a) entitled Kapuwai ‘to a PPD award based on the
impairment of his creat toe if that taward] exceeds the LIRAB’s
current award based on the impairment of his whole person.”
Id. (emphasis added). Inasmuch as *(tJhe LIRAB did not
determine what Kapuwai's PPD award would have been if based on
the impairment of his great toe under the HRS § 386-32(a)
schedule,” the ICA could not itself “tell if an award based on
the impairment of Kapuwai’s great toe would exceed the anount
‘awarded by the LIRAB based on the PPD of Kapuwai's whole
person." 1d, Accordingly, the ICA vacated the LIRAB‘s
decision and remanded the case to the LIRAS for a determination
of a PPD award based on the impairment of Kapuwai’s great toe
as requested by him.’ 1d, at 306-07, 196 P.3d at 308-09.
Based upon its decision to remand the case to the
LIRAB for further proceedings, the ICA recognized that it could
not “decide" Kapuwai’s remaining contention regarding the
LIRAB‘s denial of his requested attorney's fees and costs
because *[t]he determination of whether the City is the loser
of its appeal to the LIRAB under HRS § 386-93(b) must be based
on the final decision of the LIRAB.* Id, at 313, 196 P.3d at
315 (citation omitted). Inasmuch as the ICA vacated the
5 However, che ICA declared that it aia
‘contention thar,
{npalreent, the rating physician and the LISAB must select the highest
percentage in the range." 3d, at 312, 196 P.3d at 214.
a1.
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LIRAB‘s decision and order, there was no final decision upon
which the award of attorney's fees and costs could be based.
Despite the ICA’s recognition that it could not “decide” the
issue of attorney's fees, it, nevertheless, opined on the
application of HRS § 386-93(b) to "provide guidance . . . to
assist the LIRAB on remand.” Id, at 306, 196 P.34 at 308.
Specifically, the Ick, after conducting a review of
the legislative history of HRS § 386-93(b), stated:
We conclude that {,] when an employer does not dispute the
Conpensability of the exployee's injury and only appeals
fon the ground that a PPD award is excessive, it should be
Fogarded as the loser under HRS § 386°93(b) if ie falls
fo abtain a substantial reduction in the compensation
avard. in our view, this test is faithful co both the
USnguage of HRS § 386-93 (b). which only permite the
sessment of attorney's fees and costs against an
jppealing employer “if the employer loses," and the
Tegisiative purpose to discourage unnecessary appeals and
aveld unfairly burdening an enployee with the costs of
Gefending against an appeal. The test was derived by
ruing the language of HRs § 366-93 (b) within the
Context and spirit of che workers’ compensation law.
‘The crucial isgue in the type of case presented
hhere is the amount of compensation the employer is
Fequired to pay. The employer does not prevail on this
isgue if it Only obtains a sinor or insubstantial
reduction in the award. in determining whether the
employer has achieved 2 substantial reduction in the
award, the LIRAB should consider both the relative and
absolute amount of the reduction. For example, if the
‘onployer appeals only a small compensation award, a
percentage reduction in the award may not be sufficient
fo avoid the assessment of the employee's attorney's fees
and costa, Aa noted, we do not agree with Rapuwal'e
Contention chat the employer should automatically be
Fegarded as the loser cn appeal if ie fails to obtain the
full reduction it requested. In construing a different,
attorney's fees statute, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
held that “where a party prevails on the disputed main
issue, even though not to the extent of hie original
contention, he will be deened to be the successful party
for the pulpose of taxing costs and attorney's fees.”
=
Haw. 608, 620,575 P20 869, 679 (1978). However, we
believe the LIRAB may consider the position taken’ by the
employer on appeal as a factor in its determination of
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whether the exployer 1 the loser and has achieved a
Gubstantial reduction in the award
Id, at 318-19, 196 P.3d at 320-21
‘The ICA entered its judgment on appeal on Decesber 8,
2008. On January 23, 2009, Kapuwai timely filed his
application for a writ of certiorari. The City filed a
response on February 6, 2009. This court accepted Kapuwai's
application on March 3, 2009.
TI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Agency Decisions
Appellate review of the LIRAB's decision
governed by HRS § S1-14(g) (1993), which provides:
Upon review of the record{,] the court
nay affirm the decision of the agency of
Femand the case with instructions for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify 0
Secision and order if the substantial rights
of the petitioners may have been prejudiced
Because the administrative findings,
conclusions, decisions, or orders are
(1) tm violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions; or
(2) Envexcess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the agency: oF
(3) made upon unlaweul procedures oF
(a) Affected by other error of las
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of
probative, and substantial evidence on the
Whole record; oF
(6) Arbitrary or capricious, oF
Characterized by abuse of discretion or
Clearly unwarranted exercise of
Siscretion
Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law (Cots) are
reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions
Fegarding procedural defects are’ reviewable under
Subsection (3)
A.CoL is not binding on an appellate court and is freely
Feviewable for correctness. Thus, the court reviews Cols
de nove, under the right /wrong standard.
a1.
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Tam_v. Kaiser Permanente, 94 Hawai'i 487, 494, 17 P.34 219, 226
(2001) (citations, original brackets, and ellipsis omitted)
(format altered) .
B. Rineness
It is axiomatic that ripeness is an issue of subject
matter jurisdiction. ‘whether a court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law reviewable de novo.”
Kaho'chanchano v. Dep't of Human Serve,, 117 Hawai'i 262, 281,
178 P.3d 538, 557 (2008) (citation omitted).
III. Iscusston
As previously indicated, the City contends on
application that the ICA erred in: (1) ruling "that it was
necessary to remand this case for the [LIRAB’s] determination
of a [PPD] award based on an impairment of [Kapuwai‘s) great
toe’ and (2) concluding that “an employer is regarded as the
loser on appeal if it fails to obtain a substantial reduction
of the compensation award.” At the outset, we hold that the
City’s contention regarding remand to the LIRAB is without
merit inasmuch as we agree with the ICA’s rationale supporting
its ultimate conclusion that (1) Kapuwai’s case should be
remanded to the LIRAB for a determination of a PPD award based
on the impairment of Kapuwai’s great toe and that, (2) as
between the awards for the great toe and the whole person,
Kapuwai is entitled to the greater. Kapuwai, 119 Hawai'i at
311, 196 P.3d at 313. However, we are concerned about the
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liberty taken by the ICA to provide guidance with respect to
HRS § 386-93(b) (dealing with liability for attorney's fees and
costs) in light of its decision to remand the case to the LIRAS
for further proceedings.
As indicated above, the ICA stated that it would not
‘decide’ the issue whether Kapuwai was entitled to attorney's
fees and costs because "(t]he determination of whether the city
is the loser of its appeal to the LIRAB under HRS § 386-93(b)
must be based on the final decision of the LIRAB,* which
decision will presumably be issued after remand. Kapuwai, 119
Hawai'i at 313, 196 P.3d at 315 (citation omitted)
Nevertheless, the ICA, in its opinion, set forth *guidance on
how to interpret HRS § 386-93(b)," id., which, in our view,
renders that portion of the opinion advisory because the issue
of attorney’s fees and costs was not ripe for decision.
preliminarily, we acknowledge that neither party has
challenged the advisory nature of the ICA’s opinion, ive., that
the issue of attorney's fees and costs was not ripe for
decision. However, we are equally cognizant that this court
has previously stated that,
(uIbile the courts of the state of Hawai't are not
bound by a "case of controversy" requirement, we
Ronetheless recognize that the “‘prudential rules’ of
judicial self-governance ‘founded in concern about the
Proper -- and properly Iinived =~ role of courts ina
Senoeratic society" are alvays of relevant concern.
‘Life of the Land v. Land Use Comission, 63 aw. 166,
172, 625 Pid 431, 438 (1981) (citations omitted). For
even in She absence of constitutional resscictions,
courte must stil) carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy
n1s-
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State v. Fields, 67 Haw, 268, 274, 686 P.24 1379, 1385 (1984)
(emphasis added) (footnote and brackets omitted)
Additionally, we have previously indicated that, in ‘the
absence of ripeness,” appellate courts are ‘without
jurisdiction to consider (the) appeal.’ State v, Moniz, 69
Haw. 370, 373, 742 P.24 373, 376 (1987) (holding that
‘appellate courts are under an obligation to insure that they
have jurisdiction to hear and determine each case” and,
“because of the absence of ripeness and standing, (this court
was] without jurisdiction to consider [an] appeal") .*
Moreover, it is well-settled in this jurisdiction that, *[ilf
the parties do not raise the issue [of a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction), a court sua sponte will.* Tamashiro v, Dep’t of
Hunan Servs., State of Hawai'i, 112 Hawai'i 388, 398, 146 P.34
103,113 (2006) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). “when
reviewing . . . whether the lower court has jurisdiction, four
appellate courts] retain jurisdiction, not on the merits, but
only for the purpose of correcting the error in jurisdiction.”
+ tn the federal court systen (which -- unlike the ICA and this
court -- is bound by the federal constitution’s article IIT cage and
Controversy requiresent), if i# well-established that
Ripeness is nore than a nere procedural question: it is
determinative of jurisdiction: ff a claim is unripe,
federal courta lack subject matter jurisdiction and the
complaint must be dismissed. This deficiency nay be raised
‘Ha sponte if not raised by the parties:
‘Souther Pec. Transp. Co. v. City of os Anaeles, 922 F.2d 498, S02 (9th cir.
1990), cart. denied. 5020.5, 943 (1991) (citation omitted)
-16-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
Ad, (citation, internal quotation marks, and original backets
omitted). Thus, we may properly raise the issue of ripeness
sua sponte and, additionally, retain jurisdiction for the
limited purpose of correcting the ICA‘s error in jurisdiction.
In Light of the ICA’s remand, the LIRAB has yet to
make a final decision on the underlying worker's compensation
claim. As such, any determination whether the employer loses"
and, thus, is required to pay attorney’s fees and costs is
premature, iie., not ripe. Accordingly, we conclude that,
inasmuch as there is no current “controversy” over attorney's
fees and costs, the ICA’s issuance of an advisory opinion on an
unripe issue implicates concerns “about the proper -- and
properly limited -- role of courts in a democratic society" and
contravenes the “prudential rules of judicial self-governance."
Fields, 67 Haw. at 274, 686 P.2d at 1385. The dissent,
however, disagrees with our conclusion inasmuch as it believes
that ‘this court has also issued advisory opinions in the past*
and that the majority in this case has not *explain[ed] why we
may issue advisory opinions and the ICA. . . cannot.*
Dissenting op. at 1, 3. In support of its argument, the
diss
points to a number of cases wherein this court has
provided guidance to the trial courts on renand.
Although the dissent is correct, it overlooks an
important distinction between the cases it cites and the case
at bar. Specifically, in the cases cited by the dissent, this
-17-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
court provided guidance to another court, ive, an entity
within the same branch of government; whereas, in the instant
case, the ICA provided guidance to the LIRAB, an administrative
agency within the coequal executive branch of governnent,
which, as discussed more fully infra, raises serious concerns
regarding separation of powers, judicial interference, and
prenature adjudication.
In the context of the premature review of
administrative decisions, we have atated that:
and the
traditional reluctance of courts to apply injunctive and
Geclaratory renedies to administrative determinations ip
Eo prevent courts, through avoidance of premature
inlatrative boll
‘Protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized and its
‘chal
‘Thus, prudential rutes of judicial self-governance
founded in concern about the proper =~ and properly
Limited ~~ role of courts in a democratic socket
considerations floving from our coequal and coexistent
system of government, ictate that we accord these
Charged with drafting and adsiniatering our laws a
reasonable opportunity to craft and enforce then in a
manner that produces @ lawful result
Save_Sunset Beach Coal, v, City & County of Honolulu, 102
Hawai'i 465, 483, 78 P.3d 1, 19 (2003) (emphases added) (format
altered) (citations, internal quotation marks, and original
brackets omitted). In our view, the foregoing rationale
clearly recognizes the separation of powers doctrine as it
relates to the adjudication of matters reserved for
administrative agencies in the other branches of government
In other words, the administrative agency of a separate,
ne
FOR PUBLICATION * **
in West’s Hawai‘i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
coequal branch of government should be accorded the opportunity
to first decide and enforce its own decisions without the
premature interference by the judiciary.
None of the cases cited by the dissent involve this
court's issuance of an advisory opinion providing guidance to
an administrative agency or entity within the executive or
Legislative branches or within county government, In fact,
this court, in Save Sunset Beach, declined to issue an opinion
regarding challenges to a proposed use of the county zoning
istrict because the issue was not ripe. 102 Hawai" at 482-
83, 78 P.3d at 18-19, Likewise, the ICA, in Bremer v, city &
County of Honolulu, 96 Hawai'i 134, 28 P.34 350 (App. 2001),
refused to decide a constitutional challenge to a county zoning
ordinance because the ordinance had not yet been implemented,
and the issue was, therefore, again not ripe for adjudication.
Id, at 143-44, 28 P.34 359-60. tmplicit in these cases is the
demonstration of the appellate courts exercising restraint and
jot prematurely delving into areas committed to the other
branches of government -- a principle recognized by this court
in Fields.
In Fields, this court was faced with the issue
whether a condition of probation contravened the defendant's
constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures. 67 Haw. at 271-73, 686 P.2d at 1384-85.
Specifically, the probation condition imposed upon the
-19-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
defendant made her ‘subject at all times during the period of
her probation to a warrantless search of her person, property
and place of residence for illicit drugs and substances by any
law enforcement officer including her probation officer." Id.
at 273, 686 P.2d at 1364, The Fields court recognized that,
inasmuch as the government had not yet made an effort to
enforce the particular condition of probation, the ripeness
doctrine, if strictly applied to the situation at bar, would
“preclude an adjudication of the issue raised on appeal.” Id.
at 275, 686 P.2d at 1386, Nevertheless, this court determined
that *[oJther important considerations” led it ‘to believe [it
was] confronted with the exceptional case demanding attention
in advance of an actual attempt by the government to enforce
the condition." Id, Specifically, this court declined to
apply the ripeness doctrine inasmuch ae: (1) “the deprivation
of a fundamental right may not be lightly regarded, even when
exacted as part of the price of conditional release"; and
(2) the probationary condition at issue was a creature of
judicial ingenuity and that, therefore, its "inquiry would
focus ical acti n rt
not_be venturing ‘into areas committed to other branches of
government.‘ Id, at 275-76, 686 P.2d at 1386 (citation
omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Fields court concluded
that it was appropriate “to act before there [was] an attempt
-20-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
to enforce the sentencing court’s order, since [its] bounden
che prevention of i 2 mi: in
situations where resort to appeal may be otherwise foreclosed."
Ia.
Indeed, the guidance provided by this court in nine
of the eleven cases cited by the dissent focused on the
propriety of judicial action or the deprivation of
constitutional rights, and none ventured into areas committed
to other branches of government. see, e.g., State v. Nichols,
111 Hawai'i 327, 340, 141 P.3d 974, 987 (2006) (providing
guidance to the circuit court on remand regarding jury
Anstructions); Courbat v, Dahana Ranch, Inc., 111 Hawai'i 254,
141 P.34 427 (2006) (providing guidance to the circuit court
regarding the correct application of a statute on remand); KG
Corp. v. Kim, 107 Hawai": 73, 110 P.3d 397 (2005) (providing
guidance to the circuit court on remand that statute did not
violate the due process or equal protection clause); Gap v.
Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai'i 325, 104 P.34 912 (2004)
(providing guidance to the circuit court on remand with regard
to setting of appropriate sanctions pursuant to Hawai'i Rules
Procedure Ri 16, which rules are promulgated
by the suprese court); Ditto v. McCurdy, 102 Hawai'i 518, 78
P.3d 331 (2003) (providing guidance regarding writs of
execution and the applicability of the district court rules,
which are also promulgated by the supreme court); state vw.
woe
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
Wakicaka, 102 Hawai'i 504, 78 P.34 317 (2003) (providing
guidance to the circuit court regarding evidentiary matters,
iie., the exclusion of an expert witness); state v, Culkin, 97
Hawai'i 206, 35 P.34 233 (2001) (addressing evidentiary matters
co provide guidance to the circuit court on renand); state v
Mahoe, 89 Hawai'i 284, 972 P.24 287 (1998) (providing guidance
to the circuit court on remand regarding a jury instruction!
Skate v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i 195, 948 p.24 1036 (1997)
(addressing unripe evidentiary and constitutional issues).
wien rn
ject to the two remaining ci
8 cited by the
@issent, to wit: Bil Lounge Operation Co., Inc, v. Liguor
Commission of City & County of Honolulu, 118 Hawai'i 320, 350,
189 P.34 432, 462 (2008), and In ce Water Use Permit
Applications, 105 Hawai'i 1, 12, 93 P.34 643, 654 (2004), we
fail to see how those cases constitute advisory opinions on
unripe issues. In both cases, this court decided issues
squarely presented and necessary for a full and complete
@iscussion of its ultimate holding in each case. It did not
address any unripe issues or provide guidance to a separate
government agency
Based on the foregoing, we believe the dissent’s
citations to the above cases as support for its position that
the ICA's advisory opinion in this case should be allowed to
stand because this court has also issued advisory opinions in
the past is unavailing. This court's issuance of previous
-22-
FOR PUBLICATION * **
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
advisory opinions, as cited by the dissent, is consistent with
this court’s prior case law and practice of limiting its
guidance to entities within the judicial branch while
refraining from doing so in cases involving a separate
governmental entity.
We agree, however, with the dissent that the
determination whether it is the LIRAB or the appellate courts
that’ awards attorney’s fees and costs depends on when the
appeal is *final.* Dissenting op. at 4-5 (citing Lindinha, 104
Hawai'i at 171, 86 P.3d at 980 (stating “we read [HRS
§ 386-93(b)] as assessing fees and costs against an employer if
the employer loses the final appeal- (emphasis added))). In
other words, "the statute plainly authorizes assessment of
attorney's fees and costs against the employer if it loses,
Whether the case ends in the LIRAB or this court." Id.
(emphasis added). By providing that “the costs of proceedings
of the appellate board or the supreme court of the state,
together with reasonable attorney's fees shall be assessed
against the employer, if the employer loses," HRS § 396-93 (b)
(emphasis added), the legislature clearly contemplated that
proceedings could end and be final at the LIRAB-level, thereby
empowering the LIRAB to make an award of attorney’s fees and
costs "if the employer loses.”
We disagree, however, with the dissent’s position
that it was permissible for the ICA to provide guidance to the
-23-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
LIRAB because “the plain language of HRS § 386-93(b) applies to
the judicial branch of the government in the same manner as the
executive branch." Dissenting op. at 5. The fact that the
statute applies to both the judicial and executive branches
does not render it permissible for the judicial branch to
interfere with the decision-making process of an executive
branch agency simply because the statute bestows the same
decision-making authority upon the judicial branch. Because an
appeal from a decision of the director can, depending on the
circumstances, becone *final* at the LIRAB-level or the
appellate-level, the statute mist necessarily contemplate those
circumstances.
In the present case, the appeal at the LIRAB-level
was not final because Kapuwai appealed to the ICA and the city
further appealed to this court. Likewise, the appeal at the
ICA and this court was also not ‘final* for purposes of
attorney’s fees and costs in light of the remand to the LIRAB
for further proceedings regarding Kapuwai’s PPD award. once
the LIRAB makes such determination and, if no further appeal is
taken, then, the "final appeal’ would have occurred at the
LIRAB-level, empowering it to make the requisite determination
and award of fees and costs. By opining on the application of
the subject statute, the ICA invaded the province of the LIRAB
to make its own independent assessment as to whether the City,
under HRS § 386-93(b), is the “lose[r]” for purposes of an
-24-
*** ROR PUBLICATION * **
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
award of attorney's fees and costs. As such, the ICA
impermissibly ventured into an area legislatively committed to
the LIRAB and, thus, implicates separation-of-powers concerns
that were not present in the decisions cited by the dissent.
Finally, the dissent also maintains that, if ‘the ICA
lacked jurisdiction because the attorney's fees and costs issue
is unripe, then it logically follows that we too lacked
jurisdiction to issue the advisory opinions that we did.*
Dissenting op, at 4 (citation omitted). However, as discussed
fupra, the guidance provided by this court in the cases cited
by the dissent (1) focused on the propriety of judicial action
or the deprivation of constitutional rights, (2) aid not
venture into areas committed to other branches of government,
thereby obviating any separation-of-power concerns, and (3)
were consistent with its ‘bounden duty* to prevent judicial
mistakes or the reoccurrence of a judicial mistake on remand.
Eields, 67 Haw. at 276, 686 P.2d at 1386.
In sum, we conclude that the ICA’s opinion regarding
the issue of attorney's fees and costs was not ripe for
decision and constitutes an advisory opinion aki to the
issuance of an opinion where there is no subject matter
jurisdiction. voniz, 69 Haw. at 373, 742 P.2d at 376. more
importantly, the advisory portion of the ICA’s opinion
constitutes inappropriate judicial interference with an
administrative decision of an entity within a separate, coequal
-25-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
branch of government that has not been formalized and has not
yet affected the challenging parties in a concrete way, Save
Sunset Beach, 102 Hawai'i at 483, 78 P.3d at 19, thereby
implicating separation-of-powers concerns. Consequently, we
hold that the ICA's exercise of appellate power in this case
constitutes error that must be corrected by this court by
vacating the advisory section of the ICA’s opinion,
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the part of the
ICA's opinion, specifically section IT, that deals with the
issue of attorney's fees and costs.
Paul K. Hoshino, Deputy
Corporation Counsel, for
petitioner/employer-appellee, .
self-insured fon v.2—_
Herbert R. Takahashi and
Danny J. Vasconcellos (of
‘Takahashi Vasconcellos &
Covert), for respondent/
claimant-appellant
-26-
| 6510f185144c71bb2fe002ae866c044295e29697a32adc52f4bf50c7f1719259 | 2009-07-16T00:00:00Z |
cf42f812-b491-49c7-8ab5-a2480608353c | State v. Mark | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
3
3
NO. 26784 = &
ae °
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWA\ = =
2
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appell. e
SHANE MARK, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
(NO." 26784; CR. NO. 03~1-0495)
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintift-Appellee
SHANE MARK, Pet itioner/Defendant~Appel lant
(NO. 26785; CR. NO. 03-1-0496)
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NOS. 03-1-0495 @ 03-1-0496)
(By: Acoba, J., for the court’)
The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
August 27, 2009 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Shane Mark is
accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument.
‘The parties
will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, October 2009.
FOR THE couRT: LRRD
xT is
‘Associate Justice 8
Dwight C.H. Lum, on De oe of
the application for SORE”
petitioner /defendant-
appellant.
+ Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ.» and
Circuit Judge Kim in place of Recktenusld, Je, recused.
aa
| 867e4bf72fd5cb1122c6d0416b0d36f79bbd833425792cec92d9f5adb4056c26 | 2009-10-08T00:00:00Z |
84dd0923-a6a8-4068-95b0-4d42c10757d9 | In re the Arbitration Between United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO v. State of Hawaii, Department of Public Safety, WCCC | null | 28858 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 28858
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN
UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL~Czp,
Union-Appellant, 3
C
ed
fear
Bi),
and
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,”
of Cherene Makua re: whether Makua rea:
10:8 Ht Ocha gyy
oats
STATE OF HAWAII,
(Griev.
for failing to return to work 15 days after T;
UMOP); Sec. 1, 11, 14, 38, 58; BA-06-09 (2006;
Employer-Appellee
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(8.B, NO. 07-1-0286)
FOR WRIT OF
(By: Recktenwald, J. for the court’)
Petitioner/Union-Appellant United Public Workers,
AFSCNE, Local 646, AFL-CI0‘s application for writ of certiorart
2009, is hereby rejected.
savai'd, gune 30, 2009.
(rrr
Honolulu,
FOR THE COURT:
SEAL ‘
Mert © fleditemonkd
Ceoeul
Associate Justice
filed on May 18,
DATED:
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayana, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenvald,
aa,
| 7851ba24e17aa4e6dfcb102b145e336edd050df7bc73309013a7c6619e96c4ad | 2009-06-30T00:00:00Z |
f4ca59af-11f2-4cb9-b58e-75bc9a7cf3fe | State v. Cho | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No, 28349
1 STATE OF HAWAT'
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
“O34
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(HPD CRIMINAL NO. 06084084)
RU
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court®)
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant’s application for writ
of certiorari filed on June 25, 2009, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 22, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Basia Coca
Asaociate Justice
Dwight C.H. Lum and
Reginald P. Minn for
petitioner /defendant-appellant
on the application
‘considered by: Moon, C.J.» Nakayama, Acoba, and Dutty, JJ., and
circuit Judge Nishimura, in place of Recktenwaid, J., recused.
| 88843dfd1fd9f3da1be8e88ab561a5ed599ef3dd5fea7ee50905b89ec9b85e98 | 2009-07-22T00:00:00Z |
de955602-6841-45b2-9a41-619e2e5fbc40 | County of Kauai v. Office of Information Practices, State of Hawaii | null | 29059 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 29059
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
COUNTY OF KRUA'Z, KRUA'T COUNTY COUN
BILL “KATPO" ASING, JAMES KUNANE TOKIOKA,
JAY FURFARO,, SHAYLENE. SERE~CARVALHO, DARYL, Wl
TANESHIRO, MEL. RAEOZO, JOANN A. YORTHURA, a
PETER A. NAKAMURA in their official. capacities
Respondents/Plaintiffs-hppellees,
Be
aane
LO ka eznne oaee
OFFICE OF INFORMATION PRACTICES, STATE OF HAWAII,
‘and LESLIE H. KONDO, Director of the Office ol
Information Practices, in his official capacity,
Petitioners /Defendants-Appellants.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIVIL No. 05-1-0088)
WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Duffy, J., for the court")
Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants’ application for weit
of certiorari, filed on May 14, 2009, is hereby accepted and will
be scheduled for oral argument. The parties will be notified by
the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 23, 2009.
Paul 7, Tsukiyana, FOR THE COURT: (Fr
a
Cathy L. Takase, and
Sennifer 2, Brosks, (of
Office of information Gone Rely « SEAL
Practices), and Aasociate sustice Bo
or
Gail ¥. Cosgrove and
Kunio Kuwabe (of Hisaka
Yoshida & Cosgrove) for
petitioners /defendants~
appellants on the application
© Considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
céreust Judge Hara, in place of Recktenwald,, J-, recused,
Alfred B. Castillo
(of Office of the County
Attorney, County of Kauai)
David J. Minkin and
Becky T. Chestnut
(of McCorriston Miller
Mukai MacKinnon LLP) for
respondents /plaintiffs-
appellees on the response
| 03c8d1228806f91fc03c391bc0bfab59adc7b9c31c2f08c0398b9e0df8a39afc | 2009-06-23T00:00:00Z |
28b178b7-c2e1-40d2-9390-8ee55f4230aa | Sato v. Broderick | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 29925
‘THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
MELANIE SATO, Petitioner, .
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL F. BRODERICK, JUDGE OF THE’)
COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I,
MIKE A. TROUT, Respondents
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(FC=DA NO. 09-1-1202)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Melanie Sato and the papers in
support, it appears that petitioner can file a protective notice
of appeal to preserve her right to appeal and petitioner can
obtain relief from the July 2, 2009 temporary protective order at
the July 27, 2009 hearing on the motion for protective order.
Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to extraordinary relief.
See Kema v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.24 334, 338 (1999)
(A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not
issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable
right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress
adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.).
Accordingly,
IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 13, 2009.
pin
2 lO raeny arc
Poti
MAE Me ectinhS
| 7bc248483e260f4264e28d1d6774e1d29c5a001f804d68c16139e6fd413428c4 | 2009-07-13T00:00:00Z |
71d722c0-ec5e-4bec-840e-e7cc333824a2 | State v. Belen | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No, 28925
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 06-1-0500)
(By: Recktenwald, J. for the court")
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Antonio Keoni Belen's
application for writ of certiorari filed on June 10, 2003, is
hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 10, 2008
FOR THE COURT:
Pine E Peeckslnve
ane E ae |
Associate Justice 4 © L
oe ws
| Nakayama, Acoba, Ouffy, and Recktenvald,
| 97cf574094371387c8b366892f2fe3a402e5d9bd573ccfca04d75671f1d12556 | 2009-07-10T00:00:00Z |
ece6b09e-742e-49c8-ba01-aa801debaa23 | Grandinetti v. U.T.M.F. Garcia | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29308
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
FRANCIS A. GRANDINETTI Ir,
Petitioner /Plaintiff-Appellant,
U.T.M.F. GARCIA, FDC/SCC, et al
Respondents /Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(crv. NO. 08-1-0190)
ERT
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court")
onDER
Petitioner/plaintiff-appellant Francis A. Grandinetti's
“certiorari Review Briefing," filed May 28, 2009, which we deem
as an application for a writ of certiorari, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, June 12, 2009.
von me ceo SE
« SEAL *]
fe dustice 5
%, 5
ee
oes”
3
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald,
a.
| 750f57ecbd895ca1a0140b7b78296b8248e8d0f77b4e7e89f4d8f69173f2d5c7 | 2009-06-12T00:00:00Z |
3efe1c3c-3742-4c2d-9726-5e244fa2fa74 | Blaisdell v. Trader | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
No. 29895
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT
RICHARD BLAISDELL, Petitioner,
‘THE HONORABLE ROM A. TRADER, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAT'I, Respondent
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CIVIL NO. 04-1-1455)
(y: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, AGoENS Dufty, and Recktenwald, 3.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
nandanus filed by petitioner Richard Blaisdel! and the papers in
support, Lt appears that: (2) relief from the Nay 22, 2008
judgment entered sn Civit Ho. 041-1455 is available to
petitioner in the cizcult court pursuant to HRCP 60(b) and (2)
relief from respondent as presiding Judge in Civil No, 4-1-1455
1s available to petitioner in the circuit court pursuant to HRS §
601-7 (1993 and Supp. 2008). Therefore, petitioner 1s not
entitled to extraordinary relief. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai‘
200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary renedy that will not issue unless the petitioner
demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack
of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or
cbtain the requested action.)
Tt further appears that Lssuance of a declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of Act 75, 26th Leg., Reg.
aa
Sess. (2009) is not within the original jurisdiction of the
suprene court. See HRS $$ 602-5 (Supp. 2008) and 632-1 (1993).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 7, 2009.
Gore
Reuse ONO
a
Veron € Suey Oy 4
Pet O See ttn eet 7
| 22fdfc7b1a2fa88a5cc7691ed35b46cc31f6f6e106ed0701814535052817bb49 | 2009-07-07T00:00:00Z |
93002f3e-d224-428e-8bad-d0f85ae5c514 | Williams v. Aona. ICA mem.op., filed 12/10/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 334. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/27/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/06/2009 [pdf]. | 121 Haw. 1 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | + FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
---000---
CEDRIC C. WILLIAMS, Respondent /Petitioner-Appellee
ROBERT AONA, Petitioner/Respondent-Appellant
No. 28691 2
jf 2 rc
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 2 &
(CIVIL CASE NO, 18S07-1-353) 5 = oc
a
JUNE 19, 2009
MOON, C.J.) NAKAYANA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, Jd.» AND
CIRCUIT JUGGE CHANG, ASSIGNED BY REASON’ OF VACANCY
QPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Petitioner/Respondent-Appellant Robert Rona (Aona)
(application)
filed a timely Application for Writ of Certiorari
urging this court to review the December 30, 2008 judgment of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) based on its Memorandum
Opinion in Williams v. Aona, No, 28691, 2008 WL 5182933 (App.
Dec. 10, 2008). The ICA’s Memorandum Opinion affirmed the
district court of the first circuit's! (district court) July 17,
2007 Order Granting Petition for Injunction Against Harassment
(injunction order).
* the Honorable Gerald #. Kibe presided.
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In his Application, Aona argues that the ICA gravely
erred in affirming the injunction order because:
(1) “The ICA incorrectly held that the district court had
jurisdiction over Williama’s Petition [for a temporary
restraining order and injunction against harasement].”
(2) “The ICA incorrectly affirmed the district court's
injunction imposing a distance restriction on Aona while in
the workplace.”
(3) “The ICA incorrectly affirmed the district court's refusal
to admit and consider evidence of Willian’
prior criminal
conviction.”
(4) “the ICA incorrectly affirmed the district court’s refusal
to admit and consider evidence of the (Department of
Environmental Services} workplace rules.”
We accepted the Application for the Limited purpose of
correcting an error by the ICA when it affirmed the district
court's jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of preemption.
We agree with the ICA’s Memorandum Opinion in all other respects.
‘BACKGROUND
Aona and Cedric Willians (Williams) aze both employees
of the City and County of Honolulu (city and County) Department
of Environmental Services (DES), Honolulu Yard. Aona works for
DES as a “refuse collection supervisor.” Aona’s duties include
“conducting periodic” post-checks on refuse vehicles, “like snap
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inspections.” A post-check is an examination of the refuse truck
that occurs at the end of a shift. During a post-check, the
driver is responsible for examining certain parts of the truck
including the lights, tires, rims, and frame. Conducting
periodic post-checks is “not a set duty.” Instead, it is rotated
among various supervisors.
Williams works for DES as a “crew leader.” A crew
leader is responsible for driving the refuse vehicle. After his
shift, Williams is responsible for conducting a post-check on his
refuse vehicle.
A, Retition for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
on July 3, 2007, Williams filed a petition for Ex Parte
‘Temporary Restraining Order and for Injunction Against Harassment
(petition) against Aona. The petition was based on “[rJecent or
past act(s) of harassment.” Williams explained that:
Saturday June 30, 2007 at approximately 11:55 A.M. Robert
Rona pained me on ay left sided chest area causing an
imediate sharp pain that required anergency medical
treatment at Straub clinic and hospital. 1 was diagnose
with a bruised chest. Assault occurred at Honolulu Refuse
Collection Yard located at 26 Migdle Street, Honolulu, HT
56815, Police Report was filed and superintendent and
refuse collection auninistrater was notified. shen T
questioned Robert Aona as to why he did this to me he
Fesponded that T am a foolish boy.” I feel that this may be
J racial term and he may dislike ne due to ny race of being
Ateican Aserican. “I have notified refuse collection
Soninistrator that Aobert Aona is causing se psychological
Serene due to the fact that he is s larger nan than amy, be
may not Like my race snd I fear he may attack me and cause
hRe much more severe bodily and psychological harm than Ae
Siready has. I feel severely threatened by Robert Aona due
to his excessive size. He causes me anxiety when I see him.
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B. District Court Proceedings
on July 17, 2007, a hearing was held in district court,
Willians’s testimony
Williams testified that on June 30, 2007, after he
the
brought his refuse truck back to the refuse yard, Aona w
supervisor in charge who supervised Williams's post-check of his
truck. According to Williams, Aona first helped him check the
Lights on the truck and then
T parked the truck, got out and then (Aona) stepped back
(and) ‘said Start trom wherever you want. So'l started from
the front tires, check the lugs; check che rim, going downy
Check the frame, going down. I'was dréving the Bulky truck
that day. That‘e two back tires, so there's four on one
Side, so I"m checking those tires, the rims, check the last
ize!
‘As I was going around the truck, he stopped me, (“start
fagsin, sow oxplain to me what you doing, {"] and then I said,
(wnaer(")” And then 1 (Jyou know what, you Juse
gotta write me up because I’m not gonna doa pest-check with
yout.)
Williams testified that he did not think that it was unusual that
Aona was conducting a post-check; rather “{jJust the way he
wanted me to do it, to start all over and explain to him what 1’m
doing. That’s not right.”
After Williams disobeyed Aona’s instructions, he stated
that,
X went walk to the truck to get my bag, he pushed the door
shut. So, T tried to open (it) again, then right there, he
palnéd me’on the chest snd aaid [“lyou nothing but a £00113
oy, {*] and I tole(sic) ‘em, ("Jwhat's up with that, you hit
mme and you calling me names” (”]
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Williams testified that after Ana palned him, he felt “a sharp
pain” in his chest and noticed “a mark” on his chest. williams
called his union steward and then called the police. Williams
completed a police report and informed the police that he wanted
to press charges against Aona, The police asked if Willians
wanted them to call an anbulance, but Williams told them that he
would go to the hospital on his own.’ Williams had his girlfriend
drop him off sat the hospital. He was diagnosed with a bruise on
his chest and prescribed pain pills.
2. Aona’s testimony
On June 30, 2007, Aona testified that he was the
supervisor on duty who supervised Williams's post-check of his
refuse vehicle. Aona stated that he was dissatisfied with
Williams's post-check because Williams had skipped several steps.
Rona eventually told Williams “you missed a whole lot. . . [slo
let's go back and start where we left off and work our way back
hore,” but Willians “totally ignored” Aona. then, Aona said, “I
think I'm gonna have to ask you to tell me what you doing because
that way, I‘11 know you're doing it.” According to Aona,
[Williams] starts saying, (%)1 doing my post-check, I doing
my pore-check(*) ‘ahd all he’s doing 48 playing with
The lug nuts on the bick th
Sot said, (*){Willians), you're forcing me to do
this. “I’m giving you's direct order, let's go back to the
Front, start over and do the post=check properly like you
were taught, ("] and then he stands up and ne goes ("]you
Cannot teil me what to do, ("] Teecause) Tam not hie
supervisor.
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After that, Aona testified that he
said (“lyes, (*) T can and will require you to do this. T
Malked right hero and (Wilitans) was standing there Looking
at me kind of belligerently like, "("]yea cannot. [")
“Jwell, 1711 just wait, you know. So, T waited,
Tdon't know, lees then a minute, you know, seconds, and Ne
hadn't moved, so.1 told him... ["Jlet’s stare here, [*)
and he still’ doesn’t move, so I said ["can we do the post
Gheck now?(*)
At this point, he rushed up to me and he was, he had a
glowering look on his face, ne had his dark shades and he’s
Puffing Rinself up and trying to be intimidating
hen he came. . , too close for my personal space, I put ay
hand on his shoulder and went ("Jetop, stop,” =. (we're
Sn'that position for five seconds, and I'm thinking £0
myself, okay, great, situation resolved, we're gonna start
the post=check:
hon he starts, he takes a step back and goes (*}you
wen touch me, you wen touch me, ("] and his voice 1s getting
Iouder, literally shouting and he starts hopping around in
that afea. .- (2)o, 1 backed up to the front of the truck
sped out his cell
phnd and I thought that was a good ides, 20 1 whipped out
hny coll phone and Z called the Base yard office. sss I'm
Corned away from hin and I’m shaking my head, ch, this ie a
foolish move.
He stops his dancing and cones up to me again and goes
(vIwhat you wen call ne(") screaming, but he's not really,
he stili maintain {sic} safe enough space from se, but he's
‘Screaming at me, ["Iwhat you wen call me, what you wen call
Be.("] 1 told "on, (]{Willians}, 1 didn’t cali you
Snything.("]. This is when be brings his face so close to my
ace Ym taller than him, but he's trying, you koe,
do the face, body push and he's’ pushing me, and then I told
Yen, {"]back pr {") you know, and he didn’t back up.
[njnis is when I put my hand on (his) . . . and I told ‘em,
[Tback opr") he didn’t back up.
Soy he finally backed up just a Little bit, but it was
fgnough for me that 1 disengaged and I walked far’ away, maybe
fon fect in front of the vehicle, and at this tine too, "he
haa kine’a (sic) backed up to halfway in the body of the
truck and ‘ny phone had gotten flipped off at this
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time, so Z called again (sic] innediately acting
supervisor(<]
After Aona called the supervisor and asked hin to cone
to the yard, Aona claims that he “turn{ed) around and receive
[sic] three forearm smashes into [his] sternum. . . from
[Williams's] right forearm and it stunned [him], it rocked [his]
head back.”? Aona stated that two superintendents were “in
sight” and Willians “innediately backed off." However, according
to Aona, neither superintendent witnessed Willians’s alleged
attack on Aona.
Soon after, the police arrived. Aona clains that he
voluntarily gave a statement to police detailing Williams's
alleged attack on him.
Aona also testified that, at the end of the day, he
Grove to the Kaiser urgent care clinic where he “was seen and
treated for soft tissue damage.” He stated that “I was
prescribed ice, ice regime, pain killer, and it was suggested
that I have follow-up on gentle massage and was suggested that 1
have follow-up visits and perhaps even counseling for any post-
stress that I might have suffered from being attacked.”
Aona denied “striking Willians with an open palm or
otherwise in his chest area(.]”
® non questioned by the district court, Aona testified that Willians
hit him with bis left forearm, because he still had his phone in his right
hand!
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The District Court's Discussion with Deputy Corporation
Counsel About Workplace Management
Also present at the hearing was Deputy Corporation
Counsel Gary Takeuchi (Takeuchi) representing the employer, the
City and County. Takeuchi stated that “we do have an agreement
of the parties that in the injunction that might issue in this
case, we would not include the place of employment, that the
parties are confident that the employer can work out
arrangements.” Takeuchi also stated that “the supervisory people
that I spoke to strongly believe that they can manage the
worksite so there won't be issues . . . whatever geographical
standard might be imposed would be difficult to maintain at the
work location.”
C. The District Court’s Order Granting Williams's Petition for
Indunction
‘The district court granted Willians’s petition and
filed the Order Granting Petition for Injunction Against
Harassment against Aona. The district court found that Williams
was more credible than Aona:
ME COURT: I have considered the evidence that has
been presented during the course of this hearing. have
considered all factual issues by the clear and convincing
Standard, and I hava made eterninations on igeves of
eredibility and, indeed, this case turns on questions of
Credibility between Mr. Williams ang Hr. Rona because there
are no other percipient witnesses to what happened Between
{the tho gentlemen on June 30, 2007, at just before noon at
the Honolulu Refuse Division Facility on Middle street
iow, I have had during the course of this long hearing
fan opportunity to watch both sides while they were making
Their statenents. “I've thus been able cbserve their
Geneanor, behavior, Listened to what they have said, how
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they have said it, facial expressions, body language, those
Kinds of thinga, and those ail contribute to ny ability te
render a determination on the issue of credibility.
ow, one thing I do note a2 reflected by my question
to Mr. Rota is that during the course of his testizony, he
Gis reference touching Mr- WLillans not once, but two times
in his initial testinony. How, he endeavored to correct
that in response to ay questions by indicating that it was
Guring the first tine chat there was any hint of any trouble
that Hr, Aona said that Wr. Nilliams approached Mr. Rona
that Mr: Aona put out Mis hand to aaintain sone distance
\eith Mr, Williams and thus kept his hand, right hand on Mr.
Willians’s Lee shoulder for sone time
But then, and Le was during this morning's sesaicn,
Me. Willians iidicatea that, excuse ne, Mr- Aona said that
there was a farther tine when Mr, Miliians cane. forward, got
close again to his, We. Aona ssid that he put nig hand on
Mg. Williams’ (s} shoulder just Like wae demonstrated
earlier, and tome, that's an inconsistency in terme of what
Mr. Aana Says happened. It's, it was something that I took
Rote of at that point and questioned Me. Aona about it, but
Pidon’t feel confortable in the way that Hr. Rona responded.
And further, in the way in which Mr. Aona again
proceeded with nis testimony in comparison to the very clear
Gnd firm testinony, very straightforward testinony of ME
Willians, 11 of this leads me to conclude that Mr.
Williams! (s] version of events is sore credible than that of
Be. Aone.
As a result, the court found that Williams had
established by clear and convincing evidence that Acna had
harassed him according to the definition in Hawai'i Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 604-10.5(a) (1) (1993 & Supp. 2008) and that a
temporary restraining order was warranted.’
> Rs § 604-10.5 grants the district court the power to enjoin and
temporarily restrain harassment. it states, in relevant part
“Harasonent” means
(2) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the thr:
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, oF assault (+)
of
(b) The district courts shall have power to enjoin oF
prohibit or temporarily restrain harassnent.
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The order required Aona to not intentionally be within
fifteen feet away of Williams at any time for three years. There
was no separate distance requirenent for the work site.
D. IcA’s Memorandum Opinion
The ICA affirmed the district court’s Order Granting
Petition for Injunction Against Harassment. Williams, 2008 WL
5182933, at *10.
(c) Any person who has been subjected to harassment may
petition the district court of the disteset in which the
Petitioner resides for a tenporary restraining order and an
Tnjuncelon from further harassment.
(a) A petition for relief from harassment shali be in
writing and shall allege that a past act or acts of
harasssent may have occurred, or that threats of harasenent
ake it probable that acts of harassment may be immineney
{and shall be accompanied by an sffiaavit mage under oath or
‘Statement made under penalty of perjury stating the specific
facts snd circumstances fron whieh gellef 1s seughe.
w
(The parties naned in the petition may file or give
oral responses explaining, excusing, Justifying, or denying
the alleged act or acts of harassment. The court shall
Fecelve all evidence that io relevant at the hearing, and
nay make independent inquiry.
LUTE the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that harasenent as defined in paragraph (1) of that
definition exists, it nay enjoin for no sore than three
yes
further harassment of the petitioner, or that
janent as defined in paragraph (2) of that definition
yxists, it shall enjoin fer no more than three years further
harasshent of the petitioner) provided that thi® paragraph
Shall not prohibit! the court from issuing other injunctions
Against the naned parties even if the tine co which the
Injunction applies exceeds total of three yeare,
HRS $ 604-10.5(a) (1), (b)=(d), (4).
10
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TI, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. durisdiction
Whether the district court had jurisdiction over
Williams's petition “presents a question of law, reviewable de
novo.” See Hawaii Med, Ass'n v. Hawaii Med, Serv, Ass'n, Inc.,
Hawai'i 77, 90, 148 P.3d 1179, 1192 (2006).
The Issuance of a TRO
With respect to the issuance of a TRO, a relief in equity,
the relief granted by a court in equity ie discretionary” nd
wilt not be overturned on review unless the court abused its
Giscretion, . A court abuses its discretion whenever it
exceeds the bounds of reason of disregarde roles cx
Principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment,
bea party.
In re Guardianship of Carlsmith, 113 Hawai'i 211, 223, 151 2.34
692, 104 (2006) (internal quotation marks, citations, brackets,
and ellipses in original omitted).
TI. DISCUSSION
The central issue in this Application is whether the
district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Williams's
petition or whether Williams was first required to exhaust his
contractual renedies under the collective bargaining agreement
(CBR) between the City and County and United Public Workers
AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO. Aona correctly clains that the ICA
erred when it affirmed the district court’s jurisdiction on the
basis of the doctrine of preemption. However, we hold that the
@istrict court properly exercised jurisdiction over Williams's
petition for the reasons discussed below,
nu
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The District Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction over
Williams's Petition for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order and For Injunction Against Harassment,
In addition to filing the petition for a TRO, williams
filed a grievance against Aona with the City and County in the
form of a “workplace violence incident report.” At the hearing,
the district court asked Aona if he wanted to make a motion to
postpone the hearing until after any “personnel action” was
taken. Aona chose to proceed with the hearing.
On appeal to the ICA, Aona argued that the district
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Williams's
petition because the conduct Williams complained of was an
employment matter. According to Aona, employment matters were
governed by the CBA and Williams had not exhausted his
adninistrative remedies under the CBA. Aona claimed that:
In his petition for a TRO and injunction, Willsans
essentisily makes the complaint nis employer, 08S, violated
ction 46.02a of the CBA, which requires DES to provide a
violence-free workplace by providing the means snd methods
to prevent the risk of violence to employees, such (as)
Witllans. Under the CBA, however, Killiams was required to
‘Ive that ‘complaint pursuant to the grievance procedure
t forth in section 15 of tne CBA.
In other words, Aona argued that Williams should have waited for
the results of the workplace investigation into the grievance he
filed against Aona before filing his petition with the district
court.
‘The ICA concluded that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the hearing. The ICA stated that
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“preemption of state court jurisdiction [by a contract grievance
provision in a collective bargaining agreement] is not unlimited
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or Hawai'i policy.”
Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at *4. Specifically, the ICA
concluded that Williams's interest in protection from “outrageous
conduct, threats, intimidation, and words” was “not diminished or
preempted because it is related to matters contained in a CBA
grievance process.” Id, The ICA further concluded that “Acna
failed to demonstrate that a written remedy was available under
the CBA grievance procedure that could protect Williams from
future harassment, Because Aona did not demonstrate that the CBA
provides a reasonable alternative to an injunction order, the
presumed goal of such a policy is not applicable.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
In his Application, Aona argues that the ICA erred when
Ae concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over
Williams's petition because “the ICA erroneously confused the
doctrines of preemption and exhaustion, failed to conduct any
analysis of the exhaustion issue, and erroneously concluded that
the CBA provides no remedy to Williams.”
Although Aona is correct in his assertion that the ICA
exred in its reliance on the doctrine of preemption, the district
court had jurisdiction over Williams’s petition based upon the
following analysis.
3
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Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Aona failed to raise the exhaustion of remedies issue
in the district court. “As 2 general rule, if a party does not
raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have
been waived on appeal; this rule applies in both criminal and
civil cases.” State v, Moses, 102 Hawai'i 449, 456, 77 P.3d 940,
947 (2003).
However, Aona argues that Williams’s failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies deprived the district court of
subject-matter jurisdiction. As we have stated,
[At is wolt-established . . . that Lack of aubject matter
Jurisdiction can never be waived by any party at any tin
in re Application of Rice, €@ fw, 324, 913 F.2d 426 (1996).
Th setting forth the absolute necessity that a court possess
subject matter jurisdiction, this court rule
“the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
cannot be waived by the parties." If the parties do
not raise the issue, "a court iy for
unless jurisdiction’ of the court over the subject
batter exists, any Judgnent rendered 13 invalid,”
(Citing Mever'vs Texritary, 36 Naw. 75, 78 (1942))
Idk 68 Haw. at 335, 713 P.2d at 427. Moreover, “[sluch a
Guestion is in order at any stage of the case, and though a
Yower court 1s found to have lacked Juriadiction, we have
Jurisdiction here on appeal, not of the merits, bur for the
Purpose of correcting an erfor in Jurtadietion.” Zak,
Chun v, Emplovees’ Ret. Sys., 73 Haw. 9, 13, 828 P.2d 260, 263
(2992); see also, e.g., 488 Am Jur 2d Labor and Labor Relations
§ 2428 (2005) ("A claim that the defendants should have raised
plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust contractual remedies in
their answer and waived it by failing to do so was rejected,
since the failure to exhaust goes to the court's subject-matter
14
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jurisdiction and can be raised at any time by any party or by the
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) (3).") (citation omitted).
Thus, if the district court did not have jurisdiction over
Williams's petition, then its order mst be vacated despite
Aona’s previous failure to raise the issue. See Lingle v, Hawaii
Gov't Employees Ass’n, AFSCME, Local 152, AFL-CIO, 107 Hawai'i
178, 182, 111 P.3d 587, 591 (2005) ("A judgment rendered by a
circuit court without subject matter jurisdiction is void.”
(citation omitted) ).
a. exhaustion of renedies in general
Aona argues that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over Willian’s petition because he did not exhaust
his remedies under the CBA, Exhaustion of renedies is defined as
“(Ihe doctrine that, if an administrative renedy is provided by
statute, a claimant must seek relief first from the
administrative body before judicial relief is available.”
Black's Law Dictionary 613 (8th ed. 2004). In general, the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is a policy of judicial
economy. See generally 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 474
(The exhaustion rule serves a legitimate state interest in
requiring parties to exhaust administrative remedies before
proceeding to court, thereby preventing an overworked court from
considering issues and remedies that were available through
1s
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administrative channels.”). As such, the doctrine of exhaustion
of remedies temporarily divests a court of jurisdiction.
>. exhaustion of remedies under a CBA
Aona is correct that when parties are bound by the
terms of a CBA, we have repeatedly identified a policy interest
in requiring employees to exhaust their contractual remedies
before bringing judicial claims against an employer:
It is well-settled that an employee must exhaust any
grievance or arbitration procedures provided under 2
Collective bargaining agreement before bringing a court
action puksuanE to the aurecnent. strong policy
Considerations support this rule. The exhaustion
Fequirenent, first, preserves the integrity and autonomy of
the collective bargaining process, allowing the parties to
develop their own uniform mechanism of dispute resolution,
Te sis pronotes judicial efficiency by encouraging the
orderly and less time-consuming settlement of disputes
through alternative means.
Hokama v, University of Hawai‘, 92 Hawai‘ 268, 272, 990 P.2d
2150, 1154 (2999) (footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added). Indeed, “where the terms of public employment
are covered by 2 collective bargaining agreement pursuant to HRS
Chapter 89 and the agreement includes a grievance procedure to
dispose of employee grievances against the public employer, an
aggrieved employee is bound by the terms of the agreement.”
Winslow v. State, 2 Haw. App. 50, 55, 625 P.2d 1046, 1050 (2981).
Applying the exhaustion doctrine to the terns of a CBA “is in
keeping with prevailing National Labor Relations policy and
Hawaii policy favoring arbitration as a dispute settlement
mechanism.” Santos v, State, Dept, of Transp., Kauai Div., 64
16
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Haw. 648, 655, 646 P.24 962, 967 (1982) (per curium). However,
“[glrievance procedure is not to be resorted to with respect to
matters not included within its scope in the collective
bargaining agreement.” SIA C.J.S. Grievances § 340 (2003)
(citations omitted).
2. The ICA Erroneously Analyzed the Issue of the District
Court’s Jurisdiction Because the Doctrine of Preemption
Is Inapplicable.
The ICA concluded that the district court had
jurisdiction over Willians’s petition based on the doctrine of
Preemption. Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at ¥3-4.
‘The ICA first discussed our decision in Santos
requiring an exhaustion of contractual remedies under a CBA.
However, the ICA then stated that
of state court jurisdiction is not unlinites
‘nder the National Labor Relations Act (NL#A) or Hawas't
policy, In Radclit{e v, Rainbow Constr, Co, 254 Fuad 772
(Sth Cir, 2001), the Unites state(s) Court of Appesi(s) tor
the Winth Circuit held that certain actions under the KURA
wore not prsemsted fron state court Jurisdiction. these
actions included “torts of threatened violence,
traditionally held not to be prasmuted, or intentional
infliction of enctional distress, and defamation, both of
which the Supreme Court has held to be exceptes tron
Garnon’s'® precenption rule aven though they involve. conduct
arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.” Ragcli¢te,
25t F.3d St 785. (cieateons omiteed!))
Id. at +4.
“The ICA explained that “Gammon” refers to ae
Souncil v. Garmon, 359 0.5. 236, 79°8-Ce. 133 (1989) {Gaenen preemption rule
Fefers to Preemption of state law by the MURA). Radcliffe, 25¢ Fed at 780'n.
6." williams, 2008 WL 5162933, at “neds
u
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‘The ICA then cited our decision in Briggs v, Hotel
Corp. of Pac., 73 Haw. 276, 831 P.2d 1335 (1992) for the
proposition that “‘outrageous conduct, threats, intimidation, and
words’ which cause the plaintiff to suffer ‘grievous mental and
emotional distress as well as great physical damage’ may also
fall within an exception to the federal interest in the national
labor policy and therefore permit state law recovery.” Hilliams,
2008 WL 5182933, at *4 (quoting Bricas, 73 Haw. at 284, 831 P.2d
at 1341). Finally, the ICA stated that “[t]he State has a
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of
abuse of which Williams complained. That interest is not
diminished or preempted because it is related to matters
contained in a CBA grievance process.” Id, (emphasis added).
Preemption is commonly defined as “[t]he principle,
(derived from the Supremacy Clause [of the United States
Constitution}) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any
inconsistent state law or regulation.” Black's at 1217; see also
id. at 303 (defining the term “conplete-preemption doctrine” as
“[t]he rule that a federal statute’s force may be so
extraordinary and all encompassing that it converts an ordinary
state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
Purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule”). In contrast to
the doctrine of exhaustion’s temporary divestment of
jurisdiction, when a federal statute preempts a state law claim,
a8
‘+#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
preemption fully divests the state-law court of all subject-
matter jurisdiction over a particular issue, As we have stated
in the context of employment law:
ven it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which 2 State purports to regulate are protected
By $7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute. an
unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal
enactnent requires that state jurisdiction must yield, To
leave the States free to regulate conduct 20 plainly within
the central aim of federal regulation involves too great &
Ganger of confilet between power asserted ay Congress and
Fequirenents imposed by state law.”
Briggs, 73 Haw. at 283, 831 P.2d at 1340 (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Gammon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)). Thus, the
preemption doctrine is triggered when a court is presented with
conflicting state and federal statutes.
Here, the district court was not presented with
conflicting state and federal statutes because the NLRA does not
apply to the City and County. The NLRA only applies to
“employers,” as defined by the NURA. See generally 29 U.S.C.
* conflicting state statutes can also trigger the preanption
doctrine, Indeed, HRS chapter 69 preempts conflicting state statutes:
‘This chapter shall take precedence over all conflicting
statutes concerning this subject matter and shall preempt
all contrary local ordinances, executive orders,
Tegisiation, or rules adopted by the State, a county, of any
department or agency thereat, inclusing the departments of
hnuman resources development Or of personnel services oF the
Civil service commisason:
RS § 89-19 (2993 ¢ Supp. 2008). However, HRS $ 89-19 does not apply here
because Acra challenges the CBA and not the provisions of ARS chapter 83. Sea
Mawal's Org. of Police Officers v.-Gos'y of rot, Journalists Univ, of tua
Chapter, £3 await 376, 403, 927 P.24 906, 412 (1996) ("By its own langues
MRS" § 89-19 accords preenptive effect to the provisions of HRS chapter £9 and
not to the agreements entered into between parties pursuant to the authority,
Procedures, and rules established in ARS chapter #9.” (emphasis added) )~
19
‘*#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
$ 182(1) (2000). Under the NLRA, the term “employer” “shall not
include . . . any State or political subdivision thereof{.)” 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000) (emphasis added). Aona and Williams's
employer is the City and County of Honolulu, @ political
subdivision of the state of Hawai'i. See Haw. Const. art. VIII,
$1, Therefore, the NLRA does not apply and the ICA’s discussion
of preemption was irrelevant.
In sum, Aona is correct that the doctrine of preemption
is inapplicable to the facts of this case. As a result, we hold
that the ICA’s application of preemption principles to conclude
that Williams was not required to exhaust his contractual
remedies was erroneous.
3. Despite the ICA's Error, It Correctly Concluded That
the District Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction Over
Williams’s Petition.
Although the ICA used an erroneous framework to
determine that the district court had jurisdiction over
Williams’s petition, the ICA correctly concluded that the
district court had jurisdiction becai
(1) Williams's petition
involves conduct outside the scope of the CBA? (2) even if CBA
remedies did apply, tort claims are excepted from the general
rule that employees must exhaust their remedies under the CBA
before seeking judicial relief; (3) the CBA did not provide
Williams with an adequate remedy; and (4) public policy does not
20
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATTREPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
support limiting injunctions against harassment for employees
subject to CBAs.
a. exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine
The doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute.
“[B]xceptions to this doctrine exist, such as when pursuing the
contractual renedy would be futile.” Poe v. Hawaii Labor
Relations ad., 97 Hawai'i 528, 536, 40 P.34 930, 938 (2002)
Likewise, “[a]n aggrieved party rieed not exhaust administrative
remedies where no effective renedies exist.” Hokana, 92 Hawai‘t
at 273, 990 P.2d at 1185. Furthermore, “[a]s a general
proposition . . . the contractual grievance procedure does not
apply to tort actions.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Finally, policy interests underlying the exhaustion doctrine may
be outweighed by other interests. See Vaughn v, Pac, tw, Bel]
Tals Cou, 611 P.2d 281, 290 (Or. 1980) (“We conclude that a
worker claiming any type of unlawful employment. discrimination
. . is entitled to bring suit for injunctive relief pursuant to
that statute, notwithstanding the availability of a remedy under
the collective bargaining agreement. We reject defendant’ s
argument that workers who have a remedy under a collective
bargaining agreement are limited to that exclusive remedy. We
hold that the state policy favoring exclusivity of collective
bargaining agreement remedies does not foreclose the plaintiff's
right to seek injunctive relief in this case.”
21
“*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
as sired
Liams sou was oursi of
he CBA.
In Hokama, we stated that “(flor purposes of the
exhaustion requirement, we must determine whether [the
employee's] claims arise from the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.” Hokama, 92 Hawai'i at 273, 990 P.2d at
1155. In order to determine whether Williama’s clain arose from
the terms of the CBA, we must look to the relevant CBA
provisions.* According to section 15.02 of the CBA, “[t]he term
‘The CBA was not submitted into evidence at the district court.
Pursuant to HRS § 64
elvery appeal shail be taken on the record, and no new
evidence shall be introduced in the supreme court. Ihe
Sppeliate court may correct any error appearing oh the
Fecord, but need not consider « point that was not presented
in the crisi court in an appropriate manner. No jusgnest,
order, or decree shall be Feversed, amended, oF modified for
any error or defect, unless the court is of the opinion thee
it’nas injuriously Sffected the substantial rights of the
appellant
ARS § 641-2 (1993 6 2008 Supp.). Thus, as a generat rule, we would not
consider the ters of the CEA.
However, Rona states that “Aona attached as Appendix B to his
opening brief a copy of the relevant portions of the written CBA and requested
the ICA to take judicial notice of chat document.” It ia not clear if the Ic
took judicial notice of the CBA, but for the following reasons, we take
Judicial notice of the attached portions of the CBA.
Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 201 (1993), provides that
judicial notice may be taken of facts “capable of accurate ‘and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned” and that [a] court may take Judicial notice, whether fequested or
not," HE Rule 201(c) “at any stage of the proceeding,” HRE Rule 201(f1-
Indeed, “(tihe trial court may take judicial notice of « fact if it ss. conmon
knowledge or easily verifisble.” State v. lord, 63 Haw. 270, 272, 625 P.2a
1038, 1039 (1981) (citation omitted); Additionally,
an appellate court is not precluded from exercising its
iseretion to take judicial notice of certain facts where
22
‘*#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
grievance shall mean a complaint filed by a bargaining unit
Employee, or by the Union, alleging a violation,
misinterpretation, or misapplication of a specific section of
this Agreement occurring after its effective date.” Section
15.01 of the CBA requires that “{a] grievance that arises out of
alleged Employer violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication
of this Agreement, its attachment, and appendices shall be
resolved as provided in Section 15.” Section 15 of the CBA
the trial court elected not to do so, See Application of
53. Haw. 496, 497 P.24 $49 {1970)- As we se
of the Judicial notice rule, and it would
‘wholescne one, is to eliminate the necessity
time of the court and Jury to make formal
proof of @ fact which cannot be dispated. van Selcen
Rangey'2, Inc, 199 Kan, 417, 420 Pc2d 298 (1987)
State vs Mave, 1 Haw. App. 644, 646, 623 P.2d #98, 299 (1981) (per curiam).
Rona argues that it is appropriate for che ICA and this court to
take judicial notice of the CBA because the CEA ia a “natter of public
record." See HRS § 82-3 (1593). (""Goverasent record’ ‘means information
maintained by an agency in written, auaitory, visual, electronic, or other
Physical form."); MRS § 9ZF-i1(a) 1993) ("Ail government records are open to
public inspection unless access ie restricted or closed by taw."l«, Jo
Kaho'chanohane v, State, 214 Hawai'i 302, 328, 162°P.3d 696, 722 (2007), we
took Judicial notice of “[Employees’ Retirement System of the State of” Baw
(ERS)] reports for the fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2604, and 2005" becaus
were “a matter of public record, and appropriate for judicial notice,
their significance bears directly on the instant matter.”
528, 162 P.3d at 722. We also noted that “[t]his case ia a proper case’ for
judicial notice of subsequent events inasmuch as the iasue of standing 1s coly
Falsed on appeal, and the parties were unable to develop the record regarding
the ERS” standing.” ig. at 329'n.13, 162 2.34 at 723 m.19
We have the discretion to take judicial netice of the CEA because
it 1s a matter of public record and easily verifiable, Also like the
Standing issue in Kabo'chanchano, the issue of exhaustion was raised for the
first tine on appeal and the Tecord below was sot adequately developed.
Therefore, we take judicial notice of the CBA provisions appended to Aona’s|
opening brief.
23
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
outlines the steps that must be taken to file a grievance.
Section 46.02a of the CBA provides that:
‘The Employer shall conply with all applicable Federal,
State, or Local safety Lave, rules and regulations. (6.C.
Chapter 12-208, Havall Administrative Rules, pertaining ¢o
protective clothing, shoes and accessories), inclucing the
Hawaii Workers Compensation Law. Tha Employer shail provide
a workplace free from violence by providing safety and
health training that includes cecogsition ef conditions and
Denavior that say lead to or increase the risk of violence
and the means and the methods to prevent or reduce thar risk
fo -Employees and supervisors during work hours
Upon review of the facts alleged and issues raised in
Williams's petition, it is clear that they do not arise from the
terms of the CBA. See Blair v, ing, 96 Hawai'i 327, 332, 31 P.3d
1e4, 189 (2001) (in order to determine if an action vas in tort
or in the nature of assumpsit “this court has locked to the
essential character of the underlying action in the trial court.
+ + The character of the action should be determined from the
facts and issues raised in the complaint, the nature of the
entire grievance, and the relief sought.” (internal citations
omitted)). Williams’s petition states that:
Robert Acna is causing me psychological stress due to the
fact that he is a larger man than i am, he say not like ay
‘ace and I fear he say attack ne and couse ne much nore
re bodily and psychological haze than he already has. 1
severely threatened by Robert Aona due to his excessive
size. He causes me anxiety when I see him.
Williams’s petition does not constitute a CBA grievance because
it does not “alleg[e] 2 violation, misinterpretation, or
misapplication of a specific section of [the CBA) occurring after
24
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
its effective date.” Instead, it is clear that Willians is
seeking @ TRO and injunction as an individual against Aona solely
sn his individval capacity; the fact that Willians and Aona are
also employee and supervisor 1s not relevant to the relief
sought, In sum, Williams's petition is beyond the scope of the
can.
eM e nis
Sitdiass Soapiained of naean intentional tore
Additionally, even if the CBA applied, because the
conduct Millians sought to enjoin was an intentional tort, he was
not required to exhaust Ais remedies under the CBA. See Hokama,
92 Hawai'i at 273, 990 P.2d at 1155. In his petition, willians
alleged that Aona “palmed [him] on [his] left sided chest area
causing an innediate sharp pain that required energency medical
teeatnent [.]” There ss no indication that Williams assented to
this bodily contact. Therefore, Aona’s conduct clearly fits the
common law intentional tort of battery, as “a defendant causes
battery when he or she ‘intentionally causes bodily contact to
the plaintif£ in a way not justified by the plaintiff's apparent
wishes or by a privilege, and the contact sa in fact hamful or
against the plaintiff's will.’* Doe Parente No, iv, state,
Dept. of Educ, 100 Hawai'i 34, 68, 58 8.34 545, 599 (2002)
(acoba, J., dissenting) (quoting Dobbs, The Lay of Tarts, § 28 at
52-53 (2000) (citations omitted) ).
25.
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Additionally, Williams claims that Aona 1s causing hin
“psychological stress." The infliction of emotional distress is
also a cognizable tort claim recognized by this court. See, e.9,
Kaho'chanchano v. State, 117 Hawai'i 262, 306, 178 P.3d 538, 582
(2008) (explaining that “a plaintiff may recover for [the
negligent infliction of emotional distress], absent any physical
manifestation of his or her psychological injury or actual
physical presence within 2 zone of danger, where a reasonable
person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circunstances of the
case”) (citation omitted)); Hac v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 102 Hawai'i
92, 106, 73 P.3d 46, 60 (2003) (“Intentional infliction of
emotional distress is an injury recognized by the Restatement as
independently giving rise to liability.”). Therefore, the
conduct complained of in Williams’s petition constitutes an
exception to the general rule that Williams was required to
exhaust his contractual remedies before seeking judicial relief.
The cases Acna relies upon do not change the analysis.
Aona incorrectly implies that in Santos we held that the
employee-plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative
renedies before seeking a judicial renedy for tort claims related
to the intentional infliction of emotional distress, However, we
did not hold that the employee was required to exhaust
contractual remedies under the CBA before seeking a judicial
26
‘+#* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
remedy for tort claims. Instead, we held that a previous circuit
court judgment that the employee “could not bring an action
against the State (his employer] without first having exhausted
his contractual remedies became final when (the employee] did not
appeal the same and the time provided for such appeal expired.
Thus, [the employee] is barred from relitigating that issue.”
Santos, 64 Haw. at 656, 646 P.2d at 967. As such, Santos does
not conflict with a holding that the exhaustion of contractual
remedies does not apply to tort claims.
Aona also clains that the ICA’s decision in Winslow is
controlling. In Winslow, an employee was denied paid
administrative leave. Subsequently
[the employes] filed a grievance . . . in accordance with
the grievance procedures set out [4h the CBA) alleging that
the failure to grant her request for paid acminiserative
eave and transfer violates the terna of the collective
bargaining agreement, specifically, Sections 11
(Disciptine) 12) (Layotf), 49 (sanirary Conditions), 50
(Staffing and Workload), nd 46. (Working Condition:
Safety)’ in ner grievance, appellant slso sage allegations
of sex discrimination and inopecified Occupational Satety
and'Health Act (OSHA) ‘lolations
Winslow, 2 Haw. App. at 53, 625 P.2d at 1049-50. Before
completing the grievance process “appellant filed suit in circuit
court against the state and the Union alleging essentially the
same claims that were initially raised in the grievance.” Id. at
53-84, 625 P.2d at 1050. The complaint included “allegations of
negligence” and “infliction of emotional distress.” Id, at 54
n.3, 625 P.2d at 1050 n.3. The ICA held that “where the terms of
2
“+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
public employment are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement pursuant to HRS Chapter 89 and the agreement includes a
grievance procedure to dispose of employee grievances against the
public employer, an aggrieved employee is bound by the terms of
the agreement.” Id. at 55, 625 P.2d at 1050.
Although Winslow required the employee to exhaust her
contractual remedies for claims that included claims in tort, the
facts and circumstances in Winslow are distinguishable from those
in the instant Application. It is true that the employee in
Winslow included the tort claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in her complaint; however, the tort claim
arose out of her primary claim that she was denied paid
administrative leave in violation of the terms of the CBA. Here,
Williams’s tort claims of battery and “psychological stress” form
the bases for his entire petition. Unlike the employee in
Winslow, Williams does not allege any violation of the CBA. Nor
does he name the City and County as a party to his petition.
Additionally, to read the ICA’s decision in Winslow
broadly as: requiring the exhaustion of contractual claims for all
tort claims would be inconsistent with our later decision in
Hokama, where we stated that “(aJs a general proposition, we
agree that the contractual grievance procedure does not apply to
tort actions.” Hokama, 92 Hawai'i at 273, 999 P.2d at 872
28
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
(anteinal citations omitted). As such, the district court's
exercise of jurisdiction was not inconsistent with Minslov.
4. Williams was not remixed to exhaust his
The TCA concluded that “ona failed to desonstrate that
a written remedy was available under the CBA grievance procedure
that could protect Willians fron future harassment, Because Aona
did not denonstrate that the CBA provides a reasonable
alternative to an injunction ofder, the presumed goal of such a
policy 4s not applicable.” Williams, 2008 WL 5182933, at +4
(footnote omitted) .
Rona argues that the TCA erred because (1) the CBA
denonstrates the City and County's concern over workplace
violence and contractual abligation “te provide a workplace free
from violence by providing . . . the method and means to prevent
or reduce the risk £0 Employees and supervisors," and (2)
testimony before the district court from Deputy Corporation
counsel for the City and County expressed the city and County's
position that “DES wished to manage the worksite itself, without
court interference, and that DES can manage the situation in
various ways, such (#ic] arranging no direct dealings between
wsiaiaae and ona, reassignnents, or having a third party present
during those tines that Williams and Acna might have to be
kogether.”
29
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
The ICA correctly concluded that the CBA did not
provide an effective remedy for Williems. See Hokama, 92 Hawai'i
at 273; Fruit and ve Wazehousens 260 v.
Morley, 378 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1967) (stating that “the
exhaustion of intraunion remedies doctrine cannot apply unless
there is available from the union a remedy which is neither
uncertain nor futile. Inherent in this proposition is the idea
that to invoke the exhaustion principle the union must show that
there was a procedure available to the menbers within the union
structure reasonably calculated to redress the particular
grievance complained of.”).
‘The CBA provision Aona claims is controlling is titled
workplace safety. Willians’s petition was not limited to the
workplace. Instead, Williams sought a TRO and injunction to
enjoin Ana from “contacting, threatening, or physically
harassing” Williams or anyone residing at his residence; calling
Williams on the phone; and “entering or visiting” Willians’s
“residence, including yard and garage” and “place of employnent.”
In other words, Williams asked the district court to regulate
conduct not only in the workplace but beyond the workplace ~~
places where the CBA hi
no effect. Therefor
as the relief
Williams sought was not limited to the workplace, the CBA could
not provide an adequate remedy,
30
+4** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Additionally, the CBA did not present specific steps
that would be taken in the event of a physical altercation
between an employee and a supervisor. The CBA’s broad mandate to
provide unspecified “means to prevent or reduce the risk (of
violence] to Employees and supervisors” is not specific enough to
provide an adequate alternative to the specific tezms of a TRO
and injunction against harassment.
Furthermore, Aona’s argument that the ICA should have
considered the testimony of the Deputy Corporation Counsel
regarding the steps that the City and County would take to manage
the work site is also unavailing, The CBA is a contract between
the City and County and United Public Workers AFSCME, Local 646,
AFL-CIO. When interpreting a contract, it is well-settled that
courts should not draw inferences from a contract zeqarding
the parties’ intent when the contract se definite and
Unambiguous. in fact, contractual cerss should be
interpreted according to their plain, ordinary meaning and
accepted uge in common speech. The court should look no
farther than the four corners of the docunent to determine
whether an ambiguity exists
United Pub, Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO v. Dawson Int'l,
Incs, 113 Hawai'i 127, 140, 149 P.3d 495, 508 (2006) (quoting
State Farm Fire 4 Cas. Co. v, Pac, Rent-All, Inc., 90 Hawai'i
315, 324, 978 P.2d 753, 762 (1999) (citations omitted)). As
such, the ICA was not required to consider the Deputy Corporation
Counsel's testimony regarding interpretation of the CBA
contractual terns.
31
“+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
e. public policy
We agree with the ICA’s conclusion that “(t]he state
has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the
kind of abuse of which Williams complained.” Williams, 2008 WL
51862933, at *4. The broad availability of a TRO and injunction
serves the public interest by preventing physical and
psychological violence.
Allowing an injunction against harassment in cases like
this does not conflict with the policy favoring the exhaustion of
contractual remedies. Williams did not attempt to circunvent the
contractual grievance process. Instead, he filed his petition in
conjunction with a grievance. According to Williams, he only
wanted the injunction to last until the workplace violence
investigation was concluded. A TRO and injunction provide timely
intervention and hopefully prevent future harassment. As
Williams explained in his answering brief -- filed more than nine
months after the district court hearing -- “I did file a
grievance. To date there has not been a response. This was an
assault that needed an immediate response. It takes a long time
for [sic] any action is taken on a grievance.” Depriving
employees of the opportunity to seek a TRO and injunction against
harassment merely because they we:
parties to a CBA would
leprive employees of an immediate remedy against violence.
32
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Iv. concwsron
Accordingly, while the ICA erred when it affizmed the
district court's jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of
preemption, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction on
the alternative bases discussed in detail in this opinion.
Consequently, in accordance with Rule 36(d) (2) of the Hawai'i
Rules of Appellate Procedure, we (1) vacate the judgment entered
by the ICA on Decenber 30, 2008; (2) vacate the part of the ICA's
Memorandum Opinion concerning preemption; and (3) affirm the
district court's July 17, 2007 Order Granting Petition for
Injunction Against Harassment.
Frederick W. Rohlfing
and Michael G. Kozak
(of Case Lombardi s Pettit)
for petitioner/respondent=
appellant Cacti LI
Cedric C. Williams
respondent/petitioner- DP >
appellee, pro se
Conca €, Duly by +
Co tb ny
3
| c4b446ae3b63844bd4734ab1253a889dcb3be835f9f5f5fbdf52b46a5be82022 | 2009-06-19T00:00:00Z |
b752be51-84a5-4af1-a213-f88a5961ebfd | State v. Schwab | null | 29556 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
NO. 29556
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
aug
Vivi
STATE OF HAWAT'T, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appelless]
ors
MENDTE M. SCINAB, Petitioner/Defendant-Arpe1 1d
a
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 07-1-0582)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION POR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Moon, C.J. for the court")
Petitioner /Defendant~Appellant Wendie M. Schwab's
application for writ of certiorari filed on May 5, 2009 is hereby
Hawai'i, May 28, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
rejected.
DATED: Honolulu,
Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ, and circuit
2 Considered by: Moon. C.J.
guage Perkins, assigned by ‘ronson of waconcy.
| 64a0396f44a6437faf90b6289e16451372fe6d273e8de9986f17c97cf3127903 | 2009-05-28T00:00:00Z |
c0ff8f1f-ebb5-4ae2-a75e-5e09249ebeff | State v. Peralta | null | 28829 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 28829
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
ont
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellei
ROGER PERALTA, Petitioner/Defendant~Appel lant
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 02-1-2023)
R WRIT OF CERT
Duffy, J., for the court!)
(By:
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Roger Peralta‘ s
application for writ of certiorari, filed on April 20, 2009, is
hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 26, 2009. TR
FQ,
FOR THE COURT: e \
SEAL
Ynan 6, Doli & g
Loe WY
Associate Justice
Richard L. Hoke, Jr.
for petitioner/defendant-
appellant on the application
Considered by: Moon, C.J, Nakayama and Duffy, J0., Chroust Judge
ito, in place of Accba, J.) recused, and Circuit Judge Sakamoto, assigned by
Feasen of vacancy.
| be1940317ae4452266d622a0d08a1619c0db8656194063cbd5f077ffaf3a786f | 2009-05-26T00:00:00Z |
46950a5f-6565-4695-ba57-7f13df1f6113 | Kay v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | Wo. 27581
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
WILLIAM KAY, JR., Individually and as Special Administrator of
the Estate of JEFFREY KAY, Respondent/Petitioner-Appellant,
KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, INC.
Petitioner /Respondent~Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(S-P. NO. 02-1-0261)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court")
Petitioner/Respondent-Appellee’s application for writ
of certiorari filed on May 7, 2009, is hereby rejected.
DATE!
Honolulu, Hawai", June 16, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Busetce Caen
Associate Justice
George W. Playdon, Jr.,
Kelvin H. Kaneshiro, and
R. Aaron Creps for Petitioner/
Respondent-Appellee on the
application
aa
fihel Hd QL Hull 6002
‘considered by: Moon, C.J.» and Nakayama, J., Circuit Judge Town, in
place of Acobay J, recused, Circust Judge Wong, in place of Duffy,
Fecused, and Cirevit Judge Crandall, in place of Recktenwald, J., recused.
| 338162440f971cd834e61c7faa7a4eab07549d032a3160b0518b2c9f1a7d2d6e | 2009-06-16T00:00:00Z |
35c598bb-28eb-41c1-92bf-5ed50e6f8190 | In re Hardy | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
no, 29773
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
IN RE JANE E. HARDY
00d,
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
RDER GRANTING PETITION 7
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktér 2)
Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached
affidavits, Hardy's May 22, 2009 letter and attached
certification of marriage issued by the State of Florida showing
that Petitioner Jane &. Hardy’s name legally changed to Jane
Hardy Miller when she married Irving M. Miller on May 2, 1982,
the lack of objections by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, and
the record, it appears that Jane Hardy Miller is the Jane
Elizabeth Hardy assigned attorney number 1918, and that
Petitioner Jane B. Hardy’s petition complies with the
requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of the Suprene Court of
the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Hardy shall
return her original license to practice law to the Clerk of this
court forthwith. The Clerk shall retain the original license as
part of this record. Petitioner Hardy shall comply with the
notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), (b),
(a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16.
qaws
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the
name of Jane Elizabeth Hardy, attorney number 1918, from the roll
of attorneys of the State of Hawai'i, effective with the filing
of this order.
DATE!
Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 3, 2009,
Ge
Bectes Tete Or
Ao ae
Gone 6 Reblig
PNAC, Reet Ch
| 04e4cd5c8a4668413d94641403de1c5e6acdbe865c6da5894f344f9e1139223e | 2009-06-03T00:00:00Z |
94893cbd-7650-4bb7-96d1-eca1347ba59f | State v. Bousman | null | 28747 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | wo, 28747
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T
SS
STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee
PHILLIP J. BOUSMAN,
Petitioner/Defendant~Appellant
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 06-1-0351(4))
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORART
(By: Acoba, J., for the court)
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
April 27, 2009 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Phillip J.
Bousman is hereby rejected.
, May 19, 2009.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai
FOR THE COURT:
‘Associate Justice
Jon N. Ikenaga, Deputy
Public Defender, on
the application’ for
petitioner/defendant-
appellant.
and Duffy, JJ., and
{considered by: Moony C.J++ Nakayama, Acob
Circuit Judge Crandall, assigned by resson of vacancy.
| d5ec44f9cbd5361880e4e3411c102f9a3af1400d72c656c95b17a27254ec70f4 | 2009-05-19T00:00:00Z |
9bf22146-2d0f-40d4-8dd6-c9132653dd5a | Swift v. Perkins | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | HY 21 No ooue
wo. 29844 F
L
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIIE = = S
8
BENJAMIN CORTEZ SWIFT, Petitioner,
‘THE HONORABLE RICHARD K. PERKINS, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT
coUaT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I and
STATE OF HANAT'T, Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(SEP No. 7-1-0026)
ORDER
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the papers submitted by Benjamin
Cortez Swift, which is deemed a petition for a writ of mandamus,
At appears that petitioner fails to demonstrate a clear and
indisputable right to relief. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i
200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an
that will not issue unless the petitioner
and indisputable right to relief and a lack
of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or
obtain the requested action.). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petition for a writ of mandamus without
payment of the filing fee.
I IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
extraordinary remedy
demonstrates a clear
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, June 12, 2009.
Teprtim,
ON ise
NS
Ymca
er € Ned ont
| 9b5a83133fbbfe2189b14ac719200281c3b2a7c316bfb63e8d09a03932766410 | 2009-06-12T00:00:00Z |
1a61cf13-416f-4072-9c2f-b1f6e0977aa3 | Office of Discplinary Counsel v. Hartnett | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No, 29952
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, =|
ANDREW S. HARTNETT, IZ, Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(oDC 098-036-8753)
ORDER OF DISBARMENT
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
(By:
Upon consideration of the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel's petition for issuance of reciprocal discipline notice
to Respondent Andrew S. Hartnett, pursuant to Rule 2.15(b) of the
Rules of the Suprene Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH), the
memorandum, affidavit, and exhibits thereto, the Affidavit of
Thomas F. Robertson Regarding Service of the August 5, 2009
Notice and Order, the exhibits thereto, Respondent Hartnett’s
Statement of Non-Objection, and the record, it appears that: (1)
on May 12, 2009, the Supreme Court of Kansas accepted Respondent
Hartnett’s voluntary surrender of his license to practice law in
Kansas and disbarred him; (2) RSCH 2.15(b) requires the same or
substantially equivalent discipline, or restrictions or
conditions upon the attorney's license to practice law in the
State of Hawai'i, unless Respondent Hartnett shows cause under
RSCH 2,15(c) as to why imposition of the same or substantially
equivalent discipline should not be imposed; (3) Respondent
Hartnett responded to our August 5, 2009 order and states that he
does not object to or otherwise oppose the petition filed in this
case; (4) the same discipline is warranted in this jurisdiction;
and (5) the same discipline in this jurisdiction is disbarment.
It further appears that Respondent Hartnett does not maintain 2
practice in the State of Hawai'i and that, notwithstanding RSCH
2.16(c), the disbarment should be effective inmediately.
‘Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Andrew S. Haztnett
is disbarred effective upon the filing of this order.
IT 18 FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Hartnett shall
pay all costs of this proceeding.
IT 18 FINALLY ORDERED that Respondent Hartnett shall
comply with the notice, affidavit, and record requirements of
sections (a), (b), (a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, September 14, 2009,
Porte
Seu crore) aie
Boel
Gua Dosey
Pim ©: Mech bowl off
| 723f19eac379c502690f0bd6adcb6070df26edf3210fb081e696ba0ddbbfa998 | 2009-09-14T00:00:00Z |
ed80bb5b-1457-48c2-a63b-13a9ead98ba7 | Gannett Pacific Corporation v. Fujioka | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29821
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
GANNETT PACIFIC CORPORATION,
dba The Honolulu Advertiser, Petitioner, 2
BARON S. FUJIOKA,
tor, State Procurenent Offic:
Administ
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
‘ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Gannett Pacific Corporation, dba the
Honolulu Advertiser and the papers in support, it appears that
the issuance of an invitation for bids involves the exercise of
discretion and judgment by respondent State Procurement Office
Administrator. See Hawai'i Administrative Rules §§ 3-122-10, 3
122-13, 3-122-16.06, 3-122-21. Therefore, petitioner is not
entitled to mandamus relief. See Hanabusa v. Lingle, 119 Hawai'i
341, 347, 198 P.3d 604, 610 (2008) (Mandamus relief is available
to compel an official to perform a duty allegedly owed to an
individual only if the individual's claim is clear and certain,
the official’s duty is ministerial and so plainly prescribed as
to be free from doubt, and no other remedy is available. A duty
is ministerial where the law prescribes and defines the duty to
be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave
nothing to the exercise of discretion and judgment.).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, gune 2, 2009.
Goro
Pecsetes Cin aweseynrrie
LN
Weare Beet’
De © Mt be of
| e00c4a4e75f0c560bd6fa9646962cd1a258f6f324e8915c5677948973d7ee6cf | 2009-06-02T00:00:00Z |
3f377a47-6e3d-4101-8079-d6784c66cc43 | Martin v. Lingle | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29643
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
ANDY MARTIN,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,
LINDA LINGLE, in her official capacity
as Governor of the State of Hawai'i;
DR. CHIYOME FUKINO, in her official capacityay
‘as Director of the Department of Health,
Respondents /Defendants-Appeliees.
62:6 Yc ony
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(crv. No. 08-1-2147)
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court®)
Petitioner/plaintiff-appellant andy Martin's
application for writ of certiorari, filed on July 9, 2009, is
hereby rejected
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 3, 2009.
* considered by: Moon, C.J.
Nakayana, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald,
ams
| 3714b97556953c877bbbccb764341c523e8dd902a6ee38f4605e26e1f1e1e85a | 2009-08-03T00:00:00Z |
b564aebe-9a3e-46dc-92e8-12e60065fee1 | Killion v. State | null | 29077 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 29077
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
LARRY KILLION, JR.,
Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant
vs.
STATE OF HARAI'I,
Respondent /Respondent-Apellee
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(S.P.P, NO. 0771-0010; CR. NO. 89-0008)
ORDER REJI PI
(By: Acoba, J., for the court")
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on May 4,
2009 by Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Larry Killion, Jr., is
hereby rejected.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 3, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
(e
Porm tne NY
DATED:
Larry Killion, Jr.,
petitioner pro se,
the application.
3
1
+ Considered by: Moon, C.J, Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and “I
Recktenwald, JJ.
O32
| 24354490e4c0cee7662d1b48a493dbf66fbc047d8de15de3ad8109c54b30ff1e | 2009-06-03T00:00:00Z |
04c63910-2e64-43ea-b320-66a31cd9fb21 | State v. Line | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRA
No, 27850
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'
STATE OF HAWAT'T, of
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee ze
z 2
vee e =
aft m
c
MELODIE C. LINE,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant ;
Le. ae
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 05~1-0429(3))
2 Zid 8 area
Acoba, J., for the court!)
Upon review of the Order Accepting Application for Writ
of Certiorari and Requesting Further Briefing, filed in this case
on July 6, 2009, it appears that Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
Melodie C. Line’s name is misspelled in the caption, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's first name in the
caption of the said Order is corrected by striking the “Y” and
inserting “IE” in its place. The clerk of the court is directed
to incorporate the foregoing change on the original order.
+ duly 8, 2009.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai
and Duffy, 39.) and
5 considered by Moon, C.J. tak
Circuit Judge Aim, assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 08488534668e8389a8c0431ac4e814e1141bb8a16ffb641e19d6c1494b4767e6 | 2009-07-06T00:00:00Z |
50c58dba-cd29-4491-8fe2-b615b2814fbf | Fresch v. Estate of Tavares | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 28273
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
LEIMOMI LESLIE FRESCH, as Next Friend for HOWARD K. LESLIE, JR.,
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appel lant,
and
LEIMOMI LESLIE FRESCH, Individually, and HOWARD K, LESLIE, SR3,
Respondents/Plaintiffs-Appellees, 3
‘THE ESTATE OF JAMIE K. TAVARES, deceased,
Respondent /Defendant-Appellee,
OZ Ne 4
and
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.
(CIV. No. 97-0448)
HOWARD K. LESLIE, OR., Petitioner/Plaintitt-appellant,
and
MEGAN LESLIE, a minor, and MALYSSA LESLIE, a minor, through
their Guardian Ad Litem, MARLENE K. ANDUHA,
sspondents/Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs
JEFFREY K. KANUI, Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF
JAMIE K. TAVARES, Deceased, Respondent /Defendant-Appellee,
and
JOHN DOES 1-30; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.
and
JEFFREY K. KANUL, Personal Representative of THE ESTATE OF JAMIE
K. TAVARES, Deceased, Respondent /Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
one
LEIMOMI L. FRESCH and HOWARD K. LESLIE, SR.,
Respondents/Third-Party Defendants-Appellees
JOSEPH L. WILDMAN and SIBILLA & WILDMAN,
Respondents /Intervenors-appellees.
(CIV. NO, 98-5468)
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NOS. 97-0448 and 98-5468)
APPLICATION FOR
Moon, C.J., for the court")
Petitioner/plaintiff-appeliant Howard K. Leslie, Jr.’s
application for writ of certiorari, filed May 1, 2009, is hereby
rejected,
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 4, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
kl SAD
"SEAL
5
Ve og ws
Considered by: Moon, C.z., Wakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 23., and
Cireuit Judge Lee, assigned by reason of vacancy
-2-
| e2b2b950e57e975f9198f9c15299ac3168af189b1dd31d9bf376c69ad7531d75 | 2009-06-04T00:00:00Z |
5e7db7fb-a268-4e31-8269-e78a33384d3e | In re D. B. | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29238
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAr'r
IN THE MATTER OF
D.B., A Minor Person.
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(Fe-MIsc. NO. 08-1-0198)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court")
Petitioner/petitioner-appellant Camira Bailey’s
application for writ of
filed gune
2009, is
hereby rejected.
DATE!
Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 6, 2009.
* considered by: Moon, C.., Nakayana,
Cireule Judge Kis, in place of Recktenwald, 2
coba. and Duffy, Jd.: and
recused.
| 08566ad4edd85fdca7ef017d0e22f2fcca49af34b413b9587808340a4bc2e360 | 2009-07-06T00:00:00Z |
97318bee-7623-4f3a-bb3b-e77c52f3c94d | Schillaci-Lavergne v. Murashige | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | no, 29831
a
=
z
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAET
JONEA SCHILLACI-LAVERGNE, Petitioner, 3
20:2 Wa |e noe sug
sunid
THE HONORABLE CALVIN K. MURASHIGE, JUDGE OF THE FAMILY
COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(UCCJER NO. 07-1-0003)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus and prohibition filed by petitioner Jonea Schillaci-
Lavergne and the papers in support, it appears that the question
of judicial disqualification is reviewable on appeal from a final
order ending the custody modification proceeding in UCCJEA No.
7-1-0003. Petitioner can appeal from a final order pursuant to
HRS §§ 571-54 (2006) and 641-1(a) (Supp. 2008). Consequently,
petitioners case is not one in which the question of
disqualification cannot otherwise be reviewed and immediate
review by way of mandamus and/or prohibition is not warranted.
See Peters v, Jamieson, 48 Haw. 247, 257, 397 P.2d 575, 582
(2964) (*[A] writ of prohibition will lie to compel a trial judge
to recuse him[] or [her]self because of bias or prejudice which
appears from the record, where . . . the case is one in which the
question of disqualification cannot otherwise be reviewed.”).
It further appears that the matters concerning
expert evaluations, discovery, and proof required for custody
modification are reviewable on appeal from a final order ending
asus
the custody modification proceeding in UCCJEA No. 071-0003.
Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to extracrdinary relief.
See Kena v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999)
(A weit of mandamus and/or prohibition is an extraordinary remedy
that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear
and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means
to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action. Such writs are not intended to supersede the legal
discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they
Intended to serve as legal renedies in lieu of normal appellate
procedures.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus and prohibition is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawas't, June 3, 2009.
Revert OT eateneyrrer
nn
Yom 10665,
Plot © (tects Bert
| 8af74e1f382b1570b26c5467c3c8305f37fb3cde06de736f2bff9fbd43f1b433 | 2009-06-03T00:00:00Z |
368a44d8-ab5f-4337-bd83-9884816a4430 | State v. Assaye | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
vo, 28078
sh) THE GOPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWATT
STATE OF WANAT'T, Respondent-Plaintite-repei@
vs. =
S 2
ABIYE ASSAYE, Petitioner-Defendant-Appel lant} ~ r
fh
g
3
Ss
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEGES
(HPD TRAFFIC NO. 1DTC-07-046070)
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court")
Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant’s Application for Writ
of Certiorari filed on April 17, 2009, is hereby accepted
‘the parties will be
and will be scheduled for oral argument.
notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 27, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
DATE!
Bama 6
Associate Justice
James $. Tabe,
Deputy Public’ Defender,
for petitioner-defendant-
appellant on the
application
and clreust
‘considered by: Hoon, C.J. Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 3d.
yadge Marks, in place of Fecktenwald, J., recused.
| e6affacc17d567596e5e5d40d9324c67d73fc79b258b2ce5830fc2f838f5424f | 2009-05-27T00:00:00Z |
ed8baf1c-acd0-41c5-857f-f19ccc1cbaa6 | Okamura v. C.T.C. Construction Company | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 20412
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
TERRI T. OKAMURA, Petitioner/Plaintift-Appellant,—
rc
i
C.7.C. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Hawaii corporation, s
and HYUNDAE PLUMBING, Respondents/Defendants-Appel lees,
and
HERMAN Y. HO? DOE INDIVIDUALS 1-20; DOE CORPORATIONS
1-20; and DOB ENTITIES 1-20, Respondents/Defendants.
(civ. No. 03-1-2037)
TERRI T. OKAMURA, Petitioner/Plaintiff,
.T.C. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LIMITED, a Hawaii
Corporation, and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
an T1linois corporation; DOE INDIVIDUALS 1-20, DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-20; and DOE ENTITIES 1-20, Respondents/Defendants.
(CIV. NO. 06-1-0126)
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NOS. 03-1-2037 and 06-1-0126)
(By: Duffy, J., for the court’)
Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Terri T. Okamura’s
application for writ of certiorari, filed on May 4, 2009, is
hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 4, 2009.
Junsuke Otsuka FOR THE couRT:
for petitioner/
plaints f£-appeilant
Grune. Duddy h +
on the application
Associate Justice
Moon, C.J., Nakayana, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ, and
* considered by:
jaigned by ‘reason of vacancy.
careuse Judge August,
Arthur S.K. Fong
‘and Peter C.K. Fong
for respondent /defendant~
appellee C.T.C Construction
Company, Limited on the
response
| 67378f8633194e98ac3f0e46cf5219f36abfa5553c5c04cfbd2862c45af48337 | 2009-06-04T00:00:00Z |
8b5a9f7f-f148-4ddc-ac8a-9095cb707fe4 | Razo v. State | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 20848
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
VINCE WILLIAM RAZO,
Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant © 7
vs. §
STATE OF HAWAI'E,
Respondent /Respondent-Appellee
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(S.P.P. NO. 07-01-0003(2); CR. NO. 03-1-0283(2))
RTTORART
(By: Acoba, J., for the court")
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on April
6, 2009 by Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Vince William Razo is
hereby rejected.
DATE! Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 8, 2009. BE
For The cou: eo’
poe
os S
associate Justice Ceo
Vince William Razo,
petitioner, pro se, on
the application.
+ considered by: Moon, €.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Circuit Judge Chang, assigned by reaaoh of vacancy.
| 16f66803af51d03660c3117a250b443b49c9c363e7f1ff58b2ba4811203af48c | 2009-05-08T00:00:00Z |
fdaf45fc-1a89-4205-b58a-95c2c7bcfd03 | State v. Burull | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
no. 28922
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF RAWAT'T
STATE OF HAWAT', 3, 3
nespondenr/Piaintit Appellee = to
= 1 a
vs. sed =
38 z rm
NEIL J. BURULL, a y oS
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE NO. 3DTA-06-04140)
RDER
‘Acoba, J., for the court")
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on June
25, 2009 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Neil J Burull is
hereby rejected.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 8, 2009.
DATED:
FOR THE COURT: sie
ae y
PN
Associate Justice \a SEAL
Coe ws
Gregory T. Grab, on
the application for
pet itioner/defendant-
appellant.
land putty, 39.
Considered by: Moon, C.J. Nakayama, Acob:
céeouit Judge Hizes, in place of’ Reckténwala, J.) secused”
| a665ebec63ad4455265c5f83ddee2ae111970103cf42ff7d5b01fdeedc960875 | 2009-07-08T00:00:00Z |
f11a0aad-39a3-47ac-b598-d645876e8047 | State v. Kahalewai | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 28685
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
STATE OF HAWAI'T, 5
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee $4lx
RADFORD KAHALEWAT,
Petitioner /Defendant Appellant
——————
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 6-1-1299)
REJECTI FOR WI BARI
(By: Acoba, J., for the court")
The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
March 27, 2009 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Radford
Kahalewai is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 8, 2009,
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
Richard D. Gronna, on
the application for
petitioner/defendant-
appellant.
{considered by: Moon, C.J-, Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
Cérouit Judge Alm, assigned by reason Of vacancy.
| ae59f33811f64abb3a63935d74ce030e590e0b349dbd8f52210ba1dca9690de3 | 2009-05-08T00:00:00Z |
a6c30cc7-9e84-4af5-9c0a-ee7824638d9f | Vimahi v. Blondin | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF EAWAT'TZ
NATASHA AVELA VIVANT and LOSEANE ENETI VIMAKT, ealtsonggo,
vs. J
THE HONORABLE KAREN N. BLONDIN, JUDGE OF THE, CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I and
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(GHVSE NO. Osc1=1788)
(ey: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, ACoEA Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition filed by petitioners Natasha Anela Vinahi
and Luseane Enits Vinahl and the papers in support, it appears
that the circuit court and the intermediate court of appeals
denied petitioners a stay of the writ of ejectment pending
Ateposition of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, net
pending disposition of petitioners’ appeal. Petitioners’ notion
to stay the writ of ejectnent pending appeal ss pending before
the circuit court and petitioners have not filed a motion to stay
the writ of ejectment pending appeal with the intermediate court
of appeals, ‘Therefore, petitioners are not entitled to
extraordinary relief. See Kema v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204,
962 P.24 324, 238 (1999) (A writ of mandamus and/or prohibition
ean extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the
petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief
and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged
wrong or obtain the requested action. Such writs are not
intended to supersede the legal discretionary authority of the
oats
lower courts, nor are they intended to serve as legal remedies in
lieu of normal appellate procedures.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June 2, 2009.
| e11e8b203c0d9b445fefc5557b7c4c9ae01c45a3ace7bef2ee4bbb8a5e38a211 | 2009-06-02T00:00:00Z |
35f4bee8-282c-4331-a662-f56f2d81d6ea | Tashio Holdings, LLC v. Anekona KBR LLC | null | 29484 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29484
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
TASHIO HOLDINGS, LLC, AXLE LLC, and MAX HOLDINGS, LLC,
Respondent s/Plaintiffs-appel lees,
ANEKONA KBR LLC, and BRIAN A. ANDERSON,
Respondents/befendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants
KB RESORT LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Petitioner/Interested Party-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIV. NO. 06-1-1709)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. and
Circuit Judge Nishimura, assigned ‘by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of appellant’s motion to dismiss
appeal, the papers in support and the record,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss appeal
is granted. This appeal is dismissed.
The parties shall bear
their own costs and fees.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 8, 2009.
yr
asec, Co Nentiney arte
On
orem. €: Rute Oh
PnbeWsliona
any
| c178bb49c74c7298ccd6108e3b260d1b87e67b41f5008c06a4badbebdc28308c | 2009-05-08T00:00:00Z |
62bf73ac-c871-4a49-8358-84be9b773599 | Conner v. Crandall | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29751
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
DE MONT R. D. CONNER, Petitioner, — / .
THE HONORABLE VIRGINIA L. CRANDRLL, JUDGE, OF TH. CERCUIRY
COURT OF THE FIRS? CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'E
CLAYTON FRANK, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT: OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondents. »
aS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(SPP NO, 06-1-0021 (Cr. Nos. 59460, 60121, 84-0553, @5-0110))
‘ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J.» Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. and
Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge Reckterwald,
assigned by reason of vacancy)
upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandanus filed by petitioner De Mont R. D. Conner, the papers in
support, and the record of SPP No, 06-1-0021, it appears that SPP
No, 06-1-0021 is scheduled for an evidentiary hearing before the
respondent judge on June 22, 2009 at 1:30 p.m. The June 22, 2009
hearing date was set by the respondent judge and counsels for the
parties at the February 23, 2009 status conference. Petitioner
was represented at the status conference by private counsel
Jeffrey Arakaki, who was appointed as petitioner's counsel
pursuant to HRPP 40(i), which obliged the respondent judge to
appoint counsel to represent petitioner at the evidentiary
hearing. Petitioner can discuss the evidentiary hearing with
counsel Arakaki, who can move the respondent judge for orders
regarding scheduling, transportation, and transcripts.
Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief. See
Kena v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (a
writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue
unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right
te relief and a lack of alterna’
@ means to redress adequately
the alleged wrong or cbtain the requested action.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, April 22, 2009.
ow
Pewee rectory Ouves
AP ON
Wn, Redeye +
Met Li. ect bxmrh
| 1d304f4eb30c6c8a18c9b1fa4c288384265e9541dea87a9fca0ebc1225a293f6 | 2009-04-22T00:00:00Z |
19c5027a-e711-492a-845b-f1759cb6d26f | State v. Werle | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No, 28653
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT
STATE OF HAWAI'T, Respondent/Plainti £f-Appel Leal,
Ts
WILLIAM EDAARD WERLE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appelijgnt.
oad
eh eld 62 nee
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APP!
(CASE NO. 2DTA~06-01623)
ATIORART
(By: Duffy, J., for the court?)
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant William Edvard Werle’s
application for writ of certiorari, filed on June 22, 2009, is
hereby accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The
parties will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding
scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai", guly 29, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Crane, Daly +
Associate Justice
Phyllis J. Hironaka,
Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner /defendant-
appellant on the application
2 considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
circuit Judge Chan, in place of Recktenvald, J., recused.
| 8c4560db0e84c6c11807ea5fadbaa0d1bc37f9bf29a74e0854b4848bc5fceb1f | 2009-07-29T00:00:00Z |
1f285dfb-2dbf-4d12-bdfa-516db035eb72 | Carter v. Town | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29782
MICHAEL L, CARTER, Petitioner,
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. TOWN, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent.
‘ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(SPP NO. 08-1-0037 (CR. NO. 04-1-1977))
ORDER
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Intermediate Court of’ Appeals Judge Nakamura,
assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Michael L. Carter, it appears that
petitioner fails to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to
relief, See Kena v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204-05, 982 P.2d
334, 338-39 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy
that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear
and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means
to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petition for a writ of mandamus without
payment of the filing £
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawai", May 7, 2009.
Yijnon.
eC Noe a8
Gene
Grane, aces he
CGA Fiaharersem
| c20d4085c240cfc79592de26f11e961a0c437c6d0d89c1fe1bb155ae57861bf7 | 2009-05-07T00:00:00Z |
ad7818b0-b34e-4547-afc2-06cf738cf5b5 | Karagianes v. Department of Public Safety, State of Hawaii | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No, 29783
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
GARY KARAGIANES, Petitioner,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAI'I,
ass
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(By: Moon, Cud., Nakayama, Reobs, and Duffy, 39. and
Circuit Judge Hirai, assigned by reason of vacancy}
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandanus filed by petitioner Gary Karagianes and the papers in
Support, it appears that petitioner seeks mandamus relief against
respondent by asserting that respondent unlawfully denied
petitioner access to trust account funds needed for appellate
expenses in No. 29572. However, respondent’s March 11, 2009
response to petitioner's request to access funds for No. 29572
advised petitioner that an itemized request was required and
requested that petitioner resubmit his request in itemized form.
Respondent’ request for resubmission was not a denial of
petitioner's request to access funds for No, 29872. Petitioner
resubmitted his request in itemized form on March 17, 2009 and
petitioner provides no evidence that respondent denied the
March 17, 2009 itemized request. Absent such evidence,
petitioner fails to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to
relief. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus
relief. See Kema v, Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334,
338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that
will not issue unless the petitioner denonstrates a clear and
indisputable right to relief and a lack of other means to redress
adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.).
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'l, May 14, 2009.
| 35a0198b822d1045e055abe1f7ad3da43613c9e5f3b9db323a13cb245a12c0a8 | 2009-05-14T00:00:00Z |
7327bf7c-c1ad-426d-aa3a-3bb9d29ece90 | Boles v. Engle | null | 29394 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No, 29394
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'
GLADYS BOLES, HERK BOLTON, HARRIET S. BOLTON, KeVri
C. PAUL CHISENA, BERTHA B. CHISENA, LENA B. COOK, JI
et al., for themselves and all others similarly 3%
Respondents/Plaintiffs-Appellees, i
vs.
CLYDE ENGLE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appel lant,
and
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. and SUNSTATES CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(s.P. NO, 06-1-0078)
(By: Woon, C.J. for the court")
Petitioner/defendant-appellant Clyde Engle’s
application for writ of certiorari filed on May 6, 2009 is hereby
rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, June’ 10, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
fom
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. and circuit
guage Mekenna, assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 2a5d66139a2eeb7a6ca2c5a85751019133a21efe596b7df4e928d4c873e4dca1 | 2009-06-10T00:00:00Z |
4ea23a9a-9517-4d19-8ddd-f8a1f1856d39 | Barbee v. The Queens Medical Center | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | NO. 28084
ae
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
DAPHNE E. BARBEE, FINN T. BARBEE, and
RUSTAM A. BARBEE, Petitioners/Plaintiffs-appellants,
‘THE QUEEN’S MEDICAL CENTER and WILLTAM
YARBOROUGH, M.D., Respondents/Defendants-Appellees
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO. 04-1-0766-04)
)RDER_ REJECT cION FOR WRIT ORARI
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court”)
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants Daphne £. Barbee,
Finn 7, Barbee, and Rustam A. Barbee’s application for writ of
certiorari, filed January 29, 2009, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 11, 2009.
FOR THE COUR’
\ considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, and Duffy, J3., and Cirevit
Judge Crandall, in place of Acoba, J., recused, and Circuit Judge Wong,
assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 33c5f30313243a04c94e220b2cced15d3a136962454b1b3bf34573242a6172e2 | 2009-03-11T00:00:00Z |
8897fe11-53a7-40a1-b5d6-1e5cfb530316 | Williams v. Aona | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | UAW LIBRARY
No, 28691
I THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
CEDRIC C. WILLIAMS, Respondent /Petitioner-Appellee
ROBERT AONA, Pet itioner/Respondent-Appeliant
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIVIL CASE No. 18507-1-859)
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Duffy, J., for the court”)
Petitioner/Respondent-Appellant Robert Aona’s
application for writ of certiorari, filed on March 27, 2009, is
hereby accepted.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 6, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Youn £. PB
Associate Justice
Frederick W. Rohlfing
and Michael G. Kozak
for petitioner/respondent-
appellant on the application 3
Boa FE
jf 2 om
3 2 °
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
Chrcuse Judge chang, assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 28fcb6f945999ddd7c484150d142ba2fa8472f6f7ed67506975398940872b6ca | 2009-05-06T00:00:00Z |
071a3604-ea33-4797-99ee-8ea79fd2f1b1 | Estate of Roxas v. Marcos | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | wo. 28702
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
ESTATE OF ROGER ROXAS; and THE GOLDEN BUDHA CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation, Petiticners-Appeliees;? |
IMELDA MARCOS, Respondent-Appellant, = |= cy =
land FERDINAND MARCOS, Respondent. 2 2 Ok
if & 6
=
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEOTATE COURT OF APFERHS sa
(CIV. No. 98-0522)
(By: Nakayama, J., Zor the court’)
Petitioners-Appellees’ application for writ of
certiorari filed on March 31, 2009, is hereby accepted and will
be scheduled for oral argument. The parties will be notified by
the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 6, 2009.
FOR THE couRT: Or
Rane rnucuwyorn (SEAL
Associate Justice 3
Ward D, Jones of Soe.
Bervar & Jones and
Daniel C. Cathcart of
Magana, Cathcart §
McCarthy for petitioner-
appellee on the
application
‘considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama and Duffy, JJ., Circuit Judge Del
Rosario for Acsba, J+, Fecvaed and Circuit Judge Pollack, ‘aseigned by reason
of vacancy.
| 099da9914e8b86ae70f9c8be586fae04b79a0b843cfaa1f5cf54540bd07540ef | 2009-05-06T00:00:00Z |
a7212daa-100f-491e-85bc-2a97b531dab1 | Grindling v. State | null | 29335 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
NO. 29335
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
CHRIS GRINDLING, Petitioner-Appellant,,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee. r
CERTIORARI 70 THE INTERMEDIATE couRT oF APPEALS”
({S.P.P. NO. 08-1-0001(2)/CR. NO. 98-0325(3)) o
ORDER DISMISSING APPLICATION POR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
‘WE: 'PRETUDICE
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court’)
It appearing that the judgment on appeal in the above-
referenced matter has not been entered by the Intermediate Court
of Appeals, see Hawai'i Revised statutes § 602-59(a), as amended
by Act 149 of the 2006 Hawai'i Session Laws; see also Hawai'i
Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 36(b) (1) (2006),
XT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner-appellant Chris
Grindling’s application for writ of certiorari, filed April 29,
2009, is dismissed without prejudice to re-filing the application
pursuant to HRAP Rule 40.1(a) (*No later than 90 days after the
filing of the intermediate court of appeals’ judgment on appeal,
or dismissal order, any party may apply in writing to the supreme
court for a writ of certiorari.-)
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 8, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Petre fOr
SEAL
Re oe w
+ Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 2., and circuit
court: Moon, ¢.
| 0124efa85cde1f972e02ca79a36078ebbaa65d314201081467623b67291f5458 | 2009-05-08T00:00:00Z |
cb4c96d8-8a71-41b3-bbaa-4950c956acb5 | Blaisdell v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii | null | 29723 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No, 29723
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
RICHARD BLAISDELL, Petitioner,
3
ws. ay x
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAET
and DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Responden
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CIVIL NO. 04-1-1455)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. and
Circuit Judge Raffetto, assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Richard Blaisdell, the papers in
support, and the answer by respondent Circuit Court of the First
Circuit, it appears that petitioner, having prevailed in his
appeal of Civil No. 04-1-1455, has a clear and indisputable right
to the declaratory and other relief sought from the circuit court
and from defendant Department of Public Safety in Civil No, 0d-1-
1455. See Blaisdell v, Department of Public Safety, 119 Hawai'i
275, 196 P.3d 277 (2008). Civil No. 04-1-1455 was remanded to
the circuit court on Decenber 2, 2008 with instructions to enter
a declaratory judgment and certain orders, but such judgment and
orders have not been entered to date. Petitioner moved the
circuit court on February 9, 2009 to expeditiously dispose of
Civil No. 04-1-1455, but the circuit court further delayed
disposition by reassigning the case on February 11, 2009 and
again reassigning the case sometime after March 27, 2009. Any
further delay in disposing of Civil No. 04-1-1455 would be
contrary to the circuit court’s duty to promptly and efficiently
as
Gispose of the case. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to
mandamus relief. See Kena v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982
P.2d 324, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
renedy that will issue where the petitioner denonstrates a clear
and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means
to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is granted. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit,
shall, by June 1, 2009: (1) enter a judgment in Civil No. 04-1-
1495 declaring plaintiff Richard Blaisdell’s “restricted” account
violative of HRS § 353-20 and order such relief to plaintiff as
may be appropriate as a result of such declaration, and (2) order
interest to the extent due but not yet credited, to be paid on
plaintiff's accounts.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 12, 2009.
Frm
Pease Oruadony are
ONS
Bon 6 Dati Q
SAM
| 2a08d4a30db04500ab1a14753d2e23c7037437a59d282a32457e0ee78c1186f2 | 2009-05-12T00:00:00Z |
dc04b533-1c06-4a02-b5f3-ab75858c7098 | Himalaya-Fidele v. Blondin | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 29724
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
CAROL JEAN HIMALAYA-PIDELE, Petitioner,
THE HONORABLE KAREN N. BLONDIN, JUDGE OF THE crgurT 5
COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I-and
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE
MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED.
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-CPl, Respondents
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING -
(CIVIL NO. 08-1-1478)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. and
Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Watanabe,
‘assigned by reason of vacancy)
upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
prohibition filed by petitioner Carol Jean Himalaya-Fidele and
the papers in support, it appears that the granting and entry of
a writ of ejectment is innediately appealable pursuant to HRS §
(Supp. 2008). See Penn v. Transportation Lease Hay.
630 P.2d 646, 649 (1981); Ciesla
(1995), Petitioner can
eat-2(a)
Ltd, 2 Haw. App. 272, 274,
Reddish, 78 Hawai'i 18, 889 P.2d 702
appeal from a writ of ejectment and can seek @ stay of the writ
‘Thus, petitioner is not
See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i
(A weit of prohibition is an
pending appeal pursuant to HRAP 8.
entitled to extraordinary relief.
200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999)
extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner
demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack
of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or
obtain the requested action, Such writs are not intended to
supersede the legal discretionary authority of the lower courts,
nor are they intended to serve as legal remedies in lieu of
normal appellate procedures.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
prohibition is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, april 20, 2009.
Sr
Ranta 6 nertapane
aa
Booms, Dvbliss
Qunie KQ Klatarabe_
| 4b47e187276389cc205a86b94260316ec5dd96cc190be1418fefddf5df1650cb | 2009-04-20T00:00:00Z |
cb1628dc-93b4-43de-8b28-167844a17e9b | Tani v. Healy Tibbitts Builders, Inc. | null | 28648 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
no. 28648
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
YVONNE B, TANI, Individually and as Next Friend of JERICA N.
TANI-HIGA, BRONSON P, TANI-HIGA, CAMERON K.L. TANI-KTYOKANE,
ANDI P. TANI-HIGA, and KALEO E. WONG BEATRICE NAKAUYE,
Individually and as bersonal Representative of the Estate of
NOBUO TANI; ICHIKO MORATIN; AUDREY TANI; and LAURIE SHICHIDA,
Respondents/Plaintiffs-Appellees,
HEALY TIBBITTS BUILDERS, INC.; and GEORGE LEOUE,
Respondents /Defendants-Appellees, ©
and
PLASTIC PILINGS, INC., Petitioner/Defendant-Apgel lant
and “
DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Defendants
and GEORGE LEOTA,
HEALY TIBBITTS BUILDERS, INC.
Respondent s/Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
PLASTIC PILINGS, INC.,
Petitioner/Third-Party Defendant-Appellant,
and
Respondent /Third~Party Defendant-Appellee,
SAUSE BROS., INC.,
and
DOE DEFENDANTS 1-100, Third-Party Defendants.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(crv. wo, 04-1-0482)
ont “ATION FOR WRIT "
Duffy, J., for the court’)
Petitioner/Defendant /Third-Party Defendant-Appellant
Plastic Pilings, Inc.'s application for writ of certiorari, filed
on March 4, 2009, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, April 8, 2009,
FOR THE COURT:
Conic, Dotty,
Associate Justice
Steven K. Hisaka
and Janice T. Futa
for petitioner/defendant/
third-party defendant~
appellant on the application
Robert G. Frame,
Michael J. Nakano, and
Mark S. Hamilton (Frame
& Nakano) for respondents/
defendants /third-party
plaintiffs-appellees on
the response
‘considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Accba, Duffy, JJ., and
Circuit Juage Pollack, aesigned by reason of vacancy.
2
| 6a5cf4e44f61bd8ab3d79c8a1b12cec62ab8908752e1c3fb677caf360266b976 | 2009-04-08T00:00:00Z |
b3fcc1fb-bb72-48a5-bfa3-c1440e0b2002 | State v. Kelly | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 26850
AH sone
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE oF Hawar‘} &
———
STATE OF HAWAI'Z, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appeliee
00% Wy
DWAYNE KELLY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 05-1-2639)
\G_ABPLICI OF CERTIOI
1 Duffy, J., for the court?)
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Dwayne Kelly's
application for writ of certiorari, filed on April 13, 2009, is
hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 26, 2009.
FOR THE couRT:
Yorn, Duden «
Aasoclate Justice
Karen T. Nakasone,
Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner /defendant-
appellant on the application
Donn Fudo, Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney,
for respondent /plaintiff-
appellee on the response
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
Circuit Judge Hirai, assigned by reason of vacancy.
fate
| 460e2a6a00d476f500175958ddfc1c05a08cac64a905e893284a9675ca28a487 | 2009-05-26T00:00:00Z |
415ec456-2c74-443c-aaa6-1aa1c0ba2ce1 | State v. Ganiron | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | saw LIBRARY
No. 28974
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee,
STATE OF HAWAT’
EMILIO GANIRON, JR., Petitioner/Defendant-appeiiant. .2 on
- ST
js 2 a
22 = S
CERTIORARI T0 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF AP! 2
(eR. NO. 07-1-1280) a 8
STION FOR
EMILIO™A. GAM
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court)
It appearing that petitioner /defendant-appellant Emilio A.
Ganiron, gy. filed an application for writ of certiorari on March
27, 2009 and a second, seemingly identical application for writ
of certiorari on March 30, 2009,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the second application (filed
March 30, 2009) is stricken as (1) unnecessary and (2) untimely
inasmuch as March 30, 2009 is the ninety-first day measured from
Revised
the December 29, 2008 judgment on appeal, see Hawai
Statutes § 602-59(c)
Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 30, 2009.
(supp. 2007).
DATED:
FOR THE COURT:
, er
considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakeyama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Circste sudge Cardoza, assigned by reason of vacancy
| 3e148bce8ee71c97b73635315ea55c58419d3bfe601634bee0e03ec470325158 | 2009-03-30T00:00:00Z |
8926a6ce-cd4c-4490-bbea-851c39018710 | Murakami v. Hifo | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | aw USRAF
Wo. 29706
az
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT"
Md L- av obld
GLENN NOBUKI MURAKAMI and ANN SUE ISOBE, Petits
Les
THE HONORABLE EDEN ELIZABETH HIFO, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'T;
MICHAEL DAVID SAKATANI; ‘CHRISTINE MARIE
SAKATANI; and 808 DEVELOPMENT LLC, Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CIVIL NO. 03-1-1712)
‘ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and Intermediate
Court of Appeals Chief Judge Recktenwald, in place of
Nakayama, J., recused, and Intermediate Court of Appeals
Judge Watanabe, assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus and/or prohibition filed by petitioners Glenn Nobuki
Murakami and Ann Sue Isobe and the papers in support, it appears
that the question of whether the respondent judge was required to
immediately determine the legal sufficiency of the March 10, 2009
declaration of judicial disqualification is reviewable on appeal
from a final order ending the post~judgment
No, 03-1-1712.
proceedings in Civil
Petitioners can appeal fron a final order
pursuant to HRS § 641-1 (a) (Supp. 2008). Consequently,
petitioners’ ¢
Ag not one in which the question of
disqualification cannot otherwise be reviewed and immediate
review by way of mandamus and/or prohibition is not warranted.
Seq Koma v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai"i 200, 204, 962 P.2d 334, 338 (1999)
(A weit of mandamus and/or prohibition is an extraordinary remedy
that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear
and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means
to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action. Such writs are not intended to supersede the legal
discretionary authority of the lower courts, nor are they
intended to serve as legal remedies in lieu of normal appellate
procedures.); Eeters v, Jamieson, 48 Haw. 247, 257, 397 P.2d 575,
582 (1964) (*(A] writ of prohibition will lie to compel a trial
judge to recuse him[{] or [her]self because of bias or prejudice
which appears from the record, where . . . the case is one in
which the question of disqualification cannot otherwise be
reviewed.”}. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus and/or prohibition is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, april 7, 2009.
Cron 8. Dusery Oe
PMC Meer Ci ch
urine K.Q Watenalg_
| 0b33ebc0695bcdae94d06ed32914e1cae132c535b47f7675c42e7481225eb847 | 2009-04-07T00:00:00Z |
6a5070f3-bdb4-471e-9804-99552fb481e1 | State v. Tanaka | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAWUBRARY
No. 28681
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
STATE OF HAWATI, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee,
JASON TANAKA aka KEVIN NAKAYAMA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appel lant
CERTIORARI 70 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(OR. NO. 04-1-0735)
ORDER REIECTH WRI OF CER
(By: Hoon, C.d., for the court")
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Jason Tanaka aka Kevin
Nakayama's application for writ of certiorari, filed February 18,
2009, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, March 11, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
a i.
SEAL °
1 ud 6002
‘ony
aa
62
\ considered by: oon, C.J. Wakeyena, Acoba, and Duffy,
uage Crandall, agaigned by reavon of vacancy
| 99fe2ca49fc712be493ad743493fe8f08593202acae22b2994c205990b04655c | 2009-03-11T00:00:00Z |
79052aca-eff1-47bb-bafb-ebd065fcb779 | Save Diamond Head Waters, LLC v. Hans Hedemann Surf, Inc. | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 27804
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
SAVE DIAMOND HEAD WATERS LLC., a Hawaii limited
liability corporation; KAPIOLANI PARK PRESERVATION SOCIETY,
LLC, a Hawail limited liability corporations MIKE
‘an individual,
‘an individual; and RICHARD K. QUINN,
Petitioners/Appellants-Appellees,
BEASON,
HANS HEDEMANN SURF, INC.,
Respondent /Appellee-Appellant,
and
2
=
2
@
x
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, by and through the
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND PERMITTING,
Respondent /Appellee-Appel lee,
and
and
McINERY FOUNDATION, a Hawaii corporation;
HOTEL KAIMANA, INC., a Hawaii corporation,
Respondent s/Appellees-Appellees.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO, 05-1-1145)
ING APPLICATION wi
Duffy, J., for the court!)
Petitioners/Appellants-Appellees’ application for writ
of certiorari, filed on February 5, 2009, is hereby accepted and
The parties will be
will be scheduled for oral argunent.
notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawas'i, March 16, 2009. sie
Dane L. Miller and FOR THE COURT:
Wilma Sur (of Miller
LLP) Came. avetyrns — \g
2 oe
Tokuyama & Sur,
Associate Justice
for petitioners/appellants-
appellees on the application
Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
son of vacancy.
» considered by:
Circuit Juage Alm, assigned by 2
William W.L. Yuen and
Philip W.T. Chang
(of Ching, Yuen & Morikawa)
for respondent /appellee-
appellant Hans Hedemann Surf,
Inc. on the response
Don S. Kitaoka,
Deputy Corporation Counsel,
for respondent /appellee-
appellee City and County of
Honolulu, by and through the
Department of Planning
and Permitting on the joinder
| 71c754581c0cea9156c957004a1ec9ac9558aa66375fa80e083d068e62dd375a | 2009-03-16T00:00:00Z |
f5606e3d-13ec-4795-920c-40707253239d | Murauskas v. Gusman | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | NO. 29143
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
KEITH MURAUSKAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ELLEN GUSMAN, Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
HONOLULU DIVISION
(Civ. No. 1RC06-1-5037)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration of
the September 29, 2009 order denying the September 18, 2009
motion for extension of time to file an application for writ of
certiorari and for a copy of the record on appeal, it appears
that, contrary to the suggestion of petitioner, the September 29,
2009 order did not deny the September 18, 2009 motion on the
grounds the motion was not filed within the ninety-day period for
filing an application for writ of certiorari. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for
reconsideration is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, December 14, 2009.
| 2d4f3478c13bffe7140ea2ec4f854bf1e93b7fd17ac30c72098a683e2ed14bac | 2009-02-23T00:00:00Z |
f6eb3095-9f9e-4402-ba09-4d582a6eb8c9 | Coleman v. State | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | wo. 28364
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI“I
GARTH COLEMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, 3
: 3 2
= m
= o
STATE OF HAKAL‘Z, Respondent Appellee.
—__ eee
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE couRT oF arPExis
(gibsB. Nor O4-1-002K; CR. NO. 39-0034)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION £OR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Tayi Nakayanas Jes for the court’)
Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of
is hereby rejected.
certiorari filed on January 9, 2009,
Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 13, 2009.
DATED:
FOR THE COURT:
Doon ONT RR iT
Associate Justice
Michael S. Zola
for petitioner-appellant
on the application
Cosy Nakayama, Recbay and Duffy, Jd.) and
mney.
jason of vs
‘considered by: Moon,
Guage Lee, assigned by
| e2b3a0978999876b762ab62769e0770c15e77f8f06820cf9ad9c79f990a45a10 | 2009-02-13T00:00:00Z |
6984ee08-577b-4b03-b242-1089fda23be9 | State v. Hinton | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
STATE OF HAWAI'E, Respondent /Plaintitt-Appellant,
MARSHALL HINTON, Petitioner /Defendant-Appel lee.
CERTIORARI 70 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 04-1-2546)
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: for the court")
Petitioner /defendant-appellee Marshall Hinton’s application
for writ of certiorari, filed December 17, 2008, is accepted and
will be scheduled for oral argument. The parties will be
notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
PATED: Honolulu, Hawai't, canvary 29, 2009. |
FOR ‘THE COURT: 207
So:
ehh
2 5
y
3
8
Moon, C.J.» Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy
gudge Blondin, assigned by ‘reason of vacancy,
Ju. and cizeutt
| 8a7966d0b033e1f559b737179b6b4e0016b4dca91b37535e916da4058f7f8b72 | 2009-01-29T00:00:00Z |
761aecdb-11ce-4dc7-b9dc-37d59b6badc9 | State v. Corn | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 28778
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Plaintiff-Appellee,
JAMES L. CORN, JR., Petitioner-Defendant~Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 5-1-1800)
(By: Duffy, J., for the court”)
Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant James L. Corn, Jr.
filed on January 15, 2009,
application for a writ of certiorari,
is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 23, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Kone soa, ds
Associate Justice
Ronette M. Kawakami,
Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner-defendant-
appellant on the application
£2 eassuae
ae
L0:2
Considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayana, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
gned by Feason of vacancy:
chreuse Judge chang,
| e761863e18ac6413deded202bf49146fb8f940a8e20d5019cebc3ec8d864ed2d | 2009-02-23T00:00:00Z |
2a73389c-f6dd-4276-a7b5-5943c74c2a87 | In re “T Children: S.T. and M.T., III | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
Wo. 28573
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
IN THE INTEREST OF “I” CHILDREN:
8.7, and M.7., IIT
(No. 28573; FC~s NO.
04-09462)
oats
OSs Hd 1 aasune
IN THE INTEREST OF c.7.
(No. 28587; FC=S NO. 0409460)
IN THE INTEREST OF B.T-L
(No. 28588; FC=S No. 04-09461)
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(Fe-S NOS. 04-09462; 04-09460; 04-09461)
ORDER
(By: Acoba, J., for the court”)
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
January 21, 2009 by Petitioner/Mother-Appellant is hereby
rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 18, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
@asociate Justice \eq
Randal I. Shintani, on
the application for
petitioner /mother=
appellant.
2 considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Circuit Judge iifo, assigned by reason’ of vacancy,
| 513a114414d21d603b05a0fedb7dad628cd5d48a860afa11f6395d0fb3f956c1 | 2009-02-18T00:00:00Z |
e68f1c2f-8dbb-40d3-9bb0-89e9b61215ea | Smith v. Kim | null | 29628 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LBRARY
no. 29628
2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT S
ole a
- m
GARDINER BOSEY SMITH III, Petitioner, oje 3 a
vs. s & °
THE HONORABLE GLENN J. KIM, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT SPURT o9
OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respond s
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(civ, NO. 07-1-0785)
OADER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Juage Nakamura,
‘assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Gardiner Bosey Sith TIT and the
papers in support, it appears that petitioner fails to
demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to placenent of Civil
No. 07-1-0785 on the ready calendar or to entry of a final
default judgment. See Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(c)
(service of a complaint and summons shall be made by personal
service). Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus
relief. See Kena
Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204-05, 982 P.24
334, 338-39 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary renedy
that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear
and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means
to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petition for a writ mandamus without
payment of the filing fee.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a wri
mandamus is denied.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 23, 2009.
Gov
hawt er LT outed Bek
INS
Crea €. Kidlgs te +
Cy Hh Dakar
DATE!
| 61b151645c26cbcef5f599331eaeedbb7f6d69b2be31e7d70123631964f9f80f | 2009-02-23T00:00:00Z |
b3c12bdc-2aad-44f4-9787-a6450b3b12bf | OGrady v. Nakamura | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29612 ac
21 aaa suoe
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT‘E =
MICHAEL PATRICK O'GRADY and LEILANI 0! GRADY;
Petitioners,
2021
THE HONORABLE GREG K. NAKAMURA, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT, STATE OF HANATI;
STATE OF HAWAI'I; STATE OF HAWAI'I, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;
COUNTY OF HAWAI'I; HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC COMPANY; HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC
LIGHT COMPANY; HAWAIIAN ELECTRIC INDUSTRIES, INC.; and
HULU LOLO, Lic, Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(civ. No. 07-1-0372)
(By: Moon, ¢.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and putty, 39.
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge
Recktenwald, assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioners Michael Patrick O'Grady and Leilani
O'Grady and the papers in support, it appears that there is no
federal or state constitutional right to pro hac vice appearance
of counsel before any Hawai'i state court, See Bank of Hawaii v.
Kunimote, 91 Hawai'i 372, 388, 984 P.2d 1198, 1214 (1999), citing
Leisy, Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442-43 (per curiam), reh’g denied,
441 U.S, 946 (1979). The pro hac vice appearance of Raymond
Johnson as plaintiffs’ counsel in Civil No. 07-1-0372 was within
the discretion of the respondent judge. See RSCH 1.9, The
denial of pro hac vice appearance was not a flagrant and manifest
abuse of discretion, Thus, petitioners are not entitled to
mandamus relief. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai‘i 200, 204, 982
P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a
clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative
means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the
requested action. Such writ is not intended to supersede the
legal discretionary authority of the lower court. Where a court
has discretion to act, mandamus will not lie to interfere with or
control the exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has
acted erroneously, unless the judge has exceeded his or her
jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of
discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before
the court under circumstances in which it has a legal duty to
act.). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 12, 2009.
G—
Diecte Batra
J ee
Crea. Dey»
MoE: (alae!
| 7434da649efc706742163d04cbccc1b427933d04c6f3e40f8fd5c753198b1764 | 2009-02-12T00:00:00Z |
2a8afadf-27fb-478c-bf5d-46986a1181dd | State v. Woodfall. ICA s.d.o., filed 10/30/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 232. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/20/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/18/2009 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 05/15/2009 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order, filed 07/01/2009 [pdf]. | 120 Haw. 387 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
000. z
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent~Appellee, 37|~
sOUWY 62 uay|
MICHAEL WOODFALL, Petitioner-Appellant.” 3)”
Se
no, 28838
1
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 06-1-0430)
APRIL 23, 2009
MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE AHN, ASSIGNED ‘BY REASON OF VACANCY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Michael Woodfall
petitions this court to review the Intermediate
(*Woodfall")
(SICA’s") November 18, 2008 judgment affirming
Court of Appeals’
the October 10, 2007 judgment of the first circuit court!
convicting Woodfall of the offenses of
(“circuit court”),
in violation of Hawai'i
identity theft in the second degree,
Revised Statutes ("HRS") 5 708-839.7 (Supp. 2006),? forgery in
‘The Honorable Richard X. Perkins presided.
+ uns § 208-839.7, entitled “Identity theft in the second degree,”
states, in its entirety:
identity theft in
(2) A person commits the offense of
causes to be made,
the second degree if that person makes oF
either directiy or indirectly, 9
by any oral statement, any
britten statement, oF any statement conveyed by any
Slectronic means, with the intent to commit the offense of
theft in the second degree from any person or entity
continue,
o3aus
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
the second degree, in violation of HRS § 708-852 (Supp. 2006),?
and attempted theft in the second degree, in violation of HRS §
705~$00 (1993)* and HRS $ 708-831(1) (b) (Supp. 2006)*. We
accepted Woodfall’s application for a writ of certiorari, and
(2) Identity theft in the second degree ie a class B
felony.
(Emphasis added.)
> nas § 708-852 provides:
(2) A person commits the offense of forgery in the
second degree if, with intent to defraud, the person falsely
makes, completes, endorses, or alters 2 written instrurent,
Of utters s forged instrument, or fraudulently encodes the
agnetic ink character recognition sunbers, which 1s or
purports to be, of which is calculated to become or to,
tf completed, a deed, wiil, codieil, contract,
spt, commercial instrument, of other instrument shich
does or may evidence, cr oF
otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or
i2) rorgery in the second degree is a class C felony
+ aes $708.
0 provides, An ite entirety:
(2) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crine if
the person:
[al IntentSonally engages in conduct which would constitute
the crine if the attendant cireunstances Were as the person
believes them to ber or
() IntentLonally engages in conduct which, under the
circumstances as the person Believes them to be, constitutes a
Substantial step ina course of conduct intended to culmina
the person's commission of the crime.
(2) when causing a particular result is an element of the
erine, 3 person ie guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if)
acting with the state of mind required to establish lisbilicy with
Fespect to the attendant circurstances specified in the definition
Of the crime, the person intentionally engages in conduct which 1s
2 substantial step ina course of conduct intended of known to
Cause such a result,
[3) Conduct shati not be considered a substantial step under
this section unless lt is strongly corroborative af the
defendant’: criminal intent.
* onder ts § 708-851(1) (b), “[a} person commits the offense of
theft in the Te the pergon commits theft” “[olf property of
Services the ‘exceeds $300[.]"
2
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
oral argunent was held on March 19, 2008.
Woodfall asserts that the ICA gravely erred by
affirming the circuit court's judgment of conviction, inasmuch as
the HRS $ 708-839.7 phrase “transmission of any personal
information of another” prohibits the “transmission of any
personal information” of an actual person, and he transmitted
information associated with a fictitious person.
Because HRS § 708-839.7 is susceptible to two
interpretations, we construe the statute under the rule of lenity
and in favor of Woodfall. Accordingly, we vacate the lower
court's judgment and order and remand the case to the circuit
court for resentencing.
‘BACKGROUND
Woodfall Charged With Identity Theft In The Second Degree
on March 6, 2006, the State of Hawai'l (“the
prosecution”) filed a complaint alleging that Woodfall committed
the following offenses: (1) identity theft in the second degree,
(2) forgery in the second degree, and (3) attempted theft in the
second degree. The parties did not dispute the facts that led to
this complaint. On February 27, 2006, Woodfall attempted to cash
a check from maker Design Build, Incorporated, payable to
Christopher 8. Bailey -- a fictitious person -~ at the First
Hawaiian Bank located at 438 Hobron Lane, in Honolulu, Hawai'i.
Woodfall identified himself to a bank teller as Christopher 8.
Bailey, presented an Idaho driver's license in the name of
Christopher 8. Bailey, and endorsed the check. when the teller
discovered that the account of the maker had insufficient funds
to cash the check, she subsequently contacted the maker’s bank
3
‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST
HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
branch. The teller was instructed to detain Woodfall and notify
the police. Upon investigation, the police discovered that the
maker did not issue “Christopher B. Bailey” a check and that
Christopher 8, Bailey was a fictitious person.
B. Woodfall’s Motion To Dismiss Count T
Woodfali filed a motion to dismiss count I of the
complaint, identity theft in the second degree (“notion to
dismiss"), on December 27, 2006. Woodfall argued that, based on
Hawai'i case law and the HRS § 701-118(8) (Supp. 2006) definition
of “another,” the statutory language of HRS § 708-839.7
prohibiting “a transmission of any personal information of
another,” refers to the “transmission of any personal
information” of an actual person. Woodfall reasoned that he
attempted to assume a fictitious identity but did not attempt to
transmit the “personal information of another.” Therefore, he
urged the court to dismiss this count.
‘The prosecution filed an objection to this motion on
January 17, 2007, highlighting HRS § 708-639.7's phrase “personal
information.” The prosecution pointed out that for purposes of
Chapter 708, “personal information” is defined as “information
associated with an actual or a fictitious person . . . that is
used . . . to confirm the identity of an actual or a fictitious
person." HRS § 708-800. It concluded that the elements “a
transmission of any personal information of another” include “a
transmission of personal information of a fictitious person.”
(Emphasis added.)
At the January 17, 2007 hearing on this motion,
Woodfall argued that “the ‘personal information’ [of HRS 5 708-
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
839.7] is now qualified by the words ‘of another.’ The
definition ‘of another’ by statute or by case law is a human
being who was born and alive.” Woodfall’s counsel reiterated
that under the plain language of the statute, Woodfall cannot
“legally be found guilty of identity theft when he did not use
the identity of an actual real person.” The prosecution
countered that the statute and the statutory definitions of
“personal information” and “another” provide adequate notice that
the conduct requirement of HRS § 708-639.7 prohibits the
transmission of personal information of an actual or fictitious
person
In an order dated February 23, 2007, the circuit court
denied Woodfali's motion, concluding that the phrase in question
prohibits the transmission of any personal information of an
actual or fictitious person. The court rejected Woodfall’s
narrow interpretation of HRS $ 708-839.7, noting that it would be
“directly at odds” with the HRS § 708-800 definition of “personal
information.” It further held that “it certainly is not clear --
especially in light of [HRS $] 708-800's definition of ‘personal
information’ - that the legislature's use of ‘another! was meant
to exclude fictitious persons.” In denying Woodfall's motion,
the court constructed “another” as follows:
1A construction of the term “another” that would give force to and
Preserve both the legislature's intent to exclude tne tranceiseren
$be°835"7°and’the cincormation associated with a fictitious
person” Language of [HRS §] 108-800" Sefinition of "personal
Enformation” is simply ~~ "any real or fictitious person other
than the person trangaieeing the information.”
on January 17, 2007, Woodfall pled no contest to
forgery in the second degree and attempted theft in the second
5
"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
degree. After the court denied Woodfall’s motion to dismiss, on
June 15, 2007, Woodfall pled guilty to the charge of identity
theft in the second degree. The court agreed to follow the plea
agreenent between the prosecution and Woodfall, which included
the following terms: (1) Woodfall must serve an open ten year
tezm to run concurrently with counts II (open five year sentence)
and III (open five year sentence) and with any other sentence he
is serving, and (2) Woodfali’s guilty plea in count I is
conditional,‘ and Woodfall preserved the right to appeal the
circuit court’s ruling denying his motion to dismiss.
The court entered final judgment on October 10, 2007.
Woodfall filed @ notice of appeal on November 8, 2007.
C. ICA Affirmed The Circuit Court’s Ruling
on appeal, Woodfall argued that the plain language of
the HRS § 708-839.7 phrase “transmission of any personal
information of another” prohibits the transmission of personal
information from a real person, but not a fictitious person.
Woodfali also maintained that, even assuming that the statute is
ambiguous and the court is required to resort to the statute's
legislative history, extrinsic documents verify that the statute
intended to “provide criminal penalties for those who steal the
Adentity of another.” (Quoting Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 446,
in 2002 House Journal, at 1409-10.) (Emphasis in original.)
‘The prosecution argued that the circuit court's
* Onder Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 11(a) (2), “a defendant
nay enter a conditicnal plea of guilty of nolo contendere, reserving in
Writing the right, on appeal from the judgrent, to seek review of the adverse
Setermsnation of any specific pretrial motion, A defendant who prevails on
appeal shall be allawea to withdrew the plea.”
6
+ Yo UMC ATION IN WEST'S HANA REORTS AND PACE RORTER
sing a false of Gctitious sities.” (Quoting fee. Cont. Cerm
top. Ho. 25, An 2092 sooge Journ, at 2768.) (Bphasie in
origina.)
Seren ered orice re et es
es Lane et cst “Ere ety ae
with the intent to commit the
‘of theft in the second aegree™
often:
(Enphasis added.) Noting that “Woodfail admitted that he used a
fictitious identity with the intent to commit theft in the second
degree," the ICA declined to reverse the circuit court's decision
to deny Woodfall’s motion to dismiss. The ICA filed a judgnent
on appeal on Novenber 18, 2008.
on January 20, 2009, Woodfall filed a timely
application for writ of certiorari.
III, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AL certiorari
‘The appropriate standard of review for determining
whether to accept or reject an application for writ of certiorari
‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
is set forth in Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 602-59 (Supp.
2008), as follows:
(a) After sesuance of the intermediate appellate court's
joggment ‘or disnissal order, a party may Seck review of the
Intermediate appellate cours’: Secision and judgment oF
dismissal order only by application to the suprene court for
a writ of certiorari, the acceptance or rejection of which
Shall be discretionary upon the supreme court, —{b) The
application for writ of certiorari shail tersely stave ite
Grounds, which shall include:
1) Grave errors of law oF of facts or (2) Obvious
inconsistencies in the decision of the intermediate:
appellate court with that of the suprene court, federal
Secisions, or its own decision, and the magnitude of those
errors of inconsistencies aictating the need for forther
sppeal.
Statutory Interpretation
“the interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewable de novo.” Capua v, Weyerhaeuser Co., 117 Hawai"i 439,
443, 184 P.3d 191, 196 (2008) (citing Flor v, Holguin, 94 Hawaii
10, 76, 9 P.3d 382, 388 (2000)) (brackets, citations, and
ellipses omitted). Statutory construction is guided by the
following rules:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself,
Second, where the statutory language 1s plain and
unambiguous, our scle duty is to give effect to ite plain
and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
Statutory construction 2 our foremost obligation to
Sscertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, wiich Ls to be obtained primarily from the
Isnguage contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
or uncertainty of an expression used ina statute, an
ambiguity exists, “And fifth, in construing an ambiguous
Statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
Gxanining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences nay be compared, in order to
Sccertain their true meaning.
Carlisle v. One (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i 245, 256, 195 P.3d 1177,
1188 (2008) (quoting In xe Contested Case Hearing on Water Use
Permit Application, 116 Hawai'i 481, 489-90, 174 P.3d 320, 328-29
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWA REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
(2007)) (block quotation format altered) .
III. DISCUSSION
As previously stated, Woodfall challenges the ICA's
interpretation of HRS § 708-839.7, arguing that the term “of
another” is a crucial and plain element of the statutory phrase
“transmission of any personal information of another.” He
further maintains, in the alternative, that this interpretation
is supported by the statute's legislative history: the statute's
purpose “is to provide criminal penalties for those who steal the
identity of another . . .” (Quoting Sen. Stand. Com. Rep. No.
2960, in 2002 Senate Journal at 1421.) Woodfall contends that
his use of @ fictitious identity did not satisty the conduct
element of identity theft in the second degree, and he urges this
court to vacate the circuit court’s order denying his motion to
dismiss this charge.
A. Plain Language of HRS § 708-839.7
To analyze HRS § 708-839.7, we begin with the language
of the statute itself. HAS § 708-839.7 provides, in relevant
part:
A person commits the offense of identity theft in the second
Gegree if chat person makes of causss to be made, either
Gizectly or indirectly,
‘a transmission of any personal
formation of ansther by any oral statenent, ony written
Statement, or any statement conveyed by any electronic,
eans, with the intent to sonait the offense of theft in the
Second degree from any person or entity.
(Emphasis added.) Specifically, we focus on the phrase “a
transmission of any personal information of another.”
“(Personal information” is defined in HRS $ 708-800,
for purposes of Chapter 708, as follows:
Antormaticn associated with an actual person of a fictitious
9
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Reraon that 1s a name, an address, a telephone nunber, an
Glectronie mail address; a driver's License number, a/ social
Security nonber, an employer, 0 place of employment,
information related to enployment, an employee
identification aunber, a mother’s maiden name, an
identifying number ofa depository account, a bank account
funber, a password used for accessing information, or any
Sther fame, number, oF code that is used, alone or in
Conjunction wien other infermation, Eo sonfiem the identiey
pianactual ora fictitious person
(Emphases added.)
Similarly, we apply the HRS § 701-118 (Supp. 2006)
definition of “another” to HRS § 708-839.7, inasmuch as this
definition applies to the entire Hawai'i penal code “unless a
different meaning plainly is required.” We decline to accept the
prosecution’s argument that the HRS § 701-118 definition of
“another” is “special,” and that the identity theft statute
applies the “ordinary” dictionary meaning of “another.”” See HRS
§ 701-118 (defining various terms to apply “[iln this Code,
unless a different meaning is plainly required”); see also HRS §
701-102 (3) (1993) (“The provisions of chapters 701 through 706 of
the Code are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes,
unless the Code otherwise provides.”). Thus, “another,” as
stated in HRS § 708-839.7, employs the HRS $ 701-118 definition,
“any other person,” and “person” is further defined as “any
natural person.”* HRS § 701-118. “[A]nother” in HRS § 708-839.7,
° The prosecution contends that “the legislature desired the term
‘personal information’ ag defined in (HRS § 708-800) to be used in qualifying
the phrase “of another.” It argues that the definition of "personal
information” "is contained in the sane chapter as [HRS § 708-839.7) and
ereated by the same piece of legislation.” However, we aust first construct
the statute based on its plain language before considering extrinsic evidence.
+ person” is defined in HRS § 701-118's as, “any natural perscn,
including eny natural person whose sdentity can be established by means of
scientific analysis, including but not limited to scientific anslysia of
Geoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints, whether or not the natural perscn’s
Eontinue...
10
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therefore, refers to any “natural person” other than the person
who “makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, a
transmission of any personal information . . . with the intent to
commit the offense of theft in the second degree from any person
or entity.” (Emphasis added.)
The terms of HRS § 703-839.7, therefore, conflict:
“another” is defined as a “natural person,” but “personal
information” includes “information associated with... a
fictitious person." Based on these differences, Woodfall and the
prosecution dispute the plain meaning of HRS $ 708-839.7.
According to Woodfall, the words “of another" is a
wmoditying term” of “personal information,” and “limit (] the
prohibitions of the statute only to information from a natural,
actual person.”* Therefore, HRS § 708-839.7 requires the
+ ccontinve
ame is known, and, where relevant, a corporation of an unincorporated
associationt]”
+ Alchough “another” is already defined in HRS § 708-118 for
purposes of the entire Hawai's penal code, see supra, Woodfall also points to
Hawai'i case law defining "another" for purposes of interpreting HRS’ $ 108
839.7. Woodfall cites to three cases, 1 Haw. Bpp- 13, 25,
613 P.24 1326, 1333 (1980) (determining that tho choice of evils defense vas
ot available co the defendant necause a natural person ~~ and not a delphin ~
“ia'*another,” pursuant to HRS § 701-116), Stace's. garding, 101 Hawa’: 3,
9-10, 61 F.3d 514, 519-20 (App. 2002) (holding that the defendant may not use
the choice of evils defense for protecting an unborn child where t)
Legislature did not Inclue “unborn children” in the definition of “another”
or person"), and stats v, Aiwshi, 109 fawai's 11S, 123 P.3d 1230 (2005),
arguing that’ they each Interpret “another” ag a “natural person” and not a
Fictitious person. Under the sane analysis of Levasseur and Jaxding, =
fictitious person ts not included in the definition of ‘ansther” or “person.”
See Levasseur, 1 Haw. App. at 25, 613 F.2d at 1333; Jarding, 101 Hawai'i at 9-
10, 61 P.3a at 519-20.
woodfall also cites to Aixohi to support his claim that “another”
clearly refers to an actual person. In Aiohi, this court reviewed the
Eequirenents of HRS § 707-702(1) (aj, which states that *(a) person commits the
offense of manslaughter if . . . {nje recklessly causes the death of anather
parson.” 109 Hawai at 118-29, 123 P.dd at 1213-24 (emphasis added) «The
continue.
a
‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWALI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
transmission of any other natural person's personal information.
In our view, Woodfall presents a strong argument. The words “of
another” appear to qualify the phrase “personal information.”
Woodfall’s interpretation of HRS § 808-839.7, therefore, may be
valid under the plain language of the statute.
‘The prosecution's interpretation of HRS § 708-839.7 is
also persuasive. As the circuit court reasoned, if the phrase
“personal information of another” “refers only to personal
information of a real person, not a fictitious person,” it would
directly contradict the statutory definition of “personal
information.” See HRS § 708-800 (defining “personal information”
as “information associated with an actual person or a fictitious
person”). Presented with these conflicting terms, the circuit
continue
defendant argued, anong other things, that her manslaughter prosecution
Contragicts the plain language of the manslaughter statute, inasmuch
joa prenatal conduct was directed at her fetus, which ie not a.
Foquires by the statute.” id, at 117, 123 P.34 at 1223. Tais court agreed,
Foling that (1) the manclaughter statute is clear and ambiguous and (2) a
tus does not fit within the RS § 707-700 definition of “person.” Id. at
126-29, 123'P.34 at 1223-24. Woodfall’s reliance of Aiuahi is sisplaced.
Aiwohi!s analysis of HRS $ 707-700's “person” is irrelevant here, where (1) we
are examining the word “another,” not “another person," and (2) the identity
theft statutes are not in Chapter 707 and are not governed by the chapter’ s
Sefinitions
The prosecution counters that Aiuohi actually supports its
interpretation of “another.” In Biuchi, this court noted that “person” is
defined, in two ways ~~ the general awai'l penal code definition ("any natural
jo defined in HRS § 701-118(7}) and the definition governing Le
hnunan being who has been born and is alive,” ae defined an HRS §
and applied the chapter's definition in interpreting the
manslaughter statute. 109 Hawai'i at 118, 123 P-3d at 1213. Based on Aiwohi,
The prosecution argues that “the definitions to be applied shovid come fron
the Sane chapter of the penal code as the charged offense, rather than using
general definitions from other chapters,” and that, here, “personal
Information” as defines in HRS § 108-800 trumps the definition ef "another" in
HRS § 701-118. Although this court applied the spectfic definition of
Sperton” to determing if the term inclodes a fetus, a# opposed to the general
Hguai's penal code definition of “person,” the two definitions did not
conflict. Aiuohi did not suggest ‘that the chapter's definicion trumps the
general pensi code definition:
12
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court determined that the word “ancther” must refer to “any real
or fictitious person other than the person transmitting the
information.”
Constructing “another” this way would correspond with
the definition of “personal information,” but doing so would
impermissibly require this court to add terms to the definition
of “another.” See State v, Aiwohi, 109 Hawai‘i 115, 129, 123
P.3d 1210, 1224 (2005) (“(A] criminal statute ‘must be strictly
construed and . . . cannot be extended beyond the plain meaning
of the terms found therein.’ (quoting State v. Johnson, 50 Haw.
525, $26, 445 P.2d 36, 37 (1968)))7 State v, Mueller, 102 Hawai'i
391, 394, 76 P.3d 943, 946 (2003) (*[T]his court cannot change
the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in
order to make it suit a certain state of facts.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We cannot accept this
construction, inasmuch as it would directly contradict the
definition of the word “another.”
The prosecution also asserts that the statute cannot
prohibit the transmission of “information associated with an
actual person” but not information associated with a fictitious
person because such a result would be absurd. See State v
Rates, @4 Hawai‘i 211, 220, 933 P.2d 48, 57 (1997) ("Provisions
of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable
interpretation . . . in order to preserve its overall purpose and
to avoid absurd results.”). Tt claims that the identity theft
statutes were “designed to protect individuals and businesses
from loss due to @ defendant's misrepresentation of his actual
identity.” We disagree, As further discussed below, the
3
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legislature appeared to be concerned with protecting the person
whose identity was stolen. See Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 446,
in 2002 House Journal, at 1409-10 (expressing concern that
“misappropriation of other people's identification information is
on the rise”); Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2002 House
Journal, at 1765 (same); see also infra.
Indeed, in recognition of the harms of identity theft,
the U.S. Congress provided additional criminal penalties for
identity theft “of another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2004)
(imposing a term of imprisonment of two years to a person
committing certain felony violation and “knowingly
transfer[ring], possesses(sing], or us{ing], without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person”). In
adopting this legislation, the Committee on the Judiciary noted
the increasing problem of identity theft, “crimes in which
someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person's personal
data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for
economic or other gain. . . .” H.R. Rep, No. 108-528, at 4
(2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N, 779, 780 (emphasis added).
Tt observed the FTC's random sample survey that suggested that
almost ten million Americans were victims of some form of
identity theft in 2003. Id. It further noted that identity
theft threatens national security and that it cost businesses and
financial institutions $47.6 billion and individual consumers
95.0 billion, and that it harmed the credit rating of the person
4
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those identity was stolen.” Id. Contrary to the prosecution's
argument, it would not be absurd if HRS § 708-839.7 provided
criminal penalties for transmitting the personal information of
another actual person but not the information of a fictitious
person, with the intent to commit theft in the second degree from
any person or entity.
Because both parties’ construction of the identity
theft in the second degree statute are plausible based on the
statute's plain language, we next consider the legislature's
intent in creating the statute.
B. Extrinsic Aids
As previously quoted,
in the event of anbiguity in a statute, the meaning of the
ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which
the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in
order to ascertain their true aeaning- Moreover, the coures may
Fesort to extringic aids in determining legislative intent, such
a5 legislative history, oF the reason and spirit of the law
State v. Baviv, 118 Hawai'i 1, 7, 185 P.3d 186, 192 (2008)
(citing Peterson v. Hawaii Elec, Light Cou, Inc., 85 Hawaii 322,
327-28, 944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (1997), superseded on other
grounds by HRS § 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1. Legislative history of HRS $ 708-839.7
‘The original bill that enacted HRS § 708-839.7, House
Bill 2498, sought to amend chapter 708 by adding new sections
" smples of the danage that people wer:
capable of when stealing another person’ s identity == they used the identities
of other actual people ss part of a pict to blow up Los Angeles International
Airport and to obtain Federal incone tax returns, loans and Lines of credit,
nd government benefits, H.R. Rep. No. 108-S28, at Su6 (2004), reprinted io
200¢°0.5-C.C.A.N. at 781-82.
a5
HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’
regarding (1) “identity theft,” (2) “obtaining a government-
issued identification document under false pretenses,” and (3)
“deceptive use of a fictitious identity.” H.B, No. 2438, 2ist
The Lil sought to add three new sections regarding identity
theft, which were entitied “Identity theft in the first degree,” "Identity
theft ‘in the Second dearee, ana "Identity thefe in the thiza degree.”
ks §.708-839.6 (Supp. 2008), entitled “Identity theft in the first
degree,” provides in relevant pare
(2) A person conaits the offense of identity theft in the
first degree if that person makes or causes to be made, either
directly of indirectly, a transniasion of any peracnal information
of another by any oral statement, any written statement, oF any.
Statement conveyed by any electronic means, with the intent cot
a) Facilitate the commission of a murder in any degree, 2
class A felony, Kisnapping, unlawful imprisonment in any degree,
extortion in any degree, any offense Under chapter 134, crininal
property damage in she firet or second degres, scape. in any
Gogree, any offense under part VI of chapter 110, any offense
under Section 711-1103, or any offense under chapter 842; or
(B) Conmit the offense of theft in the first degree from the
person whose personal information is used, or from any other
person or entity.
RS § 708-839.8 (Supp. 2008), entitled “Identity theft in the thir
degree,” states:
(2) A person commits the offense of identity theft in the
third degree’ if that person Makes or causes to be made, either
Girectiy or indirectly, a tranemiesion of any personal information
Of another by any oral statement, any written statement, OF any.
Statement conveyed by any electronic means, with the sncent £0
Commit the offense of theft in the third of fourth degree from any
person oF entity.
(2) Tdentity theft in che third degree is a class C felony.
% The proposed “Deceptive use of a fictitious identity” anendzent
(2) A person commits the offense of deceptive use of &
fictitious identity if that person, with the intent to deceive the
person or entaty to whom the statement is directed, makes oF
Eouses to be made, either directly or indirectly, by any oral
Statenent, any written statenent, of any statenent conveyed by ani
Slectronie means, a trananisaion of fictitious personal”
Infornation of 2 person purported to be real but who ie
flotitious.
(2) Deceptive use of 2 fictitious identity is a misdensancr,
H.B. No. 2438, 2st Leg., Reg. Sess. (2002).
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Leg., Reg. Sess. (2002).! The legislature passed this act, but
removed the bill's “deceptive use of a fictitious identity”
amendment and the “personal information” definition for HRS
Chapter 710. H.B, No. 2438, H.D. 1, 2ist Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2002); H.B. No. 2438, H.D. 1, S.D. 1, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2002); #.B. No. 2438, H.D. 1, S.D. 1, C.D. 1, 2ist Leg., Reg.
Sess. (2002).
The Conference Committee report, written by the
committee that last amended House Bill 2438, provided that “(tJhe
purpose of this bill is to provide criminal penalties for
Persons: (1) Committing identity theft of another individual;
and (2) Obtaining identity documents under false pretenses or
using a false or fictitious identity.” Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No.
25, in 2002 House Journal, at 1765. Importantly, the final form
of the bill was intended to criminalize “identity theft of
another individual,” (emphasis added), indicating that the
legislature intended that the identity theft statutes only relate
to the transmission of another actual person's personal
information. Moreover, the legislative intent to criminalize
“using a false or fictitious identity,” appears to relate to the
amendnent regarding obtaining a government-issued identification
document under false pretenses, inasmuch as it is juxtaposed with
the purpose of prohibiting a person from “[olbtaining identity
committees on Judiciary and Hawaiian Affaire and
ind Commerce announced that the bill served to criminalize
acts that appear to correspond with those sections: (1) “[s]tealing the
identity of another (first section), (2) “{o]beaining identity documents
under £21se pretenses” (secona section), ana (3) "(u)sing false or
fictitious identity (thira section) Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 446, in 2002
House Journal, at 1408-10 (emphasis added
uv
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documents under false pretenses or using a false or fictitious
identity.
Furthermore, in discussing the problem of identity
theft," the House Judiciary and Hawaiian Affairs and Consumer
Protection and Commerce Committee and the Conference Committee
took issue with transmitting any other actual person’s
information. The committees expressed concern that
the penalty for “using a false or fictitious identity,” refers to
tthe criminal statutes fegarding “sbtaining 2 government-issued identification
document under false pretenses” (codified as HRS §§ 710-1016.3-.4 (Supp.
2008))-. HRS $§ 710-1016. 3~.4 provide criminal penalties for’a person who
“obtaiA(s] identity documents =» - using's false or fictitious identity.”
‘These sections. pronibie:
obtain(ing) an identification document tesued by the state
oF any political subdivision therect by (a) (mlsking any
satemant, oral or written,
Eolbetrue, “in an application for any identification
Gocument issued by the State or any political subaivision
thereof; or (b) (slubmitting or inviting reliance on any
uriting that the person knows to be falsely mags, completed,
or altered
HRS $6 710-1016.3-.4 (emphases added). Under these statutes, 2 person is
prohibited from knowingly falsely identifying him or herself’ as a fictitious
Person to “obtein() an identification document issued by the State or any
political subdivision thereof.” The plain language of the statute inde
Sprovide(s) criminal penalties for persons ... . (obtaining identity
documents under false pretenses oF
Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2002 Rouse Journal, at 1763 {emphasis added) .
1 the Senate committee on Judiciary discussed the broader issues
related to identity theft, as follows:
[t)0 Light of the terrorist attacks of september 11, 2001,
tthe rans fications of identity theft have proven much nore
grave than previously thought. Iéentity theft, » nage
Problem in financial fraud and theft cases, now has.
Inplicacions for national security. This measure. provides a
comprehensive framework of statutes to deal with the various
aspects of identity theft
Sen. Stand. Comm, Rap. No. 2960, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1421. these
consequences of identity theft are generally the sane so those described by
‘the U.S. Congress when adopting 18 0.5.c. § 1028A (2004), waich imposes a term
of imprisonsent of two years to a person committing a certain felony viclation
and “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, 3
means of identification of another gezson.” "(Emphasis added.) See supra.
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“misappropriation of other people's identification information is
on the rise.” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 446, in 2002 House
Journal, at 1409-10; Hse. Conf, Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2002 House
Journal, at 1765 (emphasis added). Based on this specified
problem and the Conference Committee’s report, it follows that
HRS § 708-839.7 relates to @ person from transmitting an actual
person's personal information, but not the information associated
with a fictitious person.
a ing mation”
Though the legislature clearly intended that HRS § 708-
839.7 relate to the transmission of another actual person's
information, this construction renders a portion of the HRS §
708-800 definition of “personal information” superfluous. See
HRS § 708-800 (defining “personal information” as “information
associated with an actual person or a fictitious person. . . to
confirm the identity of an actual or a fictitious person). ‘This
definition is particularly relevant in constructing HRS § 708-
839.7 because it was created in the same legislation as HRS §
708-839.7."* 2002 Haw. Sess. L, Act 224, § 1 at 894-96, In
Light of the “personal information” definition and the expressed
legislative intent of Act 224, it is not entirely clear whether
the identity theft statute is meant to prohibit the transmission
of the information of a fictitious person.
¢. The Rule of Lenity
When a statute is ambiguous, and the legislative
In addition, we note that the “personal information” phrase
rs only three times in HRS Chapter 108, specifically in the identity
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history does not provide sufficient guidance, we follow the rule
of lenity. Aiwohi, 109 Hawai'i at 126, 123 P.3d at 1213 (“In the
absence of clear statutory language, and with no legislative
guidance vis-
is the rule of lenity.” (citing State v. Shimabukuro, 100
Hawai'i 324, 327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002) (stating that “[w)here
vis legislative history, the applicable doctrine
a criminal statute is ambiguous, it is to be interpreted
according to the rule of lenity”))); State v. Kaakimaka, 84
Hawai'i 280, 292, 933 P.2d 617, 629 (1997) (stating that
“{almbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity”) (citations omitted). This “means
that the court will not interpret a state criminal statute so as
to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such
an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what
the legislature intended.” State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawai'i 409,
413 n.3, 70 F.3d 635, 639 n.3 (2003) (quoting State v. Soto, e4
Hawai's 229, 248-49, 933 P.2d 66, 85-86 (1997)). Accordingly,
“{ulnder the rule of lenity, the statute must be strictly
construed against the government and in favor of the accused.”
State v. Kalani, 108 Hawai'i 279, 268, 118 P.34 1222, 1231 (2005)
(quoting Shimabukure, 100 Hawai'i at 327, 60 P.3d at 277)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bayly, 118 Hawai'i
at 15, 185 P.3d at 200 (ruling that, under the rule of lenity, it
is "more appropriate to adopt a less expansive meaning of the
tem “collision")
Because HRS § 708-8397 1s ambiguous and the
Legislative history does not provide sufficient guidance, we must
apply the rule of lenity and adopt a less expansive meaning of
20
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the phrase “personal information of another.” We hold that the
HRS § 708-839.7 phrase “transmission of any personal information
of another” prohibits the transmission of personal information of
an actual person, but not the transmission of information
associated with a fictitious person, Because Woodfall did not
transmit the personal information of an actual person, he did not
satisfy the conduct element of HRS § 708-839.7 and cannot be
convicted of identity theft in the second degree. Therefore, the
circuit court erred when it denied Woodfall’s “Motion to Dismiss
{Identity Theft In The Second Degree].”
IV. concnusroN
Accordingly, we (1) vacate the ICA’s November 18, 2008
judgment, the circuit court’s October 10, 2007 final judgment,
and the circuit court’s February 23, 2007 order denying
Woodfall's motion to dismiss, and (2) remand this case to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
on the briets Cpe
Jon N. Tkenaga,
Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner-appellant esi Gaetan
Delanie D. Prescott-rate,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, PONS
for respondent-appellee
Yoren£, Duty +
BE
21
| c104917f10b2ff4e5e840df64e63a48297f73b3958d7ff2d73cdf75038a7aa23 | 2009-04-29T00:00:00Z |
d507f507-a0b4-4090-b65a-70065ced6ef4 | Lamoya v. A.L. Kilgo Company, Inc. | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
No, 28042
SS Nye cone
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T.
os
RENEE K. LAMOYA, Claimant-Respondent,
vs
A.L. KILGO COMPANY, INC., and EAGLE INSURANCE COMPANIES,
Employer/Insurance Carrier-Petitioners.
INC.,
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE No. AB 2003-517 (2-59-08679))
‘ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court)
Employer/Insurance Carrier-Petitioners’ application for
writ of certiorari filed on December 19, 2008, is hereby
rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 26, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
ae ONT ie aey
Associate Justice
Sidney J.Y. Wong and
Colette #. Gomoto of
Wong & Oshima for
employer/insurance carrier-
petitioners on the application
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, 23., and
‘considered by
Circuit Judge Crandall, assigned by resson 2f vacancy,
an
| 5864bc2e92a234cec2e5f20394848ff74f7e05e9c851821b52b13d867254867c | 2009-01-26T00:00:00Z |
c0a3d4c3-cb46-46dd-92ac-63e57b342da6 | Rapozo v. Frank | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | Law UBRARY
wo. 2918 4
as
1 we surnene couse or tue stare or unr]
—_ SEE COO OF THE STMT OP NL OS
ECHARD R. RAPOLO, Petitioner, SE bE
ve “3 2 6
CLAYTON FRANK, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OB|
PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.,
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Lecnard,
‘assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by petitioner Richard 8, Rapozo, it appears that
habeas corpus relief is available to petitioner in the circuit
court and petitioner presents no special reason for invoking the
supreme court’s original jurisdiction. See Oili v, Chang, 57
Haw, 511, 512, 557 P.2d 787, 788 (1976). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
without payment of the filing fee.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is denied without prejudice to seeking habeas
corpus relief in the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 660-3
(2993).
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, april 9, 2009.
cease, Lo Nee
ony
6 Rabin tye
| c99ff4bc63f06a5626e15886b0bfc35f6afecce65fa399401bce5779620a2891 | 2009-04-09T00:00:00Z |
3d0f16e6-8949-4a42-bd6f-634e167b2711 | State v. Laride | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | NO. 27823
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee,
GWENNETTE NALANI LARIDE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 04-1-2409)
“TING _APPI FOR WRIT {PTORART
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court”)
Petitioner/defendant-appellant Gwennette Nalani
taride’s application for writ of certiorari, filed ganuary 20,
2009, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 24, 2009.
Shawn A. Luiz, for FOR ‘THE COURT:
petitioner/defendant-
appellant, on the
application
fot sustic
ead
Considered by: Moon, C.J. Nakayama, Acoba, and Duf!
cireutt Judge Marks, assigned by reason of vacancy,
| 2a8f3cdd7a54ef150635b96412dce221bae7e5e8ea239fdce70867fd6253ed12 | 2009-02-24T00:00:00Z |
a4a663c2-a076-4fe1-920d-f98f518f3b64 | Beam v. Luke | null | 29805 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No, 29805
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
va. le =
SHE HONORABLE LINDA K.C. LUKE, JUDGE OF THE FAMPLYSCOURR | =
OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Resp: te m
S
caietis reocexonic 3 2
CRESIRL ROCESS &
ORDER
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Accba, Duffy, and Recktenwald, JJ.)
upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Catina Stefanik and the papers in
support, it appears that the motion to dismiss the custody
proceeding is not scheduled for hearing after the custody trial
inasmuch as the motion to dismiss is scheduled for hearing on
galy 15, 2009, Wednesday, at
scheduled for trial during the week of -- not on -- July 13,
2009. There is no evidence that the motion to dismiss will not
0 a.m, and the custody matter is
be heard before commencement of the custody trial and the denial
of the motion to shorten the time to hear the motion to dismiss
is reviewable on appeal from a final order on the custody
proceeding. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief.
See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999)
(A weit of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not
issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable
right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress
adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action.
Such writs are not intended to supersede the legal discretionary
authority of the lower courts, nor are they intended to serve as
legal renedies in lieu of noxmal appellate procedures.).
Accordingly,
IT TS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai’:
+ May 15, 2009,
Pet &. Me bitin vente
| d03bcb75dcfdd902296db11e08b19983fda09f027cc91339177baedfaf33250f | 2009-05-15T00:00:00Z |
c540c1c8-f00c-4670-88fe-444c5512965a | Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn | 120 Haw. 50 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
no, 27832
TN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
BANK OF HAWAII,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee
Oats
MICHAEL L. SHINN,
Pet itioner/Defendant-Appellant
912 Hd Li essay
and
KANACHTKA & LEZAK,
Defendant~Appel
BAYS, DEAVER, HIATT,
@ Hawai'i partnership,
and
DONALD T EOVINO; KAHALA VENTURES,
general partnership; FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK; DONALD #.
WILSON, as Trustee of the Jerry 7. Lynn Charitable
Remainder Trust; BéT ENTERPRISES, a California
RICHARD WALLACE and PATRICIA DAVISON
a Hawad't
corporation;
WALLACE, as Trustees of the Muldoon & Associates
Money Purchase Plan and Trust; UNIVERSAL SECURITIES
O., LTD., a Japan corporation; LOREN H. COOK;
DARCY H. COOK; J. ROGER ALLEN; CATHREINE G.
ALLEN; JOHN DOES 1-50; JANE DOES 1-50; DOE
PARTNERSHIPS 1-50; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-50; DOE
ENTITIES 1-50; and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-50,
Defendants
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(civ. NO. 93-1151)
‘Moon, C.J., Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.
and Retired Justice Levinson, appointed by reason
ef vacancy on January 9, 2003, dissenting,
with whon Nakayama, J., joins)
Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration
filed on January 8, 2009 by Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
Michael L. Shinn, requesting that this court review its opinion
filed on December 29, 2008, the opposition filed by
Respondent /Plaintiff-appellee Bank of Hawai'i on January 26,
2009, and the record herein,
IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for
reconsideration denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 17, 2009.
Gary Victor Dubin,
Long #. Vu, and
Frederick J. Arensmeyer
(Dubin Law Offices) ,
on the motion A eel
for petitioner/defendant-
appellant. Yous Duchy
Mark T. Shklov,
Michel A. Okazaki, and
Peter Van Name Esser,
on the opposition
for respondent /plaintift—
appellee.
Having filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, T
respectfully dissent and would grant the motion for
reconsideration.
Prada Coa ey nee
Slat hLacrnae—
| 225c8b06aeff8970d0d132f65ced6cf53b8f6c572755088e198571bd4913f49d | 2009-02-17T00:00:00Z |
fd97b71e-c3ac-4f2d-8935-2b5504b89457 | Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kloos | null | 29155 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No, 29155
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner,
HY 6- vw saag
BILL KLOOS, Respondent.
ss >
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING Jog
(o0e 08-024-8667)
ats
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.,
‘and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Foley,
assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel's ex parte petition for issuance of reciprocal discipline
notice to Respondent Bill Kloos, pursuant to Rule 2.15(b) of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH), the
memorandum, affidavit, and exhibits thereto, the Declaration of
Charles H. Hite Regarding the May 30, 2008 Notice and Order, the
exhibits thereto, and the record, it appears that: (1) on
January 28, 2008, the Supree Court of Oregon publicly
reprimanded Respondent Kloos for his ethical misconduct in case
No. 07-99; (2) RSCH 2.15(b) requires the same or substantially
equivalent discipline, or restrictions or conditions upon the
attorney's license to practice law in the state of Hawai'i,
unless Respondent Kloos shall show cause under RSCH 2.15(c) as to
why imposition of the sane or substantially equivalent discipline
(2) Respondent Kloos has not filed a
should not be impose
response to our May 30, 2008 notice and order; (4) a
substantially equivalent discipline is warranted in this
jurisdiction: and (5) a substantially equivalent discipline in
this jurisdiction is public censure by the supreme court.
Therefore,
IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Bill Kloos is
publicly censured.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Kloos shall pay
all costs of this proceeding.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 9, 2009.
Gorm
Bia OM Met Caen
pay
Yon € Ducla
Sole Le
| 777dd41236f8b8c83c14c28f5a47a8da19933c166a0b21eb919e04420186ba66 | 2009-03-09T00:00:00Z |
dde831f8-455c-41db-90ab-4ca647ab5116 | In the Matter of Arbitration Between United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO and City and County of Honolulu | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | Man usHAnY
wo. 28120
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
on Between
In the Matter of the Arbitrat
UNITED PUBLIC WORKERS, APSCME, LOCAL 646, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
and
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (GRIEV. OF
DENNIS MOTONAGA RE: 20 DAY SUSPENSION); SEC 1, 11, 14, 637
UNIT 1; LK-05-09; (2008-140), Respondent-Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(3. B, NO. 06-1-0016)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court?)
Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of
certiorari filed on February 13, 2003, is hereby rejected.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 25, 2009,
FOR THE COURT: aN
Peace OM remerrave|* SEAL i)
&
Associate Justice
oe ws!
DATED:
Herbert R. Takahashi and
Rebecca L. Covert of Takahashi
Vasconcelos & Covert for
petitioner-appellant
on the application
Sung
ne
Wy
‘Wawa L Wii
oats
SN Hd Sz uv su
Moon, C.J.) Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
‘considered by
Circust Judge Nakanura, assigned by reason of vacancy,
| 67d74704d7f07278efee861bc5bf9c2cfefa469ba18ab5aff70e0144ea8c43ba | 2009-03-25T00:00:00Z |
c3a9d3ab-a70f-44cc-9478-a844ee6d7bc7 | State v. McMillen | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | CAWUBRARY
No, 28768
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent~Appellee,
YVONNE M. McMILLEN, Petitioner-Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 06-1-1685)
ee ee re court
and Accba, J., dissenting, with whom Moon, C.J., joins)
upon further consideration of the records and files in
this case, it appearing that the writ of certiorari herein was
improvidently accepted,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this certiorari proceeding is
dismissed.
Honolulu, Hawai, March 12, 2009.
FOR THE COUR’
DATE!
Denese bs
Associate Justice
70,0
am,
3
2
aan
az
Eo
62:
considered by: Moony C.J.» Nakayama, Acoba, and Dufty,
circuit Guage Aim, assigned by reason of vacancy
| 8ef0f0ca165196d812301586ed0353049f0b72f4372932e040dc09daf76f755b | 2009-03-12T00:00:00Z |
ce5deff4-b1db-44d6-b372-100b8b185d4b | State v. Pia | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | no. 29666
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent~Appellee,
RYRON L. PIA, Petitioner-Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 05-1-0243)
cr} 08
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court")
Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of
certiorari filed on March 2, 2003, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, April 3, 2009.
FOR THE COURT: (FEQ.
‘ \
nie Oe ane |” SEAL)
Associate Justice
Mary Ann Barnard for ne
petitioner-appellant
on the application
iconsidered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
carcuit Juuge Lee, assigned by reason of vacancy
| 6bbc6d07db47a99494c49bbfbddf12c6b5a65db0039be94901d26185c1980593 | 2009-04-03T00:00:00Z |
294a4b50-99b6-4497-901b-7e73418c7e19 | Suzuki v. Thom | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LISRARY
no, 29716
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T.,
LOLA SUZUKI, Petitioner,
a 6
ROLAND O.F. THot, CHATRIAN, tASOR AND THOUSTED
Sa ee at TUNE TREE
Ur, pau TRAVELEAS, Reapondeneas | 2
Hid 6
oats
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CASE NO. AB 2007-497 (2-06-14727))
(CASE NO. AB 2007-498 (2-07-04617))
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and Circuit
Judge Valenciano, assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus filed by petitioner Lola Suzuki and the papers in
support, Lt appears that petitioner fails to demonstrate that the
xespondent chairman of the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals
Board (LIRAB) had a duty to rule in favor of petitioner on the
matters of treatment, discovery, appeal issues, summary judgment,
and sanctions, Respondent’s rulings will be reviewable on appeal
to the intermediate court of appeals from the LIRAB’s final
decision in AB 2007-497 and AB 2007-498. See HRS § 386-88 (Supp.
2008). Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to mandamus relief.
See HRS § 602-5(3) (Supp. 2008) (The supreme court has
jurisdiction and power to issue writs of mandamus directed to
public officers to compel them to fulfill the duties of their
office:
d+ In Re Disciplinary Bd, Of Hawaii Supreme Court, 91
Hawai'i 363, 368, 984 P.2d 688, 693 (1999) (Mandamus relief is
available to compel an official to perform a duty allegedly owed
to an individual only if the individual’s claim is clear and
certain, the official’s duty is ministerial and so plainly
prescribed as to be free from doubt, and no other remedy is
available.}; Salling v. Moon, 76 Hawai'i 273, 274 n. 3, 874 P.2a
1098, 1099 n.3 (1994) (“A duty is ministerial where the law
prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of
discretion and judgment."). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for leave to
anend the petition is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, april 9, 2009.
Gren
Reet Onesie em
BN
enon €: Katie tr +
ParbeQ YSeveiong
| 9d036250859e1f1587045ee443b5663204eef0b24ee968ff05762561b3acecb9 | 2009-04-09T00:00:00Z |
e68d31bb-5123-4501-a324-d64e06a48ee7 | State v. Miller | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
No. 28849
Y Hs 6- a3ysuqg
ass
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'E
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee
DOUGLAS MILLER, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(EC-CR NO. 07-1-0303)
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Acoba, J., for the court; and
Nakayama, J., dissenting, with whom Hirai, J., joins*)
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Douglas Miller's
9g
application for writ of certiorari, filed on December 24, 2008,
is accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The parties
will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘, February 9, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Simeon R. ACOBA,
Associate Justice
Hayden Aluli, on the
application, for
petitioner/
defendant-appellant.
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Considered by:
Circuit Judge Hirai, assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 718fdfb6b3f9b4260656f985ec0c9e96b3d450bfcc47edfa563636e10069ffa4 | 2009-02-09T00:00:00Z |
cbd109b0-dd59-4d01-8b8b-f49282e862a3 | Marn v. Marks | null | 29693 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 29693
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
ALEXANDER Y. NARN, Petitioner, 3
“ fe E
THE HONORABLE VICTORIA S. MARKS, suDGE OF THE Gu@IT
COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWA! ss = oC
unvegt. NAR, JR.) JANES Hat. DUM, Succesese TELBtee op
Oe the’ annabenie 4. buon Brust, Dated June 16, gel
ind Thiouns E. HAYES, Receiver, Respondents Oh
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CIVIL Nos, 98-4706, 98-5371, 07-1-0565)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 3J., and
Circuit Judge Hara, assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
mandamus and prohibition filed on March 11, 2009 by petitioner
Alexander Y. Marn and the papers in support, it appears that
petitioner's claim that the respondent judge improperly
authorized the interim payments of taxes, attorney's fees, and
expenses is not clear and indisputable. The April 3, 2008, June
5, 2008, September 16, 2008, and December 22, 2008 orders are
reviewable on appeal from final judgments entered in Civil Nos.
98-4706, 98-5371, and 07-1-0565. Thus, petitioner is not
entitled to a writ of mandamus and prohibition. See Kena v.
Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i 200, 204-05, 982 P.2d 334, 338-39 (1999) (A
writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is an extraordinary renedy
that will not issue unless the petitioner demon
ates a clear
and indisputable
nt to relief and a lack of alternative means
to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested
action.) .
It further appears that the March 11, 2009 petition
cannot be treated as an application for a writ of
certiorari to
review the intermediate court of appea!
dismissal orders filed
in Nos, 29421 and 29448 inasmuch as the p
the requirements of HRS § (Supp. 2008) and HRAP 40.
‘Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus and prohibition is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for expedited
review is denied.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawai'S, March 25, 2009.
Tf
Seales Crecente
NS
Bune trae
| c3e0873d868a0c8c78b20f4b97bd38d99b35de6e34b25d3178fbb1c494cd867c | 2009-03-25T00:00:00Z |
c1b05d6a-0067-4ebb-8fbd-4f403de403d1 | Alvarez Family Trust v. Association of Apartment Owners of the Kaanapali Alii | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 27695
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T
ALVAREZ FAMILY TRUST; SERGIO S. ALVAREZ
AND MARGARET J. ALVAREZ,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS
OF THE KAANAPALI ALIT,
Respondent /Defendant Appellee
98:5 WY LI evo
qa
and
JOHN DOES 1-100; JANE DOES 1-100;
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-100; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-100;
AND DOE ENTITIES 1-100, Defendants
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(civ. NO. 05-1-0013)
‘Acoba, J., for the court")
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
February 27, 2009 by Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants Alvarez
Family Trust; Sergio S. Alvarez and Margaret J. Alvarez is
C.J. Nakayama, Acobs, and Duffy, Jd., and
5 considered by: Moon,
Circuit Judge Nishimura, assigned by reason of vacancy
accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The parties
will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding scheduling.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 17, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
e
‘Terrance M. Revere and
Rebecca A. Szucs (Motooka
Yamamoto & Revere), on
the application for
petitioners/plaintifts-
appellants.
Matt A, Tsukazaki,
(Li & Teukazaki), on
the response for
respondent /defendant-
appellee.
| 2c2887ac9a905c4f40cbb277070474ae5beb53103eba852bb32079adc1aa9d61 | 2009-03-17T00:00:00Z |
d3a00d35-d81e-4aa1-821f-d2e5c52eb6bb | Rinking v. County of Hawaii, Hawaii Police Department | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 28752
1 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAr'I ~
ee eee
DEAN A. REINKING, Respondent-Clainant-Appeliant, ©
COUNTY OF HAWAI'I, HAWAI'I COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Petitioner-Employer-Appellee, Self-Insured,
and
STATE OF HAWAI'I, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION DIVISION,
Petitioner-Third-Party Administrator-Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE NO. AB 2006-174 (H) (1-85-0132) }
(By: Duffy, J., for the court")
Petitioner-fmployer-Appellee, Self-Insured County of
Hawai'i, Hawai'i County Police Department and Petitioner-Third~
Party Administrator-Appellee State of Hawai'i, Department of
Human Resources Development, State Workers’ Compensation
Division's application for a writ of certiorari, filed on
December 23, 2008, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 30, 2009.
Joseph XK. Kanelanela and FoR THE COURT:
isense1 3. Gaouie, Deputies
Corporation Counsel, for
Petitioner Employer-Appellee, Cane folly
Self-inoured," Couney ef Hawet't, Associate Justice
Hawai'i County Police Department
and Petitioner-Third-Party
Acministrator-Appellee State
of Hawai'l, Department of Human
Resources Development, State
Workers’ Compensation Division
on the application
considered by
circuit Juage
Moon, C.J.» Nakayama, Acobe, Duffy, JJ., and
gned by reason of vacancy.
| 49985864b648c54fadb131d3b9b850ffb1b2481d9ef0c8753b5699dc61381ff6 | 2009-01-30T00:00:00Z |
2e197d99-a37d-442e-ad72-3f3222e394e7 | In re Fisher | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29520
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
ORDER ACCEPTING AFFIDAVIT IN L1EU OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE
EVIDENCING LICENSE 20 PRACTICE LAW IN THIS STATE
Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ-y
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge Fujise,
‘assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of Petitioner Sheree Michelle
Fisher's Affidavit Re Order Granting Petition to Resign and
Surrender License, it appears that (1) on December 22, 2008, this
court granted Petitioner Fisher's RSCH 1.10 petition to resign
and surrender Licenses (2) the December 22, 2008 order provided,
in part, that "Petitioner Fisher shall return her original
License to practice law to the Clerk of this court forthwith
and) [t]he Clerk shall retain the original license as part of
this record;" and (3) Petitioner Fisher avers that, after a
thorough and diligent search, she cannot find her original
license to practice in the State of Hawai'i, and believes it has
been destroyed. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the supreme court's
Decenber 22, 2008 order in this case is modified to the extent
that Petitioner Fisher’s affidavit shall be deemed to satisfy the
requirement that she submit to the Clerk the original certificate
ww. If Petitioner Fisher
evidencing her license to practice
ary
finds the original certificate evidencing her license to prac
law in this State, she shall inmediately deposit the same w:
the Clerk of this court, and the Clerk shall thereupon retain the
license as part of this record.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 30, 2009.
Dro
Bea O Reacteey ane
IIo
Yore, betyudh,
| 66493d9e53277905ecada6282efb7bc31ffe3355650a8d8e3f4a094fc7375faa | 2009-01-30T00:00:00Z |
ae1e3a46-8850-4cbd-9da6-8a0187415704 | State v. Kalua | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 28403
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
Bee, 3
gs
Respondent /Plaintiff-apy
STATE OF HAKAZE,
“ of 8
FRANK A. KAUUA, Petitioner/Defendant-Apppiane.
323 =
PEALSSS
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF
(CR. NO, 06-1-0101(3))
PL EC
for the court)
(By: Noon, C.J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Frank A, Kalua’s
application for writ of certiorari, filed February 11, 2009, is
hereby rejected.
DATED: Honélulu, 2009.
i, March 24,
FOR THE COURT
Hawa:
Y considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Circuit Judge Abn, assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 9ffb859ed85c6f396803c4901703521b504a5323bb59b678ce3f1f5117fd4995 | 2009-03-24T00:00:00Z |
5f9d7e38-26fd-4130-bff8-c97a11769b07 | State v. Taylor | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 28168
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
No. 20168
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintift-1 Appelieds
vs.
Petit ioner/Defendant-Appel lant
JEFFREY TAYLOR,
(CR. NO. 06-1-0054(4))
Visld 2— ayy gy
no. 28169
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee,
JENNIFER TAYLOR, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
(CR. NO. 06-1-0085(4))
CERTIORARI TO THE INTESMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NOS. 06-1-0054(4) & 06-21-0055 (4) }
CERT
(By: Duffy, J., for the court")
Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants Jeffrey Taylor and
Jennifer Taylor’s application for writ of certiorari, filed on
February 12, 2009, is hereby dismissed as untimely.
March 2, 2009.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawa:'t, <
Meyer Ml. veoka FoR THE couRT: ee Sy
for pevitioners/
defendants appellants Yoron €. Bogs + » SEAL
Associate Justice ecuat”
on the application
Moon, c.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
5 considered by:
cireuis Juage Kim, agsigned by reason of vacancy.
| a98be098bab98a67165b98a2c730b98dc9c4a0e6396c7716728a088c64481792 | 2009-03-02T00:00:00Z |
bbba5fa6-4195-40ca-9ef5-0ee830328b31 | Dural v. State | null | 28533 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court |
no. 28533
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT‘T
ROYNES JOSESH “ERIC” DURAL IT,
Petitioner/Pet itioner-Appellant
STATE OF HAWAI'I,
Respondent /Respondent-Appellee
aats
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(SPP NO. 06-1-0037; CR. NO. 02-1-2791)
CERTIORART WITHOUT PREJUDICE
(By: Acoba, J., for the court')
The Application for Writ of certiorari filed on
Decenber 12, 2008 by Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Roynes
Joseph “Eric” Dural 11 is hereby rejected, without prejudice to
fling another Rule 40 petition in the circuit court based on
alleged website statenents of shyla Combis and the declarations
of Chad Kalavaia and Viblana Slutter, referred to in the
Application.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawat"L, January 27, 2009.
FoR THE coURt
aa ve
S,
fesociate Justice
Virginia E. Hench (The
Hawai'i Innocence Project),
on the application for
petitioner/petitioner-
appellant.
Considered by: Moon, C.J-, Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, J. and
Cizcust Judge Bifoy assigned by reeson of vacancy
| b31a05241181e9c72071d3b00c2e5ad04ee5b36044424a94a22e7a2887678cf2 | 2009-01-27T00:00:00Z |
cfd5c65e-5d6b-4e33-ae4d-d1483334221c | Costa Rica VI v. County of Kauai | null | 29577 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No, 29577
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
JOAQUIN AYRES COSTA RICA VI, Petitioner,
COUNTY OF KAUAI, Respondent. 3
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
‘ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.
ana Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Foley,
‘assigned by reason of vacancy)
upon review of Joaquin Ayres Costa Rica’s papers dated
January 9, 2009, which purport to be a petition for writ of
mandamus, it appears that the petition seeks supreme court review
of Civil No. 03-1-0084. We lack jurisdiction to review Civil No.
03-1-0084. See HRS § 602-5 (Supp. 2007). Therefore,
17 IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the appellate
court shall process the January 9, 2009 papers as a petition for
writ of mandamus without payment of the filing fee.
IT 1S FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for writ of
mandamus is dismissed.
DATE:
Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 23, 2009.
Gorin
cue tes Cut beeen) nes
poe
7] oy _
F
f
| 84810ab0f5c52f30e45029d5fb2e3f0e0b4141c2bda2e937c93b652ac8414ac4 | 2009-01-23T00:00:00Z |
a7cc36fe-a74e-4303-b686-e707006e6fc3 | Association of Apartment Owners of the Cliffs at Princeville v. Premier Resorts International | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | Uw BRA
No, 27558
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAr'r
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT OWNERS OF THE CLIFFS AT PRINCEVILLE,
‘Applicant-Appellee,
PREMIER RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., dba VILLAGE RESORTS,
Respondent-Appel lant. “
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 4
(S-P, NO, 4-1-0003)
lend
aaws
(By: Nakayama, J., for the Court®
‘and Acoba, J., dissenting)
“yaiva'L VHBN
62: Rd ONT
Upon consideration of Respondent /Appellant Premier
Resorts International, Inc., dba Village Resorts’ motion for
reconsideration of the Decenber 30, 2008 order partially granting
and partially denying Applicant /Appellee Association of
Association of Apartment Owners of the Cliffs at Princeville’s
request for fees and costs, and the record herein,
IP IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 20, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Paria Oru desyen) i)
Associate Justice | ,
DISSENT BY ACOBA, J.
I respectfully disagree and would grant the motion for
reconsideration. ooo
‘considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ., and
Retired Justice Levinson, appointed by reason of vacancy, on January 15, 2009.
| 3162069e65225e744c3f6c6e5fb7b97a37e0118b6dba7c4957a6bedafa0087f4 | 2009-01-20T00:00:00Z |
c2bb18e5-6566-4078-b5a9-e73df6b504fa | State v. Hinton. ICA s.d.o., filed 08/26/2008 [pdf], 118 Haw. 419. Dissenting Opinion by J. Foley [pdf]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 12/17/2008. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/29/2009 [pdf]. | 120 Haw. 265 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | *** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
00 --~
STATE OF HAWAI'T, Respondent /Plaintift-Appellant,
MARSHALL HINTON, Petitioner /Defendant-Appellee.
No. 27719
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF AP!
(CR. NO. 04-1-2546)
MARCH 19, 2009
90:1 Hd 61 UN GUIE
MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ., AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE BLONDIN, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
. On January 29, 2009, this court accepted a timely
application for a writ of certiorari, filed on December 17, 2008
by petitioner/defendant-appellee Warshall Hinton, seeking review
of the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) September 18, 2008
judgment on appeal, entered pursuant to its August 26, 2008
sunmary disposition order (SD0). Therein, the ICA vacated the
Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s' December 21, 2005 findings
‘The Honorable Richard K. Perkins presided over the underlying
proceedings
ast
*** FORPUBLICATION *
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
of fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (COls), and order granting
Hinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. oral
argument was held on February 19, 2009,
Briefly stated, Hinton was indicted for allegedly
touching the then-thirteen-year-old complainant [hereinafter, the
complainant) on her genital area outside her clothing and was
subsequently tried by a jury for sexual assault in the third
degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
5 707-732(1) (b) (Supp. 2008).? However, the trial court declared
a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict
and, upon motion by Hinton, dismissed the indictment with
prejudice, pursuant to State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d
705 (1982), discussed infra. On appeal by respondent /plaintiff-
appellant State of Hawai'i (the prosecution), a majority of the
ICA concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
Gismissing the indictment and, accordingly, vacated the trial
court's dismii
1. Judge Foley dissented, concluding that the
s{erial] court aia not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
indictment against Hinton.*
Hinton argues on application that ‘the ICA gravely
erred in concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in
2 as § 707-732(1) (b) provides: *A person commits the offense of
sexual assault in the third degree if... [t]he person knowingly subjects to
Sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes
such a person to have sexual contact with the person[.1”
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
dismissing the case under Moriwake* inasmuch as the ICA
‘improperly incorporated [a] novel ‘separation of powers’
consideration" into its analysis that “conflict[s] with Moriwake
and its progeny.” Based on the discussion below, we hold that
the ICA erred in (1) injecting an additional “separation of
powers’ analysis into the Moriwake framework and (2) holding that
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the
indictment with prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the Ica’s
judgment on appeal and affirm the trial court’s December 21, 2005
FOFs, COLs, and order granting Hinton’s motion to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice.
1. BACKGROUND
A. Relationship Between Hinton and the Complainant
Hinton and the complainant’s grandmother, Karen Dupont,
were involved in a ronantic relationship for approximately
twenty-seven years and, during that time, had two children
together, Hinton and Dupont’s relationship began when the
complainant's mother, Jeminis Dupont (Jeminis), was two-years-
old, and, although Hinton was not her biological father, Jeminis
referred to him as “Dad.* Likewise, the complainant referred to
Hinton as *Papa.*
At the time of the alleged assault, Hinton and Dupont
were no longer in a romantic relationship; however, they
apparently remained friends. Hinton often spent time at Dupont‘s
residence, visiting his biological children and working on cars
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
that he kept there. Dupont estimated that Hinton spent "a couple
hours" two or three days a week at her house.
B. Indictment and Trial
On December 23, 2004, Hinton was indicted with one
count of sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS
5 707
32 (1) (b), for allegedly placing his hand on the
complainant's genital area outside her clothes. A two-day jury
trial was held on September 12 and 13, 2005.
The prosecution’s main witness at trial -- the
complainant -- testified that, on December 7, 2004, she cane hone
from school to Dupont’s house in Salt Lake, where the complainant
was residing with her mother, Jeminis, and other family menbers.
Upon arriving at the house, the complainant saw Hinton and Dupont
outside the hou
on direct examination the complainant
testified as follows:
A {87 the complainant} {inton) told me to cone
behind the truck. And then he showed me the porno magazine,
(Q (Sy the prosecution) Now, how did you krow 12 was a
ine?
were naked people on the cover
holding this magazine?
A Tsincon
Q, Mow iong'do you think that he was holding it in
front Of you?
2 About five seconds:
Okay. “Mow id looking at this magazine sake you
feel?
A Awhward
> At the tine of the alleged assault, the complainant had only been
residing at the Dupont house for about six wonthe =~ since July 2004, For the
four years prior eo soving to the Dupont house, ‘the complainant had been
Living in New Jersey with a fanily mesber because of her mother’s drug use.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
@ Mow, what did you do to the magazine when (Hinton!
tried fo show it ta you?
D” T'Teoked away.
O mat dia you do after he showed you the magazine?
5 T'went into the ou
The complainant further testified that Hinton then followed her
into the house and told her to sit down next to him on the couch
in the living room. The complainant indicated that she and
Hinton were sitting *close* to one another so that they were
touching. when asked, ‘what happened after [she] sat down next
to [Hinton], the complainant testified that:
A (By the complainant} [Hiinton} grabbed my hand.
Q [By the prosecution} And what hand =~ which of your
hands did he grab?
‘she Jefe.
And which one of his hands did he grab your hand
wich?
the right.
‘Okay. "And how was he holding your hand?
Elke eriss-croas:
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Your honor, may the record
reflect the witness is shoving intertwined fingers?
[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Thank you.
by [the prosecution) :
‘ow, where id [itinton] put your hands at first?
Gn hi dap.
Okay. Aad where exactly on his lap?
Like by his knee
Did he move your hands?
Yes
And where did he move your hands?
To my nant area.
Do you have any other words for your nani?
Private part
Okay. Want part of hie body couched your nani?
Bis band.
Bo you know how long his hand was on your nant?
Three seconds
Did he move hig hand at all while it was on your
nani?
What direction did he move his hand?
‘Up and down.
Mere you wearing clothes at the tine?
Okay. And was this under your clothes or over your
4
over
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
2 hat happened after (Hinton] touched your nani?
A T'lee go of Ale hand and went into the kitchen,
Q How did you feel at this timer
Beira
@ Dia'=> aid {Hinton} follow you into the kitchen?
A Yes
0 Did'he say anything to you at this tine?
A He wanted me to flash my boobs:
Q Okay. How do you know that?
A fe'dia hand motion.
Q Okay. And could you describe what you mean by hand
motion?
A He wont up Like chat.
TPROSBCUTING ATTORNEY) :\ Your Honor, may the racord
reflect that the witness hag shown ewo fice from a lover
position to a higher position?
By [the prosecution]
‘So what did you think he wanted you to do?
Plas
Okay. And what @o you mean by flash?
Lift up sy shire.
Okay. "and did’ you do chat?
The complainant testified that Dupont then entered the kitchen
area, but that she (the complainant) did not immediately say
anything or tell anyone (including her mother or grandnother)
about what happened. About a week later, the complainant told
her mother’s friend, ‘Aunty Kelly," about the alleged Decenber 7,
2004 assault.
‘The complainant also testified that, on December 19,
2004 while riding in Hinton’s vehicle, Hinton made her watch a
DvD of “{pleople having sex.* she later reported the incident to
wer family menbers, and the police were called that evening. The
police searched Hinton’s vehicle and recovered a DVD player, but
no pornographic DvD was found. Although the December 19 incident
4id not give rise to criminal charges, the Decenber 7 alleged
Ameident, which was also reported to the police at that tine, led
to the instant case
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
Dupont also testified for the prosecution. In her
testimony, she indicated that, on December 7, 2004, she ‘walked
in the house and [Hinton and the complainant] were sitting on the
couch talking, and [the complainant] was smiling and laughing.*
Dupont indicated that she believed the complainant was smiling
“‘cause [Hinton] was explaining to her about getting her a cell
phone for her for Christmas, and gifts, Christmas gifts.* Dupont
also indicated that, after the alleged December 7 incident was
reported to the police on December 19, 2004, she and Hinton asked
Jeminis and the complainant to move out of the Dupont house.
However, on cross-exanination, Dupont stated that, prior to the
alleged incident being reported to the police, she and Hinton
spoke with Jeminis and the complainant about leaving the hone.
Dupont indicated that both geminis and the complainant were very
upset that Dupont was kicking them out.‘
Aunty Kelly and Jeminis, among others, also testified
for the prosecution, essentially confirming the complainant's
testimony that she told Aunty Kelly about the alleged Decesber 7,
2004 as xanination, Jeminis
ult, Additionally, on eros:
admitted to methamphetamine use at or around the time of the
alleged incident. At the close of the prosecution’s case-in-
«ze was Hinton’s theory at trial that the complainant sade the
allegations ‘of abuse because she was angry about Hinton and Dupont telling her
and her mother to move out.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
chief, Hinton moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied
by the trial court
Hinton -- the only witness called by the defense --
testified on his om behalf and denied that he touched the
complainant on her genital area on December 7, 2004 or that he
asked her to flash him on that same day, Hinton testified as
follows regarding the events that allegedly occurred on
December 7:
Well, 1 wes working on a car at the time. And [the
complainant) cane up and she sald, Mi, papa. And then her
geandrother, (Dupont), went down to ack her why was she late
Coming hone’ from school: Aa far aa her explanation T don’
Feally know.
continved to work on the car. and afi
while i wad nor outside, so Twent in the house ou
Bathroom, 1 don’t know whether [the complainant] was on the
Couch or in the kitchen, Sut my daughter wae in he
Feom. "SoZ went to use’ the bethroom. And when'T came back
Sat, (the complainant] was asking me about a cell phone that
we were supposed co get her for Christmas|]
About that time, we was in the middie of a
conversation and sy cell phone ring, and was [linten’s
Gieliviend], ‘The birds was chirping and 2 could barely heer
What ahe wae saying, f ves ike, hello. And so 1 went
headed towards the door ‘Aad [the complainant]
puiting me back because she
ation about the telephone. So
Yiwar talking co sy girlfriend, and my phone began co 0
dead. “fo what f did vas 1 told her T would cal! her back,
After that I tung up the phone. aad [the complainant] was
pulling ne by my hand, so 7 turned, Constantiy talking to
Ber about the phon
‘Shortly after that, (Dupont) walks in, and T
ask ner to'get her house phone to call up [iinton’
Girlfriend], And then shortly after chat, she went and got
the phone ahd brought it back out to me(.j
yigez the phone and I step outside to call my
otritriend:
> finton also denied the allegations that he showed the complainant a
pornographic video in hie vehicle on the evening of December 19, 2004.
<2.
*** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
‘The case was submitted to the jury on the afternoon of
September 13, 2005. on September 14, 2005, the jury sent a
communication (Communication No. 1) to the trial court, asking,
*[wlhat is the definition of the genitailia [sic] areas? is the
back of the hand on pubic hair considered touching the genitailia
{sic} area?]" The trial court -- upon consultation with counsel
-- responded:
As to your first question, the term ‘genitalia’ is
De Understood in Sta conmen or Gaual vse or meaning
‘As to your second quaation, this is for you co
determine based on the instructions you already have,
A few hours later, the jury sent another communication
(Communication No. 2), indicating that the jury was ‘deadlocked,
and asking ‘what should [it] do?” In response, the trial court
sent a question to the jury, asking: ‘Would further deliberation
of any length be reasonably likely to result in a unanimous
verdict?" The jury indicated "no" and submitted a note that
stated, *[wlith copies of police reports, written statements of
wittnesses [sic] and transcripts, we might be able to reach a
unanimous verdict. Otherwise no," On September 15, 2005, the
jury sent Communication No. 3 to the trial court, requesting to
hear the testimony of a number of witnesses, including the
complainant and Hinton. The trial court declined the jury's
request. Thereafter, the jury sent Communication No. 4, stating
that *{t]he jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict." The trial
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
court determined that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and
declared a mistrial.‘
on October 5, 2005, Hinton filed a motion to dismiss
the indictment with prejudice, pursuant to Moriwake, discussed
Anfza. The prosecution opposed Hinton’s motion to dismiss. A
hearing was held on October 12, 2005, and, subsequent to hearing
arguments by the parties, the trial court orally granted Hinton’s
motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. specifically,
the trial court reasoned that
such
(wlnder Moriuake, when faced with a motion to disni
as the one that has been filed in this case, (che trial
Court] mist look to a mimber of factors. the firs: is che
Severity of the offense charged. Now, this is a class C
felony.” It ie the least serious felony class ~~ or it is
within the Least serious felony class. I’m not minimizing
the offense itself, bat it ie the lowest level felony. And
fhat, to me, weighs against retrial. we've got A's and B's
fo deal with, "And there afe so apecial circumstances here
Eh tems of injury.” ‘There's nothing that i saw, ‘no physical
hharm to. the complainant, so T think looking at the offens
Steel! and the classifications the legislature has given ic,
that one weighs against retrial
‘The second Horivake factor concerns the sunber of
prior alstrials and the circustances of the jury
Seliberation therein so far as is knows. ‘well, we have only
one mistrial. Chief Justice Richardson, in a footnote,
Seems £0 say usually after a second hung jury mistrial, it's
probably 2 good idea to think seriously about dismissing =
Case. That sort of suggeste that doing it after one
Rlattial or doing it -~ or allowing @ trial after wo hung
Juries 1s probably less -- well, sore unusual. But still,
Let ne look at the circunatances of the deliberations.
1 don't know sho pur it in the moving papers, but
sonebody said twas eight co four for acquittal, It's not
so mich in the numbers. And there ig an indication that at
Teast. two people were going back and forth so it could have
been 50/50'at one point in tise. And in ay Judgment, that's
nore significant, the fact that they were evenly split, than
here it ended up at eight to four for acquittal, The jury
id sean £0 have problems following the evidence, but they’
(tore allowed to take notes, I'm not sure I saw many of them
tsking a lot of notes during the course of the trial. But
« we note that both trial counsel met with the jurors after they were
dismissed and lesrned that the vote was eight for acquittal and four guilty.
-10-
*** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
al in all, the questions they asked and their trouble
Following the evidence makes ne feel that this factor weichs
favor of a retrial.
"The next Usrivake factor is the character of prior
trlais in terme of length, complexity, and similarity of
evidence presented. Well, we've only had one prior trial
Te wasn't very long, So { think that kind of weighs in
favor of retrial. It was not complex. In my judgment, it
was not a complicated trial, The key issue was credibility.
Te'was (Hinton) 's credibiiity versus [the complainant] and
her mother pretty much. So to me, chat factor weighs
against retrial.
Now, the Sext factor is che similarity of evidence,
and this iooks back at the prior trials, We've only got one
trial so we're not talking about similarity so I'm going to
Skip that one. i don’t think it applies £0 our case
‘The next factor ie the Likelihood of any substantial
Gifterence in a subsequent trial if allowed. And that one,
to me, is important, “(The prosecution] argues the phone
records, videotape, {") and. = clarifying the term
genitalia. “Te phone records -- well, let me say this much.
Svhew trial is noe to correct aistaxes that were made in the
first trial because that impacts the fairness factor. So T
tend to discount that. The video and the [prosecution]
being able to call {a witness] next tine around, T think Z
have to dSscount as well because 1 don't ehink (Hinton's
counsel] would get into that area again, and it is not
Independently admissible as far as T can seo.
"and, you know, the clarification of the term genitalia
is -- T don't know what else to do. Most people know what
that is, And if they didn’t, they could have asked us for a
Gefinition. But when we responded that that word was to be
Eaken in its ordinary comon meaning, we didn't get anymore
Guestions in that area. I think they were more concerned
ith whether just touching =~ 1 think there was a reference
fo pubie hair =~ was enough, To ne, they were looking at.
how serious the offense was rather than any confusion with
regard to what genitalia sean
I think all of these things considered that in the
next trial, the evidence would be substantially similar, Tt
would not differ all that much. So that one, rhat factor,
weighs against retrial.
fon the (trial) court’s evaluation of the evidence, 1
think “- and thie ie the [trial] court's pereonal view -~ s¢
Weighs in favor of retrial. But this factor should be, T
PHBE, discounted in view of the ‘auprenel court's opinion
in Gtdte ve Lincola(, 72 Haw. 480, 825 P.24 64. (1992)).
don't think the Trial] court's view of the evidesce should
+ Me note that the trial courts reference to ‘the videotape’ is not
the one related to the Decenber 13, 2004 incident, but a different
Spornographic" tape, Specifically, che complainant testified at trial that,
prior to the alleged Decesber 7, 2004 incident, Hinton had used her cancorder
and made a recording “of him playing with hineelf,~ hich video he left in the
complainant's camcorder. However, this videotape was never recovered by the
police or the prosecution. Indeed, at oral argunent, the prosecution conceded
That the subject videotape was not in their possession and, thus, ie would not
be Likely for it to be introduced at a subsequent trial.
ane
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(Smphasis
cots, and
determine whether there's a retrial or not. 7 can cone
{nto balance, but I don't think the court should place too
much weight on that
‘And the final factor is the professional conduct and
Sgence of the respective counsel, particularly that of
the prosecuting attorney. You know I'don'e have —- T chink
both of you did a good job in this case, T think, a
of you seen to be Saying, that the professional conduc
@iilgence of counsel was fine, was adequate, appropriate, et
cetera. And I agree. And I think given that, that factor
weighs against retrial
‘you know, so 1've looked at all these things. and 1
haven't given “- well, have tp gay 1: Le a close fase
But all things considered. 1 think more of the tactore waich
aealnst a retrial. And so 1m going to grant the action to
‘Sienies:
added.)
on Decenber 21, 2005, the trial court entered its Fors,
an order, consistent with its oral ruling, granting
Hinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. of
particular relevance are the trial court's COLs, which stated:
1. The trial court has the inherent discretionary
apiiity to dianies an indictment with prejudice after
Balancing the vintarest of 1 e against fundanental
fairneat to a defendant as well as the orderly functioning
of the court aysten:
20" tn balancing these interest(s) the (eriat) court
shall consider the following factors: (1) the severity of
the offense charged; (2) the nunber of prior mistrials and
the ireunstances of the jury deliberations therein, so far
ae is know; (3) the character of prior trials in corns of
Tengen, conplexity(,] and similarity of evidence presented:
(2)"the likelihood of any substantial difference ina
fubsequent trial, if allowed; (5) the trial court's orn
evaluation of relative case strength; and (6) the
professional conduct and diligence of respective counsel,
particularly that of the prosecuting attorney.
3. Ag to the severity of the offense charged,
character of the trial, likelihood of any substantial
Gitference in a subsequent trial, and the professional
conduct and diligence of counsel, the (trial) court finds
fsiel that these factora weigh against retrial.
4." consequently, the (triai] court finds (sic) that
in balancing ali of the afore-sentioned [sic] factors, the
interest is] of the state do not outweigh the fundamental
fairness £0 0 defendant as well as the orderly functioning
of the court systen.
on January 20, 2008, the prosecution filed a timely notice of
appeal.
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C. Appeal Before the ICA
on direct appeal, the prosecution argued that "the
trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting (Hinton]‘s
motion to dismiss the indictement [sic] with prejudice’ inasmuch
as the trial court's COLs were “wrong” and its FOPs ‘in support
thereof [were] clearly erroneous." In response, Hinton contended
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the indictment with prejudice
on August 26, 2008, the ICA issued an SDO, vacating the
trial court’s December 21, 2005 FOFs, COLs, and order granting
Hinton’s motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, and
remanded the case for further proceedings. D0 at 8. As
discussed more fully infra, the ICA, citing to State v. Lincoln,
72 Haw. 480, 491, 825 P.2a 64, 70 (1992), and two out-of-state
cases, expressed concern that the trial court's dismissal of the
indictment with prejudice raised ‘separation-of-powers concerns.”
Ad, at 3. In that light, the ICA examined the six Morivake
factors and determined that -- contrary to the trial court's
conclusion -- such factors ‘weigh{ed) strongly in favor of a
retrial’ and that, therefore, the trial court abused ite
discretion in dismissing the indictment with prejudice. Id.
gudge Foley issued a dissent, indicating that, contrary to the
majority's view, *[tJhe [trial] court did not exceed the bounds
of reason or disregard rules or principles of law or practice,
and, therefore, the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion in
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dismissing the indictment against Hinton.” Id. at 3 (Foley, J,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Additionally, Judge Foley noted
that he “believe[d] that the majority’s ‘separation of powers
concerns’ [were] unwarranted." Id. at 3 n.1.
The ICA’s judgment on appeal was issued on Septenber
18, 2008. Thereafter, on January 29, 2009, this court accepted
Hinton’s application and heard oral argument on February 19,
2009.
IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW
*A [trial] court's ruling on a motion to dismiss an
indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.
kau, 118 Hawai’
44, 51, 185 P.34 229, 236 (2008) (citation
omitted).
‘The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly
exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules oF
principles of law or practice to the substantial detrinent
bea party litigant. “the burden of establishing abuse of
Giscretion is on appellant, anda strong showing is required
fo eeeabiieh te
State v. Wong, 97 Hawai'i $12, 517, 40 P.34 914, 919 (2002)
(citation omitted) .
IIT. DISCUSSION
As previously stated, Hinton’s assignment of error is
grounded in his contention that the ICA ‘improperly incorporated
[a] novel
paration of powers’ consideration” into its analysis
which “conflictis] with Moriwake and its progeny’ and, therefore,
“failed to properly apply the abuse of discretion standard of
review.” More specifically, Hinton argues that the ICA's
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citation to Lincoln ‘as a segway to import a novel ‘separation of
powers’ factor from out-of-state cases, into Hawaii's established
Morivake analysis[,]" erodes the inherent constitutional power of
the trial court and disregards Moriwake.
A. The Relevant case Law
1. Moriwake
In Moriwake, this court was faced with, inter alia, the
issue ‘whether an indictment for manslaughter was properly
ismissed with prejudice following two hung jury mistrials on the
charge [of manslaughter]. 65 Haw. at 48, 647 P.2d at 708.
During the first trial, which lasted three days, the defendant
argued that he did not have the requisite state of mind to commit
the crime due to extreme intoxication. Id, at 49, 647 P.2d at
708. Following approximately ten hours of deliberations, the
jury informed the trial court that it could not reach a verdict,
and the trial court, after questioning the jurors, ‘concluded
that the jury was at an impasse and declared a mistrial sua
sponte." Id, Three months later, a second trial was conducted
on the same charge. Id, Again, the jury could not reach a
verdict, and the trial court declared a second mistrial. id.
‘Thereafter, the trial court
upon motion by the defendant --
Gismissed the indictment, reasoning, inter alia, that, ‘under the
circumstances of this case, a third trial would pose an undue
emotional, personal[,] and financial hardship on the defendant.”
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Id. at 50, 647 P.2d at 708. The prosecution appealed the trial
court’s dismissal. Id, at 50, 647 P.2d at 709
on appeal, this court, recognizing the ‘inherent or
implied powers of the court," id, at 55, 547 P.2d at 712, stated
that ‘the inherent poser of the court is the power to protect
itself; the power to administer justice whether any previous form
of remedy has been granted or not; the power to promulgate rules
for its practice; and the power to provide process where none
exists.” Id. (quoting In xe Bruen, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (wash.
1918)) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). This
court further stated that the "aspect of the judicial power which
the declaration of one or more mistrials because of cenuinely
deadlocked juries, even though the defendant's constitutional
rights are not yet implicated." Id, (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). The Moriwake court also recognized that:
Fx an interest ia ns
‘the iudiciel orocess and in etauring fairness 19
os roceedinas Gndanencal
Hust pe-mubiect to the power and reaponaibiliny of the
Id. at 56, 547 P.2d at 712 (quoting State v. Braunsdorf, 297
N.W.24 808, 817 (Wisc. 1980) (Day, J., dissenting)) (emphasis
added) (format altered). “Simply put,’ the Moriwake court
stated, ‘it is a matter of balancing the interest of the state
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against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the added
ent of the orderly functioning of Ide
(emphasis added) (citation,
(ternal quotation marks, and
original brackets omitted). Based on the foregoing, the Moriuake
court laid out the following six factors, ‘which the trial court
should consider in undertaking [the aforementioned] balance," id.
at 56, 647 P.2d at 711
(2) the severity of the offense charged; (2) the number of
prior mistriais and the circumstances of the Jury
Geliberations therein, so far as is known; (3) the character
Of prior triais in terms of length, complexity(,] and
Sinilarity of evidence presented; (4) the likelihood of any
Substantial difference in a subsequent trial, if allowed;
(SI the trial coure’s own evaluation of relative case
strength: and (6) the professional conduct and diligence of
Feapective counsel, particularly that of the prosecuting
attorney,
Ud. at 56, 647 P.2d at 712-13 (citation omitted). Applying the
six factors to the case before it, the Moriwake court held that
it did “not perceive the trial court to have abused its
discretion in dismissing the indictment[.]" Id. at 57, 647 P.24
at 713.
2. Lincoln
Lincoln, like Moriwake, involved an appeal from the
Gismissal of an indictment; however, the procedural history of
Lincoln differs from that of Moriwake. The defendant in Lincoln
was initially charged with and tried on two counts of ‘murder for
hire* and one count of ‘attempted murder for hire." 72 Haw. at
482, 825 P.2d at 66. The jury convicted the defendant of all
three charges, but failed to find that the defendant perpetrated
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the cries “for hire" as was required by the statute. Id, On
appeal, the ICA determined that such failure was harmless and
affimmed the detendant’s convictions. Id. at 482-83, 625 P.2d at
66. However, the federal courts (the United States District
court for the District of Hawai'i and the United states Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) thereafter granted the defendant's
petition for habeas corpus and required that he be retried. Id,
at 483, 825 P.2d at 66-67. on retrial, the defendant was
convicted of only one of the charges. Id. at 483, 825 P.2d at
67. On appeal to this court, the defendant's conviction was
overturned inasmuch as the defendant's confrontation right was
violated at trial. id, In overturning the defendant's sole
conviction, this court explicitly remanded the case for a new
trial. Id, Upon remand (during the pretrial phase of the
scheduled third trial), the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for a judgment of acquittal and/or dismissal of the
Indictment as to the single murder count. Id, at 483-84, 625
P.2d at 67. In so doing, the trial court
citing this court's
decision in Moriwake -- based its ruling on its ‘inherent ability
to dismiss an indictment with prejudice in the administration of
justice. Id, at 484, 825 P.2d at 67. On appeal, this court
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment. Id. at
492, 825 P.2d at 71. Looking to the six Moriwake factors, the
Lincoln court stated:
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Except for the “case strength factor, we find little in the
[exial) court's decision to suppor: a dismissal of the
indictment. Furthermore, in Moiwake aa well aa in State v,
Alvey, 67 Haw. 49, 678 P.2d 5 (1984), we cautioned that a
Ertat' court's inkevent pover co disniss an thdictment ta not
2 broad power and tha: trial courts must recognise and weigh
the [prosecution's] interest in prosecuting crime against
fundamental falresa to the defendant. In Moriwske we aid,
swe think that the magnitude of the respective interests of
society and of criminal defendants which are implicated in
this area of the law requires that we more fully delineate
the paraneters within which thia discretion Le properly
exercised." 65 Haw. at 56, 647 P-2d at 712. Im alvey ve
made clear that, even if "there ae serious questions” about
Eimaterial elenont of a crine, Lt 1a not within the erial
Court's discretion to usurp the function of the trier of
fact before trial. 67 Hav. at 58 -n-6, 678 P.2d at 11 4.6.
Ta the ingtant cage, the (trial) court was not
confronted with the prospect of s third trial based on
evidence which had failed to convict a defendant to
previous tines. Rather, the trial court faced the prospect
bia ehird trial following two prior convictions, albeit
With a lesser quantum of evidence than previously available
it ig not for the trial court to'welah the evidence
in determining whether te proceed to trial.
Id. at 491-92, 825 P.2d at 70-71 (emphases added) (footnote
omitted). In other words, this court reasoned that “[iJt is the
duty of the trial court, on remand, to comply strictly with the
nandate of the appellate court” and ‘implicit in [this court’s]
remand was a finding that, on balance, the public’s interest and
the defendant's interest in fundamental fairness were served by
conducting a new trial. Id. at 485-86, 825 P.2d at 68.
B. The Ica‘s Analveia
Although recognizing the six Moriwake factors, the 7cA
joned that separation of powers concerns require that the
trial court's power to dismiss an indictment be used “only in
rare and unusual cases when compelling circumstances require such
a result to assure fundamental fairness in the administration of
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justice.*
stated:
sD0 at 3.
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$00 at 3 (citations omitted). Specifically, the ICA
‘hile the dismissal of en indictsant after one or more
nistrials should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, that
Elseretion ia limited in light of the “magnitude of the
feapective interests of society and of criminal defendants
Shien are implicaved in this area of the law(.]* (Morivake,
65 aw.) at 56, 647 P.24 at 712; gee State z, Lincoln, 72,
Maw. 80, 493, 825 P.24 64, 70. (1992) tavating that va trial
court's inherent power to digniss an indiccnent is not a
broad power and that trial courte must recognize and weigh
the state's interest in prosecsting crime against
Eindamental fairness to the defendant"). indeed, some
Courts have observed that digmiseal of an indictment in
these circunstances raises separation-of-powers concerns
Walch require that the power to dlanies be used sparingly
[wlecause of separatton-of-povers considerations
and the public's interest in the prosecution of
Those charged with criminal offenses, the trial
court's discretion to disniss cases. in the
interest of justice is necessarily Limited,
Generally, trial courts say dlomise prosecutions
Gh furtherance of justice agsinst the wishes of
the prosecutor only in rare and unusual c:
When compelling circumstances require such 2
Feault to assure fundamental fairness in the
Administration of justice
take v. Sauve, 666 A.24 1164, 1267 (ve, 1995) (citations
Setetea); State y. Gonzales, 69 7.34 581, 686 (NM. Ct. App.
3002) (whe long as the court's discretion in dismissing
Eiecessive prosecutions is limited and exercised with great
Caution, there i no separation of powers violation,
we Linit the discretion of trial courts so that they
may disnies criminal prosecutions only in the nost extreme
of casea-*)
In the light of the aforementioned separation of
powers principles, the ICA turned next to analyze each of the six
Moriwake factors as follows:
a
Severity of offense ‘The ICA reagoned that "the (prosecution!
charged
Contended thas Hinton was sexusl predator,
While the defense portrayed him as an
{anocent vietim, there ie a strong societal
interest in having a jury resolve chat
Gisputel.)" ad. at 8. Thus, contrary to
the trial court, che ICA held that "this
factor weighs ih favor of a retrial."
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2
Munber of prior mistrials
and circumstances of jury
Geliberations therein, 60
far ag is known
‘The ICA agreed with the trial court “that
the jury had trouble following the evidencet
and, acterdingly, reasoned that ‘there [wes]
2 basis for concluding that another Jury
Would Be able to reach a verdict,” id. at
5
3
Character of prior trials
(length, complexity, &
similarity of evidence!
The ICA concluded that the fact that there
was “only one prior trial weighe
Significantly in favor of allowing a
Feerial." Ide at 6-7.
@, Likelihood of any The IGA did not directly analyze ehls
Substantial difference in | factor, but stated vit does not appear
Zaubsequent trial, if | Likely’ that the (prosecution] will introduce
alowed significantly different evidence in another
trial." ide at 7
5. Trial court's own ‘The ICA concluded that the trial court's
evaluation of the View that Lincoln prevented it from weighing
Felative case strength | the evidence was erroneous. Id at 5-6
Nowever, the ICA did not present ite own
view of the relative case strength.
%. Professional conduct and |The ICA aid not address this factor.
Ailigence of respective
counsel, particularly
that of the prosecuting
In sum, the ICA concluded that:
There are substantial factors here weighing in favor of a
Fetrial: this isa serious offense, there is reason to
Gonciude that ancther jury could reach a verdict, and the
Getendant hes been subjected to only one trial. ‘There are
fone factors that weigh against a retrial, such as the fact
that it does not appear likely that the [prosecution] will
introduce significantly different evidence in another #riat
Walle tha is a legitimate consideration, ve believe that it
mist be tempered by the (erial] court's observation that the
Jury appeared confused by the testimony even though the
Eriat was not particularly complex. Thus, there is basis
for concluding that another jury could reach a verdict even
if the evidence is essentially the same. On balance, we
believe that che factors idenvified by Morivake weiss
strongly in favor of a retrial, and(,) accordingly, we
Conciude that the [trial] court abused its discretion in
Glenissing the Indictnent.
Td. at 7-8.
In his dissent, Judge Foley reasoned simply that the
trial court “applied the Yoriwake factors . . .{,] did not exceed
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the bounds of reason or disregard rules or principles of law or
practice, and, therefore, . . . did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the indictment against Hinton.” D0 (Foley, J.,
Gissenting) at 2-3. Additionally, Judge Foley noted that, in his
view, “the majority's ‘separation of powers concerns’ [were]
unwarranted” inasmuch as:
ra Moriwake, the Haw
Suprene Court stated:
(ile are cognizant of the deference to be accorded the
scuting attorney with regard to crininal proceedings
ich deference Le not without Bounds, Ag seated
sleewnere:
Society has a strong interest in punishing
criminal conduct. aut soclety algo haa an
Interest in protecting the integrity of the
judicial process and in ensuring fairness to
defendancs in judiclal proceedings. Where those
Fundamental interesta are threatened, the
Sdiseretion’ of the prosecutor mist be subj
to the poser and responsibility of che court.
(Worivake, 65 Haw.) at 56, 647 P.2d at 712 (quoting State v
297 W¥.24 808, B17 (Wis. 1980) (Day, Joy
Sasenting)
Id at 3nd.
c. ta ene"
Preliminarily, we address Hinton’s arguments regarding
the ICA’s “separation of powers concerns.* Specifically, Hinton
argues that the ICA erred inasmuch as it: (1) ‘use[d] dicta from
Lincoln to begin injecting novel separation of powers
considerations into the established Moriwake analysis” and, thus,
“radical{ly] depart led] from Moriwake and its progeny"; and
(2) ‘attempled) to elevate the ‘wishes of the prosecution’ factor
within the current Moriwake analysis and concomitantly
Giminish(ed) the trial court's discretion.” additionally, Hinton
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takes issue with the ICA‘s use of two out-of-state cases, Sauve
and Gonzales, which he claims “are clearly distinguishable and
inapposite.*
As previously indicated, the ICA, in its SD0, reasoned
that separation of powers concerns require that the power to
Gismiss be used ‘only in rare and unusual cases when compelling
circumstances require such a result to assure fundanental
fairness in the administration of justice." sD0 at 3 (citations
omitted). However, we believe, as did Judge Foley, that the ICA
najority’s separation of powers concerns are unwarranted.
Indeed, even the prosecution disavowed any reliance on, or
applicability of, Sauve or Gonzalez.
As indicated in Judge Foley's dissent, this court, in
Moxinake, explicitly stated that it was ‘cognizant of the
deference to be accorded the prosecuting attorney with regard to
criminal proceedings.’ SD0 (Foley, J., dissenting) at 3 n.1
(quoting Moriwake, 65 Haw. at 56, 647 P.24 at 712). However,
this court also pointed out that ‘such deference [was] not
without bounds," holding that, where society's fundamental
interests in protecting the integrity of the judicial process and
in ensuring fairness to defendants in judicial proceedings are
threatened, *the ‘discretion’ of the prosecutiion| must be
subject to the power and responsibility of the court." Morivake,
65 Haw. at 56, 647 P.2d at 712 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). Nowhere in its opinion did the Moriwake court "limit
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the discretion of trial courts so that they may dismiss criminal
prosecutions only in the most extreme cases." SDO at 3 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as observed by
then-ICA Judge Acoba:
(this court’s} recognition of the trial court's inherent
power to dismise an indictment with prejudice {in Hariuake!
Bnd ite adoption of @ standard from the dissenting opinion
£297 W.w.24 808 (Wis. 1980),
oted the fajority's holding in that’ ca
£ Involved the prosecution's motion to diemi
Eharge of welfare fraud without prejudice since te was not
ready to proceed to trial. The trial court granted the
motion, but dismissed it with prejudice. Id. at 610. The
Bajority() held that() ‘trial courts of this'state do not
Possess the power to disniaa a criminal case with presudice
Delor to the attachment of Jeopardy except in the case of
Wolacion of a constitutional right toa speedy trial.” Id.
ae aie.
State v. Magee, 78 Hawai'i 33, 37 0.9, 689 P.24 1092, 1096 n.9
(app. 1995). In other words, by holding that the trial court has
the inherent power to dismiss an indictment upon “balancing the
interest of the state against fundamental fairness to a defendant
with the added ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court
systen,* 65 Haw. at 56, 647 P.2d at 712, the Moriwake court
implicitly rejected the view that the trial court's discretion
was limited to "extraordinary situations.
Inasmuch as the Moriwake court was clearly cognizant of
the deference to be given to the prosecution in pursuing criminal
indictments, as well as the other interests at stake when it
adopted the six-factor framework laid out in the opinion, any
*separation of powers concerns" are subsumed within such
framework. Accordingly, the ICa’s injection of an additional
*separation of powers" analysis into the six-factor
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Moriwake framework represents a departure from, and thus is in
contravention of, Hawaii’s case law. It is unnecessary to look
to cases outside this jurisdiction when Hawai" case law on the
igeue exists and, especially, when the existing case law is on
point.’ Moreover, because any separation of powers concerns are,
as indicated above, subsumed within the Moriwake analysis, the
ICA‘s analysis on this point was unnecessary. At oral argument,
the prosecution, in fact, conceded that any separation of powers
concerns were included withing the Moriwake factors.
Additionally, the ICA’s citation to Lincoln is
unavailing inasmuch as it is factually distinguishable and,
therefore, inapposite. This court’s decision in Lincoln was
based primarily on the fact that the case bad been remanded to
the trial court for a retrial; thus, the trial court was without
+ the ICA majority's decision to reach out to foreign jurisdictions and
adopt, the language expounded in gave and Gonzales in the face of controlling
Rawei's lew was a departure trom this court’ precedent, which the ICA ie
bound to follow. The ICA majority thereby disregarded the well-settled
principle that
Under the rule of stare decisis, where a principle has been
fussed upon by the court of last resort, it-te the duey of
Geoard to their views a4 to ies propriety, until the
Gecision bas been reversed or overruled by the court of last
esort or altered by legislative enactnent
Bobingon v. Arivosh{, 65 Maw. 631, 653, 658 P.24 287, 297 (2982) (emphasis
added) (format altercd) (citation omitted). When the ICA fails to follow
Brocedent, It casta the law in disarray, creating uncertainty for trial
Courts, the prosecution, and the defense. Indeed, the ICA has been
Gnconsictent'in its treateent of Nociwake. See State v. fumbawa, No. 27902
(app. Aug. 30, 2007) (SDO), cert. denied, No, 27902 (aw van. 25, 2008)
(Gpho.ding the trial cours’ diemissal of indictwente pursuant to\voriwake
over dissents separation of povers argunente relying on, inter alia, Sauve
and Gonzales). “In light of the fact that Hawai'i Aules of appellate Procedure
Rule 35-(2008) now permite sp0s to be cited for persuasive value, it is
eapecially inportant for the ICA to consistently follow precedent, which, i
the instant case, it failed to do.
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discretion to dismiss the indictment prior to the mandated
retrial. Conversely, Moriwake and the instant case deal with the
trial court’s discretion to dismiss an indictment after one or
more mistrials have been declared. ***
Based on the foregoing, we hold that, by injecting an
additional “separation of powers” analysis, taken from two out-
of-state cases, into the Moriwake framework, the ICA acted in
contravention of this jurisdiction’s case law. Accordingly, we
turn next to an examination whether the ICA, under Morivake,
erred in vacating the trial court’s December 21, 2005 FOFs, Cots,
and order.
D. Application of the Moriwake Factors:
1. The Severity of the offense charged
Here, Hinton was charged with sexual assault in the
third degree, which, as indicated by the trial court, is a
class C felony. The trial court found that this factor weighed
against retrial because (1) a class C felony ‘is the least
serious felony class" and (2) there were ‘no special
circumstances . . . in terms of injury," when “looking at the
offense itself.* Conversely, the ICA determined that this factor
weighed in favor of a retrial because, although “the statutory
classification of the offense is a legitimate reference point,”
the prosecution "contended that Hinton was a sexual predator,
while the defense portrayed him as an innoc:
victim" and that,
therefore, “[tJhere [was] a strong societal interest in having a
=26-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
jury resolve that dispute." SD0 at 4. We agree: however, the
same can be said for every criminal prosecution. Indeed, as the
Morivake court explicitly recognized, ~society has a strong
interest in punishing criminal conduct." 65 Haw. at 56, 547 P.24
at 712. Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court’s
determination that the severity of the offense factor weighs
against retrial did not “exceed the bounds of reason’ because,
when considered in light of, or as compared with, other felony
offenses (such as murder, rape, or kidnapping), the charged
offense is less serious. We do not suggest, however, that ‘less
serious’ equates with "not serious." we emphasize that, by
assessing sexual assault in the third degree as “less serious,”
it is not our intent to minimize the impact that a perpetrator’s
conduct has upon a victim or to suggest that society has less of
an interest in punishing such criminal conduct. In this case, we
hold -- contrary to the ICA -~ that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that the first Moriwake factor weighed
against retrial.
2. The Munber of Prior Mistrials and the
Circumstances of the Jury Deliberations Therein,
So Far as is Known
‘The trial court found that this factor weighed in favor
of a retrial because there had been only one trial and, although
the jury indicated that it was eight to four for acquittal at one
point, it seemed confused. The ICA agreed with the trial court’s
assessment “that the jury had trouble following the evidence" and
-27-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
additionally reasoned that, inasmuch as the case against Hinton
was ‘not a particularly complex case, . . . there [was] a basis
for concluding that another jury would be able to reach a
verdict." sb0 at 5, We agree with the ICA that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the second factor
weighed in favor of a retrial.
3. The Character of Prior Trials in Terms of Length,
Complexity and Similarity of Evidence Presented
The trial court determined that this factor weighed
against retrial because (1) the trial was not very complicated
and (2) the key issue was credibility -- Hinton’s versus that of
the complainant and her mother. The ICA disagreed with the trial
court’s assessnent of this factor and reasoned that "the fact
that there [had] been only one prior trial weighs significantly
in favor of allowing a retrial." $00 at 6. Specifically, the
ICA reasoned:
57, 647 Pr2d at 713, Concerns about the unfalraet
esting a defendant to the burden of multiple
3¢, 667 P.2d at 712, are lees strong when = defend
only been subjected to one prior trial
Id, at 6-7, The ICA seemed particularly troubled by the fact
that Hinton id ‘not cite[] any appellate decision from Hawai'i
or any other jurisdiction in which a dismissal after a single
mistrial based on a hung jury was affirmed." Id. at 7.
‘he ICA was correct that the Moriwake court ‘recognized
that dismissal could be appropriate after a single mistrial, (but
-28-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
that} the opinion implies that such dismissals would be rare.’
65 Haw. at 57, 647 P.2d at 713 (holding that, in certain
cixcunstances, “the preclusion of a second’ trial would be
appropriate). However, the fact that Hinton failed to cite toa
single appellate decision affirming a dismissal after only a
single mistrial is not fatal to his position. Indeed, such
dismissals are seemingly rare and should not be encouraged as a
conmon practice; nevertheless, the Moriwake court squarely placed
the discretion in the hands of the trial court to determine under
which "certain circumstances" dismissal after one or more
mistrials would be appropriate. Here, the trial court, in
weighing thie factor, found in favor of dismissal because (1) the
trial was not very complicated and (2) the key ii
credibility. The trial court’s determination was not
unreasonable, and, thus, we conclude, contrary to the ICA, that
the trial court's finding that the third factor weighed against
retrial was not an abuse of discretion.
4. The Likelihood of Any Substantial Difference in a
Subsequent Trial, if Allowed
The trial court believed that this factor was an
important factor and determined that the evidence submitted in a
subsequent trial, if allowed, ‘would be substantially similar.
ze would not differ all that much.* Apparently, the ICA agreed,
stating that "it does not appear likely that the (prosecution!
will introduce significantly different evidence in another
-29-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
trial.’ SDO at 7. Accordingly, we agree with the ICA that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this
factor weighed against retrial.
5. The Relative Case strength
With regard to the relative case strength factor, the
trial court stated:
che [trial] court's evaluation of the evidenc
think = and this io the (erlal] court’s personal view
weighs in favor of retrial. Bot this factor should be, T
think, discounted in view of the (supreme) court's opiton
fn Stace v. Lincoin(, 72 Faw, 460, 625 P-20 66 (1992)). 7
Teriai) court's view of the evidence should
Yel or not. “ie ean cone
(emphasis added.) tn our view, the trial court’s belief that
this factor should be “discounted” under Lincoln was based on an
incorrect reading of that case. In that regard, we believe the
trial court erred
We recognize, however, that the trial court stated
that, were it to evaluate the evidence, it would find that this
factor weighed in favor of retrial and, additionally, that it
believed that the relative case strength factor could *come into
balance,’ when weighing the Moriwake factors (although it would
not give this factor too much weight). Nothing in Morivake
indicates that all factors must be given equal weight or that
certain factors must be given more weight than others. We,
therefore, believe that, although the trial court did not issue a
specific finding or conclusion on this factor, it did consider
it. The record reflects that the trial court -- in its final
-30-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
analysis -- "balanced" the relative case strength factor and
determined it weighed in favor of retrial. We, therefore, hold
that the trial court's erroneous reading of Lincoln was harmless.
‘Thus, giving due deference to the trial court’s determination, we
hold that this factor weighs in favor of retrial
‘The Professional Conduct and Diligence of
Respective Counsel, Particularly That of the
Prosecuting Attorney
Here, the trial court determined that this factor
weighed against retrial inasmuch as the attorneys for both
parties "did a good job.* SD0 at 13. The ICA aid not contend
that this factor weighed in favor of retrial. In sum, the trial
court considered all of the factors enunciated in Morivake and,
recognizing that the circumstances presented ‘a close case,"
determined that, ‘in balancing all of the afore-mentioned
factors, the interests of the [prosecution] do not outweigh the
fundamental fairness to the defendant as well as orderly
functioning of the court system.*
Based on the. discussion supra, none of the trial
court's findings or conclusions ‘exceed the bounds of reason or
Gisregard rules or principles of law or practice." Thus, we
agree with Judge Foley that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the indictment against Hinton. Inasmuch
as the ICA majority determined otherwise, we hold that it erred.
oe
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter
2v. concuszos
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the ICA erred in
(2) snjecting an additional ‘separation of powers" analysis into
the Morinake framework and (2) holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in disnissing the indictnent with
prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s Septesber 18, 2008
judgment on appeal and affirm the trial court's Decenber 21, 2005
rors, cous, and order granting Hinton’s motion to dismiss the
indictment with prejudice.
Karen T. Nakasone, Dipl
Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner /defendant-
appellant Prsiles Crete uno
venus masse, —
32+
| 4feb70ff411b62c4824aec98cee43337d788c7ee9cceca66854bc5fa9170e925 | 2009-03-19T00:00:00Z |
9a56bab2-b8d3-4351-83e9-f65d7ed63d1a | Torres v. State | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | g
No. 28682
ony
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
ee
ROONEY TORRES, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appetiant =
8
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent /Respondent-Appellee
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(S.P.P. NO. 04-1-0007K; CR. NO. 94-076K)
(By: Acoba, J., for the court")
‘The Application for Writ of Certiorari filed on
January 6, 2009 by Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Rodney Torres
is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 10, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
‘Associate Justic \ “
John L. Olson, on
‘the application for
petitioner/petitioner-
appellant.
jana, Acoba, Duffy, Jd.1 and
Codey Nake
+ considered by: Hoon,
Circuit Judge Ayabe, assigned by reason of vacancy.
| 42ee04b9983233e4ba7985e4a69e12945a9d731f4b04a512f32f2d807d095d00 | 2009-02-10T00:00:00Z |
6217bda9-ed47-45ad-9a93-a055d98897e1 | Davies v. Moysa | null | 29533 | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
‘6002
so. 29533
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT’
O34
ERIC 1. DAVIES AND MIRELIA M. ORVIES, etitioapre, 3
a s
DAVID 7. MOYSA AND JANE F. MOYSA; THE HONORABLE
MARK E. RECKTENWALD, THE HONORABLE CORINNE K.A. WATANABE;
AND THE HONORABLE ALEXA D.M. FUJISE, Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
1 rt
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ.,
and Circuit Judge Lee, assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of the "petition for writ of
mandamus to the intermediate court of appeals" submitted by
Petitioners Eric L. Davies and Mirella M. Davies, and the
declaration and exhibits attached thereto,
pursuant to Rule 21(c) of the
IP IS HEREBY ORDERED,
Hawai'l Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the Petition is
denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 27, 2009.
hom
seh a C1 rounlbuey re
Goon Aatign de » onan NS
TR HL ok
| 8dd19bbb9dab72db74bcc26416b70e8e06217eeb63eb53cbdb0dd6298373b7d4 | 2009-01-27T00:00:00Z |
a416a669-5aca-4031-ad49-b43c477ea4c2 | Doe v. Doe | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 27490
WE 02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
JOHY DOE, Petitioner Plaineitenmpeleae
z 6
vs. ie 2
JANE, DOE, Respondent-Defendant-apperiantsl
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(FC-DIVORCE NO. 95-2875)
ORDER
(By: Nakayama, J.)
Upon consideration of the stipulation to Dismi,
Respondent-Defendant-Appellant’s Novenber 10, 2008 Request for an
Advance of Fees to Respond to Plaintift’s Application for Writ of
Certiorari and the record herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stipulation {s approved.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 6, 2009.
Presaear Coed re
Associate Justice
| 5fc74a8d19f3dde2fb7a67e0196d8f24e23b3748925252dc9bbf9b47e06b170c | 2009-01-06T00:00:00Z |
428b2bf5-494b-4f55-bf76-dd446f7457eb | In re Pabst | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29861
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
IN RE THOMAS STEPHAN PABST, Petitioner. 2
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 3
QRDER GRANTING PETITION TO RESIGN AND SURRENDER LICENSE
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.,
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge Nakamura,
‘assigned by reason of vacancy)
Upon consideration of Petitioner Thomas Stephan Pabst’ s
Petition to Resign and Surrender License, the attached
affidavits, and the lack of objections by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, it appears that the petition complies
substantially with the requirements of Rule 1.10 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH). Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Pabst shall
return his original license to practice law to the Clerk of this
court forthwith. The Clerk shall retain the original license as
part of this record. Petitioner Pabst shall comply with the
notice, affidavit, and record requirements of sections (a), (b),
(a), and (g) of RSCH 2.16.
IT IS PINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk shall remove the
name of Thomas Stephan Pabst, attorney number 2298, from the roll
of attorneys of the State of Hawai'i, effective with the filing
of this order.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 3, 2009.
Pees C1 Teh Lr.
Yuu e Rudtignn -
Gn U. Vlohearas—
| 8bb18045cca8df035eec994d50552143bde089b20959a73037b3d43ec12eeb54 | 2009-02-03T00:00:00Z |
cd736f5d-0e51-4cc8-94c4-f18bef519310 | Kapuwai v. City and County of Honolulu, Department of Parks and Recreation | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
No. 27915
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
DARRELL N, KAPUWAT, Respondent /Claimant-Appellant,
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS
AND RECREATION, Petitioner/Employer-Appellee, Self-Insured,
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE NO. AB 2004-328 (2-01-13437))
ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Duffy, J., for the court’)
Petitioner/Employer-Appellee, Self-Insured City and
County of Honolulu, Department of Parks and Recreation’s
application for a writ of certiorari, filed on January 23, 2009,
is hereby accepted.
DATED:
Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 3, 2009,
FOR THE COURT:
Com Dats +
Associate Justice
Paul K, Hoshino,
Deputy Corporation Counsel,
for petitioner/empioyer-
appellee, self-insured 2
on the application 3
Herbert R. Takahashi 3 a
and Danny J. Vasconcellos } =
for respondent /claimant- = rm
appellant in opposition = o
* considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, Duffy, JJ., and
Cérouse Judge Kim, assigned by Feason of vacancy.
| 2a2baa3f144af5a4e75be1031876baebd5ca6d1a6a6703cd4d472e1ce8ee2dd7 | 2009-03-03T00:00:00Z |
1419f761-33da-4563-8964-c525c007190e | Lolohea v. State | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | LAW LIBRARY
Nos. 28051 and 28052 “3
a
IM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI?
oats
SIONE LOLOEA, Petitioner-Appellant, =:
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
28051, $.P.P. NO. 05-1-002K (Cr. No. 98-017K))
98-215K))
(no.
SIPLP. NO. 05-1-003K (Cr. No.
(no. 28052,
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court")
Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of
certiorari filed on December 9, 2008, is hereby rejected.
Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 23, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
Bee Co Tou our
associate Justice
DATED:
Karen T. Nakasone for
petitioner-appellant
fon the application
‘considered by: Moon, C.J.) Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, 39., and
circuit Judge Hong assigned by reason of vacancy
| 468f82dcc93899890c3073188c51cc159a14c2d858eebb9ea2b543b1000a4c3e | 2009-01-23T00:00:00Z |
367f7de8-7bcb-41ca-8cb5-3981c057d74e | Kostron v. Perkins | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | no. 29599
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
EUGENE KOSTRON, Petitioner,
THE HONORABLE RICHARD K. PERKINS, JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
(CR. NO. 7-1-1510)
‘ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy,
and Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Fujix
assigned by reason of vacancy) *
‘Vu 1 VHUGN
U4:2 Hd 4 634
upon consideration of the petition for a writiot
mandamus filed by petitioner Eugene Kostron and the papers in
support, it appears that the respondent judge’s decision to
dismiss Cr. No. 07-1-1510 with prejudice was announced on
August 25, 2008 and reduced to a written order filed on
October 28, 2008 (dismissal order). The August 25, 2008 decision
was subject to a motion for reconsideration filed on October 28,
2008 with a hearing date before the respondent judge on
December 10, 2008. The dismissal order was filed after the
filing of the motion for reconsideration and during the pendency
of such motion. The filing of the dismissal order on October 29,
2008 did not terminate the proceedings in Cr. No. 07-1-1510
inasmuch as the motion for reconsideration remained to be heard
on Decenber 10, 2008. The filing of the dismissal order after
the filing of the motion for reconsideration and during the
pendency of such motion did not divest the respondent judge of
jurisdiction te hear the motion for reconsideration. The
aad
respondent judge had inherent power to reconsider the August 25,
2008 decision. See HAS § 603-21.9(6) (1993); Kawamata Farms v
United Agri Products, 86 Hawai'i 214, 242, 948 P.2d 1085, 1083
(2997). The granting of the motion for reconsideration was not a
flagrant and manifest abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioner is
not entitled te mandamus relief. See Kema v. Gaddis, 91 Hawai'i
200, 204-05, 982 F.2d 334, 338-39 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is
an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner
demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack
of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or
obtain the requested action. Where a court has discretion to
act, mandamus will not lie to interfere with or control the
exercise of that discretion, even when the judge has acted
erroneously, unless the judge hi
exceeded his or her
Jurisdiction, has committed a flagrant and manifest abuse of
discretion, or has refused to act on a subject properly before
the court under circumstances in which it has a legal duty to
act.). Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 4, 2009.
ve Cacti ore
Yorme Badia \
Becen OP Fgh -
| fd418320eda46539780866ada750a31d2898e95e8a49546380dd095b58f793c0 | 2009-02-04T00:00:00Z |
9c909a43-a436-454e-b823-b15061bd796c | Pacific Mortgage Investors LLC v. Johnson | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 29317
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T
PACIFIC MORTGAGE INVESTORS LLC,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee,
THOMAS MOSES JOHNSON, I3I, algo known as Thomas M. Johnson, III,
Petitioner /Defendant-Appel lant,
3
and =
FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK and BANK OF HAWAII, a
Respondents /Defendants-Appellees, =
and 2
JOHN DOES 1-5; JANE DOES 1-5; DOE PARTNERSHIPS
DOE CORPORATIONS 1-5; DOR ENTITIES 1-5; and
DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-5, Defendante
FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK,
Respondent /Counterclaim Plaintiff£-appellee,
PACIFIC MORTGAGE INVESTORS, LLC,
Respondent /Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee,
and
THOMAS MOSES JOHNSON, III, also known as Thomas M. Johnson, III,
Petitioner/Cross-Claim Defendant-Appeliant,
and
COLONY SURF, LTD. and COLONY SURF ASSOCIATION OF
APARTMENT OWNERS, Respondents/Tdentified Defendant
Doe Corporation 1 and Doe Entity 1/appellees
and
JOHN DOES 1-5; JANE DOES 1-5; DOE CORPORATIONS 2-5; DOE
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-5; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-5; and
DOE ENTITIES 2-5, Defendants,
gas
and
JOHN DOES 6-20; JANE DOES 6-20; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 6-20
DOE CORPORATIONS 6-20; DOE *NON-PROPIT* CORPORATIONS 6-20
‘and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 6-20, Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. NO. 07-1-1893)
ORDER
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court!)
Upon consideration of the “motion for stay pending
review by the United States Supreme Court,* filed on February 13,
2009 by petitioner /defendant /cross-claim defendant /appellant
‘Thomas Johnson, III, the papers in support and in opposition, and
the record,
I IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for stay is
denied.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, Warch 5, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
He gustice
+ Considered by: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy, JJ. and
circuit Juage Town, aasigned by reason of vacancy:
2
| fa9c715b910fe7bc9971e0cfb0eac8c8b3c99c9b848db9879c10a22eeec39ba1 | 2009-03-05T00:00:00Z |
5c2ed536-c6e2-4ff1-8c63-4171f130ce30 | State v. Mailo | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 28512
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAMA:
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee,
PENIAMINA MAILO, Petitioner-Appellant.
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 06-1-1770)
ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(By: Nakayama, J., for the court®)
Petitioner-Appellant’s application for writ of
certiorari filed on January 30, 2009, is hereby rejected.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, March 9, 2009.
rok tHE cour: ran
Bere Crneccaeyane ¢ seat 4)
Associate Justice
x oy
s
Boe ws
Stuart N. Fujioka, for ~
petitioner-appellant
on the application
2 7 2
B 6 F
2 2 fh
? =z 9
‘considered by! Moon, C-J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Ouffy, J+, and
césoust Judge Slondin, aceigned by reason of vacancy
| e5c57bd8d8fec0bebd8c2f4780b1ee1d85c46886461c75fa8476c1f0f656935d | 2009-03-09T00:00:00Z |
e5b95ffc-73eb-47d8-b791-274f6545a67d | Hanabusa v. Lingle | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No, 29391
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
COLLEEN HANABUSA, Individually and in her capacity as
‘Senate President and NORMAN SAKAMOTO, Individually
and in his capacity as Chair of the Senate
Committee on Education, Petitioners,
vs. : 2
LINDA LINGLE, Governor, State of Hawai'i, Respondent 7
= SF
se ~~
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 3802 &
ORDER 5 g
(By: Moon, C.J., Nakayama, Acoba, and Duffy,"bs.") &
upon consideration of Respondent Governor Linda
Lingle’s “motion to amend order filed December 4, 2008 to permit
additional time to appoint the second at-large regent of the
University of Hawaii" and the papers in support, in opposition,
and in reply,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to amend the
Decenber 4, 2008 order is denied. Respondent shall, within five
days of the date of this order, nominate the second at-large
regent of the University of Hawaii from the list of qualified
candidates duly presented to respondent on February 21, 2008 by
the Candidate Advisory Council.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, January 20, 2009.
yh
ON ates ts
Bao
Carns, Rabin r-
Associate Justice Levinson, who heard oral argument in this case,
retired from the bench on Oecesber 30, 2008. gee Hawai Revised staruces
§ 602-10 (Supp. 2007) ("After oral argunent of a cage, if 2 vacancy
w the case say be decided or disposed of upon the concurrence of
nonbers of the court without filling the vacancy ox the place of
such justice.)
| eccd4a2ec02c12f0619ccee0731a49efd7b4e18ad4b3400d9be35ea2fe4fc656 | 2009-01-20T00:00:00Z |
7c55ec94-851d-4565-ad96-3a61cebe8246 | AIG Hawaii Insurance Company, Inc. v. State Farm Insurance Companies | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 27789
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAL
Petitioner/
AIG HAWAII INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. ,
Plaintiff-appellant /Cross-appellee,
a
a
oats
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents/-
Defendants-Appel lees /Cross-Appellantsi|>
al
DOE CORPORATION 1-1
a
2
=
G
and
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10;
‘and DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, Defendants.
CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO. 02-1-0367)
(By: Moon, C.J., for the court")
Petitioner/plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee AIG
Hawaii Insurance Company, Inc.'s application for writ of
certiorari, filed December 31, 2008, is hereby rejected
February 5, 2009.
FOR THE COURT:
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i,
Considered by: Yoon, C.J., Nakayama, Accba, and Duffy, 33., and
judge Border, assigned by reason of vacancy
chreute
| a16b5f5b8e3f4ef6b06ffca106f28bd129e30bc72c56e3c2aa1fd5d3a400f3ff | 2009-02-05T00:00:00Z |
9a742ae3-7183-4794-b207-a7b5cf5d4e1a | In re Investigation of Fong | null | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | No. 25098
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T
In the Matter of the Investigation of 3
DAVID L. FONG,
Judge, District Court of the First Circuit, R
State of Hawai't
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
Moon, CJ., for the court’)
We have considered (1) the Commission on Judicial
Conduct's Report and Recommendation for the imposition of public
censure upon former First Circuit District Judge David L. Fong,
(2) the record, including Respondent Fong’s Stipulation of Facts,
and (3) Respondent's lack of opposition to the Report and
Recommendation, as exhibited by the fact Respondent declined to
Eile exceptions or a brief or otherwise oppose the Report and
Recommendation, It appears from the record that Respondent Fong
did not fully disclose his wife's many and various financial,
fiduciary, and ownership interests, or acquisitions and transfers
of such interests, on financial disclosure statements filed
between 1990 and 2003, It further appears that Rule 15 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii (RSCH)
required disclosure of the interests. It also appears that
Respondent Fong was at least aware of alleged criminal activity
Duffy, Ja.
Considered by: Moon, CJ; Levinson, Nakayama, Acoba and
at a property owned by his wife. Respondent Fong’s conduct,
summarized above, cast his judicial office into disrepute and
were violations of RSCH 8.5(a) (4) and RSCH 8.5(a) (5) and Canon 2
of the Hawai'i Revised Code of Judicial Conduct. Finally, in
mitigation, it appears that Respondent Fong was highly respected
and performed his duties ably and conscientiously during the time
he served as a per diem and full-time judge of the District Court
of the First Circuit. Because the Conmission’s recommendation
for public censure is supported by the record, particularly the
stipulation of facts entered into by Respondent and special
counsel,
IT TS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent David L. Fong is
hereby publically censured.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, December 22, 2003.
FOR THE COURT:
Le Justics
| 495dba1bea566afd265480c52a90be54810ab171be2a0f5b47266dcc232bda47 | 2003-12-22T00:00:00Z |
79944f46-5dd2-48f8-91ad-567e17129284 | Colony Surf, Ltd. v. Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting. | 116 Haw. 510 | null | hawaii | Hawaii Supreme Court | *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'I
---000---
COLONY SURF, LTD., Plaintif£/Appellant-Appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND PERMITTING; MICHEL! S
INC. and D.G. ANDERSON, Defendants/Appellees-Appellante,
ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, Defendant/Appellee-Appellee.
SSS
ive
Wo. 26037
92330)
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No, 03-1-0294)
DECEMBER 26, 2007
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendants/Appellees-Appellants, director of the
Department of Planning and Pezmitting, State of Hawai'i, Michel's
Inc., and D.G. Anderson (collectively referred to as
“Appellants”), appeal from the first circuit court's! July 23,
2003 judgment on appeal in favor of Plaintif# /Appellant-Appellee,
Colony Surf, Ltd. ("CSL"), Appellants
jet the following
points of error on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred by ruling
that the daytime operation of Michel’s “constitute(d] an
‘expanded’ nonconforming use” under section 21-4.110 (c} (1) of
the Land Use Ordinance, codified as Revised Ordinances of
+The Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presided.
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Honolulu ("ROHY) § 21-4.120(c) (1)s* (2) the circuit court erred
by ruling that the daytime operation of Michel's following its
tenporary cessation constituted an “action” within the meaning of
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5),? inasmuch as it did not intend to reduce
its hours; (3) the circuit court erred by construing ROH $6 21-
4,120(¢) (2),* (c) (3),* and (c) (5) dn-pari materia and by ruling
that the daytime operation of Michel’s violated ROH § 21-
4,110(c) (5) and (4) the circuit court erred by ruling that the
daytime operation of Michel's increased its hours of operation
+ RoW § 21-4.110(c) (2) states in pertinent part, "A nonconforning
lise shall not extend to any part of the structure or lot which was not
arranged or designed for such use at the time of adoption of the provisions of
this chapter or subsequent amendment; nor shall the nonconforming use be
‘expanded in any manner, or the hours of operation increases.”
% Row § 21-4.110(c) (5) provides, “Any action taken by an owne:
lessee, or authorized operator which reduces the negative effects associated
with the operation of s nonconforming use =~ such aa, but not limited to,
Teducing hours of operation of exterior Lighting intensity <= shell not be
reversed.”
‘Row § 21-€.120(¢) (2) states, An pertinent part
Any nonconforning use that is discontinued for any
reason for" [thelve] ‘consecutive nonths, cr for [eighteen]
fonths during any three-year period, shall not be resumed:
however, a temporary cessation of the nonconforming use for
porposes of ordinary repairs for a period not exceeding 120
Says during say [twelve)-nonth perios shall not be
Considered « discontinuation.
* Row § 21-4.110(¢) (3) provides, in pertinent part:
ork may be done on any structure devoted in whole oF
in part to any nonconforming use, provided that work oa the
nonconforming use portion shall be limited to ordinary
Fepairs, For purposes of this subsection, ordinary repairs
Shall only be construed to ineluge the following
May include work required to comply with federal
Eandates such as, but not limited to, the Anericans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) oF the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA)
(©) May include interior and exterior alterations,
provided that there is no physical expansion of the
Ronconferming use or intensification of the use
2
+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
within the meaning of ROH § 21-4.110(e) (1).
Based upon the following analysis, we reverse the
circuit court's July 23, 2003 judgment.
T. BACKGROUND
CSL is the owner of Colony surf, a residential
apartment building located at 2895 Kalakaua Avenue, Honolulu,
Hawai'i. Colony Surf was originally constructed in 1959 and
included a ground-floor restaurant as an accessory use.
In 1961, CSL subleased the restaurant space to Colony
Surf Development Corporation for the purpose of operating
Michel's Restaurant ("Michel's"). At that time, Michel’s
operated 365 days per year, from 6:30 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.
In 1982, the area was rezoned A-2, which rendered the
accessory restaurant use nonconforming.
In October 1995, Michel’s was temporarily closed as a
result of a mortgage foreclosure. D.G. Anderson (“Anderson”)
emerged as the successful bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale,
held in January 1996. Immediately after purchasing the lease,
Anderson sought to renovate Michel’s in two phases.
Upon completion of the first phase of interior
renovations in August 1996, Michel’s reopened, mainly operating
from 4:30 p.m. to about 2:00 a.m. and offering Sunday brunch
daytine services “for about a month.” From August 1996 until
January 1998, limited daytime operation of Michel’s consisted of:
(a) a regular Sunday brunch from Decenber 29, 1996 until June 15,
1997; (b) three lunch functions held on August 22, 1996, Novenber
22, 1996, and December 7, 19977 and (c) one breakfast function
held on July 12, 1997. In January 1998, Michel’s began its
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
daytime operations from 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. to accommodate
private functions, including weddings, on a periodic basis.
After Colony Surf consented to ADA access compliance
Amprovenents on September 23, 1998, Anderson conmenced
construction of this second phase of renovations. Once the
second phase renovations were completed in October 1998, Michel's
entered into a $650,000 contract with Wedding Emporium to host
wedding services and receptions inside of its restaurant.
Michel's opened its dining room to regularly‘ host wedding
ceremonies from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and receptions from 10:00
a.m, to 10:00 p.m.
‘The daytime wedding emporium use of Michel's resulted
in “noise, traffic and congestion” in the residential
neighborhood “which severely and negatively affect [ed] the
neighborhood quality of life."* On December 3, 1998, CSL sent a
‘The frequency of wedding receptions at Michel
per day to none during a week
ranged from three
> the restaurant was not open to the public during daytime hours but
wes available to the public for dinner and private dinner parties.
* csi complained that the wedding emporium is incompatible with the
residential character of the neighborhood
colony Surf has zero parking stalls for Michel"s ~ zero, none, not
one. There is not even a leading zone for delivery trucks
Deeger trucks can’t even turn around on the property. irucks
making food deliveries to Michel's aust use the neighbor’ ¢
froperty cr back cut a twovnundred-foot long, twonty-food wide
Griveway to Kalakaua Avenue. The trucks backing up fills the
Fesidential neighborhood with the incessant beep-beep-beep of
their reversing signals, "Now add to that problem @ series of
thirty-foot Long limousines arriving at the sane tine (norning
hours}, each with a bride and groom, an entourage of wedding
attendants, photographers, anda driver. None of these wedding
parties arrives ina taxi! There is no place to park the
Tisousine so st alts clogging the driveway, The limousines can’t
turn around, so they too mst back out {oF use the neighbor's
property).
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTEI
letter to the director of the Department of Planning and
Permitting, State of Hawai'i (“director”) challenging Michel's
use of the premises for weddings, receptions, and other private
functions. By letter dated February 17, 1999, the director
rejected CSL’s challenge, informing it that such uses were
subsumed within the scope of restaurant uses.
In a January 19, 2001 letter to the director, CSL
questioned Michel's hours of operation under ROH $$ 21-
4.120(c) (1) and (5). By letter dated January 2, 2002, the
director concluded that “the daytime operation of (Michel's)
nonconforming use (an eating establishment with an accessory
wedding chapel) is not in conflict with (ROH $$] 21-4.110(c) (1)
and/or (5).
B. Procedural History
1, Director declared that Michel's did not increase its.
operating nours
on March 1, 2002, CSL filed a petition for a
Declaratory Ruling with the director alleging that Michel's
reduced its hours of operation and subsequently “reversed the
reduction in hours and began opening at about 9:00 a.m. for
wedding functions” in violation of ROH §§ 21-4.110(c) (1) and (5).
‘The director concluded that:
there was no action taken by the new owner of Michel"s to reduce
the Inpact of the nonconforming eating establishment when daytime
Services were not fully restored open assuming ownership. Andy
therefore, there was no increase in operating hours ence the owner
was finally able to resune full daytime services after renovations
wore completed.
* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2. Zoning Board of Appeals affirmed the director's ruling
On May 28, 2002, CSL appealed the director's ruling to
the Zoning Board of Appeals ("ZBA”). CSL argued that Michel's
violated ROH §§ 21-4.110(1), (2), and (5), inasmuch as: (1) its
wedding operations constituted an expanded type of nonconforming
use, (2) it resumed its daytime operation, and (3) it increased
its operating hours of the nonconforming use. In its “Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision, and Order on
Petitioner Appealing From Director’s Declaratory Ruling No.
2002/DEC~1," filed January 10, 2003, the ZBA affirmed the
director's decision.
3, Circuit court reversed the ZBA's decision
On February 7, 2003, CSL filed a notice of appeal in
the circuit court. On July 23, 2003, the circuit court filed a
judgment on appeal reversing the decision of the ZBA.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
circuit court found and concluded in pertinent part:
1. FINDms oF race
6. eeu te ‘son aggrieved” by the 20A Decision within
tthe meaning of Haweli Revised Statutes ("HRS") 31-149).
7." The Court hereby incorporates by reference che
Findings of Fact set forth in the Director's Ruling and the 2B
Decsaion
(2:00 a.m. (daytime seeearieny oat (tutes an “expanded
2 -
SESS ss iste a eisiin the pean ef (eoal {6)_izhe
S, ii daxbine operation of Michel's “increased” ite
“hours of operation” sithin the neaaTae at Thon Teta
eter
3 . amas an
‘Anderson's davtime operation of Michel's was an
“action” by Anerson Wich reversed a reduction in “the neative
‘Sicects associaced with the operation of Michels witnia che
ea aisle
$** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
(Emphases:
appeal.
TT. CONCLUSIONS OF Law
In determining whether the daytime operation of
Michel's violates the (FOll), "strict Limits are placed upon
Ronconforning uses to discourage the perpetuation of these us
an thus facilitate the tinely conversion to conforming uses."
(Row) (6) 21-4.110%}
5.) "A honconforming use shall not be expanded in any
manner.” (ROR) {8} 21-4.110(c) (1)
é, “the hours of operation of a nonconforming use shall
not be increased. (ROH) {8} 21-110(c) (2)
4.125
The contrary conclusions set forth in the Director’ e
Ruling and the Z8A Decision are in “vielation of constitutional or
statutory provisions” within the meaning of ARS 91-1¢(9)(1)-
5.” P'the term “use” in’ [80H] (6] 21-4110(e) (2) (sie] refers
to the Aonconforming use in the entirety, as opposed to daytime
20, The daytine use of Michel's does not violate (Rot) ($)
2a-a1i0(e) (2) Tate) -
21, Laws in'pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,
shall be ‘construed with reference to each other. What is clear in
one stetute may be called in aid to explain what se doubtful in
fanether. Kan’. Woh, 770 P-2d 414 (Haw. 1969)
12, ““the subsections of (ROM) Sec. 71-4/110(c) are dn part
materia. Kam ¥. "Noh, 170" P.24 414. (Haw. 1983) |
13. o
wien S Peicular with the tine
Disabilities ac = way of (80H
SLC U0, the davtine operation of Michel's violates
BOW 1s) 2i-C ties
Te. The contrary conclusions set forth in the Director's
Ruling and the Z6A decision are in “violation of constitutional oF
statutory provisions” within the meaning of HRS (§] 91-14(g) (1)
added.)
on August 22, 2003, Appellants filed a timely notice of
XI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Secondary Appeal
Review of a decision made by the cizcuit court upon its
review of an agency's decision ta a secondary appeal. The
Standard of review i one in which this court most determine
whether the circuit court was right or wrong in ite decision,
Spplying the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) (1993) te the
agency's decision.
1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
v. Zonin
and County of Honolulu, 114 Hawai'i 184, 193, 159 P.3d 143, 153
(2007) (citing Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawai'i v
Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1998).
HRS § 91-14, “Judicial review of contested cases,”
provides in pertinent par
(g) Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of
the agency or renand the case with instructions for further
proceedings; of it may reverse or nodity the decision and order if
fhe substantisl rights of the petitioners nay have been prejudiced
Decause the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, oF
(2) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions: of
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency: oF
(3) Made pon unlawful procedure; oF
(4) Affected by other error of Law or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; oF
(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of
Giscretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of digcretion.
Interpretation of Administrative Rule!
When interpreting municipal ordinances, we epply the sane
rules of construction that we spply to statutes. ‘while an
Adainistraive agency's interpretation of the ordinance that it is
Fesponsible for implenenting is normally accorded grest weight, no
Geforence is required when the agency's interpretation conflicts
with or contragicts che manifest purpose of the ordinance it secks
fo implement
City and County of Honolulu v. Hsiung, 109 Hawai'i 159, 172, 124
P.3d 434, 447 (2005).
III, DISCUSSION
A, ‘The Issue That the Daytime Operation of Michel's Constitutes
an “Expanded” Nonconforming Use Under ROH § 21-4,110(c) (1)
Was Not Properly Before the Circuit Court
Appellants’ first point of error asserts that the
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
circuit court erred by ruling that the “operation of Michel's
prior to 4:30 p.m. and after 2:00 a.m. (‘daytime operation’)
constitutes an ‘expanded’ nonconforming use of Michel’s within
the meaning of [ROH §] 21-4.110(c) (1).” Although framed as a
challenge on the merits, Appellants actually argue that the
circuit court “exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling that the
daytime operation of Michel’s” “expanded” the nonconforming use,
insofar as CSL “challenged the daytime hours of operation under
[ROH] $§ 21-4.110(c) (1) and (5), and not the use of Michel's for
wedding functions” in its petition to the director. Thus,
according to Appellants, the director and the 2BA did not rule on
the issue, and it vas therefore not a matter properly before the
circuit court.
Although CSL petitioned the director regarding the
“daytime operation” of Michels violating ROH § 21-4.110(e) (1),
it did not contend that Michel’s expanded the type of
nonconforming use, but merely argued that the increase in
operating hours of Michel's violated ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1).? CSL.
presented case law and legal arguments in support of its sole
position that “Michel's is a nonconforming use, which reduced its
hours of operation and then reversed the reduction and expanded
ts hours of operation in violation of [ROH $§ 21-4.110(c) (1) and
(5)1." (Emphasis added.) ‘Thus, the director properly limited
his review of the petition to whether Michel's was precluded from
+ cst explained that the petition followed the director’s
determination that “the daxtime operation of the... nonconforming use (an
esting establishment with an accessory wedding chapel) is not in conflict with
[ROK ),21-4.110(e) (1) and/or (8]," But dig net reassert thet the daytine
operation conflicts with NOH § 21°4.110(c) (2) in the petition itself,
9
‘+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
increasing its hours of operation pursuant to ROH §§ 21-
4.110(c) (1) and (5).
Because the director ruled that Michel's did not
increase its hours of operation in violation of ROH § 21-
4.110(c) (1), the 2BA’s ruling regarding whether Michel’s complied
with ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1) was limited to this matter. See
Revised Charter of Honolulu § 6-1516 (2001) (providing that the
ZBA shall “hear and determine appeals from the actions of the
director”). Inasmuch as the 2BA did not rule on whether the type
of daytime operation itself (a wedding business) constituted an
“expansion” of the nonconforming use, the matter was not properly
before the circuit court, and the circuit court’s finding that
the daytime operation violates ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1) should be
reversed. See Hoh Corp, v, Motor Vehicle Indus, Licensing Bd.
Dep't of Commerce ¢ Consumer Affairs, 69 Haw. 135, 141, 736 P.2d
1271, 1275 (1987) (*[JJudicial review of an agency determination
must be ‘confined to issues properly raised in the record of the
administrative proceedings below.’”); Aetna Life Ins, Co. vs
Bark, 5 Haw. App. 115, 119, 678 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1984) ("It is
explicit in the provisions of HRS § 91-14, and in the case law
interpreting those provisions, that a review of the
Commissioner's decision is confined to the issues properly raised
in the record of the proceedings leading up to that decision.
10
"ATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
B. Anderson Did Not Take An “Action” That Reduced the Negative
Effects of the Nonconforming Use Pursuant to ROH §§ 21-
4.110(c) (2), (3) and (5), Inasmuch As The Nineteen Month
Cessation of Daytime Operation Was Within the Permissible
Discontinuation of the Nonconforming Use, and Therefore, He
Zs Not Precluded From Resuming the Daytime Operating Hours
of Michel’ s Under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5)
In their second point of error, Appellants argue that
the circuit court erred by (1) ruling that the resumption of the
daytime nonconforming use following its temporary cessation for
nineteen months constituted an “action . . . which reduces the
negative effects associated with the nonconforming use” within
the meaning of ROH § 21-4,110(c) (5); (2) construing ROH § 21~
4.110(c) (5) in pari materia with ROH §§ 21-4,110(c} (2) and (3);
and (3) concluding that ROH § 21~
the daytime operation of Michel’s, inasmuch as the owner of
-110(c) (5) precludes renewal of
Michel’s did not intend to reduce the hours of Michel's, and
therefore, could not have later increased the negative effects of
the daytime nonconforming use.
1. Action” under ROH § 21-4.110(c)(5) does not require
he_intent_to permanently reduce the negative effects
of the nonconforming use
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5) provides, “Any action taken by an
owner, lessee, or authorized operator which reduces the negative
effects associated with the operation of a nonconforming use --
such as, but not limited to, reducing hours of operation or
exterior lighting intensity -- shall not be reversed.” In
determining whether “action” under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5) requires
the intent to permanently reduce the negative effects of the
nonconforming use, we are guided by established principles of
statutory interpretation.
un
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
linen construing a statute, our forenost obligation is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is te
bbe obtained primarily trom the language contained in the statute
itself. And we mist read statutory language in the context of the
entire statute and construe it ina manner consistent with ie
purpose’
hen there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, oF
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in @
statute, an ambiguity exist
In construing an ambiguous statute, “{t}he mesning of the
anbiquous words may be souaht by examining the context, mith which
tthe ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in
order to ascertain their true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(1) (1993)
Gray v, Admin, Dir. of the Court, 84 Hawai'i 138, 148, 931 P.2d
580, 590 (1997) (some citations omitted). “Furthermore, the
legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and
legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible,
inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality.” Id. (relying on
HRS § 1-15(3) (1993) ("Every construction which leads to an
absurdity shall be rejected.”)).
Clearly, the “action . . . which reduces the negative
effects associated with the operation of a nonconforming use”
must be “voluntary” or “intentional” in order to preclude the
owner, lessee, or authorized operator from later increasing the
negative effects. ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5). See Black's Lay
Dictionary 26, 1605 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “act”
“{slomething done or performed, (especially) voluntarily, and
“voluntary” as “done by design or intention”). However, the
Appellants’ interpretation that the ordinance requires a
voluntary “action” as well as an action with the intention of
permanently reducing the negative effects is an additional
element that is not supported by the ordinance’s plain language.
Under a strict interpretation of ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), once an
2
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
waction . . . which reduces the negative effects associated with
the operation of a nonconforming use” is taken, the action may
not be reversed, See Waikiki Marketplace Inv, Co, v. Chair of
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 86 Hawai'i 343, 354, 949 P.2d 183, 194
(App. 1997) ("[ZJoning laws and ordinances are strictly
construed, ‘as they are in derogation of the common law, and
their provisions may not be extended by implication." (citing
Foster Village Community Ass'n v. Hess, 4 Haw. App. 463, 469, 667
P.2d 850, 854 (1983))).
Inder the in pari materia doctrine, ROH $$ 21-
eotjoier (2) and) clarify ROWS 21-4, 11076115
However, inasmuch as “we must read statutory language
in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner
consistent with its purpose,” the construction of ROH § 21-
4.210(c) (5) is not complete. Gray, 84 Hawai'i at 148, 931 P.2d
at 590 (citation and emphasis omitted). ROH $§ 21-4.110(c) (2),
(3), and (5) relate to the subject matter of nonconforming uses.
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (2) permits the cessation of a nonconforming use
based on the purpose and period of time of the discontinued use,
as follows:
Any nonconforming use that is discontinued for any reason for
(twelve) consecutive months, or for [eighteen] months during any
a temporary
‘of ordinary
jeriog not exceeding 120 Gays during any [twelve]-
1 not be considered @ discontinuation.
repairs for
snonth period
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (3) permits “ordinary repairs,” including
“interior and exterior alterations,” to be done on any structure
with a nonconforming use so long as the nonconforming use is not
expanded. As construed above, ROH §21-4.110(c) (5) prohibits an
13
++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
“action . . . which reduces the negative effects associated with
the operation of a nonconforming use” from being reversed. AS
this court has stated, however, “where the statutes simply
overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if
possible, as repeal by implication is disfavored.” Enoka v. AIG
Hawai'i Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai'i 537, 560, 128 P.3d 850, 873
(2006) (quoting Richardson v. City 6 County of Honolulu, 76
Hawai'i 46, 54-55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1201-02 (1994) (brackets
omitted)).
Therefore, in order to apply ROH $§ 21-4.110(2) (3),
and (5), these subsections must be construed materia,
inasmuch as they pertain to the same purpose and subject matter.
Appellants argue that the circuit court erred by construing ROH
$$ 21-4.110(c) (2), (3), and (5) in pari materia because it
invoked this doctrine sua sponte and these subsections pertain to
different purposes and were enacted at different times. HRS $
1-16 (1993) (“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject
matter, shall be construed with reference to each other.”).
However, these subsections have the same purpose:
“Strict limits are placed on nonconforming uses to discourage the
perpetuation of these uses, and thus facilitate the timely
conversion to conforming uses.” ROH § 21-4.110(c). Moreover,
Appellants admit that ROH §§ 21-4,110(c) (2) and (5) relate to the
same subject matter, which is exactly what requires a court to
invoke the in pari materia doctrine. HRS § 1-16. Accordingly,
53 P.3d 214, 235
mnting) (stating that “[s}tatutes are considered to be
to the sane person or thing, to the same
Wve the sane purpose or object”)
class of persons or things,
14
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ROH §§ 21-4.110(c) (2), (3), and (5) must be construed in
reference to each other, and the circuit court did net err by
doing so.
Under the in pari materia doctrine, ROH §§ 21-
4.110(e) (2) and (3) clarity ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), which does not
specify any period of time or manner in which the reconmencenent
of the nonconforming use is permissible. ROH § 21-4.110(c) (2),
which protects the temporary cessation of nonconforming use,
explains which of ROH § 21-4,110(c) (5) “actions . . . which
reduce the negative effects associated with the operation of a
nonconforming use” may be taken without jeopardizing the right to
resume the operation of the nonconforming use. Further, ROH §
21-4.110(c) (3) provides that work on @ nonconforming use may be
performed for purposes of “ordinary repairs,” which includes
‘work required to comply with federal mandates such as, but not
Limited to, the (ADA],” and interior and exterior alterations
that do not physically expand the “nonconforming use or
intensification of use." ROH $§ 21-4110(c) (3) and (5).
Hence, a nonconforming use may be temporarily
discontinued (and thereby is an “action” which reduces the
negative effects) for (1) less than twelve consecutive months for
any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary repairs during any twelve
month period or (2) for less than eighteen months during any
three-year period for any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary
repairs during any twelve month period, and then resumed. ROH
§§ 21-4.110(c) (2) and (5). This construction provides clarity
and exactness to ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), and moreover, it promotes
the purpose of the ordinance, to “discourage the perpetuation” of
as
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **+
nonconforming uses. ROH § 21-4.110(c).
3
davrine cnecetior op manet san month a scutes a
the: Eton neon! use,
Under the foregoing interpretation of ROH § 21-
4,110(c) (5), the January 1998 “daytime operation” of Michel's,
which Increased its hours of operation of Michel's since its
cessation in October 1995, is not an “action” in violation of ROH
§ 21-4,110(c) (5), because Appellants discontinued these hours and
reduced the negative effects within the permissible
Siscontinuation of nonconforming use period.
Since its closure in October 1995 until January 1998,
the regular daytime operation’! of Michel’s consisted of: (1) a
Sunday brunch in August 1996 “for about a month,” (2) a Sunday
brunch from December 29, 1996 to June 15, 1997, and (3) 7:00 a.m.
to
0 p.m. hours of operation beginning January 1996. Thus,
the daytime operation of Michel's was temporarily ceased for ten
months from October 1995 until August 1996, three months from
Septenber 1996 until December 1996, and 2ix months from June 1997
until January 1998, for a total of nineteen months over a twenty-
six month period.
However, between March 1996 and August 1996, Michel's
[Although Michel's held two special lunch functions in fal) 1996
and a breakfast and Lunch function in 1997, they were #0 infrequent that they
fare not relevant in determining the regular daytine operation cf Michel's
y 325-A.26 654, 658 (Fa. 1974) ("after a
Cessation of activity Dy an owner, nowever, a more casual, occesional and
infrequent return to the original activity is not sufficient te continue oF
Fenew a prior nonconforming use, nor can & new, separate, and distinct
enterprise gain the protection of the nonconforming use." (citing fH, Mifflin
wa toning Wearing Bil, 20¢A.24 320 (Pe. 1971)))
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‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
was closed because of “extensive interior renovations,” or
Yordinary repairs.” As construed supra, an owner, lessee, or
authorized operator has 120 days to make “ordinary repairs,”
which aze net counted as part of the permissible temporary
cessation of the nonconforming use. ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5).
Because the nineteen month discontinuation of the daytime
operation of the nonconforming use included 120 days in which the
owner of Michel’s nade “ordinary repairs,” the daytime cessation
of Michel's was within the permissible temporary discontinuation
period of: (1) twelve consecutive months for any purpose and 120
days for ordinary repairs, and (2) eighteen months in a three
year period for any purpose and 120 days for ordinary repairs.
Therefore, Michel's is not precluded from resuming its daytime
operations under ROH § 21-4,110(c) (5). We reverse the circuit
court’s rulings that:
(1) Anderson's daytime hours of operation
of Michel’s was an “‘action’ by Anderson which reversed a
reduction in ‘the negative effects associated with the operation’
of Michel’s within the meaning of [ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5),” and (2)
“the daytime operation of Michel's violates ROH [$] 21-
4.110(¢) (5).
¢. The Circuit Court Erred By Concluding That The Daytime
Operation of Michel's Violates ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1)
In their third point of error, Appellants assert that
the circuit court erred by ruling that the “daytime operation of
Michel's violates ROH § 21-4.110(c)(1)." As stated supra, there
was no decrease in operating hours under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5) and
thus, Appellants correctly assert that there was no increase in
operating hours in violation of ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1). Therefore,
uv
+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
we reverse the circuit court’s conclusion that “[t]he daytime
operation of Michel's violates (ROH $] 21-4.110(c) (1).”
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we hold that: (1)
the issue as to whether the operation of Michel’s as a different
type of use constitutes an “expanded” nonconforming use within
the meaning of ROH § 21-4.110(c)(1), was not properly before the
circuit court, inasmuch as (a) CSL argued before the director
that Michel's violated ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1) by increasing its
hours of operation, (b) the director limited his review of the
petition to whether Michel’s was precluded from increasing its
hours of operation pursuant to ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1), and (ec) the
2BA was limited to rendering a decision regarding the additional
hours of operation of Michel's; (2) ROH $$ 21-4.120(c) (2), (3),
and (5), which have the same purpose, subject matter, and clarity
what constitute permissible “actions” which reduce the negative
effects associated with nonconforming uses, must be construed in
parimaterias (3) Under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), a nonconforming use
may be temporarily discontinued (constituting an “action” which
reduces the negative effects) for (a) less than twelve
consecutive months for any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary
repairs during any twelve-nonth period or (b) for less than
eighteen months during any three-year period for any purpose plus
120 days for ordinary repairs during any twelve month period, and
then resumed; (4) the January 1996 “daytime operation” of
Michel's, which increased the hours of operation of Michel's
after temporarily discontinuing its daytime operation of the
nonconforming use for nineteen months, including 120 days for
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FOR PUBLICATION IN WES’
HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
“ordinary repairs,” was permissible because the discontinuation
was within the permissible temporary cessation period of: (1)
twelve consecutive months for any purpose plus 120 days for
ordinary repairs, and (2) eighteen months in a three year period
for any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary repaire;
and (5) the
daytime operation of Michel’s does not violate ROH § 21-
4,110(c) (1), inasmuch as it did not “decrease” ite operating
hours under ROH § 21-4.110(c} (5) and therefore, did not
“increase” its operating hours in violation of ROH § 21-
4.2206) (2).
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s July 23,
2003 judgment.
On the briefs:
of Planning and Permitting A
and Donna Y.L. Leong, and ae
Kaiulani £.S. Kidani of Cades Vanes Cede 4 06
Schutte LLP, for Defendants/
Appellees-Appellants Michel’ s
Inc. and D.G, Anderson
Bruce L. Lamon of Goodsill Grnere. Duly Ore
Andersch Quinn ¢ Stitfel,
for Plaintiff /Appellant~Appellee
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